



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

February 9, 2023
Ref: DODOIG-2023-000010
DODOIG-2023-000018
DODOIG-2023-000019

SENT VIA EMAIL TO: john@greenewald.com

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.
The Black Vault, Inc.
27305 W. Live Oak Road, Suite 1203
Castaic, CA 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for the following records:

- A copy of the video and/or audio of Mr. Luis Elizondo's interview with Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations that occurred on, or around, May 19, 2021, a transcript of the interview, and all internal notes, communications, and emails about the interview;
- All emails within Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations which contain the word "Elizondo"; and
- All emails that are to/from (bcc'd or cc'd) the DoD OIG and attorney Daniel Peter Sheehan, from January 1, 2020, to the date of processing your request.

We received your requests on October 4, 2022, and October 11, 2022, and assigned them case numbers DODOIG-2023-000010, DODOIG-2023-000018, and DODOIG-2023-000019, respectively.

The Administrative Investigations Component and the Mission Support Team conducted searches and located records responsive to your requests. Upon review, we determined that the attached 101 pages are appropriate for release in part, and 66 pages are exempt from release, pursuant to the following FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552) exemptions:

- (b)(3), which pertains to information exempted from release by statute, in this instance the Inspector General Act of 1978, confidentiality of employee complaints to the Inspector General;
- (b)(5), which pertains to certain inter-and intra-agency communications protected by the deliberative process privilege. The purpose for withholding such recommendations is to encourage the free and candid exchange of opinions and advice during the decision-making process. In applying the foreseeable harm standard, we determined that disclosure of this information is likely to diminish the candor of agency deliberations in the future;
- (b)(6), which pertains to information, the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and
- (b)(7)(C), which pertains to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

Our review included consideration of the foreseeable harm standard, as stated in DoDM 5400.07. Under this standard, the content of a particular record should be reviewed and a determination made as to whether the DoD Component reasonably foresees that disclosing it, given its age, content, and character, would harm an interest protected by an applicable exemption.

In regard to the portion of DODOIG-2023-000010 for the audio recording of an interview, please be advised that our agency does not currently have the capability to segregate third-party privacy information from an audio transcript. In the interest of providing you with a timely response, we are providing you with a copy of the written transcript.

If you consider this an adverse determination, you may submit an appeal. Your appeal, if any, must be postmarked within 90 days of the date of this letter. Since you have created an account in FOIAonline, please log in to your account, retrieve your original requests, and then click on the "Create Appeal" tab in the left-hand column. FOIAonline will populate your requests and contact information automatically. In the "Basis for Appeal" box, provide your explanation, attach supporting documentation (if necessary), click on preview, and then click on submit. Your appeal will automatically be sent to our office via FOIAonline. However, please note that FOIA appeals can only examine adverse determinations concerning the FOIA process. For more information on appellate matters and administrative appeal procedures, please refer to 32 C.F.R. Sec. 286.9(e) and 286.11(a).

During our review, we determined that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff (OSD/JS) is the release authority for documents that may be responsive to your requests. Therefore, we have referred those pages to the OSD/JS FOIA Requester Service Center, Freedom of Information Division, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington DC 20301-1155, for processing and direct response to you. If you would like to inquire about the status of this portion of your requests, please contact OSD/JS directly by calling 571-372-0498 or by sending an email to whs.mc-alex.esd.mbx.osd-js-foia-requester-service-center@mail.mil. For further information, you may also visit their website at <https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOID.aspx>.

You may contact our FOIA Public Liaison at FOIAPublicLiaison@dodig.mil, or by calling 703-604-9785, for any further assistance with your requests. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, MD 20740-6001, email at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. However, OGIS does not have the authority to mediate requests made under the Privacy Act of 1974 (request to access one's own records).

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Joseph Kasper at 703-604-9775 or via email at foiarequests@dodig.mil.

Sincerely,



Searle Slutzkin
Division Chief
FOIA, Privacy and Civil Liberties Office

Attachment(s): As stated

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

TRANSCRIPTION

INTERVIEW OF
MR. LUIS ELIZONDO

Case Number: 20210505-071182-1234567

May 19, 2021

Transcript Prepared by:

Free State Reporting, Inc.
1378 Cape St. Claire Road
Annapolis, MD 21409
(410) 974-0947

PROCEEDINGS

INVESTIGATING OFFICER(S) (IO)

IO#1: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ; IO#2: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

WITNESS (W): Mr. Luis Elizondo

IO#1: Good afternoon. The time is now 1524 Eastern Time. This telephonic recorded interview is being conducted on May 19th, 2021 from Stafford, Virginia. Persons present are the investigating officer, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Investigator, DoD IG, the complainant, Mr. Luis Elizondo, currently located in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and counsel for the complainant, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (ph.), currently located in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). We are conducting a clarification interview with Mr. Elizondo regarding allegations that he was reprimed against by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (ph.), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (ph.), and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (ph.), for his protected communications. At this time, sir, I ask you to acknowledge that this interview is being recorded by the DoD IG.

W: Yes, I acknowledge.

IO#1: And can you please confirm this interview is not being recorded by either you yourself or by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

W: This conversation is not being recorded on our end.

IO#1: So, Roger.

W: No, we wouldn't record.

IO#1: -- and can you please also, sir, Mr. Elizondo, acknowledge that you've received a copy of the DoD Privacy Act

1 Notice.

2 W: I have received the copy of the DoD Privacy Act Notice of
3 1974, correct.

4 IO#1: Roger, thank you, sir. I'll now administer the oath.
5 Please raise your right hand. Let me know when you have done
6 so.

7 W: I have done so.

8 IO#1: Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you
9 are about to give shall be the truth, the whole truth and
10 nothing but the truth?

11 W: I do.

12 IO#1: Roger. You can lower your hand. Just to say on the
13 record, we will not be discussing classified in this interview.
14 It is an entirely unclassified interview.

15 W: Agreed.

16 IO#1: Sir, can you please state your full name for the record?

17 W: Yes. My name is Luis Daniel Elizondo (ph.).

18 IO#1: Roger. And in terms of your contracting employment, who
19 is your current employer?

20 W: I am contracted right now by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (ph.). They are
21 out of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

22 IO#1: Roger. And when did you start working for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

23 W: I started working for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

24 IO#1: Roger. And what is your role?

25 W: I am a consultant.

1 IO#1: And as a consultant, sir, in this specific case, can you
2 give me a brief overview of what it is that you do?

3 W: IO#1: Yes. I provide support to several contracts,
4 particularly in the aviation industry. And I am also a
5 consultant for another defense contractor known as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

6 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). And I'm providing
7 contract and consultation support to elements within Space
8 Force.

9 W: Roger. And as a contractor, sir, are you a W-2? Are you
10 1099'd?

11 IO#1: I -- gosh, obviously I don't know. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

12 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). I --

13 W: Well, let me ask it to you this way, sir. Are you a
14 permanent employee of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)?

15 IO#1: I am a permanent contractor to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

16 W: Roger. And are you a permanent employee of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
17 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)?

18 IO#1: I am a permanent employee of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

19 W: IO#1: Roger. Can you describe for me your current security
20 clearance level?

21 W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

22 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

23 IO#1: And to your knowledge, sir, what is the current status of
24 that security clearance?

25 W: It is currently under investigation. It is current, but it

1 is under evaluation.

2 IO#1: And under evaluation by whom?

3 W: By the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency, DCSA.

4 IO#1: Roger, sir. And why are you currently having your
5 clearance reevaluated?

6 W: I was contacted by a DCSA investigator approximately one
7 month ago, and there were two allegations. One allegation was
8 that there were three -- while I was a DoD employee, I had
9 released three videos, unclassified videos to the public. And
10 the other allegation was that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

11 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

12 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

13 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

14 IO#1: Roger. And this investigation from DCSA, who initiated
15 that?

16 W: It was initiated by a -- I was told by the investigator --
17 an individual, senior individual, who made the allegation --
18 those two allegations. And so they are investigating me for
19 those allegations which by the way, for the record, are patently
20 false. But we can't get into that.

21 IO#1: And have you previously been investigated for similar
22 allegations?

23 W: I've never been investigated by DCA for any of -- any
24 allegations. This is the first time DCA. But I will tell you I
25 was recently informed that there was an Air Force OSI inquiry

1 that looked into how those videos -- the three videos -- were
2 released to the public.

3 IO#1: Now when you say, sir, your clearance is currently being
4 reevaluated, how do you know that?

5 W: Because I was told so by the Special Agent from the Defense
6 Counterintelligence Security Agency, conducting the reinterview
7 of me -- a subject interview.

8 IO#1: Roger. And that Special Agent's name?

9 W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -- I believe (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
10 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -- a female, and she is out of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). I
11 don't know the exact location, but I have her contact
12 information, I think, should you need it.

13 IO#1: I would, if you could please forward that to me. And
14 Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), did she identify to you the individual who
15 initiated this investigation, or did she just say a senior
16 official?

17 W: She just said senior official.

18 IO#1: Roger. Have you seen any initiation letter? Have you
19 seen any sort of formal guidance granting her the authority to
20 conduct this investigation?

21 W: No, but she did indicate her information for me to validate
22 who she was. And she is a representative of DSCA.

23 IO#1: Roger. And do you have a case number?

24 W: I do not have a case number. She did not provide that to
25 me.

1 IO#1: Roger. And while I'm asking, do you have the number of
2 the contract that you're currently working on for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

3 W: I do not have that available in front of me, but I can
4 certainly try to find that for you.

5 IO#1: Roger, sir. And back to your access -- your eligibility
6 to access classified, sir. Has the DoD CAF or DISA notified you
7 that your access to classified has been suspended?

8 W: Negative. My access to classified has not -- information
9 has not been suspended, nor has it been revoked.

10 IO#1: Roger. And has it ever been in the past?

11 W: Never.

12 IO#1: Roger. This investigation, when you were interviewed by
13 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), you said. When did that interview occur?

14 W: That was probably two weeks ago. She called me twice in the
15 last month, to interview me and then get clarification on those
16 two incidents.

17 IO#1: Roger. And that interview, can you put that on the
18 calendar for me?

19 W: Gosh. Yes, but for the record I want to be careful because
20 I don't know the precise date. And I just want to make sure
21 that I -- if I'm off by a day or two it's not necessarily held
22 against me because --

23 IO#1: No, no sir. If you could give me an on-or-about that
24 would be fine.

25 W: Okay, 10-4. Let me look now. Please give me one moment.

1 I'm going to the calendar. So this would have been

2 IO#2: While you're looking, this is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), for the
3 record.

4 W: Yes, sir.

5 IO#2: And as we go through here and we're asking these
6 questions and, you know, on some of these things you have, you
7 know, identify -- oh, yeah, I have, you know, information
8 pertaining to that or an email or, you know, a point of contact.
9 Whether you want to provide it to us or you want to have (b) (6),
10 (b) (7)(C), your attorney, provide it to us, if one of you would
11 keep up a list of what we call do-outs (ph.).

12 W: Understood.

13 IO#2: Just like, yeah. Like in this case, we're going to need
14 the point of contact information for the DISA investigator who
15 reached out and contacted you. That's going to be a do-out.
16 I'd also like to place on your do-out list, we're going to need
17 points of contact for the respective contractors that you work
18 for, where we can get a hold of someone in, you know, H.R. or in
19 corporate office, you know, if we need to, to identify ourselves
20 and do things like obtain copies of the contract so that we can
21 review it and --

22 W: Okay.

23 IO#2: -- obtain contract information if that's necessary.

24 W: Sure.

25 IO#2: Thank you.

1 W: It would have been April. Looks like here April, the week
2 of April 6, and then the week of April 19th.

3 IO#1: And on April 6th, the week of. That was your initial
4 interview, and then the week of April 19 was a clarification or
5 a follow-up interview?

6 W: Correct. For my -- I had my initial periodic
7 reinvestigation interview back in October of last year. And
8 then I was called last month due to the allegations.

9 IO#1: Roger. Now you mentioned you periodic. Has your
10 clearance been readjudicated lately?

11 W: It's under periodic reinvestigation right now.

12 IO#1: And when did that begin, to your knowledge?

13 W: September or August of 2020.

14 IO#1: September or August 2020, Roger. Now we show, sir, that
15 on March 9th, 2021, you're (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) investigation was
16 completed. Does that match up with what you've -- what you
17 perceive to be true?

18 W: It does. And then it was reopened with new allegations in
19 April.

20 IO#1: Roger. And as a result of those new allegations, have
21 you been read off of any programs?

22 W: Negative. I have not been read off of those programs.

23 IO#1: Roger. So the programs you were read into you still
24 maintain access to.

25 W: Correct.

1 IO#1: Roger, sir. And just for my clarity to help me frame the
2 rest of these questions. In what way has your access to
3 classified information been denied?

4 W: It is an attempt to remove my security clearance, and in
5 essence then I will not have an ability to perform my work
6 functions and I will be unemployed. It is not that -- the
7 reprisal hasn't taken place. I have been fortunate enough to
8 fight off the allegations with facts. And so the reprisal is
9 the attempt, in essence, to hurt or destroy my security
10 clearance. It is so far not effective, but anything can happen.
11 I mean, it -- tomorrow I could get a notification that my
12 security clearance has been revoked. Who knows?

13 IO#1: Roger, sir. You said though this is an attempt to damage
14 your employment. An attempt made by whom?

15 W: This is an attempt by whom I believe is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who
16 is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

17 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He is ultimately the individual who is
18 responsible for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and he is an
19 employee of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
20 Intelligence under the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He
21 was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the time when I was a government
22 employee. And he is the same individual who told me on my last
23 day of work that he would make sure that this reflects on my
24 security clearance, the fact that I've been (indiscernible).

25 IO#1: Roger.

1 W: He made --

2 IO#1: So now, your last day of government work was around four
3 years ago. And since then you've been favorably readjudicated.
4 What evidence do you have that ties (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) now to attempting
5 to impact your access to classified?

6 W: Well, there's two. The allegations themselves are
7 unsubstantiated and patently false. The first one involves the
8 release of those three videos. There is documentation that
9 exists that substantiates the process in which those videos
10 release were executed consistent with DoD policy, rules and
11 regulations. Air Force OSI, under a Freedom of Information Act,
12 had released their findings, their investigative findings, in
13 which they also substantiated and concluded that those videos
14 were unclassified. Later on, another email under the FOIA
15 process was retrieved by the media in which an individual at the
16 Pentagon, in the PAO office, indicates pointedly that if there
17 were any missteps in the release of those videos it was the
18 fault of the Department of Defense and not Mr. Elizondo. So the
19 fact that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had told me that this would reflect on my
20 security clearance, and the fact that now the organization in
21 which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is now conducting yet another
22 investigation on an issue that has been now close and proven to
23 be my favor, is indicative of the fact that someone is trying to
24 unfairly revoke or threaten my security clearance. I was told
25 that blatantly that this was going to happen. Secondly, I was

1 told by a colleague who works for the Defense Intelligence
2 Agency that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was going to put something -- he had told
3 people around the office he was going to put, "something or some
4 notes" in my security clearance to jeopardize my (b) (6),
5 eligibility. (b) (7)(C)

6 IO#1: And you were told by --

7 W: Thirdly --

8 IO#1: -- by whom, sir? Who was that colleague?

9 W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (ph.), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He is currently the
10 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

11 IO#1: And I'm going to want his contact information as well,
12 sir.

13 W: Sure. I was also told by another individual who worked for
14 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), her name is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), that
15 they were -- that both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were conducting
16 efforts internally to the Department to disparage my character
17 and threaten my security clearance. I was told, "They are
18 coming after you." Now --

19 IO#1: And how would both of these individuals have had access
20 to that information?

21 W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked in security, which she was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
22 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). She
23 was the one that was assigned to handle it. Fortunately, (b) (6),
24 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) before I was an employee, and knew
25 what I was doing. She knew I was working for ATIP. So she

1 explained to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -- at the time who worked for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2 -- that I was indeed running the program. And she said she
3 didn't care and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted "blood." And then there
4 was another allegation that was made by DCSA that said that I
5 said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) --
6 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). I
7 never said such a thing in my life. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
8 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
9 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
10 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
11 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) --
12 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
13 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). I never said
14 such a thing ever.

15 IO#1: Now the feedback that you received from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and
16 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -- her last name one more time, please?

17 W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

18 IO#1: Roger.

19 W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

20 IO#1: Roger, thank you.

21 W: I also received information as well from another individual.
22 He does not want to be named, but if I name him you'd have to
23 keep him confidential. He is still a senior in the Department
24 of Defense who also was --

25 IO#2: We don't -- yeah. We can't do that.

1 IO#1: Okay, never mind. Then I won't say his name.

2 IO#2: Okay.

3 W: I have to protect him, sorry guys. I mean, (indiscernible).

4 IO#1: Now the information they passed on to you, sir, is that
5 first-hand knowledge? Or how did they come by that?

6 W: First-hand knowledge. They heard (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) speaking
7 and saying that. They -- and she was actually -- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at
8 one point was actually part of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
9 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

10 IO#1: Roger. So help me understand just with as much
11 specificity as you can please, sir. What action did (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
12 take that led to this initiation of the investigation?

13 W: Well I, you know, I'm not in Washington, D.C., so I only --
14 I can only tell you what I think. But I'm not sure that's
15 really material to this discussion because I wasn't there when
16 he did it. I'm only reporting as it was reported to me. And
17 then of course, the actions that were taken against me. But I
18 can't tell you if it was on a Tuesday or a Wednesday that he
19 made a call to DCSA. But (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
20 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , and I was notified by him directly on my last day
21 at the Pentagon, and even the day after when I spoke to him on
22 the phone, that he was going to do this.

23 IO#2: This is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , for the record.

24 W: Yes, sir.

25 IO#2: And I'm completely following what you described. It's a

1 lot of clarity in there, thank you.

2 W: Yes, sir.

3 IO#2: But what we need to flesh out, okay, we deal with very
4 specific things. And you know, allegations are either first-
5 hand or second-hand, it -- you know, hey, I got this email.

6 This person told me they had a conversation with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he
7 made the statement in front of them, you know? I -- we have to
8 be very careful about, you know, framing things that are
9 speculative in nature. And --

10 W: That's why I don't want to speculate. That -- that's
11 precisely what I don't want to do.

12 IO#2: -- some of the things you've described need further
13 clarity.

14 W: Sure.

15 IO#2: Okay? In what you described for us, if you can please
16 clarify for me.

17 W: Absolutely.

18 IO#2: You know, those two individuals who, you know, contacted
19 you, you know, either just prior to you, you know, resigning or
20 immediately thereafter, and explain what they believe (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
21 was going, you know, take an action that would affect your
22 eligibility for classified information, as you described. You
23 need to clarify further, you know, with specificity. Were these
24 people, you know, was this something -- their opinion? Or was
25 this a fact?

1 W: No, it was a fact.

2 IO#2: Okay. Let's --

3 W: They told me they were going to other people and they were
4 disparaging me and my name and calling me a liar. That is a
5 fact and they heard it first-hand, and they gave orders to
6 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to find "dirt" on me. And I also received a call
7 from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the moment I left government, (b) (6),
8 (b) (7)(C), who was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who
9 indicated to me that it would be in my best interest to come
10 into the Pentagon and speak with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and "smooth
11 things over" because he had influence and power over my security
12 clearance. And that was on a telephonic conversation which took
13 place on 5 October 2017.

14 IO#2: Was there anyone else in the conversation besides the two
15 of you?

16 W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). I believe I had it on
17 speaker phone, but you know, obviously that's hearsay so I'm not
18 going to -- I mean, it's probably irrelevant.

19 IO#2: Understood. And was there any follow-up correspondence
20 between yourself, him, or anyone else?

21 W: I believe there was one more follow-up call in which he
22 tried to once again encourage me to come in and speak to (b) (6),
23 (b) (7)(C) because he was very angry with me, and it would be in my
24 "best interest" to come in and speak with him.

25 IO#2: Would you have phone records that could corroborate?

1 W: I could probably find if I had to. I did not pull them, but
2 I'm sure if I go through Verizon I could -- it would probably be
3 expensive but I could probably pull some if they are still
4 retained in the Verizon call system. I could probably pull
5 records, but I don't know for sure because I don't control that.

6 IO#2: Any texts or emails or hard copy documents that you're in
7 possession of that link specifically to these incidents that
8 you're describing for us?

9 W: Negative. These were all telephonic conversations I had
10 with people. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in particular was very careful
11 not to put things in writing because of the job that he had and
12 that I had. There was a -- a lot of the documentation was done
13 on classified systems. So this was a telephonic conversation.

14 IO#2: Okay. And just to also clarify. We're talking these
15 incidents if you've been notified by these individuals of
16 potential retribution occurred in the September, October,
17 November 2017 timeframe.

18 W: Began in that timeframe.

19 IO#2: Began, okay. And you didn't see -- just to clarify.
20 What you're explaining to me is an action didn't come to
21 fruition until as recent as what? I believe you said October of
22 2020? Is that correct?

23 W: Yes. Because I -- let's not forget, there was a gap between
24 the -- by the time I was a -- I left the U.S. Government and the
25 time I was seeking employment as a contractor. So there would

1 be no ability to conduct retribution in that manner. But of
2 course, during that time there was other retribution. Not from
3 a security clearance perspective, but from an attack -- an
4 attempt to assassinate my character and provide false
5 information for the purposes of disparaging my character.

6 IO#2: Okay. Were any type of those actions related to either
7 of the contractors that you are currently employed with,
8 directly from government personnel?

9 W: They weren't related to my contractors. But people in my
10 contract company have come to me, particularly in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and
11 they have been -- they know who I am and who I was. And they
12 have asked me several time why is the Pentagon continuing to lie
13 about your role in ATIP (ph.) and the purpose of ATIP?

14 IO#2: Okay.

15 W: Several of these individuals --

16 IO#2: Understood. But the direction I'm looking for. Have any
17 of those individuals reached out to corporate individuals in an
18 attempt to impact your security clearance?

19 W: Oh, I see what you're saying. Not --

20 IO#1: And saying it was the corporation.

21 W: -- not that I am aware of. I'm not aware of that. I am
22 aware of individuals who were part of the ATIP program with me,
23 who wound up becoming (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), after I left, of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

24 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who told me bluntly that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was still
25 very upset with me and was trying to punish me.

1 IO#2: Okay. So --

2 IO#1: And, Mr. Elizondo, for my clarity, sir. Punish you for
3 what?

4 W: Punishing me for stepping out and what is perceived to be
5 stepping out of rank. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was my -- I had two job

6 when I was in the Pentagon working for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

7 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

8 and I cannot go into any further detail than that over this
9 call. And I was also running the ATIP program, the Advanced
10 Aerospace Threat Identification Program. And when I left the
11 Pentagon, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not read into the ATIP program. And so
12 when I left, I was told that he felt betrayed. He felt that he
13 had a need to know about the ATIP program. And because I was
14 the program manager and I decided really who got read on and who
15 didn't, I think he took great exception to that. And he told
16 me, he said, you know, this sounds kooky. How can you run an
17 operation without my approval? And I said well, sir, it wasn't
18 your program. The program was directed by the Senate, and I was
19 reporting to the front -- directly to the front office of OSD.
20 And you know, there were people in USDI that were read on, but
21 I'm sorry you weren't one of them. And he said, you know, he
22 says well, you know, this is going to affect you. This is going
23 to impact you. And he was right, it did. And to this day I am
24 still suffering because he is -- he has made every attempt to
25 publicly, through the PAO office, provide fraudulent and false

1 information about me and about ATIP. And it has now gotten to a
2 point where the concern is that the department has been put into
3 a position where it has been lying officially and publicly for
4 three years. And unfortunately, the truth is going to -- it
5 will eventually come out. And because of the deeds of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ,
6 not only (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , but other people now are complicit in these
7 fraudulent statements against me.

8 IO#1: Roger. So I want to make sure I'm understanding you
9 correctly. It's your assertion that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is attempting to
10 punish you via your access to classified because you resigned
11 without reading him into your program.

12 W: Correct. And he was very, very much taken back by that.
13 And I think only once he found out that the program was real --
14 because he spent the first week telling everybody that I was
15 crazy and there was no such program. And he did not want to
16 even give my resignation letter to Secretary Mattis. And he's
17 like, well what do -- he asked me, what do I do with this? I
18 said, sir, you should do what you're supposed to do with it. It
19 was addressed to General Mattis. And he said, well, I can't
20 give this to him. I said well, sir, you probably should because
21 his staff knows. And it's not very happy with me for that.

22 IO#1: And in your opinion, sir, was that -- was not being read
23 on, was the professionally embarrassing to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

24 W: Absolutely it was. It wasn't in my opinion. Everybody told
25 me. Everybody said that he feels that I made him look silly and

1 he blames me. Apparently, afterwards he had some of his
2 authorities taken away. And I was told that only made him more
3 angry. And so he -- he's not very happy with me. I also want
4 to make this clear that he also may not be happy with me because

5 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

6 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

7 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (ph.), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). And potentially

8 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

9 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

10 IO#1: And what can you tell me about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

11 W: Well I can tell you the one about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

12 because I was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

13 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) --

14 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

15 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

16 IO#1: And at the time, sir, when is at the time?

17 W: Two -- golly. Early 2019, I believe.

18 IO#1: Roger. And you (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

19 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

20 W: Yes, sir.

21 IO#1: Okay.

22 W: And, sir, so --

23 IO#1: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

24 W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

25 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

1 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

2 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

3 IO#1: Roger. And how did (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) become aware that you had

4 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

5 W: Well, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

6 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . I don't know for sure, but that is

7 speculation. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

8 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

9 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

10 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

11 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . They seemed surprised, and they said that they don't think

12 that will be an issue. But if it is then I should contact the

13 DoD OIG office, and that's exactly what I've done.

14 IO#1: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

15 W: That is correct.

16 IO#1: Roger. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

17 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

18 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

19 W: Yeah. But my position was pretty clear. I mean, there's

20 only one Director of National Program's Special Management Staff

21 so, you know. I hear you loud and clear but it -- it's pretty

22 easy as a trained investigator, you guys know just like I do.

23 It's pretty easy to find out who said what.

24 IO#1: Roger, sir. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

25 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ? Am I correct?

1 W: He was.

2 IO#1: Roger. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

3 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

4 W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

5 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

6 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

7 IO#1: Okay. Well explain that for me. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

8 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

9 W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

10 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

11 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

12 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

13 -- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

14 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

15 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

16 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

17 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

18 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

19 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

20 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

21 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

22 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

23 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

24 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

25 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

1 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6),
(b) (7)(C)

2 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

3 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

4 IO#1: Things like what, sir?

5 W: I mean, guys, I -- do we really want to go here? I mean,
6 this is --

7 IO#2: No. I think -- let's not dive -- this is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ,
8 for the record. Let -- let's not digress into this.

9 W: Okay.

10 IO#2: If, you know, it's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . There's a record of
11 it. That's always something that the DoD has.

12 W: It's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the record.

13 IO#2: Okay.

14 W: And I think it speaks for itself.

15 IO#2: Okay.

16 W: And I think if you were to go back and look at the record
17 you're going to -- you will have a very compelling picture of
18 what happened. And it's not speculation.

19 IO#2: Okay.

20 W: You don't need my speculation on this. It's all for the
21 record.

22 IO#2: Here -- here's what I'm going to say on that. You know,
23 you -- you're kind of bridging two areas. You know, back when
24 you were a government employee with, you know, which we talked
25 about. And for there to be a clearance action, that would have

1 had to have taken place while you were a government employee. I
2 get it you can make disclosures back into those disclosures, but
3 they pertain to an action taken against you in a context of
4 being a contractor. As to, you know, we have to have a nexus
5 that connects the current investigation that you're saying is
6 being done in reprisal to the government officials to the
7 contractor.

8 W: Yeah.

9 IO#2: And so, you know, we've got some hard break lines there
10 that make things, you know, difficult to put together.

11 W: I understand.

12 IO#2: But what I'd like you to describe for us is, has -- and
13 if you could for the record, restate the names of the two
14 companies you work -- you currently are employed by?

15 W: Yes. I work for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), I think it's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

16 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). And I work for -- that's right, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

17 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). And I work for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

18 IO#2: Okay. Have any corporate people from either of these
19 companies taken any action against you that would affect your
20 eligibility for access to classified information to date?

21 W: Negative.

22 IO#2: Okay. The government owns your clearance. The companies
23 don't. And so, what you're describing for us is an incident of,
24 what you're saying, because of your prior employment and things
25 that occurred while you were a GS employee. That, you know,

1 these things over time have -- just help me clarify here -- have
2 created an issue right now where you believe your clearance
3 owned by the government is potentially going to be impacted
4 based on -- and you might lose your access for eligibility,
5 classified information.

6 W: Correct. Employer as well.

7 IO#2: Because of actions being taken in reprisal by folks who
8 -- specifically, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -- who you worked with, cautioned.

9 W: Correct. And I'll go further by saying is being impacted,
10 but not in the tangible way where you think that, well, because
11 you still have your clearance it's not being impacted. It is
12 being impacted because it's taking time and effort for me to
13 have to defend myself against erroneous allegations. And so
14 there is an attempt. It's not that, well, there's an attempt
15 but you still have your clearance, so no harm no foul. No, no,
16 no. Because tomorrow I may lose my clearance as a result of
17 this. They are actively, as we speak, trying --

18 IO#2: Please --

19 W: -- to take away my clearance.

20 IO#2: -- please describe for me what direct -- I'm searching
21 for the -- just the right thought here.

22 W: No worries, no worries. Take your time.

23 IO#2: Just please describe for me, you know, what direct action
24 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has in relation to --

25 W: Sure.

1 IO#1: -- over the ownership of your claim.

2 W: Yeah. So I'll -- I think it was very simple
3 (indiscernible).

4 IO#2: Hold on a second. Your clearance is maintained by
5 Department of Defense, Central Adjudication Facility, correct,
6 as a contractor right now in good standing?

7 W: So let me make this more clear for you from DoD speak. The
8 Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence is in charge of all
9 intelligence and security across the Department of Defense and
10 its field activities, full stop. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

11 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

12 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

13 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

14 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . Yes, there is a

15 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was going to be (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), until they
16 realized (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). So there is

17 another (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and that person reports to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

18 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), full stop. So all the authorities of GCSA and security
19 clearances at our Central Adjudication Facility, that entire
20 process (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

21 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), whether it's

22 security clearance, whether it's law enforcement investigations,

23 whether it's background investigations, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

24 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

25 IO#2: Okay. And to connect the dots and answer the nexus here

1 for me. Specifically, what date, to whom, and what content of
2 protected disclosures did you make pertaining to violations of
3 law, rule or regulation?

4 W: Sure.

5 IO#1: That (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would have knowledge of.

6 W: Sure. Protected communications include --

7 IO#2: Protected disclosures.

8 W: Yep, protected disclosure. Any and all unclassified
9 conversations I've had about my time working at the Pentagon.
10 There is -- if it is unclassified and I have done nothing wrong,
11 that communication, it -- there is no legal basis for him --

12 IO#2: That is not what I'm asking.

13 W: Okay.

14 IO#2: A protected disclosure is when you, as an individual,
15 communicate to anyone violation of a law, rule, regulation.

16 W: Oh, okay.

17 IO#2: Fraud, waste, abuse, or gross mismanagement.

18 W: Got it.

19 IO#2: Okay?

20 W: So --

21 IO#2: And there's two parameters here, okay? And that's in
22 your former position in life as a GG (ph.) employee with the
23 government, okay? As a contractor, what constitutes a
24 disclosure is a little bit different, okay? And it's, you know,
25 you've made a disclosure to basically a -- anyone in your

1 contracting agency pertaining to a violation of the contract or,
2 you know, something -- and if it's an intelligence community
3 matter, okay, then there's even, you know, different sets of
4 rules where it has to be made to the appropriate committee in
5 Congress. It has to be made to, you know --

6 W: Yeah.

7 IO#2: -- an inspector general or, you know.

8 W: Yeah.

9 IO#2: Someone in the intelligence community.

10 W: So I have had conversations with staff members of Congress,
11 and they are aware of my participation in ATIP and the reality
12 of the program. And the fact that I've done that I would
13 consider that's certainly protected communication. I would also
14 say (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

15 is also considered protected communication.

16 IO#2: Okay. And what were the dates of these protected -- and
17 again, it's protected disclosure.

18 W: Disclosure, I'm sorry.

19 IO#2: Yeah, protected. And it's just a -- it's a term of art
20 here, but a protected communication falls under a different
21 statute.

22 W: (Indiscernible).

23 IO#2: So --

24 W: I apologize.

25 IO#2: -- if you make a protected disclosure, if you disclose a

1 violation of a law, rule or regulation, fraud, waste or abuse,
2 gross mismanagement, you know, that type of thing, as a
3 government employee. Specifically, when did you do that? What
4 was it about? How would (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) have known that you made a
5 disclosure?

6 W: Yeah. I made that disclosure to senior government officials
7 that the program was not receiving the support it needed. But I
8 don't know if that qualifies as a --

9 IO#2: No. That's a --

10 W: -- protected disclosure.

11 IO#2: -- that's a policy and business.

12 W: Yeah. Yeah, I don't think that would count. As a
13 government employee, honestly gentlemen, I don't think I -- that
14 qualifies because I don't recall, as a government employee,
15 claiming to -- I remember talking to the Secretary's staff and
16 explaining that we needed some more senior leadership. We got
17 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to step up to the plate and assume (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
18 role. But then afterwards, when I left the department, he
19 assumed that role. But I don't know what -- if -- as far as
20 being a government during that time. Think -- I think, to be
21 honest with you, most of this has to be during my time as a
22 contractor, if you -- if we want to, you know, be very specific
23 here. That's really the time of the retribution. It was after
24 I left government and while I was a contractor.

25 IO#2: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), you have anything?

1 IO#1: Just for my clarity, sir. When did you get hired as a
2 contractor?

3 W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . No, I'm sorry, (b) (6), (b)
(7)(C) . I apologize.

4 IO#1: Roger. So who was your employer in the -- during the
5 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

6 W: That would have been (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

7 IO#1: And when did you start working for them?

8 W: Oh, wait no. I'm sorry -- (b) (6), (b)
(7)(C) . Gosh guys, I'm sorry. I
9 was not working as a government contractor at the time that (b) (6),
(b) (7)(C)

10 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

11 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . That was not -- I was not a government contractor
12 at the time.

13 IO#1: Right, sir.

14 W: I had a security clearance, but I -- it was not a government
15 contractor.

16 IO#1: Roger. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , no. I have nothing further here.

17 IO#2: Okay. Yeah, we're going to have to -- we're probably
18 going to have some clarification questions from you?

19 W: Sure, sure.

20 IO#1: Yeah.

21 W: Well, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , too, at some point. I'd like to --
22 maybe not today. We can do another call. But you know, there's
23 as a government contractor, her continued falsifying statements
24 for the record is certainly some form of reprisal, for sure. As
25 far as protected communication, I have talked about the

1 mismanagement of the ATIP program as it currently stands. And
2 I've had that conversation with members on the Hill, with
3 staffers. And they are definitely continuing to provide false
4 information, erroneous information, not only about me but the
5 program that I ran.

6 IO#2: Well, one of the things (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and myself are going
7 to take a look at is, you know, the current status of your
8 clearance. For, you know, for us to be able to proceed forward
9 there has to be an action.

10 W: Understood.

11 IO#2: And you know, if -- in this case right now what we've got
12 is some loosely connected dots that we'll take a look at and see
13 if they firm up or not, of your allegations that a government
14 official from 2017, from your prior employment, is in a position
15 to adversely affect your eligibility for access to classified
16 information via having an investigation initiated against you,
17 which you believe to be at this point in time an action stepped
18 in reprisal, which could cost you your job.

19 W: Correct.

20 IO#2: So, you know, that's what we're -- we're not conducting
21 an investigation at this point. What we're doing is, you know,
22 gathering initial basic facts, you know, based on what our right
23 and left limits are and what we can look at.

24 W: 10-4.

25 IO#2: And, you know, we're going to analyze that and I can

1 quite certainly let you know that we're probably going to have
2 some email clarification questions for you.

3 W: Sure.

4 IO#2: You know, another quick call. It's probably not going to
5 be, you know, at this length. Because generally and, you know,
6 until we've gathered, you know, some additional information, got
7 your transcript back, gone through it and really, you know,
8 digested what you told us. You know, it's -- if an action was
9 taken, if you're like, hey, I lost my clearance. I got read off
10 of these -- that's why we asked you if you get read off of your
11 programs.

12 W: Yes, sure.

13 IO#2: You know, I lost my update. They revoked my clearances,
14 suspended my access --

15 W: Sure.

16 IO#2: -- read me off SAP, et cetera, et cetera.

17 W: Sure.

18 IO#2: You know, that's a very significant and defined action.

19 W: Well while we're having that conversation, that's precisely
20 why we're having this conversation now because tomorrow may be
21 another day. And then you will see first-hand. So I, you know,
22 this is -- action is being taken. There is no result yet, but
23 there is action being taken. And I just want to make sure I'm
24 very clear with that. Just because the action hasn't come to
25 its conclusion and I haven't been negatively impacted completely

1 yet --

2 IO#2: And we might have to wait for that.

3 W: -- right.

4 IO#2: And, you know, this -- and see if your clearance is
5 adjudicated and its favorable and this goes away, you know. And
6 that becomes a factor for us to look at too. But --

7 W: Absolutely, absolutely.

8 IO#2: -- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), do you have his date of birth and Social
9 Security number?

10 IO#1: I do.

11 IO#2: Let's not put that on the record. Let's -- that's a
12 separate date.

13 IO#1: Oh, yeah. I have both of those pieces of information.

14 IO#2: Because okay, yeah. We can pull security clearance
15 information check, various things that are being adjudicated are
16 allowed, and that's one of the things that we'll take a look at.

17 Okay. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), do you have any additional information for --

18 IO#1: No, I'm good to go. Mr. Elizondo, do you have any
19 questions for me while you have me on the phone?

20 W: Both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), I first of all want to
21 thank you sincerely for your time. I know it's probably time to
22 go home and see family. I want to say thank you. I know you do
23 a lot of these and you got a lot of irons in the fire. But I do
24 want to say thank you for looking at -- into this, and taking
25 the time to hear me, hear me out.

1 IO#1: Well part of our work, sir, is making sure that everybody
2 that wants to be heard is heard. And that's what we did today,
3 you know, give you an opportunity. Tell me your story. Let's
4 talk about what happened, and then we will, you know, balance
5 what you've told us today against the statutes that were in play
6 and the regulations that govern us in terms of our
7 jurisdictional authority, things like that. And we will go from
8 there. I agree with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there will probably be some
9 follow-ups, and I will reserve the right to contact you with
10 those --

11 W: Sure.

12 IO#1: -- as needed. Do you have any concerns about the manner
13 in which I've conducted this interview?

14 W: No. You've been very professional. Same with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .
15 I do have one question for you.

16 IO#1: Sure.

17 W: Unfortunately, I -- I am a personality on TV. And the media
18 asks me and approaches me on a routine basis. And I want to
19 make sure if I'm asked the question specifically, is there an IG
20 complaint or is there an investigation, or is there some sort of
21 IG effort going on, I want to know my left and right limits. I
22 want to make sure I don't say something that either jeopardizes
23 your investigation or does something that I shouldn't do. So
24 what I'd like to do is ask you, if I am asked directly by a
25 member of the media, is there another IG complaint or

1 investigation or is there, you know, some sort of effort going
2 on involving you, can I say without talking about people's names
3 or specifics just say, yes, there is?

4 IO#2: What generally -- this is part of our read out, but I'll
5 give it to you now. And that's, you know, in order to protect
6 the integrity of our analysis we ask that you not discuss these
7 matters or these questions that we've asked you during this
8 interview with anyone other than your attorney. This does not
9 apply or restrict your right to contact an IG or member of
10 Congress. You know, it's -- we're in fact-finding mode right
11 now.

12 W: Sure.

13 IO#2: That could take some time.

14 W: Sure.

15 IO#2: We don't take things and, you know, stick them under the
16 rug and hide them or, you know, let them die a slow death. We,
17 you know -- we'll try to address everything that you've got as
18 quickly as possible.

19 W: Understood.

20 IO#2: With all available resources.

21 W: Is the fact that I spoke to members of the IG, is that also
22 protected? Can I say that I have? If I'm asked, hey, have you
23 spoken to somebody from the IG? Can I acknowledge that or do I
24 have to say I cannot give you that?

25 IO#2: You know, I get that, (indiscernible) and it would be --

1 but we can't curtail that. It, you know -- or we're taking the
2 complaint information that you gave us, we're collecting it.
3 We're going to go on and analyze it and possibly, you know.

4 W: Sure.

5 IO#2: We'll look at some of the things that you brought to our
6 attention, you know.

7 W: My intention is not to compromise.

8 IO#2: What you decide to say publicly or during the media,
9 that's -- I can't control that, sir.

10 W: Understood. And my intention is not to compromise or hinder
11 your efforts in any way. And so I just want to make sure that I
12 -- but at the same time I don't want to be disingenuous or lie
13 to the public.

14 IO#2: And again, I can only reemphasize, you know, we ask that
15 in order to protect the integrity of our analysis, we ask you
16 not discuss these matters, the questions we asked with anyone
17 other than your attorney. And he's online with us.

18 W: He is.

19 IO#2: But we're asking you that. We're not telling your or
20 directing you do that.

21 W: Understood.

22 IO#2: And that just allows us to, you know, try to efficiently
23 go out and get done what we need to do.

24 W: Understood. And I don't want to jeopardize that. So if I'm
25 asked, I'm going to try to be as benign and general. I will not

1 go into any specifics at all.

2 IO#2: Your call, sir.

3 W: I won't go into names, times, places, offices -- nothing
4 like that. No, appreciate that but I'm letting you know. My
5 intent is not to disrupt your efforts in any way. I don't want
6 that to happen.

7 IO#2: And our intent is not to disrupt yours and to, like (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) -
8 - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said at the beginning of this interview is we're
9 impartial fact finders.

10 W: Yes, sir.

11 IO#2: And, you know, that's what we're here -- we're going to
12 take the information we give you. We're going to boil it down.
13 We're going to take a look at the regulations. We're going to
14 see, you know, if there's, you know, what applicable things
15 apply. You know, do we have enough to move forward or not?

16 W: Right.

17 IO#2: And we will hopefully in a very expeditious way, be able
18 to say -- you know, respond to you in a responsive and thorough
19 manner.

20 W: Yeah.

21 IO#2: And provide you with, you know, our feedback.

22 W: 10-4, gentlemen. Well, I really sincerely appreciate your
23 time again. Thank you for your service, and thank you for what
24 you gentlemen do. As a former investigator myself, all I can
25 say is I appreciate what you do. So thank you very much.

1 IO#1: Roger, sir. Please stay on the line for me. Let me read
2 you out. And I'll let you know when you can break off.

3 W: Yes, sir.

4 IO#1: Should you remember anything else you believe may be
5 relevant to my analysis, please contact me. And finally, in
6 order to protect the integrity of our analysis we ask that you
7 not discuss these matters or the questions we have asked with
8 anyone other than your attorney. This does not apply to nor
9 does it restrict you from your right to contact an IG or member
10 of Congress. If anyone asks you about your testimony or our
11 analysis, please inform them DoD IG has asked you not to discuss
12 the matter. If anyone persists in asking you about your
13 testimony or if you feel threatened in any manner because you
14 provided testimony, please contact me directly. The time is now
15 1618, and the tapes are secured.

16 (End of recording.)

17

18

19

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23

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25

1 CERTIFICATION

2 This is to certify that the attached transcript is the complete,
3 true, and accurate transcript of the audio file provided by DoD
4 OIG, which has been compared to the audio recording and
5 transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

6

7

8

9

10

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

11

12

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

13

Transcriber

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ., [OIG DoD](#)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "
Subject: Case Update: 20210505-071182-CASE-02 5-6-21
Date: Thursday, May 6, 2021 3:27:00 PM

Good afternoon, Mr. Elizondo,

My name is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and I am an investigator with the DoD IG. I have received your complaint dated May 3, 2021 and am currently reading and reviewing everything you have provided to this office.

Before I schedule you for any potential interview, I need to clarify that I am a whistleblower reprisal investigator. This specific agency only investigates whistleblower reprisal - that someone took an action against you because of a report of wrongdoing that you made.

Within your submission to DoD, I read that you're reporting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

Please respond soonest so that I can ensure your complaint is directed to the appropriate agency for review.

v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Investigator
Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
Department of Defense
Office of Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500
Office - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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From: [Luis Elizondo](#)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .OIG DoD
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fw: Reply: DoD IG Request for Assistance
Date: Tuesday, May 11, 2021 2:36:28 PM

Sir,

I am in receipt of your request for a sworn interview.

Wednesday, 19 May 2021, at 15:00 hours, EST is most convenient for me. Provided that time works for you, I will be ready. My personal cellular telephone number is: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Lastly, below you will see my reply to another DoD IG Investigator, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who asked me some of the same questions. I am forwarding our correspondence to ensure consistency in our communication and to facilitate the development of some of your questions. Please do not hesitate to ask for any additional information that you may need.

Again, I sincerely appreciate your time and attention to this matter. I know you are very busy and I appreciate your service to our country.

Sincerest Regards/Very Respectfully,
Luis D. Elizondo

----- Forwarded Message -----

From: Luis Elizondo <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil>
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2021, 11:28:24 AM GMT-7
Subject: Reply: DoD IG Request for Assistance

Greetings (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);

Thank you sincerely for your prompt e-mail requesting additional information pertaining to the following:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and;
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

and those senior-level Pentagon officials who are involved, namely, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Much of the information you requested can be found within the narrative of my complaint; however, below is a brief synopsis for your consideration/review/action

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C):

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C): (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Large redacted block of text]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Thank you again for taking the time to address these issues. Should you need any additional information, please feel free to contact me any time.

Best Regards/Very Respectfully,
Luis D. Elizondo

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil>
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2021, 02:18:27 PM GMT-7
Subject: DoD IG Request for Assistance

~~CUI~~

Mr. Elizondo,

Good afternoon.

My name is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and I am a senior official investigator with the Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. Our office is in receipt of your complaint regarding AATIP.

In reviewing your complaint, I noted a few matters that I would like clarification on:

You wrote that certain senior-level Pentagon officials engaged in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). You also identified three officials as persons who committed wrongdoing: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

In order for me to better address your issues, will you identify which person committed above the listed wrongdoing?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Investigator
Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
Department of Defense Inspector General
(O) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil

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~~Controlled by: DoD OIG, Administrative Investigations
CUI Category: Law Enforcement
Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON
POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)~~

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From: [Luis Elizondo](#)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Letter of Representation: REF-Elizondo
Date: Monday, May 17, 2021 2:00:41 PM

Yes Sir, no worries. I look forward to speaking to you as well.
Very best,
Lue

[Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android](#)

On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 1:17 PM, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#)
<(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [@DODIG.MIL](#)> wrote:

Sir,

I am in receipt of the letter of representation you provided to this office, thank you.

Of note: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) specifically requested that DoD IG provide to you a recording and/or certified printed transcription of your interview. All requests for DoD IG files must be made through our FOIA office and not through an individual investigator. You are very welcome to forward your request to them, and it will be handled in the appropriate manner.

I look forward to speaking with you on Wednesday.

Thank you again,

v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Investigator

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations

Department of Defense

Office of Inspector General

4800 Mark Center Drive, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

Office - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Mobile - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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From: Luis Elizondo <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
Sent: Saturday, May 15, 2021 8:05 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)> @DODIG.MIL>
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Letter of Representation: REF-Elizondo

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

Per your request, attached is my letter of Representation.

Best,

Luis "Lue" Elizondo

[Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android](#)

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

May14, 2021

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Investigator
Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
Department of Defense
Office of The Inspector General
4800 Mark Center, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

Dear (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

My name is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted body text]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I am legally representing Mr. Luis Elizondo in the protection of his First Amendment right *not* to be retaliated against by Federal Government officials and employees for his speaking out publicly about the non-classified aspects of his work as the Director of the United States Defense Department's Advance Aerospace Threat Identification Program. Lue has asked me to be present (telephonically) and represent him during your sworn interview of him to be conducted on Wednesday, May 19, 2021 at 1500 hours Eastern Standard Time. And I have agreed to do this.

Please call me and patch me into your interview call with Lue at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shortly before 1500 hours Eastern Time. And I would appreciate it if Lue could be provided a recording and/or a certified printed transcription of his interview.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions prior to the interview. I look forward to being of whatever assistance I can be to you in your investigation of the information that is necessary for you to successfully complete your investigation of Lue's assertions regarding the actions taken against him by officers and employees of the Defense Department for his exercise of his Right to Free Speech.

Thank you,

Very respectfully,

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , , [OIG DoD](#)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , [OIG DoD](#)
Subject: FW: Follow-Up--ROI Review
Date: Tuesday, June 8, 2021 3:38:32 PM

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ,

For Elizondo: (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

I don't know if it'll be relevant, but I spent two weeks trying to track down the answer, so I thought I'd send it over just in case.

v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Investigator
Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
Department of Defense
Office of Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500
Office - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DCSA DCSA HQ (USA) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @mail.mil>
Sent: Friday, June 4, 2021 1:31 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @DODIG.MIL>
Subject: Follow-Up--ROI Review

~~CUL/PRIG~~

Sir,

As requested I have reviewed the ROI for Mr. Elizondo. (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

If you have any further questions or need any additional information, please contact me.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA)

601 10th Street

Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Mobile: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

~~Controlled by: DCSA OIG~~

CUI Category: Privacy / IG Records

POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Release: FED

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#)
Subject: RE: PPD-19/Elizando (Senior Official allegations requiring DIG AI review/approval)
Date: Tuesday, June 29, 2021 10:23:18 AM

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), thanks, I'll take a look – any idea where ISO is at with respect to its review of the related case?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
DoD Office of Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (DSN: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C))

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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 10:37 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Subject: RE: PPD-19/Elizando (Senior Official allegations requiring DIG AI review/approval)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C):

We have revised the White Paper per your guidance (attached as MS Word for ease of editing). Please advise if additional revisions are required.

v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2021 12:54 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Subject: RE: PPD-19/Elizando (Senior Official allegations requiring DIG AI review/approval)

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
DoD Office of Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (DSN: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C))

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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2021 12:40 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Subject: RE: PPD-19/Elizando (Senior Official allegations requiring DIG AI review/approval)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations Directorate
Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive
Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cell: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>

Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2021 12:15 PM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>

Subject: FW: PPD-19/Elizando (Senior Official allegations requiring DIG AI review/approval)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, resending – just want to make sure we’ve covered all bases in this one?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD

Sent: Thursday, June 3, 2021 8:53 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>

Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD

<(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)> @DODIG.MIL>

Subject: Re: PPD-19/Elizando (Senior Official allegations requiring DIG AI review/approval)

Team, thank you - as mentioned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) yesterday I discussed this one briefly (b) (5)

D-CATS is down so I was not able to verify this morning whether ISO in fact has an open case and if so whether it stems from this same complaint or a different one.

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD

Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 11:47 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD

Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG DoD; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD

Subject: FW: PPD-19/Elizando (Senior Official allegations requiring DIG AI review/approval)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

Had to recall/resend as I had the wrong oncoming complaint file attached.

v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD

Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 11:40 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @DODIG.MIL>

Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),, OIG DoD

<(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @DODIG.MIL>

Subject: PPD-19/Elizando (Senior Official allegations requiring DIG AI review/approval)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

PPD-19/Elizondo with Bio for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), CEW, CL, and incoming complaint documents (all attached) for your review. (Note: no action affecting eligibility to access classified information).

White Paper Narrative:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) INTAKE SUMMARY

We have developed a PPD-19 intake containing Senior Official allegations with recommendations (b) (5) for your review. Specifically, 20210505-071182-CASE-02 filed with the DoD Hotline by Mr. Luis Elizondo (the Complainant), Contractor employee, Consultant to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and Consultant to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The Complainant was formerly a GG-15, Supervisory Intelligence Operations Specialist, Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP), USD(I), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The Complainant alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), attempted to reprise against him via actions affecting his eligibility to access classified information. Specifically, that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) to conduct an investigation relating to a 2018 Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) investigation into the Complainant's release of videos to the New York Times the New York Times whom published an article on December 16, 2017 referencing the videos and confirming the existence of the AATIP program.

BLUF: (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted BLUF content]

BACKGROUND: (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted Background content]

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted text block]

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

RECOMMENDATION: (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations Directorate
Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive
Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cell: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

INTAKE SUMMARY

We have developed a PPD-19 intake containing Senior Official allegations with recommendations (b) (5) [redacted] for your review. Specifically, 20210505-071182-CASE-02 filed with the DoD Hotline by Mr. Luis Elizondo (the Complainant), Consultant, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (formerly, Supervisory Intelligence Operations Specialist, GG-15, Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP), USD(I)) alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), attempted to affect his eligibility to access classified information by directing the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) to conduct an investigation into false allegations related to a 2018 Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) investigation in reprisal for his protected disclosures.

BLUF: (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[redacted]

BACKGROUND: (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[redacted]

On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], the Complainant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted]. The Complainant explained to us that he (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted].

[redacted]

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[redacted]

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

RECOMMENDATION: (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ,. [OIG DoD](#)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#)
Subject: RE: Elizondo Status
Date: Thursday, July 8, 2021 3:39:01 PM

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), thank you. I will take another look at your prior submission and reassess as soon as I can. (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ,. [OIG DoD](#) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @DODIG.MIL>
Sent: Thursday, July 8, 2021 3:06 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @DODIG.MIL>
Subject: FW: Elizondo Status

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

Update from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , ISO.

BLUF: Does not sound as though ISO is getting closer to completion. (b) (5)

v/r
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#)
Sent: Thursday, July 8, 2021 2:51 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ,. [OIG DoD](#) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) @DODIG.MIL>
Subject: RE: Elizondo Status

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

Thanks for the update. Attached is the weekly IG report that gets distributed to us all.

Will let WRI leadership no that ISO Elizondo is still in the works.

v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations Directorate
Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive
Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cell: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Sent: Thursday, July 8, 2021 2:47 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Subject: RE: Elizondo Status

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

Due to other competing priorities, we are still working on this case.

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

We will keep you posted on this case.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

V/R,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Investigations of Senior Officials
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Alexandria, VA 22350-1500
E-mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil
Phone: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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~~Controlled by: DoD OIG, Administrative Investigations~~

~~CUI Category: Law Enforcement~~

Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON

POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) / (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil

~~CUI~~

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>

Sent: Wednesday, July 7, 2021 6:16 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>

Subject: Elizondo Status

(b) (6),
(b) (7)(C):

Can you please provide an update on anticipated completion status for ISO intake on Elizondo? (b) (5)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C). I need to brief WRI Director on status.

v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations Directorate
Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive
Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cell: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#)
Subject: RE: DISS Request - 20210505-071182-CASE-02
Date: Thursday, January 27, 2022 1:47:00 PM

~~CUI~~

Good afternoon, Sir,

Thank you very much, I greatly appreciate it.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Investigator
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations

Work Cell: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

NIPR: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [@dodig.mil](#)

SIPR: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [@dodig.smil.mil](#)

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~~Controlled by: Administrative Investigations, Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations~~

~~CUI Category: PRIIG // INV // WHSTL~~

~~Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON~~

~~POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)~~

~~CUI~~

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [@DODIG.MIL](#)>

Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2022 1:40 PM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [@DODIG.MIL](#)>

Subject: RE: DISS Request - 20210505-071182-CASE-02

See attached. (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

DoD Office of the Inspector General

4800 Mark Center Drive, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (fax)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>

Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2022 2:12 PM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>

Subject: DISS Request - 20210505-071182-CASE-02

CU

Good afternoon, Sir,

If you could please assist in pulling a DISS report for the following individual, including any derogatory if listed:

Elizondo, Luis Daniel

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

This request is in the support of my official duties analyzing case 20210505-071182-CASE-02.

Thank you very much, I greatly appreciate your assistance and support in this matter.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Investigator

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations

Work Cell: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

NIPR: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil

SIPR: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.smil.mil

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~~Controlled by: DoD-OIG~~

~~Controlled by: Administrative Investigations, Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations~~

~~CUI Category: PRIIG // INV // WHISTL~~

~~Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON~~

POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

~~CUI~~

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [, ,OIG DoD](#); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [, ,OIG DoD](#)
Subject: RE: WRI Senior Official Intake #2
Date: Wednesday, February 16, 2022 11:31:37 AM

~~CUI~~

(b) (5)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[Redacted]

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
DoD Office of Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive, Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (DSN: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C))

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Controlled by: Administrative Investigations, Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
CUI Category: PRIIG//INV//WHISTL
Distribution/Dissemination Control: FEDCON
POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)~~

~~CUI~~

From: Tolek, Nilgun, OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil>
Sent: Wednesday, February 16, 2022 11:28 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [, ,OIG DoD](#) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [, ,OIG DoD](#) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [, ,OIG DoD](#) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Subject: RE: WRI Senior Official Intake #2

~~CUI~~

Mr. O'Donnell approved closure today.

Nilgun Tolek
Director
Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

~~Controlled by: DoD OIG~~
~~Controlled by: Administrative Investigations, Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations~~
~~CUI Category: PRIIG//INV//WHSTL~~
~~Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON~~
POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

~~CUI~~

-----Original Message-----

From: Tolek, Nilgun, OIG DoD
Sent: Friday, February 4, 2022 5:50 PM
To: Garrison, Marguerite C., SES, OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .,
OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ., OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ., OIG DoD
<(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ., OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Subject: WRI Senior Official Intake #2

~~CUI~~

The Complainant, Luis Elizondo, former GG-15, Supervisory Intelligence Operations Specialist, Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program AATIP), Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) alleged that (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

(b) (5)

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Nilgun Tolek
Director
Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
4800 Mark Center Drive
Suite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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Controlled by: Administrative Investigations, Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
CUI Category: PRIIG//INV//WHSTL
Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON
POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)~~

~~CU~~

From: [Garrison, Marguerite C., SES, OIG DoD](#)
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), [OIG DoD](#); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [OIG DoD](#)
Subject: RE: WRI Senior Official Intake #2
Date: Friday, February 18, 2022 6:51:36 PM

Mr. O'Donnell approved closure at our Wednesday meeting this week.

Marguerite C. Garrison
Deputy Inspector General
for Administrative Investigations
Room (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22350
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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~~Controlled by: DoD OIG
Controlled by: Administrative Investigations
Category: PRIG/INV/WHSTL
Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON
POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)~~

-----Original Message-----

From: Tolek, Nilgun, OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil>
Sent: Friday, February 4, 2022 5:50 PM
To: Garrison, Marguerite C., SES, OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Subject: WRI Senior Official Intake #2

CTI

The Complainant, Luis Elizondo, former GG-15, Supervisory Intelligence Operations Specialist, Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program AATIP), Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) alleged that (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Nilgun Tolek
Director
Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
4800 Mark Center Drive
Suite (b) (6),
(b) (7)(C)
Alexandria, VA 22350
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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~~Controlled by: DoD OIG
Controlled by: Administrative Investigations, Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
CUI Category: PRIG//INV//WHISTL
Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON
POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)~~

~~CUI~~

From Luis Elizondo <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
 To "(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)", "OIG DoD" <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
 Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
 Subject RE: [Non-DoD Source] Reply: DoD IG Request for Assistance
 Date Tue, 29 Jun 2021 18:56:38 +0000
 Message-Id <1546285457.6083614.1624992998967@mail.yahoo.com>

Greetings Ma'am,
 I am currently (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but will get this info to you this weekend! Thank you for your continued patience and apologies for the delay.
 Very Respectfully,

Luis

Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android

On Tue, Jun 29, 2021 at 9:02 AM, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "OIG DoD" <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL> wrote:

Mr. Elizondo,

Good morning. I wanted to check in with you to see if you've had the opportunity to respond to the questions below?

Please let me know if you have any questions.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Investigator

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations

Department of Defense Inspector General

(O) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil

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~~Controlled by: DoD OIG, Administrative Investigations~~

~~CUI Category: Law Enforcement~~

Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON

POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: Luis Elizondo <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>

Sent: Tuesday, June 8, 2021 9:52 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "OIG DoD" <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "OIG DoD"

<(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Reply: DoD IG Request for Assistance

Greetings (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

I am in receipt of your questions. Please give me a day or two to respond thoughtfully. My schedule is full and I want to make sure I provide you complete and thorough answers.

Thank you.

Sincerely/Very Respectfully,

Luis

Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android

On Tue, Jun 8, 2021 at 7:40 AM, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "OIG DoD"

<(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL> wrote:

Mr. Elizondo,

Good morning. I have additional clarifying questions:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Thank you,
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Investigator
Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
Department of Defense Inspector General

(O) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil

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~~Controlled by: DoD OIG, Administrative Investigations
CUI Category: Law Enforcement~~

~~Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON
POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)~~

~~From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OIG DoD
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2021 2:40 PM
To: 'Luis Elizondo' <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Reply: DoD IG Request for Assistance~~

Mr. Elizondo,
Thank you for the additional information. I will review it and if I have additional questions, I'll reach out to you.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Investigator
Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
Department of Defense Inspector General

(O) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil

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~~Controlled by: DoD OIG, Administrative Investigations
CUI Category: Law Enforcement~~

~~Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON
POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)~~

From: Luis Elizondo <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2021 2:28 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Reply: DoD IG Request for Assistance
Greetings (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);

Thank you sincerely for your prompt e-mail requesting additional information pertaining to the following:

- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and;
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

and those senior-level Pentagon officials who are involved, namely, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

. Much of the information you requested can be found within the narrative of my complaint; however, below is a brief synopsis for your consideration/review/action

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

-(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

Thank you again for taking the time to address these issues. Should you need any additional information, please feel free to contact me any time.

Best Regards/Very Respectfully,

Luis D. Elizondo

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil>
 To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
 Sent: Monday, May 10, 2021, 02:18:27 PM GMT-7
 Subject: DoD IG Request for Assistance

~~CUI~~

Mr. Elizondo,

Good afternoon.

My name is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and I am a senior official investigator with the Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. Our office is in receipt of your complaint regarding AATIP.

In reviewing your complaint, I noted a few matters that I would like clarification on:

You wrote that certain senior-level Pentagon officials engaged in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). You also identified three officials as persons who committed wrongdoing: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

In order for me to better address your issues, will you identify which person committed above the listed wrongdoing?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Investigator

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
 Department of Defense Inspector General

(O) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil

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Controlled by: DoD OIG, Administrative Investigations

CUI Category: Law Enforcement

Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FEDCON

POC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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From: Luis Elizondo <(b) (6)>
 To: '(b) (6)', OIG DoD <(b) (6)> @DODIG.MIL>
 Cc: (b) (6) <(b) (6)>
 Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fw: UAP Interview & OIG contact information
 Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 17:22:10 +0000
 Message-Id: <840330336.3280129.1622740930234@mail.yahoo.com>

Sir. Apologies for not responding sooner. I am on a plane. Received your voicemail. Proposed itinerary works for me! Please consider this confirmation.

Bes Regards/Very Respectfully
 Luis

Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android

On Thu, Jun 3, 2021 at 10:34 AM, (b) (6), OIG DoD
 <(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL> wrote:

Sir,

The best day right now is Tuesday, June 15. Would 1300 work? I'll book a room 1300-1430, but not sure if we'll need that entire time. It will mostly depend on how much information you have to help with our evaluation. As I'm sure you recall, I'm working on the Evaluation of DoD's actions regarding UAPs. We do not do any of the administrative investigations, which are handled by a separate component within the OIG.

Since you are planning on bringing your attorney, I guess we won't need a room that is cleared for classified discussion?

Let me know if Tuesday the 15 th at 1300 doesn't work for you so I can schedule a room for a different time. Looking forward to meeting you in person.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: Luis Elizondo <(b) (6)>

Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 9:22 PM

To: (b) (6), OIG DoD <(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6), OIG DoD

<(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL>

Cc: (b) (6) <(b) (6)>

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fw: UAP Interview & OIG contact information

Greetings Sir,

Looks like i have the logistics arranged. Which day works better for you? What time is best? My attorney and i will accomodate your schedule!

Best Regards,

Lue

Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android

On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 4:49 PM, (b) (6), OIG DoD

<(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL> wrote:

Sir,

Not a problem. We can't be flexible! Don't rush out on our account, this project will take some time.

V/r,

(b) (6)

Sent with BlackBerry Work

(www.blackberry.com)

From: Luis Elizondo <(b) (6) <mailto:(b) (6)>>

Date: Tuesday, May 25, 2021, 6:47 PM

To: (b) (6), OIG DoD <(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL <mailto:(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL>>

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fw: UAP Interview & OIG contact information

Sir, i am currently looking at my calendar. (b) (6)

. Doing my best to accommodate. Please stand by.

Best,

Lue

Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android<https://go.onelink.me/107872968?pid=InProduct&c=Global_Internal_YGrowth_AndroidEmailSig__AndroidUsers#_wl=ym#_sub1=Internal#_sub2=Global_YGrowth#_sub3=EmailSignature>

On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 8:00 AM, (b) (6), OIG DoD

<(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL> wrote:

Lue – just checking to see if you have solidified your plans to visit DC? Does the 15th or 17th work for you?

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6), OIG DoD

Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2021 1:05 PM

To: 'Luis Elizondo' <(b) (6)>

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Fw: UAP Interview & OIG contact information

Lue,

That week is still pretty open. Would 1300 on Tuesday the 15th or Thursday the 17th work? We will have a set of questions by then, but would want to be sure we give you time for anything we didn't think to ask about that you think is important for us to know.

V/r,

(b) (6)

From: Luis Elizondo <(b) (6)>

Sent: Wednesday, May 19, 2021 5:50 PM

To: (b) (6), OIG DoD <(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL>

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fw: UAP Interview & OIG contact information

Greetings Sir, and good evening. Is there a day that works particularly good for you and/or your colleagues the week of 14 June?

Best,

Lue

From: "(b) (6), OIG DoD" <(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL>

To: "(b) (6)" <(b) (6)>

Cc:

Sent: Fri, May 14, 2021 at 2:04 PM

Subject: UAP Interview & OIG contact information

Mr. Elizondo,

Thanks for taking my call. As we discussed, the UAP evaluation team would like to interview you early in the course of the evaluation. It sounds like the week of June 14th may work the best for you if we are to do the interview in person. Let me know your preference for a date when you can.

We look forward to hearing your insight on the topic.

V/r,

(b) (6)

Space, Missile and Nuclear Evaluations

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

(b) (6) /DSN (b) (6)

Cell: (b) (6)

S-VOIP (b) (6)

(b) (6) @DoDIG.mil<mailto:(b) (6)@DoDIG.mil>

(b) (6) @DoDIG.smil.mil<mailto:(b) (6)@DoDIG.smil.mil>

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From Luis Elizondo <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
To "(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OIG DoD" <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@dodig.mil>
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
Subject [Non-DoD Source] Response to IG questions
Date Tue, 27 Jul 2021 19:13:50 +0000
Message-Id <284997028.312369.1627413230096@mail.yahoo.com>

Greetings (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

I apologize for the delay. Please see my responses to your questions below:

Good morning. I have additional clarifying questions:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



From "Stone, Randolph R., SES, OIG DoD" <(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL>
 To (b) (6) <(b) (6)>, (b) (6) <(b) (6)>
 Subject RE: [Non-DoD Source] Greetings/Update (ELIZONDO)
 Date Mon, 30 Aug 2021 01:00:36 +0000
 Message-Id <9f81fde0b4394e1f84f3ed3e12daa8a5@DODIG.MIL>

Hi Lue,
 Good to hear from you. (b) (6) As I mentioned earlier my folks cant help with the administrative complaint but the evaluation into the UAP is progressing!
 Best to you and your family
 Randy
 Sent with BlackBerry Work
 (www.blackberry.com)

From: (b) (6) <(b) (6)> <mailto:(b) (6)>>
 Date: Friday, Aug 27, 2021, 11:47
 To: Stone, Randolph R., SES, OIG DoD <(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL<mailto:(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL>>, (b) (6) <(b) (6)> <mailto:(b) (6)>>>
 Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Greetings/Update (ELIZONDO)

Sir,

Apologies for not seeing you this month but (b) (6)

I will try for sometime in late September to meet again with your investigators/auditors at a time of their convenience.

In the mean time, i thought you might find the below link interesting. As a result of a recent FOIA request, it appears that Pentagon PAO is still publically stating "I had no assigned responsibilities for AATIP during my time at OUSDI". Clearly they still do not acknowledge my role and addressing the public in this manner is disingenuous because it appears that i had no responsibilities at all. Hopefully during your efforts, you have a much more clear picture by now. (b) (6)

(b) (6) I was given a job to do by the Pentagon, and now they pretend i didnt do the job i was asked to do. It is a feeling of betrayal by certain individuals i cant begin to explain.

Thank you for your efforts.

Best Regards/Very Respectfully,

Luis "Lue" Elizondo

<https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/department-of-defense-briefing-card-on-unidentified-aerial-phenomena/>

(As of May 17, 2021:) "[If asked about the role of former DoD employee Luis Elizondo in the Advanced Aerospace

Threat Identification Program (AATIP):] Luis Elizondo had no assigned responsibilities for AATIP while assigned to OUSD(I)."

From Whistleblower Mailbox <whistleblower@dodig.mil>
 To "(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)" <"(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)">, "(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)" <"(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)">
 Bcc <"(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)">
 <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>, <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>, <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>, <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)@DODIG.MIL>
 Subject DODIG Notification Letter DCATS# 20210505-071182-CASE-02 (Elizondo)
 Date Wed, 16 Feb 2022 19:51:35 +0000
 Message-Id <583be7fae0c44b2aa14ab999e1eab599@dodig.mil>

~~CUI~~

**** DO NOT REPLY. THIS MAILBOX IS NOT MONITORED ****

Dear (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

Attached is correspondence related to a whistleblower reprisal complaint.

Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
 4800 Mark Center Drive
 Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

**** DO NOT REPLY. THIS MAILBOX IS NOT MONITORED ****

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~~Controlled by: Administrative Investigations, Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations~~

~~CUI Category: PRIIC // INV // WHISTL~~

~~Distribution/Dissemination Controls: FED CON~~

~~POC: See the attached document~~

~~CUI~~

.....
 Attachment Name : CL_Elizondo_20210505-071182-CASE-02.pdf

Attachment Name : smime.p7s



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

February 16, 2022

20210505-071182-CASE-02

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Dear (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

This letter is in response to the complaint your client, Mr. Luis Elizondo, filed with the DoD Hotline on May 4, 2021, alleging reprisal under Presidential Policy Directive 19 (PPD-19), “Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information,” October 10, 2012, as implemented in the Department of Defense by Directive-type Memorandum 13-008, “DoD Implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 19,” July 8, 2013 (Incorporating Change 4, July 19, 2017).

Your client alleged that a senior government official directed an investigation into his security clearance based on allegations that he made unauthorized classified disclosures, in order to negatively affect his eligibility for access to classified information, in reprisal for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

The evidence we reviewed does not support your client’s reprisal complaint because no action affecting his eligibility for access to classified information was taken or threatened against him. Specifically, he was interviewed by a representative of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) as part of a periodic review of his security clearance and his eligibility for access to classified information has not been impacted in any way. DTM 13-008 defines “eligibility for access to classified information” as the result of the determination whether an employee:

- Is eligible for access to classified information in accordance with Executive Order 12968, “Access to Classified Information,” August 2, 1995, as amended (relating to access to classified information) and Executive Order 10865 (relating to safeguarding classified information with industry), and,
- Possesses a need to know under such orders.

Your client’s eligibility for access to classified information remains intact. Accordingly, we are closing his case.


Your client may request an external review of this matter by a three-member Inspector General panel chaired by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. For more information, see <http://www.dodig.mil/Portals/48/Documents/Policy/ppd-191.pdf> and http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICIG/C_Employee_ERP_Regs.pdf.

For more information about the security clearance process, including information on how to file an appeal of a denial or revocation of a security clearance, your client may visit the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency at <https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/pv/mbi>.

If your client has any questions, please contact (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], or e-mail (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] [@dodig.mil](mailto:[redacted]@dodig.mil).

Sincerely,

**Nilgun
Tolek**



Digitally signed by Nilgun Tolek
Date: 2022.02.16 13:54:44 -05'00'

Nilgun Tolek
Director
Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations

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From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Tue May 4 11:57:12 2021 MDT Page 1 of 65

FAX

From: Luis D Elizondo
Return Fax: ()-
Attention To: DoD Hotline
Regarding: IG Complaint

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From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Tue May 4 11:57:12 2021 MDT Page 2 of 65

Fraud, Waste and Abuse
DO D HOTLINE
 1.800.424.9098 • www.dodig.mil/hotline

Fraud, Waste and Abuse
Complaint Form

Self-Identifying Form

(*) Required information

PART I - Your Information*

Your selection of the filing option below implies you have reviewed the information and understand the choice you are making.

- I choose to identify myself for the complaint and:
- I give permission for DoD Hotline to release my identity outside the DoD Hotline on a need-to-know basis.
- I do NOT give permission to DoD Hotline to provide my name and contact information outside the DoD Hotline. I understand that in doing so the DoD Hotline may be unable to address my concerns.

I understand that if the Director, DoD Hotline determines the allegation(s) in my complaint cannot be investigated without disclosing my identity on a need-to-know-basis to organizations outside the DoD Hotline, my lack of consent may prevent further action from being taken on my complaint. I further understand that even if I elect confidential status, my identity may be disclosed, if required by applicable legal authority, or the Director, DoD Hotline, determines that such disclosure is otherwise unavoidable.

Prefix (Mr., Mrs., Ms., etc.) Mr

First Name* Luis Middle Name* Daniel Last Name* Elizondo


- Employee Status* Check one of the following options or list your status if not listed.
- Military Active Duty
 - Military National Guard
 - Military National Guard
 - Military National Guard
 - Military - Reserves
 - Civilian Employee
 - Contractor Employee -
 - Contractor Employee -
 - Non-Appropriated
 - Retiree
 - Other _____

- Assigned DoD Branch* Check one of the following listed options.
- Department of Defense
 - Army
 - Navy
 - Marine Corps
 - Air Force
 - I am not a DoD Employee

Department of Defense Hotline • The Pentagon • Washington D.C. 20301-1900
 FWA Hotline: (800)424-9098 • SWA Hotline: (877)363-3348 • Hotline Fax: (703)604-8567
 www.dodig.mil/hotline

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From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Tue May 4 11:57:12 2021 MDT Page 3 of 65



(*) Required information

Other Agency or Office _____ Job Title / Series _____
Organization/Location (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-mail Address* (b) (6), (b) (7) _____
City* (C) _____ State or APO* (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) _____ Zip/Postal Code* (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) _____
Country USA Home Telephone _____ Mobile Telephone same
Work Telephone (Commercial) same Work Telephone (DSN) _____
Interview* Yes, I am willing to be interviewed. No, I do not want to be contacted.

PART II – Allegation Details

Use this section to clearly describe your complaint. If you wish to file a reprisal complaint, do not use this form.

IDENTIFY THE Person(s) - WHO COMMITTED THE ALLEGED WRONGDOING?

Person's First Name (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) _____ Person's Middle Name _____ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Person's Last Name _____ Where does this individual work? USDC (C)


Person's Status

- Military Active Duty Military National Guard Military National Guard
- Military National Guard Military – Reserves Civilian Employee
- Contractor Employee – Contractor Employee – Non-Appropriated
- Retiree Other _____

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IDENTIFY THE Person(s) - WHO COMMITTED THE ALLEGED WRONGDOING?

Person's First Name (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Person's Middle Name (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Person's Last Name (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Where does this individual work? (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Person's Status

- Military Active Duty
- Military National Guard (Title 10)
- Military National Guard
- Military - Reserves
- Civilian Employee
- Contractor Employee -
- Contractor Employee -
- Non-Appropriated
- Retiree
- Other _____

IDENTIFY THE Person(s) - WHO COMMITTED THE ALLEGED WRONGDOING?

Person's First Name _____ Person's Middle Name _____
Person's Last Name _____ Where does this individual work? _____

Person's Status

- Military Active Duty
- Military National Guard
- Military National Guard
- Military National Guard
- Military - Reserves
- Civilian Employee
- Contractor Employee -
- Contractor Employee -
- Non-Appropriated
- Retiree
- Other _____

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Fraud, Waste and Abuse
.....
.....
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Fraud, Waste and Abuse
Complaint Form
Self-Identifying Form

IDENTIFY THE Person(s) - WHO COMMITTED THE ALLEGED WRONGDOING?

Person's First Name _____ Person's Middle Name _____
Person's Last Name _____ Where does this individual work? OSD (T)

Person's Status

- Military Active Duty
- Military National Guard
- Military National Guard
- Military National Guard
- Military - Reserves
- Civilian Employee
- Contractor Employee -
- Contractor Employee - S
- Non-Appropriated F
- Retiree
- Other _____

IDENTIFY THE Person(s) - WHO COMMITTED THE ALLEGED WRONGDOING?

Person's First Name _____ Person's Middle Name _____
Person's Last Name _____ Where does this individual work? _____

Person's Status

- Military Active Duty
- Military National Guard
- Military National Guard
- Military National Guard
- Military - Reserves
- Civilian Employee
- Contractor Employee -
- Contractor Employee -
- Non-Appropriated
- Retiree
- Other _____

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Fraud, Waste and Abuse

DODIG HOTLINE

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Fraud, Waste and Abuse
Complaint Form

Self-Identifying Form

(*) Required information

We can best process your complaint if we receive accurate and complete information. Provide a summary of your complaint, to include an event chronology, if appropriate.

If your complaint involves contractor fraud, provide the name of the primary contractor, subcontractor, type of contract, contract's, date of contract award, and name(s) of agency official(s) if known.

What did the person(s) do or fail to do that was wrong? *Conducted retribution and provided false information to the public. Abusing government authority. Digital destruction of information.*

When did the incident(s) occur? * *2018 - Present*

When were you made aware of the problem(s)? *2017*

Where did the incident(s) take place? *Pentagon*

What rule, regulation, or law do you believe to have been violated? *Whistleblower Protection Act; Multiple DoD Directives, Instructions; Freedom of Information Act.*

Briefly summarize how you believe our office can assist you regarding your matter. *IG should conduct a comprehensive review, inquiry, investigation into abuse of power, lying to the public, destruction of evidence, conspiracy.*

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Fraud, Waste and Abuse

Fraud, Waste and Abuse
Complaint Form

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(*) Required information

PART III - Other Actions You Are Taking

Please indicate in this section if you have filed your complaint with any other office, to include other Inspector General offices, and your Congressperson. If you have contacted other entities, clearly identify the agency, office, or command, and provide your understanding of the current status of your matter. If you have received any responses from those office(s), provide our office with a copy.

Have you reported this matter to any other organizations/agencies? Yes No

If yes, which Organization / Agency? *

When*

What is the status of that complaint? *

- Open
- Under Investigation
- Closed
- Unknown

Part IV – Additional Document Submission

Mail this form along with supporting documentation to:

ATTN: DoD Hotline
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1900

Make sure to print copies of the forms you submitted and keep for your records.

PART V – Certifications

- *I certify that all of the statements made in this complaint are true, complete, and correct, to the best of my knowledge. I understand that a false statement or concealment of a material fact is a criminal offense (18 U.S.C. § 1001; Inspector General Act of 1978, As Amended, §7).
- *I have provided my election concerning my filing status in Part I of this form (Release of Identity, Non-Release of Identity, or Anonymous). If I did not provide my release election, I understand that this will cause a delay in the processing of my complaint. I further understand that if I have elected either confidential or anonymous status, it may impact the ability of the DoD Hotline to either conduct an inquiry, if warranted, and/or to appropriately address my issue(s). I also understand that if I elect anonymity, without providing any contact information, I will be unable to request confirmation of receipt of this complaint to the DoD Hotline, or to receive advisements as to open or closed status.
- *I understand that if the Director, DoD Hotline determines the allegation(s) in my complaint cannot be investigated without disclosing my identity on a need-to-know-basis to organizations outside the DoD Hotline, my lack of permission to release my identity may prevent further action from being taken on my complaint. I further understand that even if I elect confidential status, my identity may be disclosed, if required by applicable legal authority, or if the Director, DoD Hotline, determines that such disclosure is otherwise unavoidable.

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5/3/2021

Glowing Auras and 'Black Money': The Pentagon's Mysterious U.F.O. Program - The New York Times

The New York Times | <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/16/us/politics/pentagon-program-ufo-harry-reid.html>

Glowing Auras and 'Black Money': The Pentagon's Mysterious U.F.O. Program

By Helene Cooper, Ralph Blumenthal and Leslie Kean

Dec. 16, 2017

WASHINGTON — In the \$600 billion annual Defense Department budgets, the \$22 million spent on the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program was almost impossible to find.

Which was how the Pentagon wanted it.

For years, the program investigated reports of unidentified flying objects, according to Defense Department officials, interviews with program participants and records obtained by The New York Times. It was run by a military intelligence official, Luis Elizondo, on the fifth floor of the Pentagon's C Ring, deep within the building's maze.

The Defense Department has never before acknowledged the existence of the program, which it says it shut down in 2012. But its backers say that, while the Pentagon ended funding for the effort at that time, the program remains in existence. For the past five years, they say, officials with the program have continued to investigate episodes brought to them by service members, while also carrying out their other Defense Department duties.

The shadowy program — parts of it remain classified — began in 2007, and initially it was largely funded at the request of Harry Reid, the Nevada Democrat who was the Senate majority leader at the time and who has long had an interest in space phenomena. Most of the money went to an aerospace research company run by a billionaire entrepreneur and longtime friend of Mr. Reid's, Robert Bigelow, who is currently working with NASA to produce expandable craft for humans to use in space.

On CBS's "60 Minutes" in May, Mr. Bigelow said he was "absolutely convinced" that aliens exist and that U.F.O.s have visited Earth.



Harry Reid, the former Senate majority leader, has had a longtime interest in space phenomena. Al Drago/The New York Times

Working with Mr. Bigelow's Las Vegas-based company, the program produced documents that describe sightings of aircraft that seemed to move at very high velocities with no visible signs of propulsion, or that hovered with no apparent means of lift.

Officials with the program have also studied videos of encounters between unknown objects and American military aircraft — including one released in August of a whitish oval object, about the size of a commercial plane, chased by two Navy F/A-18F fighter jets from the aircraft carrier Nimitz off the coast of San Diego in 2004.

Mr. Reid, who retired from Congress this year, said he was proud of the program. "I'm not embarrassed or ashamed or sorry I got this thing going," Mr. Reid said in a recent interview in Nevada. "I think it's one of the good things I did in my congressional service. I've done something that no one has done before."

Two other former senators and top members of a defense spending subcommittee — Ted Stevens, an Alaska Republican, and Daniel K. Inouye, a Hawaii Democrat — also supported the program. Mr. Stevens died in 2010, and Mr. Inouye in 2012.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/16/us/politics/pentagon-program-ufo-harry-reid.html>

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5/3/2021

Glowing Auras and 'Black Money': The Pentagon's Mysterious U.F.O. Program - The New York Times

While not addressing the merits of the program, Sara Seager, an astrophysicist at M.I.T., cautioned that not knowing the origin of an object does not mean that it is from another planet or galaxy. "When people claim to observe truly unusual phenomena, sometimes it's worth investigating seriously," she said. But, she added, "what people sometimes don't get about science is that we often have phenomena that remain unexplained."

James E. Oberg, a former NASA space shuttle engineer and the author of 10 books on spaceflight who often debunks U.F.O. sightings, was also doubtful. "There are plenty of prosaic events and human perceptual traits that can account for these stories," Mr. Oberg said. "Lots of people are active in the air and don't want others to know about it. They are happy to lurk unrecognized in the noise, or even to stir it up as camouflage."

Still, Mr. Oberg said he welcomed research. "There could well be a pearl there," he said.

In response to questions from The Times, Pentagon officials this month acknowledged the existence of the program, which began as part of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Officials insisted that the effort had ended after five years, in 2012.

"It was determined that there were other, higher priority issues that merited funding, and it was in the best interest of the DoD to make a change," a Pentagon spokesman, Thomas Crosson, said in an email, referring to the Department of Defense.

But Mr. Elizondo said the only thing that had ended was the effort's government funding, which dried up in 2012. From then on, Mr. Elizondo said in an interview, he worked with officials from the Navy and the C.I.A. He continued to work out of his Pentagon office until this past October, when he resigned to protest what he characterized as excessive secrecy and internal opposition.

"Why aren't we spending more time and effort on this issue?" Mr. Elizondo wrote in a resignation letter to Defense Secretary Jim Mattis.

Pentagon officials say the program ended in 2012, five years after it was created, but the official who led it said that only the government funding had ended then. Charles Dharapak/Associated Press

Mr. Elizondo said that the effort continued and that he had a successor, whom he declined to name.

U.F.O.s have been repeatedly investigated over the decades in the United States, including by the American military. In 1947, the Air Force began a series of studies that investigated more than 12,000 claimed U.F.O. sightings before it was officially ended in 1969. The project, which included a study code-named Project Blue Book, started in 1952, concluded that most sightings involved stars, clouds, conventional aircraft or spy planes, although 701 remained unexplained.

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Robert C. Seamans Jr., the secretary of the Air Force at the time, said in a memorandum announcing the end of Project Blue Book that it "no longer can be justified either on the ground of national security or in the interest of science."

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5/3/2021

Glowing Auras and 'Black Money': The Pentagon's Mysterious U.F.O. Program - The New York Times

Mr. Reid said his interest in U.F.O.s came from Mr. Bigelow. In 2007, Mr. Reid said in the interview, Mr. Bigelow told him that an official with the Defense Intelligence Agency had approached him wanting to visit Mr. Bigelow's ranch in Utah, where he conducted research.

Mr. Reid said he met with agency officials shortly after his meeting with Mr. Bigelow and learned that they wanted to start a research program on U.F.O.s. Mr. Reid then summoned Mr. Stevens and Mr. Inouye to a secure room in the Capitol.

"I had talked to John Glenn a number of years before," Mr. Reid said, referring to the astronaut and former senator from Ohio, who died in 2016. Mr. Glenn, Mr. Reid said, had told him he thought that the federal government should be looking seriously into U.F.O.s, and should be talking to military service members, particularly pilots, who had reported seeing aircraft they could not identify or explain.

Luis Elizondo, who led the Pentagon effort to investigate U.F.O.s until October. He resigned to protest what he characterized as excessive secrecy and internal opposition to the program. Justin T. Gellerson for The New York Times

The sightings were not often reported up the military's chain of command, Mr. Reid said, because service members were afraid they would be laughed at or stigmatized.

The meeting with Mr. Stevens and Mr. Inouye, Mr. Reid said, "was one of the easiest meetings I ever had."

He added, "Ted Stevens said, 'I've been waiting to do this since I was in the Air Force.'" (The Alaska senator had been a pilot in the Army's air force, flying transport missions over China during World War II.)

During the meeting, Mr. Reid said, Mr. Stevens recounted being tailed by a strange aircraft with no known origin, which he said had followed his plane for miles.

None of the three senators wanted a public debate on the Senate floor about the funding for the program, Mr. Reid said. "This was so-called black money," he said. "Stevens knows about it, Inouye knows about it. But that was it, and that's how we wanted it." Mr. Reid was referring to the Pentagon budget for classified programs.

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5/3/2021

Glowing Auras and 'Black Money': The Pentagon's Mysterious U.F.O. Program - The New York Times

Robert Bigelow, a billionaire entrepreneur and longtime friend of Mr. Reid, received most of the money allocated for the Pentagon program. On CBS's "60 Minutes" in May, Mr. Bigelow said he was "absolutely convinced" that aliens exist and that U.F.O.s have visited Earth. Isaac Brekken for The New York Times

Contracts obtained by The Times show a congressional appropriation of just under \$22 million beginning in late 2008 through 2011. The money was used for management of the program, research and assessments of the threat posed by the objects.

The funding went to Mr. Bigelow's company, Bigelow Aerospace, which hired subcontractors and solicited research for the program.

Under Mr. Bigelow's direction, the company modified buildings in Las Vegas for the storage of metal alloys and other materials that Mr. Elizondo and program contractors said had been recovered from unidentified aerial phenomena. Researchers also studied people who said they had experienced physical effects from encounters with the objects and examined them for any physiological changes. In addition, researchers spoke to military service members who had reported sightings of strange aircraft.

"We're sort of in the position of what would happen if you gave Leonardo da Vinci a garage-door opener," said Harold E. Puthoff, an engineer who has conducted research on extrasensory perception for the C.I.A. and later worked as a contractor for the program. "First of all, he'd try to figure out what is this plastic stuff. He wouldn't know anything about the electromagnetic signals involved or its function."

The program collected video and audio recordings of reported U.F.O. incidents, including footage from a Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet showing an aircraft surrounded by some kind of glowing aura traveling at high speed and rotating as it moves. The Navy pilots can be heard trying to understand what they are seeing. "There's a whole fleet of them," one exclaims. Defense officials declined to release the location and date of the incident.

"Internationally, we are the most backward country in the world on this issue," Mr. Bigelow said in an interview. "Our scientists are scared of being ostracized, and our media is scared of the stigma. China and Russia are much more open and work on this with huge organizations within their countries. Smaller countries like Belgium, France, England and South American countries like Chile are more open, too. They are proactive and willing to discuss this topic, rather than being held back by a juvenile taboo."

By 2009, Mr. Reid decided that the program had made such extraordinary discoveries that he argued for heightened security to protect it. "Much progress has been made with the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings," Mr. Reid said in a letter to William Lynn III, a deputy defense secretary at the time, requesting that it be designated a "restricted special access program" limited to a few listed officials.

A 2009 Pentagon briefing summary of the program prepared by its director at the time asserted that "what was considered science fiction is now science fact," and that the United States was incapable of defending itself against some of the technologies discovered. Mr. Reid's request for the special designation was denied.

Mr. Elizondo, in his resignation letter of Oct. 4, said there was a need for more serious attention to "the many accounts from the Navy and other services of unusual aerial systems interfering with military weapon platforms and displaying beyond-next-generation capabilities." He expressed his frustration with the limitations placed on the program, telling Mr. Mattis that "there remains a vital need to ascertain capability and intent of these phenomena for the benefit of the armed forces and the nation."

Mr. Elizondo has now joined Mr. Puthoff and another former Defense Department official, Christopher K. Mellon, who was a deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence, in a new commercial venture called To the Stars Academy of Arts and Science. They are speaking publicly about their efforts as their venture aims to raise money for research into U.F.O.s.

In the interview, Mr. Elizondo said he and his government colleagues had determined that the phenomena they had studied did not seem to originate from any country. "That fact is not something any government or institution should classify in order to keep secret from the people," he said.

For his part, Mr. Reid said he did not know where the objects had come from. "If anyone says they have the answers now, they're fooling themselves," he said. "We do not know."

But, he said, "we have to start someplace."

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
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5/3/2021

The Pentagon's Secret Search for UFOs - POLITICO Magazine

POLITICO



Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images

DEFENSE

The Pentagon's Secret Search for UFOs

Funded at the request of Harry Reid, the program probed a number of encounters military pilots had with aircraft they believed didn't operate like anything they had seen before.

By **BRYAN BENDER** | December 16, 2017

he Pentagon, at the direction of Congress, a decade ago quietly set up a multimillion-dollar program to investigate what are popularly known as unidentified flying objects—UFOs.

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5/3/2021

The Pentagon's Secret Search for UFOs - POLITICO Magazine

The “unidentified aerial phenomena” claimed to have been seen by pilots and other military personnel appeared vastly more advanced than those in American or foreign arsenals. In some cases they maneuvered so unusually and so fast that they seemed to defy the laws of physics, according to multiple sources directly involved in or briefed on the effort and a review of unclassified Defense Department and congressional documents.

The Advanced Aviation Threat Identification Program, whose existence was not classified but operated with the knowledge of an extremely limited number of officials, was the brainchild of then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.), who first secured the appropriation to begin the program in 2009 with the support of the late Senators Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) and Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), two World War II veterans who were similarly concerned about the potential national security implications, the sources involved in the effort said. The origins of the program, the existence of which the Pentagon confirmed on Friday, are being revealed publicly for the first time by POLITICO and the *New York Times* in nearly simultaneous reports on Saturday.

One possible theory behind the unexplained incidents, according to a former congressional staffer who described the motivations behind the program, was that a foreign power—perhaps the Chinese or the Russians—had developed next-generation technologies that could threaten the United States.

“Was this China or Russia trying to do something or has some propulsion system we are not familiar with?” said a former staffer who spoke with POLITICO on condition of anonymity.

The revelation of the program could give a credibility boost to UFO theorists, who have long pointed to public accounts by military pilots and others describing phenomena that defy obvious explanation, and could fuel demands for increased transparency about the scope and findings of the Pentagon effort, which focused some of its inquiries into sci-fi sounding concepts like “wormholes” and “warp drives.” The program also drafted a series of what the office referred to as “queried unverified event under evaluation,” QUEU reports, in which pilots and other personnel who had reported encounters were interviewed about their experiences.

Reid initiated the program, which ultimately spent more than \$20 million, through an earmark after he was persuaded in part by aerospace titan and hotel chain founder Bob Bigelow, a friend and fellow Nevadan who owns Bigelow Aerospace, a space technology company and government contractor. Bigelow, whose company received some of the

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5/3/2021

The Pentagon's Secret Search for UFOs - POLITICO Magazine

research contracts, was also a regular contributor to Reid's reelection campaigns, campaign finance records show, at least \$10,000 from 1998 to 2008. Bigelow has spoken openly in recent years about his views that extraterrestrial visitors frequently travel to Earth. He also purchased the Skinwalker Ranch in Utah, the subject of intense interest among believers in UFOs. Reid and Bigelow did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

According to a Pentagon official, the AATIP program was ended "in the 2012 time frame," but it has recently attracted attention because of the resignation in early October of Luis Elizondo, the career intelligence officer who ran the initiative. In his resignation letter, addressed to Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Elizondo said the efforts of his program were not being taken sufficiently seriously. The Pentagon official could not confirm Mattis had actually seen the letter.

"We tried to work within the system," Elizondo told POLITICO in a recent interview. "We were trying to take the voodoo out of voodoo science."

He described scores of unexplained sightings by Navy pilots and other observers of aircraft with capabilities far beyond what is currently considered aerodynamically possible. The sightings, Elizondo told POLITICO, were often reported in the vicinity of nuclear facilities, either ships at sea or power plants. "We had never seen anything like it."

But, in his view military leadership did not appear alarmed by the potential threat. "If a Russian 'Bear' bomber comes in near California, it is all over the news," he said. "These are coming in the skies over our facilities. Nothing but crickets."

Shortly after his resignation, Elizondo was listed as one of the key players in a for-profit company called To The Stars Academy of Arts and Sciences, co-founded by Tom DeLonge, an entertainment mogul and former guitarist and vocalist for the rock band Blink-182. An April 2016 profile of DeLonge in "Rolling Stone" magazine described his fascination with theories about extraterrestrial space travel as an "obsession."

In a video advertising the company, DeLonge describes To The Stars as a "public benefit corporation" that has "mobilized a team of the most experienced, connected and passionately curious minds from the U.S. intelligence community, including the CIA, Department of Defense, who have been operating under the shadows of top secrecy for decades."

The founders say they believe "there is sufficient credible evidence of UAP [unidentified aerial phenomenon] that proves exotic technologies exist that could revolutionize the human experience."

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The goal of the academy's researchers, it says on its website, is "to use their expertise and credibility to bring transformative science and engineering out of the shadows and collaborate with global citizens to apply that knowledge in a way that benefits humanity," adding "without government restrictions."

Also helping drive the effort is Chris Mellon, a former Democratic staff director for the Senate Intelligence Committee and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence. Other members of the company include a former high-level CIA official and the former director of advanced systems at Lockheed Martin's super-secret Skunk Works facility in California.

"I think we're all frustrated by the fact that our government and science neglects some of the most interesting and provocative and potentially important issues out there," Mellon says in the video.

POLITICO learned of the Pentagon program earlier this fall, shortly after Mellon and his colleagues rolled out their new private effort, which is now seeking investors with a minimum purchase of \$200 in common stock shares. Its website claims 2,142 investors, who have purchased slightly more than \$2 million worth of shares.

At a recent press conference for To The Stars in Las Vegas, Mellon described one of the sightings reported by U.S. Navy pilots: "It is white, oblong, some 40 feet long and perhaps 12 feet thick ... The pilots are astonished to see the object suddenly reorient itself toward the approaching F/A-18. In a series of discreet tumbling maneuvers that seem to defy the laws of physics, the object takes a position directly behind the approaching F/A-18. The pilots capture gun camera footage and infrared imagery of the object. They are outmatched by a technology they've never seen."

"They did not exhibit overt hostility," Elizondo, listed as director of global security and special programs for To The Stars, explained in a recent published interview of the series of reported encounters. "But something unexplained is always assumed to be a potential threat until we are certain it isn't. On the bright side, I believe we are closer than ever before in our understanding of how it operates."

The Pentagon's AATIP program marked a 21st-century effort to replicate some of the decades of inconclusive research undertaken by the Pentagon in 1950s and 1960s to try to explain thousands of reported sightings of unidentified flying objects, or UFOs, by military and civilian pilots and average citizens—particularly an effort known as Project Bluebook that ran from 1947 to 1969 and is still a focus of intense interest for UFO researchers.

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The more recent effort, which was established inside the Defense Intelligence Agency, compiled “reams of paperwork,” but little else, the former staffer said.

Pentagon spokeswoman Dana White confirmed to POLITICO that the program existed and was run by Elizondo. But she could not say how long he was in charge of it and declined to answer detailed questions about the office or its work, citing concerns about the closely held nature of the program.

“The Advanced Aviation Threat Identification Program ended in the 2012 time frame,” White said. “It was determined that there were other, higher priority issues that merited funding and it was in the best interest of the DoD to make a change.”

White added: “The DoD takes seriously all threats and potential threats to our people, our assets, and our mission and takes action whenever credible information is developed.”

But some who were aware of the effort in its earliest days were uncomfortable with the aims of the program, unnerved by the implication that the incidents involved aircraft that were not made by humans.

“I thought it was a little bizarre at the time,” recalled a former senior intelligence official who knew about Reid’s role first-hand. He asked those in the know: “Tell me what this is, and what we are doing and what is going on and that we aren’t doing something that is nonsense here.”

“I was concerned the money was being funneled through it to somebody else who was an associate of Harry Reid’s,” added the former official, who asked not to be identified. “The whole circle was kind of a bizarre piece.”

Reid enlisted the support of Inouye, then chairman of the powerful Appropriations Committee, as well as Stevens, who two sources involved in the effort were told had related to Reid that as a pilot he had personally witnessed similar unexplained aerial phenomenon.

There was also interest among some analysts at the DIA who were concerned that the Russians or Chinese might have developed some more advanced systems. Reid’s views on the subject were also shaped by a book about the Skinwalker Ranch, co-authored by his acquaintance George Knapp, the former congressional staffer said.

“When this was brought to Senator Reid he said, “There is enough here and I am obligated if this is a national security issue to invest some money in this,” he explained. “Stevens and Inouye agreed with this.”

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“I still remember coming back from that meeting and thinking of the implications of what Reid said,” the former senior official said. “I remember being concerned about this. I wanted to make sure it was supervised and we were using the appropriation to do actual research on real threats to the United States.

He said he was assured that the research being done was valid. “It was not a rogue individual out of control.”

The former staffer said that eventually, however, even Reid agreed it was not worth continuing.

“After a while the consensus was we really couldn’t find anything of substance,” he recalled. “They produced reams of paperwork. After all of that there was really nothing there that we could find. It all pretty much dissolved from that reason alone—and the interest level was losing steam. We only did it a couple years.”

“There was really nothing there that we could justify using taxpayer money,” he added. “We let it die a slow death. It was well-spent money in the beginning.”

Theodoric Meyer and Gabriel DeBenedetti contributed tp this report.

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