



14 October 2020

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Reference: F-2019-02254

Dear Requester:

This letter is a final response to your 6 August 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for **records, electronic or otherwise, of the Role of CIA in Nuclear War**. We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, as amended.

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located the enclosed document, consisting of 35 pages, which we can release in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statutes are Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

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NUCLEAR WAR

PUBLISHED 1 JAN 1958 (b)(3)
BY: CIA RESERVE PANEL (b)(6)

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HISTORICAL DOCUMENT

Destroy only with consent
of the Historical Staff

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FOREWORD

In this report the Special Reserve Panel has sought to analyze the likely impact of global nuclear warfare on CIA's wartime role. Principal emphasis has been placed on the period through 1960, during which U.S. military planning is based on a concept of unlimited nuclear warfare, implying the use of nuclear weapons in both strategic and tactical roles in all areas of the world in which suitable targets are located.

The Panel is cognizant of and has given much attention to the alternatives to all-out nuclear war. However, because the official U.S. concept of the character of a general war resulting from a Soviet attack through 1960 is based upon massive retaliation utilizing nuclear weapons and because realistic war planning must in any case be based upon the most adverse circumstances in which CIA initial wartime activities would be carried out, the Panel has considered only CIA's role in a war involving all-out use of nuclear weapons by both sides.

The Panel has placed primary emphasis on an analysis of CIA's overseas role. The impact of an attack on Washington is likely to be such that the field may have to operate with little Headquarters direction and support for an indefinite period of time.

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In preparing this report, the Panel has taken into consideration:

(1) U.S. policies, insofar as available, governing the conduct of a future general war; (2) CIA war plans; and (3) NIEs and other intelligence on the wartime capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Satellite nations, and neutral countries and our Allies.

H. S. Craig, Chairman
James Critchfield
Robert Komer

[REDACTED]
John Warner
[REDACTED]

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1 January 1958

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CONCLUSIONS

1. Major war up to 1960 would be an all-out nuclear war.
2. At least the first phase would be one of all-out and possibly very brief unrestricted exchange of nuclear attacks.
3. There may be a subsequent phase or phases of what has been termed "broken back" war.
4. The initial phase of all-out nuclear warfare would take place in limited areas of highest strategic importance while large areas, either neutral countries or "strategic islands," would be left relatively untouched, even by fall-out. Even small areas within the major combat zones, i.e., "tactical islands" would be more or less free of nuclear damage.
5. Since nuclear war would almost certainly begin with a surprise attack, which Soviet advances in nuclear weapons and delivery systems make increasingly feasible, early warning becomes ever more vital but increasingly difficult to achieve.
6. CIA's ability to function during the first phase in areas of intensive nuclear exchange would be severely limited. A large proportion of existing CIA assets and facilities in areas of nuclear destruction would be neutralized if not destroyed.

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(a) Great difficulties would arise in the redeployment and reorganization of CIA field stations.

(b) Agent resources in particular would be highly vulnerable to the effects of nuclear weapons.

(c) Extensive disruption of communications would occur.

Under these circumstances CIA would be capable of only the most limited first phase operations in combat theaters. CIA's primary task would be to cope with the problems of survival and redeployment for subsequent phases of operations and the establishment of satisfactory relationships with the military commanders.

7. In contrast to the severe limitations on CIA's first phase role in areas of extensive nuclear exchange, greatly expanded opportunities for useful CIA operations would occur in the subsequent phase of "broken back" warfare. In this phase extensive requirements for intelligence on the chaotic post attack situation in key areas and numerous possibilities for stimulating resistance activities and guerrilla warfare will exist.

8. Moreover, from the very outset of a war CIA could play a major role in those areas which, because they remain neutral or are of secondary military importance, would not come under intensive nuclear attack. Indeed CIA operations in these areas could probably make a

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greater contribution to the over-all national effort than could the limited activities which would be feasible in nuclear combat zones. In many cases CIA staff personnel and assets might be the only major U.S. resources available to carry out U.S. policy.

9. The employment of nuclear weapons by the U.S. and its Allies in satellite areas could decisively affect CIA operations in these areas, but to date these problems have not been adequately explored.

10. The terms, timing and circumstances of surrender negotiations which might occur after an extremely short period of nuclear exchange would critically affect planning for CIA's wartime role as well as for the key role CIA might have in the immediate post hostilities period. Here, too, however, there does not appear to be any adequate national planning.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Early warning operations must be given a clear-cut priority over wartime requirements including those placed by the military upon CIA.
2. CIA should accept only the most limited requirements in anticipated areas of major nuclear exchange during the first phase of a war.
3. Instead, CIA war planning for areas of likely nuclear exchange should emphasize survival, reorganization and the establishment of proper relationships with military commanders, in order to ensure adequate CIA support of the military in these areas in the subsequent phase of the war.
4. CIA war planning for areas likely to remain neutral or the large "strategic islands" likely to escape nuclear damage should be premised on the concept that CIA can make a major and perhaps its most important, contribution to the national war effort in and from such areas.
5. An emergency communications system adaptable to the situation of a nuclear war should be developed. It should include:
 - (a) Alternate facilities to those presently in use;

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- (b) Facilities independent of existing military and civilian systems;
- (c) Equipment which can be operated by untrained CIA personnel;
- (d) Stored, protected and available equipment in both the "tactical islands" within the combat areas and in the "strategic islands" and neutral areas.

6. CIA should undertake a study to determine where strategic and tactical islands would be likely to exist in a nuclear war and should undertake war planning on the basis of this study; and

7. CIA should attempt to influence U.S. national planners to consider the pros and cons of employing nuclear weapons in Satellite areas.

8. CIA should examine the problem of the terms, timing, and circumstances of possible surrender negotiation to determine the impact these would have on CIA's wartime and post-hostilities roles.

9. Finally, we recommend that the above principles be adopted as the guidelines for future CIA war planning.

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DISCUSSION

I. PROBABLE NATURE OF NUCLEAR WAR

1. We have attempted to make the most realistic appraisals as to the likely nature and scope of nuclear warfare. The following views are those on which we believe realistic CIA war planning must be based.

2. In the absence of major changes in the foreign and domestic policies and military potential of either the USSR or the U.S., a global war over the next several years will almost certainly involve an immediate full-scale nuclear exchange. This is the basic concept on which this study is predicated. U.S. strength-in-being and ability to win a war is so heavily dependent on our massive retaliatory capability that it is almost certain that the U.S. would have to conduct such an offensive if it were attacked. The Soviets must have made a similar conclusion; their own nuclear warfare capabilities are constantly growing, and available intelligence indicates that they are seeking to develop and maintain nuclear warfare capabilities comparable with, if not superior to, those of the U.S. Moreover, even if general war should start without initial resort to nuclear weapons, realistic war planning must assume that these could subsequently be introduced at any time, particularly if one side felt itself in danger of military defeat.

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3. If the USSR initiates general war during the period through 1962, whether as a result of pre-planning or miscalculation, it will most certainly do so by launching a surprise nuclear attack (see NIE 11-4-57). The vital importance of achieving surprise and of getting in the first nuclear blows almost dictate Soviet reliance on an initial surprise nuclear attack, particularly since success in destroying our retaliatory capability would be a decisive factor.

4. The priority targets of the initial Soviet nuclear attacks would probably be: (1) Allied nuclear retaliatory strengths, wherever located, (2) key Allied depots and industrial centers, and (3) key Allied forward bases and forward airfields. It is estimated that most major cities, sea-ports, and communications centers in Europe and such major military installations as tactical and strategic airfields would be attacked.

5. Soviet Bloc forces probably will not conduct initial attacks, nuclear or otherwise, in areas which are not of highest priority. Soviet nuclear stockpiles probably will not be sufficient, at least through 1960, to meet all military requirements. Therefore, the Soviets will reserve their nuclear weapons for high priority targets. Numerous secondary targets will not be attacked, at least in the initial period. Similarly, with respect to ground forces, it is likely that the Soviets will initially

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mount only the highest priority land campaigns, waiting on the others until the effects of the initial nuclear exchange have become clearer. Indeed the Soviets might initially mount even the highest priority land campaigns (such as that in northwest Europe and into the Middle East) on a reduced scale without prior buildup in order to avoid premature detection which would compromise achievement of surprise in the initial nuclear attacks. Thus even in nuclear war, strategic and tactical islands and neutral areas will exist.

6. A full-scale nuclear war will involve at least an initial phase of all-out nuclear exchange and possibly a subsequent phase (or phases) of much reduced nuclear activity. The first phase would end when one or both sides had lost its capability to continue intense nuclear attacks. The war could end at this point. In any event, at the end of this phase, both the civilian population and the military forces within combat theaters would be faced with problems of great magnitude and generally chaotic circumstances. Communications throughout the world would, because of nuclear damage, sabotage and overloading with high priority traffic, probably prove inadequate; vast areas of the world would tend to be separated through failures of communications; U.S. governmental authority would of necessity be greatly decentralized to the senior officials

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in these areas.

7. A second phase of so-called "broken back" warfare might follow the first phase, with both sides employing conventional forces and remaining atomic and nuclear weapons. This phase, in contrast to the first, could extend almost indefinitely and gradually be expanded to include other countries which had initially remained neutral, but which had territorial or other ambitions they regarded as attainable by entering the war at this point.

8. During the initial stages of a nuclear attack, the present Allied headquarters structure will suffer severe disruption and may be unable to function effectively. Such large military headquarters and complicated communications systems are considered to be extremely vulnerable. (b)(3)
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9. An attack on the U.S. may result in an attitude of poised opportunism among the neutrals who are able to remain so -- particularly the Afro-Asian countries. They will undoubtedly try to take the greatest possible advantage of this situation in terms of national interests and to recognize a winner at the earliest possible time. Even

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Communist China might well choose not to be a belligerent but to stay neutral and attempt to advance its interests by various means during this period.

II. LIMITATIONS ON CIA ROLE IN A NUCLEAR WAR

10. Difficulty of redeployment and reorganization of CIA field stations during a period of initial nuclear exchange. Too little attention has been given to the development of workable and simple plans to govern the redeployment of CIA human and material resources in those areas of the world which would probably be immediately involved in nuclear combat. In some of these areas planning has, because of the presence of U.S. military forces, been strongly influenced by the military authorities. In general such plans are based upon the assumption of a period of tension preceding actual military operations and not on the basic assumption of surprise attack taken by this Panel. These plans are designed primarily for mass movement of Americans, including CIA personnel, from forward areas vulnerable to attack by conventional Soviet forces, but they involve moving these people back through and into areas that will almost certainly be major targets of Soviet nuclear attack. Emergency redeployment plans assuming a

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situation brought about by a surprise Soviet nuclear attack -- probably initially against targets in the U.S.A., the U.K., Europe and the Middle East -- have not been given adequate attention.

11. Vulnerability of CIA resources in key target areas. Any CIA stations, bases, communications facilities or other assets located in or near the areas of likely nuclear targets (particularly those against which high yield thermonuclear weapons would probably be employed) would be highly vulnerable to destruction or damage.

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of these areas. It is also probable that large areas in and adjacent to target zones will at least temporarily be denied to CIA because of bomb damage and contamination produced by fall-out. The disruption of normal life, including all travel and communications services, would eliminate such areas from consideration for either clandestine activity or as redeployment areas for CIA.

12. Impact on agent personnel. The physical and psychological impact on CIA agents in areas of the world immediately affected by nuclear attacks -- whether those of the Bloc or the Western Allies --

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will be so great and dependent on so many imponderable factors, that it is almost impossible to estimate their behavior and effectiveness under such circumstances. It can be assumed that even a nuclear war will produce circumstances in which certain individuals will demonstrate the same high courage and willingness to take great risks that they have in past wars. In general it is believed that agents in the West who are being prepared for commitment into enemy territory after the beginning of a war should be prepared in every way to survive a nuclear war and damages therefrom. But except in special circumstances, it does not appear to be either feasible or desirable that agents already established in hostile areas be prepared to cope with nuclear attacks.

13. Impact of nuclear war on communications. Major and widely separated geographical areas will be directly affected; time and space will be drastically compressed compared to the situation that obtained in World War II, intensifying the need for rapid and reliable handling of vital traffic. But at a time when intelligence communications will be of great importance, it must be assumed that a very large percentage of the facilities located in areas affected by the initial exchange will not be usable.

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III. CIA OPERATIONS IN A NUCLEAR WAR

A. Distinction Between Military Theaters and Neutral Areas.

14. In event of general war parts of Europe, the Far East and the Middle East and perhaps some areas immediately adjacent to these would probably immediately become theaters of military operations under the control of U.S. or Allied commands. However, other areas of the world probably would not, at least during the initial phase of a nuclear war, become involved in the conflict. They would remain under the control of existing civil governments with whom our existing diplomatic relationships would continue. The planning of the CIA wartime roles in each of these areas must take into account the significant differences that will exist at all phases of a nuclear war between a CIA effort subordinated to a theater command and a CIA effort which remains under existing command arrangements.

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15. Survival, reorganization and the establishment of relationship with the military commanders will pose immediate and overwhelming problems to CIA stations in the active military theaters. CIA in military theaters will inevitably be subject primarily to the control, influence and requirements of the local military commanders. Nevertheless, the global character of modern war and the role of CIA in the government dictates that CIA stations within military theaters remain in touch with and responsive to Headquarters requirements.

16. On the other hand, it is not anticipated that the organization of CIA stations in the "neutral" areas of the world will be immediately changed by war; relationships with the U.S. Chiefs of Mission (i.e., Ambassadors, Ministers, etc.) and Headquarters will not be initially effected by war.

B. Intelligence Requirements

17. The first and priority requirement is, obviously, that CIA concentrate its efforts on the problem of determining in advance any Soviet plan to launch an attack. This is far more important than any tasks CIA could perform during the initial stages of a war which had already begun.

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18. The first phase of nuclear war -- the period of intense nuclear exchange -- will be characterized by a tremendous demand from Washington and from military installations around the world for reporting on military events, the physical impact of nuclear attacks, political reactions and attitudes of "neutral" countries and any other information that will permit continuing examination of the balance between the opposing forces.

19. Within the active military theaters, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, the senior U.S. military commanders will have an immediate and urgent demand for tactical intelligence

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On the other hand, it is unlikely that the military commanders in the field will have, during the first phase of the war, pressing requirements that can be met by either PW or GW/Resistance activities. Decisions by the United States to refrain from making nuclear attacks on selected Soviet Bloc areas could, however, provide a situation in which pre-planned PW and GW/Resistance activities would assume immediate importance (see Chapter IV below).

20. There will also be requirements, imposed by Washington, for political action and PW operations in "neutral" areas. Many of these

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will become significant only after the initial exchange of nuclear attacks has been completed and political reactions in these areas develop. This could conceivably be within a period of days or perhaps weeks after the beginning of the war.

21. But the limitations on CIA operations in areas of intense nuclear exchange are so great that the specific requirements placed on CIA by the military for support of first-phase combat operations must be re-evaluated to determine which targets are so important as to justify an extraordinary effort. The CIA effort to satisfy requirements must be measured against the significance of the contribution which fulfillment would bring.

C. CIA Role in Military Theaters During the Initial Phase.

22. In those areas in which both nuclear and ground force attacks by the Soviets can be anticipated, staggering problems of survival, evasion and redeployment will exist. Therefore highest priority during the first phase must be given to meeting these problems. But, as pointed out in paragraph 10, present evacuation planning is based on the unrealistic assumption that some orderly movement to the "rear" utilizing available transportation facilities will be possible. Instead of present

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plans for such redeployment to areas which will themselves probably come under nuclear attack, alternative plans should be prepared for the movement of Staff members into areas of at least temporary safety. These areas might include the so-called strategic islands of lesser military significance or even tactical islands which might exist in theaters of widespread military operations. For example, even in event of a major nuclear campaign in Western Europe certain isolated or mountainous regions such as the Alpine region or Southwest France would remain relatively free of nuclear damage or contamination. In fact, a number of our Staff personnel in military theaters may find themselves in situations not unlike that of the downed aircraft crews in the hands of an "E and E" organization. The possible useful intelligence exploitation of individuals who become isolated in such tactical islands has not been considered in our planning. A trained intelligence officer provided with instructions and a means of communication could conceivably provide timely and vital intelligence information during the period that he remains in this situation.

23. Since a nuclear war extending into a second phase of "broken back" warfare or mopping up would require a massive and thoroughly re-organized U.S. intelligence effort, CIA should clearly distinguish which

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assets being developed for wartime use are intended for use in the first phase from those that are to remain dormant until the second phase has been reached. This becomes an especially practical matter with regard to the instructions being issued to W/T agents. Also, a realistic appraisal of our capabilities in the first phase of a nuclear war will be a definite consideration in planning the organization of our CIA establishments in the military theaters. It may be that the realistic approach to this problem would be to limit ourselves to what we can really expect to accomplish during the brief period of days, or weeks of the initial nuclear exchange, leaving all other potential assets for our second phase activities.

24. Operational Intelligence. Determination of the operational situation in each area of the world including an assessment and report of the impact of the initial exchange of nuclear attacks on our personnel, facilities and areas of operational activity will be an immediate and vital requirement during the initial phase.

25. Positive Intelligence. As reflected in our discussion of requirements and the general character of the first phase of a nuclear war, both the U.S. Government and the local U.S./ and allied commanders in military theaters will have immediate and urgent demands for information of the type that could be provided by carefully planned

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FI operations. It is again emphasized, however, that CIA would have an extremely limited capability under the circumstances that would exist.

26. Psychological and Political Operations. Unless U.S. military planners are prepared to give considerable prior attention to the psychological significance of granting some immunity from allied nuclear attacks, it does not appear that there would be any immediate impact of PW operations within areas directly involved in the earliest military operations. However, a great deal could be done toward stimulating support for the U.S. in areas which are not directly involved in the initial nuclear exchange if these stations are prior to the outbreak of war, provided with instructions and the means of carrying out an effective psychological or political action program. The people of the satellite nations and of Red China might also be vulnerable to psychological warfare efforts in the first phase of a war beginning with nuclear weapons.

27. Escape and Evasion Operations. The planning now of E and E operations in denied areas and the wartime operation of E and E facilities in areas in which the population is generally hostile to the U.S. are felt to be so problematical and have such limited prospects of success that

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they must be accorded an extremely low priority. On the other hand, undenied areas that are likely to be overrun by the Soviet armies will probably continue to provide circumstances favoring the conduct of E and E operations -- provided these areas are not subjected to devastating nuclear attack alienating the population.

D. Subsequent Phase Operations in Military Theaters.

28. Under the circumstances that have been envisaged in this paper, time factors, communications problems and the difficulties of conducting operations during the initial phase of a nuclear war will result in many and probably most of CIA's wartime assets and potential not being brought into action during the initial phase. For example, many of our W/T agents today have instructions to report in to a base station only a month or more after the outbreak of a world war. Such assets should, in planning, be considered part of our subsequent phase operations.

29. Moreover, given the type of nuclear war we have envisaged, it is in the subsequent phase or phases of nuclear war that the Agency could exert a more worthwhile effort. The chaotic conditions, not only in actual areas of nuclear conflict but in peripheral areas, will afford

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excellent opportunities for an organized effort such as CIA would be able to mount to move in and assert leadership for whatever purpose is appropriate. These purposes could include assisting in maintenance of friendly political forces in control or on the other hand, deposing unfriendly political elements. Organization of FI collection nets could be a principal function in certain of the peripheral areas which would not be vital targets for aerial photographic reconnaissance.

30. It would also appear that much of the present detailed war planning that has been done at headquarters and in the field is more appropriate to the type of operations and the situation which will exist during the subsequent phase. However, much of this current planning is in fact directed at the initial phase. Because of the difficulty in determining the circumstances that will exist in specific parts of the world following the initial phase of nuclear war, our planning should be done on a flexible basis to permit deployment of prepared assets to areas where they can be truly useful. The events which occur in the initial phase, including devastation of specific areas and political events such as whether Communist China remains neutral or whether Sweden joins the war, will determine the areas of opportunity for CIA and the specific role that it will play.

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E. Communications in Military Theaters.

31. The execution of operations will be dependent upon an Agency-operated communications system of great flexibility if problems arising from an unpredictable situation are to be successfully solved.

As stated earlier, many agent W/T assets will not be employed during the initial period. Those intended for use will have to be provided the capability of adapting their operations to prevailing circumstances.

32. In neutral or other areas where delays in operational communications would be detrimental to our efforts, methods of avoiding censorship or other delaying tactics will be required.

F. Operations in Neutral Areas and Strategic Islands.

33. Even in event of full-scale thermonuclear war there will inevitably be large areas of the world which will not be immediately involved. Indeed, as we have already stated, the USSR may forego

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initial campaigns in any but the most vital areas in order to maximize surprise and to await the result of the initial nuclear exchange. Thus large areas may not initially be theaters of active combat. Moreover, many countries, even U.S. allies, may be influenced by considerations of self-interest or Soviet "nuclear blackmail" to stand aloof from the conflict, at least initially. Even Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam might prefer to remain neutral at the outset, to see how the early stages of the war come out. Most of the uncommitted countries will certainly seek to remain neutral.

34. Thus there will be large areas in which active nuclear warfare is not taking place and in which allied or enemy forces are not deployed, at least initially. Even though these areas are not theaters of active military operations, they may be highly important from the U.S. point of view. Both sides will be actively interested in securing their benevolent neutrality or their entry on one side or the other, and in forestalling moves of the other side. It may be desirable to overthrow hostile governments, install regimes favorable to the U.S., lay the groundwork for future operations in these areas, etc. Since these so-called strategic island areas will not be theaters of active military

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operations, CIA resources will be among the only assets available for achieving U.S. objectives, and CIA may be the key arm of U.S. policy in these areas.

35. Consequently these strategic island areas may be highly desirable theaters of CIA activity, particularly of an "exceptional operation" nature. To the extent that CIA operations in areas of major nuclear warfare may be severely restricted and of marginal value, it may even be that CIA should emphasize operations in strategic island areas as the most profitable field available in event of nuclear war. It is conceivable that CIA operations in these areas could make a far greater contribution to the overall national effort than could the limited activities which will be feasible in major military theaters.

36. The precise nature of the operations which would be most useful can only be determined by careful area-by-area analysis. Nevertheless a considerable degree of prior contingency planning and peacetime earmarking or development of assets should be possible. For example, assuming most Arab states remain neutral, the U.S. might find it most desirable to covertly encourage dissident elements to install friendly governments in such key states as Egypt and Syria,

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where keeping open the oil pipelines and Suez Canal would be so vital to us. Or again, if certain allied governments, or even certain leaders, appear unduly susceptible to Soviet blackmail or pressures, the U.S. may want to forestall unfavorable developments by covert means. In some cases it may be essential to pave the way for subsequent allied occupation of certain neutral base areas vital to our war effort. In all areas there will be a problem of forestalling Communist efforts to stir up trouble or even revolution, or agent provocateur operations to embarrass the U.S.

IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM NUCLEAR WAR

37. We have thus far dealt with the wartime impact of unrestricted use of nuclear weapons, including high yield thermonuclear weapons, on regular CIA operations. There are other highly important aspects of the problem which present possible opportunities for the Agency to utilize its unique facilities and know-how in fulfillment of its responsibilities.

38. Restrictions on use of Nuclear Weapons against Soviet Satellites and USSR Minority Groups. Even in a general war with the USSR, it is possible that less than unrestricted use of nuclear weapons might be desirable. This concept could range from the strictly tactical use of atomic weapons to a broader use just short of unrestricted. Such

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a concept of nuclear war would require much closer coordination of the appropriate elements of government.

39. As an illustration, we can look at the revolt in Hungary which demonstrated the potentialities of the people of the satellite nations to interfere with organized Russian land forces. It is possible that such interference could for a short time be of a serious degree. We can visualize CIA actions in establishing channels of communications to military and other leaders of the satellite nations as being of enormous assistance if, upon the outbreak of war, the United States called upon the people of the satellites to rise up in revolt against the Soviet forces. However, indiscriminate nuclear attacks on these countries would not be compatible with such a plan. Of necessity, integrated war planning would be required for the success of such a concept. There is no evidence that present war plans adequately consider either the political or military advantages which might accrue by declaring certain satellite areas immune to U S. nuclear attack, and thus creating opportunities for clandestine or other operations of major potential value.

40. No less worthy of consideration, but probably having less

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chance of complete success, is the possibility of stimulating revolt on the part of groups within the USSR against their own dictatorship in the event of general war, or of profiting by a spontaneous uprising. The national minority groups in Russia could provide a fertile field for study in this connection.

41. The responsibilities placed on CIA require that we, at the very least, relate these implications of the matters discussed above to current war planning, without waiting for specific requirements. The Agency can initiate some plans and actions to anticipate possible requests or to uncover opportunities.

42. The Question of Timing or Nature of Cease-Fire or Surrender.
At the present time there is no real national or military planning on the question of the possible nature of surrender terms in the event of a general war. Still unanswered are the questions, "How do we know when we have won the war?", "What is victory?", and "Under what circumstances would we offer terms of ceasefire?" Existing national policy apparently is to develop surrender terms after war has begun. But the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons and the possibility that a nuclear war might be over within a few weeks or even days dictate serious reconsideration of this aspect of such a problem. A difference

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of only a few days in the cessation of nuclear hostilities would alter the postwar problems by a staggering factor. Not only would the enemy be involved, but the entire world would be affected by the economic and social aspects of such widescale destruction. Added to this would be the genetic damage from which no one would be secure; failure to stop the release of radio-active elements could be a true world-wide disaster. Governmental considerations of this question would probably point to a role for CIA to assume. But the Agency need not wait for a directive on the subject, and it should assume the initiative in order to be prepared to fulfill its share of the responsibility for this most important question.

43. Post-Hostilities Role of CIA. The role of CIA in a nuclear war must include consideration of its role in the post-hostilities period. Few would argue the principle that CIA should not utilize and expose assets during the war on marginal activities if those assets could be maintained in place to perform more important functions in the post-war era. The true difficulties arise in determining the relative importance of various efforts and activities during hostilities as against their use in the aftermath of a major nuclear war. In any event, the

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vastly increased destructiveness of nuclear weapons so compresses the likely time scale of a future war that post-war planning must be accomplished prior to the outbreak of war; it cannot be left until hostilities are upon us. The basic problems of locating fall-back bases and re-deployment of staff personnel overseas should be planned with one eye on CIA's post-hostilities role.

44. The vast physical destruction and huge loss of life to be expected in a nuclear war make it difficult to grasp the full implications for the political, social, and economic structure of the entire world. Even if the United States were the "victor," its pre-eminent position would, at the very least, be subject to serious challenge. At the worst, the United States could find itself in the position of a second rate power on the new scale of world power. These dire possibilities suggest careful consideration of the role CIA should plan for in the peace following a nuclear war.

45. A general postwar move toward a measure of world government and disarmament, with the resulting relinquishment of a degree of sovereignty, could well generate the requirement for an intensified intelligence effort in many countries now low on the list of priorities. While this Panel cannot determine any new priorities in detail, CIA should begin now to develop concepts for its potential role in a post-nuclear war environment.

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