



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

December 28, 2023

FOIPA Request No.: 1246614-000

Subject: 080-HQ-805

Dear :

You were previously advised we were consulting with another agency concerning information related to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request.

A portion of that information has been returned to the FBI and is enclosed. The documents were reviewed under the FOIA/FOIPA, Title 5, United States Code, Sections (s) 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. The checked exemptions used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552

☐ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(2)

☒ (b)(3)

50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)

50 U.S.C. § 3507

☐ (b)(4)

☒ (b)(5)

☒ (b)(6)

☐ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☒ (b)(7)(C)

☒ (b)(7)(D)

☒ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (b)(8)

☐ (b)(9)

Section 552a

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (k)(1)

☐ (k)(2)

☐ (k)(3)

☐ (k)(4)

☐ (k)(5)

☐ (k)(6)

☐ (k)(7)

28 pages were reviewed and 25 pages are being released.

☒ The appropriate redactions were made by the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Trade Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission.


Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. "Part 1" of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. "Part 2" includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. "Part 3" includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Additional information about the FOIPA can be found at www.fbi.gov/foia. Should you have questions regarding your request, please feel free to contact foipaquestions@fbi.gov. Please reference the FOIPA Request number listed above in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by emailing the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison at foipaquestions@fbi.gov. The subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. G. Seidel", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Confidential Informant Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of confidential informant records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F)] and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552a (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records would reveal confidential informant identities and information, expose law enforcement techniques, and endanger the life or physical safety of individuals. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches and Standard Search Policy.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems, such as the Central Records System (CRS), or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. The CRS is an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. The standard search policy is a search for main entity records in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include a search for reference entity records, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files.
 - a. *Main Entity Records* – created for individuals or non-individuals who are the subjects or the focus of an investigation
 - b. *Reference Entity Records*- created for individuals or non-individuals who are associated with a case but are not known subjects or the focus of an investigation
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Foreseeable Harm Standard.** As amended in 2016, the Freedom of Information Act provides that a federal agency may withhold responsive records only if: (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the nine exemptions that FOIA enumerates, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law (5 United States Code, Section 552(a)(8)(A)(i)). The FBI considers this foreseeable harm standard in the processing of its requests.
- (iv) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

~~SECRET~~ (U)

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

[redacted]
SECOM-D-365

5 November 1982

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
FBI Member, SECOM

FROM: [redacted]
Chairman

b6 per FBI, CIA
b7C

SUBJECT: Capitol Hill Security (U)

COUNTERMEASURES

1. [redacted] asked me to broker the attached proposal with the DDCI [redacted] b3 per CIA
[redacted] has approved the arrangement. It is now necessary to document b6 per FBI, CIA
the FBI's agreement. Please arrange for [redacted] to send [redacted] a b7C
memo acknowledging the FBI's assumption of this responsibility under the terms
of the attachment. As soon as this is done, I suggest that [redacted]
CIA Legislative Liaison, and I meet with you and the appropriate Legislative
Branch and Capitol Police officials to transfer the program. (S) (U)

2. On a related topic, I would urge you to energize the Army to press on b3 per CIA
with negotiations to place a countermeasures team on Capitol Hill to cover b6 per FBI
DoD testimony. Col. Press tells me he was advised by "the FBI action officer" b7C
to stand down on this effort. Captain [redacted] of the Capitol Police has expressed
his concern about lack of response from the Army on this matter. (S) (U)

3. Please advise if I can be of assistance. (U)

Attachment [redacted]

Received via Liaison
11-8-82; 12:03pm,
[redacted]

80-805-272X
3/1/83
ORIG CL BY [redacted]
DECL OADR [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ (U)

71 MAR 29 1983

RECEIVED
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE DIV.

Nov 9 1 47 PM '82

out class
to

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3/21/82



~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-360
4 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[REDACTED]

Chairman.

b3 per CIA
b6 per CIA

SUBJECT: Capitol Hill Security

1. Action Requested: Your approval of an FBI proposal to assume primary responsibility for the upgrading of technical security countermeasures capability of the US Capitol Police.

2. Background: FBI liaison has advised that [REDACTED] has proposed the following plan in response to our initiative on this subject:

b3 per CIA
b6 per FBI, CIA
b7C
b7E

a. The FBI will take the lead in dealing with the US Capitol Police and Legislative Branch officials.

b. A group will be formed under the Security Committee, chaired by the FBI, to ensure that Community support is provided to the FBI's effort when needed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

c. The [REDACTED] will train the Capitol Police countermeasures technicians.

d. [REDACTED] the FBI Member of SECOM, will serve as the focal point officer for this activity.

3. [REDACTED] plan is essentially the same as the one we presented to the FBI on 6 October 1982. The only variation is the FBI's proposal for a SECOM group to ensure that they are supported by the Community.

4. Recommendation: I recommend that you approve the FBI's proposal and authorize [REDACTED] and me to proceed with handing over the program to [REDACTED] and FBI Legislative Liaison.

[REDACTED]

80-805-272X


~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE

ORIG CL BY [REDACTED]
Decl OADR

DCI
EX-103
REG

SUBJECT: Capitol Hill Security

APPROVED:


Director of Central Intelligence

05 NOV 1982

Date

Distribution:

Orig - Return C/SECOM

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

1 - D/ICS

1 - D/OCC/ICS

1 - ICS Registry

1 - C/LLD/OEXA

Memorandum

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277
Exec AD Inv. b6
Exec AD Adm. b7C
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Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv. b6
Ident. b7C
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & In.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

To :

[redacted]

Date 11-24-82

From :

[redacted]

Subject: ~~CAPITOL HILL TECHNICAL SECURITY~~ (U)

COUNTERMEASURES

PURPOSE: To advise of meetings held on 11/22-23/82 to coordinate the FBI assuming the lead agency role in coordinating Intelligence Community responsibilities for technical security on Capitol Hill. (S) (U)

RECOMMENDATION: None, for information. (U)

APPROVED

[redacted]

Director

Exec. AD-Adm.

Exec. AD-Inv.

Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Servs.

Crim. Inv.

Int.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Legal Coun.

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.

Rec. Mgnt.

Tech. Servs.

Training

DETAILS: On 11-22-82, a meeting was held at Capitol Hill Police Headquarters with representatives from the U.S. Army Intelligence Security Command (INSCOM), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Security Committee (SECOM), Capitol Hill Police and FBI (list of attendees attached). The purpose of this meeting was to get all parties together who are involve with technical security on Capitol Hill and advise them that the lead agency role formerly held by the CIA will hereafter be handled by the FBI. Attendees were advised that FBI Security Programs Manager [redacted] would serve as the point of contact with Capitol Hill on this matter, that the FBI would arrange for necessary training of personnel at the [redacted] and that a subcommittee of the SECOM chaired by the FBI would be established to ensure the necessary participation by all interested Intelligence Community agencies. (S) (U)

b3 per CIA
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Encl

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

1 -
1 -
1 -
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1 -

[redacted]

[redacted]

DE-82
Classified by [redacted]
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

80-805-273X

10 DEC 3 1982

[redacted]

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Rem 5425-

File in 80-845-26
12/7/83

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DIVISION


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U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE

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Nov 30 8 59 AM '82

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12/9/83

Nov 29 1 23 PM '82
EXEC. A. D.
FBI



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DE 84

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from [redacted]
Re: Capitol Hill Technical Security (U)

The U.S. Army INSCOM currently has two full-time personnel conducting technical security countermeasure sweeps on Capitol Hill and will continue to make these personnel available to conduct operations and provide on-the-job training for Capitol Hill Police, who will eventually assume the complete responsibility. The [redacted] CIA, FBI and Department of Defense will continue to conduct their own technical sweeps until the Capitol Hill Police are capable of assuming the entire responsibility, which is expected to be in approximately two years. (S) (U)

b3 per FBI, CIA
b6 per FBI, CIA
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On 11-23-82, a meeting was held at the U.S. Capitol Building with [redacted] Sergeant-at-Arms, U.S. Senate; [redacted] Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives; [redacted] Chairman of SECOM; Captain [redacted] Capitol Hill Police; [redacted] CIA Liaison; and [redacted] FBI Security Programs Manager. Messrs. [redacted] also have duties as the Capitol Hill Police Board and in that capacity oversee the Capitol Hill Police functions and budget. They were briefed on the change in lead agency responsibility, and procedures for the necessary liaison were established. (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

Attendees at 11-22-82 Meeting
Capitol Hill Police Headquarters

[redacted] Headquarters Army Staff
[redacted] Intelligence Security Command
[redacted] Intelligence Security Command
[redacted] Security Programs Manager, FBI
[redacted] Technical Services Division, FBI
[redacted] Technical Services Division, FBI
[redacted] CIA Liaison
[redacted] Capitol Hill Police
[redacted] Capitol Hill Police
[redacted] Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, FBI
[redacted] Chairman, CIA Security Committee
[redacted] CIA
[redacted] CIA
[redacted] CIA

b3 per CIA
b6 per FBI, CIA
b7C

ENCLOSURE

80-805-2738

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 12/27/85

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~~TSCM - REQUEST FOR SWEEP AT~~
~~DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN~~
~~SERVICES~~

be performed for the office suites of the Secretary of HHS, the Under Secretary and the Chief of Staff and that sweeps also be conducted at their private residences as soon as possible.

He advised the Secretary, Under Secretary, and Chief of Staff are newly sworn in and that they would like the sweeps to be done to allay their concerns about the possibility of eavesdropping techniques being used against them. He emphasized there are no reasons to suspect that such is the case.

MADDOX was told the FBI does not provide countermeasures services for other government agencies on a routine basis and that he must send a written request to the Technical Services Division, FBIHQ, for approval. He was also advised that private residences generally are not swept unless a concrete reason can be given that a potential countermeasures threat does exist.

In anticipation that FBIHQ will authorize sweeps of the offices, arrangements were made to conduct the sweeps at ~~HHS on~~ 12/29/85. UACB, WFO will not do the private residences.

②-Bureau
1-Washington Field Office

3
Approved:

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

~~JUN 27 1986~~

JUL 18 1986



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Office of Inspector General

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JAN - 3 1986

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

[redacted]
Technical Services Division, FBI
Department of Justice
10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear [redacted]

As you know, on December 20, 1985, Dr. Otis R. Bowen was officially sworn in as the new Secretary of Health and Human Services. In the past, Special Agent [redacted] FBI, Electronic Analysis Unit, has conducted a security check for the offices of the Secretary, Under Secretary and Chief of Staff for this Department.

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Reference is made to the telephone conversation on December 23, 1985, between Charles C. Maddox, Director, Security and Protection, of my office, and Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] FBI. Agent [redacted] advised that a request should be made through your office. On Monday, December 30, 1985, Agent [redacted] conducted a security check of the requested telephones. On behalf of Secretary Bowen, I wish to thank you and your Agents for the fine service that was provided on such short notice.

In addition, Secretary Bowen has requested that the telephones in his residence also be checked. Please contact Larry Morey, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, on 472-3208 or have a member of your staff contact Charles C. Maddox on 245-7373 to confirm if your agency can again assist us regarding the Secretary's residence.

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Sincerely yours,

[Signature]


Richard P. Kusserow
Inspector General

80-805-4642

7 JAN 14 1986

*No response from TSD
is necessary. WFO has
already responded*

APR 7 1986





U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington Field Office
Washington, D.C. 20535
June 27, 1986

Mr. Larry D. Morey
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations
Department of Health and Human Services
330 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20201

Dear Mr. Morey:

Reference is made to your letter dated June 11, 1986, which requests the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct an [redacted] at the Office of the Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the SSA [redacted] Baltimore, Maryland.

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As your letter noted, the Bureau's countermeasures resources are limited. For that reason the FBI does not perform countermeasures surveys as a routine service for other agencies. Bureau policy with regard to sweeps requested by federal agencies and departments outside the Department of Justice is that they will be performed only in response to valid requirements to protect matters of national security or high sensitivity which, if compromised, would cause serious damage to the government's interests.

Further, all requests must include substantial justification to indicate a technical penetration has been effected and that a sweep is necessary. For instance, [redacted] will not be performed in response to reports of "leaks" of information until the requesting agency has thoroughly investigated all possible sources for the leaks and no other explanation other than a possible technical compromise can be identified.

b7E

From your letter it is not apparent that your department's request meets the criteria established by FBI policy. Your request is, however, being forwarded to FBI Headquarters for further consideration. If the sweep is approved it will be conducted by Technically Trained Special Agents from our Baltimore field office.

80-805-482*1

If my office can be of any further assistance to you
with this matter please contact Supervisory Special Agent [redacted]
[redacted] at (202) 252-7476.

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b7c

Sincerely yours,

Dana E. Caro
Special Agent in Charge



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Office of Inspector General

Washington, D.C. 20201

June 11, 1986

Mr. Dana Caro
Special Agent in Charge
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D.C., 20535

Dear Mr. Caro:

Reference is made to the telephone conversation between Charles C. Maddox, Chief Inspector of my office and [redacted] Special Agent, FBI, Washington Field Office, on May 13, 1986 regarding [redacted]

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On December 30, 1985, upon our request, technically trained Special Agents of the FBI conducted [redacted] sweeps in the offices of this Department's Secretary, Under Secretary and Chief of Staff. Their sweeps included [redacted]

I respectfully request that your agents conduct additional [redacted] sweeps in the Immediate Office of the [redacted]

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[redacted] Baltimore, Maryland. I am aware of the demands and other priorities placed upon your agents for this type of request. Therefore, please have Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] contact Chief Inspector Charles C. Maddox on 475-6534 at his earliest convenience for further details and/or information.

Your consideration in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Larry D. Morey
Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations

80-805-482x1

DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Office of Inspector General
330 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20201

Official Business
Penalty for Private Use \$300



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b7C

Postage and Fees Paid
U.S. Dept. of H.H.S.
HHS 391

Mr. Dana Caro
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D.C., 20535

Attn:
Supy. Special Agent/TSS



FBI

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b7C

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS 6/30/86

Date

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: SSA [redacted]
EAU/TSD, NEWINGTON)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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b7C

FROM: [redacted] WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (66-5539)

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS (TSCM) -
REQUEST FOR SURVEY AT OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

All markings, notations and items of information
contained in this communication are classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~"
unless otherwise noted.

Re memo dated 5/19/86 from SA [redacted] to SAC, WFO.

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b7C

Attached for FBIHQ and Baltimore are two (2) copies
each of a letter received from the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES (H&HS) dated 6/11/86 requesting a sweep at the Office of
the Commissioner, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, and a letter
from SAC, WFO, to Mr. LARRY D. MOREY, Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations, H&HS.

For the information of FBIHQ and Baltimore, on 5/14/86
CHARLES MADDOX, Chief Inspector, H&HS, telephonically contacted
WFO TTA [redacted] and requested a sweep be conducted at the office
of the newly appointed Commissioner of the SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION. MADDOX advised there was no basis to suspect a
technical penetration and no urgency to the matter. He said the
Commissioner was aware a sweep was conducted for the Director of
H&HS when he took office and that she felt the matters handled by
her office were sensitive enough that she should be accorded the
same treatment.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: [redacted]
Declassify on: OADR

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

(2)-Bureau (Enc. 4) 1-TSD - ES, EAM
2-Baltimore (Enc. 4)
1-Washington Field Office (Attach. 2)

b6
b7C

(5)
Approved: [redacted]

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per [redacted]

Received Eng Section 7/16/86

7/16/86

Inspector [redacted] was contacted on 7/21/86. He
said the request was routine
and the [redacted] does
not have any suspicion that her
offices are bugged, no leads, nothing
(over)

5 DEC 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MADDOX was told to submit a written request with sufficient justification for the sweep. No date was scheduled for the sweep pending receipt of the written request. At the time of conversation WFO was unaware that the Commissioner's office is located in Baltimore.

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b7c

other that she
wanted a TSCM inspection.
Maddox was advised that in view of
the above, no TSCM would be conducted.
He thanked for the call and stated
that a TSCM at the SSA [redacted] was
not required

SSA [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

8/7/86

Date

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 (ATTN: SSA [redacted] EAU/TSD,
 NEWINGTON)

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (66-5539)

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS (TSCM);
 REQUEST FOR SWEEPS BY U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

Attached for FBIHQ is a copy of a letter from the U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION requesting a sweep, and a copy of WFO's response.

Based on the routine, non-investigatory nature of the request, and citing Bureau TSCM policy, WFO declined to accomodate the request. UACB WFO is taking no further action in the matter.

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 b7C

b6
 b7C

②-Bureau (Enc. 2)
 1-Washington Field Office (Attach. 2)

(3)

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

11 AUG 18 1986

Approved: [redacted]

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

97 DEC 18 1986

CHAIRMAN



UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20436

July 29, 1986

Mr. Danae Caro
Special Agent in Charge
1900 Half Street, NW.
FBI
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Mr. Caro:

At the request of the Chairman of the United States International Trade Commission, each of the Commissioners' suites and several other offices must be checked for electronic listening devices, (i.e., debugged).

The sophistication and political sensitivity, as well as the dollar value of investigations being adjudicated before the Commission have risen sharply. The growing importance of international trade makes foreknowledge of Commission decisions an extremely valuable asset.


While no specific instance of transgression can be cited, it is felt that it would be appropriate to assure that appropriate safeguards have been taken. One such safeguard is the periodic electronic examination of Commission space.

The areas to be examined are the suites of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and of four Commissioners, as well as the Offices of the Directors of Operations, Investigations, Industries, Congressional Liaison, and the General Counsel.

For further information and assistance, please contact

b6 per FTC, FBI
b7C

Sincerely,


Lorin L. Goodrich
Director
Office of Administration

80-805-491
SAC
(info)

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
AUG 1 1986	



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington Field Office
Washington, D.C. 20535
August 11, 1986

Mr. Jonathan Brown
United States International Trade Commission
Office of Administration
701 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20436

Dear Mr. Brown:

This is in response to your agency's letter of July 29, 1986, requesting the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to conduct countermeasures sweeps of various offices and your telephone conversation with Special Agent (SA) [redacted] on August 5, 1986.

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b7C

As SA [redacted] explained, the FBI does not perform countermeasures sweeps for other agencies as a routine service. The Bureau recognizes and appreciates that other agencies have a need for periodic countermeasures sweeps, but our countermeasures program does not have the time, manpower or equipment to respond to requests for routine, non-investigative sweeps.

FBI policy regarding sweeps for other agencies is that they will be performed only in response to valid requirements to protect matters of national security or high sensitivity which, if compromised, would cause serious damage to the government's interests. Further, all requests must include substantial justification to indicate a technical compromise has been effected and that a sweep is necessary. For instance, a sweep will not be conducted in response to a report of a "leak" of information until the requesting agency has thoroughly investigated all possible sources for the leak and no explanation other than a possible technical compromise can be identified.

Because of the heavy demand for our countermeasures resources, we have found it necessary to strictly adhere to the Bureau's policy. In view of the non-investigatory nature of your request, we cannot conduct the sweeps you have requested.

80-805-491

ENCLOSURE

If my office can be of any further assistance to you
with this matter please contact Supervisory Special Agent [redacted]
[redacted] or SA [redacted] at 252-7476.

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b7C

Sincerely yours,

Dana E. Caro
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1246614-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 2

Page 2 ~ b5 - per SEC; b6 - per SEC,FBI; b7C - per SEC,FBI; b7D - per SEC; b7E - per SEC,FBI;

Page 3 ~ b5 - per SEC; b6 - per SEC,FBI; b7C - per SEC,FBI; b7D - per SEC; b7E - per SEC,FBI;

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FBI

b6
b7C

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

8/15/86

Date

b6
b7C

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]
(ATTN: SSA [redacted] EAU/TSD)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES
MATTER (TSCM); REQUEST FOR AN OFFICE
SWEEP, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

(3)

b5 per SEC
b6 per SEC, FBI
b7C per SEC, FBI
b7D per SEC
b7E per SEC, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: [redacted]
Classify on: OADR [redacted]

- ②-Bureau (Enc. 1)
1-Washington Field Office (Attach. 2)

(3)

b6
b7C

Approved: [redacted]

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per [redacted]

47 MAY 14 1987



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington Field Office
Washington, D.C. 20535
August 15, 1986

b5 per SEC
b6 per SEC, FBI
b7C per SEC, FBI
b7D per SEC
b7E per SEC, FBI

Sincerely yours,

Dana E. Caro

Dana E. Caro
Special Agent in Charge

80-805-49145
ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1246614-000

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Washington Field Office
Washington, D.C.
December 19, 1986

b5 per SEC
b6 per SEC, FBI
b7C per SEC, FBI
b7D per SEC
b7E per SEC

Sincerely yours,



W. Douglas Gow
Special Agent In Charge

November 17, 1986

MEMORANDUM

b5 per SEC
b6 per SEC, FBI
b7C per SEC, FBI
b7D per SEC
b7E per SEC

MEMORANDUM

November 21, 1986

b5 per SEC
b6 per SEC, FBI
b7C per SEC, FBI
b7D per SEC
b7E per SEC