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## Approved For Release 2004/04/02 CIA RDP96-00788R001200410008-7

20 Dec 79

SUBJECT: Establishment of INSCOM GRILL FLAME Task Force (U)

- 1. (S) In response to DCG-I comments concerning the size of the recommended task force for project GRILL FLAME, the following information is submitted to provide additional data upon which to make a decision.
- a. I want to re-emphasize that the recommended action calls for the establishment of a task force not a TDA unit. If the project develops and proves worthwhile, then the FY82 POM submission that we have made should take care of establishing a TDA unit at the appropriate time.
- b. Project Manager (PM) Operations Officer: It is essential that one individual be available and responsible for managing the day-to-day activities. The PM, on an average, is unavailable 40% of the time. Working group meetings, both DA and DOD, and liaison with other elements working in this field keep the PM fully occupied. The project needs someone to interface with the various intelligence elements they are working with. The Operations Officer, among other responsibilities, must maintain the units scheduling activities and insure that any given requirement is being "attacked" with the proper resources.
- c. Analyst Positions: We have carefully selected the individuals involved to insure that we would have representation from each of the disciplines. Each of the analysts will have several roles within the task force: all are individuals who will be doing remote viewing; all are individuals who are being trained as interviewers thereby giving us the capability of doing multiple sessions at the same time. We realize that there is an element of danger in having analysts also doing remote viewing. However, internally we have taken the necessary steps to insure that proper compartmentation is maintained and by doubling up on functions we are able to keep down man-power requirements.
- d. Secretary Position: Plain and simple one secretary cannot keep up with the work-load. We have training reports over 1 month old still waiting to be typed (current secretary has worked paid overtime and has given considerable free time in an effort to reduce this back-log). The current operational task (Iran) has generated enough work to keep two secretaries busy without even considering other aspects of the program. In fact, when a second secretary has not been available it has meant that reports that might contain meaningful information have been delayed up to a week from reaching the customer. As a reminder, each session is completely taped and all reports typed verbatim; which adds up to a lot of required typing support.
- e. Training Officer/NCO Positions: TAG training officer is essential to the development of the program and he also serves as one of the primary interviewers. The NCO doubles as a remote viewer. He also helps in collating the data obtained from the sessions and is responsible for maintaining the training charts, briefing aids and our weekly status summaries. Basically, he serves as the senior administrative chief and assists in developing training procedures. Also, he is responsible for maintaining all equipment that belongs to the element.

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2. (Կ) Summary: I have carefully scrubbed and re-scrubbed this proposed task force and feel that the request is justified in keeping with current man-power constraints and yet providing INSCOM with the necessary assets to fully explore and develop this potentially tremendous intelligence collection program. According to various officials (Dr. Laberge, Dr. Verona among them) it's our program which is leading the way for the Intelligence Community. With the high visibility it has, INSCOM can not afford to "fail" for want of proper support. Request that our rather modest task force requirements be approved as originally given.

CHAD B. WHITE Colonel, GS ADCSOPS-HUMINT

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