

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

1 February 2024

John Greenewald, Jr.
27305 W. Live Oak Road
Suite 1203
Castaic, CA 91384

Reference: EOM-2020-00275

Dear Requester:

This letter is a final response to your 10 February 2020 Mandatory Declassification Review request referenced above and submitted under Executive Order 13526 (hereafter, "the Order") **for all responsive documents to FOIA Case F-2012-02068 / Civil Action No. 17-cv-00160.**

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and the enclosed document which can be released in segregable form with deletions as marked on the basis of Sections 3.3(h)(2) and 6.2(d) of the Order.

As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please explain the basis for your appeal. You may address appellate correspondence to:

Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

The remainder of the documents released in FOIA case F-2012-02068 / Civil Action No. 17-cv-00160 were unclassified and therefore ineligible for mandatory declassification review per Section 3.5(a) of the Order. If you have any questions regarding this response, you may seek assistance by calling this office at 703-613-1287.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Stephen Glenn".

Stephen Glenn
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

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BIWEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

#140

4 May 1964

Central Propaganda Directive

Briefly Noted

Propagandist's Guide to Communist Dissensions

#27, 11-24 April 1967

[uncl. Chronology in Eng., Fr., and Span.]

778. SEATO Council Rejects Neutralization
of South Vietnam
- 779 AF,FE,NE,G. "Bandung" Afro-Asian Conference
Scheduled for Africa 1965
780. 20 July 1964: Twentieth Anniversary
of the Anti-Hitler Plot*
- 781 AF,FE,NE,WH. Firm Government Action Defeats
Communist Subversion*
- 782 AF,G. Dictatorship in Ghana*

*unclassified attachment(s)

CENTRAL PROPAGANDA DIRECTIVE

THE FREE WORLD

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

Factionalism

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

Communist conflicts over means and ends; Soviet pacifism contested by Chicom

Communist Domestic Difficulties

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

Economic failures; strains in Communist society (e.g. control, succession)

Communist Attacks on National Sovereignty 782 AF, g

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

Guerrilla Warfare (South Vietnam, Laos); instigation to revolt (Latin America -- Panama et al)

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

Communist Efforts

Briefly Noted; 780; 779 AF, FE, NE

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

International official missions (trade, news services, diplomatic et al)

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

Free World

Briefly Noted; 781 AF, FE, NE, WH

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

Strength of democratic processes

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

Briefly NotedMajority of Brazilians Approve of Goulart Ouster:

A recent poll of 500 Brazilians, from all walks of life and economic levels, reveals that very heavy majorities, ranging from 55 to 85 percent of persons polled, favored the ouster of Goulart from the Presidency (1 April 1964) and subsequent anti-Communist policies of the new government. For example, the most popular action taken by the Supreme Military Revolutionary Command was the removal of Communists from public office. In Rio, 85% favored the action, 8% opposed it, and 7% had no opinion.

The attached article from Washington News, 21 April, by Scripps-Howard staff writer Hal Hendrix, "Brazilian Voters Had no Confidence," forwarded with Spanish translation, can be republished or used as the basis of appropriate commentary on this encouraging development. Other democratic governments, plagued by Communist subversion, will find comfort in this poll. Communists are well organized and noisy, but their real strength is never so formidable as that of the great body of decent, democratically-minded citizens. Government leaders should base their counter-subversive action upon this assumption.

Swedish Press Freedom Curtailed to Shield Khrushchev

The atmosphere of terror which surrounds Soviet dictators is felt at times beyond the borders of the Soviet Bloc. Prior to an earlier Khrushchev visit to France and at the demand of Khrushchev's Security Police, the French Government arrested hundreds of selected French citizens for the duration of the visit. More recently the Swedish Government has proposed a curious press law under which the criticism of any foreign government official would be punishable as a serious crime against Swedish security. Since Swedish law already prohibits the defamation of foreign Heads of State, which Khrushchev technically is not, it is clear that in this peculiar proposal the Swedish Government aims at muzzling the mounting and well-founded resentment in the Swedish free press of Khrushchev's impending visit to Scandinavia in the guise of Peace apostle. The massive Soviet-sponsored espionage against Allied military defenses, for which Swedish Col. Wennerstrom now stands indicted, makes the resentment especially keen. And the recent discovery that Khrushchev's Ambassador to Sweden, Nikolai Belochvostikov, is an officer of the KGB, a professional spy, was almost more than the Swedish public could stomach. Popular Swedish disapproval of the proposed press ban was evident when the Swedes promptly began calling it "Lex Nikita." Press media elsewhere have continued to deride Moscow's peaceful pretensions, while a deafening silence on the subject emanates from the Stockholm dailies.

~~SECRET~~

4 May 1964

Assets in Scandinavia and other Free World areas should take note that this repression of the free press does violence to Scandinavian democratic traditions and illustrates that whoever deals with the Communists risks being contaminated by Communist methods to some extent, if only out of self-protection.


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(Briefly Noted)

DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST

- 26 May Khrushchev arrives Belgrade, blames 1948 break on Beria. 1955.
- 28 May Conf. for European Relaxation of Tensions and Security, (WPC - supported), May 28-29. Salzburg Austria.
- June Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, Preparatory Meeting, Djakarta, 1964--full conference in late 1964 or early 1965.
- 5 June Secretary George Marshall proposes the European Recovery Program ("Marshall Plan") in Harvard speech. (Soviets prevent Poland and Czechoslovakia from participating). 1947
- 11 June Marshal Tukhachevsky and 7 other top Red Army Generals arrested, tried secretly and executed. 1937
- 14 June China-Russia sign second "Unequal Treaty," Tientsin, 1958.
- 15 June USSR occupies Lithuania 15 June 1940, Estonia and Latvia 17 June 1940
- 17 June German Day of Unity (West Germany) commemorating East German riots of workers/youths 16-17 June 1953 quelled by Soviet troops.
- 17 June Hungary announces trial, execution of Imre Nagy, 1958.
- 19 June Tibet: International Commission of Jurists charges Chicom with genocide, 1960.
- 29 June Ruthenia (formerly part of Czechoslovakia) ceded to USSR, 1945)
- 1 July Communist Party of China founded. 1921
- 10 July Korea ceasefire negotiations begin 1951. (Armistice signed by UN, North Korea and Communist China 27 July 1953.)
- 10 July Arrest of Lavrenti Beria for treason announced. 1953. (Secretly tried and shot 18-23 Dec. 1953).
- 13 July President Urrutia, in TV address, charges Communism endangers Cuban revolution. 1959.

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)



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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#27

11-24 April 1964

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. Political and propaganda activity throughout the Communist world was greatly intensified during this period. Developments directly tied to the counter-offensive efforts launched by the CPSU against the Chinese on April 3 included CC plenary sessions in many parties, official statements of position, editorials and commentaries in party and state organs, speeches by leaders, and the Gomulka-led Polish delegation's visit to Moscow. The Sino-Sovietbrawl also figured prominently in the commemorations of two major anniversaries, Khrushchev's 70th on the 17th and the 94th of Lenin's birth on the 22nd.

2. The Gomulka visit brought -- at a Soviet-Polish friendship rally on the 15th -- Khrushchev's strongest, frankest and most colorful language yet in denouncing and ridiculing the Chinese, -- but he failed to call for any action beyond such commonplaces as "struggling for unity" and "defending the general line." Gomulka also went further than before in lauding and swearing fealty to the CPSU, -- but he held to his reservations about a conference unless it could give promise of bringing unity.

3. Khrushchev's birthday caused a flood of messages and speeches ranging from polemical support of the CPSU and denunciation of the Chinese in some -- led by the East Germans and Bulgarians -- to non-committal congratulations. Surprise was a 500-word telegram signed by top Chinese which acknowledged differences and lack of unity but expressed conviction that "all this is only temporary." In the event of crisis, we "will undoubtedly stand together." Within the USSR, the birthday served to bring massive tribute and affirmation of devotion, although the adulation was carefully limited to avoid the excesses of Stalin's 70th.

4. The CPSU made broad use of the Lenin anniversary to reassert its line as the true Leninism, and keynote speaker Andropov pointed to the "insincere character" of the Chinese birthday telegram, "calculated to mislead," and to throw doubt on the validity of its confident forecast of the two standing together in time of crisis. Other parties treated the event as might be expected -- except for the Chinese who seemed to slight it.

5. In addition Soviet media continued their widespread campaign to support a counter-offensive, using "statements of support" by parties throughout the world, domestic meetings, rallies, editorials, articles, letters, the belated May Day slogans, -- and two more "heretofore unpublished documents" deriving support

from the dead masters, one more from Lenin and one from Marx and Engels! Soviet sources are not openly pushing for a world conference, but about half of the statements of other parties reported by Soviet media include such a call.

6. Meanwhile, there was no reaction to the Soviet campaign from the Chinese camp until the 19th, when the North Korean daily Nodong Sinmun published a harsh editorial attack which reverses all of Suslov's charges and sounds a call to action in fighting against this "rampage." It concludes by saying "we deem it necessary to convene an international meeting," -- but calls for "full preparations" first and depicts a conference in which the "true Marxist-Leninist" would "safeguard unity" by smashing the revisionists! The Chinese finally countered a week later (after the end of our period), publishing on the 26th the full text of this Nodong Sinmun editorial and on the 27th the texts of the 3 Soviet documents from April 3 Pravda with an editorial note derisively abusing Khrushchev and the CPSU leadership, -- and threatening to publish material proving K's former Trotskyite leanings! On the 26th, the Chinese also published Chou En-lai's report of his visit to 14 countries, which included a denunciation of K's proposal for renouncing force in territorial disputes and "the third volume of anti-China materials from the Soviet press."

7. On the 26th, the Rumanians released the materials from their secret April 15-22 plenum! The surprise is an urgent call for a meeting of the Soviet and Chinese leaders to agree to a 3-party meeting -- with the Rumanians as mediators.

8. Meanwhile, press reports (Addendum, April 25) said that the CCP had finally replied -- negatively -- to the CPSU letter of March 7 which had proposed a May, June/July, and October timetable for bilateral talks, preparatory committee meeting and world conference, respectively. The Chinese are said to have been curt, snubbing the Soviet plan but agreeing to bilateral talks on their own terms -- in October in Peking. The same report forecast that Khrushchev would accept the Peking suggestion, however reluctantly, because of the pressure being exerted by other parties not to force a split.

9. The millions of words exchanged during this period includes some formulations worthy of special note:

-- Italian CP boss Togliatti said "we must have courage to tell the Chinese" that "revision is what we want," if by that we mean the sort of creative development and growth which "we" and the CPSU have been engaging in. (Chrono, April 11 and continuing)

-- Polish boss, Gomulka went a step further in whitewashing the term: Lenin was the greatest revisionist of all time, as he "enriched Marxism and all Marxist theory." (Chrono, April 13-13.)

-- Gomulka (in the same speech) frankly admitted: "there is no such revolutionary situation today, not in a single imperialist country, especially not in the United States." He also asked the Chinese bluntly a number of piercing questions intended to throw doubt on whether they even believe their own line.

-- Khrushchev on the same occasion dropped some frank revelations. He acknowledged that CPSU de-emphasis of revolution in favor of peaceful coexistence is not the result of any change in desire but in practical factors ("if it depended only on our desire to make a revolution...."). Then, in deriding the Chinese experience with "communes vs. human nature," he is in essence acknowledging that Communism itself can only be expected in the dim, distant future because of the same sort of problems with human nature.

10. And finally, eyewitness reports by Russian refugees from Sinkiang testify to the hatred which the Moslems in Sinkiang still bear toward the Chinese (Chrono, April 15) and to the clandestine distribution of Soviet passports to Moslems in Sinkiang in 1961-62, which led directly to the bloodily-suppressed riots and consequent closing of the Soviet Consulate.

Significance:


Despite the numerous tumultuous events and pronouncements of this period, there is no clearer picture of probable Soviet plans and capabilities to meet the Chinese threat than before. An unconfirmed newspaper report "from qualified sources" described in paragraph 8 above says the Chinese have finally replied negatively to the timetable proposed by the CPSU letter of March 7 and countered only with a proposed bilateral meeting in Peking in October -- which K. is reportedly expected to accept reluctantly. Pending further confirmation or clarification, however, we can be sure that -- with both sides now openly bent on "exposing" the other -- the polemical war will grow ever hotter and rougher, with potentially increasing damage to the entire Communist movement.

This period alone has brought new acknowledgement of the damage already done, -- and a number of frank new disclosures (such as those described in para. 9 above) which will undoubtedly serve -- or can be made to serve -- to disillusion and discourage sympathizers still further.

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

(Commentary Cont.)

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3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

~~SECRET~~

(Commentary)

CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#127

11-24 April 1964

April 7 (delayed) - The Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit features a 13,000-word editorial "The Modern Revisionists on the Path of Social Democratic Degeneration and of a Merger with Social Democracy" with some new, extreme formulations.

"...the modern revisionists never relaxed their efforts to find other allies as well.... They turned...to their 'brothers' in treason -- the leaders of the social democratic right, because present-day revisionism and social democracy are two manifestations of the same bourgeois ideology. Social democracy is a manifestation of bourgeois ideology in the workers movement whereas revisionism is a manifestation of bourgeois ideology in the Communist movement."

After castigating the Italian and French Party leaderships as well as Khrushchev and Tito -- the Albanians call out:

Modern revisionism...is

"It is time for each party to react..the 'Trojan horse' of imperialism within the socialist camp and the ICM."

And the "troika of Troy," say the Albanians, is none other than "the N. Khrushchev group, the Tito clique, and the revisionist leadership of the Italian CP!"

April 11 and continuing - Soviet and pro-Soviet media continue to reflect support of the CPSU efforts at counter-offensive launched April 3. Some of it specifically endorses the call for an international conference, some expresses reservations or opposition to same, and some fail to mention it. We shall mention only the most significant among those very numerous items. -- A "40-page special number" of the Italian CP journal Renascita on the 11th is devoted to latest developments, with a front-page editorial by Togliatti, plus a 12-page resume of the Suslov report and a 3,000-word extract of the 31 March Chinese joint article. Togliatti (also published in L'Unita and Paesa Sera on the 10th) scathingly denounces the "sheer lunacy" of the Chinese "campaign of subversion and disunity within the socialist camp, making the flimsiest and silliest of charges against the greatest and first of the socialist countries, the Soviet Union." Togliatti speaks plainly:

"We must have the courage to tell the Chinese leaders that if all their talk about revisionism means the development of our doctrine and our action under conditions radically different from those of the past, and therefore its growth into patterns and forms and meanings that could never have been foreseen 50 or 20 or even 10 years ago, then revision is what we want...."

(Chronology Cont.)

(Chronology Cont.)

However, Togliatti has nothing to say about concrete action to counter the Chinese, except for general phrases such as "We must do our best to see that the Chinese leaders are forced to give not mere lip service, but diplomatic and political support, to the unremitting, necessary, and all-out struggle for easing tensions and for peace."

-- Pravda on 12th summarizes statement of support by the Haitian National Unity Party CC and reprints article from Beirut newspaper Al Akhbar by Syrian Muhammed Rashid Ashraf on Arab support.

-- Pravda on 13th publishes summary of resolution of 18th Congress of Canadian CP condemning CCP splitting activities and urging international conference as soon as possible.

-- East German Party daily Neues Deutschland on the 15th carries full-page statement of SED/CC dated 14th which surpasses all previous SED output (and possibly all other on the Soviet side) in the harshness of its anti-Chinese invective and its emphatic support of the CPSU. It specifically reiterates SED support for the CPSU time-table (set forth in CPSU letter of March 7) for preparing an all-Party meeting in fall 1964. (Lengthy summary published in Pravda on 24th.)

-- Pravda on 15th publishes summary of article from the Burmese "progressive newspaper Botataung" by its editor U Thein Pe Myint, "prominent leader of the national liberation movement," attacking "the provocative disrupting activities" of the Chinese at the Algiers AAPSO session.

-- Pravda on 19th features an article by Chilean Communist Pablo Neruda affirming the support of "the Communist movement in my country." China's errors, he states, "stem from one source -- the personality cult....Mao Tse-tung has become a living Buddha, separated from the people by court bonzes who interpret Marxism and modern history according to his wishes...." He also condemns the CCP propaganda campaign in Latin America:

"...Every day the mail brings me and thousands of other Chilean citizens letters, pamphlets, and all kinds of reports on one and the same topic -- dogmatic understanding of a very problematical truth. Hundreds of establishments in capitals of the Latin American continent are preparing this material which is harsh, erroneous, and biased, and all this is being done to prove that the Chinese are not mistaken. And it is against this paper army, which is on the move day and night, that I address my words."

-- On the same day Pravda reports a new resolution by the Australian CP, published in Guardian, denouncing the Chinese splitting activities which led to the foundation by E.F. Hill of the so-called CPA (M-L). And Tass reports: that a Danish

(Chronology Cont.)

CP plenum adopted a statement supporting the CPSU and "deems it necessary to call a new meeting of representatives of the Communist parties"; -- and that the CC of the CP of Argentina did likewise, also "deeming" a world meeting "necessary."

-- Pravda on the 20th reprints from the Uruguayan newspaper El Popular a statement by the CP of Ecuador denouncing the Ecuadorean "splinter group headed by Rafael Echeverria, Carlos Rodriguez, and Jorge Arellano, who "acting from without, with support of anything but the fraternal parties fighting for the unity of the world Communist movement," promote the "Chinese line" and use "every opportunity to smear, distort, and slander the positions of the CPSU and the CPE," and also "encroach on the unity of each party separately and all parties of Latin America and the entire WCM."

-- Tass on the 21st reports from Athens that the paper AVVI has published a decision of "the April plenum of the Greek CP/CC" denouncing the Chinese and supporting the CPSU, including "the speediest possible convening of a conference...."

-- The extent of Soviet internal mobilization in support of the campaign was demonstrated by a section of Literaturnaya Gazeta on the 14th containing articles by "Soviet poets and artists, who write of their full support of the CPSU line and denounce the Chinese leaders' statements...." Tass bulletins on the 18th reveal that the main editorial and two major signed articles (by Konstantinov and Tolkunov) in the new Kommunist treat various aspects of the dispute.

-- And finally, further efforts were made to rally the dead to support the CPSU in its great trial. In our last installment (Addendum, April 11), we referred to the publication in Izvestiya of another "hitherto unpublished Lenin document" interpreted as supporting the Khrushchev line. Pravda (which carries same on the 12th) publishes on the 22nd "For the first time, Lenin's 'Amendments to and Comments on'" the foregoing "draft statement." It further spells out Lenin's support of peaceful coexistence, quoting: "...we undoubtedly consider it to be our duty to support by all means any attempts for a peaceful settlement of disputes." And the April issue (No. 4) of Problems of Peace and Socialism goes all the way back to the fountainhead, publishing "a new document" of Marx and Engels from 1872, "discovered by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow." Devoted to rules changes in the First International, it infers that if alive today Marx and Engels would agree with Moscow and exclude Peking from the movement.

April 12-19 - The high-level Japanese CP delegation led by Makamada which has been visiting the USSR, China and North Korea (see Chrono, April 3 and continuing) flew from Canton on the 12th to North Vietnam. Hanoi on the 19th reports that the delegation "left Hanoi for home on 19 April after a seven-day friendship visit to the DRV."

Chronology Cont.

April 13-18 - The "friendship visit" to Moscow of the top-level Polish delegation led by Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz (see Chrono, April 9, and Addendum, April 13 for earlier references) featured a "friendship rally" on the 15th, where Khrushchev (after announcing the extension of the mutual aid and friendship treaty for another 20 years) used some of the strongest, frankest, and most colorful language yet in denouncing and ridiculing the Chinese (some of which came in extemporaneous digressions from his text which were toned down or deleted in reported versions of the speech.

"There is no longer any doubt that the Chinese leaders are trying to split the Communist movement, ... the socialist camp to impose their hegemony."

"The Chinese leaders are criticizing (us) for concentrating on economic construction, for trying to improve the economy and the well-being of the people.... How would our Party, our people, have taken it had we convened a Party congress and decided... (to) produce less so as not to grow fat and thus prevent our degeneration, a bourgeois degeneration?.. Is this the inspiration for our people to march ahead? Whither ahead? Into the grave? ...

"Put let us talk to the Chinese workers, the Chinese peasants.... What do they want now, war or rice? Yet somebody or some group of people have had a worm go up the wrong way, you understand, and it wriggles and turns; and he thinks, so to speak, that it is he who in reality directs world development. Life will show. There was Trotsky; where is he now? Rotting....

"... If it depended only on our desire to make a revolution, comrades, I guarantee you that the CC would have done everything to see that the bourgeois world was no more and that the red flag flew over the whole world. Put, comrades let's not indulge in fantasies about this, but act like people able to think realistically. The desire by itself is little.... One cannot play a t revolutions. Lenin put it very well: revolution cannot be exported....

"Only quite recently the CCP leaders were stressing the importance of developing their economy to show the superiority of socialism in economic rivalry with capitalism. They have

(Chronology Cont)

Chronology Cont.

now forgotten this....Mao Tse-tung said: 'This year we have produced 5.2 million tons of steel. In five years' time, there will be 10-15 million tons of steel; after five more years' -- you see how he said -- 'there will be 20-25 million tons and in the following five years 25-40 million tons.' And why not?...This is from one who never smelted steel and does not know how to smelt it. He thinks, you know, one waits a little at the hearth and all at once steel comes tumbling out, you understand, out of open-hearth furnaces....

"Chinese propaganda asserted at that time that China would set an example for all for the entry into Communism ahead of schedule....Thus, for example, it was planned with the aid of small-scale metallurgy, the 'backyard furnaces' for smelting metal, to increase the year's steel output from 5.3 million tons to 20 million. We learned that Sun Yat-sen's widow also built a metal works under her window, some sort of small stove, that is....Some metallurgists! Well, comrades, miracles don't happen....

"Free food and equal distribution of foodstuffs were introduced in people's communes....But they did not calculate the amount of food available, only told the people to loosen their belts, and they did! They ate, and they ate it all up!

I remember Zasyadko went to China at Chou En-lai's invitation (in 1958 or even in 1959)He told me afterwards about a conversation he had had with Chou. 'I said to him, listen, where are your hens? There are no eggs, there is nothing in the country. You used to have all these things!...And what did Chou say?..."Our hens, of course, have not flown away. We have eaten them all, and there are none to lay eggs now! And that is really so, comrades, because we ourselves know. A peasant is invited to join the commune, and you know how the peasant goes to the commune.. If he has his own chicken, he says: let's eat it, and then we will be eating Communist chickens in the commune. And every peasant has done this; each ate his chickens; they arrived at the commune without chickens, and where are the chickens to come from? After all they do not grow out of worms...."

K. says that he warned Mao during his 1958 visit to Peking. "I said: it is your affair, but we are not going to do it. To begin with, this is not new to us; we have already done it; ...we ate the chickens once already!"

K. then launches on a new criticism of the Chinese:

"When the Chinese leaders failed in their great leap forward and people's communes policies, they adopted yet another extreme and in essence abandoned the industrialization of the country. This, too, is erroneous and incorrect. Of course, this is their internal affair....But this new mistake...cannot be passed over in silence, since they are trying to depict abandoning the industrialization of the country as a kind of a law necessarily valid for other socialist states...."

"...The Chinese leaders are attacking with particular fury the decisions of the 20th congress, which exposed the cult of personality.... The times of great and small cults have passed irrevocably,...

"Our CC receives with profound anxiety the reports from China that the Peking leaders have, for some years now,...been trying to sow and grow feelings of distrust and enmity toward the Soviet people and the peoples of other socialist countries. We are becoming increasingly convinced that a petty-bourgeois nationalist trend alien to the spirit of M-L has gained an upper hand among the CCP leaders. The Chinese splitters would like to become leaders and mentors of the revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They maliciously oppose the national liberation struggle of the peoples of these continents to the workers movement in the countries of socialism. They try even there to introduce a schism, distrust, and alienation. Their reactionary idea that allegedly the white people will never understand the black and the yellow people, that allegedly their interests are different, serves the same purpose....This is the shameful role the Chinese leaders are playing now...."

Gomulka's response, while restrained in comparison, is his strongest statement to date. He stated inter alia:

"One can not drown concrete reality in a flood of revolutionary slogans....It must be said in all honesty that there is no such revolutionary situation today, not in a single imperialist country, especially not in the United States....If the CCP leaders appraise the situation and the revolutionary forces in these countries as ripe and capable of independently overthrowing imperialism, they are making a profound

(Chronology Cont.)

mistake and have understood nothing and learned nothing of Lenin's revolutionary teaching....

Here Gomulka digresses to introduce a powerful new formulation in support of K:

"The CPSU leaders, especially Comrade Khrushchev, are being called (by the Chinese) the 'greatest revisionists in the history of the workers movement.' I think that they are mistaken. I consider that at least as great if not a greater 'revisionist' was Lenin, who enriched Marxism and all Marxist theory to an unusual extent...."

G. concludes by saying "we would consider" a conference desirable -- "if it would bring us nearer to" the goal of unity.

April 14 - The Chinese press publishes a long summary (full page in People's Daily) of a Chinese-flavored article on "The Present-day National Liberation Question" from the March issue of the North Vietnamese Party journal Hoc Tap.

Moscow's May Day slogans -- published almost a week later than last year -- reflect the development of the conflict in subtle changes. A long-standing reference to the "commonwealth" of bloc states is deleted. A new slogan hailing "the working class of the entire world" emphasizes their courageous struggle "for the socialist transformation of society." The slogan for Japan calls for friendly Soviet-Japanese relations, replacing a reference to the Japanese quest for friendship with "neighboring states."

April 15 - In an interview with American correspondents in Hong Kong, the leader of a group of 125 Russian refugees just arrived from Sinkiang, Gregory Michenko, said that in 1961-62 the Soviet Consulate in Kuldja had clandestinely distributed thousands of Soviet passports to Moslems in Sinkiang who presented them to Chinese border authorities demanding exit visas, thus precipitating the riot of May 29, 1962, suppressed by Chinese troops with machine gun fire, and consequent closing of Soviet Consulate. Michenko said Moslems still hate Chinese, long to cross into USSR and frequently listen to prohibited and highly inflammatory Soviet broadcasts in native languages.

An "editorial manifesto" in the new issue of the pro-Chinese magazine Revolution reportedly attacks the pro-Soviet Thorez leadership of the French CP violently for "multiple betrayals" of the masses, appeals openly to the members to overthrow the leadership, and announces that a conference of the pro-Chinese elements will be held at the end of this year. The same issue contains article by British dissident Communist A. H. Evans attacking Khrushchev's agricultural policy and a summary of

(Chronology Cont.)

speech by chief editor Jacques Verges asserting that K. has declared a 20-year truce in the revolutionary struggle merely in order that the Soviet Union might overtake the U.S.A. in industrial production.

April 15-22 - The Rumanian Party CC plenum took place in complete secrecy. (See Addendum, April 26, for publication of materials.)

April 16-19 - The old-line, Soviet-aligned CP of Ceylon held its 7th Congress in Colombo, with guest speeches by "representatives of Communist and workers parties of more than 30 countries," including the CPSU and 4 Moscow-following ruling parties of Eastern Europe (excluding Poland and Rumania) and Mongolia. (See Chrono, Jan. 19-21, for report of rump "7th Congress" held by pro-Chinese dissidents, and March 9 for report of "Soviet recapture" of trade union movement.) Congress resolution condemns CCP leadership and comes out for calling a meeting of fraternal parties -- as reported by Tass.

April 17 - Khrushchev's 70th birthday celebration gathered in Moscow the party chiefs of all European Communist bloc countries except Albania -- and Rumania. The latter had an ostensible excuse in the continuing CC plenum, and sent Premier Maurer and CC Secretary Stoica to participate. No special emissaries from Castro or Tito. Speeches at ceremonies and messages from around the world provided further clues to the posture of parties in the conflict, with Chinese attacked directly in messages and speeches of at least 9, led by East Germans. Longest, most sycophantic defense of Khrushchev against Chicom criticism (without naming Chinese) was by Bulgarian Zhivkov. Surprisingly, Gomulka on the 16th hailed K. with rarely used term which was standard for Stalin, "velikiy vozhd," ("great leader") and called him "vozhd" again on the 17th. Shortest and coolest was from Japanese CP chairman: "Congratulations on your 70th birthday, Sanzo Nosaka." The CCP sent a 500-word message signed by Mao, Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-chi and Chu Te which said: "Although at present there are differences between you and us on a number of questions of principle concerning M-L and there is lack of unity, we are deeply convinced that all this is only temporary. In the event of a major world crisis, the two parties, our two countries and our two peoples, will undoubtedly stand together against our common enemy." The message from Indonesian CP boss Aidit seemed to reflect advance coordination with Peking as he referred also to "the situation characterized by differences of opinion" which Indonesian Communists think of as "of a temporary nature," -- although no other Chinese-aligned Asian party made any mention of differences. The frankly hostile Albanians, on the other hand, observed the occasion by holding a meeting of the Tirana People's Council to "revise its decision of 30 May 1959" which awarded the title of "Honorary Citizen of Tirana" to K. and to withdraw the title!

Domestically, the Soviet media devoted a majority of space on the 17th and 18th to the anniversary, including messages,

(Chronology Cont.)

portraits, and award of 4th Order of Lenin. Military leaders Malinovsky and Grechko emphasize K. role as supreme commander-in-chief. Content considered by Western observers as not excessively adulatory, certainly not in comparison with Stalin's 70th.

At the award ceremony, K. limited himself to indirect attacks on the Chinese and, apparently again trying to reassure foreign parties, said: "We must not burn our boats in our relations with those with whom we are not at the moment in full unity." The visiting Party leaders disbanded immediately after the celebration, with no evidence that a political meeting had been held.

April 19 - The first acknowledgment in the Chinese camp of the Soviet move toward a counter-offensive came with a 5,000-word editorial in the North Korean Party daily Nodong Sinmun which attacks it harshly -- without naming the culprits:

"those who have created the present situation...should repent and immediately stop the open violation of the revolutionary principles of the declaration and statement and their big-power chauvinistic acts undermining solidarityHowever, their anti-China campaign,...in a new frenzy, and their noisy clamor about 'collective measures,' show that they are sinking deeper into splittism....To isolate China, comprising two-thirds of the population of the socialist camp, means in fact to break up the camp...."

After running through their extensive indictment, the North Koreans sound the call to action:

"Such evil doings in the ranks of the Communist movement cannot be permitted but must be eliminated....The world communists and the international working class have before them the sacred task of launching vigorous action to defend unity for the victory of the ICM.... The socialist camp and the ICM are not a plaything of any individual or any individual party. The rampage of certain people can be checked when an increasing number of Communist parties and Communists fight against it. If all the parties and all Communists who want unity pool their strength and fight, the splitting machinations will meet fiasco...."

In order to defend the purity of M-L and strengthen the genuine unity of the socialist camp and the ICM, sincere criticism should be extensively unfolded within the ranks of the Communist movement....When extensive criticism is conducted, it will be made clear for all who

(Chronology Cont.)

is in the right and who is in the wrong, and the wrong will go bankrupt and the purity of the ranks of the ICM will be preserved....We deem it necessary to convene an international meeting of brother parties for the solution of the differences,"

-- but they follow this with a 400-word conclusion which makes it clear that the conference should come only after "full preparations" are made and that it will be a conference in which "the Marxist-Leninist parties and the true Communists" will "safeguard unity" by "shattering the splitting maneuvers" of the wild revisionists.

Also on the 19th, the East German cultural weekly Sonntag publishes a long article attacking the revisionist views (a "direct attack on socialist state power") expressed by Austrian CP leader Ernst Fischer in lecture at Prague University and published in Nos. 17 and 20 of the German-language Czech newspaper Aufbau and Frieden.

April 20 - Speaking in Warsaw on the 19th anniversary of the Soviet-Polish mutual aid and friendship treaty, Gomulka quotes from the Chinese message to Khrushchev the passage about the differences being only a temporary manifestation and adds:

"It would be extremely useful if the Chinese comrades would begin as quickly as possible to be guided by this attitude. The near future will show whether their words correspond with the CCP's practical activity."

April 20-23 - The Bulgarian Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly (titular chief of state), Dimitur Ganev died. He had also been a Politburo member of the BCP. On the 23rd, the National Assembly "approved" the "nomination" by BCP boss Zhivkov of Georgi Traykov to succeed Ganev: he is nominally not a Communist, but "secretary and most eminent worker" of the National Agrarian Union, an organization which in the "Fatherland Front" "has developed as a militant assistant of the BCP in the construction of the new life."

April 22 - The 94th anniversary of Lenin's birth brings a new spate of materials reflecting the current stage of the conflict. Keynote speaker in Moscow is CC Secretary for Relations with Bloc Parties Andropov. He devotes the last quarter of his 7500-word speech to the troubles with the Chinese, who, "in the struggle for hegemony, are increasingly and openly replacing Leninism with Mao Tse-tungism." Recently they "have quite openly proclaimed that the only chance to avert a split in the Communist movement consists in...unconditional capitulation, and accepting the line of the CCP leadership....As for the bloc which the CCP leaders are now feverishly trying to knock together on unprincipled grounds, it is doomed to failure...."

Andropov refers to the Chinese birthday message to K.:

"All who read it could not but notice the insincere character of that document....How to understand the activities of the Chinese leaders who, having sent the congratulations, at the same time, on that very day, published in the Chinese press foul anti-Soviet materials? ...Was not the telegram calculated to mislead the Soviet and world public, to create the impression among the Chinese people...that the CCP leaders really care about strengthening Soviet Chinese friendship? By the way, comrades, the telegram expresses the confidence that if serious major events occur in the world, as they write, the CCP and the CPSU, the CPR and the USSR, will fight together (telegram said "stand together") against a common enemy. This is, of course, an important statement, but how is it to be reconciled with the slanderous assertions of Chinese propaganda that allegedly our country has joined a plot with the imperialists, has concluded with them some sort of alliance?"

However, Andropov keeps the olive branch in sight:

"While openly exposing the splitting course of the CCP leadership and fighting against it, our Party at the same time does not refuse to continue, as in the past, to look for ways to normalize relations with the CCP.... There are people who allege that the CPSU is striving to expel China from the socialist camp. This is, of course, nonsense...."

Pravda publishes the text of an 3,000-word editorial from the new issue of Party Life on the occasion, most of which is a defense of the current concept of "the transformation of the CPSU into a party of all the people" and the USSR into an "all-people's state." New Times also features the anniversary with an editorial which stresses the "reality of the socialist society in one country" which serves as "an example for the peoples of all states."

The Chinese, on the other hand, almost slight the occasion: People's Daily marks it only with a 5th-page article of routine content by an unknown Kuan Ya-ming, and the North Korean and North Vietnamese articles are of a routine nature. The Albanians -- also in a "routine" Zeri I Popullit editorial -- denounce the modern revisionists who are "mutilating Lenin."

Addendum to Chronology #27

Post-deadline items

April 25 - News reports from London cite "qualified sources" as saying that the Chinese had replied negatively to the CPSU's letter proposing direct Sino-Soviet talks in May, a preparatory meeting of selected parties in June and a world conference in October. "China's reply was reported to have been curt, snubbing the Soviet plan but agreeing to bilateral ideological talks on its own terms -- in October and in Peking." The press also reported: "authoritative informants believe Khrushchev will approve the Peking suggestion, however reluctantly." However, "considerable pressure is being exerted on the Kremlin against a summit showdown with China from satellite and other ranking Communist leaders."

April 26 - The Rumanian Party daily Scinteia publishes the materials of the April 15-22 plenum, consisting of a "statement" and a "policy analysis" running to more than 12,000 words, according to press reports -- but the text is not available here at the time this goes to press. The feature is an urgent call for a meeting of the Soviet and Chinese leaders -- with the Rumanians as mediators -- to make preparations for a world-wide meeting of CP leaders. The statement also says that the Soviets have "agreed in general" to the plan but that the Chinese had thus far failed to heed it.

In Peking on the same day, People's Daily publishes the full text (summary in other papers) of the North Korean Nodong Sinmun editorial of April 19 striking back at the new Soviet initiative, and all papers feature under banner headlines Chou En-lai's report on his visit to 14 countries -- which included a denunciation of Khrushchev's call for agreement to renounce the use of force in settlement of territorial disputes as "a new fraud." NCNA also announces that the "third volume of anti-China materials from the Soviet press" went on sale throughout China.

April 27 - People's Daily devotes 6 pages to the full texts of the 3 Soviet documents published in April 3 Pravda: the Suslov plenum report, the plenum decision and Pravda's editorial, -- together with a 1,000-word PD editor's note which reaches new extremes in derisive abuse of Khrushchev and the CPSU leadership. It implies that K. had once been forced "to make self-criticism for committing the error of Trotskyism" and declares that "we are prepared to publish the relevant materials when necessary." (Fuller comments will be included in next installment.)

(Addendum.)

4 May 1964

778. SEATO Council Rejects Neutralization of South Vietnam3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

OBJECTIVE: [redacted] proposals for neutralizing South Vietnam as tantamount to handing that country to the Communists and inviting the Communist take-over of all Southeast Asia.

BACKGROUND: At the mid-April SEATO meeting in Manila, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville again advocated a "political solution" to Communist insurgency against the South Vietnamese government. SEATO's Council of Ministers rejected their French colleague's proposal unanimously, endorsing instead the new military and political program of the South Vietnamese government. The SEATO communique says:

"The Council agreed that defeat of the Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of Southeast Asia. It will also be convincing proof that Communist expansion by such tactics will not be permitted."

The SEATO treaty specifically provides that members of the alliance guarantee the security of South Vietnam, and in this context the communique says:

"The Council agreed that members of SEATO should remain prepared if necessary to take further concrete steps within their respective capabilities in fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty."

Other sections of the communique charged North Vietnam with directing, supplying, and supporting the Viet Cong guerrillas. The communique was signed by Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States. The French delegate concurred in general with the communique, including those portions dealing with Communist aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia, but abstained from the section dealing with South Vietnam.


Most delegates and observers at the SEATO meeting agreed that France had suffered a diplomatic set-back, not so much for the failure to persuade other delegations to support their neutralization policy as for the unwillingness or inability of the French delegation to produce any practical plan for their grand concept. President De Gaulle referred to such a conception as long ago as last summer and prior to his 31 January 1964 press conference it was widely anticipated that he would on that occasion offer the world the particulars of his plan. However, his remarks at that time were no less vague than they had been before. The delegates thought that by the time of the SEATO conference, more specific and concrete planning might have been done and their French colleagues might bring forth dramatically specific proposals -- and perhaps even some indication that the

Chicoms would accept real neutralization of Southeast Asia. Such was not the case. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville limited himself to nothing more concrete than describing the neutralization concept as "a long-range proposal."

Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman described the French proposal as "tantamount to the delivery of the country, bound hand and foot, to the northern aggressors." Other delegates were equally firm and sharp in their rejection of the French proposals. Most of the delegates, in calling the concept "utopian," "visionary," etc., referred to neighboring Laos as an example of a failure of neutrality to bring peace. That country had been "neutralized" by agreement among 14 countries and yet the Communist Pathet Lao had consistently and at will violated the neutrality agreements. They had, at the behest of Peking and Hanoi, frustrated all the attempts of the International Control Commission (ICC) to police the neutrality and guarantee the Laotians freedom from outside interference and assault. The "neutralization" of Laos has permitted Hanoi and Peking to supply, support and reinforce the Communist Pathet Lao's subversive attempts to expand their control over the country and has also made possible the continued use of the "Ho Chi Minh trail" to send men and material to sustain the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam.

The real problem, in fact the tragedy, of vague and inane talk of a "political solution" or "neutralization" in Southeast Asia is that it is cruelly deceptive for those very people who are willing to fight to defend their freedom. Such talk has two effects on the South Vietnamese people, many of whom are understandably war-weary, both equally pernicious and defeatist: First it encourages the more naive elements in South Vietnam to believe that if the Khanh government were overthrown, the successor government could end the war by a "political solution" and remain free from domination by Hanoi and Peking; second, such misguided efforts by those who fall for the "neutrality" siren song forces the Khanh government to withhold part of its strength from the struggle against the Viet Cong in order to immunize itself against coup attempts by elements foolish enough to conclude that a "political solution" is available if only it is sought. The facts do not support such a conclusion.

The facts, however, are not always known or easy to know, particularly when they are not even accurately reported. The French Press Agency (AFP) for example distorted SEATO Secretary General Konthi's remarks on Vietnam to suit the interests of French government policy and has on several occasions slanted its reporting on South Vietnam to cause confusion and misunderstanding.



3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

We recall that the 1954 Geneva Agreements, that divided Vietnam into North and South, implied a neutralization of the whole country. A first step toward true neutrality requires that North Vietnam (and its supporters in the Communist world) terminate its armed aggression against South Vietnam. We remind the world that exactly one day after the 1954 Agreement was signed, Ho Chi Minh publicly called for a "resumption of the struggle." Since that date there has been a continuous and persistent increase in North Vietnam's direction and support of the attacks against South Vietnam.

We point also to the example of the stultification of the ICC in Laos showing that Communists persistently refuse to accept effective control and enforcement of neutrality guarantees.

We show that neutrality is a valid concept and has worked out well in cases such as Switzerland. Neutrality can succeed when a country is not coveted by large and aggressive neighbors, when it is to the advantage of other countries to respect a

country's neutrality, and most important, when that country is prepared, militarily and psychologically, to protect herself against every conceivable foreign intervention. These essential characteristics do not prevail in Southeast Asia and their absence dooms neutralism from the start. The final proof of the Communists' unwillingness to accept a r e a l neutralization of South Vietnam is their staunch insistence that North Vietnam n o t be included in any such scheme. They rely on their old formula: "What's mine is mine and what's yours we can negotiate."

4 May 1964

779 AF,FE,
NE,g.

"Bandung" Afro-Asian Conference Scheduled for
Africa 1965 (See also BPG #135, item 743, dated
24 Feb 1964)

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)**OBJECTIVE:**

impact of the Afro-Asian Conference on U.S. and Western policy interests.

BACKGROUND: The outcome of the ministerial-level preparatory meeting for a Second Afro-Asian (Bandung) conference, held in Djakarta from 10-15 April, ought to have been a disappointment for the Chicoms and the Indonesians. Nonetheless, NCNA termed the Conference a "great success" (as seems now standard Communist practice no matter how the Sino-Soviet conflict rages at international front and other gatherings -- see BPG #139, item 722, dated 20 April 1964) and quoted Indonesian CP chairman Aidit as terming it a "total victory" which smashed the "imperialist plot" against Afro-Asian unity. The importance attributed to the preparatory conference by the Chicoms became evident with the dispatch of Foreign Minister Chen Yi as the head of a large, senior delegation. While the results of the meeting undoubtedly did not fulfill Chicom expectations, the meeting did provide -- as will the main Conference -- an important arena for the Chicoms to further break out of isolation.

Twenty-two nations¹ were represented at the meeting. It is important to note that the Chicoms were not scheduled to participate and ended up as co-sponsors of the meeting. They came to Djakarta late, kept in the background "on a stand-by basis," asked for and accepted Indonesia's invitation -- after most major participants had arrived or were firmly committed to participation.

The three major areas on which the Chicoms and Indonesians were forced to concede or to compromise were:

1. The Date and Site of Conference. Following India's motion, supported by pressures from African and non-African Arab countries, the meeting decided to hold the Conference in Africa beginning 10 March 1965 with the actual Conference site likely to be decided by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Chicoms and Indonesians had treated the Conference matter as "urgent" and persistently pressed for an early conference date, aiming no doubt at a Conference b e f o r e the second Non-aligned (Belgrade) Conference (scheduled to be held in Cairo in the first week of October 1964). More surprising than the late date, however, is the decision to hold the Conference in Africa. Indonesia's approach over many months implied that a second Bandung Conference would take place in Indonesia, where

¹Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ceylon, the CPR, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Syria, Tanganyika, Turkey, the UAR.

Sukarno with Chicom guidance and support would have set the stage. An African site will most likely diminish Chicom/Indonesian influence in this Conference, and assert African interests in the overall Afro-Asian framework at the expense of the former's "leadership," be it on governmental or non-governmental (AAPSO) levels. According to best indications available, the Indonesians appear to want to save face by accepting the decision on the Conference site in good grace, acquiescing to the validity of African and Arab demands.

2. Soviet admission. The USSR's participation, suggested by India and strongly supported by Ceylon, led to major debates and conflicts of opinion. No agreement was reached on whether the USSR should attend, or whether the question of admission should be submitted at the Conference. In other words, the Chicoms apparently did not succeed in having the Soviets excluded. According to an AP report of 25 April, PRAVDA leveled an angry 2,500-word blast at the Chicoms for blocking an immediate Soviet invitation to the Conference. The article accuses the Chicoms of shameless slander and cheating and charges them with trying to isolate the Soviet Union from the nations of Asia and Africa.

India had pleaded the case for Soviet admission on the basis of the Soviet presence in many Afro-Asian non-governmental bodies, the geographic position of some Soviet provinces, and the consistent Soviet backing of Afro-Asian actions and aspirations. India's move for Soviet participation was interpreted by opponents of the proposal as a deliberate attempt to obstruct the proceedings.


The proposal to have the Soviets included drew fire from Chen Yi and was also strongly opposed by Pakistan. Chen Yi and others argued that the seat of the Soviet Government is in Europe; the CPR had opposed Soviet participation in the first Bandung Conference when there was no dispute between the two countries; and the CPR's opposition had nothing to do with the present ideological conflict. Grounds for rejecting the proposal also rested on the fact that if the Soviet Union were included in this Afro-Asian regional conference, there would be no basis for rejecting the participation of others, e.g. the United States with its negro population, (the states of Hawaii or Alaska), Albania which has a Moslem population, or Spain which has relations with African countries, etc.

3. Malaysian admission. India was also responsible for the submission of the proposal for Malaysia's admission. The communique issued at the end of the meeting ambiguously stated that "it was hoped that the obstacles which prevented reaching an agreement on the invitation would be eliminated," in which case "an invitation should be extended as soon as possible." -- Indonesia had led the opposition to Malaysia's admission and was supported by the CPR, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Some of the countries which recognize Malaysia maintained that Malaysia is a sovereign country and is entitled to be represented at the Conference.

Composition of Conference. The meeting resolved to invite the following categories of countries to the Conference: All the 29 countries which participated in the Bandung conference; all members of the Organization of African Unity; Afro-Asian countries which will attain independence between now and the convening of the conference, as well as Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Cyprus, Kuwait, West Samoa, and the provisional government of Angola. Additionally, representatives of all national movements from nonself-governing territories in Asia, and those in Africa which are recognized by the Organization of African Unity, may attend with the right to be heard -- a provision specifically to apply to South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Oman, Aden, and Palestine.

Conference agenda. The communique contains a 10-point provisional agenda for the Conference, including the heading "world peace and disarmament" under which is listed "nondissemination of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons," as well as strict international control, prohibition of all types of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, creation of nuclear-free zones, and complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons. Another heading on the agenda, which is also listed in the communique as one of the conference objectives, is "the peaceful settlement of disputes and the renunciation of the threat or use of force in international relations." In addition to such subjects as peaceful coexistence and the anti-imperialist struggle, the agenda includes items on the strengthening of the United Nations and the desirability of establishing a permanent secretariat to facilitate cooperation among Afro-Asian nations.

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)



3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

While
Moscow played the Conference in low key, Radio Moscow did reject the "slandorous reports", spread by "interested parties" who are attempting to drive a wedge between the USSR and the Afro-Asian peoples, that the Soviet Union prefers the prospective non-aligned and opposes the Afro-Asian conference. We point out that now that the staging of the Conference has been decided upon, the Soviet Union displays a keen interest and wants to assure its participation. Earlier, we point out, Moscow showed a preference for the non-aligned over the Afro-Asian Conference. A 22 February PRAVDA article hailed the prospects of a non-aligned meeting and said that the forces for peace and against imperialism should not be divided, geographically or otherwise, apparently implying that the Afro-Asian movement is racist and undermines unity.

4 May 1964

780. 20 July 1964: Twentieth Anniversary of the Anti-Hitler Plot

OBJECTIVE: [redacted] the myth of Communist "anti-Fascism" [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

BACKGROUND: [Note. The Communists were never anti-Fascist in the sense of being against oppressive totalitarianism. They were and are against everything, including free democratic ideologies, that might thwart their imposition of their own brand of totalitarianism. They indifferently support anything or attack anything in maneuvering toward their own goal of eventual domination. It would be difficult to present evidence proving conclusively that the Communists, as a tactic to insure their own takeover in Germany after her defeat in WW II, intentionally informed the Gestapo of the conspiracy against Hitler in June 1944. It would be simpler to prove that the German Communists, due to their own lack of security precautions, were penetrated by the Gestapo. However, established writers have made statements in their published works which at least implicate the Communists in exposing this last plot to kill Hitler. These statements can be used to seriously damage the self-image the Communists try to create of being the saviors of those threatened by Fascism.]

"Fascist resurgence and Nazi revanchism" is a dead horse which Communist propagandists have flogged ad nauseam since WW II. The twentieth anniversary of the attempt to assassinate Hitler on July 20th offers good occasion for a public reminder that Hitler and Fascism could never have come to power without the support of Stalin and the German Communist Party, acting under direction from Moscow. Different writers have suggested that the Communists actually saved Hitler in 1944 by deliberately betraying the assassination plot to the Gestapo. (See unclassified attachment). The failure of the assassination attempt led to the near obliteration of what moral fiber remained in German officialdom, while causing incalculable and needless additional human suffering.

Numerous eminent or high ranking personages in Nazi Germany were convinced that Hitler must be killed and were fully prepared to do so personally. Elaborate plots and active attempts were made by different groups from 1939 onward, all of which were thwarted by mischance or the fantastic security measures surrounding Hitler's person. Spurred to new efforts by the success of the Allied invasion in mid-1944, a conspiratorial group centered around Dr. Karl Friedrich Goerdler began to take desperate measures to assassinate Hitler and depose his Nazi retinue. This conspiracy included all of the numerous anti-Nazi elements in Germany except the illegal German Communist Party (KPD), the

remnants of which had been driven underground. On 22 June 1944 the conspirators reluctantly broke a long-standing resolve by taking into their confidence two surviving members of the KPD, hoping that the latter could at least be counted on to cooperate against the Nazis. Two Social Democrats among the conspirators, Reichwein and Leber, met with KPD representatives Saefkow and Jacob, who brought with them a third man introduced as "Rambow." Rambow turned out to be a Gestapo informer, and Reichwein and Leber were arrested by the Gestapo on July 4th and 5th. This forced precipitate action, and Count Claus von Stauffenberg was nominated to personally plant a brief-case bomb under the staff conference table during the 20 July visit by Hitler to his Rastenburg field Headquarters in East Prussia. Owing perhaps to the haste of the preparations, Hitler survived the blast without serious injury. His revenge was a fratricidal purge which involved 7,000 arrests and 5,000 deaths, eliminating the potential for any further anti-Nazi movement within Germany. During the winter of 1944-45 what remained of the spiritual elite of Germany was behind bars. Those who remained alive in April 1945 were, so far as possible, shot out of hand by the S.S. lest they survive the war and play the part that would naturally have been theirs in post-war Germany.

According to all logic of motive, betrayal of the anti-Hitler group to the Gestapo, was consistent with and typical of Moscow's methods -- before, during and after the war. While undermining and betraying its "allies" and "enemies" of the moment with fine impartiality, Moscow managed to build for itself a popular image of heroic anti-Fascist struggle. The falsity of this image has been extensively documented, as reflected in Prop Note 19 (B), 5 June 63, with its accompanying unclassified publication and bibliography, "Communist Nazi Relations: The Myth of Communist Anti-Fascist Resistance in WW II" (e.g. after two years of outright Soviet-Nazi cooperation at the start of WW II, all Communist Parties followed the Soviet lead in attacking Germany and Fascism after Hitler attacked the USSR; CP's in all countries involved in the war, joined the resistance movements which they had denounced and fought while Hitler was attacking only non-Communist countries.) This study affords a broad perspective of the grievous human tragedy which has been inflicted by Moscow throughout the length and breadth of Eurasia in times of peace as well as in war.

Mounting difficulties, foreign and domestic, have beset the Soviet regime in recent years. The perennial agricultural and economic problems at home have not yielded to Marxist-Leninist theorists. The European satellites have grown more independent and restive, while the Sino-Soviet schism threatens to destroy what remains of the Kremlin's monolithic power posture. Moscow badly needs a period of "peaceful co-existence" and help from abroad to cope with its internal problems and re-assert its

slipping controls. As is usual with Communists in trouble, the Kremlin is radiating comparative sweetness and reason. And much of the Free World is reacting with a wave of wishful speculation that the Soviets may be changing their stripes.

Communists use the 20th anniversary of the plot to improve their own anti-Fascist image, to (1) impart a creditable belief that they were implicated in or responsible for exposing the plot and (2) to show that their relations with German Naziism were guided by sheer opportunism and not by any revulsion for Fascism per se.

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

The surviving generation of people who suffered in WW II are targets of Communist propaganda efforts to (a) revive bitter emotions, and (b) masquerade as champions of anti-Fascism.

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

The attraction of Soviet overtures and propaganda is perhaps greatest among youths and students, who had no personal identification with wartime events.

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

4 May 1964

732 AF,g Dictatorship in Ghana**OBJECTIVE:**
becoming a totalitarian societyGhana is 3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

BACKGROUND: "To build a Socialist society, Ghana marches on, guided by immutable principles of Marxism-Leninism. Long live Kwame Nkrumah, founder of Ghana! Long live the Central Committee of the revolutionary Convention Peoples Party!" (Ghana Evening News, February 19, 1964.)

As Ghana is being rapidly turned into an authoritarian society, she is just as rapidly adding a number of Communist features. A completely controlled party-state structure is President Nkrumah's evident aim; radical leftist advisors are infusing public media and institutions with Soviet-style concepts and are apparently gaining influence in the conduct of Ghanaian affairs and in Nkrumah's councils as well. Whatever the motivations, the facts are incontestable. The following developments are a measure of the Soviet style totalitarian trends in Ghana:

1. The Soviet presence in Ghana is rising. Military and technical teams arrive in Ghana in large numbers. In addition, persistent rumors say that Nkrumah has had at least one Soviet bodyguard in constant attendance since the most recent assassination attempt. A reported switch from British to Soviet arms sources would undoubtedly increase both the numbers of Soviets in Ghana and the numbers of Ghanaians going to the USSR for military training.
2. Ghana is receiving Communist bloc support for Nkrumah's pan-African organizational schemes. The Ghanaian Vice President of the All-African Trade Union Federation, J. Tettegah, is the leading advocate of a Communist-backed scheme for African trade union organizations to disaffiliate from either the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) or the free world International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Hidden Communist ties and influences could then exploit labor organizations more easily. The new Secretary General of the Accra-based Pan African Union of Journalists is the former editor of Ghana's extremist paper, Spark, modelled after Lenin's Iskra, which has the same meaning. The Communist International Organization of Journalists assisted Ghana in organizing the conference.
3. Opposition has been stifled. All political parties except the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) have been outlawed, opposition press has been banned, the principle and practice of an independent judiciary have been abandoned, opposition leaders jailed or exiled.
4. Popular referendum was rigged. Improper threats and pressures, failure to provide a "no" ballot box, and irregular

ballot counting procedures were all used to obtain a patently false approval for Nkrumah's party-controlled state.

5. Personality cult is increasing. The press deifies Nkrumah, calls him "Osagyefo" (redeemer), "messianic dedication" and "Great One." "And so let the word go forth that indeed we do have a miracle called Kwame Nkrumah who walks the face of Africa today." Ghanaian Times, Jan 11, 1962.

6. A deteriorating economic situation receives little attention. Playing politics with the economic sector and failing to show concern for the worsening plight of the people have brought the once active Ghanaian economy to a deplorable state. However, the serious depletion of the treasury has not cancelled expenditures for subversive activities in other African countries or for prestige developments at home.

7. Propaganda attacks against non-Communist countries are increasing. Despite the desperate need for capital investment and despite developmental assistance given Ghana by the West, tirades against the US and UK are frequent occurrences. The government-controlled press often couches the attacks in familiar Communist terminology and berates the usual sins of the non-Communists.

8. Key areas of press, labor and youth are now directed by extremists with Communist bloc ties (see attached, unclassified Biographic Sketches).

9. Moderating influences have all but disappeared from the government. Purges have removed independent, moderate elements from police and civil service, leaving the extremists as Nkrumah's only source of advice and so-called information. He is said to believe, for instance, that the 99% vote which approved restrictive constitutional amendments accurately reflects the will of his people and his own undiminished popularity.

10. Ghana has declared a class war. The middle class of merchants, professional men and civil servants is to be deprived of its role in developing the country. The farmer and worker are now extolled as builders of the future; a move unsuited to Ghana's needs but necessary to "scientific socialism."

References:

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)



Soviet influence in the center of political power in Ghana seems to be developing. It has been reported that about 150 Ghanaian students have joined

(782 Cont.)

~~SECRET~~

a branch of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party which opened recently at Moscow State University.

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

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(782)

4 May 1964

781 AF, FE, NE, WH. Firm Government Action Defeats Communist Subversion

OBJECTIVE: [redacted] firm government action is most urgently needed to treat Communist subversion and aggression among the democracies.

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

BACKGROUND: [This guidance has three unclassified attachments: a zerox copy of an article by Eudocio Ravines, "Apaciguamiento y Thermidor en Bolivia," which appeared in Este y Oeste, 1-15 March 1964, Year II, No. 40, a summary in English and a summary in Spanish of the article.]

[redacted]

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

There is general agreement that Communist-led violence will thrive wherever conditions of poverty and underdevelopment impell the masses of the people to take desperate measures. It is equally true that it is not always among the poverty-stricken societies that the problem of Communism is the most serious. However, even where serious economic problems exist, judicious firmness by the governing authorities in resisting pressure and in handling individual cases of illegal Communist subversion will have a more immediate effect than the best efforts to improve the economic lot of the people. The material conditions of the poorer nations of the world are not improving fast enough to give much hope for the present generation and the gap between the wealthy and the poor nations is widening instead of narrowing.


This does not mean that Communist subversion should be considered purely a police problem. As pointed out in a previous guidance [Stability in Free World Governments]

[redacted] the masses must be given some hope through tangible reforms and an expanding economy. Mexico is an outstanding example of a country whose government has been for many years responsive to the needs of the masses, and while Communists seek influence throughout the society, Communism is not an important issue, especially when compared with most other underdeveloped countries.

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

But Communists, particularly in Latin America, are more and more resorting to illegal actions -- subversion, aggression, intimidation -- in efforts to force their way into power. During the last year two governments -- Venezuela and Bolivia -- successfully resisted extreme cases of barbarian Communist assaults and maintained stability in their countries.


The attached article by the well-known Peruvian author and former Communist, Eudocio Ravines, touches upon Communist attempts to prevent the Venezuelan election but is mainly concerned with the crisis that shook Bolivia for ten days last



3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

Other governments in the underdeveloped areas of the world are more often faced with minor crises in the form of mob action, rather than armed and disciplined striking miners. We point out to governments, that if they take firm measures to control demonstrations and other actions against law and order -- e.g. student, labor, and any other types of groups -- they thereby prevent the development of organized techniques against themselves and diminish the chance of recurring illegal actions and civic disorder.

The attached article can be published in part, in whole or summarized. The summaries can be used to inspire articles or radio commentary on subjects like government obligation to act within the rule of law and with the police power of the state for the welfare of the people.



3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

Selected References
on

Anti-Hitler Plots and the Communists

BOVERI, Margret

Treason In The Twentieth Century, Putnam, N.Y. 1963

(German Title: Der Verrat im 20. Jahrhundert)

p. 281. "Leber and Reichwein were the two who made the ill-fated contact with the Communists in the early summer of 1944. Leber did this in the full knowledge of the dangerous aspects of an alliance with the Communists and of the possibility of Communist penetration of the Kreisau movement. Wilhelm Leuschner, the grand old man of the SPD, opposed Leber's intention strongly on the grounds that the formation of Communist cells precludes exact knowledge of the individuals included, and that therefore Leber might in effect be inviting Nazi spies already ensconced in the Communist groups into the Kreisau movement. In retrospect, one must say that both were right. Leber was certainly on the right track in his over-all conception of an aroused Volk, a state of agitation in the people only to be achieved by complete cooperation of all the resistance groups. Leuschner was unhappily all too prescient of the immediate consequences. In fact a Gestapo agent was present at Leber's meeting with the Communists which led directly to Reichwein's arrest on the 4th of July and Leber's on the 5th. These arrests in their turn forced Stauffenberg's hand...."

FITZGIBBON, Constantine

20 July (British edition: The Shirt of Nessus). Norton, New York 1956.

p. 143. "Now, however, the relationship between the conspirators and the Communists assumed a new and disastrous importance. Adolf Reichwein...had retained a link with what remained of the Communist underground within Germany....Such contact was approved by Julius Leber, though on different grounds. According to Frau Leber, her husband had no intention of collaborating with the Communists. But, she has told the author, he said that the conspirators must find out what those people are doing behind our backs and what line they proposed to follow if the assassination were successfully accomplished...."

p. 144: "The first meeting took place on June 22nd in eastern Berlin, with Reichwein and Leber representing the Social Democrats, Saefkow, Jacob and a third man by the name of Rambow being the Communists present. Rambow was unknown to Reichwein and Leber. The Communists seem to have been already far too well informed about the conspiracy. They demanded a further meeting, particularly with the military leaders, which was provisionally fixed for July 4th....Rambow was an informer. Reichwein attended the second meeting and was there arrested with Saefkow and Jacob. Leber was picked up by the Gestapo on the following morning...."

It has never been established whether the informer committed his act of Judas solely in the role of Nazi stool pigeon or whether he was simultaneously acting as a Communist agent...."

GISEVIUS, Hans Bernd

To the Bitter End. Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1947. (Also in German)

p. 504: "The day before yesterday his (i.e. Stauffenberg's) intermediaries, Leber and Professor Reichwein, together with three leading Communists, had been arrested, just as they were on the point of arranging a meeting between Stauffenberg and the Communists. Goerdeler did not yet know that one of the three Communists had been a Gestapo spy, but he was outraged...."

HELLWIG, Joachim and OLEY, Hans:

Der 20. Juli 1944 und der Fall Heusinger

Verlag Der Nation, Berlin (East). 1959. Pictures and Text.

COMMENT:

This glossy propaganda book serves two purposes: to impress readers with the role of the Communists in war-time German resistance and to blame Heusinger for having betrayed the 20th July conspirators and for having cooperated with Hitler again afterwards.

NITZSCHE, Gerhard

Die SAEFKOW-JACOB-BÄSTLEIN Gruppe. Dokumente und Materialien des illegalen antifaschistischen Kampfes.

(Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED). Dietz, East Berlin 1957.

COMMENT:

This official Communist document is particularly interesting because of what it does not say: it does not connect the arrest and execution of SAEFKOW with the 20 July conspiracy and does not mention any date for meetings with Leber and Reichwein later than October 1943 (p.69). It condemns the conspiracy as a whole as reactionary, militaristic, etc. (pp. 65-68). It does not identify the informer who betrayed the entire group -- unlike FITZGIBBON (q.v.).

PECHEL, Rudolf

Deutscher Widerstand. Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Zurich 1947

p. 94: "When Saefkow and Jacob...held meetings with the Social Democrats Dr. Leber and Prof. Reichwein, both of whom belonged to the Kreisauer circle, the Gestapo succeeded in smuggling an informer in who participated in one of these meetings...."

Second International Conference on the History of the Resistance
Milano, 26-29 March 1961 (reproduced from typewritten copy)

"The German Resistance and the Allies during the Second World War" by Prof. Dr. Walter Bartel

p. 17: "On 22 June 1944 Anton Saefkow and Franz Jacob and the representatives of the Social Democratic Party, Leber and Reichwein, members of the Kreisauer circle, met. Agreement was reached for future collaboration in the common fight against Hitler. This collaboration was never effected because on 4 July 1944 the Gestapo arrested all participants. Existing documents lead to conclude that a provocateur had introduced himself into the Kreisauer circle and the Gestapo had knowledge of that meeting....(reference: Otto WINZER, Zwölf Jahre Kampf gegen Faschismus und Krieg, Berlin 1955, p. 227).

SHIRER, William L.

The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Simon & Schuster, New York 1960.

p. 1043: "From the beginning the Beck-Goerdeler-Hassell circle had declined to have anything to do with the Communist underground, and vice versa. To the Communists the plotters were as reactionary as the Nazis and their very success might prevent a Communist Germany from succeeding a National Socialist one. Beck and his friends were well aware of this Communist line, and they knew also that the Communist underground was directed from Moscow and served chiefly as an espionage source for the Russians
....

p. 1044: "Reluctantly he (i.e. Stauffenberg) agreed to Leber and Reichwein meeting with the underground Communist leaders on June 22. But he warned them that the Communists should be told as little as possible. The meeting took place in East Berlin between Leber and Reichwein, representing the Socialists, and two individuals named Franz Jacob and Anton Saefkow who claimed to be -- and perhaps were -- the leaders of the Communist underground. They were accompanied by a third comrade whom they introduced as "Rambow." The Communists turned out to know quite a bit about the plot against Hitler and wanted to know more. They asked for a meeting with its military leaders on July 4. Stauffenberg refused, but Reichwein was authorized to represent him at a further meeting on that date. When he arrived at it, he, along with Jacob and Saefkow, were promptly arrested. "Rambow," it turned out, was a Gestapo stool pigeon...."

20. Juli 1944

Herausgegeben von der Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst, Bonn 1960.

p. 239: "Julius Leber was arrested on 5 July 1944. He was the victim of an informant who had gained entrance into the highest

leadership of the illegal KPD with whom Leber had established contact with all due security measures...."

WEISENBORN, Gunther, ed:

Der Lautlose Aufstand

Rowohlt Verlag, Hamburg 1954

p. 175: "One of the largest organizations of the German resistance movement was undoubtedly the SAEFKOW group....In July 1944, a GESTAPO informant succeeded to penetrate into its ranks and soon the largest part of this organization was arrested. Saefkow with almost 100 activists of his group was executed in Brandenburg...."

APACIGUAMIENTO O FIRMEZA FRENTE A LA SUBVERSION COMUNISTA
(Resumen del artículo, "Apaciguamiento y Thermidor en Bolivia,"
de Eudocio Ravines. Este y Oeste, 1-15 de marzo de 1964,
Año II, N° 40.)

En todas partes, los nuevos gobiernos democráticos han sentido la necesidad de diferenciarse de los regímenes dictatoriales que los antecedieron. Para acentuar la diferencia, han querido dar a la práctica de la democracia un carácter tal de tolerancia que beneficia a los agentes del comunismo internacional. En muchos casos, los comunistas actúan bajo la sombra de la impunidad que les otorga la tolerancia democrática para llevar adelante su labor de propaganda, penetración y subversión. A veces los gobiernos dejan de aplicar la represión necesaria por temor a una resistencia masiva del pueblo. Recientemente, dos gobiernos han demostrado que la firmeza paga buenos dividendos, que allí donde los comunistas pierden su impunidad, suelen hacer una retirada táctica.

En Venezuela, las elecciones del mes de diciembre próximo pasado cerraron un año entero de violencia y sabotaje sin paralelo en la América Latina. El gobierno de Rómulo Betancourt se había esforzado conscienzudamente en observar las libertades civiles, y se vaticinaba en muchos lugares que la subversión Comunista llegaría a tal punto de violencia como para impedir las elecciones o precipitar una revolución. Pero el gobierno hizo un despliegue de fuerza y determinación, y la jornada electoral resultó tan tranquilo como cualquier día corriente.

Un ejemplo aun más aleccionador es la manera en que el gobierno de Bolivia trató el célebre caso de los mineros en huelga y sus veintiún rehenes.

Este incidente tenía sus raíces en el conflicto entre el presidente Víctor Paz Estenssoro y su vice-presidente filocomunista, Juan Lechín Oquendo. Este tenía ambiciones presidenciales pero no tenía el respaldo de los elementos moderados del Movimiento Nacional Revolucionaria (MNR -- El partido oficialista). Cuando Paz Estenssoro regresó de una visita a Washington, donde se entrevistó con el Presidente Kennedy, los comunistas le acusaron de actuar como "agente del imperialismo yanqui," como "entreguista," y como realizador de una "operación thermidoriana."

Entretanto, el gobierno procesaba a tres miembros de la Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros, Irineo Pimentel, Federico Escobar, y Jorge Zaral, todos comunistas conocidos. Los dos primeros eran acusados de haber asesinado a un dirigente sindical oponente. El tercero era culpable de malversación de fondos destinados a la construcción de viviendas para los mineros. Los comunistas, sobretodo los fidelistas y trotskistas, veían este proveso como un desafío a su posición dentro del MNR, y exigieron la liberación de los prisioneros. El gobierno se mantuvo inamovible.

Después de mucha agitación, los mineros de Catavi, azuzados por

los comunistas, se lanzaron, el 6 de diciembre, contra un grupo de extranjeros que estaban de paso en la zona minera y secuestraron a 21 de ellos como rehenes. Cuatro de las víctimas eran norteamericanos: el agregado obrero de la Embajada Norteamericana de La Paz, un miembro del Cuerpo de Paz, y dos funcionarios del Servicio periodístico de Información (USIS).

Desde el comienzo, Juan Lechín daba su respaldo completo a los mineros, quienes habían declarado la huelga, y reclamaba la libertad de los tres criminales comunistas como rescate de los 21 rehenes. El 9 de diciembre, Lechín emitía un comunicado sobre la situación, en el que aseveraba que los rehenes estaban sanos. Al mismo tiempo, cargaba toda la responsabilidad de los hechos sobre Paz Estenssoro.

A esta altura, los rehenes habían sido llevados a la Mina Siglo Veinte, donde estaban rodeados por 6,000 mineros armados, y estrechamente guardados por las mujeres de los mineros, provistas de cargas de dinamita con sus respectivos fulminantes.

Llegaron las protestas y las súplicas de muchas fuentes : de la Cruz Roja, del Arzobispo de La Paz, y sobre todo del gobierno de Los Estados Unidos.

Para toda contestación a Lechín y los comunistas, Paz Estenssoro con toda premeditación ordenó que las tropas pusieran cerco a los mineros rebeldes. Simultáneamente, el MNR ordenó la movilización de las Milicias Campesinas del Departamento de Cochabamba. El 14 de diciembre, mientras las tropas y las Milicias convergían sobre la zona minera, Juan Lechín habló por radio y ofrecía liberar a los rehenes bajo dos condiciones: a) que los tres prisioneros comunistas fueran procesados en La Paz en vez de en Potosí, y b) que las tropas se retiraran de la región minera. Una vez más, el gobierno quedó inamovible, negándose a aceptar las condiciones.

Dos días más tarde, el 16 de diciembre, los rehenes fueron liberados sanos y salvos. Ninguna de las condiciones de Lechín había sido aceptada, no hubo derrame de sangre, y la firmeza del gobierno había resultado en un golpe tremendo contra el prestigio del movimiento comunista de Bolivia.

La crisis que estremeció a Bolivia durante diez días llenos de suspenso ha venido a demostrar tres verdades políticas concluyentes:

a) Los gobiernos latinoamericanos que toman una fuerte posición anticomunista no deben temer las críticas en el sentido de que su independencia o su soberanía haya amainado. Aunque el gobierno de los Estados Unidos dió pleno respaldo al procedimiento de Paz Estenssoro, esta crisis fue resuelta por el gobierno boliviano y con los medios que él tenía a mano.

b) No es sólo la miseria, sino también la impunidad la que favorece la subversión comunista. La falta de firmeza de parte de los comunistas como instrumentos políticos y electorales son las fuerzas que están ayudando al comunismo en la América Latina.

c) La división entre las dos facciones del movimiento comunista es más aparente que real. A veces simulan marchar separadamente, pero la hora de la acción, que es la hora de la verdad, los encuentra combatiendo juntos. En la crisis boliviana, el ministro del interior, Antonio Arze Murillo, tenía pruebas documentales de la existencia de una frente popular ad hoc compuesto del ala izquierda del MNR, los comunistas de filiación moscovita, y los trotskistas.

La "batalla de Catavi" la ganó espectacularmente el Presidente Paz Estenssoro, y los comunistas sufrieron una severa derrota. Sin embargo, no hay que olvidar que los comunistas de Bolivia han perdido sólo una batalla: sus fuerzas permanecen numéricamente intactas. Aunque las condiciones para la campaña electoral del mes de junio no sean ni mejores ni peores que antes, lo que sí es auténtico es que la crisis ha servido para definir posiciones y esclarecer actitudes.

APPEASEMENT OR FIRMFESS AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

(Summary of an article: "Apaciguamiento y Thermidor en Bolivia," by Eudocio Ravines. Este y Oeste, 1-15 March 1964, Year II, No. 40)

Everywhere in Latin America, new democratic governments have felt a special obligation to be different from the oppressive regimes which they replaced. And in order to accentuate this difference, they have sought to give to the practice of democracy a tolerance which only benefits the agents of international Communism. In all too many cases, Communists operate under the cloak of democratic tolerance in order to carry forward their propaganda, penetration, and subversion. Sometimes governments refrain from taking the necessary repressive measures for fear of massive resistance from the populace. Two governments have recently demonstrated that firmness pays; that where Communists are deprived of their impunity, they make a tactical retreat.

The Venezuelan elections last December climaxed a whole year of Communist-led violence and sabotage without parallel in Latin America. The government of Romulo Betancourt had leaned over backwards in observing civil liberties, and it was widely predicted that Communist subversion might reach a climax on 1 December and prevent the elections or precipitate a revolution. But the government made a determined show of force, and election day turned out to be quieter than the average for the year.

An even more eloquent example is the manner in which the Bolivian government handled the now-famous case of the striking miners and their twenty-one kidnap victims.

This incident had its roots in the conflict between President Victor Paz Estenssoro and his pro-Communist vice-president Juan Lechin Oquendo, whose presidential ambitions were opposed by the more moderate elements in the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR, the government party). When Paz Estenssoro returned from a visit to Washington, where he interviewed President Kennedy, the Communists accused him of being an agent of "Yankee imperialism" and of having tried to institute a "thermidorean operation" within the Bolivian revolution.

Meanwhile, the government was prosecuting three members of the Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros: Irineo Pementel, Federico Escobar, and Jorge Zaral, all well-known Communists. The first two were accused of murdering an opposition labor leader, and the third, of misappropriation of funds destined for the construction of miners' dwellings. The Communists, especially the Castroite and Trotskyist factions, considered the trial a challenge to their position within the labor movement, and demanded release of the prisoners. The government refused. After considerable agitation, the miners in the Catavi region were induced, on 6 December 1963, to seize as hostages 21 of a group of foreigners who happened to be in the mining zone. Of

these, four were Americans: the labor attache of the U. S. Embassy in La Paz, a member of the Peace Corps, and two officers of the U.S. Information Service.

From the beginning, Juan Lechin supported the miners, who had now declared a strike, and called for the release of the three Communist prisoners in exchange for the 21 hostages. In a communique dated 9 December, he reported on their physical condition and assumed full responsibility for the action.

By now, the hostages had been removed to the Siglo Veinte mine, were surrounded by 6,000 armed miners, and closely guarded by miners' wives equipped with dynamite charges, caps, and fuses. Protests and pleas came to the miners from many sources: the Red Cross, the Bolivian Church Hierarchy, and especially from the U. S. Government.

In answer to Lechin and the Communists, Paz Estenssoro deliberately ran the risk of a civil war by ordering troops to surround the striking miners. At the same time, the MNR high command ordered the peasant militia in the department of Cochabamba to be mobilized. On 14 December, as the troops and militia were converging on the mining region, Juan Lechin spoke on radio and agreed to release the hostages on two conditions: a) that the prisoners should be tried in La Paz instead of in Potosi, and b) that the troops should be withdrawn from the mining region. The government refused to meet either of these conditions.

Two days later, 16 December, the 21 hostages were freed from their captivity unharmed. Lechin's conditions had not been met, no blood had been shed, and the government's firmness had resulted in a serious blow to the prestige of the Communist movement in Bolivia.

Three important truths can be derived from this crisis that shook Bolivia for ten suspenseful days:

a) Latin American governments that assume a strong anti-Communist attitude need not fear criticism to the effect that national pride, independence, or sovereignty have suffered in the slightest. Although the U. S. Government fully supported Paz Estenssoro's position, this crisis was solved by the Bolivian government and with the means it had at hand.

b) It is not poverty alone that favors Communist subversion: impunity is also to blame. Lack of firmness on the part of governments, political corruption, and the utilization of Communists as political and electoral instruments are the forces that help Communism in Latin America.

c) The division between the two major factions of the Communist movement is more formal than real. They sometimes pretend to march separately, but the moment of action, which is the moment of truth, finds them fighting side by side. In the Bolivian crisis, the minister of the interior, Antonio Arze Murillo, had documentary proof of the existence of an ad hoc popular front composed of the left wing of the MNR, the Moscow Communists, the Trotskyists, plus two right wing factions!

The "battle of Catavi" resulted in a victory for President Paz Estenssoro and a severe defeat for the Communists. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the Communist forces in Bolivia have lost only a battle: they remain numerically intact. Although the conditions that bear upon the forthcoming June elections may be neither better nor worse than before, the crisis has served to define positions and clarify attitudes.

/ May 64

APPEASEMENT OR FIRMNESS AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

(Summary of an article: "Apaciguamiento y Thermidor en Bolivia," by Eudocio Ravines. Este y Oeste, 1-15 March 1964, Year II, No. 40)

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Item 781

Everywhere in Latin America, new democratic governments have felt a special obligation to be different from the oppressive regimes which they replaced. And in order to accentuate this difference, they have sought to give to the practice of democracy a tolerance which only benefits the agents of international Communism. In all too many cases, Communists operate under the cloak of democratic tolerance in order to carry forward their propaganda, penetration, and subversion. Sometimes governments refrain from taking the necessary repressive measures for fear of massive resistance from the populace. Two governments have recently demonstrated that firmness pays; that where Communists are deprived of their impunity, they make a tactical retreat.

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a) Latin American governments that assume a strong anti-Communist attitude need not fear criticism to the effect that national pride, independence, or sovereignty have suffered in the slightest. Although the U. S. Government fully supported Paz Estenssoro's position, this crisis was solved by the Bolivian government and with the means it had at hand.

b) It is not poverty alone that favors Communist subversion: impunity is also to blame. Lack of firmness on the part of governments, political corruption, and the utilization of Communists as political and electoral instruments are the forces that help Communism in Latin America.

c) The division between the two major factions of the Communist movement is more formal than real. They sometimes pretend to march separately, but the moment of action, which is the moment of truth, finds them fighting side by side. In the Bolivian crisis, the minister of the interior, Antonio Arze Murillo, had documentary proof of the existence of an ad hoc popular front composed of the left wing of the MNR, the Moscow Communists, the Trotskyists, plus two right wing factions!

The "battle of Catavi" resulted in a victory for President Paz Estenssoro and a severe defeat for the Communists. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the Communist forces in Bolivia have lost only a battle: they remain numerically intact. Although the conditions that bear upon the forthcoming June elections may be neither better nor worse than before, the crisis has served to define positions and clarify attitudes.

ESTE & OESTE

REDACCION:

86, BOULEVARD HAUSSMANN
PARIS 8^e (FRANCIA)

ADMINISTRACION:

APARTADO DEL ESTE 11.243
CARACAS (VENEZUELA)

EDICION ESPECIAL PARA AMERICA LATINA DEL BOLETIN DE LA ASOCIACION DE ESTUDIOS
E INFORMACIONES POLITICAS INTERNACIONALES (B.E.I.P.I.) DE PARIS

Apaciguamiento y Thermidor en Bolivia

CARACTERISTICA de la política doméstica de las repúblicas de América Latina en la etapa presente, ha sido el marcado apaciguamiento empleado por los gobiernos frente a los comunistas.

LA TESIS del determinismo económico, fabricada por los intelectuales y periodistas de Washington, ha servido para arrojar toda la responsabilidad de la subversión sobre la pobreza, la miseria y las condiciones de subdesarrollo. Y asimismo para acordar en muchos campos, a la sombra de esa filosofía, una creciente y progresiva impunidad a las acciones de todo género emprendidas por los comunistas.

En todas partes, los nuevos gobiernos han sentido la necesidad de diferenciarse de los dictadores que les antecedieron. Para acentuar la diferencia, han querido dar a la práctica de la democracia un carácter tal de tolerancia, que beneficia a los agentes de Rusia, China, Cuba y Yugoslavia.

La política de apaciguamiento tiene, además, móviles más inmediatos e intereses más directos, para los gobiernos latinoamericanos. Ante todo, esta política de tolerancia favorece los intereses electorales del bando en ascenso y ejerce influencia en la intrigante política doméstica. De otro lado, suministra las dosis

de chantaje adecuadas para presionar a Washington. Y pone en manos de los gobiernos el instrumento agresivo que consiente en dejarse utilizar contra los opositores del gobierno.

Los cambios recientes que han intervenido en Washington, así como la necesidad de afrontar procesos electorales decisivos, han determinado cambios que pueden tornarse reacciones saludables a condición de extenderse y de ser consecuentes.

Dos gobiernos, el de Venezuela y el de Bolivia, se han visto forzados a emplear una política de firmeza frente a la subversión comunista, demostrando que, por sobre todo, tal clase de plaga en este lado del mundo, es el engendro de la impunidad que los gobiernos otorgan a los comunistas. Tan pronto como la tolerancia cesa y la impunidad disminuye, el peligro amaina, la subversión y sus capítostes pierden la cara, la insurgencia de las masas entra en quiebra.

Las elecciones del mes de diciembre de 1963, obligaron al gobierno de Venezuela a desplegar la fuerza para someter al terrorismo que asolaba el país y que proclamó su voluntad de impedir la realización de las elecciones. El despliegue de fuerza del gobierno bastó para que el apocalipsis comunista se transformase espectacularmente en farsa. Durante la jornada electoral hubo menos víctimas que en cualquier día corriente de terrorismo.

Sólo dos personas, en todo el país, fueron víctimas de actos de terror.

El fenómeno político venezolano acaba de recibir consagración histórica en los baluartes comunistas de Bolivia. La prisión de tres delincuentes comunistas y la captura y liberación por los comunistas, de los rehenes extranjeros, al propio tiempo que la firmeza de la política del gobierno de Bolivia, han demostrado lo que la impunidad significa en todo el siniestro juego político de la actual etapa latinoamericana.

BOLIVIA se encuentra en la víspera de una contienda electoral. Ella ha puesto frente a los dos protagonistas de la revolución boliviana de 1952: Víctor Paz Estensoro, actual Presidente de la República, y Juan Lechín Oquendo, Vice-Presidente. A estas horas, cada uno de estos personajes comanda un ala del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, la organización política promotora y realizadora de la Revolución. El conflicto es eminentemente ideológico: mientras Paz Estensoro retorna a los caminos del nacional-reformismo y a las vías capitalistas, Juan Lechín opera como el jefe de la facción del MNR. profundamente infiltrada por los comunistas de Moscú, y mucho más enérgicamente — como acaban de probarlo hechos macizos— por los fidelistas y comunistas de la obediencia de Pekín y de La Habana.

Está ya a más de doce años de distancia el día en que Juan Lechín, con la anuencia de Paz Estensoro y en su beneficio, negoció el pacto de unión entre el Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, la Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia y el Partido Comunista boliviano. El compromiso, negociado en abril de 1951, constó de once puntos y fue firmado el 3 de mayo de 1951 por José Fellman Velarde —actual Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores— por el M.N.R.; Juan Lechín Oquendo firmó en representación de la Federación de Mineros y Jorge Quiroga Vargas como representante autorizado del Partido Comunista de Bolivia.

Bajo las más variadas circunstancias y a pesar de todos los avatares políticos de Bolivia, la alianza de 1951 se ha mantenido. A través de más de doce años, el M.N.R. utilizó al Partido Comunista para golpear despiadadamente a sus opositores de toda clase. A cambio de tales servicios, el comunismo ha disfrutado en Bolivia de todas las libertades que el pacto del 3 de mayo de 1951 le concedía, incluyendo la de organizar las Milicias Obreras y Campesinas. Estas milicias son las que han intentado presentar combate en la crisis que ha tenido una resonancia internacional en el mes de diciembre.

La situación conflictiva creada por las elecciones de junio próximo, alcanzó aguda tensión después de la visita que el Presidente Paz Estensoro realizara a Washington, al fi-

nalizar el mes de octubre. El jefe de la revolución boliviana y actual Presidente de su país, recibió honores especiales y el Presidente Kennedy, en discurso oficial, señaló a Bolivia como el ejemplo que debía ser imitado por las demás naciones de la América Latina.

A su retorno de Washington, Paz Estensoro fue acusado por los comunistas de la obediencia de Pekín, de actuar como "agente del imperialismo yanqui", como "entreguista" y como realizador de una "operación thermidoriana".

Al mismo tiempo se hizo evidente para todos que el Presidente Paz Estensoro y el sector del M.N.R. que le sigue, no apoyaría la candidatura a la Presidencia de Juan Lechín, en las elecciones próximas.

La circunstancia crítica y la atmósfera de la crisis quedaron así creadas. Hubo ruido de escudos en las minas de Catavi, baluarte del comunismo y del Vice-Presidente Juan Lechín. La propaganda comunista contra Paz Estensoro se hizo más violenta en el tono y más áspera en el contenido.

El Presidente Paz Estensoro reorganizó su Gabinete Ministerial el 6 de diciembre, renovando solamente tres carteras: Minas, Asuntos Campesinos y Agricultura. En los dos primeros, colocó a dos jefes militares retirados. Hay que considerar que estas tres carteras son fundamentales en la circunstancia actual boliviana.

ENTRE TANTO, el Poder Judicial venía conociendo los procesos seguidos, por homicidio y por robo, contra los dirigentes sindicales Irineo Pimentel, Federico Escobar y Jorge Zaral. Los dos primeros estaban acusados de haber asesinado o hecho asesinar a un dirigente sindical oponente. El tercero era culpable de apropiación ilícita de fondos destinados a la construcción de viviendas para los mineros precisamente. El Fiscal que conocía la causa había dispuesto la prisión de los tres acusados, quienes eran tres conspicuos dirigentes comunistas. Su prisión determinó el estallido de la crisis que conmovió a Bolivia y a la América Latina durante diez días con sus noches.

Pimentel y Escobar eran dos comunistas de la intimidad de Juan Lechín. Su prisión fue estimada como un reto, circunstancia que fue aprovechada por los comunistas de tendencia fidelista y trotskista, para organizar las represalias.

Tras una vigorosa propaganda anti-yanqui, que acusó a Paz Estensoro de "traicionar a la revolución" y de "venderla al imperialismo yanqui", los comunistas lograron lanzar a los mineros armados contra un grupo de extranjeros, algunos de ellos diplomáticos, que se encontraban en la zona minera. Veintiún personas fueron apresadas como rehenes, exigiendo a cambio de su libertad la de los tres presos comunistas, Pimentel, Escobar y Zaral.

Entre los rehenes se encontraban cuatro norteamericanos. Uno de ellos, Agregado Obrero de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos, un miembro del "Cuerpo de Paz", una de las creaciones de la Alianza para el Progreso, y dos funcionarios del Servicio Periodístico de Información de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos. Además, les acompañaban tres canadienses, un inglés naturalizado, un alemán y un holandés. Todos ellos estaban destinados a ser canjeados por los tres presos comunistas, acusados por la justicia boliviana de delitos comunes.

La exigencia comunista colocó ante el muro al gobierno de Paz Estensoro. La circunstancia obligaba a Bolivia a decidir la alternativa que los mineros armados, acaudillados por los comunistas, planteaban. Y Paz Estensoro acogió el desafío, lo enfrentó y canceló la política de apaciguamiento de que ha sido campeón el gobierno de Bolivia.

El Ministro del Interior Antonio Arze Murillo, proclamó la decisión del gobierno de rechazar cualquiera negociación sobre canje, afirmando la exigencia de liberación inmediata de los rehenes, sin condiciones. Al propio tiempo ante los periodistas, en conferencia de prensa, el Ministro exhibió documentos que probaban la formación de un "frente" constituido por el ala izquierda del M.N.R. opuesta a la política del gobierno, por el Partido Comunista, por los Trozkistas, por el Partido Revolucionario Auténtico y por la Falange Socialista Boliviana. Independientemente de la validez de los documentos exhibidos, el Ministro estaba trazando la línea divisoria que separaba dos políticas: la que favorecía a los comunistas y la que se comenzaba a oponer frontalmente a ellos.

El Gobierno de Estados Unidos anunció que ofrecía "Asistencia Plena" al Gobierno de Bolivia para que impusiese la autoridad de la ley y liberase a los rehenes, sin condiciones. El Gobierno de La Paz, ordenaba la movilización de tropas sobre la ciudad de Oruro, a las órdenes, del General Alfredo Ovando, Jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas de Bolivia. Por su parte, la Federación de Mineros, que comanda Juan Lechín Oquendo, decretó la realización de huelgas escalonadas y la movilización general de sus milicias. Convocaba al mismo tiempo a las Milicias Campesinas de la región de Oruro a ponerse en pie de guerra y dar apoyo a los mineros.

Juan Lechín, en su carácter de Vice-presidente de la República, otorgó pleno apoyo a los mineros y exigió el canje de los tres comunistas presos por la veintena de rehenes, que fueron trasladados para mayor seguridad, a las Minas Siglo XX.

En esta forma se cancelaba la alianza que fuera sellada en mayo de 1951. La presión de los comunistas de obediencia castrista y pekinés se había impuesto de manera total. Los comunistas de obediencia moscovita se sumaban a los insurgentes y acataban las directi-

vas que venían de Catavi. El 9 de diciembre, Juan Lechín emitía un comunicado oficial sobre la situación, en el que aseveraba que los rehenes estaban sanos, aunque prisioneros en espera del canje exigido. Lechín cargaba toda la responsabilidad de los hechos sobre la actitud asumida por Paz Estensoro.

ANTE la exigencia de Lechín y de los comunistas, el Gobierno de la Paz reaccionó ordenando a las tropas de Oruro poner cerco a Catavi. Simultáneamente, el Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario leal ordenaba la movilización de las Milicias Campesinas del Departamento de Cochabamba, ordenándoles que marcharan sobre Catavi y las minas.

Bolivia se convirtió en el escenario de una movilización espectacular de personalidades. El Vicario de la Iglesia, Monseñor Andrew Kennedy y el Arzobispo de La Paz, Embajadores de casi todos los países americanos y altos dirigentes de la Cruz Roja, dirigentes estudiantiles y emisarios sindicales, se desplazaron a la región minera para obtener la liberación de los rehenes. El Gobierno de La Paz se mantenía firme en su posición de no negociar. No podía haber canje de gente honrada, capturada con infracción de toda norma jurídica, con delincuentes comunes, responsables de delitos ante la justicia.

El 10 de diciembre por la mañana, los mineros francamente sublevados contra el gobierno de La Paz, daban un ultimátum. Exigían la libertad inmediata de Pimentel, Escobar y Zaral, dentro de las 24 horas. En caso de negativa, la declaración oficial sentenciaba que "el gobierno cargaría con las consecuencias".

Los funcionarios del Departamento de Estado de Washington multiplicaban las notas de protesta. Renovaban los ofrecimientos de "Ayuda Plena" del Presidente Johnson y reiteraban las notas conminatorias pidiendo la liberación de los rehenes norteamericanos.

El Embajador de los Estados Unidos, Douglas Henderson, envió un mensaje telegráfico a Juan Lechín, haciéndole responsable de lo que les pudiese ocurrir a los cuatro rehenes norteamericanos. En áspera réplica, Lechín respondió que los rehenes norteamericanos no obtendrían su libertad mientras el gobierno de La Paz no liberase a los tres sindicalistas detenidos por orden judicial.

Lechín aseveró a través de la prensa y de la radio, que sus tres amigos habían sido reducidos a prisión arbitrariamente por el Ministro del Interior. Que el Agregado Obrero de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos, había sido capturado por los mineros a causa de haberse entrometido en la política interna de Bolivia, pretendiendo formar una organización sindical distinta de la que dirigía Lechín. Reiteró su exigencia de libertad inmediata de los

tres comunistas presos y anunció que seis mil mineros, con las armas en la mano, se encontraban en ese momento en pie de guerra.

La perspectiva de guerra civil se abrió ante Bolivia dramáticamente. El Presidente Paz Estensoro mantuvo su posición primitiva y ordenó reforzar la guarnición militar de Oruro, elevando a seis mil el número de soldados.

El 11 de diciembre, se produjo un duelo telegráfico entre Juan Lechín y el Embajador de los Estados Unidos. El Embajador le telegrafió directamente a Lechín, diciéndole:

"El crimen de secuestro es visto con horror y repugnancia en el mundo entero."

Juan Lechín, en su respuesta se limitó a reiterar su decisión de mantener presos a los rehenes mientras Paz Estensoro no aceptase las condiciones planteadas por los comunistas.

Mientras tanto, Dean Rusk, Secretario de Estado de Washington, Teodoro Moscoso, de la Alianza para el Progreso, Pierre Salinger, Jefe de Prensa de la Casa Blanca, Walter Reuter, dirigente sindical de los obreros del automóvil de los Estados Unidos y otras personalidades, se dirigieron a Juan Lechín, cominándole a ordenar la liberación de los rehenes.

Los comunistas y Lechín se mantenían en su posición, mientras los rehenes prisioneros se apiñaban en una habitación de cuatro metros por seis. Sobre el suelo estaban extendidos colchones, en cada uno de los cuales reposaban más de dos prisioneros. La guardia la realizaban las mujeres de los mineros, provistas de cargas de dinamita, y con sus respectivos fulminantes.

A esta hora de la crisis, todos los comunistas se habían unificado: los que obedecían a Pekín tanto como los fidelistas, los trotskistas y los de obediencia moscovita. La unidad era total: las discrepancias habían quedado reducidas a literatura sobre temas internacionales. En Catavi no existían discrepancias. Las que existían tres días atrás, solamente, habían desaparecido.

LOS PARTIDARIOS de Juan Lechín y los comunistas, convocaron a una gran manifestación en La Paz, con la finalidad de ejercer presión sobre el gobierno y obligarle a ceder. Los comunistas de las diversas observancias se mostraron activos. Pero, al fin, la manifestación no logró movilizar a tres mil manifestantes. Ningún sector importante del trabajo fue paralizado en la capital del país. Los comunistas desfilaron al grito de "Paz Estensoro... al paredón... Juan Lechín, al Poder...".

Ante el fracaso de la manifestación de masas de La Paz, el Ministerio del Trabajo dictó una serie de amenazas contra los mineros huelguistas. La Corporación Minera de Bolivia, la empresa nacionalizada, suspendería sus operaciones en las minas de Catavi y Siglo XX.

Esto implicaba un "lock-out" contra siete mil trabajadores, a quienes se cortaría el suministro de abastecimientos. Se suprimiría, además, el pago del aguinaldo de Navidad y el de los salarios por los días no trabajados.

En aquel mismo momento, la Justicia iniciaba un proceso contra los quince principales dirigentes de la operación comunista que había capturado a los rehenes en la zona minera.

La ofensiva del gobierno causó impacto profundo en las filas comunistas. La actitud desafiante fue abandonada. Los gritos destemplados contra el imperialismo yanqui fueron cambiados en recriminaciones al gobierno por su "actitud testaruda, antirrevolucionaria, anti-obrera...". Y la propaganda se hizo calurosa sobre la actitud generosa y benevolente de los mineros, que "trataban a los rehenes como a hermanos...", "sin hacerles daño alguno y tratando solamente de canjearlos...".

Juan Lechín Oquendo presentó nuevas condiciones. El mismo, renunciaría a su cargo y a la investidura de Vicepresidente de la República de Bolivia. Se sometería a proceso penal ante los Tribunales de Justicia, reemplazando a los tres dirigentes sindicales presos. Tan pronto como esta nueva proposición hubiese sido aceptada por el gobierno de La Paz, los rehenes serían puestos en libertad.

Paz Estensoro rechazó fulminantemente la nueva proposición. Respondió exigiendo la libertad inmediata y sin condiciones de los rehenes. Notificó que los tres dirigentes sindicales quedarían presos y sometidos al proceso judicial que se les había iniciado. Anunció que los dirigentes de Catavi que habían dirigido la operación de captura de los rehenes serían procesados.

Mientras tanto, las tropas de Oruro avanzaron sobre Catavi y las Milicias Campesinas, que habían partido de la localidad de Ucureña, a las órdenes del Coronel Osinaga, marchaban sobre la zona minera. Los mineros iban a ser tratados como rebeldes.

Un avión de reconocimiento se estrelló en la zona minera y sus dos ocupantes perecieron, siendo las únicas víctimas de toda la crisis.

El Cuerpo Diplomático acreditado en La Paz se movilizó rumbo a la región de Catavi; los dignatarios de la Iglesia, los dirigentes estudiantiles, los jefes sindicales y políticos intentaron realizar la misión de mediadores. Juan Lechín respondió a todas las gestiones afirmando que todo dependía de la resolución del gobierno y de Paz Estensoro.

Súbitamente y en forma dramática, un abogado norteamericano, hermano de uno de los rehenes prisioneros, dio a la publicidad una carta en la que Irineo Pimentel y Federico Escobar, dos de los comunistas presos, acusados de homicidio, pedían a sus camaradas mineros poner en libertad a los rehenes, sin condiciones, por el bien de Bolivia y de los trabajadores. En un fragmento, la carta decía, textualmente:

"Estando en duro trance de sacrificio los mineros de Catavi y Siglo XX, y ante el desplazamiento de tropas del Ejército y queriendo evitar una masacre roja, deponiendo toda actitud sectaria y pensando en los trabajadores, llamamos y rogamos, para dar una lección a los bárbaros, poner en libertad a los rehenes, exigiendo al propio tiempo la normalización de las labores en las minas, el pago de los haberes por los días de huelga y que el gobierno atienda a las demandas de mejoras sindicales..."

La carta fue tachada de apócrifa por los comunistas. Desde Washington, Edwin M. Martin, alto funcionario del Departamento de Estado, telegrafiaba a Juan Lechin pidiéndole que diera fe a los mineros de la autenticidad de tal carta, certificando que ella había sido firmada por Pimentel y Escobar libremente y sin coacción.

Los comunistas plantearon una nueva condición. Se pondría en libertad a los rehenes, pero los presos comunistas no serían juzgados en La Paz, donde "no tenían garantías", sino en Potosí, donde sí las tenían. El gobierno de La Paz, rechazó categóricamente la nueva condición y exigió la inmediata libertad de los rehenes.

EN LA MADRUGADA del sábado 14 de diciembre, el cerco militar en torno a Catavi, cerraba sus tenazas. El General Ovando asumía el mando de las tropas y una operación de carácter militar iba a comenzar objetivamente. Lechin se convenció que el gobierno de Paz Estensoro estaba resuelto a imponer autoridad sin consentirle siquiera salvar la cara. Al atardecer, la radio dejaba escuchar la voz conmovida de Juan Lechin:

"El pueblo ha ganado la batalla... En conocimiento de que las tropas se encuentran, en estos momentos, a escasos kilómetros de Catavi y Siglo XX, con las trágicas consecuencias que son previsibles para los trabajadores bolivianos y para los técnicos extranjeros y los diplomáticos norteamericanos, con el fin de evitar derramamiento de sangre y horas trágicas, la Federación de Trabajadores Mineros, acepta la propuesta del gobierno..."

"Los rehenes prisioneros —añadió Lechin— serán entregados a Monseñor Abel Antezana, Arzobispo de La Paz, quien había venido actuando como mediador."

Las condiciones del arreglo fueron:

- Liberación incondicional de los rehenes.
- Proceso a los tres dirigentes comunistas en La Paz, no en Potosí.
- Retiro de las tropas de la zona de Catavi y Siglo XX.

Incidentalmente y partiendo hacia la zona minera, se encontraron en el aeropuerto de La Paz el Embajador de los Estados Unidos, Dou-

glas Henderson y el Vicepresidente Juan Lechin.

—"¿Cómo permitió usted que se enviaran tropas contra los mineros...?" —inrepó Lechin al Embajador.

—"Yo no he venido a este país para mandar", replicó Henderson.

Horas más tarde, los rehenes eran liberados, sin que ninguna de las condiciones comunistas hubiesen sido aceptadas. Había prevalecido la firme actitud del gobierno y la batalla la había ganado rotundamente Víctor Paz Estensoro.

LA CRISIS boliviana del mes de diciembre ha venido a demostrar tres verdades políticas concluyentes:

- Cuando el gobierno de Washington "da Apoyo Pleno" a la acción contra el comunismo, los gobiernos de América Latina se deciden, varían su posición apaciguadora, cambian sus actitudes de tolerancia interesada. No por esto, ni a causa de esto, llega a sufrir un rasguño la soberanía, ni la independencia, ni el orgullo nacional.

- No es la miseria sino la impunidad lo que favorece la subversión comunista. La falta de firmeza de los gobiernos, la actitud democrática claudicante, la corrupción política, la utilización de los comunistas como instrumentos electorales y como ingredientes de la intriga palaciega, constituyen las fuerzas que están ayudando al comunismo en América Latina. La infiltración y la subversión prosperan, no allí donde hay más miseria, sino donde mayor es la tolerancia y donde más altos grados alcanza la impunidad.

- La división entre los comunistas que obedecen a Moscú, los que obedecen a Pekín y los que siguen a La Habana, es meramente formal. En Bolivia se ha hecho claro a través de esta crisis que los fidelistas, los trotskistas y los obedientes a Pekín no están separados por ningún desacuerdo real. La oposición de los que obedecen a Moscú se enardece en las palabras, estalla en palabrería traducida del ruso, para acallarse totalmente a la hora de la acción, que es la hora de la verdad. Tanto en Bolivia, como en Venezuela, los comunistas de las diversas corrientes dejan una experiencia probada: simulan estar separados o marchan efectivamente separados, pero en la hora de la acción, el combate los encuentra juntos.

La batalla de Catavi la ganó, de manera campal, Víctor Paz Estensoro y la corriente del M.N.R. acusada de "Thermidoriana" por los comunistas. Esta lucha ha demostrado que el comunismo en Bolivia, y en América Latina, ha sufrido una severa derrota, pero está probado asimismo que el comunismo no ha sido vencido. Ni en Venezuela, ni en Bolivia. En Catavi se le ha permitido replegarse en orden y realizar una retirada que bien puede ser con-

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siderada como estratégica. Las fuerzas del comunismo en Bolivia permanecen intactas numéricamente.

Las condiciones para la campaña electoral del mes de junio, quizá no son mejores ni peores que antes de la crisis. Lo que sí es auténtico es que la crisis ha servido para definir posiciones, para delimitar fronteras y esclarecer actitudes. En las elecciones de junio no habrá alianza íntima entre el M.N.R. y el Partido Comunista. Cualesquiera que fueren las maniobras que realicen los comunistas de obediencia moscovita, la corriente fidelista y pekinésa les arrastrará a posiciones que no son de coexistencia pacífica, sino de áspera oposición al gobierno acusado de "thermidoriano".

EUDOCIO RAVINES

ESTE & OESTE

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Apaciguamiento y Thermidor en Bolivia

CARACTERISTICA de la política doméstica de las repúblicas de América Latina en la etapa presente, ha sido el marcado apaciguamiento empleado por los gobiernos frente a los comunistas.

LA TESIS del determinismo económico, fabricada por los intelectuales y periodistas de Washington, ha servido para arrojar toda la responsabilidad de la subversión sobre la pobreza, la miseria y las condiciones de subdesarrollo. Y asimismo para acordar en muchos campos, a la sombra de esa filosofía, una creciente y progresiva impunidad a las acciones de todo género emprendidas por los comunistas.

En todas partes, los nuevos gobiernos han sentido la necesidad de diferenciarse de los dictadores que les antecedieron. Para acentuar la diferencia, han querido dar a la práctica de la democracia un carácter tal de tolerancia, que beneficia a los agentes de Rusia, China, Cuba y Yugoslavia.

La política de apaciguamiento tiene, además, móviles más inmediatos e intereses más directos, para los gobiernos latinoamericanos. Ante todo, esta política de tolerancia favorece los intereses electorales del bando en ascenso y ejerce influencia en la intrigante política doméstica. De otro lado, suministra las dosis

de chantaje adecuadas para presionar a Washington. Y pone en manos de los gobiernos el instrumento agresivo que consiente en dejarse utilizar contra los opositores del gobierno.

Los cambios recientes que han intervenido en Washington, así como la necesidad de afrontar procesos electorales decisivos, han determinado cambios que pueden tornarse reacciones saludables a condición de extenderse y de ser consecuentes.

Dos gobiernos, el de Venezuela y el de Bolivia, se han visto forzados a emplear una política de firmeza frente a la subversión comunista, demostrando que, por sobre todo, tal clase de plaga en este lado del mundo, es el engendro de la impunidad que los gobiernos otorgan a los comunistas. Tan pronto como la tolerancia cesa y la impunidad disminuye, el peligro amaina, la subversión y sus capítostes pierden la cara, la insurgencia de las masas entra en quiebra.

Las elecciones del mes de diciembre de 1963, obligaron al gobierno de Venezuela a desplegar la fuerza para someter al terrorismo que asolaba el país y que proclamó su voluntad de impedir la realización de las elecciones. El despliegue de fuerza del gobierno bastó para que el apocalipsis comunista se transformase espectacularmente en farsa. Durante la jornada electoral hubo menos víctimas que en cualquier día corriente de terrorismo.

Sólo dos personas, en todo el país, fueron víctimas de actos de terror.

El fenómeno político venezolano acaba de recibir consagración histórica en los baluartes comunistas de Bolivia. La prisión de tres delincuentes comunistas y la captura y liberación por los comunistas, de los rehenes extranjeros, al propio tiempo que la firmeza de la política del gobierno de Bolivia, han demostrado lo que la impunidad significa en todo el siniestro juego político de la actual etapa latinoamericana.

BOLIVIA se encuentra en la víspera de una contienda electoral. Ella ha puesto frente a los dos protagonistas de la revolución boliviana de 1952: Víctor Paz Estensoro, actual Presidente de la República, y Juan Lechín Oquendo, Vice-Presidente. A estas horas, cada uno de estos personajes comanda un ala del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, la organización política promotora y realizadora de la Revolución. El conflicto es eminentemente ideológico: mientras Paz Estensoro retorna a los caminos del nacional-reformismo y a las vías capitalistas, Juan Lechín opera como el jefe de la facción del MNR. profundamente infiltrada por los comunistas de Moscú, y mucho más enérgicamente — como acaban de probarlo hechos macizos — por los fidelistas y comunistas de la obediencia de Pekín y de La Habana.

Está ya a más de doce años de distancia el día en que Juan Lechín, con la anuencia de Paz Estensoro y en su beneficio, negoció el pacto de unión entre el Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, la Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia y el Partido Comunista boliviano. El compromiso, negociado en abril de 1951, constó de once puntos y fue firmado el 3 de mayo de 1951 por José Fellman Velarde —actual Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores— por el M.N.R.; Juan Lechín Oquendo firmó en representación de la Federación de Mineros y Jorge Quiroga Vargas como representante autorizado del Partido Comunista de Bolivia.

Bajo las más variadas circunstancias y a pesar de todos los avatares políticos de Bolivia, la alianza de 1951 se ha mantenido. A través de más de doce años, el M.N.R. utilizó al Partido Comunista para golpear despiadadamente a sus opositores de toda clase. A cambio de tales servicios, el comunismo ha disfrutado en Bolivia de todas las libertades que el pacto del 3 de mayo de 1951 le concedía, incluyendo la de organizar las Milicias Obreras y Campesinas. Estas milicias son las que han intentado presentar combate en la crisis que ha tenido una resonancia internacional en el mes de diciembre.

La situación conflictiva creada por las elecciones de junio próximo, alcanzó aguda tensión después de la visita que el Presidente Paz Estensoro realizara a Washington, al fi-

nalizar el mes de octubre. El jefe de la revolución boliviana y actual Presidente de su país, recibió honores especiales y el Presidente Kennedy, en discurso oficial, señaló a Bolivia como el ejemplo que debía ser imitado por las demás naciones de la América Latina.

A su retorno de Washington, Paz Estensoro fue acusado por los comunistas de la obediencia de Pekín, de actuar como "agente del imperialismo yanqui", como "entreguista" y como realizador de una "operación thermidoriana".

Al mismo tiempo se hizo evidente para todos que el Presidente Paz Estensoro y el sector del M.N.R. que le sigue, no apoyaría la candidatura a la Presidencia de Juan Lechín, en las elecciones próximas.

La circunstancia crítica y la atmósfera de la crisis quedaron así creadas. Hubo ruido de escudos en las minas de Catavi, baluarte del comunismo y del Vice-Presidente Juan Lechín. La propaganda comunista contra Paz Estensoro se hizo más violenta en el tono y más áspera en el contenido.

El Presidente Paz Estensoro reorganizó su Gabinete Ministerial el 6 de diciembre, renovando solamente tres carteras: Minas, Asuntos Campesinos y Agricultura. En los dos primeros, colocó a dos jefes militares retirados. Hay que considerar que estas tres carteras son fundamentales en la circunstancia actual boliviana.

ENTRE TANTO, el Poder Judicial venía conociendo los procesos seguidos, por homicidio y por robo, contra los dirigentes sindicales Irineo Pimentel, Federico Escobar y Jorge Zaral. Los dos primeros estaban acusados de haber asesinado o hecho asesinar a un dirigente sindical oponente. El tercero era culpable de apropiación ilícita de fondos destinados a la construcción de viviendas para los mineros precisamente. El Fiscal que conocía la causa había dispuesto la prisión de los tres acusados, quienes eran tres conspicuos dirigentes comunistas. Su prisión determinó el estallido de la crisis que conmovió a Bolivia y a la América Latina durante diez días con sus noches.

Pimentel y Escobar eran dos comunistas de la intimidad de Juan Lechín. Su prisión fue estimada como un reto, circunstancia que fue aprovechada por los comunistas de tendencia fidelista y trotskista, para organizar las resesalias.

Tras una vigorosa propaganda anti-yanqui, que acusó a Paz Estensoro de "traicionar a la revolución" y de "venderla al imperialismo yanqui", los comunistas lograron lanzar a los mineros armados contra un grupo de extranjeros, algunos de ellos diplomáticos, que se encontraban en la zona minera. Veintiún personas fueron apresadas como rehenes, exigiendo a cambio de su libertad la de los tres presos comunistas, Pimentel, Escobar y Zaral.

Entre los rehenes se encontraban cuatro norteamericanos. Uno de ellos, Agregado Obrero de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos, un miembro del "Cuerpo de Paz", una de las creaciones de la Alianza para el Progreso, y dos funcionarios del Servicio Periodístico de Información de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos. Además, les acompañaban tres canadienses, un inglés naturalizado, un alemán y un holandés. Todos ellos estaban destinados a ser canjeados por los tres presos comunistas, acusados por la justicia boliviana de delitos comunes.

La exigencia comunista colocó ante el muro al gobierno de Paz Estensoro. La circunstancia obligaba a Bolivia a decidir la alternativa que los mineros armados, acaudillados por los comunistas, planteaban. Y Paz Estensoro acogió el desafío, lo enfrentó y canceló la política de apaciguamiento de que ha sido campeón el gobierno de Bolivia.

El Ministro del Interior Antonio Arze Murillo, proclamó la decisión del gobierno de rechazar cualquier negociación sobre canje, afirmando la exigencia de liberación inmediata de los rehenes, sin condiciones. Al propio tiempo ante los periodistas, en conferencia de prensa, el Ministro exhibió documentos que probaban la formación de un "frente" constituido por el ala izquierda del M.N.R. opuesta a la política del gobierno, por el Partido Comunista, por los Trozkistas, por el Partido Revolucionario Auténtico y por la Falange Socialista Boliviana. Independientemente de la validez de los documentos exhibidos, el Ministro estaba trazando la línea divisoria que separaba dos políticas: la que favorecía a los comunistas y la que se comenzaba a oponer frontalmente a ellos.

El Gobierno de Estados Unidos anunció que ofrecía "Asistencia Plena" al Gobierno de Bolivia para que impusiese la autoridad de la ley y liberase a los rehenes, sin condiciones. El Gobierno de La Paz, ordenaba la movilización de tropas sobre la ciudad de Oruro, a las órdenes, del General Alfredo Ovando, Jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas de Bolivia. Por su parte, la Federación de Mineros, que comanda Juan Lechín Oquendo, decretó la realización de huelgas escalonadas y la movilización general de sus milicias. Convocaba al mismo tiempo a las Milicias Campesinas de la región de Oruro a ponerse en pie de guerra y dar apoyo a los mineros.

Juan Lechín, en su carácter de Vice-presidente de la República, otorgó pleno apoyo a los mineros y exigió el canje de los tres comunistas presos por la veintena de rehenes, que fueron trasladados para mayor seguridad, a las Minas Siglo XX.

En esta forma se cancelaba la alianza que fuera sellada en mayo de 1951. La presión de los comunistas de obediencia castrista y pekinesa se había impuesto de manera total. Los comunistas de obediencia moscovita se sumaban a los insurgentes y acataban las directi-

vas que venían de Catavi. El 9 de diciembre, Juan Lechín emitía un comunicado oficial sobre la situación, en el que aseveraba que los rehenes estaban sanos, aunque prisioneros en espera del canje exigido. Lechín cargaba toda la responsabilidad de los hechos sobre la actitud asumida por Paz Estensoro.

ANTE la exigencia de Lechín y de los comunistas, el Gobierno de la Paz reaccionó ordenando a las tropas de Oruro poner cerco a Catavi. Simultáneamente, el Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario leal ordenaba la movilización de las Milicias Campesinas del Departamento de Cochabamba, ordenándoles que marcharan sobre Catavi y las minas.

Bolivia se convirtió en el escenario de una movilización espectacular de personalidades. El Vicario de la Iglesia, Monseñor Andrew Kennedy y el Arzobispo de La Paz, Embajadores de casi todos los países americanos y altos dirigentes de la Cruz Roja, dirigentes estudiantiles y emisarios sindicales, se desplazaron a la región minera para obtener la liberación de los rehenes. El Gobierno de La Paz se mantenía firme en su posición de no negociar. No podía haber canje de gente honrada, capturada con infracción de toda norma jurídica, con delincuentes comunes, responsables de delitos ante la justicia.

El 10 de diciembre por la mañana, los mineros francamente sublevados contra el gobierno de La Paz, daban un ultimátum. Exigían la libertad inmediata de Pimentel, Escobar y Zaral, dentro de las 24 horas. En caso de negativa, la declaración oficial sentenciaba que "el gobierno cargaría con las consecuencias".

Los funcionarios del Departamento de Estado de Washington multiplicaban las notas de protesta. Renovaban los ofrecimientos de "Ayuda Plena" del Presidente Johnson y reiteraban las notas conminatorias pidiendo la liberación de los rehenes norteamericanos.

El Embajador de los Estados Unidos, Douglas Henderson, envió un mensaje telegráfico a Juan Lechín, haciéndole responsable de lo que les pudiese ocurrir a los cuatro rehenes norteamericanos. En áspera réplica, Lechín respondió que los rehenes norteamericanos no obtendrían su libertad mientras el gobierno de La Paz no liberase a los tres sindicalistas detenidos por orden judicial.

Lechín aseveró a través de la prensa y de la radio, que sus tres amigos habían sido reducidos a prisión arbitrariamente por el Ministro del Interior. Que el Agregado Obrero de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos, había sido capturado por los mineros a causa de haberse entrometido en la política interna de Bolivia, pretendiendo formar una organización sindical distinta de la que dirigía Lechín. Reiteró su exigencia de libertad inmediata de los

tres comunistas presos y anunció que seis mil mineros, con las armas en la mano, se encontraban en ese momento en pie de guerra.

La perspectiva de guerra civil se abrió ante Bolivia dramáticamente. El Presidente Paz Estensoro mantuvo su posición primitiva y ordenó reforzar la guarnición militar de Oruro, elevando a seis mil el número de soldados.

El 11 de diciembre, se produjo un duelo telegráfico entre Juan Lechín y el Embajador de los Estados Unidos. El Embajador le telegrafió directamente a Lechín, diciéndole:

"El crimen de secuestro es visto con horror y repugnancia en el mundo entero."

Juan Lechín, en su respuesta se limitó a reiterar su decisión de mantener presos a los rehenes mientras Paz Estensoro no aceptase las condiciones planteadas por los comunistas.

Mientras tanto, Dean Rusk, Secretario de Estado de Washington, Teodoro Moscoso, de la Alianza para el Progreso, Pierre Salinger, Jefe de Prensa de la Casa Blanca, Walter Reuter, dirigente sindical de los obreros del automóvil de los Estados Unidos y otras personalidades, se dirigieron a Juan Lechín, conminándole a ordenar la liberación de los rehenes.

Los comunistas y Lechín se mantenían en su posición, mientras los rehenes prisioneros se apiñaban en una habitación de cuatro metros por seis. Sobre el suelo estaban extendidos colchones, en cada uno de los cuales reposaban más de dos prisioneros. La guardia la realizaban las mujeres de los mineros, provistas de cargas de dinamita, y con sus respectivos fulminantes.

A esta hora de la crisis, todos los comunistas se habían unificado: los que obedecían a Pekín tanto como los fidelistas, los trotskistas y los de obediencia moscovita. La unidad era total: las discrepancias habían quedado reducidas a literatura sobre temas internacionales. En Catavi no existían discrepancias. Las que existían tres días atrás, solamente, habían desaparecido.

LOS PARTIDARIOS de Juan Lechín y los comunistas, convocaron a una gran manifestación en La Paz, con la finalidad de ejercer presión sobre el gobierno y obligarle a ceder. Los comunistas de las diversas observancias se mostraron activos. Pero, al fin, la manifestación no logró movilizar a tres mil manifestantes. Ningún sector importante del trabajo fue paralizado en la capital del país. Los comunistas desfilaron al grito de "Paz Estensoro... al paredón... Juan Lechín, al Poder...".

Ante el fracaso de la manifestación de masas de La Paz, el Ministerio del Trabajo dictó una serie de amenazas contra los mineros huelguistas. La Corporación Minera de Bolivia, la empresa nacionalizada, suspendería sus operaciones en las minas de Catavi y Siglo XX.

Esto implicaba un "lock-out" contra siete mil trabajadores, a quienes se cortarían el suministro de abastecimientos. Se suprimiría, además, el pago del aguinaldo de Navidad y el de los salarios por los días no trabajados.

En aquel mismo momento, la Justicia iniciaba un proceso contra los quince principales dirigentes de la operación comunista que había capturado a los rehenes en la zona minera.

La ofensiva del gobierno causó impacto profundo en las filas comunistas. La actitud desafiante fue abandonada. Los gritos destemplados contra el imperialismo yanqui fueron cambiados en recriminaciones al gobierno por su "actitud testaruda, antirrevolucionaria, antiobrera...". Y la propaganda se hizo calurosa sobre la actitud generosa y benevolente de los mineros, que "trataban a los rehenes como a hermanos...", "sin hacerles daño alguno y tratando solamente de canjearlos...".

Juan Lechín Oquendo presentó nuevas condiciones. El mismo, renunciaría a su cargo y a la investidura de Vicepresidente de la República de Bolivia. Se sometería a proceso penal ante los Tribunales de Justicia, reemplazando a los tres dirigentes sindicales presos. Tan pronto como esta nueva proposición hubiese sido aceptada por el gobierno de La Paz, los rehenes serían puestos en libertad.

Paz Estensoro rechazó fulminantemente la nueva proposición. Respondió exigiendo la libertad inmediata y sin condiciones de los rehenes. Notificó que los tres dirigentes sindicales quedarían presos y sometidos al proceso judicial que se les había iniciado. Anunció que los dirigentes de Catavi que habían dirigido la operación de captura de los rehenes serían procesados.

Mientras tanto, las tropas de Oruro avanzaron sobre Catavi y las Milicias Campesinas, que habían partido de la localidad de Ucareña, a las órdenes del Coronel Osinaga, marchaban sobre la zona minera. Los mineros iban a ser tratados como rebeldes.

Un avión de reconocimiento se estrelló en la zona minera y sus dos ocupantes perecieron, siendo las únicas víctimas de toda la crisis.

El Cuerpo Diplomático acreditado en La Paz se movilizó rumbo a la región de Catavi; los dignatarios de la Iglesia, los dirigentes estudiantiles, los jefes sindicales y políticos intentaron realizar la misión de mediadores. Juan Lechín respondió a todas las gestiones afirmando que todo dependía de la resolución del gobierno y de Paz Estensoro.

Súbitamente y en forma dramática, un abogado norteamericano, hermano de uno de los rehenes prisioneros, dio a la publicidad una carta en la que Irineo Pimentel y Federico Escobar, dos de los comunistas presos, acusados de homicidio, pedían a sus camaradas mineros poner en libertad a los rehenes, sin condiciones, por el bien de Bolivia y de los trabajadores. En un fragmento, la carta decía, textualmente:

"Estando en duro trance de sacrificio los mineros de Catavi y Siglo XX, y ante el desplazamiento de tropas del Ejército y queriendo evitar una masacre roja, deponiendo toda actitud sectaria y pensando en los trabajadores, llamamos y rogamos, para dar una lección a los bárbaros, poner en libertad a los rehenes, exigiendo al propio tiempo la normalización de las labores en las minas, el pago de los haberes por los días de huelga y que el gobierno atienda a las demandas de mejoras sindicales..."

La carta fue tachada de apócrifa por los comunistas. Desde Washington, Edwin M. Martin, alto funcionario del Departamento de Estado, telegrafiaba a Juan Lechin pidiéndole que diera fe a los mineros de la autenticidad de tal carta, certificando que ella había sido firmada por Pimentel y Escobar libremente y sin coacción.

Los comunistas plantearon una nueva condición. Se pondría en libertad a los rehenes, pero los presos comunistas no serían juzgados en La Paz, donde "no tenían garantías", sino en Potosí, donde sí las tenían. El gobierno de La Paz, rechazó categóricamente la nueva condición y exigió la inmediata libertad de los rehenes.

EN LA MADRUGADA del sábado 14 de diciembre, el cerco militar en torno a Catavi, cerraba sus tenazas. El General Ovando asumía el mando de las tropas y una operación de carácter militar iba a comenzar objetivamente. Lechin se convenció que el gobierno de Paz Estensoro estaba resuelto a imponer autoridad sin consentirle siquiera salvar la cara. Al atardecer, la radio dejaba escuchar la voz conmovida de Juan Lechin:

"El pueblo ha ganado la batalla... En conocimiento de que las tropas se encuentran, en estos momentos, a escasos kilómetros de Catavi y Siglo XX, con las trágicas consecuencias que son previsibles para los trabajadores bolivianos y para los técnicos extranjeros y los diplomáticos norteamericanos, con el fin de evitar derramamiento de sangre y horas trágicas, la Federación de Trabajadores Mineros, acepta la propuesta del gobierno..."

"Los rehenes prisioneros —añadió Lechin— serán entregados a Monseñor Abel Antezana, Arzobispo de La Paz, quien había venido actuando como mediador."

Las condiciones del arreglo fueron:

- Liberación incondicional de los rehenes.
- Proceso a los tres dirigentes comunistas en La Paz, no en Potosí.
- Retiro de las tropas de la zona de Catavi y Siglo XX.

Incidentalmente y partiendo hacia la zona minera, se encontraron en el aeropuerto de La Paz el Embajador de los Estados Unidos, Dou-

glas Henderson y el Vicepresidente Juan Lechin.

—"¿Cómo permitió usted que se enviaran tropas contra los mineros...?" —increpó Lechin al Embajador.

—"Yo no he venido a este país para mandar", replicó Henderson.

Horas más tarde, los rehenes eran liberados, sin que ninguna de las condiciones comunistas hubiesen sido aceptadas. Había prevalecido la firme actitud del gobierno y la batalla la había ganado rotundamente Víctor Paz Estensoro.

LA CRISIS boliviana del mes de diciembre ha venido a demostrar tres verdades políticas concluyentes:

- Cuando el gobierno de Washington "da Apoyo Pleno" a la acción contra el comunismo, los gobiernos de América Latina se deciden, varían su posición apaciguadora, cambian sus actitudes de tolerancia interesada. No por esto, ni a causa de esto, llega a sufrir un rasguño la soberanía, ni la independencia, ni el orgullo nacional.

- No es la miseria sino la impunidad lo que favorece la subversión comunista. La falta de firmeza de los gobiernos, la actitud democrática claudicante, la corrupción política, la utilización de los comunistas como instrumentos electorales y como ingredientes de la intriga palaciega, constituyen las fuerzas que están ayudando al comunismo en América Latina. La infiltración y la subversión prosperan, no allí donde hay más miseria, sino donde mayor es la tolerancia y donde más altos grados alcanza la impunidad.

- La división entre los comunistas que obedecen a Moscú, los que obedecen a Pekín y los que siguen a La Habana, es meramente formal. En Bolivia se ha hecho claro a través de esta crisis que los fidelistas, los trotskistas y los obedientes a Pekín no están separados por ningún desacuerdo real. La oposición de los que obedecen a Moscú se enardece en las palabras, estalla en palabrería traducida del ruso, para acallarse totalmente a la hora de la acción, que es la hora de la verdad. Tanto en Bolivia, como en Venezuela, los comunistas de las diversas corrientes dejan una experiencia probada: simulan estar separados o marchan efectivamente separados, pero en la hora de la acción, el combate los encuentra juntos.

La batalla de Catavi la ganó, de manera campal, Víctor Paz Estensoro y la corriente del M.N.R. acusada de "Thermidoriana" por los comunistas. Esta lucha ha demostrado que el comunismo en Bolivia, y en América Latina, ha sufrido una severa derrota, pero está probado asimismo que el comunismo no ha sido vencido. Ni en Venezuela, ni en Bolivia. En Catavi se le ha permitido plegarse en orden y realizar una retirada que bien puede ser con-

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siderada como estratégica. Las fuerzas del comunismo en Bolivia permanecen intactas numéricamente.

Las condiciones para la campaña electoral del mes de junio, quizá no son mejores ni peores que antes de la crisis. Lo que sí es auténtico es que la crisis ha servido para definir posiciones, para delimitar fronteras y esclarecer actitudes. En las elecciones de junio no habrá alianza íntima entre el M.N.R. y el Partido Comunista. Cualesquiera que fueren las maniobras que realicen los comunistas de obediencia moscovita, la corriente fidelista y pekinés les arrastrará a posiciones que no son de coexistencia pacífica, sino de áspera oposición al gobierno acusado de "thermidoriano".

EUDOCIO RAVINES

Biographic Sketches

GHANA

Kodwo Addison

Director, Kwame Nkrumah Institute of
Economics and Political Science

Born in 1922 at Cape Coast, Addison became involved in trade union work at a young age. In 1953 he travelled to Europe, seeking WFTU support for his union; this led to his enrolling in a WFTU training course in Budapest in 1954. In 1953 he assisted in organizing a Ghanaian delegation to the Fourth World Youth Festival in Bucharest.


In 1958 he joined John Tettegah (q.v.) in the Ghana Trade Union Congress, became the Principal of its Leadership School and a member of the Ghana delegation to the International Labor Organization conference in Geneva, 1959. Although not generally popular in labor ranks because of his Communist affiliations, he pushed hard for GTUC's disaffiliation from the free world International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. In line with Ghana's pan-African push, Addison became administrative secretary of the All-African Peoples' Conference in 1960.

Addison is also a member of the Central Committee of the Convention People's Party, the inner circle which is responsible for ideological and organizational party decisions.

Kweku Akwei

Education Secretary,
Convention People's Party (CPP)

Born Isaac Vanderpuije, date unknown, Akwei is director of the ideological department of the CPP and a member of the Central committee. Considered one of the radical leftist group of the CPP, he is also very close to President Nkrumah.




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Kofi Baako

Minister of Defense

Born in Saltpond, 1926; educated in mission schools and at St. Augustine College, Cape Coast.

An early political secretary to Nkrumah, Baako's political activity has included membership in the radical ideological League of Ghana Patriots in the early 1950's. He also took a trip through Europe in 1953 with the International Union of Socialist Youth in 1953. He was elected to the Legislative Assembly in 1954 and in 1957 became Minister of Information and Broadcasting. At that time he described himself as a Marxist Socialist but now claims to be an "Nkrumahist" and an interpreter of the philosophy of "Nkrumahism."




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6.2(d)

Herman Meyer Basner

Columnist, Ghanaian Times

Born in Latvia in 1903, Basner grew up in South Africa but was educated in California. On his return he joined the Communist Party of South Africa. He was elected to the South African Senate in 1942 from which he resigned in 1948. During the same period he was correspondent for the Communist paper, Guardian, a member of the South African Friends of the Soviet Union and an outspoken opponent of the Government's non-European policy.




3.3(h)(2)
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Kofi Batsa

Secretary General, Pan-African
Union of Journalists

Born August 1931 in the former British Togoland; educated in Togo and at St. Augustine College, Cape Coast, Ghana.

An early member of the Ghana Patriots Club, he was a member of the Young Communist League by 1949. In 1952, while a member of the Ghana Trade Unions Congress (GTUC), Batsa was active in distributing material for the Communist labor front, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In 1953 he was a GTUC delegate to the WFTU Social Security Conference and the Communist-sponsored International Conference for the Defense of the Rights of Youth, both in Vienna, and the World Youth Festival in Bucharest. In 1955, while working with the Ghanaian Federation of Youth, he established a Communist study group which called itself "The Nucleus." He was expelled from the Convention Peoples Party in 1953 because of his ties with Communist youth and trade union organizations.



3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

He became editor of the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA) organ, Voice of Africa, in 1961 and of the pro-Communist BAA weekly Spark, in 1962. In 1963 he was elected secretary general of the Pan-African Union of Journalists, an organization which grew out of the African group sponsored by the Communist-front International Organization of Journalists.

Geoffrey Henry Cecil Bing Adviser to President Nkrumah

Born July 24, 1909, in Northern Ireland of Anglo-Chinese origin; educated in England (Oxford); called to the bar in London; admitted to practice in Ghana (then Gold Coast) 1934. He was elected to Parliament as a Labor member in 1945 at which time he apparently relinquished his Communist Party membership but retained his association with several Communist fronts -- including the British-China Friendship Association, and the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee. After his defeat in the 1955 parliamentary elections, he opened a law practice in Ghana and in the next year became a Constitutional Adviser to Nkrumah.

On independence, he became the first Attorney General of Ghana.
in 1957.

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)

John K. Tettegah

Secretary General of the Ghana
Trade Union Congress (GTUC)

Born September 9, 1930, at Ada; educated at mission schools and the Secretarial College, Accra. He became active during the 1950s in the labor movement which provided a base for his political ambitions. By 1954 he became Secretary General of the Ghana Trade Union Congress (GTUC), a position he has held nearly continuously ever since. Under his guidance, the GTUC, modeled on Communist bloc counterpart organizations, has become a militant left-wing organization.

3.3(h)(2)
6.2(d)