




INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

October 28, 2022
Ref: FOIA-2016-00798

SENT VIA EMAIL TO: john@greenewald.com

Mr. John Greenewald
The Black Vault, Inc.



Dear Mr. Greenewald,

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for report DODIG-2016-125, Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance. We received your request on September 28, 2016, and assigned it case number FOIA-2016-00798.

The Intelligence and Special Program Assessments Component (now the Evaluations Component) conducted a search and located the report responsive to your request. In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff, and the United States Strategic Command, we determined that this report (totaling 60 pages) is appropriate for release in part pursuant to the following FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552) exemptions:

- (b)(1), which pertains to information that is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526, sections:
 - 1.4(a), military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
 - 1.4(f), United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
 - 1.4(g), vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security;
 - 1.7(e), compilations of items of information that are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that: (1) meets the standards for classification under this order; and (2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information.
- (b)(5), which protects communications that are part of the deliberative process. The purpose for withholding such recommendations is to encourage the free and candid exchange of opinions and advice during the decision-making process. In applying the foreseeable harm standard we determined that disclosure of this information is likely to diminish the candor of agency deliberations in the future; and

- (b)(6), when the disclosure of such information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

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If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Thomas Lutte at 703-604-9775 or via email at foiarequests@dodig.mil.

Sincerely,



Mark Dorgan
Director
FOIA, Privacy and Civil Liberties Office

Attachment(s):
As stated

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



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
INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Defense

September 19, 2016

Report No. DODIG-2016-125

(U) Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance



Classified by: 83026
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 2025-12-08

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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance

(U) September 19, 2016

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether responsibilities and authorities for nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems and DoD nuclear command and control systems are effectively aligned within the office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and ad hoc/statutory committees. Specifically, we examined decision-making processes, interdepartmental coordination, and any gaps, seams, and overlaps between offices and committees.

(U) Findings

(U) We determined that responsibilities and authorities for nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, and nuclear command and control systems are properly aligned. However, not all required oversight structures exist, and new governance structures are not codified.

(U) A lack of adequate interdepartmental coordination mechanisms has led to gaps, seams, and overlaps in nuclear enterprise governance.

(U) In addition, decision making processes, including risk-management and prioritization, are rarely documented.

(U) Recommendations

(U) Deputy Secretary of Defense:

- (U) Codify the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group in Department of Defense Directive 5105.79, "DoD Senior Governance Councils."
- (U) Ensure the Department measures and reports the implementation tasks of the Nuclear Posture Review.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics:

- (U) Establish a two-tiered senior-level governance structure to address nuclear weapon security requirements or include the requirements in an existing, senior-level body.
- (U) Include the oversight of delivery platform acquisition and sustainment in an existing, senior-level body.
- (U) Collaborate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict on policy, committees, and exercises involving response to nuclear weapons accidents and incidents.
- (U) Document actions on recommendations from the Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapon Surety.

(U) Under Secretaries of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- (U) Document actions and track nuclear enterprise deficiencies or recommendations identified in internal and external reports.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:

- (U) Develop and oversee implementation of policy, programs, plans, and guidance for Defense Intelligence warfighting support for the U.S. nuclear mission to combatant commands.

(U) Director, Joint Staff:

- (U) Issue doctrine for joint nuclear operations.



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Deputy Secretary of Defense's comments addressed all specifics of the recommendations to codify the Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group [REDACTED]

OSD/JS (b)(5) [REDACTED]

(U) Comments from the Director, Joint Staff, addressed all specifics of the recommendation to issue doctrine for joint nuclear operations. OSD/JS (b)(5) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics addressed all specifics of Recommendations A.2, B.2, and C.2, and no further comments are required. OSD/JS (b)(5) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence addressed all specifics of Recommendation B.1, and no further comments are required. OSD/JS (b)(5) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page.

(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Deputy Secretary of Defense	C.1	A.1, C.3
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics	C.3	A.2, B.2, C.2
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	C.3	
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence	C.3	B.1
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy		C.3
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness		C.3
Director, Joint Staff		B.3

(U) Please provide Management Comments by October 19, 2016.



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

September 19, 2016


MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance
(Report No. DoDIG 2016-125)

(U) We are providing this final report for review and comment. The Deputy Secretary of Defense did not address all specifics of the recommendation to measure and report the implementation tasks of the Nuclear Posture Review. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and the Director, Joint Staff, responding for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not address the specifics of the recommendation to document actions and track nuclear enterprise deficiencies or recommendations identified in internal and external reports. We considered all other comments from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Director, Joint Staff when preparing the final report.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the Deputy Secretary of Defense addressed all specifics to Recommendations A.1 and C.3, however, we request additional comments on Recommendation C.1. Comments from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics addressed the specifics of Recommendations A.2, B.2, and C.2, however, we request additional comments on Recommendation C.3. The Director, Joint Staff, addressed all specifics to Recommendations B.3. However, we request additional comments on Recommendation C.3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence addressed the specifics of Recommendation B.1. However, we request additional comments on Recommendation C.3. We request that all additional comments be provided by October 19, 2016. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at DoD OIG (b)(6) or DoD OIG (b)(6)


Anthony C. Thomas
Deputy Inspector General for
Intelligence and Special
Program Assessments

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether responsibilities and authorities for nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, and DoD nuclear command and control systems are effectively aligned within the office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Joint Staff, and ad hoc/statutory committees. Specifically, we examined decision-making processes; interdepartmental coordination; and any gaps, seams, and overlaps between offices and committees.

(U) Background

(U) Nuclear enterprise roles and responsibilities span the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. However, most responsibilities to support the SECDEF in nuclear weapon employment reside with four senior DoD leaders: the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]); the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]); and the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO).

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)
[Redacted text block]

(U) DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P])," December 8, 1999, directs the USD(P) to develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of DoD strategy and policy for deploying and employing strategic and theater nuclear offensive forces. The USD(P) also reviews and evaluates plans, programs, and system requirements for such forces and systems to ensure consistency with national and DoD strategy and policy. The USD(P) is supported by the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASD) for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities; Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC); Homeland Defense and Global Security; and International Security Affairs. The ASD for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities is supported by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Nuclear and Missile Defense.

(U) The Guidance for Employment of the Force, August 2012, Annex B, "Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons," directs the CJCS, in conjunction with the USD(P), to review the nuclear plans of all Combatant Commanders. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS provides detailed military guidance to the Combatant Commanders on preparing plans involving the potential employment of nuclear weapons.

(U) Pursuant to DoD Directive 5134.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L])," April 1, 2008, the USD(AT&L) is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs. The USD(AT&L) Chairs the Nuclear Weapons Council and is supported by the ASD for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (NCB) and the DASD for Nuclear Matters (NM).

(U) The ASD(NCB) is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the USD(AT&L) on nuclear weapons. DoD Directive 5134.08, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD[NCB])," February 14, 2013, directs the ASD(NCB) to integrate the management of all nuclear weapons; oversee and develop plans, policies, and procedures for nuclear weapons safety, security, survivability, transportation, and use control; and plan and implement the modernization and upgrading of the nuclear stockpile. Additionally, ASD(NCB) exercises policy and oversight responsibility for nuclear weapons and physical security for critical nuclear command and control facilities.

(U) DoD Directive S-5210.81, "United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security," August 8, 2005, identifies the DoD CIO as the Principal Staff Assistant for the Secretary of Defense for coordinating the development of command, control, and communications policy and providing oversight of command, control, and communications programs that support the nuclear command and control system (NCCS). Additionally, the DoD CIO coordinates these nuclear command and control activities with other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies as appropriate.

(U) In the next 10 years, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the United States must make \$296 billion of nuclear weapon-related decisions. We agree with the findings of previous Defense Science Board and Federal Advisory Committee reports² that without centralized, integrated management, decision-makers will be challenged to properly analyze modernization and sustainment issues.

² (U) Chiles, Henry et al; Defense Science Board; Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills; September 2008; Mies, Richard et al; Report of the Nuclear Command and Control System Comprehensive Review Federal Advisory Committee; December 2009.

(U) Finding A

(U) Nuclear Enterprise Responsibilities and Authorities are Properly Aligned but Lack Required Oversight Governance Structures

(U) The reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, along with the establishment of the Council on Oversight of National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System, created a foundational governance structure for the DoD nuclear enterprise. However, no governance structure exists to address nuclear weapon delivery systems, and the Security Policy Verification Committee, currently chaired by a Lieutenant Colonel, is the ranking committee focusing on nuclear weapon security. The lack of these oversight bodies, coupled with the temporary status of the Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group, increases the risk that oversight of the DoD nuclear enterprise will eventually diminish.

(U) The Reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

(U) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy was reorganized in January 2015. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2010, Section 906, as amended, directed DoD to eliminate all remaining non-Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed Deputy Under Secretaries of Defense. The 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 901(i)(3), delayed the elimination until January 1, 2015. To comply with Section 901, gain efficiencies, and reflect changes to national defense priorities, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel initiated a comprehensive reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Senior leaders in OSD, the Joint Staff, and USSTRATCOM stated to us that they viewed this reorganization positively, and that it creates a foundational structure for nuclear enterprise governance.

(U) This reorganization affected the ASD positions within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Section 138 of Title 10, U.S.C., authorizes 14 ASDs. Title 10 defines the functions and titles of nine ASDs. The remaining five ASDs can be established at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Before the January 2015 reorganization, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy had three of these discretionary ASDs.³

(U) On January 9, 2015, the Secretary of Defense eliminated the positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces. In turn, the Secretary of Defense established the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. The new ASD assumed the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces' legacy responsibilities and also the ASD Global Strategic Affairs' nuclear and missile defense policy missions.

(U) Assessment of the Current Alignment and Potential Alternatives

(U) To determine the effectiveness of the alignment of offices responsible for nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, and DoD nuclear command and control systems, we examined the Department's analysis and determinations for the realignment of the organizational structure of OSD, and we interviewed senior leaders in OSD, the Joint Staff, and in USSTRATCOM. We also analyzed the three most feasible alternative governance structures for the DoD nuclear weapon enterprise: realignment of OSD Nuclear Matters, the DoD Executive Agent Program, and the single advocate model.

(U) Current alignment after OSD Organizational Review. The Secretary of Defense directed the OSD Organizational Review in August 2013 which aimed to achieve a more effective and efficient organizational structure for OSD. The purpose of the review was to identify opportunities to improve functional alignment, eliminate redundancies, improve span of control, strengthen management functions, and eliminate unnecessary legacy functions. The organizational review resulted in the realignment of nuclear and missile defense policy functions from ASD Global Strategic Affairs; security cooperation policy from ASD Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; and Strategy, Plans and Forces policy from the DUSD Strategy, Plans, and Forces to a new ASD for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. This created a new ASD focused on overarching DoD strategy

³ (U) ASD for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, ASD for International Security Affairs, and ASD for Global Strategic Affairs.

(U) and plans, coupled with nuclear and missile defense and security cooperation policy. Through interviews and an analysis of the roles and responsibilities of nuclear enterprise stakeholders in OSD, we conclude that this change improved functional alignment of the nuclear enterprise within OSD and in-turn, will help provide integrated governance.

(U) Potential Alternative to Realign OSD Nuclear Matters. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs/Nuclear Matters serves as the focal point for DoD activities and initiatives to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and to counter the threat from nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Nuclear Matters also advises the Secretary of Defense on arms control and treaty issues. Realigning Nuclear Matters under ASD Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities could eliminate some redundancies and potentially improve integrated governance. However, our analysis of the OSD structure, coupled with senior leader interviews, led us to conclude that the efficiencies of the current functional alignment outweighs any additional realignment of nuclear enterprise responsibilities. The current structure provides clear end-to-end alignment of strategies and execution from Nuclear Matters to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to nuclear defense programs and as the Chair of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

(U) Potential Use of the DoD Executive Agent Program. The DoD Executive Agent program is outlined in DoD 5101.1, "DoD Executive Agent." An Executive Agent is defined as the Head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD Components. It is DoD policy that the DoD Executive Agent designation shall be conferred when no existing means to accomplish DoD objectives exists, or DoD resources need to be focused on a specific area or areas of responsibility in order to minimize duplication or redundancy.

(U) Based on a document analysis of current DoD Executive Agent portfolios and interviews with OSD senior leaders, we concluded that the DoD nuclear weapon enterprise is too large and complex to assign to a single DoD Executive Agent to manage. We found eleven DoD Executive Agent programs. Of the eleven, ten programs are limited in scope to a single material, technology, or center. Please refer to Appendix B for additional information.

(U) Potential Use of a Single Advocate Model. The single advocate approach was recommended by the September 2014 report by the Internal Nuclear Enterprise Review Team, "Internal Assessment of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise." The Review Team recommended that the Secretary of Defense should create a senior position for oversight of the Nuclear Enterprise for a period of time—4 to 6 years to ensure implementation of the necessary improvements. The Review Team added that this position should have direct-reporting authority to the Secretary of Defense. It should be supported by a small staff, should be a member of the Senior Executive Service or a 2- or 3-Star military officer.

(U) Similar to our concerns with using the DoD Executive Agent program as a DoD nuclear enterprise governance structure, we believe the nuclear enterprise is too large and complex for a single manager. Additionally, we do not support any recommendation for DoD nuclear enterprise governance that is a temporary solution as it increases the risk that oversight of the DoD nuclear enterprise will eventually diminish.

(U) The Establishment of the Council on Oversight of National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System

(U) The Council on Oversight of National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System provides a senior leader forum for the nuclear enterprise governance structure. The Council oversees critical Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications; has an established system for risk management and adjudication of dissents; and can leverage support from other organizations.

(U) Oversight Responsibilities

(U) Section 1052 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2014 directed DoD to establish the Council on Oversight of National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System. The Council oversees performance assessments including interoperability, vulnerability identification and mitigation, architecture development, and resource prioritization. The Council provides a forum for senior leaders to manage three overlapping missions: Presidential and senior leader communications; Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications; and continuity of operations and government communications. In addition to the requirements specified in Section 1052, the Council has assumed the responsibilities of the Senior National Security Presidential Directive-28 Oversight Committee, established in DoD Directive S-5210.81, "United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security," August 8, 2005.

(U) Adjudication and Risk Management

(U) Of the committees and components examined during this evaluation, the Council is the only body with an established risk management system that includes a mechanism for voting and adjudication of dissenting opinions. Actions are voted on and require consensus from the established seven members.⁴ The Council co-chairs adjudicate dissenting votes and make the final determination. After adjudication, any remaining dissents are recorded in the Council's decision record.

(U) Support

(U) The Council leverages and is supported by the National Leadership Command Capabilities Executive Management Board and subordinate groups. The DoD CIO chartered this board in 2009. The governance structure includes functional subordinate groups such as the National Leadership Command Capabilities Senior Steering Group; the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Issues Working Group; and various tiger teams and Integrated Process Teams that track specific issues.

⁴ (U) The Council is co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other members of the Council are the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command/U.S. Northern Command; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer.

(U) The National Leadership Command Capabilities Executive Management Board ensures the Council is informed of issues that need principal-level decisions. The Council vets any DoD National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications issues scheduled to be discussed at a Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense-level meeting, and coordinates and prioritizes resourcing recommendations.⁵

(U) No Senior-Level Governance Structures Exist to Address Nuclear Weapon Security Requirements or Delivery Systems Sustainment

(U) The Council on Oversight of National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System provides a senior leader forum for Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications, but the USD(AT&L) has not established the appropriate senior level governance structure needed to address nuclear weapon security requirements. DoD Directive S-5210.81, "United States Nuclear Command and Control, Safety, and Security," August 8, 2005, requires a two-tier management and oversight structure to address nuclear weapon security requirements, identify vulnerabilities, and monitor actions to correct deficiencies. The directive requires the governance structure to consist of a four-star/flag level committee, supported by a two-star/flag level committee.

(U) The Department established the Senior National Security Presidential Directive-28 Oversight Committee to meet the directive's requirements. However, after reviewing two years of committee meeting minutes and interviewing subject matter experts, we concluded that the committee focused solely on nuclear command, control, and communications, and did not include security concerns as required. The Council on Oversight of National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System has subsumed the on-going efforts of the Senior National Security Presidential Directive-28 Oversight Committee, but nuclear weapon safety or security oversight requirements are not specified as Council responsibilities in Section 1052 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2014. Therefore, the Security Policy Verification Committee, currently chaired by a Lieutenant Colonel, is the ranking chartered committee focusing on nuclear weapon security.

⁵ (U) "Charter for the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System," March 2014.

(U) Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-35, "United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security," superseded National Security Presidential Directive-28 on December 8, 2015. PPD-35 directs the establishment of a Security and Incident Response Council to address nuclear weapon physical security issues and incident response capabilities, and to coordinate the activities of the Nuclear Weapon Accident and Incident Response Subcommittee and the Security Policy Verification Committee. If DoD establishes the Security and Incident Response Council, the current gap of a senior governance structure for nuclear security will be closed.

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USSTRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[Redacted]

(U) The Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group is a Temporary Forum

(U) In the wake of several events adversely impacting the DoD nuclear enterprise, former Secretary of Defense Hagel directed independent and internal reviews of the DoD nuclear enterprise.⁶ In response to the findings of these reviews, former Secretary of Defense Hagel established the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group in November 2014 to provide for senior leader accountability and bring together all elements of the nuclear force into a coherent enterprise. The review group consists of the leaders responsible for the training, funding, and implementation of the nuclear mission. The Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group reports to the Secretary of Defense quarterly, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense chairs all other meetings. The widely publicized deficiencies, mostly between 2007-2014, were the catalyst for the current high level of attention. The level of senior leader oversight of the DoD nuclear enterprise is at an all-time high since the Cold War.

(U) The Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group has been the catalyst for DoD taking action to resolve the key problems and implement more than 100 recommendations from the independent and internal reviews.⁷ The Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation leads an effort to track and assess the implementation of these recommendations and will also conduct an analysis to determine if corrective actions are having the desired effect. In another example of progress, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command now conducts quarterly nuclear force readiness reviews focused on critical resources required for the nuclear mission. However, there is no plan to formalize or sustain the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group.

(U) The Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group does not have terms of reference or a charter, and there is no plan or directive in place to ensure that senior leader accountability and integration will endure. Without a mechanism in place to ensure the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group or similar senior-leader forum endures, the lack of permanency of the corrective actions identified in the internal and independent reviews may cause oversight of the DoD nuclear enterprise to diminish.

⁶ (U) Report by the Internal Nuclear Enterprise Review Team on the Internal Assessment of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise, published September 2014; Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise, published June 2014.

⁷ (U) Ibid.

(U) Conclusion

(U) Responsibilities and authorities for nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, and nuclear command and control systems are properly aligned within OSD and the Joint Staff, and we did not identify any compelling need to recommend further reorganization. However, unless required governance structures are established and codified, and the Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group is sustained, progress gained from recent focus may diminish.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation A.1

(U) We recommend that the Deputy Secretary of Defense codify the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group in Department of Defense Directive 5105.79, "DoD Senior Governance Councils."

(U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Comments

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5)



(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Deputy Secretary of Defense addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

(U) Recommendation A.2

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics:

- (U) a. Establish a two-tiered senior-level governance structure to address nuclear weapon security requirements or include the requirements in an existing, senior-level organizational body.**

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Comments

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required. OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]

(U) b. Include the oversight of delivery platform acquisition and sustainment in an existing, senior-level organizational body.

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] No further comments are

required.

(U) Finding B

(U) The Lack of Adequate Interdepartmental Coordination led to Gaps, Seams, and Overlaps in Nuclear Enterprise Governance

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g); USSTRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g); USSTRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g); USSTRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g); USSTRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [Redacted]

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Establish and oversee the implementation of policies and procedures for the conduct of the DoD Operational Security (OPSEC) Program including monitoring, evaluating, and periodically reviewing all DoD OPSEC activities.

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Additionally, USD(I), in coordination with the USD(AT&L) and the USD(P), implements NCCS procedures and policy guidance to:

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g); USSTRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g); USSTRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g); USSTRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g); USSTRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

(u) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-35, "United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security," superseded National Security Presidential Directive-28 on December 15, 2015. DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) ASD(SOLIC) is Not Represented in Nuclear Weapon Consequence Management Planning or Exercising

(U) The ASD(SOLIC) is not represented in nuclear weapon policy discussions, incident response planning, or incident response exercises though guidance exists directing otherwise. DoD Directive 3150.08, "DoD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents," January 20, 2010, directs ASD(SOLIC) to develop, coordinate, and oversee DoD policy for the development and employment of explosive ordnance disposal forces and capabilities in response to nuclear weapons accidents and incidents. DoD Directive 5130.62, "Single Manager Responsibility for Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training," identifies ASD(SOLIC) as the OSD proponent for explosive ordnance disposal. In this role, ASD(SOLIC) develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DoD policy for explosive ordnance disposal technology and training. Further, ASD(SOLIC) serves as the OSD point of contact for the Military Departments on explosive ordnance disposal policies and issues of concern. The ASD(SOLIC) monitors programming and budgeting issues, ensures that Military Department explosive ordnance disposal programs have sufficient resources, and coordinates with the Departments on any funding adjustments to those programs.


(U) Contrary to guidance in DoD Directive 3150.08, we determined that ASD(SOLIC) has little influence on policy for the employment of explosive ordnance disposal forces and planning capabilities in response to nuclear weapon accidents and incidents. Staff from the Office of the ASD(SOLIC) stated during interviews that they do not attend the Nuclear Weapons Accident Incident Response Subcommittee and do not participate in the Nuclear Weapon Accident Incident Exercise Program. Office of the ASD(SOLIC) staff members stated they were vaguely aware of the subcommittee and exercise but added that they are not invited to participate. The Nuclear Weapons Accident Incident Response Subcommittee, and the Nuclear Weapon Accident Incident Exercise Program, are the only two DoD formal mechanisms to plan and exercise U.S. nuclear weapon accident or incident response. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters leads both programs, and staff from that office confirmed that representatives from ASD(SOLIC) do not attend the Nuclear Weapons Accident Incident Response Subcommittee and do not participate in the Nuclear Weapon Accident Incident Exercise Program.

(U) Joint Nuclear Enterprise Doctrine Does not Exist

(U) On November 22, 2013, the Joint Staff cancelled an internal program directive to update the joint publication on joint nuclear doctrine. This decision was based on a 2010 front-end analysis that concluded that “while it is accurate that there is no overarching, unclassified joint publication that covers nuclear operations, the question is whether a new joint publication is required, whether current doctrine is sufficient in existing joint publications, or perhaps whether existing joint publications can be modified to accommodate gaps and seams identified in the proposal.” The front-end analysis identified the need to establish a common joint nuclear operations framework, define terms, and identify related mission areas and responsibilities. The analysis also cited a need to provide overarching joint doctrine articulating the linkage between joint guidance and supporting Service doctrine as well as serve to provide the basis for NATO doctrine. The Joint Staff cancelled the proposal to update rescinded joint nuclear doctrine without seeking formal input from or coordination with OSD, the Services, or combatant commands. As of September 2015, no overarching doctrine or revised joint publication accommodates the gaps identified in the front-end analysis.

(U) Conclusion

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)



(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)



~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation B.1

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:

- (U) a. Develop and oversee implementation of policy, programs, plans, and guidance for Defense Intelligence warfighting support for the U.S. nuclear mission to combatant commands; and**
- (U) b. Evaluate and oversee U.S. nuclear enterprise intelligence activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National Reconnaissance Agency to ensure effective support to DoD and U.S. Government interagency operations and activities.**

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5)
[Redacted text block]

(U) Our Response

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(5)
[Redacted text block]

[Redacted text] . No further comments are required.

(U) Recommendation B.2

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics collaborate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict on policy, committees, and exercises of the response to nuclear weapons accidents and incidents.

(U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Comments

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]

(U) DoD Directive 3150.08, "DoD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents," January 20, 2010, directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict to develop, coordinate, and oversee DoD policy for the development and employment of explosive ordnance disposal forces and capabilities in response to nuclear weapons accidents and incidents. **OSD/JS (b)(5)**

[REDACTED]

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Comments

(U) **OSD/JS (b)(5)**
[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

(U) Recommendation B.3

(U) We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, update and reissue Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations.

(U) Director, Joint Staff Comments

(U) **OSD/JS (b)(5)**
[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Director, Joint Staff, addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required. OSD/JS (b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding C

(U) Decision Making Processes to Include Risk-Management and Prioritization are Rarely Documented

(U) Neither OSD nor the Joint Staff have a documentation process that contains a document trail or verifiable results for nuclear enterprise deficiencies, progress, or risk-management decisions. Senior leader and other management determinations on nuclear enterprise deficiencies and progress, even when required by Presidential guidance, are undocumented. This results in the failure by management, or those charged with governance, to assess the effect of a significant deficiency previously reported to them and either correct it or conclude that it will not be corrected.

(U) Tracking the Nuclear Posture Review's Implementation

(U) Until recently, most of the senior leadership in OSD and the Services were unaware of problems within the nuclear enterprise.⁸ One reason is that DoD does not adequately track the implementation of findings and recommendations from independent assessments of the nuclear enterprise. For instance, DoD is not tracking implementation of recommendations from the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review as required. Presidential Policy Directive-11, "The Nuclear Force Posture of the U.S.," August 5, 2011, directs DoD, in coordination with the Departments of State and Energy, to provide a brief annual report to the President assessing the progress in implementing the Nuclear Posture Review. During interviews, senior Defense Department leaders stated that while there is excellent collaboration between the White House and the DoD, there has been no White House demand for an annual report. We determined through our interviews that the Department does not measure implementation of the Nuclear Posture Review or report the assessment to the President as required by Presidential Policy Directive-11.

⁸ (U) Creedon, Fanta 2014.

(U) Nuclear Enterprise Deficiency Reporting in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff

(U) OSD and the Joint Staff do not document determinations that nuclear weapon enterprise deficiencies have been corrected and the desired results achieved. The Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123, revised December 21, 2004, requires agencies to identify and implement procedures necessary to ensure effective internal controls and how to assess the effectiveness of those controls.

(U) We conducted a data call in writing to each of the Under Secretaries and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asking for specific documents related to tracking, prioritizing, and implementing recommendations from nuclear weapon, nuclear command and control, and nuclear command, control, and communications reports before the 2014 Secretary of Defense-directed Nuclear Enterprise Review. The data call asked for documents relating to reports from the Government Accountability Office, Defense Science Board, and Federal Advisory Committees. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, does not document actions taken on recommendations or advice from the Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapon Surety as required in the USD AT&L Memorandum to the Chairman, Defense Science Board, "Terms of Reference-Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety," November 17, 2006, and DoD Instruction 5105.04 "Department of Defense Federal Advisory Committee Management Program," August 6, 2007. Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense for AT&L, Policy, and Intelligence, and the Joint Staff do not track or document actions taken on nuclear enterprise deficiencies or recommendations identified in Federal Advisory Committee reports, Government Accountability reports, Office of DoD Inspector General reports, or reports produced by other task forces.

(U) Nuclear Command and Control System Committee of Principals did not Convene in Five Years

(U) National Security Presidential Directive-28 directed the Secretary of Defense to establish the Nuclear Command and Control System Committee of Principals to “coordinate interdepartmental NCCS supporting policies and programs, recommend priorities for funding, monitor corrective actions, and establish mechanisms to share best practices and lessons learned.” The committee was comprised of a senior official, normally an Under Secretary, from each Department and agency with nuclear weapon or NCCS responsibilities directed in National Security Presidential Directive-28.

(U) The NCCS Committee of Principals has not convened since 2010. No documentation exists to show the determination process, including personnel involved, that was used in the decision to discontinue this Presidential requirement.

(U) Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-35, “United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security,” superseded National Security Presidential Directive-28 on December 15, 2015. PPD-35 rescinds the requirement for the NCCS Committee of Principals and provides for a new, decentralized model for governing the nuclear enterprise. The Secretary of Defense, as the Executive Agent of the Nuclear Command and Control System, will coordinate oversight of the Nuclear Command and Control System using the Nuclear Weapons Council; the Council on Oversight of National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System; and the newly required Security and Incident Response Council. We reviewed meeting minutes and reports from the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Council on Oversight of National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System. We verified that management determinations are documented appropriately. The Security and Incident Response Council has not yet met, thus we did not evaluate this council’s documentation process.

(U) These committees, however, are not full-time bodies and cannot examine every programmatic decision detail or deficiency. On the contrary, the full-time extant system of decision making within OSD and the JS does not adequately document nuclear weapon, nuclear command and control, or nuclear command, control, and communications management determinations.

(U) Conclusion

(U) With the exception of the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Council on Oversight of National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System; there is no well-defined documentation process within OSD and the Joint Staff that tracks nuclear enterprise decisions. Senior leader and other management determinations on nuclear enterprise deficiencies and progress, even when required by Presidential guidance, go undocumented. This results in the failure by management, or those charged with governance, to assess the effect of a significant deficiency previously reported to them and either correct it or conclude that it will not be corrected.

(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(U) Management Comments on Documenting Nuclear Enterprise Actions and Decisions

(U) Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer Comments

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) We appreciate the comments elaborating on Finding C provided by the Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Revised Recommendation

(U) As a result of the Deputy Secretary of Defense's comments to our draft report, we revised draft Recommendation C.1 to clarify the criteria and the nature of the actions needed to meet the criteria.

(U) Recommendation C.1

(U) We recommend that the Deputy Secretary of Defense ensure the Department measures and reports the implementation tasks of the Nuclear Posture Review in accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 11, "The Nuclear Force Posture of the U.S.," August 5, 2011.

(U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Comments

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5)
[Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5)
[Redacted]

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5)

(U) Recommendation C.2

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics document actions taken on recommendations or advice from the Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapon Surety.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Comments

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5)

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

(U) Recommendation C.3

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretaries of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, document and track nuclear enterprise deficiencies or recommendations identified in Federal Advisory Committee reports, Government Accountability reports, Department of Defense Office of Inspector General reports, or reports produced by other task forces.

(U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Comments

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5)

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Deputy Secretary of Defense addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Comments

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Comments

(U) OSD/JS (b)(5) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Management Comments

(U) Deputy Secretary of Defense



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JUL 08 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Draft Report, "Evaluation of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance"

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to your recommendations in the draft report, "Evaluation of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance," which provided valuable insights into the Department's nuclear enterprise.

OSD/JS (b)(5)



(U) Deputy Secretary of Defense (cont'd)

OSD/JS (b)(5)

Thank you again for your review of the nuclear enterprise and your valuable recommendations. The Department will take action on them as described above.



(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

JUL 20 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report on Evaluation of Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise Governance (Project No. D2015-DISPA1-0130.000)

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the general content and recommendations contained in the subject report. The report offered valuable insights into the Department's management of the Nuclear Enterprise. I have provided responses to each recommendation applicable to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OSD(AT&L)) below.

Recommendation A.2:

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)):

- (U) a. Establish a two-tiered senior-level governance structure to address nuclear weapon security requirements or include the requirements in an existing, senior-level organizational body.
- (U) b. Include the oversight of delivery platform acquisition and sustainment in an existing, senior-level organizational body.

OSD/JS (b)(5)



(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (cont'd)

OSD/JS (b)(5)

Recommendation B.2:

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics collaborate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict on policy, committees, and exercises of the response to nuclear weapons accidents and incidents.

OSD/JS (b)(5)

Recommendation C.2:

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics document actions taken on recommendations or advice from the Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapon Surety.

OSD/JS (b)(5)

Recommendation C.3:

We recommend that the Under Secretaries of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, document and track nuclear enterprise deficiencies or recommendations identified in Federal Advisory Committee reports, Government Accountability reports, Office of DoD Inspector General reports, or reports produced by other task forces.

OSD/JS (b)(5)



Frank Kendall

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence



INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

JUL 19 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: (S//NF) Inspector General Draft Report, "Evaluation of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance"

(U) Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on your draft report, "Evaluation of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance."

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)

(U) My specific comments on the content of the draft report are attached for your consideration. Thank you again for the opportunity to review and comment on the report and I look forward to working on ensuring the success of this critical component of our Nation's defense and security. My point of contact for this action is

Marcel Lettre

Attachments:
As stated

Classified By: 81026
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20250901

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~




(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (cont'd)


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Excerpt from Inspector General Draft Report, "Evaluation of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance"

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)




OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)



(U) Excerpt from Inspector General Draft Report, "Evaluation of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance"

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)



(U) **Recommendation B.1.a.:** "Recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develop and oversee implementation of policy, programs, plans, and guidance for Defense Intelligence warfighting support for the U.S. nuclear mission to combatant commands."

(U) **Recommendation B.1.b.:** "Recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence evaluate and oversee U.S. nuclear enterprise intelligence activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National Reconnaissance Agency (sic) to ensure effective support to DoD and U.S. Government interagency operations and activities."

Classified By: 83026
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20250901

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (cont'd)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g)



(U) Excerpt from Inspector General Draft Report, "Evaluation of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance"

(U) **Finding C:** "Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense for AT&L, Policy, and Intelligence, and the Joint Staff do not track or document actions taken on nuclear enterprise deficiencies or recommendations identified in Federal Advisory Committee reports, Government Accountability Office reports, Office of DoD Inspector General reports, or reports produced by other task forces."

(U) **Recommendation C.3:** "We recommend that the Under Secretaries of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, document and track nuclear enterprise deficiencies or recommendations identified in Federal Advisory Committee reports, Government Accountability Office reports, Office of DoD Inspector General reports, or reports produced by other task forces."

OSD/JS (b)(5)



(U) Director, Joint Staff

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM					
CLASSIFICATION SECRET NOFORN					
EXTERNAL SUSPENSE 16 Jun 16	STAFF SUSPENSE 14 Jun 16	ACTION NUMBER 16-01613			
TO DJS <i>WCM 17th/16</i>	THRU	THRU DJ-3 RADM Lewis for DJ-3 17 May 2016			
SUBJECT (U) /O-DIG/ Draft Report Evaluation of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance					
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY					
<p>1. (U) <u>Purpose</u>. Provide the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DIG) with Joint Staff coordination on the subject draft report, "Evaluation of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance."</p> <p>2. (U) <u>Issue</u>. The DIG has requested the Joint Staff respond to two recommendations listed in the draft report.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">a. (U) <u>Recommendation B.3</u>. Recommend the DJS update and reissue Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. ✓</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">b. (U) <u>Recommendation C.3</u>. CJCS in conjunction with the Under Secretaries of Defense, document and track nuclear enterprise deficiencies or recommendations identified in Federal Advisory Committee reports, Government Accountability reports, Office of DoD Inspector General reports, or reports produced by other task forces.</p>					
OSD/JS (b)(5)					
COORDINATION					
NAME	AGENCY	DATE	NAME	AGENCY	DATE
	VDJ-3	17 May 16		USSTRATCOM	6 May 16
	J33	10 May 16		J-8	5 May 16
	J33/NOD	9 May 16		J-7	5 May 16
	OCJCS Legal	4 May 16		J-5	5 May 16
AO;J/DIV;EXT: DoD OIG (b)(6) J33/NOD; DoD OIG (b)(6) Date Prepared: 2 May 16					
CLASSIFICATION			CLASSIFICATION/DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS		
SECRET NOFORN			UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY When Separated From Classified Attachment		
23 FORM 136 March 2013 opp		INTERNAL STAFF PAPER, RELEASE COVERED BY CJOSI 571441		136NOCVR.dct	
PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE					

(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

OSD/JS (b)(5)

4. (U) Background

a. (U) The Department of Defense Inspector General conducted an evaluation to determine if the authorities and responsibilities of the DoD nuclear enterprise are effectively aligned within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

b. (U) The review found the authorities and responsibilities of the nuclear enterprise are properly aligned within the Department of Defense.

c. (U) The recent progress accomplished by the nuclear enterprise may diminish because the temporary forum known as the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) is temporary and was set up to address the recent findings of the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review.

d. (U) A more formal process to address, track, measure, and report on the implementation of recommendations identified in nuclear enterprise reports is now needed to continue and enhance the work of the NDERG.

e. (U) The attached DoD Inspector General report identifies 12 recommendations to implement across the Department of Defense with two recommendations pertaining to the Joint Staff.

5. Recommendation. DJS approve the concurrence as stated in the Bottom Line.

Approve

ny/16
OSD/JS (b)(6)

Disapprove

See Me

ENDNOTE

16-01613

COORDINATION						
NAME	AGENCY	DATE	NAME	AGENCY	DATE	

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(U) Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer

[REDACTED]

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Gentlemen,

The Planning, Performance and Assessment (PPA) Directorate and Intelligence Oversight Division within the DCMO has reviewed the subject draft report and have agreed that we have a "Concur/No-Comment" response.

From the DCMO/PPA Directorate perspective, we appreciate and concur with Recommendation C.1 (and its related findings):

"(U) We recommend that the Deputy Secretary of Defense ensure the Department measures and reports the implementation tasks of the Nuclear Posture Review in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act."

OSD/JS (b)(5)
[REDACTED]

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:

OSD/JS (b)(5)
[REDACTED]

(U) Office of the Deputy, Chief Management Officer (cont'd)

OSD/JS (b)(5)



Please let us know the outcome of the recommendations provided in the subject report, in particular Recommendation C.1, as we may be able to facilitate its implementation.

Sincerely,



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(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope

(U) The scope of this evaluation includes nuclear weapon, nuclear command and control, and nuclear command, control, and communications authorities and responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. Combatant command and Service level governance were not in the scope of this evaluation.

(U) National Security Presidential Directive-28, "United States Nuclear Command, Control, Safety, and Security," June 10, 2003, was superseded by Presidential Policy Directive-35, "United States Nuclear Command, Control, Safety, and Security," on December 15, 2015. Our recommendations do not conflict with any changes between the National Security Presidential Directive and the updated Presidential Directive.

(U) Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from February 2015 through April 2016. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. These standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objective.

(U) We conducted interviews with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. We also interviewed select senior leaders in U.S. Strategic Command and Air Force Global Strike Command.

(U) We reviewed Presidential directives, public laws, and DoD and Joint Staff policy to identify authorities and responsibilities for the DoD nuclear mission.

(U) Use of Technical Assistance

(U) We did not use technical assistance in performing this evaluation. There is no impact on the reported information.

(U) Appendix B

(U) The DoD Executive Agent program is outlined in DoD 5101.1, "DoD Executive Agent," May 9, 2003. A search of guidance on the Defense Technical Information Center resulted in the following Executive Agent programs.

- (U) DoD Executive Agent for Space
- (U) DoD Executive Agent for the United States Central Command Rest and Recuperation Leave Program
- (U) DoD Executive Agent for Bulk Petroleum
- (U) DoD Executive Agent for Medical Materiel
- (U) DoD Executive Agent for Subsistence
- (U) DoD Executive Agent for the Military Postal Service and Official Mail Program
- (U) DoD Executive Agent for Construction and Barrier Materiel
- (U) DoD Executive Agent for the Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence
- (U) DoD Executive Agent and Single Manager for Military Ground-Based Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare Technology
- (U) DoD Executive Agent for the DoD Cyber Crime Center
- (U) DoD Executive Agent for the Defense Centers Of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD(NCB)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
ASD(SOLIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
ASD(SPC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities
CIO	Chief Information Officer
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
C3	Command, control, and communications
DASD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DASD(NM)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters
EMB	Executive Management Board
GSA	Global Strategic Affairs
JP	Joint Publication
JS	Joint Staff
NCCS	Nuclear Command and Control System
NII	Networks and Information Integration
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSD(I)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
SPF	Strategy, Plans, and Forces
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(I)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USSTRATCOM	U.S. Strategic Command

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

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