



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

June 13, 2024
Ref: DODOIG-2024-000309

SENT VIA EMAIL TO: john@greenewald.com

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.
The Black Vault
27305 W. Live Oak Road, Suite 1203
Castaic, CA 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for “a copy of ALL emails that are to/from (bcc’d or cc’d) the Department of Defense OIG office, and Garry Reid, Director for Defense Intelligence (Intelligence and Security), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,” from January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022. We received your request on February 29, 2024, and assigned it case number DODOIG-2024-000309.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. 552(c). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

The Mission Support Team conducted a search and located records responsive to your request. Upon review, we determined that the enclosed 132 pages are appropriate for release in part, and 31 pages are exempt from release in their entirety, pursuant to the following FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552) exemptions:

- (b)(5), which pertains to certain inter-and intra-agency communications protected by the deliberative process privilege. The purpose for withholding such recommendations is to encourage the free and candid exchange of opinions and advice during the decision-making process. In applying the foreseeable harm standard, we determined that disclosure of this information is likely to diminish the candor of agency deliberations in the future; and
- (b)(6), which pertains to information, the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

For your reference, the 31 pages being denied in their entirety consist of a discussion draft of the report that was ultimately published as DODIG-2022-095, Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the Armed Forces. A copy of the final report is included as part of our release packet.

Our review included consideration of the foreseeable harm standard, as stated in DoDM 5400.07. Under this standard, the content of a particular record should be reviewed and a determination made as to whether the DoD Component reasonably foresees that disclosing it, given its age, content, and character, would harm an interest protected by an applicable exemption.

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If you consider this an adverse determination, you may submit an appeal. Your appeal, if any, must be postmarked within 90 days of the date of this letter, clearly identify the determination that you would like to appeal, and reference to the FOIA case number above. Send your appeal via mail to the Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, ATTN: FOIA Appellate Authority, Suite 10B24, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500, via email to foiaappeals@dodig.mil, or via facsimile to 571-372-7498. However, please note that FOIA appeals can only examine adverse determinations concerning the FOIA process. For more information on appellate matters and administrative appeal procedures, please refer to 32 C.F.R. Sec. 286.9(e) and 286.11(a).

During our review, we determined that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff (OSD/JS) is the release authority for documents that may be responsive to your request. Therefore, we have referred those pages to the OSD/JS FOIA Requester Service Center, Freedom of Information Division, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155, for processing and direct response to you. If you would like to inquire about the status of this portion of your request, please contact OSD/JS directly by calling 571-372-0498 or by sending an email to whs.mc-alex.esd.mbx.osd-js-foia-requester-service-center@mail.mil. You may also visit their website at <https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOID.aspx> for further information.

You may contact our FOIA Public Liaison at FOIAPublicLiaison@dodig.mil, or by calling 703-604-9785, for any further assistance with your request. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, MD 20740-6001, email at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. However, OGIS does not have the authority to mediate requests made under the Privacy Act of 1974 (request to access one's own records).

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Ms. Toni Chism at 703-604-9775 or via email at foiarequests@dodig.mil.

Sincerely,




Searle Slutzkin
Division Chief
FOIA, Privacy and Civil Liberties Office

Enclosure(s):
As stated

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

From
To

(b) (6) [redacted] OIG DoD" (b) (6) [redacted] @DODIG.MIL>
 (b) (6) [redacted] OSD OUSD P-R (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 (b) (6) [redacted] OSD OUSD P-R (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, "MILLER,
 Stephanie P SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] OSD OUSD P-R (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
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 [redacted] OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, "Condo,
 Janice L SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>,
 (b) (6) [redacted] OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>,
 "Millick, Brad A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>,
 "Blake, Matthew J SES OSD (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, "Reid, Garry
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Subject: DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report - Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000, DoD Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism in the Armed Forces

Importance: High
 Good Afternoon,

Attached is the DoD OIG Evaluations discussion draft report for project D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000 - "DoD Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism in the Armed Forces" for your review and comment. We are sending this discussion draft to the organizations that provided information or documentation supporting this report. This report is for discussion purposes only and does not require a formal organizational response. Please review the discussion draft report to ensure it is factually accurate, and notify us of any information that is not factually accurate by close of business Friday, January 14, 2022. For any disputed information reported within this discussion draft, please provide evidence supporting the dispute.

This discussion draft report contains recommendations that will be included in the draft report and will require an official response. When the draft report is issued, a formal organization letter head response will be required within 30 days of issuance. Consequently, responses received to the recommendations in our draft report will be included in our final report. We encourage organizations to begin developing response to the draft report recommendations upon receipt of the discussion draft to ensure your responses are received with sufficient time to be included in our final report.

Also attached is a request for security marking review form; please reference the form for detailed instructions on its completion. We request that you review the discussion draft and identify any inaccurate paragraph markings or potential compilation issues. Your review will ensure markings are correctly applied. Please have the appropriate security POC complete the attached "Request for Security Marking Review" document and identify the correct classification or handling instruction markings for any information that is not marked.

In accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5200.48, "Controlled Unclassified Information," March 6, 2020, we request that you, as an original source of the information, review the attached to determine whether:

- # the markings and portion#markings are accurate and reflect the status of CUI;
- # information that is not marked should be marked; and
- # any compilation of data affects the overall marking.

Additionally, please identify the agency and office that controls the CUI information, as well as the CUI category, distribution or dissemination controls, and the point of contact to discuss CUI-related matters.

We also request your office review what DoDI 5200.48 refers to as "legacy information" marked as FOUO and let us know if your agency or department has re-categorized this information as CUI. If you have not begun the steps to re-categorize the legacy FOUO information as CUI, please simply let us know and determine whether:

- # the markings and portion#markings are accurate and reflect the security status of FOUO;
- # any information that is not marked that should be marked; and
- # any compilation of data that affects the overall marking.

Also, if the report contains legacy FOUO information, please provide the appropriate FOIA exemptions.

By close of business on January 14, 2022, please transmit comments to the discussion draft report and the request for security marking review form to:

-(b) (6) (b) (6) @dodig.mil, (b) (6)
 -(b) (6) (b) (6) @dodig.mil, (b) (6)

If you would like to discuss your questions and comments, please let us know as soon as possible.

It is important to safeguard this report to prevent publication or other improper disclosure of the information it contains. This DoD OIG discussion draft report should not be disseminated to personnel outside of the organizations receiving this message.

Thank you for your assistance and review of this important DoD OIG discussion draft report.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

Evaluations Component - Program Evaluations II
 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Unclassified (b) (6)
 Mobile (b) (6)
 NIPR (b) (6) @dodig.mil
 SIPR (b) (6) @dodig.smil.mil
 JWICS searchable in JWICS GAL

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Attachment Name : DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report - DoD Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism in the Armed Forces (Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000).pdf

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Attachment Name : DoD OIG Discussion Draft Report - Security Marking Request.pdf

Request for Security Marking Review

Request Date

January 7, 2022

The attached was developed by the DoD OIG using original classification sources. We marked the pages and portion-marked the paragraphs, as necessary, in accordance with DoD Manual 5200.01, "DoD Information Security Program," and DoD Instruction 5200.48, "Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)," based on classification information and security markings provided by the original sources. Additionally, we underlined the specific CUI, legacy FOUO, and classified information, as necessary, to make it easier to identify.

We request that you, as an original source of the information, review the attached to determine if:

- the markings and portion-markings are accurate and reflect the security status identified below;
- information that is not marked should be marked;
- information that is marked FOUO can be converted to CUI or if the legacy FOUO information will remain FOUO; or
- any compilation of data affects the overall marking.

As part of your review, please bracket or underline the specific information you believe to be either CUI, legacy FOUO, or classified, as necessary. If the report contains CUI, please identify the agency and the office that the information is controlled by, the CUI category, the distribution and dissemination controls, and the CUI POC. If the report contains FOUO or classified information, please provide applicable FOIA exemptions, national security policy, classification guides, or other sources that support the identified information.

Failure to notify the DoD OIG of CUI, legacy FOUO, or classified information that is not marked correctly could result in the public release of that information.

Unclassified. The attachment is unclassified and does not contain CUI or legacy FOUO, or classified information. Therefore, none of the information has been portion-marked. However, the draft version of the attachment is marked CUI and/or FOUO while it remains in a draft status. The CUI and/or FOUO markings will be removed from the final version.

CUI/ FOUO. The attachment is CUI or FOUO and the pages have been marked and paragraphs portion-marked. The underlined content is the information specifically identified as CUI or FOUO, to assist with this review. This report does not contain classified information.

- When attachment is removed, this document is not CUI.
- When attachment is removed, this document is CUI.

Controlled by:

CUI Category:

Distribution/ Dissemination:

POC:

Classified. The attachment is derivatively classified. The attachment is marked at the highest classification level identified. The underlined content is the information specifically identified as either CUI, legacy FOUO, or classified, to assist with this review.

Report Title

DoD Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism in the Armed Forces

Project Number

D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000

Submit your review by:

January 14, 2022

If you have any questions, please contact:

Name (b) (6)

Title (b) (6)

Phone (b) (6)

E-mail (b) (6)@dodig.mil

Section to be completed by the reviewing official:

Organization Name

Reviewer's Name

Reviewer's Title

Reviewer's Phone

Reviewer's E-mail

If the entire attachment was not reviewed, identify the section(s) and page(s) that you reviewed as they pertain to your activity:

Please check one:

- I reviewed the attachment and I have no changes to the classification or markings.
- I reviewed the attachment's security markings, identified changes to the markings, and provided comments with this review.

By signing below, I acknowledge that I have the proper authority to make the security and release determinations for the attachment.

Reviewer's Signature

Date

Additional comments or notations:

From: (b) (6) OIG DoD" (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>
 To: (b) (6) OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) @mail.mil>, "Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) @mail.mil>
 Cc: (b) (6) OIG DoD" (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>, (b) (6) OIG DoD" (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>, "Jones, Tara L SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) @mail.mil>, (b) (6) OIG DoD" (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>, (b) (6) OIG DoD" (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>, (b) (6) (USA)" (b) (6) @mail.mil>
 Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)
 Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 14:04:41 +0000
 Message-Id: <79e83f14a5c64571ac6d8d0163c1084b@DODIG.MIL>

(b) (6)
 That is fine. I will send a conference line momentarily.

(b) (6)
 -----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>
 Sent: Sunday, January 23, 2022 10:57 AM
 To: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>
 Cc: (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; Jones, Tara L SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>

Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

(b) (6)--
 Have to apologize again. Are you able to bump up our chat to 12:30-1:30 on 24 Jan? I'm sorry, but I forgot about an appt I have @ 2pm. If this doesn't work on your end, then we can discuss another date/time.

Best,
 (b) (6)
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intel & Security)
 Counterintelligence & Law Enforcement Directorate (CILED)

(b) (6)
 Office: (b) (6)
 Personal Cell/Telework: (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----
 From: (b) (6) OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>
 Sent: Friday, January 21, 2022 3:56 PM
 To: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>
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Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons
From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

(b) (6) --

Apologies . . . 24 Jan @ 1300 works even better for us, as long as that's
still good for you.

Best,

(b) (6)

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intel & Security)
Counterintelligence & Law Enforcement Directorate (CILED)

(b) (6)

Office: (b) (6)

Personal Cell/Telework: (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

Sent: Friday, January 21, 2022 3:52 PM

To: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

(b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) (USA)

(b) (6) @dodig.mil>

Cc: (b) (6) (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6)

OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; Jones, Tara L SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC

(USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) (USA)

(b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) (USA)

(b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) NGIC (USA)

(b) (6) @mail.mil>

Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons
From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

(b) (6) --

24 Jan @ 1030 works just fine; low-side conference call?

Best,

(b) (6)

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intel & Security)
Counterintelligence & Law Enforcement Directorate (CILED)

(b) (6)

Office: (b) (6)

Personal Cell/Telework: (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

(b) (6) @mail.mil>

Sent: Friday, January 21, 2022 2:27 PM

To: (b) (6) (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>

Cc: (b) (6) (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6)

OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OSD OUSD INTEL &

SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; Jones, Tara L SES OSD OUSD INTEL &

SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) (USA)

(b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) (USA)

(b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) NGIC (USA)

(b) (6) @mail.mil>

Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons
From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

Checking with the team - (b) (6) or (b) (6) will reach out to you directly to set
this up.

Vr

garry

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) [REDACTED] OIG DoD (b) (6) [REDACTED] @DODIG.MIL>
 Sent: Friday, January 21, 2022 2:05 PM
 To: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED] @mail.mil>
 Cc: (b) (6) [REDACTED] (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED] @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) [REDACTED]
 OIG DoD (b) (6) [REDACTED] @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) [REDACTED] OSD OUSD INTEL &
 SEC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED] @mail.mil>; Jones, Tara L SES OSD OUSD INTEL &
 SEC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED] @mail.mil>; (b) (6) [REDACTED] (USA)
 (b) (6) [REDACTED] @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) [REDACTED] (USA)
 (b) (6) [REDACTED] @dodig.mil>

Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons
 From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

Garry,

Thank you for your quick response and documentation. Does Monday (24th) at
 1030 or 1300 work. If not, we are basically good to go all day Tuesday.

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
 (b) (6) [REDACTED] @mail.mil>
 Sent: Friday, January 21, 2022 2:01 PM
 To: (b) (6) [REDACTED] OIG DoD (b) (6) [REDACTED] @DODIG.MIL>
 Cc: (b) (6) [REDACTED], OIG DoD (b) (6) [REDACTED] @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) [REDACTED]
 OIG DoD (b) (6) [REDACTED] @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) [REDACTED] OSD OUSD INTEL &
 SEC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED] @mail.mil>; Jones, Tara L SES OSD OUSD INTEL &
 SEC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED] @mail.mil>; (b) (6) [REDACTED], OIG DoD
 (b) (6) [REDACTED] @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) [REDACTED] OIG DoD
 (b) (6) [REDACTED] @DODIG.MIL>

Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons
 From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

Thanks, we can make (b) (6) and his team available by conference call at your
 convenience next week. What works for you?

Attaching information pertaining to "voluntary departures". Note initial
 guidance dated Aug 29th left the option for Afghans to get vaccines and
 other processing on their own provided they did so within 7 days. After the
 Safe Havens started flagging concerns - as I recall the DoD team at Ft Bliss
 was the first to raise it - that people were "walking off" the base at will,
 DHS re-issued the guidance and made completion of medical and other
 processing a mandatory element of parolee status. Therefore the Sept 6
 guidance stipulates they must stay at the Government facility until the
 processing is complete. Also note Sep 5 guidance to DoD that immunizations
 are required before departure. These document support our recommended edit
 on this issue.

Also note US Citizens and LPRs (Green Card holders) were never subject to
 these parole conditions since they are already cleared to enter the US.

Some did however elect to stay in the safehavens with relatives that were
 pending parolee status.

Vr

Garry

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) [REDACTED] OIG DoD (b) (6) [REDACTED] @DODIG.MIL>
 Sent: Friday, January 21, 2022 12:56 PM
 To: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED] @mail.mil>
 Cc: (b) (6) [REDACTED] (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED] @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) [REDACTED]
 OIG DoD (b) (6) [REDACTED] @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) [REDACTED] OSD OUSD INTEL &
 SEC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED] @mail.mil>; Jones, Tara L SES OSD OUSD INTEL &
 SEC (USA) (b) (6) [REDACTED] @mail.mil>; (b) (6) [REDACTED] (USA)

(b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) (USA)
(b) (6) @dodig.mil>

Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons
From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

Mr. Reid,

We have reviewed all comments. We accepted and incorporated most, but would like to follow up and discuss a couple. I have attached our responses (highlighted responses). Additionally, there were many requests to mark paragraphs CUI. As we would like to get as much out to the public as possible, we need to discuss what specific information in these paragraphs are CUI. (b) (5)

. Please provide us with a date and time we could conduct a conference call with designated members of your team. Thank you.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Overseas Contingency Operations Evaluations
Department of Defense
Office of the Inspector General

(b) (6)

BlackBerry: (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)

(b) (6) @mail.mil>

Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2022 4:03 PM

To: (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>

Cc: (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6)

OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OSD OUSD INTEL &

SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; Jones, Tara L SES OSD OUSD INTEL &

SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6), OIG DoD

(b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD

(b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>

Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons
From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

Great, thanks!!

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>

Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2022 3:44 PM

To: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>

Cc: (b) (6) (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6)

OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OSD OUSD INTEL &

SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; Jones, Tara L SES OSD OUSD INTEL &

SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) (USA)

(b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) (USA)

(b) (6) @dodig.mil>

Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons
From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

Mr. Reid,

Received. Thank you for your input. It will take a day or two to look over the comments. We will likely need to circle back with (b) (6) for further discussion and to request supporting documentation. I will send out an email in the near future to discuss conference call dates.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
Overseas Contingency Operations Evaluations
Department of Defense
Office of the Inspector General
(b) (6)
BlackBerry: (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
(b) (6) @mail.mil>
Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2022 1:40 PM
To: (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>
Cc: (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; Jones, Tara L SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>
Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)
Per your request, the OUSDI&S comments are provided. Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft. Please let me know if there's anything we can do to assist you.

Vr
Garry

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>
Sent: Tuesday, January 4, 2022 4:31 PM
To: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
(b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) NGIC (USA)
(b) (6) @army.mil>; (b) (6) NGIC (USA)
(b) (6) @army.mil>; (b) (6) NGIC (USA)
(b) (6) @army.mil>; (b) (6) HQDA DFBA
(USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) JS J3 (USA)
(b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) NORAD-USNC
SPC STF (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) HQDA DCS G-2 (USA) (b) (6) @army.mil>; OSD Pentagon OUSD Policy List GAO Team <(b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) JS DOM (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) NORAD-USNC SPC STF (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; JS Pentagon DoM Mailbox Joint Secretariat <(b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) @army.mil>; (b) (6) @navy.mil Cc: (b) (6) @us.af.mil>; (b) (6) @us.af.mil>; (b) (6) HQDA OTIG (USA) (b) (6) @army.mil>; (b) (6) @navy.mil>; (b) (6) OSD OUSD C (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) OSD OUSD C (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; HQMCAuditLiaisons <(b) (6) @usmc.mil>; OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec Mailbox CoS ExecSec <(b) (6) @mail.mil>; Roark, Michael J SES (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) DODIG (USA) (b) (6) @us.navy.mil>; (b) (6) DODIG (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) DODIG (USA)

(b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) DODIG (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>;
 Meyer, Troy M SES (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) DODIG
 (USA) (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) (USA)
 (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; (b) (6) (USA)
 (b) (6) @dodig.mil>; Kilgo, Mitchell L MG USARMY HQDA OTIG (USA)
 (b) (6) @army.mil>; (b) (6)
 (b) (6) @oig.dhs.gov>; (b) (6)
 (b) (6) @oig.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons
 From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

Good afternoon,

I did not attach the report on the last email. I apologize for the
 inconvenience. Please find the DRAFT REPORT attached.

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) OIG DoD

Sent: Tuesday, January 4, 2022 4:20 PM

To: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>;

(b) (6) NGIC (USA) (b) (6) @army.mil>;

(b) (6) NGIC (USA) (b) (6) @army.mil>; (b) (6)

NGIC (USA) (b) (6) @army.mil>; (b) (6)

HQDA DFBA (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>;

(b) (6) JS J3 (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6)

NORAD-USNC SPC STF (USA)

(b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) HQDA DCS G-2

(USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>;

(b) (6) @mail.mil'

<(b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) JS DOM

(USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) NORAD-USNC SPC STF

(USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; JS Pentagon DoM Mailbox Joint

Secretariat <(b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6)

JS J2 (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>;

(b) (6) @army.mil'

<(b) (6) @army.mil>;

(b) (6) @navy.mil' <(b) (6) @navy.mil>

Cc: (b) (6) @us.af.mil' <(b) (6) @us.af.mil>;

(b) (6) @us.af.mil' <(b) (6) @us.af.mil>;

(b) (6) HQDA OTIG (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>;

(b) (6) @navy.mil'

<(b) (6) @navy.mil>; (b) (6) OSD OUSD C

(USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) OSD OUSD C (USA)

(b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) OSD OUSD C (USA)

(b) (6) @mail.mil>; HQMCAuditLiaisons

<(b) (6) @usmc.mil>; OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec Mailbox CoS

ExecSec <(b) (6) @mail.mil>; Roark,

Michael J., SES, OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD

(b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD

(b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD

(b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD

(b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD

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(b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD

(b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; Meyer,

Troy M., SES, OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD

(b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD

(b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) OIG DoD

(b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>; (b) (6) @mail.mil'

(b) (6) @mail.mil>; (b) (6) '
(b) (6) @oig.dhs.gov>; (b) (6) '
(b) (6) @oig.dhs.gov>

Subject: DRAFT REPORT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons From Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

Good afternoon.

We are providing this DRAFT REPORT for your review and comment on the recommendation and the report's public release. We conducted this evaluation from September 2021 through November 2021 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

For the recommendation review, we will attach your response to the final report. In your response, please state whether you agree or disagree with each of the recommendations. If you agree with our recommendation, describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendations and include the actual or planned completion dates of your actions. If you disagree that the recommendations can be implemented, please provide the reasons why you disagree and propose alternative corrective actions in your response for our consideration. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly.

Potential Release to the Public and to Congress, and Report Markings. We will consider releasing this report to the public and Congress, consistent with the authorities and responsibilities of the DoD OIG and the markings applied to the final report. CUI may be exempt from public release or release to Congress provided the information falls within a protected CUI category and is subject to a limited dissemination control (LDC) prohibiting dissemination outside the Executive Branch. DoD CUI categories and LDCs are located at DoD CUI Program website <https://www.dodcui.mil/>.

Additionally, legacy FOUO information may be exempt from public release if it qualifies as CUI. Your office has a substantial interest in this report, so we ask whether you believe any specific information in the draft report, as well as your response to the draft, is exempt from release in accordance with an applicable CUI category or under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), United States Code, Title 5, Section 552.

Your management or appropriate security official, on behalf of the originating office of information contained in our report, should review the report to identify any information you believe to be CUI and ensure that information is appropriately marked CUI. This includes legacy FOUO information. While the DoD CUI Program does not require the re-marking of documents bearing legacy markings, any new document created with information derived from legacy material, including this DoD OIG report, must be marked as CUI if the information qualifies as CUI. We require your assistance to make this assessment for your legacy information, if any. Note: We will not carry forward legacy FOUO markings in the final DoD OIG report. Please bracket or underline the specific words or sentences in each paragraph you believe are CUI. For any CUI identified, specify the applicable CUI category in each instance. Also, please specify any applicable limited dissemination control.

Failure to notify the DoD OIG of CUI within the time frame requested, or failure to determine and provide proper CUI markings for legacy FOUO information, could result in the unintended public release of that information.

You must NOT distribute, share, or use the enclosed information for any purpose other than providing management comments or considering information exempt from release pursuant to the DoD CUI Program.

Please send a PDF file containing your comments on the recommendations and public release review to (b) (6) @dodig.mil by January 20, 2022, in order for them to be considered in the final report. If you arrange to send

classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. If you have any questions, please contact (b) (6) at (b) (6) (DSN (b) (6)). We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

Overseas Contingency Operations Evaluations Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General

(b) (6)

BlackBerry: (b) (6)

~~This e-mail is from the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD-OIG). It may contain Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), including information that is Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES), subject to the Privacy Act, and/or other privileges and restrictions that prohibit release without appropriate legal authority. Do not disseminate without the approval of the DoD-OIG. If received in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete all copies of this message.~~

.....

Attachment Name : smime.p7s

From (b) (6) OIG DoD" (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>
 To (b) (6) , OIG DoD" (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>, "Jones, Tara L SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) @mail.mil>, (b) (6) , OIG DoD" (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>, (b) (6) , OIG DoD" (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>, (b) (6) (USA)" <(b) (6) @mail.mil>, "Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" <(b) (6) @mail.mil>
 Subject Meeting to discuss USD(I&S) resposnes
 Date Mon, 24 Jan 2022 14:10:13 +0000
 Message-Id <82b23613382f41d6b22bbab8694eecb5@DODIG.MIL>

Conference call to review a couple of responses to the report. Please feel free to forward this invite.

EXTERNAL CALLERS
 COM: 703-699-6060
 DSN: 499-6060
 Call ID (b) (6) #
 Meeting PIN (b) (6) #

.....

Attachment Name : Response to USD I&S comments.pdf

From
To

(b) (6) [redacted] OIG DoD" (b) (6) [redacted] @DODIG.MIL>
 (b) (6) [redacted] OSD OUSD P-R (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] OSD OUSD P-R (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, "MILLER,
 Stephanie P SES OSD OUSD P-R (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] OSD OUSD P-R (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] OSD OUSD P-R (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>,
 (b) (6) [redacted] (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] OSD OUSD POLICY (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, "Condo,
 Janice L SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>,
 (b) (6) [redacted] OSD OUSD INTEL (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>,
 "Millick, Brad A SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>,
 "Blake, Matthew J SES OSD (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, "Reid, Garry
 P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, "Jones, Tara
 L SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] OSD OGC (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, "Sullivan, Dwight H
 SES OSD OGC (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] JS J5 (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] JS J5 (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, "Leahy, Kevin C BG
 USARMY JS J5 (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted] JS
 J5 (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted] JS J5
 (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted] JS J5 (USA)"
 (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil"
 (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil", (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>,
 (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] @mail.mil" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil"
 [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil" (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted] HQDA ASA MRA (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted] HQDA DCS G-1
 (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] HQDA ASA MRA (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] HQDA DCS G-1 (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @mail.mil>,
 (b) (6) [redacted] HQDA ARBA (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted] @ma
 il.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted] HQDA (USA)" (b) (6) [redacted]
 [redacted] @mail.mil>, (b) (6) [redacted] @army.mil" (b) (6) [redacted] @ar
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Good Afternoon,

The Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG), is providing the attached draft report for review - Department of Defense Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the Armed Forces (Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000). The evaluation that produced this report was conducted in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

This report will be considered for public release consistent with the control markings applied to the final report. Your office has a substantial interest in this report, so we ask whether you believe any specific information in the draft report, as well as your response to that draft, is categorized as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 or other statute, regulation, or authority.

Management or appropriate security official, as the originating office of the information, should review the report to identify any information you believe to be CUI, and ensure that information is appropriately marked CUI. Please bracket or underline the specific sentences in each paragraph you believe are categorized as CUI or exempt from release under the FOIA or other statute, regulation, or authority. In addition, you should identify the specific CUI category or FOIA exemption, statute, regulation, or authority for each piece of information marked, with a detailed rationale justifying why the marked information is exempt from public release. The originating office of FOUO information should also assess and convert, when appropriate, the FOUO designation to CUI. Failure to notify the DoD OIG of CUI or FOUO within the time frame requested could result in the public release of that information. The enclosed copy must NOT be distributed, shared, or used for any purpose other than for providing management comments or considering information exempt from release under FOIA.

Please provide your written response to the draft report in official letter head format by March 3, 2022, specifying corrective actions taken or planned on the recommendations and proposed completion dates for implementation of such actions. Your responses along with our conclusions will be incorporated into the final report. If you have any questions regarding this request for review, please contact (b) (6)

(b) (6) at (b) (6), (b) (6) @dodig.mil, or (b) (6), (b) (6) @dodig.mil.

(b) (6)

Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General

Office: (b) (6)

Cell: (b) (6)

Attachment Name : DRAFT Report - Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism in the Armed Forces.pdf

Attachment Name : DoD OIG Announcement Memorandum, Project D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000.pdf



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

January 14, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND
READINESS
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Develop and Implement Policy and Procedures Addressing Ideological Extremism Within the U.S. Armed Forces (Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000)

The DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) plans to begin the evaluation in January 2021. Our objective is to determine the extent to which the DoD and the Military Services have implemented policy and procedures that prohibit active advocacy and active participation related to supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes by active duty military personnel, as required by DoD Instruction 1325.06. The DoD OIG may revise or expand the objective and scope as the evaluation proceeds, and we will consider suggestions from management for additional or revised objectives.

We will perform the evaluation at the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the General Counsel for the DoD, and the Military Service Secretaries. We will include in our review the Military Departments and subordinate agencies that recruit, train, and sustain active duty military forces. We may identify additional offices and personnel during the evaluation.

Please provide a point of contact for the evaluation within **5 days** of the date of this memorandum. The point of contact should be a U.S. Government employee, GS-15, or pay band equivalent, or the military equivalent. Provide the contact's name, title, grade/pay band, phone number, and e-mail address to (b) (6) at (b) (6) [@dodig.mil](mailto:(b) (6)@dodig.mil).

You can obtain information about the DoD Office of Inspector General from DoD Directive 5106.01, "Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG DoD)," April 20, 2012, as amended, DoD Directive 5106.04, "Defense Inspectors General," May 22, 2014, and DoD Instruction 7050.03, "Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense Access to Records and Information," March 22, 2013. Our website is www.dodig.mil.

If you have any questions about this evaluation, please contact (b) (6) at (b) (6) (b) (6), (b) (6) @dodig.mil, or (b) (6) at (b) (6), (b) (6) @dodig.mil.



Carolyn R. Hantz
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs, Combatant Commands, and
Overseas Contingency Operations

cc:

INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

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 To "Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) @mail.mil>,
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 Subject FW: Final Report - Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons From Afghanistan
 (Report No. DODIG-2022#065)
 Date Tue, 15 Feb 2022 21:50:30 +0000
 Message-Id <4cb2820efb724e27b1f4036825593456@DODIG.MIL>

Good Afternoon

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General has completed the Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan. A copy of the final report is attached.
 In addition to providing your organizations with a copy of the report, we will provide this report to the Secretary of Defense on February 15, 2022, and to Congress on February 16, 2022. The report will be posted to the DoD OIG public webpage on February 17, 2022.

If you have any questions, please direct them to (b) (6), at (b) (6) (e-mail: (b) (6) @dodig.mil) or to (b) (6) at (b) (6) (e-mail: (b) (6) @dodig.mil).

Regards

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Evaluations / DoD Office of Inspector General

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-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6), OIG DoD
 Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2022 4:16 PM
 To: JS Pentagon DoM Mailbox Joint Secretariat <(b) (6) @mail.mil>;
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Subject: Final Report - Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons From Afghanistan (Report No. DODIG-2022065)

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General has completed the Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan. A copy of the final report is attached.
 In addition to providing your organizations with a copy of the report, we will provide this report to the Secretary of Defense on February 15, 2022, and to Congress on February 16, 2022. The report will be posted to the DoD OIG public webpage on February 17, 2022.

If your organization would like to provide additional comments to the final report, they can be sent as a PDF file to (b) (6) @dodig.mil. Your additional comments will not be included in the final report, but will be used by the DoD OIG to assess and track management's response to the recommendations.

For any additional comments, the DoD OIG requires an actual signature (digital is acceptable) of the authorizing official for your organization. If your official comments are classified confidential or SECRET, please arrange to send those comments over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to (b) (6) @dodig.smil.mil.

If you have any questions, please direct them to (b) (6) , at (b) (6) (e-mail: (b) (6) @dodig.mil) or to (b) (6) at (b) (6) (e-mail: (b) (6) @dodig.mil).

Regards

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Evaluations / DoD Office of Inspector General

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
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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

FEBRUARY 15, 2022



Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE





**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

February 15, 2022


wMEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan
(Report No. DODIG-2022-065)

This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

This report contains one recommendation that is considered closed and one recommendation that is resolved, but open. The Department of Homeland Security and the National Ground Intelligence Center issued an updated sharing agreement on December 10, 2012, that extends the National Ground Intelligence Center's access to Customs and Border Protection data until June 27, 2022. This action taken meets the intent of Recommendation 1; therefore, we consider this recommendation closed. The United States Northern Command Chief of Staff, responding on behalf of the United States Northern Command Commander, non-concurred with Recommendation 2, stating that the United States Northern Command does not have the authority to address the recommendation. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement), responding on behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, agreed with Recommendation 2, but requested it be directed to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security for action. Therefore, we have redirected Recommendation 2 to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and consider the recommendation resolved, but open. We will close the recommendation when we receive verification that procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with DoD and interagency stakeholders are in place.

DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Send your response to either (b) (6) [@dodig.mil](mailto:(b) (6)@dodig.mil) if unclassified or (b) (6) [@dodig.smil.mil](mailto:(b) (6)@dodig.smil.mil) if classified SECRET. If you have any questions, please contact (b) (6) at (b) (6) (DSN (b) (6)).



Andre Brown

Acting Assistant Inspector General for
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Overseas
Contingency Operations Evaluations Directorate

Executive Summary

The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD managed and tracked displaced persons from Afghanistan through the biometric enrollment, screening, and vetting process. We determined that the DoD had a supporting role during the biometric enrollment of Afghan evacuees in staging locations outside the continental United States (OCONUS) and assisted in screening Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants. However, the DoD did not have a role in enrolling, screening, or overseeing the departure of Afghan parolees at temporary housing facilities (safe havens) within the continental United States (CONUS).

Additionally, we found that Afghan evacuees were not vetted by the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) using all DoD data prior to arriving in CONUS. This occurred because Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) enrollments were compared against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) data, which did not initially include all biometric data located in the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) database and because the DoD's National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) has agreements with foreign partners that prohibits the sharing of some ABIS data with U.S. agencies outside of the DoD. Subsequently, in August 2021, NGIC personnel expanded their normal analytic review of all biometric watchlist matches to also include non-watchlist matches of Afghan evacuees using all DoD data to close these gaps. Because NGIC personnel needed access to CBP records to complete this analysis, the NGIC entered into an agreement with the DHS to access the necessary CBP records. This agreement was set to expire December 27, 2021, prior to NGIC completing a full review of all Afghan evacuees.

Furthermore, during their analytic review, NGIC personnel identified Afghans with derogatory information in the DoD ABIS database who were believed to be in the United States. When NGIC personnel began their analytic review, they developed informal procedures to notify both the DoD and interagency stakeholders about these individuals. Subsequently, the NGIC relied on a broad dissemination list, with the expectation that the individual base commanders of CONUS safe havens would attempt to determine if the Afghan with derogatory information was located on their base.

We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Director, Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency; and the Commander, National Ground Intelligence Center, extend the data sharing agreement with the DHS. They completed the extension on December 10, 2021, extending the agreement until June 27, 2022. We also recommended that the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the DoD and interagency stakeholders. Based on

comments received from the Chief of Staff, U.S. Northern Command, and the Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD[I&S]), we redirected the recommendation to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.

Objective

The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD managed and tracked displaced persons from Afghanistan through the biometric enrollment, screening, and vetting process. Specifically, we evaluated the:

- screening of individuals biometrically, and whether the processes to screen these individuals was followed;
- identification, tracking, and management of the biometric enrollment of individuals who have never been enrolled in a DoD database;
- management of individuals identified as security risks through the screening process; and
- management and tracking of individuals' ingress and egress to DoD-managed facilities.

We performed site visits or conducted interviews with personnel at five of the eight DoD installations that were providing temporary housing for Afghan evacuees: Fort Lee, Virginia; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico; and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Additionally, we conducted interviews with personnel from the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the OUSD(I&S), the U.S. Army G2, and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).

Background

On July 14, 2021, the President initiated an inter-agency effort to evacuate and relocate Afghans who had applied for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) along with other vulnerable Afghans to address the rapid takeover of Afghan cities by the Taliban. The evacuation and relocation effort included transporting evacuees out of Afghanistan to temporary locations in the United States to allow for the completion of the immigration process.

Operation Allies Refuge

On July 14, 2021, the President announced Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) to support the relocation of interested and eligible Afghan nationals, and their immediate families, who supported the U.S. Government and applied for a SIV.¹ On July 19, 2021, the Department of State (DOS), the lead Federal agency for OAR, activated the Afghanistan Coordination Task Force, which coordinated the U.S. Government's efforts to bring qualified SIV applicants

¹ SIV applicants worked directly with the U.S. Armed Forces as translators or interpreters or were employed by or on behalf of the U.S. Government or the International Security Assistance Force for at least 2 years between 2001 and 2021 in the region.

to the United States once their security vetting was complete. However, in August 2021, the Taliban rapidly gained control of Afghanistan's cities, culminating in the seizure of the country's capital, Kabul, placing many Afghans who assisted the United States or its allies at increased risk of retaliation from the Taliban. As of August 2021, the United States had evacuated more than 120,000 people on U.S. military evacuation flights, including American citizens, lawful permanent residents of the U.S., Afghan SIV applicants, and vulnerable members of Afghan civil society.

Operation Allies Welcome

On August 29, 2021, the President directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). OAW is a coordinated effort to implement ongoing initiatives across the Federal government to support displaced persons from Afghanistan, including those who are eligible for an SIV, through a broad range of services. Additionally, on August 29, 2021, the President directed the DHS to lead the coordination of ongoing efforts across the Federal government to resettle Afghan refugees by establishing and leading the Unified Coordination Group. Efforts under OAW included initial immigration processing, screening, and coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) testing. Additionally, the Unified Coordination Group planned all operations related to OAW, including screening and vetting Afghan personnel prior to arrival in the United States and processing Afghan evacuees at U.S. military facilities. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy represents the DoD at the Unified Coordination Group meetings.

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, Enrollment, and Screening

On August 21, 2021, a Joint Staff Director of Operations (J3) general administration message directed DoD personnel to enroll Afghan evacuees in the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) Tracking System (NTS), which assigns a unique number, printed on a wristband, to each evacuee.² DoD personnel were then tasked to support the enrollment of every Afghan evacuee assigned an NTS number in the Biometric Automated Toolset System or the CBP Automated Targeting System for biometric screening.³ On August 29, 2021, the President designated the DHS as lead for biometric screening of Afghan evacuees traveling to the United States and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) military installations. The DHS worked with DoD personnel to conduct OCONUS biometric enrolling, screening, and vetting activities.⁴

² General Administration messages provide general information, request information, or request support, but do not task commands or staff offices.

³ Enrollment in the Biometric Automated Targeting System or the CBP Automated Targeting System is limited to activities that include collecting biometrics and biographic data and does not entail any analysis. The enroller enters the evacuee's information into the respective database and determines if there is any derogatory information on the evacuee.

⁴ Screening is the process of taking the enrollments and searching for other information available about the individual on the various databases to create a dossier.

Vetting is a determination of suitability. The U.S. Government uses the enrollment and screening information to decide whether an evacuee is suitable for something, such as access to an installation.

On August 21, 2021, the Joint Staff J3 directed DoD combatant commanders supporting the biometric enrollments during the Afghan relocation mission to assist with screening enrolled individuals against the DoD and CBP identification databases. The DoD stored its collected enrollment data in the DoD ABIS.⁵ CBP conducted approximately half of the enrollments of Afghan evacuees at the OCONUS staging bases (also known as “lily pads”) and stored its collected information in the DHS IDENT. The DoD completed the remaining enrollments and screened its information against the DoD ABIS database. Both the DoD and the CBP enrollment information was then sent to the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC). The NTC then sent the combined DoD and CBP enrollment data to the NCTC to crosscheck the information with the FBI classified Terrorist Screening Database and Terrorist Identities DataMart databases to determine whether an individual was free of derogatory information and was cleared for travel or if the individual needed further adjudication.⁶ After these preliminary checks, the NCTC transmitted the results through the NTC to the NGIC and the CBP. The NGIC received the list of individuals approved to travel and notified OCONUS airports designated to coordinate departures, while the CBP notified the continental United States (CONUS) airports designated to receive cleared individuals. The DHS and the CBP then approved the manifest for flights and certified that all passengers were clear to fly to the United States.

CONUS Placement of Afghan Evacuees

The DoD transported Afghan evacuees and SIV applicants to intermediate staging bases located in several countries, including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Spain, Italy, Bahrain, and Germany. These staging bases (lily pads) served as emergency processing centers. Afghan evacuees were screened at the lily pads before being transported to DoD-provided temporary housing facilities (also known as “safe havens”) for SIV applicants and other Afghan evacuees at eight DoD installations: Fort Bliss, Texas; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort Lee, Virginia; Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; and Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico.

Upon arrival in the United States, evacuees with green cards or U.S. citizenship were allowed to travel to their final destinations, while those who did not possess either a green card or proof of U.S. citizenship were sent to temporary safe havens for further processing.⁷ While at the safe havens, evacuees received medical services and a complete health screening, including COVID-19 testing. Furthermore, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) provided administrative support to evacuees to expedite the processing

⁵ DoD’s ABIS supports storing, matching, and sharing of collected biometric data.

⁶ Derogatory information is information that potentially justifies an unfavorable fitness or access determination. Such information may prompt a request for additional investigation or clarification to resolve an issue.

⁷ A Green Card, officially known as a Permanent Resident Card, allows the bearer to live and work permanently in the U.S.

of applications for work authorization and immigration. The DOS and DHS also worked to provide initial relocation support to Afghan evacuees granted humanitarian parole, ensuring that those Afghans arriving in American communities have initial support, including short-term emergency health insurance.⁸

DoD Roles and Responsibilities

Several DoD components were involved in developing policy and direction for the DoD in support of the inter-agency effort to relocate Afghan evacuees. DoD Directive 8521.01E identifies specific DoD roles and responsibilities in regards to biometric processes, and Joint Publication 3-68 defines the roles and responsibilities of DoD organizations during a NEO.⁹

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

According to DoD Instruction O-3300.04, the OUSD(I&S) is the lead authority for DoD oversight of and guidance on DoD Biometric Enabled Intelligence programs, activities, and initiatives, which includes biometric enrolling, screening, and vetting.¹⁰ The OUSD(I&S) is responsible for directing the development and sustainment of Biometric Enabled Intelligence resources, capabilities, and capacity to meet validated requirements; providing support to irregular warfare; and countering human network operations.¹¹ According to DoD Directive 8521.01E, the OUSD(I&S) serves as the primary DoD point of contact with other Government agencies and international entities for all DoD entities that conduct biometric enrollment intelligence activities.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

According to Joint Publication 3-68, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinates the deployment and employment of U.S. forces in support of NEOs approved by the Secretary of Defense and monitors U.S. force participation in the protection and evacuation of noncombatant evacuees. The Joint Staff issued OAW NEO-focused general administrative messages for all combatant commands detailing how DoD elements should enroll, track, and screen the Afghan evacuees. The Joint Staff also established a Crisis Management Team to coordinate operational activities between the DoD and other U.S. Government agencies involved in the Afghanistan NEO. In addition, the Joint Staff supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Unified Coordination Group led by the DHS.

⁸ The DHS, through USCIS, is authorized to grant humanitarian parole to foreign nationals to temporarily enter the United States due to emergency or urgent humanitarian reasons.

⁹ DoD Directive 8521.01E, "DoD Biometrics," January 13, 2016 (Incorporating Change 2, Effective October 15, 2018).

Joint Publication 3-68, "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations," November 18, 2015 (Validated November 14, 2017).

¹⁰ Department of Defense Instruction O 3300.04, "Defense Biometric Enabled Intelligence and Forensic Enabled Intelligence," May 25, 2012 (Incorporating Change 1, Effective May 28, 2020).

¹¹ Human network operations include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counter-proliferation, counter-narcotics, counterpiracy, and counter-smuggling.

U.S. Northern Command

The Secretary of Defense tasked USNORTHCOM as the lead combatant command for OAR, responsible for providing support to the DOS for SIV applicants brought into the United States. USNORTHCOM further delegated U.S. Army North as the lead operational command for the OAW mission. U.S. Army North provides medical screening, transportation, lodging, and general support to the DOS for Afghan evacuees on DoD installations.

National Ground Intelligence Center

The NGIC supports OAW and OAR screening and vetting efforts led by the DOS. On June 1, 2021, the DOS requested that the DoD support the DOS Afghan SIV applicant process. On June 2, 2021, the OUSD(I&S) informed the DOS that the Army tasked NGIC with screening Afghan SIV applicants for derogatory information that would make the applicant ineligible for the Afghan SIV program. On August 23, 2021, a collaborative general administration message from the Joint Staff J-3 requested that the NGIC post lists of the Afghan evacuees who were vetted and approved by the NCTC for onward travel to the United States on an unclassified, digital dropbox developed by the NGIC to ensure that all DoD personnel had access to the approved lists.¹² Additionally, the NGIC notified personnel at OCONUS air points of departure when the lists were available so OCONUS DoD personnel could create flight manifests for Afghan evacuees.

Defense Forensic and Biometrics Agency

The Defense Forensic and Biometrics Agency (DFBA) is a component of the U.S. Army's Office of the Provost Marshal General. In accordance with DoD Directive 8521.01E, the DFBA executes the responsibilities of the Executive Agent for DoD Forensics and Biometrics on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. As the Executive Agent, the DFBA leads, consolidates, and coordinates forensics and biometrics throughout the DoD across the range of military operations. The DFBA stores biometric data collected during military operations via direct enrollment or forensic analysis of material and shares the data with DoD partners. The DFBA, in coordination with the NGIC, is responsible for negotiating sharing agreements with the DHS for forensic and biometric data as it relates to Afghan evacuees.

DoD Roles and Responsibilities for Enrolling, Screening, and Vetting at Lily Pads and Safe Havens

On June 1, 2021, the DOS sent the DoD a memorandum requesting that the DoD support Afghan SIV applicant processing by verifying SIV applicants' qualifying employment with the United States. On June 2, 2021, OUSD(I&S) replied to the DOS memorandum and stated that DoD personnel, including the NGIC, were tasked with verifying SIV applicants' qualifying

¹² General Administration Message, "Genadmin Biometric Enrollments During Afghan Relocation Rev 01," August 23, 2021.

employment with the United States, which included a review for derogatory information that would make the applicant ineligible for employment. This review was specific to Afghan SIV applicants and did not include other Afghan evacuees. Once OAR commenced and Afghan evacuees began arriving at the lily pads, the DHS did not request additional NGIC support for the screening of Afghan evacuees, beyond the NGIC's continued support for screening Afghan SIV applicants. However, in August of 2021, to ensure U.S. agencies vetted Afghan evacuees against all biometric data, the NGIC expanded their normal analytic review of biometric watchlist matches to also include non-watchlist matches of all evacuees, in addition to SIV applicants. Additionally, the DoD assisted the DOS and the DHS in enrolling the evacuees into NTS at the lily pads and also provided biometric capable equipment that was interoperable with the DoD and DHS databases.

The DoD provided support for OAW, in conjunction with other organizations, within CONUS, including emergency housing and sustainment at DoD safe havens. Personnel at the five safe havens we visited or contacted confirmed that the DoD was not responsible for, or participating in, enrollment, screening, or vetting of evacuees at the safe havens. Instead, DoD efforts ensured that Afghan evacuees received basic life support and could continue moving forward with finalizing the immigration process.

Afghan Evacuee Immigration Categories

The DOS and USCIS identify Afghan evacuees in the OAW process as either SIV applicants or parolees. Under the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, the DHS and DOS are authorized to issue an SIV to certain Afghan nationals who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. Government.¹³ The DHS, through the USCIS, is authorized to grant humanitarian parole to foreign nationals to temporarily enter the United States due to emergency or urgent humanitarian reasons.¹⁴

Special Immigrant Visas

The DOS can issue an SIV under two separate programs. Under Section 602(b) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, the DOS can issue an SIV to Afghan nationals who were employed in Afghanistan by or on behalf of the U.S. Government or by the International Security Assistance Force.¹⁵ The SIV applicant must have worked on a U.S. military base in Afghanistan, or the SIV applicant must have served as either an interpreter or translator off base. In addition, the applicant must have experienced an ongoing threat because of their employment and must have served for at least 1 year. Approximately 34,500 SIVs have been allocated under this program since December 19, 2014.

¹³ Public Law 111-8, March 11, 2009, "Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009," section 602, amended by Public Law 117-31, July 30, 2021.

¹⁴ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services website, "Humanitarian or Significant Benefit Parole for Individuals Outside the United States," updated November 12, 2021.

¹⁵ Public Law 111-8, March 11, 2009, "Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009," section 602, "Protection for Afghan Allies, Section B Special Immigrant Status for Certain Afghans," amended by Public Law 117-31, July 30, 2021.

Under Section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the DOS can issue up to 50 SIVs annually to Iraqi and Afghan translators and interpreters who worked directly with the U.S. Armed Forces or under the Chief of Mission authority at the U.S. Embassy Baghdad or U.S. Embassy Kabul. An amendment to Section 1059 expanded the total number of visas to 500 per year for FY 2007 and FY 2008 only. In FY 2009, the number of visas available for this category reverted to 50 annually.

The DOS and non-governmental organizations assist Afghans who have completed the SIV process and their dependents begin the resettlement process. The DHS grants humanitarian parole to those who have not finished the SIV application process while their SIV applications are adjudicated. SIV applicants can also apply for another immigration status through USCIS while awaiting their adjudication from the DHS.

Immigration Parolees

The United States Code permits the CBP, under the DHS, to process Afghan evacuees who are not enrolled in the SIV program and parole them into the United States for 2 years for urgent humanitarian reasons.¹⁶ An Afghan evacuee's immigration parole status is conditional upon their compliance with medical screening and vaccination requirements outlined in the USCIS Afghan Parole information document provided to evacuees upon arrival. To receive and maintain parolee status, evacuees are required to stay at the safe havens until all medical screening and vaccinations have been successfully completed.

Upon leaving the safe havens, the parolees must provide their address to USCIS and notify USCIS of every change of address. Additionally, parolees must comply with all public health directives, requests for additional information from the DHS and Federal law enforcement, and comply with local, state, and Federal laws and ordinances. Parolees may be subject to additional conditions of parole on a case-by-case basis. The U.S. Government arranges the parolee's travel to their final destination in the United States upon completion of the U.S. immigration process. U.S. Government agencies also help individuals connect with non-governmental organizations that may assist in their resettlement in the United States.

Finding

Afghan evacuees were not vetted by the NCTC using all DoD data prior to arriving in CONUS. Specifically, the NCTC did not have access to some DoD biometric and contextual data located in the ABIS database or to intelligence databases used by the DoD that are located on the Secret Internet Protocol network when they vetted Afghan evacuees. This occurred because CBP enrollments forwarded to the NCTC by the NTC for vetting purposes were compared against the CBP IDENT data, which did not initially include all biometric data located in the

¹⁶ Section 1182, Title 8, United States Code (8 U.S.C §1182), "Aliens and Nationality: Excludable Aliens," Section (d)(5), January 3, 2012.

ABIS database and because the NGIC has agreements with foreign partners that prohibits the sharing of some ABIS data with U.S. agencies outside of the DoD. Subsequently, in August 2021, NGIC personnel expanded their analytic review of all biometric watchlist matches to include non-watchlist matches of Afghan evacuees. NGIC personnel required access to the CBP electronic enrollment records to conduct the analytic review of Afghan evacuees and, on September 30, 2021, the NGIC entered into an agreement with the DHS to access CBP records to complete the review. However, this agreement was set to expire on December 27, 2021, and NGIC personnel estimated that they would not be able to screen all Afghan evacuees that are located in CONUS against the DoD's ABIS database by this date.

Additionally, during their analytic review, NGIC personnel identified Afghans with derogatory information from the DoD ABIS database who were already in the United States. When NGIC personnel began their analytic review, they developed informal procedures to notify both the DoD and interagency stakeholders about these individuals. Subsequently, the NGIC relied on a broad dissemination list, with the expectation that individual base commanders would attempt to identify if the Afghan of concern was located on their base.

As a result of the NCTC not vetting Afghan evacuees against all available data, the United States faces potential security risks if individuals with derogatory information are allowed to stay in the country. In addition, the U.S. Government could mistakenly grant SIV or parolee status to ineligible Afghan evacuees with derogatory information gathered from the DoD ABIS database.¹⁷

U.S. Agencies Did Not Vet Afghan Evacuees Using All Available DoD Data

U.S. agencies did not use all available data when vetting Afghan evacuees. Specifically, the NCTC did not use all DoD tactical data located in the ABIS database when vetting Afghan evacuees entering the United States.¹⁸ The NCTC did not have access to all DoD tactical data located in ABIS because enrollments conducted by CBP forwarded to the NCTC by NTC for vetting purposes were compared against the CBP IDENT database, which did not include all biometric and contextual data located in the ABIS database. While the IDENT database includes some ABIS data, it does not include DoD tactical data. Additionally, agreements in place with foreign partners prohibited sharing some DoD ABIS information outside of the DoD.

¹⁷ The DHS, in accordance with 8 U.S.C. §1182, designates Afghan evacuees as parolees while in CONUS locations, and those evacuees receive all rights inherent to their immigration parole status. According to DoD and DHS personnel, parolees cannot be detained by the DoD or other Government agencies and are authorized to leave CONUS facilities once medical requirements are complete.

¹⁸ DoD tactical data is information and data that is collected that details tactical operations, typically on operations in deployed environments. Examples of tactical data are tactical patrol reports from ground units, tactical operation debriefings, after-action reports, detention operations, and fingerprints on improvised explosive devices. This information also includes the who, what, when, where, and why of enrollees.

Because Afghan evacuees were not screened against all data found in the DoD ABIS database, NGIC personnel expanded their analytic review of biometric watchlist matches to include non-watchlist matches of all Afghan evacuees located within the United States, in addition to the OUSD(I&S) task of screening Afghan SIV applicants. This analytic review began in August 2021, and consisted of reviewing DoD tactical data to determine if the Afghan evacuees located in the United States had derogatory information in DoD databases that would make them ineligible to be in the parolee program. Additionally, according to NGIC personnel, the NGIC included all evacuees, not just evacuees enrolled by the CBP, because, at the time, the NCTC did not use intelligence databases located on the Secret Internet Protocol Network when they vetted the Afghan evacuees. According to NGIC personnel, by not including intelligence databases located on the Secret Internet Protocol Network, the NCTC did not include multiple databases that contain DoD tactical data. As of November 2, 2021, NGIC personnel had identified 50 Afghan personnel in the United States with information in DoD records that would indicate potentially significant security concerns.¹⁹

NGIC personnel did not receive formal tasking to conduct an analytical review of Afghan evacuees who were not SIV applicants; however, DoD Instruction 3300.04 directs the NGIC to perform analytical work in support of DoD force protection.²⁰ Specifically, as the Biometric Enabled Watchlist managers, the NGIC is tasked to develop and maintain procedures to nominate, de-nominate, validate, and share Biometric Enabled Watchlist entries in accordance with national, DoD, geographic combatant commands, and U.S. Special Operations Command requirements.²¹ Because of the responsibilities outlined in DoD Instruction 3300.04, the NGIC initiated the analytical review. OUSD(I&S) personnel stated that they were aware the NGIC was performing this analytical review.

According to NGIC personnel, when the NGIC began this self-initiated analytic review of non-SIV applicants, it did not have access to CBP enrollment electronic records created during the NEO evacuation operations because a data sharing agreement was not in place addressing the Afghan evacuee enrollment data. The NGIC cannot perform an analytic review of Afghan evacuees enrolled by CBP without the CBP enrollment data. This was approximately half of all evacuee enrollments. While it was not in the original policy to include the NGIC in the vetting process, the DHS's Office of Biometric Identity Management and the NGIC developed a temporary sharing agreement where CBP enrollments are sent to the DoD ABIS for screening to ensure that the NGIC has access to all enrollment data for Afghan evacuees. However, this temporary agreement was set to expire on December 27, 2021. As of December 13, 2021,

¹⁹ Significant security concerns include individuals whose latent fingerprints have been found on improvised explosive devices and known or suspected terrorists and for which the NGIC sends derogatory information notifications to appropriate DoD personnel.

²⁰ DoD Instruction 3300.04, "Defense Biometric Enabled Intelligence and Forensic Enabled Intelligence," May 25, 2021 (Incorporating Change 1, Effective May 28, 2021).

²¹ The Biometric Enabled Watch List is the NGIC-managed biometric database listing persons of interest, with individuals identified by biometric sample instead of by name, and the recommended action to be taken upon encountering each individual.

NGIC personnel have reviewed approximately 58,455 of the 80,404 Afghan evacuee identities received and have assessed that it will take until approximately March 2022 to finish this analytic review.

In addition, on December 27, 2021, the NGIC was initially required by the sharing agreement to purge all unmatched DHS Afghan enrollment information provided under this agreement, which would limit the NGIC's ability to conduct an analytic review on any Afghan evacuees not yet reviewed. According to NGIC personnel, their ability to do an analytic review on any remaining identities, as well as on any Afghan evacuees enrolled after December 27, 2021, would be severely inhibited if they were required to purge all unmatched DHS Afghan enrollment information. We discussed the need to extend this agreement with DoD and DHS personnel. On December 13, 2021, NGIC personnel provided us with an updated data sharing agreement. This data sharing agreement between the DoD and DHS extended the expiration date for the temporary sharing agreement from December 27, 2021, to June 27, 2022.

Some Afghan Evacuees With Derogatory Information Could Not Be Located

DoD personnel could not locate some Afghan evacuees whom NGIC personnel identified as having derogatory information that would make them ineligible for the parolee program conducted at CONUS safe havens. Specifically, NGIC personnel stated that they could not locate some Afghan evacuees when attempting to report derogatory information to the DoD and U.S. Government agencies supporting CONUS safe havens. NGIC personnel stated that there was an issue with either field representatives or operators failing to upload data or maintain devices properly. For example, personnel conducting enrollments at Afghan enrollment locations may not have properly updated the location field in the electronic enrollment devices. If the location field was not updated, the location recorded during enrollments would have had the wrong location.

For example, as of September 17, 2021, the NGIC had identified 31 Afghans in CONUS who had derogatory information. Of those 31, only 3 could be located. To attempt to locate the 31 individuals, the NGIC developed an informal process of sending e-mails detailing the derogatory information to DoD and U.S. Government personnel that either were located at, or had oversight of, all CONUS safe havens. The distribution for these e-mails included DoD, FBI, and DHS personnel. Additionally, the NGIC maintains a consolidated database that includes all Afghan evacuees it identified as having derogatory information that DoD and U.S. Government personnel overseeing CONUS safe havens can request access to.

As a result of not knowing the location of all Afghan evacuees with derogatory information, the NGIC developed informal reporting procedures to inform the DoD and interagency stakeholders. However, using informal procedures does not ensure consistency and timeliness of notifying the appropriate personnel of a potential security risk. Not being able to locate Afghan evacuees with derogatory information quickly and accurately could pose a security risk to the United States. In addition, the U.S. Government could mistakenly grant ineligible Afghan evacuees with derogatory information from the DoD ABIS database SIV or parolee status.

DoD Does Not Control Parolees Leaving Safe Havens Before Completing the Immigration Process

We confirmed through discussions with DHS personnel and DoD personnel at Fort Lee, Fort Pickett, and Fort McCoy, Afghan parolees have the right to leave the safe havens at any time after receiving the required vaccinations and tuberculosis testing, which was also described in the DHS Afghan Parole Information document. As of September 29, 2021, USNORTHCOM reported that the safe havens had received 55,346 Afghan evacuees, with 1,236 of those evacuees having left the safe havens voluntarily without finishing processing, other than meeting medical requirements, and 1,358 evacuees having completed processing and moved out of the safe havens.

For example, DHS personnel at Fort McCoy stated that at their location, most of the approximately 255 voluntary departures were either American citizens or individuals who had family in the United States that the parolees could use for support. We also confirmed with DoD personnel at Fort Lee that when Afghan personnel requested to leave and re-enter the safe haven, DoD personnel used a Commander's Critical Information Requirement log to track the individual's departure and return to the safe haven and reported that movement in a daily update brief to the commander.²²

The management and tracking of parolees' ingress and egress to the safe havens is coordinated between DoD, DHS, and DOS personnel. For example, DoD personnel from Fort Lee, Fort Pickett, and Fort McCoy described the departure process as staff at the departure desk notifying the appropriate DHS and DOS personnel of an evacuee choosing to leave the safe haven. DHS or DOS personnel conduct a meeting with the parolee to discuss the ramifications of leaving the immigration program early, arrange for the parolee's exit from the facility, and record and track the parolee's removal from the installation's lodging and other records.²³

²² Commander's Critical Information Requirements are elements of information required by commanders that directly affect decision making and dictate the successful execution of military operations.

²³ According to the USCIS Afghan Parole Information Fact Sheet, the ramifications can lead to termination of parole, detention and removal from the United States, and could prevent the parolee from becoming a lawful permanent resident or obtaining other benefits and immigration relief for which they might otherwise be eligible.

Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

OUSD(I&S) Comments

The OUSD(I&S) Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement), responding on behalf of the USD(I&S), provided comments disagreeing with one substantive item in the finding. The Director stated that his office disagrees with the assertion that Afghan evacuees were not vetted by the NCTC using all DoD data prior to arriving in CONUS because the NCTC did not have access to some DoD biometric data located in the ABIS database or to intelligence databases used by the DoD. The Director stated that during approximately the first 60 days, not all enrollments were verified with the DoD ABIS. The Director stated that after a DoD-DHS biometric agreement was reached, all enrollments were checked against DoD holdings and previous non-DoD evacuees that matched to the DoD Biometric Enabled Watchlist were automatically selected for additional screening by the DHS. Lastly, the Director stated that the NCTC does not typically use SIPR, which would limit the NCTC's ability to access additional contextual information in real-time; however, he stated that this information is replicated to JWICS so that the NCTC would have access to it.

Our Response

We made minor changes based on comments provided by the OUSD(I&S) Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement) to ensure the accuracy of our finding. For example, we incorporated text in the finding stating that contextual data, in addition to some biometric data, was not included in the information provided to NCTC and stated that the NGIC closed the gap by conducting an analytic review of all biometric watchlist matches to also include non-watchlist matches of Afghan evacuees. Additionally, we incorporated text in the finding stating that enrollments did not initially include all biometric data, instead of stating that the DoD never addressed the issue. However, we did not change the statement that the NCTC may have incorporated the contextual information not included in the initial screening. We did not change the language because the OUSD(I&S) did not provide sufficient evidence to support a change. Additionally, we concluded that actions taken by the DHS to ensure that the NGIC continued its analytic review of all Afghan evacuees not on the watchlist, such as the extension of the data sharing agreement, indicate that NCTC did not have access to all available DoD data.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Redirected Recommendation

The USNORTHCOM Chief of Staff, responding on behalf of the USNORTHCOM Commander, non-concurred with Recommendation 2, stating that USNORTHCOM does not have the authority to take action on the recommendation. The OUSD(I&S) Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement), responding on behalf of the USD(I&S), agreed with Recommendation 2, but requested it be directed to the OUSD(I&S) for action. Therefore, we have redirected Recommendation 2 to the USD(I&S).

Recommendation 1

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Director, Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency; and the Commander, National Ground Intelligence Center, negotiate an extension to the temporary sharing agreement of biometric information with the Department of Homeland Security beyond the expiration date of December 27, 2021, to allow National Ground Intelligence Center personnel to complete their analytic review of Afghan evacuees for derogatory information.

Management Actions Taken

During the evaluation, we met with DoD officials from the NGIC to discuss the recommendation. On December 13, 2021, NGIC personnel provided us with an updated data sharing agreement with DHS. The updated sharing agreement, issued on December 10, 2021, extends NGIC's access to CBP data until July 27, 2022. By extending the agreement NGIC personnel will be able to complete their analytic review of Afghan evacuees for derogatory information. Therefore, management actions taken met the intent of this recommendation and no further comment is required. Therefore, the recommendation is closed.

Recommendation 2

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the Department of Defense and interagency stakeholders.

OUSD (I&S) Comments

The OUSD(I&S) Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement), responding on behalf of the USD(I&S), agreed with the recommendation but requested it be re-directed from USNORTHCOM to the USD(I&S) for action.

U.S. Northern Command Comments

The USNORTHCOM Chief of Staff, responding on behalf of the USNORTHCOM Commander, non-concurred with the recommendation, stating that USNORTHCOM is not tasked with, and does not have the appropriate authorities to engage in, the screening and vetting of Afghan evacuees or to respond to derogatory information

Our Response

The USNORTHCOM Chief of Staff and the Director for Defense Intelligence's comments were responsive. We have redirected the recommendation to the USD(I&S), and consider the recommendation resolved, but open because the OUSD(I&S) agreed with the recommendation. We will close the recommendation when we receive verification that the OUSD(I&S) implemented procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with DoD and interagency stakeholders.

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this evaluation from September 2021 through November 2021 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

We identified and reviewed policies, directives, and orders related to biometric enrollment, screening, and vetting of Afghan evacuees to determine the DoD's roles and responsibilities throughout the OAR and OAW missions. Specifically, we reviewed the following criteria.

- DoD Directive 8521.01E
- Joint Publication 3-68
- Joint Staff General Administration Message, August 21, 2021
- DoD Instruction 3300.04 (Incorporating Change 1, Effective May 28, 2021)
- Public Law 111-8
- Section 1182, title 8, United States Code (2012)

We submitted requests for information and conducted interviews to gather information to determine which DoD organizations were tasked to conduct the biometrics enrollment, screening, and vetting; how information was collected and shared with the DHS and DOS; and what actions occur when the DoD identified an evacuee as a potential threat to national security.

We conducted an entrance conference with personnel from USNORTHCOM, the Joint Staff J3, OUSD(I&S), NGIC, Army G2, and the Army Intelligence and Security Command to determine their respective roles in the biometric enrollment, screening, and vetting efforts in relation to the OAW and OAR missions and determine their roles at the safe havens housing Afghan evacuees in CONUS.

We conducted site visits at CONUS locations, including Marine Corps Base Quantico, Fort Pickett, and Fort Lee and met with personnel at Fort McCoy and Holloman Air Force Base to discuss their involvement with enrollment, screening, and vetting processes for Afghan evacuees. We focused these site visits and meetings to determine potential shortfalls, issues, and concerns related to the communication and sharing of screening information between the DoD, DOS, and DHS. We collected rosters of Afghan evacuees from the safe havens we visited and evaluated the data on each of the rosters to determine how each installation is maintaining accountability concerning the Afghan evacuees located at their site. Specifically, we used the rosters to review and evaluate how DoD personnel track the Afghan evacuee movements on and off the designated living area at the respective installations when the evacuees are not fully vetted and cleared.

Management Comments

OUSDI(I&S)



INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

January 20, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bryan T. Clark, Program Director for Overseas Contingency
Operations Evaluation, Office of the Department of Defense Inspector General

FROM: Garry Reid, Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement,
& Security)

SUBJECT: Response to Draft Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons From
Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000)

This memorandum provides responses to your request for OUSDI&S review of the
subject draft report. The Department greatly appreciates the opportunity to participate in this
important effort.

OUSDI&S concurs with Recommendation #1, noting the task has already been
accomplished. We also concur with Recommendation #2, however we request you assign the
responsibility for developing the data sharing agreement to USDI&S and not USNORTHCOM.

Additionally, we offer the attached recommended revisions to the report in order to more
accurately capture the details of the vetting process.

Lastly, the attached also identifies the portions of the report that should be marked and
handled as Controlled Unclassified Information.

Please feel free to reach out directly to my staff if you have any additional questions. The
point of contact is [REDACTED]

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Garry P. Reid
Director for Defense Intelligence
Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement,
& Security

Attachment:
DD form 818, Consolidated Comment Matrix

UNCLASSIFIED						
CONSOLIDATED DoD ISSUANCE COMMENT MATRIX						
U.S. DoD IG: "Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan" Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000						
CLASS	#	PAGE	PARA	BASIS FOR NON-CONCUR?	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL
U		1	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement "CBP enrollments were compared against the CBP IDENT data, which does not include all biometric data located in the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) database" is partially incorrect.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: "It took roughly 60 days after the beginning of the NEO for CBP enrollments to be checked against the ABIS. A DHS-DoD sharing arrangement needed implementation before the data could flow real-time to support the effort more effectively. However, eventually all enrollments in support of OAW were checked against the DoD ABIS."</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	<p>OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>
U		1	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement "NGIC personnel were unable to notify specific base commanders and U.S. Government representatives at CONUS safe havens because the location of many of the Afghans that were identified as having derogatory information were unknown" is partially incorrect.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: NGIC personnel were able to send notifications to all eight (8) identified safe havens, Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (ACICA), and US Army North, however NGIC was unable to determine which personnel could action the information appropriately based on the information found. NGIC sent representatives to U.S. Army North to mitigate this issue. NGIC representatives worked with 902nd Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (ACICA) at U.S. Army North to reach counterintelligence screeners at each identified safe haven in an attempt to locate Afghans with derogatory information. The process of locating Afghans with derogatory information typically took three (3) to four (4) days, and occasionally the attempt was unsuccessful. It was determined that the Afghans who could not be located most likely had left (walked off) the safe haven sometime after arrival.</p>	<p>OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>

**UNCLASSIFIED
CONSOLIDATED DoD ISSUANCE COMMENT MATRIX**

U.S. DoD IG: "Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan" Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000

CLASS	#	PAGE	PARA	BASIS FOR NON-CONCUR?	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL
					<p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	
U		4	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement "Upon arrival in the United States, evacuees with green cards or U.S. citizenship were allowed to travel to their final destinations, while those who did not possess either a green card or proof of U.S. citizenship were required to remain at the temporary safe haven until they fulfilled all medical requirements" is incorrect.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: During the initial stages of OAW there were no restrictions placed on Afghan personnel walking off the safe havens. Eventually, Afghan personnel were informed that leaving the installation would result in adverse consequences regarding immigration processing.</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	<p>OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>
U		5	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement "In July 2021, the Secretary of Defense designated the Director of Defense Intelligence (Intelligence & Security) DDI(I&S) as the lead for the internal DoD Crisis Action Group" is incorrect.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: In July 2021, the Secretary of Defense designated the Director of Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement & Security) DDI(CL&S) as the lead for the internal DoD Crisis Action Group.</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	<p>OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>
U		5	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement "The DDI(I&S) coordinates the effort to support the DOS request for assistance in screening</p>	<p>OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED]</p>

**UNCLASSIFIED
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U.S. DoD IG: "Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan" Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000

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					<p>Afghan SIV applicants and tasked the NGIC to provide this support.”, is incorrect.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: The DDI(CL&S) coordinates the effort to support the DOS request for assistance in screening Afghan SIV applicants and tasked the NGIC to provide this support.</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	<p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>
U		5	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement “The DDI(CL&S) coordinates the effort to support the DOS request for assistance in screening Afghan SIV applicants and tasked the NGIC to provide this support”, is incorrect.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: Department of State and Department of Homeland Security formally requested DoD Biometric Support. Secretary of Defense concurred via the Executive Secretary process, which tasked the U.S. Army, as the Executive Agent for DoD Biometrics. The U.S. Army then tasked NGIC to provide support.</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	<p>OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>
U		6	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement “On June 2, 2021, the OUSD(I&S) informed the DOS that the NGIC was tasked with screening Afghan SIV applicants for derogatory information that would make the applicant ineligible for the Afghan SIV program.” Is incorrect</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: Department of State requested DoD Biometric Support. Secretary of Defense concurred via the Executive Secretary</p>	

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					<p>process, which tasked the U.S. Army, as the Executive Agent for DoD Biometrics. The U.S. Army then tasked NGIC to provide support.</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	
U		8	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement "Afghan evacuees were not vetted by the NCTC using all DoD data prior to arriving in CONUS. Specifically, the NCTC did not have access to some DoD biometric data located in the ABIS database or to intelligence databases used by the DoD that are located on the Secret Internet Protocol network when they vetted Afghan evacuees", is incorrect.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: Biometric enrollments ingested into DoD ABIS are automatically ran against all DoD biometric holdings, including the entire DoD Biometrically Enabled Watchlist (BEWL). The first approx. 60 days, not all enrollments were conducted by or submitted to DoD ABIS. After DoD-DHS biometric sharing agreement was reached, all enrollments were ingested and checked against DoD holdings, and previously non-DoD submissions were retroactively checked against DoD ABIS. Subject's that matched to the DoD BEWL were automatically selected for additional screening by DHS. NCTC, along with other IC components do not typically utilize SIPR which would limit NCTC's ability to access additional contextual information located in the DoD's Biometrics Identity Intelligence Resource (BI2R) in real-time, however information housed on SIPR BI2R is replicated to a JWICS instance which NCTC would have access to (replication typically takes 24-48 hours).</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	<p>OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>

**UNCLASSIFIED
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CLASS	#	PAGE	PARA	BASIS FOR NON-CONCUR?	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL
U		9	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement "However, when NGIC personnel attempted to notify the base commanders and U.S. Government representatives at CONUS safe havens, they found that the Afghans' locations were unknown", is partially incorrect.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: NGIC personnel notified base commanders through large email distribution lists and it was unclear if the information was received by the appropriate personnel on a case-by-case basis. NGIC sent representatives to U.S. Army North to mitigate this issue. NGIC representatives worked with 902nd Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (ACICA) at U.S. Army North to reach counterintelligence screeners at each identified safe haven in an attempt to locate Afghans with derogatory information. The process of locating Afghans with derogatory information typically took three (3) to four (4) days, and occasionally the attempt was unsuccessful. It was determined that the Afghans who could not be located most likely had left (walked off) the safe haven sometime after arrival.</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	<p>OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</p>
U		9	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement "While the IDENT database includes some ABIS data, it does not include DoD tactical data." is partially incorrect.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: DHS IDENT includes a portion of the DoD ABIS that is shared. Contextual information associated with the biometric information is available to all SIPR and JWICS users through BI2R.</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	<p>OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</p>

UNCLASSIFIED
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U.S. DoD IG: "Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan" Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000

CLASS	#	PAGE	PARA	BASIS FOR NON-CONCUR?	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL
U		10	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Statement "This data sharing agreement between the DoD and DHS extended the expiration date for the temporary sharing agreement from December 27, 2021, to July 27, 2022", is incorrect.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: This data sharing agreement between the DoD and DHS extended the expiration date for the temporary sharing agreement from December 27, 2021, to June 27, 2022.</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
U		12	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: The statement "The updated sharing agreement, issued on December 10, 2012, extends NGIC's access to CBP data until July 27, 2022.", is incorrect.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: The updated sharing agreement, issued on December 10, 2012, extends NGIC's access to CBP data until June 27, 2022</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
U		12	4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<p>Coordinator Comment and Justification: Recommendation "Commander of the United States Northern Command develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the Department of Defense and interagency stakeholders", is is not an appropriate role for USNORTHCOM based on its tasking and authorities. USNORTHCOM's role in Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) and Operation Allies Welcome (OAW) is limited to providing basic life support and transportation for Afghan Evacuees (AE) in support of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). USNORTHCOM is not tasked with and does not have the appropriate authorities to engage in the screening/vetting of AEs or responding to derogatory information. DHS is responsible for those tasks as the</p>	OUSD(I&S) Identity Intelligence Division, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

**UNCLASSIFIED
CONSOLIDATED DoD ISSUANCE COMMENT MATRIX**

U.S. DoD IG: "Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan" Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000

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					<p>LFA, and is the Federal department with the immigration and law enforcement authorities required. To the extent that DOD has provided any support to DHS for screening/vetting of AEs or responding to derogatory information, such support has been coordinated by USD(I&S), not USNORTHCOM. DHS is also responsible for the CONUS tracking of AEs from arrival through resettlement.</p> <p>Coordinator Recommended Change: Recommend Commander NORTHCOM develop procedures in conjunction with DHS and DOS for ensuring shared awareness regarding location of Afghan evacuees located on U.S DoD facilities. Ensure information is disseminated throughout DoD and interagency stakeholder organizations. OF NOTE: USNORTHCOM CJ34 Rep Mr. Gosselin, recommended Critical non-Concur to USNORTHCOM CJ3 regarding Recommendation 2.</p> <p>Originator Response: Choose an item.</p> <p>Originator Reasoning:</p>	<p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>

UNCLASSIFIED
 CONSOLIDATED DoD ISSUANCE COMMENT MATRIX

U.S. DoD IG: "Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan" Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000

HOW TO FILL OUT THE DD 818-1 MATRIX

GENERAL GUIDANCE:

- **To sort table** by page/paragraph number, hover your mouse over the top of the first cell in the "page" column until a downward arrow appears; click and drag to the right to select both page and para columns. Under Paragraph on the Home ribbon, select A-Z button, set to sort by Column 3 and then Column 4, and select "OK." **To add new rows**, copy and paste a blank row to keep consistent formatting. **To add automatic numbering to column 2**, select entire column and click on the Numbering button under Paragraph on the Home ribbon.

OSD COMPONENT (OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY):

- Do **not** use the DD Form 818.
- Consolidate comments from all coordinators and adjudicate them. When **pasting** coordinator's comments from the coordinating Components' DD Form 818s into your consolidated DD Form 818-1, use "Insert New Row" paste option. You do not need to include administrative comments (spelling, paragraph numbering, etc.), in the consolidated DD Form 818-1. Leave columns 3 and 4 blank for general comments that apply to the whole document.
- **Sort comments** by the pages/paragraphs to which they apply using the **General Guidance** sort feature (e.g., all comments from all coordinators that apply to Page 3, Paragraph 1.1.a., should be together; all comments that apply to Page 3, Paragraph 1.1.b., should be next). Set classification header, footer, Column 2, and complete the last two entries in Column 6:

COLUMN 6 If you rejected or partially accepted a comment, enter your rationale in the originator reasoning area. If any material is **classified**, follow DoDM 5200.01 guidance for marking the document. Leave originator reasoning area blank if you accepted it. Include any related communications with the coordinating Component. You **must** provide convincing support for rejecting nonconurrence comments.



**NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
AND
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND**



JAN 19 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD OIG), 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350

SUBJECT: NORAD and USNORTHCOM (N&NC) Response to DoD OIG's Recommendation in the draft Report Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan (Project No. D2021-DEVOPD-0161.000)

This is the N&NC response to the recommendation in the subject draft report dated January 4, 2022. N&NC appreciates the DoD OIG's work on this engagement, as well as the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report. We have reviewed your recommendation and our response is below.

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Commander of the United States Northern Command develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the Department of Defense and interagency stakeholders.

USNORTHCOM's response to Recommendation 2: Non-Concur

USNORTHCOM's role in Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) and Operation Allies Welcome (OAW) is limited to providing basic life support and transportation for Afghan Evacuees (AE) in support of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). USNORTHCOM is not tasked with and does not have the appropriate authorities to engage in the screening/vetting of AEs or responding to derogatory information. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for those tasks as the LFA, and is the Federal department with the immigration and law enforcement authorities required. DHS is also responsible for the CONUS tracking of AEs from arrival through resettlement. To the extent that DoD has provided any support to DHS for screening/vetting of AEs or responding to derogatory information, such support has been coordinated by USD(I&S), not USNORTHCOM.

Point of contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED]

Sincerely,

Michael Holland
RADM, USN
N&NC Chief of Staff

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABIS	Automated Biometric Identification System
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CONUS	Continental United States
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease-2019
DFBA	Defense Forensic and Biometrics Agency
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOS	Department of State
IDENT	Automated Biometric Identification System
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Center
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NGIC	National Ground Intelligence Center
NTC	National Targeting Center
NTS	NEO Tracking System
OAR	Operation Allies Refuge
OAW	Operation Allies Welcome
OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
OUSDI(I&S)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
SIV	Special Immigrant Visa
USCIS	United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
USD(I&S)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command



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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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Alexandria, VA 22350-1500
www.dodig.mil
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From "Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" <(b) (6)@mail.mil>
 To "Stone, Randolph R SES DODIG (USA)" (b) (6)@dodig.mil>
 Cc '(b) (6) OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" <(b) (6)@mail.mil>
 Subject RE: OIG Evaluation of DoD's Transition From a Trusted Foundry Model to a Quantifiable Assurance Method for Procuring Custom Microelectronics Report
 Date Tue, 1 Mar 2022 20:08:36 +0000
 Message-Id <SN5P111MB0606DD8B0590D0DAEA31E1EEF2029@SN5P111MB0606.NAMP111.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>

Randy, here is the delinquent response, sorry for the delay.

Vr

Garry

-----Original Message-----

From: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)
 Sent: Tuesday, March 1, 2022 11:31 AM
 To: Stone, Randolph R., SES, OIG DoD (b) (6)@DODIG.MIL>
 Subject: RE: OIG Evaluation of DoD's Transition From a Trusted Foundry Model to a Quantifiable Assurance Method for Procuring Custom Microelectronics Report

So sorry I did not catch this when it arrived on Feb 24. Not familiar with this report - digging into it now and will get you a response asap

Vr

Garry

-----Original Message-----

From: Stone, Randolph R., SES, OIG DoD <(b) (6)@DODIG.MIL>
 Sent: Tuesday, March 1, 2022 9:44 AM
 To: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) <(b) (6)@mail.mil>
 Subject: RE: OIG Evaluation of DoD's Transition From a Trusted Foundry Model to a Quantifiable Assurance Method for Procuring Custom Microelectronics Report

Garry?

Randolph R. Stone

Assistant Inspector General for
 Space, Intelligence, Engineering & Oversight Evaluations Component
 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General
 Office - (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Stone, Randolph R., SES, OIG DoD
 Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2022 6:51 PM
 To: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL (USA) (b) (6)@mail.mil)
 <(b) (6)@mail.mil>
 Subject: OIG Evaluation of DoD's Transition From a Trusted Foundry Model to a Quantifiable Assurance Method for Procuring Custom Microelectronics Report

Hi Garry

Excuse the formality, my staff wrote this e mail for me!. My team recently issued the subject draft report on December 15, 2021 and requested that your office review and provide formal comment to the report by January 18, 2022. At the request of your office, we have provided two extensions to the initial due date to provide comments. The first extension was granted to provide comments by February 4, 2022 and the second request was granted until February 9, 2022. I believe that we have given a fair amount of time

to receive official comments. However, It is now two weeks past the last approved extension and our office will proceed with issuing the subject report if we do not receive your formal response by Friday, February 25, 2022.

Hope all is well with you and yours

Randy

Randolph R. Stone

Assistant Inspector General for

Space, Intelligence, Engineering & Oversight Evaluations Component

Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General

Office - (b) (6)

~~This e-mail is from the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD-OIG). It may contain Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), including information that is Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES), subject to the Privacy Act, and/or other privileges and restrictions that prohibit release without appropriate legal authority. Do not disseminate without the approval of the DoD-OIG. If received in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete all copies of this message.~~

.....
Attachment Name : OUSDIS Response Memo - D2021-DEV0SI-003.00 - Evaluation of the Department of Defense's Transition Foundry Model to a Quantifiable Assurance Method for Procuring Custom Microelectronics.pdf

.....
Attachment Name : smime.p7s

From "Stone, Randolph R., SES, OIG DoD" (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>
 To "Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) @mail.mil>
 Subject RE: News of Interest: The Debrief
 Date Wed, 13 Apr 2022 21:58:26 +0000
 Message-Id <bd6fa48c520348b9930e5f3b1e1944dc@DODIG.MIL>

Good to hear!

Randolph R. Stone

Assistant Inspector General for
 Space, Intelligence, Engineering & Oversight
 Evaluations Component

Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General

Office – (b) (6)

From: Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA) (b) (6) @mail.mil>

Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2022 5:27 PM

To: Stone, Randolph R., SES, OIG DoD (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>

Subject: Re: News of Interest: The Debrief

Yes. Still here, same job. (b) (5)

From: "Stone, Randolph R., SES, OIG DoD" (b) (6) @DODIG.MIL>

Date: Wednesday, April 13, 2022 at 4:33:46 PM

To: "Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) @mail.mil>, "Reid, Garry P SES OSD OUSD INTEL & SEC (USA)" (b) (6) @mail.mil>

Subject: FW: News of Interest: The Debrief

Are you still with the DoD? See below

Randolph R. Stone

Assistant Inspector General for
 Space, Intelligence, Engineering & Oversight
 Evaluations Component

Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General

Office – (b) (6)

SEX, LIES, AND UFOS: PENTAGON'S HEAD OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY OUSTED

<https://thedebrief.org/sex-lies-and-ufos-pentagons-head-of-counterintelligence-and-security-ousted/>

TIM MCMILLAN · APRIL 13, 2022

As the Pentagon's Director for Defense Intelligence and a senior executive in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security OUSD(I&S), Garry Reid was in charge of all counterintelligence, security, and law enforcement operations within the Department of Defense.

This, in addition to heading up the Afghanistan Crisis Action Group, the office tasked with evacuating Afghan refugees during America's withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Now, in an exclusive, The Debrief has learned that Reid was recently dismissed from his duties within the U.S. government.

Before his ousting, Reid had been the subject of a nearly two-year-long investigation by The Debrief. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, multiple current and former Pentagon employees told The Debrief Reid had engaged in wide-ranging misconduct and corruption for years.

In the past four years, the DoD's Inspector General's Office had investigated Reid on numerous allegations, including maintaining a sexual relationship with a subordinate employee, sexual harassment, and fostering a hostile work environment.

In 2020, the IG Office found that Reid had violated Joint Ethics Regulations by creating an appearance of an inappropriate relationship or preferential treatment with a female subordinate and mishandling of Controlled Unclassified Information.

In May 2021, Reid was named in yet another formal IG complaint, this time involving former Director of National Programs Special Management Staff at OUSD(I&S), Luis Elizondo.

In his complaint, Elizondo accused Reid of playing a central role in obfuscating information regarding the Pentagon's intriguing newfound interest in "unidentified aerial phenomena," more commonly known as UFOs.

Reid was also accused of maliciously misleading the public about Elizondo's involvement with the DoD's quasi-secret UFO program, the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP).

It's not entirely clear what led to Reid's recent dismissal. However, multiple defense officials familiar with the situation told The Debrief they believed the weight of the numerous past allegations, the disastrous withdrawal of refugees from Afghanistan, and current investigations into misconduct were too significant, and ultimately led to his dismissal.

In an email, Senior Spokesperson for the Department of Defense's Public Affairs Office, Susan Gough, did not refute that Reid had been dismissed. However, the DoD declined to provide any further comment on the matter at this time.

SEX...

According to a "Report of Investigation" obtained by The Debrief via the Freedom of Information Act, in late 2019, Reid was investigated by the DoD's Inspector General's Office regarding four separate complaints of him having sexual affairs with subordinate employees, sexual harassment and creating a "negative work environment."

Two of the complaints accused Reid of having a sexual affair and providing preferential treatment to a female subordinate, identified in the report as "Employee 1."

Various witnesses told IG investigators they had observed Reid and Employee 1 engaging in questionable behavior, including kissing, hugging, and close personal interactions. "They definitely stand closer to each other than I would stand next to any of my [colleagues]," one witness told investigators.

In 2018 and 2019, Reid and Employee 1 took personal trips out of town together on at least two occasions. During a third official trip to Europe in 2018, investigators said Reid and Employee 1 took two days of personal leave to go "sightseeing."

Daily lunches between Reid and Employee 1 also raised eyebrows among co-workers.

According to witnesses, Reid and Employee 1 frequently enjoyed office lunches together, with some accounts saying the door to Reid's office was often seen closed. Several witnesses also described the lunchtime powwows as "very weird."

"[There were] two place settings, like ... a restaurant" complete with "salt and pepper shakers, a side table, and some sparkling water," witnesses were quoted saying.

IG investigators determined that for more than a year, Reid and Employee 1 regularly commuted to work and went to the gym together. One witness described the couple's carpooling as "odd."

"He's the boss, and she's a subordinate," said one witness. "[I have] never seen that type of relationship between a supervisor and subordinate."

Out of twenty witnesses interviewed by IG investigators, only three said Reid and Employee 1's relationship was "solely professional." The remaining witnesses described the couple as "close," "very close," "perceived close," or "inappropriately close." Several witnesses told investigators the relationship between Reid and Employee 1 made them feel "awkward."

Then-Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Kari Bingen told IG investigators she had heard "rumors" that Reid and Employee 1 spent a lot of time together and had even raised the issue with him sometime in 2019. According to the report, Reid told Bingen he was merely "mentoring" Employee 1.

Independent investigation by The Debrief revealed the perception that Reid and Employee 1 were involved in an inappropriate relationship extended far beyond just the offices in OUSD(I&S).

Former senior officials who worked directly for former Secretary of Defense James Mattis and in the White House during the Trump administration told The Debrief it was "common knowledge" that Reid and Employee 1 were involved in an inappropriate, assumed romantic relationship.

One official who worked within the Office of the Secretary of Defense said they had heard a rumor that Reid and Employee 1 had been caught engaging in some type of sexual activity in the Pentagon parking lot. The official, who still works for the Department of Defense, reiterated this was only a rumor.

During interviews, both Reid and Employee 1 denied allegations of being in a sexual affair, both describing their relationship instead as merely a very close friendship.

Employee 1 told IG investigators that she referred to herself as the "[Reid] whisperer and [Reid] interpreter" because "people bring things to me first, and they make me deliver the bad news," which is "kind of my role."

For his part, Reid described his interactions with Employee 1 as being akin to a mentor and mentee.

Both Reid and Employee 1 admitted that on occasion, they may have kissed on the cheek or briefly hugged each other, but in a strictly platonic manner. Employee 1 told investigators that all of the kisses she received from Reid were "never uncomfortable" and didn't "feel aggressive or inappropriate or meaningful."

Reid denied providing preferential treatment, saying any added responsibilities or inclusion on travel trips outside of Employee 1's scope of employment were part of his mentorship. Reid said this was done based on

guidance by Deputy Undersecretary Bingen to “build up a bench” as part of talent management efforts by the DoD.

Though unmentioned in the IG report, The Debrief learned in its independent investigation that in January 2019, Employee 1 was promoted to a high-level executive position within the newly formed Defense Counterintelligence & Security Agency (DCSA). In November 2019, while the IG Office was conducting its investigation, Employee 1 resigned and left the DoD for the private sector.

Ultimately, the IG Office concluded that Reid had violated DoD Joint Ethics Regulations by “establishing and maintaining a close and unduly familiar relationship with Employee 1, creating a widespread perception of an inappropriate relationship and favoritism.”

In a rebuttal to the IG Office’s conclusions, Reid said his frequent interactions with Employee 1 were due to an administrative reorganization in February 2019, in an apparent reference to Employee 1’s promotion at DCSA. Short of flatly accusing Reid of lying, IG investigators said his statements “minimized his interactions” with Employee 1 by failing to highlight they had taken personal out-of-town trips and were commuting, eating lunch, and attending the gym together daily, in at least 2018.

While there was considerable circumstantial evidence, the IG’s Office ultimately said they could not substantiate that Reid and Employee 1 were engaged in a “sexual affair.” Investigators, however, noted they uncovered “many instances of conduct by Mr. Reid and her that were unduly personal and not professional or performance-related.”

The report’s authors underscored their conclusion by highlighting that Reid kissed Employee 1 on at least one occasion in her office and “routinely in the morning and evening hours during their commute together.”

[Editorial Note: During its investigation, The Debrief was able to determine the identity of “Employee 1.”

However, the individual is no longer in public service, and their identity has therefore been withheld from this report.]

LIES...

In 2020 the DoD Inspector General’s Office investigated Reid regarding another allegation that he was involved in an inappropriate sexual affair with a subordinate female co-worker, identified in reports as “Employee 2.”

The dynamics of the IG’s investigation quickly changed when Employee 2 denied that she had been in a sexual relationship with Reid, instead claiming she had been the victim of repeated sexual harassment.

According to the IG’s report, Reid had “kissed and hugged” Employee 2 in the workplace on multiple occasions, something Employee 2 said made her “uncomfortable” and was “unwelcome and inappropriate.”

Employee 2 said Reid kissed and hugged her “always in the context of some goodbye” or after a heated exchange as a “let’s make up [and] let’s hug it out.”

During hugs, Employee 2 said she would always try to turn her head away because Reid “would try to kiss her on the ‘cheek or closer.” Employee 2 said Reid would kiss her on the “mouth, side of the mouth, or cheek, depending on how quickly she could move her head.”

Employee 2 admitted she had never confronted Reid, who was her supervisor, about the unwanted interactions out of fear of the consequences.

“If you tell Reid, ‘I’m really not comfortable with that, that’s really inappropriate,’ then you have Hell to pay. Your life is miserable. And it just wasn’t worth it. So you put up with it,” Employee 2 was quoted.

“I just felt like this is a real crappy thing that I have to put up with. ... So, I don’t, I mean, it’s not like I was like, ‘Oh my God, I’ve been violated. I need to call the sexual assault helpline,” said Employee 2 when asked how the kisses and hugs made her feel.

“Like, I’m so conditioned to just deal with it. [It] sucks that women have to put up with this, and I’m one of them, and it’s just part of doing business.”

Ironically, Employee 1 from the first IG complaint told investigators she had witnessed Reid “kiss Employee 2 occasionally,” but that it did not “make an impression on [her] as anything concerning or noteworthy.”

When confronted with the allegations, Reid told investigators that he had “never sexually harassed anybody, male or female.” Reid did not deny, however, that he occasionally hugged or kissed Employee 2, but only on the cheek. Reid said Employee 2 never told him his kisses were unwelcome or gave a “negative response.”

“I sit here watching TV with Harvey Weinstein and everything else going on here, and again I’m still in shock that you came in here, and you told me of all the things you included, that I sexually harrassed [Employee 2],” said Reid. “But I did nothing of the sort and did everything to the contrary to help her, and she agreed with the help, and she would be the first to tell you I helped her.”

Reid went on to say he thought perhaps Employee 2’s allegations of sexual harassment were out of “revenge and retaliation” because he did not support her career advancement. “She took that very negatively – – that [I] didn’t have her back.”

During their investigation into the sexual harassment allegations, IG investigators said they examined text messages and emails between Reid and Employee 2. Investigators said messages showed Employee 2 “frequently engaging Reid in common interest conversations” and seemed to show “support for his work.” In light of Reid admitting to on occasion kissing or hugging Employee 2, the IG office concluded: “Considering the totality of the relationship between Mr. Reid and Employee 2, we did not find sufficient evidence to determine that Mr. Reid’s conduct toward Employee 2 constituted sexual harassment or some other form of misconduct.”

The Debrief was able to speak with a female former Pentagon official who was familiar with the IG’s 2020 investigation into Reid for sexual misconduct and harassment. The former official requested anonymity out of concern for reprisal. The Debrief verified the former official was indeed in a position to comprehensively understand the workplace dynamics in OUSDI under Reid’s leadership.

According to the former official, Reid’s inappropriate behavior towards female employees was apparent and widely known amongst the staff at OUSDI. “He was extremely arrogant. It didn’t matter who was around, senior civilian staff, attorneys, military officials. It didn’t matter. He would still do completely inappropriate things.” The career female defense official said she understood why “Employee 2” in the IG investigation didn’t initially report Reid’s behavior, and it only came to light due to another allegation of misconduct.

“As a woman working in the Pentagon, which is still largely a boy’s club, when you see someone like Reid blatantly behaving like he did, you say, ‘Why bother?’ Why speak out because all that is going to happen is you’re going to be penalized, but nothing will happen to someone like Reid. So you just accept it’s not worth it.” “And look what happened,” the former female defense official added. “Nothing was done about him sexually harassing one co-worker [Employee 2], while the other co-worker [Employee 1] he was having an affair with got promoted into a senior position. What kind of message does that send?”

Another current female defense official who was not working in the Pentagon during the IG’s initial investigation, but whose current position put her in contact with Reid and OUSD(I&S) told The Debrief that she would like to hope things are changing for the better. However, evidence often suggests otherwise.

“Let’s be honest here. He [Reid] didn’t get run off until he screwed up Afghanistan and a man [Elizondo] filed an IG complaint,” said the current female Defense official.

“As a woman, personally I look at his behavior and think he’s a pig,” the current female Defense official added. “Professionally, I’d consider him a huge CI [counterintelligence] risk. If I’m a foreign adversary, I realize all I need to do to compromise this guy is wave a skirt in front of him. It’s kind of remarkable he was the head of counterintelligence.”

In yet another IG complaint during the 2019-2020 time frame, an anonymous co-worker accused Reid of creating a hostile and combative work environment. Of twenty-one witnesses interviewed by IG investigators, one-third gave unfavorable appraisals of Reid’s leadership, describing him as “nasty,” “gruff,” “moody,” “unpredictable,” “not very communicative,” or “incredibly inconsistent.”

One witness said Reid could get “angry” and “downright mean” when things weren’t going well, and he wanted answers.

“When he’s talking to you, like he’s interrogating you, [and] talking to you like you’re the gum on his shoe, bottom of his shoe. Just no, even basic human respect. I mean it was like he had no time for you,” said one witness. “If he was not happy with you, you knew it and felt it.”

Twelve witnesses offered a slightly more favorable appraisal, saying Reid was “firm” and “blunt” but also “smart,” “strategic,” and “successful.”

Reid’s then-boss, Deputy Undersecretary for Intelligence Kari Bingen, described him as a “pit-bull as in if you give him something and he will kind of be dogged about getting it down.”

Bingen admitted there had been “several, or a handful of individuals” who said it had been “really hard to work for him” during exit interviews upon leaving the Pentagon. Bingen, however, told investigators she had seen “flashes of him doing his job very well, him building relationships, [and] him getting things done effectively.”

Ultimately, the Inspector General’s Office said the negative comments about Reid’s leadership “did not rise to the level of violations of the JER,” concluding Reid had not fostered a negative work environment.

During their overall investigations in 2020, the DoD IG said they uncovered that Reid had at times used his personal email account to conduct “official DoD business.” On 65 occasions, investigators found Reid had used his personal email to share Controlled Unclassified Information.

Reid claimed he had only used his personal email for “rare and extraordinary” situations but agreed, “I probably should have known better.” In their final conclusion, the IG Office said Reid violated DoD policies regarding email use, highlighting his later remarks and agreeing “[He] should have known better.”

AND UFOS...

In October 2017, the then-Director of National Programs Special Management Staff at OUSD(I&S), Luis Elizondo, resigned from the Pentagon following a lengthy career in which he had served in various senior intelligence roles.

Elizondo's reason for suddenly departing his employer of over 20 years involved UFOs, or in contemporary parlance, unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP).

Elizondo says he headed up a secretive working group within the Pentagon for over half-a-decade investigating UAP encounters by members of the U.S. military under the moniker of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP).

Elizondo's sudden October 2017 resignation was in protest after it became clear that some in Pentagon leadership were preventing senior defense officials from being briefed on these concerning UAP incidents. In December 2017, Elizondo revealed the existence of AATIP in an expose by the New York Times. Following the feature article—which thrust Elizondo, AATIP, and UAP into the limelight—was the release of three DoD videos captured in 2004 and 2015 by the targeting cameras of F/A-18 fighter jets. The Pentagon has since begrudgingly admitted the objects seen in the videos are characterized as UAP.

In the ensuing years, Elizondo has become one of the most prominent and vocal advocates for the formal investigation of these mysterious incidents.

To their credit, the Pentagon and Congressional leadership have backed up Elizondo's most extraordinary claim: That devices of apparent intelligent control and unknown origin are flying in our skies with impunity. Current Senators, former directors of the CIA, Office of National Intelligence, Deputy Secretaries of Defense, Naval Secretaries, Presidents of the United States, military fighter pilots, and a newly formed and congressionally mandated DoD Office specifically tasked with investigating UAP – have all substantiated Elizondo's core claims.

Perhaps unsurprising given the taboo nature of UFOs, that's not to say there hasn't been some controversy regarding Elizondo's claims.

Specific to the well-known UFO whistleblower, after initially confirming Elizondo ran AATIP since the spring of 2019, the DoD has been steadfast in claiming he had no "assigned responsibilities" in the program. In fairness, over the last 5 years, the DoD's position on AATIP or UAP has been, at best, indecisive.

According to Elizondo and several current and former defense officials that The Debrief spoke with, the Pentagon's inconsistent messaging on Elizondo's involvement in AATIP and general aversion to being open about its interest in UAP is in large part due to one person: Luis Elizondo's former boss at OUSD(I&S).

Or as one current senior Intelligence Official worded it when speaking with The Debrief, "Garry Fucking Reid." According to documents related to a May 2021 IG complaint filed by Elizondo, which was reviewed by The Debrief, shortly after resigning on October 5, 2017, Elizondo received a call from his former boss Garry Reid. A "clearly upset" Reid wanted to know what he should do with Elizondo's resignation letter and demanded he come to see him at the Pentagon. When Elizondo declined the invitation, Reid reportedly threatened him, saying he would "tell people you are crazy, and it might impact your security clearance."

By November, Elizondo said he received several phone calls from former colleagues at OUSD(I&S) warning him that Reid and "Employee 1" (from the IG complaint) were "coming after him."

This could be written off as an apparently emotional and volatile former boss blowing off steam. However, it would seem, Reid indeed did attempt to make good on his threats.

On December 22, 2017, five days after Elizondo and AATIP made headlines in the New York Times, an investigation into Elizondo and the release of the three DoD videos depicting UAP incidents was launched by the Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI).

A copy of the final report obtained by The Debrief via the Freedom of Information Act indicates AFOSI's primary task was to investigate the release of the three UAP videos under the presumption these videos were classified. The report notes the videos were classified as Secret/No Foreign.

The fact that AFOSI investigators initially thought the videos were Secret is intriguing.

The DoD has since admitted the three brief clips were never classified. Additionally, emails obtained through FOIA show that this was abundantly clear as far back as the summer of 2017, when Elizondo was trying to get the videos cleared for public release.

Given that they were indeed unclassified, Elizondo could have, at most, potentially committed an administrative violation for publicly releasing the videos before they had been cleared by the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR).

From the onset, had AFOSI been aware of this, they would have known that an investigation was pointless since Elizondo was no longer working for the DoD. Nevertheless, the impression that the videos were classified caused it to become a criminal matter, which allowed AFOSI to initiate the investigation.

After over four months of investigation, AFOSI arrived at the same conclusion that should have been abundantly clear from the beginning: "The three videos obtained by the SUBJECT were confirmed to be UNCLASSIFIED."

Both AFOSI and the Unauthorized Disclosure Program Management Office considered the matter closed on April 13, 2018.

Copies of AFOSI's final report were forwarded for "Action" to OUSDI, acknowledging OUSDI as the office initially requesting the investigation.

The person working out of OUSDI in charge of all counterintelligence, security, and law enforcement operations for the DoD at the time had been Garry Reid.

Speaking under the condition of anonymity, a senior defense official who had firsthand knowledge of the incident told The Debrief they knew for certain that the 2017-2018 AFOSI investigation was done at the behest of Reid as a way of retaliating against Elizondo.

Reid's aim, reportedly, was to try and get Elizondo's security clearance revoked. Treating it as a counterintelligence matter only ensured increased scrutiny.

"OSI all but came back and told him [Reid] it was improper use of their resources. Based on his position, they couldn't actually say that, but if you read between the lines on the report, that's what you see."

According to the Defense official, this was far from the only act of retribution Reid took against Elizondo.

"Reid had USDI Security put an entry in Elizondo's file on Scattered Castles, which is the clearance system used for IC interagency clearance passage, so that if he tried to go to any SCIF in the IC, Reid would get a call and be able to cause questions so that Interagency partners would come to believe there was a 'problem' and not let him in," the Defense official explained.

"This is a stealth administrative way to block someone's access without overtly putting anything out there. These types of admin dirty tricks were perpetrated by Reid against Elizondo over and over again."

Multiple former and current Defense Officials familiar with the matter told The Debrief that going after Elizondo's security clearance had been only one of the administrative dirty tricks Reid played.

Initially, when news of AATIP came to light in 2017, then-Pentagon Spokesperson Dana White acknowledged Elizondo had run the program.

By Spring of 2019, however, the DoD did an about-face, releasing the boilerplate statement that "Mr. Elizondo had no responsibilities with regard to the AATIP program while he worked in OUSDI [the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence]."

A former senior advisor to Secretary of Defense James Mattis told The Debrief they had been briefed at the Pentagon by Elizondo several times in early 2017 on UAP incidents and were dumbfounded when they saw the DoD's new "no responsibilities" position.

"I actually called PAO and said, 'How can you say that? I was read into this and [was] briefed by him [Elizondo].'" The former advisor says they never provided an adequate explanation for why the DoD was now denying Elizondo's role with the program.

Two current Defense officials told The Debrief they knew that senior leadership at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), who at the time was managing the DoD's officially sanctioned UAP Task Force, had provided clarifying statements to the Public Affairs Office reflecting Elizondo had been the senior ranking official in the joint working group investigating UAP known as AATIP.

Documents reviewed by The Debrief show that on June 3, 2020, Elizondo emailed the DoD's newly appointed UAP public affairs czar, Susan Gough, requesting a correction to previous statements that more correctly reflected his involvement with AATIP. In the email, Elizondo provided 14 names of individuals ranging from senior Pentagon officials, private contractors, to members of Congress who could verify his involvement. Each of Elizondo's attempts to correct the record on his former role with the AATIP program went unrecognized.

Several current and former Defense officials tell The Debrief that the DoD's steadfast denial regarding Elizondo and often inconsistent and confusing public statements on UAP can be traced back to Elizondo's last boss, Garry Reid.

After three years of attempts at clearing his name and setting the record straight, Elizondo finally filed a formal complaint with the DoD Inspector General's Office in May 2021.

In unclassified documents reviewed by The Debrief, Elizondo accused Reid of "malicious activities, coordinated disinformation, professional misconduct, whistleblower reprisal, and explicit threats."

In the cover letter to his complaint, Elizondo said, "I am fully aware of the magnitude of my allegations against certain individuals in the Department, and I am able to substantiate these claims."

Speaking with The Debrief, Elizondo said part of Reid's vendetta against and misleading statements about his involvement with AATIP are likely related to the fact he was never made aware of the program. "Since I could not trust him, I never indoctrinated him into the program, and instead was working with echelons within the Department above him," said Elizondo.

"I was aware of his perceived misconduct and could not risk the integrity of the program by involving him. Last I heard, he was coaching Pentagon Spokesperson, Susan Gough how to respond to inquiries by the media about

me. This would explain the obvious inaccuracies provided to the media about me by Ms. Gough,” surmised Elizondo.

“THE WORST IS YET TO COME” – THE LATEST ON RUSSIA’S INVASION OF UKRAINE

The Inspector General’s Office declined to comment on Elizondo’s complaint.

Just before Elizondo filed his complaint, the IG’s Office announced they were launching an evaluation “to determine the extent to which the DoD has taken actions regarding Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP).” Both the investigations into Elizondo’s complaint and the evaluation of the DoD’s handling of UAP are still on going and when it comes to the DoD’s handling of UAP, once again all roads lead to Garry Reid.

In August of 2020, the DoD officially announced the establishment of a UAP Task Force to “improve its understanding of, and gain insight into, the nature and origins of UAPs.”

However, copies of emails obtained by The Debrief via FOIA show that senior DoD leadership, as high as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of the Navy, were being briefed on UAP at least a year earlier in 2019. Lawmakers on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee were also receiving briefings on UAP by 2019.

And while all of these efforts in 2019-2020—including those by the UAP Task Force—were being managed by the Office of Naval Intelligence, the cognizant authority for the DoD’s UAP investigations was the Defense Intelligence, Collection, and Special Programs Office at OUSD(I&S), which fell under the direct control of the Director of Defense Intelligence: Garry Reid.

So while Congress was passing legislation requesting preliminary evaluations of UAP incidents and establishing a formal UAP investigative office in the Pentagon, the principal executive overseeing these efforts was Reid. The same Reid that multiple defense officials say has not only maintained a years-long vendetta against Elizondo but also played a central role in obstructing efforts to formally investigate purported UAP sightings going back to at least late 2017.

Notwithstanding all of this, in November 2021, when the DoD decided to get ahead of an upcoming Congressional mandate, Reid was named as the Executive Secretary of the newly formed UAP investigative office, the verbosely titled the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG).

With Reid’s sudden departure, the Director for Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support) Air Force Major General Aaron Prupas will likely take over leadership of the AOIMSG, at least for the time being.

BUT WAIT, THERE’S MORE...

In light of having been named in multiple past IG complaints; in violation of DoD Joint Ethics Regulations;” and the subject of a still ongoing IG investigation involving allegations of “malicious activities”; miraculously, in July 2021, Reid found himself named as the Director of the DOD Crisis Action Group for Afghanistan.

In this role, Reid served as the lead DoD official overseeing the relocation of refugees and transportation of U.S. embassy staff, American citizens, allies, and other partners during the U.S.’s frantic withdrawal from Afghani stan.

Horrific images of desperate Afghans clinging to the landing gear of massive C-17 cargo planes as they took to the sky would suggest that Reid’s Afghanistan Crisis Action Group was a complete disaster. And the data would concur.

In a joint press conference with Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby on August 16, Reid said while working closely with the Department of State, the Crisis Action Group was focusing on relocating Special Visa Applications (SIV). “To date, nearly 2,000 Afghans have passed through this process,” said Reid.

According to a February 2022 report issued by the Association of Wartime Allies, of the 81,000 SIV applicants who had pending visa applications on the day of Reid’s press conference, on August 31, when the final U.S. cargo planes went wheels up, 78,000 were left behind.

Six months after America’s withdrawal, AWA collected data on 10,803 of the 78,000 Afghan refugees left behind. Of those surveyed, 30% had been imprisoned by the Taliban; 88% reported loss of employment; 94% reported economic hardship; 70% said they went without food at least once in the last month; 84% reported going without medical care due to angst about leaving home and facing reprisals from the Taliban; and 77% said they had witnessed some form of physical violence against others for their service to the United States.

The State Department has disputed AWA’s figure that 78,000 Afghan refugees were left behind, saying in early August 2021, there were about “18,000 SIV applicants.” Both organizations agree that only 3,000 SIV applicants were ultimately evacuated by August 31.

So while the State Department’s total figure of SIV applicants is considerably smaller than AWA’s estimate, it still reflects the U.S. didn’t get out nearly 84% of Afghan refugees.

According to some senior Defense officials, including those from the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and Intelligence Community, Reid and Crisis Action Group out of OUSD(I&S) bear a large part of the blame for the U.S. not being able to get more refugees out of Afghanistan.

Officials tell The Debrief that all evacuation of refugees had to go through Reid's office in OUSD(I&S), which created a bureaucratic bottleneck that often brought operations to a standstill.

Frustrated that some military agencies were still doing everything they could to get refugees out as the Taliban swooped in and seized control of Kabul, Defense officials said OUSD(I&S) ordered all U.S. military helicopters grounded, with permission to fly having to be granted by them.

"JSOC folks and some other agencies were already working to get people out, but USDI and Reid suddenly came in and put everything to a halt. They repeatedly held things up, for no other reason than they just wanted to say they were in charge," one senior JSOC official speaking on the condition of anonymity told The Debrief. "The military, JSOC, and other agencies, were getting it done. I can't overstate it enough how much USDI and Reid's group just came in and screwed things up."

The bureaucratic ineptitude of the DoD's evacuation process was so incredible that an ad hoc group of former U.S. special operators, aid workers, and intelligence officers with experience in Afghanistan banded together in what was dubbed "Task Force Pineapple" to save as many of their former Afghan allies as possible.

An Afghan SIV applicant who was ultimately left behind told AWA, "We are suffering the worst days of our life. I never go outside my living area. I have [not] left my home since the Taliban took over the country... I have lost my job furthermore, I cannot walk freely in the city/village because the Taliban will arrest me."

UNUSUAL PROBLEMS SEEM TO ALWAYS SURROUND REID

Since Spring of 2020, The Debrief had been investigating claims of misconduct by Reid after a current Pentagon official reached out and expressed concerns.

The individual said they knew of the past investigations, and because Reid "had friends in high places," they had little faith in the DoD's formal oversight channels. Hence their decision to turn to the media.

In examining the claims against Reid, The Debrief reached out and spoke with numerous current and former Pentagon and Intelligence officials who had either worked with or were familiar with Reid over the following nearly two years.

Of these individuals, the only remotely favorable evaluation was from one former Senior Advisor who said they "knew about rumors" of past misdeeds, including the alleged affair with Employee 1, but their interactions with Reid were always generally good.

The remaining persons The Debrief spoke with painted a picture of an arrogant and spiteful senior public official, who some seemed afraid of due to his significant power in the DoD's security and law enforcement apparatus. Being judicious in our investigation and not mischaracterizing someone based merely on others' subjective opinions, The Debrief attempted to further evaluate several individuals' claims about Reid.

On May 18, 2020, The Debrief filed a Freedom of Information Act Request for copies of various communication records, including all of Reid's emails, calendar invites, real-time communications on government cell phones, Blackberry devices, or messages using SameTime or similar computer-based real-time messaging.

On July 27, 2020, The Debrief was informed by OSD's FOIA Office that OUSD(I&S) had replied that our "request is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and does not reasonably describe the documents being processed. Further, based on the scope and terms of your request, the component is not able to reasonably suggest an appropriate, more narrow search/request."

The Debrief was informed it had until the close of business on July 7 to clarify the scope of our request, or the matter would be closed. The cutoff date was twenty days before we were ever initially asked to clarify the request.

OUSD(I&S)'s claim that the original FOIA request was "overly broad" was odd. Initially, The Debrief's legal counsel had drafted a 19-page FOIA request that explicitly indicated what records were sought and exactly where these items could be located.

Adding to the confusion, on the same day The Debrief had filed a FOIA request for Reid's communications, it had made identical requests regarding two other senior DoD officials, one of whom worked in OUSD(I&S) for Reid. The two other exact requests were being processed. Only the one for Reid had faced problems. When reminded of this, OSD's FOIA Office told The Debrief to disregard the previous concern, and the records request was now being processed.

For more than a year, The Debrief didn't hear anything until October 19, 2021, when OSD's FOIA Office sent the exact same response that OUSD(I&S) claimed our response was "overly broad."

Ultimately, it is unknown why repeated problems have arisen in seeking copies of records pertaining to Garry Reid. The other two identical requests have continued to be processed without issue.

At the time of his dismissal, The Debrief was engaged in legal efforts to facilitate the release of Reid's communication records.

"IT'S A HUGE DEAL"

The ultimate reason for Garry Reid's dismissal from the DoD remains unknown.

When The Debrief reached out to Public Affairs to clarify if Reid had voluntarily resigned or was terminated, the Department of Defense declined to comment.

Current and former Defense officials familiar with the situation said the official claimed reason for Reid's ousting remains a mystery to them as well. However, out of the Officials who spoke with The Debrief, all universally said it was likely from a combination of factors and that investigation into Lue Elizondo's formal complaint by the IG Office likely uncovered all sorts of nasty skeletons.

"Although I cannot confirm what ultimately led to his termination, I can surmise that it was caused, in part, by information contained in my IG complaint," Elizondo told The Debrief.

When asked how they felt on hearing the news, officials The Debrief spoke with said that Reid's departure was long overdue. Many also expressed surprise at his ousting.

"The guy was part of the system for a very long time. To fire him is no joke!" said one former Defense

official. Another current senior Pentagon advisor said, "The guy ran all counterintelligence, security and law enforcement for the entire DoD, worldwide. This is a huge deal!"

Some who had known Reid for years expressed disappointment in the overall situation. Prior to going to work in the Pentagon in 2007, Reid had served nearly 30 years in U.S. Army Special Operations, including as the Command Sergeant Major for the Army's 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment, "Delta Force." By all accounts, even those who spoke poorly of Reid's Pentagon behavior, said he had been a respected member of the Special Operations community. "He just lost his way when he got to the Pentagon," said one long-time JSOC official.

Assuming past allegations of misconduct and Pentagon Official's descriptions of his behavior are any indication, Reid's fall from grace will have an immediate positive impact on OUSD(I&S).

When it comes to former Pentagon officials turned advocates for formal scrutiny of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena, they say Reid's departure will have a significant positive impact on Government's investigations into UAP.

"It's a really big deal," said Elizondo. "He was one of the biggest obstacles to the DoD's investigations and public transparency of unidentified aerial phenomena."

Given that he was on the receiving end of Reid's ire for several years, The Debrief asked Elizondo how he felt about Reid's removal.

"While I profoundly respect his past military service to our country, obviously in his later career, he forgot his promise to the American people," Elizondo said.

"This action by the Department is significant and should be taken as a warning to others in the Department who continue to obfuscate the UAP topic and deny our previous efforts and findings in the AATIP program as they relate to a legitimate potential threat to the National Security of the United States," Elizondo added.

Before publication, The Debrief sent several unanswered requests to Reid for comment.

"As I indicated before, those involved in the purposeful and deliberate obfuscation of the truth will be held accountable," added Elizondo.

"We are now seeing this process in action."

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Attachment Name : smime.p7s

From
To

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In addition to providing your organizations with a copy of the report, we will provide this report to the Secretary of Defense on May 11, 2022, and to Congress on May 12, 2022. The report will be posted to the DoD OIG public webpage on May 13, 2022.

If your organization would like to provide additional comments to the final report, they can be sent as a PDF file to (b) (6) @dodig.mil. Your additional comments will not be included in the final report, but will be used by the DoD OIG to assess and track management's response to the recommendations. For any additional comments, the DoD OIG requires an actual signature (digital is acceptable) of the authorizing official for your organization.

If you have any questions, please direct them to (b) (6), at (b) (6), e-mail: (b) (6) @dodig.mil.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

Evaluations Component - Program Evaluations II
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
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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

MAY 10, 2022



Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the Armed Forces

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE





Results in Brief

Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the Armed Forces

May 10, 2022

Objective

The objective of our evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD and the Military Services have implemented policy and procedures that prohibit active advocacy and active participation related to supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes by active duty military personnel, as required by DoD Instruction 1325.06.

Background

This evaluation was planned and conducted to align with the DoD OIG's focus on ethical decision-making and conduct, in the context of incidents indicating the presence of prohibited extremist activity within the U.S. military.

DoD Instruction 1325.06, "Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces," prohibits Service members' active advocacy of and participation in organizations that espouse supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes. However, recent surveys and incidents have raised concerns about the presence of ideological extremists within the U.S. military.

We identified nine publicly reported incidents involving active and former military members from several branches of the military that have been charged with criminal offenses related to participation in or advocacy of violent extremist or supremacist groups and ideologies since January 2020. For example, in October 2020,

Background (cont'd)

two recently discharged Service members linked to violent extremist groups were charged with plotting to kidnap the Governor of Michigan. In addition, the DoD has received six congressional inquiries since February 2019 regarding the DoD's policy on prohibited activities, especially extremist and supremacist activities in the Armed Forces.

Findings

DoDI 1325.06 prohibits active advocacy of extremist ideology and active participation in extremist organizations. However, DoDI 1325.06 was last updated on February 22, 2012, and does not have sufficiently detailed and easily-understood definitions of extremism-related terminology, including the terms "extremist," "extremism," "active advocacy," and "active participation." Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and Military Service officials consistently stated that Service members and commanders do not know what behaviors constitute extremism or extremist activity. As a result, the DoD cannot fully implement policy and procedures to address extremist activity without clarifying the definitions of "extremism," "extremist," "active advocacy," and "active participation."

We also found that the DoD collects data through a variety of processes to track extremist-related activities within the Armed Forces; however, these processes are not interconnected. As a result, the DoD is not able to accurately collect and analyze Service-level data and develop a DoD-wide understanding of extremist-related activity within the Armed Forces. In addition, senior officials cannot determine the full extent of extremist activity to adequately address the issue within the Armed Forces.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, update DoDI 1325.06 to clarify the meanings of terms related to extremism and



Results in Brief

Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the Armed Forces

Recommendations (cont'd)

extremist activity. In addition, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Military Departments review their extremist-related policies, procedures, and training materials to ensure conformity with the revised version of DoDI 1325.06.

We also recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, develop and publish standardized policies, processes, and tracking mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities. According to Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness officials, during our evaluation the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness drafted an implementation policy and coordinated the draft policy with the Services for their review and feedback. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and remains open, pending OUSD(P&R) issuance of the implementation policy.

Management Actions Taken

On December 20, 2021, the Secretary of Defense updated DoDI 1325.06. The updated policy improved the definition of extremist activities to ensure that DoD policy on extremist activities is easily understood by both Service members and commanders. Specifically, the updated DoDI 1325.06 provides a clarifying definition for the term “extremist activities” and the term “active participation.” This action fully addresses the recommendation to clarify the meanings of terms related to extremism and extremist activity; therefore, this recommendation is closed.

Management Comments and Our Response

Senior officials from the Military Departments concurred with and fully addressed the recommendation to develop and publish policy and guidance for identifying, tracking, and reporting service member involvement in prohibited extremist-related groups and activities; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and remains open. We will close the recommendation when the Secretaries for the Military Departments provide us a copy of their approved and published policies.

All management comments we received agreed with our recommendation to develop and publish standardized policies, processes, and mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities. The management comments addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments provide us a copy of their issued policies.

Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Secretary of the Army	None	A.2, B	A.1
Secretary of the Navy	None	A.2, B	A.1
Secretary of the Air Force	None	A.2, B	A.1
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness	None	B	A.1
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security	None	B	A.1

Please provide Management Comments by June 13, 2022.

Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

May 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the
Armed Forces (Report No. DODIG-2022-095)

This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report; these comments are included in the report.

Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force concurred with the recommendations presented in the report; therefore, we consider the recommendations resolved and open. As described in the recommendations section of this report, we will close the recommendations when we are provided with documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations are completed. Therefore, within 90 days, please provide us your response to specific actions in progress or completed on the recommendations; send your response to followup@dodig.mil.

If you have any questions, please contact (b) (6) at (b) (6), (b) (6) [@dodig.mil](mailto:(b) (6)@dodig.mil). We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. Dubinok", is positioned above the typed name.

Jefferson L. Dubinok
Acting Assistant Inspector General for
Program Evaluations, Combatant
Commands, and Overseas Contingency
Operations

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Introduction

Objective

The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD and the Military Services have implemented policy and procedures that prohibit active advocacy and active participation related to supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes by active duty military personnel, as required by DoD Instruction 1325.06.¹

Background

DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1325.06 establishes DoD policy regarding Service members' participation in prohibited activities. The Instruction prohibits Service members from actively advocating for "supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes." In addition, Service members may not actively participate in organizations that advocate supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes. Although the Instruction does not explicitly define "extremism," "extremist activity," or "extremist organization," it states the following in regard to active participation:

Active participation includes, but is not limited to, fundraising; demonstrating or rallying; recruiting, training, organizing, or leading members; distributing material (including posting online); knowingly wearing gang colors or clothing; having tattoos or body markings associated with such gangs or organizations; or otherwise engaging in activities in furtherance of the objective of such gangs or organizations that are detrimental to good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment or are incompatible with military service.

DoDI 1325.06 also recognizes that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects individuals' freedom of speech and the right to peaceable assembly. Accordingly, the Instruction states that a Service member's First Amendment rights should be preserved to the maximum extent possible, while also charging commanders to not be "indifferent to conduct that, if allowed to proceed unchecked, would destroy the effectiveness of the military unit." According to the Instruction, this balancing of Constitutional rights with military good order and discipline "depends largely upon the calm and prudent judgment of the responsible commander." In addition, DoDI 1325.06 requires that each Military Department

¹ DoD Instruction 1325.06, "Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces," November 27, 2009 (Incorporating Change 1, Effective February 22, 2012).

establish policies and procedures to implement the Instruction's requirements. Therefore, each Service has incorporated guidance regarding prohibited activities into its extremism policies.

Incidents or Allegations of Extremist Activity Within the DoD

Although DoD and Service policies clearly prohibit extremist behavior by military Service members, recent surveys and incidents have raised concerns about the presence of ideological extremists within the U.S. military. For example, a 2020 Military Times poll "found about one-third of all active-duty respondents said they saw signs of white supremacist or racist ideology in the ranks."²

We identified nine publicly reported incidents involving active and former military members linked to violent extremist or supremacist groups since January 2020. The active duty and Reserve Component Service members involved in these incidents were serving or had served in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Army National Guard. The suspects were charged with criminal offenses related to participation in or advocacy of violent extremist or supremacist organizations and ideologies. For example, according to the Department of Justice, 13 defendants, including two former U.S. Marines, were arrested on charges related to domestic terrorism, including a plot to kidnap the Governor of Michigan in October 2020. One of these former Marines was discharged from the Marine Corps Reserve the same day charges were announced against him, while the other was discharged from the active duty Marine Corps in 2019.

In a January 2020 report to Congress, the DoD noted 45 allegations involving supremacist, neo-Nazi, and other extremist affiliations by Service members during the preceding 12 months.³

- The Department of the Navy disclosed 10 cases involving Sailors or Marines affiliated with extremist or hate groups.
- The Department of the Army disclosed 24 cases involving Soldiers affiliated with extremist or hate groups.
- The Department of the Air Force disclosed 11 cases involving Airmen affiliated with extremist or hate groups.

² Military Times, "Troops: White nationalism a national security threat equal to ISIS, al-Qaida," (Tysons, Virginia), September 3, 2020.

³ Department of Defense Report to Congress, "Military Personnel and Extremist Ideologies," January 16, 2020.

Congressional Inquiries Regarding DoD Policy on Prohibited Extremist Activities

The DoD has received six congressional inquiries since February 2019 regarding the DoD's policy on prohibited extremist activities, especially extremist and supremacist activities in the Armed Forces. These inquiries included requests for:

- clarification and review of DoD policy on prohibited activities, particularly regarding extremist and supremacist ideology and activity;
- information on actions the DoD is taking to prevent the accession of recruits with ties to supremacist or hate groups;
- development of DoD guidance to assist recruiters in identifying extremist groups and activities; and
- clarifying the term "extremism" and the scope of violent extremism among Service members.

Following the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, 11 Senators requested that the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigate "supremacist and violent fringe extremist activity within the military." Additionally, the request called for recommendations to prevent and neutralize extremist ideology within the Armed Forces.

The DoD Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks

On February 5, 2021, the Secretary of Defense directed commanders and DoD supervisors at all levels to conduct a one-day stand-down with their personnel to address the issue of extremism within the ranks.⁴ Stating that Service members, DoD civilian employees, and all those who support the DoD mission deserve an environment free of behaviors characterized by discrimination, hate, and harassment, the Secretary of Defense called upon all those who hold leadership positions within the DoD to guard against these behaviors and set the example for those they lead.

The Secretary of Defense gave commanders and DoD supervisors the discretion to tailor the program of instruction for their unit's stand-down day. However, the Secretary of Defense required the stand-down instruction to include:

- the importance of the Oath of Office taken by Service members and Federal civilian employees upon entering public service. The Oath of Office, which the U.S. Constitution requires all Service members to take, includes the commitment to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;

⁴ Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Stand-Down to Address Extremism in the Ranks," February 5, 2021.

- a description of impermissible behaviors related to extremism, including actions associated with extremist or dissident ideologies;
- procedures for reporting suspected or actual extremist behaviors in accordance with DoDI 1325.06; and
- an opportunity for DoD personnel to offer their concerns, experiences, and possible solutions.

As stated in the memorandum, the stand-down day is one element of what must be a concerted effort to better educate Service members about the extent of extremist activity within the DoD and to develop sustainable ways to eliminate the corrosive effects of extremist ideology and conduct on the DoD workforce.

The DoD Countering Extremism Activity Working Group

In an April 9, 2021, memorandum to DoD senior leadership, the Secretary of Defense directed several immediate actions to address extremism within the DoD.⁵ These immediate actions included a review and update of DoDI 1325.06 to revise its definitions of extremism and extremist activities; development of personnel training in regard to the potential targeting of separated and retired Service members for recruitment by extremist groups; the development of enhanced screening questionnaires for military recruits; and the initiation of a study to determine the scope of extremist behavior within the DoD.

The Secretary of Defense memorandum also directed the establishment of the DoD Countering Extremism Activity Working Group (CEAWG), led by the Senior Advisor on Human Capital and Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, to oversee the execution of these activities and to develop additional recommendations for Secretary of Defense consideration. The Secretary of Defense tasked the CEAWG to examine policy and programmatic changes along four lines of effort (LOE).

1. Military Justice and Policy—Evaluate whether seeking an amendment to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is appropriate to address extremism and if current regulations are sufficient or should be expanded.
2. Support and Oversight—Determine how the DoD can facilitate improved information collection and sharing among Service Insider Threat Programs, law enforcement organizations, security organizations, commanders, and supervisors, as well as examine standards of conduct and the expectations for social media use and reporting within the DoD.

⁵ Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Immediate Actions to Counter Extremism in the Department and the Establishment of the Countering Extremism Activity Working Group,” April 9, 2021.

3. Screening Capability—Examine the DoD’s pursuit of capabilities to screen publicly-available information for accession of military recruits and for continuous vetting of national security positions.⁶
4. Education and Training—Examine existing training and use lessons learned from the stand-down to make recommendations for training at different leadership levels and discrete, targeted audiences, as necessary.

The Deputy’s Workforce Council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, will review the final recommendations from the CEAWG and any related recommendations from DoD Components and will guide the work of the CEAWG.⁷

⁶ While outside the scope of this evaluation, we discuss our observations on screening recruits in Appendix B, Other Matters of Interest, “DoD Efforts to Screen Social Media of Members of the Armed Forces for Extremist Activity.”

⁷ The Deputy’s Workforce Council addresses the Department’s people management, personnel policy, and total force requirements. Topics include Countering Extremism.

Finding A

DoD Policy Prohibits Participation in Extremist Organizations; However, DoD Officials Expressed Difficulty in Identifying Extremist Activity

The DoD developed and implemented policy to prohibit activities with extremist organizations and ideologies by Service members. DoDI 1325.06 provides guidance related to prohibited activities, including prohibited active participation with extremist organizations and active advocacy of extremist ideologies by Service members. Specifically, DoDI 1325.06 requires that:

- military personnel must reject active participation in organizations that advocate supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes;
- military commanders must remain alert for signs of prohibited activities;
- military commanders must intervene early, primarily through counseling;
- military commanders are authorized to employ a full range of administrative and disciplinary actions, including administrative separation or appropriate criminal action, against military personnel who engage in prohibited activities; and
- the Military Departments must ensure that policy and procedures on prohibited activities outlined in the DoDI 1325.06 are included in Service training programs.

However, DoDI 1325.06 was last updated on February 22, 2012, and does not have sufficiently detailed and easily-understood definitions of extremism-related terminology, including the terms “extremist,” “extremism,” “active advocacy,” and “active participation.” The CEAWG is reviewing and amending the definitions within DoDI 1325.06.

Officials from the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Personnel and Readiness (P&R), and Intelligence and Security (I&S), and from the Military Services we interviewed consistently stated that Service members and commanders do not know what behaviors constitute extremism or extremist activity and that identification of extremist activity is often subjective and is inconsistently reported by the Services. In addition, Service training commands are unable to develop detailed training materials for Service members about extremism, including procedures for reporting extremist activity, because sufficiently detailed and easily understood definitions of extremism, as well as information on what

behavior constitutes extremist activity, have not been provided. The DoD cannot fully implement policy and procedures to address extremist activity without clarifying the definitions of “extremism,” “extremist,” “active advocacy,” and “active participation.”

DoD Instruction 1325.06 Prohibits Active Participation in Extremist Organizations, but DoD Officials Expressed Difficulty in Identifying Extremist Activity

The OUSD(P&R), in coordination with the OUSD(I&S), the Joint Staff, the Office of the General Counsel of the DoD, and the Military Departments, developed and implemented policy related to prohibited activities with extremist organizations and ideologies by Service members, as outlined in DoDI 1325.06. DoDI 1325.06 provides guidance related to prohibited activities, including prohibited active participation with extremist organizations and active advocacy of extremist ideologies by Service members.

However, discussions with officials from the OUSD(P&R), OUSD(I&S), Joint Staff, Military Departments, and each of the Services highlighted difficulties with identifying and reporting extremist activities within the DoD. For example, officials from the Services’ Judge Advocate General offices commented on the subjectivity in identifying extremist activities and organizations: what one person might consider to be an extremist organization, another person might see as a group advocating for the protection of individual rights within the U.S. Constitution. An Air Force recruiting official noted that an applicant for enlistment may believe that the group they belong to is not an extremist organization; however, a recruiting officer may think otherwise.

Moreover, a Service member’s advocacy of an extremist organization or ideology may go unrecognized by colleagues, potentially leading to an unreported prohibited activity. Officials from the Joint Staff J5, Army Criminal Investigation Division, Navy Recruiting Command, and Marine Corps Insider Threat Program also commented on the use of the word “active” to describe certain prohibited activities, noting that the interpretation of the word “active” led to confusion when trying to determine advocacy of, or participation in, prohibited activities.

Officials from all four Services agreed on the need for a more clear and concise DoD-wide definition of extremism to appropriately revise and implement extremist-related policy. Therefore, although DoDI 1325.06 provides examples

of activities that constitute active participation in extremist organizations, it does not clearly define extremism, nor does it elaborate on behaviors that would indicate active advocacy of such organizations or related ideologies.⁸

DoDI 1325.06 Balances the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Speech Against the Military's Requirement for Conduct Consistent With Good Order, Discipline, and National Security

DoDI 1325.06 both prohibits Service members' advocacy of, and participation in, certain activities, and acknowledges their Constitutional right to free speech. The DoDI cites the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." DoDI 1325.06 directs that a "Service member's right of expression should be preserved to the maximum extent possible," while also maintaining good order and discipline. For example, a Navy official stated that, although clear definitions of extremist-related terms are needed, Service members' Constitutionally-protected rights must also be taken into account.

Reconciling an individual's right of freedom of speech with military order and discipline is left to the subjective judgement of unit commanders. DoDI 1325.06 states that the "proper balancing of these interests depends largely upon the calm and prudent judgment of the responsible commander." According to an internal Department of the Navy "Tiger Team" report, provided by an official from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, commanders "shoulder the responsibility" for recognizing and addressing domestic extremism, but without clear policy or guidance and with little to no training.⁹ As a result, according to the Department of Navy Tiger Team report, it is difficult for commanders to ascertain when a Service member has crossed a threshold into a prohibited activity.

⁸ DoDI 1325.06 states: "Active participation includes, but is not limited to, fundraising; demonstrating or rallying; recruiting, training, organizing, or leading members; distributing material (including posting online); knowingly wearing gang colors or clothing; having tattoos or body markings associated with such gangs or organizations; or otherwise engaging in activities in furtherance of the objective of such gangs or organizations that are detrimental to good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment or are incompatible with military service."

⁹ Department of the Navy, "Report of the Department of Navy Domestic Extremism Tiger Team," (undated). The purpose of this report was to report on the results of the Department of Navy's domestic extremism tiger team. The tiger team sought to (1) document existing capabilities for preventing, detecting, and mitigating domestic extremism, and (2) identify gaps in current capabilities.

The DoD Cannot Fully Implement Policy and Procedures to Address Extremist Activity Without Clarifying the Definition of Extremism

OUSD(P&R), OUSD(I&S), and Service officials acknowledged that the lack of a clear definition has created confusion for Service members and commanders in their understanding of extremism. Officials from the Joint Staff J5, Army Criminal Investigation Division, Navy Recruiting Command, Navy Security and Intelligence Office, and Marine Corps Counter Insider Threat Analysis Service recognize that, along with the imprecise definition of extremism, related terms such as “active,” “advocate,” and “participation” are also subject to differing interpretations. These uncertainties make it difficult for Service members to identify and report extremist behaviors and activities, as well as create challenges with the development of the training needed to educate Service members about extremism and extremist activities.

In addition to the challenges expressed by the Services with regard to identifying, reporting, and acting on extremist activity, Congress has also expressed concern over the ambiguity of DoD definitions of relevant terms. Since 2019, Congress has sent six inquiries to the DoD regarding the DoD’s definition of extremism. For example, a June 2020 letter to the Secretary of Defense, signed by 40 members of the House of Representatives, requested clarification of the terms “supremacist” and “extremist,” as referenced in DoDI 1325.06. Additionally, in letters to the Secretary of Defense from April and June 2021, a member of Congress referred to a “glaring omission” in the DoD’s definition of extremism and the need to define terms related to extremism in the Services. These congressional concerns were similar to those of DoD officials we interviewed regarding the ambiguity of key definitions related to extremism, including “extremism,” “extremist,” “active advocacy,” and “active participation.”

The congressional inquiries regarding the DoD’s clarification of the term “extremism” also discussed extremism-related training for Service members. A June 2020 letter from members of the House of Representatives requested the review and clarification of DoD policy on prohibited activities, particularly regarding extremist and supremacist ideology and activity. This included an inquiry into extremist- and supremacist-related training provided to Service members. However, officials from the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services stated that effective, targeted training cannot be developed and provided to military personnel if there isn’t a clearly-defined meaning of extremism upon which the program of instruction is based.

Additionally, Section 554(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2021 requires that the Secretary of Defense establish standard policies and processes across the Armed Forces to ensure proper documentation and tracking of prohibited activity allegations.¹⁰

Current DoD Efforts to Revise DoD Instruction 1325.06 and Clarify the Definition of Extremism

On April 2021, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum establishing the CEAWG and directing several immediate actions, including the review and update of the definition of extremism contained in DoDI 1325.06. Specifically, the memorandum directed the OUSD(P&R) and the DoD Office of General Counsel to review the Instruction and revise its definition of prohibited extremist activities among uniformed military personnel. According to an OUSD(P&R) official, the DoD is in the beginning stages of deciding how to revise DoDI 1325.06. OUSD(P&R) officials have been working on clarifying the definition of extremism for several years and, during that time, have received recommendations from Congress and from senior DoD leaders that have informed and guided their work.

One OUSD(P&R) official stated that although the DoDI 1325.06 is 9 years old, the information contained within remains appropriate. The official also stated that any review and prospective updates of DoDI 1325.06 should be thoughtful and deliberate to preserve Service members' rights. Another OUSD(P&R) official agreed, stating that the DoD should carefully consider any changes to the DoDI, particularly changes related to potential legal and policy implications. Joint Staff and Marine Corps Military Equal Opportunity officials commented on the distinction between actions and thoughts, noting that any definitions related to extremism or extremist activity should address an individual's "problematic conduct," without infringing on their rights of free speech.

According to one OSD Office of General Counsel official, a standardized definition of "extremism" and "supremacy," "does not need to be updated." The official further stated that he is hesitant to predict the feasibility of standardizing these definitions. Similarly, a Headquarters Marine Corps Judge Advocate Division official stated that consideration of definitions for extremism or for extremist activity "walks a very thin wire" with respect to staying within Constitutional First Amendment constraints protecting freedom of speech and expression.

¹⁰ Public Law 116-283, "The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021," Section 554(b), "Inspector General Oversight of Diversity and Inclusion in Department of Defense; Supremacist, Extremist, or Criminal Gang Activity in the Armed Forces," January 1, 2021.

In June 2021, the Military Justice and Policy subcommittee of the CEAWG provided us a draft of its proposed language updating the DoD policy on prohibited activities. The draft includes the revision and expansion of definitions regarding “extremist activities” and “active participation,” as well as distinguishing between extremist and criminal gang activities. The CEAWG submitted its report and recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s Office in late July 2021 for coordination with the Services.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation A.1

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, update Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06 to clarify the meaning of the terms “extremism,” “extremist,” “active,” “advocate,” and “participation,” to encourage greater understanding throughout the Armed Forces of the Department of Defense policy on extremism and extremist activities.

Management Action Taken

During our evaluation, on December 20, 2021, the Secretary of Defense released the DoD Report on Countering Extremist Activity within the Department of Defense, which included information on the revised DoDI 1325.06. The revised DoDI improved the definition of extremist activities to make it clearer. Specifically, the updated DoDI 1325.06 provides clarifying definitions for the terms “extremist activities” and “active participation.”

The definition of “extremist activities” provides more detail about what Service members can and cannot do with regard to extremist activities and active participation, to include cyber activities (for example, posting, liking, sharing, re-tweeting, or otherwise distributing social media content). The revised DoDI 1325.06 also provides more specific instruction on what commands are responsible for and includes a glossary that defines key terms related to extremism, including advocacy, liking, distributing literature, and sharing.

Our Response

The management action taken fully addresses the recommendation to clarify the meaning of the terms associated with extremism and extremist activities; therefore, this recommendation is closed.

Recommendation A.2

We recommend that the Secretaries of the Military Departments update their Service's extremist-related policies, procedures, and training materials to ensure compliance with the revised version of Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06.

Department of the Army Comments

The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) agreed and stated that the Department of the Army submitted its draft implementation guidance to the OUSD(P&R) in accordance with OUSD(P&R) instructions. The instructions directed the Services to develop and submit draft implementation guidance for Change 2 of DoDI 1325.06 to the OUSD(P&R) for review and approval prior to implementation. An Army Directive will implement Change 2 of DoDI 1325.06 and will include the specific text to be inserted in paragraphs 4-12 and 4-13 of a future revision of Army Regulation 600-20, "Army Command Policy," which is pending OUSD(P&R) and DoD Office of General Counsel approval.

In addition, the Joint Staff is currently developing a stand-alone Joint Knowledge Online block of training to address extremism as part of the DoD Countering Extremist Activities Working Group recommendations. The Acting Assistant Secretary stated that, upon completion and fielding of the Joint Knowledge Online training, the Army will develop its Service-level training to integrate the Joint Knowledge Online training concepts, learning objectives, and standards.

Our Response

The comments from the Acting Assistant Secretary addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when the Department of the Army provides us a copy of the approved and published Army Command policy.

Department of the Navy Comments

The Director of Readiness and Transition for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) agreed. On February 4, 2022, the Department of the Navy provided a draft policy implementing DoDI 1325.06 to the OUSD(P&R) and the Office of the DoD General Counsel for approval. Upon receipt of approval, the Department of the Navy will issue the policy implementing the DoDI. The projected completion date for publishing the final Department of the Navy policy is August 31, 2022.

Our Response

The comments from the Director addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when the Department of the Navy provides us a copy of the issued policy.

Department of the Air Force Comments

The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) agreed and stated that the Air Force has completed draft guidance implementing DoDI 1325.06, which is currently being reviewed for approval by the OUSD(P&R) and the DoD Office of General Counsel, as required. The Acting Assistant Secretary further stated that there is no timeline for completing the review; however, the Air Force will publish the final Air Force policy promptly as soon as the OUSD(P&R) draft guidance is approved and published.

Our Response

The comments from the Acting Assistant Secretary addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when the Department of the Air Force provides us a copy of the approved and published policy.

Finding B

Without Collecting and Analyzing Data, the DoD Cannot Fully Determine the Extent of Extremist Behavior and Activities Within the Armed Forces

The DoD collects data through a variety of processes to track extremist-related activity within the Armed Forces. However, there is no process in place to share this information within the Armed Forces, the processes employed by the DoD are not interconnected, and the data from the various processes are not aggregated into a central repository that can be accessed by senior DoD personnel. Section 554(b) of the FY 2021 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to establish standard policies, processes, tracking mechanisms, and reporting requirements for extremist activity in the Armed Forces. According to a January 2020 OSD report, DoD personnel are required to report behaviors that run counter to ethical standards, DoD policies, and U.S. law, including when they witness or experience incidents of extremist, supremacist, or hate-based activity or harassment.¹¹

Both the OUSD(P&R) and the OUSD(I&S) receive information from the Office for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, which is an office within the OUSD(P&R), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation related to extremist-related activity within the Armed Forces. Specifically, the OUSD(P&R) receives a consolidated annual report from the Office for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion that incorporates an aggregation and assessment of data related to Military Equal Opportunity complaints through which extremist incidents can be reported. In addition, OUSD(I&S) officials stated that they collaborate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to share and receive information, which helps the DoD identify individuals who may have tendencies to engage in extremism-related violence. OUSD(I&S) officials also stated that Services send certain extremism-related reports through the DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC), an operational element of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency under OUSD(I&S) oversight.

However, we found that although the OUSD(P&R), OUSD(I&S), and the Services have employed a number of programs, processes, and databases that are leveraged to collect information on allegations or incidents of extremist activity, the databases of these separate reporting processes are not interconnected. This lack of data interconnectivity occurred because the DoD does not clearly outline in

¹¹ OSD report, "Military Personnel and Extremist Ideologies," prepared pursuant to Senate Report 116-103, page 24, accompanying S. 2474, the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2020, January 16, 2020.

DoDI 1325.06 what information related to extremism is required to be reported, by what processes, and to what entity. Specifically, the OUSD(I&S), in conjunction with the OUSD(P&R), has not developed and implemented standard policies, processes, tracking mechanisms, and reporting requirements to collect and analyze Service-level data on extremist-related activity within the Armed Forces.

As a result, the DoD is not able to accurately collect and analyze Service-level data and develop a DoD-wide understanding of extremist-related activity within the Armed Forces, as required by Section 554(b) of the FY 2021 NDAA. Without Service-level extremist-related activity data, senior officials cannot determine the full extent of extremist activity within the DoD and, therefore, cannot make information-based decisions to develop and implement recruiting, training, retention, and security policies to address extremist activity and ideology within the Armed Forces.

The DoD Collects Data on Extremist Activity Within the Armed Forces, but Has Gaps in Its Data Collection

Although the DoD collects extremist-related activity data, it is not able to accurately and efficiently identify all instances of extremist behavior or extremist activity within the Services. According to the December 2020 DoD Board on Diversity and Inclusion Report, testimony given in a 2020 hearing before the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee highlighted gaps in tracking extremist activities within the DoD, including data collection and reporting.¹² During the hearing, a Representative stated, “I think that data is a huge key to unpacking the issue. We need to define the problem and get reliable data on how prevalent it is in the military. I realize that we do not have a lot of reliable data on this. Aside from a recent newspaper poll on racist behavior in the military, we have few solid statistics on extremist behavior in the military.”

Service Processes for Collecting Data Related to Extremist Activity

The Military Services have processes in place for collecting extremism activity data. During the 2020 hearing before the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, a Representative stated that over the last 5 years the DoD has reported 21 criminal cases involving white supremacy within the Services. In addition, during our fieldwork we found that Army Criminal Investigation Division records

¹² Department of Defense Board on Diversity and Inclusion Report, “Recommendations to Improve Racial and Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in the U.S. Military,” December 2020. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel, “Hearing on White Supremacy and the Military,” February 11, 2020.

identified 21 Soldiers subject to disciplinary actions due to participation in extremist organizations or activities from 2015 to 2020, although the underlying basis for these actions may have been characterized more generally as “misconduct violations.” An Air Force official stated that eight Service members received non-judicial punishment for participation in extremist organizations or activities in the last 5 years. A Navy official stated the Navy does not currently track disciplinary action for participation in extremist organizations and activities.

The Services collect data on allegations or incidents through a variety of processes, such as:

- a military unit’s organizational chain of command;
- referrals from the DoD OIG Hotline and from each Service’s OIG Hotline;
- the military police forces of the Services;
- the installation or unit security office;
- the installation or unit human resources office;
- each Service’s Employee Assistance Program;
- the installation or unit counterintelligence office;
- the military component’s Insider Threat Program office; and
- Military Equal Opportunity offices.

Although Service-specific policies and procedure are in place for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the DoD has not directed or developed Departmental policies, processes, and tracking mechanisms that could be standardized across all the Services and which would allow for extremist activity to be consolidated in a central repository. For example, an Army official stated that there are three “channels” in which extremist incidents can be reported and tracked: the Military Equal Opportunity office, the Army Inspector General, or the Insider Threat Program. But he also went on to state that if the incident related to extremist activity crosses the criminal threshold, the incident is tracked in the Army alert/law enforcement database. However, these channels for reporting extremist-related incidents are not linked, so there is not a central Army repository for collecting and tracking extremist-specific data.

Disciplinary actions reported may derive from, or be related to, participation in extremist organizations or activities. However, the underlying basis for disciplinary action may be characterized more generally as “misconduct”—for example, a violation of an AR or directive, such as AR 600-20. Therefore, according to Army officials responding to our January 29, 2021, request for information, the

Army does not currently have a tracking mechanism that captures all disciplinary actions imposed by commanders for incidents involving, or related to, participation in extremist organizations or activity.

Similarly, in addition to disciplinary action, Army officials responding to our January 29, 2021, request for information stated that a Soldier may ultimately be discharged for using racist or discriminatory verbiage or for advocating hatred or intolerance during discourse with another Soldier. A Soldier's commander is empowered to initiate proceedings to separate the Soldier from the Service for violating prohibitions against extremist activity articulated in AR 600-20, and a higher commander may execute the separation. The separation may be conducted in accordance with a commander's authority prescribed in AR 635-200, "Active Duty Enlisted Administrative Separations," and AR 600-8-24, "Officer Transfers and Discharges".¹³ Under current recordkeeping systems, Headquarters, Department of the Army may record the number of Soldiers separated for misconduct. However, Army officials said Headquarters, Department of the Army does not specifically track the underlying basis for separation, such as, "advocating hatred or intolerance."

In addition, according to several officials from the different Services, none of the Services can accurately or sufficiently report extremism activity. For example, a Department of the Navy official stated, "Domestic extremism flagged reporting requirements are not established in policy and are not well understood by commanders." A U.S. Marine Corps official also "acknowledged that there is currently no way to accurately capture data regarding extremism, and violations can't be tracked, at least in part, since current UCMJ articles don't reference extremism."

The DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC)

The DITMAC was created in 2014 following the Washington Navy Yard active shooter incident and is the DoD's enterprise for reporting, analyzing, and sharing data involving insider threat activity within the DoD.¹⁴ The DITMAC collects all DoD Components' insider threat information, which can include extremism-related data. Specifically, according to the DoDI 5205.83, DoD Component heads share insider threat information with the DITMAC director.¹⁵ DoD Component heads deliver to the DITMAC post-processed results of information system monitoring, as appropriate, in accordance with criminal thresholds published by the DITMAC.

¹³ Army Regulation 635-200, "Active Duty Enlisted Administrative Separations," December 19, 2016. Army Regulation 600-8-24, "Officer Transfers and Discharges," September 13, 2011.

¹⁴ Enterprise systems are software applications that have cross-organizational capabilities as opposed to department or group-specific programs. Enterprise systems allow for collaboration and communication across the organization through collection of data that is accessible and usable by multiple departments.

¹⁵ DoD Instruction 5205.83, "DoD Insider Threat management and Analysis Center," March 30, 2017 (Incorporating Change 1, Effective October 29, 2020).

The DITMAC director oversees the management and analysis of insider threat information by a multidisciplinary team of DITMAC personnel. DITMAC personnel assess the information on potential insider threats, track responses by DoD Components to insider threats within a DoD enterprise level information management system, and generate relevant metrics and reports to inform DoD Component heads of reported and identified insider threats.

However, reports of extremism within the insider threat information reported in DITMAC are not specifically identified or extracted automatically by DITMAC personnel. In addition, reports on extremism and violent extremism can and do cross multiple categories of offenses and, according to OUSD(I&S) officials, can be searched within DITMAC databases under a variety of descriptors. Furthermore, OUSD(I&S) officials stated that querying DITMAC databases for extremism-specific incidents is a very time-consuming, sometimes manual, word-search process. The DITMAC is exploring automation of capabilities that will enable specific data-tagging and search solutions to more effectively track and account for extremism cases and other areas of concern.

DoD Officials Have Not Developed and Implemented Standard Policies and Processes to Track Extremist Activity Data

The Services do not have a standardized mechanism in place to track and report extremist activity data because the DoD has not developed and implemented standard policies and processes requiring the Services to provide this data. The FY 2021 NDAA states that all allegations and related information that a member of the Armed Forces has engaged in prohibited activity are to be referred to the DoD OIG and that the Secretary of Defense will establish the policies, processes, and mechanisms for doing so. However, the FY 2021 NDAA does not provide information related to the assignment of such responsibility to a particular DoD Component, office, or entity, nor has the Secretary of Defense assigned that task to a specific DoD Component, office, or entity.

Responsibility for Policy and Process Development and Implementation to Standardize the Tracking of Extremist Activity Within the DoD Is not Clearly Assigned

The Secretary of Defense has not established standard policies, processes, tracking mechanisms, and reporting requirements across the Armed Forces for all extremist activity to be reported, as required by the FY 2021 NDAA. Therefore, the Services are not tracking and reporting all extremist activity related cases in a standardized manner, as required by the FY 2021 NDAA.

None of the DoD officials we interviewed were responsible for developing policy and processes to standardize tracking extremist activity within and across the DoD. An official from the OUSD(P&R) acknowledged that there has been disparate reporting on extremist behavior across the Services, but stated that the Joint Staff is looking at ways to collect this information in a more standardized fashion. When we spoke to officials from the Joint Staff, we were told that there is currently no way to accurately capture data regarding extremism and that violations can't be tracked at least in part because current UCMJ articles don't reference extremism. Another official from the OUSD(P&R) stated that it is "taking a fresh look at this area" to ensure policies are sufficient and properly aligned with DoD policy.

Officials with the OUSD(I&S) stated that the OUSD(P&R) has the overall lead for standardizing policies related to extremism in the Armed Forces and is leading the effort for policy standardization and possible revision through the CEAWG. In addition, according to an official from the OUSD(I&S), that office is waiting for approval of the CEAWG recommendations before determining a way forward in the development of standard policies, processes, tracking mechanisms, and reporting requirements for extremist activity in the Armed Forces.

Without Complete Data on Extremist Activity, the DoD Is Unable to Make Information-Based Decisions to Address Extremist Activity Within the Armed Forces

Without standard policies, processes, tracking mechanisms, and reporting requirements for extremist activity in the Armed Forces, as required by section 554(b) of the FY 2021 NDAA, the DoD cannot accurately quantify or qualify the instances of extremist-related activity within the Armed Forces. With Service-level extremist-related data, senior officials could better determine the extent of extremist activity within the DoD and, therefore, make information-based decisions to develop and implement recruiting, training, retention, and security policies to address extremist activity within the Armed Forces.

Recommendation, Management Comments and Our Response

Recommendation B

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, develop and publish standardized policies, processes, and mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities.

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security agreed with our recommendation. However, the USD(I&S) suggested that we consider modifying the recommendation to account for the shared responsibilities of the OUSD(I&S) and the OUSD(P&R). The USD(I&S) stated that Intelligence and Security has oversight of the DoD's Insider Threat program and that Personnel and Readiness has oversight of personnel matters. For example, the OUSD(P&R) has a draft policy in coordination to implement Section 554(b)(1) of the "William M. ("Mac") Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021," which may fulfill the intent of the recommendation for Personnel and Readiness.

Likewise, the USD(I&S) stated that the OUSD(I&S) is currently updating DoD Directive 5205.16, "The DoD Insider Threat Program," to address processes and mechanisms for reporting Service member involvement in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities. The update to the DoDD 5205.16 will likely be published in FY 2023.

Our Response

The comments from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when the OUSD(I&S) and the OUSD(P&R) provide us a copy of their updated policies that includes processes, and mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities.

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness agreed and stated that the OUSD(P&R) is coordinating a draft policy with the Military Departments, DoD Office of Inspector General, and other Department entities in compliance with Section 554 (b)(1) of the "William M. ("Mac") Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021."

Our Response

The comments from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when the OUSD(P&R)

provides us a copy of the approved and published policy that includes processes and mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities.

Department of the Army Comments

The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) agreed, but stated that the Army cannot effectively develop and publish standardized policies, processes, and mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement in extremist activities until the DoD issues implementation guidance to the Services in accordance with Section 554 (b)(1) of the “William M. (“Mac”) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.”

Our Response

The comments from the Acting Assistant Secretary addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when the Department of the Army provides us a copy of the approved and published policy that includes processes, and mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities.

Department of the Navy Comments

The Director of Readiness and Transition for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) agreed and stated that the new DoD Instruction 1325.06 provides mechanisms to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement in prohibited activities. The Director further stated that the draft Department of the Navy implementing guidance assigns reporting requirements and delineates responsibilities accordingly.

Our Response

The comments from the Director addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when the Department of the Navy provides us a copy of the approved and published policy that includes processes, and mechanisms to enable

the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities.

Department of the Air Force Comments

The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) agreed. The Department of the Air Force reviewed the draft OUSD(P&R) implementation policy and provided comments on the draft policy to OUSD(P&R). The Acting Assistant Secretary further stated that the Department of the Air Force is awaiting additional review or finalization of this policy; therefore, he did not provide a timeline when this action will be complete.

Our Response

The comments from the Acting Assistant Secretary addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when the Department of the Air Force provides us a copy of the approved and published policy that includes processes, and mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities.

Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this evaluation from January 2021 through November 2021 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.¹⁶ Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

We planned and conducted this evaluation to align with the DoD OIG’s focus on ethical decision-making and conduct, in the context of incidents indicating the presence of prohibited extremist activity within the U.S. military. We reviewed information related to active duty forces only; Service operational commands, combatant commands, DoD agencies, field activities, and elements at the unit level were not evaluated. We also did not review details of individual UCMJ-related disciplinary actions, but rather reviewed the aggregate of such actions at the Service-level. The information we reviewed was focused on the last 5 years, from January 1, 2016, to July 3, 2021.

Interviews With Officials

We interviewed DoD officials to follow up on responses provided to our written requests for information and to understand their concerns and challenges associated with addressing extremist activity within the Armed Forces. Because extremist activity is an emerging topic, we relied heavily on testimonial evidence to identify the most pressing challenges the DoD faces. Additionally, due to coronavirus disease-19 restrictions, we conducted virtual site visits and meetings with the organizations identified in this report. We met with officials from the following organizations:

- OUSD(P&R), Office of Legal Policy
- OUSD(I&S), Office of the Director for Defense Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy, Accessions Policy

¹⁶ Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” January 2012.

- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance–Domestic Counterterrorism and Global Anti-Terrorism
- OSD Office of General Counsel, Military Justice and Policy
- OSD, CEAWG
- Joint Chiefs of Staff J5, (Global Integration Directorate)
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G1
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower and Reserve Affairs
- Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Diversity and Inclusion
- Military Department and Service officials from commands and staff directorates with responsibility for legal, recruiting, Inspector General, military criminal investigative, counter-Insider Threat, military equal opportunity, and accessions policy

Data Collection

To determine whether DoD officials complied with DoD and statutory requirements to address prohibited activity, including extremist activity, in the Armed Forces, we collected and reviewed the following documents.

- Federal statutes that address extremist activity within the Armed Forces, including relevant Articles of the UCMJ;
 - Section 888, title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), UCMJ Article 88, Contempt toward officials, 2006
 - Section 892, title 10, U.S.C., UCMJ Article 92, Failure to obey order or regulation, 1956
 - Section 922, title 10, U.S.C., UCMJ Article 122, Robbery, 1956
 - Section 917, title 10, U.S.C., UCMJ Article 117, Provoking speeches or gestures, 1950
 - Public Law 116-283, NDAA for FY 2021, Section 554(b), “IG Oversight of Diversity and Inclusion in DoD; Supremacist, Extremist, or Criminal Gang Activity in the Armed Forces,” January 1, 2021
 - Public Law 116-92, NDAA for FY 2020, Section 530, “Study Regarding Screening Individuals Who Seek to Enlist in the Armed Forces,” December 20, 2019
- DoD congressional testimonies on extremist activity within the Armed Forces;

- House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Hearing on White Supremacy and the Military, February 11, 2020
- House Armed Services Committee, Hearing on FY 2022 Budget Request for the Defense Department (includes Secretary of Defense testimony on extremism and definitions), June 23, 2021
- Congressional letters to the Secretary of Defense, DoD reports, and letters prepared in response to congressional inquiries related to extremist activity within the Armed Forces;
 - House of Representatives letter to Acting Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Department of Homeland Security regarding Extremism in Military, February 25, 2019
 - OUSD(P&R) Report to House of Representatives, “Military Personnel and Extremist Ideologies,” January 16, 2020
 - Congressional letter to the Secretary of Defense on Extremism in the Military, June 30, 2020
 - OUSD(P&R) response letter to June 30, 2020 congressional letter, August 21, 2020
 - OUSD(P&R), “Report to Armed Services Committees on Screening Individuals Who Seek to Enlist in the Armed Forces,” October 14, 2020
 - DoD Board on Diversity and Inclusion Report, “Recommendations to Improve Racial and Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in the Military,” December 2020
 - Senate letter to DoD Acting IG on Extremism in the Military, January 14, 2021
 - House of Representatives letter to the White House, the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence concerning connections between military service members and violent extremist groups, January 29, 2021
 - House of Representatives letter to the Secretary of Defense to request a detailed review of the stand down order to address extremism within the military and to reiterate the need for the DoD to define the terms and scope of the problem of violent extremism among Service members, April 21, 2021
 - OUSD(P&R) letter in response to congressional letter of April 21, 2021, concerning the request to review the stand down order and the need for the DoD to define the terms and scope of extremism among Service members, May 19, 2021

- House of Representatives letter to the Secretary of Defense, “Extremism Definition Follow-up and Social Media Usage within DoD,” June 4, 2021
- Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandums and guidance addressing extremist activity within the Armed Forces;
 - Secretary of Defense memorandum, “Diversity and Inclusion in the U.S. Military,” December 17, 2020
 - Secretary of Defense memorandum, “DoD Stand-Down to Address Extremism,” February 5, 2021
 - Secretary of Defense memorandum, “Delegation of FY 2021 NDAA Section 554 Duties,” February 8, 2021
 - Secretary of Defense memorandum, “Reaffirming Values and Ethical Conduct,” March 1, 2021
 - Secretary of Defense memorandum, “Immediate Actions to Counter Extremism,” April 9, 2021
 - Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, “Governance Structure for Deputy Secretary Managed Processes,” March 11, 2021
 - OSD Directive memorandum 19-008, “Expedited Screening Protocol,” November 6, 2020
- DoD policies;
 - DoDI 1020.03, “Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces,” February 8, 2018
 - DoDI 1304.26, “Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction,” October 26, 2018
 - DoDI 1325.06, “Handling Dissident and Protest Activities,” November 27, 2009 (Incorporating Change 1, February 22, 2012)
 - DoDI 1350.02, “DoD Military Equal Opportunity Program,” September 4, 2020
 - DoDI 2000.26, “DoD Use of the Federal Bureau of Investigation eGuardian System,” December 4, 2019
 - DoD Directive 1344.10, “Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces,” February 19, 2008
- Military Department and Service-level policies;
 - Army**
 - Army Regulation (AR) 381-12, “Threat Awareness and Reporting Program,” June 1, 2016
 - AR 525-2, “Army Protection Program,” December 8, 2014

- AR 600-8-24, "Officer Transfers and Discharges," September 13, 2011
- AR 600-20, "Army Command Policy," (Chapters 1-4), July 24, 2020
- AR 635-200, "Active Duty Enlisted Administrative Separations," January 18, 2017
- AR 670-1, "Wear and Appearance of Uniforms & Insignia," (Chapters 1-3), January 26, 2021
- Army Directive 2013-18, "Army Insider Threat Program," July 31, 2013

Navy

- Chief of Naval Operations Instructions 5354.1G, "Navy Equal Opportunity Program Manual," July 24, 2017
- Naval Military Personnel Manual, Section 1910-160, May 28, 2008
- Navy Regulations, Article 1167, "Supremacist Activity," September 3, 1997

Air Force

- Air Force Instruction 36-2706, "Equal Opportunity Program Military & Civilian," October 5, 2010
- Air Force Instruction 51-508, "Political Activities, Free Speech, and Freedom of Assembly," October 12, 2018
- Air Force Instruction 51-903, "Dissident and Protest Activities," July 30, 2015
- Notice to Airmen 20-15, "Air Force Recruiting Service Extremist or Criminal Organization Policy," August 20, 2020
- Notice to Airmen 21-07, "Air Force Recruiting Service Extremist or Criminal Organization Policy," January 11, 2021
- Air Force Policy Directive 36-27, "Equal Opportunity," March 18, 2019
- Secretary of the Air Force memorandum, "FY20 Equal Opportunity & Non-Discrimination Policy," February 4, 2020
- Air Force Manual 36-2032, "Military Recruiting & Accessions," (extract), September 27, 2019

Marine Corps

- Marine Corps Order 1020.34H, "Marine Corps Uniform Regulations," May 1, 2018
- Marine Corps Order 5354.1E, "Prohibited Activities and Conduct Prevention and Response Policy," June 15, 2018
- Marine Administrative Message 016/21, "Permissible and Prohibited Conduct, Public Demonstrations," January 12, 2021

- Marine Corps Recruiting Command Order 1100.1, “Marine Corps Recruiting Command Enlistment Processing Manual,” November 9, 2011
- Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Assessments; and
 - Federal Bureau of Investigation-Department of Homeland Security Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism, May 2021
 - Federal Bureau of Investigation, Intelligence Assessment-White Supremacist Recruitment of Military Personnel, July 7, 2008
- CEAWG briefings and information papers;
 - OSD training aid for Leadership Stand Down to Address Extremism, February 26, 2021.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office issued one report related to U.S. Government efforts to counter violent extremism and the Congressional Research Service issued one Insight document related to military personnel and extremism. However, the DoD OIG is not aware of previous work specifically examining the topic of prohibited ideological extremist activities in the U.S. military at any oversight organization, including the GAO.

Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>.

Unrestricted Congressional Research Service reports can be accessed at <https://crsreports.congress.gov>.

GAO

Report No. GAO-17-300, “Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts,” April 2017

The GAO was asked to review domestic Federal Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts. In 2011, the U.S. Government developed a national strategy and Strategic Implementation Plan for CVE aimed at providing information and resources to communities. The GAO found that the U.S. Government does not have a cohesive strategy or process for assessing the overall CVE effort. However, the GAO was not able to determine if the United States is better off today than it was in 2011 as a result of these tasks because no cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes has been established

to guide the multi-agency CVE effort. Such a strategy could help ensure that the individual actions of stakeholder agencies are measurable and contributing to the overall goals of the U.S. Government's CVE effort.

The GAO also found that the U.S. Government had not established a process by which to evaluate the effectiveness of the collective CVE effort. The CVE Task Force was established in part to evaluate and assess CVE efforts across the U.S. Government but has not established a process for doing so. Evaluating the progress and effectiveness of the overall Federal CVE effort could better help identify successes, gaps, and resource needs across stakeholder agencies. The GAO recommended that the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice direct the CVE Task Force to (1) develop a cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes and (2) establish a process to assess the overall progress of CVE efforts.

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service Insight No. IN11086, "Military Personnel and Extremism: Law, Policy, and Considerations for Congress," updated May 16, 2019

This Congressional Research Service Insight document is not a full report. However, the Insight is relevant because the Congressional Research Service stated that, while the DoD has several policies in place outlining restrictions on certain activities, there is an opportunity for further study on the prevalence of supremacy ideology among Service members and the extent to which the DoD and the Military Services are effectively implementing these policies. The Congressional Research Service suggested that Congress, in its oversight role, consider, with respect to the DoD and extremism, data collection and reporting, including whether a standard process exists for reporting; analyzing and sharing data across DoD components; screening and monitoring; and training and awareness.

Appendix B

Other Matters of Interest

During our evaluation, we identified the following two recurring other matters of interest: the DoD efforts to screen social media of members of the Armed Forces for extremist activity and the considerations for a UCMJ article to address extremist activity.

DoD Efforts to Screen Social Media of Members of the Armed Forces for Extremist Activity

We found that screening of individual users' social media, as a component of personnel background investigations, may be needed to address extremism in the Armed Forces. An official from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command stated that most extremist-related activity is conducted online, while another official from Headquarters Marine Corps Judge Advocate Division added that "since so much extremism-related activity takes place online and on social media platforms, screening social media would be a major part of any effort to identify Service members' previous or current affiliation with, or participation in, extremist organizations." However, a DoD official testified to Congress in February 2020 that the military recruiting process does not include checks on an applicant's social media, although the DoD was working to determine how best to potentially incorporate that requirement.

DoDI 1304.26 establishes policy for "judg[ing] the suitability of individuals to serve in the Military Services on the basis of their adaptability, potential to perform, and conduct."¹⁷ DoDI 1304.26 sets standards designed to ensure that individuals under consideration for enlistment, appointment, or induction into the Armed Forces are able to perform military duties successfully and to select those who are the most trainable and adaptable to Service life. For example, basic entrance qualification standards are prescribed for age, aptitude, citizenship, dependents, education, medical, character, conduct, and physical fitness.

An official from the OUSD(I&S) stated that DoD policies and processes developed with regard to security screening and vetting of prospective candidates seeking to join the Armed Forces ("accessions") look at "the whole picture," including trying to determine whether accessions hold extremist ideologies. The official added that "signals that a candidate for enlistment might hold such ideology can be more subtle than, for example, displaying swastika tattoos."

¹⁷ DoD Instruction 1304.26, "Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction," March 23, 2015 (Incorporating Change 3, October 26, 2018).

Identifying extremist ideology in potential recruits is challenging, according to officials from the Accessions Division at Headquarters, Department of the Army. For example, the officials stated that if an individual's extremist ties are not identified through a records check of law enforcement systems, the Army's current screening tools are incapable of identifying that individual unless the individual self-admits to holding extremist ideologies or to affiliation with extremist organizations. According to Army officials, a review of an applicant's social media history would be the best way to collect information about possible extremist affiliations. However, there is no current U.S. Army policy for screening applicants' social media.

Section 530 of the FY 2020 NDAA directed the Secretary of Defense to study the feasibility of screening applicants who seek to enlist in the Armed Forces for extremist and gang-related activity.¹⁸ The FY 2020 NDAA further required the Secretary to submit an unclassified report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives containing conclusions of the Secretary regarding the study. On October 14, 2020, the DoD submitted its response to Congress in an unclassified report.¹⁹ The report stated that the DoD was exploring the screening of social media in the conduct of background checks and that more review and analysis was required before the DoD will be able to determine how, and if, it can integrate social media screening into the background check process.

OUSD(I&S) officials told us their office is examining prototypes for screening social media of DoD personnel comments and posts. According to the OUSD(I&S) officials, the social media screening pilot program involves "sentiment analysis," which consists of reviewing public social media interactions using key words. In addition, OUSD(I&S) officials stated that the OUSD(I&S) is considering additional questions on the standard National Security Questionnaire form, or SF 86, related to social media—for example, requesting e-mail addresses and social media "handles."

The OUSD(I&S) officials we spoke with also identified challenges related to screening social media, such as potential constraints involved with screening social media of personnel in an organization as large as the DoD. For example, an official from the OUSD(I&S) stated that there is "no tool in existence today that can meet [the Department's] needs to search social media on the scale we require." Another

¹⁸ Public Law 116-92, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020," Section 530, "Study regarding screening individuals who seek to enlist in the Armed Forces," December 20, 2019.

¹⁹ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, "Report to Armed Services Committees on Screening Individuals Who Seek to Enlist in the Armed Forces," October 14, 2020.

official stated “we cannot scrape the entire internet every day for all three million people in the Department.” Additional constraints stated by officials related to prospective screening of social media by the DoD include:

- the difficulty of defining search parameters, such as what social media behavior or activity the DoD defines as “extremist,” for screening social media; and
- the inability of the DoD to go into private social media groups or private chat lines without legally sufficient pre-authorization based on probable cause, or the authority to allow a Government representative to join a private social media group.

In a memorandum dated April 9, 2021, the Secretary of Defense established the DoD’s CEAWG, assigned initial LOE to address extremism, and directed the CEAWG to provide a report of its mid-term and long-term recommendations no later than 90 days from its first meeting on April 14, 2021. LOE 3 directly addressed the screening of social media:

This LOE directed officials to examine the Department’s pursuit of scalable and cost-effective capabilities to screen publically available information in accessions and continuous vetting for national security positions. The LOE directed officials to make recommendations on further development of such capabilities and incorporating algorithms and additional processing into social media screening platforms.

DoD officials stated that the first wave of social media screening will be associated with accessions and the details will be developed in the CEAWG. The CEAWG submitted its report and recommendations to the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense in July 2021 for coordination with the Services.

DoD Consideration of a Uniform Code of Military Justice Article to Address Extremist Activity

There is currently no UCMJ article that specifically addresses extremism-related violations. In a December 17, 2020, memorandum concurring with the recommendations of the Board on Diversity and Inclusion, the Acting Secretary of Defense directed that the DoD Office of General Counsel, based on the findings and recommendations of the report on extremist and hate group activity, provide a plan of action and milestones required to modify the UCMJ by July 31, 2021.

Because there is no UCMJ article, Service members who violate regulations addressing extremist activities are subject to disciplinary action under other articles of the UCMJ. For example, an Air Force official stated that extremism-related incidents in most cases are prosecuted under UCMJ Article 92,

“failure to obey an order or regulation,” and the Marine Corps’ annual training briefing on prohibited activities states that violations may subject involved members to disciplinary action under Article 92 or other Articles of the UCMJ, as applicable.²⁰ Another official from the Department of the Air Force, Office of the Judge Advocate General, stated that, with regard to extremism, military members are subject to the UCMJ punitive articles that impact their traditional First Amendment rights, such as Article 88, contempt toward officials, and Article 117, provoking speech or gestures.

A December 2020 report by the DoD Board on Diversity and Inclusion recommended that the:

- DoD Office of General Counsel, in coordination with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, draft language for consideration within the Executive Branch to propose that Congress update the UCMJ to address extremist activity within the U.S. military; and
- OUSD(P&R), in conjunction with the OUSD(I&S), develop a report specifically concerning initiatives to more effectively prohibit extremist or hate group activity.

According to the December 2020 report, upon completion of the OUSD(P&R) report focused on initiatives to prohibit extremist or hate group activity, the DoD will have established the baseline facts necessary to determine a course of action related to a prospective updating of the UCMJ to address extremist activity. In addition, when the CEAWG was established by the Secretary of Defense, the purpose of LOE 1 on Military Justice and Policy, was to evaluate whether seeking to amend the UCMJ is appropriate in order to address extremism.

However, officials from the Judge Advocate General Divisions within the headquarters of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps all stated that a UCMJ article specifically directed at extremist activity was unnecessary.

- According to an Official from the Air Force Judge Advocate General office, current UCMJ articles are sufficient to prosecute extremism-related violations. For example, a robbery related to extremist activities could be prosecuted under existing UCMJ article 122 for robbery.
- According to the Air Force and a Department of the Navy Judge Advocate General officials, a new UCMJ article is not needed solely for the added convenience of providing a method for tracking the number of extremist activity incidents, as the UCMJ is an “imperfect tool to use as

²⁰ The Marine Corps Prohibited Activities and Conduct Prevention and Response annual training brief lists advocating or active participation in supremacist organizations and extremist groups as examples of prohibited activities.

a data collection” system. Rather than creating a new UCMJ article, an administrative mechanism can be developed and implemented to make tracking of extremist activity-related courts-martial easier.

- According to an official from the Department of the Navy Judge Advocate General office, elements of intent and motive related to extremism could be difficult to prove if a Service member was charged under a prospective UCMJ article focused specifically on extremist activity. In addition, the member might plead guilty to some elements of the offense, while pleading not guilty to other elements and that very often charges are reduced because of a guilty plea associated with a plea bargain to a lesser-included offense.
- According to an official from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, some allegations or incidents of extremist activities do not need to become criminal investigations. Commanders already have, and are aware of, a wide range of available administrative and disciplinary measures for addressing the spectrum of behaviors that may qualify as extremist activity, but the challenge for commanders is how to gain sufficient evidence of extremist activity to effectively reprimand or deliver consequences for the behavior.

A Marine Corps official stated that there is currently no way to accurately capture data regarding extremism, at least in part because current UCMJ articles don't reference extremism. However, according to one member of the DoD Board on Diversity and Inclusion, “[t]he UCMJ article recommendation sends a clear, zero-tolerance message for extremist activity and allows the Services to hold members accountable for such activity.” The current effort to address a prospective UCMJ article for extremist activity was developed by the CEAWG, which submitted its report and recommendations to the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense in July 2021 for coordination with the Services.

Management Comments

Department of the Army Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
111 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0111

SAMR-MRA (800B)

MEMORANDUM FOR Office of Department of Defense Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report: Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Develop and Implement Policy and Procedures Addressing Ideological Extremism Within the U.S. Armed Forces

1. References:

a. Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG) Announcement Memorandum: Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Develop and Implement Policy and Procedures Addressing Ideological Extremism Within the U.S. Armed Forces (Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000).

b. DoD IG Draft Report: Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the Armed Forces, Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000, 03 February 2022.

2. Background. The objective of the DoD IG evaluation announced in reference a. was to determine the extent to which the DoD and the Military Services have implemented policy and procedures that prohibit active advocacy and active participation related to supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes by active duty military personnel, as required by DoD Instruction 1325.06. The evaluation was conducted from January 2021 through January 2022, with a draft report of the evaluation's findings and recommendations released by DoD IG on 03 February 2022 (Reference b.). Recommendations A.2 and B contained within the draft report require Army review and comment to outline the Army's progress on satisfying the recommendations.

3. Army response to recommendations A.2 and B.

a. Recommendation A.2: *We recommend that the Secretaries of the Military Departments update their Service's extremist related policies, procedures, and training materials to ensure compliance with the revised version of Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06.* The Army concurs with recommendation A.2, and has taken the following actions:

1) The Army submitted draft implementation guidance to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) [OUSD(P&R)] in accordance with instructions from OUSD(P&R) CATMS Tasking CATMS-21122021-46DE, which

Department of the Army Comments (cont'd)

SAMR-MRA (800B)

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report: Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Develop and Implement Policy and Procedures Addressing Ideological Extremism Within the U.S. Armed Forces

directed Services to develop draft implementation guidance for Change 2 DODI 1325.06 and submit to OUSD(P&R) for review and approval prior to implementation.

2) Army implementation of Change 2 DODI 1325.06 will occur via Army Directive (AD), which will include the specific verbiage to be inserted in paragraphs 4-12 and 4-13 of a revised Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, Army Command Policy, pending OUSD (P&R) and DoD Office of General Counsel approval of the draft implementation guidance.

3) The DoD Joint Staff is currently developing a stand-alone Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) block of training to address extremism as part of the DoD Countering Extremist Activities Working Group recommendations; Upon completion and fielding of the JKO training, the Army will develop its Service-level training in order to integrate the JKO training's concepts, learning objectives, and standards.

b. Recommendation B: *We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, develop and publish standardized policies, processes, and mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities.* The Army concurs with recommendation B, and offers the following comment: The Army cannot effectively develop and publish standardized policies, processes, and mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement in extremist activities until DoD issues implementation guidance to the Services for Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act Section 554(b), which is currently pending issuance.

4. My point of contact for this action is [REDACTED]

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W [REDACTED]

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BOURCICOT:YVETTE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Yvette K. Bourcicot
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Manpower & Reserve Affairs)

Department of the Navy Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR
GENERAL

SUBJECT: Department of the Navy's Response to the Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report on "DoD Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism in the Armed Forces"

Reference: (a) Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report, "DoD Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism in the Armed Forces," February 2, 2022

Reference (a) requests the Military Departments provide corrective actions taken or planned and proposed completion dates for recommendations provided by the draft report. There are two recommendations specified for the Department of the Navy (DON):

RECOMMENDATION A.2: We recommend that the Secretaries of the Military Departments update their Service's extremist related policies, procedures, and training materials to ensure compliance with the revised version of Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1325.06.

DON RESPONSE: Concur. On February 4, 2022, the DON provided a draft policy implementing DoDI 1325.06 to the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Department of Defense General Counsel for approval. Upon receipt of approval, the DON will promulgate the instruction. The projected completion date for publishing the final DON policy is August 31, 2022.

RECOMMENDATION B: Concur. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, develop and publish standardized policies, processes, and mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities. The projected completion date for publishing the final DON policy is August 31, 2022.

DON RESPONSE: Concur. The new DoDI 1325.06 provides mechanisms to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement in prohibited activities. The draft DON implementing guidance assigns reporting requirements and delineates responsibilities accordingly.

The DON remains committed to continued efforts combatting extremist activities. I remain the point of contact for this issue [REDACTED]

MCINTOSH
BRADENHEATHERU [REDACTED]
Digitally signed by MCINTOSH-
BRADENHEATHERU
Date: 2022/03/17 09:53:05 -0500

Heather McIntosh-Braden
Director, Readiness and Transition
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Military Manpower and Personnel)

Department of the Air Force Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

01 March 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: SAF/MR
1660 Air Force Pentagon, Room 4E1010
Washington DC 20330-1660

SUBJECT: Air Force Response to DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Report, "Department of Defense Efforts to Develop and Implement Policy and Procedures Addressing Ideological Extremism within the U.S. Armed Forces" (Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000)

1. This is the Department of the Air Force (DAF) response to the DoDIG Draft Report, "Department of Defense Efforts to Develop and Implement Policy and Procedures Addressing Ideological Extremism within the U.S. Armed Forces" (Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000). The AF concurs with the report as written and welcomes the opportunity to review.
2. SAF/MR in coordination with AF/JA will correct issues identified in this report, and develop and implement a corrective action plan outlined in the following recommendations:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The DODIG recommends the Secretaries of the Military Departments update their Service's extremist related policies, procedures, and training materials to ensure compliance with the revised version of Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE RESPONSE: DAF concurs with recommendation 1 and has already completed draft guidance implementing DoDI 1325.06. This draft guidance (Tab 1 – DAFI 51-508 DAFGM 2022-01) is currently being reviewed for approval by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Office of the General Counsel, as required prior to publication by a 20 December 2021 memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. There is no timeline by which this review will be complete; however, as soon as this draft guidance is approved, it will be published promptly.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The DODIG recommends that the Secretaries of the Military Departments develop and publish standardized policies, processes, and mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the

Department of the Air Force Comments (cont'd)

Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities.

AIR FORCE RESPONSE: DAF concurs with recommendation 2 and had the opportunity to coordinate on the implementation policy drafted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and provided feedback. We are awaiting additional review or finalization of this policy. As such, we cannot provide a timeline by which this action will be complete.

3. The SAF/MR point of contact is [REDACTED]

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FEDRIGO.JOHN.A [REDACTED]
Date: 2022.03.01 17:03:30 -05'00'

JOHN A. FEDRIGO, SES
Acting Assistant Secretary
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

Attachment:
Tab 1 – DAFI 51-508_DAFGM 2022-01

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness



██████████
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

MAR 10 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: (U) Response to Department of Defense Inspector General Report Project No. D2021 DEV0PB-0079.000, "Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the Armed Forces"

(U) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) has reviewed the one open recommendation, Recommendation B, associated with DoD Inspector General Report Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000, "Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the Armed Forces" (the Report). Recommendation B reads:

██████████ *We also recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, develop and publish standardized policies, processes, and tracking mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities.*

(U) Recognizing that OUSD(P&R) responsibilities with respect to the recommendation are ancillary to those of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, to the degree our office plays a role, we agree with Recommendation B.

(U) Further, to the extent that policy in compliance with section 554(b)(1) of the William M. ("Mac") Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2021 may fulfill Recommendation B, OUSD(P&R) is coordinating draft policy in satisfaction of this section with the Military Departments, DoD Office of Inspector General, and other Department entities.

(U) Thank you for the opportunity to review and respond to the Report's recommendation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gilbert R. Cisneros, Jr.".

Gilbert R. Cisneros, Jr.

██████████

████████████████████

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments



INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

March 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, (ATTN: ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR EVALUATIONS PROGRAMS, COMBATANT COMMANDS, AND OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS)

SUBJECT: Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the Armed Forces (Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000)

Thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comments on Recommendation B of the subject report. As currently drafted, Recommendation B reads:

We also recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, develop and publish standardized policies, processes, and tracking mechanisms to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities.

I request you consider modifying Recommendation B to read:

We also recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, develop and publish standardized policies, processes, and tracking mechanisms for programs under their purview to enable the DoD to identify, quantify, characterize, and report Service member involvement across the Services in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities.

The reason for modification is to account for the shared responsibilities of USD(I&S) and USD(P&R). I&S has oversight of the Department's Insider Threat program, and P&R has oversight for personnel matters. For example, OUSD(P&R) has a draft policy out for coordination to implement Section 554(b)(1) of the William M. ("Mac") Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 which may fulfill Recommendation B for P&R.

Likewise, OUSD(I&S) is currently updating DoD Directive 5205.16, "The DoD Insider Threat Program," to address processes and mechanisms for reporting Service member involvement in prohibited activities that include active advocacy of and active participation in extremist groups and activities. The update to the DoDD 5205.16 is projected to be published in Fiscal Year 2023.

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments (cont'd)

I additionally request you consider making the following modifications, in the interest of clarity and precision, to page 16 of the report:

- Change from “The DITMAC collects all DoD Components’ insider threat information, which can include extremism-related data.”
- Change to “The DITMAC receives insider threat information, pursuant to specific reporting requirements, from DoD Components, which can include extremism-related data.”
- Change from “DoD Component Heads deliver to the DITMAC post processed results of information system monitoring, as appropriate, in accordance with criminal thresholds published by the DITMAC.”
- Change to “DoD Component Heads deliver to the DITMAC post processed results of information system monitoring, as appropriate, in accordance with insider threat thresholds published by the DITMAC.”

Our review also determined that the draft report as it pertains to information referencing matters under USD(I&S) oversight are appropriately marked as Unclassified.

Thank you for the outstanding work on this important topic. My staff is available to discuss our proposed modifications in greater detail with your team if needed. The I&S point of contact [REDACTED]

REID.GARRY.PA [REDACTED]
UL [REDACTED]
Garry P. Reid
Director for Defense Intelligence
Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement,
& Security

Digitally signed by
REID.GARRY.PAUL [REDACTED]
Date: 2022.03.10 12:44:01
-05'00'

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CEAWG	Countering Extremism Activity Working Group
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DITMAC	DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center
I&S	Intelligence and Security
LOE	Line of Effort
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
P&R	Personnel and Readiness
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice



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Attachment Name : D2022-DEV0PD-0173.000 Announcement Letter_19 Sep 22.pdf



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

September 19, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY
COMMANDER, INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
COMMANDER, NATIONAL GROUND INTELLIGENCE CENTER

SUBJECT: Evaluation of DoD Support to Other Agencies' Requests For the Screening of
Displaced Persons from Afghanistan (Project No. D2022-DEV0PD-0173.000)

We plan to begin the subject evaluation in September 2022. The objective of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which the DoD supported other agencies' requests for screening Afghan evacuees by reviewing DoD databases. In addition, we will determine the extent to which DoD personnel are authorized to remove biometrics information from DoD databases. We may revise the objective as the evaluation proceeds, and we will consider suggestions from management for additional or revised objectives.

We will perform the evaluation at the National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, Virginia, and the Pentagon. We may identify additional locations during the evaluation.

Please provide us with a point of contact for the evaluation within **5 business days** of the date of this memorandum. The point of contact should be a Government employee—a GS-15, pay band equivalent, or military equivalent. Send the contact's name, title, grade/pay band, phone number, and e-mail address to (b) (6) at (b) (6) @dodig.mil and (b) (6) at (b) (6) @dodig.mil.

You can obtain information about the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General from DoD Directive 5106.01, "Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG DoD)," August 19, 2014; and DoD Instruction 7050.03, "Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense Access to Records and Information," March 22, 2013. Our website is www.dodig.mil.

If you have any questions, please contact (b) (6) at (b) (6) or (b) (6) at (b) (6)

Maurice Foster
Acting Assistant Inspector General for
Evaluations Program, Combatant Commands,
and Overseas Contingency Operations

cc:

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Inspector General, Joint Staff

Auditor General, Department of the Army

Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency

Inspector General, Intelligence and Security Command