

#### **OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE** 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

> January 12, 2024 Ref: DODOIG-2023-001013

SENT VIA EMAIL TO: john@greenewald.com

Mr. John Greenewald The Black Vault 27305 W. Live Oak Road, Suite 1203 Castaic, CA 91384-4520

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for "all records and materials submitted or communicated to the Department of Defense Inspector General by David Charles Grusch in or around July 2021." We received your request on June 9, 2023, and assigned it case number DODOIG-2023-001013.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. 552(c). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

The Administrative Investigations Component, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and the Evaluations Component conducted searches and located records responsive to your request. Upon review, we determined that the enclosed 16 pages are appropriate for release in part pursuant to the following FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552) exemptions:

- (b)(5), which pertains to certain inter-and intra-agency communications protected by the deliberative process privilege. The purpose for withholding such recommendations is to encourage the free and candid exchange of opinions and advice during the decision-making process. In applying the foreseeable harm standard, we determined that disclosure of this information is likely to diminish the candor of agency deliberations in the future; and
- (b)(6), which pertains to information, the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

Our review included consideration of the foreseeable harm standard, as stated in DoDM 5400.07. Under this standard, the content of a particular record should be reviewed and a determination made as to whether the DoD Component reasonably foresees that disclosing it, given its age, content, and character, would harm an interest protected by an applicable exemption.

If you consider this an adverse determination, you may submit an appeal. Your appeal, if any, must be postmarked within 90 days of the date of this letter, clearly identify the determination that you would like to appeal, and reference to the FOIA case number above. Send your appeal via mail to the Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, ATTN: FOIA Appellate Authority, Suite 10B24, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500, via email to foiaappeals@dodig.mil, or via facsimile to 571-372-7498. However, please note that FOIA appeals can only examine adverse determinations concerning the FOIA process. For more information on appellate matters and administrative appeal procedures, please refer to 32 C.F.R. Sec. 286.9(e) and 286.11(a).

You may contact our FOIA Public Liaison at FOIAPublicLiaison@dodig.mil, or by calling 703-604-9785, for any further assistance with your request. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road–OGIS, College Park, MD 20740-6001, email at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. However, OGIS does not have the authority to mediate requests made under the Privacy Act of 1974 (request to access one's own records).

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact our office at 703-604-9775 or via email at foiarequests@dodig.mil.

Sincerely,

Searle Slutzkin Division Chief

FOIA, Privacy and Civil Liberties Office

Enclosure(s): As stated

This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

## The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com** 

#### (U) Purpose

- 1. (U) The purpose of this work paper is to document our interview with Major David Grusch on July 12, 2021.
- 2. (U) We interviewed Major Grusch to determine whether he could provide background information that might be relevant to our evaluation.
- 3. (U) The Overall classification of this meeting was at the TOP SECRET//TK//NOFORN level due to the vulnerabilities, subject matter discussed, and potential compilation of information.

#### (U) Sources:

- 1. (U) The interview was conducted on June 12, 2021.
- 2. (U) Attending the interview:
  - A. (U) [Air Force] Major David Grusch
  - B. (U) on behalf of the DoD OIG:
    - (b)(6) ; DoD OIG Evaluations, (b)(6) of the Space, Missile, and Nuclear Division (EVAL/SMN)
    - (b)(6) ; DoD OIG Evaluations, (b)(6) of the Research and Engineering Division (EVAL/R&E)
    - (b)(6); DoD OIG Evaluations (EVAL/SMN), (b)(6)
    - (b)(6); DoD OIG Evaluations (EVAL/Intelligence);

Evaluator

; DoD OIG Evaluations (EVAL/R&E); (b)(6)

#### (U) Scope:

1. (U) The stated objective of the project is to determine what actions the DoD has taken in regard to UAP reporting and policies. The scope of this interview is to determine what efforts DARPA has published, developed, received, and implemented that is associated with UAP sightings and events.

#### (U) Methodology:

1. (U) The interview was accomplished to gain testimonial evidence from a member of the UAP task force to gain a better understanding into what the DoD has done and should be doing regarding the UAP problem set. 2. (U) The team prepared a list of questions to guide the discussion with Major Grusch regarding the DoD's actions taken in response to unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP); however, the interview was conducted in a less structured manner, allowing Major Grusch to provide any information he believed was relevant to our evaluation.

#### A. Summary of Interview:

1. (U) On July 12, 2021, we met with	Major David Grusch to obtain information he had
regarding our evaluation of the DoD's	actions taken in response to unidentified aerial
phenomena (UAP). <sup>(b)(6)</sup>	recommended that we speak to Major Grusch
regarding the topic of our evaluation.	(Refer to the "Source" tab of this work paper for a
specific list of the meeting attendees.)	The Overall classification of this meeting was at
the TOP SECRET//TK//NOFORN leve	el due to the vulnerabilities, subject matter
discussed, and potential compilation of	of information. The remainder of this work paper
summarizes the discussion that occur	red during the meeting and the statements that
were attributed to Major David Grusch	. Major Grusch provided us with general
background information on the DoD's	actions regarding UAP (to his knowledge).

2. (U) Major Grusch stated that <sup>(b)(6)</sup>	I
. He stated that he "has	
peen studying UAPs for 15 years" and that he serves as the NRO liaison to the UAP	
ask Force.	

- 3. (U) Major Grusch stated that there was no formal reporting mechanism for reporting UAP observations and initiating investigations. However, he stated that there were "some forms" that should be e-mailed to (b)(6)
- 4. (U) Major Grusch stated that [in his opinion] the analysis done for the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) UAP report "was not very in-depth."
- 5. (U) Major Grusch stated that we should speak with (b)(6), an Air Force point of contact, regarding potential recovered UAP materials.

6. (U) Major Grusch stated that he recommended the DoD fund and conduct "red and blue assessments" [of UAP], in addition to establishing a permanent office to investigate what he called "strategic anomalies." Additionally, Major Grusch provided us with a copy of a briefing regarding a proposed permanent office to handle such strategic anomalies (including UAP).

#### (U) Conclusion

1. (U) Major Grusch provided us with general background information on the DoD's actions regarding UAP (to his knowledge).


(U) Update by (b)(6) 1/6/2023: (b)(5)



# Strategic Anomaly Resolution

### Background






#### **Strategic Anomalies**



All are explainable (weather, airplane, balloon, space debris, etc)








90 % are explainable 10% are from somewhere else



**Theories** 



# Background


# A Task Force is Temporary

What should an enduring, comprehensive capability look like?





Key Questions Lines of Effort (L			
Primary	Focus		
What is it? – Scope & Severity	(1) Operations & Intelligence		
How does it work?	(2) Research & Development		
Secondary	Enablers		
What do we do about it?	(3) Policy		
How do we talk about it	(4) Communication		
How do we work with others?	(5) Partnerships		
How do we protect our equities?	(6) Security		



### **Focus Areas**


Operations & Intel	Research & Development		
Patterns/Characteristics Open Source, Classified, & Direct Witness Reporting	Knowledge Management & Data mining Support Ops/Analysis, Data Sharing, Visualization		
Control Variables Dedicated Collection Campaigns	Collection Infrastructure Tailored for Missions, Calibrated, Repeatable		
Avoid Strategic Surprise Collection on foreign programs	Hypothesis Generation Academics, Experimentalists, Engineers Co-located		
Rapid Breakthroughs Recovery	Reengineering Infrastructure & Experts		
Assess Risk Threat Assessment	Tech Transfer Intellectual Property protection, exploitation		



### **Enablers**

Policy	Communication		
NSS Policy Update	Implement SM Strategy		
Strategic Messaging (SM) Strategy	Academic Institutions		
	Public Affairs & Media Interaction		
Partnerships	Security		
Inter-Agency	Layered Approach		
International	IT, Infrastructure, & Contracting		
Coordinated Campaigns	Counter-Intelligence		

### **COAs**



COA	FY21-22 (Transition)	FY 23 (IOC)	FY 24+ (Enduring)	Pros	Cons
1 (Status Quo)	Task Force Only (~\$0-10M)	Task Force Only (~\$5-10M)	Task Force Only (~\$5-10M/year)	Low Cost Inter-agency	Slow Progress, Resilience
2 (Safe)	Task Force + Office (~\$5M)	Office/OSAR (~\$15-20M)	Office/OSAR (~\$30-50 M/year)	Dual Use, Fast Start	Enduring Funding Risk
3 (Hail Mary)	Task Force/ Office (~\$15 M)	OSAR/Federal Lab (~\$30M)	OSAR/Federal Lab (~\$30-200M/year)	Dual Use, Fast Start, Comprehensive, High likelihood of Enduring Cap	Future Cost Growth


<sup>\*\*\*\*</sup>Costs are based on not knowing the full scope of activities required\*\*\*

OSAR - Office of Strategic Anomaly Resolution



# Backup


# Strategic Anomaly and Observation Resolution (SOAR) Prototype



### Knowledge Management & Visualization

#### **Goals:**


- Create an environment to capture, store, and interact with data in an intuitive and rapid manner
- 2) Integrate an analytics package to create both standardized and customizable outputs for trend analysis and prediction
- 3) Incorporate Artificial Intelligence algorithms to continually assess data quality through association or erroneous data identification



Project Blue Book Used as First Test Case


### Visualization (Project Bluebook Example)





### **Observations**






Date
Time
Description
Quality Score
Latitude Longitude
Attributes
Associated Files
-Video
-Pictures
-Tracks
-Reports

# **Data Analytics**





### Federal Lab → Tech Exploitation



### **Future Power Competition**

A Federal Laboratory would focus on advancing traditional <u>and</u> quantum physics-based breakthroughs in three 3 key space centric technology areas:

- -> Propulsion
- -> Power Generation/Storage
- -> Advanced Materials

A Federal Laboratory would drive innovation, retain enduring subject matter expertise, and ensure technology cross-flow to stakeholders to promote economic growth, exploration, and security in space

