



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



FAC-2C

June 16, 2021

John Greenewald
27305 W. Live Oak Rd.
Castaic, CA 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated December 30, 2016, which you submitted to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for information concerning Chemical Warfare Capability of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya Defense Intelligence Report: DDB-1620-7-85, dated July 1985. I apologize for the delay in responding to your request. DIA continues its efforts to eliminate the large backlog of pending FOIA requests.

A search of DIA's systems of records located one document (23 pages) responsive to your request. Upon review, I have determined that some portions of the document must be withheld in part from disclosure pursuant to the FOIA. The withheld portions are exempt from release pursuant to Exemptions 1 and 3 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption 1 applies to information properly classified under the criteria of Executive Order 13526. Exemption 3 applies to information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. The applicable statutes are 10 U.S.C. § 424. Statute 10 U.S.C. § 424 protects the identity of DIA employees, the organizational structure of the agency, and any function of DIA. Statute 50 U.S.C. § 3024 (i) protects intelligence sources and methods.

If you are not satisfied with my response to your request, you may contact the DIA FOIA Requester Service Center, as well as our FOIA Public Liaison at 301-394-6253.

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. You may contact OGIS by email at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770, toll free at 1-877-684-6448 or facsimile at 202-741-5769; or you may mail them at the following address:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS
College Park, MD 20740-6001

You may also exercise your right to file an administrative appeal by writing to the address below and referring to case number FOIA-00148-2017. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 90 days after the date of this letter.

Defense Intelligence Agency
7400 Pentagon
ATTN: FAC-2C (FOIA)
Washington, D.C. 20301-7400

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Steve Tumiski". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "S" and "T".

1 Enclosure

Steven W. Tumiski
Chief, Records Management and Information Services

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault





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


(b)(3):50 USC 3024
(i)

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
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Chemical Warfare Capability of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya (U)

JULY 1985



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CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY
OF IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, AND LIBYA (U)

DDB-1620-7-85


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(b)(3):10 USC 424


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

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(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

PREFACE



(b)(3):10 USC
424;(b)(1);Sec.
1.4(c)



(U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: , Washington, D.C. 20301-6111. Requests for additional copies should be forwarded through command approval channels, as appropriate, to DIA (ATTN: , using DD Form 1142, Interagency Document Request, in accordance with DIA Manual 59-3, DIA Reference Library.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

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1. INTRODUCTION

(U) While the four countries in this report have ratified or acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the "use in war of asphyxiating poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare," at least Iraq had resorted to the use of such weapons. Also, all of these countries have signed the 1972 Biological Warfare Disarmament Convention, banning the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. Yet there have been numerous reports of the four countries either attempting or studying the feasibility of obtaining such weapons. All four countries are reportedly engaged in some research to develop a chemical warfare (CW) capability and either have already built or engaged in activities to develop chemical industry storage facilities. However, the four countries are limited in their technological capability to research such weapons. Therefore, they are dependent on outside, mostly Soviet and Western European, assistance in obtaining chemical and biological weapons and for training in their offensive employment. Syria is heavily dependent upon the Soviet Union; the other three countries have contacted numerous Western nations to request assistance on their chemical and biological industrial development, with varying success. Syria and Libya might be hesitant to actually resort to deployment of such weapons in a conflict with Israel, for fear of retaliation; Iraq, however, has probably been using chemical weapons since 1983 in its war against Iran. Therefore, in a renewal of an Arab/Israeli conflict, the actual employment of chemical and/or biological weapons should not be totally discounted.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

2. SYRIA

a. Chemical Warfare Agent Production and Storage Capabilities

(b) (1);Sec. 1.4 (c)

Document contains 23 pages

Pages 7 – 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

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