

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

4 January 2022

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Reference: EOM-2020-00346

Dear Requester:

This letter is a final response to your request under the mandatory declassification provision of Executive Order 13526, as amended, for review of:

**Background on Six Subjects Suggested By Acting DDI, Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000900150001-2**

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located one document (enclosed) that can be released in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of Executive Order 13526 §§ 3.3(h)(2) and/or 6.2(d). The statutory bases for our 6.2(d) deletions are Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. § 3507, as amended) and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1), as amended).

As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please explain the basis for your appeal. You may send appellate correspondence via facsimile transmission to (703) 613-3007, or may address appellate correspondence to:

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Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505

If you have any questions regarding this response, please call this office at (703) 613-1287.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mark Lilly".

Mark Lilly  
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
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7 August 1967

This book contains relatively recent background on the six subjects suggested by Acting DDI for the Senatorial dinner 9 August. An up-to-date briefing on each subject will be inserted at opening of business Wednesday, 9 August.

## OCI Presentations

HAITI: Weeklies of 2 June, 23 June, and 4 August; draft briefing for aborted 3 Aug. Russell briefing.

PANAMA: Weekly of 21 July; 19 July Rivers Briefing.

RUMANIA: Weekly of 28 July; CIWR Special Report, 21 July.

ALGERIA: Domestic Situation: Memo of 14 June, Algerian Involvement in the Middle East Crisis.

ALGERIA - MOROCCO: CIWR Special Report, 16 June, Frictions in the Maghreb.

NORTH KOREA: Weekly of 30 June.

Pat,  
Very good.  
Thanks,  
Ed

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8 August 1965

DDI BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER

HAITI

- I. Haiti has been in the news this summer with a government and army purge, a couple of invasion rumors, and a security forces alert, but the over-all picture in brief is this: the political and economic situations are deplorable, and there is very little prospect that either will improve in the near future.
- A. Haiti is run by what can only be described as a ruthless dictatorship.
- B. Its economy is stagnant. Per capita income-- about \$70--is one of the lowest in the world. Literacy is only about 10 percent. Public health standards and services are minimal.
- C. Even the insiders in the political and military power structure are apprehensive as a result of recent reshufflings, arrests, trials, and executions.
- II. In most countries, and in many dictatorships, these conditions would be more than enough to touch off a coup or a revolution.
- A. In Haiti, however, things have never been much

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better, so the missing ingredient is that conditions have not become sufficiently intolerable to make any group of Haitians undertake the extreme personal risks involved in any attempt to overthrow the regime.

B. President Duvalier's control at present appears to be as strong as ever.

1. Would-be conspirators have been cowed by the ruthlessness "Papa Doc" showed in dealing with suspected dissidents early in June, when he executed 19 army officers for plotting.
2. A good share of the army's weapons and ammunition is kept under lock and key in the basement of the Presidential Palace.
3. Duvalier's principal control forces are his goon squads called the Ton-Ton-Macoutes-- Creole for "Boogeyman."
4. But the recent purges have even shaken up the leadership of these strong-arm gangs.

C. Duvalier's suspicions reach even into his own household. An ambitious son-in-law, Max Dominique, has been on shaky ground since June. In July, he left for Spain as Ambassador-designate.

1. No sooner was he out of the country than Duvalier charged him with conspiracy, and

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ordered him to return in 30 days or face trial in absentia. Dominique prudently resigned and stayed in Spain.

2. This maneuvering is typical of Papa Doc. He obviously wanted to be rid of Dominique, but didn't want to execute his daughter's husband, or bring on the embarrassment of a son-in-law taking asylum in one of the local embassies, so he maneuvered him into exile.

III. <sup>and July</sup> The recent curfew and alert were ordered in response to another of the recurrent rumors, sometimes with some basis in fact, that a group of exiles were mounting an invasion.

- A. Actually the non-Communist Haitian exile groups have little capability for mounting any substantial operations against Duvalier at the present time.
- B. Communists, with Soviet and Cuban help, have some capability for infiltrating agitators, but once inside the country, the agitators would find little room for action in the politically oppressive atmosphere.
  1. By and large, the Haitian Communists are limiting themselves to building up their apparatus and their communications against

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the day when Duvalier passes or is pushed  
from the scene.

- IV. The situation in Haiti is inherently fragile, but  
only because President Duvalier--in contrast to the  
impression he seeks to convey with his use of  
Voodoo--is a mortal man.

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## WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Political tensions continue throughout the hemisphere and riots broke out in the French West Indies island of Guadeloupe last week.

The riots were a spontaneous outgrowth of a month-long strike, and were fueled by economic and racial grievances. Security forces brought the rioters under control on 28 May, but not until at least five persons had been killed and 60 wounded.

The arrest of 16 Haitian military officers, the first cabinet reshuffle since November 1965, and the replacement of a number of President Duvalier's representatives in outlying cities have coincided with the development of a bitter feud in Duvalier's own family that could have severe political consequences.

Border clashes on 29 and 30 May between Honduran and Salvadoran troops resulted in several casualties on both sides. A bilateral commission is investigating the incidents, and no break in relations is expected.

A budding political crisis in Peru was averted when an eleven-hour compromise postponed a major confrontation between the Belaunde administration and the opposition-controlled Congress over how to handle the serious fiscal situation. In neighboring Ecuador, the turbulent political scene will change only slightly as a result of the constituent assembly's completion of the new constitution--the country's 17th since 1830.

Meanwhile, student unrest persists in Brazil. President Costa e Silva and Education Minister Dutra are convinced that the students are deliberately seeking an opportunity to test the strength of the new government.

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~~SECRET~~POLITICAL TENSION MOUNTS IN HAITI

A recent series of military and government shake-ups in Haiti is the latest indication that President Duvalier's power base has undergone considerable erosion during the last year. Ambassador Timmons predicts that "the final act in this drama could come at any time."

At least 16 military officers were arrested in late May. Some of them had held important posts in the elite Presidential Guard, and many had ties with Duvalier's ambitious son-in-law Colonel Max Dominique. [redacted]

[redacted] Dominique has protested by submitting his resignation, but the President is not known to have accepted or rejected it.

In addition to the military shake-ups, Duvalier reshuffled his cabinet last week, for the first time since November 1965, and replaced a number of national representatives and municipal authorities in outlying cities. This flurry of activity coincides with a time of increasing finan-

cial hardship and international isolation for the Duvalier regime.

Last fall Duvalier foiled an incipient conspiracy by announcing the "retirement" of five General Staff officers and the dismissal from service of at least 15 others. This development came hard on the heels of rare antigovernment demonstrations and protests in several outlying towns.

The over-all situation is further complicated by a bitter feud in Duvalier's family. Part of the problem involves a dispute between Max Dominique and Duvalier's other son-in-law, Director of Tourism Luc Foucard. In addition, Dominique's wife is reportedly so upset over the attentions Duvalier has been paying to his mistress that she has urged her husband to "take action" against Duvalier. These developments have probably raised Duvalier's suspicions about the possibility of a palace intrigue involving members of his own family. [redacted]

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## INVASION JITTERS HIT HAITI

Haitian President Duvalier established a nationwide curfew on 29 July following reports of an imminent invasion of the north.

Duvalier's action was initiated in response to "invasion" reports reaching him from his representatives in Washington and Miami. He acted characteristically in tightening security controls while investigating activities which had aroused his suspicions.

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] Duvalier believed that a force of 150 men in the Bahamas was preparing to invade

Haiti on 1 August. [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

The US ambassador reports that Port-au-Prince is calm even though rumors of an invasion have been heightened by the curfew. Anti-Duvalier exiles are considered to have little capability for mounting a serious invasion attempt at this time. [redacted]

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## OTHER INTELLIGENCE ISSUANCES

Received during the week of 27 July-2 August 1967

## RESEARCH REPORTS AND REFERENCE AIDS

3.3(h)(2)  
6.2(d)EgyptSuez Canal seven weeks after closing. il map  
C.I.A. OER. IM 67-47. 6p. JI'67.6.2(d)  
3.3(h)(2)IndiaSix months of postelection turmoil in India.  
maps C.I.A. OCL. Spec. Rpt. 0300/67A  
9p. JI 28'67. P338280787.

6.2(d)

IranElections in Iran, [scheduled for Aug 4'67]  
C.I.A. OCL. Intell. Memo. 1372/67. 4p.  
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3.3(h)(2)U.S.S.R.Appearances of Soviet [military and political]  
leaders, Apr-June'67. graphs tab C.I.A.  
OER. A 67-17. 117p. JI'67.

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Vietnam, NorthForeign shipping to North Vietnam in June'67.  
il graph map tab C.I.A. OER. IM 67-48.  
16p. JI'67.

6.2(d)

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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

Probable Soviet objectives in rearming Arab  
States. U.S.I.B. SNIE 11-13-67. 5p. JI 20  
'67.

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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEYS

Bolivia: Subversion and insurgency. il maps  
por tab NIS 93. section 57. rev. 41p. My  
'67.

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Pakistan: Trade and finance. graphs mapstab  
NIS 36. section 65. rev. 51p. F'67.

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Singapore: Subversion and insurgency. bibliog  
il graph maps por tab NIS 44C. section 57.  
rev. 31p. Ap'67.

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Weather and climate: meteorological organiza-  
tion and facilities [Ivory Coast, Dahomey,  
and Republic of South Africa] bibliog il  
maps tab NIS, section 23S. 1 vol. JI'67.

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Requests for publications cited above should  
be made through normal requesting channels  
to the Customer Services Branch of Indexing  
and Services Division, extension

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~~SECRET~~POLITICAL UNREST IN HAITI

The situation in Haiti has deteriorated since the execution of 19 military officers for "high treason" on 8 June. Rumors of coup plotting are again prevalent as is the expectation of further punitive action by Duvalier. As many as 72 people have taken asylum in various embassies in Port-au-Prince.

Some of the officers who were executed had been close to Duvalier for years, and the action against them, combined with numerous changes in military commands which followed, has eroded Duvalier's already narrow power base. The creation of an unarmed police force on 1 June coincides with an apparent move on the part of Duvalier to downgrade the national militia as a security force. No segment of Haitian officialdom has remained unscathed by the purge, and businessmen are beginning to wonder if they are to be next. One current rumor has it that Duvalier has admitted to the recent execution of 22 additional prisoners.

The internal situation has caused trouble with both the Brazilian and Bahamian governments. A dispute over the asylum question resulted on 8 June in the expulsion of Brazil's chargé, who had

been on duty for only a week. Relations are also strained with the government of the Bahamas, which has demanded that Haiti stop the flow of emigrés. A thousand or more Haitians have reached the Bahamas in recent weeks, but most of them were seeking economic improvement rather than political asylum. They are being sent back to Haiti.

The feud within the Duvalier family may be eased for the time being by the departure of son-in-law Colonel Max Dominique and his wife, the former Marie Denise Duvalier, who are leaving on 23 June for Europe. Dominique has been appointed ambassador to Spain, possibly to get him out of the way. Many of the purged officers had been close to Dominique, who resigned as military commander of the Western Department in late May as a protest against their arrest.

A new threat has been posed, however, by the growing confusion and suspicion among Duvalier's closest associates, some of whom may be desperate enough to take some united action against him.

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## NEW DISORDERS POSSIBLE IN NORTHERN MEXICO

The Mexican Government may face more trouble in the northwestern border state of Sonora in connection with the elections scheduled there for 2 July. General order is likely to be maintained, as it has been for the past month, only by the presence of federal troops who were sent in to quell a violent public protest against the gubernatorial candidate "imposed" by the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

The refusal of the PRI to bow to overwhelming popular opposition to the nomination--and therefore almost certain election of Faustino Felix Serna has increased the potential for renewed violence, however. Government-influenced newspaper and radio comment has added to the initial resentment by treating all opposition to Felix Serna as inspired by Communist subversives.

Further exacerbating the situation are the continuing reprisals against those who oppose Felix Serna's candidacy. An estimated 300 student leaders of the protest movement have sought

refuge across the border in Arizona, many teachers have been fired, and respectable and prominent citizens have been arrested and harassed. Rumors that vast amounts of public money were used to "purchase" Felix's candidacy and to buy off the press point up popular belief that corruption is rampant.

If voters do not boycott the election, there will probably be a strong protest vote in favor of the National Action (PAN) candidate, Gilberto Suarez. Suarez, not a PAN member, is an attractive personality with funds to wage a good campaign.

3.3(h)(2)

the dichotomy between the PRI's authoritarianism and Mexico's increasingly politically awakened public is cutting deeply into the political unity that has kept the country stable for over three decades.

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Draft for aborted 6.2(d)  
3 Aug. Russell briefing

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Haiti

1. The political and economic situation in Haiti remains deplorable with little prospects for improvement in either sector in the near future. The recent arrests, trials, and executions as well as the general reshuffling of President Duvalier's military household have undeniably increased <sup>apprehension</sup> among most politically conscious Haitians, including government functionaries and army officers.
2. The missing ingredient in this generally dismal picture is any sign that conditions have become so intolerable as to motivate any group of Haitians to take the great personal risks involved in an attempt to overthrow the regime. Duvalier's control appears to be as strong as ever at the present time; would-be conspirators apparently have been cowed with which by the ruthlessness/the regime dealt with suspected anti-Duvalier dissidents in early June. In addition, the ingredient of family dissension which played an important role in ~~increasing~~ the tension existing in Port-au-Prince in June

Duvalier has now charged Dominique with treason, ordering him to return or face trial in absentia, and Dominique promptly resigned and stayed in Spain. The dictator's timing of the diplomatic appointment and indictment was probably designed to avoid the family embarrassment which would have resulted if Dominique were executed, or forced into asylum in one of the foreign embassies in Port-au-Prince.

has dissipated somewhat with the departure of Duvalier's sons-in-law, the ambitious Max Dominique to "golden exile" as ambassador to Madrid. X

3. The perennially plotting non-Communist Haitian exile groups have little capability for mounting a serious ~~knockdown~~ anti-Duvalier operation at the present time. The Communist exiles have some capability for infiltrating agitators into the country, but <sup>the</sup> overall threat they <sup>might</sup> pose is also minimal for the present. Communists inside Haiti have little room for action in the politically oppressive atmosphere in the country, although they and their colleagues in exile are ~~making~~ building cadres and generally increasing their activities pointing to the day when Duvalier passes from the scene.

4. In essence, the Haitian situation remains very fragile. Within the Haitian context, however, the situation seems to have stabilized during the last month or so with Duvalier <sup>still</sup> firmly in the saddle.



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PANAMA

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*Auth: Charles Adair*

8 August 1967

DDI BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR SENATORIAL DINNERPANAMA

- I. In Panama, an increasing groundswell of opposition to the new canal treaties may cause President Robles to defer ratification until after the Panamanian presidential election next May.
- A. His original intention had been to stage a quick, intensive, promotional campaign for the proposed treaties and then push ratification through a special session of the assembly--before the regular opening date of October first, and before the issue could become intertwined with the election campaign.
- B. Robles has been forced to reconsider this schedule by mounting criticism from cabinet members; from the Foreign Relations Council; from political parties not only of the opposition, but within the government coalition; and from a clique of key National Guard officers.
- C. The Foreign Relations Council--an informal advisory group appointed by the president--

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*is insisting on*  
~~has asked for~~ time for extended discussion,  
and an opportunity to negotiate changes.

1. Foreign Minister Eleta told the U.S. Ambassador that the Council has already come up with 28 proposed revisions for the treaty drafts.
2. Objections center on U.S. domination of<sup>5/4</sup> the joint canal administration, the proposed judicial system in the canal area, and what are referred to as certain "excessive" powers of the joint administration to make concessions to the U.S. armed forces.

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3.3(h)(2)

- D. The chief negotiator for Panama, de la Rosa, has indicated that he is still displeased with some aspects of the treaties as they are now written. De la Rosa thinks that time will work in favor of Panama,

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- II. Most of the pro-government deputies in the assembly have indicated that they would prefer to postpone the ratification debate until the regular session

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in October, or even until after the elections, to allow more time to study the drafts.

- A. Robles will probably be reluctant to take his chances on a ratification vote during the supercharged pre-election atmosphere that will mark the regular assembly session.

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two cabinet ministers--each of

6.2(d)

whom hopes to be the presidential candidate of the president's Liberal Party--may be withholding support for the treaties in hopes of extorting endorsement for nomination from Robles.

2. If the treaties get mixed up with that kind of bargaining, their only chance for acceptance may be to get the election over with first.

III. The perennial opposition presidential candidate, Arnulfo Arias, left the country for a European trip

about the time that the proposed treaties became available for discussion. *He is now in the U.S. on a leisurely trip home.*

- A. There was speculation that he did not want to risk a possible losing fight against the treaties. So far, his public stand has been that regardless of the treaty provisions, he was cheated out of the last election, and

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that consequently any treaties negotiated with the Robles regime are illegal.

- B. Arias may feel that the governing coalition, with an election in sight, will break apart more easily without his unifying presence.
- C. Another recent report is that the Panamenistas, the party of Arias, want Robles to commit himself thoroughly to the treaties, by signing them or by submitting them for ratification, before they launch their attack.

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## WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The Western Hemisphere was generally quiet during the week as most countries were preoccupied with their own problems.

Cuba is gearing up for its annual 26 July celebrations, to be held this year in the eastern city of Santiago. The highlight will be Fidel Castro's speech, which will set the stage for the Latin American Solidarity Organization meeting to be held in Havana from 31 July to 8 August.

In Costa Rica, a major legislative battle is brewing on a bank reform bill which President Trejos has made a key goal of his administration. The country's present banking system was instituted by the opposition National Liberation Party, which makes this reform a highly controversial issue.

Efforts by Panamanian President Robles to hasten ratification of the new canal treaties may be torpedoed by the legislature's desire for more time to study the drafts--time the opposition will use to build a case against the treaties.

In South America the most immediate challenge to stability exists in Uruguay, where Communist-incited labor strife continues. Argentina interest centered on the Bolivian guerrilla problem and on plans for the OAS meeting at which Venezuela's charges against Cuba will be discussed. In Brazil the accidental death of former president Castello Branco has removed a friend of the US as well as a moderating political influence.

In Colombia and Peru, political progress seems to have been stymied by long-lasting battles between president and congress. Similar problems in Chile and Bolivia are compounded by the fact that in Chile the president is at odds with members of his own party and in Bolivia the president's coalition of minor parties has just collapsed.

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## NEW DIFFICULTIES WITH PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Efforts by the Panamanian Government to achieve early ratification of the new canal treaties with the United States have hit a number of snags.

Foreign Minister Eleta has expressed concern to Ambassador Adair over alleged discrepancies on a map of the land transfers to be implemented by the new treaties. Eleta claims the map shows larger military base areas and smaller areas of territory to be jointly administered than were agreed to by US and Panamanian negotiators. This controversial point could lead to a resumption of discussions of the draft defense treaty.

President Robles is reconsidering plans to come to Washington early next month for signing ceremonies because of increasing opposition to a hasty ratification of the treaties. Both in the cabinet and among government supporters in the National Assembly, there are doubts about the advisability of his leaving the country during such a crucial period. There is also concern that calling a special session this summer to ratify the treaties will give the impression that the government is trying to ram them through without adequate time for a thorough study of the drafts.

If the special session is not called by 1 September, debate would probably carry over into the regular session that opens on 1 October. The foreign minister wants an early session in order to deprive the opposition of time to build a case against the treaties. Most government deputies, however, favor postponing debate until the regular October 1967 session or until a special session can be called after the presidential election next May.

Meanwhile, Robles has released the entire text of the draft treaties for serial publication in the conservative daily La Estrella. This move was prompted by alarm over the wide circulation of unauthorized versions of the documents by opponents of the treaties and by the fear that the government would lose support by continuing to withhold copies from the National Assembly. The government is now marshalling its resources for a propaganda campaign to "sell" the treaties.

There are indications that the self-seeking politicians who control large segments of Panama's news media are using the treaty issue to bargain for political and economic concessions from the

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### US military reservations

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administration. [redacted]

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[redacted] As knowledge of the treaties becomes widespread, opponents of the government can be expected to find fault with the contents, especially the defense treaty.

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*(Map - overleaf)*

## POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR CHILEAN PRESIDENT

Chilean President Eduardo Frei's Christian Democratic Party (PDC), already torn by internal dissension, is being criticized both in Chile and abroad for its acceptance of the establishment of a committee of the Havana-based Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) in Chile.

The PDC's position on LASO demonstrates the increasing strength of the left-wing "rebel" faction which has been extremely critical of Frei's policies. In a statement issued on 10 July, the party's National Council recognized that LASO is linked to the Cuban advocacy of guerrilla warfare, but supported the right of political groups to affiliate with an international organization so long as they do not interfere with Chilean politics. The statement added that guerrilla movements resulted from "underdevelopment and exploitation by national oligarchies and foreign interests," as well as from Castroite agitation. Domestic criticism of this attitude has been echoed in Venezuela, which is very sensitive on the subject of Castro.

Frei lost little time in disassociating himself from the PDC's

position. He unequivocally condemned the international activities of LASO and stated that the Chilean LASO committee would not be permitted to incite violence in Chile or in other Latin American countries.

Frei's control of the party has been further weakened, however, by the election of "rebel" leader Senator Rafael Gumucio as president of the PDC at the National Assembly meeting on 15 and 16 July. Although the PDC will continue to support the government, it probably will take more extreme positions both in legislative debates and in public statements.

In the past Frei has often been able to rally public support in his battles with the opposition-controlled Congress by claiming that the only alternative to the PDC is the Communist-Socialist Popular Action Front (FRAP). With the left wing of the PDC sounding more and more like FRAP, this argument is losing much of its strength. [redacted]

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19 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEEPANAMA CANAL TREATIES

I. President Robles' efforts to achieve early ratification of the new canal treaties with the United States have hit a number of snags.

A. Foreign Minister Eleta has expressed concern to Ambassador Adair over alleged discrepancies on a map of the land transfers to be implemented by the new treaties.

1. Eleta's claims that the map shows larger military base areas and smaller areas of territory to be jointly administered than were agreed to by US and Panamanian negotiators. <sup>This</sup> could lead to a resumption of discussions on the draft defense treaty.


B. Chief treaty negotiator De la Rosa is discontented with some aspects of the draft canal treaties as they are now written [REDACTED]

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PAN-1


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
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C. President Robles' plan to come to Washington early next month for signing ceremonies is running into opposition from some cabinet members and government supporters in the assembly who think it unwise for him to leave the country during such a critical period.

1.  Robles' eagerness to conclude a canal settlement is alienating progovernment politicians who expect favors in return for support of the treaties.

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3.3(h)(2)  
6.2(d)

PAN-2

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D. There is also concern among government officials that a hurried special session of the legislature to ratify the treaties will give the impression that the government is trying to ram them through without adequate time for a thorough study of the drafts. 6.2(d)

E. If a special session is (not) called by September 1, debate would probably carry over into the regular session that opens on October 1.

1. Foreign Minister Eleta wants an early session to deprive the opposition of time to build a case against the treaties.
2. Most government deputies, however, favor postponing debate for either the regular October 1967 session or for a special session to be called after the presidential election next May.

F. Prompted by alarm over the wide circulation of unauthorized versions of the documents by opponents of the treaties, President Robles moved this week to have the entire text of the drafts released for serial publication in a leading Panamanian newspaper. In addition, Robles feared that the

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government would lose support by continuing to withhold copies from the National Assembly.

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1. The Robles government is now marshalling its resources for a propaganda campaign to "sell" the treaties.

II. As knowledge of the treaties becomes widespread, opponents of the government can be expected to find fault with the contents, especially the defense treaty.

- A. There are already indications that the self-seeking politicians who control large segments of Panama's news media are using the treaty issue to bargain for political and economic concessions from the administration.

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- B. Opposition leader Arnulfo Arias, who has long maintained that he would oppose any Canal settlement negotiated by the present "illegal" government, departed unexpectedly on July 1 for Europe.

1. Arias' unexplained departure on the eve of treaty debates reportedly left a wake of

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confusion and dissension among his followers;  
some are charging that Arias decided it  
would be useless to try to prevent ratification  
and preferred not to imply approval by remaining  
in the country.

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C02887287

Approved for Release: 2022/01/04 C02887287

ROMANIA

Approved for Release: 2022/01/04 C02887287

8 August 1967

DDI BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR SENATORIAL DINNERRUMANIA

- I. If terms like "the Soviet bloc," or "Russia and her satellites" are losing some of their validity in intelligence reporting today, a prime example is Rumania, which has placed its national interests ahead of solidarity with its Communist allies.
- A. The Rumanian Communist Party has been edging toward its own brand of "national Communism" throughout the 1960's, and formally proclaimed this independent course in April, 1964, with the publication of what amounted to a declaration of independence.
- B. The 1964 declaration was the most forthright and thoroughly reasoned rejection of Soviet political and economic supremacy ever made by an ostensible supporter of the Soviet Union.
- II. Since 1964, the Rumanian party and state leaderships have reaffirmed this independent course frequently--most recently in last month's session of parliament--and in the process have broadened the domestic base of popular support.
- III. The roots of Rumanian alienation from Moscow run across the board. They are not only political and economic, but historical in character.

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disput + CEMA  
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- A. Traditionally a highly nationalistic Latin nation, Rumania has an anti-pathy towards Russia dating back many years.
- B. Moscow's blatant economic exploitation of Rumania--through the Soviet-Rumanian joint stock companies (until their abolition in 1954) and oppressive war reparations--stalelated Bucharest's efforts to achieve economic progress.
- C. Until 1952, Moscow's "men" politically dominated the Rumanian party.
- D. Soviet efforts to achieve close economic and political control impinged on Rumania's concept of national sovereignty and equality.

IV. Rumania's nationalist leadership stresses independence of action in foreign and interparty affairs and a pragmatic interpretation of Communist doctrine.

- A. This drive for independence has, of course, had its greatest impact on relations with the USSR.

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1. The regime has resisted Soviet-  
sponsored supranational planning  
in the Council for Economic Mutual  
Assistance (CEMA), has called the  
Warsaw Pact and all military alliances  
"anachronistic," and has adopted  
a "neutral" stance in the Sino-  
Soviet dispute.
  2. Rumania boycotted the Karlov  
Vary Communist parties meeting  
last April.
  3. The regime refused to sign the  
June declaration in Moscow which  
condemned Israeli "aggression."  
It failed to attend the subsequent  
meeting in Budapest, and did not  
go along with the Soviet Union at  
the recent United Nations meeting.
- B. Rumania has expanded its politico-economic  
ties with the West, particularly Western  
Europe

*Trade pact with  
Israel (April 67)  
67-70.*

-3-

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1. In 1966, approximately 40 percent of Rumania's foreign trade was with the Free World (as opposed to about 20% in 1955, 33% in 1964)
2. Rumania is the only Eastern European country which has granted full diplomatic recognition to West Germany (January 1967)
3. Rumanian-US relations have markedly improved since the first of this year, Vietnam notwithstanding, and Maurer is the only Eastern European Communist Premier to talk with a U.S. President.

W. Germ, France,  
U.K., Italy.

24-25 July, special  
Clausenescu  
Pino - US  
Increase of Trade,  
Econ, Cultural, &  
Military.

V. Rumania's independent course has already had a significant effect in the Communist world. It has:

- A. weakened Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.
- B. blocked economic integration within CEMA which from Moscow's point of view is a device to maintain Soviet economic-political control of Eastern Europe
- C. hindered Soviet efforts to make the Warsaw Pact into an instrument of

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greater political control over Eastern European countries.

- D. given a positive impetus to the spread of polycentrism--pragmatic Communism--elsewhere in the Communist world, especially in Eastern Europe

*Subsequent to Alliance  
Balance between  
USSR & China.*

VI. Rumania's brand of national Communism can serve as an object lesson for other socialist countries.

- A. Bucharest has shown that it is possible to gain independence under unfavorable geographic conditions through deft maneuvering, courageous diplomacy, and skillful timing.
- B. Moscow's response thus far has been insufficiently strong to alter this independent course.

*Small nations  
not to be pursued  
large.*

Yesterday announced against NPT draft.

*GNP 2 1/5 bill  
10p = 19.5m  
6 Lio/11*

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## EUROPE

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko has returned to Moscow empty-handed from the abortive special session of the General Assembly, which created new problems for Moscow's Middle East policy. His closed-door efforts to win Arab acceptance of a realistic resolution on Israeli withdrawal from Arab soil succeeded only in straining Soviet relations with the Arabs, especially with the radical Algerians and Syrians.

The furor over defense cuts in West Germany has subsided following Defense Minister Schroeder's public acknowledgment that there will be some annual increase in actual defense spending over the next four years. Previously, Schroeder insisted that the cuts Chancellor Kiesinger had proposed from the original estimates would result in a reduction in defense outlays in 1968, and require a troop reduction of some 60,000 men. Controversy is likely to continue behind the scenes, however, over how economies are to be achieved. A new clash between Kiesinger and Schroeder would not appear to serve either's interests at this time, but the basic rivalry between them could yet bring on a showdown.

De Gaulle's eagerness to attack US power as a danger to the independence of other countries embroiled him in Canada's internal French-English rivalry during his official visit.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] His fit of pique will probably strengthen moderate French Canadian support for the confederation and relieve some of the pressure on Ottawa from Quebec to continue the pro-French policy it has cultivated in recent years.

[REDACTED]

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## RUMANIA REAFFIRMS INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

The Rumanian regime strongly reaffirmed the independent thrust of its foreign policy during the 24-26 July meeting of parliament. The session heard nearly 40 speeches on foreign affairs and interparty relations, including those of party chief Ceausescu, party ideologue Niculescu-Mizil, and Premier Maurer. There was no pulling back from Bucharest's insistence on following a completely independent line.


Ceausescu opened the session with a two-and-a-half-hour tour d'horizon on foreign relations which accentuated positive aims with respect to both the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Stressing that he spoke on behalf of the Rumanian people, government, and party, he attributed Rumania's current freedom of maneuver between East and West to the correctness of the stridently independent guidelines approved at the party's last congress two years ago. He also reiterated his opposition to all military blocs, reaffirmed the regime's policies toward the Middle East, and called for improved relations with the US.

Throughout his speech, Ceausescu dwelt on the theme of the domination of small nations by large ones. Although he carefully hedged his criticism of the latter, there were visible traces of the

historical antipathy between Rumania and Russia. He asserted that the idea of all-powerful big-nation politics "no longer corresponds to the new conditions of social development" and that small nations "refuse any longer to play the role of pawns."

Turning to relations with individual Communist countries, the Rumanian leader expressed esteem for the "Communist party created by Lenin," but he named none of today's Soviet leaders. Although he predictably struck a balanced attitude as between Moscow and Peking, he spoke in friendliest tones of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria of all the Communist states.

The meeting also served notice on the Communist world that Rumania places great importance on a pragmatic interpretation of Communist doctrine. Speaking on 26 July, ideologist Niculescu-Mizil went beyond the standard defense against the criticism that the regime is serving its national interests at the expense of "proletarian internationalism." He stressed for example, that "in general, only life is the supreme judge, only the practical results can confirm the correctness of the political line or stand."


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Developing further the vaguely anti-Soviet undertone apparent in the speeches of Ceau-sescu and Niculescu-Mizil, Premier Maurer launched a strong attack on interference and pressure in the relations between Communist countries. In a reference to Rumania's difficulties with the Soviet Union, he noted that dif-

ferences between Communist parties are not unnatural. "What is un-natural," he said, "is the fact that methods and practices con-tradicting the standards of equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs...should occur in the relationships among the socialist countries." [REDACTED]

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### SOVIET ROCKET FORCES EXERCISE THE BIGGEST EVER

The Soviet Rocket Forces launched five ICBMs almost simultaneously on 20 July in the biggest demonstration to date of their missile strike capability. One of the shots was from the Tyuratam Missile Test Center and the others from operational sites in the Urals and in Siberia. Four of the five launches came within less than a minute, the fifth about four minutes later.

Three of the missiles appar-ently were SS-9s, one an SS-7, and the fifth either an SS-7 or an SS-11. These are the three

major missile systems deployed in the USSR.

The firings apparently were part of an exercise designed to demonstrate the ability of widely scattered missile sites to coor-dinate their activities. They back up the recent public boast of the rocket forces commander, Colonel General Tolubko, that the USSR could launch a number of missiles simultaneously. Simi-lar tests of the command and con-trol capabilities of the force can be expected in the future.

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## SOVIETS UPGRADING AIRBORNE FORCES

The Soviets are making new efforts to improve the capabilities of the airborne element of their ground forces. Apart from seeking the advantages of highly maneuverable ground troops, the USSR probably wants to keep pace with Western developments in this area.

New weapons have been added to the airborne forces inventory, including the air-droppable 16-round rocket launcher first identified in late 1965. Moreover, the Soviets may intend to equip these forces with tactical and air defense missiles which can be transported in the new An-22 aircraft. Frog tactical surface-to-surface missiles and Ganef mobile air-defense missiles with airborne

forces markings were unloaded from An-22s during an air assault demonstration at the recent Moscow air show. This coordinated demonstration also involved a drop of about 1,000 paratroopers, delivery of assault guns in An-12 transports, and the landing of ground troops, assault guns, and conventional and antiaircraft artillery pieces in helicopters.

Airborne forces have been featured in recent parades and exercises. An article in a restricted Soviet periodical last year concluded that a greater proportion of ground troops would be moved by air in future operations and that the number of airborne troops would increase.

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

## *Special Report*

*Impact of Arab-Israeli Conflict on Eastern Europe*

*Romania - pp. 5-6*

~~Secret~~

№ 37

21 July 1967  
No. 0299/67B

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## IMPACT OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT ON EASTERN EUROPE

A deep emotional reaction among the populations of most Eastern European countries has developed because of their regimes and the USSR backing the Arabs against Israel. One effect has been to intensify within many Communist hierarchies long-existing strains deriving from the chronic antisemitism which persists in varying degrees in most of the countries. Popular reactions have been strongly pro-Israeli. This attitude, in the circumstances, also has an anti-Communist quality indicating increased alienation between the rulers and the ruled. Most of the regimes, except Rumania, have followed Moscow's vehement pro-Arab lead with more or less reluctance because of differing factors of national self-interest. Within some of the ruling Communist cliques, the strains between influential Jews and antisemites may have lasting effects on intraparty politics.

### Pro-Israeli Sentiment Versus Antisemitism

The outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities came as a surprise and shock to Eastern European countries. The impact was perhaps the greater because there was no preparatory propaganda campaign to which the populations of these countries have long been accustomed. The most significant result has been the emergence of strong and widespread pro-Israeli sentiment, imbued with antiregime overtones.

This effect has been most marked in three countries with strong traditions of antisemitism, Poland, Hungary, and to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia. This can be partially explained by the close personal ties which still exist between individuals in

these countries and the emigrant survivors of prewar Jewish populations who have gone to Israel and elsewhere in large numbers since World War II. This is especially true of Poland, and to a lesser extent of Hungary, where many of the remaining Jews hold influential positions within the party and state apparatus. In Czechoslovakia, where purges during the Stalinist period swept most Jews out of power, the population's predisposition for Israel as the "underdog" in the conflict was bolstered by an emotional reaction against the party's antisemitic and anti-Zionist past.

Until World II, the bulk of Eastern Europe's Jewish population resided in these three countries and Rumania. Poland had proportionately the largest Jewish minority of any country in the

*Rumania: pp. 5-6*

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world--some 3.5 million representing about ten percent of its population. The socioeconomic competition between the Jews, most of whom belonged to the middle class and the professions, and all the ethnic populations except the Czechs, tended to strengthen antisemitism among the urban elements as well as among the peasantry where it had been prevalent for centuries. Generally, however, most Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, and Rumanians were inclined to view antisemitism as a purely domestic issue, or at most a typical Eastern European one, and not as a feature of the world-wide Zionist question.

Antisemitism in these countries was successfully exploited by the Nazi regime during World War II. Most Eastern Europeans came to realize, however, that they ranked little higher than the Jews on the Nazi racial scale. This feeling was later augmented by sympathy developing for the Jewish victims of Nazi extermination policies, especially in Poland, where the role of Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in 1944 drew admiration.

The virtual destruction of Jewish minorities in Eastern Europe during the war created something akin to neurosis among most of the non-Jewish populations there. One ingredient in the conflict of sentiment that persists is a sense of relief that the prewar social and economic strains arising from the existence of sizeable Jewish minorities had been eliminated. Along with this, however, there is a mixture of

guilt about the past and of respect for the survivors of European Jewry who are successfully developing a new homeland against great odds. On the other hand, the relatively high proportion of Jews within the Communist leaderships of Eastern Europe at one time or another during the postwar period has tended more than any other factor to perpetuate antisemitism, even though most of the Jews who survived the post-Stalin purges and who remain in the ruling cliques tend to be moderates.

Over most of Eastern Europe, however, the antisemitism directed at Jews who helped impose unpopular Communist policies at home does not extend to Israel itself. Strong popular admiration for Israel as a state has thus emerged. Many Eastern Europeans identify and sympathize with Israel's search for security, the nonrecognition of its borders by its neighbors, and its inclination to make territorial adjustments. These facets of Israel's history, as well as the presence within its frontiers of hostile populations are similar to, or reminiscent of, the post - World War II experience of many Eastern European countries, as for example Poland and Czechoslovakia. The resulting sense of understanding has tempered the antisemitic character of public attitudes.

Since the late 1950s these popular sympathies seem also to have been reinforced by the increasingly antisemitic and anti-Israeli policies of the Soviet Union, climaxed by what most

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Eastern Europeans viewed as Moscow's crude pro-Arab power play since May of this year. The Soviet propaganda offensive following the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the willingness of most Eastern European regimes to parrot such a line, appears to have engendered a strong feeling that "my enemy's enemy is my friend" among large segments of the Jewish and non-Jewish population.

In East Germany, where sensitivity to antisemitism is widespread, the population appears to have generally avoided the racial aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict. There is some evidence, however, that the majority of East Germans--like other Eastern Europeans--rejected their regime's assertions that the Arab-Israeli confrontation was a class war of "progressives against imperialist reaction."

As in other countries of the area, such propaganda merely promoted the belief that the real issue was the onslaught of Communist-supported dictatorships against a small, democratic state. East Germany's propaganda has also tended to strengthen popular fears over the implications for Eastern Europe of Moscow's stand, including a possibility of direct military involvement. When the extent of the Israeli victory became clear, there was a general tendency to question the value of Soviet support for the Arabs and even the worth of Soviet commitments in general. There is no information on popular reaction to the crisis in Bulgaria,

where prior to World War II, antisemitism was not a serious problem.

#### Regime Reactions and Motivations

With the exception of Rumania, the Eastern European regimes allied with the USSR supported Moscow's strongly pro-Arab position, and by 12 June had broken diplomatic relations with Israel. The convictions behind this support varied in intensity, as did the motivations. Apart from Yugoslavia, most of the Eastern European regimes followed Moscow's lead because of their alliances with the Soviet Union. The reactions of the regimes most dependent on Soviet military and political guarantees, i.e., East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were especially vehement. The leaders of these regimes appear to have been convinced that the Arab-Israeli conflict was merely part of a concerted political, military, and ideological offensive by the West against Soviet prestige, designed to exploit growing diversity within the Communist bloc.

Yugoslavia's Tito apparently shared this fear. His decision to associate himself with Moscow was probably also strongly motivated by concern over the future of his ties with Cairo. There is evidence, however, that the public and many high party and government leaders feared that Belgrade's signature on the 9 June bloc declaration in Moscow foreshadowed closer relations with the USSR. Tito seems to have been sufficiently concerned by the prevalence of such ideas to

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think it wise to emphasize in a speech on 1 July that no return to the bloc was contemplated and that Yugoslavia would remain independent and nonaligned.

The degree of support most other Eastern European regimes gave Moscow's line has varied, depending generally on the level of pro-Israeli sentiment among the people and within the parties. In Poland, the official reaction has been vehement largely because of the sensitivity of Gomulka and others in the leadership (whose wives are Jewish) to domestic and foreign Communist criticism of the "excessive" numbers of Jews within the party and state apparatus. It must have been embarrassing to the regime that the majority of Poland's ambassadors to the Arab countries are of Jewish origin. Gomulka's warnings on 19 June to influential Jewish elements against "double loyalties" reflected this sensitivity, which was evidently enhanced by the private "victory" celebrations which many prominent Jews in Poland reportedly held following Israel's victory.

A topical joke circulating in Warsaw concerns a telegram allegedly sent by Israeli Premier Eshkol to Gomulka after Poland broke diplomatic relations, which read simply, "Unless you rescind your decision, we shall withdraw all our people from your party and government."

Differences over the regime's anti-Israeli measures were probably widespread within the Polish

party both before and after the "summit" meeting of Eastern European leaders in Moscow on 9-10 June. Although severance of diplomatic relations with Israel was probably decided at the meeting, Poland did not take this step until 12 June, and was the last Eastern European country to do so. Moreover, on Polish initiative, two Israeli and two Polish diplomats remained at their posts without diplomatic status until 4 July, when the continued presence of the Israeli officials in Warsaw became untenable.

As in other Eastern European countries, internal differences within the Polish party were probably strengthened by arguments of ranking foreign trade officials who feared the impact of the crisis on the regime's commercial relations with Jewish businessmen in Western countries, especially in the United States. A similar situation probably exists in most other countries of the area, all of which have quantitatively small but well-established trade relations with Israel which they do not want to jeopardize. Polish-Israeli trade, for example, has so far remained at near normal levels, and commercial representatives of both countries apparently have remained at their posts.

Similar indications of dissent beneath the surface have developed in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where elements of some strength within the party were, if not in total sympathy with

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the Israeli cause, at least opposed to unquestioning support of Moscow's pro-Arab policy. A vehemently anti-Israeli editorial published in the 15 June issue of the main Czech party newspaper was said to have caused a heated central committee debate, and drew censure by the party and a warning to the editorial board. It is likely that the central committee was concerned lest the zeal of the press in vindicating Prague's anti-Israeli policy be construed by the public as signaling a return to the neurotically antisemitic line of the early 1950s.

In Hungary, similar evidence of intraparty dissension has appeared, although the reports are less specific. Differences between Jews and antisemites within the party and elsewhere in public life were sharpened, and special party meetings reportedly were held in many parts of the country to counter pro-Israeli sentiment. Probably as a response to this, various senior regime spokesmen, including First Secretary Janos Kadar, issued a series of warnings in late June against the excesses of either anti- or philo-semitism, designed to prevent racial overtones from overshadowing the "class nature" of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Differences of opinion also existed among East European officials attending the UN General Assembly session. Many of these were said to be piqued at the failure of the Soviet mission to supply adequate information and

coordination during the proceedings. In private, some officials showed relative moderation and realism, while others confined themselves to parroting the regime line. Similar ambivalent reactions have been noted among some Eastern European UN correspondents, several of whom courted regime sanctions by expressing their opposition to official policy by deliberately failing to file stories.

Albania has also reacted harshly, but the regime nevertheless appears to be cautious. Its people, although 70-percent Moslem, are indifferent. Tirana's alliance with Peking--whose pro-Arab but anti-Soviet position it shares--has predictably led it to charge US-Soviet collusion against the Arab world.

#### Rumania--A Special Case

Alone among Eastern European countries, the Rumanian regime formally declared its neutrality in the crisis, refused to sign the bloc statement on 9 June following the Moscow meeting which it attended, and failed to break diplomatic relations with Israel. These moves once again illustrated the confidence of the Bucharest leadership in its national Communist point of view, and the subordination of both foreign and domestic factors to a policy of self-interest.

The domestic factors which might have been expected to affect Bucharest's policy on the crisis are no less sensitive and

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paradoxical than those in most other Eastern European countries. Rumania traditionally has been among the most antisemitic nations in the area, and party chief Ceausescu reportedly shares the national prejudice. The pre-Ceausescu leadership in 1959 was the last in Eastern Europe to liberalize Jewish emigration to Israel. Nevertheless, the present regime's policy on this score has been among the most restrictive. Since 1955 Jewish membership on the party central committee has been whittled from over 15 percent to about six percent. The proportion of Jews in the total population is one percent.

Despite the prevalence of prejudice, however, the regime's policy has evolved from other sources and is consistent both with its drive for independence from Moscow and its recently augmented economic relations with Israel. Moreover, with its sense of national sovereignty, the Ceausescu leadership probably also noted the parallels between Israel's isolation among the Arabs and Rumania's already marked isolation within the Communist bloc.

Although Bucharest's declaration of 10 June called for the "withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories," it did not assign responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities. The Rumanian statement also sharply conflicted with that of its allies by calling for direct Arab-Israeli negotiations. Most other Eastern

European leaders are also on record in support of Israel's right to statehood, but Ceausescu's 17 June public statement to this effect was the most emphatic and unequivocal.

The economic motives underlying Rumania's neutral stand are underscored by its 1967-70 trade, technical, and scientific cooperation agreement with Israel signed on 14 April--the first such formal accord concluded with Israel by any Communist State. The agreement calls for further development of mutual trade, which had already more than doubled during the 1960-66 period. For example, commercial exchanges in 1967 are to be double those in 1966, according to a Bucharest radio Yiddish-language broadcast beamed to North America on 5 June--the opening day of Arab-Israeli hostilities.

Popular reaction in Rumania to the regime's Middle East policy probably is in broad accord with the official position. Past regime actions reflecting Rumanian nationalism and independence generally have had the effect of broadening the party's base of popular support.

#### Outlook

The Middle East policy Moscow has promoted with most of the regimes in Eastern Europe raises another major obstacle to contacts with the West and strengthens the hand of hard-line elements opposed

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to expansion of such ties. Further unspecified commitments by the Eastern Europeans, including supplying arms to the Arabs, apparently were made at the bloc meeting on 11-12 July in Budapest. Such aid to Arab countries could pose additional economic strains, especially on Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and probably East Germany.

The course of Rumanian policy will clearly increase its isolation in Eastern Europe, and add to existing strains in its relations with Moscow. Rumania did not attend the meeting in Budapest. Yugoslavia's Tito, now committed to joint bloc action, may find it increasingly difficult to reconcile this position with his nonaligned policy and to forestall opposition within his own leadership.

In terms of internal party repercussions, the Polish regime appears to be the most susceptible. There, the hard-line, antisemitic faction of the party may seek to use the current situation to intensify its long-standing efforts to diminish Jewish influence, especially in the Foreign Ministry where such influence is dominant. Whether this faction, whose strength had been waning in recent months, will now be more successful than in the past remains to be seen. In the absence of suitable replacements for Jews within the top and middle echelon of the leadership, it is unlikely that a sweeping purge is imminent. Some dismissals and reshuffling may occur, but Gomulka's propensity for maintaining a political balance within the regime suggests that such

changes would not automatically mean a rise in the power of the hard-line, antisemitic elements.

Similar problems may arise in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, although in view of the relatively small number of Jews in the Czech party, differences may hinge more on substantive policy issues than on the question of antisemitism. Probably least affected in the long run will be the regimes in Bulgaria and East Germany. Antisemitism is weak in Bulgaria whose tangible contributions to bloc pro-Arab policies are potentially small. In East Germany, the ability of the Ulbricht regime to smother domestic opposition has been demonstrated in the past.

The recent crisis may have a lasting impact of widening the gulf between the peoples of Eastern Europe and the ruling Communist cliques. In most of the countries whose regimes have supported Moscow's pro-Arab stand, the effort to demonstrate bloc "unity" could have effects counter to party interests and could promote popular nationalistic tendencies. This is likely to be mirrored within the respective parties themselves, where strains may increase between elements who had hoped for a further loosening of Moscow's influence and those who have sought to stem the trend toward diversity. Such differences may, in turn, have potential long-range effects on old controversies and party factional disputes over issues unrelated to the Middle East crisis. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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ALGERIA:  
— BOUMEDIENE

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*17 and  
Jenagan*

8 August 1967

DDI BRIEFING NOTES FOR  
SENATORIAL DINNERALGERIA

- I. Algeria's present role as one of the most radical of the Arab governments, with President Boumediene insisting on a jihad or holy war against Israel, offers nothing that is completely new.
- A. In the recent past, Algeria has had its moderate moments under Boumediene, and it has stressed its bid for African leadership when relations with other Arabs turned sour.
- B. But Algeria was radical, revolutionary, Arab-oriented, pro-Soviet, and anti-U.S. under Ben Bella, before Boumediene overthrew him in <sup>1963</sup>1953.
1. And if any of these facets have been muted since then, it has been largely tactical, transient, and temporary.
  2. Boumediene's initial moderate course may have been dictated in part by coolness and suspicion on the part of Ben Bella's friends. By early this year, he and his country were back in the mainstream of extremism.

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- II. Houari Boumediene, by training a school-teacher, is president of the Algerian Revolutionary Council-- the group of 24 or 25 men, with an army majority, which establishes Algerian policy.
- A. He is President of the council of ministers, which administers the country.
- B. He is also commander of all military forces, and minister of defense.

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6.2(d)

- III. Boumediene made his way to power through the army, and it is both the principal source, and the prime beneficiary, of his strength.
- A. So far, whatever the political or economic problems, Boumediene has done his utmost to see to it that the army's needs and desires are satisfied.
- B. The only political party, the National Liberation Front, is not a particularly

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effective instrument. It was still in the process of post-independence re-organization when Boumediene's coup called for still further reorganization.

- C. Labor and student groups are potential opposition, but both enjoy privileged positions, after the army. Organized labor is particularly privileged in a country where nearly half the labor force is unemployed.
- D. There is considerable opposition, but it is uncoordinated, fragmented, leaderless, and as a result inactive. Many of the politicians who were prominent before independence appear to be marking time, hoping that when some other force ousts Boumediene, they will be called to power by popular acclamation.

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This is to be expected in

a country where independence is still recent enough so that men are classified according to where they were, and what roles they played, during the revolution.

1. The men most frequently named as possible rivals to Boumediene are Colonel Tahar Z'Biri, the chief of staff, and Colonel Said Abid,

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commander of the Second Military Region,  
centered in Algiers.

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*has surrounded himself with a small*  
Boumediene ~~is alleged preference for a~~  
number of French-trained officers who  
have had long experience in the French  
Army.

3. Security and stability are not such that  
you could rule out the elimination of  
Boumediene, but there does not appear to  
be anybody else available at present who  
can challenge his authority, rally equivalent  
backing, or--more to the point--who is  
willing to take over Boumediene's respon-  
sibilities.

IV. Since the Arab-Israeli war, the posture of Boumediene  
and his regime occasioned speculation that he is  
bidding to take over Nasir's mantle of Arab leadership--  
Uncompromising, inflexible, determined to carry on  
the war against the Infidel alone if necessary.

A. Actually, before the fighting started Boumediene's  
inclination was to avoid involvement, although he  
was persuaded to pledge token forces and some  
equipment.

- (a dozen light bombers,)*  
1. He sent Nasir some fighters, and some tanks,  
which the Soviets are replacing, and there

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are still apparently some Algerian troops within gunshot of the Israelis along the Suez Canal, but the actual Algerian participation on the battlefield never quite caught up with their propaganda.

- B. Boumediene might aspire to Arab leadership now despite his use of the "cult of personality" charge to overthrow Ben Bella, but it seems highly unlikely that the Middle Eastern Arabs would respond
- [REDACTED]

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1. The Soviets do not appear to have given Boumediene any encouragement to bid for leadership.
- [REDACTED]

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3. On the basis of past performance, Algeria has not demonstrated that it could take and hold the leadership of even the less advanced radical regimes of Africa.

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

*Algerian Involvement in the Middle East Crisis*

~~Secret~~

6

14 June 1967  
No. 0655/67



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
14 June 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Algerian Involvement in the Middle East Crisis

1. The degree of Algerian involvement in the Middle East crisis--the rapid sending of troops and aircraft to Egypt, the break in relations with the US, and the "never say die" attitude on continuing the battle--appears to be largely an emotional response of a normally practical people. There are several factors, however, which almost demanded of Algeria the response its government has made.

2. First of all, Algeria regards itself as a Moslem-Arab state, socialist oriented and anti-Western; it has developed strong military and economic ties with the Soviet Union. It has aligned itself with the "progressive" Arab states--Egypt, Syria, and to a lesser extent Iraq--and considers itself a leader in the "third world." It has a revolutionary outlook similar to Nasir's, is hyper-suspicious of the West, and, in its own eyes, is ready to come to the aid of those endangered by the Western imperialists. Moreover, many Algerian leaders are convinced that the "imperialists" are out to get the Algerian regime, and their suspicions are fed by US support of Morocco and Tunisia, and by fears of a US-instigated encirclement.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence following informal discussions with analysts in the Office of National Estimates and in the Clandestine Services.

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3. Popular sentiment for the Arabs and pressures within the Boumediene regime itself were very strong. Even before the hostilities, there was evidence that Boumediene, frustrated perhaps with economic problems at home, was turning to a more adventurous external policy similar to that of Ben Bella's. [REDACTED] a more activist role in the liberation of southern Africa [REDACTED]

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4. Algeria, unlike the other two North African states, had nothing to lose by offending the US. Both Morocco and Tunisia are closely aligned with the US and want to keep those ties. US-Algerian relations, however, have been at a low ebb for some time, and, shortly before hostilities, long drawn-out negotiations over Algerian requests for US wheat--about the only American aid to Algeria--failed, possibly giving Boumediene a further sense of kinship with Nasir.

5. Long-held suspicions of the West also probably are playing a role in the propaganda battle. The atmosphere in Algeria was and is ready-made to accept Cairo radio's stories. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Boumediene's speech on 11 June is replete with charges against the "imperialists" and suggestions that Israel could not have done as well without aid from the US and UK.

6. The Algerians also probably wanted to show that they could fight. They consider themselves rough and tough and were reportedly extremely angered at Cairo's decision not to fight on. They were stunned that Egypt gave up in four days, when they--in order to win their independence--fought the superior French for seven years. The Algerians may even have some ambitions to play a more leading role

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in the Middle East in the wake of the Egyptian debacle.

7. There is no evidence that the Soviets egged on Algeria, and the Soviet push for a cease-fire would tend to discount any speculation that they did. The Algerians, however, because of their heavy dependence on the Soviets for arms and economic assistance, obviously are vulnerable to any pressures the Soviets choose to exert.

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ALGERIA v. —  
MOROCCO

Approved for Release: 2022/01/04 C02887287

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8 August 1967

DDI BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER

ALGERIA - MOROCCO

I. Relations between Algeria and Morocco are dominated by two elements of friction: Moroccan territorial claims to the potentially rich mineral resources around Tindouf in extreme southwestern Algeria; and Algeria's massive build-up of Soviet weapons since 1953, when Moroccan forces outfought the Algerian army in a brief border war. The two elements are, of course, simply opposite sides of the same issue.

A. Morocco has pursued its territorial claims in the United Nations and in the Organization of African Unity, but the Algerians justify their military build-up on the fear that Morocco will ultimately attempt to seize the disputed territory by force.

1. The Algerians assert--and are inclined to believe--that Morocco and Tunisia have secret alliances with the United States. Their line is that U.S. policy is to destroy all Socialist regimes.

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2. Therefore, the Algerians argue, they must have enough military force to deter an attack on Algeria by Morocco and Tunisia with the support of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.
- B. The Moroccans for their part fear that the Algerians will attack them, either to put an end to Morocco's territorial claims, or as a deliberate move by Boumediene to divert Algerian attention from domestic difficulties.
1. The Moroccans are looking for modern arms, particularly aircraft and armor, to offset the Algerian build-up.
- C. The disparity is huge. Algeria has 124 jet fighter aircraft to Morocco's 5, and 358 tanks to Morocco's 75.
1. Most of Algeria's modern armaments come from the Soviet Union. Morocco would prefer arms from Free World sources, but has apparently been offered weapons by the Soviet Union.
- II. Neither side appears to have made preparations for imminent attack along the border, despite the tension.
- A. There is little military build-up on either side of the frontier.
- B. Both have built new roads, however, which would be useful for military purposes.
1. The Algerians have taken over military

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facilities vacated by the French at Bechar early this summer, and have built several airfields to support border action.

2. The airfields do not yet have the P.O.L. supplies or other support facilities which would be necessary for military use.

(Comparison of selected military items, next page)

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## SELECTED ITEMS OF COMPARISON

	Algeria	Morocco
Jet fighters	124*	5
Light bombers	33**	0
Transports	7	15
Tanks	358***	75
Patrol boats	17	3
Army strength	61,000	49,100
Air	1,900	2,660
Navy	1,500	1,100
	<u>64,400</u>	<u>52,860</u>

\* figure predates transfers to UAR.

All or part of the 41 transferred may already have  
been replaced by the USSR.

\*\* 12 transferred to UAR.

\*\*\* 51 transferred to UAR.


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

*Frictions in the Maghreb*

Special Report  
WEEKLY REVIEW

~~Secret~~

No 467

16 June 1967  
SC No. 00774/67A

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## FRICTIONS IN THE MAGHREB

The problems and frictions that have developed among the three former French-ruled North African territories of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have for the moment been beclouded by the cry for Arab unity in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The issues have not disappeared, however, and the aftermath of the hostilities may in fact heighten them. Although intellectuals in all three countries continue to toy with the idea of Maghreb unity or federation, the problems that have persisted since independence in their relationships with each other, with their Arab and African neighbors, and with the Western powers preclude the development of any meaningful collaboration among them.

Background

A deceptive aura of unity based on common heritage and mutual interests and goals surrounds the Maghreb--Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. All are Arab and Muslim in language and tradition, with a veneer of French culture and philosophy; all are emerging nations, striving to develop their backward--largely agricultural--economies and eliminate illiteracy, poverty, and disease. All are bound closely to France, their former colonial master, all have sentimental ties with other Arab states, and all seek to expand horizons in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The three are also ambitious for recognition not only as leaders in Africa but in the whole underdeveloped world as well.


Yet the members of the Maghreb do not sing the same tune,

as is evident in their divergent means of expressing "full support" of Arab solidarity in the present Arab-Israeli confrontation. In fact, each assiduously undercuts the others to promote its own interests while at the same time giving lip service to the concept of Maghreb unity.

Early Attempts at  
Unified Action

Long before the first two of the French-ruled North African countries recovered independence--Morocco on 2 March and Tunisia on 20 March 1956--North Africans collaborated to scheme about throwing off French control. The earliest of these councils probably were "bull sessions" of Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian students, principally in Paris but also in Cairo and other centers. After World War II, when Egypt gave sanctuary to Abdelkrim, the legendary

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hero of the Rif rebellion of the 1920s, Cairo became the site for hatching North African intrigues. But Abdelkrim failed to supply the dynamic leadership needed to mold the individual nationalist groups into an organization capable of producing union and action, and the nationalist politicians in Cairo soon fell to bickering among themselves.

In April 1958, although Algeria was not yet free, an attempt was made to lay the foundations for a Maghreb union or federation. Under the auspices of the Moroccan Istiqlal Party, representatives of Istiqlal, the Tunisian Neo-Destour Party, and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) met in Tangier, Morocco. A Mauritanian observer also attended this meeting. Later on, Libyan representatives were invited to participate in Maghrebian meetings. The hard core, however, remains the three former French-held areas.

At Tangier, the Moroccans committed themselves to provide assistance to the FLN more on a par with what the Tunisians were already supplying, while the FLN postponed its plan to establish a provisional government. All agreed to exert every possible pressure to prevent France from marketing Saharan crude oil.

This apparent harmony was disrupted less than five months later when the Algerians launched their provisional government in Cairo without the courtesy of notifying their Moroccan and Tunisian partners in advance. Sub-

sequently, while the Algerians were still fighting the French, Tunisian President Bourguiba angered the Algerians when he permitted France to construct a pipeline across Tunisian territory in order to move Saharan crude oil from Edjeleh to the Mediterranean. The growing number of Algerian refugees in both Morocco and Tunisia also were constant sources of friction, as were the free-wheeling activities of Algerian troops based in both border areas. Both Rabat and, particularly, Tunis began to regard their armed rebel guests as threats to their own regimes.

#### Algerian Independence

When Algeria achieved independence in July 1962 and the Algerian refugees and troops had departed Morocco and Tunisia, new irritants prevented the development of harmonious relationships among the three governments. Morocco had remained a conservative monarchy. Tunisia had become a moderate socialist republic. Both, however, were alarmed at the development of a radically revolutionary-socialist regime in Algeria. King Hassan and President Bourguiba, having supported moderates such as Ferhat Abbas, the first head of the Provisional Algerian Government, came to distrust the erratic and flamboyant Algerian President Ben Bella and his growing group of leftist and Marxist advisers.

The feeling was mutual: Ben Bella blamed the Moroccans for "betraying" him in 1956, thereby permitting the French to capture

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and imprison him and some other Algerian leaders. Moreover, he sharply resented Bourguiba's efforts to counsel and guide him in the intricacies of establishing a new government. There was also some bureaucratic dislocation in Tunis and Rabat occasioned by the withdrawal of experienced Algerian personnel who had been working in the Tunisian and Moroccan civil service in order to become the nucleus of an independent Algerian civil service.

Ben Bella also quickly moved close to Nasir, who was constantly feuding with Bourguiba and had small regard for Hassan in particular and the Moroccans in general. In an effort to gain ground with Algiers, which already was planning a grandiose reception for Nasir, Hassan craftily managed to upstage the Egyptian leader and be the first chief of state given a state reception by independent Algeria. Having been caught off balance, Ben Bella was in an embarrassing position vis-a-vis Nasir and in the long run, Hassan's ploy redounded to his own disadvantage.

Meanwhile, Hassan--who fancied himself a protégé of De Gaulle, while the blunt and undiplomatic Bourguiba was in the French President's disfavor--soon was acutely aware that French relations with Algeria were to be, in De Gaulle's mind, the model for a relationship which would appeal to other underdeveloped areas. Both Tunisia and Morocco found French assistance to them curtailed while that to Algeria seemed to them surprisingly generous. Moreover, when Algeria nationalized French farm-

lands, both Hassan and Bourguiba were under strong domestic pressure to do likewise. After capitulating to this pressure, however, their governments fell into new difficulties with France whereas Algerian-French relations were not seriously affected by Algiers' land seizures. Algeria remains the favorite son in French eyes to this day.

#### Border Problems

Border problems continue to be a main irritant in Maghreb relations. On gaining independence both Morocco and Tunisia claimed territory that France was continuing to administer as part of Algeria. Pressed by nationalist extremists who demanded large areas of southwestern Algeria as well as all of Mauritania and Spanish Sahara, the Moroccan Government soon after Algerian independence broached this subject to Algeria, citing a commitment of Ferhat Abbas to negotiate Moroccan claims after Algerian independence. Ben Bella categorically refused to discuss the question, claiming that Algeria's borders were not subject to negotiation and citing a provision in the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to support this thesis. Although Tunisia's claims were extremely minor compared with those of Morocco, the Algerians also would make no concessions to Tunis.

Numerous border incidents--illegal crossings, banditry, movements of migrant workers, and seasonal migrations of nomadic tribes and their herds--caused many problems for all three governments.

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Tempers in Algiers and Rabat rose in mid-October 1963 when an Algerian patrol clashed with a Moroccan auxiliary unit at a Saharan waterhole they had been sharing. The conflict quickly escalated, and the Moroccan Army--benefiting from air support while the few Algerian MIGs, loaned by Nasir, were stranded at a French-controlled field near Bechar--clearly outfought the Algerian troops.

A cease-fire, supervised by Mali and Ethiopia, was arranged on 1 November and the two forces were separated by a narrow buffer zone that each continues to keep under close surveillance lest the other occupy its strong points. The seven-member OAU commission established to determine the responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict and to recommend a settlement of the border dispute has served mainly to mark time. Having already met in 11 sessions, usually at the request of the Moroccans, it hears arguments counterarguments, and rebuttals with little likelihood of reaching a decision. This Algerian military "defeat" is sometimes cited as justification for the subsequent Algerian arms build-up and sustains Moroccan suspicions that one day Algeria intends to "get even."

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[redacted] were Algeria to negotiate the restoration to Morocco of Tindouf, more extensive Moroccan claims would be dropped, but the Algerians remain adamant in refusing to negotiate and are taking steps to develop the region.

Moroccan policy with regard to Spanish Sahara--Rabat has publicly supported independence for the area while privately seeking to annex it--has contributed to Morocco's isolation from its neighbors. Consultations among Spain, Mauritania, and Algeria have led Morocco to suspect that it is being surrounded by a Madrid-Nouakchott-Algiers axis.

Tunisian territorial claims center on a wedge of desert along Tunisia's southwestern border. This issue became acute after a Tunisian-Italian drilling team in 1964 discovered exploitable quantities of oil very close to the disputed area. Some weeks ago, an Algerian company also had an oil strike within a few miles [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] of the Tunisian well. Rumors of clashes between drilling personnel and of the concentration of troops on both sides of the border are probably exaggerated. A joint Algerian-Tunisian military team has visited the area to direct the placement of border markers in the vicinity of oil drilling operations. Tunisia has not, however, abandoned its demand for the negotiation of the undefined portion of its southwestern border.

#### Maghrebian Dissidents

Another issue contributing to Maghrebian tension in the sanctuary each of the three countries gives to antiregime dissidents from the others.

Since Algerian independence, Moroccan and Tunisian dissidents have gravitated to Algiers, where they have found some encouragement

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and assistance for their effort to undermine the two moderate regimes. Ben Bella refused to extradite three or four Tunisians who fled to Algeria after the discovery late in 1962 of a plot against Bourguiba's life. Algeria also openly encouraged the activities of a handful of Youssefists--supporters of Bourguiba's murdered rival, Salah ben Youssef. Before the overthrow of Ben Bella two years ago, Algeria not only had established training camps, but had armed and equipped some 200 Moroccan military defectors. The Algerians also encouraged the Moroccan left-wing opposition, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), granting asylum and diplomatic facilities to UNFP leader Mehdi ben Barka--who was under a Moroccan death sentence--and other Moroccan leftist refugees.

Boumediene, on coming to power in 1965, is reported to have closed down the Moroccan dissident training facilities, although he has not expelled the dissidents themselves. He also has snubbed the Tunisian exiles, most recently in connection with the holding in Algiers of an Arab socialist seminar, to which he had invited representatives from the ruling Tunisian Destourian Socialist Party (the present name for the Neo-Destour) over the objections of the leading Youssefist.

For their part, Morocco and Tunisia have irritated Algiers by receiving Algerian opposition leaders and for reportedly encouraging them to resolve their

differences. Rabat angered Boumediene last January when the Moroccan Government facilitated, if not sponsored, a state funeral for Algerian oppositionist Mohamed Khider and openly conferred then and later with other Algerian exiles.

#### Soviet Arms Build-up in Algeria

Both Morocco and Tunisia have been increasingly alarmed as their larger neighbor Algeria continues to build up its inventory of sophisticated Soviet weapons. Bourguiba particularly, fearing that Nasir will quickly overrun Libya when the present aged Libyan ruler dies, views himself as wedged in between an antagonistic Algeria and a hostile Egypt. Hassan, as his relations with France deteriorated following the disappearance in Paris of Mehdi ben Barka, has found himself isolated.

Both Bourguiba and Hassan therefore have moved closer to the US and have pressed for military assistance above and beyond existing US programs. They have also attempted to secure additional weapons in Europe. While in Moscow last October, Hassan obtained some spare parts for the obsolescent Soviet equipment he had acquired in 1961 and 1962 as well as some small arms for his auxiliary forces.

Although the Algerian threat has impelled the Moroccan and Tunisian governments to collaborate to a degree, certain basic divergencies between these two

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pro-Western moderates will continue to prevent the development of a truly warm relationship. In 1960, Morocco resented the fact that Tunisia recognized Mauritanian independence, and relations between Rabat and Tunis were virtually nonexistent for several years thereafter. Hassan, moreover, is constantly offended by Bourguiba's patronizing and undiplomatic methods. Bourguiba, in turn, has vainly sought staunch Moroccan support for his attempts to develop an alignment of moderate Arab governments as a counterforce to the Arab radicals, for Hassan sees himself instead as a mediator in the quarrels between the two groups.

Boumediene, for his part, denies any aggressive intention toward his neighbors and claims that the modern arms Algeria has acquired are merely to protect its extended frontiers. Nevertheless, he has made it clear that he would retaliate with force were Morocco or Tunisia to attempt to wrest disputed territory from Algeria. Algeria also chose to misinterpret Hassan's appeal on 28 February 1967 to the UN secretary general to take steps toward a reduction of armaments in the Maghreb, countering that the OAU was already attempting to resolve Morocco's territorial dispute with Algeria.

#### Relations With the US

Both Morocco's growing friendship with the US and Tu-

nisia's special relationship as a recipient of a long-term commitment for American economic assistance cause additional frictions in the Maghreb. Many Algerian officials assume that American capitalism seeks the destruction of all socialism, particularly Algeria's revolutionary brand. Fearful of a US-backed Moroccan-Tunisian encirclement, they give credence to rumors of the consummation of alliances and the establishment of military bases in Morocco and Tunisia.

When a Florida shipbuilding firm was negotiating with the Tunisians to establish a ship repair facility near Bizerte, the Algerian Government readily believed that Tunisia was providing a base for the Sixth Fleet despite repeated denials by American and Tunisian officials. The Algerians also assumed, when a contract was signed for the construction of an international airport at the site of the former US base at Nouasseur, Morocco, that the US was reactivating the installation.

The Algerians also resent the fact that the US has not pressed large-scale development projects on them and they make unfavorable comparisons between American aid to Algeria--even though immediately after independence the US fed up to half of the Algerian population for many months--with American assistance to Moroccan and Tunisian industry.

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Attitudes Toward  
Arab-Israeli Conflict

In the early days of the present Arab-Israeli confrontation, all three Maghreb governments pledged full support to Nasir, and Tunisia, which formally broke with Cairo in October 1966 after 18 months of de facto rupture, resumed relations. There was a sharp divergence, however, in the degree and amount of support each gave to the Arab cause.

Algeria, as a brother progressive socialist regime, pledged "all-out" assistance to Nasir and, if necessary, a "fight to the death." Algiers sent troops and jet aircraft, and quickly followed Nasir in breaking relations with the US; however, at least some Algerian officials are skeptical of Nasir's charges that the US aided Israel and were prepared to accept US denials. The Algerians reacted to early Egyptian reverses by characterizing the Egyptian soldiers as cowards and were eager for Algerian troops to avenge Arab honor. Subsequently, they have indicated some disillusionment with the lack of Soviet support for the Arabs.

Although King Hassan sent troops to Egypt immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, there are indications that this was not a wholehearted commitment and that he probably preferred they not be engaged in battle. The Moroccan foreign minister has assured the American Embassy that Morocco will

not break relations with the US. Moroccan authorities have taken precautions to prevent public disorder of any kind, but especially against the US, UK, or the Moroccan Jewish minority. Rabat also labeled as "interference" in Moroccan internal affairs an Algerian radiobroadcast urging Moroccans to sabotage the "American bases at Kenitra and Nouasseur."

Bourguiba offered troops to Nasir, but did not send them out of the country. He went through the motions of expressing solidarity with the Arabs and denouncing Israel--indeed, he could have done no less in the face of the strong popular emotion generated by the outbreak of hostilities. He has privately reiterated his friendship for the US, however, and stated that he would not break relations.

Outlook

The three governments did collaborate to some extent during the Arab-Israeli crisis--Algeria offered transit facilities to Moroccan troops, and Tunis provided transit stops for both Moroccan and Algerian planes and troops--but the prospects for a really amicable relationship seem slight so long as the political orientations of the three diverge so sharply and the military disparity remains so profound. The Israeli military victory and the posthostilities period of recrimination seem certain to add to the existing frictions.

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Some small progress may continue in purely administrative and economic spheres, such as the technical committees now working on standardizing postal and customs procedures. In addition, some lip service probably will still be rendered by all

three to the concept of Maghrebian unity. But larger economic projects such as a proposed Maghrebian airline and the joint development of basic industries and resources seem likely to founder on basic political incompatibility. [REDACTED]  
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NORTH KOREA

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No Foreign Dissem

8 August 1967

DDI BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR SENATORIAL DINNERNORTH KOREAN INFILTRATION

- I. In Korea this summer, armed harassment and agent infiltration by the North against South Korea is at an all-time high.
- A. The Communist activity so far does not suggest an intention to open a diversionary "second front" for the Vietnamese war at this time.
- B. It is, however, apparently intended to show support for Hanoi, and discourage the deployment of additional R.O.K. troops to South Vietnam, while expanding subversion and aggravating political tensions in South Korea.
- II. The armed incursions across the Demilitarized Line by North Koreans showed a sharp rise last October, but subsided into the usual midwinter lull when the snow and the lack of foliage made cover and concealment difficult.
- A. With the first good spring weather, the North Korean forays rose sharply again.
- B. By early August, there had been more than 280 incidents between United Nations Command troops

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and the North Koreans--280 so far in 1967, compared to 44 all last year, 55 in 1965, and 32 in 1964.

1. In this year's incidents, the North Koreans have lost about 61 killed, the South Koreans 27, and the U.S. six.

C. Some of the increase in incidents reported may be attributable to increased patrolling along the DMZ, and greater alertness by the U.S. and South Korean troops.

1. Nevertheless, South Korean leaders are showing considerable concern over improving their capabilities to cope with infiltration, as a result of the Communist aggressiveness.

III. The North Koreans have also stepped up the infiltration of heavily armed agent teams into the interior of South Korea by sea. (*17 teams infiltrated since May*)

A. We estimate that there are now at least 12 such teams, of seven to eight men each, operating in remote eastern and southern areas. In 73 clashes with agent teams, the South Koreans have killed <sup>89</sup>61 and captured <sup>54</sup>4, but 38 members of South Korean security forces have been killed.

1. Captured agents say their mission is to determine the feasibility of establishing

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guerrilla bases in the South and recruiting sympathizers.

2. The teams, composed largely of company-grade officers, have limited funds and supplies. They are supposed to live off the country, and return to North Korea in the fall.

3.3(h)(2)

IV. The shift to more militant tactics probably comes from an assessment in Pyongyang that the effort to subvert South Korea--a priority objective since the war ended--has been failing.

- A. The North Koreans may also be apprehensive over the stronger U.S. presence in Asia.
- B. Pyongyang would expect that as long as the harassment is kept below the level which could provoke major retaliation, aggressive tactics will keep the South Koreans and U.S. forces there off balance; test our military capabilities and reactions; aggravate political instability in the South; and possibly disrupt economic progress.

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1. North Korea's Gross National Product has increased by only 4 to 5 percent annually in recent years, compared to an 8 to 12 percent growth in the South. Border incidents could be useful to explain the need for belt-tightening at home, and evoke greater effort in defense industries.
- V. The South Koreans are adding a vigorous reaction to the advantages of a population which is basically unsympathetic to Communism, and a popular consensus that life in the South is getting better and better.
- A. South Korea has deployed about 14,000 troops and police against the agent teams

3.3(h)(2)


- B. The future of the North Korean subversion effort will probably be determined when Pyongyang counts noses on the returning agents this fall. If a large percentage get home, the effort will be stepped up next year. If 50 percent make it home, the North Koreans will probably try again with at least an equal effort.
1. But if only a few survive, the infiltration may taper off.

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## ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS IN BURMA

Relations between Communist China and Burma have fallen to their lowest point as a result of the anti-Chinese mob violence in Rangoon over the past week. The unprecedented demonstrations at both countries' embassies and against ethnic Chinese in Rangoon may foreshadow a significant turning point in Sino-Burmese relations, which have remained correct if uneventful in recent years.

These incidents pose a serious test for the Ne Win regime's traditional neutralist policy, a feature of which has been the avoidance of difficulty with Communist China. Although the Burmese Government was apparently surprised at the extent of the violence against the Chinese population, it probably gave tacit encouragement to the demonstrators in the early stages of the disturbances.

3.3(h)(2)

Burma's government-controlled press last week had played up a demonstration by Chinese students protesting a ban on wearing Mao Tse-tung lapel buttons. It was these protest rallies at state-run schools in Rangoon which apparently touched off the large-scale disturbances. Chinese Embassy officials, several of whom have recently returned from reindoctrination courses in China, were reportedly handing out the

Mao buttons and encouraging the Chinese student demonstrators. It is doubtful, however, that Chinese diplomats had any intention of provoking a major crisis.

As violence spread and several dozen Chinese residents were killed, Burmese security forces began to take more decisive action. In defiance of a hastily imposed ban on demonstrations, a mob of several thousand stormed the Chinese Embassy compound on 28 June. One Chinese technician was killed, and eyewitnesses claim several Burmese were shot. The regime imposed martial law that night in troubled areas.

Although the Ne Win government probably hopes to avoid a serious crisis in its relations with China, Peking clearly intends to hold the Burmese authorities responsible for the riots. A Chinese Foreign Ministry note of 28 June charged that the Burmese Government "instigated" mob action and demanded that Rangoon ensure the safety of Chinese nationals and diplomats. Almost immediately the Chinese stepped up diplomatic pressure on the Burmese by a massive demonstration before the Burmese Embassy in Peking. Replete with loud-speakers and effigies of Ne Win, it was reminiscent of demonstrations which placed other embassies under a virtual state of siege earlier this year.

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~~SECRET~~NORTH KOREANS EXPANDING AGENT ACTIVITY

North Korea is stepping up the infiltration of armed agent teams into South Korea and is showing increasing aggressiveness in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

Several recent incidents indicate that perhaps as many as 60 men in nine teams are operating in remote eastern and southern areas of the country.

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] the mission of the teams is to recruit Communist sympathizers and to establish operational bases for future guerrilla activities. The teams appear to be well armed, but have limited funds and food supplies, and reportedly are under instructions to return to North Korea in the fall. Previous agent activity was largely concerned with the collection of intelligence and had a less ambitious mission.

Some 10,000 South Korean military and civilian security forces are trying to track down and destroy the teams. Since the first of June, twelve agents have been killed and one captured at the cost to the government of 13 killed and 21 injured.

In addition, Pyongyang has sharply stepped up armed reconnaissance and probing activities in the DMZ area. Over 200 incidents involving United Nations

Command troops and North Korean personnel have occurred so far this year, compared with 44 in all of 1966, 55 in 1965, and 32 in 1964. The North Koreans have lost about 47 killed in this year's incidents, the South Koreans eight, and the US three.

3.3(h)(2)

There has been nothing in either statements by North Korean leaders or Pyongyang's propaganda suggesting any intent to open a "second front" to divert attention from the Vietnam war. It is possible, however, that one of Pyongyang's aims may be to discourage further deployment of South Korean troops to Vietnam, as well as to demonstrate general support for Hanoi. The still largely hostile attitude of the South Korean people toward the North Korean Communists militates against any early success of a new Communist guerrilla effort.

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By Jean M. White

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Johnson told Congress yesterday that the need for a new canal across Central America to link the Atlantic and Pacific may develop sooner than the year 2000 suggested in past studies.

Sea-going traffic has picked up faster than forecast in the earlier estimates, Mr. Johnson noted.

Mr. Johnson made his statement as he sent Congress the third annual report of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission. The study group has asked for a two-year extension and \$7.5 million more in funds to complete its investigations for a new sea-level canal.

The new canal would supplement the present lock-style Panama Canal built 80 feet above sea level.

One reason that the Commission study, originally set at \$17.5 million, is behind schedule is that the Atomic Energy Commission's program of Plowshare nuclear excavation experiments was postponed during negotiations on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Congress has appropriated money for the Plowshare tests this fiscal year.

Nuclear excavation might be employed in three of the four general routes being studied by the Commission—across the Darien region of Panama, near the Nicaragua-Costa Rica, and in extreme Northwest Colombia.

A route near the present Panama Canal could be excavated by conventional earth-moving means.

Cost estimates range from \$2.3 billion for the conventionally dug canal to \$747 million for nuclear excavation on the shortest Panama route.

In his statement to Congress, the President emphasized the need to "proceed as rapidly as possible" on the study since it will take up to 15 years for legislation, planning and construction.

Yesterday morning the President delivered a chalk-and-chart lecture on the Nation's finances to an assembly of 50 or 60 House Democrats summoned to the White House.

George Christian, the White House press secretary, said that the one-hour session was a general discussion and not a "sales campaign" to win support for Mr. Johnson's propos-

al for a 10 per cent surtax on income.

A group of Illinois donors gave the President an original bronze bust of Abraham Lincoln done by Augustus Saint-Gaudens. The gift was presented by Illinois Gov. Otto Kerner, who is chairman of the President's Special Commission on Civil Disorders.

In accepting the Lincoln bust, Mr. Johnson noted that the country has been "experiencing some of the same problems that Abraham Lincoln did 100 years ago." The President said he hoped he could handle them with the same "compassion and wisdom."

Yesterday the President also conferred with Chester Bowles, American Ambassador to India who is scheduled to return to New Delhi on Tuesday.

## Rumania Urges Controls On Superpowers' Arms

Special to The Washington Post

GENEVA, Aug. 8—Rumania strongly supported the non-aligned position on nuclear nonproliferation today and thus made a major advance in its efforts to establish itself as an independent voice in international affairs.

Dissociating his country from the broad policy line of the other four Communist bloc members in the 17-nation Geneva Disarmament Conference, the Rumanian delegate, Dr. Nicolae Ecobesco, set these conditions for Rumania's support of a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons:

The nuclear powers must commit themselves to halt the production of nuclear weapons, end underground testing for military purposes and eliminate existing nuclear arsenals.

Unless these conditions are met, the treaty, far from reducing the risk of thermonuclear war, will indefinitely perpetuate it, Ecobesco said.

In its present form, worked out by Russia and the United States, the draft treaty contains no such commitments. It seeks only to prevent nonnuclear countries from manufac-

turing or acquiring nuclear weapons and places no conditions on the present nuclear powers.

Quoting a recent statement of Rumanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Ceausescu, Dr. Ecobesco remarked that the idea that the fate of humanity lies exclusively in the hands of the superpowers no longer corresponds with new conditions of social development.

The Rumanian statement indirectly encouraged West German criticism of the proposed treaty based on the need for the unhampered development of a peaceful nuclear industry.

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