



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

October 25, 2018

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD JR.
SUITE 1203
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request No.: 1408366-000
Subject: 105-HQ-89923

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

Records responsive to your request were previously processed under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Below you will find informational paragraphs relevant to your request. Please read each item carefully.



A search of the Central Records System maintained at FBI Headquarters indicated that records responsive to your request have been sent to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Since these records were previously processed under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, we are providing you a copy of the previously processed documents.

Please be advised if this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your information needs for this request, you may make a request to NARA at the following address, using file number 105-HQ-89923 as a reference:

National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, MD 20740-6001

Enclosed are 693 pages of previously processed documents and a copy of the Explanation of Exemptions. This release is being provided to you at no charge.

Documents or information referred to other Government agencies were not included in this release.

Please be advised that additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your information needs for this request, you may request an additional search for records. Submit your request by mail or fax to – Work Process Unit, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, fax number (540) 868-4997. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S. C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following web site: <https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing ogis@nara.gov. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Sincerely,



David M. Hardy
Section Chief,
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552


- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1408366-0

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

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Name Searching Unit - Room 6527

Service Unit - Room 6524

Forward to File Room

Attention

Return to

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1571
Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

Regular Request (Analytical Search)

All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)

Subversive References Only

Nonsubversive References Only

Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

Restricted to Locality of _____

Exact Name Only (On the Nose)

Buildup Variations

Subject "The O.C.A.R.D. Photo Shop"

Birthdate & Place _____

Address 153 Giralda St. Coral Gables
Fla.

Localities _____

R# _____ Date 4/25 Searcher Initials Dem

Prod. _____

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

NR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-3-96 BY SP4BJM/LLH

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- Parsons _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- DeLoach _____
- Malone _____
- McGuire _____
- Rosen _____
- Tamm _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

Airgram

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Cablegram

URGENT 5-13-60

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LEGAT, MEXICO CITY NO. 801


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Baron
Cuba
U.I.G.
Mexico

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REC-76

CLIP. REBULET MARCH 29 LAST. (PROTECT IDENTITY) WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN PAST ADVISED MAY 13 INSTANT THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION



NO LOCAL DISSEMINATION

Classified by *SP-1/MLH*
Declassify on: OADR 5/14/85

JOHN F. DESMOND

RECEIVED: 5-17-60

12:59 PM

BLF

EX-102 105-89923-13

DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION DUE TO TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE LEASE LINE ACCORDING TO ADVICE RECEIVED FROM STATE DEPARTMENT

REC-76

4 MAY 27 1960

ORIG: MR. PARSONS FOR DIRECTOR
CC: MR. BELMONT
CC: MR. L'ALLIER

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-1/MLH
ON 7-19-96

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 109-

b6
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Not clip operation
for SA Kapich per 5/17
5/18/60

copy Mexico, Comm
5/20/60
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on 5/25/60
cc: C, P, G, 2
DF, JS, IS-DW
5/25/60
mm and New Mexico

105-862020

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

SECRET

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REC-80

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/ret
 ON 10/25/96

Castro Newspaper Building Gunned From Car

HAVANA, May 31 (AP) — Gunmen today fired from a speeding car at the building housing the semi-official newspaper *Revolucion*. This was the second attack in two days on publications supporting Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Several shots from automatic weapons struck the *Revolucion* building. No one was injured. The gunmen escaped.

Revolucion is the official organ of Castro's 26th of July Movement. Yesterday the front of the building housing the pro-Castro magazine *Bohemia* was peppered by sub-machinegun fire from a passing car.

Meanwhile, another pro-Castro newspaper accused the United States of setting up a powerful radio transmitter in the Caribbean area to "combat" the Cuban revolution.

Liberacion, official organ of the 26th of July Movement in Las Villas Province, charged that the station was set up in violation of international agreements. It gave this account:

The 50,000-watt station, to be known as *Radio Swan, International Voice of the Caribbean*, will inaugurate English-Spanish programs Wednesday on 1160 kilocycles. It is located on Swan Island, 30 miles south of the United States.

(Available records show a Swan Island off the Honduran coast owned by an American family named Smith. It has been used as a U. S. weather station.)

Cuban military officials today declined to confirm a report by the Miami Daily News

that a raiding party led by Raul Castro broke into a meeting of air force officers who were conspiring against the regime and arrested them this weekend.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

by Donahoe

Classified by ~~AINSC-30~~
 Declassify on: OADR 9/3/85
 2591654

File J. C. [unclear]

memo attached to Belmont
Radio Station 6/2/60
inv: vaj

Honduras

- The Washington Post and Times Herald A10
- The Washington Daily News _____
- The Evening Star _____
- New York Herald Tribune _____
- New York Journal-American _____
- New York Mirror _____
- New York Daily News _____
- New York Post _____
- The New York Times _____
- The Worker _____
- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
- Date _____

~~SECRET~~

JUN 1 1960

105-89923-22
~~105-86020-95~~
 ENCLOSURE
 105-86020 (3)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - DeLoach
- 1 - Donahoe
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Nasca

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- Parsons _____
- Belmont _____
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- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 2, 1960

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

SECRET

SUBJECT: [CLIP] (\$) u

10/25/96
 CLASSIFIED BY SP4BYA/mew
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1



The "Washington Post and Times Herald" on 6/1/60 reported that "Liberacion," the official organ of Castro's July 26 Movement in Las Villas Province, Cuba, reported that a 50,000-watt station to be known as "Radio Swan, International Voice of the Caribbean" would inaugurate English-Spanish programs on Wednesday (presumably 6/1/60). This station was located on Swan Island. "Liberacion" charged that the station was set up in violation of international agreements and accused the U.S. of setting up a powerful radio transmitter in the Caribbean area to "combat" the Cuban revolution.

Referral/Consult

ACTION:

None, this is for your information.

[105-86020] \$ u

Classified by 9145-CL-JC
 Declassify on: OADR 9/3/85
 105-89923-22
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FOI/PA #	259 654
APPEAL #	
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E.O. #	12356
DATE	9/3/85
INITIALS	JC

ENCLOSURE

52 JUN 13 1960

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NAT. INT. SEC.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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7/27/60

Airtel

To: SAC, Miami

From: Director, FBI (105-86020)

CLIP

Reurteletype 7/23/60 advising letterhead memo being sent AMSD 7/23/60. Letterhead memo not yet received at Bureau. Immediately submit. If submitted, furnish date and caption under which letterhead memo submitted.

VHN: baj
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-19-96 BY SP4 GJA/STW

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19 JUL 28 1960

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AUG 2 1960

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 28 1960

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. McGuire	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

AHB
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URGENT 7-28-60 6-46 PM. EST. JWA

TO DIRECTOR, FBI 105-86020

FROM SAC, MIAMI 62-3573

*Forwarded ASAC
7/28/60 to
out with
item mailed 7/28/60*

DONAHOE

b6
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CLIP. RE TEL. CALL FROM SECTION CHIEF STERLING DONAHOE TODAY.

LETTER SUBMITTED JULY TWENTY THREE SIXTY CAPTIONED QUOTE

CLIP UNQUOTE. SENT AMSD REGISTERED MAIL. ENCLOSING LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM ELEVEN PAGES IN LENGTH SAME DATE AND CAPTION. 105-89923-50

END

ACK PLS

REC-23

JUL 29 1960

WA 7-48 PM OK FBI WA JA

52 AUG 3 1960

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DATE 7-19-96 BY SPICER/STJ-86020

Mr. Belmont

F B I

Date: 7/28/60
PLAIN TEXT

Transmit the following in _____
AIRTEL (Type in plain text or code) AIRMAIL

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-86020)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (62-3573)

RE: CLIP

ReBuairtel, 7/27/60.

A letter with enclosed letterhead memo captioned, "CLIP" was submitted to the Bureau, dated 7/23/60, re info which was furnished to the Bureau by teletype dated 7/23/60.

Over
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3 - Bureau (RM) (AM)
1 - Miami
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REC-104

105-89923-51
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Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

8-12-60, 1959

Name Searching Unit - Room 6527

Service Unit - Room 6524

Forward to File Review

Attention

Return to

Supervisor

Room

Ext.

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154

Type of References Requested:

Regular Request (Analytical Search)

All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)

Subversive References Only

Nonsubversive References Only

Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

Restricted to Locality of Cuba

Exact Name Only (On the Nose)

Buildup

Variations

Subject

The Colony Hotel

Birthdate & Place

Address

Isle of Pines
Cuba

Localities

(El Colony Hotel)

R#

Date

Searcher

Initials

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Prod.

FILE NUMBER

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The Colony

62-9-210-15 pl

The Colony Hotel

NR

El Colony Hotel

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DATE 7-19-96

BY SP4 B. J. [Signature]

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 W.C. Sullivan _____
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Guerrilla Camp Found in Florida; Seize 13 Cubans

HOMESTEAD, Fla., Aug. 26 (UPI). — Police investigating the shooting of a young prankster today stumbled on an Everglades "boot camp" for Cuban guerrilla warfare. Scene of the "training center" was a large shingle house near Homestead, twenty-five miles south of Miami.

John Francis Keogh, sixteen, of Homestead, was grazed on the scalp by a rifle bullet fired when he and a group of youths drove by the camp last night to heckle the recruits by throwing firecrackers.

Metropolitan Dade County police arrested two of the Cubans, Raul Soto Castells, twenty-one, and Enrique Hernandez Acevedo, nineteen, on charges of assault with intent to commit murder. Officers returned later to round up thirteen Cubans early today on vagrancy charges. Police said others may have fled into the heavy underbrush surrounding the property.

"This obviously was being used as a camp for training in jungle fighting," said Sgt. Shelton Merritt.


Officers said the house had been turned into a barracks complete with about twenty Army-type cots and mess kits. Outside they found an obstacle course and knife-scarred target of a man placed against a large Ponciana tree. Two U. S. Army M-1 rifles with fourteen rounds of ammunition was seized.

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October 21, 1960

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FROM DIRECTOR FBI



REURTEL OCTOBER TWO ZERO, LAST. AUTHORITY
GRANTED. BE CERTAIN INFORMANT DOES NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN VIOLATION
OF LAW AND FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION REGULATIONS. KEEP
BUREAU ADVISED OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS.



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VHN:ms

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See Cover Memo Donahoe to Belmont, dated 10-21-60, re same subj,
prepared by VHN:ms.

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- 1 - 105-87912 (FRD)

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First Reaction

Fidel Is Opposed

By HENRY RAYMONT
HAVANA, March 14 (UPI) — Premier Fidel Castro assailed President Kennedy's proposed hemispheric "Alliance for Progress" early today as "an attempt to buy the conscience of Latin America."

"We'll see whether the conscience of Latin America can be bought for \$500 million, as Kennedy intends, or whether, as we contend, it cannot be bought at any price," Castro said in a rambling, three-hour speech to a crowd at Havana University.

Earlier, Ambassador to Moscow Faure Chaumont had formally proclaimed the Castro regime's "loyalty to communism" to the same audience, while Castro looked on, beaming.

Castro blamed the United

States for a "pirate ship" attack yesterday on the Santiago waterfront, which was reported to have put the seized Texaco oil refinery out of action for several weeks at least.

The Castro regime said at least one man was killed in the attack by a boat described only as fast and heavily armed for its size. During his speech, Castro displayed a 57-mm. (2¼ inch) shell which he said had been fired by the sea raider. He said it was "made in the U.S.A." The Cuban navy announced last night that it had abandoned its search for the boat, hinting broadly that it believed the boat had put into the U. S. Navy's big base at Guantanamo in eastern Cuba.

"Nothing to it, as far as we're concerned," said an American officer at Guantanamo. "No ship, or otherwise, has been in here."

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Anti-Castro Cubans Say C. I. A. Imprisoned Them for 11 Weeks

Spokesman Asserts 17 Were Mistreated for Opposing Role for 'Batista Men'



The New York Times May 7, 1961
Guatemala's Petén region (cross) was said to be the site of a detention camp.

By SAM POPE BREWER
Special to The New York Times.
MIAMI, May 5—An anti-Castro Cuban volunteer declared today that the Central Intelligence Agency had held him and sixteen others prisoner and incommunicado for eleven weeks before and during last month's abortive invasion of Cuba.
He said he was in fear of death much of the time.

The statements were made by Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa, 27-year-old lawyer, one of seventeen held in a remote camp in the jungle of Petén in northern Guatemala until last Friday. The fact of their imprisonment was well-known in Miami and was reported earlier.

Originally their number was given incorrectly as eighteen. The full details have not been available until now.

Dr. Nodal and his fellow prisoners have just organized a new Cuban movement to be known

as the 7th of April movement in memory of the invasion they missed. They have called for the cooperation of all Cuban groups to overthrow Premier Fidel Castro but under Cuban leadership and without the participation of the C. I. A.
Dr. Nodal and his companions maintain that because they opposed Capt. Manuel Artime and other leaders backed by the

Continued on Page 4, Column 1

C. I. A., they were threatened, handcuffed, kept in "subhuman" prison conditions, accused of being Communists and submitted to lie detector tests at gun point.

According to Dr. Nodal, members of the group were neither charged with any offense, nor brought to trial during their eleven weeks of imprisonment. He said that until they landed outside Miami last Friday they had not been able to find out where they were being taken.

They charge that the intelligence agency employed "thugs" and "gangsters" who stood between the Cuban volunteers and their own Cuban leaders. Dr. Nodal said that throughout their imprisonment, except for a few days, they were under "American" guards.

Pressed for details, he said that by "American" he meant that they were the C. I. A. representatives in charge of the camp who were assumed to be American and whose authority was unchallenged. He said that some spoke English with an accent and were believed by the Cubans to be naturalized United States citizens, "perhaps of Central European origin." They were known to the Cubans only by code names.

Most Refuse to Talk

Most of the former prisoners will not discuss their experiences for fear of some form of reprisal.


Dr. Nodal emphasized that the group's resentment was directed not against the United States but against the "incredible men" who ran the camp. This, in chronological detail, is his story:

Dr. Nodal came to Miami from Cuba to work for the Democratic Revolutionary Front last October. On Dec. 6 he enlisted in Miami and was sent to Guatemala for training.

On Jan. 31 about 300 men in the training camp at Trax, Guatemala, were mustered by their senior military adviser known to them only as Frank. They were told that two Cuban officers who had been in charge had been sent away "for playing politics."

This left Capt. José Perez San Román in charge of the camp as far as Cubans had any control. Captain San Román was one of the leaders of the April 17 invasion and has since been captured by the Cuban Government.

Exile sources here agree that Captain San Román was an officer in Cuba under Fulgencio Batista, whose dictatorial regime was overthrown by Fidel Castro. He is said to have fought against the Castro revolution in the Sierra Maestra, although there is no way to confirm this.



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230 Seek to Resign

Of the 300 men, 230 asked to resign from the force at Camp Trax because of the change in leaders. A new North American agent known to them as Bernie then appeared on the scene. He accused the troops of insubordination, as a result of Communist influence.

Bernie said he had authority from the Democratic Revolutionary Front to name commanders and that he had chosen Captain San Román.

The 230 dissenters demanded that their case be heard by a member of the Front within seventy-two hours. Otherwise they wished to be discharged and returned home.

They elected a committee of five to call on Bernie with their demand. He refused to see more than a single spokesman and Dr. Nodal was chosen by the others.

Dr. Nodal said he explained in detail that they were neither mercenaries nor conscripts but volunteers and that they could not accept leaders who they considered represented the opposite of what they were fighting for.

After discussion it was agreed that the men would continue training for five days while they waited to hear when they might expect a representative of the Democratic Front.

Troops Strike Again

When seven days had gone by without an answer the troops went on strike again.

Frank arrived back from a trip to Washington on that day but would say only that he hoped a representative of the Democratic Revolutionary Front would arrive "within a month."

The next day they were formally ordered back to training. Under the pressure of threats and promises all but twenty gave in during the next few days. The others agreed to resume training with the promise that their demands would be met.

On Feb. 11 the men were ordered out on a field exercise. While the camp was virtually empty one of the advisers called for eight of the twenty remaining standouts and asked them to go with him. They thought there was to be a further conference.

They were led along a jungle path to a big canvas-covered truck and suddenly found themselves covered by Thompson submachine guns held by three men. They were ordered into the truck and driven away.

At La Sulza, an estate where there was a Guatemalan Army camp, they were surrounded by eight or ten men with automatic weapons. The prisoners were taken from the truck one at a time and led away out of sight. They felt they were about to be shot.

Each was taken into a small room, forced to empty all his pockets and remove all his clothes.

"I felt this was it," Dr. Nodal said. "I was sure we were going to be murdered."

When they had given up all their possessions — "even our love letters" — they were told to dress again and taken away to a shed in the camp. As they assembled they found five other

men from their unit who had had no connection with the mutiny but who had quarreled with Captain San Román. Two days later another prisoner was brought in, making their total number fourteen.

The shed they were in was about 15 by 30 feet with a concrete floor, wooden walls and a galvanized iron roof. In the sunny Guatemalan highlands it was so hot in the daytime that they lay naked and panting on the floor. But it was bitter cold at night.

Dr. Nodal said they were given black beans, rice and tortillas without salt to eat.

5 Prisoners Questioned

On Feb. 24 five prisoners were taken away without any explanation. Outside each was put into a pick-up truck and driven away to the Helvetia camp not far away.

There they were questioned separately by Pat, the chief security guard. Dr. Nodal described him as "6 feet, 4 inches tall and about 230 pounds and stupid." His questioning, however, was said to be courteous. At La Sulza Dr. Nodal said.

Dr. Nodal was then taken into another shed and turned over to a young man operating a lie-detector.

Dr. Nodal said the interrogation was aimed at making him say he was a Communist.

The prisoners then were allowed to bathe and shave for the first time in twelve days and were given clean clothes and an edible meal. They were taken back to the shack at La Sulza.

Five days later, March 1, an agent known as Pappy, who was said to be the chief of the whole operation in Guatemala, came to say that they were being moved again but he would not say where.

Four were taken away in handcuffs at that time. The next day the remaining ten, including Dr. Nodal, were taken



The New York Times

VISITED REBELS: Dr. José Miro Cardona, head of Cuban revolutionary council. He was said to have visited men separated from forces and kept prisoner, and to have offered aid. The men have been released.

to the air base at Retalhuleu, and flown to a river in the Petén jungle area.

They were taken up the river for an hour in canoes. There, in a crude camp at the top of a cliff they found their four previous companions and two other men they had not seen since leaving the Trax camp.

They were warned, Dr. Nodal said, that they would be shot if they tried to escape. They found living conditions better than in their last prison. Yet still no one would answer any questions. Their guards brought in a

radio set for an hour a day so they could hear the news programs from Radio Swan, a station operated from Swan Island, off the Honduran Coast.

A seventeenth prisoner was brought in to join them when they had been there two days.

On March 28 they heard that Dr. José Miró Cardona was to be named president of the Revolutionary Council. Two days later he arrived to visit them. Dr. Nodal said, with Dr. Manuel A. de Varona, the Council's Secretary of War.

Dr. Miró Cardona said he had no part in their misfortune and that he would see they were set free within a few days. He carried away the first letters they had been able to send out to their families since their arrest.

They awoke April 17 to find that their guard had disappeared. They were still guarded, however, by a detachment of forty-seven Guatemalan soldiers under a lieutenant. "At all other times," Dr. Nodal said, "we were guarded by Americans with automatic weapons."

Invasion News Broadcast

Later that day they learned by radio of the Cuban invasion. They were discussing their chances for an escape when the Guatemalan lieutenant, who had a direct radio link with Retalhuleu, told them that an American was coming from Retalhuleu to get them.

Two days later five heavily armed men arrived, headed by a short, bald, middle-aged man known to them as Mac.

Dr. Nodal said Mac berated them at length for not being with the invasion forces. He said they had missed their chance to do their patriotic duty and that when the invaders won out the prisoners would be handed over to Captain San Román "in handcuffs."

Mac then left the camp but four guards stayed with them. On Friday, April 28, eleven

days after the invasion began, their guards suddenly took them by canoe to a village on the mainland and, after an hour's ride in a jeep, they were put into a DC-3 airplane at a jungle airstrip.

They were flown back to Retalhuleu, carefully searched and loaded into a C-54 aircraft, where they found 118 other volunteers who for one reason or another had not taken part in the landing.

Even then, they said, when they asked the security officer, whom they knew as Don, where they were going, the only answer was that they would learn when they got there.

They arrived at a Florida airport before dawn Saturday. Dr. Nodal said he found himself in the same hangar from which he had started out for Guatemala. He did not know where it was except that it was about an hour's ride south of Miami.

That odyssey ended when they were dumped from trucks before daybreak in Miami itself. They found themselves free men again after eleven weeks.

Nodal Heads New Group

Dr. Nodal is president of the new 17th of April group. He was politically active in Cuba in the AAA movement, a code name for the National Revolutionary Front headed by Dr. Aureliano Sánchez Arango during the Batista regime.

The secretary general of the new group is Dr. Omar Castañeda, a lawyer who was a leader in the university students anti-Castro organization.

Their fellow prisoners included: Francisco and René Chavéz, newspaper men on the staff of the Diario de la Marina; Adalberto Delgado, medical student; Rodolfo Bartelemy, Dominicus, captain in the Castro police; An-

tonio Frontela, Somez, electrical worker; Cecilio Fuentes Rico, bartender; Rolando Fuentes Rico, truck driver; Epifanio González Arrasti, laborer and a member of the Castro Commandos of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform; Humberto Olivera Perez, former captain in the regular army; Luis Alberto Olivera, student; Ricardo Martínez de la Cruz, customs chief of José Martí Airport, Havana, under the Castro regime; Julio Antonio More, law student; Marlin Torres, art student, and two others who concealed their

names because they have families in Cuba.

Officials Decline Comment

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, May 6—Official circles withheld comment today on the report by Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa on the imprisonment of anti-Castro Cubans in a camp in Guatemala.

CIA Accused of Imprisoning 17 Cubans for 11 Weeks

The Central Intelligence Agency has been charged with imprisoning an anti-Castro Cuban leader and 16 companions for 11 weeks both before and after the Cuban "invasion" fiasco.

The New York Times, in a story from Miami, identified the Cuban as Rodolfo Nodal Taraga, 27, a lawyer who was

active in the National Revolutionary Front during the Batista regime.

Nodal said he and the other 16 Cubans were held 'incommunicado' in a remote camp in the jungle of Peten in northern Guatemala until April 28 — 11 days after the Cuban landings began.

They were flown back to

Miami and released on the following day, he reported.

He attributed the imprisonment to their opposition to Capt. Manuel Artime and other leaders' backed by the CIA for the abortive Cuban landings.

The 17 were kept in "subhuman" prison conditions, Nodal declared, accused of being Communists, and subjected to lie-detector tests at gunpoint.

The Times said the fact of their imprisonment was well known among Cuban circles in Miami, but full details had not been disclosed previously.

Nodal went to Miami from Cuba last October to work for the democratic revolutionary front and later was sent to Guatemala for training. These are other details of his story:

After he and others in the camp objected to the Cuban leaders in charge, they were put under guard and shuttled from one camp to another. They were questioned constantly.

Some of the prisoners were taken away and others added as they went along. On March 30, Jose Miro Cardona, later named president of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, visited them and promised to have them set free.


When he left, he took with him the first letters they had been able to send their families since their arrest. He also told them he had nothing to do with their arrest.

Finally, a month later, they were flown to Miami in relays and released.

Nodal and his fellow prisoners have organized a new Cuban organization to be known as the 17th of April movement in memory of the Cuban landings.

They have called on Cuban groups to work together for the overthrow of Castro but without the participation of the CIA.

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Cuban Rebel Survivors Reported U. S. Captives

Believed Held on Vieques Island Behind Tight Screen of Secrecy

By BEM PRICE
Associated Press Staff Writer

There is reason to believe, that the United States is holding survivors of the Cuban invasion forces incommunicado—prisoners, if you will—on a Caribbean island.

And there is evidence that the United States troubles with communism in Central and South America are just beginning.

The first rumor about the United States-held survivors of the invasion, some of whom reportedly are wounded, reached the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay soon after the military effort collapsed.

The grapevine there is so efficient that reports of activities in Havana, 600 miles west, sometimes reach the base before they are broadcast by the Castro regime.

Within hours after the grapevine report reached the base, the Castro captives from the abortive invasion—who were being interrogated in Havana on television—began talking of a particular island, Vieques.

Trained at U. S. Base

They said they had been trained for the invasion at the United States Marine base at Vieques, which is just a 30-minute helicopter ride from San Juan, Puerto Rico.

While the rumor about the Vieques prisoners was seeping into Guantanamo; it was also circulating in San Juan, and New York.

A Navy officer talked by radio to the naval station at San Juan, asking if newsmen wanting to check on the rumors could be admitted to Vieques. The answer was that no one

Continued From First Page
sion, flop apparently has been a great upsurge in Communist activities in Central and South America.

Early this month a chartered Cuban airliner landed at Kingston, Jamaica, to refuel. Out stepped 35 Communists, including two women, who said they had departed from Recife, Brazil, for Havana.

They made no bones about the fact that they were going to Havana to learn how Fidel Castro carried Cuba into the Soviet orbit.

There are reports that Cuban airliners are flying around the Caribbean picking up Communists and depositing them in Havana.

At a post-Cuban invasion background briefing, a high Pentagon official said the United States could expect more revolutions and more Castros south of the border.

Dubious on MIGs

Other reflections in the invasion aftermath:

Did the Castro forces have Russian-built MIG fighters aloft during the fighting? Assorted communique from the anti-Castro groups made that assertion. But the best radar the Navy owns, including shipboard and airborne, has yet to detect the presence of high performance jet aircraft in Cuba. The Cubans do have American-built jet trainers, but they are incapable of supersonic flight.

During the invasion and for some time thereafter, the United States Navy had Navy ships and aircraft in the Cuban area.

Their presence was described by the Navy as routine. They had nothing to do with the Cuban danger, the Navy said.

Though a plane from the super carrier Independence had landed at Guantanamo to pick up film for shipboard movies, the Navy consistently denied the Independence was anywhere about. They did, that is, until the seagoing airfield rammed an ammunition ship,

the USS Diamond Head. The Diamond Head brought her sad story to Guantanamo.

Pipeline to Castro

There are roughly 3,200 Cubans working on the base and some of them make a pretty good pipeline to Castro.

Further, any time the Iron Curtain countries want a good look at whatever portion of the United States Fleet happens to be in Guantanamo, all they have to do is send a ship in.

The naval base is built around the outer bay of Guantanamo. There is a Cuban-controlled inner bay and access to this bay by ships of any nation is guaranteed by treaty.

In the last month, or two, a couple of Iron Curtain cargo ships have sailed right down the middle of the Guantanamo harbor.

would be admitted to the base without special permission from Washington.

On the assumption that training bases are normally open to visitors, efforts were made to gain access to Vieques through the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House.

The CIA was noncommittal. A White House spokesman said it would not assist in the matter of entry.

Doctor Held Captive

Presumably the United States wants no one to talk to these survivors until the furor over the Cuban debacle—and the CIA's role in it—has died down.

While the Vieques operation was kept secret, the New York Times has reported the story of Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa, 27-year-old lawyer and member of the anti-Castro invasion forces.

Dr. Nodal said he and 16 other volunteers had been held captive at gunpoint in Guatemala by CIA agents because they refused to serve in the invasion forces under a man they described as a murderer in the regime of Dictator Fulgenicio Batista.

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Cuba Revolt Survivor Report to Be Probed

By the Associated Press

Senator Morse, Democrat of Oregon, said today his Senate Latin Affairs Subcommittee will look into reports that the United States is holding some survivors of the Cuban invasion force incommunicado on the Caribbean Island of Vieques, a United States Marine base.

The subcommittee, of which Senator Morse is chairman, has been hearing secret reports on the invasion flop.

Reports that invasion survivors, some reportedly wounded, were being held on the Marine base cropped out at the United States naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba; at New York City, and at San Juan, Puerto Rico.

News men have been denied permission to visit Vieques, presumably because United States officials want the furor over the Cuban debacle to die down.

"This is all news to me," Senator Morse said in an interview as he read the report. "I will see what the subcommittee can find out about it."

Senator Morse said the Cuban invasion was "handled to a great extent by the White House staff, rather than regular State Department channels."

It was learned from reliable sources that Senator Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, only member of Congress to learn in advance of the invasion plans, overheard them by chance while a guest of President Kennedy en route by airplane to Florida on March 30.

The same sources said that White House staffers masterminding the invasion included Arthur N. Schlesinger, jr., special assistant to the President, and Adolph A. Berle and Prof. Lincoln Gordon of the special Cubans are being held prisoner Cuban task force.

Asked about the report that on Vieques, Assistant White House Press Secretary Andrew Hatcher declined comment yesterday. The State Department referred questions to the Defense Department.

department declined also comment.


A United States official, who would not permit use of his name, said there are no Cubans on Vieques. However, he confirmed in part a report, first printed in the New York Times, that 17 Cubans had been held incommunicado in Guatemala while the invasion was under way.

The Times quoted a spokesman for the 17 Cubans, all released later, as saying the men were held captive by the Central Intelligence Agency because they refused to serve

in the invasion forces under a man they described as a murderer in the regime of Dictator Fulgencio Batista.

The United States official, however, described as correct a different version which described the 17 Cubans as mutineers and misfits and said they would have been turned over to the new Cuban government for trial if the invaders had overthrown Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

Indict Allen

How Castro Combs Out The I

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4 Fliers Missing On Cuban Mission

BY JERRY NORRIS AND SANDRA PIRTLE

Four Birmingham civilian airmen, flying a cargo plane for anti-Castro forces in the April 19 Cuban invasion, are missing and presumed dead.

A Miami attorney representing the firm that hired the flyers for the anti-Castro Cubans, said the four men broke radio silence during the invasion and reported that one of their two engines had gone out, and that they were losing altitude. Nothing more was heard from the plane.

Alex E. Carson, attorney for Double Check Corp., said the four men were Riley W. Shamburger, 36, 916 75th-st. s, pilot; Thomas Willard Ray, 33, of 1435 Sloan-av, co-pilot; Lee F. Baker, 35, 4408 15th-av n, engineer, and Wade


Guardsman Claims Others Approached

A Birmingham Air National Guardsman said last night that he knew of at least two other Guard members who had been approached here with offers of \$3000 for three months" to fly anti-Castro forces.

The man asked that his name be withheld.



PRESUMED DEAD—Lee F. Baker.



PILOT — R. W. Shamburger.

BIRMINGHAM POST HERALD
5-5-61
Birmingham, Alabama
BH Office

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY
ACTIVITIES -- IS-CUBA

Bufile No. 109-480

Carroll Gray of Pinson, radio operator.

Carlson said he did not know whether the two-engine C-46, carrying an undisclosed cargo, had been shot down.

Plane Remnants Found

Remnants of the plane's wreckage have turned up in the Caribbean but no bodies have been found, he said.

Carlson made his statements in See 4 FLIERS, Page 2

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ENCLOSURE

4 Fliers Missing

Continued from Page 1

a news conference here yesterday after consulting the families of all four men. "I don't think their families knew where they were going, or what they were going to do," he said.

The fatal flight apparently started "somewhere in Central America," he said. The exact destination was unknown.

The Cuban exiles employed Double Check Corp. to locate a four-man crew for hazardous flying aboard a C-46, Carlson stated. He said the contacts with the Birmingham men were made in early April.

"These men knew what they were getting into," he said. "It was a calculated risk. If they came back they had a nice nest egg."

"Their families will receive substantial benefits as part of the contract," he added.

Described As Valiant

He described the four men as valiant and dedicated, "fighting for something this country believes in."

He said as far as he knows, the four men are the only fliers that Double Check put in touch with the Cubans.

The pilot, Riley W. Shamburger, is a combat pilot of World War II and Korea and has been a test pilot for the Hayes Corp. for several years. He was a major in the Air National Guard, an RF84 jet pilot assigned to the 106th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, as operations officer.

His wife, Marion Jane Shamburger, said he had 12,000 hours of flying time to his credit. She told reporters at her home that April 19—the day the plane went down—was their 15th wedding anniversary.

"I've just told my daughter what happened," she said. "I've known about it for some time, but I told no one—other people's lives could have been endangered."

Shamburger had been a pilot for 18 years.

Attended Woodlawn

Mrs. Shamburger said she and her husband had gone to school together at Barrett and Woodlawn High School. They have a 13-year-old daughter.

Brig. General G. Reid Doster,

Air National Guard commander here, said so far as he could determine, "Shamburger was the only Guardsman among the four men involved."

General Doster said he was "much distressed at losing a very fine officer." He had known nothing of Shamburger's departure, he said, because the flyer had not been away long enough to have missed any number of meetings.

"They knew what they were getting into, but I didn't," said Mrs. Catherine Baker, 4408 13th av. n, wife of the engineer on the ill-fated trip.

Mrs. Baker, who is expecting her second baby in September, was hospitalized last week after learning from Carlson that her husband was missing.

She said that Baker first left home about the second week in February, returning to Birmingham two or three times a month. He never revealed where he had been, and she assumed that he was on ordinary flying expeditions.

"The last time Leo came home was about two weeks before Easter (April 2)," she said, "but he sent me flowers for Easter Sunday."

Received Letter

She received a letter from him April 21, dated April 13, but she said he mentioned nothing about what he was doing.

"He often talked about Shamburger, but I never met him," said Mrs. Baker. "I didn't know Gray and Ray at all."

Baker was owner of two restaurants here—Leo's Pizza shack number one in East Lake and Pizza shack number two in Home-wood.

The Bakers have two children—Theresa Anne, 11, Baker's daughter by a previous marriage, and Catherine Elizabeth, who had her first birthday last month.

In addition to his restaurant operation, Baker had been employed as a flight engineer at Hayes since Feb. 12, 1957. He was a native of Boston, Mass., and graduated from high school there.

Air Force Veteran

An executive at Hayes said that his record showed that he was an Air Force veteran, having entered the service in 1944 and receiving a discharge as a technical sergeant.

Mrs. Baker, the former Catherine Walker, has lived in Birmingham most of her life and is a graduate of Woodlawn High School.

Gray, like Shamburger, formerly was a test pilot with Hayes

Corp. He was 38; married to Violet Lean Gray and had no children.

He had lived in Pinson all his life; attended Pinson School and Tarrant High School, where he graduated in 1947.

A member of the family said "He's been gone about three months. He didn't tell anybody where he was going, or why. We don't know much about this."

Thomas Willard Ray, the co-pilot, 1435 Sloan, also was an employe of Hayes, working as a classified planning and technical inspector. He joined the company in December, 1952. The Hayes spokesman said he resigned March 18 this year.

Born in Tarrant, on March 14, 1931, he was a 1950 graduate of Tarrant High School. He served in the Air Force from 1950 until 1952, receiving a discharge as a staff sergeant.

Ray was married to the former Margaret Hayden and has two children — Thomas Morgan Ray, 9, and Janet Joy Ray, 6. His mother, Mrs. Mary Lou Ray, and a brother, Joe Dillard Ray, are other survivors.

Although the family refused to talk with newsmen, their attorney announced that memorial services for Ray will be at 3 p.m. Sunday, May 14, at Rock Methodist Church, Tarrant City.



BAKER FAMILY—Mrs. Leo F. Baker, with one-year-old Catherine Elizabeth at their home, first heard last week that her husband was among four Birmingham crew members of a C-46 cargo plane which crashed in the Caribbean during the Cuban invasion.

Four local airmen lost on flight for anti-Castro exiles

BY DAVE LANGFORD, News staff writer

Four Birmingham airmen, in the employ of anti-Castro forces, were lost somewhere in the Caribbean when an engine failed on their C46 airplane.

A spokesman for a firm of Miami confidential agents said today the four were reported missing and presumed dead after they left on a cargo mission from an undisclosed airstrip to Central America.

He identified them as:

Riley W. Shanbarger of 916 75th-st. s. pilot; Thomas Willard Ray of 1435 Sloan-av. co-pilot; Lee F. Baker of 4408 15th-av. n. engineer, and Wade Carroll Gray of Pinson, radio operator.

ALEX E. CARLSON, an attorney of Miami Springs, Fla., said at a news conference he was speaking for the Double Check Corp. of Miami, which put the anti-Castro Cubans in touch with the four Birmingham airmen in early April.

He said the C46 was maintaining radio silence when it left the secret airstrip about April 19.

"They were told to use the radio only in case of an emergency," he said. "Then they reported one engine had gone out and they were losing altitude. That was the last they have been heard from."

The date of their departure coincides with the abortive attempt at an invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro forces.

THE BIRMINGHAM NEWS
5-4-61
Birmingham, Alabama
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CARLSON SAID he was in Birmingham to notify the families of the four that their husbands were presumed dead.

He said Double Check Corp. contacted the four in behalf of an organization which requested that its identity remain confidential.

"But it is presumed to be an exiled group of Cubans," he said.

He said Double Check, acting as only an agent, hired the four at a monthly salary for multi-engine aircraft flying cargo.

He said he did not know the nature of their cargo nor their destination.


"THESE MEN knew what they were getting into," he said. "It was a calculated risk. If they came back they had a nice nest-egg."

The 'user' informed me a week ago that the men were missing. In the interim period the wives were notified, but their ultimate whereabouts are not yet known.

He said a search of the area where the airplane is believed to have gone down revealed only parts of the airplane.

He said the men were guaran-

Turn to Page 2, Column 3



WORLD WAR II ERA CURTIS C-46 "COMMANDO" TWIN ENGINE TRANSPORT
 ... Plane in picture is similar to craft local men were flying

Fliers

Continued from Page 1
 teed "substantial benefits" to their wives and families, each having a separate arrangement.

SHAMBURGER was a major in the Alabama Air National Guard, an RF-4 jet pilot assigned to the 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing.

Baker was owner and operator of Leo's Pizza Shop in East Lake. Wives of the airmen were identified as Mrs. Violet Lean Gray, Margaret Rebecca Ray, Marion Jane Shamburger and Catherine Baker.

Carlson said Double Check could be described as a "broker." "We only put our client in touch with the pilots," he said.

He said these four were the only airmen Double Check has contracted.

BAKER WOULD have been 35 April 24. In addition to the Pizza Shop, he operated another restaurant in Birmingham.

His wife, Catherine, said she knew nothing of her husband's whereabouts, or what he was doing, until notified about a week ago that he was missing.

The Bakers have two children

—Theresa Anne, 11, Baker's daughter by a previous marriage, and Catherine Elizabeth, who had her first birthday last month.

"I didn't know what he was doing, and I don't know how much money he was supposed to get," she said. "All I know is that Leo always made a good living for us."

Baker was a flight engineer in World War II, she said:

RELATIVES of Ray, age 30, said any information about his activities would have to come from Atty. Frank Dixon of Birmingham, who is working in conjunction with the Double Check attorney.

Gray, married with no chil-

dren, was 33. He formerly was a test pilot for Hayes Corp. here, but was laid off about a year ago, said his brother, George Gray. "He's been gone about three months," the brother said. "He didn't tell anybody where he was going or why." Shamburger, 36, had been employed as a test pilot at Hayes Aircraft Corp. since 1953. He has one daughter, Marlon Jane, 13.

Central Research Section

U. S. Believed Holding Survivors of Invasion

By Bem Price
Associated Press

There is reason to believe that the United States is holding survivors of the Cuban invasion forces incommunicado—prisoners, if you will—on a Caribbean island. And there is evidence that the U. S. troubles with com-

munism in Central and South America are just beginning. The first rumor about the U. S.-held survivors of the invasion, some of whom reportedly are wounded, reached the U. S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay soon after the military effort collapsed. The grapevine there is so

efficient that reports of activities in Havana, 600 miles west, sometimes reach the base before they are broadcast by the regime of Premier Fidel Castro.

Within hours after the grapevine report of U. S.-held survivors reached the base, the Castro captives from the abortive invasion—who were being interrogated in Havana on television—began talking of a particular island, Vieques.

U. S. Base Mentioned

They said they had been trained for the invasion at the U. S. Marine base at Vieques, which is just a 30-minute helicopter ride from San Juan, Puerto Rico.

While the rumor about the Vieques prisoners was seeping into Guantánamo, it was also circulating in San Juan and New York.

A Navy officer talked by radio to the naval station at San Juan, asking if newsmen wanting to check on the rumors could be admitted to Vieques.

The answer was that no one would be admitted to the base without special permission from Washington.

On the assumption that training bases are normally open to visitors, efforts were made to gain access to Vieques through the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House.

The CIA was noncommittal. A White House spokesman said it would not assist in the matter of entry.

Presumably the United States wants no one to talk to these survivors until the furor over the Cuban debacle—and the CIA's role in it—has died down.

While the Vieques operation was kept secret, the New York Times has reported the story of Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa, 27-year-old lawyer and member of the anti-Castro invasion forces.

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16 Held Captive
 Nodal said he and 16 other volunteers had been held captive at gunpoint in Guáimala by CIA agents because they refused to serve in the invasion forces under a man they described as a murderer in the regime of ousted President Fulgencio Batista. The Washington Post reported these men were arrested as mutineers.

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
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SECTION TWO

* **CUBA**
and
U.S. POLICY

By Theodore Draper

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Cuba and United States Policy

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

U.S.
~~THEODORE~~ DRAPER has spent the last 25 years as a journalist, historian and editor who has specialized in international affairs and American foreign policy, with extended excursions into the history of the American labor movement in general and the American Communist movement in particular. He has worked in and written about France, Germany, Morocco, Haiti, Guatemala, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and other countries.

The author of four books, his first, *The Six Weeks' War*—a study of the French defeat of 1940—appeared in 1944. His second, *The Battle of Germany*, published in 1946, was the official history of the 84th Infantry Division, the unit with which he served in World War II. When the project on Communism in American Life was formed by the Fund for the Republic, Draper was asked to write the history of the Communist party of the United States from its beginnings to 1945. His first volume in this series, *The Roots of American Communism*, came out in 1957; the second, *American Communism and Soviet Russia*, was issued in May of last year. He plans to start working on the third and final volume, dealing with the period 1930-45, next fall.



FOREWORD

MUCH HAS happened in Cuba and in Cuban-United States relations since the publication of Theodore Draper's first supplement, "Castro's Cuba: A Revolution Betrayed?" in *THE NEW LEADER* of March 27, 1961. The abortive invasion of April 17 has, of course, raised new problems—but old ones have also reappeared in one form or another more sharply than ever.

Draper's previous supplement was mainly devoted to the period before Fidel Castro came to power in January 1959. The present supplement deals chiefly with the period after he came to power. The two, therefore, complement each other and may be read independently or together.

Information concerning the price of reprints, which applies to both pamphlets, appears on the back cover.

Cuba and

United States Policy

By Theodore Draper

THE ILL-FATED invasion of Cuba last April was one of those rare politico-military events—a perfect failure. So many things went wrong that it was relatively easy to fix the blame on anyone or anything connected with it. So far, the organization responsible for the operation, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has come in for the largest share of criticism. But experience should warn us that the “intelligence failure” is usually the initial stage of a post-mortem. When a fiasco is really pure and complete, something deeper and more fundamental has probably been responsible. I do not think that the Cuban invasion is going to be an exception to the rule.

There were two sides to the failure, Cuban exile politics and United States policy. The first Cuban exiles to take refuge in the United States early in 1959 were the former *Batistianos*. Numbering only a few thousand, they succeeded mainly in giving Fidel Castro a propaganda point to score against the United States for harboring them. They were no serious threat to Castro's regime. They were thoroughly discredited, morally and politically. They were leaderless, since not even the most hardened and highly placed of dictator Fulgencio Batista's former henchmen dared to wish him back in power. They were, above all, utterly without support in Cuba itself.

Then came the frightened rich. Some of them were a step ahead, or behind, of Castro's newly formed Ministry for the Recovery of Illegally Acquired Property. Some simply preferred the rather less revolutionary atmosphere of Florida. Almost all had backed or belonged to parties of the Right, respectable or otherwise. Some had held their noses or had averted their eyes during the dictatorship, and a few had even contributed to Fidel's cause in the past.

The main exodus came the following year. It started in the spring, speeded up in the summer, and took on the proportions of a mass flight by the end

of 1960. Among the spring refugees were the older politicians of the pre-Batista period, such as the former Premier, Manuel Antonio de Varona, and the former Minister of Education, Aureliano Sánchez Arango; some of them were urged on by the threat of physical violence, as in the case of Sánchez Arango. The large-scale expropriations that summer induced a large portion of the business community, big and small, to go. The purge of the universities and secondary schools drove out hundreds of teachers. The Communist take-over of the trade unions added many of their formerly pro-Fidelista officials to the stream. Professionals and intellectuals fled in increasingly large numbers. And, finally, Castro's own 26th of July Movement began to send a flow of disillusioned members and sympathizers to the United States, among them the former Minister of Public Works, Manuel Ray, the former Minister of Finance, Rufo López Fresquet, and the former President of the National Bank of Cuba, Felipe Pazos.

By 1961, over 100,000 political emigres had gathered in the United States. And this number was only a fraction of those who had tried to get out but could not. If all who wanted to leave had been able to do so, the figure might easily have reached a quarter of a million, an incredible percentage for a small island with a total population of 6.5 million. The emigration was top-heavy with businessmen, professionals and intellectuals, but skilled and semi-skilled workers were conspicuous in the later stages of the outpouring. Nevertheless, the Cuban exiles were hardly representative of Cuban society as a whole.

Politically, the world of the exiles seemed like a crazy quilt. A staggering number and variety of *organizaciones, movimientos, asociaciones, comites, frentes, juntas, uniones*—and these categories do not exhaust the list—proliferated in Miami. The fragmentation, however, was less bizarre and alarming than it seemed because so many of the groups were little more than cliques of self-appointed leaders. In the profusion and confusion, three main tendencies could be distinguished—the traditional Right, Center and Left—within which there were, of course, many different forms and shades.

In general, the Right had benefitted from the old order in Cuba and was less opposed to it than disappointed that it had not lasted longer. It was passionately anti-Communist, but cast its net so far and wide that some of President Kennedy's closest advisers could be—and, indeed, were—caught in it. The Center chiefly came out of the 1944-1952 pre-Batista regimes of Ramón Grau San Martín and Carlos Prío Socarrás, with their peculiar mixture of promise and disappointment. Unlike the Right, its most responsible leaders had rejected and even conspired against Batista, but they had also rejected and in some cases had conspired against Castro as Batista's successor. The Left was mainly distinguished by its concern for social as well as political reform. It was almost entirely drawn from the former ranks of the 26th of July Movement which, in the course of 1959, had split into pro- and anti-Communist segments.

Into this turmoil and strife among the thousands of desperate and impatient Cuban exiles, a catalyst injected itself, both of its own volition and by invitation.

1. INVASION IN THE WINGS

FORMER VICE PRESIDENT Richard M. Nixon has let it be known that he advocated training Cuban guerrilla forces to overthrow Castro as early as April 1959. In that month, Castro and Nixon spent three hours together in Washington, as a result of which Nixon wrote a three-page memorandum. Evidently he called Castro not a Communist but a "captive" of the Communists, and, therefore, even more dangerous. Since only the conclusions, but not the text, of Nixon's memorandum have been "leaked," it remains to be seen what Castro could have told Nixon to have justified such drastic action. Whatever it was, it was not enough to convince the other policy-makers, and American policy continued to be cautious and indecisive.

But what would have happened if Nixon's recommendation had been accepted? In the spring of 1959, the bulk of Cuban exiles in the United States were repentant or unrepentant *Batistianos*. The internal situation in Cuba was still fluid, whatever Fidel Castro's personal position may have been. The vast majority of Cubans as yet were admittedly under his spell. The Cuban Communists had already made great headway but they had run into resistance in Castro's own movement—as we now know, within his Cabinet—the full potential of which could not yet be determined. On his return to Cuba in May, Castro found such dissension in his own ranks on the issue of Communism, and it was so openly expressed in the organ of the 26th of July Movement, *Revolución*, that he considered it necessary to make a major speech on May 8 in which he went to great pains to dissociate himself from "Communist ideas."

A Cuban guerrilla force in the spring or summer of 1959 would necessarily have been organized with the material at hand, and that material was almost exclusively composed of ex-Batista officers and soldiers. It would have been forced to invade a Cuba which was only beginning to show signs of disillusionment with Castro and which, in any case, still infinitely preferred—and perhaps always will prefer—him to Batista. And even if an invasion would have been "successful," it could only have been the first stage of a military occupation, wholly dependent on American arms, if not more, and faced with the hostility of the great majority of Cubans.

One can only marvel at this proposal of April 1959. If Fidel Castro wanted the United States to do anything, it was to ally itself with the *Batistianos* in its midst. He had defeated them when they were in power, and he had least to fear from them when he was in power. In his eagerness to overthrow Castro Nixon could think of nothing better than a military operation, and he was limited, whether he knew it or not, to the means at hand. His military "solution" was, in effect, political abdication. It was rejected, and better judgment prevailed. Yet, a residue of Nixon's thinking remained, and it always hovered in the wings as an alternative policy if the situation continued to deteriorate.

Much remains obscure and controversial about Castro's trip to the United States in the spring of 1959. Castro's propagandists have made a great deal

of the fact that he was not invited by the American government and that no American offers of aid were made to him. The truth is, as several of his closest associates were aware, that Castro had made it known he did not want an official invitation and was not interested in offers of aid. Whatever Castro may have said to Nixon, his public statements, speeches and interviews in the United States were among his most "democratic" utterances. After his departure, the Eisenhower Administration decided to send a new ambassador to Havana, Philip W. Bonsal, with instructions of a conciliatory nature. But Castro would not see him for almost three months and then brushed him off publicly as a person of no importance.

2. POINT OF NO RETURN

THE REAL POINT of no return in Cuba was passed in the fall of 1959, long before any overt American action was taken against the Castro regime. It was marked by the arrest of Hubert Matos, a school teacher by profession, who had brought the first plane-load of arms and ammunition from Costa Rica to Castro's besieged forces in the Sierra Maestra mountains in March 1957. Matos fought through the rest of the rebellion, rose to the highest rank of Major, and was entrusted after the victory with the military leadership of Camaguey province. He was, therefore, in an exceptional position to know what was going on, and he began in the spring of 1959 to question why Communists were being put into leading positions in provincial and town administrations at the expense of 26th of July members.

When an epidemic of such replacements broke out in the rebel army itself, he decided to demonstrate his opposition. After vain efforts to discuss the matter with Castro, Matos' protest took the form of a resignation, which he sent on October 19. His case was not an individual aberration. A majority of the Camaguey army leaders, the head of the 26th of July Movement in the province, and others resigned with him. The scandal of the increasing Communist take-over in Camaguey was an open one, and opposition to it in the Army and the Movement had been building up for months.

Matos was arrested at home (not "trying to escape," as one canard has it) on October 20. Castro rushed to Camaguey and cracked down on the dissenters. The repercussions of this incident might have been less explosive in Castro's own top leadership if he had not insisted on charging Matos with "treason." The charge was too much for a group within the Cabinet, which had itself been watching with increasing misgivings the curious favoritism shown to Communists. One minister, Faustino Pérez, the former head of the Havana underground, refused to sign the Cabinet resolution denouncing Matos as a traitor. Toward the end of October, six Cabinet members came together for a private discussion—President Osvaldo Dorticós, Minister of Education Armando Hart, Minister of Public Works Manuel Ray, Minister of Transportation Julio Camacho, Minister of Communications Enrique Oltuski and Faustino Pérez of the Ministry for the Recovery of Illegally Acquired Property. They agreed among themselves about the Communist danger, but one or two of them, probably Dorticós or Hart or both, reported

the tenor of the discussion to Castro. He came to the Cabinet meeting the next day determined to force a showdown and insisted that anyone without full confidence in him did not belong in the Cabinet. Pérez and Ray expressed their views firmly. Oltuski and Hart spoke up more ambiguously. Pérez had presented his resignation before the meeting and Ray did so afterward. Half-hearted efforts were made to change their minds, but they were permitted to go on November 26. At the same time, Major Ernesto "Ché" Guevara replaced Dr. Felipe Pazos as head of Cuba's National Bank.

Matos' trial was held in December. I have read about 90 published pages of the record, including all of the most important testimony by Fidel Castro, and I suspect that the Matos trial will go down in recent Cuban history as the equivalent of the "Moscow trials" of the 1930s. Not a semblance of treason, in any meaningful sense of the term, was proven, or even charged, against Matos. He was merely accused of having been worried about the Communist advance, and it was contended that his resignation could have been so contagious that the regime might have been endangered. So it might have been, and so it is, in every system which provides no means for peaceful change and in which even the most passive forms of resistance take on a significance unthinkable in anything resembling a democratic order. Matos was condemned to 20 years' imprisonment. It contrasted oddly with the 15 years—of which he had served only 20 months—to which Fidel Castro had been sentenced by the Batista dictatorship for leading a full-scale attack on an Army barracks.

The implications of Matos' punishment were boldly exploited by the Communists. Early in February 1960, Juan Marinello, president of the *Partido Socialista Popular* (PSP), the official Cuban Communist party, for the first time publicly equated anti-Communism with treason: "He who raises the flag of anti-Communism raises the flag of the traitor." In the same month, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan signed the first Soviet-Cuban agreement in Havana, amidst an official reception that betokened more than trade relations. In March, Blas Roca, the PSP's General Secretary, associated his party with the Government and orientation of Fidel Castro, and offered the Communist program "to illuminate the road toward the historically inevitable transition to Socialism."

Blas Roca's boasts provoked a reply from the popular writer and radio commentator, Luis Conte Agüero, whose personal and political ties to Castro had been extremely close, but who now voiced the fear that the Communists were "achieving their purpose, pulling us instead of marching by our side." Immediately, Conte Agüero was crushed.¹ The pro-Castro press

1. A writer in the Trotskyist paper, the *Militant*, has chided me for shedding "a few sympathetic tears" for Conte Agüero. How little this Trotskyist has learned from the history of his own movement! In the first years of the Bolshevik regime, Trotsky helped to crush the Kronstadt rebellion, the Social Democrats and opposition groups within the Bolshevik party. When his turn came, he was defenseless. The irony is that the Trotskyists can expect as short shrift in Cuba as they got in Soviet Russia, and it will be because the issue was not Conte Agüero but the way he was silenced.

Indeed, the Cuban delegation at the First Latin American Youth Congress in Havana in the summer of 1960 issued a long denunciation of the Trotskyist delegates from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Paraguay. It used the following language: "The project of the manifesto presented by the Trotskyists repeats in its observations on the Cuban revolution the same counterrevolutionary calumnies that issue daily from the imperialist arsenal by the mouthpieces of the United States State Department" (*Revolución*, August 5, 1960).

attacked him so violently that he decided to go off the air. An organized crowd of demonstrators prevented him from making a farewell appearance. Castro himself devoted a four-hour television program to ridiculing, insulting and denouncing him. Conte Agüero took the hint and sought refuge in a foreign embassy on his way out of the country.

These were episodes in what had become, for Fidel Castro, a second civil war. In the first, he had represented a democratic cause, and it had required a civil war against Batista's dictatorship. In the second, he represented a totalitarian alliance with the Communists, and it required a civil war against the democratic elements in his own movement. Castro waged the second civil war as ruthlessly as the first, striking down all those who stood in his way and leaving them only the alternatives of following him blindly or fighting back in a second underground.

3. FRD AND CIA

IN THE SPRING of 1960, the Eisenhower Administration made the decision which it had refused to make the previous spring and which led directly to the invasion attempt the following spring. For months, a strong if not the dominant wing of Cuban exiles had been seeking American support for every conceivable means of overthrowing Castro, including the arming and training of an invasion force. The exiles at this time were still predominantly representative of the Right with little desire or ability to organize a democratic underground or to wean the masses of Cubans in Cuba away from Castro. After a year of resisting this pressure, the Administration, influenced by the course of events in Cuba, agreed to help organize a force of Cuban exiles—not necessarily to use it but to have it ready. The implementation of this decision, requiring the greatest secrecy, was entrusted to the Central Intelligence Agency. It need not be imagined that the Administration had to look for Cuban exiles to carry out its plan; plenty of exiles were perfectly satisfied with it and displeased only with the delay.

The first problem was which Cubans to work with. The initial choice fell on a group known as the *Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionario* (MRR), of which the Secretary General was a former captain of the rebel army in his late 20s—Manuel Artime. In the spectrum of Cuban exile politics at that time, the MRR stood somewhat left of center. It was, however, a relatively small group incapable of uniting the mass of exiles. To overcome this weakness, a united front was fostered, and the *Frente Revolucionario Democrático* (FRD) was formed by five groups early in June 1960.² In effect, the FRD represented the Center of the exile world at a time when the Right was still unduly prominent and the Left had not yet arrived in large numbers. Since Artime was put in charge of the FRD's military activity, he remained the chief link to the CIA.

2. The five groups were: *Movimiento de Rescate Revolucionario*, headed by Manuel Antonio de Varona; *Movimiento Democrático Cristiano*, of José Ignacio Rasco; *Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionario*, of Manuel Artime; *Asociación Montecristi*, of Justo Carrillo; and the *Frente Nacional Democrático* (Triple A), of Aureliano Sánchez Arango.

But the FRD also seemed unwieldy to the CIA. It was headed by a five-man Executive Committee, each with equal power, each jealous of his own status and distrustful of the others. The CIA made known that it preferred to deal with a single president or chairman of the Committee, and this demand precipitated a crisis in the FRD. One of its strongest personalities, Aureliano Sánchez Arango, had been complaining for some time about the very thing that outraged some of the Cuban leaders in the invasion attempt six months later—the treatment of the FRD as if it were an appendage of the CIA, subject to the latter's orders and incapable of living a life of its own. "The brief history of the relations between the FRD and the organism assigned to deal with Cuban questions is the history of an incessant series of pressures and impositions," were the first words in a confidential memorandum submitted by Sánchez Arango to the FRD on September 30, 1960. His protest went unheeded, and he took his organization out of the FRD.

But the other leaders of the FRD were satisfied with the arrangement, or at least not sufficiently dissatisfied to change it. "Tony" Varona was named "coordinator" of the remaining four groups, and the FRD became more dependent than ever on the CIA. The split in the FRD presents the Cuban-American problem in essence without any of the lurid details associated with the later invasion. Too many Cuban exile politicians of the Right and Center, with the notable exception of Sánchez Arango, were content to accept the dictation of the CIA, just as the CIA was content to dictate to them.

For the amenable Cuban politicians, the arrangement was most convenient. At one stroke they solved most of their financial and organizational problems outside the stresses and strains of the Cuban community. The best of these politicians were free of any taint of the Batista dictatorship, but their own pasts identified them with regimes that by their corruption had prepared the way for Batista, and they were hardly the symbols of a new Cuba determined to get something better than Batista or his predecessors.

On the American side, the Eisenhower Administration was, at best, cautious and indecisive; at worst, it played into Castro's hands. Such an administration was attracted, in time, to a military "solution" of the Cuban problem—tightly controlled from above, with a minimum commitment to any program that might disturb the sensibilities of the Cubans or the Americans who had benefitted most from the *status quo ante*. For this purpose, the Eisenhower policy needed Cuban exiles who had not been compromised by the Batista or Castro regimes, but were not compromised by anything very different from the pre-Batista regimes either.

Yet the Eisenhower Administration was not capable of carrying out even this course consistently or successfully. The invasion force of Cuban exiles, which the CIA undertook to organize, did not reflect the political complexion of the FRD. Since the military operation was ostensibly a "non-political" one, former members of Batista's Army were readily admitted on the ground that their training and availability made them desirable. Most of them were, in fact, typical of the career officers and conscripts who had made up Batista's Army, which had been in large part the pre-Batista Army, and had not fought very hard for him. But the sadists and "criminals" among them had enabled

Castro to make the entire Army a by-word of shame and to disband it amidst a popular sigh of relief. Even on this unselective basis, moreover, the so-called invasion force did not amount to much. It numbered, I have been told, less than 1,000 until January 1961. In effect, the Eisenhower Administration dawdled along without a serious political or military policy for a revolution that was plunging from stage to stage at breakneck speed.

4. ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

WHILE THIS setup was able to withstand Sánchez Arango's walk-out, it was threatened from another direction. By the summer of 1960, a different kind of Cuban exile began to arrive in the United States. José Miró Cardona, the Cuban Premier in the first six weeks of Castro's rule, sought asylum in July, and Manuel Ray, the former Minister of Public Works, went underground in May and left Cuba the following November. Except for his past association with the Castro regime, Miró Cardona was not noted for a radical social outlook, but Ray and others were unrepentant critics of Cuba's former political and social order. They were representative of that portion of the 26th of July Movement which had taken Castro's original program of democratic social reform seriously, had believed in him, and had reluctantly come to the realization that he was heading inexorably toward a form of Communist totalitarianism. They were not willing to repudiate all that had been done in Castro's first months in power, but neither were they willing to tolerate at any price the surrender of all political and intellectual freedom. They organized the *Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo* (MRP) and their first manifesto stated: "To fight against the '*fidelismo-comunista*' faction is not to fight against the Revolution for which thousands of Cubans gave their lives, but to redeem it from those who have betrayed it."

The influx of this group for the first time made the Left a serious rival of the Right and Center in the Cuban emigration. It did not take long for the other two wings to wake up to the threat and to launch a major political offensive at the newcomers. The issues may seem theoretical, but the implications were not.

Was the revolution betrayed? For the Right and a portion of the Center the answer was emphatically, No. They took the position that Fidel Castro and his closest aides had never been anything but, or anything better than, Communists, and that his revolution had always been Communist in character. They treated the 26th of July Movement as if it had been and was a branch of or a cover for the official Communist party. They condemned anyone who had ever belonged to the Movement, and especially anyone who had occupied a post of some responsibility in Castro's government, as unfit for decent Cuban political intercourse.

I cannot pretend that I am a neutral bystander in this controversy because I have already written at some length on it. It has seemed to me that the merest acquaintance with Castro's statements and promises before he took power demonstrates that he has used his power for altogether different ends. Like many arguments, however, this one may go on forever because the op-

posing sides tend to talk about different things.—One side is really concerned with the inner intentions of Fidel Castro and his closest associates, especially his brother, Raúl, and his political mentor, Guevara. I would not rule out the possibility that Fidel always knew where he was going, and the likelihood is much greater for the other two. But from the available evidence I strongly doubt it, at least in Fidel's case, and I am mildly amused that his enemies on the farthest Right should attribute to him a political consistency and integrity that he has done little to deserve. Whatever the answer to this question may prove to be, it will at most tell us something about Fidel, not about his entire Movement.

For the 26th of July Movement was never homogenous, and the larger it grew in 1957 and 1958, the less homogeneous it became. It included those who merely wished to restore the constitution of 1940 and those who demanded "a real social revolution." It attracted those who admired and those who detested the United States. It took in fervent anti-Communists and ardent fellow-travelers. To hold this conglomeration together, Castro had progressively moderated his program and propaganda. By 1958, he had voiced little more than the traditional aspirations of the socially conscious, democratic-minded Cuban middle and working classes. He may not have been sincere, but many of those who followed him undoubtedly were.

Those who insist that Castro has led a Communist revolution from the start have never thought through the implications of their position. The overwhelming majority of Cubans of all classes were admittedly pro-Castro in January 1959. If they wittingly supported a Communist revolution and knowingly preferred a Communist regime, the anti-Communist cause in Cuba was lost at the outset. But no one, least of all Fidel Castro, has even intimated that this was the case. He took special pains in the first months of his regime to assure the Cuban people that he was not a Communist; the organ of the 26th of July Movement conducted a war of words with the organ of the official Communist party; and the anti-Communists in his Cabinet made no secret of their views. All this may have been a blind, but it was a blind made necessary by the non-Communist character of the revolution. Whatever may have been Castro's personal intent, it should not be confused with the entire anti-Batista rebellion which was much larger and broader than even the 26th of July Movement.

Nevertheless, Castro's ex-associates in exile were met with a furious campaign which accused them of something called *Fidelismo sin Fidel*. It is not clear how *Fidelismo* can exist without Fidel, since he has always been the essential charismatic ingredient that made it possible. And it is not clear what *Fidelismo* is, since it has been several different things in its relatively brief life. In its public expression, the *Fidelismo* of 1958 was only distantly related to the *Fidelismo* of 1960, and even less to the *Fidelismo* of 1961. But whatever *Fidelismo sin Fidel* may mean, it served the purpose of making the break with Castro's regime by Ray, Pazos and the rest of the MRP seem superficial and untrustworthy. If *Fidelismo* was just the same or just as bad as Communism, it made them seem just the same or just as bad as Communists, with or without faith in Fidel. And yet, paradoxically,

they had broken with Fidel precisely because they had believed him when he used to say that *Fidelismo* and Communism were intrinsically different, and because they had refused to follow him into Communism.

These controversies were not altogether theoretical. They were intimately related to a practical question of crucial importance—whether the underground in Cuba or the exiles in the United States should constitute the primary front in the struggle against Castro. For some, the underground came first, and the role of the exiles was mainly to assist and support it. For others, the exiles came first, and the underground had virtually no place in their plans. This choice between the underground and the exiles was one of the chief dividing-lines between the Left and the Right. The Left invariably stressed the underground, the Right was almost exclusively in favor of the exiles, and there were elements of the Center in both camps. Those with an underground orientation could not hope to be effective in Cuba with the same type of program and propaganda that might appeal to many exiles in the United States. The underground had to live and work among Cubans who in the great majority had once believed in Castro and who were most likely to turn against him because he had disappointed them. Many of the exiles had never had any faith in Castro to lose, and he was just as obnoxious to them before taking power as after.

Thus the war against Castro was inextricably bound up with the war among the exiles, and theoretical issues were inextricably bound up with practical implications. A debate over the "revolution betrayed" was also a dispute over the overthrow of Castro primarily by forces in Cuba or by forces in the United States. A decision to organize a relatively small, tightly controlled, professionally led invasion force was an expression both of American policy and of Cuban exile politics.

5. THE FUSION

MEANWHILE, in Cuba itself another turning point was reached. I have already suggested that a decisive step was taken in the fall of 1959 with the arrest of Hubert Matos in October, the replacement of Ray, Pérez and Pazos in November, and the cruel punishment of Matos in December. American policy played a relatively minor role in this period. The crisis came from within Castro's own 26th of July Movement and had been brewing from his first month in power. It was generated not by the United States but by the Communists, or rather by their sponsors and protectors in the Cuban government.

The next major step came in the summer of 1960. Although it was far more closely related to actions taken by the United States and has received much more publicity, it was but another stage in a continuous process rather than an impulsive, unpremeditated beginning.

The final rupture between Cuba and the United States was precipitated in June 1960 by the Cuban demand that three U.S.- and British-owned oil refineries in Cuba process two barge-loads of Soviet crude oil. The companies refused, and their refineries were quickly taken over. In July, after

hesitating for months, the Eisenhower Administration suspended the 700,000 tons that remained of Cuba's total 1960 sugar quota of about 3 million tons. Cuba retaliated with a decree expropriating all enterprises and properties wholly or partially owned by U.S. citizens or companies. Most of this expropriation was carried out in August, the rest in September.

These events cannot be understood by themselves, and the "cause" of the wholesale expropriation of American property was only superficially the oil and sugar disputes. The Cuban government had not been paying the three companies for over two years and had piled up a huge debt of \$16 million for oil imports and \$60 million for previous refining. The companies had given up hope of ever getting their money back and expected to be taken over anyway.³ Indeed, the oil companies accounted for only a small portion of the U.S. credits extended to the Castro regime, the total of which amounted to over \$200 million.

As for the sugar quota, the Cuban attitude had been stated by the clairvoyant Guevara early in March 1960: "There is some talk about lowering the Cuban sugar quota, indeed, of suspending it altogether. The sooner the better. For Cuba, it is a symbol of colonialism. We shall be better off without imperialist yokes." After that, it was a tussle between the Castro regime and the Eisenhower Administration to see which could maneuver the other into providing the best alibi and bearing the most blame for lowering or suspending the quota. I doubt that the Eisenhower Administration came off best in this contest, but I am also skeptical that more adroit tactics would have changed anything fundamentally.

Moreover, Castro's wave of expropriation did not stop with American-owned companies. On October 13, 1960, at one blow, Law No. 890 nationalized 376 all-Cuban enterprises, including 18 distilleries, 5 breweries, 4 paint factories, 61 textile factories, 16 rice mills, 11 movie theatres and 13 department stores. Some, as in the case of the well-known Bacardi company, had supported Castro against Batista. The Castro regime expropriated over 3 million acres of U.S.-owned land, but soon afterward also expropriated almost as much Cuban-owned land. The expropriation of foreign properties was clearly only a part of a much larger transformation, and the latter cannot be accounted for by the refusal of three oil companies to refine some Soviet oil or the suspension of 700,000 tons of the sugar quota, the total elimination of which none other than Guevara had demanded "the sooner the better."

Nationalization had never been in Castro's program, except for the electric and telephone companies, and by 1958 he had even changed his mind, or at least said he had, about them. In the fall of 1960, he nationalized on a scale that had appeared inconceivable that very spring. No one reading the Cuban press or speaking to anyone in the regime could have anticipated it. If this was the transition from the "bourgeois-democratic" to the "proletarian" stage of the revolution, the Cuban proletariat had little or nothing to do

3. The Cuban case was based on the Mineral Fuel Law of 1938, which required foreign-owned refineries to process Cuban crude petroleum. The companies replied that this law referred only to oil taken from Cuban soil.

with it. The Castro Movement had never considered itself socialist, and had never, therefore, advocated socialism or conducted any socialist education. Nor had the official Communists been demanding nationalization or intimating that the time had come for socialism in Cuba. The Cuban trade unions were certainly not the repositories of socialist faith. First came "socialism," and then the proletariat was told how lucky it was to have it.

Such transition as there was took place wholly in the top leadership of Castro's regime. The bellwether, as always, was Guevara. At the end of July 1960, he informed a youth congress in Havana that the Cuban revolution was "Marxist." He reiterated this thought in an article published in the official organ of the Cuban armed forces, *Verde Olivo*, in October. Then, on November 7, at a celebration in Havana of the Bolshevik Revolution, a trade union leader, José María de la Aguilera, ventured that it was time to say without fear "that we are marching inexorably towards socialism in our country." These brief and isolated statements exhaust the references to "Marxism" or "socialism" in 1960. They indicate that something was going on in the top echelons of the Castro leadership, but as usual, Fidel Castro himself waited for the right occasion before committing himself, a very different matter from the naive notion that the occasion caused him to commit himself.

The summer of 1960 also introduced a new stage in Soviet-Cuban relations. In July, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev threatened to retaliate with Soviet rockets if Cuba were attacked, a commitment which he later qualified as "really symbolic." By the end of the month, Fidel Castro announced the arrival of the first automatic rifles from Czechoslovakia. By November 8, he exulted: "We have acquired arms, much arms, much more of them than the mercenaries and the imperialists have imagined." Guevara made another long pilgrimage to the East in October-December 1960 and on his return explained, with his usual brutal candor, what had motivated the Soviet bloc to sign up for large quantities of Cuban sugar. The Soviets produced so much sugar themselves that they did not need any from Cuba, he said, but they were willing to give the Cubans advantageous terms for "political" reasons.⁴

And economic aid was not the only thing the Soviets were willing to give for "political" considerations. At a parade in Havana on January 2, 1961, the full range of arms shipments from the Soviet bloc was put on display—heavy tanks, 55 mm. and 105 mm. cannon, truck-drawn field artillery, mortars, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns and automatic weapons. On March 4 Castro declared that "Cuba can obtain mountains on mountains of Communist arms," and "Cuba now has more thousands of tons of arms than a year ago." These weapons, and the training that went with them, had obviously resulted from more "political" agreements reached many months before.

The "politics" of the trade agreements and arms shipments was internal as well as external. This aspect of the new situation can also be traced back

4. *Obra Revolucionaria*, 1961, No. 2.

to the summer of 1960. In August 1960, at the Eighth Congress of the PSP, General Secretary Blas Roca set forth the perspective of "complete union," of "fusion," of all the revolutionary forces "in a single movement." At the end of October, as the first installment of fusion, the youth divisions of the PSP and the 26th of July Movement merged to form the *Jóvenes Rebeldes* (Young Rebels). In December, at the meeting of the Communist parties in Moscow, Guevara mentioned the prospect of a "united party" in Cuba.

To help the merger along, Blas Roca and Fidel Castro said *mea culpa* to atone for their old sins against each other. The Communists had to live down their former contempt for Castro's assault on the Moncada Barracks in 1953 as a "petty-bourgeois putsch." At the Eighth Congress, Blas Roca made amends by giving Fidel credit for seeing the possibilities of, and taking the practical steps toward armed struggle to overthrow the Batista dictatorship.

Fidel had a similar problem. Once upon a time—on May 21, 1959, to be exact—he had distinguished his revolution from capitalism and Communism, the one because it "killed people with hunger," the other because it suppressed their liberties, "the liberties which are so dear to man." The human being, he had proclaimed, was being sacrificed in both the capitalist and Communist states, and Cuba intended to make its own "autochthonous" revolution, as distinctive as its music. These words, and others like them, were characteristic of his first months in power; a proud and even arrogant Castro used to insist that the Cuban revolution had its own superior ideology. For the Communists the memory rankled, and something had to be done before a "complete union" could be sanctified.

On February 1 of this year, the Italian Communist organ, *l'Unità*, published an interview with Castro of unusual significance. One of the questions asked by its correspondent in Havana, Arminio Savioli, was: "Major, what is your opinion of the *Partido Socialista Popular*, the party of the Cuban Communists?"

Castro replied: "It is the only Cuban party that has always clearly proclaimed the necessity for a radical change of structure, of social relationships. It is also true that at first the Communists distrusted me and us rebels. It was a justified distrust, an absolutely correct position, ideologically and politically. The Communists were right to be distrustful because we of the Sierra, leaders of the guerrillas, were still full of petty-bourgeois prejudices and defects, despite Marxist reading. The ideas were not clear to us, though we wanted with all our strength to destroy tyranny and privileges. Then we came together, we understood each other, and began to collaborate. The Communists have given much blood, much heroism, to the Cuban cause. Now we continue to work together, loyally and fraternally."

This new note of ideological inferiority was struck again in a carefully prepared speech by Castro on March 25. The occasion was also typical of the new era. The International Organization of Journalists, a Communist group with headquarters in Prague, recently awarded its annual prize to *Revolución*, the organ of the 26th of July Movement, or what remains of it. In celebration of the event, *Hoy*, the official Cuban Communist organ,

sponsored a banquet for more than 2,000 people in honor of *Revolución* at which the Premier was the main speaker. One passage harked back to the past in the same curiously apologetic and even guilty way.

"The Revolution was beginning," Castro recalled. "It was a process that had to go on for a long time; it had to go on step by step. It was weak in its origins; it was above all weak in the ideological sphere. The leaders of the Revolution had great support among the people, the Revolution in itself had an extraordinary amount of sympathy, for what it had cleared away, not for what it had done; but, ideologically, the Revolution was weak."

And, in a public address in Havana on March 13, in the presence of Premier Castro, the Cuban Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Faure Chomon, declared: "We and the Communists will march together." He added: "The students of tomorrow will say how the people of Cuba made itself Communist, and we will see how all the peoples of Latin America shall be Communist."⁵

There has always been but one real party in Castro's Cuba, the Communist PSP, but it was not good form until recently to show too much deference or attribute too much prominence to it publicly. All that has changed since the summer of 1960. The old-time Communist leaders, Blas Roca, Juan Marinello, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Aníbal Escalante, Lázaro Peña and the rest, all products of the school of Stalinism for a quarter of a century, formerly content to work in the background, have stepped forward to claim their due. The members of the PSP's *Buró Ejecutivo*, or Politburo, have been busy addressing a new type of audience—of Government employes.⁶ The former Communist head of the Cuban Confederation of Labor (CTC), Lázaro Peña, has again visibly emerged as the strong man of its top leadership.⁷ *Verde Olivo* was always considered the most openly Communist of the official Government organs, but now the popular magazine, *Bohemia*, is running it a close second. A feature article on Juan Marinello referred to him and Blas Roca as "pupils of the greatest university of all: the marvelous university of Marxism-Leninism."⁸

One more sign of the times in Cuba was the fate of a book. The well-known bookshop in Havana, *Librería Venecia*, had ordered copies of Boris Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* in a Spanish translation published in Buenos Aires. The books arrived, but the owner of the shop, Ricardo del Campo Gordón, received a notice that they had been seized as counter-revolutionary literature. He no longer sells books in Cuba.⁹ Until a few

5. *Bohemia* (Havana), March 19, 1961.

6. *Revolución*, March 24, 1961, for example, devoted a column and a half to a talk on economic planning by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez to the officials and employes of the National Institute of Sports, Physical Education and Recreation, at which its Director General presided. Another column and a half reported a lecture by Aníbal Escalante, Executive Secretary of the PSP, on "The Cuban Revolution, Its Character and Its Development" to employes and officials of the Ministry of Finance.

7. *Bohemia*, March 26, 1961, carried an article on the CTC, accompanied by photographs of six leaders. The picture of Lázaro Peña led all the rest. At the recent May Day parade in Havana, he marched in the first line, next to Minister of Industries Guevara, President Dorticós, Premier Castro and Blas Roca, in that order.

8. *Bohemia*, March 26, 1961. (The owner and editors of the original *Bohemia* went into exile and now publish *Bohemia Libre* in New York and Caracas.)

9. Far more interest in this incident was displayed in Mexico, where the press reported it widely, than in the United States or Europe, though an interview with Ricardo del Campo Gordón appeared in *Avance* (Miami), April 21, 1961.

months ago, observers in Havana were impressed with the open display of books like *The God That Failed* and Milovan Djilas' *The New Class*. But the purge of this "subversive" literature has almost been completed, and now the visitor is impressed by the place of honor given to the works of Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev in the bookshop of the Government-owned *Imprenta Nacional* in the lobby of the hotel *Habana Libre* (formerly the Hotel Hilton).¹⁰

Early this year, also, a major change in agricultural policy was introduced. Hitherto, the so-called cooperatives had received the most attention and publicity. They are now being swiftly overtaken by another innovation, *Granjas del Pueblo* or People's Farms, closely modeled on the Soviets' *soukhos* or state farm system. They are such deliberate imitations that, according to Premier Castro in a speech on January 21, Cuba is importing 1,000 Soviet instructors for the *granjas* and sending 1,000 Cuban farm youth to Russia to learn Soviet agricultural methods. A report on May 17 by Captain Antonio Núñez Jiménez, Executive Director of the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), revealed that the cooperatives had already taken second place to the *granjas* in area; the *granjas* now cover 6,567,426 acres or 29.16 per cent of all productive land, and the cooperatives only 2,664,000 acres or 11.83 per cent of the productive land. The cooperatives are still ahead in manpower, 122,448 to 96,498, but at the present rate of growth, the *granjas* will soon forge ahead in this respect, too. In any event, the cooperatives are so tightly controlled by INRA that they could and probably will be easily transformed into *granjas* whenever the Castro regime pleases to go all the way.

And Castro's Cuba even has its equivalent of the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939. Rumors of a deal between Castro and his arch-enemy, Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, began to spread last year. One Dominican radio station suddenly started to specialize in pro-Castro and anti-United States propaganda. Then, in a speech on January 6, the deal was confirmed by Guevara who publicly referred to Trujillo as "now our friend."¹¹ Indeed, Trujillo intends to give Castro some competition as the exemplar of Caribbean socialism. On May Day, the official Dominican Radio Caribe announced that *Trujillismo* was "the vanguard of socialism" and claimed credit for having taken that road before Cuba.

As one of this year's winners of the Lenin Peace Prize, Fidel made a speech on May 19 in which he showed how far he had travelled politically by bursting out: "Glory to our José Martí! Glory to Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin!"

One reason for these developments was suggested by Castro himself in his interview in *l'Unità*. He was asked: "What has the Socialist camp contributed to the Cuban revolution?" To which he replied: "My boy, what would have happened to us if Khrushchev had not sent us oil, if he had not bought our sugar? And if the Czechoslovaks had not sent us the arms to defend ourselves? And machines, spare parts, technicians?"¹²

10. Fritz René Allemann, "Die Revolution der Bärtigen," *De Monat*, April 1961.

11. *Obra Revolucionaria*, 1961, No. 2.

The economic agreements, the arms shipments and the piecemeal political fusion were not separate, unrelated events; they were interconnected aspects of a single, simultaneous process. Of the three, the last undoubtedly signifies the most. As long as Castro maintained even a nominal political independence in Cuba, his foreign relations might be distinguished from his internal political position. This distinction has been fading to the vanishing point. Whatever the nascent "united party" may be called, it will merely be an enlarged version of the official Communist party. It will, in effect, represent the induction of the top-ranking *Fidelistas* into the PSP. It would not be too surprising to learn, judging from Castro's obeisance to Communist ideology, that this step has already been taken.

I cannot suppress the feeling that the new self-critical Fidel is totally out of character. Whatever may be the reasons for submitting to the ideology of the party, he can hardly transfer his *mystique* to it, and it still needs him at least as much as he needs it. Yet Castro's newborn humility before the Communists is not merely a pose. He enjoyed the greatest advantage over them in the years of struggling for power, less and less after winning power. While they were still timidly advocating "clean, democratic elections" to get rid of Batista,¹³ he celebrated force and force alone. But in that period, his political program betrayed little originality; it was, if anything, less radical than that put forward by Grau San Martín in 1933. Since Castro took power without a real ideology, a real army or a real party, he could conceivably have survived without them only by making his power consistent with his promises, and thus holding his original backing together. But this is precisely what he chose not to do.

In the Communist-style state which he established in Cuba in less time than it took the Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia—80 per cent of the Cuban workers are now employees of the state—a new ideology, a new army and a new party were urgently needed. For all his old boasts that the Cuban revolution was unlike any other and needed no ideology, army or party, Castro has turned to all three for survival, and they are painfully familiar and not at all the seemingly fresh, innocent experiments that so enamoured sympathetic observers in the past.

Fidel Castro must certainly be ranked with the greatest pseudo-messiahs of the century, but no one is likely to mistake him for a creative political thinker. For a long time, he has been dependent on the superior intellect of Guevara who, unlike his nominal chieftain, never wastes words unnecessarily and should always be taken seriously. Guevara once told Mme. Simone de Beauvoir that he would "spend hours explaining a complex economic problem to Fidel," who would then successfully boil it down to half an hour on television the next day. This is the inestimable gift of the popularizer

12. The price Cuba has paid for the Soviet bloc's economic "aid" brings to mind the words recently spoken by the great Peruvian revolutionary, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, now the object of indecent abuse in the official Cuban press: "You ask me what difference is there between our getting a loan from Russia or from the United States? Imperialism in its economic form—in the movement of capital—is the same: both must be paid for. But the political consequences are different. The economic imperialism of totalitarianism brings totalitarianism with it. The economic imperialism of democracy allows us to keep democracy."

13. Declaration of the National Committee, signed by Marinello and Blas Roca, June 28, 1958.

and demagogue, not the genius of an original social revolutionary, and both Castro's strength and weakness explain his usefulness and subservience to the Communists.

There is room for argument about the reasons for the virtually complete symbiosis that has taken place between the Communists and top *Fidelistas*. It may be debated whether this is a good or bad thing. But the willful blindness still flaunted on this subject passes understanding. The assurance last September by Paul Johnson in the British weekly, *New Statesman*, that "in the future perspective of the Sixties" *Fidelismo* and Communism were "natural enemies" seemed a somewhat excessively hazardous way of insisting that there were differences between the two, and one was tempted to admire his recklessness without taking too seriously his literary extravagance. But much has happened since last September, as I have indicated, and one never expected to see such obstinate refusal to face reality turn up in the same place again. Blas Roca had thought the time had come to send forth auguries of "complete union" and "fusion." Fidel had swallowed his pride and had genuflected before the Communists' ideological superiority. Faure Chomon had put not only the people of Cuba but all the peoples of Latin America in the Communist camp. Yet, the leading editorial in the *New Statesman* of April 28, 1961, could brush aside the belief that Cuba "is already a center for Communist subversion" as a "wild over-simplification."

One wonders what would convince the *New Statesman* that Castro and the Communists have all but in name achieved the "complete union" that Blas Roca called for. And if it were convinced, would it make any difference? The implication of all this sensitivity about Fidel's dalliance with the Communists is that there might be something sinful about it. But, somehow, it never turns out that way. Whatever relations Fidel has had with the Communists, his sympathizers and apologists have had no trouble justifying or explaining them away. What the *New Statesman* will say if it changes its mind about the "wild over-simplification" remains to be seen.¹⁴

6. SIGNS OF CHANGE

IN THE SUMMER and fall of 1960, while great changes were taking place in Cuba, the United States was preoccupied with the election campaign and change of administrations. The new Administration was far from a free agent, as a result of the extreme anti-Castro position assumed by John F. Kennedy in the campaign and of the actions taken by his predecessor, especially the rupture of diplomatic relations in January 1961. Nevertheless,

14. The self-righteousness of some British publications on the Cuban question has long been one of the more amusing curiosities of the recent past. After the United States had declared an embargo on all arms to Cuba in March 1958—an action which undoubtedly hastened Batista's downfall, even if it was not basically responsible for it—Great Britain stepped into the breach as one of Batista's main arms suppliers. British planes and tanks were delivered to Batista's forces precisely during the period of the American embargo, and questions were raised about them in the House of Commons. Among the British magazines which did not bother to protest, or even to comment, on this phase, somewhat nearer home, of the struggle against Batista were *Time and Tide* and the *New Statesman*. The latter published a report on Cuba on the eve of Batista's downfall by "A Latin American Correspondent" who wrote these whimsical words: "Fidel Castro is as opportunistic as Batista."

a re-examination of United States policy *vis-à-vis* Cuba was undertaken.

On one level, changes occurred. The most notable, on the Cuban exile side, was the formation in March 1961 of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, headed by Dr. José Miró Cardona. While the former American policy had favored the centrist FRD, the new Revolutionary Council was based on both the FRD and MRP, a distinct shift to the left. The Council's Declaration of April 9, 1961, clearly reflected this political shift. "We are not, nor could we be counterrevolutionaries," it asserted. "We were revolutionists who fought against the previous regime, which had impoverished the whole country for the benefit of a minority lusting for gold and power. It is with the same convictions that we now oppose the present regime, which has betrayed our country and plunged it into chaos."

Another passage stated: "Let there be no mistake. During the immediate post-revolutionary period some ideals of the people, which were a part of the national goal, were achieved. It will be necessary to incorporate them into the provisions of the Constitution. There will be no going back to a past which we all oppose—neither Communism nor reaction."¹⁵

The second evidence of a change was the so-called White Paper on Cuba issued by the State Department. This document defined the "grave and urgent challenge" of Castro's Cuba as follows: "The challenge results from the fact that the leaders of the revolutionary regime betrayed their own revolution, delivered that revolution into the hands of powers alien to the hemisphere, and transformed it into an instrument employed with calculated effect to suppress the rekindled hopes of the Cuban people for democracy and to intervene in the internal affairs of other American Republics."

The U.S. document also interpreted the "betrayal" in the same sense as the Declaration of the Revolutionary Council: "The positive programs initiated in the first months of the Castro regime—the schools built, the medical clinics established, the new housing, the early projects of land reform, the opening up of beaches and resorts to the people, the elimination of graft in government—were impressive in their conception; no future Cuban government can expect to turn its back on such objectives. But so far as the expressed political aims of the revolution were concerned, the record of the Castro regime has been a record of the steady and consistent betrayal of Dr. Castro's pre-revolutionary promises; and the result has been to corrupt the social achievements and make them the means, not of liberation, but of bondage."

On paper, the line had clearly veered to the left. The change was taken seriously not only by the Left-wing MRP but by the Right-wing Cuban exiles who immediately stepped up their campaign against the "revolution betrayed" and *Fidelismo sin Fidel*. The organ of the extreme Right, *Diario de la Marina*, went into paroxysms of rage and vituperation not only against the *ex-Fidelistas* but against the "leftists in the State Department" and "the

15. The full text in English was published in the *New York Times*, April 9, 1961.

SOCIALISTS in Washington."¹⁶ All those groups which had been left out of, or would not come into, the Revolutionary Council, many of them on the Right, met together at the end of March 1961 and formed a *Junta Revolucionaria de Liberación Nacional*, with Aureliano Sánchez Arango as Secretary General.

The practical implications of the Declaration of the Revolutionary Council and the White Paper of the State Department were, indeed, incompatible with the Right-wing policy of a small, professionally trained, tightly controlled invasion force to "liberate" Cuba from the outside. As late as January 1961, Dr. Miró Cardona, after predicting that a "general uprising" was fast approaching, was asked: "But is that enough? Will there have to be an invasion?" To which he replied: "After the uprising, there will have to be a military decision on whether to help the people with a mass invasion or with a continuation of the infiltration by specially trained men. It is impossible at this point to decide whether a mass invasion will be necessary."¹⁷ This emphasis on the internal uprising as the primary front in the anti-Castro struggle was a fundamental tenet of the Left wing.¹⁸

But what to do with the relatively small, professionally trained, tightly controlled invasion force that had been inherited from the Eisenhower Administration? In January 1961, recruiting started once more and about 500 more men were added, for a total of less than 1,500. Again, little political differentiation was made in the selection of recruits. This very lack of discrimination, however, was indirectly responsible for influencing the political composition of the force. Many former members and even officers of the rebel army were available in the emigration. But most of them would not fight alongside former members of Batista's Army and police, and certainly would not serve under them. I have been told that the *ex-Batistianos* made up only about 15 per cent of the total but that their percentage went up sharply in the leadership. In one of the Guatemalan camps with about 300 men, it has been reported, one *ex-Batistiano* officer was enough to cause 230 to go on strike. Nevertheless, the invasion force was broadly representative of the entire exile community—from *Batistianos* to the sons of Varona and Miró Cardona, from professional military cadre to idealistic young professionals.

7. BEHIND THE INVASION

THE PREPARATION for an "invasion" of Cuba was divulged in the Guatemalan paper, *La Hora*, as early as October 30 of last year, and it was then described as "well under way." The alarm about the Guatemalan camps was first raised in the United States by a most unlikely source—the director

16. *Diario de la Marina* (Miami Beach) March 18, 1961. Also see the next three issues for more of the same.

17. *U.S. News & World Report*, January 23, 1961.

18. One figure who cannot be so easily classified is Dr. Aureliano Sánchez Arango, a long-time fighter against both Batista and Castro. He also had taken the position that the anti-Castro underground came first, and he had broken with the FRD on the issue of subservience to the CIA. But he has refused to have any dealings with anyone who had ever served under Castro, and he has strongly rejected the thesis of the "revolution betrayed." In his latest phase, he believes that distinctions of Left and Right have lost their usefulness in the present Cuban situation.

and staff of the *Hispanic American Report*, published by the Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies at Stanford University. After some hesitation, the U.S. press went after the story and succeeded in making the camps an open secret without being able to dig out some of the vital details. Some of the figures, guessed at or planted, were ludicrously inflated, and they later contributed to the public misconception of the entire operation.

But the Cuban exile leaders had been wrestling with their consciences about the relatively small force in the camps for a long time, and they knew how politically explosive it was. Before the negotiations for the Revolutionary Council could be consummated, a hitherto unpublished agreement entitled, "Confidential Bases of Unity Between the *Frente Revolucionario Democrático* and the *Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo*" (see Appendix, page 34) dated March 22, 1961, and signed by A. de Varona and M. Ray, was reached. Its second section, "Insurrectional Struggle," reads:

1. The Council which is formed as a consequence of this agreement must give maximum priority to the aid of the combatants who are already inside Cuba fighting against the Communist oppressor.

2. No person who held an objectionably responsible position with the criminal dictatorship of Batista can be admitted into any armed force which may be organized outside of Cuba. Because of the very harmful effect that any apparent utilization of these elements can have, both organizations agree that they must share the responsibilities of preventing even the use of these persons in the recruiting offices.

3. The military commands of all the revolutionary forces which may be organized outside of Cuba must be in the hands of Cubans who give full guarantee to the President of the Council and to both groups (which sign this document) with respect to their integrity and understanding, their responsibilities and functions in a democratic society, their full deference to the authority of the Revolutionary Council during the insurrectional struggle and to the Civil Government of the Republic.

4. The Revolutionary Council must immediately assume the responsibility that these criteria should fully prevail in the forces which are being organized.

This document clearly embodied a point of view which made the underground in Cuba the primary front and sought to remove any possible taint of *Batistismo* from the invasion force organized outside of Cuba. In principle, there was no reason why Castro should not be opposed by forces inside and outside Cuba, as Batista had been opposed. But the two forms of opposition could work against each other as well as with each other. Priority to the outside force could have a negative effect on the underground, which might be encouraged to wait for "liberation" from the outside. The inclusion of *Batistianos* in the invasion force would not sit as well with the Cubans in Cuba as with some of those in exile. And the political orientation

necessary for the underground struggle differed drastically from the political outlook, or lack of it, characteristic of the invasion force.

The Revolutionary Council and the White Paper represented one side of the new Kennedy Administration's policy, the invasion force the other side, and never the twain did meet. In the 12 days that elapsed between the *Bases Confidenciales* signed by Varona and Ray and the decision to send the invading force to Cuba, nothing had changed and, in so short a time, nothing could have changed. A real change of policy would have required a sharply reversed attitude toward the underground and a complete overhauling of the invasion force. But on April 4, when President Kennedy and his chief advisers apparently made the final decision on the expedition, time was the one thing that could not be reversed or overhauled. A few more months of the Soviet bloc's "mountains on mountains" of arms to Cuba made any new, long-range plan appear to be increasingly difficult and dangerous. Many of the Cuban exiles had been gripped by what may be called a "deadline fixation." They were persuaded, and bent on persuading everyone else, that if Castro were not overthrown by March or April—or June, at the latest—he could never be overthrown.

This frantic desperation that time was running out, combined with an intense conviction that there would never be a better time, may have been contagious. The notion that the "United States gathered together a few "mercenaries" for the invasion ludicrously misses the point. The Cuban exiles themselves exerted a tremendous pressure for quick action, and their only apprehension was of the lengths to which the United States might go to help them. In the training camps, a similar mood prevailed, and the option seemed to be to use the force, such as it was, or to disband it. In effect, without starting over again, the Kennedy Administration was basically limited to the policies and instrumentalities of the Eisenhower Administration.

Only one important change seems to have been made in the old plan, which apparently had provided for "air cover" by American planes while the Cubans secured a beachhead. President Kennedy decided against any direct American participation in the attack, including aerial support, and refused to change his mind after the exile pilots had lost control of the air on the second day of the invasion. The American policy seems to have been to train, finance and equip the exiles, but to require them to do their own fighting. This was not very different, in substance, from what the Soviet bloc has done on a vastly greater scale for Castro's forces.

In the end, however, the Cuban Revolutionary Council served as a fig leaf for the invasion. Maximum priority was given to the outside invasion force, not to the Cuban underground. Objectionable personnel were admitted and not weeded out of the invasion force. The Council was not in command of the situation, and its members were humiliated by those who were.

On the surface, two different lines were pursued simultaneously, one for the Revolutionary Council, another for the invasion force. The former implied that some re-examination had taken place in the Kennedy Administration; the latter amounted to an expression of modified Nixonism. The differ-

ence between these two lines is the key to what was wrong with the conception, as well as the execution, of this invasion.

The invasion force was given such absolute priority that the anti-Castro forces inside Cuba were virtually ignored. The inversion of the two was a crucial factor. By putting the invasion first, the Intelligence Agency could only guess at how far the popular rebellion against Castro had gone or what it was capable of doing. It was apparent, even from the speeches that Castro and Guevara had been making, that the Castro regime had been slipping in popular support for months, especially in the middle and working classes. But the opposition knew that it had made the least headway among the peasantry, the teenagers (all of whom carried weapons), a portion of those whose existence was wholly dependent on the all-embracing state machine, an indeterminate propaganda-drenched group in all classes and, of course, the committed Communists and hero-worshipping *Fidelistas*. The process of disenchantment could not be forced artificially and, in the nature of a repressive state, even those closest to Fidel had appeared to be loyal to him before their defection. A policy which called for an outside invasion first and an internal rebellion afterward could never be sure of any rebellion.

Not only did the invasion come as a surprise but it discouraged the anti-Castro forces inside from doing anything until its nature and extent had become clear, and by then it was too late. No one would risk his life for an invasion that could not succeed because it was too small, or for an invasion that could succeed by itself because it had the full backing of the United States—and the latter was the first impression. Thus the invasion plan made the first stage of the battle a purely military one on a very limited terrain—a beachhead. It enabled Castro to concentrate overwhelming forces at a single point for a knockout blow.

The other course would have been to put the rebellion first and to hold an invasion in reserve to support an already existing popular movement, as Miró Cardona had explained in January 1961 and as the *Bases Confidenciales* had implied in March. But the leaders of the Revolutionary Council were not strong or self-confident enough to insist in practice on what they had agreed in principle. Some went along with the invasion because they had for many months given it their blessings, and others because they did not wish to open themselves to the charge that they had stood in the way of a possible victory. The two operations—the political, exemplified by the Revolutionary Council, and the military, represented by the invasion force—were kept so far apart that at least one portion of the Council knew little about the details of the invasion.

The situation in Cuba had been building up to some kind of popular explosion, but it could not be synchronized with the "deadline fixation," both Cuban and American. There was, of course, no guarantee that there would ever be a large-scale popular rebellion against Castro; the existing policy, however, had for many months not even encouraged one, politically or practically; and there were no guarantees about anything else. As long as the United States did not wish to be dragged into full-scale intervention, the priority for the anti-Castro forces in Cuba was a matter of necessity, not

of choice. The Eisenhower Administration had not given the underground priority, and the Kennedy Administration ruled out full-scale intervention.

Yet, short of the Castro regime's collapse at the first blow from the outside, the invasion required a spontaneous outburst of popular support or an ever-increasing measure of American support. An invasion force which succeeded in overthrowing Castro without a demonstrative show of popular support could only have ruled Cuba in a state of perpetual civil war or as a thinly disguised American occupation. At best it would have postponed another outbreak of *Fidelismo* for a few months or years. At worst, it could have made Cuba into another Algeria. The alternative policy was formulated in the *Bases Confidenciales*, but never really put into practice. It is late, but not too late.

8. THE MORNING AFTER

FAILURE, as well as success, can bring out fundamental attitudes and values not altogether clear in the course of the struggle, and the failure of Cochin Bay has brought them out in many quarters more sharply than ever before.

President Kennedy's first reaction expressed a determination not to accept the defeat as final and an intention to rethink the whole problem posed by Cuba. Perhaps the most significant feature of his speech on April 20 was the suggestion that the parts played by arms and politics in such a crisis urgently needed re-examination. If he seriously follows up his remark that "too long we have fixed our eyes on traditional military needs," more may have been gained from the Cuban defeat than lost.

The Republicans have been somewhat inhibited from making political capital of the Cuban setback, despite the President's willingness to assume full responsibility for it, because of its peculiarly bipartisan ancestry. If the Cuban venture had proved a success, the Republicans might not have been able to resist pointing out that the Democrats had merely carried out what they had prepared for them, as Nixon did not fail to point out in the case of the first American astronaut.

Eisenhower's sense of fair play and national interest made him a model of discretion in this difficult moment, but Nixon could not altogether resist temptation. The former Vice President hinted broadly that "more power" should have been committed in Cuba to compensate for the mistaken intelligence estimates. This divergence may reflect more of a difference between Eisenhower and Nixon than between Kennedy and Eisenhower. It has been credibly reported that Nixon once argued in favor of landing American forces in Cuba if the exiles could not make it on their own, and that Eisenhower vetoed the proposal.

Among the Cuban exiles, the defeat has had the effect of intensifying all those divisions which existed before. The Right and Center have been overcome by pessimism bordering on despair, and publicly or privately express their belief in direct U.S. intervention as the only salvation. On the other hand, the anti-Castro Left which had never believed in the precedence given

to an armed invasion under U.S. auspices has been confirmed in its view and holds it more strongly than ever. Because of this post-invasion schism, the Cuban Revolutionary Council has fallen apart.

The invasion also provided Fidel Castro with the occasion for officially confirming the "socialist" character of the Cuban revolution. He actually did so for the first time on April 16, the day before the invasion, in a rather casual, mocking reference to the "imperialists": "That is what they cannot forgive—that we should be here under their nose and that we have effected a socialist revolution under the very nose of the United States."

In his speech on May 1, however, he made the pronouncement somewhat more formally: "Our deeds have signaled to the world the birth of a patriotic democratic and socialist revolution." What he meant by "socialist" he made sufficiently clear by hailing support from "the powerful socialist world, headed by the great Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China." Since May 1, the "socialist revolution" in Cuba has become *de rigueur* for all means of communication in Cuba.

Ché Guevara once invented the theory, since repeated by innumerable epigoni, that the United States was responsible for Castro's actions or "responses," and presumably the latest coincidence between the frustrated invasion and Cuban "socialism" fits this pattern perfectly. A French writer, Claude Julien, has written a book in behalf of the view that the United States forced Castro to betray his own revolution to the Communists and Soviet Russia.¹⁹

It is not necessary to exculpate the United States of all blame or even a large share of the blame for the recent history of Cuba to feel, as I do, that this thesis is mistaken, profoundly mistaken. Fidel Castro and his inner circle have never been innocent victims of circumstances; they have always been the engine of this revolution in perpetual motion; they have leaped at one pretext or another to do what they wanted to do; they have incessantly increased their power by taking the initiative against their enemies and relentlessly pressing the advantage. A revolutionary leader does not betray the fundamental character of his revolution because American oil companies refuse to refine Soviet oil or because the United States suspends a sugar quota that has been attacked as "a symbol of colonialism." If he is really committed to a new social order different from capitalism and Communism, he does not resist the one by capitulating to the other with the speed of a push-button operation.

By waiting for the opportune occasion, every aggressive action can be made to appear in a defensive light, but history teaches us to look into the more obscure past for the deeper causes and motivations of such immediate and far-reaching "responses." In this case, as I have suggested, the decisive moves were made behind the scenes in 1959, and only their consequences were put on public display in 1960 and 1961.

No, Castro and his group have not merely been reacting to American moves, as if they were American puppets *manqués*, as if the United States

¹⁹. *La Révolution Cubaine*, Julliard, 1961.

always pulled the strings which forced them to do what they did not want to do or go where they did not want to go. This interpretation of the Castro revolution does not even do justice to its leader; it deprives him of any real control over his own revolution. There may be more than one way to explain why Castro betrayed the democratic revolution, and one of them is to blame the United States, but the betrayal is still no less a betrayal. I believe that the truth must be sought elsewhere, in the inner life and dynamism of *Fidelismo*.

9. THE DAY OF RECKONING

ONLY THE ingenuous can still believe that Fidel Castro walked into a Communist trap or that he gave up the democratic road because the United States did not give him enough support in his early months in power. The Communists and Fidel walked toward each other, each with his eyes open, each filling a need in the other. The "trap theory" attributes a gullibility to Fidel which is again hardly fair to him. Official American offers might have embarrassed him a little more than the policy which respected his clearly understood preference for private rather than government forms of aid, but I fear that they would have accomplished little else. The \$16 million credit which the oil companies extended to Castro's Cuba did not save them from expropriation, and five or ten times that amount would not have bought them an indulgence. External circumstances influenced the Castro regime's methods and timing, but they did not determine its nature and direction.

The ordinary Western mind can only with the greatest difficulty comprehend the dynamism of this revolution. It was not made by a revolutionary party which had struggled for years to formulate an ideology and create an organization. It derives from 12 men who made their way to the Sierra Maestra mountains in December 1956—less than five years ago!—and increased in number to only 300 in May 1958—little more than three years ago! Their victory over Batista's bloated Army and police was somewhat incredible, almost miraculous, and for them the miracles have not ceased.

It does not seem more far-fetched that Cuba should set off a Latin American revolution than that the tiny group in the Sierra Maestra should have set off a Cuban revolution. To this must be added the conviction that the Cuban revolution cannot be finally victorious without a Latin American revolution, and that a Latin American revolution cannot be finally victorious without a revolution in the United States—an eventuality to which Fidel has of late made frequent allusions, only half in jest.

All this may be due to dizziness from success or illusions of grandeur, but the spirit of *Fidelismo* cannot be fathomed without taking it into account. The ideological and organizational vacuum of *Fidelismo* has been filled by Communism, which, in turn, has been given a new confidence and impetus by *Fidelismo*. As a result of this interpenetration, Cuba has begun to resemble every other Communist state in its essential political, economic and ideological conformation; the "humanistic" improvisations of Castro's first year in power may soon seem just as far away as the Soviet's New

Economic Policy of the 1920s seemed from Stalin's forced collectivization in the 1930s.

Whether the United States was wise to have suspended the sugar quota when it did is less important, in the long run, than that the suspension was the answer to a *Fidelista* prayer. The technique used to bring about the break of diplomatic relations—a 48-hour demand for a drastic reduction of U.S. Embassy personnel—was similar. The dictate faced the United States with the choice of bowing to an ultimatum or going a step further and getting the inevitable over with quickly. Short of utter capitulation, I cannot conceive of any U.S. policy that would have satisfied the souls of Fidel, Raúl and "El Ché."

For those who desire, condone or ignore the Communist conquest of Cuba, the recent invasion presents no difficult problem. They can gloat over the failure or enjoy an orgy of *Schadenfreude*. Some can do so, however, only by deceiving themselves about the reality of Communist influence in Cuba. But the day of reckoning must come. At the present rate of *Fidelista*-Communist fusion, they will soon have to recognize that reality or risk making laughingstocks of themselves. And if they do not go along to the bitter end, they too will know what it means to be "betrayed" by Fidel Castro; he may even ridicule them on television if they should make nuisances of themselves complaining of their disillusionment.

"Non-intervention" also presents them with no great problem. As long as the only intervention is by definition United States, everything becomes absurdly simple. But the Cuban revolution has never been that simple. It has never been contained within the borders of Cuba. In 1955, Castro used Mexico as the training ground for his invasion force. He set up an organization in the United States to collect funds and recruit volunteers. In March 1957, President José Figueres of Costa Rica sent the first arms to Castro's forces in the Sierra Maestra. To overthrow Batista, Castro accepted aid wherever he could get it. If the same stringent rules were applied to him as some are trying to apply to his present enemies, Batista might still be in power.

Since 1959, Castro has been intervening flagrantly throughout Latin America. In November 1960, young anti-Castro Cubans broke into the Cuban Embassy in Lima, Peru, and forced the Chargé d'Affaires to give them a file of documents marked "Strictly Confidential." Photostats of these documents have been published, and the then Secretary of the Embassy Andrés Quintín Noas, now in exile, has confirmed their authenticity. One letter, dated October 4, 1960, from Ambassador Luis Ricardo Alonso to Raúl Castro, reported the payment of \$15,000 (427,500 Peruvian soles) to eight professors, 16 newspapers and magazines, 15 labor unions and 10 political organizations, and another \$15,000 to the Communist party in 13 Peruvian cities and towns. All the names and amounts were carefully recorded. As a result of this evidence, Peru broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Intervention can take many forms—from the Castro regime's vicious war of nerves against the admirable Administration of Governor Luis Muñoz Marín in Puerto Rico to the Soviet bloc's huge investment of arms and

manipulation of a servile Cuban Communist party. Much of what passes for "non-intervention" in the Cuban civil war is, in practice, an acceptance of unilateral Soviet intervention.

For those who do not desire or cannot ignore the Communist conquest of Cuba, the present situation poses difficult and complex problems. The invasion was indefensible in conception as well as execution, but much of the criticism has been transmuted into support or apologetics for Castro's regime. In the end, the most unfortunate result of the fiasco may be that the guilt arising out of it has sought an outlet in tolerance for and subtle identification with an onrushing totalitarianism. I have never heard an argument in favor of the Cuban dictatorship—from the uselessness of elections to the mistreatment of the Cuban peasants who constituted about one-third of the nation—which could not be applied with slight modifications to virtually every other country. Some of the criticisms of the invasion require at least as much criticism as the invasion itself.²⁰

I cannot separate the politics of arms from the arms of politics. The politics of the arms that went into the invasion of Cochinos Bay made the failure a costly defeat and would have made the success a Pyrrhic victory. But to say this and no more is to doom in advance the prospect of any future anti-Castro opposition, even the most democratic. These arms were used badly, but any politics in Cuba today demands arms. Castro cannot be overthrown except by force, just as there was no other way to overthrow Batista. When Castro sentenced Matos to 20 years' imprisonment, he served notice on all opposition to go underground and fight force with force or submit without a struggle. As long as there are men and women in Cuba who believe in civil liberties, representative government, land reform instead of Soviet-style state farms, freedom of expression, association with the democratic West, and free trade unions, there will be an underground and, despite the present setback, it will revive and grow. If no one else will provide the necessary conditions for its growth, Castro and the Communists will do so.

But no anti-Castro movement can resist Russian tanks and Czechoslovak machine guns with sympathy alone. It would be more humane and more honest to advise any movement not to resist than to resist with bare hands. Castro's democratic opponents have the right and the duty to obtain arms where they can, as Castro did and as other revolutionary movements have done. The United States can help, but a democratic Cuban opposition worthy of the name will accept arms or other assistance only on its own terms. Whatever the United States or any other power does or does not do must influence the situation in Cuba; the United States could remove its influence

20. This is particularly true of the "Open Letter to President Kennedy" drafted by a few members of the Harvard faculty and signed by 70 intellectuals in the Boston area, as published in the *New York Times*, May 10, 1961. If it were merely an anti-invasion appeal, I would have no quarrel with it. But it goes much farther afield and betrays such curious squeamishness in its references to the character of the Castro regime, such superficiality in its explanation of the "sharp increase in the power of the local Communist party" and such gullibility in its recommendations for detaching the Castro regime from the Communist bloc, that one wonders whether many of its distinguished signatories ever devoted much time or energy to a study of recent Cuban history.

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APPENDIX

CONFIDENTIAL BASES OF UNITY BETWEEN THE 'FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO' AND THE 'MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO'*

I. FUNDAMENTAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

1. The person designated to preside over the Revolutionary Council will select freely the members of the Council indispensable for the tasks in exile; the others will be selected in Cuba, inasmuch as the Revolutionary Council should be formed by persons in exile but also, in its majority, by persons fighting in Cuba when the [present] regime falls and who, for reasons of security, cannot be designated now.

2. Once the Communist tyranny collapses, the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Government will be formed by members with portfolio to carry out the exclusive function of government and by six to ten members without portfolio who, jointly with the members with portfolio, will exercise the legislative function.

3. These members without portfolio will be designated by the President of the Revolutionary Council who will select them from lists of three names submitted by each revolutionary group.

4. This Revolutionary Council will assume the functions of the Provisional Government when it moves to Cuba.

II. INSURRECTIONAL STRUGGLE

1. The Council which is formed as a consequence of this agreement must give maximum priority to the aid of the combatants who are already inside Cuba fighting against the Communist oppressor.

2. No person who held an objectionably responsible position with the criminal dictatorship of Batista can be admitted into any armed force which may be organized outside of Cuba. Because of the very harmful effect that any apparent utilization of these elements can have, both organizations agree that they must share the responsibilities of preventing even the use of these persons in the recruiting offices.

3. The military commands of all the revolutionary forces which may be organized outside of Cuba must be in the hands of Cubans who give full guarantee to the President of the Council and to both groups (which sign this document) with respect to their integrity and understanding, their responsibilities and functions in a democratic society, their full deference to the Authority of the Revolutionary Council during the insurrectional struggle and to the Civil Government of the Republic.

4. The Revolutionary Council must immediately assume the responsibility that these criteria should fully prevail in the forces which are being organized.

III. AGRARIAN REFORM

Both groups declare that they will take steps to reach an agreement within the next two weeks on the effective form of prohibiting *latifundia*, as a consequence of which a fundamental criterion would be established to avoid harmful conflicts at the initiation of the Provisional Government.

New York, March 22, 1961

For the FRD
A. DE VARONA

For the MRP
M. RAY

*Unofficial translation.

only by disappearing. Some forms of "non-intervention" are nothing more than acquiescence in someone else's intervention; and some forms of "intervention" are so wrong and futile that they amount in their practical effect to non-intervention.

In and through Cuba, I fear, we are reliving many of the problems that plagued us in the era of Hitler and Stalin. Hitler never permitted us to forget the crimes of the Versailles Treaty, the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic and the millions of unemployed. The Bolsheviks never permitted us to forget the dark Tsarist past. The *Líder Máximo* never permits us to forget the evils of imperialism, the misdeeds of previous democratic governments and the poverty of the Cuban peasants. But the avenger of Versailles, the grave digger of Weimar and the savior of the unemployed was also a demonic nihilist who inflicted such degradation on his own people and infamies on other peoples that they cannot even now be uttered without sickening us. The absolute power of one party degenerated into the absolute power of one man, and that man degenerated into a psychopathic executioner of millions, among them his own comrades. The totalitarian disease in Germany and Russia did not strike in all its virulence at once; it crept up on its victims in stages; it came sugar-coated as national liberation and economic development. In the end, however, one thing mattered more than all else—the capacity for evil of these all-embracing, insatiable, suffocating tyrannies grew with their accretion of power. Each generation, it seems, must learn the lesson in its own way. Unfortunately, this lesson is always an expensive one.



Two Guerrillas 'Chute Into Cuba

By DOM-BONAFEDE
Herald Staff Writer

Two anti-revolutionary medium bombers, defying Fidel Castro's military power, flew into the heart of Cuba to drop propaganda leaflets and parachute two operators with short wave radio equipment.

The unmarked Billy Mitchell B25s, similar to those which bombed Tokyo early in World War II, encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire over the city of Cienfuegos but completed the mission without being pursued by Cuban air force planes.

The flight took place Sunday night.

Called "Operation Fantasma," it was believed to be part of a campaign to step up guerrilla operations inside Cuba.

Cuban exile sources, including those who participated in the daring raid, reported that more than 250,000 "call-to-arms" pamphlets were dropped in the Cienfuegos region.

The two radio operators successfully parachuted along the slopes of the Escambray Mountains, considered the main stronghold of the anti-Castro movement.

It was learned they will be used to send out military information on a secret frequency to Cuban exiles.

Anti-Castro leaders here declined to say where Sunday's flight originated other than to report that the two planes

took off "somewhere in the Caribbean."

The planes' return base also was kept secret.

Since before the abortive April 17 invasion of Cuba, U.S. Border Patrol agents have been maintaining a vigil at South Florida's numerous small airstrips.

The B25 is considered a model aircraft for such operations since it does not need a long runway and is ideal for flying at treetop level.

Financial backing of the latest air action against Castro is believed to have come from a former Cuban diplomat who defected from the revolutionary government.

The mission was the second flown to Cuba in the past three months. Last Oct. 21, two anti-Castro planes scattered leaflets over the city of Camaguey in Central Cuba.

The plane, which was said to have dropped as low as 4,000 feet, was described as an Il-yushin 14.

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
Date 12/19/61

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Adlai Tells U. N. 'for 11th Time' U. S. Plans No Invasion of Cuba

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., March 16 (UPI)—Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson today denied, "for the 11th time," charges by the Soviet Union "and its new satellite, Cuba," that the United States has plans for a new invasion of Premier Fidel Castro's island country.

"We shall not compete with the technique of the big lie," he told the United Nations Security Council.

The 11-nation Council adjourned until Tuesday without taking action on Cuba's

demand for an International Court review of the legality of the Organization of American States' expulsion of the Castro regime.

The Council was expected to refuse the demand. This expectation was supported today by Chile, one of the objectors to the Punta del Este conference decision of the AOS to expel Cuba. Chilean delegate Humberto Diaz-Casaneuva said that despite its dissent, his government considered itself bound by the majority AOS vote.

Stevenson upbraided Soviet Ambassador Platon D. Morozov for his criticism that the United States had not answered, in the Council debate, Cuban-Communist charges that a new invasion was being planned.

"Mr. Morozov has abused me for not talking about the invasion of Cuba, which he says the United States is preparing," Stevenson said. "Evidently he has not read the Cuban letter which is the subject before us on our agenda and which makes no reference to U. S. plans for invasion of Cuba. This seems to me surprising because I thought the Soviet delegate was familiar with the Cuban letter. Indeed, I thought he wrote it. . . ."

"I want to comfort him by reassuring him once again—I think for the 11th time—that the United States is not planning any armed attack on Cuba. . . ."

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Anti-Castro raids continue

Cuban Exiles Have Learned to Hate CIA

By ROBERT K. BROWN

ANTI-CASTRO military activity in the Caribbean and Miami area has reached an all-time low. Even an occasional mention of large training camps and/or impending anti-Castro operations are now hard to find in once rumor-ridden Miami.

Present counter-revolutionary operations are limited to a few surreptitious runs conducted by small groups operating independently of the Central Intelligence Agency, which provides food, medicine, agents and a handful of weapons for their contacts in Cuba. Three or four organizations give classes on demolition and other military subjects in their offices or maintain scraggly training camps where their men exist on rice, beans, hope and the pleasure of cursing the CIA. Since the abortive invasion of Cuba which CIA sponsored in April, 1961, that agency has become almost as unpopular as Fidel Castro with large numbers of Cubans.

CIA - sponsored operations against Castro started slackening off in January of this year before the foreign ministers' meeting at Punta del Este. Failure to initiate operations after Punta del Este was explained by pointing out that nothing should be done which might substantiate Castro's charge of renewed United States aggression before the United Nations.

After that "crisis" passed, the Cubans were pacified with the story that it would take time for new CIA boss John McCone to orient himself.

Then it was said that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was taking over the operational missions of the Central Intelligence Agency.

If the Cubans have been unimpressed by these explanations, they have been even more unimpressed with the CIA itself—its operating techniques, personnel, accomplishments, reliability and its relations with the Cuban exile movement in general.

THE exiles say CIA maintains tight control over the majority of anti-Castro organizations by its dispensation of funds, guns and its system of informants which do not spy on Castro but on the counter-revolutionaries.

Money, the lifeblood of any revolutionary movement, has been in short supply. During the successful 1959 revolt against dictator Fulgencio Batista, Cuban revolutionaries obtained most of their funds

from inside Cuba—from the middle and upper classes. This has not been possible for the last year and a half. Furthermore, funds that were brought out of Cuba and made available for revolutionary activity have been expended and cannot be replaced. Thus, if no personal funds are available

to buy supplies, the exiles look to the CIA for weapons, medicine, foods, ships and all the other materials necessary to keep a revolution going. Cuban exiles who are not corrupt, who are daily risking their lives for freedom, say they have been unable to raise any sizable amounts of money from American citizens or industry.

These exiles say that the CIA pays a monthly lump sum—some estimate it at between \$100,000 and \$200,000—to the "Consejo" which is lead by Dr. Miro Cardona, former Premier of Cuba under Castro. Cardona then parcels the money out to the various organizations that make up the "Consejo," they report.

One group which recently broke with the Consejo reportedly received a monthly lump sum of \$2,070. This was supposed to pay the rent, salaries of the department heads of the organization and office supplies.

Several Americans, who helped set up a training camp in the Everglades, reported that as soon as it became known that a training camp was in operation and young

The DENVER POST
Denver, Colo.

June 3, 1962

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Cubans were clamoring to sign up, the CIA contacted the exile organization sponsoring the camp through Cardona and promised to contribute a sizable sum of money to the organization if it would take its men out of the field for just a couple of weeks. The men returned to Miami, the organization got the CIA money and the training camp wasn't reopened, these Americans say.

AND one doesn't have to look far in Cuban exile circles to hear numerous complaints of CIA ineptness in regards to operations.

Here is an account of one such complaint:

Sometime ago, a Cuban millionaire bought a small World War II surplus warship (which we'll call the "Florida") and installed the most advanced navigational equipment and engines available. After the boat was equipped to the tune of better than \$50,000, the CIA moved in and offered to take care of operational expenses—salary for the 20-man crew, repairs, ammunition, fuel, etc., as long as they were allowed to control the ship.

The millionaire, who by this time was no longer a millionaire had no alternative but to agree.

Friction developed between the ship's Cuban crew which was captained by an American and the CIA representatives in Key West after several missions failed due to faulty or incomplete CIA intelligence reports. The CIA then attempted to force replacement of the critical, outspoken but extremely able American captain who didn't hesitate to tell the "spooks" (nickname for CIA agents) what he thought of their operations.

Eventually, the CIA was able to take over the "Florida" due to its control of the purse strings and the original crew and captain were replaced by a crew commanded

by Roberto Bombino who had recently defected from the command of the Cuban frigate "Marti." This same frigate and its commander, Bombino, had chased and attempted to sink the "Florida" three months earlier according to one of the former crew members.

The American captain, who we'll call "Johnny," told me he was offered a year's pay and a trip around the world, or a job as port engineer of Key West if he would withdraw from the "Florida" quietly. With the rest of his crew listening, "Johnny" told me how the new, more pliable crew had promptly run the "Florida" aground while testing her.

"Since we were the only ones that could run her," Johnny laughed, "the CIA reluctantly gave the "Florida" back to us. After making extensive repairs, we left on a mission to Cuba. A few miles out of Key West, the automatic pilot broke and we had to return to base. On our way back, we decided to test the small outboard motors that we use to power the small boats that ferry men and guns from the ship to shore. They didn't work. After stripping all 4 motors, we discovered water had seeped into the cylinders."

"Johnny" went on to charge that these motors which were supposed to be new had been

used by CIA agents for water skiing.

THIS incident and the resentment it engendered caused the CIA to take over the "Florida" once again. And once again the new crew rendered the ship inoperative by burning out both engines and a generator. One member of the "Florida's" original crew has been negotiating with the CIA to repair the "Florida." With the money earned from such a repair job, the "Florida's" crew hope to buy a smaller ship with which they can conduct their own operations — without CIA "guidance."

CIA personnel, according to the "Florida's" original crew, are "stupid, inexperienced and have not guts." They charge that the head man of the CIA in Key West—code name of "Max"—is an ex-Agriculture Department official who knows nothing about marine operations, and that "Gordon," who is head of marine operations in the Miami area never commanded anything larger than a 50-ft. yacht.

Another Cuban from a different organization told of a CIA "safe house" which was located on a vegetable farm outside of Miami. It soon became obvious, he said, to the surrounding neighbors that growing vegetables was not the primary purpose of the farm's new owners when these "vegetable farmers" raised a big fuss about crop dusting planes flying over their acreage.

When one of the trainees asked his instructor why his M-3 submachine gun only fired single shots, the instructor replied, "Federal law prohibits firing automatic weapons in the U.S." Nonetheless, The Cuban said, the

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CIA expected these same Cubans to risk their lives with weapons with which they were not completely familiar.

Members of yet another organization bitterly claim they were given cases of Thompson submachine guns for shipment to underground forces in Cuba. When at sea they attempted to test-fire the weapons only to find that the ammunition provided was of a different caliber and therefore completely useless. On another occasion they were given .57 mm. recoilless rifles and .75 mm ammunition.

"Jose," a well-known Cuban athlete who worked for an American company in Cuba, told how he stole a boat with several friends and escaped to the U.S. in August, 1961.

After arriving in the U.S., he said, he was promised by the CIA that he would be sent to a camp for specialized training in the near future. He commented sarcastically, "I'd like to know what they mean by near future, as I'm still waiting."

"Jose" related how he and several of his co-workers had placed large amounts of C-4—a high explosive—in vital points throughout the plant in which he worked. When, he said, they gleefully informed their American manager the plant was ready to blow up the manager frantically objected, "Don't do that. We'll be back and we don't want that plant destroyed."

THERE are confirmed reports that Cuban lackeys of the CIA also have dealt poorly with their more courageous countrymen. In December, 1960, Miro Cardone, nominal head of the CIA-financed "Consejo," invited young Cubans to join the American armed forces. Several Cubans I talked with claimed they had been promised faithfully that they would be sent directly to special training camps at which they would be taught the special skills they would need to fight the Cuban Communists.

One young chap told me that "Miro himself promised that if I enlisted I would get the training I wanted and needed. So I enlisted in the Air Force. I was sent to Lackland Air Force Base where for six weeks I did little more than polish boots, pick up cigarette butts and clean latrines. I went to my commanding officer and asked when I could expect the special training I was promised. He said he knew nothing of any such "special training." I wrote to the chief of the Air Force and was discharged shortly thereafter."

When I asked him why he thought such promises were made, he answered, "I think they want to keep us from getting in the company's hair. Cubans call the CIA the "company" as the Spanish abbreviation for company is Cia."

Last month, it is known that the heads of three anti-Castro organizations (no longer supported by the CIA) flew to Washington to confer with several congressmen. They reported they were told, "to wait, wait, it's the best way to save lives." "Meanwhile, Castro gets more and more arms and kills more of our friends," one leader commented.

IN SPITE of the CIA, Cuban freedom-fighters continue to peck away at Fidel's police state. They say they feel that such efforts are not in vain. They point out that they now bribe fishermen and Castro's militia with ice, food and medicine so they can carry out their missions.

American volunteers, in no way connected with the CIA or any other governmental agency, who advise and train the Cubans maintain that a multitude of small scale raids carried out by killer-raider teams could possibly increase the strain on Castro's now straining economy to the breaking point.

According to these volunteers short hit and run missions would keep the Communists off balance, destroy morale and force them to tighten up their control even further. The number of personnel involved in such activities would be small and consequently the likelihood of the security of such missions being compromised would be slight.

One American adviser related how he and several Cubans had stayed on a key near Cuba for several days while awaiting to make a contact on the mainland. They didn't make their contacts nor did they get involved in any firefights with Castro militia. However, he said, word got out of their presence and Castro had 5,000 militia combing the area for two weeks—after the counter-revolutionaries had left. By his account it cost the American and his counter-revolutionary friends \$50 for

their trip. He estimated it cost Castro's already strained budget tens of thousands of pesos as well as consumption of precious gasoline and wear on vehicles used to transport the militia to and fro.

"You don't have to spend millions of dollars to hurt Castro," the American adviser continued. "Multiply what we did a hundred times over and he would really be hurting."

Guerrillas operating in the Escambray and resistance leaders from the cities continue to trickle into Miami with reports that men are available to fight but they can't do it with their bare hands. After assessing the do-nothing situation in Miami, they compare the Kennedy Administration's policy of hoping that Fidel will wither on the vine to the little boy that was thrown from a horse the first time he tried to ride him and decided not to try again till the horse died.

The result of such bungling, other than giving the CIA a worse name than it had after the Bay of Pigs failure, may produce some side effects that were not counted on. Several persons said it is likely that if and when Castro falls, the leadership replacing him will not be those individuals sponsored by the CIA; such leadership may come from elements which have had to work against the CIA as well as Fidel, in which case they may not turn Cuba into as pro-American a bastion as we would desire.

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UM, Zenith Firm 'Know Nothing' Of 'Link' to CIA

By **DON BOHNING**
Herald Staff Writer

If the Central Intelligence Agency is operating under the guise of an electronics research firm on the University of Miami South Campus, school officials said Monday they are unaware of it.

An article appearing in the current issue of Look Magazine, claims the Zenith Technical Enterprises on the UM South Campus is a "cover" for the CIA.

"As far as we're concerned," said University Vice President and Treasurer Gene Cohen, "the university is leasing space to an organization we consider a good tenant which pays its rent promptly.

"There's nothing to indicate they have any connection with the CIA."

Zenith Manager H. Robert Graham also denied any dealings with the CIA.

"We have an electronics research job that we do here that is highly classified and we work with the Department of Defense," Graham said. "We know absolutely nothing about the CIA."


Graham said Zenith had opened its office on the South Campus in September 1961.

The firm, he said, is a sub-contractor for a Defense Department prime contractor.

Cohen, who handled the lease arrangements for the university, said there is nothing unusual about it. "We have leased space to quite a few different enterprises where we appeared to have space available for what they wanted."

number. There was no answer Monday.

Gibraltar Steamship moved to Miami from New York in September 1961 to operate Radio Swan, a 50-kilowatt station on Swan Island off the coast of Honduras. It beams anti-Castro news to Latin America.



Building 25
... 'it's not true'

The magazine article further claimed that the relationship between the CIA and some universities is two-way — "The agency secretly finances research programs at some universities; in turn, the universities help to recruit CIA personnel."

"I know of no such activity at this University," Cohen declared.

In addition to Zenith, Look claimed "the CIA has also operated under at least three other commercial cover names in Miami."

They were listed as the Double-Check Corp., the Gibraltar Steamship Corp and the Vanguard Service Corp.

Miami Springs Attorney Alex Carlson, president of Double-Check, said he "has no knowledge of any such implication."

He said Double-Check has been inactive since the spring of 1961 and its purpose at the time "was as a procurement agency for aviation personnel."

Double-Check had recruited four U.S. fliers killed during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

Offices for both Gibraltar Steamship and Vanguard Service are listed in the Langford Building under the same phone.

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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

(Being followed)

Date: 6/2/64

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Title:

CIA OPERATIONS
[62-3573]

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office: Miami

Being Investigated

ENCLOSURE
105-19923-247

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Mohr	_____
DeLoach	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Evans	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: 10-21-64

FROM : W. S. Tavel *WST*

SUBJECT: CLIP

Bufile: 105-89923

7th floor

The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Branch, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1113 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

This file can be removed from the Special File Room.

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FEB 9 1965
[Signature]

85 FEB 9 1965

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

'My Revolution Is Strong'

Spare Would-Be Assassins, Castro Asks Cuban Court

HAVANA (AP) — Declaring that his revolution is strong, Prime Minister Fidel Castro asked a court Tuesday to spare the lives of four men on trial on charges of plotting to kill him.

Castro's plea for clemency was read to a five-man military court by Prosecutor Jorge Serguera, who had asked the

death penalty for four of seven defendants arrested last month. Serguera then changed his request to 30 years in prison for the four.

Castro's letter came after the prosecution introduced a surprise witness who claimed he was a double agent who worked until last month for

the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The Cuban, who identified himself as Juan Pelaez Canan, said he was really in the service of Cuban intelligence during the three years he said he worked for the CIA in Miami and Cuba.

After he read Castro's letter, Serguera asked for prison sentences of 30 years each for former army majors Rolando Cubela and Ramon Guin and Jose Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta and Alberto Blanco Romariz.

Serguera asked for a 10-year sentence for Juan Alfina Navarro. He asked that the court decide upon penalties for Guillermo Conill Alvarez and Angel Herrero Veliz.

Castro's letter, addressed to the prosecutor, said the assassination plot was "one of the most cowardly and repugnant acts" to take place during the seven years of Cuba's revolutionary regime.

He said death sentences, particularly for Cubela and Gallarreta, would be "natural and severe penalties" for such an act.

His letter ended with the exhortation:

"I ask that you not appeal for the death penalty for any of those accused. The revolution is strong."

The tribunal then recessed until an unspecified date, when it will announce the sentences.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

2A

The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

Being followed

Date: 3/9/66

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

**CIA OPERATIONS
[MM 62 - 3573]**

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office: **Miami**

Being Investigated

MAR 21 1966

ENCLOSURE

105-89923-



INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS

clip

A POLICY TESTED BY LIFE
 OIL, TRADE AND POLITICS
 THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
 NEW DEBATES IN THE "ATLANTIC CLUB"
 WEST BERLIN AND ITS PROBLEMS
 THE ETERNAL CITY'S WORRIES
 STRAUSS THE REVENGE-SEEKER
 Documents of the Potsdam Conference

4

1966

Book Reviews • International Commentary • **NOT RECORDED**
 Facts and Figures
 MAY 27 1966

Jdl
[Handwritten initials]

P358

54 MAY 27 1966

105-89923

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

SOMEBODY GET SMART

A Handy-Dandy Spy Kit Found Floating In Bay

By **WILLIAM TUCKER**
Reporter of The Miami News

Have U.S. government agents been playing a game of spies and saboteurs in Biscayne Bay with side trips to Jewfish Creek and the Cuban Coast?

The possibility is raised by the discovery at Dinner Key Marina of a freshly dunked suitcase full of sinister-reading documents.

Radio Station WGBS says the FBI has determined the suitcase belonged to an employe of "another U.S. government

agency" and has been returned to its owner.

The FBI man who handled the (suit) case wouldn't confirm this for The Miami News.

"I can't say anything at all officially," he said. "Perhaps there has been some sort of misunderstanding."

Jim Bruns, a WGBS news announcer, said he helped Mike Boshnack, a college student, retrieve the suitcase off a Dinner Key pier three weeks ago.

"We saw it floating practically on top of the water," Bruns recalled.

"But by the time it took us to get a row-boat and go after it, it had sunk almost to the bottom."

The contents, however, were intact and nearly dry, indicating the suitcase had been in the water only a few minutes.

Inside, Bruns and Boshnack found:

—A diagram of a 9 millimeter pistol with instructions to aim it at a human body from 10 yards.

—Diagrams of bridge sections showing where to place explosives.

—Code Lists.

—Charts of Biscayne Bay, the Jewfish Creek area and the Cuban coast with apparent rendezvous points marked.

—Several papers in Spanish marked "secret."

—A list of survival gear.

—A list of radio frequencies.

—Pictures of various weapons and instructions in the use of machine guns, mortars and rifles.

—Diagrams and instructions for miniature radio transmitters.

—Several waterproof flares.

—A copy of the book "The Gravediggers" by Phyllis Schlafley, attacking the U.S. political system.

Bruns and Boshnack turned the suitcase and contents over to the FBI



Suitcase Is Examined

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

1A

The MIAMI NEWS

Miami, Florida

Date: 4/3/68

Edition: Blue Streak

Author:

Editor:

Title:

RE: CIA OPERATIONS IN UNITED STATES

Character:

[**MM-62 - 3573**]

Classification:

Submitting Office: Miami

Being Investigated

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and awaited that agency's
evaluation.

Bruns said the FBI told him last night that the suitcase had been lost by an employe of another government agency while he was moving the contents of his home in Miami.

The other agency, Bruns reported, "wants to remain unnamed."


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- Tamm
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

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 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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 DATE 7-11-96 BY SPUC/PT/PT

Clip

Coyle

DOY DONAHOE

UPI-100

(RADIO STATION-CUBA)

A POWERFUL, AMERICAN-OWNED RADIO STATION IS BROADCASTING NEWS TO CUBA FROM A TINY ISLAND OF DISPUTED SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CARIBBEAN, IT WAS LEARNED TODAY.

THE PROJECT, DISOWNED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, HAS BROUGHT ANGRY BLASTS FROM CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO WHO CHARGED IT IS A STATE DEPARTMENT ANTI-CASTRO PROPAGANDA OUTLET.

THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY UNTIL VERY RECENTLY WAS PLANNING ALMOST THE SAME PROJECT TO FILL WHAT THE GOVERNMENT FEELS IS AN URGENT NEED TO GET STRAIGHT NEWS TO CUBA. MOST CUBAN RADIO STATIONS ARE NOW GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED, BUT THE AGENCY SAID IT ABANDONED THE IDEA BECAUSE OF "INTERFERENCE AND LICENSING" PROBLEMS.

THE STATION IS OPERATED BY A PRIVATE AMERICAN GROUP, THE GIBRALTAR STEAMSHIP CORP. OF NEW YORK CITY (29 BROADWAY), WHICH OWNS NO SHIPS. IT SET UP SHOP LAST MONTH ON TWO-MILE-LONG SWAN ISLAND, 97 MILES FROM THE COAST OF HONDURAS AND 300 MILES SOUTHWEST OF CUBA.

IT BEGAN MAKING MEDIUM-WAVE TEST BROADCASTS AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY CUBA BEGAN BLASTING WHAT IT CALLED A "U.S. GOVERNMENT COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" STATION ON THE ISLAND.

ON JUNE 1 A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE "THE ONLY STATION THAT I KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT ON SWAN ISLAND IS A U.S. WEATHER BUREAU STATION."

HORTON H. HEATH, COMMERCIAL MANAGER OF THE NEW YORK FIRM, TOLD UPI THE 50-KILOWATT, MEDIUM-WAVE "RADIO SWAN" BEGAN REGULAR BROADCASTS MORE THAN A WEEK AGO BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 8 P.M. AND 10 P.M.

HE SAID THEY INCLUDE MUSIC, SOAP OPERAS AND NEWS, IN BOTH ENGLISH AND SPANISH, AND THAT THE STATION REACHES 15 COUNTRIES IN THE CARIBBEAN, CENTRAL AMERICA AND ON THE NORTHERN FRINGES OF SOUTH AMERICA.

"IT IS STRICTLY A COMMERCIAL VENTURE," HE SAID, "AND JUST A COINCIDENCE THAT IT IS WHAT USIA HAD THOUGHT OF. WE PLAN TO GET ADVERTISERS. WE HAVEN'T GOT ANY YET BUT ARE NEGOTIATING."

HEATH SAID GIBRALTAR GETS ITS NEWS FROM ORDINARY U.S. NEWS SERVICES, AND "CASTRO SEEMS TO THINK THAT'S 'PROPAGANDA'."

WALTER C. LOHR OF BALTIMORE, A STOCKHOLDER, SAID THE PRESIDENT OF GIBRALTAR IS THOMAS DUDLEY CABOT OF WESTON, MASS., A DIRECTOR OF THE JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, BANKER AND FORMER PRESIDENT OF UNITED FRUIT COMPANY.

REC-40

105-89923-A

NOT RECORDED

51 JUL 8 1960

EX-133

176 JUL 5 1960

WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

105-89923-A

ANOTHER STOCKHOLDER IS SUMNER SMITH OF BOSTON WHOSE FAMILY SAYS IT OWNS SWAN ISLAND AND LEASES IT TO GIBRALTAR. ^{MASS.}

THE PROJECT THREATENED TO REOPEN AN OLD FIGHT BETWEEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND HONDURAS OVER WHO OWNS THE GREAT AND NEARBY LITTLE SWAN ISLANDS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID THEY ARE U.S. TERRITORIES BY VIRTUE OF CONTINUOUS U.S. POSSESSION SINCE THEIR DISCOVERY BY AMERICAN GUANO TRADESMEN IN 1857. ^{N.Y.}

HONDURAS SAYS IT OWNS THEM BY VIRTUE OF SPANISH DISCOVERY IN THE 16TH CENTURY.

RECENTLY WHEN A U.S. CENSUS SHIP WENT THERE TO COUNT THE INHABITANTS -- SOME TWO DOZEN NATIVES AND A HANDFULL OF U.S. WEATHERMEN -- HONDURAN STUDENTS THREATENED TO LAUNCH A BOAT EXPEDITION TO RECLAIM THE ISLANDS.

THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION SAYS IT DOES NOT LICENSE RADIO SWAN BECAUSE "WE DON'T KNOW WHO OWNS THAT ISLAND." THE HONDURAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES HAS INDICATED HONDURAS MIGHT CLAIM LICENSING AUTHORITY.

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Clip - Program of Anti-Castro Activity - C.F.A. [unclear]

(U)

Truth-to-Cuba Radio Chains Co-operating World-Wide to Join With Radio Swan

From the Herald-Tribune Bureau
WASHINGTON, Sept. 3.

Walter S. Lemmon, president of the World Wide Broadcasting System, announced tonight that beginning Sept. 12 his stations will begin co-operative operations with Radio Swan, in telling Cuban people the truth about their Communist-dominated regime. Swan Island

World Wide has offices in New York City and shortwave broadcasting facilities at Scituate, Mass. Radio Swan is a 50,000-watt standard-wave length station on Swan Island off the coast of Honduras.

May Co-operate

Rep. Roman C. Pucinski, D., Ill., sponsor of Radio Free Cuba which plans a high-powered transmitter in Florida, conferred with Mr. Lemmon this week and said he would urge his group to co-operate fully with World Wide and with Radio Swan, the latter operated by the Gibraltar Steamship Corp. of New York, the World Wide president said.

To Tape "Havana Rose"

Since April, World Wide has been beaming short-wave "truth" broadcasts to the Cuban people. These include those of "Havana Rose," Miss Pepita Riera, a Cuban commentator in exile, who specializes in spotting lies and misrepresentations by the official Castro-controlled press and radio and broadcast stations, and "telling the truth" over World Wide's five powerful short-wave transmitters.

Under the arrangement with Radio Swan announced by Mr. Lemmon, the latter station will tape World Wide's shortwave broadcasts beamed at Cuba, including those of "Havana Rose," and re-broadcast them one hour later over standard AM wavelengths.

Calls It Breakthrough

Rep. Pucinski, representing Radio Free Cuba, another privately supported operation designed to "beam the truth about Castro and his Communist advisers to the people of Cuba," has agreed to urge his people to make the operation a triple one, Mr. Lemmon said.

Of the combined operation, Rep. Pucinski said:

"Properly organized this can be the most significant breakthrough in the Cuba situation in a year and a half. The great

thing about it is that it will be a people-to-people program and a great example of American ingenuity."

Mr. Lemmon said 360,000 Cuban homes have shortwave receivers, and, according to mail reports, as many as eighteen to twenty Cubans gather around each of them to listen to the World Wide's Spanish-language broadcasts.

Attacked by Castro

"Castro has attacked our broadcasts," Mr. Lemmon said, "so we know our programs are effective. . . . By expanding the facilities through Radio Swan we will be able to bring the truth about what is going on to all the Cuban people. . . . We will be able to tell them about things which are going on that they can't get in their own press and radio. . . ."

Reports of Olympic Games results in Rome have been broadcast by World Wide for some time, and 100 associated stations in Latin America pick them up and re-broadcast them. Recently, Mr. Lemmon said, World Wide received a request from "of all places" the official Castro government radio for permission to re-broadcast these sports reports.

The "Havana Rose" operation consists of having Miss Riera and other refugees from the Castro government monitor official Cuban government stations and read Cuban newspapers. When outright lies and misrepresentations are discovered in either, "we broadcast the truth," Miss Riera says.


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- The Washington Post and Times Herald _____
- The Washington Daily News _____
- The Evening Star _____
- New York Herald Tribune _____
- New York Journal-American _____
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- The Worker _____
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- The Wall Street Journal _____
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46 SEP 13 1960

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VOICE OF AMERICA WELCOMES CO-OPERATION

Private U.S. Broadcaster Will Beam Truth to Cuba

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- W.C. Sullivan ✓
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REC-89

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By PETER ANDREWS

Hearst Headline Service Special to N. Y. Journal-American
WASHINGTON, Sept. 7.—The Voice of America today welcomed the establishment of a privately sponsored series of truth broadcasts in Spanish to Cuba with "cautious optimism."

The cause of the optimism is an announcement by New York broadcaster Walter Lemmon, president of World Wide Broadcasting System, that his company in cooperation with Radio SWAN of Honduras, will start a series of radio programs beamed to Cuba "telling the Cuban people the truth about their Communist regime."

Henry Loomis, director of the Voice, said, "There are tremendous advantages in having both private and public facilities involved in this. When it comes to the truth, you can't have too much of it."

Particularly attractive to the VOA is a series of proposed broadcasts over the World Wide program conducted

by Cuban exiles and refugees from the Castro government. "Properly handled," Mr. Loomis said, "this can do a lot of good."


Present plans, Mr. Lemmon said, call for a joint effort with the proposed Radio Free Europe, which has been sponsored by Rep. Pucinski (D-Ill.).

Saying, "This can be the most significant breakthrough in the Cuban situation in a year and a half," Rep. Pucinski urged a combined effort of the World Wide operation and Radio Free Cuba.

While Americans were going ahead with plans for more truth broadcasts to the Cuban people, in Havana Premier Castro announced today a worldwide propaganda drive to rally "popular masses" behind the Castro "Declaration of Havana" attacking the United States.

American officials said they were glad to get any help they could in combating the gigantic Communist propaganda machine in Cuba and Latin America.

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- The Washington Daily News _____
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- New York Journal-American ✓
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- The Wall Street Journal _____
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DATE 7-11-94 BY SP4UC/MLP

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170 SEP 14 1960

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The Lemmon broadcasts will have some advantages over existing shows beamed for Cuban consumption. Coming in over medium wave the World Wide broadcasts will be able to be heard by many Cubans who can not receive the short wave broadcasts of the Voice.

The Voice broadcasts never have openly tangled with Castro or the Castro government, but have stuck to a formula of presenting the United States' position on various Latin American questions. The World Wide broadcasts as a private enterprise and not an agency of the U. S. will be able to make a harder sell and directly challenge Castro's propaganda fulminations.

For the past four months the Voice has stepped up its own Cuban and Latin American broadcasting program to meet the Castro attacks.

The Voice, which sends out a regular daily schedule of one hour of Spanish and three and one-half hours of English, is picked up and rebroadcast by about 100 stations in Latin America.

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 Ingram _____
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Voice of Truth ^{20L}

BEGINNING this week, and through co-operation of private enterprise, a powerful radio station only 400 miles from Cuba will beam truth broadcasts on a regular daily schedule to the Cuban people. This is good and important news.

Arrangements have been made between Radio Swan, located on greater Swan Island some 100 miles north of Honduras, and World Wide Broadcasting System, with offices in New York. Radio Swan is owned by the Gibraltar Steamship Company, also with New York headquarters. World Wide, which is headed by Walter S. Lemmon, broadcasts from its Station WRUL in Scituate, Mass.

Since April, WRUL has been beaming shortwave broadcasts to Cuba. It has gotten through but it has not been as effective as it could be because the number of Cubans owning sets equipped for shortwave is limited.


Radio Swan broadcasts on medium wave length. Under the arrangement, a 30-minute program in Spanish broadcast by WRUL will be repeated on Swan an hour later.

This newspaper began months ago to recommend the greatest possible use of radio facilities, either through the Government or private commercial stations or both, to counteract the slanders, lies and distortions of the Castro regime by beaming the truth to the Cuban people. It seems to us the Government's Voice of America ought to support the project in every way it can. Our congratulations to WRUL and Radio Swan. It may be that they will bring Castro's swan song nearer.

REC-6

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 DATE 7-11-96 BY *[signature]*

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- The Worker _____
- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
- Date SEP 11 1960

clip

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 176 SEP 15 1960

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 52 SEP 16 1960 EX 109

105-89923

Cuba Says Guatemala, U. S. Plot an Invasion

By JERRY CLAPSO

Cuba charged in the UN yesterday that U. S. planes and airmen have been sent to Guatemala to join adventurers and Cuban counterrevolutionaries for the eventual invasion of Cuba.

Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa took the floor in the General Assembly to blast charges by Guatemala Wednesday that Cuba was Moscow-ruled and was planning aggression against the Central American republic.

Roa called Guatemala a U. S. satellite created and guided by the State Department and the United Fruit Co. He said the U. S. and Guatemala have branded Cuba Communist to lay the foundation for intervention.

Secret Bases

The fiery Cuban said the U. S. has established "clandestine" bases in Guatemala and that Guatemala, for its part, was organizing "criminals and adventurers" to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime.

He charged that American planes and instructors, and in recent weeks more than 100 American airmen and experts, have arrived in Guatemala, all financed by North American money.

Predicts 'Piracy'

Moreover, Roa declared, Guatemalan army and navy units have been concentrated on the Atlan-

tic and, since August, airfields and roads have been built to pave the way for "international piracy."

Roa's charges were greeted with applause by the Cuban and Communist delegations. The U. S. delegation had left the hall at the start of Roa's tirade.

Earlier, Nationalist Chinese Ambassador Tingu E. Tsiang warned against letting Red China into the UN. He called the Peiping regime the "greatest menace to international peace and security."

Red Domination

Tsiang said Red China was dedicated to the "historical mission" of bringing all Asia under Communist domination.


"At home," he continued, "the Chinese Communist regime has spawned a gigantic system of terror and torture, surveillance and repression, the like of which the world has never known."

"Eleven years of unlimited propaganda and unlimited indoctrination have failed to reconcile the Chinese people to the regime," Tsiang said. "The day will surely come when they will rise in revolt against their oppressors."

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- The Worker _____
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- The Wall Street Journal _____
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DATE 7-11-96 BY SP4 BJA/mk

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49 OCT 14 1960

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Cuba Reports U.S. Aiding Anti-Castro Forces

REC-26

CLIP

HAVANA — (AP) — Government-controlled newspaper printed on their front page Tuesday a report from Tegucigalpa, Honduras, distributed by the Cuban News Agency, that 30 transport planes from the United States have landed supplies for anti-Castro forces in Guatemala.

reports of continuing airlifts of Castro forces, including heavily armed special troops, into Cuba's interior.

The reports tend to support the belief that there still is considerable insurgent activity in the Escambray Mountains of Las Villas Province, where Castro claimed a complete victory over counterrevolutionary forces earlier this month.

"THE MIAMI HERALD"

October 19, 1960

Miami, Florida

Orellana Bueso, was quoted as saying the planes brought with the supplies some Cuban backers of ex-Dictator Fulgenio Batista who want to join an invasion force.

Meanwhile, Cubans were told Tuesday that, after this Thursday, the government instead of private owners will be the landlord of all rented homes and apartments.

Rent payments thereafter should be made to Cuba's postal saving banks, the semiofficial newspaper Revolution told readers. The public works ministry will handle the rent-payment details.

Prime Minister Fidel Castro's troops and militia here at home stayed on full alert Tuesday, with more and more armed men appearing on Havana streets. There have been

Under a sweeping urban reform decree, Castro virtually wiped out private control of property, on the one hand, and

inaugurated a system whereby renters can buy the houses and apartments they occupy, on the other.

CUBA
HONDURAS

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DATE 7-11-94 BY SPY/STP/STH

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149 OCT 26 1960

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Protest Filed

U.S. Practicing Air Aggression, Cuban Tells U.N.

The New York Times Service
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. —
Cuba filed a complaint with
the United Nations Tuesday
accusing the United States of
acts of aerial aggression.
The complaint was filed by
Foreign Minister Raul Roa in
the office of Frederick H. Boland,
president of the General
Assembly.
Roa asked that the com-

plaint be put on the Assembly's
agenda. He also was reported
to have requested that it be
placed as an item of business
before the Assembly's political
committee.

Roa charged that a four-
engine plane with North
American markings flew over
from U.S. territory Sept. 29
and dropped large quantities
of machineguns, rifles, hand
grenades and maps near the
town of Escambre in Las Vil-
las Province.

Although Premier Fidel Cas-
tro bitterly criticized the Unit-
ed States when he addressed
the General Assembly on Sept.
26, he did not ask for any ac-
tion to be taken here.

In his four-hour speech be-
fore the Assembly, Castro
charged the United States with
aggression and asked for sup-
port from the African, Asian
and Latin-American nations.
Neither he nor his delegation
however, presented any resolu-
tion calling for a U.N. vote.

On Oct. 14, the United States
came back with a detailed 10,
000-word indictment of Cuba's
actions toward the U.S. It
charged deliberate sabotage of
good relations between the two
countries and seizure of prop-
erty for political rather than
economic reasons.

In another U.N. develop-
ment Tuesday, Secretary
General Dag Hammarskjold,
counterattacking against yet
another thrust by the Soviet
Union, warned that "the best
members of the secretariat
may withdraw" if they cannot
accept conditions under which
the United Nations "is permit-
ted to survive."

Hammarskjold's one refer-
ence to his own position came
in a comment that the mem-
ber states need "not expect
anybody with a sense of his
responsibilities to assume the
duties of the secretary gen-
eral" if the organization be-
came ineffective. It was pre-
sumed he would abide by his
announced decision to remain
on the job until the end of his
term of office in April, 1963,
come what may.

CLIP

"THE MIAMI HERALD"

October 19, 1960

Miami, Florida

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Russia Pounces on Issue in UN

Castro May Invade N. Y. Again to Push U. S. Invasion Charge

NEW YORK, N. Y., Oct. 20 (UPI)—Diplomatic sources said today Fidel Castro may fly back to the United Nations to press his charge, supported by Russia, that the United States is preparing to invade "at any moment."

The accusation, made in a memorandum to the General Assembly yesterday, appeared certain to spark a full debate.

By taking his case directly to the General Assembly instead of putting it first before the 11-member Security Council Castro assured himself of a wider audience.

Several Latin American sources said they thought Castro would leave it up to his foreign minister, Raul Roa, to present the Cuban case but others pointed out that when Castro left New

York last month he said he planned to return before the end of the session.

Russia quickly seized on the Cuban charges. Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin brought it into the disarmament debate yesterday, saying the Cuban complaint confirmed the United States was mistreating peace-loving states.

The Cuban memorandum did not specify just who the invaders would be — whether uniformed troops or private mercenaries acting with government support — but it directly accused the State Department, the Pentagon and "U. S. monopolies" of organizing a full scale attack.

It also accused Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Sen. John F. Kennedy of "cynically advocating aggression, intervention and subversion against the Cuban Government and people."

Hill Fears Move on Guantanamo

—MIAMI BEACH, Oct. 20 (UPI)—The U. S. Ambassador to Mexico said yesterday that Cuba, on instructions from Russia and Red China, may move against the Guantanamo Naval Base to disturb this nation on the eve of its national elections.

In such an event, "the United States must defend Guantanamo base with all its strength," Ambassador

Robert C. Hill told the American Legion Convention.

Mr. Hill also accused Cuba of murdering "American boys."

"We must act strongly. We must isolate Cuba's dictatorial Red-leg regime," he said.

Mother Watched Son Condemned


MIAMI, Oct. 20 (UPI)—A mother told yesterday how she watched a Cuban military court condemn her son to a firing squad and then was denied the right to bury him.

Spectators in the courtroom shouted "to the wall" and a boy sold soft drinks while her son's fate was decided, she said.

Mrs. Jennie Jewett Fuller, 59, described the last hours of her son, Robert Fuller, 25, who was shot by a firing squad near Santiago, Cuba, last Sunday.

"Near me Cuban men and women started to chant: 'To the wall, to the wall.'"

"I stood up and stretched out my arms to a group of Cuban women nearest me and said: 'Please don't. Please don't. I'm a mother, too. One of those boys over there is my son.'"

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U.S. Plots Invasion. Cuba Says

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UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Oct. 19 (UPI)—Premier Fidel Castro has notified the General Assembly he expects a "large-scale invasion" to be mounted against Cuba from the United States "within the next few days," it was officially disclosed today.

The charge was contained in a memorandum explaining Castro's request that the General Assembly take up immediately on its agenda "a complaint by the revolutionary government of Cuba regarding the various plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the United States."

The Soviet Union quickly supported the Cuban charges, Associated Press reported. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian A. Zorin, discussing disarmament in the Assembly's Political Committee, said the Cuban complaint showed the United States was following a policy of "open military provocations against peace-loving states" and sending planes into the air space of other nations.

Trade Embargo Cited

The Cuban memorandum mentioned the U. S. trade embargo placed on Cuba at noon today as one of the signs that the invasion was imminent. Another "proof," it said, was the State Department's recommendation to U. S. dependents to leave the island.

The memorandum said the alleged invasion attempt had been plotted out by the U. S. State Department, the Pentagon and "U. S. monopolies."

"According to reliable information in the possession of the Cuban authorities (it) will be attempted within the next few days," it said.

Evasive on Details

The Castro statement did not specify what kind of an "invasion" is expected.

Castro has charged many times he expects U. S. Marines to attack Cuba.

The memorandum claimed that a smaller invasion force composed of "mercenaries" invaded Cuban territory early this month in a shrimp boat flying an American flag and coming from "Florida, United States."

The statement did not say where the larger invasion was expected to be mounted.

Claim Arms Run Made

It also charged that a four-engine aircraft of U. S. registration, coming from U. S. territory and piloted by U. S. airmen, made an arms run into Cuba on Sept. 29 as a prelude to the fullscale invasion.

As far as was known here, the accusation represented the first time Castro has ever charged the U. S. military with taking part directly in a hostile operation against Cuba.

Previously his charges of U. S. "aggression" had been laid to "mercenaries" and "war criminals" in the pay of the U. S. Government.

U. S. officials had no immediate comment on the invasion charge.

The situation was made more tense by an official U. S. document presented to Hammar skjold here last week which alerted the United Nations for possible violence over the big U. S. naval base at Guantanamo in Cuba. The U. S. statement, said Castro seemed intent on "provoking an incident" there.

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
(CUBA)

UNITED NATIONS--CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA SAID TODAY THAT CUBA EXPECTS "MOMENTARILY" TO BE INVADED BY FORCES "BASED IN GUATEMALA AND AIDED BY THE UNITED STATES."

THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA, HE SAID, "HAS CONVINCING PROOF" THAT "18 U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT FLEW YESTERDAY FROM PUERTO RICO TO GUATEMALA TO JOIN THE INVASION FLEET IN CLANDESTINE AIRPORTS."

ROA SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT FREDERICK BOLAND THAT THERE WILL BE A MEETING TUESDAY TO CONSIDER CUBA'S REQUEST THAT ITS "AGGRESSION" CHARGES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BE PLACED ON THIS SESSION'S AGENDA.

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
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UPI-171

(CUBA)

MEXICO CITY--FORMER MEXICAN NAVY MINISTER HERIBERTO JARA SAID TODAY THAT AN INVASION OF CUBA FROM GUATEMALA "WILL TAKE PLACE THIS MONTH."

JARA, LEFTIST HEAD OF A MOSCOW-SPONSORED "PEACE COMMITTEE," SAID IN A PRESS STATEMENT THAT PURSUIT PLANES, LANDING SHIP, LIGHT AND HEAVY ARTILLERY AND OTHER EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED IN GUATEMALA FOR USE AGAINST CUBA.

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UPI -39

(CUBA)

MOSCOW--MOSCOW RADIO CHARGED TODAY THAT DETACHMENTS OF U.S.-BACKED "HIRELINGS" ARE "POISED TO ATTACK CUBA" FROM GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA, HONDURAS AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

"THIS THREAT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY INTENSE DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS," THE COMMENTATOR SAID.

"AMERICAN DOLLARS AND THE PROSPECT OF PLUNDER HAVE SWOLLEN THEIR RANKS WITH ADVENTURERS AND CRIMINALS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD."

THE BROADCAST SAID THE ALLEGED COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES WERE "RECEIVING GREAT STOCKS OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION" FROM THE UNITED STATES AND MAY SERVE AS AN ADVANCE FORCE FOR U.S. MILITARY INTERFERENCE IN CUBA ON THE PRETEXT OF PROTECTING THE U.S. NAVAL BASE AT GUANTANAMO.

"QUITE RECENTLY, 30 AMERICAN TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT TOOK A LARGE CONSIGNMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO GUATEMALA. U.S. WARSHIPS ARE READY TO FERRY BANDS OF REBELS TO CUBA. AMERICAN AIRCRAFT, SECRETLY CONCENTRATED ON THE AIRFIELDS OF GUATEMALA, ARE TO GIVE AIR SUPPORT TO THE LANDING TROOPS," THE BROADCAST SAID.

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
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UPI-159

(U.N.)

UNITED NATIONS--CUBA CHARGED TODAY THAT "MERCENARIES" ARE STANDING BY TO INVADE ITS COUNTRY "UNDER THE ORDERS OF AMERICAN ADVENTURERS OF ALL TYPES."

CUBA FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA MADE THE CHARGE BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IT APPEARED TO BE A BACKDOWN FROM HIS CHARGE BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY'S STEERING COMMITTEE LAST WEEKS THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PLOTTED AN INVASION WHICH "MIGHT COME AT ANY HOUR."

ROA AGAIN REFERRED TO THE "SCANDALOUS ACCUSATIONS" AGAINST CUBA BY VICE PRESIDENT NIXON AND SEN. KENNEDY IN THEIR "GREAT DEBATE" OF THE U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

THE ASSEMBLY AGREED TO ITS STEERING COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION TO PUT CUBA'S CHARGES OF U.S. "AGGRESSION" ON ITS AGENDA. IT WAS DEBATING CUBA'S DEMAND THAT THE ISSUE BE DEBATED IN THE FULL AND FORMAL ASSEMBLY, RATHER THAN BE SENT TO THE 99-NATION POLITICAL COMMITTEE, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE STEERING GROUP.

ROA DID NOT ELABORATE ON HIS PREVIOUSLY STATED CHARGE THAT "THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS TRYING ECONOMICALLY TO STRANGLE CUBA AND TO CARRY OUT A LARGE SCALE INVASION, BASING ITSELF IN GUATEMALA AND THE SWAN ISLANDS (IN THE GULF OF MEXICO)."

"A SMALL COUNTRY IS BEING SUBJECTED TO A DRAINING OF ITS RESOURCES BY AMERICAN IMPERIALISM," HE SAID. "WE DEMAND THE SOLIDARITY OF OTHER SMALL COUNTRIES AND THE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE WELL FOUNDED CHARGES BY A SMALL COUNTRY AGAINST A MOST AGGRESSIVE AND UNSCRUPULOUS POWER MUST BE HEARD."

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ADD UN. UNITED NATIONS (UPI-159)

"CUBA FEARS AN ATOMIC WAR IF THE UNITED STATES CARRIES OUT SOME HARE-BRAINED PLAN FOR AN ATTACK."

ROA REPEATED CHARGES THAT U.S. PLANES HAD DROPPED BAZOOKAS, MACHINE GUNS, RIFLES, HAND GRENADES, DEMOLITION CHARGES, TRANSMISSION EQUIPMENT, MAPS AND COMMUNICATIONS CODES IN THE ESCAMBRAY HILLS, IN QUANTITIES TOO GREAT TO HAVE BEEN CONTRABAND COLLECTED BY COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES.

TEN DAYS AGO, HE SAID, A NUMBER OF U.S. B-26 BOMBERS TOOK OFF FROM PUERTO RICO AND FLEW TO GUATEMALA, FROM WHERE "CUBA IS TO BE INVADED BY LAND AND SEA."

THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES LINED UP STRONGLY BEHIND CUBA. SPEAKERS FROM POLAND, ROMANIA AND ALBANIA FOLLOWED ROA WITH LONG SPEECHES DELAYING A DECISION ON WHETHER TO SEND THE "AGGRESSION" CHARGES TO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE.

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U.S. Scores Castro Cry Of Invasion

By PIERRE J. HUSS

Hearst Headline Service Special
to N. Y. Journal-American

UNITED NATIONS HQ.

Nov. 1.—The United States is punching back in UN today at Fidel Castro's invasion charges with sharp jabs calculated to convince the Assembly that Cuba is in no danger from outside threats, except that of Soviet Russia.

Ambassador James J. Wadsworth is laying it on the line this afternoon in the 99-Nation Assembly to defeat Castro's demand that the 1,000 plenary delegates act immediately to forestall U.S. forces from attacking the Caribbean Island.

Indications are that the Assembly will support Mr. Wadsworth by a heavy majority vote.

COMMITTEE SWITCH

It is to be polled on the question of supporting the 21-nation steering committee's recent recommendation that Cuba's charge of impending "aggression" by the U. S. be relegated to the less important political committee—a demonstration in itself that few take Castro's whooping-up of invasion fever seriously.

It may take a month or six weeks before the political committee can get around to Cuba's charge.


By that time, developments will have exposed Castro's propaganda outcry against the U. S. or evaluated the situation to the point where further discussion in UN of the issue is overshadowed by new events.

The whole Cuban and Soviet bloc maneuver to smear the U. S. in the Assembly as engaged in an invasion plot hit a Western wall of silence last night and forced the Communists to request adjournment of the Assembly until this afternoon.

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Report to Readers: The Caribbean,

fidelismo and gunboats

CLIP

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REC-43

THE PRESIDENT, in Georgia for twelve days of golf topped off with a day of quail shooting before Thanksgiving, found no need to intervene in Louisiana, where the state government fomented mob action against a handful of Negro first-graders seeking to enter New Orleans white public schools for the first time.

But when the President of Guatemala, following an abortive uprising of army officers, called for U.S. protection on the unsupported ground that the uprising was fomented by Cuba, our nation's president authorized the assignment of the 70-plane aircraft carrier, Shangri-La, five destroyers and two Navy reconnaissance planes from Florida to police the Caribbean. In addition the Navy's Squadron 10, with a complement of 2,000 Marines aboard the assault-helicopter carrier Boxer and other ships, also was deployed in the Caribbean in what the N.Y. Herald Tribune called an "obvious . . . show of force."

ANYTHING that can detract the present President from his golf game is worth headlines, and the action in response to Guatemala (joined by Nicaragua) was no exception—the story got screaming headlines all over the hemisphere, and editorial applause from all armchair supporters of gunboat diplomacy.

Inquisitive reporters soon discovered, however, that the fleet had been patrolling Guatemala's pinpoint shore line on the Caribbean for at least five days before the President's announcement—an action undertaken by the Navy, reporters were told, in response to "oral" requests from Guatemala and Nicaragua. Later, when the two countries decided to put their requests in writing and Guatemala's President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes planned to make his request public, reporters were told that President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter decided on a White House announcement.

How a foreign country goes about making an "oral"

[Handwritten notes: "Hick" and "Cap..."]

request to another country's navy without going to the chief of state is a matter no correspondent dug into, but following the White House announcement, Washington correspondents pointed out that when rebellion struck against President Luis A. Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua on Nov. 11 and that weekend against Ydigoras in Guatemala, both countries charged that the revolts were Cuban-instigated. The State Department on Nov. 14 and right up to the time of the White House announcement, told Washington correspondents that it had no evidence of Cuban complicity.

FROM THE FOREGOING, it appears that the State Dept. and probably the President himself, were unaware of the Navy's action or unwilling to publicize it until imminent publicity from some other source forced a White House announcement of the Navy's activity.

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More than a week before the White House announcement, the GUARDIAN learned of reports of a concentration of naval vessels without markings in the area of Puerto Barrios, Guatemala's port on the Caribbean. The vessels were presumed by Cuban reconnaissance to be U.S. craft, and were immediately linked with earlier reports reaching Cuba of a build-up for an invasion of Cuba from Guatemala. Cuba breathed a bit easier when the vessels, said to number 13, disappeared from the area.

THEN LAST WEEK the Nation, in an exclusive report (11/19) which no newspaper has yet published or commented on to our knowledge, disclosed that Dr. Ronald Hilton, director of Stanford University's Institute of Hispanic-American Studies, had recently returned from Guatemala with reports that:

"1. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has acquired a large tract of land, at an outlay in excess of \$1,000,000, which is stoutly fenced and heavily guarded. Dr. Hilton was informed that it is 'common knowledge' in Guatemala that the tract is being used as a training ground for Cuban counter-revolutionaries who are preparing for an eventual landing in Cuba. It was also said that U.S. personnel and equipment are being used at the base. The camp is said to be located in Retahuleu, between Guatemala City and the coast."

Dr. Hilton's report said the foregoing was reported by the director of the Guatemalan newspaper La Hora in violation of a government prohibition against any public discussion of the matter, and that ultimately President Ydigoras admitted the existence of the base during a TV appearance, but refused to discuss it further.

Commenting on Dr. Hilton's report in its Nov. 19 issue, which went to press before the White House announcement of the Navy deployment in the Caribbean, the Nation said: "Fidel Castro may have a sounder basis for his expressed fears of a U.S.-financed 'Guatemala-type' invasion than most of us realize."

The term "Guatemala-type" invasion recalls the difference between Sen. John F. Kennedy and Vice-President Richard Nixon in their TV debate, in which Kennedy proposed supporting "anti-Batista" Cuban expatriates in this country in an attack on Cuba, while Nixon proposed an approach to the problem such as was employed in overthrowing the Arbenz reform government in Guatemala in 1954—a near admission of what everyone else now says freely, that the U.S. C.I.A. staged the invasion of Guatemala from Honduras which overthrew Arbenz and installed the Castillo Armas government, of which Ydigoras is the heir.

WHILE NO PRESS EDITORIAL other than the Nation's has countenanced the possibility—quickly charged by Cuba—that the U.S. buildup in the Caribbean might have been regarded as a "cover" for an invasion of Cuba from Guatemala, several have cocked a wary eye at the proceedings. The N.Y. Post saw a "hint of a synthetic crisis" in the situation, and expressed the "uneasy feeling" that the large naval-air units assigned by the President "to seek out and prevent" possible invasion of Guatemala from Cuba are "looking for more trouble in the Caribbean than already exists." The St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times questioned, as did the Washington Post and the N.Y. Herald Tribune, why response to the requests of Guatemala and Nicaragua was not directed through the Organization of American States, as in the case of Panama last year. On that occasion, in April, 1959, when Panama was invaded by a landing party allegedly from Cuba, two gunboats off the Panama coast were considered sufficient. The St. Petersburg Times noted that Guatemala had actually asked postponement of an OAS investigation of its charges that Cuba was behind the Nov. 12 uprising, and urged the White House to act through the OAS or tell us "what is the full story?"

Though the N.Y. Times editorially supported the White House action to the letter, its correspondents in Washington and in Guatemala shed a different light on what is happening in Latin America. Paul Kennedy, writing from Guatemala, noted that it has become "more or less customary" for Latin American chiefs of state "to attribute even minor disturbances to Castro agents." While there is disagreement over "the physical contribution of Premier Fidel Castro's Cuba" to unrest in Guatemala, there is little disagreement, Kennedy wrote, over the psychological impact of "fidellismo," the concept of revolt against existing social and political forms in the Caribbean region. The upheavals had long been in the making, he wrote,

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REPORT TO READERS

Fidelismo and gunboats

(Continued from Page 2)

"and were finally brought into being with fidelismo as the catalytic agent."

From Washington E. W. Kensworthy wrote in the Times:

"What the experts on Latin America fear is the instability in a number of countries—particularly Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Venezuela. This instability is a legacy of old wrongs—of peonage, exploitation, police brutality, suppression of liberty, and the postponement of economic reforms by the small ruling classes." Because the U.S. "has had to deal with ruling groups . . . the U.S. has become associated with old social and economic grievances. All this makes fertile ground for 'fidelismo'."

FIDELISMO is a meaningful new word for our vocabulary, and it is to be hoped that the Kennedy administration, despite briefing by Allan Dulles, will take a more enlightened view of it than has the Eisenhower-Nixon-Herter old guard. It means economic development for Latin America *sin amo*, without a master in the form of U.S. industry; and it will not be appeased by handouts for new roads, arms to put down the people and Cadillacs for the "small ruling classes"—the N.Y. Times' phrase, please note, not Pravda's. It means raising living standards from the most miserable lows anywhere in the world, with health, education and racial equality guaranteed. It means, in sum, what Cuba is now seeking to achieve for its 6,000,000 people, and unless the U.S. recognizes this and extends a helping hand, rather than the mailed fist of repression, the whole of Latin America may turn its face to the east economically—with disastrous consequences for the U.S. economy, with its reliance on exports.

It now appears that the untimely publicity accorded U.S. maneuvers in the Caribbean may have forestalled any comic-opera plots for an invasion of Cuba by a cat's-paw nation, even though Guatemala is demanding a "Korea-type" police action against Cuba and talks of unilaterally declaring "retaliatory" war. But just in case, the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was organizing a mass picket line before the United Nations in New York on Saturday, Nov. 26, from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m., with picket signs saying **Hands Off Cuba, End Gunboat Diplomacy in the Caribbean, Why Not Patrol the Florida Coast to Stop Attacks on Cuba? and U.S. Negroes Demand Federal Troops in New Orleans, Not in Havana!** And in Cleveland, a Fair Play meeting was scheduled for Tues. eve. Nov. 29 at the Unitarian Society, East 82nd St. and Euclid.

At a Fair Play meeting of more than 1,000 in New York's Harlem Nov. 17, NAACP leader Robert F. Williams and William Worthy, correspondent for the Afro-American newspapers, joined other speakers in denouncing U.S. military intervention in the Caribbean. Said Williams: "In Cuba, I first breathed the air of freedom—not in Monroe, North Carolina, not in Washington D.C. and not in Harlem, New York." Worthy told the audience that the white segregationists rioting in New Orleans would very quickly find themselves "in the revolutionary jug" in Cuba; and added that "The only place in Cuba today where a color line prevails is on the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo."

LIKE THE GUARDIAN, the Fair Play Committee is conducting a tour to Cuba during the Christmas holidays and we both look for plenty of tourists who are game to see Cuba for themselves, witness the giant strides of the agrarian reform, and preview Cuba's Year of Education, 1961. It is a historic time to visit Cuba—a foretaste of things to come in the rest of Latin American. And somehow, we don't think any task force from Guatemala will ever brave the beaches of Cuba in "retaliation" for introducing "fidelismo" into our language.

—THE GUARDIAN

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
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Never get caught

AFTER A SPEECH at San Francisco's Commonwealth Club, Lyman A. Kirkpatrick, CIA Inspector General and Allen Dulles' second-in-command, was asked from the floor: "Prof. Hilton of Stanford University says that there is a CIA-financed base in Guatemala where plans are being made for an attack on Cuba. Prof. Hilton says it will be a black day for Latin America and the U.S. if this takes place. Is this true?" After a long pause, Mr. Kirkpatrick replied: "It will be a black day if we are found out."
 —The Nation, Nov. 28

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
**Castro Says CIA
 Aids Terrorism**

HAVANA, Dec. 15 (Thursday) (AP). — Fidel Castro charged early today that the United States was equipping counter-revolutionary elements with a "special type of explosive of great power" used by the United States Army.


The Cuban Prime Minister said the new type of explosive is being given to his enemies by United States Central Intelligence Agents and "bandits of the Pentagon."

Castro spoke at a meeting called to denounce the anti-Communist leaders of the Electrical Workers Union.

Earlier story, Page A4



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Castro Says U. S. Supplies Foes' Bombs

HAVANA, Dec. 15 (AP).—Prime Minister Fidel Castro, in one of his angriest speeches, charged today that enemies of his revolution were being equipped by the United States with a powerful new "special explosive."

The prime minister made the charge in a 2½-hour address at a midnight meeting of the Electrical Workers Union that was summoned to oust what he called "traitorous" leadership.

Amaury Fraginals, booted out as boss of the union in absentia, has been accused of blacking out Havana for four days with a well-placed bomb.

The whereabouts of Mr. Fraginals is not known. Diplomatic sources said he was not among 11 known members of the Electrical Union who took asylum in various embassies yesterday.

Election Protested

Mr. Fraginals was one of the leaders of a march of his union to the Presidential Palace last week to protest what they claimed was an attempt by the Communist-tinged Cuban Confederation of Workers to dictate a union election.

Some members of the union claimed last night they were not allowed to enter the meeting which paved the way for a Red-line directorate to take over. They claimed the hall was packed with pro-Castro and Communist followers.

Putting in a personal appearance at the meeting the Prime Minister scathingly denounced the union leaders as "counter-revolutionaries." His unexpected appearance appeared to underline the gravity with which the regime viewed the first real open defiance from the labor front.

His face contorted with rage, he seemed to grope for the vilest words he could recall.

"Pentagon Bandits"

A new "special type of explosive of great power" used by the United States Army, he said, was being supplied to his enemies by United States Central Intelligence Agency agents and Yankee Pentagon bandits.

American-financed anti-government elements, he added, included "puppets garbed in cassocks"—a reference to Roman Catholic priests.

"I propose to you," he said to the meeting, "that we shake up the electrical industry so that enemies will know the generous revolution can also be firm when circumstances dictate."

In an apparent hint at more trouble with union leaders, he said it was possible "one segment (of the unions) is still confused."

He did not elaborate but the Foodhandlers' Union was the only one in the Cuban Confederation of Workers to vote against condemning the Electrical Union's leadership for its open defiance of the Castro regime.

The Cuban Foreign Ministry, in a note to the United States Government, accused the United States of protecting anti-Castro exiles and underwriting counterrevolutionary activities and demanded that Washington put a stop to all actions harmful to the Cuban government.

Leaflets Dropped

The note followed showers of anti-Castro leaflets dropped by planes earlier this week over Havana and other places. Tony DeVarona, head of a Cuban exile group in Miami, said the planes came from airfields outside the United States.

Cuba charged that "pirate plane" flights over Cuba were being timed with the start of the sugar harvest. The Castro government claims large sugar cane acreages were burned by marauding planes last year.


Fire of unknown origin early today ravaged the fourth and fifth floors of the government-controlled CMQ radio and television station—a favorite Castro outlet for anti-American blasts.

Three companies of firemen, with American equipment, were summoned to the heart of Havana's former tourist belt to fight the fire. Low water pressure and the eager assistance of some Cuban photographers seemed to prolong the fire-fighting, and it was nearly three hours before the blaze was finally controlled.

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Shouting Cuban Demonstrators Disrupt Meeting of U.N. Council

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Jan. 4—The usually somber Security Council chamber was the scene twice today of shouting by Cuban demonstrators supporting and opposing the Castro Government. It was the stormiest meeting in years.

The morning session was interrupted by four men and two women who rose to scream "Liar" and "Communist" at Dr. Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister, as he charged the United States with preparing to invade his country.

In the afternoon, despite an alerted contingent of United Nations guards, six men and a woman leaped to their feet shouting "Viva Castro" after James J. Wadsworth, United States delegate, had replied to the accusations. In both cases the demonstrators were questioned and released.

The demonstrations were not restricted to the Council chamber. Pro-Castro and anti-Castro men and women fought and shouted at each other in the public lobby of the General Assembly Building, outside its gates and across the street from the United Nations Headquarters.

The first incident of the day occurred when Dr. Roa, spurning diplomatic transportation, decided to walk to the United Nations Building. He approached a group of pickets at the Forty-fifth Street entrance and, thinking they were pro-Castro demonstrators, shouted "Viva Castro."

The pickets responded by heaving small chunks of ice at the diplomat and his aides.

The morning session erupted after Dr. Roa had been invited to sit at the horseshoe-shaped Council table to present his case against the United States. He had charged that Washington was trying to "squash the revolution" and dominate his

country when a middle-aged woman began shouting from the center of the gallery.

Shaking her fist at Dr. Roa, she said: "This is the voice of the women of Cuba. You're a murderer, an assassin, a Communist * * *"

United Nations guards surrounded her and Dr. Roa demanded that the meeting be closed to the public.

Dr. Roa then asserted that these were "prepared machinations, carried out in stages." He insisted that he be "guaranteed freedom of speech."

Omar Loutfi, United Arab Republic representative and president of the council for January, slammed his gavel down and ordered a five-minute recess. When the meeting resumed, he warned against further outbursts and Dr. Roa was permitted to finish his speech.

The demonstrators were questioned and said that they were members of the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front, an anti-Castro organization. They were being escorted from the building when, in the public lobby, they encountered twenty pro-Castro supporters. The groups shouted at each other.

In the afternoon, after Mr. Wadsworth had charged that Cuba was serving as a springboard for Soviet subversion in the Western Hemisphere, six men and a woman began hurling insults at the United States diplomat. From opposite sides of the gallery they shouted "Viva Castro."

The day ended as it began. When the pro-Castro demonstrators left the building in the early evening they were pelted with eggs and tomatoes thrown by the anti-Castro group. City police moved in quickly to end the barrage.

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- Mr. Parsons _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Callahan _____
- Mr. DeLoach _____
- Mr. Malone _____
- Mr. McGowan _____
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- Miss Gandy _____

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EDITOR: CHARLES MERZ

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-CUBA


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United Press International
OUTSIDE: A policeman attempts to keep order as anti-Castro demonstrators picket near the United Nations.

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AIRWAVES COMMUNICATION NEEDED NOW

Cuba Is Not Getting U.S. Message

By DAVE REQUE

Is the U. S. getting its message thru to the ordinary Cuban man-in-the-street by radio?

The answer is no.

Now that diplomatic relations have been severed, entry of foreign publications into Cuba halted, and the island's press rigidly controlled by anti-Yankee dictator Castro, the need to communicate by the airwaves is urgent.

Nevertheless, the Voice of America, our Government's agency charged with presenting the United States' freedom story over the world's airwaves, says it is almost impossible for an American broadcast to be heard in Cuba, except on relatively scarce short wave sets.

There are six and a half million people in Cuba. There are 1.3 million radio sets. But only 10,000 of them can receive short wave.

CLAIMS

However, Radio Swan, a new American-owned outfit broadcasting from Swan Island near Honduras and 400 miles from Cuba, claims it is being heard well in Castro-land on ordinary, medium-wave receivers. Radio Swan also transmits on short wave.

There has been a long-running disagreement on the technical practicality of trying to reach Cubans via ordinary sets. Our severing relations with the island promises to blow it up into a hot controversy.

Most ordinary sets in Cuba, as elsewhere, are medium-wave, but the VOA broadcasts only on short wave.

Cuba, of course, receives the VOA's two hours of daily programming to Latin America.

In 13 countries, 125 stations make the VOA's broadcasts a part of their regular programming, rebroadcasting them on medium wave. But, of course, Castro won't allow this rebroadcasting in Cuba.

But Cuba is only 90 miles from Miami. Couldn't we shoot over a powerful medium wave that could easily be heard?

QUESTIONS

Sen. Karl Mundt (R., S.D.) put this question to VOA Director Henry Loomis during appropriations hearings last June.

Mr. Loomis explained that there are 48 domestic stations in Cuba and that the medium wave band is packed.

"Our program would interfere with a Cuban program, but ours wouldn't be heard either," he said.

Sen. Mundt asked him if every effort had been made to find a way.


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"We have been wracking our brains, but we can't come up with a way to do it," Mr. Loomis said.

The Swan Island transmitter, which went on the air in May, was built by A. D. Ring and Associates of Washington on a bit of deserted coral and sand off the coast of Honduras. Mr. Ring says flatly, "the medium-wave programs are being listened to in Cuba."

He denied reports that the transmitter used a new jam-proof method. "It's a conventional directional system with two towers. It gets thru simply by producing a stronger signal," Mr. Ring said.

The obvious question is, why should it be "impossible" to get thru from Miami, only 90 miles away, as Mr. Loomis says, and yet get thru from Swan Island, hundreds of miles further away, as Mr. Ring says?

NO DATA

The Federal Communications Commission says it has no technical performance data on Swan Radio. It is not licensed by the FCC because ownership of the island is in dispute between the U. S. and Honduras.

The U. S. lags in fourth place in weekly hours of in-

ternational government broadcasting on a nation-by-nation basis. It is far behind the Communist bloc in broadcasts to Latin America. None of the Red programs are re-broadcast in medium-wave however.

Castro beams 30 minutes of his propaganda daily to Haiti, and two hours daily to "Cubans abroad."

Radio Moscow short-waves 38 and a half hours weekly to Latin America. From Radio Peiping comes 21 hours; Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia combined send 44 hours.

COMPARISON

The comparison on total international hours weekly is:

Moscow, 997; Red China, 687; United Arab Republic, 670; U. S., 618; and Britain, 600.


Therefore, facilities for anti-U. S. broadcasting from the two big communist powers total 1684 hours a week, plus the Arab's 670, making a total of 2354 hours a week. This does not include any of the broadcasting from the other Iron Curtain countries.

Against this, the United States puts up a total time of less than a third from the two Red powers alone.

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UPI-104

(CUBA)

HAVANA--PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO'S GOVERNMENT CHARGED TODAY THAT AIRCRAFT FROM THE NORTH HAD PARACHUTED AMERICAN-PACKAGED ARMS TO STRATEGIC POINTS IN CUBA TO STIMULATE UPRISING THAT WOULD COINCIDE WITH ALLEGED U.S. "INVASION" PLANS.

CUBAN MILITIAMEN WERE REPORTED TO HAVE SEIZED A GROUP OF SUSPECTS IN THE TARGET AREAS OF THE ALLEGED ARMS DROPS. A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN INDICATED THE PRISONERS ADMITTED A REBEL UPRISING WAS TO BE SYNCHRONIZED WITH "A MAJOR INVASION ATTEMPT."

A PRESS COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT SAID THE WAR MATERIAL DROPPED INCLUDED MORTARS, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, AND AMMUNITION AND THAT ALL OF IT WAS CAPTURED BY THE MILITIA.

ONE ARMS DROP WAS REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE CONDADO ZONE OF LAS VILLAS PROVINCE IN CENTRAL CUBA SOME 130 MILES EAST OF HAVANA. ANOTHER WAS LOCATED AT BAHIA HONDA, ON THE NORTH COAST SOME 50 MILES WEST OF HAVANA.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT DID NOT SAY THE ARMS CAME FROM THE U.S. PHOTOGRAPHS IN CUBAN NEWSPAPERS SHOWED THE ARMS TO BE CONTAINED IN BOXES MANUFACTURED IN THE U.S.

THE CHARGE THAT ARMS HAD BEEN PARACHUTED BOLSTERED BELIEF THAT THE CASTRO REGIME PLANNED TO KEEP THE ISLAND ON A WAR FOOTING AT LEAST UNTIL THE EXPIRATION OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S TERM OF OFFICE JAN. 20.

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Castro Foes Arrested, Ten Are Linked to U. S.

By The Associated Press

HAVANA, Jan. 8.—The Cuban government arrested ten accused terrorists and rounded up suspects throughout Pinar del Rio Province today in a crackdown on opposition within Premier Fidel Castro's invasion-alarmed land.

Military intelligence headquarters announced a raid on La Luisa ranch at Cotorro, five miles south of Havana, and the smashing of a bomb-making ring there.

The government said the ring had links with the American Central Intelligence Agency. The ten men seized at the ranch were identified as members of a counter-revolutionary group headed by former Public Works Minister Manuel Ray.

Under a new law the ten are subject to execution. One of the band was reported still at large.

Agents also seized a cache of weapons, ammunition, explosives, chemicals, fuses, and radio transmitters.


Travelers from westernmost Pinar del Rio Province said government agents there detained sixty to eighty persons in the last two days for investigation.

Meanwhile, the "great network of liberty," a fusion of all Cuban radio and television stations into a single outlet, continued to broadcast periodic warnings of "imminent invasion by Yankee imperialism."

Soldiers and militia still manned battle posts at Havana on rooftops and along the Malecon.

Militia women still ringed the American embassy, an almost deserted building posted with signs saying the Swiss government now protects it.

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Castro's Men Nab 12; Charge U. S. Spy Tie

HAVANA, Jan. 9 (AP)—Castro security agents today announced the arrest of 12 more men accused of counter-revolutionary terrorism and links with the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Officers said they seized the 12 in a bakery where they found supplies of Molotov cocktails (gasoline fire bombs) and 200 pounds of tacks (presumably for tire puncturing). The agents also found 415 United States pennies which they said anti-Castro groups

used for identification among themselves.


The government charged that the CIA had been bribing and supplying the 12 with explosives.

The men will be tried by a military tribunal which is authorized under a new decree to give them the death sentence.

Last Saturday Castro police raided a ranch five miles south of Havana and arrested 19 men accused of terrorist plots. A communique said explosives found at the ranch were of United States manufacture.

W.C. Sullivan
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
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UPI-165

(CUBA)

NEW YORK--INFORMED SOURCES SAID TODAY CUBA'S PRESENT INVASION SCARE RESULTED FROM A REPORT GIVEN FIDEL CASTRO BY A CUBAN SOLDIER-OF-FORTUNE AFTER A BRIEF PERIOD IN COMMANDO TRAINING CAMPS IN THE MOUNTAINS OF GUATEMALA.

THE MERCENARY WAS IDENTIFIED AS GUILLERMO HERNANDEZ VEGA. HE WAS SAID TO HAVE ENLISTED IN A "FOREIGN LEGION" TRAINING IN THE GUATEMALAN MOUNTAIN HIDEHOUTS FOR THE DUAL PURPOSE OF REPELLING AN EXPECTED CUBAN ATTACK ON GUATEMALA AND A "REVENGE" COUNTER-BLOW AT CUBA.

THE SOURCES SAID HERNANDEZ WAS A RECRUIT IN ONE OF THE MANY HELVETIA FARMS FLANKING GUATEMALA'S "MYSTERY" AIRBASE AT RETALHULEU, NEAR GUATEMALA'S PACIFIC COAST AND IN THE MOUNTAINS BORDERING MEXICO. HE IS SUSPECTED OF HAVING MADE HIS WAY TO MEXICO CITY WHERE HE REPORTED TO THE CUBAN EMBASSY ON THE SIZE AND STRENGTH OF THE "DEFENSIVE-OFFENSIVE" FORCE BEING TRAINED BY THE GUATEMALANS.

SUBSEQUENTLY HERNANDEZ DISAPPEARED AND IT WAS PRESUMED THAT CUBA'S MOST RECENT COMPLAINT TO THE UNITED NATIONS AGAINST ALLEGED GUATEMALA'S PLANS TO "INVADE" CUBA WERE BASED ON HIS STATEMENTS.

GUATEMALA'S PRESIDENT MANUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES, LAST NOVEMBER OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED THE EXISTENCE OF SECRET TRAINING CAMPS IN MOUNTAINS AND SAID AT THE TIME THERE WERE "MORE THAN 20" SUCH CAMPS. GUATEMALAN AND OTHER FORCES ARE BEING TRAINED IN COMMANDO AND GUERRILLA WARFARE TACTICS THERE TO BE ABLE TO DEFEND GUATEMALA FROM WHAT IT BELIEVES TO BE A CONTINUED THREAT OF INVASION FROM CUBA, HE SAID.

THE AIR BASE AT RETALHULEU WAS IDENTIFIED AS ONE OF THE CAMPS. UPI CORRESPONDENT JOHN ALIUS REPORTED LAST NOV. 1 ON A TRIP TO GUATEMALA THAT THE CONSENSUS IS THAT THE BASE IS BEING PREPARED AS A POSSIBLE FUTURE INSTALLATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE PANAMA CANAL AS WELL AS A BASE FROM WHICH TO ATTACK ANY CUBAN INVASION FLEET).

CUBAN EXILE SOURCES, MEANWHILE, CONFIRMED CASTRO CLAIMS THAT TWO RECENT "AIR DROPS" OF AMERICAN-MADE ARMS HAD BEEN MADE IN CUBA TO ANTI-CASTRO GUERRILLA FORCES. THEY SAID THEY MADE THEM FROM "FOREIGN" BASES. THE EXILES SAID THE AMERICAN ARMS WERE THOSE SUPPLIED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FROM WAR SURPLUS STOCKS TO CUBA'S CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS FROM 1948 THROUGH 1956, UNDER HEMISPHERE DEFENSE AGREEMENTS, AND SUBSEQUENTLY SHIPPED SECRETLY OUT OF CUBA BY CASTRO TO ARM REVOLT MOVEMENTS IN CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

THEY SAID CASTRO WAS "HARDLY IN A POSITION" TO CRITICIZE THE AIR DROPS OR TO ACCUSE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OF SUPPLYING THE ARMS. THEY SAID THERE HAD BEEN SIMILAR ARMS DROPS IN THE PAST "AND THERE WILL BE MORE IN THE FUTURE, THANKS TO THE ARMS RECOVERED FROM THOSE REVOLT FORCES ARMED BY CASTRO WHICH HAVE FAILED IN PARAGUAY, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, HAITI, NICARAGUA, GUATEMALA AND COSTA RICA, AMONG OTHERS."

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
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
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(COMMANDOS)

WASHINGTON--STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS OFFICER LINCOLN WHITE SAID TODAY HE WAS UNABLE TO CONFIRM OR DENY REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS HELPING TO TRAIN COMMANDO AND OTHER FORCES IN GUATEMALA FOR AN EVENTUAL SHOWDOWN WITH CUBA.

HE SAID HE HOPED TO HAVE SOME COMMENT ON REPORTS TO THAT EFFECT LATER DAY.

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U. S. Reported Helping Train Anti-Cuba Force

A-1 Guatemala Project Called Defensive But Ydigoras Foes Brand It Offensive

By the Associated Press

The United States is supplying Guatemala with training personnel, material and other assistance in the preparation of a commando-type force for a possible clash with Cuba, the New York Times reported today.

A dispatch by Paul F. Kennedy from Retalhuleu, near the southwest coast of Guatemala, said the United States also helped finance the construction of a nearby airfield where intensive daily air training is going on.

"Guatemalan authorities from President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes on down insist that the military effort is designed to meet an assault, expected almost any day, from Cuba," said the dispatch.

"Opponents of the Ydigoras administration have insisted that the preparations are for an offensive against Cuba and that it is being planned and directed, and to a great extent being paid for, by the United States."

Charged by Roa.

Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa charged in the United Nations Security Council last week that training camps for "mercenaries" for use against Cuba were operating in Guatemala and elsewhere. He complained that the United States was planning an invasion of Cuba at almost any hour.

President Ydigoras previously charged that a frustrated uprising in Guatemala last November was aided by Cubans.

At his request President Eisenhower sent United States naval and air patrols off Guatemala's coast to prevent any invasion of the country.

The United States Embassy in Guatemala City is maintaining complete silence on the activity at Retalhuleu, Mr. Kennedy said. But he wrote that President Ydigoras admitted in an interview that training in guerrilla warfare is going on at the large Helvetia plantation near Retalhuleu and that an airfield 3 miles west of the town is being used for military purpose.


The plantation, Mr. Kennedy said, is largely owned by Roberto Alejo Arzu, "probably" Guatemala's largest independent coffee producer and a close friend and adviser of Mr. Ydigoras.

Constructed Last Summer

Mr. Kennedy reported: The airstrip was constructed in an around-the-clock operation last summer by a United States construction firm from funds contributed in part by

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local landowners but mostly by the United States.

Two B-26s and two DC-4s or DC-6s, without identification letters, are operating from a 5,000-foot strip behind a corrugated iron fence. The field has a terminal and other buildings that look like barracks and a radio shack.

Because of a security lapse, Mr. Kennedy, before he was stopped, penetrated nearly 7 miles into the plantation where Guatemalans are being trained in guerrilla tactics.

A Guatemalan authority told him Guatemalans originally were in charge of training at the base, but the project grew so rapidly that foreign experts in guerrilla fighting, mostly from the United States, were brought in.

Cuban Training Denied

Two Russian-speaking trainers were being used, the Guatemalan reported, so the trainees could become accustomed to hearing Russian commands. The source denied, however, that Cubans are being trained now at the plantation.

"An informant (in Retalhuleu) said there were a number of United States military personnel and other foreigners at the air base for training purposes," Mr. Kennedy reported.

"Officers appearing to wear United States Air Force uniforms have been seen in downtown Retalhuleu driving automobiles, but none thus dressed has been seen walking on the streets."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JANUARY 10, 1961

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U. S. Helps to Train Anti-Castro Force At Secret Guatemalan Air-Ground Base

**Clash With Cuba Feared
—Washington Supplies
Men and Materiel**

By **PAUL P. KENNEDY**
Special to The New York Times


RETALHULEU, Guatemala, Jan. 9—This area is the focal point of Guatemala's military preparations for what Guatemalans consider will be an almost inevitable clash with Cuba.

There is intensive daily air training here from a partly hidden airfield. In the Cordillera foothills a few miles back from the Pacific, commando-like forces are being drilled in guerrilla warfare tactics by foreign personnel, mostly from the United States.

The United States is assisting this effort not only in personnel but also in material and the construction of ground and air facilities.

Guatemalan authorities from President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes down insist that the military effort is designed to meet an assault, expected almost any day, from Cuba.

Opponents of the Ydigoras



The New York Times, Jan. 10, 1961
Guatemala is building her military strength at a U. S.-equipped base at Retalhuleu (1) in anticipation of an eventual clash with the Castro Government in Cuba (2).

Administration have insisted that the preparations are for an offensive against Cuba and that it is being planned and directed, and to a great extent being paid for, by the United States.

The United States Embassy is maintaining complete silence on the subject. Guatemalan authorities will speak only guardedly about it.

One authority who has negotiated with the United States for assistance in the Retalhuleu


land and air operations said that application for certain amounts of war materials over the amount already received had been turned down by the United States.

The reason, he said, was that Washington considered that the amount and type of materials applied for went beyond the needs of defensive operations.

This source showed concern on two counts. First, he main-

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- The Worker _____
- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
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U. S. Helps Anti-Castro Force At Secret Guatemala Facility

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

taind that the materials desired were demonstrably of a defense nature. Second he said there were "loads" of Czechoslovak military equipment stored in Guatemala but without ammunition. The equipment had been purchased by the Communist-infiltrated regime of Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, who was overthrown in 1954. "We still have the equipment and it is usable," the informant said, but he added: "The only way we can get ammunition for this equipment is to go into a commercial transaction with Czechoslovakia and we do not want to do that."

President Confirms Training
 President Ydigoras agreed in an interview that training in guerrilla warfare tactics was being carried out in the foothills of the large plantation named Helvetia. This plantation is situated a few miles from the provincial capital.

The President also said that the air base about three miles west of the capital toward the Pacific was being used for military purposes. However, he added that he hoped it would be transformed to a commercial base in the foreseeable future.

The airfield is partly fenced in by a corrugated metal wall. The present airstrip was constructed last summer over an already established base that had been used in the 1954 revolution by fighter planes with American pilots who attacked military objectives in Guatemala, the country's capital.

The present installation was constructed in an around-the-clock operation by a North American construction company, Cornwall-Thompson.

A check of seven leading directories by The New York Times and the Engineering Societies Library failed to turn up the name of the

Cornwall-Thompson company.

According to a Guatemalan authority who helped arrange the details of the construction, it was paid for partly by subscriptions from land-owners in the Fourth Military Zone, in which the State of Retalhuleu is situated, and partly by the United States. The latter was by far the heavier contributor. The concrete strip, more than 5,000 feet long, is used by two B-26 planes and two DC-4's or 6's. A third B-26 on the field is inoperable because of some damage apparently caused in a landing. None of the craft bore any identification letters or numbers.

Besides a large civilian-like terminal building, the field has several buildings that look like barracks, a radio shack and other minor installations.

Airfield Facilities Limited

The field is not a military installation in the true sense. It could not possibly serve in its present state as a large-scale offensive base. It has no dispersal areas, hardstands for plane parking or lateral existing and entering runways.

According to persons assisting in directing the construction of the base, the strip will take four-engine planes up to the C-54 type. It was agreed that in an emergency the present strip could handle jet fighters, but only in limited operational scope and with an element of danger.

Although the air operation is about ten miles from the commando-training area, the two are geared for quick cooperative action.

This was shown in early November during an abortive barracks revolt in which the rebels captured three important garrison cities before they were defeated by a combination of



DEFENDS BUILD-UP
 President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes of Guatemala. He maintains that military effort in country is designed only for defense.

air power and ground troops.

The commando troops, who are divided into separate groups, one from each of Guatemala's eight military zones, were flown immediately to their respective military zone units and were swiftly integrated. The groups were returned to the Helvetia training center after limited combat.

The Helvetia finca, or plantation, lies high in the foothills about five miles east of the road to the port of Champerico on the Pacific coast. Its nearly 3,000 acres are owned by Roberto Alejo Arzu, president of the National Association of Coffee Planters and probably the largest independent coffee producer in the country. He is a close friend and adviser of President Ydigoras, who spent last week-end at the Alejo Helvetia home.

At the entrance of the Helvetia estate the visitor is challenged by armed guards. He is

challenged again five miles beyond the entrance by more guards. Here, and in the plantation village, there are relatively heavy detachments of troops and stored munitions.

This writer, because of a military lapse in security, proceeded nearly two miles farther up into the mountains before being stopped and sent back down to the plantation village.

Only plantation workers with special passes were supposed to reach that point. Except for a few lounging troops in green commando garb, there was nothing at that point to suggest any unusual activity.

A Guatemalan authority at the Helvetia plantation village said the secret activities were taking place considerably above that point. He added that the guerrilla operations, which he repeatedly referred to as "anti-guerrilla" tactics, had been hindered by "snoopers" and that several nights the guards had used rifle fire to repel intruders.

The authority said the guerrilla training originally had been assigned to Guatemalans, who themselves had been thoroughly trained, presumably, in the United States or by United States personnel.

However, he said, the project had grown so rapidly that foreign trainers had been brought in. Most of these, he said, were North American guerrilla-tactics experts. Experts from several other nations also were brought in, he said. He indicated that the trainee group included Cubans, but denied that Cubans were being trained now in Helvetia. He said that among the trainers were two Russian-speaking persons who were used primarily for shouting orders in Russian so that the trainees could become acquainted with the language. Residents of the quiet, shaded city of Retalhuleu appear to be increasingly restless over the mystery surrounding the air base and the Helvetia installation.

There appears to be a step-

ping up of formation training at night activity from the air base. The planes, usually four in formation, sweep over the plantations daily.

An informant said there were a number of United States military personnel and other foreigners at the air base for training purposes.

Officers appearing to wear United States Air Force uniforms have been seen in downtown Retalhuleu driving automobiles, but none thus dressed have been seen walking on the streets.

Some speculation has arisen over the feasibility of the air base, whose site near the Pacific coast is across the country from the scene of any possible Caribbean invasion.

However, it has been explained in Retalhuleu that the field's inland site affords it greater defensive preparation and that it is the best site available in mountainous Guatemala for constructionless take-offs and approaches.

The New Leader _____
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- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Callahan _____
- Mr. Conrad _____
- Mr. DeLoach _____
- Mr. Malone _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tavel _____
- Mr. W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Ingram _____
- Miss Gandy _____



—Photo by The Times-Picayune.
JORGE LUIS ZELAYA CORONADO
 denies invasion force, training.

**ANTI-CUBA UNITS
 ROLE IS DENIED**

**Guatemala Delegation in
 Orleans on Tour**

The president of the Guatemalan Congress denied here Tuesday reports that his government was aiding or training anti-Castro forces in Guatemala for an invasion of Cuba. Asked about these reports, Jorge Luis Zelaya Coronado said that "Guatemala maintains and has always maintained a policy of nonintervention in the affairs of other countries."

Zelaya is head of a delegation of Guatemalan congressmen who arrived here Monday night to begin a 45-day visit to the United States. He spoke through an interpreter at an interview in International Trade Mart. The Guatemalan government, he said, has been forced to dou-

REVOLT PUT DOWN
 Zelaya noted that a revolt by pro-Castro supporters against the Guatemalan government had been put down in November last year.

Most of the pro-Castro supporters, he noted, were followers of the former Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz, the Red-supported political leader who was ousted in 1954.

Zelaya said that perhaps the fact that Guatemala had once had a pro-Communist government was the reason why "Castro has picked Guatemala as his next step."

The president of Guatemala's highest legislative body said that the cordial relations between his country and the United States could be "greatly improved" by opening United States markets for Guatemalan products. Doing this, he said, would improve the standard of living in Guatemala.

Zelaya said that his country would like to sell more sugar to the United States.

TO MEET WITH MAYOR
 The delegation, which is stopping at the Royal Orleans hotel, visited International Trade Mart and International House Tuesday. Wednesday the delegation will meet with Mayor deLesseps S. Morrison in City Hall. The group will take a trip aboard the Good Neighbor, the Dock Board's yacht, Thursday.

Other Guatemalan deputies on the cultural exchange tour under the auspices of the state department are: Victor Eduardo Arriza Leon, chairman of the congressional communications; Luis Antonio Diaz Vasconcelos, chairman of the committee on economy; Ruben Flores Avendano, chairman of the finance committee; Francisco E. Mejicanos Ferrigno, chairman of the defense committee. While here Flores will visit his daughter Mrs. Alberto Riepele, who lives in New Orleans.

The group leaves Thursday for Austin, Tex., the first of 11 other cities on the tour.

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
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THE TIMES-PICAYUNE
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ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
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Stories of troop training activities in Guatemala in Sec. Page 2.
 her defense efforts because the "constant threats of Cuban infiltration."

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REC-58

Cuban Invasion Scare Is Traced To 'Trainee' of Guatemalan Camp

NEW YORK, Jan. 10 (UPI) — Informed sources today said Cuba's present invasion scare resulted from a report given Prime Minister Fidel Castro by a Cuban soldier-of-fortune after a brief period in commando training camps in the mountains of Guatemala.

The mercenary was identified as Guillermo Hernandez Vega. He was said to have enlisted in a "Foreign Legion" training in the Guatemalan mountain hideouts for the dual purpose of repelling an expected Cuban attack on Guatemala and a "revenge" counter-blow at Cuba.

The sources said Hernandez was a recruit in one of the many Helvetia farms flanking Guatemala's "mystery" airbase at Retalhuleu, near the Pacific coast and in the mountains bordering Mexico.

He sought political asylum in the Mexican Embassy at Guatemala City just after Christmas, but was denied a safe-conduct by the Guatemalan Government, which described him as a "vulgar delinquent" with a gangster background.

Last Seen at Hidalgo

Subsequently, Hernandez "escaped" the embassy and crossed the Guatemalan border into Mexico. He was last sighted at the border town of Hidalgo, where he sought un-

successfully to cash a large check.

From Hidalgo, he is suspected of having made his way to Mexico City, where he reported to the Cuban Embassy on the size and strength of the "defensive-offensive" force being trained by the Guatemalans.

Guatemala's President Manuel Ydigoras Fuentes last November officially confirmed the existence of secret training camps in the mountains and said at the time that there were "more than 20" such camps.

Guatemalan and other forces are being trained in commando and guerilla warfare tactics there to be able to defend Guatemala from what it believes to be a continued threat of invasion from Cuba, he said.

The United States was reported supplying Guatemala with training personnel, material and other assistance in the preparation of commando-type force for a possible clash with Cuba.

U. S. Finance Reported

The New York Times dispatch from Retalhuleu said the United States also helped finance the construction of a nearby airfield, where intensive daily air training is going on.

In Washington, State Department press officer Lincoln White said today that for the

time being he had no comment on the newspaper story.

"As everyone well knows," White said, "the United States under the inter-American defense system is helping practically every Latin American country excepting, of course, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. As to a report of some specific base, I know absolutely nothing about it," the Associated Press reported.

9 Cuban Diplomats Seek Asylum in U. S.

United Press International

At least nine Cuban diplomats have asked for asylum in the United States rather than return to Cuba after the U. S. break in diplomatic relations with the Fidel Castro regime.

State Department and immigration officials yesterday said their applications are being considered.

The defecting Cubans asked U. S. officials not to reveal their names for fear of reprisals against their families in Cuba.


Immigration officials said more applications are expected to come in during the next few days.

The first nine held diplomatic jobs in some of the 15 Cuban consulates around the country, none of them at the Cuban Embassy in Washington.

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- The Wall Street Journal _____
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Facts of Life

MAX LERNER

It is time to state some of the facts of life about the U. S. Cuba mess.

Paul F. Kennedy, a good responsible reporter who showed me the ropes when we were both watching the decline and fall of the pro-Communist Arbenz regime in Guatemala, reports unsurprisingly that the Guatemalans are training under American auspices with an eye to Castro. There is an American-built airbase, with fliers (and parachutists?), there are American Air Force uniforms around town, and there is an "anti-guerilla" training camp nearby. There is even an instructor whose special pitch is to bark commands in Russian—an antic-turn which may have meaning or may be just small-boy histrionics.

The Guatemalan authorities protest, of course, that this is all for defense purposes. In doing so they stay within the proper legal forms. After all, Fidel tried recently to engineer a coup against the Guatemalan government, and the latter has the right to call upon American help in resisting an invasion attempt which may be linked with another revolt. It is as good a version as you can get in a haywire world in which anything can happen—and often does.

The facts of life I have in mind run somewhat as follows:

Fact one. Castro's cries that the American invasion is imminent are one-third guess, one-third fear, and one-third bluff. Priding himself on his skill in the war of nerves he hopes to scare off any potential hostile adventure by presenting to it the bristling array of an armed camp.

He may have learned from Mao Tse-tung's writings the merits of politicizing war and of militarizing politics. His danger here is that of crying "wolf" too much and too soon, and finally losing his audience.


Fact Two: To overthrow a regime like Castro's its enemies must agree on leaders—which they have not done. They must also combine internal revolt with invasion. It is too early for the first and too late for the second. An invasion now would be bloodily repulsed, with a howling triumph for Fidelism and a disaster for American influence, whether or not the U. S. kept clear of it.

In fact, Castro's dream would be to have his double agents mount a nice unsuccessful invasion-revolt against him, which would be like a soldier's self-inflicted "million-dollar wound."

REC-26

EX-113

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
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Mr. Ingram	
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PAGE 41

FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

EDITOR: JAMES WECHSLER

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-CUBA

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Fact Three: Every modern state uses not only political intelligence (spies) but agents who are not above and beyond the job of prodding history a bit by helping the enemies of an unfriendly regime to topple it. The Russians, Chinese, Egyptians, Iraqi, and East European Communists do it habitually, and the British and French have been known to dabble in it.

The U. S. did it notably in Guatemala against the Arbenz regime and in Iran against Mossadegh. The Americans lack a nice useful instrument like a Communist Party apparatus, so they have to sweat and pay for it through CIA when the big decision-makers decide it has to be done.

The airstrip at the Helvetia Finca is actual, and somewhere else on a little island there are probably Cubans training for their D-Day, to overthrow a hated dictator who is linked with the Grand Design of world communism.

* * *

Fact Four: Castro is doing well in getting Communist arms and training his loyal militia. But he can no longer depend on his former army associates because their revolution has been betrayed. The hopes of the middle-class businessmen, professional men, students, teachers, skilled workers, for a constitutional regime with a Socialist pattern have turned to dust.

Some former supporters have been shot and imprisoned, some have gone to the hills, many have fled to the U.S. where they eat the bitter bread of voluntary exile, and the rest are trapped in Cuba, waiting in agony for the days of wrath to come.

On Castro's side is the Russians' support of their ward state, and the continued devotion of most of the formerly disinherited, for whom Castro preaches a new heaven and a new earth. On his side is also the watchful, restless sympathy of the similarly disinherited in other Latin nations.

Against him is the narrowness of his economic base, given his grandiose aims; his efforts now to keep his able-bodied men peering through gunsights are paralyzing the economy. Against him also is the fact that he is no longer winning the war of ideas, and is likely to win it even less when Kennedy comes in. The distant Yanqui giant is no substitute for the formerly clear and present Batista terror.

* * *

Fact Five: A revolution is bound to come. But an invasion now would hurt rather than help. Failure of success, it would feed the fires of Fidelism in the grand arc of Latin American discontent, justifying the fulfilling Castro's indictment of the U.S. as a bully-boy imperialist.

What is needed is massive patience by the U.S., and a shifting of sights from Cuba to the rest of the hemisphere. The task now is to contain, construct, and confound Castro's swollen ambitions. With it should come a bold effort to build a system of hemispheric common counsel and common action, such as the Eisenhower regime has never achieved.

With it should come also a stepped-up effort to help build in this hemisphere a number of welfare democratic societies, as a contrast to the showcase prison-house which Castro and his romantic supporters mistake for a paradise.

Tolson ✓
 Mohr ✓
 Parsons ✓
 Belmont ✓
 Callahan ✓
 DeLoach ✓
 Malone ✓
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 Trotter ✓
 W.C. Sullivan ✓
 Tele. Room ✓
 Ingram ✓
 Gandy ✓

clip

NAT. INT. SEC. *Job*

UPI -27

(CUBA)

GUATEMALA CITY--PRESIDENT MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES SAYS THE ONLY FORCES IN TRAINING IN GUATEMALA ARE GUATEMALAN REGULARS BEING CONDIT-
TIONED TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY AGAINST POSSIBLE ATTACK BY CUBA.

AT A PRESS CONFERENCE LAST NIGHT, YDIGORAS EMPHATICALLY DENIED RECURRENT REPORTS THAT FOES OF PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO ARE PREPARING AN INVASION OF CUBA FROM BASES IN RETALHULEU PROVINCE.

"GUATEMALA IS NOT AN AGGRESSOR..." HE SAID. "WE ARE NOT RECEIVING 10 SHIPLOADS A WEEK OF COMMUNIST-MANUFACTURED ARMS, NOR DO WE HAVE (RED) CHINESE INSTRUCTORS TO TEACH US TO FLY COMMUNIST JET FIGHTERS."

"WHAT WE HAVE ARE MEN READY TO FIGHT FOR OUR INDEPENDENCE AND OUR POLITICAL FREEDOM."

THE REFERENCE TO COMMUNIST ARMS AND RED INSTRUCTORS CONCERNED THE AID CASTRO IS SAID TO BE RECEIVING FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN.


YDIGORAS' STATEMENT ALSO DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY UNUSUAL NUMBER OF U.S. OFFICERS STATIONED IN GUATEMALA.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

105-89923

Caribbean Fantasy

When a reporter asked a State Dept. specialist in Latin American affairs about a secret air base and commando training center allegedly supported by the U.S. in Guatemala, a few miles from Cuba, the response was: "Don't ask us about it, ask the spooks—the Central Intelligence Agency." The notion that CIA spooks are shaping our foreign policy in the Caribbean will provide a new pretext for Fidel Castro's "invasion" hysteria.

Yesterday's Times dispatch from Guatemala about the base, hidden near Mexico and the Pacific Coast corroborates recent reports in other American publications of war-like preparations there. Such exercises could hardly be possible without U. S. backing.

None of the stories proves the U. S. intends to invade Cuba; indeed, Guatemala's President Ydigoras maintains that the guerilla warfare training and the air strip recently constructed by a U. S. firm on a crash basis, have a purely defensive purpose. But since the site is on the opposite coast from any possible Cuban landing, it is not surprising that its existence and the presence of U. S. guerilla warfare experts create large questions. Nor can Washington's decision to conduct naval maneuvers in the Caribbean this week serve as a tranquilizer. However peaceful our intentions may be one does not have to share Castro's paranoia about the U. S. to be disturbed by these spooky developments.

Such war games, of course, are more likely to augment Castro's popular support than to undermine it. Moreover, while the military installations in Guatemala seem unsuited for any action on a large scale, the training of commandos on a private 3,000-acre estate belonging to one of the largest coffee producers in the country suggests that once again the U. S. is identifying itself with the Latin "haves" against the "have nots."

Surely the incoming Administration should have an opportunity to re-examine the whole Cuban problem before spooks in Washington hopelessly befog it.

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Boardman _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Belmont _____
 Mr. Casper _____
 Mr. Callahan _____
 Mr. Conrad _____
 Mr. DeLoach _____
 Mr. Evans _____
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 Mr. Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Ingram _____
 Miss Gandy _____

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
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EDITOR: JAMES WECHSLER
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
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UPI-115

(CUBA)

UNITED NATIONS--RUSSIA FLATLY ACCUSED THE UNITED STATES TODAY OF SETTING UP AN INVASION BASE IN GUATEMALA FOR AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA. THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS MADE THE CHARGE IN A PRESS STATEMENT BASED LARGELY ON REPORTS APPEARING IN U.S. NEWSPAPERS AND NEWS MAGAZINES.

IT SAID CONSTRUCTION OF A MAJOR AIRFIELD WAS STARTED AT RETALHULEU, GUATEMALA, LAST AUGUST AND WAS SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES WITH B-26 BOMBERS AND OTHER MILITARY AIRCRAFT AS SOON AS IT WAS COMPLETED. IT QUOTED GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES AS SAYING THE RETALHULEU BASE WAS BUILT TO PROMOTE "EXPORT BY GUATEMALA OF BANANAS, MEAT AND SHRIMP."

"THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, LEANING ON THE REACTIONARY ANTI-POPULAR REGIMES OF THE GUATEMALAN TYPE IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, HAS NOT DISCONTINUED PREPARATION FOR A DIRECT MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, IS SPEEDING UP THESE ACTIONS BY ALL MEANS," THE STATEMENT SAID. "...THE INTERESTS OF PEACE DEMAND THAT AN END SHOULD BE PUT TO THE POLICY OF PROVOCATIONS AGAINST THE CUBAN PEOPLE."

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Murder Will Out

ASSASSINATOR RAUL ROA had been...
dictator of Washington's intervention and...
aggression... in his appearance before the...
Nation... had de... of
the... Guatemala.

at the... of aggression and...
fifth column and overseas invasion of Cuba by U.S. armed
forces... looted down... editorials
and front page indignation stories in all... press.

But you can't conceal the movements of an aircraft
carrier warming with jet bombers, you can't build air
fields and military encampments only by the light of the
moon.

★

OCIP

THE WEIGHT of evidence became so overwhelming
that the Pentagon gang and the government in Wash-
ington were in an advanced stage of unleashing a mur-
derous attempt upon the sovereignty and life of the Cuban
nation, until even The New York Times could no longer
conceal all the facts.

So its front page story of January 10, datelined Re-
talhuleu, Guatemala, has lifted the lid of lies and denials,
for all to see the clear and present danger that Washing-
ton has cooked up not only against the integrity of Cuba
but the peace of the world.

The Batista gangster, Manuel A. de Varona, it is
admitted, is being paid \$350,000 a month to train an in-
vasion group of arsonists and assassins in Miami, Florida,
for deeds of murder in Cuba. Alan Dulles and the U.S.
government treasury are paying him for running his
school for murder—of—Cubans.

The conspiracy to launch a "secret" war of invasion
against Cuba, using men trained for murder in Florida,
Guatemala and Honduras, trained by U.S. officers and fi-
nanced by the tax monies of every U.S. citizen, is now no
longer a secret. It is known to all.

★

LET EVERY PERSON with a regard for the fate of
our country, let all who want to prevent our country from
being pushed blindfolded down the chute that can lead to
a thermonuclear war, raise their voices.

Let them raise loud their voices and demand that the
government in Washington put an immediate end to this
criminal folly of organizing war against Cuba.

Demand that the Kennedy administration reverse the
Eisenhower madness in reference to Cuba and restore nor-
mal relations on the basis of equality and full respect for
Cuba's sovereignty. For peace and friendship with Cuba
its government and its people, not aggressions, plots
and terror against her!

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- The New York Times _____
- The Worker *P. 3* _____
- The New Leader _____
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Cuba on Guard Against Pentagon Invasion Threat

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DANIEL MASON

The danger of an imminent military aggression against Cuba by Wall Street imperialism became clearer last Tuesday in the baring of the open secret that Guatemala is oneycombed with invasion bases.

U. S. Helps Train an Anti-Castro Force At Secret Guatemalan Air-Ground Base

HEADLINE over the N. Y. Times story last Tuesday conceding the existence of military sites in Guatemala, sponsored by the Pentagon and aimed at an invasion of Cuba.

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- New York Mirror _____
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These bases are on plantations owned by the United Fruit Co. on U. S. government property paid for and commanded by Pentagon brass.

The bases swarm with the scum of dictator Batista's thugs and mercenaries from all Latin America preparing for the aggression against Cuba with U. S. arms and planes.

The Pentagon has also embarked on so-called maneuvers around Cuba with 150 battleships of various types led by the huge aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt, and 40,000 soldiers and marines with Guantanamo base on Cuba's own territory as the headquarters for the threatening action.

These aggressive acts followed closely upon the breaking of diplomatic relations by Washington a week ago Tuesday. That obviously was the first step in the aggression plot now unraveling. Two days later, Stewart Hensley, a United Press International Washington Correspondent, wrote:

"U. S. officials believe that Premier Fidel Castro must go before there can be any consideration of restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba."

Hensley asserted:

"The U. S. apparently hopes that his downfall will be hastened by actions of other Latin American republics."

These menacing moves give emphasis to the warnings given by the Cuban government and the charges made by Foreign Minister Raul Roa to the UN Security Council two weeks ago that the U. S. was planning an invasion before Jan. 18.

That this date is significant was unwittingly corroborated by the U. S. Navy Department, which admitted that its massive forces would be operating in the Cuban area for ten days from Jan. 9 on.

DULLES AND PENTAGON

Apparently, Allen W. Dulles, chief of Central Intelligence Agency, and the Pentagon have taken over active control of the government from the impotent Eisenhower administration, and are seeking to saddle the American people with a hot war in the interest of Wall Street before the administration of President-elect John F. Kennedy takes office Jan. 20.

That this plot began some time ago was revealed in the syndicated column of the knowing Washington correspondent Marquis Childs Jan. 5, 1961.

He reported that anti-Castro Cubans in the U. S. were complaining last year "that the United States was interested only in providing an invading force from the outside" and that "it looked as though a new military dictatorship would be imposed on Cuba as the only alternative to Castro."

REPORT IN OCTOBER

Childs declared:

"In October reports persisted that an invasion would be mounted before the election. There apparently was some substance to these reports."

But having thus admitted the existence of a plot in Washington's top government circles to invade Cuba, Childs tried to

deny the validity of the charges on the imminence of an invasion made at the turn of the year by claiming that "it is hard to believe in Castro's latest cry of 'wolf' against the U. S., for surely our intelligence must know the heavy odds against an invasion and the perils that would flow from it on the eve of a new administration."

But it was precisely "our intelligence," under the authority of Allen Dulles and the Pentagon, which made the decision for breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba at the conference with President Eisenhower less than two weeks ago.

PATTERN FOR INVASION

According to the National Review of last July, as cited by Cuban Foreign Minister Roa, in his charges to the UN Council, the pattern for invasion by the U. S. would take the following course:

First, there would be breaking of diplomatic relations; second would come an embargo, with the Atlantic fleet ordered to patrol the Cuban area; third, the outright military and naval attack on Cuba.

Events of the last two days have carried out the first two points of the program. The revelations about the invasion bases in Guatemala that appeared in the N. Y. Times demonstrate the truth about the third point.

But the Times was quite tardy about its revelations.

NATION ARTICLE

Early in November the Nation magazine had published an article baring the existence of these bases under the control and direction of Washington. And at the UN Council meeting a week and a half ago, Roa gave proof of this. He declared:

"On December 8, the second lieutenant of Guatemala, exiled in Honduras, Rodoleno Edwardo Chacon, declared before the press of Tegucigalpa, that 12,000 parachutists were being prepared in Guatemala to drop over Cuba. He spoke of a catapult in La Suiza farm there. He said that there was a double purpose of instructing pilots and preparing the operations for plane carriers, and that the installations had been set up by the Johnson Powers Company of the U. S."

Roa continued:

"Although it is perfectly unnecessary to repeat this, it is necessary that we mention the fact that the puppet government of Guatemala has opened its territory for the installation of these camps. Among others we can cite Camp Corriente, the property of the United Fruit Company, Rancho Elorido, in the Department of Escuintla; the Helvetia farm; Chaguita, where new mobile units are being instructed; the Inca farm, also of the United Fruit Company; Aurora farm, and many others. The government of Guatemala has confessed that more than 20

private firms exist holding mer-

CORROBORATION

This was all denied at the Council meeting by James Wadsworth, the U. S. delegate, in a scoffing tone. But now Times correspondent Paul P. Kennedy, writing from the site of one of the Guatemalan invasion bases, gives the direct lie to the U. S. delegate. Describing the bases, the Times reporter declares:

"The U. S. is assisting this effort not only in personnel but in material and the construction of ground and air facilities."

He reports: "In the Cordillera foothills a few miles back from the Pacific, commando-like forces are being drilled in guerrilla warfare tactics by foreign personnel, mostly from the United States."

In the Nation of Jan. 7, 1961, Don Dwiggins reports:

"In a bar at Caracas, Venezuela, one itinerant pilot told me that there is a go-between who handles secret messages for members of a newly formed Caribbean Legion of fliers of fortune. These fly-for-hire air-men, he said, are secretly bringing into the Caribbean theater a growing armada of strange aircraft, from British Vampire jet fighters to World War II B-25s and P-51s."

AIR RAID PLOT

Dwiggins, who is aviation editor of the Los Angeles Mirror, also writes:

"In Los Angeles, a member of a former pro-Castro gun-smuggling ring, now turned anti-Castro, tells of a fantastic air-raid operation scheduled for some time early in 1961:

"They are offering \$25,000 for pilots to fly on this mission," he said.

On the very first day of the U. S. "maneuvers," the aircraft carrier landed marines at Guantanamo Base in Cuba, whose task was to string up barbed wire along the approaches from Cuban territory, certainly not a very peaceful activity.

Because of their realization that Wall Street and the Eisenhower administration are planning an invasion of Cuba, Batista's henchmen, representatives of the ousted Cuban millionaires and various types of traitors are setting up organizations in the U. S., bidding for money from the monopolists and subsidies from Washington.

However, while encouraging

these factions to continue their propaganda in the U. S. and Latin America, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon are keeping tight control on the actual forces that would be involved in the invasion of Cuba.

Regarding the arrival of the carrier Roosevelt at Guantanamo, the Havana daily newspaper, "Revolucion," charged it is "part of the aggression plan." The newspaper warned that the U. S. forces at Guantanamo might "stage a self-attack" as a phony excuse to launch its attack on Cuba.

DENOUNCE PLOT

The national committee of the Popular Socialist Party (Communist) of Cuba denounced the machinations and plotting of the U. S. government against Cuba and pointed out:

"The breaking of diplomatic relations hurt North American imperialists, but did not damage Cuba. It damaged the U. S. and its position in the world. It was the same when they stopped shipping oil; that did not harm Cuba, but it hurt U. S. economic interests. When they suspended the sugar quota, they did not harm Cuba, but hurt the people of the U. S. A., who find their sugar situation more difficult daily. So it was when they imposed a blockade. They caused no national catastrophe, but damaged North American interests. With or without relations, our motherland will win. The revolution will go forward."

Reactions in Latin America to the U. S. break in relations with

Cuba have put Washington in a gloomy mood. Originally, the Central Intelligence Agency and Pentagon had planned to have a number of Latin American nations sever diplomatic relations with Cuba first. That was behind the prodding of the puppet Peruvian government into December.

This was supposed to spur an avalanche of denunciations of Cuba in other Latin American countries. It was when this did not happen, that Washington proceeded to act unilaterally. This, in turn, was aimed at forcing the other countries to move speedily to do the same. Such action was expected to be the ideological support for the projected invasion of Cuba. But it hasn't worked out that way.

Ray Cromley, a Washington correspondent, wrote in the N. Y. World-Telegram Jan. 9:

"There's a growing fear in Washington that Fidel Castro's Cuba cannot be contained."

Cromley continues:

"The worriers are spread through the Departments of State and Defense and on Capitol Hill. They include Kennedy Democrats as well as Eisenhower Republicans."

Cromley points out that the very men in the government who are urging diplomatic breaks, naval maneuvers, economic sanctions and other aggressions against Cuba, "are doubtful that they can ever be carried out effectively. Some of these diplomats are doubtful that these strong measures—even if pushed through—would be really effective against the spread of Castro-type revolutions."

The top echelons in government, according to the Washington correspondent, are afraid that these revolutions are going to spread to between half a dozen and a dozen Latin American countries in the near future.

Cromley comments wryly about these countries: "U. S. representatives are in close contact with the middle and upper classes, building goodwill there. The Castro men and their Red allies are in close contact with the worker and the peasant. There are many times more workers and peasants."

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- Gandy

Would End Hostility To U. S., Castro Says

By Henry Raymond

HAVANA, Feb. 14 (UPI) — Premier Fidel Castro held out the olive branch to the United States today, but with many conditions attached.

He assailed the United States for what he described as its aid and encouragement of his political foes, and he warned that Cuba was "in a position to unleash serious problems for the United States throughout Latin America" if it did not cease what he described as "its aim to overthrow our government."

He has no desire, Castro said, to continue hostility toward Washington, and he said he hoped eventually to re-establish friendly political relations between the two countries.

But for such a rapprochement he listed as conditions:

- That the United States halt what he described as its active support of his enemies;
- That President Kennedy demonstrate "by deeds" that Washington "will not interfere" with Cuban internal affairs;
- That the United States ac-

cept Cuba's close ties with Communist nations.


Castro expressed deep conviction of the "superiority" of the "socialist system" over the capitalist system.

The Cuban leader "deplored" what he termed were Kennedy statements pledging support of his enemies.

He said he was sure the American President wanted to "relax" the official Washington attitude toward Cuba, but was "impeded" by what he described as "political pressures."

He asked why, if Mr. Kennedy "had the courage to defy vested interests" by asking Soviet Russia to participate in economic aid for underdeveloped nations, "he has not had the courage to change toward Cuba."

The Cuban leader charged that the "Pentagon" and the "Central Intelligence Agency" are organizing daily airdrops of weapons to anti-Castro guerilla forces in the Escambray Mountains of central Cuba and said this was "an obvious impediment to peaceful relations."



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 - New York Post _____
 - The New York Times _____
 - The Worker _____
 - The New Leader _____
 - The Wall Street Journal _____
 - Date _____

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United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
New York, New York
February 3, 1961

Re: Frente Revolucionario
Democratico (FRD)
also known as Cuban
Democratic Revolutionary
Front, Cuban Revolutionary
Front

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On January 26 and 27, 1961, New York T-1, [redacted] an anti-Castro organization, who has furnished insufficient information to establish reliability, made available the following data:

This source advised that [redacted] of the FRD, Miami, Florida, has appointed his brother as head of the FRD in Mexico. According to the above source, the anti-Castro Cubans residing in Mexico are very disappointed with [redacted] above, inasmuch as he is "spending money and living too well" in Mexico.

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While in Miami, Florida, New York T-1 [redacted] who is now working with the FRD in Miami, Florida. According to this source, [redacted] was offered \$1500 a month to work for the FRD. The source deplored the fact that the FRD was offering amounts of money such as that above to individuals when many Cubans were risking their lives in the Cuban underground and needed both financial and material aid so greatly.

The above source deplored what was described as the poor organization of the FRD in the United States and the lack

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ENCLOSURE

105-4-2903

Re: Frente Revolucionario
Democratico (FRD)

of anti-Castro forces in the United States to unite. Source stated that many Cubans active in the anti-Castro underground in Cuba and those Cubans fighting Castro forces in Oriente Province and the Escambría Hills are awaiting aid from anti-Castro forces outside of Cuba and if this is not soon forthcoming, they will become disillusioned and cease their resistance to the Castro Government.

New York T-1 added that the people of Cuba deplore any United States assistance to organizations led by former members and leaders of Batista's Government. The source described the following as organizations led by ex-Batista officials:

Organization


Official

Rosa Blanca (White Rose)
Tigres de Masferres



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The source advised that the following anti-Castro officials have abandoned the FRD because of its poor organization, inefficient management and lack of direct assistance to anti-Castro forces, currently active in the Cuban underground:



(First name unknown)

Movimiento

Recuperacion Revolucionarias (MRR).

New York T-1 added that the source had visited



which transmits Latin-American programs to the Caribbean area and South American countries, and



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Re: Frente Revolucionario
Democratice (FRD)

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New York T-1 added that the current [redacted] -
[redacted] - in the office of Insua, Fernandez and
Diaz, Havana, Cuba, above, is working with, or has contacts
in the anti-Castro underground, and would probably be
receptive if contacted by any United States representative
in Cuba.

New York T-1 described the following as current

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- (1) [redacted] of a group, now fighting
in the Escambrian Hills, Cuba.
- (2) [redacted] in the underground
in the Havana, Cuba, area.

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The following individuals, the source stated, who are

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- (1) (first name unknown) [redacted] connected
with the FRD in Miami, Florida.
- (2) (first name unknown) [redacted] of the
Christian Democratic Party.

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This document contains neither recommendations
nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and
is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-87912)

2/3/61

SAC, NEW YORK (105-41380)

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
(FRD) aka Cuban Democratic Revolutionary
Front, Cuban Revolutionary Front
IS - CUBA

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau is the original and four copies of a letterhead memorandum, captioned as above. One copy of the enclosed letterhead memorandum is being designated for Bufile 105-89923 ("clip") inasmuch as information appearing therein is pertinent to that operation.

One copy of the enclosed letterhead memorandum is being furnished to the Miami Office for information purposes in view of the interest of that office in captioned organization.

No dissemination of the letterhead memorandum is to be made except to CIA at Bureau level.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is being classified "~~Secret~~" inasmuch as the unauthorized disclosure of data contained therein could result in serious damages to the U. S., jeopardize international relations, and endanger the effectiveness of a program of vital importance to the national defense. Unauthorized disclosure of data appearing in the enclosed memorandum could also result in compromising individuals currently active in the anti-CASTRO underground in Cuba.

NY T-1, in enclosed letterhead memorandum, is

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- [Redacted Box]
- 3 - Bureau (105-87912) (Encls. 5) (RM)
 - 1 - 105-89923 ("clip")
 - 1 - Miami (105-) (FRD) (Info.) (RM) (Encl. 1)
 - 1 - New York (105-35253) (ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES)
 - 1 - New York (105-40574) ("clip")
 - 1 - New York (105-41380)

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(7)

6 MAR 1 1961

105-89923
NOT RECORDED
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ENCLOSURE
F18

ORIGINAL FILED IN

NY 105-11510

[redacted] furnished information to SA HENRY C. RUDA, on 1/26 and 27/61. She appeared at the NYO on 1/26/61, and was recontacted on 1/27/61, by SA RUDA.

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Inasmuch as [redacted] has only furnished information on the above two dates, her reliability has not been established.

[redacted] stated that she was born on [redacted] at [redacted] had arrived in the US on 10/7/60, at [redacted]

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She advised that she had been issued Cuban passport number [redacted] at Havana, Cuba, on 5/30/56, valid until June, 1961.

She stated that she had resided in Dallas, Texas, from October to December 31, 1960, at which time she travelled to Tampa and Miami, Florida, and had, about a week ago, arrived in NYC.

She advised that [redacted]

[redacted] and displayed a letter dated 11/2/60, signed by [redacted]

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Concerning the probability of a US representative contacting [redacted] in the firm of [redacted]

[redacted] suggested that as a method of establishing such contact, [redacted] be advised that the caller has a message from [redacted] of that firm).

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According to [redacted] who returned to Cuba on 1/27/61, to liquidate his business and take care of his last customers, still has some employees doing some work at the [redacted] Havana, Cuba.

NY 105-41380

She added that [redacted] furnished information regarding an audit of records of the [redacted] Havana, Cuba, to the American Embassy, Havana, in September, 1960.

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[redacted] advised that [redacted] will be permitted to leave Cuba after he has settled his business affairs there. She added, however, that in the event he is permitted to depart from Cuba, he intends to become active in some anti-CASTRO organization in the United States.

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[redacted] advised that [redacted] is in the process of liquidating his firm in Havana, arrived in the US on 12/13/60, at New Orleans, La., on a pretext of visiting [redacted] was allegedly gravely ill. [redacted] met [redacted] in Dallas, Texas, and then travelled to Mexico City, Mexico DF, where he met the following Cubans. [redacted] [redacted] now active in the FRD, who, [redacted] stated, are allegedly in contact with an unknown US representative:

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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The above information is not included in the enclosed letterhead memorandum because it is not known whether the US representative, referred to above, is a member of CIA, the US Department of State, or a representative of the Bureau.

NY 105-41300

[redacted] advised she has previously contacted the Bureau office in Miami, Florida.

[redacted]

On 2/3/61 [redacted] again appeared in the New York Office and advised that she had moved to the [redacted]

[redacted]

She stated that she had become disappointed with the difficulties of working for the FRD in NYC, and contemplated returning to Miami, Florida.

The above information is being furnished to the Bureau in letterhead memo form, in the event the Bureau wishes to disseminate this data to CIA.

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Would End Hostility To U. S., Castro Says

By Henry Raymond

HAVANA, Feb. 14 (UPI) — Premier Fidel Castro held out the olive branch to the United States today, but with many conditions attached.

He assailed the United States for what he described as its aid and encouragement of his political foes, and he warned that Cuba was "in a position to unleash serious problems for the United States throughout Latin America" if it did not cease what he described as its aim to overthrow our government.

He has no desire, Castro said, to continue hostility toward Washington, and he said he hoped eventually to re-establish friendly political relations between the two countries.

But for such a rapprochement he listed as conditions:

- That the United States halt what he described as its active support of his enemies;
- That President Kennedy demonstrate "by deeds" that Washington "will not interfere" with Cuban internal affairs;
- That the United States accept Cuba's close ties with Communist nations.

Castro expressed deep conviction of the "superiority" of the "socialist system" over the capitalist system.

The Cuban leader "deplored" what he termed were Kennedy statements pledging support of his enemies.

He said he was sure the American President wanted to "relax" the official Washington attitude toward Cuba, but was "impeded" by what he described as "political pressures."

He asked why, if Mr. Kennedy "had the courage to defy vested interests" by asking Soviet Russia to participate in economic aid for underdeveloped nations, "he has not had the courage to change toward Cuba."

The Cuban leader charged that the "Pentagon" and the "Central Intelligence Agency" are organizing daily airdrops of weapons to anti-Castro guerilla forces in the Escambray Mountains of central Cuba and said this was "an obvious impediment to peaceful relations."

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-11-96 BY SP4BJP/pen

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117 FEB 17 1961

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- The Washington Daily News _____
- The Evening Star _____
- New York Herald Tribune _____
- New York Journal-American _____
- New York Mirror _____
- New York Daily News _____
- New York Post _____
- The New York Times _____
- The Worker _____
- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
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EX-114

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-11-96 BY SP4C/STP

UPI-20

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT OF FIDEL CASTRO IS "VERY STRONG" AND MOSTLY LIKELY WILL NOT BE OVERTHROWN IN THE NEAR FUTURE, ACCORDING TO A NEWSMAN RECENTLY RETURNED FROM CHRA.

THE REPORTER, JAMES WALLACE OF THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, SAID LAST NIGHT CASTRO AND HIS SUPPORTERS ARE MAINTAINING "PHYSICAL CONTROL" OF THE ISLAND NATION THROUGH A COMBINATION CONSISTING OF "PARTLY MACHINE GUNS, PARTLY PROPAGANDA AND PARTLY PROMISES."

WALLACE SAID CUBAN PEASANTS, WHO HAVE EXISTED ALL THEIR LIVES ON A SUBSISTENCE LEVEL, STILL HAVE FAITH IN CASTRO BECAUSE HE HAS RAISED THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING SLIGHTLY AND THEY "HAVE NO WAY TO GO BUT UP."

WALLACE TOLD A MEETING OF THE SIGMA DELTA CHI JOURNALISM FRATERNITY THAT THIS PEASANT SUPPORT IS VERY IMPORTANT, FOR WITHOUT IT A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT SEEKING TO DEPOSE CASTRO CANNOT BE SUCCESSFUL.


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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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JPI-232

(CUBA)

HAVANA--CUBA WAS REPORTED TODAY TO HAVE NAMED A NEW AMBASSADOR TO THE HOLY SEE IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES WITH THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.

DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID THE CASTRO REGIME HAS ASKED THE VATICAN CITY "AGREEMENT" ON A NEW MISSION CHIEF. HE IS BELIEVED TO BE LUIS AMADO BLANCO, A DENTIST AND WRITER AND EX-AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL.

CUBA HAS BEEN WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION AT THE VATICAN FOR A YEAR AFTER EX-CUBAN AMBASSADOR JOSE RUIZ VELAZCOEN WAS RETURNED TO HAVANA.

THE GOVERNMENT, MEANWHILE, CLAIMED NEW TRIUMPHS AGAINST ANTI-CASTRO GUERRILLA FORCES IN THE ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS OF CENTRAL CUBA. IT REPORTED THE CAPTURE OF TWO REBEL LEADERS BUT DID NOT IDENTIFY THEM.

SOURCES CLOSE TO THE GOVERNMENT SAID ARMY AND MILITIA UNITS HAVE CAPTURED A "HUGE QUANTITY" OF MODERN ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. THE WEAPONS MAY BE PUT ON PUBLIC DISPLAY TO SUPPORT CUBAN ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES THAT THE PENTAGON AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ARE ORGANIZING AIR DROPS OF SUPPLIES TO THE ANTI-CASTRO FORCES.

2/21--N754PES

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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
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02/1/61

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CIA, says

Kelly not CIA

was not CIA

2/23/61

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UPI-187

(CUBA)

HAVANA--A GOVERNMENT PROSECUTOR SAID TODAY 27 ANTI-CASTRO REBELS SENTENCED TO STIFF PRISON TERMS SATURDAY IMPLICATED A FORMER U.S. EMBASSY OFFICIAL AND SEVERAL CATHOLIC PRIESTS IN THEIR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

PROSECUTOR FERNANDO FLORES SAID THE PRISONERS "CONFESSED" AT THEIR TRIAL THEY RECEIVED ORGANIZING INSTRUCTIONS FROM A "COL. KELLY," AS WELL AS SOME PRIESTS, AS WELL AS PLEDGES OF EXPLOSIVES AND WEAPONS FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES.

COL. KELLY WAS IDENTIFIED AS MILITARY ATTACHE AT THE EMBASSY. (A COL. SAM KALL, A KOREAN WAR VETERAN, WAS MILITARY ATTACHE AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN HAVANA AT THE TIME OF SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE U.S. 1ST DECEMBER.)

2/20--N647PES

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
WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

105-89923

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UPI-239

(CUBA)

HAVANA--CUBA TONIGHT ACCUSED THE UNITED STATES OF PLANNING TO BRING ABOUT THE OVERTHROW OF PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO'S GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS.

FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA MADE THE ACCUSATION IN A LETTER CIRCULATED TO ALL LATIN AMERICAN EMBASSIES HERE.

THE LETTER SAID THE ALLEGED PLANS WERE TO GO INTO EFFECT BEFORE THE QUITO, ECUADOR, MEETING OF THE 11TH INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE. THE MEETING IS SET FOR MAY 24.

2/27--N1002PES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-17-96 BY SP4CJ/MS

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117 MAR 3 1961

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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UPI-240

ADD CUBA, HAVANA

ROA SAID THAT IF THIS "SHORT TERM PLAN" FAILED, THE UNITED STATES HAD AN ALTERNATE "LONG TERM PLAN."

HE SAID THE SHORT TERM PLAN WOULD BE BASED ON A "PRETEXT FOR MILITARY INDIRECT AGGRESSION, DIRECTED AND EQUIPPED BY THE PENTAGON AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, MASKED UNDER A DECLARATION OF WAR ON CUBA BY GUATEMALA, PERU, OR NICARAGUA."

THIS ACTION, HE ADDED, WOULD "PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BEACHHEAD ON CUBAN TERRITORY AND THE ARTIFICIAL FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, WHICH WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED AND PROBABLY WOULD RECEIVE DIRECT MILITARY AID."

ROA SAID THE PLAN WAS TO BE PUT INTO ACTION SHORTLY BEFORE THE QUITO CONFERENCE, AT WHICH HE SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD SEEK TO HAVE ALL LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS BREAK OFF RELATIONS WITH CUBA. HE SAID U.S. DELEGATES ALSO WOULD CALL FOR CREATION OF AN INTER-AMERICAN POLICE FORCE, AS SUGGESTED BY SEN. GEORGE SMATHERS, D-FLA.

ROA CLAIMED THAT THE UNITED STATES COUNTED ON THE SUPPORT OF GUATEMALA FOR THE PLAN AND ADDED AMERICAN INSTRUCTORS WERE TRAINING 5,000 MERCENARIES IN GUATEMALA.

HE CHARGED THAT MOST OF THE MERCENARIES WERE RECRUITED IN MIAMI AND FLOWN TO GUATEMALA IN AMERICAN PLANES AND THAT PLANES WITH U.S. AIR FORCE INSIGNIA FLEW PRACTICE MISSIONS FOR PARATROOP TRAINING OF THIS FORCE.

ROA ALSO CLAIMED THE UNITED STATES PLANNED TO HARM CUBA'S REPUTATION IN LATIN AMERICA BY STAGING A SERIES OF ARMS SHIPMENTS, OSTENSIBLY FROM CUBA, TO PRO-CASTRO REBELS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

2/27--N1018PES

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ADD CUBA, HAVANA (UPI-239)
 (IN WASHINGTON, U.S. OFFICIALS SAID ROA'S STATEMENT APPARENTLY WAS
 MERELY ANOTHER RENEWAL OF THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT'S CHARGES THAT THE
 UNITED STATES PLANNED AN INVASION OF CUBA. THEY SAID THEY KNEW OF NO
 PARTICULAR REASON WHY THE ACCUSATIONS WERE MADE AGAIN AT THIS TIME.
 (SOME OFFICIALS HAVE SAID PRIVATELY THEY BELIEVE CASTRO OFFICIALS
 HAVE KEPT MAKING THE ALLEGATIONS IN ORDER TO DIVERT THE MINDS OF THE
 CUBAN PEOPLE FROM DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.)

2/27--N1137PES

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UPI-9

(CUBA)

HAVANA--PREMIER CASTRO'S GOVERNMENT, POSSIBLY ALARMED BY A SHOOTING ON THE DOORSTEP OF ONE OF ITS LEADERS, CHARGED TODAY THE U.S. PLANS TO OVERTHROW IT BY MID-MAY.

FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA MADE PUBLIC A NOTE HE HANDED OUT LAST WEEK TO LATIN AMERICAN EMBASSIES HERE SAYING AN ATTACK "ORGANIZED, DIRECTED AND EQUIPPED BY THE PENTAGON AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY" COULD BE EXPECTED AT ANY MOMENT FROM GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA OR PERU.

ROA CHARGED THAT 5,000 "MERCENARIES" FLOWN FROM THE U.S. ALREADY ARE BEING TRAINED IN GUATEMALA FOR AN INVASION OF CUBA.

IF THE PLAN FOR IMMEDIATE ATTACK FAILS, ROA SAID, THE U.S. HAS A "LONG-TERM PLAN" TO OUST THE CASTROITES THROUGH INTERVENTION BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.

THE CUBAN NOTE SAID THE IMMEDIATE U.S. PLAN CALLED FOR "INDIRECT AGGRESSION...MASKED UNDER A DECLARATION OF WAR ON CUBA BY GUATEMALA, PERU OR NICARAGUA" TO CREATE A BEACHHEAD IN CUBA.

THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED, ROA CHARGED, BY "ARTIFICIAL FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, WHICH WOULD BE RECOGNIZED IMMEDIATELY AND PROBABLY WOULD RECEIVE DIRECT MILITARY AID."

2/28--GE925A

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117 MAR 6 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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51 MAR 6 1961


WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Wash Post

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UPI-208

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--CUBAN AMBASSADOR CARLOS LECHUGA DELIVERED TODAY TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AN 18-PAGE NOTE WHICH IS BELIEVED TO LIST CHARGES OF "AGGRESSION" AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

LECHUGA DELIVERED THE NOTE IN PERSON TO OAS COUNCIL CHAIRMAN FERNANDO LOBO, AMBASSADOR OF BRAZIL.

THE NOTE, APPARENTLY IDENTICAL WITH OTHERS SENT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS A FEW DAYS AGO, IS REPORTEDLY TO HAVE PRESENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY ALSO TO UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS.

IT ASKED LOBO TO CIRCULATE THE INFORMATION AMONG THE OAS DELEGATIONS AND TO MAKE IT PART OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE ORGANIZATION.

LOBO SAID THE NOTE WOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC UNTIL AFTER IT REACHES THE HANDS OF THE 21 DELEGATIONS TO THE OAS.

2/28--N616PES

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117 MAR 7 1961


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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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 DATE 7-11-96 BY SP8/MLH

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UPI-232

(CUBA)

KINGSTON, JAMAICA--A PLANE MANNED BY CUBAN REFUGEES AND MARKED BY BULLET HOLES LIMPED INTO MONTEGO BAY AIRPORT YESTERDAY ON THREE ENGINES, POLICE SAID TODAY.

IT WAS BELIEVED THE AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE BEEN USED FOR A LEAFLET-DROPPING FLIGHT OVER CUBA. ONE ANTI-CASTRO LEAFLET WAS FOUND ABOARD.

THE AMERICAN-BUILT DC-4 WAS LEAKING GASOLINE FROM ONE TANK WHEN IT LANDED. IT BORE NO REGULAR REGISTRATION OR IDENTIFICATION MARKINGS.

THE NINE CUBANS ABOARD SAID THEY WERE REFUGEES ON A FLIGHT FROM GUATEMALA TO TAMPA, FLA. THEY WERE BEING HELD FOR QUESTIONING AND CLEARANCE OF THEIR PAPERS. THE PLANE WAS PUT UNDER POLICE GUARD.

3/6--N1013PES

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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See memo Belmont to Parsons 3/12/61 Re: Cuban Situation

REC-73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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 DATE 7-11-96 BY SPUB/AF/et

Liaison
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03/13

UPI-13

(CUBA)

HAVANA--PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO SAID EARLY TODAY CUBAN GUNNERS SHOT DOWN ONE PLANE "SENT BY THE (U.S.) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY" SATURDAY AND DAMAGED ANOTHER WHICH HE SAID WAS DROPPING ARMS IN WESTERN CUBA.

IN A 3-1/2-HOUR SPEECH TELECAST FROM THE EXTREME-LEFTIST "REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF PLANTATIONS," CASTRO SAID THE PLANE SHOT DOWN CRASHED INTO THE SEA NEAR BARACOA.

THE PREMIER SAID A BULLET-DAMAGED DC4 WHICH LIMPED INTO THE BRITISH WEST INDIAN ISLAND OF JAMAICA SUNDAY WITH A GAS-TANK LEAKING AND ONE ENGINE SHOT OUT HAD BEEN HIT BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNNERS NEAR CABANAS IN WESTERN CUBA.

HE SAID HE WOULD DEMAND EXTRADITION OF NINE CUBANS ABOARD THE PLANE.

CASTRO SAID THE DC4, WHICH HE CHARGED WAS "CONSTRUCTED IN GUATEMALA BY THE CIA," CIRCLED REPEATEDLY OVER THE CABANAS AREA EARLY SATURDAY.

"SOME MILITIAMEN WHO HAPPENED TO BE AT ANTI-AIRCRAFT PRACTICE OPENED FIRE, SCORING HITS," HE SAID. "LATER, THE PLANE APPARENTLY THREW OUT ITS CARGO OF ARMS TO LIGHTEN ITS LOAD AND LANDED IN BAD SHAPE IN JAMAICA."

CASTRO ALSO:

--SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS "SOME FORM OF MUTUALLY-ADVANTAGEOUS INDEMNIZATION" FOR SEIZED U.S. PROPERTY IF THE UNITED STATES RESUMED PURCHASES OF CUBAN SUGAR. HE GAVE NO DETAILS.

--PREDICTED THAT "ECONOMIC DETERIORATION" EVENTUALLY WOULD BRING ABOUT A CUBA-STYLE REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES.

--DISOWNED HIS ELDER BROTHER RAMON, AN INDEPENDENT SUGAR PLANTER WHO HAS CRITICIZED CASTROITE FARM POLICIES.

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
WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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UPI-22

(MANION)
 SOUTH BEND, IND.--DEAN CLARENCE E. MANION, FORMER HEAD OF THE NOTRE
 DAME UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, TODAY URGED THE IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION
 OF THE UNITED STATES IN CUBA TO STAMP OUT COMMUNISM.
 FAILURE TO TAKE SUCH ACTION, MANION SAID, WOULD BE THE EARLY
 SUBJUGATION OF THE U.S. BY MARXISM.
 IN A NATIONWIDE RADIO (MANION FORUM) ADDRESS, MAN ON DIRECTED
 HIS APPEAL TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

105-89923

The wishful thinkers

BACK IN J MARY, when the Cuban people mobilized every
of militia over in their country in fear of a U.S. inv
(hinted by the Uruguayan foreign office on the basis of a still un-
repudiated State Dept. communication) the Kiplinger-Washington
Letter advised its subscribers that "Castro might stage a fake 'in-
vasion' . . . to stir up his people."

About this time the whole U.S. press started to bubble with re-
ports of invasion forces of Cuban expatriates and mercenaries in
raining in Florida and Guatemala, using U.S. government airfields
and installations in both places. By now so much has been published
on all this—series in the New York Times, New York Daily News,
Louisville Courier-Journal, Los Angeles Mirror and others in addi-
tion to the Florida papers—that no one who reads the press can be
unaware of the plotting afoot to overthrow the Cuban revolution.

Now comes Kiplinger's with a new batch of wishful predictions:
Castro will be overthrown within months by "revolutionary" Cubans
now training in Guatemala. The U.S. will not interfere. Landings
will be timed to fit local uprisings "to look like an inside coup." The
time: late spring. Big-scale desertions from Castro forces have been
arranged. There will be great slaughter.

After the collapse (still Kiplinger's predicting) Cubans now be-
ing trained in Florida for the task will be flown in to restore order.

FROM ANOTHER WISHFUL quarter, the American Metal Mar-
ket, a trade paper, comes advice to American businessmen with
interests in Cuba to give "serious consideration to the probability of
returning to the island republic some time this year." Writing from
Miami, the Metal Market correspondent quotes Americans with in-
terests in Cuba and some "hard-headed realists" among Cubans
in-Miami as believing that Castro will be overthrown and "some
form of responsible government" set up in Cuba this year.

The Kennedy Administration would move in with "subtle" in-
fluence, "suggestive rather than compulsive," with aid in tractors,
industrial machinery, not tanks and jets. JFK would "undoubtedly
want to make Cuba a model for the 'New Look' in Latin America."
Cuba would get "a lot of help" in moving away from a one-crop
economy; mining investment would be encouraged; but land reform
would "probably go forward . . . along practical lines and with com-
pensation rather than outright confiscation." The Metal Market
man says you can discount many of the anti-Castro groups in Florida
as crackpots and even out-and-out gangsters, but that either the
conservative Frente Revolucionario Democratica or the "more lib-
eral" Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo will call the shots.

THE OUT-AND-OUT GANGSTERS, meanwhile, are doing their
bit wherever they can call a muster to break up meetings called
for the purpose of urging fair play for Cuba.

Latest of these turned out badly Mar. 4 for a half dozen
counter-revolutionaries who made the mistake of pulling a gun on
a plainclothes policeman and wound up in a Los Angeles jail, but
not before they had stormed the speakers' stand at the Embassy
Auditorium from which Vincent Hallinan was about to speak and
blackjacked a member of the audience who tried to halt them.

The Embassy meeting had been in public controversy for days
ahead. Under pressure from counter-revolutionary Cubans, the meet-
ing was at first canceled but was re-scheduled when the L.A. Fair
Play for Cuba Committee posted a \$3,000 bond. About 75 pickets—
renegade Cubans and youth identifying themselves as Young Con-
servatives—patrolled the entrance to the hall while an audience
of 1,000 entered and took seats. Some of the pickets bought tickets
and entered the hall also. Once gathered inside they rushed the
speakers' stand, some swinging blackjacks. They were ousted by uni-
formed police. Outside, the gunplay and arrests occurred.

Vincent Hallinan was uninjured, and went on to address the
meeting after the disturbance. He was a recent visitor to Cuba with
his wife, Vivian, and four of their sons, as a leader of the Fair
Play for Cuba Committee.

IN SPITE OF HOODLUMISM and hostility in the press, the truth
about Cuba is being told in communities all over the country by
members of GUARDIAN and Fair Play Committee tours to Cuba.

The Fair Play Committee advocates resumption of diplomatic
relations and normal trade relations with Cuba, including restora-
tion of Cuba's sugar quota. We most certainly join in these recom-
mendations, and urge GUARDIAN readers who visited Cuba on our
tours, last summer and at Christmas time, to continue the val-
uable job they have undertaken to tell the story of Cuba in letters
to newspapers, interviews and at public forums. Fair play is the least
the people of the U.S. owe the people of Cuba. —THE GUARDIAN

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UPI-78

ADD CUBANS, NEW YORK (UPI-49)

(THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE REPORTED TODAY IN A COPYRIGHT STORY FROM MIAMI THAT A HARD-TRAINED, WELL-ARMED "LIBERATION ARMY" IS WAITING IN AT LEAST FIVE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES FOR ORDERS TO "REINVADE THEIR HOMELAND.")

(THE NEWSPAPER QUOTED A REPORT SAYING THE ANTI-CASTRO FORCES HAVE MODERN U.S. WEAPONS AND WERE TRAINED BY AMERICAN, WEST GERMAN AND NATIONALIST CHINESE OFFICERS.)

(IT ALSO QUOTED MIRO CARDONA AS SAYING "WE ARE GOING TO HAVE A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 1940.")
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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Guatemala's Position

I read with great interest Karl E. Meyer's article "Exiles Unite in Drive to Oust Castro," which appeared in your March 22 edition.

After discussing the possible overthrow of dictator Castro's government, Mr. Meyer makes an unwarranted statement to the effect that "An army estimated at several thousand is presently training at a clandestine camp in Guatemala."

On behalf of my government, I categorically deny this to be a fact. Not one Cuban exile is receiving training in Guatemala. There are several hundred of them in my country, but we strictly enforce the Pan American instruments governing territorial asylum. Whenever these have been overlooked or disregarded, my government has immediately requested the Cuban refugees concerned to leave the country.

It is our own army which is getting military training, but for defensive reasons alone. The present democratic and constitutional government of Guatemala is duty-bound to defend itself from extracontinental forces, based on Cuba, which are determined to overthrow it by force. Nobody can deny Guatemala the immemorial right of self-defense, recognized as such by the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Charter of the United Nations.

CARLOS ARRUTIA-APARICIO

Ambassador of Guatemala to the Organization of American States, Washington.

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
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U.S. Asks Court Bar Questions On Castro Foes in Miami Area

General Sessions Judge Here Halts Line of Testimony in Molina Trial

By PETER KIHSS

An unidentified United States agency has asked that questions about activities in the Miami area by Cubans seeking the overthrow of Premier Fidel Castro be barred in a trial under way here.

For the second successive day prosecution witnesses in the murder trial of Francisco Molina in General Sessions Court refused on constitutional grounds to say whether they had attended meetings in the Miami area in which military matters were discussed. Judge Mitchell D. Schweitzer sustained their invoking of Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.

Molina is on trial for the fatal shooting of a 9-year-old Venezuelan girl during a fight among Cubans in an Eighth Avenue restaurant last Sept. 21. A witness testified yesterday that Molina, a 28-year-old Cuban, had taunted others present as "traitors sold to Yankee imperialism."

Assistant District Attorney Alexander Herman was authoritatively reported to have told the judge Wednesday that "an agency of the Federal Government has requested me to convey to Your Honor that no questions be permitted of this, or other witnesses, with reference to activities about which I know nothing of my own knowledge but which concern activities in the Miami area, aside from what this witness has testified so far."



The New York Times
Richard Gibson

Rafael

Cuba
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N.Y. TIMES
EDITION LATE CITY
DATED 3/24/61
PAGE 3
FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

EDITOR: CHARLES MERZ

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL
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with Jose Miro Cardona to become Provisional President of a projected regime.

Molin's counsel, Samuel A. Neuburger, moved vainly yesterday for a mistrial. He argued that he wanted to show that witnesses against his client might go to lengths against their political adversaries.

Mr. Duquesne then refused to answer a question on whether he had attended any meeting at which military affairs were discussed. A similar refusal came yesterday from Jesus Artigas, 21, who said he left Cuba last August and helped organize a "Workers in Exile" movement in Florida.

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B. approx 1940

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Admonition Cited

Mr. Neuburger had argued in court that he should not be limited in his cross-examination. The United States Supreme Court, he said, has admonished prosecutors that if matters harmful to the security of the country might come up, it might be better procedure to terminate a prosecution. Otherwise, he said, it was up to the prosecution to accept responsibility for disclosure.

In the Fair Play statement, Mr. Gibson said there had been repeated reports of C. I. A. support of an anti-Castro enterprise. It had been known, he said that "mercenary forces have been using Florida as a training area and staging point for attacks against Cuba," and that invasion forces were being recruited in New York, Los Angeles and elsewhere. Reckless C. I. A. action, he said, could "lead this country willy-nilly into a major war."

Defense Protest Futile

Judge Schweitzer noted that the witness—Carlos Duquesne, 18 years old, who had come from Cuba in September, 1959, and joined the anti-Castro Student Directorate two months later—was opposing the present Cuban Government. The judge said he saw no useful purpose in probing further.

The intervention by the unidentified agency became known while, independently, the Fair Play for Cuba Committee called yesterday for a Congressional investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency. Richard Gibson, acting national secretary of the committee, said he based his call on Wednesday's announcement of a "Revolutionary Council" set up by the two major anti-Castro groups here.

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Journey to a Dead Counter-Revolution

By JOSEPH NORTH

HAVANA.—When the national poet Manuel Navarro Luna told me he was headed up to the Escambray and suggested I get permission to come along, I assented promptly. That mountain range had world import, I knew.

For weeks it was evident that the interventionists had more hopes in these craggy, remote mountain fastnesses than the peaks had palms. If they succeeded in establishing a beachhead of invasion here, much more would happen. The wheels were greased for further and greater efforts to overthrow the Castro government, and no doubt many counter-revolutionists in Miami and Guatemala dreamed happily of a quick return to the nutritious fleshpots of Batistiano times.

In my mind's eye I pictured the mountain range; something like the Smokeys in North Carolina or the Adirondacks in New York state. The reality, as seen from a lurching jeep that seemed to climb like a fly up sheer walls, was considerably different than I had envisaged.

WHATEVER the best maps can say about the number of feet the peaks rise, they could not possibly portray the remote, difficult and virtually inaccessible heights and abrupt drops we encountered. After we passed the market town of Manicargua and came into the big tobacco country, the campesinos working in the verdant fields under the brilliant sun, the Escambray heights loomed higher. When we got off the paved highways and began to wind through the yellow mountain trails among the pines, my understanding of the scope and intricacy of this operation grew fast.

Caves, sudden valleys, deep stands of palm, tangled foliage, rapid ascents, turns and sudden twists of the perilous roadway made this a treasure-house for the ambush.

Miles upon miles of mountain and valley and sudden small tablelands where considerable-sized bodies of men could bivouac, set up machine-gun stands and raise general hell. Tough terrain, though, wonder the counter-revolutionists chose this

region. This, but they had more reasons than I knew at the moment.

We passed a military mountain hospital and stopped to chat with the personnel. A clean, efficiently run ward contained a score of patients, some with bandaged heads, others with wounds in their legs or arms or chest. Two, I learned, were counter-revolutionists. They were getting the treatment that the militiamen received, and there was, I fancied, a look of guilty bewilderment in their faces.

★
ONE OF THE militiamen, young, bearded, with those beads they wore around their necks in their custom, asked one of the captured men a few questions. The replies were mumbled monosyllables almost unintelligible. "What kind of men do you think they are?" I asked the militiaman afterward. A look of disgust crossed his face. "Adventurers," he replied. "Without knowledge." My memory flashed back to Republican Spain where I once interviewed a captured Navarrese; the fanatic followers of Franco.

"Why do you fight for Franco?" I had asked the gaunt, hollow-eyed man with his black stubble of beard. After a long silence he said with a sullen defiance, "The Reds. They would take the country."

I asked him who the Reds were, did he know any? "No," he replied. "And what do they stand for?" I asked. He shook his head. "They are bad," he said. "Just bad." I asked if he knew their policies, their program? "I don't need to know," he said. "I don't need to know. They are bad." That Navarrese was a notch above this man, if one can put it that way. For this counter-revolutionary did the job for pesos, a day's pay for murder.


The other one in this mountain ward was more like the Navarrese. He murmured "Because they are Reds."

Ignorance knows no distinctions and certainly he would not know that a Red, a Communist here in Cuba, was a selfless follower of Castro and his liber-

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ating revolution against tyranny. And after all, this captured prisoner was the son of a former latifundist.

★
THE SECOND NIGHT, after visiting various encampments of the militia many of whom were helping the farmers here with their crops, we stayed in a hacienda, high on a mountain that once belonged to a prominent Batistiano. Down in the valley we could see some milicianos, wielding the plow hitched to a bullock, while one stood guard in case of attack.

This hacienda had a veranda that ran around the house and in its northeast corner it mounted a long anti-aircraft gun. It stood almost invisible from a hundred yards, amid coffee trees that nestled under the bananas. A Negro soldier they called Lumumba, manned the gun. He scrubbed and cleaned it as though it were an infant son. "Delicate people, these guns" he smiled, "got to treat them right so they'll work right for you." He could speak English and we spent hours talking.

Some thirty-five milicianos were stationed here, kidding each other as soldiers will, for humor is anodyne to danger, and the rough-house humor of the barracks is traditional. As I talked further with them I discovered they were remarkably knowledgeable men in their great majority. Volunteers, they knew why they were here, what the stakes were. The texture of the personalities was so utterly different from that of the counter-revolutionaries to whom we spoke. Pride sparkled from their words.

Several showed me letters from their children which opened with the national dateline you find on all letters: "Year of Education, 1961," and concluded with the avowal "Venceremos" — "We Shall Win." They showed me photographs of their children, their wives, their sweethearts. They talked of life back home: they were of all walks — proletarians, school-teachers, stu-

dents, and they hankered to get home and see their families. But when the job was done. When Fidel said "Go home."

Many had been away for months on this operation. Daily they scoured the heights and craggy remotenesses searching the enemy. Nightly they held classes, heard lectures, read, studied. The percentage of illiteracy here, I felt, was less than the national figure. Many in this detachment were city people and books were no mystery to them. We talked among many other things, of their favorite writers.

★
THEY ASKED ME questions about the USA. Didn't Kennedy really know what a mess he was going to get the USA in? If he kept up this way he would have to tangle with all Latin America, not to speak of the USSR and the socialist countries. I was surprised when some greeted me as an old friend — these had read my contributions to the newspaper, Hoy (which means Today). Others had heard me on the Santa Clara radio several nights before which carried my talk on Lincoln, Douglass, Washington. I seemed among old friends.

Here, I thought, seeing them, are volunteers, away from home, longing for their families, the Citizens' Army, the people in uniform, as Camilo Cienfuegos had said. Armed with guns and armed with that greatest weapon, understanding.

The anti-aircraft gunner, the one they called Lumumba, was a good example. As we spoke,

his eyes scanned the sky. He explained some of the reasons the Counter-Revolution had chosen the Escambray for its operations.

The Revolution, the miliciano said, had scarcely reached these remote regions. Many of the farmers here had not caught up with the times. Furthermore, this was the region that some adventurers and self-seeking individuals had posed as Revolutionists. They were in charge of a considerable sized unit here, which was in bad with the small farmers hereabouts. When these so-called Revolutionists needed meat, say, they came down and commandeered the stock of farmers, and without compensation. "Cow-eaters," Castro called them, when the Revolution caught up with them.

A dozen or so of the ring-leaders set out on a motor craft and escaped to Florida. Others remained to head up the counter-revolutionary plot. They recruited from the dregs of the area, declassed individuals ready to murder for pay, and fanatics drugged by religious hatred stirred up by the hierarchs, and sons of the ousted latifundistas.

At most they had combed together some 600, scattered through the length and heights of these valleys. They counted on a rapid invasion from Guatemala or Florida or Guantanamo. They got munitions via parachutes from planes, made-in-USA — that flew over here in the dead of the night and dropped the stuff by pre-arrangement. Most of the stuff, machine-guns, mortars, hand-grenades and the like, which I was to see later, fell into the hands of the government militia. "It must be worth millions," Lumumba said. He laughed remembering what Fidel had said — that the Government of the U. S. had clamped an embargo on Cuba, and here it was shipping Cuba free millions of dollars in valuable arms.

DURING THE NIGHT there was an alert. Shots sounded in the near distance and men sleeping on the hammocks sprang into their shoes. In a trice the crowded quarters were emptied. The men of the Citizens Army were gone into the darkness, prepared to face whatever the night offered.

At dawn they returned. They said nothing and a guest, even a friendly one, asks no questions unless answers are offered. Later the commander, a captain of the militia, and a schoolteacher, told me the story — A former superintendent of the latifundia was known to be in hiding somewhere near, in a cave where they had stored arms to attack the Fidelistas. He had made a break during the night, was spotted by sentries high on the crest of that mountain we were on, and had plunged into the underbrush. He was still at large, but he could not get far, the captain said. They were bound to find him. Three days later they did. He tried another getaway, and that was the end of his story.

That afternoon we climbed into the jeep and went on, through the winding trails, up astounding ascents and down. The campesino-soldier who drove the jeep knew it as though it were his own bullock. He knew when to shift gears when it seemed as though we would plummet backward and downward into nothingness, knew what gadgets to finker with when the radiator began to boil, knew how to cross the mountain freshets when the water seemed ready to inundate us. "It's under control," Navarro Luna said. "You are as safe as in your father's house."

P.S. Since the above was writ-

ten, Castro announced that 80 percent of the Escambray revolutionists were captured or killed in the mountain frays. A long list of the munitions dropped to them by parachutes from Florida-based planes was published. The guns, bazookas, grenades were put on display in the Prado. It was not a pretty sight.

Exiled Traitors Plot Cuba Attack This Spring

By ART SHIELDS

AN INVASION of Cuba in Spring is predicted by the so-called "Revolutionary Council" that exiled traitors have set up on American soil.

The Council is backed by Allen Dulles's Central Intelligence Agency. It is spear-

heading the American Government's "Operation Counter-Revolution." And it makes a mockery of President Kennedy's half billion dollar Latin American aid plan, which he calls "Operation Pan America."

This traitor "Council" is led by ~~Alfonso~~ ^{Cuba} ~~Castro~~, a renegade from the Castro revolution, and ~~Mangel~~ ^{Manuel} ~~De~~ ^{De} ~~Marona~~, a millionaire exile, who promises to restore the properties seized by the people of Cuba to "their rightful owners." That is to greedy Wall Street corporations.

This invasion talk could be laughed at if the exiles had to depend on themselves. But they are backed by the money and military equipment of the richest imperialist country in the world. And world peace is therefore in great danger this Spring.

President Kennedy talks of attacking hunger and illiteracy in Latin America with his ten year half billion dollar plan. The idea is "majestic," the President said. And the voice of America carried his glowing words far and wide.

But something else was happening while Kennedy was speaking. A pirate ship was raiding Cuba's Santiago Bay. Its 55 millimeter guns were shelling an oil refinery. Fires were started; tanks were perforated. And a Cuban sailor fell dead.

LIKE U. S. WARSHIP

The identity of the pirates was not admitted by any U. S. authority. But the report of Cuba's Foreign Minister to the President of the United Nations General Assembly cannot be dismissed. The vessel had the same design as a U. S. Navy torpedo boat, Mr. Paul Roa said.

Such pirate actions have mocked Washington's kind words again and again. And there have been hundreds of terrorist incidents in Cuba since the cam-

paign to overthrow the Fidel Castro government began.

Thus factories were bombed. Sugar cane fields were set afire. Enemy bands were flown into the mountains, and supplied by air drop until they were wiped out by militia men. And Cuba's successful drive to raise the people's living standards has been somewhat retarded, although it could not be stopped.

U.S. TAXES PAYS BILLS

The cost to the U. S. taxpayer is enormous, of course. For pirates do not work cheaply. And it is estimated that Kennedy's Ten Year Plan could be financed with a fraction of the funds paid to arsonists, bomber-gangsters, aviators, mercenary troops and the contractors and munition magnates behind them.

This means that starving children in Northern Brazil could be fed if this money were used for life, instead of death. Illiteracy could be wiped out in Central America. And there would be something left for U.S.A.'s unemployed workers as well.

The costs of Operation Counter-Revolution are constantly increasing. Thus airfields and training camps are built in

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Handwritten notes and a diagram of a box with a lid.

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Guatemala for the invasion that former sugar planters and mine barons desire.

This invasion may come quickly, and preparations are in the final stages, declared the U. S. News & World Report, as it sadly admits the anti-Castro forces in the Cuban mountains are weakened.

BILLION DOLLAR STAKES

The Central Intelligence Agency is playing for a stake of one billion dollars in Operation Counter-Revolution. This stake includes nearly half a million acres of sugar lands that used to be owned by two big sugar companies — the Francisco and Manati firms — in which Allen W. Dulles, the CIA chief, was interested. These companies were controlled by the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp. of New York, of which Dulles was a director before he entered government service.

The CIA secret funds are not open to Congress inspection, but they have been estimated at one billion dollars a year by the N. Y. Times. And at twice that by some others. And one thinks how many hospitals could be built in Central American lands, where Kennedy says the life expectancy is only thirty-five years, if some of that money were used for genuine aid.

U. S. SPECIAL SERVICES

This counter-revolutionary money doesn't all come from Dulles, however. The U. S. Army boasts it is training invasion forces too. The boasts are relayed by Louis Kraar, a Wall Street Journal writer, in a dispatch from Fort Bragg, N. C.

Fort Bragg men are trained as "guerrilla" fighters by the Army's Special Forces outfit. They are trained, say Kraar's informants, for work in "Communist" lands. And they are taught to handle Cuban-style weapons.

The Special Forces outfit has

the active backing of President Kennedy, the Wall Street Journal reports.

Kraar adds that the Army is actively helping Castro's enemies:

"... it is no secret," he says, "that this country is furnishing weapons and supplies to anti-Castro forces in central Cuba's Escambray Mountains, and training counter-revolutionaries in Florida and Guatemala."

American boys may follow the weapons into Cuba unless this deadly folly is stopped.

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UPI - 19

(CUBAN DEFECTORS)

HAVANA--THE ENTIRE DETACHMENT OF A SMALL NAVY POST AT GUANABO
 BEACH--21 SAILORS AND AN OFFICER--WERE REPORTED TO HAVE DEFECTED
 FROM THE CASTRO REGIME TODAY AND ESCAPED ABOARD A COAST GUARD VESSEL.
 THE ACTION FOLLOWED REPORTS IN HAVANA YESTERDAY THE GOVERNMENT HAD
 BROKEN UP A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT BY 300 NAVAL PERSONNEL
 IN GROWING OPPOSITION TO THE PRO-COMMUNIST POLICIES OF THE GOVERNMENT.
 IT WAS THE FOURTH REPORTED MUTINY BY NAVAL OFFICERS AND MEN.

SIXTY SAILORS AND OFFICERS WERE REPORTED YESTERDAY TO HAVE
 FLED TO HAITI ABOARD THREE PT BOATS WHILE OTHERS ESCAPED IN SMALLER
 NUMBERS ABOARD LESSER CRAFT. INFORMANTS SAID THEY FLED ABROAD
 WHEN THE GOVERNMENT LEARNED OF THE PLOT.

THE ARMED FORCES SECRET POLICE MEANWHILE IDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF A
 COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY GROUP CAPTURED YESTERDAY AND BLAMED FOR
 SABOTAGING POWER AND TELEPHONE LINES, SETTING FIRES IN A MATTRESS
 FACTORY AND SPRINKLING NAILS IN THE PATH OF CARNIVAL FLOATS.

THEY ACCUSED MARIO MANUEL ESCOTO VELAZCO, 47, OF LEADING THE
 GROUP ON BEHALF OF AURELIANO SANCHEZ ARANGO. ANOTHER WAS ERNESTO
 FRANCISCO VENTURA, DESCRIBED AS AN ORGANIZER TRAINED IN THE UNITED
 STATES MERCENARY CAMPS. THREE OF THOSE ARRESTED WERE WOMEN.

NEWSPAPERS MEANWHILE BITTERLY DENOUNCED UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
 REPORTS FROM PALM BEACH OF AN ALLEGED PLOT BY PRO-CASTRO CUBANS TO
 KIDNAP OR HARM CAROLINE KENNEDY, A 3-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER OF PRESIDENT
 KENNEDY.

EL MUNDO FRONT PAGED A LONDON STORY IN WHICH THE EVENING NEWS WAS
 SAID TO HAVE RIDICULED THE STORY. THE COMMUNIST HOY BLAMED UPI
 FOR CARRYING A REPORT IT SAID HAD BEEN DISAVOWED FROM THE FIRST
 BY PALM BEACH POLICE.

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- Mr. Ingram _____
- Miss Gandy _____

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CASTRO MINISTER SAYS U.S. WAGES UNDECLARED WAR

Roa Denounces Washington Pamphlet Urging Havana to Cut Ties With Reds

PLANS CHARGE IN U.N.

Cuban Says Army of 4,000 Is Being Trained, Mostly at Camps in Florida

By PETER KIHSS

Foreign Minister Raul Roa of Cuba asserted yesterday that the State Department's latest denunciation of Premier Fidel Castro's regime "constitutes formalization of the undeclared war which the United States is making against us."

In an interview, Dr. Roa charged that the United States was supporting a "so-called liberation army of 4,000 to 5,000 counter-revolutionaries, mercenaries and adventurers." He said these included Cubans, Americans, Puerto Ricans, Spaniards, Nicaraguans, Guatemalans "and even ex-Nazis."

The Cuban Foreign Minister asserted that the greater part of this alleged force, constituting ground forces, was now in Florida. Paratroopers and pilots, he said, are in Guatemala.

Dr. Roa was interviewed at the home of Dr. Raul Primmeres, Cuban delegate to the United Nations, at 333 East Forty-sixth Street. He spoke in Spanish.

Appeal Made to People

The State Department statement, issued Monday, called on the Castro regime "to sever its links with the international Communist movement" and "to restore the integrity of the Cuban revolution."

The United States document added that "if this call is heedeed, we are confident that the Cuban people, with their passion for liberty, will continue to strive for a free Cuba."

It gave the United States "considered judgment" that the Castro regime "offers a clear and present danger to the authentic and autonomous revolution of the Americas—to the whole hope of spreading political liberty, economic development and social progress through all the republics of the hemisphere."

Dr. Roa said he was prepared to tell the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in a debate due to start Monday about specific locations of "several" recruiting centers in New York City and training camps in the Miami area, Fort Lauderdale, Orlando and the Keys in Florida.

This program, he said, is run by the Democratic Revolutionary Front. He said the camps

CLIPPING FROM THE

N. Y. TIMES

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DATED 4/6/61

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FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

EDITOR: CHARLES MERZ

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-CUBA

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were training up to 300 to 400 men in military tactics, sabotage and terrorism.

Dr. Roa contended he could link the anti-Castro effort to the United States Government by displaying "arms that could only go from government to government," but he declined to be more specific.

He said he also had photo copies of checks that had been sent to dependents after the trainees, as he put it, had "submerged in Florida" in locales unknown to their families. But these, he said, could not be made public without endangering the recipients.

Other sympathizers of Premier Castro have reported recruiting in as many as eight places in New York. They also have told of flights from La Guardia Airport and a specific airstrip in Florida, and a hotel rendezvous in Miami.

They talk also of checks for dependents drawn on a specific Miami bank on the account of two Spanish names in sums ranging from \$150 a month for a wife and \$25 for each child.

Charges Are Denied

Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona, coordinator of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, has repeatedly denied that the training camps are in the United States. Dr. Varona has insisted that his anti-Castro movement is financed by contributions by Cubans and other persons.

Asked if he could prove that the anti-Castro forces' funds came from the United States Government, Dr. Roa said the Central Intelligence Agency was said to have "millions of dollars" at its disposal. He contended that Dr. Varona and other Cuban leaders had large sums to spend.

It was recalled to Dr. Roa that Premier Castro had traveled around the United States raising funds before his 1956 invasion of Cuba by yacht from Mexico, and had acquired arms for his revolt in the United States.

Dr. Roa said the Premier had told him that in all his revolutionary effort from before the invasion through his seizure of power Jan. 1, 1959, the sums raised in the United States and Latin America had totaled not more than \$300,000.

The United States naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, Dr. Roa said, has become "a base of subversion against us." Renewing a charge he made in a Security Council debate Jan. 4, he declared that forces trained in Guatemala had been taken to Guantánamo, starting with 150 men arriving Oct. 24 on a United States Navy ship, the Burman, commanded by Capt. Joseph McDonald.

[The Navy said in Washington that it had no ship called the Burman.]

Dr. Roa predicted that the United States would seek to get an inter-American conference of foreign ministers to declare Cuba a Western Hemisphere outlaw, but said a number of Latin American governments would refuse to go along.

Thereafter, he contended, anti-Castro forces would be given a signal to attempt to seize a beachhead in expeditions from Florida and Guatemala and to declare a provisional government on Cuban soil that would then appeal for aid from the United States. Dr. Roa said such forces could not hold a beachhead, so that United States Marines would have to "guarantee" it.

Dr. Roa asserted that the Castro Government had repeatedly affirmed its readiness to negotiate disagreements with the United States on the basis of independence and sovereignty.

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UPI-237

(CUBA)

NEW YORK--THE COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM REPORTED TONIGHT THERE ARE UNMISTAKABLE SIGNS THAT A MILITARY INVASION BY CUBAN EXILES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO IS NOW IN ITS FINAL STAGES.

A RADIO REPORT FROM MAIMI, FLA., BY STUART NOVINS, CBS NEWS CORRESPONDENT ASSIGNED TO LATIN AMERICA, SAID IT WAS LEARNED THAT MOBILIZATION ORDERS WERE ISSUED LAST WEDNESDAY BY THE ANTI-CASTRO COMMAND. IT ORDERED MEMBERS OF ANTI-CASTRO FORCES TO REPORT TO THEIR PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED BASES.

HIS REPORT SAID SOME OF THE BASES WERE IN FLORIDA, ONE IN LOUISIANA AND TWO IN GUATEMALA. NOVINS SAID HE HAD LEARNED THAT THE FLORIDA BASES HAD BEEN CLEARED OF CUBAN EXILE TROOPS WHO LEFT BY BOAT FROM HIDDEN PORTS AND IN PLANES FROM FORMER U.S. AIR BASES. THE SHIPS AND PLANES LOADED WITH UNIFORMS AND WEAPONS WERE CARRYING SPECIAL COMMANDO TROOPS TO FINAL STAGING AREAS IN THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN AREAS, HE SAID.

NOVINS REPORTED THAT PT BOATS HAVE BEEN MOVING IN AND OUT OF THE FLORIDA AREA FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS ON TRANSPORT MISSIONS TO CENTRAL AMERICA. RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATED A MASSIVE SABOTAGE EFFORT WAS BEING PLANNED INSIDE CUBA TO COINCIDE WITH THE INVASION ATTEMPT, HE SAID.

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
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UPI-64

(CUBA)

NEW YORK--THE COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS) SAID LAST NIGHT THERE WERE "UNMISTAKABLE SIGNS" THAT A MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO WILL BE CARRIED OUT SOON. CBS LATIN AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT STUART NOVINS REPORTED HE HAD LEARNED MOBILIZATION ORDERS WERE ISSUED LAST WEDNESDAY BY THE ANTI-CASTRO COMMAND. MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-CASTRO FORCES WERE TOLD TO REPORT TO PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED BASES, THE RADIO BROADCAST REPORT SAID. SOME OF THE BASES ARE IN FLORIDA, ONE IN LOUISIANA, AND TWO IN GUATEMALA, NOVINS SAID. HE ADDED THE FLORIDA BASES HAD BEEN CLEARED OF CUBAN EXILE TROOPS, WHO LEFT BY BOAT AND PLANE FROM FORMER U.S. MILITARY BASES.

THE SHIPS AND PLANES WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN LOADED WITH UNIFORMS AND WEAPONS FOR THE SPECIAL COMMANDO TROOPS HEADING FOR FINAL MILITARY STAGING AREAS IN THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN AREAS.

IT WAS ALSO LEARNED, THE REPORT SAID, THAT ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN DOCTORS AND NURSES RESIDENT IN THE MIAMI AREA HAD BEEN MOBILIZED FOR EMERGENCY DUTY ABOARD HOSPITAL SHIPS. ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS WERE SAID TO HAVE MADE HEAVY PURCHASES OF BLOOD PLASMA AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN THE MIAMI AREA.

NOVINS, IN HIS REPORT FROM MIAMI, SAID PT BOATS HAD BEEN MOVING IN AND OUT OF THE SOUTH FLORIDA AREA FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS ON TRANSPORT MISSIONS TO CENTRAL AMERICA. HE SAID RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATED A MASSIVE SABOTAGE EFFORT WAS BEING PLANNED INSIDE CUBA TO COINCIDE WITH THE INVASION.

THE "FIRST WAVE" OF THE INVASION FORCE WAS SAID TO CONSIST OF 4,000 TO 5,000 MEN ARMED WITH AMPHIBIOUS LANDING WEAPONS. COVER FOR THE INVADERS WILL BE FURNISHED BY SHIP-BASED HEAVY WEAPONS AND PLANES, IT WAS SAID.

THE INVASION FORCES PLAN TO TIME THEIR MOVES WITH THOSE OF "SEVERAL CONTINGENTS" OF COMMANDO TROOPS ALREADY AT A TARGET AREA INSIDE CUBA, HEAVILY ARMED WITH SABOTAGE MATERIAL, CBS SAID. THE PLAN IS TO KNOCK OUT POWER INSTALLATIONS, BRIDGES, ROADS AND COMMUNICATIONS.

SEVEN-MAN SABOTAGE UNITS FOR THIS PURPOSE HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED IN EVERY CUBAN PROVINCE, IT WAS SAID.

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UPI-107

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID TODAY IT IS NATURAL THAT MANY CUBAN REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES ARE ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN OVERTHROWING THE CASTRO REGIME.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN, JOSEPH W. REAP, REFUSED TO SAY WHETHER THE U.S. GOVERNMENT KNOWS OR APPROVES OF REPORTED PLANS BY THE ANTI-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO INVADE CUBA FROM BASES IN FLORIDA, LOUISIANA AND GUATEMALA.

REAP, TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE IT IS "A WELL-KNOWN FACT" THAT THERE ARE MANY THOUSANDS OF ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN REFUGEES IN THIS COUNTRY.

"NATURALLY," REAP SAID, "MANY OF THEM ARE ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN RECONQUERING FREEDOM FOR THEIR HOMETLAND AND IN RESUING ITS REVOLUTION."

WITH THAT, REAP FLATLY SAID HE WOULD HAVE "NO FURTHER COMMENT" ON THE MATTER.

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UPI - 46

ADD CUBA, HAVANA

THREE OTHER BOMBS EXPLODED IN HAVANA DURING THE NIGHT, INJURING AT
LEAST FIVE PERSONS. ONE OF THE BOMBS RIPPED OUT THE DOORWAY OF THE
HOME OF OSCAR CARRENO GOMEZ, COMMUNIST ELECTRICAL WORKERS' UNION LEADER.
CARRENO AND HIS MOTHER WERE INJURED SLIGHTLY.

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UPI-14

(CUBA)

HAVANA--PREMIER CASTRO WARNED CUBANS LAST NIGHT THAT SHORTAGES MAY FORCE THE GOVERNMENT TO RATION CERTAIN GOODS AND MATERIALS AND CUT DOWN ON IMPORTS. HE BLAMED THE UNITED STATES.

THE PREMIER, IN A 2-1/2 HOUR TELEVISION SPEECH, ALSO LASHED OUT AT THE "ENEMIES OF THE FATHERLAND" AT HOME AND ABROAD.

"BULLETS WILL NEVER BE RATIONED," HE SAID. "THERE'LL ALWAYS BE PLENTY TO GIVE (SHOOT AT) THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES."

ABOUT THE TIME CASTRO WAS SPEAKING TO A LABOR UNION RALLY, SABOTEURS BOMBED A PUMPING INSTALLATION ON AN AQUEDUCT ABOUT 15 MILES FROM HAVANA, CUTTING OFF WATER SUPPLIES TO SEVERAL SUBURBS.

CASTRO TOLD HIS AUDIENCE THAT IMPORTS WOULD BE REDUCED TO PRESERVE CUBA'S DOLLAR RESERVES, RESULTING IN FURTHER SHORTAGES.

HE SAID THAT "ALL WHO COMPLAIN ABOUT SCARCITIES OF GOODS ARE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES."

"SOME IMPORTANT ARTICLES WE LACK AND OTHERS ARE SCARCE," HE SAID. "TO PREVENT SPECULATION AND DISORDER, WE ARE DISPOSED TO RATION THEM TO GUARANTEE THE PUBLIC'S SUPPLIES."

"HE WHO PRODUCES WILL GET HIS SHARE BEFORE HIM WHO DOES NOT PRODUCE." CASTRO CONTENDED THAT CUBANS WERE SURROUNDED BY "IMPERIALIST" ENEMIES AND HAD "PESSIMISTS AND DEFEATISTS...IN OUR MIDST" BUT ADDED:

"WE WILL SUFFER ALL PRIVATIONS NECESSARY BUT WE WILL NEVER SUBMIT OURSELVES TO THE YANKEE YOKE."

HE CLAIMED THAT AN AMERICAN EMBARGO ON GOODS TO CUBA WAS FAILING IN ITS PURPOSE.

"THEY THOUGHT WE WOULD TRADE OUR SOVEREIGNTY FOR A PIECE OF SOAP OR SOME AUTOMOBILE SPARE PARTS OR SOME GARY COOPER OR MARILYN MONROE FILMS," HE SAID.

HE ALSO SAID THERE WAS "NO HOPE WHATSOEVER THAT AMERICANS WILL EVER BE ABLE TO RECOVER ANYTHING THEY LOST HERE."

MEDICINES WILL RECEIVE PRIORITY IN IMPORTS, FOLLOWED BY MACHINERY AND FOOD ARTICLES THAT CUBAN CAN NOT PRODUCE, HE SAID.

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Castro Warns Workers Of Rationing to Come

HAVANA, April 7 (AP) — Prime Minister Fidel Castro said tonight rationing might become necessary in Cuba for some articles.

He did not identify the articles but said he guaranteed an adequate supply of medicine, food, clothes, shoes and books.

Blaming shortages on what he called United States aggression and on a United


States embargo, Castro told a workers rally: "We will limit the spending of foreign exchange to the most strictly necessary things."

Castro also said the United States is backing a plot to invade Cuba and is supplying terrorists and counter-revolutionary bands operating inside Cuba.

He said the plot is being di-

rected by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

(In New York Jose Miro Cardona, head of the anti-Castro-Cuban Revolutionary Council, said Friday night a general revolt against the Castro regime would get under way soon.)



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
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Castro's Foes Reported Moving to Invade Cuba

NEW YORK, April 7 (UPI) - The Columbia Broadcasting System says there are "unmistakable signs" that a military operation against the government of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro will be carried out soon.

CBS Latin American correspondent Stuart Novins reported he had learned that mobilization orders were issued last Wednesday by the anti-Castro command. Members of the anti-Castro forces were told to report to previously assigned bases, his broadcast report said.

Some of the bases are in Florida, one is in Louisiana,

and two are in Guatemala, Novins said. He added that the Florida bases had been cleared of Cuban exile troops, who left by boat and plane from former U. S. military bases.

The ships and planes were said to have been loaded with uniforms and weapons for the special commando troops heading for military staging areas in the Caribbean and Central American areas.

It was also learned, the report said, that anti-Castro Cuban doctors and nurses resident in the Miami area had been mobilized for emergency duty aboard hospital ships. Anti-Castro Cubans

were said to have made heavy purchases of blood plasma and medical supplies in the Miami area.


Novins, in his report from Miami last night, said PT boats had been moving in and out of the South Florida area for the past several days on transport missions to Central America. He said reliable sources indicated a massive sabotage effort was being planned inside Cuba.

The "first wave" of the invasion force was said to consist of 4000 to 5000 men armed with amphibious landing weapons. Cover for the invaders will be furnished by ship-based heavy weapons and planes, it was said.

The invasion forces plan to time their moves with those of "several contingents" of commando troops already at a target area inside Cuba, heavily armed with sabotage material, CBS said.

The entire operation was said to be under coordination of Jose Miro Cardona, who expects to be named provisional President of a Cuban revolutionary government.

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
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UPI-124

(CAPTURED)

HAVANA--THE CUBAN ARMY TONIGHT ANNOUNCED THE CAPTURE OF A BAND OF 22 COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES IN WESTERN PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE AS THEY AWAITED A PLANE TO DROP THEM ARMS.

NO DATE WAS GIVEN IN THE ARMY ANNOUNCEMENT AND IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE MEN WERE SEIZED TODAY. AMONG THE GROUP WERE THREE FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE LA EPOCA DEPARTMENT STORE WHICH WAS DESTROYED IN A \$5 MILLION FIRE LAST NEW YEAR'S EVE.

THEY WERE ACCUSED OF SETTING THE FIRE.

A COMMUNIQUE FROM THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE HEADQUARTERS (G-2) SAID THE 22 MEN PLANNED TO STAGE AN "UPRISING" IN COORDINATION WITH CUBAN EXILES IN THE U.S. AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA).

IT SPECIFICALLY REFERRED THE EXILES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT MOVEMENT HEADED BY ANTONIO DE VARONA, NOW NUMBER TWO MAN IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HEADED BY FORMER CUBAN PREMIER JOSE MIRO CARDONA.

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UPI-131

JDD CAPTURED, HAVANA
THE GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER PRENSA LIBRE SAID THE ANTI-CASTRO REBELS WERE WAITING FOR A "YANKEE PLANE." THE ARMY COMMUNIQUE VAGUELY IDENTIFIED THE CRAFTS ONE WHICH MADE A FORCED LANDING IN JAMAICA AFTER MILITIA AIR-CRAFT UNITS HIT IT OVER PINAR DEL RIO. SUCH A FORCED LANDING TOOK PLACE IN JAMAICA A MONTH AGO. THE PLANE FLED WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO DROP ANY ARMS AND LANDED AT JAMAICA.

THE COMMUNIQUE FAILED TO GIVE ANY DATE FOR EITHER THE CAPTURE OF THE 22 COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES OR THE PLANE INCIDENT IT REFERRED TO. THIS IS TYPICAL OF MOST MILITARY ANNOUNCEMENTS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT NOW JUST AS IT WAS DURING THE DICTATORSHIP OF FULGENCIO BATISTA.

MEANWHILE INFORMED SOURCES SAID PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO HAS APPEALED TO BRAZIL FOR SUPPORT IN THE UNITED NATIONS IN HIS DIPLOMATIC WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES.

CUBA WAS DEVELOPING INVASION JITTERS AGAIN AS E ILE GROUPS IN NEW YORK CALLED ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS TO ARMS AND AS A SERIES OF BOMB EXPLOSIONS IN DOWNTOWN HAVANA DURING THE NIGHT UNDERSCORED THE TERRORISM BY CASTRO FOES.

INFORMED SOURCES SAID CASTRO SENT A PERSONAL APPEAL TO PRESIDENT JANIO QUADROS URGING BRAZIL TO SUPPORT AN AFRO-ASIAN EFFORT IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO CONCILIATE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS.

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UPI-13

(CUBA)

NEW YORK--CUBA'S REVOLT AGAINST A REVOLUTION APPEARED COMING TO A HEAD TODAY. THERE WERE THESE DEVELOPMENTS:

OPPOSITION -- SPECIAL BUSES CARRYING 350 VOLUNTEERS PLEDGED TO TOPPLE THE PRO-COMMUNIST REGIME OF PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO PLANNED TO LEAVE NEW YORK TODAY FOR SECRET TRAINING SITE. MORE ACTIVELY REPORTED IN NEW ORLEANS.

ATTACK -- CUBAN SOURCES INDICATE THE BIG ATTACK AGAINST CASTRO WILL BE SOON -- BETWEEN NOW AND EARLY JUNE, PERHAPS BEFORE MAY 1. OTHERS SEE MAY 20 AS THE DEADLINE FOR A SERIES OF SABOTAGE ATTACKS, GUERRILLA LANDINGS, FRONTAL ASSAULTS.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL -- DR. JOSE MIRO CARDONA, HEAD OF THE UNITED OPPOSITION TO CASTRO, PLEADED WITH CUBANS TO TAKE UP ARMS AGAINST CASTRO AND COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE COUNCIL. "FIDEL KNOWS HIS DAYS ARE NUMBERED," MIRO CARDONA SAID.

CASTRO -- FIDEL SCOFFED AT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BUT HE ALSO WARNED THE CUBAN PEOPLE THEY FACE MORE SACRIFICES IN DEFENDING HIS REGIME FROM ATTACK.

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REC-92

35 Anti-Castro Flyers Reported in Training

MIAMI, Fla., April 10 (AP).—More than 35 anti-Castro airplane pilots were reported headed for a secret training camp today to heed a call by the Cuban Revolutionary Council for a "second war of liberation."

The pilots, including some formerly associated with Cuban Dictator Fulgencio Batista, reportedly left Miami yesterday for a secret training camp, probably in Central America.

Family members and friends said the men were stripped of their clothing and identification, given uniforms and told to say their goodbys before being spirited out of the United States.

It was the first time so-called "Batistianos" were reported to have joined forces against Premier Fidel Castro. Those with Batista ties previously had been excluded from major revolutionary organizations.

Call for Liberation

The call for a "second war of liberation" was sounded Saturday by Dr. José Miro Cardona, president of the anti-Castro Cuban Revolutionary Council, in New York. He said his country is occupied by "a foreign army at the service of those who betrayed the revolution."

Dr. Miro Cardona refused to discuss any time-table for possible landings on Cuban soil or strength of the invasion forces. He said when these forces become active inside Cuba they will number 6 million, embracing "all of Cuba."

Reports from Havana said government-controlled radio stations and newspapers ignored Dr. Miro Cardona's call.

In a nation-wide TV talk yesterday, Premier Castro repeated earlier warnings that insurgent bands and expeditionary forces invading Cuba would be liquidated but he did not refer directly to the latest call to arms against his regime.

Castro Makes Boast

Premier Castro told Cubans that despite a United States economic blockade they would not lack the essentials of life, and he said Cuba is the only Nation in the Western Hemisphere that can guarantee food, clothing, medicine and education for all its people.

in Montreal, Canada. Dr. Oscar Abello, a legal adviser to the Castro government who was defending a breach of contract action involving ships bought while Batista was in power, said he has defected and plans to join the anti-Castro forces. Meanwhile, Rolando Masferrer, one of the most notorious of Batista's former aides, was under guard in a Miami hospital. He claimed a heart condition. Mr. Masferrer was taken into custody Saturday and officials awaited a report on his physical condition before deciding whether to keep him in custody or deport him. He was arrested after the

State Department said his presence was "prejudicial to the interest of the United States." Mr. Masferrer left Cuba when Castro came to power January 1, 1959, and has been on immigration parole in this country ever since.

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UPI - 199

(EXILES)

MEXICO CITY--SPEAKERS AT A CUBAN EXILES' MASS MEETING PREDICTED
 TODAY A GENERAL STRIKE IN CUBA "WITHIN A MONTH." ONE SPEAKER SAID
 THE MEETING WAS "THE LAST ACT IN MEXICO FOR CUBAN EXILES BEFORE
 LEAVING FOR THE RECONQUEST OF CUBA."

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U. S. Bars Intervening In Cuba

Kennedy Opposes Mounting of An Offensive Here

By Carroll Kilpatrick
Staff Reporter

President Kennedy formally pledged yesterday that there will be no intervention by American armed forces in Cuba; and he said that the Government would act to prevent Americans from becoming involved in any military actions against the Castro regime.

Speaking at his press conference, Mr. Kennedy also said that he would be opposed to the mounting of an offensive from this country by anti-Castro Cubans.

Committee Has His Sympathy

But he spoke sympathetically of the revolutionary committee formed on American soil by Cuban refugees who desire the overthrow of Premier Fidel Castro's government.

And he called the Cuban dictator an opponent of democracy who has "associated himself most intimately with the Sino-Soviet bloc and has indicated his desire to spread the influence of that bloc throughout this Hemisphere."

Asked how far the United States would go to help an anti-Castro uprising or invasion, the President was prepared with a written statement. There will "not be under any conditions" armed United States intervention in Cuba, he said, and the Government will not permit American citizens to take part in actions inside Cuba.

Makes Promise to People


The President made it clear that he would oppose Cubans in this country who may wish to reestablish a Batista-like regime. He promised the Cuban people that the United States would take no steps to regain confiscated American property in Cuba except through formal negotiations with a free and independent Cuba.

"The basic issue in Cuba is not one between the United States and Cuba," the President said. "It is between the Cubans themselves. I intend to see that we adhere to that principle."

It was clear from the President's statement that he will not directly support any armed intervention from this country in Cuba but that he would continue to view with sympathy refugee Cuban activities to infiltrate their homeland to overthrow the Castro regime.

The President reminded his listeners that Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon is in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, at a meeting of the Inter-American Bank and that the Administration is pledged to assist the economic and social development of the Hemisphere.

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Miami 'Staging Areas' Send Out Recruits of Anti-Castro Army

Cuban rebels in blue baseball caps pile into a DC-4 three times each week at long-abandoned Opa-Locka Airport near Miami. The planes take off for a secret training base in Central America. Such a plane took off Wednesday. This is the anti-Castro buildup, James Buchanan, Miami Herald reporter once jailed in Havana as a "counter-revolutionist" when digging out a news story, mixed with the rebels Wednesday. His story follows:

By James Buchanan

The men wait patiently with numbered slips of paper like customers in a supermarket.

But they are not customers. They are anti-Castro. Cubans sworn to free their homeland from communism. They wait in recruiting stations.

For the first time invasion-minded counter-revolutionary officials here on Wednesday revealed how their gigantic recruiting operation works.

They detailed how they airlift armed men to Central American training camps. And they acknowledged for the first time the oft-rumored but never confirmed report of a special Louisiana base. "Specially trained men in Louisiana," explained one anti-Castro revolutionist easily, "already have moved out—moved South."

Enlistment Crush Heavy

Here in Miami the enlistment crush is so heavy that volunteers at recruiting stations on SW 27th ave. and NW 12th st. are given numbered slips of paper as they wait for processing.

This number becomes a man's serial number; is added to all his papers, and appears on his identification photo kept by the underground organization.

This organization, operating here under the guidance of the Democratic Revolutionary Front and its recently adopted brothers-in-arm, the Peoples' Revolutionary Movement, now is accepting volunteers of all

zors and blades, comb, toothbrush and paste, and soap.

"We do not supply," the rebel leaders said, "deodorant or talcum powder."

At the same time, the volunteer is stripped of all identification, including any photographs that may have either the full name of his mother, wife or girl friends—anything by which he might be identified.

Officials go through duffel bags before departure to remove such luxuries as small radios, cameras, and the inevitable small pistol that the recruit feels he had to take along to help.

Recruit Moves Again

rations of those who have gone before.

On the walls of one on N.W. Ninth ave. are the words: "Here slept the heroes of Battalion No. 13, and you who have the luck to sleep in this room shall breathe as free men."

A mid-Caribbean island now

serves as the refueling stop for the DC-3 or DC-4 that carries the normal traffic of three loads a week.

This tiny island, incidentally, may play a large part in the rebel air forces' invasion plans—after it is vacated by the airlift personnel.

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Brothers among the Peoples Revolutionary Movement, now is accepting volunteers of all anti-Castro parties, even one-time adherents of former President Fulgencio Batista. This is a "fighting-for-hire" outfit that deploys the term mercenaries. The money each member receives is a salary and dependency allotment, they say.

The No. 1 item for the new volunteer, after showing his Immigration Department admittance papers or his passport, is the signing of an anti-Communist oath.

Pledge of Recruit

This pledges that the recruit holds "democratic ideas, is anti-Communist and is ready to defend democracy."

At this point, he is handed, U. S.-style, a sheaf of papers that must be filled out in quadruplicate, and is hustled off for three examinations.

The first is by a medical examiner, working in the kitchen of a Northwest 12th st. home that serves as one of the recruiting centers. There he is given a heart check, his blood pressure is checked, along with his reflexes, and he is questioned as to past illness and disease.

The second quiz is tougher. It comes from an experienced interrogator who wants to know "why" the volunteer left Cuba and "why" he wants to return. The volunteer must supply the names of two Cubans in Miami who will vouch for his honesty and anti-Castro feelings.

The third test requires a trip to the Schrelber Medical Laboratories at 1451 N. Baskin dr., where the recruit's arm is punctured for blood tests. At this point, the volunteer is "in."

Door Open, for While

He has been accepted, but the door is left open for him to withdraw right up until the time he surrenders his passport or immigration papers at the Opa-Locka Airport for the flight to Central America.

Once on the training site, however, he cannot leave. He may decide he does not want to fight with the volunteer anti-Castro organization—but he cannot leave the base.

"For those who do not wish to fight," a source in Miami said, "there are dishes to be washed, there is laundry to be done, and food to be cooked."

The recruit may have a wait of several days, sometimes even weeks, between the time he is "in" and the day he takes off. But it is not until he gets "the call" that he is issued the U. S.-type fatigue uniforms, the paratrooper boots, and the blue baseball cap that mark him as a real anti-Castro trainee.

Final Good-by Said

Those are handed out at staff headquarters in Miami. The volunteer has said his final good-bys to family and friends. The volunteer gives his size, gets a khaki duffel bag into which he packs:

Six pairs of shorts, olive drab; T-shirts, white; one pair fatigue overalls with large hip and knee pockets, khaki colored; one "regular" fatigue outfit, also khaki; one pair paratrooper boots with leather facings; six pairs khaki socks; and a toilet kit containing ra-

along to help.

Recruit Moves Again

From the staff headquarters, the recruit moves again, this time to what is formally called a "staging area," but which is a rundown house into which a multitude of beds and cots have been pushed to make it a temporary barracks.

There are three or four such "staging areas" in Miami, and each is decorated inside with the words, phrases and decla-

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
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UPI-14

(CUBA)

HAVANA--TWO OF CUBA'S BIGGEST DEPARTMENT STORES -- IN CITIES NEARLY 500 MILES APART -- LAY IN RUINS TODAY, DESTROYED BY FIRES IN A COORDINATED CAMPAIGN OF SABOTAGE AGAINST PREMIER CASTRO.

A \$7-MILLION FIRE, APPARENTLY STARTED BY DROPPING PHOSPHORUS INTO THE AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM, TOTALLY DESTROYED THE ENCANTO DEPARTMENT STORE IN HAVANA'S CUBA'S LARGEST. AT THE SAME TIME, FLAMES RACING THROUGH SANTIAGO'S BIGGEST DEPARTMENT STORE, LA COMERCIAL, LEFT IT A CHARRED SHELL.

STREET CROWDS CHEERED AS THE FLAMES BROUGHT DOWN THE WALLS OF NATIONALIZED EL ENCANTO, A SIX-STORY BUILDING FILLING THREE-QUARTERS OF A HAVANA BLOCK.

A THIRD FIRE, IN THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED NATIONAL PAPER FACTORY, WAS DISCOVERED AND PUT OUT BEFORE IT COULD SPREAD. DAMAGE WAS ESTIMATED AT ABOUT \$900. *deceased* *Cuba*

LAST NIGHT, ABELARDO A. AGUIAR, A SUSPECTED SABOTEUR CAUGHT WITH SEVERAL ELECTRIC DETONATORS IN HIS POSSESSION, WAS THIS YEAR'S 25TH VICTIM OF THE FIRING SQUADS WHICH HAVE KILLED MORE THAN 600 CUBANS SINCE CASTRO SEIZED POWER.

ANTI-CASTRO SPOKESMEN SAY TRAINED, FULLY-EQUIPPED SABOTEURS HAVE BEEN SLIPPING INTO CUBA FROM ABROAD TO CARRY OUT A CAMPAIGN PLANNED BY A NEW, "UNIFIED COMMAND" OF GROUPS OPPOSING THE PREMIER.

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A 16 Saturday, April 15, 1961 THE WASHINGTON POST

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Anti-Castro Army Cost Soars High

By James Buchanan
Miami Herald Staff Reporter

MIAMI, April 14—The multi-million-dollar training program for thousands of anti-Castro volunteers in Central America is costing \$17,000 a day simply to maintain the four or five main bases.

Untold additional thousands of dollars are being spent daily to recruit in the United States, outfit, equip and transport the raw rookies to their training quarters.

These figures have just come to light as the Democratic Revolutionary Front and the People's Revolutionary Movement continue their stepped-up campaign aimed at the eventual invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Premier Fidel Castro.

Where the money is coming from remains a closely guarded secret.

Hint Uncle Sam Pays

Some revolutionary leaders try to leave the impression it is coming right out of Uncle Sam's pocket. Such publicity has served them well in recruiting here and in New York, since it works as a sort of psychological "insurance" for the recruit.

Clothing issued this army is strictly "GI," even if it carries no identification as such. It comes from the same manufacturers that produce for Uncle Sam, but is taken off the line before it gets the buttons with eagles and the "U. S. Government Issue" tag.

Some of the arms with which the thousands of men are training are so new in design the GIs in this country haven't seen the equipment yet.

In the recently closed Louisiana camps, a commander by the name of Capt. Nino Diaz taught a picked crew of saboteurs to use trick equipment designed for the space age.

Even Veterans Must Learn

Even a veteran of the Cuban

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if he escapes from
wants to go back, has to re-
turn through the training
camps to learn new methods.
A guerilla fighter from the
Escambray, here in Miami
this week, was interrogated in-
tensively as to what arms he
faced from Castro's troops. He
pointed out, in a book of in-
ternational arms, several wea-
pons that U. S. sources did
not know the Russian-out-
fitted Castro army possessed.
The same tough young
mountain fighter scoffed at
Castro's claims of victory over
masses of rebels.

Airdrops Widely Spread

Castro was right when he
said he was getting our ma-
terial, the soldier said. "Air-
drops landed everywhere but
in our own locale. They were
made from such high altitudes
it was a wonder the pilots
even hit the mountain area,
let alone our hideouts."

While all the financing goes
on, all U. S. offices, both pub-
lic and private, are endeavor-
ing to keep American citizens
from becoming involved.

President Kennedy's state-
ments Wednesday were a
thinly veiled hint to counter-
revolutionary forces to keep
their unwritten promises.

These "oaths", which prom-
ised Americans would never
be accepted in the fighting
forces, were given in exchange
for the United States' unwrit-
ten agreement to permit wide-
open recruiting here.

No men or materials can be
transported directly from the
United States to Cuba's shores
for counter-revolutionary use.

One Stop En Route

Even the men and materials
headed for the training camps
usually make one stop en
route.

So tight are the restrictions
against Americans that a
group of job-holding U. S.
pilots who have been awaiting
an opportunity to fly as a
Cuban version of the World
War II Eagle Squadron or
Flying Tigers have all but
given up hope.

Guerilla units of six and
eight men are fighting in Cuba
now, according to the best
sources.

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
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UPI-57
(BOMBERS)

MIAMI--AT LEAST TWO CUBAN AIR FORCE PLANES THAT BOMBED AND STRAFED
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN CUBA THIS MORNING LATER LANDED IN FLORIDA.

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UPI-141
(U.N.)

UNITED NATIONS--CUBA TODAY ACCUSED THE UNITED STATES OF AN "ACT OF
IMPERIALISTIC PIRACY" IN THE DAWN RAIDS BY B26 BOMBERS ON THREE CUBAN
BASES.

IT SAID THE ATTACKS WERE "UNDOUBTEDLY THE PROLOGUE TO A LARGE-SCALE
INVASION ATTEMPT ORGANIZED, SUPPLIED AND FINANCED" BY WASHINGTON.
4/15--MJ337PES

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UPI-144

ADD U.N., UNITED NATIONS (UPI-141)

CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA SAID TODAY THAT "MERCENARY TROOPS"
HAD ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD BOMB CUBAN CITIES AGAIN TONIGHT AT 10
O'CLOCK.

4/15 --MJ340PES

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UPI-152
 ADD UN-RAID UNITED NATIONS
 PUTTING BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S MAIN POLITICAL COMMITTEE
 THE DAWN RAID BY B26 BOMBERS AGAINST BASES AT THREE CUBAN CITIES,
 ROA SAID:
 "THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS ACT OF IMPERIALISTIC PIRACY FALLS
 SQUARELY UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES."
 4/15--WQ407PES

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UPI-155

ADD UN.N.- UPI-141)

CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA TOLD THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S MAIN POLITICAL COMMITTEE, SUMMONED INTO AN EMERGENCY SATURDAY AFTERNOON SESSION, THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ENGAGED IN A "CYNICAL EFFORT" TO PRESENT THE RAIDS AS BEING CARRIED OUT BY CUBAN AIR FORCE PILOTS.

"THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA SOLEMNLY ACCUSES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE AND BEFORE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION WITH ATTEMPTING TO USE FORCE TO SETTLE ITS DIFFERENCES WITH (U.N.) MEMBER STATES," ROA SAID.

ROA SOUGHT TO PUT HIS CHARGE OF "U.S. AGGRESSION" BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS MORNING BUT WAS RULED OUT OF ORDER BY FREDERICK H. BOLAND OF IRELAND, PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD PARLIAMENT.

AT RUSSIA'S INSISTENCE, THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WAS ADJURED INTO EMERGENCY SESSION THIS AFTERNOON.

U.S. AMBASSADOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON REPEATED PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S DECLARATION THAT "THERE WILL NOT BE UNDER ANY CONDITIONS--I REPEAT UNDER ANY CONDITIONS--ANY INTERVENTION IN CUBA BY U.S. ARMED FORCES."

STEVENSON SHOWED THE COMMITTEE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL PICTURES OF TWO PLANES WHICH LANDED IN FLORIDA TODAY AFTER PARTICIPATING IN THE RAID ON AIRPORTS AT THREE CUBAN CITIES.

"IT HAS THE MARKINGS OF THE CASTRO AIR FORCE RIGHT ON ITS TAIL," STEVENSON SAID. "IT HAS THE CUBAN STAR AND INITIALS. THEY ARE CLEARLY VISIBLE. I SHALL BE GLAD TO EXHIBIT THE PICTURE."

U.S. AMBASSADOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON TOLD THE COMMITTEE TWO PLANES WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE DAWN RAIDS AND LANDED IN FLORIDA WERE PILOTED BY CUBAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS AND MANNED BY CREWS WHICH HAD DEFECTED FROM CASTRO'S REGIME.

HE SHOWED THE COMMITTEE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL PICTURES OF THE PLANES, POINTING OUT THAT THEY BORE THE CUBAN STAR AND CASTRO MARKINGS ON THEIR TAIL ASSEMBLAGES. HE REPEATED PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S DECLARATION THAT NO U.S. ARMED FORCES WOULD INTERVENE IN CUBA UNDER ANY CONDITIONS AND SAID:

"NO U.S. PERSONNEL PARTICIPATED IN TODAY'S INCIDENT. NOR WERE THERE PLANES OF THE UNITED STATES OF ANY KIND.

"THEY WERE CASTRO'S OWN PLANES AND TOOK OFF FROM HIS OWN FIELDS."

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UPI-162

ADD UN (UPI-141)

ROA RETORTED THAT THE PICTURES WERE NOT PROOF OF ANYTHING.

"THIS SYSTEM OF PAINTING MARKINGS OF A COUNTRY TO BE INBADED IS A COMMON PRACTICE," HE SAID. "AT AN AIRPORT IN GUATEMALA THERE ARE MANY B26 PLANES WHICH DISPLAY THE EVBLEM OF CUBA."

SOVIET AMBASSADOR VALERIAN A. ZORIN, IN A THINLY VEILED THREAT, TOLD THE COMMITTEE:

"WE SHOULD NOT FORGET. CUBA IS NOT ALONE TODAY. AMONG ITS MOST SINCERE FRIENDS THE SOVIET UNION IS TO BE FOUND. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WISHES TO MAKE THIS STATEMENT TODAY MOST CLEARLY AND MOST DEFINITELY."

ZORIN CALLED FOR URGENT U.N. MEASURES "WHICH EVEN AT THIS STAGE SHOULD CONTRIBUTE IMMEDIATELY TO STOPPING THE AGGRESSION."

"WE BELIEVE THE STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES CANNOT SATISFY THIS COMMITTEE. REFERENCES HAVE BEEN MADE TO STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY THAT NOT A SINGLE AMERICAN WOULD PARTICIPATE IN AN INVASION. BUT NOTHING WAS SAID TO THE EFFECT THAT ACTIVITIES HOSTILE TO CUBA WOULD BE STOPPED ON U.S. TERRITORY..."

"IF THE UNITED STATES FEELS THAT THE CUBAN REGIME IS NOT TO ITS LIKING, IT IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTERFERE IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF OTHERS. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR ACTION ON ITS TERRITORY WHICH PROVE TO BE OF AID TO THE CUBAN UNDERGROUND ELEMENT OR IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE PREPARING AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA."

"WE ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE STATEMENT OF MR. STEVENSON AND WE EXPECT THE GOVERNMENT AND DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE ITS POSITION CLEAR."

ROA, AGITATED AND OBVIOUSLY NERVOUS, ALMOST SHOUTED AT TIMES AS HE DENOUNCED THE UNITED STATES.

"MR. KENNEDY CALLS THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT TYRANNICAL," HE SAID. "MAY I SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS A DICTATORIAL REGIME DISGUISED AS A DEMOCRACY?"

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
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(CUBA)

HAVANA--TWIN-ENGINE B26 BOMBERS RAIDED THREE CUBAN CITIES TODAY. A DIRECT BOMB HIT ON AN AMMUNITION DEPOT OUTSIDE HAVANA ROCKED THE CITY WITH THUNDEROUS EXPLOSIONS.

PREMIER CASTRO DECREED GENERAL MOBILIZATION OF HIS 300,000-MAN MILITIA. TROOPS AND MILITIAMEN BEGAN STREAMING TOWARD THE BEACHES IN FEAR OF AN IMMINENT INVASION FROM ABROAD.

THE BOMBERS HIT THE CITIES OF HAVANA, SANTIAGO IN EASTERN CUBA AND SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BANOS 20 MILES WEST OF HAVANA IN RAIDS THAT STARTED AT DAWN.

THE HEAVIEST ATTACK WAS DIRECTED AT CAMP LIBERTY, JUST OUTSIDE HAVANA. TWO PERSONS WERE REPORTED KILLED THERE AND "MANY MORE" WERE INJURED. ONE OF THE ATTACKING PLANES WAS REPORTED SHOT DOWN IN FLAMES BY HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE.

(CUBAN EXILE SOURCES IN NEW YORK AND MIAMI SAID THE PLANES WERE CUBAN AIR FORCE BOMBERS FLOWN BY PILOTS FED UP WITH CASTRO'S REGIME. THEY ATTACKED BEFORE FLEEING TO SAFETY IN OTHER COUNTRIES, THE SOURCES SAID.)

THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE BLAMING THE ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES. IT CALLED THE ATTACKS "SURPRISE AND COWARDLY" AND SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE DENOUNCED AS AN AGGRESSOR BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS.

A DIRECT HIT ON AN AMMUNITION DUMP TOUCHED OFF A SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS THAT SHOOK THE AREA FOR 40 MINUTES.

CASTRO SPED IMMEDIATELY TO THE CAMP AND CONFERRED WITH THE WOUNDED COMANDANT, WHO WAS WOUNDED IN THE SHOULDER BUT WAS CONSCIOUS.

THE HAVANA ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT BY TWO NAVY-GRAY TWIN-ENGINE BOMBERS. ONE FLEW IN LOW, RELEASED ITS BOMBS WITH DEADLY ACCURACY AND ZOOMED UPWARDS THROUGH STREAMS OF MACHINEGUN AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. TRACERS DANCED AROUND THE PLANE.

MOMENTS LATER A SECOND PLANE STRUCK, AND ROARED AWAY, AN APPARENT VICTIM OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. ONE PLANE RETURNED AND CRISS-CROSSED THE AREA IN AN ATTEMPT TO WRECK AS MANY CUBAN AIR FORCE PLANES AS POSSIBLE.

~~SOME OF THE PLANES GAVE CHASE BUT~~
SOME OF THE PLANES GAVE CHASE BUT THE DAMAGE ALREADY HAD BEEN DONE. EXPLOSIONS REVERBERATED THROUGHOUT THE AREA.

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THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE ETC.

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UPI-38

ADD CUBA, HAVANA (UPI-28)

THE SOUND OF THE FIRING CLEARLY AUDIBLE IN HAVANA CREATED GREAT EXCITEMENT BUT NO PANIC. WILD RUMORS SPREAD THROUGH THE CITY THAT U.S. MARINES WERE INVADING CUBA. OTHER RUMORS SAID A COUNTER-REVOLUTION HAD BEGUN AGAINST CASTRO.

(CUBAN EXILE SOURCES INDICATED THE BOMBINGS WERE NOT ACTUALLY THE START OF THE UPRISING BEING PLANNED IN NEW YORK BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HEADED BY DR. JOSE MIRO CARDONA. IN A STATEMENT CARDONA CALLED THE BOMBINGS A "HEROIC BLOW FOR CUBAN FREEDOM."

(EXILES IN MIAMI DISCLOSED ADDITIONAL ANTI-CASTRO TROOPS HAD LANDED IN CENTRAL CUBA. THEY WERE BELIEVED TO BE FOLLOWERS OF FORMER DICTATOR FULGENCIO BATISTA.)

CUBAN MILITIAMEN AND POLICE SEIZED CONTROL OF THE TUNNEL LEADING UNDER HAVANA BAY. SOLDIERS AND MILITIAMEN STREAMED TOWARD THE WATERFRONT AND TOOK UP POSITIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE NARROW ENTRANCE TO THE BAY BETWEEN MORRO CASTLE AND CASTILLO DE LA PUNTA.

OTHER SOLDIERS GUARDED THE BEACHES IN THE AREA WHERE CASTRO HAS HIS HOME.

THE BOMBING ATTACKS APPEARED DIRECTED CHIEFLY AT CUBAN AIR FORCE FACILITIES, IN APPARENT PREPARATION FOR AN ARMED UPRISING AGAINST CASTRO OR EVEN AN INVASION FROM SOME OTHER CARIBBEAN ISLAND.

THE PLANES BOMBED AND STRAFE THE AIRBASE AT CAMP LIBERTY WHILE OTHERS SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTACKED THE AIRBASES AT SANTIAGO AND SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BANOS.

THE BASE AT SAN ANTONIO IS THE LARGEST. IT WAS BUILT BY THE UNITED STATES DURING WORLD WAR II AT A COST OF \$20 MILLION AND WAS KNOWN THEN AS CAMP CAYUGA.

MILITIAMEN TOOK THE WOUNDED TO THE HOSPITAL. SQUADS OF MILITIAMEN AND SOLDIERS WERE POKING THROUGH THE DEBRIS AND POLICE CHIEF EFIGENIO ALMEJEIRAS SAID AT LEAST TWO MILITIAMEN WERE KILLED AND "MANY WOUNDED."

UPI REPORTER HENRY RAYMONT WAS TOLD THAT MANY MILITIAMEN RAN OUT OF THE BUILDING TO MAN THEIR POSTS WHEN THE FIRST BOMBS FELL. THEY WERE MOWED DOWN WHEN THE SECOND PLANE CAME IN LOW AND MACHINEGUNNED THEM AS THEY RAN. BUILDINGS WERE POCKMARKED WITH BULLET HOLES.

SOON AFTER CASTRO REACHED THE SCENE HE BEGAN DRAFTING A COMMUNIQUE BLAMING THE UNITED STATES FOR THE BOMBINGS AND CALLING UP THE MILITIAMEN.

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AT 8:20 A.M. HE ORDERED THE CAMP CLOSED AND TWO MILITIAMEN ESCORTED RAYMONT TO THE GATE. CASTRO GAVE THEM FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO "LET IN ONLY, RAUL (HIS BROTHER) AND CHE WHOM YOU KNOW BY SIGHT." CHE IS MAJ. ERNESTO GUEVARA, ONE OF HIS REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS.

THE CITY OF HAVANA ITSELF APPEARED OUTWARDLY CALM. BUT MILITIAMEN CORDONED OFF ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. SMALL GROUPS IN THE STREETS CLUSTERED AROUND LOUDSPEAKERS WHICH BROADCAST THE COMMUNIQUE INTERSPERSED WITH REVOLUTIONARY SONGS.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS REPEATED OVER THE AIR BETWEEN BURSTS OF MARTIAL MUSIC AND THE NATIONAL ANTHEM.

THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY CASTRO SAID:

"AT 6 A.M. B26 PLANES OF UNITED STATES MAKE SIMULTANEOUSLY BOMBED POINTS IN THE CITY OF HAVANA, SAN ANTONIO LOS BANOS AND SANTIAGO ACCORDING TO REPORTS RECEIVED UP TO NOW," THE COMMUNIQUE SAID.

"OUR ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES OPENED FIRE ON THE ATTACKING PLANES, HITTING SEVERAL, ONE OF WHICH WITHDREW ENVELOPED IN FLAMES.

"CUBAN AIR FORCE PLANES LEFT IMMEDIATELY TO PURSUE THE ENEMY.

"UP TO THE MOMENT THIS REPORT IS BEING DRAFTED EXPLOSIONS CONTINUE BECAUSE THE AMMUNITION DUMP OF THE CUBAN AIR FORCE BASE (AT CAMP LIBERTY) IS IN FLAMES.

"UP TO THE MOMENT THERE ARE NO DEAD ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NUMEROUS WOUNDED. THE ATTACK WAS A SURPRISE AND COWARDLY.

"OUR COUNTRY HAS BEEN THE VICTIM OF CRIMINAL IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION VIOLATING ALL NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

"THE CUBAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCUSE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY OF AGGRESSION.

"THE ORDER HAS BEEN GIVEN FOR MOBILIZATION OF ALL COMBAT UNITS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY AND THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MILITIA. ALL POSTS HAVE BEEN ALERTED.

"IF THIS AIR ATTACK IS A PRELUDE TO INVASION THE NATION IS PREPARED FOR COMBAT. IT WILL RESIST AND DESTROY WITH AN IRON HAND ANY FORCE WHICH INTENDS TO DISEMBARK UPON OUR LAND.

"THE PEOPLE WILL BE AMPLY INFORMED OF EVERYTHING.

"EVERY CUBAN MUST OCCUPY THE POST TO WHICH HE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED IN MILITARY UNITS AND WORK CENTERS WITHOUT INTERRUPTING PRODUCTION OR THE ANTI-ILLITERACY CAMPAIGN OR A SINGLE REVOLUTIONARY TASK.

"THE FATHERLAND WILL RESIST WITH FIRM FOOTING, SERENELY, ANY ENEMY ATTACK, ASSURED OF ITS VICTORY.

"THE FATHERLAND OR DEATH."

"FIDEL CASTRO."

4/15 --JD/MJ1040AES

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UPI-53

ADD CUBA, HAVANA

(CUBAN EXILES IN MIAMI WARNED THEIR FOLLOWERS IN CUBA THAT TODAY'S BOMBING WAS NOT THE START OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND URGED THEM TO REMAIN UNDER COVER.

(IN NEW YORK, CARDONA ANNOUNCED THE PLANES INVOLVED WERE FLOWN BY DEFECTING PILOTS WHO SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT PLANS TO DESTROY AS MUCH OF THE CUBAN AIR FORCE AS POSSIBLE.

(HE SAID THAT "WHILE CASTRO AND HIS FOLLOWERS ATTEMPT TO CONVINCING THE WORLD THAT CUBA HAS BEEN THREATENED BY FOREIGN INVASION, THIS BLOW FOR LIBERTY, AS OTHERS BEFORE IT, WAS STRUCK BY CUBANS INSIDE CUBA." HE SAID THEY WERE RESOLVED TO FIGHT TYRANNY OR DIE IN THE ATTEMPT. CARDONA SAID NO FURTHER DETAILS WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE FLIERS' FAMILIES.

(OTHER EXILE SOURCES SAID OTHER PLANES HIT BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE TODAY LANDED AT PLACES OTHER THAN MIAMI. THEY GAVE NO DETAILS.)

CUBA HAS BEEN INVASION JITTERY FOR WEEKS AND CASTRO HAS BEEN FORCED TO STEP UP HIS EXECUTION OF SO-CALLED ANTI-REVOLUTIONARIES. TWO OF THEM DIED TODAY BEFORE A FIRING SQUAD, BRINGING THE TOTAL THIS YEAR TO 29.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT SAID IT WOULD BRING CHARGES AGAINST HOWARD E. ~~CANDY~~ ANDERSON OF MIAMI FOR ALLEGEDLY SMUGGLING WEAPONS INTO CUBA. HE COULD RECEIVE THE DEATH PENALTY IF CONVICTED.

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
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(CUBA-U.S.)

WASHINGTON--THE WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY DISACOWED FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANTI-CASTRO BOMBING AND STRAFING OF HAVANA AND TWO OTHER CUBAN CITIES.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY PIERRE SALINGER SAID THE FIRST KNOWLEDGE THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD OF THE INCIDENTS CAME FROM READING NEWS SERVICE DISPATCHES. HE SAID THE WHITE HOUSE WAS TRYING TO GET FURTHER INFORMATION FROM OTHER CHANNELS.

STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN JOSEPH REAP SIMILARLY REPORTED THE DEPARTMENT HAD NO INFORMATION ON THE PLANZ ATTACKS WHICH ROUSED NEW CUBAN CHARGES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

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UPI-7
(CUBA)

HAVANA--THREE TWIN-ENGINE PLANES MADE A HEAVY BOMBING ATTACK TODAY ON THE CUBAN AIR BASE AT CAMP LIBERTY AND BLEW UP AN AMMUNITION DUMP WITH A SERIES OF THUNDEROUS EXPLOSIONS. OTHER PLANES WERE REPORTED BOMBING THE AIRPORT AT SANTIAGO IN EASTERN CUBA.

THE RUMBLE OF THE HEAVY BOMBING ATTACK AND THE SHARP CRACKLE OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ROLLED THROUGH HAVANA. WILD RUMORS SPREAD THAT U.S. MARINES WERE LANDING. OTHER RUMORS TOLD OF A MASSIVE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THROUGHOUT CUBA.

ONE OF THE PLANES ATTACKING THE BASE OUTSIDE HAVANA WAS REPORTED SHOT DOWN IN FLAMES BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE, BUT THE PLANES ALREADY HAD LEFT THE BASE A SHAMBLES. EXPLOSIONS SOUNDED THERE FOR HOURS AFTERWARD.

(CUBAN EXILE SOURCES IN MIAMI SAID THE PLANES, REPORTED TO BE TWIN-ENGINE B26 BOMBERS, STRUCK SANTIAGO IN EASTERN CUBA AND OTHER TARGETS IN CENTRAL CUBA. ANTI-CASTRO INSURGENTS HAVE BEEN FIGHTING THE GOVERNMENT IN THOSE AREAS FOR WEEKS.)

(AT 8:30 A.M. EST A CUBAN AIR FORCE PLANE WITH ONE PROPELLER FEATHERED APPEARED OVER MIAMI, AND ASKED FOR EMERGENCY CLEARANCE TO LAND AT THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.)

THE FIRST BOMBING PLANE WAS SEEN FLYING LOW OVER THE RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT OF MIRAMAR IN HAVANA BEFORE HEADING TOWARD THE CAMP. A FEW MINUTES LATER EXPLOSIONS AT THE AIR BASE ROCKED THE CITY.

THE FIRST PLANE, A NAVY-GRAY BOMBER, RELEASED ITS BOMBS AND ZOOMED INTO THE AIR. IT WAS CLOSELY FOLLOWED BY A SECOND WHICH DIVED IN OVER THE TARGET TO RELEASE ITS BOMBS WHILE FIRE FROM ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS AND MACHINEGUNS SENT A STREAM OF TRACER BULLETS DANCING AROUND THE ESCAPING AIRCRAFT.

MOMENTS LATER THE THIRD AIRCRAFT CRISSCROSSED THE FIELD FROM A DIFFERENT DIRECTION. IT DROPPED BOMBS WHICH TOUCHED OFF ANOTHER SERIES OF THUNDEROUS EXPLOSIONS.

EXPLOSIONS BELIEVED FROM THE AMMUNITION DEPOT LASTED FROM 5:50 A.M. EST WHEN THE ATTACK STARTED UNTIL 7:15 A.M. LESSER BLASTS FOLLOWED.

MAJ. RAUL CASTRO, BROTHER OF PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO, WENT ON THE NATIONWIDE RADIO NETWORK FOLLOWING THE RAIDS AND BROADCAST A MOBILIZATION ORDER TO CUBA'S 300,000-MAN MILITIA.

THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT BEGAN DEPLOYING ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS AROUND THE CITY FROM CABANA FORTRESS, HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARTILLERY REGIMENT DEFENDING HAVANA.

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(A CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SPOKESMAN IN NEW YORK SAID THE BOMBING ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT BY PLANES DESERTING CASTRO'S AIR FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVIOUSLY MAPPED STRATEGY.

(THE SPOKESMAN SAID THE PLANES "BORE CUBAN MARKINGS." ONLY YESTERDAY, TWO OF CUBA'S TOP AIR FORCE PILOTS "ON LOAN" TO COMMERCIAL AIRLINES DEFECTED TO JACKSONVILLE, FLA.

(CUBAN REFUGEE SOURCES SAID THE BOMBING ATTACK MAY BE A "SOFTENING UP" PROCESS PRELIMINARY TO AN INVASION OF THE ISLAND BY CUBAN REBELS.)

THE ATTACK APPEARED CONCENTRATED ON THE AIRBASE, CAREFULLY AVOIDING THE "SCHOOL CITY" BUILT BY CASTRO IN THE CAMP WHICH USED TO BE KNOWN AS CAMP COLUMBIA.

THE RAID BEGAN AT 5:50 A.M. EST.

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REC-39 (U)

Could Get Death Penalty

Fidel Accuses Yank of Plot

HAVANA, Cuba, April 15 (UPI)—Two more Cubans were executed early today by a firing squad for alleged counter-revolutionary activities, bringing the total of executions this year to 29.

At the same time, the Cuban Government planned to bring charges against Howard F. (Andy) Anderson of Miami for allegedly smuggling weapons into Cuba. He could receive the death penalty if convicted.

Arthur Avignon, former attache of the U. S. Embassy in Havana.

Mr. Avignon, also allegedly an agent of the CIA, left when the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Dagoberto Munoz Rodriguez and Israel Ferro Gardon went before a firing squad this morning for arming themselves with three Molotov cocktails and planning an assault on the government "Voice of Land Reform" radio station.

The big, blond American is a former U. S. Marine sergeant who served as a guard in the U. S. Embassy in Havana. He remained here after his discharge to open a service station chain. His wife and two children moved to Miami.

A reliable informant said the government will prosecute Mr. Anderson, a Havana service station operator, for bringing arms in to Pinar Del Rio province for an anti-government uprising.

Mr. Anderson was accused with 14 Cubans, including several former army officers. He allegedly smuggled several tons of arms into Cuba, only to have most of them seized by government secret service infiltrators.

The government radio accused Mr. Anderson of being an agent of the United States Central Intelligence Agency and that he took orders from

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—UPI Photo.

FLAMING CUBA—The smoldering ruins of the nationalized "El Encanto" department store, largest in Cuba, after the building was destroyed by a flash fire. The blaze, which the Revolutionary government says was started by the anti-Castro underground, was the biggest single act of sabotage since the bearded ruler took over.

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Other Attacks Claimed

3 Planes Bomb Camp on Havana's Outskirts

By HENRY RAYMONT

HAVANA, Cuba, April 15 (UPI)—Three unidentified planes bombed the Cuban air base at Camp Liberty just outside of Havana early today and scored a direct hit on an ammunition depot.

(Cuban exile sources in Miami said the planes also attacked a government army installation at Santiago on the eastern end of the island and also a third strategic objective not immediately identified.)

Maj. Raul Castro, brother of Premier Fidel Castro, went on the nationwide radio network after the raids to broadcast a mobilization order to Cuba's 300,000-man militia.

(A Cuban Revolutionary Council spokesman in New York said the bombing attacks were carried out by planes deserting Castro's air force in accordance with previous mapped strategy.

(The spokesman said the planes "bore Cuban markings." Only yesterday, two of Cuba's top air force pilots "on loan" to commercial airlines defected to Jacksonville, Fla.

(Cuban refugee sources said the bombing attack may be a "softening up" process preliminary to an invasion of the island by Cuban rebels.)

Ambulances were seen rushing from Havana in the direction of the camp.

The attack appeared concentrated on the airbase, carefully avoiding the "school city" built by Castro in the camp which used to be known as Camp Columbia.

The heavy bombardment awoke thousands of Cubans in the capital which has had invasion "jitters" for the past week. Rebel activity was stepped up with bombings in Havana during the past few days.

This correspondent saw the first plane swoop low over the residential district of Miramar in Havana and then head toward the camp.

EARLY MORNING

The raid began at 5:50 a. m. EST, when the aircraft, one

gray, twin-engine plane made their first bombing run.

The gray plane made three passes, dropping at least a dozen bombs. There were explosions on the base for at least 30 minutes after the raid and Cuban anti-aircraft batteries kept firing at the planes that sped away after the attack. Black smoke was seen billowing high in the air.

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UPI -29

(BOMBER)

MIAMI--A TWIN-ENGINE CUBAN AIR FORCE BOMBER LANDED HERE TODAY AFTER DROPPING EXPLOSIVES ON AN ARMY CAMP OUTSIDE HAVANA THIS MORNING.

THE PLANE WAS PILOTED BY A FIRST LIEUTENANT OF THE CUBAN AIR FORCE WHO ASKED FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES WHEN TAKEN INTO CUSTODY BY U.S. IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES.

THE PLANE, A WORLD WAR II B26, LANDED AT MIAMI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ABOUT 8:30 A.M. EST AFTER RECEIVING CLEARANCE FOR AN EMERGENCY LANDING.

"IT HAD ONE OF ITS TWO ENGINES SHOT OUT AND WAS PRETTY WELL SHOT UP," A BORDER PATROL AGENT REPORTED.

THE CUBAN AIR FORCE PILOT WAS UNDERGOING INTENSIVE QUESTIONING BY U.S. AUTHORITIES, WHO DECLINED TO RELEASE HIS NAME.

EDWARD P. AHRENS, CHIEF IMMIGRATION OFFICER FOR THE MIAMI DISTRICT, SAID THE PILOT WAS NOT HURT. HE SAID THE FLIER ASKED THAT NEITHER HIS NAME NOR PHOTOGRAPHS BE RELEASED BECAUSE HE FEARED REPRISALS AGAINST HIS FAMILY.

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UPI-37

ADD BOMBER, MIAMI (UPI-29)

REPORTS FROM CUBA INDICATED SEVERAL PLANES WERE INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF CAMP LIBERTY OUTSIDE HAVANA AND OTHER POINTS ON THE ISLAND THIS MORNING. FIRST QUESTIONING OF THE PILOT WHO LANDED HERE INDICATED THE BOMBINGS WERE PART OF A PLOT WITHIN THE CUBAN AIR FORCE,


~~Imm~~ ^{Imm}GRATION OFFICERS SAID.

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UPI -58

ADD BOMBERS, MIAMI

THE U.S. NAVY BASE AT KEY WEST WAS INVESTIGATING AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT A THIRD CUBAN BOMBER HAD PLUNGED INTO THE SEA NEAR DRY TORTUGAS.

ONE PLANE, DESCRIBED AS A TWIN-ENGINEED MILITARY TYPE BY THE NAVY, LANDED AT THE BOCA CHICA NAVAL AIR STATION NEAR KEY WEST AT 7 A.M. EST. THERE WAS ONE CUBAN AIR FORCE OFFICER ABOARD.

A NAVY SPOKESMAN SAID THE FLIER SAID HE STOLE THE PLANE FROM THE CUBAN AIR FORCE. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT ADMIT THAT HE PARTICIPATED IN THE CUBAN BOMBINGS THIS MORNING.

HIS PLANE WAS NOT DAMAGED IN ANY WAY, THE NAVY SAID.


ANOTHER PLANE LIMPED INTO MIAMI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AT 8:30 A.M. "ALL SHOT UP," U.S. IMMIGRATION OFFICERS REPORTED.

BOTH PILOTS ASKED FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES. BOTH WERE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY FOR QUESTIONING.

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UPI-76

ADD BOMBERS, MIAMI

THE THIRD PLANE LANDED IN ANOTHER "FOREIGN COUNTRY," INFORMED CUBAN SOURCES IN MIAMI REPORTED. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE THIRD PLANE MAY HAVE PLUNGED INTO THE SEA NEAR DRY TORTUGAS WERE BEING INVESTIGATED BY THE U.S. NAVY BUT WERE BELIEVED TO BE FALSE.

INFORMED CUBAN SOURCES IN MIAMI REPORTED THAT ONLY THREE TWIN-ENGINE BOMBERS PARTICIPATED IN THE EARLY MORNING BOMBING AND STRAFING OF THREE MILITARY BASES IN CUBA.

THE LEAN, SUNTANNED PILOT WHO STEPPED FROM THE DAMAGED BOMBER AT MIAMI TOLD NEWSMEN LATER THAT HE TOOK OFF FROM THE SAN ANTONIO CUBAN AIR FORCE BASE ABOUT 27 MILES EAST OF HAVANA AT 5 35 A.M. EST.

"I CIRCLED THE FIELD AND DROPPED MY LOAD OF BOMBS ON IT," THE MUSTACHED FLIER SAID.

THE PILOT, DRESSED IN A WHITE T-SHIRT, GREEN FATIGUE TROUSERS, AND A BLUE BASEBALL-TYPE FLYING CAP, WOULD IDENTIFY HIMSELF TO NEWSMEN ONLY AS A FIRST LIEUTENANT IN THE CUBAN AIR FORCE. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN AN AIR FORCE PILOT FOR TWO YEARS.

AS OFFICER HUSTLED HIM OFF TO IMMIGRATION SERVICE HEADQUARTERS HERE, HE DUCKED HIS HEAD TO AVOID BEING PHOTOGRAPHED. HE WORE LARGE, DARK SUNGLASSES.

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UPI -79

ADD BOMBERS, MIAMI (UPI-76)

AFTER HE DROPPED HIS BOMBS, THE PILOT SAID, "I HEARD EXPLOSIONS AND SAW FLAMES."

HE TURNED ASIDE ALL QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW MANY BOMBS HE DROPPED AND WHETHER ANY OTHER PLANES WERE INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK WITH THE RESPONSE, "I CANNOT ANSWER ANY MILITARY QUESTIONS."

THE CUBAN FLIER SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS NOT ATTACKED BY ANY OTHER PLANES. HE SAID ANTI-AIRCRAFT FROM THE GROUND KNOCKED OUT ONE OF HIS PLANE'S TWO ENGINES AND RIDDLED THE FUSELAGE WITH HOLES.


A CROWD OF NEARLY 100 CUBANS GREETED HIM WHEN HE STEPPED OUT OF THE AIRPORT IMMIGRATION OFFICE WITH CHEERS AND SHOUTS OF "VIVA CUBA LIBRE (LONG LIVE FREE CUBA)."

BOTH THE PILOTS WHO LANDED AT MIAMI AND KEY WEST ASKED THAT THEIR IDENTITIES BE WITHHELD BECAUSE THEY HAD LEFT FAMILIES BEHIND IN CUBA AND FEARED PRISALS.

THE PILOT LANDING AT KEY WEST REFUSED TO DISCUSS HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE BOMBING RAIDS. BUT CUBAN SOURCES IN MIAMI POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED HIM AS ONE OF THE THREE BOMBERS.

THE NEWS OF THE BOMBING BROUGHT CHEERS FROM MANY OF MIAMI'S CUBAN REFUGEE COLONY OF MORE THAN 40,000. THEY FLOODED NEWS MEDIA WITH TELEPHONE CALLS INQUIRING IF CUBA HAD BEEN INVADED.

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UPI-80

ADD CUBA, HAVANA
OVER-ANXIOUS ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNNERS AT CAMP LIBERTY HIT A TRAILER
TRUCK FULL OF AMMUNITION, CAUSING IT TO BLOW UP.
MACHINEGUNS ATOP THE NATIONAL PALACE IN HAVANA WERE UNCOVERED AND
ALL TROOPS THROUGH THE NATION WERE ORDERED RESTRICTED TO THEIR
GARRISONS IN A SEMI-ALERT.

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UPI -87

ADD CUBA, HAVANA

THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT CALLED THE BOMBING ATTACKS A PRELUDE TO
"LARGE-SCALE MILITARY AGGRESSION" AGAINST CUBA.


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UPI-89

ADD CUBA, HAVANA

ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER CARLOS OLIVARES CALLED IN THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND SAID THE AIR RAIDS WERE DESIGNED TO KNOCK OUT THE CUBAN AIR FORCE BEFORE CUBA'S ENEMIES MOUNT A FULL-SCALE ATTACK IN AN EFFORT TO BRING DOWN THE FIDEL CASTRO GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAID THE BOMBING RAIDS CAUSED WIDESPREAD DAMAGE IN THE THREE CITIES HIT.

CASTRO SAID THEY WERE MASTERMINDED BY THE UNITED STATES.


(TWO B26S, ONE DAMAGED BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE, LANDED IN FLORIDA. THE PILOTS SAID THE RAIDS WERE CARRIED OUT BY CUBAN AIR FORCE MEN FED UP WITH CASTRO'S COMMUNISM. ANOTHER PLANE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE LANDED IN JAMAICA.)

OLIVARES TOLD THE FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC CORPS THE UNITED STATES WAS LENDING A "GUIDING HAND" TO AGGRESSION. CASTRO HIMSELF CALLED THE ATTACKS OPEN AGGRESSION BY THE UNITED STATES.

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
UPI-94

ADD CUBA, HAVANA

OLIVARES DISPLAYED BOMB FRAGMENTS HE SAID BORE UNITED STATES MARKINGS.

(A U.S. NAVY SPOKESMAN AT THE NAVAL BASE AT GUANTANAMO BAY SAID THE SITUATION THERE WAS "VERY QUIET" AND THAT "NO EXTRA PRECAUTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN. (BUT) WE ARE PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY.")

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UPI-109

ADD CUBA, HAVANA

THIS AFTERNOON THE GOVERNMENT ARRESTED 200 EMPLOYEES OF THE ELENCANTO DEPARTMENT STORE FOR QUESTIONING IN THE SABOTAGE FIRE WHICH BURNED IT DOWN NIGHT BEFORE LAST.

IN SANTIAGO RAUL CASTRO SAID CASUALTIES WERE LIGHT WHEN THE CITY WAS HIT BY "MERCENARY AIRPLANES PAID BY CRIMINAL YANKEE IMPERIALISM."

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UPI - 117

ADD BOMBERS, MIAMI

THE PILOT WHO LANDED IN MIAMI TOLD IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS THAT HE AND THREE OTHER CUBAN AIR FORCE PILOTS HAD PLANNED "FOR SOME MONTHS" TO ESCAPE FROM CASTRO'S CUBA.

BUT HE SAID THE DECISION TO LEAVE TODAY WAS MADE ONLY TWO DAYS AGO WHEN HE SAW ONE OF THE OTHER THREE--A LT. ALVARA GALO--TALKING WITH ONE OF CASTRO'S INTELLIGENCE AGENTS.

"I ALERTED THE OTHER TWO AND WE DECIDED THAT PROBABLY ALVARA GALO, WHO HAD ALWAYS ACTED LIKE SOMEWHAT OF A COWARD, HAD BETRAYED US. WE DECIDED TO TAKE ACTION AT ONCE," THE PILOT SAID.


HE SAID IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE "TREACHERY" OF GALO THAT HE AND THE OTHERS DECIDED TO "GIVE HIM A LESSON" WITH A STRAFING AND BOMBING RUN OVER AIR BASE INSTALLATIONS ON THEIR WAY TO FREEDOM. HE SAID HE STRUCK AT HIS OWN BASE--SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BANOS--AND THE OTHER PILOTS HIT OTHER BASES.

"I CIRCLED THE FIELD AND DROPPED MY LOAD OF BOMBS ON IT," THE FLIER TOLD NEWSMEN AT THE AIRPORT. LATER, IN HIS STATEMENT TO IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES, HE MENTIONED ONLY STRAFING, AND SAID HE WAS AIMING PARTICULARLY FOR GALO'S PARKED PLANE.

HE SAID AS HE TWISTED HIS PLANE THROUGH SMALL ARMS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE, "I HEARD EXPLOSIONS AND SAW FLAMES."

THE FIRST OF THE BOMBERS LANDED AT BOCA CHICA AT 7 A.M. EST. THE PILOT, IN A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL STATE, WAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY BY U.S. NAVY AND BORDER PATROL OFFICERS.

AHRENS SAID IN MIAMI HE HAD NOT RECEIVED A FULL REPORT ON THE LANDING OF THE PLANE AT KEY WEST, BUT UNDERSTOOD THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A SECOND MAN ABOARD.



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THE LANDING OF THE BOMBERS TODAY CAME IN THE WAKE OF DEFECTION AT JACKSONVILLE YESTERDAY OF THE WELL KNOWN CUBAN FLYING BROTHERS, ROBERTO AND GUILLERMO HERDAGUER POAN. ROBERTO WAS FORMERLY CASTRO'S PERSONAL PILOT. *Cuba, Florida*

THE BROTHERS, WHO LEFT FOR MIAMI TODAY TO APPEAR BEFORE IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES ON MONDAY, LANDED AT JACKSONVILLE AT THE CONTROLS OF A CUBAN AIRLINE CARGO PLANE. TWO OTHER MEN ABOARD THE PLANE PLANNED TO RETURN TO CUBA, BUT CUSTOMS OFFICIALS HELD THE FOUR-ENGINE PLANE.

THE BOMBER PILOT WHO LANDED IN MIAMI TODAY SAID HE WAS "ONE OF 12 B26 PILOTS WHO REMAINED IN THE CASTRO AIR FORCE AFTER THE DEFECTION OF DIAS LANZ AND THE PURGES THAT FOLLOWED."

LANZ WAS THE HEAD OF THE CUBAN AIR FORCE WHO DEFECTED SHORTLY AFTER CASTRO TOOK OVER IN EARLY 1959.

THE PILOT SAID THAT HE WAS ASSIGNED THE ROUTINE PATROL FOR HIS BASE FOR TODAY, AND THAT THE OTHER TWO PILOTS, STATIONED AT CAMP LIBERTY OUTSIDE HAVANA, MADE EXCUSES FOR GETTING INTO THE AIR. ONE OF THEM WAS SCHEDULED FOR A FLIGHT TO SANTIAGO TODAY, THE PILOT SAID, AND THE OTHER "MADE THE EXCUSE THAT HE WISHED TO CHECK OUT HIS ALTIMETER."

THE PILOT SAID HE WAS AIRBORNE AT 6:05 A.M.

"BECAUSE OF ALVARO GALO'S TREACHERY, WE HAD AGREED TO GIVE HIM A LESSON. SO I FLEW BACK OVER SAN ANTONIO, WHERE HIS PLANE IS STATIONED, AND MADE TWO STRAFING RUNS AT HIS PLANE AND THREE OTHERS PARKED NEARBY. ON THE WAY OUT, I WAS HIT BY SOME SMALL ARMS FIRE AND TOOK EVASIVE ACTION," THE PILOT RELATED.

"MY COMRADES HAD BROKEN OFF EARLIER TO HIT AIRFIELDS WHICH WE AGREED THEY WOULD STRIKE. THEN BECAUSE I WAS LOW ON GAS I HAD TO GO INTO MIAMI BECAUSE I COULD NOT REACH OUR AGREED DESTINATION. IT MAY BE THAT THEY WENT ON TO STRAFE ANOTHER FIELD BEFORE LEAVING, SUCH AS PLAYA BARACOA, WHERE FIDEL KEEPS HIS HELICOPTER."

THE PILOT DID NOT NAME THE "AGREED DESTINATION."


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UPI-118

ADD CUBA, HAVANA

THE ARMED FORCES MINISTRY SAID THE ATTACK ON SANTIAGO AIRFIELD WAS CARRIED OUT BY ONE BLACK PLANE AND ONE GRAY PLANE WITH A CUBAN FLAG. IT SAID THEY "FLEW TO THE YANKEE BASE OF GUANTANAMO." AN ANNOUNCEMENT SAID THE PLANES DAMAGED THE LANDING STRIP THERE.

THE MINISTRY SAID THREE PLANES INCLUDING A JET ATTACKED SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BANOS AND SHOT UP THREE PLANES ON THE GROUND, A C47, A T33 JET TRAINER AND A SEAFURY. IT SAID 15 BOMBS WERE DROPPED AND A RESERVOIR DAMAGED.

AT CAMP LIBERTY THE MINISTRY SAID "SEVERAL" MUNITION DUMPS BLEW UP. IT SAID THE ATTACKS WERE MADE BY "CUBAN TRAITORS" AND THAT ONE HEROIC CUBAN PILOT LEFT HIS BED, "RAN NAKED TO HIS PLANE AND PURSUED AN ATTACKER ALMOST ALL THE WAY TO KEY WEST."

4/15--MJ218PES

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UPI-130

ADD CUBA, HAVANA

ONE OF THE CAMP LIBERTY DEAD WAS IDENTIFIED AS UNIVERSO SANCHO, ONE OF THE 12 SURVIVORS OF CASTRO'S ORIGINAL 1957 LANDING IN CUBA.

RAUL CASTRO THE DEFENSE MINISTER ORDERED ALL YOUTH GROUPS AND OTHER CASTRO ORGANIZATIONS TO TAKE POSITIONS ASSIGNED DURING THE "ALERT" LAST JANUARY WHEN CASTRO WARNED AN INVASION WAS IMMINENT.

(IN THE EXCITEMENT, ACCORDING TO CUBAN EXILES, SOME ANTI-CASTRO REBELS SLIPPED INTO THE MOUNTAINS OF CENTRAL CUBA TO BOLSTER THE REBEL FORCES OPERATING THERE.

(BUT EXILES IN MIAMI WARNED THEIR FOLLOWERS IN CUBA THAT THE BOMBING WAS NOT THE START OF A COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND URGED THEM TO REMAIN UNDER COVER.)

OLIVARES SAID HE HOPED THE RAIDS WOULD CONVINCe THE WORLD THAT "CUBA NEVER LIED" WHEN IT ACCUSED THE UNITED STATES OF "MASTERMINDING" AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA.

HE LATER DECLINED TO COMMENT ON REPORTS THAT THE PLANES WHICH FLEW TO FLORIDA WERE AIR FORCE PLANES.

THE GOVERNMENT SAID ONLY THAT THE PLANES WERE "NORTH AMERICAN."
THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER READ CASTRO'S COMMUNIQUE AND SAID THE COUNTRY, WHILE IN A STATE OF COMBAT READINESS, WOULD GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF THE DIPLOMATIC COLONY.

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UPI-132

ADD CUBA, HAVANA

THE GOVERNMENT SAID SEVEN PERSONS WERE KILLED IN HAVANA AND 39
INJURED BY WHAT IT CALLED AMERICAN-INSTIGATED RAIDS.
ANOTHER FIVE WERE REPORTED WOUNDED AT SANTIAGO IN EXTREME EASTERN CUBA.
A SPOKESMAN SUGGESTED THE RAIDS MIGHT HAVE BEEN A COVER UP FOR A
LANDING SOMEWHERE ALONG THE COAST.

4/15 -- MJ305 PES

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
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UPI-6

(PLANES)

MIAMI--THE UNITED STATES BECAME A HAVEN TODAY FOR TWO CUBAN PILOTS WHO BOMBED CUBAN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SATURDAY IN THEIR SPECTACULAR EXODUS FROM THE ISLAND.

IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS GRANTED THEM POLITICAL ASYLUM LATE SATURDAY. MONDAY THEY WILL INTERVIEW TWO BROTHERS--ONE OF THEM FIDEL CASTRO'S FORMER PERSONAL PILOT--WHO HAVE MADE SIMILAR REQUESTS.

EDWARD AHRENS, DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION, DECLINED TO GIVE ANY DETAILS OF SATURDAY'S ACTION.

"THESE MEN DON'T WANT THEIR NAMES RELEASED," HE SAID, "OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THEM."

ONE OF THE PILOTS, A LEAN, MUSTACHED MAN WHO LOOKED TO BE ABOUT 30, LANDED AT MIAMI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN A CUBAN AIR FORCE B26 BOMBER WITH ONLY ONE OF ITS TWO ENGINES WORKING. THE CRAFT WAS RIDDLED BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND SMALL ARMS FIRE.

THE OTHER PILOT LANDED IN ANOTHER B26 AT BOCA CHICA NAVAL AIR STATION AT KEY WEST.

INFORMED CUBAN EXILE SOURCES HERE SAID A THIRD BOMBER LANDED IN "ANOTHER FOREIGN COUNTRY" WHERE ALL THREE PLANES HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO LAND.

THE PILOT WHO LANDED AT MIAMI SAID HE AND HIS COMPANIONS ON THE RAID HAD PLANNED "FOR SOME MONTHS" TO FLEE CUBA. THEY WERE PUSHED INTO ACTION SATURDAY, HE SAID, BY FEAR THAT ANOTHER CUBAN AIR FORCE PILOT IN ON THE PLAN HAD BETRAYED THEM TO CUBAN INTELLIGENCE AGENTS.

THE PILOT SAID HE SAW LT. ALVARA GALO TALK NG THURSDAY WITH A CUBAN INTELLIGENCE AGENT AT SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BANOS AIR INSTALLATION NEAR HAVANA WHERE THEY WERE STATIONED.

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"I ALERTED THE OTHER TWO," HE SAID, "AND WE DECIDED THAT PROBABLY ALVARA GALO, WHO HAD ALWAYS ACTED LIKE SOMEWHAT OF A COWARD, HAD BETRAYED US. WE DECIDED TO TAKE ACTION AT ONCE."

HE SAID HE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED THE ROUTINE PATROL FOR HIS BASE FOR SATURDAY. ONE OF THE OTHER PILOTS HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR A FLIGHT TO SANTIAGO AND THE OTHER "MADE THE EXCUSE THAT HE WISHED TO CHECK OUT HIS ALTIMETER" IN ORDER TO GET INTO THE AIR, THE PILOT SAID. THE OTHER PILOTS HAD BEEN STATIONED AT CAMP LIBERTY OUTSIDE HAVANA, ANOTHER TARGET OF THE RAIDS.

THE PILOT SAID HE FLEW OVER SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BANOS, BOMBING AND STRAFING, WHILE HIS COMPANIONS "HIT AIRFIELDS WHICH WE AGREED THEY WOULD STRIKE."

"THEN BECAUSE I WAS LOW ON GAS I HAD TO GO INTO MIAMI BECAUSE I COULD NOT REACH OUR AGREED DESTINATION." HE DID NOT IDENTIFY THE "AGREED DESTINATION."

THE TWO BROTHERS, ROBERTO AND GUILLERMO MERDAGUER BOAN, LANDED IN JACKSONVILLE FRIDAY IN A CUBAN CARGO PLANE THEY COMMANDEERED AT GUNPOINT.

ROBERTO WAS FORMERLY THE PERSONAL PILOT OF THE CUBAN PREMIER. THE BROTHERS SAID THEY HAD "HAD ENOUGH OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN CUBA" AND FORCED THE FOUR-ENGINE "Q" AIRLINE CRAFT DOWN AT JACKSONVILLE'S IMESON AIRPORT.

THE PLANE HAD BEEN BOUND FROM HAVANA TO TORONTO CANADA. TWO OTHER CUBANS ABOARD THE PLANE RETURNED THE CRAFT TO HAVANA SATURDAY AFTERNOON.

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UPI-145

ADD CUBA, HAVANA

IT WAS LATER REPORTED THAT AT LEAST SIX PLANES TOOK PART IN THE RAIDS.

THREE PLANES STRUCK HAVANA, TOUCHING OFF THUNDEROUS EXPLOSIONS AT CAMP LIBERTY.

THE GOVERNMENT REPORTED SEVEN DEAD AND 39 WOUNDED IN HAVANA, MOSTLY SOLDIERS AND MILITIAMEN. FIFTEEN CIVILIANS WERE REPORTED AMONG THE WOUNDED.

TWO PLANES STRUCK AT THE AIRFIELD IN SANTIAGO. THE GOVERNMENT REPORTED FIVE WOUNDED AND CHARGED THE PLANES "FLEW TO THE YANKEE BASE OF GUANTANAMO."

AT LEAST ONE PLANE ATTACKED THE AIR BASE AT SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BANGS, 20 MILES WEST OF HAVANA.

THERE WERE NO IMMEDIATE REPORTS OF CASUALTIES AT SAN ANTON. O.

THE CAMP LIBERTY BASE ON THE EDGE OF HAVANA WAS SHATTERED. "THEY WERE REAL CLEVER," A MILITIAMAN SAID. "FIRST THEY GOT US WITH BOMBS AND THEN THEY STRAFED US WITH MACHINE GUNS."

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UPI - 34

(FLIER)

NEW YORK--FIDEL CASTRO'S CHARGE THAT YESTERDAY'S BOMBING MISSIONS WERE LAUNCHED FROM GUATEMALA WAS DENIED TODAY BY CUBAN EXILE LEADERS WHO IDENTIFIED ONE OF THE FLIERS AND SAID HE HAD FLOWN FROM CUBA TO "A FOREIGN COUNTRY."

LEADERS OF THE ANTI-CASTRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE REFUSED TO DISCLOSE THE NAMES OF THE TWO PILOTS WHO LANDED IN FLORIDA YESTERDAY AFTER TAKING OFF FROM A CUBAN AIR FIELD AND BOMBING CUBAN INSTALLATIONS.

BUT AFTER CASTRO CHARGED TODAY THAT THE MISSIONS WERE LAUNCHED FROM GUATEMALAN BASES, A THIRD DEFECTING PILOT WAS IDENTIFIED AS CAPT. ORESTES CAOSTA, WHO FLEW A T33 JET TRAINER THAT HAD BEEN CONVERTED TO FIGHTER USE.

THE TWO OTHER PLANES WERE B46 BOMBERS. ONE LIMPED INTO MIAMI SERIOUSLY DAMAGED FROM GROUND FIRE. THE OTHER LANDED IN KEY WEST.

AN EXILE LEADER SAID CAOSTA TOOK OFF FROM THE SANTIAGO ARMY AIR FORCE BASE AND BOMBED THE INSTALLATION BEFORE ESCAPING. HIS PLANE WAS DAMAGED SLIGHTLY ON LANDING IN "A FOREIGN COUNTRY," THE LEADER SAID, BECAUSE RUNWAY FACILITIES WERE NOT SUITABLE FOR JET USE.

"CAOSTA IS NOW UNDER OUR PROTECTION IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY," THE SPOKESMAN SAID. "HE WAS ONE OF THE ORIGINAL CASTRO PILOTS IN OUR PLAN WHICH CULMINATED IN YESTERDAY'S SUCCESS."

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- Miss Gandy _____

NDAY: APRIL 16, 1961



Time Test

WILLIAM V. SHANNON

Washington.

The Kennedy Administration has decided that it will not back any major military attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba before July. Unless a spontaneous revolution, wholly outside of American influence or control, occurs in Cuba, this means there will be no military action—except for sabotage and sporadic raids—during the next three months.

By June, the sugar crop will have been harvested. Unemployment, which is chronic in the Cuban economy, will then rise sharply in the off-season. Hunger, unrest and anti-Castro feeling will presumably also rise. Because the Castro government is running out of foreign exchange, a severe economic pinch is developing. The importation of oil and of spare parts is an increasingly serious problem. Consumer goods may have to be rationed soon. The Cubans, because of their closeness to the American market, are unlike people in other underdeveloped countries in that they have a comparatively high standard of living. They are used to American cigarets, soft drinks and similar consumer items which are disappearing from their stores.


The Kennedy Administration hopes that these growing economic strains and the steady accumulation of grievances and resentments will sap Castro's strength and improve the chances of a revolution later.

As far as it goes, this decision by President Kennedy to withhold U. S. support from a Cuban revolution for the time being represents a victory for the moderates among his advisers over the activists in the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon.

CLIPPING FROM THE

N.Y. Post
EDITION For Weekend
DATED 4/16/61
PAGE 9 (Magazine)
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Mr. Kennedy, however, has not definitely made up his mind about what he may do about Castro over the long term. He does not exclude the possibility of covert American support for a major military operation at some future date. He has decided what the U. S. will not do in the immediate future; he has not decided what it might do in the more distant future. He has said, in effect, "not now" and "go slow" but he has not said "never."

The central issue is not the use of American soldiers or American volunteers. That is only a decoy. No one in the Administration has ever seriously considered landing the Marines in Cuba.

The real issue is whether we turn our backs on the anti-Castro exiles, observe strict neutrality, and allow events to take their own course, or whether we actively cooperate in planning the revolution and give money, supplies and advice—that is, all aid short of sending our own troops.

Related to this issue is a second question—what do we do if the revolution begins to fail? If the anti-Castro groups make a major effort and Castro crushes it, that disaster would wipe out any chance of getting rid of the dictator for a long time to come. Those inside the Administration who favor a course of neutrality believe the Cuban revolutionaries must run their own risks and if they fail, we do nothing. The opposing view is that we must help manage the revolution to make sure it goes off well, because once it has begun, we cannot permit it to fail.

Those who favor the neutral, hands-off position are worried about our treaty obligations and our legal position in the UN. Mr. Kennedy is cognizant of these considerations, but he does not give them great weight. By temperament, he is too much an activist to take a wholly passive position or put legal considerations foremost.

The President is, on the other hand, aware of the practical dangers involved in the alternative course. He does not want to sponsor a revolution that fails. Nor does he want to get us involved indirectly in a protracted civil war in Cuba. He would like to see an operation against Castro that was clean-cut and quickly effective. Since the Cuban exiles cannot make a persuasive case that intervention now would lead to victory, the President does not intend to plunge into a situation that would be too messy and too risky.

Mr. Kennedy has been careful to maintain his own freedom of action. He has kept his intentions hidden. That is why his answers at his press conference Wednesday, for example, were deliberately evasive and unresponsive.

The ideal solution would be an anti-Castro revolution that broke out inside Cuba, rather than one in which the main impetus comes from the exile groups. The People's Revolutionary Movement, the most radical group among the exiles, has the best underground inside Cuba. Manuel Ray, its leader, who has opposed any major military move from the outside, estimates that 80 per cent of the people are anti-Castro. The U. S. government intends to give the underground a chance to show what it can do in the coming spring and summer months.

President Kennedy, meanwhile, is trying to put the problem of social change in a hemispheric context. There are honest, non-Communist governments in Venezuela, Brazil and other countries with which we can work for genuine economic progress.

If Congress will cooperate, the President plans to make good use of the next few months to demonstrate that his hemispheric "allegiance for progress" is not an empty gesture. In that way, he can combat Castroism over the long term and also shore up America's political position with its neighbors when the storm over Cuba finally breaks.

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Demand Halt to Anti-Cuba Plot

GUS HALL, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, last week issued the following statement on the threatened intervention in Cuba:



HALL

"The latest moves by the Kennedy Administration against Cuba heighten the danger of immediate military aggression against that country, and seriously imperil the peace of the world.

"The arrogant and provocative White Paper on Cuba prepared under the personal supervision of the President, and issued in the name of "breaking with Communism," is to lay the basis for outright military intervention against Cuban independence, and to incite a war hysteria among the American people.

"In addition, the Kennedy Administration is stepping up the use of U. S. soil in Florida, Louisiana, and of various Central American countries as training grounds for mercenary invasion forces. It is financing and backing a virtual government-in-exile against the sovereignty of Cuba. The Guantanamo base, on Cuban soil, is being increasingly converted into a hotbed of subversion and intimidation.

against the Cuban people and their Castro government.

"The Cuban government, as well as the governments of all other Latin-American nations, have the sovereign right to have friendly relations with any government they choose, irrespective of differences in social systems. The cry of "Communism" against Cuba is the same cry

that was used to murder Patrice Lumumba in order that the colonialists could re-establish themselves in the Congo.

"The main cause of the threat to Cuba, which U. S. imperialism tries to conceal under the banner of anti-Communism, is the fact that the Castro government, with the backing of the Cuban people, has taken over the U. S. monopolies and deprived them of their super-profits and their power to keep the Cuban masses in poverty, disease, and oppression. The U. S. threat to overthrow the Castro government is to re-establish a regime which will return the country to Wall Street as it was, under the puppet Batista.

"The preparations for military intervention against the Cuban revolution should be halted immediately. The counter-revolutionary guerilla bases in this country and Central America should be disbanded now. Instead, our government should open negotiations with the Castro government for the re-establishment of normal diplomatic and trade relations, based upon full respect for the sovereignty and independence of Cuba, as requested by the Castro government."

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Joseph North Reports from Cuba

By JOSEPH NORTH

HAVANA — While the milicianos were still rooting the half-starved, wild-eyed mercenaries out of the mangrove swamps the number now exceeds 700. I heard the voice of Fidel Castro over the radio warning his people that the Pentagon may be considering a direct frontal attack on Cuba.



"It will be the end of imperialism," he said. In the beach area where the invaders had landed, I watched soldiers bringing in their catch

the invasion force. They'd prefer not to come out of the woods. While out on the Zapata Peninsula, I watched the soldiers move around the beach.

While some of the milicianos were diving into the swimming pool, others were firing away at targets with rifles and machine-guns. One, in trunks, waded out to inspect three floating wrecked invasion craft.

They showed me captured gear heaped high in neat rows — rocket ammunition with the U.S. print on the boxes.

PIECES OF A MAN

One box says, "Dangerous, contains one pound packages of TNT—60 MM Mortars." They took me about a mile off and showed me a shattered B-26, two-motored. In the charred wreckage were many things.

of killers. And even as they were bringing them in, one lad, who had taken a piece of the parachute the invaders used and wound it as a scarf around his neck, pointed to the horizon. It looked as the red sun in the Caribbean and it threw into distinct silhouette the outline of a U. S. destroyer.


COTTAGES SMASHED

In the big beach resort where the invasion began, lovely cottages newly built for workers are shattered by the mortar fire the invaders opened up.

We weren't allowed on the road through the mangrove woods because mercenaries are still wandering around inside. The worst of them, they said, were the war criminals who had been sentenced to death one and, who fled, and who came back with

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"Look" one of the milicianos said, "Pieces of a man."

I looked, and there was the charred rib-case of the pilot, all that was left of the man who had bombed the Cuban Army and several civilian spots a mile from here. Anti-aircraft men brought him down — one of the nine.

I saw some of the prisoners here, decked out in their space-man garb, the green-olive abstract painting kind of regalia that is supposed to camouflage you successfully enough to avoid detection.

They were lying on the floor and they didn't give a damn about anything just then. They were resting after days wandering in the muck, hungry, thirsty, mad. For nearly three days the press corps in Havana has been questioning them. A pattern has emerged.

The captured in the majority are men who took this as a job. They got 250-300 pesos a month. Then there were former Batista officers eager to be in on the kill and get their lush, graft-ridden jobs back. Some of them were on the air with that brash, simple-minded bravado the military often affects.

BLUE BOOK

But the main thing was that many other names read like the old Havana blue book of top society. Not only was Jose Cardona the son of the president-in-exile, so-called, captured on this invasion, but the son of his right-hand man, "Tony" Varona, also.

It was clear that the oldsters back home had miscalculated wildly, or they wouldn't send their best stock in. They figured it would be a walk-over, they could set up a their government-in-exile on Cuban soil, get it recognized right away by the U. S., so they sent the cream of the crop.

It was clear too that they reckoned on a second front in Oriente at the naval town of Cajal but Cuban planes dropped about 600 of them.

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Cuban Misadventure

It is a fair guess that about 10 per cent of the United States effort expended on Laos (10,000 miles away) would have been 100 per cent effective in Cuba.

Inform Castro — in the clearest, briefest, politest language — that we have the same sort and degree of interest in Cuba today as we had 60-odd years ago when we fought for, and brought, freedom to that lovely island. That we hope he will understand our continuing interest and will, therefore, agree to have free elections there within four months . . . that he will welcome observers from all American countries to be at the polls.

If he is unwilling to do this, we (not the U. N.) should go in and see that the elections are held and invite the afore-said observers to be present.

Otherwise freedom of Cubans and other human beings everywhere will be further nibbled away as we sit and shuffle and reshuffle our "morals" and fears.

The picture of Uncle Sam as a gauche, dazed or fearful giant has been permitted to develop quite far enough.

Courage always has been and ever will be the paramount condition necessary for freedom's survival. I have the greatest respect and admiration for President Kennedy's personal courage, but I hope he will soon begin matching his undoubted personal courage with an official courage. If he is not permitted to do this, then, in very truth, all the magnificent efforts of past generations that have willingly fought and died for freedom will be gone . . . with the wind. Donald Owen Webb.

not a 'defector' from the Cuban Air Force. That was a 'cover' to hide the fact that he was part of the rebel forces stationed at an airstrip in Guatemala." We now have a "B-26 incident."

We were caught lying about the U-2, and now we have been exposed before the world on the Cuban crisis. The British press is almost 100 per cent against us. Prime Minister Nehru denounced us, as did Saudi Arabia, Mali, Equador, not to mention the Communists, as well as many other countries. And don't overlook the demonstrations at the U. N. this past week, and here in Washington last Saturday. Not all of the United States, as President Kennedy says, supports the CIA intervention, nor does the rest of the world.

Our country became great on its democratic ideals. Lies before the world, and the intervention in a country of 6.5 million people, smack of totalitarianism. What is worse is that instead of the United States apologizing, it is rattling its weapons, threatening a true United States invasion in a country that has seen the Marines more than once on its shores this century. Cuba and the people of the world will not stand for this again. The threat of nuclear war is great.

Let the Cubans, not the United States or the people that it arms, decide their own destiny. Hands off Cuba!

William J. Reever

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Adlai Stevenson denied the Cuban charges that the United States armed and transported the counter-revolutionaries. We now know that the Cuban charges were true. George Sherman, in The Sunday Star, says "It is now admitted that the pilot who landed in Miami last week and in a battle-scarred plane bearing Cuban insignia was

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
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Story of U.S. Role in Cuba Invasion

New Anti-Castro Steps in the Works

BY EDWIN A. LAHEY AND DAVID KRASLOW
Chicago Daily News Service

WASHINGTON—One stark truth looms out of the Cuban debris, like a smokestack still standing after a factory explosion:

The United States is committed irrevocably to the overthrow of Fidel Castro.

The wheels are in motion and will keep grinding until the mission is accomplished.

THERE ARE four alternate plans for destroying Castro, the first two of which are the most likely.

1. Another invasion of Cuba, by Cubans and possibly other Latin American volunteers, this time organized, trained and equipped to leave no margin for error.

2. Collective action by member nations of the Organization of American States, if two-thirds of the 21 republics support this plan.

If the necessary two-thirds do not support this proposal, the United States may be prepared to take the assistance of whatever friends will stand up and be counted, and let the OAS suffer disruption.

The remaining alternatives are remote.

3. A propaganda campaign in Cuba of greater intensity, geared to the hope that Castro can be overthrown by his own people.

4. Direct intervention by U.S. military forces, on their own.

THE U.S. commitment to destroy Castro was made surreptitiously ^{last year} ~~last year~~ ago. We made ^{it} ~~it~~ at be-

came apparent that Castro had granted a concession to the international Communist movement to use Cuba as a base for infecting all the Latin America.

We made our purpose known publicly, in an agonizing burst of honesty, after John F. Kennedy for the first time in his 43 years felt the acrid taste of complete and humiliating defeat.

The shackles of self-righteous hypocrisy were removed from Uncle Sam's burly frame as the President, still clad in white tie and tails from the congressional reception at the White House the night of April 18, faced up to the fact that he had taken his first whipping.

Until 4 a.m. April 19, Mr. Kennedy was on the White House phone, talking to staff aides, going over the painful details of the disastrous invasion of Cuba, and making plans for the future.

The taste of defeat was bitter to the President. All the Kennedys play to win, whether the game is parchesi or the balance of terror in a world armed for destruction.

But the President spent no time in handwringing on that fateful night of April 18, while he digested the fact that the invasion of Cuba, launched by Cuban exiles with the help of the Central Intelligence

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Part

Editor JOHN STANTON

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Agency, had been a colossal failure.

Mr. Kennedy picked himself off the mat, figuratively speaking, even while he was going through the motions of ceremonial graciousness with members of Congress and their wives.

From that night, Fidel Castro's number was up on John Kennedy's wall for the whole world to see.

ON APRIL 20, when the whole United States began to realize the extent of our national humiliation on the south coast of Cuba, the President publicly removed some of the veil of hypocrisy that had marked our program to topple Castro.

He told the American Society of Newspaper Editors, and the waiting world, that if the honored tradition of "non-intervention" meant that we had to stand by while the Soviet Union set up shop across the Florida Strait, we would toss that tradition out the window, in the name of self-preservation.

In the light of President Kennedy's frank discussion of our objective, there is only one logical interpretation of his decision to recall Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, former chief of staff, from retirement, for a study of "para-military" matters.

Taylor, who has been joined in this study by Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy, is clearly the architect for an invasion of Cuba that will not fail.

THERE IS another important aspect to the avowed purpose of the United States to overthrow the Castro regime.

There is an implied obligation for the President now to declare what kind of government in Cuba would meet with the approval of the United States.

This problem opens a pretty big can of worms.

THE CUBAN exiles who want most to overthrow Castro are a strange mixture of saints and sinners.

They include political racketeers who got out with their loot before Castro overthrew the Fulgencio Batista regime on Jan. 1, 1959.

They include Cubans who lost great sugar lands and other properties to the Castro revolution, who would turn the clock back if they could.

The rest of the Cuban exiles stretch across the political spectrum to the far left, to embrace former followers of Castro who feel that the Cuban leader has betrayed their revolution to the Communists.

These people are for agrarian reform and other measures that conservative middle class Cubans would destroy.

The task of imposing a workable unity on these widely separated Cuban factions has been a difficult one, and will continue to be, as the recriminations over the failure of the invasion continue.

White Paper Favors Reform

In a recent State Department white paper on Cuba, the United States made it clear that it favors the social reforms that were the original trademark of the Cuban revolution, including the redistribution of land.

The official document observed that no future Cuban government could turn its back on these reforms.

But as the day of Castro's downfall approaches, this whole question probably will embitter the talk about the future of Cuba.

The former owners of the great sugar plantations in Cuba, whether they are native Cubans or American corporations, will not accept land reform happily. And they have already found

friends in Congress to argue their case.

WHILE THE doom of Castro is projected carefully by the new planmakers in Washington, the sport of recrimination over the recent Cuban fiasco continues unabated.

This is understandable, since there are many questions that have not and probably never will be answered about that unfortunate episode.

The statement of Mr. Kennedy earlier this week that the responsibility for the whole thing was his did slow down the tempo of recrimination, but hardly ended it.

The preparations for the invasion of Cuba had begun last summer, when Mr. Kennedy, then a candidate for President, was jibing at his rival, Richard Nixon, with such cutting remarks as:

"If you can't stand up to Castro, how can you expect to stand up to Khrushchev?"

BUT THE hour of decision finally came to the President himself a few weeks ago, when he had to weigh all the opinions of Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency, Sec. of State Dean Rusk, Sec. of Defense Robert McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

When members of his official family had laid all the cards on the table, Mr. Kennedy had to make the decision to let the invasion of Cuba get under way, a decision that gave him his first experience in defeat.

THAT prayerful decision was based on three major considerations:

1. The Cuban invasion force was getting restless.

Somewhere between 1,000 and 1,500 men, recruited by the CIA in Florida and elsewhere, then transported from Opa-locka air base in Florida to a training camp in Guatemala, and thence to the port of em-

barkation at Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua, were on the verge of blowing their stacks.

These Cubans had been training without pay for many months. They were on edge and might have come emotionally unstuck if the invasion were delayed.

2. A delay in the invasion plans would get fouled up by weather. The rainy season on the south coast of Cuba was in the near offing, and if the invasion were to have clear sailing it had to get started at once.

3. Finally, and most importantly, the CIA believed that the Cubans would be another few weeks in putting together the MIG fighter planes and other war equipment it had received from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

A Rendezvous With Disaster

When the President said, "Take it away," with the qualified agreement of his advisers, the shiploads of nervous and excited Cubans set out from Nicaragua for their rendezvous with disaster.

As an overture, Cubans flew planes from Nicaragua to bomb Cuban installations in Havana and elsewhere.

Some were clipped by anti-aircraft fire and limped into Miami under the international distress signal of "May Day."

There the Cuban pilots said they had stolen the planes from the Cuban air force. American officials passed this untruth along to the American public, while shielding the Cuban fliers from inquisitive and doubtful newspapermen.

THE INVASION force of 1,000 to 1,500 Cubans, recruited and trained by the CIA, hit the inelegantly named Bay of Pigs before daybreak on April 17, and the tragedy began to unfold rapidly.

The MIG fighter planes were not still in their packing crates. They were in the air, manned by expert pilots.

The Castro air force sank the radio communications ship of the rebels and also the ship carrying the rebels' tanks.

Most of the invaders were captured. Many were killed. Some escaped to join other guerrilla fighters in the mountains of south central Cuba.

IT CAN be truthfully said that no official units of the U.S. armed services took part in the invasion.

But it is known that ships of the U.S. Navy happened to be in the neighborhood of the ill-fated invasion and helped rescue some of the survivors. The full details of this part of the invasion are still clouded in official mystery.

MEANWHILE, back at the White House . . .

On the evening of April 18, about 36 hours after the invasion of Cuba began, President Kennedy realized, while donning his formal attire for the congressional reception, that disaster was closing in on him.

The country was still unaware of the debacle in Cuba, but every bulletin brought to the President increased his own gloom and that of his staff.

The President did the old "show must go on" routine and sweated out the reception, which lasted until 1 a.m. Then he spent several more hours trying to pull the pieces together, and to launch a new chapter in the Cuban fight.

Shows Mental, Physical Strain

For the first time since he took office, Mr. Kennedy showed physical and mental strain during these critical days. But his aides noted during that fateful and worrisome week that once his decision was cast,

the spark came back to President, and they saw again the man who knew where he was going and what had to be done.

HUMILATING as the recent events in Cuba were to the President and to the United States, there were some positive values came out of the experience.

First, the picture of the Fidel Castro regime as a Soviet operation seems more clearly delineated throughout Latin America today than it had before.

U.S. officials noted with some satisfaction that the "popular demonstrations" for Castro in Latin America after the abortive invasion were pretty purely Communist affairs in each country.

There is the definite belief that the average citizen in Latin America may be coming around to the belief that there is something other than "Yankee imperialism" to worry about in this world.

The stiffening attitude of other Latin American nations toward Cuba in recent days supports this optimistic belief. Nine members of the OAS have severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, and others are showing signs of disenchantment with Castro.

SECOND, the United States has a clearer picture of the smooth controls that Castro and his Communist advisers have established in Cuba.

The failure of the Cuban underground to create chaos at the time of the invasion was a valuable lesson in this respect.

With apparently good intelligence sources himself among the revolutionary forces, Castro threw some 30,000 or 40,000 Cubans of doubtful loyalty into jails a day or two before the invasion. Until then, the anti-Castro underground had shown signs of real effectiveness.

THIRD AND last, the Cuban fiasco has once and for all ended the pretense that the United States is some kind of a sideline observer of the Cuban crisis, rather than an adversary of the Castro regime.

Because of the amenities of international politics, one



ALLEN DULLES



GEN. TAYLOR



RUSIK



McNAMARA

vital interest in the overthrow of Castro has been covered with a Machiavellian cloak that ill becomes us.

Once Uncle Sam was seen standing naked in the marshes of the Bay of Pigs, in the full glare of a spotlight from a Russian-made tank, the rest of the cleanup job becomes a little easier.

The fact that the CIA was organizing for the Cuban operation became a public secret, and also a matter of high level debate in Washington, late last August.

A Boot Camp For Refugees

There was a boot camp for Cuban refugees near Homestead, Fla., a CIA operation. (Other training spots on the keys and in other Florida areas were outside the CIA scope, and apparently financed by Cuban sugar lords and related interests.)

One day some boys rode by the Homestead training camp and threw some firecrackers from a truck. Some Cubans came dashing out, firing American

made carbines. One of the boys was shot in the head, but the wound was non-fatal.

The shooting brought out police and newspapermen. The Dade County sheriff's office informed newspapers that it had orders from the federal government to "lay off." There was

no prosecution or extended investigation of the shooting escapade.

BUT THE ROLE of the CIA among Cuban exiles became a conversation piece in south Florida.

Eventually it became an open secret that the CIA was transporting Cuban trainees from the "deactivated" Navy air field at Opa-Locka to a training base in Guatemala.

This kind of thing is unnatural (in peacetime) in the United States. The situation troubled a lot of people.

Newspaper editors in Florida were told that they would endanger the national interest by printing things that were discernible to the eye and the ear.

SINCE there is a Neutrality Act on the law books of the United States, the situation also caused some troubled thoughts in Washington.

The FBI knew what the CIA was up to. FBI agents had in their collection numerous instances of possible violations of the Neutrality Act in south Florida by Cuban exiles under the direction of another branch

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PUFFING AWAY at a cigar, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro visits office of the organization of control of children's centers in Havana (AP)



PRO-CASTRO PICKETS demonstrate across street from Conrad Hilton Hotel during President Kennedy's stay there.

of the government — the CIA.

After much pained discussion, it was decided at White House and Cabinet level to ignore the presumed violations of the Neutrality Act that were being committed in the areas where exiled Cubans were recruited and trained on U.S. soil.

The moral problem of looking the other way at law violations by our friends finally brought about the decision to have most of the preparation for the assault on Cuba carried on in other countries, notably Guatemala and Nicaragua.

* * *

MUCH OF the deceitfulness of this preparation has been discarded now, thanks to President Kennedy's realistic assertion that if the welfare of the United States is on the gaming table, anything goes.

For that reason, the future may come galloping down on Castro faster than he can dream in his present state of boisterous euphoria over Uncle Sam's humiliation.

And before Fidel's beard is an inch longer, it is quite possible that every male in Havana will be lined up in barber shops waiting for a haircut and a shave with which to greet the new order.

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Cubans Seize Invader Chief; Death Likely

Miami, April 27 (UPI).—The top field commander who led the force of exiled Cubans in their abortive invasion has been captured, Fidel Castro's radio said today.

The commander, Roberto San Roman, was believed certain to be executed by firing squad, perhaps as one of the "two or three war criminals" Premier Castro said must die. Apparently fearing world revulsion, Castro announced the other 700 invasion prisoners would be spared.

The radio also announced the capture of Ulises Carbo, son of an anti-Castro leader, the Associated Press reported. It said Carbo, son of Sergio Carbo, former editor of the newspaper Prensa Libre, was seized on a sinking barge in the invasion area.

Havana radio said San Roman, a Cuban army captain and career officer, was discovered among a "new group" of prisoners taken to an internment camp in the swampy Zapata peninsula.

Others Identify Him

San Roman was tactical commander of the force that landed April 17 at the Bay of Cochinos. The civilian leader and representative of the exile Revolutionary Council, Manuel Artime, still is at large.

San Roman was the officer who rejected evacuation when Castro forces mounted an overwhelming attack and radioed: "I shall never leave my country."

Other prisoners, interrogated on television, have identified him as the officer who finally shouted the command, "every man for himself" instead of surrendering when Castro's tanks closed in on the small invading force.

Havana radio said San Roman gave a false name when he was questioned after capture in an attempt to "elude responsibility and escape the justice of the people."

Castro went on television in an early morning broadcast today and told some 700 prisoners crowded in the Havana Sports Palace that he was going to shoot only "two or three" of the "war criminals" in their ranks.

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
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Central Research Section

CUBA CHARGES PERIL IS NEAR

MIAMI, April 28 (UPI)—Fidel Castro's Cuba told the world early today that it is in imminent danger of "direct armed aggression by the United States."

Radio Havana said President Osvaldo Dorticos handed the latest Castro charge of "U. S. aggression" to foreign diplomats summoned from their beds to a pre-dawn meeting at his official residence.

The broadcast said Dorticos made the charge thru diplomatic channels because of the "exceptional and dramatic circumstances."

Dorticos said the Castro regime is willing to try to negotiate a settlement with the United States, "but we will fight . . . to the last drop of our blood if they attack us," the radio reported.

The broadcast quoted a note signed by Castro and Dorticos citing "American press reports" as the basis for the Castroite charge that the "ruling circles of the United States" are openly preparing for war against Cuba.

It mentioned reports of U. S. "consultations and soundings" with other Latin American nations "seeking aid for direct armed action against our country."

The broadcast charged that last week's invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro refugees was "organized, equipped, directed and militarily aided by the government of the U. S. A."

"Officials of that government, and even the President of the United States have acknowledged in surprising and public form their participation in this matter," the broadcast said.

"This attitude of the Government of the United States violates the most elemental standards of international law and the principal fundamentals of the UN Charter."

It said Cuba has repeatedly expressed willingness to settle its difference with the United States, while the U. S. Government "has responded with threats, measures of aggression and economic blockades; with sabotage and conspiratorial activities, with air bombardment of our cities and more recently with the invasion of our country, using counter-revolutionary and mercenary troops."

"(The United States) plans now to use its military might against a small country . . . which can never constitute the slightest threat or danger for such a great

power," the broadcast said.

"The revolutionary government . . . denounces by this means the criminal aggression prepared against the fatherland . . . before the peoples of the world."

An earlier broadcast had quoted the Chilean Foreign Office as saying the United States was querying Latin American governments about their willingness to take part in an attack on Cuba.

A Chilean government spokesman is Santiago indignantly denied the statement.

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Fewer Executions Seen

Cubans Take Rebel Chief

MIAMI, April 27 (UPI)—The top field commander of last week's abortive invasion of Cuba, Brigadier Roberto San Roman, has been captured, Havana Radio reported today.

A broadcast heard here said Gen. San Roman was discovered among a "new group of prisoners taken to an internment area in Zapata Peninsula.

Province, for counter-revolutionary activities.

Three men received 20-year jail sentences. The others were ordered imprisoned for 10 years.

ARTIME AT LARGE

Gen. San Roman was the tactical commander of the invaders. The civilian leader of the expedition and representative of the Cuban Exile Revolutionary Council, Manuel Artime, is still at large.

The bearded Cuban's speech today, tho customarily hostile to the United States, showed no trace of the bitterness toward the captives that he had displayed in other post-invasion statements.

Even when two gunshots interrupted his speech, Castro—altho obviously disturbed—did not launch into a denunciation of his enemies. He passed it off with the remark that "someone just shot off his firearm."

The shots apparently were fired accidentally by a guard.

The Cuban radio claimed Gen. San Roman had tried to conceal his identity. It said he gave a false name when he was questioned after his capture in an attempt "to elude his responsibility and escape the justice of the people."

Gen. San Roman's capture was announced a few hours after Premier Fidel Castro said he plans to execute only "two or three war criminals" among the captured invaders of Cuba despite "popular demand" that they all be put to death.

Castro told 700 to 800 captives massed in Havana's sports palace for a radio-TV propaganda spectacular that putting them all to death "would belittle our great victory."


CHARGES

He said the men he intends to execute already had charges pending against them, like Ramon Calvino "who committed many crimes during the Batista regime."

Castro's sudden abandonment of his policy of "no mercy to the mercenaries" appeared to be a result of pleas for clemency from eight Latin American presidents and scores of organizations south of the border.

A Cuban radio broadcast reported later that 12 men were sentenced to long prison terms by a military tribunal in Santa Clara, Las Villas

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 Clip PROGRAM of Anti-Castro Activity - C.I.H. (U)

Survivor Says Castro Foiled Invasion Linkup

CORPUS CHRISTI, Tex., April 27 (AP).—A survivor of the Cuban invasion declared today the attack failed largely because Fidel Castro threw troops between the landing army and the underground in the cities.

tions with the United States in this attack."

Manuel Penabaz, stepping off an ore ship which rescued him from the sea, said:

He also declared Mr. Castro wrong when the Cuban dictator said the invaders were mercenaries.

"We never did contact the people (underground).

"We were true patriots fighting for freedom," said the wiry Penabaz.

"We were fighting outside the city in the country. We never could reach the people."

Doubts Castro Warning

He indicated that the 1,500 invasion troops expected to coordinate their attack last week with an uprising of the underground.

He repeated statements made by ship-to-shore telephone to the Corpus Christi Caller-Times that six ships landed the invaders. And the battle broke out within minutes after the troops reached the beach.

Mr. Penabaz, badly sunburned from his ordeal at sea before his rescue, excitedly switched from good English to Spanish as he related his story on the docks of the Reynolds Metals Co.

But he said he felt sure Mr. Castro's army had no advance notice of the attack.

Picked Up at Sea

Mr. Penabaz was one of five survivors of the landing brought here after being picked up from a life raft in the Caribbean Sea Tuesday.

Newsman waited almost an hour before they were permitted to talk to Mr. Penabaz. Meanwhile, Government agents interviewed the five and they were given health checkups.

They fled the invasion beaches in the raft after Castro's army crushed the invaders.

Mr. Penabaz said the other four did not wish to talk to newsmen or be photographed because of possible reprisals against their families in Cuba.

"We are not going to stop this fight because of this failure," he declared, his voice rising.

The survivor, fluent in both Spanish and English, wore borrowed slacks, sports shirt, combat jacket and sandals.

"When we get the chance, we will go back to Cuba.

Among the 75 newsmen present were several from Mexican newspapers and radio stations.

"We have only one reason now to return.

Government In Charge

"That is to attack again."

The big, 17,000-ton bauxite ore ship, S. S. Louise, that rescued the five from the life raft docked at the Reynolds Metals Co. aluminum plant docks.

In effect he said that Mr. Castro lied when he said the invasion was a United States affair.

The Government took immediate charge, and immigration, health service and other Federal authorities went aboard as soon as the ship touched the dock.

"I want to tell this," he said. "Never did we contact American soldiers or have any rela-

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
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UPI-91

(CUBANS)

GREGORY, TEX.--FIVE SURVIVORS OF LAST WEEK'S ILL-FATED INVASION OF CUBA ARRIVED HERE TODAY AND ONE PREDICTED THAT THE ANTI-CASTROITES WOULD BE READY TO TRY ANOTHER INVASION IN SIX MONTHS.

THE FIVE HAD BEEN PICKED UP FROM A RUBBER LIFE RAFT AND WERE BROUGHT HERE ABOARD THE S.S. LOUISE OF THE CARIBBEAN STEAMSHIP CO. THEY WERE QUESTIONED EXTENSIVELY BY U.S. OFFICIALS FOR HALF AN HOUR AND THEN RELEASED.

By approx 1925 Cuba Texas
MANUAL PENABAZ, 36, WHO SERVED AS FIDEL CASTRO'S JUDGE ADVOCATE DURING THE SIERRA MAESTRA BATTLE AGAINST THE BATAISTA REGIME AND WHO TURNED AGAINST CASTRO A MONTH AFTER CASTRO ATTAINED POWER, SPOKE FOR THE GROUP.

HE DECLINED TO IDENTIFY THE OTHERS, EXPLAINING THEY STILL HAD FAMILIES IN CUBA AND FEARED REPRISALS.

PENABAZ SAID THE REBELS DID NOT INTEND TO STOP THE FIGHT BECAUSE OF LAST WEEK'S DEFEAT.

"WHEN WE GET A CHANCE, WE WILL GO BACK--IN SIX MONTHS WE WILL BE READY TO GO AGAIN."

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UPI-13

(CUBA)

MIAMI--PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO SAID EARLY TODAY IN HAVANA HE PLANS TO EXECUTE ONLY "TWO OR THREE WAR CRIMINALS" AMONG THE CAPTURED INVADERS OF CUBA DESPITE "POPULAR DEMAND" THAT THEY ALL BE PUT TO DEATH.

CASTRO TOLD 700 TO 800 CAPTIVES MASSES IN HAVANA'S SPORTS PALACE FOR A RADIO-TV PROPAGANDA SPECTACULAR THAT PUTTING THEM ALL TO DEATH "WOULD BELITTLE OUR GREAT VICTORY."

HE SAID THE MEN HE INTENDS TO EXECUTE ALREADY HAD CHARGES PENDING AGAINST THEM, LIKE RAMON CALVINO "WHO COMMITTED MANY CRIMES DURING THE BATISTA REGIME."

CASTRO'S SUDDEN ABANDONMENT OF HIS POLICY OF "NO MERCY TO THE MERCENARIES" APPEARED TO BE A RESULT OF PLEAS FOR CLEMENCY FROM EIGHT LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS AND SCORES OF ORGANIZATIONS SOUTH OF THE BORDER.

CASTRO'S SPEECH TODAY, THOUGH CUSTOMARILY HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES, SHOWED NO TRACE OF THE BITTERNESS TOWARD THE CAPTIVES THAT HE HAD DISPLAYED IN OTHER POST-INVASION STATEMENTS.

HE BEHAVED LIKE A BENEVOLENT SCHOOLTEACHER, INTERRUPTING HIS LECTURE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS FROM PRISONERS WHO ROSE AND HELD UP THEIR HANDS FOR RECOGNITION.

CASTRO ALSO:

---SAID THE PEOPLE OF CUBA ARE "IN THE TRENCHES, WAITING FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE YANKEE IMPERIALISTS."

---DENIED THAT HE HAD ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE THAT LAST WEEK'S INVASION WAS COMING, SAYING THAT IF HE HAD FEW OF THE INVADERS WOULD HAVE SURVIVED.

---CLAIMED THAT THE "MUTINEER" PLANES WHICH ATTACKED CUBAN CITIES IN ADVANCE OF THE INVASION WERE U.S. PLANES WITH CUBAN MARKINGS.

---DENIED THAT HE HAD ANY RUSSIAN PLANES, SAYING HIS AIR FORCE WAS MADE UP ONLY OF PLANES "LEFT OVER FROM THE BATISTA REGIME."

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UPI-37

(CUBANS)

GREGORY, TEX--FIVE SURVIVORS OF LAST WEEK'S
ABORTIVE ANTI-CASTRO INVASION OF CUBA ARRIVED HERE TODAY ABOARD
THE MERCHANT SHIP THAT PICKED THEM UP FROM A RAFT 100 MILES FROM
CUBA.

THE FIVE, POSSIBLY THE ONLY SURVIVORS OF THE COCHINOS BAY
LANDING FORCE, WERE BROUGHT TO THE REYNOLDS ALUMINUM CO. DOCK BY
THE S.S. LOUISE OF THE CARIBBEAN STEAMSHIP CO.

THE SURVIVORS WERE QUESTIONED BY IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS
IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL. 4/27--DP1032AES

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Escaped Rebels Vow To Return to Cuba

MIAMI, Fla., Apr. 27 (AP).—“We’re going back. And the sooner the better.”

That was the deft hurled today at Fidel Castro by two rugged, sun-tanned Cubans who said that in surviving the bloody repulse of their invasion force they learned lessons that will help them “next time.”

The men, 35 and 42, smiled when asked if they and brother rebels were demobilized.

“We’re only on leave,” one, 35, said. “In a few days we’re going back to training camp.”

“Where?”

Trainees Unaware of Locale

“Fidel would like to know. Guatemala? Nicaragua? He’s not even close in his guesses so far. The men he captured didn’t know where they trained for the invasion of April 17. They traveled by night and were restricted to the training area.”

His companion, a big man with prematurely gray hair and bristling mustache, said he was an Oriente rancher. Both declined use of their names because of danger to relatives still living under the Castro government.

The older man’s beaten-up looking jump boots were the only martial note in a cozy Southwest Miami parlor where they sat with their families and described the rebels’ pull-out April 19 under fire and attack by growing hordes of Castro troops.

“I wore those boots on Playa Giron (Giron Beach) on the Southern Cuba coast, and I expect to hit Cuban soil with them again,” the wearer said.

Account of Invasion

This is the account two men gave of the invasion launched by the Cuban revolutionary council and hurried back by Castro’s troops:

Our force—about 1,500 men

—was able to land without difficulty the first day. It was four or five hours before the invaders met any material opposition.

“Most of the opposition came the next day (April 18)—wave after wave of troops; Stalin tanks and a large number of cannon.”

“We had landed five tanks, but the turrets of two were out of commission.”

“Our weakness was especially in lacking airplanes that could match the performance of the Sea Furies and jets that bombed and machine-gunned our men. Next time, we will have to have aviation that can compete.”

Left Prisoners Behind

“One ship of ours only was sunk—the 2,500-ton Rio Escudido, whose ammunition exploded when the craft was struck by a rocket. All the other ships got away. Not once did the Castro navy interfere with operations off Bahia Cochinos while we were landing and evacuating.”

“We captured more than 200 Castro militiamen and troops—and had to leave them behind. Some we confined in a building on which was painted a cross. The men in there were killed by a Castro bomb. Some had hammer-and-sickle tattoos.”

The two Cubans said they were on the beach all day of the 19th, ferrying rebels to evacuation craft by outboard motor boat. They said they

brought 51 to safety that way. “Our men fought waist-deep in water,” the younger man said.

“The badly wounded had to be left behind. Airplane was to evacuate them but it could not land under the attack of Castro’s aviation.”

“Four Castro planes were shot down. The pilot of one fell into the ocean. We could see him waving but we were unable to reach him before he sank.”

“We did not have a chance to examine the bodies of other Castro pilots killed. But their flying formations convinced us they had been instructed by foreigners.”

The two rebel survivors estimated their brigade faced numerical odds of 100 to 1 by the time they withdrew.

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Castro Tones Down Threats

Only 2 or 3 Face Death

MIAMI, April 27 (UPI) — Premier Fidel Castro said early today in Havana he plans to execute only "two or three war criminals" among the captured invaders of Cuba despite "popular demand" that they all be put to death.

Castro told 700 to 800 captives massed in Havana's sports palace for a radio-TV propaganda spectacular that putting them all to death "would belittle our great victory."

CHARGES

He said the men he intends to execute already had charges pending against them, like Ramon Calvino, "who committed many crimes during the Batista regime."

Castro's sudden abandonment of his policy of "no mercy to the mercenaries" appeared to be a result of pleas for clemency from eight Latin American presidents and scores of organizations south of the border.

The bearded Cuban's speech today, tho customarily hostile to the United States, showed no trace of the bitterness toward the captives that he had displayed in other post-invasion statements.

He behaved like a benevolent schoolteacher, interrupting his lecture to answer questions from prisoners who rose and held up their hands for recognition.

Even when two gunshots interrupted his speech, Castro, altho obviously disturbed, did not launch into a denunciation of his enemies. He passed it with the remark that "someone just shot off his firearm."

The shots apparently were fired accidentally by a guard.

200,000

It was not certain whether his promise to go easy on the captured invaders would extend to other "enemies of the revolution" arrested in an is-

land-wide roundup coinciding with the attack. A long-time resident of Cuba who arrived here last night said 200,000 Cubans had been arrested.

The prisoners assembled in the sports palace—the great indoor stadium where the "circus trials" of 1959 were held—were represented as all of the "about 1000" captives claimed by the Castorites whose wounds would permit them to appear.

Altho most prisoners apologized for taking part in the invasion or said they had been deceived by lies about Castro's weakness, some expressed opposition to his revolutionary regime.

*Clip Program of Ant
CASTRO Activity - C.I.A.*



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U.S. Force Off Coast, Cuba Says

KEY WEST, April 26 (AP)—Fidel Castro's propaganda machine intensified its efforts today, lashing out at the United States and warning that "forces off the coast of Cuba indicated the possibility of another desperate attack by the imperialists."

Government-controlled radio and television attacked President Kennedy as "an enemy of peace," and described a possible total embargo on U. S. trade with Cuba as "a brutal aggression."

No basis was given for the statement that forces were off the coast of Cuba.

During the day the normal television programs that often include American movies were cut down to make room for editorials on the embargo that Mr. Kennedy has said he is considering.

One editorial said that "in the United States itself the embargo will meet with enormous disapproval."

During the day the Cuban radio reported the arrival of several shipments of food and other supplies, including 25,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate fertilizer from the Soviet Union and 45,000 pounds of rice from Saigon.

Earlier it was announced that two men were executed by firing squads while 50 were jailed for attempting to join anti-Castro invaders last week.

The Havana radio said the Cuban charge d'affaires in Panama has been recalled. The broadcast did not elaborate.

Meanwhile, the Fidel Castro regime announced it will halt the televised questioning of captured invaders, who soon may march before his firing squad.

The last public interrogation was set for tonight after a session in which the son of anti-Castro leader Manuel Antonio de Varona conceded in a telecast monitored at Key West that he was deceived



United Press International
The Cuban newspaper Revolucion says this photo shows a United States-made B-25 plane shot down during the invasion of Cuba, citing it as "Yankee intervention."

when told the Cuban people would rise against Castro.

Young de Varona argued spiritedly with interrogators however. He asked them if they felt so certain about a public's support of the Castro regime, why did they not hold an election.

While Cuban inquisitors peppered the invasion captives with loaded questions before TV cameras, the first airline passengers arriving in Florida since the conflict were wary in expressing themselves as thankful they were able to leave Cuba.

Most of 86 persons who got off a plane at Miami were Cuban nationals. Some of them scurried away from newsmen seeking interviews. Others refused to identify themselves when telling of life in Cuba under active war conditions.

An old man said "we come from hell."

A Reuters news agency dispatch from Havana said American citizens in Cuba are being advised to register if they wish to go home. A Swiss Embassy official emphasized that repatriation will be strictly a matter of choice.

About 200 American citizens are believed to be in Cuba. About 60 visited the Swiss Em-

bassy this morning to complete registration forms.


Reuters also reported that Industries Minister Ernesto (Che) Guevara received a gunshot flesh wound in his left cheek and ear Tuesday or Wednesday of last week when he dropped an automatic weapon. An authoritative source close to the government discounted Miami reports, that Guevara had tried to commit suicide, Reuters reported. The source also discounted rumors that the government intended to execute all prisoners who took part in the rebel invasion. The feeling in Havana is that prisoners assessed as criminals from the Batista regime and possibly military leaders of the invasion will be executed.

In Washington, the State Department said six American newsmen had been arrested by the Castro government, but have now been released.

Listed as released were Harold K. Milks, the Associated Press; Richard Valeriani, National Broadcasting Co.; Henry Raymond, United Press International; Martin Houseman, United Press International; Robert Perez, Mutual Broadcasting System; and Jay Mallin, Time Magazine.

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UPI-235

(AGENTS)

MEMPHIS, TENN.--A CUBAN EXILE LEADER CHARGED TODAY THAT COMMUNIST AGENTS INFILTRATED ANTI-CASTRO GROUPS AND TIPPED OFF THE CUBAN PREMIER IN ADVANCE OF LAST WEEK'S ABORTIVE INVASION OF CUBA.

CASTRO "KNEW THE INVASION WAS COMING AND WHO WAS AGAINST HIM," SAID DR. JORGE PICAZA, A FORMER HAVANA BRAIN SURGEON WHO DIRECTED MEDICAL SERVICE FOR THE INVADERS. Cuba

HE SAID COMMUNIST AGENTS TOLD CASTRO OF THE INVASION PLANS AND FURNISHED LISTS OF "ALL THOSE PEOPLE" AGAINST HIM.

4/26--N912PES

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
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UPI-222

(CUBA)

MIAMI -- CUBAN RADIO STATIONS CLAIMED TODAY THAT "APPROXIMATELY 1,000" MEN OF THE INVASION FORCE HAVE BEEN CAPTURED AND DEMANDED THAT THE OTHERS SURRENDER.

THE FORCE WAS ESTIMATED TO HAVE NUMBERED ABOUT 1,200 WHEN THE LANDINGS WERE MADE LAST MONDAY.

THE BROADCASTS ALSO ANNOUNCED THE SURRENDER OF REBEL CAPT. RAFAEL GRENIER MARTINEZ, BELIEVED TO BE THE FIRST OFFICER CLAIMED CAPTURED, AND A SECOND PRIEST, FATHER JOSE LUGO.

EARLIER BROADCASTS SAID THE CAPTURED INVADERS WOULD EITHER BE SHOT BY FIRING SQUADS OR GO TO PRISON.

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A Proposal

MURRAY KEMPTON

We shall know with certainty very little of what really happened in the swamps of Cuba last week. Castro could hardly be expected to give us a plausible account; it is to his interest to inflate the dimensions of the operation.

The chances are that it was all over quite quickly, and that it was smaller than our spokesmen promised or than Castro is likely to say.

But there are certain facts beyond question. What harms our country is the existence of those facts, and not their discussion.

(1) The "invasion" was ordered and directed by the Central Intelligence Agency, an official arm of the United States Government.

The CIA does not appear to have trusted the Cubans with any higher responsibility than being shot at.

On Sunday afternoon, a week ago, members of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, after their meeting at the Hotel Lexington, were picked up by CIA agents—to their surprise and quite possibly against their will—and taken to Miami to be held in protective custody until the CIA had accomplished their revolution for them.

Until last Friday, no leader of the Revolutionary Council was heard to utter a public word. A reporter returning from Miami says that the only press conference held in the name of the Revolutionary Council was conducted by an American.

It should be remembered in this connection that Dr. Miro Cardona, head of the council, had a son on this operation, and that he learned of it for the first time listening to the radio.

(2) The CIA was largely responsible for deciding the date of the invasion and the character of its leadership. The CIA does not trust radical

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FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

EDITOR: JAMES WECHSLER

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-CUBA


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ex-Fidelistas; it has given them almost no money. Its illusion seems to be that Cubans will arise for the American Telephone Company. In recent months, liberal civilians of Miro's type have been admitted to the leadership of the Revolutionary Council. But the CIA has discouraged radical activists. The Council is the creature of the CIA, whose agents ordered its formation. This fact in no way clouds the patriotism of Dr. Miro; in point of fact, the CIA's enormous budget was his only real source of supply. What is important is that the CIA, an agency beyond the control of the American Congress, can use federal money to support one faction of a foreign revolution and starve another.

* * *

(3) The CIA in this operation has made public liars of the highest officials of the United States. I do not think them men who lie by habit; the assumption must be that even they did not know what the CIA was doing.

(4) The arrogance of their treatment has left the Cuban revolutionary leaders humiliated and embittered. They have stopped recruiting. We have managed to make brave and honest men ashamed of themselves; because we have treated them as our guests to be shuttled about at our will, the way the Comintern used to dispose of brave and honest men in the twenties and thirties. A patriot can know no shame as dreadful as to feel that he is the agent of a foreign power and that is the way these men have been treated.

Maurice Goldbloom of Current called yesterday to suggest that we offer Castro one CIA man in exchange for every Cuban he captured in that swamp. Not to be shot, but to be employed in his service.

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UPI-8

(CUBA)
 MIAMI --HAVANA TELEVISION PANELISTS SPENT NEARLY AN HOUR
 EARLY TODAY INTERROGATING A PURPORTED PRIEST WHO SAID FIDEL
 CASTRO'S REVOLUTION "FULFILLS THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF JESUS CHRIST."
 THE PRISONER, WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS ROMAN CATHOLIC FATHER
 SEGUNDO LASHERAS CABO, SAID ON A RADIO-TV BROADCAST HE PARACHUTED
 INTO CUBA WITH LAST WEEK'S INVADERS ONLY BECAUSE AMERICAN IN-
 STRUCTORS DECEIVED HIM. HE SAID HE WAS KEPT A VIRTUAL PRISONER IN
 AN AMERICAN-RUN TRAINING CAMP IN GUATEMALA.
 "I REPENT AND BEG THE PEOPLE OF CUBA TO ACCEPT MY REPENTANCE,"
 HE SAID. "ALL I ASK IS THAT THEY GIVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEND
 MY WAYS."
 THE PRISONER APPEARED ON THE THIRD NIGHT OF GRILLING OF PRISONERS
 ON THE CUBA-WIDE RADIO-TV NETWORK.
 THE PRETENSE THAT THE PRISONERS WERE BEING QUESTIONED BY A
 PRESS PANEL WAS VIRTUALLY ABANDONED, AND THE PROGRAM TOOK ON
 MORE AND MORE OF THE ATMOSPHERE OF A COMMUNIST "SHOW TRIAL."
 PANELISTS PUMPED QUESTIONS AT PRISONERS IN THE MANNER OF
 PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS AND EVEN CALLED "WITNESSES." THEY REGULARLY
 EMBARKED ON LONG SPEECHES EXTOLLING CASTRO AND RUSSIA AND LAMBASTING
 THE UNITED STATES.
 THE PROGRAM, WITH PARTICIPANTS INCLUDING A HYSTERICAL WOMAN,
 A RANTING MAN, AND ANOTHER MAN WHO TREATED TO STAB A PRISONER
 BEFORE THE CAMERAS, CONTRIBUTED TO THE OMINOUS ATMOSPHERE
 IN CUBA.

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Havana TV Shows Grilling of Invasion Prisoners

'Priest' Likens Castro to Jesus

MIAMI, April 25 (UPI). — Havana TV panelists spent nearly an hour early today interrogating a purported Roman Catholic priest who said Fidel Castro's revolution "fulfills the social doctrine of Jesus Christ."

The prisoner, who identified himself as the Rev. Segundo Las Mercedes Cabo, said he parachuted into Cuba with last week's invaders because American instructors deceived him. He said he was kept a virtual prisoner in an American-run training camp in Guatemala.

REPENTANCE

"I repent and beg the people of Cuba to accept my repentance," he said. "All I ask is that they give me an opportunity to mend my ways."

The prisoner appeared during the third night of the grilling of prisoners on the Cuban radio-TV network, monitored here.

At the same time, the Russians poured thousands of tons of goods into Cuba to meet growing shortages. An official broadcast said at least three communist shipments reached Havana in the past hours, including oil, trucks, tractors, jeeps and "industrial equipment."

Largest of the three shipments was 30,000 tons landed at Havana today from the "socialist countries." The cargo ranged from foodstuffs and raw materials to textiles. The broadcast was the first to mention sea-borne traffic, meaning the port of Havana has been reopened.

GRILLING

The ominous grilling of prisoners on the TV programs continued.

Castro himself, in a speech punctuated by cries of "Al Paredon" (To the Wall), mocked pleas for mercy for the 634 prisoners Havana claims to have captured in the invasion. Despite pleas by five Latin American presidents, Havana radio has carried repeated hints of a coming blood bath.

Havana radio yesterday also made the most savage attack yet on President Kennedy, saying he had planned to witness the invasion of



Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos (at center, with glasses), accompanied by his wife and aides, presides at opening of the National Cattle Fair in Rancho Boyeros. Note Red bloc flags, including the Russian hammer and sickle, on the speakers' platform.

Cuba from an American warship.

It ended with a warning that if "Kennedy continues with his Hollywood cowboy swagger" and "fascist millionaire arrogance," and does not heed the warnings of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, he will "sink like those who sank in the swamps during the invasion."

ROCKEFELLER

Meanwhile, President Kennedy in Washington prepared to tell New York Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller about the U. S. role in the Cuban crisis today and assure him the Administration isn't trying to blame the GOP for it.

Gov. Rockefeller's briefing at the White House will follow similar Presidential reports to other Republican leaders, including Sen. Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.)

Mr. Kennedy reiterated that he takes full responsibility for the situation, and told members of his Administration not to try to shift the blame.

On the Havana broadcast last night, two of the questioners wore militia uniforms and a third appeared to have distinctly Oriental features.

—UPI Telephoto.

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Joint Chiefs Reveal Stand On Cuba Raid

By RICHARD FRYKLUND
Star Staff Writer

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not approve of the Cuban landing as it was carried out, a Pentagon source said today.

The story, from a person well qualified to say what happened, is this:

The chiefs were asked to comment on two basic actions—first, a training program for Cuban refugees, in which American military personnel would help whip them into fighting shape; second, a probing action or coastal raid supported by Americans.

Short of Pilots

The chiefs approved the training program and also the raid, provided, they said, that the landing was limited in its objectives to a test of Castro defenses and refugee fighting abilities and provided that the landing was given adequate air support.

Just who was to fly what planes posed a difficult problem. The Cuban refugees did not have sufficient air crews or planes to do it alone. So the administration had to decide whether to use American Naval or Air Force units.

State Department officials recommended against the use of planes manned by personnel of the United States armed forces, presumably to avoid the possibility that a plane might be shot down and provide the Castro government with proof of direct American intervention.

President Kennedy, according to this report, accepted State Department advice.

Objectivity Boomeranged

The scope of the raid also was changed from that approved by the Joint Chiefs. Instead of a quick in-and-out raid, the refugees aimed first at a major island uprising and then establishment of a permanent beachhead.

The landing failed, and the Chiefs believe lack of air cover and too ambitious objectives were the reasons.

After the failure, some newspaper post mortems led military men to believe that the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department were trying to avoid responsibility by suggesting that the Joint Chiefs had indorsed the operation. Now these officers would like to see the outline of their case put on the record.

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CIA Hid Invasion Plan From Exiles, Paper Says

NEW YORK, April 25 (AP). — The Central Intelligence Agency kept the secret of the Cuban invasion even from certain rebel forces, the New York Post said today in a Washington dispatch.

The Post said that according to information from exile Cuban sources, the leaders of the Cuban Revolutionary Council had no part in directing the actual military operation and no opportunity to co-ordinate with the Cuban underground.

The newspaper said this information had been reluctantly confirmed by administration officials.

The article continued: "The CIA held the six leading members of the council incommunicado near an abandoned airfield somewhere in Florida while the 'invasion' was under way.

Couldn't Join Rebels

"They were not permitted to join the rebel forces or speak in their own name. Statements were issued in their behalf of which they had no knowledge.

"Only after it was clear the invasion was going to fail were they consulted by top-ranking United States officials."

The Post continued:

"The story began on Sunday April 15, when members of the Revolutionary Council in New York received word that they should go to Philadelphia. They were then flown from Philadelphia to an abandoned airbase somewhere in Florida. They were quartered in an old, rambling house in a deserted area. Armed guards were posted outside.

"Provisional President Jose Miro Cardona, Defense Minister Antonio de Varona and Manuel Ray were among the six civilian exile leaders kept incommunicado in this house for the next three days.

"Tight Security"

"The reason for holding them in this fashion was apparently a desire on the part of the United States intelligence officials to maintain tight security.

"The Cuban exile leaders first heard of the invasion from radio news bulletins on Monday. The timing of the operation caught at least some of them off guard. It provided no opportunity to work out plans with the underground inside Cuba to set off sabotage and diversionary incidents.

"The co-ordinator of the Cuban underground had a few days earlier journeyed from the

island to Miami in order to make such plans. The invasion caught him flatfooted and as a result, there was no sabotage or uprising. Some of the Cuban exiles blame the CIA for this failure. The CIA explanation is that it did not entirely trust the underground and chose not to rely upon it.

Leaders Briefed

"On Tuesday the exile leaders were briefed on the military situation in Cuba by a United States Army colonel. They grew restive, clamored for more information and demanded to be allowed to confer with their supporters.


"At 1 a.m. Wednesday morning, Adolph A. Berle, co-ordinator of the State Department task force on Latin America, was routed from his bed in Washington by an urgent call from the White House and directed to fly to Florida. He was told the invasion seemed definitely to have failed. He arrived at the guarded house in Florida shortly after daybreak and spent the morning canvassing the situation with the Cuban exiles.

"That afternoon, he flew with them back to Washington where the group met twice, once in the late afternoon and

again early in the evening, with President Kennedy.

"The President, meanwhile, was working between conferences on an entirely new draft of the speech he made the next day to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. After conferring briefly with him a third time the next morning, the Cuban exiles were released from the CIA's protective custody and allowed to go their own ways."

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UPI-164

(CUBA)

MIAMI--THE PEOPLE OF CUBA WERE TOLD TODAY THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY INTENDED TO BE A SPECTATOR ABOARD AN AMERICAN WARSHIP AT LAST MONDAY'S INVASION AND THEN LEAD A "VICTORY PARADE" INTO HAVANA.

"BUT AT THE LAST MOMENT, WHEN THE ATTACK DEVELOPED INTO A RETREAT AND THE RETREAT INTO A DEFEAT, THE YANKEE PRESIDENT CANCELLED HIS PLANS TO WITNESS THAT SPECTACLE," A BROADCAST OVER A NATIONWIDE CUBAN NETWORK SAID.

THE RADIO PROGRAM, FIRST CUBAN NEWS PROGRAM SINCE CASTRO'S FOUR-HOUR SPEECH YESTERDAY, REPEATED PORTIONS OF THE ADDRESS THAT INCLUDED HIS WARNING THAT "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES" WILL BE SHOT AS LONG AS "TERRORISM" CONTINUES.

THERE WERE FEARS OF A FIRING-SQUAD BLOODBATH FOR THE 458 MEN WHOM CASTRO OFFICIALLY DECLARES PRISONERS OF THE INVASION. BUT CASTRO NEVER SAID THAT THE PRISONERS DEFINITELY WOULD BE SHOT. FEELING IN MIAMI WAS THAT HE WOULD NOT ATTEMPT ANY SUCH KILLING OF SOLDIERS LEST HE TOUCH OFF A WAVE OF REVULSION.

THE PRESIDENTS OF ARGENTINA, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, MEXICO AND VENEZUELA ALL HAVE APPEALED FOR CASTRO CLEMENCY.

WHAT CASTRO SAID, IN EFFECT, WAS THAT THE PRISONERS WOULD BE HELD AS HOSTAGES AND EXECUTED IF ATTEMPTS AGAINST HIS REGIME CONTINUED.

SIGNIFICANTLY, THE RADIO TODAY REBROADCAST THIS PORTION OF HIS ADDRESS:

"LET THEM CEASE THEIR CAMPAIGNS OF TERRORISM, FOR WHILE THEY CONTINUE THEIR CAMPAIGN OF TERRORISM AND FOMENTING THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION WE SIMPLY HAVE TO SHOOT THEM. WE HAVE TO ACT WITH A STRONG HAND."

SIXTY FOUR PERSONS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED IN THE LAST WEEK. ALL WERE ACCUSED SABOTEURS AND OTHER CASTRO ENEMIES, NOT MEMBERS OF THE INVADING FORCE.

ALL NEWS BROADCASTS IN CUBA NOW HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER DIRECTLY BY THE GOVERNMENT. THE COMMENTARY TODAY WAS THE MOST SAVAGE ATTACK YET ON KENNEDY.

THE BROADCAST FROM STATION CMQ AND ITS NATIONAL CHAIN SAID KENNEDY WAS "STILL HOLDING MEETINGS, PREPARING NEW ATTACKS WITH HIS ADVISERS AND HIS 'WORMS'" (THIS IS THE WORD CASTRO HAS GIVEN TO THE INVADERS AND THEIR CUBAN EXILE LEADERS.)

IT SAID "YANKEE SHIPS STILL CONTINUE TO MANEUVER AROUND OUR COAST."

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THE FIRST OF THE PRISONERS "PARADED ON TELEVISION" SHOULD HAVE BEEN KENNEDY, IT SAID.

"BUT MR. KENNEDY DID NOT COME. KENNEDY RESERVED HIMSELF FOR THE VICTORY PARADE, FOR THE TRIUMPHANT ENTRY INTO HAVANA TO THE ACCLAIM OF THE LAND BARONS, EXPLOITERS, RACIAL DISCRIMINATORS, THUGS, YOUNG MILLIONAIRES IN COLONELS' UNIFORMS, OF ALL THE ENEMIES OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

"MR. KENNEDY DID NOT COME TO PLAYA LARGA OR PLAYA GIRON (THE INVASION POINTS). ALL HE DARED TO DO WAS TO ANNOUNCE THAT HE WOULD WITNESS MANEUVERS OF HIS FLEET FROM THE DECK OF AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER LEAVING FROM FLORIDA.

"BUT AT THE LAST MOMENT, WHEN THE ATTACK DEVELOPED INTO A RETREAT AND THE INVASION INTO A DEFEAT, THE YANKEE PRESIDENT CANCELLED HIS PLANS TO WITNESS THAT SPECTACLE," THE RADIO SAID.

(KENNEDY ORIGINALLY HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO WITNESS U.S. NAVAL MANEUVERS IN THE ATLANTIC. LAST WEEK, THE MANEUVERS WERE CALLED OFF.)

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(CUBA)

NEW YORK--FRANCIS L. MCCARTHY, LATIN AMERICAN EDITOR OF UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, TOLD NEWSPAPER PUBLISHING EXECUTIVES TODAY THAT ANTI-CASTRO REBEL LEADERS FEEL THAT MUCH OF THE BLAME FOR THE FAILURE OF LAST WEEK'S CUBAN INVASION MUST BE BORNE BY THE AMERICAN PRESS.

"THEY FEEL THAT THE AMERICAN PRESS GAVE TOO MUCH PUBLICITY TO INVASION PREPARATIONS," MCCARTHY SAID IN AN ADDRESS AT THE THIRD ANNUAL UPI BREAKFAST PRECEDING THE OPENING OF THE 75TH AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION CONVENTION.

MCCARTHY TOLD 175 PUBLISHING EXECUTIVES HE BELIEVES THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S CURRENT CONSULTATIONS WITH REPUBLICAN PARTY LEADERS IS A PRELUDE TO TWO MOVES:

--SOUND OUT LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS TO FIND OUT HOW FAR THEY ARE WILLING TO GO MILITARILY TO BRING CUBA BACK INTO THE DEMOCRATIC FOLD.

--SOUNDING OUT WESTERN ALLIES SUCH AS CANADA, BRITAIN AND FRANCE TO SEE HOW FAR THEY ARE WILLING TO GO IN SUPPORT OF FURTHER ANTI-CASTRO MOVES.

"I THINK PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAS ACCEPTED THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, WHICH SHOULD DO THE JOB, IS NOT GOING TO DO THE JOB," MCCARTHY SAID.

"CUBAN EXILE LEADERS ARE TOO REALISTIC TO BELIEVE THE OAS WILL JOIN THE UNITED STATES IN A UNITED FRONT AGAINST CASTRO."

MCCARTHY SAID THE ANTI-CASTRO LEADERS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE FREE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD JOIN IN A "KOREAN-TYPE ACTION IN CUBA." HE SAID THE EXILES STILL HAVE TRAINED TROOPS IN RESERVE WHICH COULD AID SUCH A MILITARY ACTION.

ONE OF THE FATAL FLAWS OF LAST WEEK'S INVASION, MCCARTHY SAID, WAS THE LACK OF COMBAT TRAINING OF THE PARATROOPERS WHO WERE LANDED IN ADVANCE OF THE LAS VILLAS PROVINCE BEACHHEAD. HE SAID THEY "RETIRED WITHOUT ORDERS" AT THE SOUND OF ARTILLERY FIRE FROM CASTRO'S SOVIET EQUIPMENT.

"THE LAST STRAW THAT BROKE THE INVASION'S BACK WAS CASTRO'S ABILITY TO TAKE REPRESSIVE MEASURES AGAINST 50,000 PEOPLE WHO WERE CAPABLE OF JOINING THE INVADER," MCCARTHY SAID.

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UPI-75

ADD 1 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-72)

--CUBAN PRESIDENT OSVALDO BORTICOS SENT A STRONGLY-WORDED MESSAGE TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) HERE ASKING IT TO ADVISE THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ANY INTERVENTION IN CUBA. HIS MESSAGE DID NOT CONTAIN ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR SPECIFIC OAS ACTION. IN THE PAST, CUBA HAS REJECTED SEVERAL ATTEMPTS BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS TO RETURN THE CUBAN PROBLEM TO THE OAS. IN HIS SPEECH, BERLE SAID CUBANS DO NOT ACCEPT CASTRO'S "BETRAYAL" OF THEIR COUNTRY.

"DESPITE THE TRAGIC DEFEAT OF A FEW DAYS AGO, THE CONTEST WILL CONTINUE UNTIL CUBA IS ONCE MORE FREE," HE SAID.

KENNEDY, HE SAID, HAS "MADE CLEAR THAT FOREIGN INTERVENTION DOES NOT CEASE TO BE FOREIGN INTERVENTION BECAUSE IT FLIES A FOREIGN FLAG AND CLAIMS TO BE A SOCIAL REVOLUTION."

IN THE "HEROIC DRAMA" OF THE PAST 10 DAYS, HE SAID, "SIGHT MUST NOT BE LOST OF THE GREAT AND HISTORIC ISSUE; WHETHER LATIN AMERICA SHALL GROW AND FLOURISH IN FREEDOM, OR AS A PROVINCE OF OVERSEAS COMMUNIST EMRES."

THIS, HE SAID, "DEPENDS IN PART ON US."

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
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UPI-123

(JOHNSTON-CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SEN. OLIN D. JOHNSTON, D-S.C., SAID TODAY "LEFT-WING PAPERS" AND SOME "SLICK MAGAZINES HAD AS MUCH TO DO WITH HELPING CASTRO TAKE OVER CUBA AS ANYTHING."

JOHNSTON ACCUSED THEM OF BIASED COVERAGE OF CASTRO'S ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES AND PREJUDICED STORIES AGAINST FORMER CUBAN DICTATOR FULGENCIO BATISTA.

HE SAID JOHNSTON SAID, GENERATED FINANCIAL, MORAL AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR CASTRO IN THIS COUNTRY.

JOHNSTON, IN HIS NEWSLETTER, SAID "THESE LEFT-WING PAPERS AND SLICK MAGAZINES FAILED TO CARRY THE WARNING MESSAGE TO OUR PEOPLE AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS OF THE COMMUNIST DOMINATION OF CASTRO IN CUBA."

HE SAID THE LARGE PAPERS AND MAGAZINES WHICH HE DID NOT IDENTIFY, MISLED THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC BY BLANDLY SUPPORTING CASTRO.

4/24--EG313PES

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Lincoln, Weston Men Tied to Anti-Castro Radio


By JOHN CHAFFEE JR.

Two prominent Boston businessmen are involved in the operation of a powerful anti-Castro radio station in the Caribbean that is broadcasting military information to rebel units in Cuba, The Herald learned yesterday.

Ex-Security Head

From obscure Great Swan Island, 97 miles off the coast of Honduras and 300 miles southwest of Cuba, Radio Swan yesterday broadcast mysterious instructions to three battalions, two squadrons and one air group.

The island is one of a group owned by the family of Summer Smith of Sandy Pond road, Lincoln, Mass.



(AP Wirephoto Map)

(Continued on Page Twenty) SWAN ISLAND—Location of Cuban rebel radio.

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. Parsons _____
- Mr. Mohr _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Callahan _____
- Mr. Conrad _____
- Mr. DeLoach _____
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- Mr. W.C. Sullivan _____
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- Mr. Ingram _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Full Program of Anti-Castro Activity - U.S.A.

- (U) Boston American, Boston, Mass.
- _____ Boston Globe, Boston, Mass.
- xx Boston Herald, Boston, Mass.
- _____ Boston Traveler, Boston, Mass.
- _____ Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Mass.
- _____ Daily Record, Boston, Mass.

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Date: 4-23-61
Edition: SUNDAY MORNING
Author: JOHN CHAFFEE JR.
Editor: GEORGE E. MINOT
Title ANTI FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES IS-CUBA

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
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Lincoln, Weston Men Tied to Anti-Castro Radio

(Continued from First Page)



THOMAS D. CABOT
Radio Swan President

coln, chairman of the board of Abington Textile Machinery Works, 19 Congress St., Boston.

Radio Swan is operated by the Gibraltar Steamship Co., a New York corporation that is said to own no ships. Its president is listed as Thomas Dudley Cabot, president and director of Godfrey L. Cabot, Inc., the world's largest producer of carbon black.

Cabot, a former president of United Fruit Co., lives at 31 Farm Rd., Weston. His office is at 125 High St., Boston. He was head of the State Department's Office of International Securities Affairs in 1951. *Jack D.*

Smith told The Herald yesterday that eight or ten years ago he foreclosed a mortgage on the Swan Islands located on the southern edge of Cayman Trough in the Caribbean. He said he has since transferred ownership of the islands to his four children.

Asked if he were a stockholder in the Gibraltar Co., Smith said he didn't know if he still was or not, but acknowledged that he had been at one time and was aware that Cabot had been connected with the firm.

"I haven't seen Tom Cabot for some time," Smith said, "so I don't know if he's still involved with the radio station or not."

DISOWNED BY U. S.

A spokesman for the Cabot corporation said Cabot was in Europe on business.

According to the Associated Press, Radio Swan broadcasts from a powerful 50 kilowatt transmitter on Great Swan

Island. It began operating last June and was immediately disowned by the State Department and the United States Information Agency.

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro charged it was a State Department propaganda outlet.

Actually, the USIA had planned a similar project to provide Cubans with objective news reports. The agency said it abandoned the idea because of "interference and licensing" problems.

Radio Swan yesterday told two rebel "battalions" apparently fighting on Cuban soil that help was on the way and urged them not to surrender.

The appeal was made a few hours after the Castro government put before Havana television cameras some prisoners captured after last weekend's invasion. One admitted their mission failed and said not too many rebels had escaped. Others said propaganda from Swan Island and North American had misled them.

FORESLOSURE TOLD

The Swan Island broadcast, monitored by the Associated Press in Miami, also repeated troop movement instructions it had sent out during the night.

Despite its name, Great Swan Island is only a speck in the sea and is unlisted on most maps. It is two miles long and a half-mile wide. Its population is about 40 persons, including five United States weathermen and about a dozen persons operating the radio station. Its other inhabitants are natives.

The United States and Honduras both claim the island. Smith said he foreclosed on the Swan Island trustees, a commercial group that had hoped to

raise coconuts, cut lumber and provide water for the Navy on the islands. His father, the late Charles Sumner Smith, acquired the mortgage many years ago, Smith said.

His four children now own the islands and lease facilities to the Gibraltar Co. for Radio Swan, Smith said. He identified the owners as Sumner Smith, Jr., of Chassett; Charles W. Smith, of Boro; Mrs. John G. Cornish, Brookline, and Mrs. John Bagby, of Birmingham, Mich.



SUMNER SMITH
Family Owns Swan Island

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*Tip Program of
ANTI-CASTRO Activity - C.I.H*

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UPI-6

ADD CUBA, UNDATED (UPI-2)
 THE MINISTRY STATION, REPORTED TWO GUNBOATS WERE FIRING ON THE BEACH FROM OFFSHORE. THEY WERE NOT FIRING AT THE PLANES, INDICATING THE BOATS WERE PART OF THE INVASION FORCE. THE GOVERNMENT INTERNAL NETWORK REPORTS INDICATED THE INVADERS HAD ESTABLISHED AT LEAST ONE FIRM BEACHHEAD. ONE INTERCEPTED BROADCAST SAID FIVE MILITIAMEN WERE KILLED AND THREE INJURED IN THE EARLY MORNING FIGHTING. CASTRO RUSHED A BATTALION OF SOLDIERS TO THE BATTLE AREA. REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS IN EXILE IN THE U.S. SAID A SIMULTANEOUS UPRISING HAD BEGUN WITHIN CUBA.

THEY SAID IT WAS SIGNALLED BY A CODED MESSAGE BROADCAST TO THE ISLAND OVER A REBEL TRANSMITTER STARTING AT 10 P.M. EST LAST NIGHT.

REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS SAID THE INVASION ACTUALLY STARTED SATURDAY NIGHT WHEN "HUNDREDS OF CUBAN ARMY OF LIBERATION TROOPS" WENT ASHORE IN ORIENTE PROVINCE IN EASTERN CUBA. MIRO CARDONA, LEADER OF THE EXILES SAID THE ANTI-CASTRO FORCES HAD "INFILTRATED" THE ORIENTE AREA AND MET "NO OPPOSITION." THE CUBAN ARMY RADIO NETWORK MENTIONED NOTHING OF THIS. RADIO SWAN, A POWERFUL TRANSMITTER ON AN ISLAND OFF HONDURAS, SAID CASTRO'S CIVILIAN MILITIA WAS "STARTING TO DISBAND." "FORCES EN MASSE HAVE UNITED WITH PATRIOTS OF THE LIBERATION ARMY," IT SAID. "CIVILIANS UNITE WITH THE LIBERATION..."

THERE WAS, SO FAR, NO INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION. THROUGHOUT THE EARLY HOURS OF THE MORNING, CASTRO'S MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS RADIOS PROVIDED A MINUTE BY MINUTE DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE.

MOST OF THE TRANSMISSIONS INVOLVED FRANTIC MESSAGES FROM A STATION IN MATANZAS NEAR THE BATTLE AREA TO HEADQUARTERS IN HAVANA.

AT 4:45 A.M., CUBAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS NOTIFIED THE BESIEGED BEACH FORCES THAT BATTALION 225 HAD BEEN RUSHED TO THE BEACH AREA.

AT 4:48 THE MATANZAS TRANSMITTER, SAID "THERE IS NOW NO COMMUNICATION WITH ANY OF THE THREE LANDING AREAS."

AT 4:59 A.M., MATANZAS ADVISED HAVANA "THE GIRON BEACH LANDING WAS EFFECTED" BUT THAT ANOTHER ATTEMPTED INVASION AT LARGA BEACH WAS HELD BACK BY FOUR MILITIAMEN "WHO PREVENTED THEM FROM LANDING."

BOTH BEACHES ARE IN COCHINO BAY, ABOUT 90 MILES SOUTHEAST OF HAVANA.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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
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UPI-13

(NO COMMENT)

WASHINGTON--U.S. OFFICIALS CLOSELY WATCHED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN INVASION TODAY. BUT BOTH THE WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT DECLINED COMMENT IN THE EARLY HOURS AFTER THE FIGHTING STARTED.

A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID ONLY "WE HAVE NO COMMENT." SIMILARLY THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE COMMENT FROM PRESS SECRETARY RETARY SALINGER.

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UPI-17

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA PLANNED TODAY TO CHARGE AT THE U.N. THAT THE U.S. STAGED THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY INVASION, IT WAS REPORTED.

QUINTIN PINO, ALTERNATE CUBAN DELEGATE TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, SAID ROA AND OAS AMBASSADOR CARLOS LECHUGA WOULD PRESENT THE CHARGE TODAY IN NEW YORK.

PINO SAID CUBA WOULD TAKE NO ACTION WITHIN THE OAS, WHICH HE TERMED "A PUPPET ORGANIZATION OF YANKEE IMPERIALISM."

INFORMED OF REPORTS THAT THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, HEADED BY JOSE MIRO CARDONA, ALREADY WAS ON CUBAN SOIL WITH INVADERS, PINO SAID:

"IT IS BETTER. WE CAN LIQUIDATE THE WORMS THERE."

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Callahan	✓
Conrad	✓
DeLoach	✓
Evans	✓
Malone	✓
Rosen	✓
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Trotter	✓
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(CUBA)

UNITED NATIONS--UNITED NATIONS DIPLOMATS LOOKED TO LATIN AMERICA TODAY TO EASE THE RISING TENSION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CUBA.

THE 20-NATION LATIN AMERICAN GROUP WAS WORKING ON A CONCILIATORY RESOLUTION AIMED AT KEEPING THE HAVANA-WASHINGTON FEUD OUT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, AND WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S MAIN POLITICAL COMMITTEE RESUMES DEBATE ON CUBA'S AGGRESSION CHARGES AGAINST THE U.S. AT 10:30 A.M.

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
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*Clip Program of Anti-Castro
Activity - C. I. A*



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UPI-37

(PILOTS)
MIAMI--THE U. S. GRANTED POLITICAL ASYLUM YESTERDAY TO THREE
DEFECTING CUBAN PILOTS WHO FLEW HERE IN TWO PLANES WHICH BOMBED
CUBAN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

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UPI -128

ADD CUBA, UNITED NATIONS
STEVENSON SAID THE U.S. HAS NO OBLIGATION TO PROTECT FIDEL CASTRO FROM HIS OWN PEOPLE.

STEVENSON UNDERLINED RUSK'S ASSERTION THAT THE U.S. WAS IN SYMPATHY WITH THE INVASION ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT STAGED FROM AMERICAN SOIL. "OUR MOTTO HAS ALWAYS BEEN: PROGRESS YES; TYRANNY NO," STEVENSON SAID.

SOVIET AMBASSADOR VALERIAN A. ZORIN SAID STEVENSON'S REPLY TO ROA WAS "CLEARCUT AND IRREFUTABLE PROOF OF THE DIRECT COMPLICITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE INVASION OF CUBA WHICH NOW IS GOING ON."

STEVENSON SAID CASTRO'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT "BETRAYED THE CUBAN REVOLUTION" AND WAS NOW SEEKING TO "OVERTHROW OTHER REGIMES BY FORCE."

"IT IS NOT THE UNITED STATES WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF DR. CASTRO'S TROUBLE, IT IS DR. CASTRO HIMSELF...", STEVENSON SAID, "IF TODAY, CUBA'S MILITIA ARE HUNTING DOWN GUERRILLAS, THEY ARE HUNTING DOWN CUBANS, NOT AMERICANS. IF THE CUBAN REGIME IS TO BE OVERTHROWN, IT WILL BE BY CUBANS, NOT AMERICANS."

"THE UNITED STATES HAS NO OBLIGATION TO PROTECT CASTRO FROM HIS OWN PEOPLES."

ZORIN DEMANDED THAT THE 99-NATION COMMITTEE MEET AT 3 P.M. TO "WORK OUR URGENT MEASURES TO FORESTALL FURTHER TERRIBLE EVENTS." HE SUGGESTED A SCHEDULED MEETING OF THE FULL GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE COMMITTEE'S AFTERNOON MEETING BE POSTPONED TO TONIGHT.

THE COMMITTEE AGREED.

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
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UPI-225

(SOVIET - CUBA)

MOSCOW--THE SOVIET TASS NEWS AGENCY SAID TON GHT THAT RUSSIA AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD ARE "PREPARED TO GIVE THE CUBAN PEOPLE THEIR HELP AND SUPPORT."

THE AGENCY, IN A COMMENTARY BY I. ORLOV, BLAMED THE ATTACK ON CUBA ON THE UNITED STATES AND DEMANDED A HALT TO THE "AGGRESSION." IT DID NOT ELABORATE ON THE OFFER OF HELP.

"THE GAMBLERS FROM THE IMPERIALIST CAMP SHOULD DO WELL TO REMEMBER THAT CUBA IS NOT ALONE," TASS SAID. "CUBA HAS MANY FRIENDS, NOT ONLY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. SHE HAS THE WHOLE OF PROGRESSIVE MANKIND AT HER SIDE."

"THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, INDEED ALL THE PEACE-LOVING NATIONS, ARE AMONG HER MOST DEVOTED FRIENDS, PREPARED TO GIVE THE CUBAN PEOPLE THEIR HELP AND SUPPORT."

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
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UPI-224

ADD 3 CUBA, NEW YORK (UPI-212)

THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SAID, HOWEVER, THAT PARTISANS WERE STRIKING THROUGHOUT THE NATION. IT SAID IN SANTA CLARA PROVINCE, WHERE CASTRO BROKE THE BACK OF THE FORCES OF DICTATOR FULGENCIO BATISTA IN DECEMBER, 1958, A MAJOR BRIDGE HAS BEEN DESTROYED.

IT SAID THE INVASION FORCE AND SABOTEURS PUT ASHORE DURING THE LAST 10 DAYS WERE USING EXPLOSIVES SO MODERN THEY WERE "NOT KNOWN TO THE FORCES OF THE DICTATOR (CASTRO)."

THE ACTUAL INVASION WAS SPREAD OVER A PERIOD OF TWO DAYS.

ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AFTER BOMBINGS OF THREE CUBAN BASES, A FORCE LANDED IN ORIENTE PROVINCE IN THE EAST AND FANNED OUT INTO THE MOUNTAINS. MONDAY BEFORE DAWN, THE MAIN FORCES HIT AT THE BAY OF COCHINOS.

CASTRO SPOKESMEN CONTINUED TO EXHORT THE PEOPLE BY RADIO TO BACK THE GOVERNMENT.

RADIO BAYAMO WHERE THE FIRST INVASION OCCURRED, URGED MOUNTAIN PEOPLE TO "FIGHT AGAINST THE IMPERIALIST INVADERS."

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UPI-150

(CRU*)

Wash. DC. Cuba

OTTAWA--CUBAN AMBASSADOR AMERICO CRUZ TODAY ACCUSED THE UNITED STATES OF CUTTING NORMAL COMMUNICATION LINKS WITH CUBA IN ORDER TO CREATE AN INCORRECT IMPRESSION OF THE INVASION.

FOLLOWING THE EARLY MORNING INVASION, HE SAID HE TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO REACH HIS GOVERNMENT FROM CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO TO RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS. HE SAID LINES HAD BEEN CLOSED IN NEW YORK AND THAT SIMILAR ACTION HAD TAKEN PLACE IN MEXICO.

HE SAID HE FINALLY RECEIVED "PERSONAL INSTRUCTIONS" BY A CANADIAN PACIFIC TELEGRAPH CABLE SENT VIA JAMAICA AND NOT PASSING THROUGH THE UNITED STATES.

CRUZ TOLD NEWSMEN THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SEVER NG THE LINKS WERE AMERICANS.

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
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Clip Program of Hat - (Castro)
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UPI-230

(CUBA)

MIAMI--THE CASTRO NAVAL OBSERVATION STATION AT VARADERO REPORTED
 TONIGHT IT HAD SPOTTED A FLEET OF EIGHT STRANGE SHIPS OFF CARDENAS,
 NORTH COAST SEAPORT ABOUT 85 MILES EAST OF HAVANA.

4/17--EGS 10PES

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
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UPI-194

(GUATEMALA)

WASHINGTON--THE GUATEMALAN EMBASSY ISSUED AN OPEN INVITATION TODAY TO U.S. AND FOREIGN NEWSMEN TO INSPECT GUATEMALA'S COASTLINE TO DETERMINE WHETHER CUBAN GUERRILLAS ARE BEING TRAINED HERE.

AN EMBASSY SPOKESMAN SAID THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE NEWSMEN TO THE DIFFERENT COASTAL TOWNS TO INSPECT THE WHOLE AREA.

THE INVITATION WAS ISSUED AFTER THE GOVERNMENT DENIED THE CUBAN INVADERS CAME FROM GUATEMALA.

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
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UPI-248

(GUATEMALA)
OMAHA, NEB.--THE COMMANDER OF THE GUATEMALAN AIR FORCE TODAY DENIED THAT HIS COUNTRY FURNISHED BASES OR FACILITIES FOR ANTI-CASTRO FORCES INVADING CUBA.
COL. JOSE LUIS LEMUS RAMIS SAID NONE OF THE GUATEMALAN FACILITIES WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO ANY ANTI-CASTRO FORCES. HIS STATEMENT ECHOED A DENIAL OF CUBAN CHARGES IN GUATEMALA ITSELF.

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UPI-156

(CUBA)

NEW YORK--A NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY CORRESPONDENT IN MEXICO CITY TODAY QUOTED CUBAN EXILE HEADQUARTERS THERE AS SAYING INVADERS HAD CAPTURED THE CITY OF PINAR DEL RIO.

PINAR DEL RIO IS THE CAPITAL OF CUBA'S WESTERN-MOST PROVINCE OF THE SAME NAME.

THE CORRESPONDENT SAID MEXICO CITY EXILES HAD RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED REPORTS FROM MIAMI AND FROM CLANDESTINE SHORT WAVE RADIO IN CUBA THAT PREMIER CASTRO'S MILITARY GUARD HAD BEEN KILLED BY REBEL FORCES ALREADY OPERATING IN THE INTERIOR OF CUBA. THESE REPORTS SAID CASTRO ESCAPED UNHARMED.

THE NBC REPORT QUOTED AN EXILE SPOKESMAN AS SAYING THE INVASION WAS "MOVING AHEAD FAVORABLY" IN MATANZAS AND IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA--THE FORMER A PROVINCE, THE LATTER A CITY IN EASTERN MOST ORIENTE PROVINCE.

INVADING PARACHUTISTS WERE BEING DROPPED IN THE ISLE OF PINES, ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS.

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UPI-219

ADD CUBA, NEW YORK
A FORCE WHOSE TOTAL STRENGTH WAS ESTIMATED AT 5,000 TRAINED MEN STRUCK FROM BASES IN "MORE THAN ONE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY," ACCORDING TO INVASION LEADERS, AND SMASHED VIA LAND, SEA AND AIR AT CASTRO'S COMMUNIST-ARMED TROOPS ON THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN CUBAN COASTS.

FRANTIC CUBAN GOVERNMENT RADIO MESSAGES SAID AT LEAST ONE DESTROYER WAS OPERATING OFF THE COAST.

CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED HIGH AND THE CUBAN RED CROSS ISSUED CALLS FOR BLOOD DONATIONS AND MOBILIZATION OF ITS PERSONNEL IN THE MAIN ATTACK AREA IN SOUTHERN LAS VILLAS AND MATANZAS PROVINCES AT THE WAIST OF CUBA.

A SEGMENT OF THE CUBAN NAVY WAS REPORTED IN REVOLT AGAINST CASTRO. THE POWERFUL CARIBBEAN TRANSMITTER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, DIRECTED BY FORMER CASTRO PREMIER JOSE MIRO CARDONA IN A SECRET UNITED STATES HEADQUARTERS, SAID NEW CUBAN AIR FORCE UNITS HAD JOINED THE "LIBERATING" FORCES.

THE MAIN BLOW OF THE INVADING FORCE WAS AT THE BAHIA DE CO HINGOS (BAY OF PIGS). THE ATTACKERS SECURED BEACHHEADS IN THE PRE-DAWN HOURS AND APPEARED TO HAVE KNOCKED BACK CASTRO FORCES IN THE INITIAL ASSAULT.

REPORTS OF THE FIGHTING THERE STILL WERE VAGUE TONIGHT AS THE CASTRO ARMH SWITCHED ALL RADIO TRANSMISSIONS TO CODE. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SAID THE INVADERS SUCCESSFULLY LANDED "MILITARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT" FOR USE BY INTERNAL RESISTANCE FORCES ALREADY OPERATING IN CUBA.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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
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UPI-233

ADD 4 CUBA, NEW YORK (UPI-212)

THE ANTI-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SAID IT HAD INFORMATION THAT "MUCH OF THE MILITIA IN THE COUNTRYSIDE HAVE ALREADY DEFECTED." IT SAID THE 300,000-MAN MILITIA FORCE WAS "EVER DWINDLING."

DESPITE OPTIMISTIC REBEL REPORTS, HOWEVER, AUTHORITATIVE QUARTERS SAID THE INVASION HAD NOT YET MADE AS MUCH PROGRESS AS ITS LEADERS MIGHT HAVE HOPED.

ITS FARTHEST POINT INLAND WAS SAID TO BE 20 MILES.

THERE WERE NO ACTUAL EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF FIGHTING.

THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SAID THE "PRINCIPAL BATTLE AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO WILL BE FOUGHT IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS." IT SAID TODAY'S ACTION WAS "LARGELY OF A SUPPORT NATURE" TO THE ANTI-CASTRO FORCES ALREADY IN CUBA.

THE COUNCIL PREDICTED THE COUNTRY WOULD RISE "EN MASSE" BY DAWN TUESDAY AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME.

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
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ADD 1 SOVIET-CUBA (UPI-225)

TASS SAID "WORLD PUBLIC OPINION" WAS INCENSED BY THE INVASION AND ALSO WAS READY TO COME TO THE AID OF CUBA.

IT CHARGED THAT THE INVASION "HAS BEEN PREPARED IN THE OPEN FOR MONTHS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND IN GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA, AND COSTA RICA, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES CONTROLLED BY UNITED STATES MONOPOLIES."

"WHAT STRIKES THE EYE IS THAT THE BOMBING OF CUBAN CITIES BY AIRCRAFT BASED ON THE UNITED STATES TERRITORY AND THE PRESENT INVASION OF CUBA TOOK PLACE JUST A FEW DAYS AFTER THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENT GAVE ASSURANCE AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT ALLOW AN ATTACK ON CUBA FROM HER TERRITORY," THE AGENCY ADDED.

"IT IS CLEAR TO EVERYONE, HOWEVER, THAT NOBODY COULD HAVE INDULGED IN ORGANIZING AND CARRYING OUT SUCH AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE, APPROVAL, AND ACTIVE COOPERATION OF THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES."

TASS SAID A MAN NAMED COL. LOPEZ, WHOM IT IDENTIFIED AS A FORMER ASSOCIATE OF EX-DICTATOR FULGENCIO BATISTA, "WAS REPORTED TO HAVE MET HIGH-RANKING PENTAGON OFFICIALS" AS A PRELUDE TO THE INVASION.

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NEW YORK--INVADING CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY FORCES BATTLED FIDEL CASTRO TROOPS IN THE SWAMPLANDS 90 MILES SOUTHEAST OF HAVANA MONDAY AND NAVY AND AIR FORCE UNITS WERE REPORTED JOINING ANTI-CASTRO PARTISANS IN THE FIGHT TO OVERTHROW THE CUBAN PREMIER.

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UPI-2

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARIES INVADED THEIR ISLAND HOMELAND BY AIR AND SEA TODAY AND CLASHED WITH FIDEL CASTRO'S FORCES IN A VIOLENT WATERFRONT BATTLE JUST 90 MILES FROM HAVANA.

LAUNCHING A LONG-AWAITED OFFENSIVE AGAINST CASTRO, THE REVOLUTIONARIES INVADED FROM THE SEA SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT. THEY STRUCK INTO THE SWAMPY AREA AROUND THE BAY OF COCHINA. THIS LIES SOUTH OF MATANZAS PROVINCE.

SEVERAL HOURS AFTER DAWN THE GOVERNMENT INTERNAL RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM---COMMANDEERED BY THE ARMY---REPORTED THE INVADERS WERE DROPPING BY PARACHUTE, PLANES WERE BOMBING AND STRAFING THE BEACHHEAD AREA, AND TWO GUNBOATS WERE SUPPORTING THE ASSAULT.

THIS WAS THE BEGINNING OF "THE BATTLE TO LIBERATE OUR HOMELAND FROM THE DESPOTIC RULE OF FIDEL CASTRO AND RID CUBA OF INTERNATIONAL CRUELTY AND OPPRESSION," SAID JOSE MIRO CARDONA, PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, IN A STATEMENT RELEASED IN NEW YORK.

RADIO SWAN, THE POWERFUL ANTI-CASTRO TRANSMITTER ON A CARIBBEAN ISLAND, BROADCAST MIRO CARDONA'S PROCLAMATION OF REVOLT TO ALL CUBANS.

IN THE INITIAL HOURS, THE CASTRO-CONTROLLED CUBAN COMMERCIAL STATIONS IGNORED THE SITUATION.

TWO WEEKS OF INTENSIVE ANTI-CASTRO SABOTAGE INSIDE CUBA PRECEDED TODAY'S ASSAULT.

THIS MORNING'S BIG ASSAULT CAME SOMETIME BEFORE 3A.M., EST, WHEN RADIO REPORTS OF FIRING WERE RECEIVED FROM MATANZAS PROVINCE.

IN THE INITIAL HOURS, NO IMMEDIATE REPORT WAS RECEIVED FROM THE HAVANA BUREAU OF UPI. THE SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE CO. IN MIAMI REPORTED THAT ALL PHONE SERVICE TO CUBA HAD BEEN CUT OFF. NO EXPLANATION WAS GIVEN FROM HAVANA.

THE FIRST OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SITUATION CAME WHEN CMQ, A GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED BROADCAST STATION IN HAVANA, AIRED A GENERAL ORDER THAT "ALL MILITIA STATIONS IN HAVANA SHOULD JOIN THEIR UNITS IMMEDIATELY." THIS WAS JUST BEFORE 8 A.M. EST.

PREVIOUS REPORTS CAME FROM A LOCAL TRANSMITTER OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR IN MATANZAS PROVINCE, WHICH WAS RELAYING BEACH-HEAD REPORTS FROM DEFENDING CASTRO FORCES TO HAVANA.

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UPI-242

ADD U.N. UNITED NATIONS (UPI-239)

ROA ALSO CHARGED THAT TWO CUTLASS JET PLANES FROM AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CARRIER ESCORTED A REBEL B26 BOMBER TO SAFETY WHEN IT WAS BEING PURSUED BY A JET PLANE OF FIDEL CASTRO'S REVOLUTIONARY AIR FORCE. HE SAID HIS INFORMATION WAS BASED ON A COMMUNICATION TONIGHT WITH DR. OSVALDO DORTICOS, PRESIDENT OF THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT.

"THIS MEANS THAT THE MERCENARY INVASION PROMOTED, ORGANIZED, ARMED AND FINANCED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOW PROGRESSIVELY BECOMING A DIRECT MILITARY INVASION," ROAD SAID. "THIS CERTAINLY BRINGS UP A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION WHICH IS NOT NOW JUST BETWEEN CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES, BUT IS BEFORE THE WORLD.

"THIS MEANS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS GONE BEYOND INDIRECT ACTION TO DIRECT ACTION. WE ARE WITNESSING A DIRECT INVASION."

AMBASSADOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON IMMEDIATELY ISSUED A CATEGORICAL DENIAL OF ROA'S CHARGE OF DIRECT U.S. INTERVENTION.

SOVIET AMBASSADOR VALERIAN A. ZORIN ECHOED ROA'S CHARGES. "WHY IS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT SAYING ANYTHING ABOUT THE INTERVENTION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES?" ZORIN ASKED. "IF HE HAS NOT SUFFICIENT INFORMATION, I BELIEVE THAT THE COMMITTEE WOULD BE INTERESTED NOT LATER THAN TOMORROW MORNING."

"THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING BECAUSE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT GIVE HIM TIME," STEVENSON SAID. "I... CATEGORICALLY DENY THAT ANY U.S. ARMED FORCES ARE IN THIS OPERATIONS."

ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR SILVIU BRUCAN PUT A RESOLUTION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE END TO MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA AND CESSATION OF AID TO THE REBELS FROM THE STATES FROM WHOSE TERRITORY THE INVASION WAS LAUNCHED.

WITH MOST DELEGATIONS RELUCTANT TO SPEAK, THE COMMITTEE ADJOURNED FURTHER DISCUSSION ON CUBA UNTIL TOMORROW AND TURNED TO DEBATE ON THE U.S. PLAN FOR AN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

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UPI-114

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

THERE WERE REPORTS SEGMENTS OF THE CUBAN NAVY HAD REVOLTED.
FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR THIS MORNING NAVAL STATIONS WERE HEARD
TRYING TO RAISE CUBAN NAVAL HEADQUARTERS IN HAVANA.

THE CONTROL TOWER AT HAVANA AIRPORT NOTIFIED MIAMI THAT THE
CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAD SUSPENDED ALL COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS
OVER THE ISLAND.

4/17--DP135 PES

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UPI-100

ADD CUBA, UNDATED
 SOURCES OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ESTIMATED 5,000 ANTI-CASTRO TROOPS HAD GONE INTO ACTION WITHIN THE LAST 48 HOURS. ONE BROADCAST INDICATED CASUALTIES WERE HEAVY. CASTRO TOLD THE PEOPLE OF CUBA THAT INVASION TROOPS WERE ATTACKING VARIOUS POINTS OF NATIONAL TERRITORY IN THE SOUTH OF LAS VILLAS PROVINCE WITH THE AID OF AIRCRAFT AND WARSHIPS. HE CALLED FOR ACTION AGAINST "THOSE WHO ARE SURPRISED COMMITTING ...SABOTAGE, SHOOTING, OR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS"--INDICATED THAT AN UPRISING WITHIN CUBA HAD ACCOMPANIED THE INVASION. STREAMS OF PERSONS WERE REPORTED JAMMING THE ROADS INTO THE ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS WHERE GUERRILLA BANDS HAVE BEEN OPERATING AGAINST CASTRO. THEY WERE BELIEVED TO BE CIVILIANS ON THE MOVE AND NOT INVADERS.

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
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UPI-95

(CUBA)

UNITED NATIONS--THE UNITED STATES TODAY FORMALLY DENIED A CUBAN CHARGE THAT TODAY'S INVASION OF FIDEL CASTRO'S ISLAND STRONGHOLD WAS LAUNCHED IN PART FROM FLORIDA.

CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA, LAYING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY INVASION SQUARELY ON WASHINGTON, TOLD THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S MAIN POLITICAL COMMITTEE:

"THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA WAS THIS MORNING INVADED BY A MERCENARY FORCE, ORGANIZED, FINANCED AND ARMED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND COMING FROM GUATEMALA AND FLORIDA."

WHEN ROA FINISHED HIS 90-MINUTE INDICTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON TOLD THE COMMITTEE:

"THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE SPEAKING FOR CUBA HAS JUST CHARGED THE UNITED STATES WITH AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA AND AN INVASION COMING FROM FLORIDA."

"THESE CHARGES ARE TOTALLY FALSE AND I DENY THEM CATEGORICALLY."

"THE UNITED STATES HAS COMMITTED NO AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA AND NO OFFENSIVE HAS BEEN LAUNCHED FROM FLORIDA OR ANY OTHER PART OF THE UNITED STATES."

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
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UPI-92.

ADD CASTRO, MIAMI
 THE PROCLAMATION WAS THE SECOND ONE BROADCAST FROM HAVANA STATIONS IN CASTRO'S NAME SINCE REBEL FORCES LANDED EARLY TODAY. THE FIRST PROCLAMATION ADMITTED "INVASION TROOPS BY SEA AND AIR ARE ATTACKING VARIOUS POINTS OF OUR NATIONAL TERRITORY, TO THE SOUTH OF THE PROVINCE OF LAS VILLAS, AIDED BY AIRCRAFT AND WARSHIPS."
 THIS, ISSUED ABOUT 11 A.M. EST, WAS THE FIRST TOP-LEVEL ADMISSION THAT INVASION WAS UNDERWAY. IT CAME ABOUT 12 HOURS AFTER THE INITIAL ASSAULT.

THE SECOND PROCLAMATION DECLARED "A STAGE OF ALERT" AND ORDERED "THE REBEL (CASTRO) ARMY, THE MILITIA AND ALL THE SECURITY FORCES TO INCREASE THEIR VIGILANCE AND PROCEED WITHOUT FURTHER THOUGHT AGAINST THOSE WHO ARE SURPRISED COMMITTING OR TRYING TO COMMIT ACTS OF SABOTAGE, SHOOTING OR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS."

BARELY AN HOUR LATER, A THIRD PROCLAMATION SAID, "ESPECIALLY DO WE ASK OUR BROTHER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS THAT THEY MAKE FELT THE UNCHALLENGABLE FORCE OF THEIR ACTION AGAINST THE NORTH AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS... FATHERLAND OR DEATH."

THE THIRD PROCLAMATION WAS SIGNED BY CASTRO AND PRESIDENT DORTICOS.

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UPI-97

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

THE MIDDAY REPORT, IF CONFIRMED, WOULD MARK THE FIRST APPEARANCE IN CUBAN SKIES OF MIGS. THE RUSSIAN-TYPE JETS HAVE BEEN REPORTED SHIPPED TO FIDEL CASTRO IN RECENT MONTHS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES PREVIOUSLY HAVE ESTIMATED THAT CASTRO HAD BETWEEN SEVEN AND 12 MIGS ON SECRET AIRFIELDS.

THE SAME HIGH EXILE SOURCES HAD REPORTED AT MID-MORNING THAT THE INVADING FORCES SEIZED AN AIR STRIP IN THE BEACHHEAD AREA AROUND COCHINOS BAY AND WERE FLYING IN AND OUT ON A REGULAR BASIS. THIS APPARENTLY WAS BEFORE CASTRO JETS WENT INTO ACTION.

CASTRO HAS REPEATEDLY BOASTED, IN TELEVISION AND OTHER SPEECHES DURING THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS, OF HIS REGIME'S POWERFUL SUPPLY OF MODERN ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.

IN ONE SPEECH LAST YEAR HE FLATLY DECLARED THAT CUBA HAD MORE FIRE POWER THAN WAS USED IN THE KOREAN WAR.

UNCONFIRMED, BUT INSISTENT REPORTS, HAVE ALSO SAID HE HAS SMALL OR MEDIUM SIZE ROCKETS.

LAST YEAR THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT ESTIMATED CASTRO'S MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND ARMS AT ABOUT TEN TIMES THE SUPPLY BATISTA HAD.

CZECH TECHNICIANS HAVE BEEN IN CUBA FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.

THE EXILE SOURCE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO TELL DEFINITELY THE NUMBER OF MIGS INVOLVED IN THE AIR BLOW.

"AT LEAST SEVEN SEPARATE MIG AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED."

HE SAID THAT THE ATTACKING AIRCRAFT ALSO INCLUDED THREE U.S.-BUILT T3 JET TRAINER PLANES CONVERTED FOR FIGHTER USE.

THESE HAD BEEN SUPPLIED TO CUBA BEFORE CASTRO CAME TO POWER.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID HE HAD NO IMMEDIATE WORD ON HOW MANY TANKS WERE IN ACTION.

EARLIER, THE PUBLIC WORKS MINISTRY HAD BEEN HEARD BROADCASTING A CALL FROM HAVANA FOR HEAVY TRUCKS CAPABLE OF MOVING TANKS INTO POSITION.

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UPI-91 (CORRECT)

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE INVADING FORCES WERE ATTACKED BY LARGE NUMBERS OF COMMUNIST-MADE TANKS, HE SAID.

CASTRO HAS LONG BEEN REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN EQUIPPED WITH TANKS FROM THE SOVIET BLOC. UNDERGROUND SOURCES SAID THEY INCLUDE THE 80-TON STALIN TYPE.

THE COMBINED ATTACKS BY AIR AND GROUND FORCES APPARENTLY CONSTITUTED AN ALL-OUT ATTEMPT TO THROW THE INVADING TROOPS BACK INTO THE SEA.
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UN Waits Proof of Roa's Charge

UNITED NATIONS, April 18 (UPI)—Shocked UN diplomats were waiting today for Premier Fidel Castro's spokesman here to offer some proof of his charge that U. S. forces from the Naval Base at Guantanamo are aiding the invasion of Cuba.

Foreign Minister Raul Roa made the charge at last night's meeting of the General Assembly's Main Political Committee. It was denied

both by U. S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and by senior officers at Guantanamo.

CONSEQUENCE

Mr. Stevenson also denied an earlier Roa charge that the invasion was launched in part from Florida, but added that the United States has no obligation to protect Castro "from the consequences of his treason."

The U. S. Ambassador assailed Russia for pouring arms and military advisers into Castroite Cuba.

"Well over 30,000 tons of Soviet equipment has arrived (in Cuba) in the last few months," Mr. Stevenson said. "This includes at least 15 Soviet 50-ton tanks, 19 Soviet assault guns, 15 Soviet 35-ton tanks, 78 Soviet 76-millimeter field guns, four Soviet 122-millimeter field guns and over 100 Soviet heavy machine guns."

"Over 200 Soviet and Czechoslovak military advisers are in Cuba, and over 150 Cuban military personnel have been sent to the (Soviet) bloc for training."

Mr. Stevenson also read a long list of former Castro supporters who have fled Cuba.

Roa offered no proof of his charges. After Mr. Stevenson's denial, he said angrily that the American diplomat "did not rebut any of my statements." Then he and his aides walked quickly out of the room as the committee turned to debate on the African development program proposed by the United States.

Most diplomats expected Roa to make another state-

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ment to the 99-nation committee today.

PROPOSE

Mr. Stevenson was considering a formal demand that the committee declare Roa's charge false and unsubstantiated as was proposed in January when Cuba charged the United States with planning an invasion.

Only Saudi Arabia and Yugoslavia were formally listed to speak this morning. If there are no further speakers, the committee will turn to either the African development debate or the question of Korea's unification. Both of these items, together with the Cuban complaint, are listed together on the Agenda.

There was only one formal proposal before the committee on the Cuban issue: "A 'cease-fire' resolution submitted by Romanian Ambassador Silviu Brucan.

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- The Washington Daily News 18
- The Evening Star _____
- New York Herald Tribune _____
- New York Journal-American _____
- New York Mirror _____
- New York Daily News _____
- New York Post _____
- The New York Times _____
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- The New Leader _____
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UPI-172

(CUBA)

NEW YORK--HEAVY SOVIET-BUILT TANKS AND MIG AIRCRAFT HAVE ATTACKED INVADING REBELS IN THE MATANZAS AREA OF CUBA AND DESTROYED LARGE AMOUNTS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ANNOUNCED.

THE ANTI-CASTRO GROUP, IN "BULLETIN NUMBER FOUR" ISSUED AT 2:20 P.M. EST, SAID PEASANTS, WORKERS AND MILITIA WERE JOINING THE ANTI-CASTRO FORCES AND WERE AIDING THE FIGHT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN A RAPIDLY EXPANDING AREA ALREADY CONTROLLED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND.

THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL EXPRESSED ITS GRATITUDE FOR "THE COUNTLESS MESSAGES OF SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT POURING IN FROM ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD.

"SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SYMPATHY ARE CONVINCING PROOF THAT FREEDOM LOVING PEOPLE OF THE WORLD REPUDIATE THE COMMUNISTIC SLAVERY IMPOSED BY CASTRO OVER THE CUBAN PEOPLE," THE COUNCIL SAID.

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
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UPI-151

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

A BULLETIN ISSUED LATER BY THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN NEW YORK ANNOUNCED THAT "CUBAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS IN THE MATANZAS AREA ARE BEING ATTACKED BY HEAVY SOVIET TANKS AND MIG FIGHTERS, WHICH HAVE DESTROYED CONSIDERABLE (AMOUNTS OF) MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT."

THE EXILE SPOKESMAN SAID THE ATTACKS LASTED FOR ABOUT AN HOUR, ENDING AT 1:30 P.M. THE LAST REPORT HE HAD, ON THE BASIS OF RADIOED INFORMATION FROM THE REBEL FORCES IN THE FIELD TO THEIR SECRET GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OUTSIDE CUBA, WAS THAT 10 PLANES WERE INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING AND STRAFING ATTACKS.

HE SAID THE INSURGENT COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, RELAYED TO GHQ THROUGH A THIRD COUNTRY IN LATIN AMERICA, WAS NOT INTERRUPTED AT ANY TIME DURING THE INTENSE ATTACK.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID THE ATTACK STARTED WITH FOUR AIRCRAFT, WHICH WERE QUICKLY JOINED BY THREE MORE AND FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER THREE.

"THE MOST STARTLING DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTACK WAS THE PRECISION WITH WHICH IT WAS CARRIED OUT," HE SAID. "THE PLANES CAME OVER IN PERFECT FORMATION, WING TO WING, PEELED OFF AND MADE THEIR STRAFING AND BOMBING RUNS AT EVEN INTERVALS."

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UPI-60

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

THERE HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY NO CONTACT WITH HAVANA SINCE THE INVASION STARTED, SAVE FOR BRIEF REPORTS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. THE UPI BUREAU IN LONDON REPORTED THAT IT GOT THROUGH TO HAVANA TODAY, BUT WAS TOLD BY THE TELEPHONE COMPANY THERE THAT THE UPI HAVANA BUREAU'S NUMBER WAS "OUT OF ORDER."

EARLY THIS MORNING, CASTRO USED AN EMERGENCY NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK INSIDE CUBA TO PROCLAIM THAT HIS FORCES WERE "FIGHTING VALIANTLY." HE PROMISED TO ANNOUNCE DETAILS LATER OF "SUCCESSSES OBTAINED BY THE ARMY." BUT THE HOURS DRAGGED BY, AND THERE WERE NO DETAILS.

MEANWHILE, A SWEEPING ROUNDUP WAS ORDERED OF CUBANS WHOSE LOYALTY TO CASTRO WAS SUSPECT.

AUTHORITIES IN THE SMALL BEACH RESORT OF VARADERO ON CUBA'S NORTH COAST WERE HEARD INFORMING HAVANA BY RADIO THAT 200 PRISONERS HAD BEEN ROUNDED UP IN THAT ONE REGION ALONE.

"WE HAVE MADE A TOTAL CLEANUP HERE AND HAVE SENT 200 PRISONERS TO MATANZAS (THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL)," THE BROADCAST SAID.

THE VARADERO REPORT SAID "THE MEASURES WE HAVE TAKEN MAKE IMPOSSIBLE ANY INVASION OF MATANZAS PROVINCE."

THE EXILE SPOKESMAN SAID A TREMENDOUS EXPLOSION AND FLASHES OF FIRE IN THE SKY WERE OBSERVED LATE LAST NIGHT AT SANTIAGO DE LOS BANOS, CUBAN ARMY AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 20 MILES WEST OF HAVANA.

HE SAID THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE EXPLANATION OF WHAT OCCURRED THERE. THE SANTIAGO DE LOS BANOS AIR BASE, A \$20 MILLION INSTALLATION BUILT FOR B17 BOMBER USE BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE IN WORLD WAR II, WAS ONE OF THE THREE MILITARY OBJECTIVES BOMBED AND STRAFED SATURDAY WHEN THREE CASTRO PILOTS DEFECTED IN TWO B26 BOMBERS AND A T3 JET TRAINER PLANE EQUIPPED AS A FIGHTER.

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UPI-131

ADD BOMBERS, MOSCOW (UPI-119)
 AMBASSADOR FAURE CHOMON ALSO SAID "SEVERAL SHIPS BRINGING
 REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE INVADERS" WERE DESTROYED.
 CHOMON DID NOT INDICATE THE SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION.

4/18 --EG221PES

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
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UPI-119
(BOMBERS)
MOSCOW--THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW TOLD A TELEVISION AUDIENCE
TONIGHT THAT FIVE REBEL BOMBERS, INCLUDING ONE AMERICAN PLANE, HAVE
BEEN SHOT DOWN OVER CUBA.

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UPI-299

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

THE SOVIET TASS NEWS AGENCY REPORTED THE ARREST OF TWO ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIESTS IN HAVANA ON CHARGES OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES.


IT IDENTIFIED THEM AS MSGR. EDUARDO BOZA MASVIDAL, RECTOR OF VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY, AUXILIARY BISHOP OF HAVANA AND A LONGTIME CASTRO FOE, AND THE REV. ONELIO BLANCO. TASS SAID THEY HAD A SUPPLY OF MEDICINE FOR THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES AND \$236 SEWN IN A SHIRT.

CUBAN EXILE SOURCES SAID THE TASS REPORT APPARENTLY WAS BASED ON A BROADCAST FROM THE "VOICE OF FREE AMERICA," A CUBAN PROPAGANDA STATION. THEY HAD NO CONFIRMATION OF THE REPORT.

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UPI-297

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

CUBAN EXILE SOURCES SAID ANTI-CASTRO FLIERS TUESDAY NIGHT BOMBED THE HAVANA AIRBASE FROM WHICH MIG JET FIGHTERS HAD JOINED RUSSIAN-MADE TANKS IN HEAVY ASSAULTS EARLIER IN THE DAY AGAINST THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY FORCES BEACHHEAD.

~~ONE RAID--ALSO REPORTED BY THE CUA~~

ONE RAID--ALSO REPORTED BY THE CUBAN NEWS AGENCY PRENSA LATINA--- HIT THE CAMP LIBERTY AIRBASE ON THE EDGE OF HAVANA WHERE HEAVY AIR ATTACKS SATURDAY TOUCHED OFF THE PRE-INVASION BUILDUP. THE OTHER TARGET WAS NOT DISCLOSED.

THE EXILE SPOKESMAN SAID THE RAIDS WERE CARRIED OUT BY TWO B26 TWIN-ENGINE BOMBERS AND A LIGHT SINGLE ENGINE PLANE WHICH TOOK OFF FROM A BEACHHEAD AIRFIELD SECURED EARLIER TUESDAY BY THE INVASION FORCES.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID ALL THREE PLANES RETURNED SAFELY TO BASE BUT THAT THERE WAS NO INFORMATION IMMEDIATELY ON THE RESULTS OF THE RAID. HE SAID THE B26S DROPPED REGULAR BOMBS AND THE LIAISON PLANE DROPPED HOMEMADE BOMBS.

CUBAN SOURCES AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK DENIED THE BOMBINGS HAD TAKEN PLACE.

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UPI-295

ADD CUBA, UNDATED (UPI-291)

THE PRENSA LATIN A BROADCAST SAID THE ATTACK CAME AT 8:34 P.M. WHEN THE CITY WAS BOMBED WITHOUT ADVANCE NOTICE. IT SAID THE CENTRAL OFFICES WERE COMPLETELY BLACKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS AND THAT THE FLASH OF TRACER BULLETS WAS EASILY SEEN.

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
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UPI-292

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

THE HAVANA OPERATOR BROKE INTO A REGULAR NEWS TRANSMISSION TO ARGENTINA TO REPORT THE AERIAL ATTACK. LATER, HE SAID THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS HAD CEASED BUT "WE STILL DON'T KNOW WHAT HAPPENED."
THE RADIO TRANSMISSION TO BUENOS AIRES SAID TRACER BULLETS FROM BOTH THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND FROM THE PLANES COULD BE SEEN IN THE DARKENED SKIES. IT SAID DAMAGE WAS NOT YET KNOWN.

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UPI-291
(CUBA)

UNDATED--THE CUBAN NEWS AGENCY PRENSA LATINA BROADCAST TONIGHT THAT HAVANA WAS UNDER AIR ATTACK BY BOMBERS FLOWN BY FOREIGN MERCENARIES AND THAT ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS HAD REPLIED TO THE ATTACK.

THE BROADCAST MONITORED IN BUENOS AIRES FOLLOWED EARLIER REPORTS BY CUBAN EXILE SOURCES THAT FIDEL CASTRO HAD THROWN COMMUNIST-MADE TANKS AND MIG JET FIGHTERS INTO THE BATTLE AGAINST CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY FORCES.

A SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS DISPATCH FROM HAVANA SAID ONE AMERICAN WAS ARRESTED ON SPY CHARGES.

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Rebels Alone Can't Win

Fate of Cuba Revolution In Hands of All Cubans

By Roscoe Drummond

WASHINGTON April 18.—The news from the invasion front in Cuba will shortly yield answers to the two biggest questions raised by the anti-Castro revolution:

1—How can the limited landing forces of the Cuban Revolutionary Council—probably not more than 5,000—possibly hold beachheads and then go on to win against a Castro army of 200,000 men and women, heavily armed? How can the invaders succeed against 40-to-1 military superiority?

2—Will Soviet Premier Khrushchev redeem the promise which he personally and publicly gave to Castro while they were both at the United Nations

last fall—the promise to back the Castro regime against any "aggression" by the use of "Soviet Rockets" if necessary?

If the going gets rough for Castro, will the Soviet Union make good its pledge—or is it an empty promise, a military and diplomatic bluff which Moscow never intended to carry out?

The answers will soon be visible. The cries of anguish and accusation against the United States which are coming from Havana are encouraging. Castro seems inordinately afraid of the little band of revolutionary invaders from among the Cuban defectors and exiles.

If the counter-revolution is successful, its very success will disprove the charge made at the United Nations by Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa that the United States will have brought down the Castro regime.

The fact is that the invading forces of the new Cuban revolutionaries, outnumbered forty-to-one, can win only if there are massive defections from the Castro army and only if there is widespread sabotage by civilians.

The anti-Castro revolutionaries can win Cuba only if Castro has already lost Cuba. The invaders are not sufficient to win by their own strength. If they succeed, Castro will be overthrown primarily by the defections of the Cuban people. The small invading forces of Cuban exiles will only have provided the spark which brought it about.

If the Cuban people and the Cuban army are loyal to Castro, the invasion now in progress cannot possibly overthrow the regime.

If Castro has lost the loyalty of a majority of the Cuban people and much of the Army, then nothing Castro can do can keep the regime from being overthrown.

And the credit will belong to the Cuban people who would rather have liberty than Castro.

But what about Premier Khrushchev's statement that the Soviet Union would be prepared to shower down rockets to protect the Cuban regime from "aggression."

Already the Soviet press is branding the invasion an "American aggression." Therefore, since the Soviets themselves say that Castro is being "aggressive," then Castro has every reason to expect that Moscow will make good its pledge to save him.

We shall shortly see whether Mr. K's promissory note is going to be redeemed. Since the invasion by anti-Castro forces began, the Soviet government has flatly stated that it will provide "all aid necessary to keep Castro in office."

They have already helped Castro with arms and money. Is Mr. Khrushchev going to invite World War III by sending either Russian forces or Russian rockets to the Western Hemisphere? U. S. officials do not believe he will, but the Kremlin has been left in no doubt that such an act would mean war with the United States.

Right now the U. S. government is at the point of deciding what it will do if Soviet arms, tanks and planes cause the anti-Castro revolt to founder. One thing is certain—the U. S. will not permit the Soviets to assert decisive military power ninety miles from our shores.

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UPI-51

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

"NOW THEY HAVE FUEL AND THEY ARE FLYING IN AND OUT," HE SAID. THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT "COMPLETE COMMUNICATIONS" HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN LIBERATION FORCES IN LAS VILLAS AND OR ENTE PROVINCES WITH THE SECRET CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OUTSIDE CUBA.

THE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, HE SAID, "IS ROUTED THROUGH A THIRD COUNTRY OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES."

PRESSED TO AMPLIFY THE REMARK, HE REPLIED THAT "WE ARE GETTING OUR NEWS FROM OUR FORCES IN CUBA THROUGH A CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY."

HE DECLINED TO ADD ANYTHING FURTHER.

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UPI-49

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

WHEN ASKED FOR THE DIRECTION OF THE MOVEMENT, HE SAID "YOU COULD DESCRIBE IT AS THE SPOKES OF A WHEEL."


JAGUEY GRANDE IS ON HARD GROUND ABOUT 20 MILES INLAND FROM THE CIENAGA DE ZAPATA SWAMPLAND AREA WHERE THE LIBERATION TROOPS STORMED ASHORE AT THREE POINTS.

THE SPOKESMAN DISCLOSED THAT THE AIR STRIP WAS CAPTURED MONDAY, BUT SAID IT COULD NOT BE USED EARLIER BECAUSE NO AVIATION GASOLINE WAS ON HAND.

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UPI-46

ADD CUBA, UNDATED
HE SAID THAT IN THE LAS VILLAS AREA THERE WERE TWO POINTS WHERE
CONSOLIDATION WAS UNDER WAY. HE DECLINED TO ELABORATE ON THIS.
THE PRINCIPAL MOVEMENT, HE SAID, HAS BEEN A SPREAD OF TROOPS
FANNING OUT FROM JAGUEY GRANDE, WHERE HE SAID MORE THAN 100 OF
PREMIER CASTRO'S MILITIAMEN WERE KILLED YESTERDAY.

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UPI-45

ADD CUBA, UNDATED (UPI-43)
 THE LANDING STRIP WAS CAPTURED AFTER FIGHTING DESCRIBED BY THE
 SOURCES AS "HEAVY."
 AN EXILE SPOKESMAN SAID FLATLY THAT LIBERATION TROOPS IN LAS
 VILLAS AND ORIENTE PROVINCES "ARE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED AND BEING
 SUPPLIED."

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UPI-43
(CUBA)

INVADING CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY FORCES HAVE SEIZED AN AIR STRIP
AND ARE NOW FLYING PLANES IN AND OUT OF THE BEACHHEAD AREA IN
COCHINOS BAY WHERE THE MAJOR LANDING WAS MADE, HIGH EXILE
SOURCES SAID TODAY.

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UPI-36

(CUBA)

MIAMI--JITTERY CUBAN GOVERNMENT RADIO OPERATORS STRUNG ALONG THE ISLAND'S NORTHERN COASTLINE MANNED THEIR POSTS ALL NIGHT IN A FRUITLESS EFFORT TO TRACK DOWN AND IDENTIFY A NUMBER OF PHANTOM SHIPS REPORTED LURKING OFF THE COAST.

THE GOVERNMENT NAVAL STATION AT VARADERO LAST NIGHT REPORTED SPOTTING A FLOTILLA OF EIGHT STRANGE SHIPS OFF CARDENAS, A NORTH COAST SEAPORT ABOUT 85 MILES EAST OF HAVANA. THE STATION SAID IT FEARED THE SHIPS WERE MASSING FOR A NEW LANDING.

LATER, THE GOVERNMENT'S COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL CENTER AT HAVANA COULD BE HEARD CALLING AT LEAST SIX COASTAL STATIONS SCATTERED OVER NEARLY 200 MILES OF COASTLINE IN EFFORTS TO LOCATE THE SHIPS.

THE STATION AT MARIEL, ABOUT 10 MILES WEST OF HAVANA ON THE NORTHERN COAST OF PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE REPORTED SHORTLY AFTER 3 A.M. IT HAD SIGHTED AT LEAST ONE SHIP.

"THE SHIP IS HEADING THIS WAY," MARIEL REPORTED. MINUTES LATER IT SAID "IT (THE SHIP) NOW HAS TURNED AWAY."

THE NEXT SIGHTING WAS REPORTED FROM THE GOVERNMENT STATION AT SANTA LUCIA, FAR TO THE WEST, AND ALMOST AT THE TIP OF THE ISLAND.

"WE HAVE SIGHTED A SHIP ABOUT 30 MILES OFFSHORE," SANTA LUCIA REPORTED. "IT IS HEADED TOWARDS PUERTO ESPERANZA, EAST OF SANTA LUCIA, TOWARDS HAVANA."

STATIONS WHICH IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES ONLY BY CODE SAID THE SHIP COULD BE A MERCHANT VESSEL.

EARLIER, NAVAL OPERATIONS HAD REPORTED NO MERCHANT VESSELS WERE EXPECTED BEFORE MORNING.

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UPI -238

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WASHINGTON--THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HAS IMPOSED A TOTAL BLACKOUT ON ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING CUBA ALTHOUGH IT PRESUMABLY IS RECEIVING FREQUENT REPORTS.

APPARENTLY UNDER ORDERS FROM "HIGHER AUTHORITY," THE DEPARTMENT TODAY BRUSHED ASIDE QUERIES ON MATTERS IT MIGHT FREELY HAVE DISCUSSED A WEEK AGO.

IN THIS SITUATION, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO LEARN WHETHER ANY UNUSUAL PRECAUTIONS OR ALERTS HAVE BEEN ORDERED FOR U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN THE CARIBBEAN AND SOUTH ATLANTIC AREAS. HOWEVER, IT APPEARED THOSE FORCES -- MAINLY NAVAL AND MARINE -- WERE FOR THE MOST PART OPERATING ON A NORMAL BASIS.

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11 / IN MEXICO CITY, EX-PRESIDENT LAZARO CARDENAS, ONE OF CASTRO'S MEXICAN SUPPORTERS, BOOKED A FLIGHT TO HAVANA AT 5 P.M. YESTERDAY BUT THE FLIGHT WAS CANCELLED AT THE LAST MINUTE. ONE REPORT WAS THAT HE HAD PLANNED TO GO TO ARRANGE ASYLUM FOR CASTRO.

EXILE SOURCES DESCRIBED YESTERDAY'S INVASION AS AIMED MAINLY AT SUPPLYING AND SUPPORTING ANTI-CASTRO FORCES ALREADY IN CUBA. THEY PREDICTED THAT TODAY "CUBA WILL RISE EN MASSE IN A COORDINATED WAVE OF SABOTAGE AND REBELLION."

WITH ALL COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS DOWN, THE MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION WERE CASTRO'S OWN RADIO AND THE EXILE LEADERS IN THE U.S. AND SOUTH AMERICA. THERE WERE NO INDEPENDENT EYEWITNESS REPORTS OF THE FIGHTING.

AT THE U.N., THE U.S. BRANDED AS A LIE A CHARGE BY THE CASTRO REGIME THAT U.S. FORCES FROM THE U.S. NAVAL BASE AT GUANTANAMO HAD INVADDED CUBA.

UPI CORRESPONDENT NORMAN CORNISH REPORTED DIRECTLY FROM GUANTANAMO THAT NAVAL OFFICIALS THERE ALSO FORMALLY DENIED THE CHARGE. SECURITY PRECAUTIONS WERE TIGHTENED AT THE BASE. MARINES AND SAILORS PATROLLED THE 17-MILE FENCE WITH DOGS AND TOOK POSITIONS IN PILLBOXES.

DIRECTORS OF THE INVASION GAVE THIS PICTURE AT THE END OF THE FIRST DAY OF THE FIGHTING:

---TROOPS DROPPED FROM PLANES AND LANDED BY SEA MONDAY AT THE BAY OF COCHINGOS WERE ADVANCING INLAND ACROSS THE WAIST OF EAST CENTRAL CUBA FROM THE SOUTHERN COAST. ONE REPORT SAID THE INVADERS NUMBERED AS HIGH AS 5,000. AN ESTIMATED 100 CASTRO MILITIAMEN WERE BELIEVED KILLED.

---NAVAL UNITS AND SOME AIR FORCE PERSONNEL DESERTED TO THE INVADERS. ONE OFFICER OF CASTRO'S MILITIA---THE CIVILIAN ARMY--- OFFERED TO JOIN THE INVADERS WITH HIS UNIT BUT WAS TOLD HE HAD TO GET HIS OWN ARMS.

---A REVOLUTIONARY FORCE WHICH LANDED IN ORIENTE PROVINCE, IN EASTERN CUBA, SATURDAY NIGHT ENGAGED IN HEAVY GUERRILLA ACTION IN THE SIERRA CRISTAL MOUNTAIN RANGE AND AT BARACOA.

---EIGHT STRANGE SHIPS WERE SIGHTED OFF CARDENAS, 75 MILES EAST OF HAVANA. A POWERFUL CARIBBEAN RADIO TRANSMITTER USED BY ANTI-CASTRO FORCES SAID THEY WERE CUBAN NAVY SHIPS SEEKING TO DEFECT AND MAKE CONTACT WITH THE ANTI-CASTRO NAVY.

---THE PORT OF HAVANA WAS CLOSED TO SHIPPING. SCATTERED GUNFIRE WAS HEARD AND SEEN IN HAVANA. CASTRO'S MILITIAMEN HAD TURNED IT INTO PRACTICALLY AN ARMED CAMP.

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
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UPI-2

(CUBA)

FIDEL CASTRO PROCLAIMED OVER AN EMERGENCY NATIONAL RADIO HOOKUP EARLY TODAY THAT HIS FORCES WERE "FIGHTING VALIANTLY" AGAINST CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY INVADERS IN LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. THE PREMIER'S MESSAGE GAVE NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION. BUT IT WAS AN ADMISSION THAT THE ANTI-CASTRO SOLDIERS HAD GAINED A STRONG Foothold AND STILL WERE BATTLING MORE THAN 24 HOURS AFTER THEY HAD LANDED.

CASTRO'S COMMUNIQUE, READ BY ANNOUNCER, SAID "IN THE NEXT HOURS, THERE WILL BE NEW DETAILS TO REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SUCCESSES OBTAINED BY THE ARMY..."

TOP EXILE SOURCES IN THE U.S. AND MEXICO SAID THE INITIAL VICTORY BELONGED TO THE INVADERS.

JOSE MIRO CARDONA WAS POISED TO SPEED TO CUBA TO SET UP AN OPPOSITION GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS HE DETERMINED HIS TROOPS HAD SECURED A SIZEABLE PIECE OF TERRITORY.

IN MOSCOW, CUBAN AMBASSADOR FAURE CHAUMONT SAID HE HAD SPOKEN BY TELEPHONE TO PRESIDENT OSVALDO DORTICOS THIS MORNING AND RECEIVED WORK THAT THE INVADERS WERE ENCIRCLED BY CASTRO FORCES. HE SAID DORTICOS TOLD HIM HEAVY FIGHTING WAS GOING ON IN MATANZAS PROVINCE. THIS WOULD PUT THE INVADERS AT LEAST 20 MILES INLAND.

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
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UPI-99

(TEXT)
NEW YORK--TEXT OF BULLETIN NO. 5 OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL:

IN SPITE OF CONTINUOUS ATTACK BY SOVIET MIGS HEAVY TANKS AND ARTILLERY FORCES THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND HAS COMPLETED THE PLANNED FIRST PHASE OF THEIR MILITARY OPERATION IN THE SOUTH OF CUBA. THIS PHASE INVOLVED THE SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACT WITH GUERRILLA GROUPS IN THE ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS. NUMEROUS ELEMENTS OF THE FORCES FROM THE COCHINOS BAY AREA HAVE COMPLETED A MOVEMENT NORTH OF CIEN-FUEGOS FROM WHICH THEY WILL BE ABLE TO REINFORCE THE PATRIOTS ALREADY FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINS.

IT CAN ALSO BE REVEALED THAT ADDITIONAL GUERRILLA UNITS HAVE INFILTRATED CENTRAL MATANZAS PROVINCE. THE HEROIC ACTION OF A SMALL HOLDING FORCE WHICH RESISTED SOVIET TANKS ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT DURING THE LAST 20 HOURS MADE POSSIBLE THIS RESULT.

ACCORDING TO THE COMMAND'S LAST INFORMATION THIS FORCE CONTINUES ITS VALIANT FIGHT AGAINST TYRANNY.

(END TEXT)

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UPI-115

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

A TOP CUBAN EXILE SPOKESMAN IN MIAMI, FLA., SUPPLEMENTED THE COMMUNIQUE FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. HE SAID ONE UNIT IN THE BAHIA DE COCHINOS AREA WAS INVOLVED IN "VERY SEVERE FIGHTING." HE SAID IT WAS "CAUGHT IN A CROSS FIRE FROM HEAVY TANKS AND PINNED DOWN, BUT IS FIGHTING HEROICALLY." HE ADDED IT HAS BEEN UNDER AIR ATTACK SINCE EARLY THIS MORNING, PRESUMABLY BY COMMUNIST-SUPPLIED MGS.

"THERE IS TERRIBLE FIGHTING GOING ON," HE SAID. "BUT WE ARE HOLDING OUR OWN."

THE SOURCE SAID ALBERTO MULLER, WELL-KNOWN CATHOLIC YOUTH LEADER AND PRESIDENT OF THE STUDENT REVOLUTIONARY DIRECTORATE WHICH HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE HAVANA UNDERGROUND IN RECENT MONTHS, HAS EMERGED FROM HIDING AND IS LEADING A BAND OF GUERRILLAS IN EASTERN CUBA'S ORIENTE PROVINCE.

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UPI-89

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

"IT CAN ALSO BE REVEALED THAT ADDITIONAL GUERRILLA UNITS HAVE INFILTRATED MATANZAS PROVINCE," THE COMMUNIQUE SAID. "THE HEROIC ACTION OF A SMALL HOLDING FORCE WHICH RESISTED SOVIET TANKS, ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT DURING THE LAST 20 HOURS MADE THIS RESULT POSSIBLE."

THE COMMUNIQUE ADDED THAT ACCORDING TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND'S LATEST INFORMATION, "THIS FORCE CONTINUES ITS VALIANT FIGHT AGAINST TYRANNY."

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UPI-87

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

A REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE SAID, "NUMEROUS ELEMENTS OF THE FORCES FROM THE COCHINOS BAY AREA HAVE COMPLETED A MOVEMENT NORTH OF CIENFUEGOS FROM WHICH THEY WILL BE ABLE TO REINFORCE THE PATRIOTS ALREADY FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINS."
 CIENFUEGOS IS ABOUT 50 MILES TO THE EAST OF THE ORIGINAL BEACHHEAD IN THE BAHIA DE COCHINOS AREA.

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UPI-85
(CUBA)

THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SAID TODAY ITS INVADING FORCES
 HAVE "COMPLETED THE PLANNED FIRST PHASE OF THEIR MILITARY OPERATION
 IN THE SOUTH OF CUBA" AND LINKED UP WITH GUERRILLA GROUPS IN THE
 ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS. THE OPERATION WAS REPORTED TO BE UNDER CONTINUOUS
 ATTACK "BY SOVIET MIGS, HEAVY TANKS AND ARTILLERY."

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UPI-122

(PROTEST)

WASHINGTON--THE UNITED STATES TODAY BRANDED THE CUBAN
GOVERNMENT'S EXECUTION OF TWO AMERICANS AS "A VIOLATION OF THE
ELEMENTARY STANDARDS OF JUSTICE PRACTICED BY THE CIVILIZED NATIONS
OF THE WORLD."

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UPI-86
(PILOT)

OKLAHOMA CITY--THE FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY SAID TODAY THE LICENSE NUMBER GIVEN BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AS IDENTIFICATION OF A U.S. PILOT ALLEGEDLY SHOT DOWN IN MATANZAS PROVINCE TODAY WAS "AN IMPOSSIBLE NUMBER."

ROBERT E. FORBES, DIRECTOR OF RECORDS FOR FAA HERE, SAID THE 80323-1M IS NOT A TRUE NUMBER. HE SAID THE "1-M" PORTION "IS NOT PART OF OUR NUMBERING SYSTEM."

HE SAID THE 80323 PART OF THE LICENSE BELONGS TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHOSE NAME DOES NOT RESEMBLE THAT OF LEO FRANCIS BERLITS, THE NAME GIVEN BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.

FORBES DECLINED TO NAME THE OTHER MAN, BUT SAID THE NAME, ADDRESS AND CLASSIFICATION "ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT."

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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
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UPI-35

ADD AMERICANS GUANTANAMO (UPI-3)

ANDERSON WAS ABOUT 45. HE SERVED IN THE U.S. MARINE CORPS AND HAD SERVED IN CUBA WITH AMERICAN ARMED FORCES IN WORLD WAR II. HE WAS COMMANDER OF HAVANA'S AMERICAN LEGION POST UNTIL IT WAS DISSOLVED AFTER CASTRO TOOK OVER. HE OPERATED A CHAIN OF SERVICE STATIONS IN CUBA FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS EVEN AFTER CASTRO APPROPRIATED MOST OTHER U.S. PROPERTY IN CUBA. A FAMILY SPOKESMAN IN MIAMI SAID HE MOVED HIS WIFE, A CUBAN-BORN, NAUTRALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN TWO SONS AND TWO DAUGHTERS TO THAT FLORIDA CITY LAST SUMMER AND STAYED BEHIND IN HAVANA TO RUN HIS BUSINESS. SHE WAS REPORTED IN SECLUSION AFTER HIS EXECUTION.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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
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UPI-123 *B. APPROX 1976*
~~deceased~~ ADD TO PROTEST WASHINGTON

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID IT WAS ASKING SWITZERLAND WHICH REPRESENTS U. S. INTERESTS IN CUBA, TO PROTEST THE EXECUTIONS OF HOWARD F. ANDERSON OF YAKIMA, WASH., AND ANGUS MCNAIR, JR. OF MIAMI. *Florida Cuba*

SPOKESMAN LINCOLN WHITE SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS "ALSO MAKING INQUIRIES OF THE SWISS ABOUT THE REPORTED ARRESTS OF AMERICANS IN CUBA." HE ADDED "WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MEANS TO PROTECT U. S. INTERESTS IN CUBA."

WHITE DECLINED TO ANSWER WHEN HE WAS ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES CONTEMPLATED "GOING BEYOND DIPLOMATIC MEANS" IF NECESSARY.

WHITE SAID THAT THE EXECUTIONS OF ANDERSON AND MCNAIR "AS FAR AS WE KNOW...HAVE TAKEN PLACE, PERHAPS WITHOUT A TRIAL BUT IN ANY CASE WITHOUT A FAIR TRIAL AND WE ARE ASKING THE SWISS GOVERNMENT FOR REPORT ON WHAT IS TAKING PLACE."

HE SAID THAT THE SWISS REPORTED THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THEIR EMBASSY IN HAVANA "BECAUSE OF AN APPARENT COMMUNICATIONS BLACKOUT IN CUBA."

NEVERTHELESS, WHITE ADDED, THE UNITED STATES HAS ASKED THE SWISS TO LAUNCH A VERY VIGOROUS PROTEST AGAINST THE EXECUTIONS.

WHITE SAID THE STATE DEPARTMENT "DEPLORES" THE ATTACK AGAINST THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.

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UPI-140

(ASSESSMENT)

(BY FRANCIS L. MCCARTHY)

THE ODDS NEW APPEAR TO BE PILING UP GRIMLY AND HEAVILY AGAINST THE THREE-DAY OLD INVASION OF FIDEL CASTRO'S CUBA.

THE POSITION OF THE OUTNUMBERED INVADERS IN THE KEY AREA AROUND COCHINOS BAY MAY BE DESCRIBED AS DESPERATE BUT--AS OF THE MOMENT--NOT COMPLETELY HOPELESS.

INFORMATION FILTERING OUT FROM THE FIGHTING AREA IS THAT THE REBEL FORCES PUT ASHORE SUNDAY NIGHT AND MONDAY ARE FIGHTING ON. BUT THEIR FATE GROWS MORE DOUBTFUL BY THE HOUR.

THE INVADERS WENT ASHORE IN THE FACE OF OVERWHELMINGLY SUPERIOR NUMBERS. THEY HAVE DRIVEN AT LEAST 20 MILES INLAND AND HAVE FORMED AN AIRSTRIP ON A 10 MILE BY 10 MILE AREA OF LIBERATED GROUND.

BUT THEIR NUMBERS DO NOT SEEM TO BE SUFFICIENT TO HOLD THE POSITION, PARTICULARLY IN THE FACE OF THE MODERN WEAPONS THAT CASTRO HAS BEEN ABLE TO HURL AGAINST THEM.

TWO FACTORS PROBABLY ARE MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GRAVE TURN OF EVENTS FOR THE INVADING FORCES:

--CASTRO'S USE OF COMMUNIST-MADE MIG JET AIRCRAFT AGAINST THE PROPELLOR-DRIVEN AIRCRAFT OF THE REBELS PLUS THE SPEED WITH WHICH HE WAS ABLE TO USE HIS SOVIET-TYPE TANKS AND CANNON IN THE LANDING AREAS.

--REBEL HOPES FOR MASSIVE ANTI-CASTRO UPRISINGS BY THE POPULACE AND FOR HEAVY DEFECTIONS FROM THE ARMED FORCES APPARENTLY HAVE NOT BEEN REALIZED. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME. BUT CASTRO'S 300,000-MAN MILITIA HAS CLEARLY BEEN EFFECTIVE IN KEEPING IT DOWN.

AS OF MID-DAY TODAY, THE SITUATION CAN HARDLY BE DESCRIBED AS ANYTHING BETTER THAN TOUCH AND GO. SOME CRUCIAL HOURS CLEARLY ARE AHEAD.

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
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UPI-262

(TASS)
MOSCOW--THE SOVIET TASS NEWS AGENCY CHARGED TODAY THAT THE REBEL
INVASION OF CUBA WAS SUPPORTED BY U.S. DESTROYERS, SUBMARINES, AND
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

IT CHARGED U.S. MAJ. GEN. WALTER O'MEARA SUPERVISED THE LANDING
FROM COSTA RICA.

IN A NEW YORK DISPATCH QUOTING "AMERICAN AND LATIN AMERICAN SOURCES,"
THE AGENCY LISTED WHAT IT SAID WERE DETAILS OF THE AMERICAN
"INTERVENTION" TO AID THE REBELS.

TASS SAID THE REBELS WERE TRAINED IN FLORIDA, PANAMA, NICARAGUA, AND
GUATEMALA.

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UPI-276

CORRECTION IN U.N., UNITED NATIONS (UPI-100)
CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA, IN HIS CHARGE BEFORE THE UNITED
NATIONS, GAVE THE PILOT'S NAME FIRST AS LEO FRANCIS BELL, BUT LATER
CHANGED THE LAST NAME TO BERLITZ.
ROA SAID THE PILOT'S AVIATION LICENSE NUMBER WAS 083-231M AND BORE A
DEC. 21, 1962 EXPIRATION DATE. HE SAID HIS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER WAS
014-07-6921 AND HIS ADDRESS 100 NASHUA ST., BOSTON, Mass

Cuba

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
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UPI-72

(TEXT)

MIAMI --TEXT OF A CUBAN GOVERNMENT BROADCAST THIS MORNING OVER HAVANA RADIO STATION CMQ:
 "THE NORTH AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE AGGRESSION WHICH IS TAKING PLACE AGAINST CUBA HAS BEEN DRAMATICALLY PROVED THIS MORNING. OUR ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES SHOT DOWN ONE NORTH AMERICAN MILITARY PLANE PILOTED BY A NORTH AMERICAN AVIATOR WHICH BOMBED THE CIVIL POPULATION AND OUR INFANTRY FORCES IN THE ZONE OF THE "AUSTRALIA" SUGAR MILL.
 THE NORTH AMERICAN AGGRESSOR PILOT WHOSE BODY IS IN THE HANDS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES WAS CALLED LEO FRANCIS BERLITZ OR BURLEY (PHONETIC SPELLING).
 DOCUMENTS WERE SEIZED WHICH REVEALED THAT THE FLIGHT LICENSE WAS 8223 (THEN THE ANNOUNCER REPEATED THE NUMBER CHANGING IT TO 80323) ISSUED WITH AN EXPIRATION DATE OF 24 DEC. 1962. HIS SOCIAL SECURITY CARD HAS THE NUMBER 014 - 07 - 6921.
 HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE HAS THE ADDRESS 100 NASSAU STREET, BOSTON 14, MASS.
 THE REGISTERED ADDRESS OF THE YANKEE PILOT IS 48 BEACON STREET, BOSTON.
 HIS HEIGHT IS 5 FEET 6 INCHES. DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE AGGRESSIVE MISSION OVER OUR COUNTRY WERE ALSO FOUND IN THE CLOTHING OF THE YANKEE PILOT.
 THIS IS ONE OF THE FOUR ENEMY MILITARY AIRPLANES SHOT DOWN THIS MORNING, TO BRING TO NINE THE TOTAL SHOT DOWN SINCE THE (CIENEGA DE) ZAPATA PENINSULA MERCENARY ATTACKS WHOSE TOTAL LIQUIDATION IS NOW ONLY A MATTER OF HOURS.
 (SIGNED GHQ, REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES)

(END TEXT)

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UPI-100

(U.N.)

UNITED NATIONS--CUBA CHARGED IN THE U.N. TODAY THAT "AN AMERICAN PLANE, MANNED BY AN AMERICAN PILOT, COMING FROM AN AMERICAN BASE" WAS SHOT DOWN THIS MORNING BY CUBAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES.

CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA IDENTIFIED THE PILOT AS LEO FRANCIS BELL OF 48 BEACON STREET, BOSTON, MASS.

HE TOLD THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S MAIN POLITICAL COMMITTEE BELL'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER WAS 014-07-2921.

ROA SAID THE "U.S. PILOT DROPPED A NUMBER OF BOMBS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES."

"THE PILOT WAS KILLED AND HIS BODY IS IN POSSESSION OF CUBAN AUTHORITIES," ROA SAID.

"THIS IS ANOTHER FLAGRANT PROOF OF U.S. AGGRESSION."
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UPI-57

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

THE ANNOUNCEMENT SAID BERLITZ HAD PILOT'S LICENSE NO. 80323-1M, WHICH WAS DUE TO EXPIRE DEC. 24, 1962. IT SAID HIS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER WAS Q14-076921. IT ADDED HE WAS FIVE FEET SIX INCHES TALL.


"THIS IS ONE OF FOUR ENEMY AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN THIS MORNING," THE BROADCAST SAID, ADDING THAT THIS "PROVED" UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE INVASION.

THE COMMUNIQUE WAS PRECEDED BY A RECORD PLAYING THE REVOLUTIONARY MARCHING SONG AS A SIGNAL FOR CUBA'S 100-ODD STATIONS TO JOIN IN THE NATIONAL NETWORK FOR "OFFICIAL STATEMENT NUMBER THREE."

THE COMMUNIQUE CONCLUDED BY SAYING:

"VICTORY TO THE REVOLUTION... VICTORY FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT IS A MATTER OF HOURS."

4/19--JR1057AES



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UPI-54

ADD CUBA, UNDATED

THE REGIME CLAIMED THE AMERICAN PILOT WAS KILLED.
THE CLAIM OF DOWNING THE FOUR LIBERATION FORCE AIRCRAFT CAME
AT MID-MORNING. DURING THE NIGHT CASTRO TURNED LOOSE A WAVE OF
TERROR THROUGHOUT CUBA IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP THE INVASION FROM
SETTING OFF AN INTERNAL UPRISING.

TWO AMERICANS AND SEVEN CUBANS WERE EXECUTED BY FIRING SQUADS,
AND THERE WERE MASS ARRESTS OF CUBANS, U.S. CITIZENS AND OTHER
FOREIGN NATIONS.

THE BROADCAST COMMUNIQUE SAID BERLITZ'S PLANE WAS BROUGHT DOWN
BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. IT SAID HE WAS IDENTIFIED FROM
PAPERS FOUND ON HIS BODY.

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ADD CUBA, UNDATED

A COMMUNIQUE BROADCAST OVER THE EMERGENCY NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK
 IDENTIFIED THE AMERICAN PILOT AS LEO FRANCIS PERLITZ, OF (100
 NASSAU ST.) BOSTON, MASS.

THE COMMUNIQUE SAID THE PLANES BOMBED THE "CIVILIAN POPULATION"
 IN THE AREA OF THE FORMER U.S.-OWNED AUSTRALIA SUGAR MILL IN
 MATANZAS PROVINCE. BUT THIS AREA PREVIOUSLY HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED
 IN CASTRO REGIME BROADCASTS AS A MOBILIZATION AREA FOR HIS MILITIA.
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
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J. Edgar Hoover

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UPI-49

(CUBA)

PREMIER CASTRO'S GOVERNMENT CLAIMED ITS FORCES SHOT DOWN
FOUR REBEL PLANES ON A BOMBING MISSION OVER A GOVERNMENT MILITIA
MOBILIZATION AREA IN MATANZAS PROVINCE TODAY, INCLUDING ONE WITH A
"U.S. PILOT" ABOARD.

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UPI-178

ADD PILOT, OKLAHOMA CITY (UPI-86)

Cuba
U.S.

IN WASHINGTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE SAID THERE NEVER HAS BEEN A SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER ISSUED TO THE PILOT, WHO WAS LATER IDENTIFIED AS LEO FRANCIS BELL.

THE DEPARTMENT SAID IT HAD BEEN GIVEN TWO DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF BELL'S ALLEGED SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER AS BROADCAST BY THE CUBANS. ONE OF THESE NUMBERS, IT SAID, BELONGED TO A 71-YEAR-OLD BENEFICIARY. THE OTHER BELONGED TO A NEW ENGLAND INDUSTRIAL WORKER WHO WAS ON THE JOB TODAY. THE DEPARTMENT DECLINED TO DIVULGE EITHER NAME.

4/19--MJ445PES

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BEACHHEAD REINFORCED

More Rebels Land 3

By **GEORGE CLIFFORD**
MIAMI, April 19—
Fresh Cuban rebel troops
poured into the Cochin
beachhead early today and
the Revolutionary Council—
Rebel Cuba's provisional
government—is poised to
go ashore at any moment.

today are part of the reserve
force of the rebel army, and
previous plans called for
them to take part in landings
elsewhere on the island.

Their use at Cochin Bay
is indicative of the high
optimism prevailing among
Revolutionary Council mem-
bers.

The decision to send in the
new troops came after the
rebel forces inflicted heavy
losses on Castro troops late
yesterday.

Meanwhile, blood donor cen-
ters have been set up here to
provide transfusions for
wounded rebels. Only Type
O blood is being taken. Many
of the donors are wives and
relatives of men now fighting
in Cuba.

The rebels now feel they
can quickly cut the island in
half.

MANY ENLIST

And men of all ages are
continuing to enlist in the
rebel army.

NO NEED NOW

A rebel official told The
Washington Daily News, "it
is conceivable we will not
need to use the troops that
are now being recruited."

"My son is at Cochin Bay
now," a former Havana
businessman said. "I am 57-
years old, but I am willing to
fight. I cannot live if that
man continues to rule my
homeland."

The Revolutionary Council
is on a boat off the Cuban
coast, awaiting word that
enough territory has been
cleared for them to set up
their government in arms.

Exiles here plan a mam-
moth demonstration tonight
to show the world their ap-
proval of the invasion and of
United States policy.

If all goes as expected to-
day the Council hopes to be
recognized as the legal gov-
ernment of Cuba by a num-
ber of hemisphere nations
before the week-end.

"This will show the com-
munists there is much more
support for the rebels than
there is for Castro," one of
the leaders of the rally said.

The troops landed in Cuba

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- New York Herald Tribune
- New York Journal-American
- New York Mirror
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- New York Post
- The New York Times
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U.S. Pilot Shot, Cubans Claim

MIAMI, Fla., April 19 (AP). —The government-controlled Cuban radio said today that anti-aircraft batteries shot down a "North American military plane" and killed its pilot, also described as a North American.

The broadcast said this proved North American intervention in the three-day old Cuban invasion.

It is customary throughout Latin America to refer to the United States as "North America." Cuban broadcasts during the last few days have consistently referred to the United States in this manner.

The communique said the plane was one of four shot down during the morning. It charged that the plane had been bombing civilians and Castro troops in the South

central area of Cuba. The only confirmed landing of anti-Castro forces Monday was in the same area.

Name Not Clear

The name of the downed pilot was not spelled out in the broadcast. Monitors here heard it as either Leo Francis Bell or Leo Francis Berry.

His address was given as 48 Beacon street, Boston. The Cuban report, though describing the aircraft as "a North American military airplane," did not give a military rank for the pilot.

In Washington, the Defense Department said it had no record of the man being in either the military forces or the civilian branch of the services. Otherwise, the department declined comment. At the White House, Press Secretary Pierre Salinger said the Government is making a further investigation. Neither he nor the State Department had any information beyond news reports.

Actually, the Castro government broadcast gave no concrete evidence that the pilot was a military man.

Documents Cited

The papers he was said to be carrying were all civilian documents, including social security card 014-07-6921.

The Cuban communique said Bell's plane was one of four downed today, bringing to nine the total of anti-Castro aircraft claimed to have been shot down since the start of the three-day old invasion.

This was the first formal claim by the Cuban government of the destruction of invading aircraft.

The communique was signed by the command of the revolutionary (Castro) army's general staff. It predicted that the anti-Castro invading forces would be annihilated "in a matter of hours."

The Cuban broadcast said that "documents dealing with the aggressive flight" were found in the dead pilot's clothing. No details were given.

Special Network

The claim of the planes' destruction was made over a hastily summoned nation-wide network. Similar hookups have been used by the Cuban radio for all major news announcements since the start of the invasion Monday.

The pilot of the downed aircraft was described as 5 feet 6 inches tall. He was said to be carrying a pilot's license valid until December 24, 1962. His number was listed as 8323-1L.

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
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NONE OF THE REPORTS WAS CONFIRMED EITHER BY THE CUBAN
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OR ANY SOURCE FROM INSIDE CUBA.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE REBELS LOST RADIO CONTACT WITH
ITS BEACHHEAD FORCE AFTER 3:30 P.M. YESTERDAY.

FOR THE SECOND SUCCESSIVE DAY THEY HAD BEEN UNDER HEAVY
ATTACK FROM CASTRO'S PLANES, TANKS AND ARTILLERY. THE FRONTLINE
COMMANDER WAS ASKED IF HE WANTED TO EVACUATE.

"I WILL NEVER LEAVE THIS COUNTRY," HE REPLIED.

ACCORDING TO CASTRO'S ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY THE LAST ORGANIZED
RESISTANCE MELTED WITHIN TWO HOURS AFTER THAT.

FOR THE FIRST TIME LAST NIGHT'S REBEL COMMUNIQUE DESCRIBED
THE ASSAULT FORCE AS NUMBERING "IN THE HUNDREDS, NOT THE THOUSANDS."
A REBEL SPOKESMAN HAD DECLARED MONDAY THAT THE LANDINGS HAD PUT
5,000 MEN ASHORE.

"THE RECENT LANDINGS IN CUBA HAVE BEEN CONSTANTLY, THOUGH
INACCURATELY, DESCRIBED AS AN INVASION," LAST NIGHT'S STATEMENT
OF EXILE LEADERS SAID. "IT WAS, IN FACT, A LANDING MAINLY OF SUPPLIES
AND SUPPORT FOR OUR PATRIOTS WHO HAVE BEEN FIGHTING IN CUBA FOR
MONTHS, AND WAS NUMBERED IN THE HUNDREDS, NOT THE THOUSANDS."

IT CONTINUED: "WE DO NOT EXPECT TO TACKLE CASTRO IMMEDIATELY
OR WITHOUT SETBACKS, AND IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT WE DID NOT
EXPECT TO FACE, UNSCATHED, SOVIET ARMAMENT DIRECTED BY COMMUNIST
'ADVISERS.' WE DID AND SURVIVED."

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UPI-4

(CUBA)
 FIDEL CASTRO PROCLAIMED TRIUMPHANTLY TODAY THAT HIS FORCES HAD DESTROYED AN INVASION OF CUBA AND SEIZED A LARGE NUMBER OF NORTH AMERICAN-MADE ARMS, INCLUDING HEAVY SHERMAN TANKS.

IN A COMMUNIQUE READ FOR HIM OVER HAVANA RADIO EARLY THIS MORNING THE CUBAN PREMIER SAID HIS REGULAR ARMY AND MILITIAMEN OVERRAN THE INVADERS' LAST POSITION AT GIRON BEACH, ON THE BAY OF PIGS, AT 5:30 YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

HE SAID HIS OWN FORCES HAD SUFFERED HIGH CASUALTIES BUT FINALLY "DESTROYED IN LESS THAN 72 HOURS THE ARMY WHICH WAS ORGANIZED DURING MANY MONTHS BY THE IMPERIALIST GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES."

THE COMMUNIQUE SAID SOME OF THE INVADERS--WHOM HE TERMED "MERCENARIES"--TRIED TO ESCAPE BY SEA BUT CASTRO'S TROOPS EQUIPPED WITH COMMUNIST-BUILT MIGS, TANKS AND ARTILLERY, SANK THE SHIPS.

"THE REMAINDER OF THE MERCENARY FORCES, AFTER SUFFERING NUMEROUS CASUALTIES OF DEAD AND WOUNDED, DISPERSED COMPLETELY IN A SWAMPY REGION FROM WHICH NONE HAS ANY POSSIBLE ESCAPE," CASTRO SAID.

REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS IN EXILE CONCEDED LAST NIGHT THEIR FORCES HAD SUFFERED "TRAGIC LOSSES" BUT THAT MANY HAD JOINED UP WITH GUERRILLA FORCES IN THE ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS.

THEY SAID THE BATTLE TO TOPPLE CASTRO FROM POWER WOULD GO ON.

EXILE GROUPS IN PUERTO RICO, MIAMI, MEXICO CITY AND NEW YORK SEETHED WITH REPORTS OF NEW OR IMMINENT REBEL LANDINGS.

ONE REPORT BROADCAST BY A CLANDESTINE REBEL RADIO CALLING ITSELF "CUBA LIBRE" BUT KNOWN TO BE OPERATING OUTSIDE CUBA SAID A LANDING HAD BEEN MADE ON THE CUBAN NORTH COAST NEAR MORON, IN CAMAGUEY PROVINCE.

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UPI-21

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--ANTI-CASTRO FORCES APPEARED TODAY TO HAVE LOST THE BATTLE BUT NOT THE LONG-TERM WAR TO OVERTHROW CUBAN PREMIER CASTRO.

THIS WAS THE VIEW OF DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS SEEKING TO APPRAISE THE REPERCUSSIONS OF CASTRO'S APPARENT DEFEAT OF AN INVASION FORCE AFTER THREE DAYS OF HEAVY FIGHTING IN THE COCHINOS BAY AREA.

THESE OFFICIALS SAID CASTRO'S SUCCESS WAS BOUND TO HAVE A HEAVY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PROPAGANDA IMPACT, PARTICULARLY ON THE U.S. POSITION IN LATIN AMERICA.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY DISCUSSED THE CUBAN SITUATION WITH TOP OFFICIALS, INCLUDING CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS OF BOTH PARTIES, AT A TWO-HOUR WHITE HOUSE MEETING LATE YESTERDAY. NONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS WOULD COMMENT.

THE COCHINOS BAY INVASION, ACCORDING TO SOURCES HERE, WAS ATTEMPTED WITH A SHOCKINGLY SMALL FORCE OF ONLY A FEW HUNDRED MEN WHOSE EFFORT WAS DOOMED TO FAILURE WHEN UPRISINGS AND DEFECTIONS IN CUBA FAILED TO MATERIALIZE.

AUTHORITIES HERE SAID THERE WAS A BRIGHT SIDE TO THE PICTURE, HOWEVER. THEY REPORTED THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE GENERAL DISORDER IN CUBA, SOME 4,000 MEN HAD SLIPPED INTO THE ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS TO JOIN ANTI-CASTRO GUERRILLA FORCES THERE. THESE MEN PRESUMABLY CAME FROM VARIOUS PARTS OF CUBA, ALTHOUGH SOME MIGHT HAVE GONE ASHORE FROM VESSELS.

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UPI -215

(CUBA)

ANTI-CASTRO EXILES, DEFEATED ON THE BEACHES OF CUBA, TURNED THEIR
INVASION INTO A GUERRILLA MOUNTAIN WAR THURSDAY AND A SERIES OF SMALL
LANDINGS TO BOLSTER THE HIT-RUN FIGHTERS WAS REPORTED.

"WE HAVE JUST BEGUN TO FIGHT," EXILE SPOKESMEN SAID AS PREMIER
CASTRO AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD PROCLAIMED THAT THE BIG INVASION
MONDAY HAD BEEN SHATTERED AND THAT ARMS, INCLUDING AMERICAN SHERMAN
TANKS, HAD BEEN CAPTURED.

CASTRO INTENSIFIED HIS GRACKDOWN ON OPPONENT. AT LEAST 12 MORE
PERSONS WERE EXECUTED BY FIRING SQUADS. THE SWISS EMBASSY WHICH
HANDLES UNITED STATES AFFAIRS IN CUBA REPORTED AT LEAST 18 AND
PROBABLY MORE AMERICANS HELD INCOMMUNICADO UNDER ARREST.

AS CASTRO STEPPED UP ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE "GGINGO" UNITED
STATES, INFORMED SOURCES AT THE U.S. NAVY BASE AT GUANTANAMO BAY
SAID THE PREMIER HAD SET UP ARTILLERY BETWEEN GUANTANAMO CITY AND
GLORIETTA, SEVEN MILES WEST OF THE BASE. GUANTANAMO REMAINED CALM
AND ALERT.

BOTH CASTRO AND THE EXILES ADMITTED "TRAGIC LOSSES" IN THE
INVASION MONDAY. CASTRO SAID THE "REMAINDER" OF THE INVADERS WERE
FLOUNDERING TRAPPED IN A SWAMP.

EXILES IN THE UNITED STATES SAID SURVIVORS HAVE MADE IT INTO THE
ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE.

AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES SAID THAT WHILE THE
COMMUNIST-ARMED CASTRO FORCES WERE USING TANKS AND MIG JETS TO SMASH
BACK THE MAIN INVADING FORCE OF MORE THAN 500 MEN AT COCHINOS
BAY MONDAY, OTHER, SMALLER FORCES BEGAN LANDING AND DRIFTING INTO
THE HILLS.

SMALLER GROUPS "AT RANDOM" MADE IT ASHORE, BRINGING COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES BADLY NEEDED BY THE REBELS OPERATING IN THE
ESCAMBRAY RANGE IN CENTRAL CUBA.

AS MANY AS 2,000 MEN MAY HAVE MADE IT INTO THE MOUNTAINS TO HELP
THE ANTI-CASTRO CAUSE, THESE SOURCES SAID.

THEY DESCRIBED THE COCHINOS BAY LANDING IN SOUTHERN CUBA MONDAY
AS THE SUNDAY PUNCH. IT MISSED. THE ATTACKERS PRESSED INLAND,
THEN WERE SMASHED BACK INTO THE SEA, THEY SAID.

BUT THE SOURCES SAID ANOTHER FORCE OF MORE THAN 500 MEN GOT ASHORE
SAFELY IN EASTERNMOST CUBA LAST SATURDAY NIGHT, AND ALMOST ALL ARE
BELIEVED SAFELY HOLED UP IN THE HILLS. 105-89923-A

THE SERIES OF SMALL LANDINGS REPORTED IN ADD TION TO THE BEACH
ASSAULTS SATURDAY NIGHT AND MONDAY WERE SAID TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE
AT VARIOUS PLACES ALONG CUBA'S 2,200-MILE COASTLINE.

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UPI-46

ADD CUBA, UNDATED (UPI-4)

CUBAN EXILE SOURCES DISPUTED CASTRO'S CLAIM TO HAVE CAPTURED U.S.-BUILT SHERMAN TANKS. THEY SAID IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO LAND THEM IN THE SWAMPY AREA WHERE THE REBELS WENT ASHORE, AND SAID THE STATEMENT WAS MADE FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.

THE EXILES SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD FURNISHED SHERMAN TANKS TO CUBA UNDER A HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE PACT AND THAT CASTRO WOULD BE ABLE TO PHOTOGRAPH SUCH TANKS AS "PROOF" OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION.

THE EXILES ALSO REPORTED THE GUERRILLA RADIO STATION IN THE ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS REPORTED INVASION FORCE MEMBERS WERE TRICKLING IN IN A STEADY STREAM. THEY CALLED THE REPORTS "HEARTENING."
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UPI-70

(RUSK)

MARIETTA, GA.--SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK SAID TODAY THE REBEL UPRISING IN CUBA WAS NOT A MAJOR INVASION, BUT REFUSED COMMENT ON REBEL CLAIMS THAT THE BLOODSHED MARKED THE BEGINNING OF A FINAL BATTLE FOR CUBA'S LIBERATION.

RUSK, RETURNING TO HIS HOME STATE FOR A SERIES OF SPEECHES FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE HIS APPOINTMENT TO THE CABINET POST, REPEATED DENIALS THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HELPED THE FORCES OPPOSING CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO.

BUT HE CONCEDED THE REBELS WERE RECEIVING A GREAT DEAL OF HELP BOTH FROM OUTSIDE AND WITHIN THIS COUNTRY.

HE SAID THIS WAS NOT UNUSUAL AND SAID OBTAINING AID IN THIS FASHION HAS BEEN A TRADITIONAL MEANS OF WAGING LIBERATION FIGHTS THROUGHOUT HISTORY.

RUSK SAID CASTRO "DID SOME RECRUITING HIMSELF" WHILE MOUNTING A REBELLION AGAINST DEPOSED DICTATOR FULGENCIO BATISTA.

WHILE DENYING THAT THE RECENT UPRISING CONSTITUTED A MAJOR INVASION, THE SECRETARY OF STATE DID NOT SUPPLY A BETTER TERM.

HE TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE ON HIS ARRIVAL THAT ANTI-CASTRO FORCES UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT FOR FREEDOM DESPITE THE APPARENT COLLAPSE OF THE RECENT EXPEDITION.

RUSK PASSED UP A POSSIBLE MEETING WITH PRINCE SOUVANNA PHOUMA OF LAOS TO MAKE HIS LONG-SCHEDULED TRIP TO GEORGIA. HE WILL ADDRESS THE ATLANTA BAR ASSOCIATION TONIGHT.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HAD TO PASS UP THE VISIT WITH THE LAOTIAN LEADER BECAUSE "HIS SCHEDULE AND MINE JUST DIDN'T FIT."

RUSK SAID THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS KEEPING A CLOSE WATCH ON THE TIMING OF CEASE FIRE IN LAOS THAT APPARENTLY HINGES ON ANOTHER EAST-WEST CONFERENCE.

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Conrad	✓
DeLoach	✓
Evans	✓
Malone	✓
Rosen	✓
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UPI-72

(PICKETS)

WASHINGTON--A GROUP OF ABOUT 70 ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS PICKETED THE VICINITY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY TODAY AND THEN PARADED IN FRONT OF THE WHITE HOUSE WITH SIGNS DENOUNCING COMMUNISM AND ASKING U.S. HELP IN THE REBEL EFFORTS.

THE PICKETS, UNDER DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW, WERE KEPT A HALF BLOCK AWAY FROM THE EMBASSY.

BUT, FOR A WHILE, THEY MARCHED IN FRONT OF THE WHITE HOUSE WITH SIGNS SUCH AS, "COMMIES GET OUT OF CUBA," "AMERICANS HELP STOP COMMUNISM," AND "CUBA SI, RUSSIA NO."

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
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Matter of Fact

American Suez

By Stewart Alsop

Joseph Alsop is on a brief vacation. In his absence his column will be written by his brother Stewart.

"CUBA LOOKS like the American Suez." This was the assessment of one American official who knows as much as anyone—which is not very much—about what has actually happened in Cuba. "And Hungary, too," another American official added.



The first man meant Stewart Alsop that the United States appears to have suffered in Cuba a setback as disastrous as that Britain and France suffered in 1956 when their Suez adventure failed. The second meant that, as during the Hungarian uprising, the United States has again stood aside while men who had been encouraged to oppose Communist tyranny were destroyed.

These views may still prove too gloomy. But as of this writing, the belief that the outcome in Cuba represents a genuine and major disaster for the United States is almost universal in the Government. There are also those who believe that, in order to retrieve the disaster, American forces may yet intervene in Cuba, despite the repeated flat statements to the contrary by President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

To understand something of what has happened, and why, it is necessary to consider what President Kennedy found on his desk when he took office.

He found, first, an Eisenhower Administration policy paper, known as "the Castro must-go paper," which ruled that the Communist infection in Cuba must be eliminated.

Second, the President found a detailed plan for eliminating the infection by force. The plan calls for a

Cuban ground contingent drawn from some 8000 Cuban refugee volunteers of military age, to be supported in an invasion of Cuba by American air cover and logistic support.

The plan had, in fact, gone well beyond the planning stage. Already some 5000 Cubans had been trained, and at one point in the autumn the invasion had actually been scheduled—it was then called off by President Eisenhower, in consultation with the President-elect.

FROM THE FIRST, the new President had strong doubts about the scheme, and especially about the proposed American participation. His subordinates were divided, with the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency generally favoring direct action, while the State Department favored the "give Castro enough rope to hang himself" theory.

As the weeks passed, events began to increase the pressure for action. Some 180 Soviet jet aircraft began arriving in Havana in February, and the intelligence reported that by mid-May the 250 Cuban pilots being trained in Czechoslovakia would be ready for action.

The Castro regime had been starving out the anti-Castro guerillas, especially the big force of 28,000 men in the Escambray Mountains, and the guerillas were thus a wasting asset.

In this situation, the Cuban refugee leaders called for action before it was too late. Some claimed hopefully that the Castro regime would disintegrate, like the walls of Jericho, at the first landing of rebel troops.

The intelligence services did not subscribe to this theory. But intelligence estimates indicated that there was a good chance that a landing would result in sufficient mass defections so that at least a sizable area of Cuba might be held, even without overt American intervention.

The rebel government, it was argued by the activists, could then be reestablished in the area, and quickly recognized by the United States and other anti-Castro governments. Massive aid to this recognized government would then assure the defeat of Castro, without the use of American arms.

So ran the theory. President Kennedy, despite his doubts, was at last persuaded, not to veto the operation. At the same time, he was also persuaded, largely through the influence of United Nations Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, to state unequivocally that American forces would not be used in Cuba.

IN THE DAYS since the landings, as the news has become worse, some of the President's advisers, including a majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have urged American intervention on the grounds that the alternative—to stand aside while the men we have trained and supported are destroyed—is intolerable.

But the President's own public promise not to use American force in Cuba has acted as a powerful brake, and as this is written the President and most of his chief civilian advisers still strongly resist any open American intervention in Cuba.


Perhaps something will be saved from the wreckage. New efforts by the Cuban refugee forces may yet succeed, where the efforts so far made have so unhappily failed. But there is no use blinking the fact that in the eyes of the world the United States has suffered a terrible defeat.

And the facts recounted above suggest that the new President may have broken his own rule, as laid down in his inaugural address: "While hoping for the best, we should prepare for the worst."

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UPI-234

ADD 3 INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON

THERE HAD BEEN A HOPE THAT MORE OF CASTRO'S MILITARY FORCES WOULD DEFECT THAN THE FEW PILOTS WHO REPORTEDLY BOMBED THEIR OWN BASES.

THERE WERE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT CUBAN PILOTS HAD BEEN TRAINED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO FLY MIGS BUT THAT THE ONLY MIGS THAT CASTRO HAD STILL WERE IN CRATES.

OFFICIALS REPORTED THERE WERE INDICATIONS MIGS WERE USED IN STRAFING THE REBEL LANDING PARTIES ON THE BEACHES.

IT WAS LEARNED MEANWHILE THAT THE REBEL LANDING PARTY WAS EQUIPPED WITH AMERICAN-MADE SHERMAN TANKS BUT THAT CASTRO'S FIRE PREVENTED THEM FROM GETTING ASHORE, AND THEY ENDED "BLOWN INTO THE WATER."

THE NUMBER OF MEN TAKING PART IN THE REBEL ASSAULT STILL WAS IN DISPUTE. THE BEST ESTIMATE HERE WAS THAT IT CONSISTED OF ABOUT 1,200 MEN, ONLY A "FEW HUNDRED" OF WHOM WERE ABLE TO STAY ASHORE IN A TENABLE POSITION.


IN OFFICIAL WASHINGTON'S ANALYSIS OF WHAT WENT WRONG THERE WERE SOME RECRIMINATIONS BETWEEN AGENCIES. SOME BLAMED THE CIA.

BUT ONE CABINET-LEVEL SOURCE WAS QUOTED TODAY AS SAYING THE MISCALCULATION WAS SHARED "BY THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT."

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UPI-233

ADD 2 INTELLIGENCE, WASHINGTON (UPI-228)
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OBVIOUSLY HAD MISGIVINGS OVER THE
MILITARY ADVENTURE, BUT GAVE ITS FULL MORAL SUPPORT FOR IT TO START
WHEN IT DID.

SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK, THE CIA, DEFENSE SECRETARY MCNAMARA
AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ALL AGREED TO LET THE REBELLION BEGIN.
THE REBELS PLANNED TO ESTABLISH A BEACHHEAD AND SET UP A
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

"THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND IN THIS COUNTRY THOUGHT THE INVASION WOULD
WORK," ONE OFFICIAL HERE SAID, "AND THEY THOUGHT IT STRONGLY ENOUGH TO
SEND THEIR SONS INTO IT."

INFORMATION FROM OFFICIALS HERE DIFFERED AS TO THE MILITARY
MISCALCULATION.

ONE HIGH ADMINISTRATION SOURCE SAID: "CASTRO TURNED OUT TO HAVE MORE
TANKS, MORE AIRPOWER IN GENERAL, MORE ARTILLERY, MORE MODERN MACHINE
GUNS AND MORE COMMUNIST-BLOC TECHNICIANS THAN ANYONE HAD THOUGHT."

OTHER OFFICIALS SAID THE MISCALCULATION WAS NOT SO MUCH IN THE
AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT AS IN THE TRAINING OF MEN TO USE IT AND THE
ABILITY TO MOBILIZE IT EFFECTIVELY.

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


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UPI-230

ADD 1 INTELLIGENCE, WASHINGTON (UPI-228)
IT BEGAN NEARLY A YEAR AGO WHEN CUBANS WHO HAD FLED HERE BEGAN
MAKING PLANS TO SOME DAY RECONQUER THEIR ISLAND.
OFFICIALS INSISTED NO MILITARY TRAINING WAS DONE HERE DURING
THAT PERIOD, BUT TOOK PLACE IN GUATEMALA AND PRESUMABLY OTHER LATIN
COUNTRIES.
BUT THE REBEL LEADERSHIP OBTAINED ADVICE HERE, AND SUPPLIES WERE
PROCURED.

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UPI -228

(INTELLIGENCE)

WASHINGTON--TWO MAJOR INTELLIGENCE "MISCALCULATIONS" WERE INVOLVED IN THIS WEEK'S TRAGIC ATTEMPT BY ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS TO REGAIN THEIR HOMELAND, KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID TONIGHT.

THEY MADE THESE POINTS:

--THERE WAS A MAJOR UNDERESTIMATION OF CASTRO'S MILITARY STRENGTH, HIS ABILITY TO MOBILIZE TROOPS AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT.

--BOTH U.S. AND CUBAN REBEL INTELLIGENCE MISJUDGED THE DEGREE OF POLICE STATE CONTROL WHICH CASTRO HAS OVER CUBA AND WHICH PREVENTED A GENERAL UPRISING OF THE PEOPLE.

OFFICIALS SAID IT WAS NOT KNOWN THAT CASTRO HAD SOVIET MIG FIGHTER PLANES IN FLYING CONDITION.

THEY SAID THE EXTENT OF HIS POLICE CONTROL AND HIS NETWORK OF AGENTS AND INFORMERS ON THE COMMUNITY LEVEL WAS NOT REALIZED UNTIL THESE MOVED INTO ACTION ROUNDING UP THOUSANDS OF CUBANS AND HERDING THEM INTO MAKESHIFT CONCENTRATION CAMPS.

THE TWO MISCALCULATIONS WENT HAND IN HAND. A LOCAL UPRISING WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE LIKELY HAD NOT THE MILITARY SITUATION BEEN SO DISMAL.

AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF SILENCE, OFFICIAL WASHINGTON TONIGHT BEGAN TELLING REPORTERS SOME OF THE STORY OF THE CUBAN INVASION.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Havana Rattles Russian Rockets

Fidel Claims U. S. Navy Covered Rebel Forces

By FRANCOIS L. MCCARTHY

Havana radio charged today that two U. S. destroyers covered the exile forces that invaded Cuba this week and that Cuban defenders under the personal direction of Fidel Castro had shot down a number of planes including a B-29 Superfortress and an F-86 Sabrejet.

Castro's radio also boasted of Soviet rocket support and hurled unparalleled invective at the United States. It warned the United States it would risk World War III if it tried to stop the march of communism in Cuba.

(George Clifford, of the Washington Daily News, reporting from Miami, quoted a highly placed rebel official as saying that iron curtain army officers are leading Castro's forces. The source said intelligence reports arriving in Miami from the scenes of recent action show that most of the officers are Czechs. The rebel source said Castro's field commander in the Escambray is a Czech.

(The appearance of European communists carries considerable significance in light of President Kennedy's statement yesterday on foreign intervention in Cuba.)

SMALL LANDINGS

Anti-Castro exile sources said there had been a number of small but successful landings at various places along Cuba's 2200 mile coastline to bring rebel forces in the mountains badly-needed reinforcements, supplies and communications equipment.

They said as many as 2000 men may have made it into the Escambray mountains of central Cuba and another 500 were believed to have holed up safely in the mountains of eastern Cuba after a landing last Saturday night.

Meanwhile, Castro reign of terror is in full swing in Cuba. Fifty thousand men, women and children reportedly were herded into improvised camps behind the mountains of the Escambray.

apparently did not include any organized uprising within Cuba which the invaders had counted on. This information was obtained in the first independent telephone contact with the Cuban capital since the invasion forces landed.

Castro's radio declared that a great number of arms were captured in the invasion—all North American made. It said these included five Sherman tanks—a statement already denied by exiles—artillery, heavy mortars, anti-tank guns, machineguns, hand grenades and radio equipment.

It said twin-engine B-26 bombers and amphibious planes were shot down during the invasion as well as at least one Sabrejet and a Super Fortress.


Castro himself was believed still in the Escambray area and there were indications his brother, Raul, was taking a hand in the Oriente campaign. Neither of the Castros has appeared personally on radio or television since shortly after the invasion began Monday.

A Cuban exile station operating in the Caribbean reported Fidel had been injured by a bomb that fell near him but there was nothing to support this. An eyewitness reported from Havana last night that the Premier was seen eating in a Havana restaurant Tuesday.

Havana Radio said in a long commentary on President Kennedy's message Wednesday on Cuba that Mr. Kennedy had ignored the Soviet "sermon" against intervention in Cuba.

"The day that Kennedy passes to the direct aggression of his threat, then he will see, to his regret, that the Soviet Union and its social-imperialist and puppet agents are at 62 on reduced be-

Clip Program of Anti-Castro Activity - C.I.A.



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
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UPI-108

(CUBAN PHOTOS)
NEW YORK--THE FIRST PHOTOGRAPHS FROM CUBA SINCE THE REBEL LANDINGS LAST WEEKEND WERE RECEIVED IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY AND DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD BY UPI.

ONE PICTURE SHOWED A LONG LINE OF MEN IDENTIFIED AS CAPTURED MEMBERS OF THE INVADING FORCE. ANOTHER SHOWED A DISABLED HEAVY TANK WHICH CUBAN AUTHORITIES DESCRIBED AS AMERICAN-MADE. U.S. MILITARY EXPERTS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MAKE AN IDENTIFICATION CHECK OF THE TANK. THE CUBANS SAID IT WAS PUT OUT OF ACTION NEAR GIRON BEACH IN LAS VILLAS PROVINCE WHERE ANTI-CASTRO FORCES BRIEFLY HELD A BEACHHEAD.

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wreck of a ship used for disembarkment.

The Yugoslav report said about 300 wounded government soldiers are in temporary hospitals set up in the area.

The general quiet in Havana

last night amid the government claims of victory was attributed by this observer to heavy casualties suffered by Castro forces in the fighting.

Suspects Arrested

A Swiss Embassy spokesman said Castro police were still arresting suspected counterrevolutionaries. The Havana correspondent of the Belgrade newspaper Politika reported "merciless arrests of suspicious characters." He said this round-up "as well as executions of those caught in sabotage is the explanation for the great success of Cuba."

In Mexico City Cubana Airlines announced it was resuming flights between that city and Havana today.

Abroad American prestige—and that of President Kennedy—look a sharp drop because of the rebel setback. Disappointment at the open American espousal of the rebel cause was expressed even in some sections of the European press usually favorable to America. But Mr. Kennedy's speech yesterday was hailed by some as a tough fighting challenge to communism.

The conservative London Daily Mail said the defeat of the Cuban invaders was "a shocking blow to American prestige and to the reputation of President Kennedy." But the Mail called Mr. Kennedy's speech strong and forthright and said "plain speaking is what Khrushchev understands—and respects."

The Daily Herald, a British Labor Party supporter, complained, "President Kennedy's words about Cuba... will fill his liberal admirers with dismay. It seems he is determined to see the downfall of Dr. Castro."

In France the left-of-center Combat said Mr. Kennedy was

compromising the chances of a renovation of American policy while Russia was making hay with American mistakes. But the right-of-center Figaro emphasized Mr. Kennedy's "energetic speech."

Rome's big independent daily, Il Messagero, said in a front page editorial: "The American Chief Executive has renewed his pledge to oppose decisively any Communist interference within the framework of American States."

Tass, the Soviet news agency, distributed a 200-word summary of Mr. Kennedy's speech but made no comment. Nor was there any immediate comment from Moscow radio.

The British Foreign Office declined comment, saying the issue is before the United Nations. But two British frigates in the Caribbean were ordered to stand by in case British nationals had to be evacuated suddenly from Cuba. Three Britons were reported among foreigners arrested by Castro police.

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U.S. Trained Rebels, Cuba Says

Invaders Reply Reds Assisted Castro Forces

Miro Cardona's Son Reported Among Prisoners Seized

By the Associated Press

The Cuban radio charged today the rebel invaders—beaten on Cuba's beaches—were trained by United States officers in Guatemala. The broadcast said the attackers were ferried to the beachhead in "North American military transports" escorted by "Yankee destroyers."

The broadcast said the story was told by prisoners captured on the beach. Among them is the son of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, head of the rebel movement in the United States, Havana asserted.

Exile leaders in New York said a son of Dr. Miro Cardona was in the landing.

The insurgent "army of liberation" answered this charge of United States intervention by declaring that the Soviet Union, Red China and Communist Czechoslovakia were actively aiding Fidel Castro's forces.

"Liberators" to Fight On

Denying Cuban government claims that not a single invader made it into the interior, the insurgent broadcast said the "army of liberation" is firmly entrenched in the Escambray Mountains of Central Cuba and is ready to fight on to victory. Then the broadcast added:

"The fight is hard. It is not easy to defeat the traitors, who are operating with the intervention of Russia, China and Czechoslovakia."

How many invaders may have made it into the mountains to join up with anti-Castro guerrillas is a matter of conjecture. Cuban exile sources in Miami say about 1,000 fighters went ashore. Roundabout Communist reports put total prisoners at 500.

In support of its claim that the invasion was the work of "Yankee mercenaries," Havana Radio said prisoners told of being flown from the United States to Rhetalelu Camp in Guatemala. They were quoted as saying they were trained there by 25 instructors from "the Yankee army."

Captured Weapons Cited

The Havana broadcast said the prisoners reported they were flown to Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua, where they boarded the "North American military transports."

Guatemala and Nicaragua have denied officially they had anything to do with the operation.

Havana said all captured weapons were "North American arms" and included five Sherman tanks, machineguns, rifles, anti-tank guns, rocket launchers, flamethrowers and trucks.

Havana once more charged that United States-type war planes supported the landings.

The rebel invaders, earlier had charged they were met on the beaches by Russian-made tanks and were attacked by Soviet-made MIG jets.

Havana radio asserted Prime Minister Fidel Castro personally led the fight against the invaders. His absence from Cuban airwaves has led to speculation he may have been incapacitated or shunted aside by the Communists.

Island Still Tense

The Caribbean island was reported still tense and swept by fears and rumors that dampened victory celebrations by supporters of the Castro regime.

The government radio said that Mr. Castro, who has not appeared on broadcasts since the landings Monday, would make an appearance at a giant May Day celebration on May 1.

The Castro regime claimed that the only survivors of the invasion surrendered yesterday after being trapped in the south coast swamps. The government said they would be shown on TV tonight.

"All the mercenaries have been counted, and are either dead or prisoners awaiting action by revolutionary tribunals," a broadcast announcement said.

The rebel Radio Swan claimed that the anti-Castro ranks were swelling with large numbers of "teachers, students, workers, peasants and housewives" joining the guerrillas in the mountains.

More Battles Predicted

Predictions of more battles came from both pro-Castro and anti-Castro camps.

The Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda told its readers there was chance of a new invasion, that "the gamblers have no intention of leaving Cuba alone."

A Cuban insurgent source in Miami said that only about one-fifth—1,000 out of 5,000

of the anti-Castro troops being trained in exile were used in the week-end landings.

Havana was reported quiet and tense as darkness fell last night after a spattering of noisy "victory" celebrations. Telephone service between Miami and the Cuban capital was restored but was spotty.

A diplomatic informant in the city said there were some rumors about the absence of top government officials—including Fidel Castro, his brother Raul and Economic Czar Ernesto (Che) Guevara. None appeared in public at the celebrations. This informant said the public apparently took the view they were in the fighting zone.

Doctor Reported Seized

The Havana radio said the son of Dr. Miro Cardona, four "Falangist priests," and four doctors were among the prisoners captured on the beachhead. Young Miro Cardona was quoted as saying both he and his father had been mistaken in their estimate of Cuban reaction to the landings.

The Cuban announcement did not give the number of prisoners taken, but reports officially distributed to Communist newspapers in East Berlin said they totaled 500, almost half the invasion force.

Yugoslav correspondents who toured the beach area said it looked like a World War II battlefield... shell holes... thousands of gun and rifle bullets... trucks and armored cars on fire... destroyed Sherman tanks... ruins of houses... and near the beach the

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(CUBA)

BELGRADE--"SOME...AMERICAN NATIONALS" WERE KILLED WHILE TRYING TO PARACHUTE INTO CUBA, THE OFFICIAL YUGOSLAV NEWS AGENCY TANJUG SAID TONIGHT IN A DISPATCH FROM HAVANA.

JOVAN MIRIC, HAVANA CORRESPONDENT FOR TANJUG, DID NOT IDENTIFY THE AMERICANS, BUT SAID THEY WERE SHOT IN THE AIR DURING A SECOND ASSAULT TUESDAY. THEY WERE BELIEVED TO BE "INSTRUCTORS AND COMMAND PERSONNEL," HE SAID.

MIRIC ALSO SAID AT LEAST 300 CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE WOUNDED AS THEY FOLLOWED FIDEL CASTRO INTO BATTLE. MOST OF THEM, HE SAID, WERE HURT IN HAND-TO-HAND FIGHTING IN LAS VILLAS PROVINCE AFTER THE INVADERS TRIED TO ADVANCE BEHIND A SHIELD OF CAPTURED CUBAN WOMEN.

THE YUGOSLAV REPORT GAVE NO ESTIMATE OF INVADER CASUALTIES, BUT SAID ABOUT 100 ENEMY SOLDIERS SURRENDERED. "NOW THE TROOPS OF THE CUBAN ARMY AND MILITIA ARE CLEARING THIS (LAS VILLAS) SWAMPY TERRAIN WHERE SMALLER GROUPS OF LANDED ARE AT LARGE."

MIRIC SAID THERE WERE MANY OVERTURNED TANKS AND DESTROYED HOUSES NEAR THE PLAJA LARGO, THE BEACH WHERE THE MOST INTENSE FIGHTING TOOK PLACE.

"THE FIRST ALARM WAS GIVEN SOMEWHAT AFTER MIDNIGHT," HE SAID. "...IT WAS STILL DARK. NO ONE KNEW EITHER THE STRENGTH OR THE DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACKERS..."

"HAVING MADE GOOD THEIR SURPRISE ATTACK, THE INVADERS SOON CONSOLIDATED THEIR POSITIONS AND...TOOK SEVERAL OF THE NEARBY LOCALITIES AND ROUNDED UP ALL THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

"AT NOON THE DEFENDERS OF CUBA (SAW) THE ENEMY SLOWLY ADVANCING BEHIND A LIVING SHIELD OF CAPTURED WOMEN."

MIRIC SAID "FIDEL CASTRO ARRIVED AT THE FRONTLINE" MONDAY AFTERNOON, ONLY MINUTES AFTER HAVANA RADIO ANNOUNCED HE HAD BEEN APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

"THE SITUATION AT THE FRONT WAS GLOOMY. THE ENEMY HELD THREE BRIDGEHEADS, HAD EMERGED FROM THE SWAMPS, FANNED OUT HIS MOTORIZED UNITS AND THROWN HIS TANKS INTO ACTION..."

"MONDAY EVENING, THE BATTLE FOR CUBA BEGAN. FIDEL CASTRO DISLOCATED HIS TROOPS AND HAND-TO-HAND FIGHTING ENSUED...THE ONLY WAY TO SAVE THE LIVES OF THE HOSTAGES."

MIRIC SAID "ABOUT 300 DEFENDERS OF CUBA WERE WOUNDED IN THIS BATTLE. THEY WERE ALMOST THE ONLY CUBAN CASUALTIES."

LATER, HE REPORTED, THE INVADERS "PANICKED AND WERE SOON PUSHED BACK INTO THE SWAMPY AREA ALONG THE SHORE. SOME, INDIVIDUALS AND MINOR GROUPS, SUCCEEDED IN GETTING INTO THE MOUNTAINS. THE ARMY... WAS NOW COMBING THE AREA AND ISOLATED SHOTS REACHED US HERE AT PLAJA LARGO."

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UPI-86

ADD MIRO CARDONA, NEW YORK (UPI-84)

THE 59-YEAR-OLD FORMER PRIME MINISTER IN CASTRO'S ORIGINAL GOVERNMENT MADE AN EMPHATIC PLEA FOR "MATERIAL AND MORAL SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ALL THE NATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA" FOR THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE.

ECHOING PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S WARNING YESTERDAY, MIRO CARDONA SAID, "CUBA CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO BE THE ABANDONED HUNGARY OF AMERICA." HE ADDED:

"EITHER CUBA THROW OFF THE YOKE THAT OPPRESSES IT WITH THE COORDINATED FORCE OF ALL THE NATIONS OF THIS CONTINENT OR THIS HEMISPHERE WILL SUCCEED INEVITABLY BEFORE THE THRUST OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE. EITHER WE DESTROY THE MOSCOW-HAVANA-PEIPING AXIS OR THEY WILL DESTROY US, ONE BY ONE."

HE CHARGED THAT MIG AIRCRAFT AND SOVIET TANKS WERE USED BY CASTRO AGAINST THE INVADERS AND "INFLECTED A GRAVE REVERSE TO CUBA'S CAUSE."

MIRO CARDONA SAID THAT THE LANDING LAST MONDAY "DID NOT ACHIEVE ALL OF ITS PROPOSED OBJECTIVES. NEVERTHELESS, THE MAJORITY OF THE COMBATANTS SUCCEEDED IN MOVING INLAND, FIGHTING BRAVELY TO VARIOUS PLACES WHERE THEY CONTINUE TO FIGHT OPPRESSIVE COMMUNISM."

MIRO CARDONA WAS RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS ANY SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE LANDING OR TO GIVE ANY DETAILS ABOUT ACTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WOULD AID THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT IN DEFENDING THE ISLAND.

HOWEVER, HE REVEALED THAT A SHIP CARRYING RADIO TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT WAS SUNK BY THE CASTRO FORCES. AS A RESULT OF THIS, HE SAID, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL DOES NOT KNOW THE EXACT NUMBER OF CASUALTIES OR THE NUMBER OF INVADERS TAKEN PRISONER.

"THIS WAS NOT A DEFEAT," HE SAID OF THE INVASION WHICH CASTRO HAS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY CRUSHED. "IT WAS JUST A SUBACK BECAUSE ONE OF OUR OBJECTIVES WAS NOT ACHIEVED."

MIRO CARDONA HAD A SECRET MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY WITH THE WHITE HOUSE ON WEDNESDAY. THE MEETING WAS HELD AT MIRO CARDONA'S TELEPHONED REQUEST AFTER IT BECAME APPARENT THE REBEL'S KEY BEACHHEAD HAD SURRENDERED TO CASTRO'S FORCES.

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UPI-84
(MIRO CARDONA)

NEW YORK--DR. JOSE MIRO CARDONA, CHIEF OF THE EXILED ANTI-CASTRO FORCES, DELCARED TODAY THAT THE ABORTIVE INVASION OF CUBA LAST MONDAY WAS MOUNTED WITHOUT ANY "MILITARY AID" FROM THE UN TED STATES.

"THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT INTERVENE MILITARILY AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME," SAID CARDONA AT A PRESS CONFERENCE HERE. "I HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY THIS IS A CUBAN FIGHT BY CUBANS AGAINST CUBANS."

MIRO CARDONA CAME HERE FROM HIS SECRET HEADQUARTERS FOR HIS FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, OF WHICH HE IS PRESIDENT, LAUNCHED ITS FIRST FULL-FLEDGED MILITARY ATTACK ON CUBA. HE REPEATED PREVIOUS DENIALS THAT THE ATTACKING FORCE NUMBERED SEVERAL THOUSAND MEN.

MIRO CARDONA SAID ONLY SEVERAL HUNDRED MEN WERE INVOLVED IN THE INVASION AND THE MAJORITY OF THEM "SUCCEEDED IN MOVING INLAND" WHERE THEY ARE CONTINUING THE FIGHT AGAINST CASTRO'S TROOPS.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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HE SAID 90 PER CENT OF THOSE WHO CAME TO FIGHT IN CUBA CAME IN THE BELIEF THAT "90 PER CENT OF THE PEOPLE WERE READY TO RISE UP IN ARMS."

HE SAID HE HAD NEVER BEEN IN POLITICS. HE IDENTIFIED HIS FAMILY AS DELIO NUNEZ OF ORIENTE PROVINCE, SUGAR PLANTATION OWNERS BEFORE CASTRO. *Cuba*

NUNEZ SAID THE AIM OF THE INVASION WAS TO ESTABLISH A GENERAL UPRISING. HE ESTIMATED THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN THE INVASION FORCE AT 1,200 TO 1,300 AND SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY WERE LEFT. NUNEZ DENIED THAT THE INVADERS HAD JET PLANES AND SAID HE DID NOT KNOW IF THEIR ARMS WERE AMERICAN.

QUESTIONING TRIED TO ESTABLISH THAT NUNEZ WAS A FOLLOWER OF FORMER DICTATOR FULGENCIO BATISTA, BUT HE FIRMLY REJECTED ANY SUCH IMPLICATION.

ASKED IF HE HAD CHANGED HIS MIND ON THE SITUATION IN CUBA SINCE THE LANDING, HE SAID "WE DIDN'T FIND THE SITUATION WE EXPECTED."

ONE QUESTIONER TOLD NUNEZ: "I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS FURTHER WITH YOU AFTER YOUR TRIAL, BUT I DON'T THINK YOU'LL HAVE MUCH TIME TO DISCUSS ANYTHING."

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ADD SOLDIERS, MIAMI
 ONE PRISONER FROM THE ANTI-CASTRO INVASION FORCE GAVE DEFIANT ANSWERS TO THE CUBAN OFFICIALS AND NEWSMEN.

THE PRISONER, WHO WAS IDENTIFIED AS PEDRO NUNEZ, A MEMBER OF ONE OF THE ISLAND'S OLDEST FAMILIES, DEFENDED THE FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM DESPITE QUESTIONS APPARENTLY AIMED AT THREATENING HIM WITH EXECUTION.

NUNEZ AND ANOTHER PRISONER SAID THE INVASION FORCE WAS CARRIED TO CUBA IN MERCHANT SHIPS BUT ACCOMPANIED BY AN ESCORT OF AMERICAN DESTROYERS.


BUT NUNEZ, WHO SAID HE DEJECTED FROM CASTRO'S ARMY IN 1959, SAID HE CAME TO CUBA "TO ESTABLISH A REGIME OF LAW, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1940."

NUNEZ SAID HE WAS A CATTLEMAN IN CIVILIAN LIFE AND OWNED 1,000 ACRES.

HE WAS ASKED IF HE BELIEVED PEASANTS SHOULD OWN THEIR OWN LAND. "YES, UNDER THE FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM," HE REPLIED. ASKED HOW PEASANTS COULD BUY LAND ON ONE AND ONE-HALF PESOS (\$1.50) A DAY, NUNEZ SAID HIS PEASANTS EARNED TWICE THAT, AND COULD BECOME LANDOWNERS UNDER FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS.

ASKED IF HE BELIEVED THE FACT THAT THREE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE COMPANIES SOLD 30,000,000 CARS WAS FREE ENTERPRISE, HE SAID "THOSE THREE AUTO COMPANIES HAD 30,000,000 STOCKHOLDERS."

HE SAID HE BELIEVED WEALTH WAS WELL-DISTRIBUTED IN THE UNITED STATES, AND CITED A CASE IN WHICH AN OLD WOMAN OWNING SIX SHARES OF STOCK ASKED THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMPANY A QUESTION WHICH LED TO HIS OUSTER.



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UPI-242

(SOLDIERS)

MIAMI -- SOLDIERS DESCRIBED HAS HAVING BEEN CAPTURED DURING THE
INVASION WERE QUESTIONED BY NEWSMEN AND OFFICIALS OF THE
CASTRO REGIME IN HAVANA TONIGHT ON A NATIONAL RADIO-TV HOOKUP.

THE FIRST PRISONER TO APPEAR, A PARATROOPER NAMED JOSE AUSTIN
BAYONA, TOLD HIS QUESTIONERS HE WAS TRAINED IN GUATEMALA, WITH
SOME OF HIS INSTRUCTORS NORTH AMERICANS AND SOME LATINS, AND THEN
TAKEN TO NICARAGUA.

HE SAID THE PARATROOPERS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEIZE HIGHWAYS
AND TERRITORY IN THE AREA OF THE SEA LANDINGS.
THE QUESTIONING OF PRISONERS WAS BROADCAST FROM THE WORKERS' PALACE
IN HAVANA AND MONITORED HERE.

THE PRISONER DID NOT SEEM TO BE A WILLING WITNESS. HE
ANSWERED QUESTIONS BUT DID NOT ELABORATE. HE SPOKE IN A SLOW
AND HESITANT VOICE.

THE SECOND MAN QUESTIONED WAS IDENTIFIED AS "PEDRO." HE SAID
HE VOLUNTEERED BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN TOLD THE SITUATION IN CUBA
WAS VERY BAD.

HE DENIED AMERICAN SHIPS CARRIED THE INVASION TROOPS, BUT SAID
A "FEW" DESTROYERS ACCOMPANIED THE SIX SHIPS OF THE INVASION FLEET.

HE SAID ONE HAD THE NUMBER 507 ON ITS SIDE. THE DESTROYER
ESCORT, HE SAID, CAME UP TO, OR VERY CLOSE TO, THE COAST OF CUBA.

ASKED WHO WAS IN THE INVASION FORCE, HE SAID "JUST CUBANS."
PEDRO SAID HE ALSO WAS TRAINED IN GUATEMALA AT CAMP RETALHUE.
HE SAID HIS INSTRUCTORS WERE GERMAN, POLISH, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN,
AND AFTER THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION BEGAN, "ABOUT 30" NORTH AMERICANS
ARRIVED AND "RAN THE SHOW."

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MOST OF THE PRISONERS SAID THEY HAD TRAINED IN GUATEMALA. SOME U.S. OFFICERS TRAINED THEM, BUT THEY DID NOT KNOW THEM BEYOND FIRST NAMES. ONE PRISONER SAID HE SAW GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT MIGUEL YDIGURAS AT THE TRAINING CAMP TWICE.

SEVERAL SPOKE OF TWO OR MORE DESTROYERS WHICH THEY BELIEVED HAD ESCORTED THE INVASION CONVOY, MADE UP OF SEVEN MERCHANT SHIPS, TOWARD CUBA.

ONE PRISONER SAID A DESTROYER WENT INTO THE BEACH AFTER DARK TO TAKE OFF WOUNDED MEN. ANOTHER IDENTIFIED A DESTROYER SAID TO BE ESCORTING THE INVASION FLEET AS 507, WHICH IS THE NUMBER OF THE U.S.S. CONWAY.

BUT ANOTHER PRISONER, IDENTIFIED AS MARTINEZ SUAREZ, 52, A 28-YEAR CUBAN ARMY VETERAN, SAID THE UNITED STATES "HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE."

MOST OF THE WITNESSES SAID THEY HAD EXPECTED A GENERAL UPRISING AND MASS DEFECTIONS TO THEIR SIDE BY CASTRO'S MILITIAMEN AND WERE DISMAYED WHEN THIS DID NOT COME ABOUT.

DIRECT REPORTS FROM HAVANA THROUGH COMMUNICATIONS MADE UNCERTAIN BY INTERNAL CENSORSHIP SAID ARRESTS OF ANTI-CASTRO FORCES WERE CONTINUING AND THE CAPITAL WAS VIRTUALLY AN ARMED CAMP.

HOWARD MILKS, CHIEF OF THE AP CARIBBEAN SERVICES, AND AP CORRESPONDENT ROBERT BERRELLEZ WERE REPORTED ARRESTED LAST NIGHT. BERRELLEZ PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN REPORTED UNDER ARREST.

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
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UPI-8

(CUBA)

THE SON OF THE LEADER OF CUBAN EXILES TOLD A CUBAN RADIO AND TELEVISION AUDIENCE TODAY THAT THE INVASION OF THE BAY OF PIGS WAS A COMPLETE FAILURE AND NONE OF THE 1,300 TO 1,400 MEN INVOLVED COULD HAVE ESCAPED INTO THE ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS.

JOSE MIRO TORRA MADE THE STATEMENT IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS BY CUBAN OFFICIALS AND NEWSMEN WHO PARADED HIM BEFORE THE CAMERAS AND MICROPHONES IN HAVANA ALONG WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER PRISONERS THEY SAID WERE CAPTURED IN THE INVASION THIS WEEK.

THE ANSWERS FROM VARIOUS PRISONERS CONFLICTED ON SOME POINTS-- PARTICULARLY THE DEGREE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT--BUT ALL AGREED ON ONE POINT: THE INVASION FORCE WAS ALL CUBAN; NO AMERICANS WENT ASHORE.

DURING THE PROGRAM THE CUBANS ANNOUNCED THEY HAD CAPTURED 76 MORE INVADERS YESTERDAY. PREVIOUSLY THEY HAD CLAIMED THE CAPTURE OF MORE THAN 400.

MIRO TORRA'S FATHER, JOSE MIRO CARDONA, PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, ADMITTED IN NEW YORK YESTERDAY THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE INVASION HAD BEEN A "HEAVY REVERSE" TO ANTI-CASTRO FORCES. BUT HE SAID THE "MAJORITY OF THOSE WHO LANDED ARE ACTUALLY FIGHTING AT THE PRESENT TIME."

MIRO TORRA DESCRIBED THE INVASION AS A "TOTAL FAILURE."

HE SAID HE HIMSELF HAD WALKED FOR 26 HOURS AND GOT NOWHERE NEAR THE ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS, ABOUT 15 MILES FROM THE BEACHHEAD.

"NO ONE COULD HAVE REACHED THE ESCAMBRAY," HE SAID.

THE PRISONER PARADE STARTED AT 10 O'CLOCK LAST NIGHT. THE ANNOUNCER HAD SAID FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF WOULD APPEAR BEFORE THE END. BUT THE PROGRAM ENDED AT 2:30 A.M. TODAY WITHOUT CASTRO SHOWING UP.

THE PANEL OF QUESTIONERS--SOME OF THEM KNOWN COMMUNISTS--FIRED LOADED QUESTIONS AT THE PRISONERS BUT DID NOT ALWAYS GET THE REACTION THEY OBVIOUSLY WERE AIMING FOR.

ONE, PEDRO NUNEZ, A MEMBER OF ONE OF CUBA'S OLDEST FAMILIES, VIGOROUSLY DEFENDED THE FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM DESPITE VEILED THREATS OF EXECUTION.

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Bitter Rebels Complain CIA Bungled Show

New York Times Correspondent Tad Szulc, a veteran specialist in Latin American affairs, has been in Miami investigating the background of the ill-fated Cuban assault and the mood of the rebels who remain here. Here are his impressions.

By **TAD SZULC**
The New York Times Service

Bitter Cuban rebels in Miami were analyzing Friday the causes of the failure of their attack this week on the regime of Premier Fidel Castro.

With their political leadership battered and divided, and with the underground organizations in Cuba badly mauled, rebel resentment is mounting against the U.S. and especially the Central Intelligence Agency, over what is regarded here as monumental mismanagement.

As has been an open secret in Florida and Central America for months, the CIA planned, coordinated and directed the operations that ended in the defeat on a beachhead in Southern Cuba Wednesday.

Among the immediate questions arising here is what is to be done with more than 4,000 men of the rebel army who were not committed in the first attack and are now scattered about the Caribbean area. They were described as disoriented and demoralized.

Meanwhile, the recruiting centers have closed in Miami and officers and men, proclaiming their bitterness, are beginning to trickle back from the camps. There was a danger the rebel army might simply evaporate.

Cuban sentiment in Miami is that it is now up to the United States to handle the situation in Cuba directly.

A second question is whether and how the underground organizations can be rebuilt in the face of mass arrests all over Cuba and of the break in communications between them, and the rebel centers in Florida.

From reports and opinions gathered among Cubans involved in this week's events, and from information available beforehand but kept confidential, the picture that emerges is one of military, political, intelligence, and security failures.

The principal charge leveled at the Central Intelligence Agency by Cubans from numerous groups is that it precipitated the attack without adequate coordination with the underground and despite urgent warnings in recent weeks against such an attempt.

The agency is also blamed for excluding from the operations several rebel groups — which include a number of experienced guerrilla officers — because of alleged favoritism for other factions for political reasons.

With such a lack of coordination, many rebels claim, the CIA could not have expected to see the fulfillment of its intelligence estimates that a major internal uprising would follow the first landing.

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Miami Herald
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
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UPI-10

(INTELLIGENCE)

WASHINGTON--TWO CRUCIAL UNDERESTIMATES OF FIDEL CASTRO'S STRENGTH DOOMED THE REBEL INVASION OF CUBA, KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION SOURCES SAID TODAY.

THEY SAID INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES MISCALCULATED CASTRO'S MILITARY POWER, HIS ABILITY TO MOBILIZE IT AND HIS TROOPS' LOYALTY.

THE OTHER UNDERESTIMATE WAS THE STRENGTH OF CASTRO'S GRIP ON THE CUBAN PEOPLE, WHICH PREVENTED A GENERAL REBELLION.

THEY SAID U.S. OFFICIALS HAD MISGIVINGS OVER THE MILITARY VENTURE, BUT SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK, DEFENSE SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AGREED WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY NOT TO PREVENT THE INVASION.

THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT AMONG GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ABOUT WHERE THE BLAME LAY FOR THE INTELLIGENCE UNDERESTIMATES. SOME BLAMED THE CIA, BUT ONE HIGH SOURCE SAID THE FAULT WAS SHARED "BY THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT."

ACTUALLY, SUCH INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ARE REACHED BY A BOARD INCLUDING ALL AGENCIES CONCERNED.

OFFICIALS SAID IT WASN'T KNOWN THAT CASTRO HAD RUSSIAN MIG FIGHTERS IN FLYING CONDITION. THERE WERE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT CUBAN PILOTS HAD BEEN TRAINED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO FLY THEM, BUT IT HAD BEEN BELIEVED THE ONLY MIGS IN CUBA WERE STILL IN CRATES.

"CASTRO TURNED OUT TO HAVE MORE TANKS, MORE AIRPOWER IN GENERAL, MORE ARTILLERY, MORE MODERN MACHINE GUNS AND MORE COMMUNIST-BLOC TECHNICIANS THAN ANYONE HAD THOUGHT," ONE ADMINISTRATION SOURCE SAID.

OTHERS, HOWEVER, SAID THE MISCALCULATION WAS NOT SO MUCH IN THE AMOUNT OF THE EQUIPMENT, BUT IN THE TRAINING OF MEN TO USE IT AND MOBILIZE IT EFFECTIVELY.

THEY ALSO SAID THE EXTENT OF HIS POLICE CONTROL AND HIS NETWORK OF AGENTS AND INFORMERS WASN'T REALIZED UNTIL THOUSANDS OF PERSONS WERE HERDED INTO MAKESHIFT PRISONS TO WARD OFF A CIVILIAN UPRISING.

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UPI-127

(KENNEDY)

CAMP DAVID, MD. -- PRESIDENT KENNEDY WON RENEWED SUPPORT FROM FORMER PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER ON THE CUBAN CRISIS TODAY AFTER BRIEFING HIS WHITE HOUSE PREDECESSOR ON THE TENSE SITUATION.

SHORTLY AFTER KENNEDY AND EISENHOWER CONCLUDED THEIR CAMP DAVID MEETING, IT WAS LEARNED IN WASHINGTON THAT EISENHOWER STRONGLY RECOMMENDED TO KENNEDY BEFORE HIS INAUGURATION THAT THE UNITED STATES ALLOW PLANS FOR THE CUBAN INVASION TO PRO EED.

IN ANOTHER OF THE SERIES OF RAPID-FIRE DEVELOPMENTS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF KENNEDY, RETORTED TO AN ANGRY MESSAGE FROM SOVIET PREMIER NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV ON CUBA.

THE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED THAT KENNEDY HAS DECIDED "NOT TO BE DRAWN INTO AN EXTENDED PUBLIC DEBATE" WITH THE SOVIET RULER ON DETAILS OF THE CUBAN CONTROVERSY, BUT ON KENNEDY'S BEHALF, THE DEPARTMENT PLEDGED AN "ENDLESS STRUGGLE" FOR ATTAINMENT OF "FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS" AND THE "POPULAR WILL" IN CUBA AND ELSEWHERE.

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A GUANTANAMO DISPATCH SAID EIGHT DESTROYERS WERE ON DUTY AT THE BIG BASE ON THE EASTERN END OF CUBA INCLUDING THE FARRAGUT WHICH IS EQUIPPED WITH GUIDED MISSILES. THREE DESTROYER ESCORTS WERE REPORTED WITH THEM--THE ROBERTS, THE R. O. HALE AND THE PETERSON.

THERE WAS NO CONFIRMATION OR DENIAL FROM U.S. NAVY SOURCES. ONE SPOKESMAN SAID THE 3,000 MARINES LANDING IN GUANTANAMO BAY WOULD RELIEVE THE SAME NUMBER ALREADY THERE. THERE WAS NO COMMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE OR BOXER. A SPOKESMAN SAID THE SHANGRI-LA WAS ENROUTE FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN TO THE EAST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES.

A REPORT FROM KEY WEST THAT A DESTROYER FORCE HAD LEFT THERE FOR GUANTANAMO BROUGHT THE RESPONSE THE SHIPS WERE ON A "ROUTINE" TRAINING EXERCISE. THE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS SAID THEY WERE JOINING THE FORCE OF DESTROYERS AND OTHER VESSELS STILL AT SEA OFF THE BIG BASE.

OBSERVERS SAID THE BUILDUP APPEARED TO BE A PLAIN WARNING TO CASTRO TO KEEP HIS HANDS OFF THE GUANTANAMO BASE. SOME EXILE SOURCES SAID AN ATTACK WAS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS GUANTANAMO MIGHT BE GIVING ASYLUM TO REMNANTS OF THE INVASION FORCE OR TO OTHER ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS FLEEING THERE FROM THE MOUNTAINS.

CASTRO HAS SET UP ARTILLERY AND ROADBLOCKS A FEW MILES FROM THE BASE FOR THE AVOWED PURPOSE OF CUTTING OFF RETREAT TO GUANTANAMO OF FLEEING REBELS.

CODED RADIO MESSAGES WERE HEARD THROUGHOUT THE DAY FROM A SECRET RADIO STATION IN THE CARIBBEAN HINTING THAT A NEW INVASION MIGHT BE UNDERWAY AND ASKING THE ANTI-CASTRO FORCES IN CUBA TO HAVE COURAGE-- "DON'T GIVE UP."

BUT CUBAN EXILE SOURCES SAID THE INVASION WAS OVER, THAT THE FLAMES OF FREEDOM SPARKED BRIEFLY BUT WAS EXTINGUISHED WHEN THE INVADING FORCE OF ABOUT 1,000 MEN WAS CRUSHED BY SUPERIOR WEIGHT OF COMMUNIST TANKS AND PLANES SUPPLIED TO THE CASTRO FORCES.

THEY SAID ANY INVASION WOULD NOT BE TIPPED OFF BY SUCH A WARNING AND THAT THE MESSAGE UNDOUBTEDLY WAS MEANT TO CHEER UP THE ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS AND LET THEM KNOW THAT HELP WOULD BE COMING--SOMETIME. THE MESSAGES THEMSELVES WERE THOUGHT TO BE INTERCEPTED BY CASTRO'S FORCES.

THEY SAID THERE UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE SMALL ISOLATED LAND NGS FROM TIME TO TIME BUT THAT IT WOULD TAKE MONTHS TO MOUNT ANOTHER MAJOR BLOW-- THE TRAINING CAMPS ARE EMPTY. THE THOUSAND OR MORE VOLUNTEERS WHO SWAMPED RECRUITING OFFICES IN MIAMI HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES FOR ANOTHER DAY.

LATIN AMERICAN EXPERTS SAID THE UNITED STATES PROBABLY WOULD TURN NOW TO THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT TO TRY TO LINE UP MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR THE ANTI-CASTRO FORCES FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.

IN THE MEANTIME, AS THE UNITED STATES WAS STRENGTHENING ITS FORCES IN THE GUANTANAMO AREA, CASTRO EXTENDED HIS REIGN OF TERROR TO NEARBY SANTIAGO, KNOWN TO BE A STRONGHOLD OF ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS.

RAUL CASTRO HIMSELF WAS REPORTED IN ORIENTE PROVINCE TO LEAD THE COMMUNIST-STYLE ROUNDUP OF CASTRO OPPONENTS.

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UPI-105

(CUBA)

THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT RADIO STATION PROGRESO SAID TODAY THE UNITED STATES WAS BUILDING UP ITS NAVAL FORCES IN THE CARIBBEAN AND WARNED THAT INTERCONTINENTAL ROCKETS OF THE SOVIET UNION WERE EVEN MORE POWERFUL THAN THE FLEET.

THE BROADCAST FOLLOWED AN EARLIER ONE WHICH HINTED THE FIDEL CASTRO GOVERNMENT WOULD SHOW NO MERCY TOWARD THE 500 CUBANS CLAIMED CAPTURED IN THE ILL-FATED INVASION OF MONDAY. IT PARADED MANY OF THEM BEFORE TELEVISION CAMERAS IN AN HOURS-LONG TELEVISION BROADCAST.

CUBAN OBSERVERS HAD REPORTED INCREASED U.S. NAVY MANEUVERS IN THE CARIBBEAN AND SAID IT UNDOUBTEDLY WAS A WARNING TO CASTRO NOT TO LET HIS ENTHUSIASM INDUCE HIM TO ATTACK THE BIG U.S. NAVAL BASE AT GUANTANAMO ON THE EASTERN TIP OF CUBA.

THE PROGRESO BROADCAST SAID HEAVY NAVAL UNITS OF THE "YANKEE ARMADA" WERE MANEUVERING TO INTIMIDATE CUBA. IT SAID PRESIDENT KENNEDY SHOULD KNOW THAT "EVEN MORE POWERFUL IS THE REVOLUTIONARY CONSCIENCE OF OUR PEOPLES, EVEN MORE POWERFUL IS THE PREPARATION OF OUR MILITIAS, OUR REBEL ARMY, EVEN MORE POWERFUL IS THE COURAGE OF THE CUBANS AND EVEN MORE POWERFUL STILL ARE THE INTERCONTINENTAL ROCKETS OF THE SOVIET UNION."

MUCH OF THE BROADCAST WAS ADDRESSED TO UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL AND INCLUDED A REQUEST TO TELL THE SECRET SWAN RADIO TRANSMITTERS TO SEND FEWER MESSAGES OF A POSSIBLE NEW INVASION AND "COME THEMSELVES TO INVADE." IT CALLED THE INVADERS "WORMS AND MERCENARIES."

THE BROADCAST SAID THE SWAMPLAND IS "AGAIN READY TO RECEIVE OTHER CONTINGENTS"--A REFERENCE TO THE SWAMPY LAND AT PIGS BAY WHERE THE ANTI-CASTRO INVASION FORCE LANDED LAST MONDAY.

CASTRO FIRING SQUADS EXECUTED MANY CUBANS DURING THE WEEK AND SATURDAY'S BROADCAST BY HAVANA RADIO HINTED THAT THE SAME FATE MIGHT BEFALL THOSE CAPTURED AT PIG'S BAY. IT WARNED THAT THE SAME FATE WOULD BE DEALT TO ANY U.S. MARINES IF THEY INVADED CUBA. *105-89923-14*

THE BIG U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER RANDOLPH ARRIVED IN GUANTANAMO SATURDAY WITH 3,000 MARINES AND 85 TO 100 MODERN JET PLANES.

THREE OTHER AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, THE BOXER, THE SHANGRI-LA AND THE INDEPENDENCE WERE REPORTED IN THE AREA WITH SCORES OF DESTROYERS AND OTHER VESSELS.

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Eisenhower Refuses Second Guess on Cuba

Wouldn't Probe Fiasco (or U-2) Now; Admits Involvement in Training Troops

By MARY McGRORY
Star Staff Writer

GETTYSBURG, Pa., May 1.—Former President Eisenhower told the country today he will have no part of any postmortems on the Cuban fiasco.

"Now is not the time to rake over the ashes," he said, in the presence of the full Republican leadership.

"I would say that one day history will tell the whole story," he told his first formal

press conference since he left office January 20. "But as of this moment I would say the last thing you would want was a complete investigation. Let us by no means start a witch hunt and get every secret in detail."

The former President freely admitted the involvement of his administration in the training and equipping of Cuban refugee troops. There was no planning at that stage, he said, because "there was not then any specific leader of these people. So the only progress was in the accumulation of information and in the training of these people."

Reaffirms Support

The former President reaffirmed the support he gave his young successor when Mr. Kennedy consulted him immediately after the Cuban debacle.

"The United States stands firmly behind the President in his effort to prevent the solidifying of a Communist stronghold," he said. "I think they will support him unambiguously as he tries to prevent Communists from making inroads in the free world."

The former President, looking pink-cheeked and fit, appeared before the press in an abandoned theater in downtown Gettysburg near the office

where he is writing the memoirs of his administration.

The former President, who repeatedly made the point that he is at the disposition of his commander-in-chief, revealed that he has canceled the trip to Japan scheduled for the fall.

He did so at the suggestion of the State Department, he said, which advised him it was not the best time to go "because of the general condition."

Cites Importance of Issue

Gen. Eisenhower appeared on what is known as the "Ev and Charlie" show, the televised press conference which follows the Republican weekly leadership meetings.

He resisted all invitations to criticize the first 100 days of the Kennedy administration. Senate Minority Leader Dirksen of Illinois reported that he had told the former President that "members of Congress on both sides of the aisle were badly shaken by the Cuban matter."

But Gen. Eisenhower would only say this: "Like any other partisan politician, I might find some glee in talking about promises and performance, but this administration is preoccupied with the most important situation in this world—the international situation."

He refused all comment on

the Laotian crisis, and a possible decision to send troops to that country, saying he was not privy to all the information coming into the White House and that the situation was "going too rapidly."

He was reminded of the investigation that followed his own most embarrassing moment in the White House—the U-2 incident, and he said he saw no use "raking over the ashes of that incident" either.

"We have a duty, all of us, to look at the problems of this administration in keeping Communist brighheads from solidifying," he said. "I stand behind them. I might have used different methods. I might have been more particular about tactics. That might have been the result of differing personalities."

Wants Sound Currencies

Only on domestic policies did the President take issue with his successor.

"No matter how much we like to say we can afford anything we want to do, sound currency is the first backstop to free enterprise," he said.

House G. O. P. Leader Halleck reported he told the former President "the American people certainly missed his wisdom and sure hand in Washington, and if he ran for President tomorrow he would win by the biggest landslide in history."

"I think he liked that," Mr. Halleck said.

Senator Dirksen said he had informed Gen. Eisenhower that Republicans "have supported President Kennedy in the Cuban crisis, in the belief that once a Nation is committed by its President, we must present a united front to the world."

The two met with the former G. O. P. President, along with others, as part of a plan to keep in close touch with top Republicans. They and other leaders met recently with former Vice President Nixon.

Have Breakfast Together

Senator Dirksen and Mr. Halleck made their views known in statements issued while they still were conferring with Mr. Eisenhower at his office in an old brick building on the edge of the Gettysburg College campus.

Mr. Halleck and Senator Dirksen had breakfast with the former President in his office before a formal conference of Mr. Eisenhower with the group of Republican leaders, including National Chairman Thorton B. Morton.

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
Mr. Halleck said he had advised Gen. Eisenhower that the Kennedy legislative program "has laid a big egg so far."

"I think it has just about talked itself to death," Mr. Halleck said. He added that in 35 legislative messages and task force reports Mr. Kennedy had rolled up 250,000 words in addition to the 750,000 he had used in presidential campaign speeches.

Senator Dirksen said he had told Mr. Eisenhower "that not one of the Kennedy proposals has generated any enthusiasm on either the Democratic or the Republican side, nor can we find any evidence of real support for the Kennedy program by the American people."

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New York Journal-American
New York Mirror
New York Daily News
New York Post
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UPI-9

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON.--THE ADMINISTRATION SENT SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK TO CAPITOL HILL TODAY TO DEFEND ITS HANDLING OF THE CUBAN SITUATION AND THE U.S. ROLE IN THE ILL-FATED INVASION ATTEMPT. RUSK'S APPEARANCE BEFORE A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA (AT 10 AM) CAME AMID GROWING CONGRESSIONAL DEMANDS FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF THE SUPER-SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND SOME DEMANDS FOR A STERNER U.S. POLICY TOWARD FIDEL CASTRO. IT ALSO FOLLOWED A NEW WARNING BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR AMERICANS STILL IN CUBA TO LEAVE "IN THE NEAR FUTURE." OFFICIALS SAID THE STEP WAS NOT PROMPTED BY ANY IMMEDIATE THREAT AGAINST AMERICANS BUT IT WAS CONSIDERED WISE TO GET AS MANY OUT AS POSSIBLE. THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING RUSK BEHIND CLOSED DOORS ALSO PLANNED TO MEET LATER IN THE WEEK WITH CIA DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES.

CHAIRMAN WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE., SAID THE SUBCOMMITTEE WANTED AN EXPLANATION OF WHY IT WAS NOT ADVISED OR CONSULTED ABOUT THE UNSUCCESSFUL CUBAN REBEL INVASION.

HE SAID THE FOREIGN RELATIONS GROUP ALSO WOULD LIKE TO FIND OUT FROM RUSK AND DULLES WHAT PLANS THEY HAVE FOR FUTURE U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA.

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
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
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UPI-38

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON.--SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK WENT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS WITH A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE TODAY TO DEFEND THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S CUBAN POLICIES AND ITS ROLE IN THE ILL-FATED CUBAN REBEL INVASION. APPEARING A LITTLE TENSE AND TIRED, RUSK HAD NO COMMENT AS HE WENT INTO A MEETING WITH A FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA HEADED BY SEN. WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE.

THE CABINET OFFICIAL WAS THE FIRST WITNESS IN WHAT MORSE PROMISED WOULD BE A THOROUGH REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATION POLICIES ON CUBA, BOTH PAST AND PRESENT.

MORSE SAID THE SUBCOMMITTEE WOULD HEAR DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOMETIME LATER IN THE WEEK, BUT NO DATE HAS BEEN SET.

RUSK'S APPEARANCE CAME AMID GROWING CONGRESSIONAL DEMANDS FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF CIA AND SOME DEMANDS FOR A STERNER U.S. POLICY TOWARD FIDEL CASTRO.

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
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UPI-92

ADD 1 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-88)

RUSK ALSO TOLD THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA THAT THE DECISION FOR THE RECENT ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION WAS MADE BY CUBAN REFUGEES AND CARRIED OUT BY THEM, ALTHOUGH WITH SUBSTANTIAL U.S. FINANCIAL AND SUPPLY AID.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEWS, GIVEN DURING A TWO-HOUR AND 55-MINUTE SESSION BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, WERE RELAYED TO NEWSMEN BY CHAIRMAN WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE.

MORSE SAID HE WOULD NOT WITHDRAW HIS PREVIOUS CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF THE CUBAN FIASCO BUT PRAISED RUSK FOR AN "EXCEEDINGLY ABLE, OBJECTIVE, FACTUAL AND OPEN BREASTED STATEMENT" ABOUT THE ENTIRE SITUATION.

MORSE SAID HE FELT HE WAS SPEAKING FOR OTHER SENATORS PRESENT WHEN HE SAID THEY PLACED "COMPLETE CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT IN THE ABLE LEADERSHIP" OF RUSK AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

RUSK TOLD NEWSMEN IT WAS "A VERY CANDID AND USEFUL DISCUSSION." MOST OF IT, HE SAID, WAS DEVOTED TO CUBA ALTHOUGH ONE OR TWO OTHER MATTERS, WHICH HE DID NOT SPECIFY, WERE RAISED IN THE SESSION.

THE SECRETARY SAID THE FULL MORNING COMPLETED HIS TESTIMONY ON CUBA, ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTS TO RETURN TO THE CAPITOL WEDNESDAY FOR A DISCUSSION OF OTHER MATTERS.

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ADD 2 CUBA, WASHINGTON

AMONG OTHER THINGS, MORSE SAID, HE FELT THAT THE PROBLEM OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SOLVED. MORSE HAD COMPLAINED THAT HIS SUBCOMMITTEE HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED IN ADVANCE OF THE CUBAN INVASION.

THE OREGON DEMOCRAT TOLD NEWSMEN RUSK ASSURED THE COMMITTEE THAT "THE DECISION FOR THE ILL-FATED INVASION WAS DONE ON THE PART OF CUBAN REFUGEES, AND CONDUCTED BY CUBANS." HOWEVER, HE SAID, THE U.S. HAD SUPPLIED ADVANCE TRAINING, MONEY AND SUPPLIES.

MORSE SAID HE REGARDED THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS A "JOINT PARTNER" WITH THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE WHITE HOUSE IN THE INVASION AID PLANS. ASKED IF THE UNITED STATES LET THE CUBAN REFUGEES GO AHEAD ON THEIR OWN, MORSE SAID "I DON'T THINK WE GAVE THEM ANY WEAK COUNSEL."

THE OREGON DEMOCRAT ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT THE APPEARANCE OF CIA DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES SOMETIME LATER THIS WEEK BE EXPANDED INTO A MEETING OF THE FULL FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. HE SAID HE MADE THE SUGGESTION AND IT WAS APPROVED BY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, D-ARK.

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UPI-12

(EISENHOWER)

WASHINGTON.--FORMER PRESIDENT EISENHOWER HAS TOLD REPUBLICAN LEADERS HE DOUBTED IF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAD A LARGE ROLE IN PLANNING THE ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION BECAUSE IT WAS MARKED BY AT LEAST ONE ERROR WHICH PROVED COSTLY IN WORLD WAR I.

REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WHO CONFERRED WITH EISENHOWER AT HIS GETTYSBURG HOME ON MONDAY WERE FRANKLY SURPRISED THAT EISENHOWER PLACED NO BLAME FOR THE INVASION FAILURE AND WAS SO RESTRAINED IN HIS CRITICISM.

BUT THE EX-PRESIDENT, IT WAS LEARNED TODAY, DID MAKE THE POINT THAT POOR MILITARY PLANNING EVIDENTLY ENTERED INTO THE FAILURE OF THE INVASION AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO'S REGIME.

HE AGREED IT WAS A MISTAKE TO HAVE HAD ALL OF THE INVASION FORCES' COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT LOADED ON ONE OLD LIBERTY SHIP, AN EASY TARGET FOR SHORE BATTERIES. THE SHIP WAS SUNK AND THE INVADERS COMMUNICATIONS MATERIEL WENT DOWN WITH IT.

"WE LEARNED NOT TO DO THAT AGAIN AFTER GALLIPOLI," EISENHOWER REMARKED.

THIS WAS A REFERENCE TO THE WORLD WAR I BATTLE FOR GALLIPOLI IN TURKEY WHICH GUARDS THE NORTHERN END OF THE DARDANELLES STRAITS.

BUT WHEN OTHER REPUBLICANS PRESENT REFERRED TO "MISTAKES" IN THE CUBAN OPERATION, THE FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF STRESSED THAT MUCH PLANNING IS REQUIRED FOR SUCH AN OPERATION.

EISENHOWER DID NOT, IT WAS SAID, CHALLENGE THE QUALITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE WHICH WENT INTO THE INVASION PREPARATION NOR PINPOINT BLAME FOR ITS FAILURE.

THE REPUBLICANS BROUGHT UP THE MATTER OF HOW MUCH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAD TO DO WITH PLANNING THE INVASION AND REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE LOST LIBERTY SHIP. THE FORMER PRESIDENT RAISED AN EYEBROW AND INDICATED HE THOUGHT THE JOINT CHIEFS COULD NOT HAVE HAD MUCH TO DO WITH THAT.

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
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UPI-268

(FLIGHT)

BIRMINGHAM, ALA.--FOUR LOCAL AREA MEN, FLYING FOR ANTI-CASTRO FORCES, CRASHED IN THE CARIBBEAN LAST MONTH AND ARE PRESUMED DEAD, A MIAMI SPRINGS, FLA., ATTORNEY SAID TODAY.

HE SAID THE MEN WENT DOWN "ON OR ABOUT APRIL 19" WHILE ON "A NONE-SCHEDULED CARGO FLIGHT TO AN UNDISCLOSED POINT FROM AN UNDISCLOSED POINT, BUT PRESUMABLY CENTRAL AMERICA."

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500,000 Troops Needed to Take Cuba, Flier Says

14 By James Buchanan
Chicago Daily News Service

MIAMI, May 3—A former Cuban businessman who flew with the tiny anti-Castro air force at Cochinos Bay is convinced that a successful invasion of Cuba will require 500,000 troops.

And he says the attackers must be ready to lose 100,000 or more men in a long-gruelling fight on a superbly defended island.

Forced to speak anonymously because of a pact with fellow airmen, the pilot made these points in an interview:

Leadership — "Jose Miro Cardona's Council probably is the only organization that can serve as a rallying point for the Cubans. It has the entire to Washington officials, upon whom our hopes rest completely. It's the old story of not changing horses, and so forth."

Recruiting — Can begin again, but only if the enlistees know they will be treated as human beings in the camps. "They must not be held as prisoners; but must be given leaves of absence and other means of relieving the strain of training."

Reserves — There are none. On the invasion they took every boy, even some who had been in camp less than 10 days.

"There are no forces floating around the Caribbean on ships or held at bases out of the country. The men are either prisoners, dead, hiding in the swamps or already back in this country."

Attack — "Only a military effort, a great one, will unseat Castro. And it must come soon before the island is even more fortified—if that is possible."

Fear and Distrust

Underground — "Fear of exposure and arrest among the Cubans, who cannot trust their own families, is too great."

"They will support the invaders, but only when the invaders are in control of their city or their area."

U. S. Guidance — "We must have it along with continuing materials, but it must be by an agency"

he had agents. But they were unnecessary. You don't surprise an enemy after your troops have all left from one port and have been at sea for six days."

Unbelievable Defense

Castro Defense — "Unbelievable. Every mile of the coast is guarded, all the way around the island, with gun emplacements and radar."

"The anti-aircraft fire is the most deadly anyone had ever seen. And Castro has some new equipment and new tricks that defy description."

Cuban Courage — "I never would have believed it before, but the courage of the men on the ground and in the air met every challenge."

"As our planes were shot down, two by two, we had a surplus of crews. These airmen actually fought for assignments on the remaining planes, knowing they faced almost certain death."

Castro Air Force — "Six lousy little planes won the war for Castro. He had seven, but we got one."

"And because of their speed and maneuverability the three jet trainers and the three piston fighters kept our bombers away from their gun emplacements and anti-aircraft batteries. Our transports were sitting ducks."

Premature Takeoff? — "No; the invasion went off as scheduled, carrying everything we were given. We had no reserves, no backlog of supplies. The order to 'go' came from your agency men, and not from Cuban military men."

U. S. Troop Report

U. S. Support — "Of course there were rumors of the takeoff point that we would be supported by U. S. troops. That was natural."

"What was wrong was the refusal of the agency men to kill the rumors, thereby leading us to believe our supplies and so forth were adequate to do what we believed was just a small part of the over-all job."

Publicity — "Many of the recruits were recruited at false promises. We had thousands of men on the ground. Imagine how many more they got there by a hundred or more."

mand—another chance, properly directed, to save our country and the men we left behind.

"We are not bitter at the U. S. Government—we realize it was the mistake of an agency, not the Government."

Future — "The future of Cuba rests solely in the hands of the United States; either


to be abandoned or saved. Any alliance of Latin American nations will have to be formed by the United States.

"It will cost men and materials, less now than later. To refuse Cuba spells political death for the United States, which never was loved but often feared. Today it is not even feared."

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D.E. Moore



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Mr. Callahan...
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Mr. Rosen...
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Mr. Tavel...
Mr. Trotter...
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Miss Gandy...

Pilots from city gambled lives, lost in Cuban attack

BY DAVE LANGEFORD
News staff writer

A MIAMI SPRINGS, Fla., lawyer, Alex E. Carlson, was in Birmingham yesterday to notify families of the four they were missing. He identified them as Riley W. Shamburger, the pilot; Thomas Willard Ray, co-pilot; Leo F. Baker, engineer; and Wade Carl Gray, radioman.

Carlson told The News his "client," Double Check Corp., contacted the men about April 1 on behalf of anti-Castro forces. The Florida secretary of state identified Carlson as president of the corporation, his wife as secretary-treasurer, and Raymond W. Cox, so of Miami Springs, as vice president.

THE MISSION of the four Birmingham men on the day their plane went down remains a mystery, but it is believed they were flying cargo in support of a Cuban invasion which had begun three days before. They were last heard from somewhere over the Caribbean when they broke radio silence to say that one of the plane's two engines had failed and they were losing altitude.

Carlson said a search of the sea turned up parts of the airplane. He said they were flying from a secret airstrip in Central America. The Miami source said it is generally believed the invasion force embarked from Guatemala, 600 miles from Cuba. HE SAID IT COULD also be assumed the crash occurred on land or just off the Cuban shore. Bits of the wreckage were spotted.

They had all worked for the same aircraft firm—Hayes Corp. in Birmingham. Two had been test pilots, one a flight engineer and the other was a classified planning and technical inspector. ALL WERE MARRIED, three of them had children and at least three were Air Force veterans.

The date of the crash was the 15th wedding anniversary for Shamburger and his wife, Marion, whom he met in high school here. Shamburger, 36, pilot of the ill-fated plane, had more than 12,000 hours flying time as a pilot in World War II, the Korean conflict, with the Air National Guard and as a test pilot at Hayes.

The Shamburgers have a 13-year-old daughter.

Mrs. Shamburger said she kept the agonizing secret of her husband's fate for some time.

Baker's wife, pregnant with her second child, was hospitalized last week when she learned he was missing.

A native of Boston, Mass., he served in the Air Force as a technical sergeant. Now 35, he had worked with Hayes since 1957 as a flight engineer. He also operated two restaurants here.

Baker had an 11-year-old daughter by a previous marriage and a 1-year-old daughter.

Gray, radioman on that last flight, had also been a Hayes test pilot. He was 33 and married, but had no children.

"He's been gone about three months," a member of the family said. "He didn't tell anybody where he was going or why. We don't know much about this."

Ray was an inspector at Hayes for eight years before resigning last March. He was 30, a native of Birmingham and had been a staff sergeant in the Air Force. He was married and the father of two.



THOMAS W. RAY
Wgs co-pilot



LEE F. BAKER
Wife didn't know

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

How CIA Staged Cuban Fiasco

By Drew Pearson

The story has now been pieced together of the tragedy of the Bay of Pigs where 1500 Cuban freedom fighters were routed by dictator Castro's militia after a heroic two-day stand, April 17-19.

It is a story of fumbling and bumbling by the Central Intelligence Agency, which is now trying desperately to hide its mistakes. Agents have been rushed to Florida to hush up the Cubans who know the embarrassing truth.

However, this column has dug out the facts and will publish its findings on the ground that the public is entitled to know the facts in order to prevent similar mistakes in the future. Here is the first installment:

President Eisenhower ordered the CIA a year ago to begin training Cuban refugees to invade their homeland. The first detachment, 32 eager recruits, departed for Guatemala in May, 1960.

They had been told that a training camp would be ready for them. They found only tangled, tropical, snake-infested underbrush. For the first week they lived on corn cakes and rain water. Since the rainy season had just started, there was no shortage of running water.

They had their own camp

out of the jungle on property donated by a wealthy Guatemalan landlord named Roberto Alejos. More camps sprang up as other trainees filtered in. One drawback: many of the camps, situated on Alejos' coffee plantations between the Pan American highway and a railroad to Mexico, were within view of passing travelers. A revolutionary air force was also recruited and rushed to Guatemala where they had been promised a base would be waiting for them. Instead, they found equipment to build a base and spent the month of August manning tractors instead of planes.

By January, an ambitious young sub-chief named Manuel Artime, had become the CIA's fair-haired boy. He ingratiated himself with Frank Bender, the CIA area chief, through Bender's secretary, Macho Barker. Artime promised to make Barker the Presidente de Delegacion Deportes, sort of a glorified sports czar, in liberated Cuba.

Artime Takes Over

Finally, on Jan. 30, the persuasive Artime staged a coup in the camps. He rallied the men with speeches full of fire and glory. Of the 1500 to 1800 freedom fighters, only 200 balked at making him their leader.

He quickly arrested and isolated these, then did missionary work among them for the remaining weeks. Approximately 80 escaped into the jungle and sneaked across Mexico back to Miami. One by one, the rest rejoined the

ranks except for a stubborn core of 17 who remained in isolation until the invasion was over.

D-day was moved up from May 1 to April 17 because Russian MIGs were reported arriving in Cuba and the May rains might hamper the operation. In the haste, however, the CIA neglected to coordinate the invasion with a planned uprising. Thousands of men, waiting inside Cuba to spring into action, never got the signal.

For some unaccountable reason, the CIA also stopped its propaganda broadcasts to the Cuban people from Swan Island in the Caribbean 16 days before the invasion. It would seem this should have been the time for stirring up the Cuban people. Swan Radio finally went back on the air as the invasion began, and announced where the landing was taking place after the first small party had scarcely hit the beach.

Three ships, packed with radio-jamming equipment, were also waiting in Miami for the big moment. Under secret plan U-40, they were supposed to slip sabotage teams ashore in Cuba to blow up Castro's communication centers in advance of the invasion. Those that couldn't be sabotaged were supposed to be jammed. But on D-Day, they were still tied up at the Miami docks.

For the invasion fleet, the CIA through Charles Mills, a Miami yacht broker, had purchased a couple of motley



Pearson

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LCIs (landing craft infantry). These were manned by defectors from the Cuban Navy but commanded by hired American merchant officers.

Drunken Heroes

Some of these hired heroes turned out to be drunks. Others were actually anti-Cuban and refused to bunk with the men they were supposed to lead on a crusade to free their homeland. As a result, half the Cuban crew deserted one ship at Vieques, the revolutionary naval base off the tip of Puerto Rico.

The CIA also leased three ships from the Garcia lines: The Rio Escondido, Huston and Atlantic. These carried mixed crews which weren't told until they arrived at the staging area about their dangerous destination.

Then they were given the option of staying with their ships for bonus wages or remaining in custody in Nicaragua until the invasion was over.

For all the CIA's stress on security, no one had bothered to check on the crew members. One radio operator, a Cuban, confessed that he was loyal to Castro. It was decided that the safest course would be to take him along where he could be watched.

But no one was assigned to watch him. Later, at sea, he was discovered in the radio room, sending frantic messages to Havana about the approaching invasion.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Makeshift Armada Invaded Cuba

By Drew Pearson

Careful examination of what went wrong in the Cuban rebel invasion shows that the seeds of disaster had been sown by the Central Intelligence Agency long before the Cuban freedom fighters splashed ashore at the Bay of Pigs.



Pearson

The unbelievable bungling began with the pre-invasion missions last year. To smuggle arms and saboteurs into Cuba, the CIA organized a private navy and began recruiting refugee Cuban seamen.

However, the CIA did not seem to trust Cubans with the liberation of their own homeland and hired American merchant officers to command this private navy of ancient ships.

Many of these American mercenaries turned out to be drunks and derelicts. Some even refused to associate with the Cubans whom they were supposed to lead. One skipper, G. C. Jullian, insisted upon naming his Cuban freedom vessel the "Barbara J" after his wife.

The American skipper of an LCI (landing craft, infantry) became roaring drunk before he reached a secret rendezvous point less than three miles from a Cuban naval sta-

tion. He was supposed to meet a small boat which approached under cover of the night.

The skipper peered into the darkness, then switched on the flood lights so he could see better. The underground leaders, who were risking their lives in the small boat, took off before they were detected from the shore. But the drunken skipper followed in pursuit, flood lights still blazing and spotlight stabbing the darkness in search of the fleeing boat.

On another night, the same skipper dropped a sabotage team near Santiago de Cuba and waited offshore for it to do its damage. Suddenly the stillness was shattered by gunfire from the shore, and tracer bullets cut patterns in the dark.

The skipper declared that he intended to abandon the saboteurs and get out of there. A Cuban medical officer, Sergio Rodriguez, however, stopped him by holding a gun at his head until the saboteurs had scrambled back on board.

The Invasion Armada

For the invasion, the CIA assembled probably the most motley, makeshift armada that has ever embarked upon conquest. It included three commercial ships—the Rio Escondido, Huston and Atlantic—leased from the Garcia lines in such haste that the crews were never checked for security. At least two members turned out to be loyal Castroites who tried to signal Cuba of the coming invasion.

There was also considerable confusion over who was commanding the invasion fleet.

Eduardo Garcia, as boss of the Garcia lines, considered himself in command and made the Rio Escondido the flagship.

But his flagship developed engine trouble before it reached the staging area and could make only four knots. Hence it had to be dispatched toward Cuba four days ahead of the invasion fleet it was supposed to lead.

The Free Cuban navy, which contributed two LCIs and several landing barges to the task force, designated the LCI Blagard as the flagship. This was commanded by an American merchant officer for whose benefit the invasion plan was neatly spelled out in English.

His job as flagship commander was to direct the landing barges by radio. But in the middle of the action, he forgot the battle plan.

A Cuban underwater demolition expert, Eduardo Zavaz Bazan, happened to have memorized the plan, was hustled to the skipper's side and prompted him on what orders to issue next.

Thus the invasion started off with two flagships in command, each giving orders. In addition, several crew members would take orders from only Jesus Blanco, a former Cuban naval officer, who had recruited them.

Unfortunately, the CIA had loaded all the aviation gas, tank shells, and antitank


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


mines aboard the slow-moving Rfo Escondido. Early in the fighting, one of Castro's Sea Fury fighters hurled a bomb into her side, and she went down in flames with all her cargo.

This left the freedom fighters on the beach without the tank shells and the antitank mines so necessary to hold off Castro's tanks. The freedom fighters had managed to capture an air strip near Jaguey Grande as a forward base for their planes. But without aviation gas, the base was useless.

On D-Day, a 168-man commando force, commanded by ~~Nino Diaz~~, was ordered to make a diversionary landing on the Cuban coast. Diaz was prepared to go ashore in Oriente Province, where he had once fought at Castro's side and where he knew the terrain intimately.

When Diaz opened his sealed orders at sea, however, he found that the CIA wanted him to land at an unfamiliar spot in Camaguey Province, not Oriente. Rather than fight on unknown terrain, he returned disgustedly to his Louisiana camp. Later he learned that 20,000 of Castro's loyal militiamen had been waiting near the site the CIA had selected for him in Camaguey Province.



Kennedy Gloom On Cuba Fading

Shaken by Invasion's Failure, He Takes Profit From the Lesson

By David Wise

WASHINGTON.

"We intend to profit from this lesson," President Kennedy told the nation's newspaper editors as the United States-backed rebel invasion of Cuba sputtered to a tragic conclusion on the Bahia de Cochinos.

Those close to the President say the shape and form of the Cuban lesson he has learned are now discernible.

The lesson falls into two parts. One result is a change in the President's personal approach to problems. The other is a change in governmental machinery.

It is now three weeks since the rebel radio broadcast the cryptic message: "Alert, Alert, Look Well at the Rainbow," that signalled the start of the invasion that failed. Some of the personal gloom that pervaded the President's mood — and the White House — during that week of disaster has now been dispelled.

There was a spring in the President's step last week, and an obviously cheerier Presidential mood, that matched the spring that has come to Washington with a bursting out of dogwood and azaleas.

Was Deeply Shaken

But during the tense days of the invasion, the President was reported deeply shaken by the tragic loss of life on the beachhead. This was brought home to him after his meeting with leaders of the Cuban Revolutionary Council at the White House.

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There, he learned that the son of Jose Miro Cardona, council chairman, was among the invading force, and that Manuel Antonio de Varona, another council leader, had a son and brother on the beachhead. The relatives of both leaders were later reported captured by the forces of Premier Fidel Castro.

The personal lesson Mr. Kennedy learned is that even the best advisers can give bad advice.

Henceforth, the word is, he will tend to rely more on his own instincts and common sense, rather than on the experts. The President apparently has come to the conclusion that he listened too much to the C. I. A. and the military men and some staff aides who advised him to go into Cuba, and not enough to

the advisers who counseled against it.

One adviser who spoke up against the invasion was Arthur M. Schlesinger, now a Special Assistant to the President. Mr. Schlesinger is an historian and a professor by trade; possibly his words did not carry as much weight as the military experts who could cite the precise strength, or so they thought, of Castro's Army and Air Force.

Responsible and informed sources in the White House say that the President had grave doubts about the invasion just before it was launched and raised sharp questions about it. In the end, however, the advice of the experts, rather than his own reservations, prevailed, and the President gave the invasion the green light.

In addition to relying more on his own judgment, the President may be expected to consult more with trusted outsiders who are not part of the Administration.

Dissent Encouraged

Also, the Cuban aftermath can be expected to encourage more healthy dissent among members of the White House staff. Some may have been reluctant during the Cuban policy-making to speak up against the judgment of the experts. The President has passed the word among his staff that he wants, and expects, them to express themselves freely.

The second part of the Cuban lesson is more tangible. Mr. Kennedy has ordered a sweeping review of the intelligence gathering apparatus. He has named Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, retired, to head it. But an important member of the panel is the President's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

There is informed speculation that the President would like to place his brother, Robert Kennedy, in as head of C. I. A. However, he has made no decision to do so. Out of all this appraising and review, there could emerge drastic changes in the scope and organization of the intelligence system.

But in the long run, the personal impact of the Cuban episode on the President's thinking may prove the real profit of the lesson of Cuba.

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
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(NEWSMEN ON CUBA)

COLUMBUS, OHIO--HENRY RAYMONT, WHO HEADED THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL COVERAGE IN CUBA BEFORE THE RECENT INVASION, SAID TODAY HE FELT THE ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE CASTRO REGIME WAS ILL-TIMED. RAYMONT SAID THAT CASTRO'S PRESTIGE HAD BEEN SAGGING AND THERE WAS A FEELING IN HAVANA THAT IF CASTRO'S OPPONENTS HAD WAITED, THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN FERMENT IN THE COUNTRY THAT WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE OVERTHROW OF THE CUBAN DICTATOR.

THE VETERAN NEWSMAN WHO WAS HELD A PRISONER FOR SIX DAYS BY THE CASTRO FORCES DURING THE INVASION SAID THERE WAS A FEELING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD BACKED THE WRONG LEADERS IN THE ILL-FATED INVASION ATTEMPT.

HE SAID THIS HAD CREATED SOME BITTERNESS AMONG THE YOUNG CUBANS WHO WERE WILLING TO FIGHT FOR SOME OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS THAT CAME WITH CASTRO'S RISE TO POWER BUT WHO WANTED THESE REFORMS WITHOUT THE EXTREMES TO WHICH CASTRO HAD GONE.

CASTRO'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON MAY 1 THAT CUBA WAS NOW A SOCIALIST COUNTRY WAS NO SURPRISE, RAYMONT SAID, BECAUSE THE CUBAN LEADER HAD BEEN SAYING FOR SEVERAL MONTHS THAT LENIN'S PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO CUBA. RAYMONT DISCUSSED CUBA WITH THREE OTHER WASHINGTON NEWSMEN ON A LOCAL TELEVISION PROGRAM. THEY WERE WILLIAM THEIS, CHIEF OF THE PUI'S STAFF COVERING THE SENATE; PETER LISAGOR OF THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS WASHINGTON BUREAU; AND CARL DEBLOOM, HEAD OF THE COLUMBUS (OHIO) DISPATCH WASHINGTON BUREAU.

RAYMONT SAID HE THOUGHT THE TIME WAS NEAR FOR COLLECTIVE MEASURES, NOT VIOLENT, BECAUSE THE U.S. CAN WIN IN THIS HEMISPHERE ON ITS IDEOLOGICAL VALUES.

IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE, HE SAID, TO WRITE CASTRO OFF AS A LUNATIC. RAYMONT SAID THAT THE BEARDED CUBAN LEADER HAS INCREDIBLE SKILL IN MANIPULATING PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY IN PRESENTING THE PERSONALITY IN TALKS WITH LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS THAT HE KNOWS THEY LIKE TO SEE IN HIM.

RAYMONT SAID HE HAD SEEN CASTRO TO BE THE PERFECT ACTOR IN PRESENTING HIMSELF TO LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AS THE POOR, AGRARIAN REFORMER BEING CRUELLY OPPRESSED BY THE

THE USE OF U.S. TROOPS IN CUBA DURING THE INVASION WOULD HAVE BACKFIRED, RAYMONT SAID, BECAUSE THE CUBANS' NATIONAL PRIDE WOULD HAVE RISEN TO THE SUPPORT OF CASTRO EVEN BY PEOPLE WHO WERE OPPOSED BY HIM.

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HE ALSO SAID HE HAD "GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN, THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA WILL SUPPORT THE U.S."

HE SAID SUCH SUPPORT WOULD NOT COME AUTOMATICALLY. HE SAID HE FELT THIS COUNTRY NEEDED TO SHOW MORE LEADERSHIP IN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS.

RAYMONT SAID THE RECENT INVASION WAS A SURPRISE TO MOST PEOPLE IN HAVANA WHO HAD FELT THAT THE INVASION TALK WAS MERELY PSYCHOLOGICAL. HE SAID HE WONDERED IF PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD WEIGHED THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION BEING A SUCCESS.

HE SAID THERE WAS A FEELING THAT IF CASTRO HAD BEEN OVERTHROWN BY FORCE WITH THE U.S. TAKING SOME PART IN THE OPERATION, THAT CASTRO'S SUPPORTERS WOULD HAVE MADE IT VERY TOUGH FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

THE NEWSMEN AGREED THAT PERHAPS SOME GOOD HAD COME FROM THE CUBAN FIASCO IN THAT IT HAD AWAKENED CONGRESS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC TO THE IMPORTANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE PROBLEMS FACED IN THAT AREA.

THEIS SAID THAT A SINCERE EFFORT WAS NOW BEING MADE IN WASHINGTON TO FIND COMPETENT DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THAT AREA.

THEIS SAID THAT ONE BIG QUESTION THIS COUNTRY FACES IS WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AROUND THE WORLD OUTWEIGHS THE RIGHT TO TAKE SOME ACTION WHEN TROUBLE ARISES.

HE SAID THIS COUNTRY SEES THE DANGER IN CASTRO BUT THAT AT THIS POINT, THE MAJORITY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES DO NOT FEEL THE SAME WAY.

LISAGOR SAID THAT THIS COUNTRY HAD MANY COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT PARTIES WOULD ACT IN UNISON, BUT HE FELT THE U.S. SHOULD PERHAPS HAVE SOME ELBOW ROOM IN SUCH ARRANGEMENTS BECAUSE THERE SHOULD BE A TIME WHEN THE U.S. COULD MOVE.

LISAGOR SAID HE FELT THERE WERE PERHAPS PROBLEMS IN LATIN AMERICA OF MORE IMPORTANCE THAN CASTRO, SUCH AS THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WHICH GAVE RISE TO CASTRO.

HE SAID THIS COUNTRY PERHAPS SHOULD GO ON TRYING TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF LATIN AMERICANS AND ISOLATE CUBA MUCH AS ONE DOES A BAD NEIGHBOR ON THE STREET. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IN TIME THIS WOULD HAVE A HEALTHY INFLUENCE ON THE CUBAN SITUATION IN THAT CUBA WOULD SEE THE VALUE OF OUR WAY OF LIFE.

THEIS PREDICTED THAT KENNEDY'S ROLE IN THE INVASION WOULD BE AN ISSUE IN THE 1964 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN. HE MADE THE COMMENT IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE WANTING TO KNOW IF KENNEDY HAD SHOT FROM THE HIP IN THE CUBAN SITUATION.

THEIS SAID THAT KENNEDY HAD PICKED UP A PROJECT INITIATED IN THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND HAD ASSUMED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT. HE SAID THAT IT WAS PRETTY OBVIOUS THAT KENNEDY'S BASIC INFORMATION AS TO THE STATUS OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE WAS NOT GOOD.

DEBLOOM SAID HE FELT THE PEOPLE WERE SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT BUT THAT IT WAS TIME THAT KENNEDY ASSURED THE COUNTRY THAT HE HAD A PROGRAM FOR DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS.

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CORRECTIONS

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Exiles Are Stirring Confusion

By VIRGINIA PREWETT

The anti-Castro Cuban exiles, not willing to depend on possible Organization of American States counter-intervention to topple Castro, are picking themselves up to-hit him again—with an underground movement.

And even those U. S. and Latin American anti-Castroites who protested against the recent U. S.-backed invasion say the U. S. should help the new effort.

POWER STRUGGLE

This writer holds no brief for the CIA nor have I ever electioneered for any anti-Castro faction. But the whole question of who rules post-Castro Cuba is involved in planning Castro's overthrow. For months before the invasion, the anti-Castroites privately assailed the CIA, the kindest charges being favoritism and not allowing the leaders to be in direct contact with their undergrounds. Yet many of these complaints obviously arose because of CIA machinery intended to keep any one camp from gaining de facto power in the invasion.

Today we again face the CIA's dilemma: how to knock over Castro without automatically creating his successor. And anti-Castro politics, which today swirl around the merits of CIA planning, cannot be dismissed as squabbles. If is a fight for power in post-Castro Cuba.

Before the freed Cubans can choose their own government, an interim régime must allow a free press to counteract Castro's saturation propaganda and political parties must hold national debates. The plan to invade Cuba and install a handpicked coalition government was meant to guarantee this outcome.

MANEUVER

But the CIA's plan failed thru lack of sufficient air cover, say men from the beaches. It thus deserves to have its head examined, which task the government has assumed.

If half the published and some is true, some CIA staff unpublished charges indicating misconduct of CIA...

members were almost criminally stupid. And those anti-Castro exiles who can be vigorously trying to use the anti-CIA outcry to get into position to become ruler of post-Castro Cuba.

Meanwhile the public opinion stampede over the fiasco is creating popular confusion that would be laughable if it weren't dangerous.

For example, Capt. Manuel Artime, Movement of Revolutionary Recuperation leader (now in Castro's jails) and former regional chief of Castro's Agrarian Reform Institute, is now nationally billed as "right-wing." Sr. "Manolo" Ray, anti-communist leftist leader of the People's Revolutionary Movement is accused of being a far-left sleeper whose underground didn't fight.

Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango, long-time associate of Costa Rica's ex-President Jose Figueres and Venezuela's President Romulo Betancourt, liberals, both, is frontpaged as "rightist."

We're threatened with another Big Shell Game like the one that created Castro in subsequent columns on the anti-Castro Cubans, this writer will try to help this newspaper's readers straighten out their lively points.

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Castro Foes Reported Living High in Prison

By Jack Best
Canadian Press Correspondent

H A V A N A, May 8 (AP) — Fidel Castro may be using gentle persuasion rather than harsh treatment on prisoners taken in the Cochinos Bay invasion in an effort to convert them into supporters of his revolution.

Reports in the government-controlled press say about 1000 prisoners are living in comparative luxury at the Sports Palace in Marianao just outside Havana.

(Other accounts of prison treatment, seeping through censorship indicate thousands of Cubans arrested in post-invasion roundups have been jammed into makeshift jails with little food or sanitary facilities. Prisoners seen on television showed no effects of ill treatment.)

With a display of forgiving magnanimity, Castro may be hoping to set the stage for a dramatic announcement that a large part of the captured force has formally renounced its aim of overthrowing Castro's government and now supports his "Socialist" state.


The newspaper El Mundo

reported some prisoners have already issued a statement saying they received better food and attention in Castro's hands than at their invasion base in Guatemala.

Immediately on entering the stadium, El Mundo said, each prisoner received a toothbrush, toothpaste and new clothes—shoes, shorts and shirts. The clothes were looked after by a laundry operated almost exclusively for the captives.

The newspaper gave this account of their day: Up at 7 a. m., wash, dress, do calisthenics and then breakfast. Lunch at 11 a. m., coffee and refreshments at 3 p. m. A "splendid" buffet dinner at 6 p. m. served by the Social Welfare Ministry. At 11 p. m., the prisoners go to bed on "commodious" mattresses.

The prisoners also enjoy complete barbering service and get a daily ration of tobacco, the paper said. Steps are being taken to install television sets so the prisoners may watch programs about the revolution's achievements.



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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

CIA Erred on Castro Air Power

By Drew Pearson

When the invasion strategy of the Cuban freedom fighters was being planned, The Bay of the Pigs was selected as the landing spot because it was surrounded by a swamp.

Three roads penetrated that swamp. However, the strategy was to mine these roads against the advance of Castro's tanks.

Then the Cuban rebels could hold out in the swamp and on the beach long enough to rouse the Cuban people to revolt.

The plan, officially labeled "Operation Pluto," was ok'd by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as entirely workable. In fact, they informed President Kennedy that it had a better chance of success than the CIA operation which overthrew the pro-Communist Arbenz regime in Guatemala.

However, success of the plan depended not only on mining the three roads against tanks, but on knocking out Castro's planes.

As reported in an earlier column, all the rebels' aviation gas, tank mines, and anti-tank shells were loaded on the SS Rio Escondido, a slow-moving Liberty ship which developed engine trouble, was able to make only four knots an hour, so was sent on in advance of the other vessels.

Arriving off the Bay of the Pigs, the Escondido was bombed by one of Castro's planes. It suffered almost a direct hit, and all the gasoline, tank mines, and anti-tank shells sank to the bottom of the Bay of the Pigs.



Pearson

This made it impossible to mine the roads against Castro's tanks, also destroyed the anti-tank shells to combat them.

Castro's Planes

On top of this, Castro's planes swooped down on the beach. These were British Sea Furies and American T-33 jet trainers, previously sold to Batista and inherited by Castro.

This was a surprise. Because Castro's planes were supposed to have been knocked out by a rebel raid over Havana on April 15, the Saturday prior to the invasion on Monday, April 17. The rebels had 18 planes in their Air Force, of which eight participated in this raid. They returned with reports and photographs showing Castro's Air Force destroyed.

This was the worst intelligence error. The CIA which was supposed to know the whereabouts of Castro's entire air force had failed to report that Castro had scattered other planes at various bases around the island.

It was these planes which turned up over the rebel beachhead, sank the Escondido and turned the beach into a booby trap. The freedom fighters had to take to the swamp.

On the second day of fighting, the rebel beach commander, Roberto San Roman, pleaded over his walkie-talkie for American planes.

The U. S. destroyers and airplane carrier standing off shore were mute. They had orders not to intervene.

Finally, early on the morning of April 19, Central Intelligence officers got President Kennedy out of bed and a 3 a. m. meeting was held in the White House.

Some Kennedy advisers

urged that American planes be ordered into battle. It was not an easy decision to make. Just three hours before at the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson had been the laughing stock of many delegates when he gave the word of President Kennedy that American armed forces were not involved. No one believed him, but what he said was true up to that point. The U. N. debate ended around midnight.

Navy Downed Plane

At the White House conference, three hours later, Kennedy finally ordered American planes into action in a last-minute effort to save the rebels from collapse.

But when Navy planes finally got off their near-by carrier, their only contribution to freedom was to help Castro. They shot down a rebel B-26.

The rebel planes had the same markings as Castro's planes except for a blue streak underneath the wing. The Navy pilot couldn't see beneath the wing, destroyed the rebel B-26.

By this time the battle was over. Kennedy's last-minute orders had been delayed by a snafu of the Navy's radio but probably would have been too late anyway. The United

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States, rebuffed by a 33-year-old bearded rabble-rouser, suffered one of its greatest defeats.

Since that defeat there have been reports that Secretary of State Rusk, together with Under Secretary Bowles and Adlai Stevenson, had vetoed the use of U. S. fighter planes between the April 15 air raid over Havana and the start of the invasion April 17.

The Joint Chiefs did come forward at the last minute with a proposal to use U. S. planes, but the President ruled that they were changing the signals too late, that their original strategy provided for no American participation. He ruled it out. Stevenson was not consulted. Chester Bowles filed a memo opposing the entire operation from the first, but there is no evidence it was given to Kennedy.

Rusk testified behind the closed doors of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he approved the invasion plan. His aides say he did so reluctantly.

After the debacle, the Joint Chiefs of Staff leaked denials that they had given their approval. But their chief, Secretary of Defense McNamara, went out of his way to tell newsmen just the opposite.

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CIA Accused of Imprisoning 17 Cubans for 11 Weeks

The Central Intelligence Agency has been charged with imprisoning an anti-Castro Cuban leader and 16 companions for 11 weeks both before and after the Cuban "invasion" fiasco. The New York Times, in a story from Miami, identified the Cuban as Rodolfo Nodal Paraga, a lawyer who was active in the National Revolutionary Front during the Batista regime. Nodal said he and the other 16 Cubans were held incommunicado in a remote camp in the jungle of Peten, in northern Guatemala until April 28 — 11 days after the Cuban landings began. They were flown back to

Miami and released on the following day, he reported. He attributed the imprisonment to their opposition to Capt. Manuel Artime and other leaders backed by the CIA for the abortive Cuban landings.

The 17 were kept in "subhuman" prison conditions, Nodal declared, accused of being Communists, and subjected to lie detector tests at gunpoint. The Times said the fact of their imprisonment was well known among Cuban circles in Miami, but full details had not been disclosed previously.

Nodal went to Miami from Cuba last October to work for the democratic revolutionary front and later was sent to Guatemala for training. These are other details of his story. After he and others in the camp objected to the Cuban leaders in charge, they were put under guard and shuttled from one camp to another. They were questioned constantly.

Some of the prisoners were taken away and others added as they went along. On March 30, Jose Miro Cardona, later named president of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, visited them and promised to have them set free.

When he left, he took with him the first letters they had been able to send their families since their arrest. He also told them he had nothing to do with their arrest.

Finally, a month later, they were flown to Miami in relays and released.

Nodal and his fellow prisoners have organized a new Cuban organization to be known as the 17th of April movement in memory of the Cuban landings.


They have called on Cuban groups to work together for the overthrow of Castro but without the participation of the CIA.

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Cuban Rebel Survivors Reported U. S. Captives

Believed Held on Vieques Island Behind Tight Screen of Secrecy

By BEM PRICE
Associated Press Staff Writer

There is reason to believe that the United States is holding survivors of the Cuban invasion forces incommunicado—prisoners, if you will—on a Caribbean island.

And there is evidence that the United States troubles with communism in Central and South America are just beginning.

The first rumor about the United States-held survivors of the invasion, some of whom reportedly are wounded, reached the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay soon after the military effort collapsed.

The grapevine there is so efficient that reports of activities in Havana, 600 miles west, sometimes reach the base before they are broadcast by the Castro regime.

Within hours after the grapevine report reached the base, the Castro captives from the abortive invasion—who were being interrogated in Havana on television—began talking of a particular island, Vieques.

Trained at U. S. Base

They said they had been trained for the invasion at the United States Marine base at Vieques, which is just a 30-minute helicopter ride from San Juan, Puerto Rico.

While the rumor about the Vieques prisoners was seeping into Guantanamo, it was also circulating in San Juan and New York.

A Navy officer talked by radio to the naval station at San Juan, asking if newsmen wanting to check on the rumors could be admitted to Vieques. The answer was that no one

would be admitted to the base without special permission from Washington.

On the assumption that training bases are normally open to visitors, efforts were made to gain access to Vieques through the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House.

The CIA was noncommittal. A White House spokesman said it would not assist in the matter of entry.

Doctor Held Captive


Presumably the United States wants no one to talk to these survivors until the furor over the Cuban debacle—and the CIA's role in it—has died down.

While the Vieques operation was kept secret, the New York Times has reported the story of Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Sarata, 27-year-old lawyer and member of the anti-Castro invasion forces.

Dr. Nodal said he and 16 other volunteers had been held captive at gunpoint in Guatemala by CIA agents because they refused to serve in the invasion forces under a man they described as a murderer in the regime of Dictator Fulgen-
cio Batista.

One consequence of the inva-

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tion, ~~flor~~ apparently has been a great upsurge in Communist activities in Central and South America.

Early this month a chartered Cuban airliner landed at Kingston, Jamaica to refuel. Out stepped 35 Communists, including two women, who said they had departed from Recife, Brazil, for Havana.

They made no bones about the fact that they were going to Havana to learn how Fidel Castro carried Cuba into the Soviet orbit.

There are reports that Cuban airliners are flying around the Caribbean picking up Communists and depositing them in Havana.

At a post-Cuban invasion background briefing, a high Pentagon official said the United States could expect more revolutions and more Castros south of the border.

Dubious on MIGs

Other reflections in the invasion aftermath.

~~the USS Diamond Head. The Diamond Head brought her sad story to Guantanamo.~~

Pipeline to Castro

There are roughly 3,200 Cubans working on the base and some of them make a pretty good pipeline to Castro.

Further, any time the Iron Curtain countries want a good look at whatever portion of the United States Fleet happens to be in Guantanamo, all they have to do is send a ship in.

The naval base is built around the outer bay of Guantanamo. There is a Cuban-controlled inner bay and access to this bay by ships of any nation is guaranteed by treaty.

In the last month or two, a couple of Iron Curtain cargo ships have sailed right down the middle of the Guantanamo harbor.

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(CUBA)

MIAMI --HAVANA RADIO TONIGHT CALLED PRESIDENT KENNEDY "THE PIRATE PRESIDENT OF THE 20TH CENTURY" AND WARNED "THE ROCKETS OF THE SOVIET UNION CAN, WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT, DESTROY ANY NATION OF THIS HEMISPHERE."

A HAVANA RADIO BROADCAST MONITORED HERE SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS ORGANIZING "LOCAL WARS" IN LAOS, SOUTH VIETNAM, KOREA, IN THE MIDEAST, THE CONGO, AND OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS IN CUBA.

"THE IMPERIALISTS ARE ORGANIZING THE THIRD WORLD WAR," THE BROADCAST SAID, "WITH THE STUPID DREAM THAT HITLER ONCE HAD OF EXTERMINATING THE INVINCIBLE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALISM, WHICH IS ADVANCING IN UNSTOPPABLE FORM FROM VICTORY TO VICTORY."

HAVANA RADIO ALSO CLAIMED TODAY ANTI-CASTRO FORCES WERE ARRIVING IN LARGE NUMBERS AT THE U.S. NAVAL BASE ON THE ISLAND OF VIEQUES OFF PUERTO RICO.

A BROADCAST HEARD HERE SAID THEIR ARRIVAL "COINCIDES WITH THE UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITY OBSERVED IN PUERTO RICO FOR THE PAST THREE DAYS, ESPECIALLY IN THE CITY OF MAYAGUEZ."

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CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Thurs., May 11, 1961 13

Tell Of Mystery Intelligence Unit in Cuban Invasion

By Charles Bartlett
Florida Cuba

EXCLUSIVE

WASHINGTON — The existence of Operation 40, a high-secret intelligence unit apparently designed to seize control of the Cuban government, came to light in the wake of the failure by the invading army of Cuban exiles. The fact of this unit, developed and maintained amid great secrecy in Miami before the invasion, has led to intense speculation among the exiles that a core of Cuban infiltrators planned to seize the government and establish a dictatorship, possibly under Capt. Manuel Artime, in the wake of victory over Fidel Castro. There is no evidence of CIA involvement in its operation.



CHARLES BARTLETT

The prospect of a terrorist strike against the Communists on the island and against any who might oppose the establishment of an autocratic government was suggested by the fact that inductees into the intelligence unit were offered instruction in killing and torture.

Curious Character
The discovery of this unit has deepened suspicions as to its intentions. It has led a number of the liberal Cuban leaders in the United States to fervent expressions of gratitude that the mission failed. Some reports say that a group of Batista toughnecks were em-

ployed by the leaders of Operation 40, Joaquin Sanguinis and Felix Gutierrez, for the purpose of shoring up the hold of a new regime.

The curious character of this group, the resentment which has attended its discovery, and an apparent postinvasion struggle for its control are all signs of the deep political dissent which has hampered the exiles at every stage of their move to oust Castro.

Operation 40 was conducted, according to the testimony of those involved with it, from a highly efficient office in Coral Gables, Fla. Recruits were selected with extreme care and a close scrutiny of their records. They were obliged to assert their anti-Communist position to a lie detector.

In the early phase of their association with Operation 40, the recruits were told that it was a commando outfit, but this guise, suffered from the fact that some of the recruits were elderly.

After induction the recruits were taken to a school in a large private home about an hour outside of Miami. The initial lectures dealt mildly with the responsibilities of an intelligence team in the invasion and in the steps that must be taken to uncover the Communists.

The later lectures, which drove a number of the recruits to resign from the unit, were given by a Cuban who talked bluntly of the need for torture and killing, for close searches of civilian women and men,

and for a number of repressive gestures on the island.

This Cuban instructor, whose name is unknown, was shipped to Guatemala before the landing. Those who stayed in the unit reported there was no further emphasis on the harsh steps of which he talked and that the unit, as it embarked for the invasion, had all the aspects of an army intelligence group. The Batistianos reported to be ready to join the unit as the landing neared did not appear.

Went Ashore Early
Some of the Operation 40 personnel went ashore early for reconnaissance but the bulk of the intelligence recruits were destined to follow the combat troops. For this reason a great many of them were saved from death or capture.

Sanguinis has not appeared in Miami since the landings, it is reported, but the man designated by Provisional President Miro Cardona to succeed him, Capt. Ernesto Despaigue, is said to have had a difficult struggle for control of the unit and its files.

There are a number of rumors about the reason for these guerrillalike efforts to keep the intelligence material from coming into his hands, and Despaigue, at last report, had resigned the assignment.

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State Department Blundered in Cuban Crisis

Failure to Brief Congress Could Have Had Serious Consequences

By Rowland Evans Jr.
 WASHINGTON.

back before it could be started in earnest.

President Kennedy did his part to consolidate the nation, and a good deal more, in the gloomy aftermath of the Cuba fiasco. He consulted more high-level Republicans than you could shake a stick at, and he stamped out the wild-fire of partisan at-

But the State Department was mesmerized, or something close to it, and couldn't seem to pick itself off the floor on the morning after. It failed utterly and dangerously to do its own job of consulting with Congress.

As a result, the Secretary, Dean Rusk, was required to go before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Latin American affairs, headed by the aggressive Wayne Morse, of Oregon, a man who knows a Senator's right when he sees it. And Allen W. Dulles of the C. I. A., who would rather not attend meetings of that kind, was likewise compelled to spend several hours with the full Foreign Relations Committee the following day.

As it happened, both Mr. Rusk, the amateur, and Mr. Dulles, the pro, acquitted themselves well, but either might easily have slipped during his long question-and-answer session with the most powerful committee of Congress. And if they had, the Administration might then have come face to face with a full-scale investigation of the kind that the Democrats forced on former President Eisenhower last year when the U-2 fiasco torpedoed the summit conference.



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urgent telegram asking for information.

The first Morse message, a telegram to Secretary Rusk asking for a briefing "in keeping with the spirit of the advice and consent clause" of the Constitution, was not even acknowledged, so far as can be determined. And yet it never should have had to be sent. Mr. Rusk and his lieutenants should have reacted automatically to the automatic need to tell the top men of Congress what was going on. The reaction should have been reflex, not forced by a telegram asking for news of what happened.

Sen. Morse dispatched his first appeal for information on April 24. When no reply came, he sent his second on April 26, this one asking Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles to come up and talk to the subcommittee on April 28. But Mr. Bowles replied that he couldn't make it.

Until that moment, Sen. Morse was punctilious in refraining from anything resembling pressure tactics. He knew that Messrs. Rusk and Bowles had a major crisis on their hands. He did not want to obstruct or confuse or get in the way.

Almost Blew Top

But when he got Mr. Bowles' refusal, he almost blew his top—and for a very interesting reason. He knew that high officials in the Administration, including Mr. Bowles and Chip Bohlen and MacGeorge Bundy and others, had been briefing large numbers of editors in the State Department auditorium on the inside story of Cuba. He also knew that some of his Senate colleagues were seriously embarrassed when they were asked by these same editors to give their assessment of the scene behind the scene—and had to beg off because they had never been shown a glimpse of it. This was not touching Senate pride, but trampling on it. With a couple of exceptions,

the Foreign Relations Committee was angry. The exceptions were the chairman, Sen. Fulbright, who was the only member of Congress let in on the secret of the invasion before it happened; and the Democratic leaders, Sen. Mansfield and Sen. Humphrey, who had gotten the word at their regular legislative breakfast with President Kennedy on April 18.

Under these circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that Sen. Morse made his speech in the Senate condemning the whole enterprise (the first member to raise the issue on the floor of either House). Nor is it surprising that he then demanded the presence of Mr. Dulles.

Most Important

The Cuban affair was the most important event ever to happen within the jurisdiction of the Morse subcommittee. Except for what they picked up in the newspapers, neither the Morse subcommittee nor the full committee had heard a word about it.

A good argument can be made, and often has been, against consulting members of Congress before an undertaking as risky and as clandestine as the Cuban invasion.

What is not accepted, and should not be acceptable in a government that divides its powers among separate branches, is failure to consult after the event, and particularly at a time when every visiting editor, and every enterprising reporter, were getting selected versions of the inside story from the top.

Relationships between the competing power blocs in Washington are sometimes decided irrevocably by errors of no larger dimension than this one, and the result can be mean for the offending party. This time, no damage was done. But, next time, it may be different.

Leads to Trouble

Consultation, or sharing part of the secret, with the proud and prerogative-conscious Senate is a vital aspect of the political game. Failure to know this and act upon it is to open a Pandora's box of unwanted and unnecessary troubles, and to exacerbate the very difficulties that need curing.

The Cuban invasion was launched on Sunday night, April 16. The State Department did not make an effort to get in touch with Sen. Morse, the chairman of the subcommittee that is directly responsible for Latin-American affairs, until April 26, more than a week later—and then only in response to Sen. Morse's second

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May 14, 1961

OUR SUNDAY VISITOR

To talk of many things

Massacre at Cochininos Bay

DALE FRANCIS

ALL of the experts have solemnly made their autopsies of the tragedy at Cochininos Bay where a valiant group of Cuban Freedom Fighters was slaughtered by Castro's militiamen.

I am amazed at the explanations. They are detailed and diverse. They speak of lack of air support, of slow landing procedures, of too few men, of inadequate armament, of lack of knowledge of the strength of the armament of Castro's forces. Blame is placed on the CIA, the President, on Commander Manuel Artime.



Dale Francis


Yet everyone seems to avoid mentioning the one plain fact for the failure of the invasion, the one thing that turned what might have been a successful attack on Communist power in Cuba into a disastrous defeat for the forces of freedom.

The real explanation is simply that someone informed, someone told Castro exactly when and where the Freedom Fighters were going to land. When they landed they were already surrounded on all sides by Castro's militia. They were simply the victims of informers who set up a terrible trap for them.

There are 50 places where landings could have been made in Cuba. The Castro forces would ordinarily have been forced to disperse their defenses to protect against possible invasion at many points. Had the landings at Cochininos Bay been the surprise they should have been, 1,500 men would have been more than sufficient. Under normal circumstances, Castro would never have had sufficient defenders on hand to stop the initial landings. But knowing exactly when and where the landings were to be made, Castro was able to set up a semi-circle of withering fire that could have destroyed a landing force of 10,000 as easily as it did the force of 1,500.

There were certain disadvantages in the area around Zapata swamp. There is no real natural cover in the area. There are a few hills but nothing like the mountains of central or eastern Cuba to offer refuge for the invading forces. This was, however, a calculated risk the invaders had to take for there were real advantages in this area as a point of invasion.

One of the advantages is the relative inaccessibility of the area. In normal circumstances, Castro could not have been expected to have had any heavy fire power available. The area is not easily reached and had the informers not betrayed them, the Freedom Fighters could have quickly moved northward.



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Parker

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Cut off junction

And just north of them, just west of the city of Colon, there was the most valuable target area for an invasion in all of Cuba. In this area, only a short 50 miles north, there is the junction point for the only two east-west railroads in Cuba and the only east-west highway. Had the Freedom Fighters reached this point they could have effectively cut Cuba into half.

They didn't reach this point, not because the military strategy was bad but because someone informed on them.

It turns out, too, that probably President Kennedy's statement that the U.S. would not militarily intervene, however well meant it was, simply proved another factor in discouraging the anti-Castro elements in Cuba from risking their necks.

Incidentally, let me say that had the invasion not been betrayed, the statement by President Kennedy would not have harmed the position of the Freedom Fighters at all and even might have helped them, so I am not criticizing the President — I'm just pointing out that when things go wrong other things turn out wrong, too. My personal opinion is that President Kennedy grows in stature all the time, and his willingness to assume responsibility for the failure demonstrates that this man is a man of potential greatness. Since obviously the President wasn't the one who did the informing and it was the informing that caused the defeat, he was not responsible for the tragedy, but his willingness to accept the blame demonstrates we have a real man as our president and for this we can all be thankful.

Dr. Manuel Artime

I have written often of Dr. Manuel Artime and I was shocked at the vituperative attacks on him in Time, Newsweek and some of the daily newspapers. Newsweek called him "an extreme right winger." This is an astonishing designation that leads me to believe that Newsweek's correspondent either knows nothing about Artime's views or else Newsweek is so far to the left that a moderate position seems to the extreme right.

Manuel Artime always made his dislike of anti-Communism evident. He disliked equally the viewpoint that all that needed to be done in Cuba was to eliminate the

~~two~~ Castros and Che Guevara and all the rest could remain. But he recognized that Cuba could not and should not return to the old system, he wanted to see social inequities eliminated.

Time was equally harsh with Dr. Artime. This magazine referred to him as "opportunistic," which means, I suppose, that he grabbed the reins of leadership. The plain fact is that Dr. Artime was certain to stand out among the members of the revolutionary council. He offered a strong personality, strong convictions and real qualities of leadership and since most of the members of the council possess none of these it was inevitable that Artime should rise to the top.

Time says Manuel Artime is dead — according to Time he was killed while still aboard a ship in the bay before the landing. While I know for a fact this is not so — I learned directly from one of the invaders that Artime reached the beach and was fighting there when last seen.

I talked with one of his closest friends and advisors the day before writing this column. He said he was virtually convinced Manuel was killed. Latest reports say that Artime was captured two weeks after the invasion and is now in the hands of the Castro government.

Ray another Castro

But make no mistake about it, even as they are downgrading Artime the newspapermen are building up Manolo Ray as a potential leader of Cuba. And make no mistake about Manolo Ray, this man differs hardly at all from Castro in his political views. I shudder to think of a struggle in which Cuba and American lives are lost to oust Castro and then to see Castro replaced by Manolo Ray. I would like to warn you to watch closely the propaganda efforts of certain magazines and newspapers to build up Ray to a position of leadership.

What should be done now? Well, Communism must be eradicated in Cuba. This the President has pledged to do and he will do. But there should be the closest investigation of all anti-Castro groups. The identity of the informer or informers must be discovered. I would hope that we had enough sense of security to have limited advance knowledge of the point of invasion and its timing to a small enough number of persons to make investigation possible.



Manuel Artime

I have written often of my absolute certainty that men committed to Communism and Castro had infiltrated the anti-Castro movement. The tragedy of Cochinos Bay is undoubtedly the work of just such traitors.

But let there be no talk of bungling on the part of the CIA — except, as I said before an explanation from the CIA man who forced acceptance of Manolo Ray into the inner council (Life says his name is Stephen Carr). The tragedy of Cochinos Bay was caused first of all by informers who let Castro know in time to reach the area.

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
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UPI-61

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S SPECIAL EXPERT ON LATIN AMERICA WENT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS WITH A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE TODAY TO EXPLAIN HIS ROLE IN THE RECENT ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION ATTEMPT.

ADOLF A. BERLE, ADVISER TO SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK AND HEAD OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA, MET WITH THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA AS CHAIRMAN WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE., RENEWED THE GROUP'S INQUIRY INTO THE CUBAN FIASCO. MORSE, HOWEVER, REJECTED THE IDEA THAT HIS GROUP WAS CONDUCTING A "PROBE" OR "INVESTIGATION." IT WAS MERELY SEEKING INFORMATION THROUGH BRIEFINGS, HE SAID.

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
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JPI-10

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE TODAY RENEWED ITS INQUIRY INTO THE CUBAN FIASCO BY CALLING A HIGH STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISER TO EXPLAIN HIS ROLE IN THE ILL-FATED INVASION ATTEMPT.

ADOLF A. BERLE, ADVISER TO SECRETARY RUSK AND HEAD OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA, WAS SCHEDULED TO APPEAR AT A CLOSED-DOOR HEARING (10 A.M.).

SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN WAYNE MORSE, D-ORE., SAID LAST NIGHT THE "RUSSIAN MIGS" THAT THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT WAS REPORTED TO HAVE USED TO HELP THWART THE INVASION ACTUALLY WERE U.S. PLANES SENT TO THE OLD BATISTA REGIME.

MORSE SAID HIS FOREIGN RELATIONS GROUP HAD HEARD "NOT A BIT OF EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A SINGLE SOVIET MIG IN CUBA. PREVIOUS WITNESSES INCLUDED RUSK AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES.

ASSISTANT SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, D-MINN., SAID YESTERDAY THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PLAYED A MORE POWERFUL ROLE IN THE INVASION DECISION THAN THE CIA OR ANY OTHER GROUP IN GOVERNMENT. ON THE WHOLE, HE SAID, THE CIA DID "A FAIRLY GOOD JOB."

SEN. JOSEPH S. CLARK, D-PA., SAID THE ORIGINAL INVASION PLAN AS CONCEIVED BY THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION WAS "VERY FOOLISH." HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD IT CALLED FOR U.S. LOGISTICAL HELP AND POSSIBLY AIR SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS.

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
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UPI-97

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SEN. WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE., SAID TODAY HIS LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE WILL CALL TOP PENTAGON OFFICIALS FOR DETAILED ANSWERS ON THEIR ROLE IN THE ILL-FATED CUBAN REBEL INVASION ATTEMPT. MORSE SAID HIS GROUP HAS ASKED GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND ASSISTANT DEFENSE SEC. PAUL H. NITZE TO TESTIFY BEHIND CLOSED DOORS IN THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE'S INQUIRY INTO THE NO DATE HAS BEEN SET BUT THE SESSION PROBABLY WILL WEEK, MORSE SAID.

THE OREGON DEMOCRAT ALSO SAID THE SUBCOMMITTEE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS, HENRY RAYMONT OF UPI AND TA THE NEW YORK TIMES, ON THE CUBAN SITUATION. NO DATE HAS BEEN SET FOR THAT SESSION EITHER.

MORSE BEAMED THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S INQUIRY TOWARD THE AND ONE-HALF HOUR SESSION WITH ADVISER TO SECRETARY RUSK AND HEAD TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA.

THE OREGON DEMOCRAT SAID BERLE ASKED MANY OF THE GROUP'S QUESTIONS ABOUT "WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED WITH REGARD TO THE INVASION" TO THE PENTAGON FOR ANSWERS. BERLE SAID BERLE TOLD THE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT "MANY OF THOSE QUESTIONS SHOULD HAVE TO BE DIRECTED TO PENTAGON WITNESSES."

MORSE SAID THAT BERLE EMPHASIZED THE REPULSED INVASION ATTEMPT, FACTORS.

HE SAID BERLE POINTED OUT THAT IT "BROUGHT CORE COMMUNISTS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF LATIN AMERICA" AND BROUGHT THEM INTO THE OPEN. ALSO, MORSE QUOTED BERLE AS SAYING, THE SITUATION HAS MADE THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF FIDEL CASTRO HAS BECOME LINKED TO THE COMMUNIST PREMIER

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UPI-101

ADD 1 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-97)

BERLE ALSO TOLD THE SENATORS THAT CUBA'S LONG HISTORY OF UPRISINGS AGAINST DICTATORIAL RULERS WOULD NOT SEEM TO SUPPORT THE THEORY OF SOME THAT THE CUBANS WILL BUCKLE UNDER INDEFINITELY TO CASTRO'S PRO-COMMUNIST REGIME.

BERLE ALSO REVIEWED AT LENGTH WITH MORSE'S GROUP THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S FUTURE PLANS FOR CARRYING OUT THE PRESIDENT'S LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM AND FOR DEALING WITH THE CUBAN REFUGEE PROBLEM.

BERLE SAID ONLY THE SESSION WAS A "FULL, FRANK AND FRIENDLY DISCUSSION" OF THE ENTIRE LATIN AMERICAN PROBLEM, INCLUDING CUBA.

SEN. BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, R-IOWA, THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S TOP REPUBLICAN MEMBER, SAID THE SESSION WITH BERLE SHED "NO NEW LIGHT" ON THE SITUATION.

MORSE SAID HE AND BERLE SHARED HIGH HOPES THAT A FORTHCOMING MEETING OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC MINISTERS, POSSIBLY AT MONTEVIDEO IN JULY, MIGHT PROVIDE THE FIRST FORUM FOR CONCERTED HEMISPHERIC ACTION WITH REGARD TO CASTRO.

BESIDES HEARING RAYMONT AND SZULC, MORSE SAID, THE SUBCOMMITTEE MAY ALSO INVITE OTHER CORRESPONDENTS WITH EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA TO GIVE THEIR VIEWS AT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS.

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DORIS FLEESON

Senators Seek Answer on Cuba

Dulles Says Joint Chiefs Approved; So Pentagon Leaders Will Be Queried

Allen Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency director, has assured a Senate subcommittee that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the luckless Cuban invasion.

One subcommittee member found the Dulles assertion so incredible he framed an inquiry about the Joint Chiefs' participation in the most direct and plainest terms. Mr. Dulles did not budge. He replied that the Joint Chiefs approved, everybody approved.

The tension was relieved when the skeptical Senator, considered by his colleagues to be pro-Pentagon, threw up his hands and insisted that if that were true the country was really in a fix. Mr. Dulles joined in the laughter.

It was decided to let the Joint Chiefs speak for themselves, so the next important witnesses to face Subcommittee Chairman Morse will be Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Army Chief of Staff, and Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Nitze, whose province is International Security Affairs.

It had been clear for some time following off-the-record

briefings at the State Department and continued inquiry on Capitol Hill that CIA was shifting the weight of the blame for Cuba to the Pentagon. Just how the military participated has not been suggested, but presumably the Army is being charged, rather than the Navy, as at first believed.

Defense sources insist they will be cleared in the end because their approval was made conditional on the accuracy of certain statements made by CIA. Whether anything in the way of proof was put in writing is not known.

One thing that has been established to the satisfaction of Senator Morse is that no Russian MIGS had been used by Premier Castro to defeat the invaders. The subcommittee, he said, has not heard one bit of evidence that the Soviets had sent some of their powerful fighter planes to the Castro government.

The subcommittee has also made it plain to Adolf Berle, head of the State Department's task force on Latin America, that they will be

glad when he and his associates relinquish their burden to a duly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for the area and an Ambassador to the Organization of American States. The task force, which was brought into the invasion discussions, is viewed by the Senators as a loose administrative device which cannot solve the urgent problems of America's present role in Latin America.

Cuba is scheduled to become an important item on President Kennedy's Canadian agenda. Canada's foreign minister has proposed that Canada mediate between the United States and the Castro government. The President now plans to reply that Canada would be welcome as a member of the OAS where it could work more effectively toward a joint effort to keep communism away from this hemisphere.

The Morse subcommittee does not expect to make a formal report of its Cuban hearings in whole or in part. However, there is nothing to prevent its member from airing their impressions on the Senate floor, and this is considered certain to happen.

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UPI-173

(CUBA)

OTTAWA--THE CANADIAN LABOR CONGRESS TODAY CONDEMNED THE U.S. FOR ITS
ROLE IN THE ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION.

IN A STATEMENT ISSUED AS PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRIME MINISTER
DIEFENBAKER BEGAN TALKS ON CUBA AND OTHER TOPICS. THE 1,100,000-
MEMBER CONGRESS SAID IT COULD NOT "JUSTIFY SUCH ACTION ON THE PART
OF ANY WESTERN STATE."

"THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE CANADIAN LABOR CONGRESS JOINS
REPRESENTATIVES AND RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL
COMMENTATORS IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE IN
CONDEMNING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS ROLE IN
THE ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO LAND IN CUBA ARMED GROUPS OF EXILES FOR THE
DECLARED PURPOSE OF STARTING A CIVIL WAR," THE CLC SAID.
THE CONGRESS, MAIN SPOKESMAN FOR CANADIAN LABOR, AGREED, HOWEVER,
WITH THE U.S. ASSESSMENT OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT. IT ACCUSED THE
CASTRO REGIME OF TURNING A GENUINE REVOLUTION INTO "A RULE OF TERROR
AND SUPPRESSION."

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THE EXILES' STORY

Cuban Invasion Plan Altered, Leaders Say

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

There are two ways of looking at the Cuban invasion fiasco of April 17—through the eyes of Washington and through the eyes of the Cuban participants. The Washington view—or at least a murky version of it—

First of Four Articles

has been put before the public in a semi-secret briefings by officials. Informed comment by members of Congress and a great mass of journalistic speculation. It adds up to this: The Kennedy administration, pressed by circumstances and poorly advised, sponsored and gave limited support to a disastrously unsuccessful attempt to invade or infiltrate Castro Cuba.

But the details of the attempt to unseat Cuba's pro-Communist regime are still far from clear. To help round out the picture, The Star has obtained the anti-Castro Cuban leaders' view of the invasion and the events leading up to it. This was done by interviewing most of those leaders and many of their followers in their headquarters of operation—New York, Miami and Washington. Many points in their story, which will be presented in this and three succeeding articles, are impossible to check with other sources. And at the outset it should be noted that there is a danger that they may have distorted or exaggerated for personal or political purposes.

CIA Declines Comment

The Star asked the Central Intelligence Agency, principal target of the exiles' criticism, for comment on the assertions of the Cuban exiles. A CIA spokesman, after reviewing the material, said that organization felt it should maintain its traditional policy of declining to comment publicly on criticism of CIA operations.

Two main points stand out in the Cuban version of the April adventure.

First, Cuban leaders declare that the landing on April 17

was contrary to their agreed-upon strategy, which was that any such step must be synchronized with extensive operations by anti-Castro forces inside Cuba.

Second, they say that certain Americans—who they believe to have been representatives of the CIA—took over their movement so completely that when the invasion occurred many of the Cuban leaders in whose name it was being carried out didn't even know about it.

Differed on Strategy

A key element in the Cuban side of the invasion story is the fact that there had been a long-standing difference of opinion on strategy among the Cuban exiles. One theory was that a "one-shot" invasion would catalyze popular discontent in Cuba and bring about a powerful move to overthrow Fidel Castro. The other was that emphasis should be on an internal revolt directed by an underground organization capable of holding together the anti-Castro factions in a long, hard fight.

Before any effective move by Cubans in this country could occur, these two points of view had to be compromised. And, say the Cubans, those whom they believed to be representatives of the CIA acted as the "marriage broker."

Form Council

The device by which the dissident exile groups were brought together was the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which was formed on March 20 with Jose Miro Cardona as its head.

It joined the Democratic Revolutionary Front, headed by Manuel Antonio de Varona, and the People's Revolutionary Movement, headed by Manuel Antonio Ray, who had once been Castro's Minister of Public Works.

Mr. Varona was actually "coordinator" of five different groups loosely united in the "Frente," as it was called. By and large, the Cubans he represented favored the invasion approach.

Many of the Cubans assert that the "Frente" was the organization most favored by what they considered to be the CIA and that its chief liaison

with American intelligence agents on military matters. Capt. Manuel Artime, a young former Castro lieutenant.

Favored Internal Revolt

Manolo Ray and his MRP favored the slower, "internal revolt" approach. This organization reportedly had a large

underground operation in Cuba, and Mr. Ray himself had been using tactics employed when he led clandestine civil resistance for Castro in the Cuban cities. The MRP was drawn into the Council, the Cuban sources say, by a desire to get a share of the American guns, ammunition and other supplies that had been going to the Frente.

The courtship preceding the marriage of the two groups was protracted and complex. The main problem was settling on a strategy of revolt, but there also were deep political differences as to what should happen after the overthrow of the Castro regime.

Mr. Ray and his chief lieutenants—Paul Chibas and Philippe Pazos—set a high price on their participation. They were not opposed to outside invasion training camps or to invasion of the island as such. But they insisted that the whole emphasis on the training camps be changed and that the neglect of opposition forces inside Cuba cease.

Reach Agreement

They won the battle—or thought they did. At the final negotiations on the Revolutionary Council at the Congress Inn Motel in Miami on March 20-21, the Varona and Ray groups reached a three-point agreement:

1. Top priority in the anti-Castro struggle should be assigned to help for the rebel forces inside Cuba.
2. Former supporters of Gen. Batista, the Cuban dictator ousted by Castro in 1959, should be eliminated from the training camps.
3. Command of the rebel forces outside Cuba should be put exclusively into the hands of the Council.

The Cubans now say that the second and third points reflected growing concern about both exile groups that control of the rebel movement had been slipping from their control and into the control of the men they believed to be CIA agents.

Mr. Miro Cardona, who had been Fidel Castro's first premier, was charged with carrying out the agreement. He was also given authority to appoint six other members to the new Council, forming a kind of cabinet in exile. In the following days, both he and Mr. Varona toured the training camps and investigated their management.

It is significant that every public pronouncement of the Council—including a "call to arms" issued by Mr. Miro Cardona on April 8—emphasized internal revolt in Cuba. At the press conference that day, and even after rebel planes had bombed air fields in Cuba a week later, both Mr. Miro Cardona and Mr. Varona scoffed at talk of an invasion.

Order for Underground

Mr. Ray, meanwhile, believed he had received a mandate to organize the underground for a final, internal push against Castro. Several days following the "call to arms" he was named Council member in charge of "interior operations."

Mr. Ray admits that he expected an invasion to take place—but not of the type or at the time of the April 17 landings. Reportedly, he understood there were to be large diversionary landings at several different places over a period of days and that they were to be backed up by a co-ordinated campaign of sabotage and guerilla warfare by internal

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of the Council members who took part was told what would happen the next day.

Mr. Varona was busy in Havana and couldn't attend the meeting, but he maintains he, too, did not know the details or the timing of the invasion "until shortly after it had begun"—even though he had been designated the Council's "defense co-ordinator" in charge of military planning.

Capt. Artime, who turned up as head of the rebel invaders (and who was captured by Castro forces in the swamps around Cochinos Bay), was absent—attending to his duties in the training camps it was said—at the time of the April 16 meeting.

Feel They Were Duped

In retrospect, there is a feeling among many of the Cubans that they were duped. And they blame the CIA for the duping.

They say they suspect Capt. Artime had been selected to play a role similar to that of Castillo Armas, who, with American backing, took Guatemala from the Arbenz government and the Communists in 1954.

They can't find much of a "collective leadership" ring to an Artime declaration broadcast from a patrol boat off the South Cuban coast on the day of the invasion: "I, Manuel Artime, convoke the Cuban people to revolt in fulfillment of my promise of a year ago."

"They feel, in fact, that their Council was used simply as a "cover" by the Americans who ostensibly were helping them. And, again, they say they are convinced that these Americans had official status as representatives of the CIA.

(Tomorrow: The Cubans' version of the CIA's role.)



JOSE MIRO CARDONA



MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA



MANUEL ANTONIO RAY
—AP Wirephotos

forces all over the island. This, of course, did not occur.

On April 12, Mr. Ray and two aides actually set out for Cuba to rally the underground after long talks at Council headquarters in New York. But their boat got stuck in the mud of Miami Bay and they had to turn back. Before they could leave again Mr. Ray was summoned to an urgent, secret Council meeting in New York on April 16, just one day before the landings.

That April 16 meeting is important in the story because the Cubans insist that not one

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In a "confidential memorandum" explaining his decision, Mr. Sanchez Arango charged "our allies" with manipulating the exile movement for their own ends. American agents, he said, were establishing a corrupt "bureaucracy in exile." He charged the agents had set up their own radio station on Swan Island in the Caribbean and were insisting that all communications with the underground in Cuba go through their channels.

Mr. Sanchez Arango has since joined another exile group.

Difficulties With Underground

It is now clear that the Americans had difficulties in dealing with underground groups in Cuba. There had been a gradual breakdown in actual and ideological contact between these groups and the exiles in this country. Some of the political ideas of the underground leaders, while mild in the context of what Castro was doing to turn Cuba into a Communist stronghold, seemed dangerously "radical" to many of the exiles here.

The underground groups were basically opposed to Castro's Communist connections, not to his radical reforms. It was after he imprisoned Maj. Hubert Matos — one of his most popular subordinates — in October, 1959, for anti-communism, that several members of his government turned against him and went underground.

Castro Defectors Unite

Manuel Ray, who had been Minister of Public Works and earlier the head of Castro's "civil resistance" against Batista, was one of those who went underground, forming the People's Revolutionary Movement (MRP) with other defecting leaders of the Castro "26th of July" movement.

The MRP was convinced that subversion and sabotage, directed from inside Cuba, were the key to the overthrow of Castro. What they wanted from the United States was military materiel — not money, men or exile organizations.

Mr. Ray and several of his top assistants came to the United States last November to seek such help. They say they were met with suspicion by the American agents and received many promises but little actual aid.

They insist the reason for the coolness was political. They feel they were too closely identified with the radical economic and social reforms Mr. Castro instituted during his first months in office. There were conservative exiles in Florida who charged that Mr. Ray offered "Fidelismo without Fidel."

Agents Not Informed

Throughout the Cuban version of the pre-invasion story, there runs a theme: That the American agents they worked with were trained specialists in undercover activities but had little or no knowledge of the politics and geography of Cuba.

They say that while Americans were busily training exile units in Guatemala they were persistently refusing to send large-scale aid to the guerilla fighters in the Escambray

mountains. The Americans, the Cubans assert, seemed to have been afraid that the whole Escambray operation was a Castro hoax. When they did sponsor several last-minute parachute drops, the equipment fell into the hands of Castro troops.

It is also asserted that when Nino Diaz, a former Castro officer, was dropped into the Sierra Maestra mountains in November to work with the guerillas, his kit contained equipment not designed for the mission or the terrain.

Call Bender Domineering

The Cuban leaders criticize the fact that Mr. Bender did not speak Spanish. He spoke English with a foreign accent, they say—German or Slavic. He was, they declare, domineering—giving orders rather than advice. He reportedly told some of his Cuban contacts that he had helped organize the French underground behind German lines during World War II, others that he had been operating in the Laotian jungles before the Cuban operation.

The Cubans who were most discontented about their relationship with their American "allies" say now that they saw indications of better days ahead soon after the Kennedy administration took over.

One of the first results of a re-examination of Cuban policy by the incoming administration seems to have been a drive to bring together the various anti-Castro groups in exile.

Outlook Brightens

Members of the Ray MRP movement say their fortunes seemed to rise rapidly after the end of January. They feel they gained indirect support from three key Washington advisers on Latin America—Adolf Berle, head of the new President's task force on Latin America; Arthur Schlesinger, a White House assistant, and Phillip Bonsal, who had been in contact with Manuel Ray and other former Castro leaders when he was American Ambassador in Havana in 1959-60.

All three of these policy advisers believed strongly that Fidel Castro headed and later betrayed a genuine social and economic revolution. This position lends itself to the view that Manuel Ray and "radical" opposition within Cuba offered more hope for popular Cuban support against Fidel Castro than did conservative exile forces organized, trained and financed from the outside.

Cuban leaders feel this sentiment led to a concentrated CIA effort to wed the MRP and the Frente into a common political organization.

Cubans Balk

The first American move in that direction seems to have come around February 24 during an informal gathering between Mr. Ray of the MRP and Mr. Varona of the Frente and their associates in Washington. Mr. Bender attended and, the Cubans say, presented a list of 26 names to each group separately, suggesting that they pick a council of 10 to represent them.

This the Cubans refused to do. They say they resented this attempt to restrict their choice of leaders. They assert that at least 10 of the men on the Bender list were former Cuban millionaires, including Julio Lobo—a one-time sugar czar.

Nevertheless, the negotiations continued. Meetings between three leaders of the Frente and three from the MRP took place behind closed doors at the Comodore Hotel in New York from February 28 to March 3. No Americans were present.

After four days of nearly continuous exchanges, the representatives agreed on the general outlines and program of a common revolutionary council. But they still could not agree on a military program.

The Americans appear to have come back into the picture about March 19—this time in Miami. A "Mr. Carr"—previously unknown, at least to MRP leaders—summoned the two groups to a night meeting at the Congress Inn Motel near the airport.

Nevertheless, unity negotiations continued, primarily in New York between February 28 and March 3. While agreement on broad outlines of a common revolutionary council apparently were reached, the conferees were unsuccessful in picking a leader.

Then, around March 19, according to the Cubans, a "Mr. Carr" called unity negotiators to a meeting in Miami. Mr. Carr, previously unknown to the exiles, also is believed by them to have been a CIA representative.

Participants say Mr. Carr was extremely polite and quite diplomatic. To the MRP this new approach and the disappearance of the irritating Mr. Bender seemed to signal a new American approach. Mr. Carr asked only that the two groups agree on a "provisional president" within 48 hours. He did not suggest any names.

Choose Leaders

Within 24 hours the MRP had decided to name Jose Miro Cardona, who had been Cuba's first Premier under Mr. Castro, their leader. The Frente representatives agreed, and the unity of the two groups was established in the early hours of March 21.

All the principals seemed sat-

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isfied. The MRP had exacted a secret agreement to revamp the training camps and begin large-scale military aid to their Cuban underground.

The Frente retained main leadership of the whole exile movement through the majority of appointments Mr. Miro Cardona later made to the seven-man Revolutionary Council.

And in both these groups' view, the CIA had achieved the unity of the main anti-Castro movement so urgently required by Washington.

Military preparations in the training camps do not seem to have changed substantially in the following weeks. In fact, Cuban leaders claim they were intensified. And the invasion went forward less than a month later.

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THE EXILES' STORY

Cubans Complain U. S. 'Took Control'

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

A mysterious "Mr. Bender" figures large in the political maneuvering and military preparation preceding the abortive April 17 "invasion" of Cuba by anti-Castro exiles.

Cuban exile leaders say Mr. Bender identified himself as an American businessman who wanted to help them unseat Fidel Castro. They also say they soon became convinced that he, and Americans working with him, actually represented the Central Intelligence Agency—and, therefore, the United States Government.

Bender Offers Help

Interviews with the Cubans, who are admittedly bitter over handling of the invasion and its dismal failure, uncover a profound resentment against Mr. Bender in particular and the CIA in general.

It is possible—even likely—that the bitterness colors their comments and even their recollection. But, rightly or wrongly, they feel that the Americans were out to take control of their movement and, in fact, did hold all the strings by the time the invasion occurred.

The Cubans say Mr. Bender

entered the picture last June when he approached leaders of the newly formed Democratic Revolutionary Front—the "Frente," as it became known—in New York. He told them, they say, that he and a group of colleagues wanted to help organize and finance their anti-Castro operations.

The Cubans say they agreed. The more bitter ones now claim that this informal partnership ended with the Americans in behind-the-scenes control.

The Cubans also report that Mr. Bender and his aides maintained they had only a vague "semi-official" status. They certainly never identified themselves as CIA agents, and the Cubans admit they have no proof they were.

But during months of close association, they say, the Americans spoke and acted with such authority that none of the Cuban principals doubt they were intelligence agents with official status.

No official American comment has confirmed the identity of Mr. Bender and his aides. High officials have admitted in "background briefings," however, that the CIA was involved in the early stages of the revolutionary movement. Reporters attended these briefings with the understanding

See CUBA, Page A-6

that their sources of information were not to be revealed.

From the beginning the alliance between the Cubans and Mr. Bender and his people was an uneasy one.

On the Cuban side, rival factions jockeyed for favored treatment in the way of money and arms. At the same time they resented the way the Americans moved in to settle their factional disputes. Leaders say they were never quite sure of over-all American strategy, mainly because the Americans seemed to separate political and military operations among the exiles. They feared control of their affairs was slipping out of their hands.

On the other side, the Americans seem to have been plagued by a dilemma: How to weld the exiles into a strong, unified anti-Castro movement which would gain maximum support and yet be politically reliable from the American point of view.

Mr. Bender quickly began to take an active interest in Frente affairs; the Cubans relate. And in late September, after an unsuccessful attempt to de-Americanize the movement by setting up headquarters in Mexico City, he and two colleagues met near Miami with the directors of the five groups which made up the Frente. The purpose: To name a president or "co-ordinator" for the Frente. Up to that time, each director had an equal voice in a collective leadership.

Wanted Co-ordinator


Cubans who participated in that meeting say the American agents argued that the collective arrangement was leading to anarchy. They urged a co-ordinator who could work with the Americans in a decisive way. One participant said that under the new arrangement, the directors were to meet once or twice a month to frame "general policy."

At a September 27 meeting, the Frente directors agreed to the idea and named Manuel Antonio de Varona, a former political leader in Cuba and one of the Frente directors, as co-ordinator.

The choice was clearly not unanimous. Immediately after the Varona selection, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, leader of the "Trials A" party in Cuba, resigned as a Frente director.

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The Washington Merry-go-Round

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CIA Covers Its Cuban Tracks

By Drew Pearson

Central Intelligence agents have been moving swiftly and discreetly to destroy tangible clues linking them to the Cuban invasion.



They appear worried sick over a Senate investigation.

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Second, the CIA has taken two ships, the Blagard and the Barbara.

So anxious were CIA agents to destroy any incriminating evidence, that they even removed standard signaling equipment.

Another vessel, the Santa Anna, which was used for use by Cuban groups to the West. The ship, the Atlantic, was pulled into Baltimore.

In each case, all incriminating equipment has been re-

moved. If the CIA had been as thorough in organizing the invasion as it was in covering up evidence of the invasion, Castro might be out of Cuba today.

Note: The CIA doesn't really have to worry about a Senate probe. Too many solons, like Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa, don't want to delve into these mistakes.

Adlai-JFK Rift

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Many delegates snickered. They were better informed than the chief American delegate.

When the full facts later leaked out and it became known that the United States had backed almost every step of the invasion, Stevenson felt that his usefulness in New York had ended. His future statements before the U. N., he felt, would carry no weight. He seriously considered handing in his resignation.

Because some newspapers had predicted, last January, that Stevenson would be the first to leave the Kennedy Administration, he hesitated. Finally he came to Washington for a talk with Mr. Kennedy and the two have now patched things up. Stevenson will be kept fully informed in the future.

Sit-In for Johnson

Serving as Vice President of the United States may be glamorous, but doing its No. 1 duty, presiding over the Senate, is a bore. As a result, the job constantly goes begging. And while Vice President Johnson has been touring the Far East, freshman Senators have been drafted as sit-ins on the Senate rostrum.

Even they, however, sometimes balk. One of these was Sen. Lee Metcalf, Montana Democrat, who recently found himself stuck in the chair for

five hours while he tried vainly to draft another freshman to replace him.

Customary procedure is to dispatch a note to a likely substitute. But Metcalf could find no fellow freshmen on the floor. They ducked out immediately after each vote. Nor was Metcalf able to induce any older Senator to take over.

"Lee, this is one of the crosses a new man has to bear," Sen. Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota told Metcalf when he tried to draft McCarthy.

"But, Gene, the mail is stacked so high in my office I can hardly see over it," pleaded Metcalf. "I can't sign it here on the floor."

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Note: Sen. Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota had a sure-fire method of beating the system when he was a freshman. When he grew tired of presiding, he sent urgent notes to other newly elected colleagues, saying that he wanted to go to "the washroom." This worked well until one day Humphrey looked around. Only freshman colleague on the floor was Sen. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.

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(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SEN. WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE., SAID TODAY HE WAS DETERMINED TO FIND OUT WHAT ROLE THE U.S. MILITARY PLAYED IN THE ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION ATTEMPT AND WHO ORDERED IT. MORSE MADE THE STATEMENT AS HIS FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE PREPARED TO QUESTION (10 A.M.) GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ABOUT THE PENTAGON'S ROLE AND HOW CLOSELY IT WORKED WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. "WE WANT TO KNOW WHAT THE EXTENT OF MILITARY PARTICIPATION WAS IN THE VENTURE -- AND WHY," MORSE TOLD NEWSMEN.

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Adlai-JFK Rift

A smouldering rift inside the Kennedy Administration between the President and his No. 1 diplomat, Adlai Stevenson, has now been patched up. For a time Stevenson was considering resigning.

The rift occurred over Cuba, and the fact that neither the State Department nor the White House let Stevenson in on the secret that American CIA forces were behind the invasion and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had OK'd the battle plans.

When Stevenson went before the United Nations on the night of April 18, therefore, to assure delegates that the United States Government had nothing to do with the rebel drive, he was made to look like either a liar or a fool. With a ring of conviction in his voice, he proclaimed to the U. N. that his government knew nothing about the landing at the Bay of Pigs, that Washington was keeping hands absolutely off.

Many delegates snickered. They were better informed than the chief American delegate.


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THE EXILES' STORY

Secrecy of Invasion Tightest in Training

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

The military training camps for exile units were the most secretive part of the whole Cuban rebel operation, even though their existence was well known before the April 17 invasion.

The reasons for secrecy were clear: In this country they were a violation of American

Third of Four Articles

neutrality laws. Elsewhere in the hemisphere they violated firm inter-American treaties against intervention in internal affairs of neighbors.

Little about their activity, organization or location could ever be officially confirmed. This led to exaggerated claims which only the invasion fiasco itself could explode.

One such claim was that upwards of 5,000 men were being trained in camps. But 1,300-odd men were later landed at Cochinob, Bay, and Cuba. Leaders admit this was of the rebel force.

Total Set at 2,0

While it is doubtful one Cuban knows the total distributed in the camps, the estimate now is 2,000. They were not included in the invasion plan.

Whether the camps were actually located in the mountains of the country is not clear. The Cuban consensus is no. They claim that any rebel group with money included former followers of

lat. can-sup generally about seven miles from the coast of Guatemala.

The Training Story

In the weeks following the invasion, recruits who did not participate have trickled back to Miami. Here is the story they tell of their recruitment and training:

Recruiting offices were set up in Miami. The largest and best was that of the Dem-

ocratic Revolutionary Front, the Frente.

Enlistment was relatively simple. The recruit gave his name in the office, had a physical examination by a Cuban doctor, and received cards entitling him to blood tests, x-rays and identity-photographs from American authorities.

Next he went through a security check consisting of a questionnaire on political affiliations. In the later phases of the operation, this whole process took about two days. Before induction the recruit had to take an oath to defend democracy.

Flown to Camps

From Miami the trainees were taken by station wagon in small groups to farms in the surrounding area to await air transport to Guatemala.

When transport became available they were taken to closed camps to

reached along a ragged path with sentries at both ends. The camps were about 600 feet high and perched on the side of a mountain.

After the invasion began a batch of about 150 Cubans arrived at this camp. They found it deserted, save for 10 American and 18 Cuban instructors, and about 20 Guatemalan civilian employees.

The head of the camp at that time was Martinez Arbona, an ex-army officer from Cuba. At a general meeting he told the newcomers they would be given a "short but intensive" training course for seven days.

After that they would relieve the Cuban bridgehead.

That promise was never kept, although formal training began. American instructors, some with nicknames like "Sam" and "Texas" and others of foreign extraction taught the Cubans to prepare explosives, to give first aid, and to assemble and shoot M-1, Browning and M-3 rifles.

The Cuban instructors many of them angry about being left behind—taught military drill and translated instructions for the Americans.

They Return

Living conditions were primitive. There was one shower for 150 men. They lived in rude shack-barracks.

All heart went out of the "intensive" training when news arrived about the defeat of the invasion.

Arbona called a meeting and explained they must continue the "struggle against communism." But he did not say how. A deluge of questions began. Who was in command of the invasion? What was the representative of the Cuban Revolutionary Council? When and where would they leave? The committee gave no answers.

Participants say they were well understood and that the invasion was successful. The Cuban Revolutionary Council was formed in Miami. The invasion was successful and the Cuban Revolutionary Council was formed in Miami.

Two days after the new camp was completely evacuated. The men returned to Miami along the same route they had come.

officers opposing his rule quietly removed from authority. The chief complaint about that rule was its political shortsightedness. Former officers in the Batista army, hated for their brutality, found their way into positions of authority. Their military experience was considered more important than their political handicap.

"When we arrived at the camp, all those with previous military experience were asked to take one step forward," explained one returnee. "Naturally the Batista soldiers stepped out. That was it. From then on they became our officers."

The result was low morale in the camps. The men felt they were volunteers, not conscripts, and had a right to oppose the politics of officers they had not chosen.

In Guatemala

Over 300 men are said to have reached a pre-arranged meeting place with a representative of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Several days later the 17 "ringleaders" under Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa were arrested one by one after separate interviews in American headquarters of the camp.

Thereafter until the invasion was over they are said to have been kept under American and Guatemalan guard in the wilds of the jungle of North Guatemala. Men who later returned to the same plane camp came out looking with matted hair and sunken cheeks. Several camps deserted. The men who straggled to the Guatemala border

A secret agreement stipulated that Batistianos be eliminated from the camps and all military operations be brought to a halt.

The Evening Star A 10

Council control. The government was never notified, and the exile leaders

rebels captured in the swamps of Bay were a Batista aide and torture and, Capt. San Roman, a Batista officer who exiles claim fought against the Castro revolutionaries in the Sierra Maestra before 1959.

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Caribbean Odyssey

Death Rides Survivors' Boat— 10 of 22 Cuban Heroes Perish

By JOHN O'ROURKE,
Editor, Washington Daily News,
A Scripps-Howard Newspaper.

This is the story of 22 men who went to sea in a boat—a little 19-foot boat with a broken engine.

Only those who were shooting at them saw them go. But, in a very real sense, the whole world was watching them.

Then, so far as they were concerned, the whole world seemed to turn its head away.

For 17 days they never saw a plane.

By that time 10 of them had died of hunger, thirst, sun, wind and exhaustion. They need not have died, if only an air patrol or a sea search had discovered them in time.

The 12 who survived assume there was some sort of search. They don't know how far-ranging it was. And officials who know won't say if there was one, or how far it went. The United States Navy won't say. The Defense Department won't say.

It was only luck that the sea did not get them all, but on the 17th day there was deliverance. A freighter, the Atlantic Seaman headed slowly toward them. By that time they had floated 1000 miles.

They lay in the bottom of their little boat, their throats split from thirst and their bodies bleeding from the sun. Fourteen starving men almost too weak to move.


Only an hour before the American Seaman's watch had seen them; Ernesto Hernandez Cossio had died, and his body was still in the boat. It was hard to tell the dead from the living. Actually, two more died aboard the freighter after they were "saved." That left 12.

The American Seaman put the dozen derelicts ashore in New Orleans last Thursday, and seven of them are still convalescing there.

Since then some of the men have gone to Miami. Their saga has been told in the Spanish-language paper published there, the Diario de las Americas.

Their bitter adventure started April 17, when the Cuban freedom force hit the mangrove swamps at the Bay of

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
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Pigs, under air attack and artillery fire.

The man who had been signed to be judge, advocate general in the headquarters company when the beachhead had been secured, was Jose Enrique Bauza, 37, called "The Old Man" by his friends. He is a former labor lawyer. During the 15-day ordeal at sea he lost 70 pounds and his face is scarred from the burns of sun, salt and wind.

His group was outflanked, he says, on the third day of the fight (April 19) when Castro landed troops and 30 Russian tanks from the sea. A U.S.-built Sea Fury plane was spotted for the Communist artillery, and its shots were good.

* * *

ug foxholes and sur-
r three days," says
a, "but then we ran
of ammunition.

"We stood up in the knee-deep water and saw the fishing boat, lying idle in the bay. Twenty-two of us took off our uniforms and waded out. We made it, swimming about 100 yards. It was the Celia.

By way out, two shells
me, and I could feel
the... like electricity, in
my legs and body.

"There was an engine aboard the Celia, but it wouldn't start, so we hoisted sail and made for open water. The Russian tanks kept firing at us and two destroyers, not far away.

"We thought they were U.S. destroyers, which would pick us up after we left Cuban water. But they didn't. They turned out to sea when the tank guns began firing at them. We never saw them again.

"Only Vicente Garcia Rosales knew anything about sailing. We called him Uncle because he was 42. We owe our lives to Vicente; he taught us to sail our boat.

"We ran into a bank but didn't hurt the boat, and storms struck so that we had to lower sail and drift. But we had a compass and the first day we went southward. The second day we went south-westward, and by the fourth day were sailing westward."

* * *

Then men hoped to reach
Guatemala or Yucatan.
"We found a pail with three

fingers of water in it. We rationed that. We found some potatoes, crude rice and onions, too. We rationed it all, and ate it raw. We dipped the rice into the sea and ate that way, soaked with salt water.

"On the fifth day, and the sixth day, we caught two fish and ate them raw. That was the last time we were to eat."

Mr. Garcia Rosales, who taught them a little how to sail, was first to die of hunger, thirst and exposure, exhausted by his vigil at the tiller.

Second was Julio Cabellero, who died in the arms of his cousin, Armando Caballero, one of the survivors.

Third to die was Raul Menocal Jr., whose father was once mayor of Havana and minister of economy under President Carlos Prío Socarras.

Mr. Dauza made funeral orations for the first three, telling his companions to honor their dead comrades by maintaining discipline and by keeping firm their hope of survival.

But after three had died, there were no more funeral services; they just dropped their comrades' bodies overboard. The fourth to die, with no formalities, was Jose Garcia Montes, former Cuban ambassador to Japan.

* * *

Ruben Vera Ortiz' mind was wandering before he perished, monotonously begging for a soft drink.

As a matter of fact, says Mr. Dauza, they all were delirious before death.

After the survivors were taken aboard the freighter, Mr. Dauza ordered the Celia sunk.

"Then I ate 16 oranges," he said, "and tried to sleep."

"Asked what he was going to do now, Mr. Dauza said: "We are going to work to overthrow Castro."

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UPI-155

(CUBAN SHIP)

MIAMI -- PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO TOLD CAUBANS TODAY THAT A NAVY PATROL CRAFT WHICH DISAPPEARED MAY 6 WITH 17 PERSONS AFTER STRIKING AN UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT 10 MILES OFF CUBA'S NORTHERN COAST COULD HAVE BEEN SUNK "BY SOME SUBMARINE OF THE (U.S.) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY."

CASTRO DISCLOSED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT PERSONNEL ABOARD THE PATROL CRAFT, IDENTIFIED AS THE R-43, AN OBSOLETE FORMER U.S. NAVY PT-BOAT, INCLUDED THE HEAD OF THE CUBAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, A CUBAN NAVY SQUADRON LEADER "AND VALUED REVOLUTIONARIES."

HE SAID "IT IS OUR DEDUCTION, ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO PRESENT CONCLUSIVE PROOF, THAT THE SHIP WAS SUNK BY A TORPEDO FIRED POSSIBLY FROM A SUBMARINE ... OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SHIP WAS SUNK BY SOME SUBMARINE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY."

HE SAID THE "GRAVE OCCURRENCE" WAS SIMILAR TO THE 1960 EXPLOSION OF THE FRENCH MUNITIONS SHIP LA COURBRE IN HAVANA HARBOR, AND A RECENT RAID BY A SWIFT AND HEAVILY ARMED MOTORBOAT ON CUBAN NAVY INSTALLATIONS IN SANTIAGO HARBOR. THE U.S. WAS PREVIOUSLY ACCUSED OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR BOTH INCIDENTS.

CASTRO ALSO COMPLAINED IN HIS TWO-HOUR, 20-MINUTE SPEECH TO THE TRADE UNIONISTS THAT CUBAN TERRITORIAL WATERS WERE BEING CONSTANTLY VIOLATED BY U.S. AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE CRAFT.

DISCUSSING THE MISSING PATROL BOAT, CASTRO SAID IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT NO WRECKAGE OR SURVIVORS HAD BEEN FOUND.

HE SAID THIS STRENGTHENED HIS BELIEF IT WAS SUNK BY A SUBMARINE. THE TWO DISTRESS MESSAGES SENT OUT BY THE CUBAN WARSHIP WERE MONITORED BY UPI IN MIAMI. THEY STATED CLEARLY THE SHIP WAS SINKING AFTER STRIKING AN UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT SUBMERGED IN THE WATER.

THE MESSAGES SAID THE IMPACT IN STRIKING THE SUBMERGED OBJECT PUT A HOLE OF SUCH SIZE IN THE BOW THAT THE BOAT WAS AWASH FROM STEM TO STERN WITHIN 12 MINUTES AND THE CREW HAD TO ABANDON SHIP. ALSO CUBAN NAVY MESSAGES INTERCEPTED IN MIAMI THE SAME DAY REPORTED FLOATING DEBRIS IN THE AREA SUCH AS OIL DRUMS AND PLANKS.

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JPI-15

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--NEW GOP NATIONAL CHAIRMAN WILLIAM E. MILLER SAID TODAY PRESIDENT KENNEDY "RESCINDED AND REVOKED" AN EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION PLAN TO PROTECT THE ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN INVADERS WITH U.S. AIR POWER."

MILLER TERMED KENNEDY'S ALLEGED ACTION A "TRAGIC MISTAKE." THE GOP CHAIRMAN IS THE FIRST RANKING REPUBLICAN TO STATE THAT FORMER PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER APPROVED USE OF AMERICAN AIR POWER IN PLANNING THE ILL-FATED INVASION.

MILLER, A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE FROM NEW YORK, WAS SUPPORTED BY SEN. HUGH SCOTT, R-PA.

IN A TELEVISION-RADIO PROGRAM (PENNSYLVANIA STATIONS) WITH MILLER AND SEN. JOSEPH S. CLARK, D-PA., SCOTT HAD THIS TO SAY OF KENNEDY'S CUBAN INVASION STRATEGY:

"WHEN HE FAILED TO SUPPORT THE CUBANS WITH AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES, AMERICAN SUPPLIES AND AMERICAN AIR COVER, THAT'S WHEN THE INVASION FAILED."

CLARK REPLIED THAT EISENHOWER'S PLANS WOULD HAVE VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND INVOLVED "GOING IN WITH AMERICAN TROOPS."

NO OFFICIAL SOURCE HAS INDICATED THAT THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION PLANNED TO GIVE THE INVADERS AIR SUPPORT.

CLARK SAID KENNEDY WAS "FOLLOWING A CAREFULLY LAID OUT PLAN BY THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION WHICH, IF HE HAD GONE ALL THE WAY WITH IT, WOULD HAVE GOTTEN US ALL IN DUTCH IN LATIN AMERICA." HE SAID, "WE WOULD NEVER HAVE GOTTEN OUT OF THE DOG HOUSE."

KENNEDY HAS PUBLICLY TAKEN FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CUBAN INVASION FIASCO. INTERIOR SECRETARY STEWART L. UDALL DREW GOP CRITICISM WHEN HE SAID THE CUBAN INVASION PLANS WERE CONCEIVED DURING THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION.

REPUBLICANS ATTACKED HIM FOR TRYING TO DUCK THE BLAME. KENNEDY THEN ORDERED CABINET MEMBERS NOT TO TRY TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY. BUT CLARK WENT BEYOND UDALL. HE DECLARED:

"THE WHOLE CUBAN POLICY RESULTED FROM A PLAN CONCEIVED BY MR. EISENHOWER, KNOWN IN FULLY BY MR. NIXON, ALTHOUGH THE KNOWLEDGE WAS DENIED BY HIM IN THE CAMPAIGN, WHICH CALLED FOR THE VIOLATION OF OUR TREATIES, THE VIOLATION OF OUR AGREEMENT WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND GOING IN WITH AMERICAN TROOPS TO CUBA. PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD THE WISDOM NOT TO GO IN WITH THOSE AMERICAN TROOPS."

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
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UPI-38

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CHAIRMAN WILLIAM E. MILLER HAS CHARGED THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY REVOKED AN EISENHOWER PLAN "TO HAVE THE CUBAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS PROTECTED BY AMERICAN AIR POWER."

MILLER SAID KENNEDY HAD MADE A "TRAGIC MISTAKE." HE MADE THE STATEMENT YESTERDAY ON A TV-RADIO PROGRAM WITH SEN. HUGH SCOTT, R-PA., AND JOSEPH S. CLARK, D-PA.

SCOTT SAID WHEN KENNEDY "FAILED TO SUPPORT THE CUBANS WITH AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES, AMERICAN SUPPLIES AND AMERICAN AIR COVER, THAT'S WHEN THE INVASION FAILED."

CLARK REPLIED THAT EISENHOWER'S PLANS WOULD HAVE VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND INVOLVED "GOING IN WITH AMERICAN TROOPS."

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Capital Silent on GOP Cuba

The White House today refused to comment on a statement by Republican National Chairman Miller that President Kennedy "rescinded and revoked an Eisenhower Administration plan to provide U. S. air power for the Cuban invasion in April. This, Miller said, was the "first mistake" President Kennedy made in the abortive invasion.


Sen. Clark (D-Pa.), speaking on the same program, countered that such a plan—known in full by Mr. Nixon although the knowledge was denied by him in the campaign—would have violated our treaties.

Miller's picture of Kennedy caution or timidity contrasted with earlier Republican charges of Kennedy recklessness.

Former Vice President Nixon, campaigning last fall as the Republican Presidential candidate, had accused Kennedy of proposing a "recklessly dangerous" policy on Cuba which would be an "invitation" to the Russians to intervene and lead to World War III.

The statement by Miller in a TV-radio broadcast yesterday in Pennsylvania was the first by a responsible Republican that the Eisenhower Administration had planned to help the invaders with U. S. military force.

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Kennedy's proposal had been that "we must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista, democratic, anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual help in throwing Castro

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ments not
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er nation.

April 20, shortly after the failure of the invasion, Nixon called on President Kennedy but refused to condemn the new

ation:

good time."

In the meantime, Interior Secretary Udall charged that Nixon and Gen. Eisenhower had conceived the Cuban invasion scheme.

used Udall of
ious partisan-

President Kennedy in effect reprimanded Udall, stating that sole responsibility on Cuba rested with the White House.

On yesterday's broadcast, Sen. Scott (R-Pa.) seconded Miller's charge against President Kennedy.

"When he failed to support Cubans with American naval supplies and

American air cover, that's when the invasion failed," Scott said. Clark retorted that while President Kennedy had been following the Eisenhower Administration plan, he "had the wisdom not to go in with those American troops."

It had been reported that after Nixon talked with Castro in April, 1959, when the Cuban Premier visited the U. S., he prepared a memorandum urging that Cuban guerrillas should be trained to overthrow Castro.

But the State Dept. argued against the plan and it was not until March, 1960 that the invasion plan was set into motion.

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UPI-16

(CUBAN)
NEW YORK (IRE BOOTHE LUCE CHARGED TODAY THAT THE CUBAN INVASION
FAILED BECAUSE PRESIDENT KENNEDY CHANGED HIS MIND AND WITHDREW U.S.
ARMED SUPPORT.

THE FORMER AMBASSADOR IN A LETTER PUBLISHED IN
THE NEW YORK TRIBUNE THAT THE CUBAN FAILURE
SPLIT IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.
MOUNTED THE INVASION AND INTENDED TO SUPPORT IT
SHE SAID.
"BUT AT THE LAST MINUTE HE WAS FORCIBLY REMINDED (WASHINGTON RUMOR
SAYS BY MR. (ADLAI) STEVENSON) THAT THIS WAS TANTAMOUNT TO
SCUTTLING OUR SOUTH AMERICAN POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION."

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UPI-214

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SEN. HUGH SCOTT (R-PA.) SAID TODAY THAT U.N. AMBASSADOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON FLEW HERE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT AND SECURED A LAST-MINUTE REVERSAL OF PLANS WHICH WOULD HAVE SUPPLIED AIR COVER FOR THE ILL-FATED APRIL 17TH CUBAN INVASION.

HE MADE THE STATEMENT IN A DISCUSSION ON THE SENATE FLOOR. HIS PENNSYLVANIA COLLEAGUE, SEN. JOSEPH S. CLARK, D., QUICKLY BRANDED SCOTT'S ACCOUNT "LARGELY, IF NOT ENTIRELY, FICTION."

THE TWO SENATORS EXPANDED, IN EFFECT, ON THEIR WEEKEND TV REPORT TO CONSTITUENTS. AS THEIR FIRST GUEST, REP. WILLIAM E. MILLER, N.Y., THE NEW GOP NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, HAD CHARGED THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY "RESCINDED AND REVOKED" AN EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION PLAN WHICH INCLUDED AIR SUPPORT.

SCOTT TOLD THE SENATE THAT HE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY TO SAY THAT FORMER PRSIDENT EISENHOWER WOULD NEVER HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT TO ANY INVASION WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY AIR COVER. SCOTT SAID, HOWEVER, THAT NO INVASION PLAN HAD BEEN FORMALIZED, NO LEADER SELECTED, AND NO DECISION MADE AS TO WHOSE PLANES WOULD COVER THE OPERATION WHEN EISENHOWER STEPPED DOWN.

SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., SAID HE UNDERSTANDS, FROM PARTICIPANTS IN THE LANDINGS AT THE BAY OF PIGS, THAT AIR COVER BY U.S. PLANES PLUS "NAVAL BACK UP" HAD BEEN PROMISED AND THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT "WAS UNDERSTOOD BY CUBANS TO HAVE EXISTED WHEN THEY STEPPED OFF THEIR LANDING BARGES IN THE INVASION."

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CLARK SAID HE BELIEVED GOLDWATER WAS "IN ERROR ON THE FACTS" AND DREW MISTAKEN CONCLUSIONS FROM THEM. CLARK PLEADED, HOWEVER, THAT HIS LIPS WERE SEALED ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE LANDINGS BECAUSE HE HAD READ CLASSIFIED SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TESTIMONY RELATING TO THEM.

SCOTT AND CLARK AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING IF A WHITE PAPER WERE ISSUED TO CLARIFY THE MATTER. GOLDWATER SAID HE BELIEVES CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. HE SAID THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SHOULD KNOW WHO CALLED OFF THE U.S. SUPPORT.

"I AM NOT CONVINCED THAT IT WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY; I AM CONVINCED THAT IT WAS SOMEONE ELSE WHO WOULD BEND THE KNEE TO ANY ENEMY," GOLDWATER SAID.

ACCORDING TO SCOTT'S ACCOUNT CUBAN INVADERS WENT INTO THE BAY OF PIGS EXPECTING AIR COVER BUT STEVENSON, WHEN HE HEARD OF IT, CONTENDED THAT SUCH U.S. SUPPORT WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE U.S. POSITION IN THE U.N. WHERE HE HAD BEEN DISCLAIMING ANY SUCH PLANS ON THE PART OF THE U.S.

SCOTT SAID STEVENSON "FLEW DOWN IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT" JUST BEFORE THE INVASION WAS LAUNCHED AND COMPLAINED TO UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE CHESTER BOWLES. THE PLANS FOR AIR SUPPORT, SCOTT SAID, WERE REVOKED "AT LEAST IN PART" ON THE BASIS OF THE STEVENSON PLEA.


IN ADDITION TO STEVENSON'S ASSURANCES TO OTHER DIPLOMATS AT THE U.N. PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD STATED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE INVASION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT INTERVENE WITH ITS ARMED FORCES IN CUBA.

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- ~~Belmont~~
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UPI-19

(CASTRO)

NEW YORK--CUBAN PREMIER CASTRO SAID THE APRIL INVASION AGAINST HIS REGIME FAILED BECAUSE "THEY UNDERESTIMATED US AND THEY USED THEIR OWN FORCES INCORRECTLY."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, IN A HAVANA-DATELINED DISPATCH IN TODAY'S EDITIONS SIGNED BY TAB SZULC, ONE OF A GROUP OF U.S. NEWSMEN NOW TOURING CUBA, REPORTED THE CUBAN PREMIER'S APPRAISAL OF THE INVASION FROM U.S.-BACKED EXILES.

CASTRO TOOK NEWSMEN ON A TOUR OF PLAYA GIRO WHERE THE EXILES LANDED AND THEN WERE DEFEATED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES. FIVE REBEL SHIPS WERE SUNK AND 10 REBEL AIRPLANES WERE SHOT DOWN.

CASTRO SAID HE HAD EXPECTED SEVERAL SIMULTANEOUS LANDINGS BUT THE REBELS CONCENTRATED THEIR ATTACK AT THE BAY OF PIGS.

"THAT WAS THEIR FIRST MISTAKE," CASTRO WAS QUOTED BY SZULC. THE CUBAN PREMIER SAID THE INVADERS DROPPED THEIR PARATROOPERS TOO LATE AND NOT IN THE RIGHT PLACE. HE SAID THEY WAITED UNTIL THE MORNING OF APRIL 17, HOURS AFTER THE BEACH LANDINGS AND TOO LATE TO CUT OFF GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS AND ROADS.

CASTRO ALSO CRITICIZED THE INVADERS FOR HOLDING BACK MAJOR UNITS OF 1,500 MEN TOO LONG, ENABLING CUBAN PLANES TO SINK THE REBEL SHIPS CARRYING THE TROOPS.

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Paper to

D. DeLoach

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UPI-136

(PILOT)

DEBHAM, MASS.--A DEBHAM HOUSEWIFE SAID TODAY SHE WAS CONVINCED HER BROTHER WAS WORKING FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WHEN HE WAS SHOT DOWN DURING THE ABORTIVE CUBAN INVASION.

MRS. ANTHONY F. INGEMI SAID, "I JUST PUT A LOT OF LITTLE THINGS TOGETHER AND I'M SURE THAT'S WHO HE WAS WORKING FOR."

SHE IDENTIFIED HER BROTHER AS LEO FRANCIS BAKER, A NAME SIMILAR TO THAT GIVEN BY THE CASTRO FORCES FOR A PILOT WHO WAS SHOT DOWN APRIL 19. SHE SAID HE AND THREE OTHER MEN ON THE C46 CARGO PLANE WERE ALL FROM ALABAMA AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALABAMA AIR NATIONAL GUARD.

MRS. INGEMI SAID SHORTLY AFTERWARD A MAN WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS "ATTORNEY COOPER FROM NEW YORK" ARRIVED BY PLANE AND TAXI AT HER SUB-URBAN HOME HERE AND INFORMED HER OF HER BROTHER'S DEATH.

"HE JUST STAYED FIVE MINUTES. HE SAID THE PLANE CRASHED. HE DIDN'T SAY IF IT WAS SHOT DOWN OR WHAT. AND HE SAID THE PLANE WAS CARRYING AN UNDISCLOSED CARGO," MRS. INGEMI SAID.

SHE SAID HER BROTHER WAS HOME IN JANUARY, HAVING RECENTLY BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE AIR FORCE IN WHICH HE WAS A FLIGHT ENGINEER IN THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND.

"HE SAID HE HAD THIS FLYING JOB FOR GOOD PAY BUT HE WAS VERY QUIET ABOUT IT. THE MAN WHO HIRED HIM WAS ATTORNEY ALEX CARLSON OF MIAMI SPRINGS, FLA., AND THE COMPANY WAS DOUBLE CHECK CORP. OF MIAMI SPRINGS. I THINK THAT WAS JUST A FRONT FOR THE CIA," THE SISTER SAID.

"OF COURSE THAT'S JUST MY OPINION. I DON'T HAVE ANY INSIDE INFORMATION OR I WOULDN'T BE TALKING," SHE ADDED.

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CIA Mum on Sister's Claim

Roslindale Flier Died for Freedom

A Dedham woman revealed yesterday that an American flier killed in the abortive invasion of Cuba April 19 was her brother, Leo Francis Baker 34, a former Roslindale resident.

Mrs. Marie Ingemi of 128 Tye Ave., Dedham, said she believed Baker was on a mission for

the Central Intelligence Agency when he met his death.

She said it was "a shame" his death should go unrecognized when he was fighting in the cause of freedom.

Neither the Department of Defense nor the State Department comment or issue a statement.

The government said Baker was on a mission for the Central Intelligence Agency when he met his death.

Alabama. He has a wife, Catherine, and two children, Theresa, 11, and Catherine, a year old, living in Birmingham, according to the sister. Mrs. Baker, she said, is expecting another child.

WANTS RECOGNITION

Mrs. Ingemi said her brother returned to Massachusetts last January to attend their father's funeral. At that time he disclosed, she related, that he was going back into the service.

(Continued from First Page)

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48 name was also given or Burley.


U. S. authorities said documents claimed to have been found on the flier's body. Attempts to identify the pilot her were made in Boston.

Mrs. Ingemi was graduated from High School in the Air Forces for her service on B-29's during World War II. She was an engineer on the Korean War, she

Later he married

REC-6

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Handwritten word: "Witch"

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Boston American, Boston, Mass.
Boston Globe, Boston, Mass.
Boston Herald, Boston, Mass.
Boston Post, Boston, Mass.
Boston Times, Boston, Mass.

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Author: George E. Minot
Editor: George E. Minot
Title: Leo Francis Bell

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LEO FRANCIS BAKER



MRS. MARIE INGEMI

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UPI -29

(CUBA)

CLEVELAND--NEW ORLEANS MAYOR DE LESSEPS MORRISON YESTERDAY SAID IF AIR COVER HAD BEEN PROVIDED THE CUBAN REBELS THEY WOULD HAVE OVER-THROWN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO'S REGIME.

MORRISON, NEWLY APPOINTED U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, SAID HE WAS SPEAKING AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN BECAUSE HIS APPOINTMENT HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE U.S. SENATE.

"IF WE HAD GIVEN THE CUBAN REBELS SOME DEGREE OF AIR COVER," MORRISON SAID ON KYW-TV'S "OPEN CIRCUIT" PROGRAM, "IT WOULD HAVE SUPPORTED THE INVASION AND CASTRO WOULD HAVE BEEN TOPPLED."

MORRISON SAID HE FAVORED THE EXCHANGE OF TRACTORS FOR CUBAN PRISONERS WITH RESERVATIONS.

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UPI-42

(CUBA)

NEW YORK--TAD SZULC, LATIN AMERICA CORRESPONDENT FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES, TODAY BLAMED "INCREDIBLE MISMANAGEMENT" BY FIELD AGENTS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE APRIL CUBAN INVASION FIASCO. SZULC, WRITING IN THE CURRENT ISSUE OF LOOK MAGAZINE, SAID THE CIA AGENTS KEPT PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN THE DARK ON DETAILS OF THE INVASION PLANNING AND EVEN DISOBEYED THE PRESIDENT'S ORDER TO EXCLUDE FOLLOWERS OF EX-DICTATOR FULGENCIO BATISTA FROM THE "LIBERATION ARMY."
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Miss Gandy	---

Story About Castro Spies Called False

11/10/61

THE MIAMI NEWS
Miami, Florida
Date: 7/10/61

By HAINES COLBERT

The Dade sheriff's office today came to the defense of federal agents who are blamed in a magazine article for the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba.

Lt. Frank Kappel, chief of the sheriff's Intelligence Squad, contradicted a statement in the current issue of Look that his records on Castro agents were ignored.

The charge was made by Tad Szulc of the New York Times in a Look article, "Cuba, Anatomy of a Failure," Szulc wrote:

by it. I think Szulc, who was poking his nose into a lot of places where he had no business, should take some of the blame for the failure of the invasion.

The statement about the Castro spies, like a number of others in the article, is untrue.

"The truth is that the federal men worked closely with us. And we didn't have 100 pictures. We had about 30 — and most of them were of people against whom we had no proof.

"We get a lot of unsubstantiated charges from one Cuban that some other Cuban is

Mag. 7/10/61

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● More About Invasion

"As preparations for the invasion began, at least 100 Castro spies circulated freely in the buildup area in Florida. Their photographs were on file in the Dade County sheriff's office, but no effort was made by federal authorities to remove them from the scene, or to conceal the movements of the anti-Castro fighters from these informers."

Said Kappel:
"I read the article and I was disgusted."

● U.S. Agents Defended

a Castro agent. We try to check them out, but in many cases we never do get any proof.

"There were three or four Cubans in our files who were pretty definitely identified as Castro spies. The federal agents put pressure on them before the invasion and they disappeared, presumably going back to Cuba."

Szulc, although Kappel said he spent considerable time in Florida before the abortive April 17 invasion, did get a little mixed

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Clip - Program of Anti-Castro Activity - C.I.A. (U)
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Internationale Played At Cuban Dedication ^{A-13}

HAVANA, July 27 (AP)—To the strains of the Communist Internationale, Fidel Castro dedicated a shell-scarred tourist center today at Giron Beach, scene of last April's abortive anti-Castro invasion. He charged the U. S. Air Force had been set to strike but the invaders were crushed before it could act.

To chant: "We are socialist. Forward, forward."

Castro's special guest, Soviet Spaceman Yuri Gagarin had been expected to be an added attraction at the dedication.

Castro explained Gagarin's absence by saying the spaceman and his Russian party wanted to rest before leaving tomorrow for Brazil.

The dedication came on the final day of the four-day anniversary observance of Castro's revolution highlighted by his announcement that all Cuban organizations will be merged in to a single Communist-styled "United Party of Cuba's Socialist Revolution."

The Cuban press acclaimed last night's announcement of the new monolithic party in huge headlines today. The newspaper Revolution proclaimed: "The people approve."

Puffing a big cigar, Castro broke into a big smile as the band struck up the Internationale to open ceremonies on the hot dusty shore area of southern Las Villas Province.

The center is only partly constructed. Some of the buildings were damaged during the invasion attempt.

Castro told the crowd including 300 guests from various Latin American countries that the April invasion was a sample of what could happen anywhere in Latin America.


As the bearded Prime Minister concluded his hour-long address the crowd took up the



A defaced copy of an American newspaper is held above. umbrellas used to shade spectators from the sun as they listen to Cuban Premier Fidel Castro speak at a revolutionary anniversary program in Havana.

clip

Waters



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- The Washington Daily News _____
- The Evening Star _____
- New York Herald Tribune _____
- New York Journal-American _____
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up about the state's geography.

The magazine article said a boat carrying explosives for the Cuban underground was captured off Tallahassee by a Fish and Wildlife Service patrol boat.

Tallahassee, of course, is in the hills, some 30 miles from the nearest coast.

Szulc's post mortem otherwise is much like that of other reporters. He tells of the miscalculations which sent a weak invading force up against Castro's unhampered army without even the support of the underground in Cuba — which wasn't told when the invasion was to take place.

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- Miss Gandy _____

The Cuban Invasion—I

White House Decisions Cited in Study Of Why Landing in April Was a Failure

This is the first of two articles on the unsuccessful attempt by anti-Castro forces to invade Cuba last April.

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

THE celebrations in Cuba last week deliberately emphasized the increasing strength of Premier Fidel Castro's pro-Communist state.

Part of the emphasis represents propaganda, but there is some truth behind the embroidered claims.

About three months after the United States sponsored abortive invasion of Cuba, Mr. Castro's regime said it has ever and in prestige. In April, 1,500 to 1,600 anti-Castro forces, with United States support, attempted to overthrow the Cuban Government. Havana had only nine operational military aircraft, all of which were C-47s. The Cuban forces were equipped with Russian small arms, machine guns and field artillery. The quantity but

men and were armed, but most of them were and sparsely trained. They were able to fight against a force of 15,000 men and more. The effectiveness of the Cuban forces was not as good as it was reported to be.

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N. Y. TIMES

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(S) FBI - Study of Anti-Castro Activity

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Today, with the victory at the Bay of Pigs behind them, the Cuban armed forces are far more confident, less likely to defect, better armed and trained. Between twenty and thirty Soviet MIG-17 jet fighters have been delivered to Cuba and are now in operation. Heavy crates, which may contain additional disassembled planes, have been seen. Some Cuban pilots have returned from jet training in Czechoslovakia. More arms and equipment for ground troops have arrived in Cuba from Communist countries.

Guerrillas Are Inactive

The underground has been virtually quiescent; the guerrillas have been inactive; Dr. Castro's opposition is disorganized and downcast. The overthrow of Dr. Castro's Government would be far more difficult today, even if United States forces were sent into the island, than it would have been three months ago. And the United States Government apparently has no plan for eliminating what many observers have called the "cancer of communism in Cuba."

The April invasion has been widely ridiculed since its failure, and the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been made the principal whipping boys. The impossibility of overthrowing Dr. Castro with 1,500 to 1,600 men appears self-evident; the rhetorical question, "How could anyone be so stupid?" has been a popular one around Washington in the last three months. Yet the operation in its original concepts was not as stupid as it has been made to appear and the responsibility for the mistakes appears to be widely distributed.

The story of the Cuban venture, pieced together from talks with many Government officials and from other sources, postulates many lessons of major importance in the Berlin crisis.

Planning Started in 1960

Planning for the Cuban assault started in the late spring of 1960, when former President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to organize, train and equip anti-Castro Cuban refugees. Allen W. Dulles, director of the C. I. A., and his deputy for operations, Richard M. Bissell, initiated the secret operation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military were not initially given any details of the plans for employment of the Cuban refugees, but as their training progressed the Pentagon was asked to assign officers, training cadres, weapons and equipment to the C. I. A.

The plan, as it developed under the Eisenhower and later the Kennedy Administration,

did not, contrary to published reports, commit United States armed forces to support of the Cuban refugees in actual military operations. Such a commitment was considered but never, as far as can be learned, officially approved, although it was not publicly and finally disapproved until a few days before the landing.

The original Eisenhower planning contemplated one or more series of relatively small landings to re-enforce the anti-Castro guerrillas in the hills. Last Nov. 30 had been, tentatively, one of the target dates for the invasion, but the impending change in Administration as a result of the November elections forced its postponement.

About December, the character of the operation appears to have changed from dispersed guerrilla landings to the establishment of one beachhead. If the beachhead appeared to be firmly established, a Cuban government in exile could be flown in, and all Cubans would then be called upon to join in the revolt against Dr. Castro. Whether the United States would recognize this government and the kind and degree of support it might give it were apparently left open.

Invasion Site Shifted

After the Kennedy Administration took office other changes were made.

The Bay of Pigs, closer to Havana but seventy-five miles from the nearest concentration of guerrillas in the Escambré Mountains, was substituted for another suggested beach, less than 100 miles to the east.

Perhaps more important, the preparations for the operation became so big and so obvious that it was no longer secret. Published stories about the refugee training camps in Guatemala, and preparations in Florida plus the expectation that Soviet MIG-17's, now in Cuba, would soon arrive increased pressure on the Administration for quick action and also rallied, within the Administration, the opposition to any United States-sponsored intervention.

On April 12, five days before the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, President Kennedy announced at a press conference that United States armed forces would "in no circumstances" be used to overthrow Dr. Castro.

The Invasion Force

The Kennedy announcement meant that about 1,600 Cuban refugees—supported by sixteen American-built B-26 propeller-driven light bombers based in Central America, transported by old United States merchant ships procured with United States funds, armed with American equipment and trained by American cadres but without the help of United States armed forces—would attempt to establish a beachhead in Cuba.

A second decision of major importance was made by the White House just a short time before the invaders actually landed at the Bay of Pigs on April 17. Two days before the invasion, preliminary air strikes were flown by a few B-26's, piloted by Cuban refugee fliers, against some of Dr. Castro's airfields. The planes were based on Central America and landed in Florida after their mission.

The United States asserted these planes were flown from Cuban airfields by defecting pilots. A storm arose in the United Nations, and Adlai E. Stevenson, the United States delegate, who had not been informed fully of our Cuban plans, declared publicly with great emphasis that the planes came from Cuba.

He was hastily informed by Washington of his mistake.

The invasion force left as scheduled from Central America, and was escorted at sea by United States Navy destroyers, with an aircraft carrier in the background. The naval vessels had orders to stay outside the Cuban three-mile limit, but to be prepared for anything.

On the night and early morning of the invasion a key air strike, flown by Cuban refugee pilots in B-26's, was scheduled to bomb the nine Cuban planes spotted in known positions on Cuban airfields. A few hours before the invasion was scheduled, while the ships were nearing the Bay of Pigs beaches,

the air strike was canceled by the White House.

The cancellation was apparently the result of representations by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and through him by Mr. Stevenson. Both of them were worried by the effect of a second air strike from Central America upon opinion in the United Nations and Latin America. The President ordered the C. I. A. to cancel the strike, but, according to an Administration spokesman, specified that the C. I. A. had the right to appeal to the President and left the possibility of reversal open. The appeal was not made, according to the spokesman.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not aware of the cancellation of this key air strike until after the beachhead had actually been established, according to Government sources.

By this time much of the damage had been done for Dr. Castro's planes, alerted by the actual landings, were in the air attacking the invading ships, and were dispersed after their sorties to new airfields. Contrary to general opinion, the actual landings achieved, as Dr. Castro has since conceded, a tactical surprise, much as the Allied landings on the coast of Normandy in World War II achieved a tactical surprise. Dr. Castro knew the invasion was coming; it could not be a strategic surprise. But he did not know where or when.

After the landing, the Cuban refugee pilots were permitted to fly close support missions from Central America but with orders to touch down first at the Bay of Pigs airstrip (within the beachhead) to provide the versimilitude of legality. But it was too late.

United States Navy pilots, flying in fast jet attack planes off the beachhead, armed and ready for action in case they should be ordered to intervene, saw the end of the invasion from the air as Cuban tanks rumbled down the roads. The invaders had run out of ammunition; there was nothing to do but surrender.

Tomorrow: Lessons of the Cuban invasion failure.

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- Mr. Evans
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- Mr. Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Ingram
- Miss Gandy

The Cuban Invasion—II

Rebels' Defeat Is Ascribed to Errors In Plan and Execution in Washington

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

This is the second of two articles on the unsuccessful attempt by anti-Castro forces to invade Cuba last April.

THE invasion of Cuba last April, it is now clear, was lost in Washington.

The small invading force was admitted shortly before the operation, in a written report submitted by a Colonel, Hawkins of the Marine Corps, to be "battleworthy" and comparably almost as well equipped as a similar United States unit. This judgment had some effect in Washington and, observers contend, was borne out by the actual fighting.

Despite the casualty statistics (some 1,200 of the 1,500 to 1,600 captured), the invaders gave a good account of themselves. Most sources agree that the refugees fought well until their ammunition ran out, that they inflicted more casualties on Fidel Castro's forces than he had conceded, and that the Cuban militia in the area of the landing almost immediately deserted in scores to the invaders' side, only to defect back again to Dr. Castro after the failure of the invasion became obvious.

Like the British and French invasion of Port Said during the Suez crisis of 1956, the Cuban operational plans and their implementation were watered down and the invasion was doomed by nonmilitary considerations.

The errors made and the blame for them are widespread.

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
EDITOR: SCOTT R. CARKS

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL
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Errors Laid to Kennedy

President Kennedy, new to supreme power, showed uncertainty in one of his first tests as Commander in Chief and met the opposing opinions of his advisers by compromise instead of clear-cut decision. His announcement a few days before the invasion that "in no circumstances" would United States armed forces be used to overthrow the Cuban Government should have led to cancellation, or major revision of the operation, for use of the United States armed forces was the one factor that could absolutely insure success.

Similarly, the cancellation of the pre-invasion air strike—a key to the achievement of air superiority, a stipulated precondition for success—was the final counterweight against the invaders.

But it is also true that the President inherited the Cuban problem and a plan that had grown too big, physically and because of its political implications, for the Central Intelligence Agency.

In effect, everybody had a hand in the Cuban venture and yet nobody was clearly in charge. It was bureaucracy at its worst, with the right hand sometimes not knowing (as in the case of Adlai E. Stevenson at the United Nations) what the left hand was doing.

The close and careful liaison between political and military planning that is absolutely essential to strategic success was lacking.

In fact, neither the military nor the State Department was the primary planner or executor of the Cuban invasion.

The invasion, partly because the original plan just grew and expanded, partly in the interests of security and secrecy (which could not possibly be maintained when the operation became so large), was primarily the "baby" of the Central In-

telligence Agency. The agency made mistakes in planning, execution and judgment. Allen W. Dulles, its director, and Richard M. Bissell, the deputy for plans and operations, and in direct charge of the Cuban affair, will probably bear the burden of failure by resigning their offices.

Failures of Joint Chiefs

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made mistakes in failing to be explicit and emphatic—in not pounding the table enough and in failing to commit all their ideas and viewpoints to paper. (In the interests of secrecy much of the Cuban planning and direction was oral.)

The White House believes the military judgments were faulty and the studies inadequate, but Pentagon sources deny this.

The State Department and other advisers bear responsibility for contributing to confusion and defeat by insisting upon legalisms that the guilty conscience of a democracy so often demands, when it resorts to naked force.

McGeorge Bundy, a Presidential assistant, shares, and manfully has accepted blame for insufficiently emphasizing to the President the dangerous and negative aspects of the operation. And the President himself has assumed full responsibility for the failure.

But the assessment of fault, although essential to analysis, is far less important than the lessons learned.

The primary lesson is the importance of the principle of the objective, as it is known in military parlance, or in slang terms, "keeping your eye on the ball."

The original objective was the overthrow of Dr. Castro. Whether this was an adequate political objective, or whether there should have been another constructive long-term goal is open to question. But even this original objective was rendered impossible of accomplishment before the assault started.

A considered statement of what one is trying to accomplish, with political, military and economic factors all carefully weighed, is the essential first step for any operation.

The operational plan must be capable of accomplishing this objective. In the Cuban invasion the objective itself seems to have become fuzzy, and the invasion plan as actually modified in execution could not possibly have accomplished the overthrow of Dr. Castro.

Need for U.S. Forces

The political and military disadvantages of any given plan must be weighed against the advantages obtained by accomplishment of the objective.

The disadvantages of the Cuban invasion were so great that either it had to succeed or it should never have been attempted. To insure success, the support of United States armed forces was essential, yet this was ruled out before the start of the operation.

The world respects power successfully used to accomplish national objectives. A successful invasion of Cuba and the overthrow of Dr. Castro backed by the United States would probably have overbalanced the adverse political, legal and moral effects of our open intervention in Cuban affairs.

As it was, we suffered all the

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opprobrium that attaches to failure, and all the psychological and political disadvantages associated with the term "Yankee imperialism." And our backing of the Cuban refugees was so thinly disguised that it immediately exposed Washington to the same charges we would have faced had United States armed forces been employed.

The second great lesson of Cuba is the importance of tight policy control, direction and management of any venture involving the application of military power, no matter how small. This control and management must center in the President as Commander in Chief; each President will use the machinery of government differently, but history has shown that ordered discussions and debates and staff work, and recorded decisions may bring new insight and prevent major mistakes. These procedures were largely lacking in the Kennedy Administration prior to the time of the Cuban invasion.

Mistakes of the C. I. A.

A third lesson of Cuba is that no military or paramilitary operation should be under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency if it is of such a size and character that it is bound to become overt or open, rather than covert or secret. Operations of the size of the Cuban invasion should be managed by the Defense Department, which is far better staffed and has more expert military knowledge than the C. I. A.

Another lesson is the necessity of keeping all secret intelligence activities and operations under constant top-echelon surveillance and review. Machinery for a critical and objective analysis of all such efforts should be strengthened by the creation of a joint Congressional watchdog committee, and by a careful supervision of the C. I. A. by the National Security Council and other White House staff agencies.

But the Cuban failure offers no valid reason for dismembering the C. I. A., or for changing its name. Intelligence operations of many different kinds—"black" or concealed radio, propaganda, sabotage and so on—must be conducted by some agency of government. Most of these do not properly fit into the Pentagon, except, of course, when the operation assumes a character distinctly military and a size and complexity that make the Pentagon the obvious place to handle it.

But specialized and distinctive secret operations of various sorts are best handled by some separate, centralized agency. There is no magic in separating these specialized operations from intelligence-gathering, collection and evaluation; in fact the two must work hand in hand.

One man, as Mr. Dulles now does, could well head both, but the organization must provide, as C. I. A. now does, for separate but coordinated efforts in secret operations and in intelligence.

Lesson for Intelligence

The C. I. A., whether we like it or not, is an inevitable part of the modern machinery for national survival in the nuclear age. It has made mistakes in the past and will again in the future. But it has also had great successes in the past, as in the U-2 operation. It must be improved, not made a scapegoat. It probably employs too many people and its administrative machinery could be considerably improved.

Power—the power of secret information—is insidious, and some of C. I. A.'s personnel need to relearn the lesson of humility and of human failure. But the C. I. A. is here to stay.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff similarly is a key body in our national security machinery. They, too, have human weaknesses,

and they, too, have made mistakes. But the principles they embody—differing military approaches to the same military problem; the right of dissent; collective wisdom, as opposed to the judgments of a single military mind—are essential in the future as they have been in the past.

In sum, the failure of Cuba was a failure of bureaucracy, but as in all failures it was essentially a failure of men rather than of organization.

Rear Admiral H. E. Eccles, retired, comments in "Notes on the Cuban Crisis," a paper prepared under the sponsorship of the George Washington University Logistics Research Project, that "somehow or other there seemed to be a complete divorce between the national policy and the power allotted to the task at hand."

He points out that "in great matters of state, the President simply cannot afford to leave these vital three (analysis of objectives, clear conceptual unity and careful follow-up) to his subordinates. The price of failure or of mediocre execution is too great."

And Admiral Eccles stresses that the Cuban venture again emphasizes that in "the protracted conflict with the totalitarian concept the fate of the free society will be determined much more by the understanding of human emotion and the exercise of intellectual power and moral values than by technological factors."

Brazilian Foë of Reds Has Chat With Gagarin

RIO DE JANEIRO, July 31 (UPI)—Maj. Yuri A. Gagarin, the Soviet space pioneer, spent ten minutes today with the outspoken anti-Communist Governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, Carlos Lacerda.

Both men were all smiles when the visit began, but the atmosphere chilled somewhat after Senhor Lacerda brought such issues as the Berlin dispute into the conversation.

Later, the rest of Major Gagarin's appointments for the day were canceled, including a lecture at the Education Ministry and a luncheon offered by Cruzeiro magazine. Soviet officials said the major "just wants to rest and may be ride around."

Major Gagarin had complained earlier that he was "exhausted" by the demands of news photographers, who he said were "worse than the space ship." He has been besieged by photographers since he arrived in Brazil.

This I doubt

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Collective Insecurity Caused U.S. to Flounder in the Cuba Invasion

BY HENRY J. TAYLOR

If we are to know what is happening to us we have to know that fixations do grip relatively unknown men whose influence on our country is enormous. Consider the idea that America must not defend herself any place on her own—which was at the root of the Cuban debacle. In short, our so-called collective security.

That fixation is typified by Sen. J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, and he is as wrong as a summer oyster. But ideas can get into men's minds and all into men's minds and all circumstance and history do not seem able to blow them out. They just think something and that is all there is to it, like many flute players about their own genius.


Because Sen. Fulbright is chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations he affects promotions within the State Department, its congressional relations and budget prospects and, thus, most importantly, America's policies not alone through the committee's statutory authority but merely on the basis of his own thinking.

We do not have collective security. We have collective insecurity. We are wise to be attached firmly to the principle. Often it is indispensable, as in NATO. But there is no NATO in Latin America, for example, and depending on collectivity wherever this involves numerous weak and shaky countries means we flounder into exactly what happened in Cuba.

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Los Angeles Times III-5

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am sure that if American armed forces were used unilaterally the reaction elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere would be so severe that we would lose more in other countries than we would gain in Cuba."

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How can he be so sure? Many much more knowing, practical and tested observers than Sen. Fulbright find we are not blamed in Latin America for the intervention but, instead, for allowing the intervention to fail.

We got slight, if any, credit for our government's self-defined morals in non-intervention, even within the Organization of American States. For all grows worse by our remedy. Everywhere southward most of our neighbors realized that both under the benefits to them of the Monroe Doctrine and because of Castro's relentless and psychopathic provocations an intervention was completely justified on moral or any other grounds. And is it, in truth, really moral not to intervene in a murder unless you can locate your cousins to walk with you? Or if you have no cousins, to turn your back?

Many down there reacted to our moral explanation as Voltaire remarked of William Tell: "All these apple stories are very suspicious." There is widespread conviction the United States failed to intervene openly in Cuba, not for a moral reason, but because our government feared that this would provoke war between the powerful Soviet Union and the United States. In short, the Yankees turned yellow. Sen. Fulbright has much to answer for in this.

★

Countless millions throughout Latin America who love freedom would have welcomed U.S. intervention in Cuba (and still would) because they fear the expansion of Castroism into their own homelands and doubt it will be stopped without intervention. These millions cannot dream in Sen. Fulbright's office and telephone thunderbolts to the State Department. They have to live (or die) with what they get. Their only test of the intervention is that it succeed; and when it did not they are the victims in all the shame and despair of this sickening tragedy along with the entire free world.

★
Sen. Fulbright opposed any kind of intervention there unless we could waltz in with a whole group of Latin-American states, as if our nation could order such a tidy state of affairs. When he found even a trickle of intervention was moving toward the beaches he, among others, insisted that the White House stop it, and rejoiced when this shabby deed was done. The Senator is on record (on Cuba) as follows: "I

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
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- Miss Gandy _____

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DeLoach

CUBA ASKS U.N. DEBATE
Again Urges Assembly to Take Up U. S. 'Aggression'
 Special to The New York Times.
UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.
 Sept. 6—Cuba has asked again that the United Nations General Assembly take up her charges of United States "aggression and intervention" against the Government of Premier Fidel Castro.
 In a note to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, made public here today, Cuba maintained that "mercenaries," "saboteurs" and "notorious criminals" were being trained for a new invasion.
 The note alleged that rebels were being trained on Vieques Island east of Puerto Rico, in Guatemala and at the United States bases at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in Panama.



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 N.Y. TIMES
 EDITION LATE CITY
 DATED 9/7/61
 PAGE 29
 FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION
 EDITOR: JOHN B. OAKES
 RE: FOREIGN POLICAL MATTERS-
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JPI-12

(CUBA)

SANTA CLARA, CUBA--FIVE "WAR CRIMINALS" CAPTURED IN THE ABORTIVE
APRIL INVASION OF CUBA WERE EXECUTED BY A FIRING SQUAD SHORTLY
AFTER MIDNIGHT TODAY.

THE FIVE MEN WERE SENTENCED BY A REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL HERE LATE
LAST NIGHT. THEIR APPEALS WERE DENIED IN A MATTER OF MINUTES, AND
BARELY TWO HOURS AFTER THE COURT ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION THEY WERE SHOT.
NINE OTHERS TRIED WITH THEM WERE SENTENCED TO 30-YEAR PRISON TERMS.
TODAY'S EXECUTIONS WERE THE FIRST ANNOUNCED BY THE GOVERNMENT

SINCE LATE APRIL, A FEW DAYS AFTER THE START OF THE INVASION,
(THERE HAVE BEEN RECURRENT REPORTS OF UNANNOUNCED EXECUTIONS IN
CUBA. IN LIMA ON THURSDAY, CUBAN REFUGEES CHARGED THAT 83 PERSONS
WERE SHOT IN THEIR HOMETLAND LAST WEEK, AND IN CARACAS TODAY IT WAS
REPORTED THAT 16 VENEZUELANAS HAVE BEEN KILLED BY FIRING SQUADS
THIS YEAR.)

THE MEN EXECUTED TODAY WERE CLASSIFIED AS WAR CRIMINALS BECAUSE
THEY WERE CONVICTED OF CRIMES COMMITTED BEFORE THE APRIL ATTACK--
IN MOST CASES, BEFORE THE OVERTHROW OF EX-PRESIDENT FULGENCIO BATISTA.
THEY WERE:

--FORMER POLICE CPL. RAMON SALVINO INSUA, CONVICTED OF MURDERING,
TORTURING OR EMASCULATING CAPTIVE CASTROITE REBELS AND OF RAPING
AT LEAST TWO WOMEN.

--JORGE KING YING, FOUND GUILTY OF KILLING REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIER
RAUL PUPO MORALES AND TAKING PUPO'S WIFE AND CHILD AS HOSTAGES WHEN
HE AND SEVERAL OTHERS FLED TO THE UNITED STATES IN A STOLEN BOAT.

--EMILIO SOLER RUIZ, CONVICTED KILLER OF SOCIALIST LEADER
ARACELIO IGLESIAS IN 1948 AND DOMINICAN REFUGEE PIPI HERNANDEZ IN
1955.

--ROBERTO PEREZ GRUZATA, A FUGITIVE WHO ESCAPED FROM CABANA
PRISON WHILE SERVING A SENTENCE FOR THE 1959 KILLING OF RAFAEL
ESCALONA ALMEIDA.

--ANTONIO V. PADRON GARDENAS, FOUND GUILTY OF MISTREATING OR
MURDERING CASTROITE REBELS CAPTURED IN THE HOLGUIN AREA OF ORIENTE
PROVINCE.

THE NINE SENTENCED TO PRISON WERE PEDRO A. SANTIAGO VILLA,
JOSE FRANCO MIRA, ROGELIO MILIAN PEREZ, ANDRES DE JESUS VEGA,
JOSE R. MACHADO CONCEPCION, JOSE R. GONTE HERNANDEZ, NICOLAS
HERNANDEZ MENDEZ, PEDRO H. REYES BELLOS AND RICARDO MONTERO DUQUE.

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Cuba Invasion Strategy Denied by Eisenhower

By the Associated Press. A-3
GETTYSBURG, Pa., Sept. 12 (AP). — Former President Eisenhower may have started a new round of post mortems on the Cuban invasion by declaring that his outgoing administration did not draw up an invasion plan.

Ever since the invasion was crushed at the Bay of Pigs last spring, it has been reported that President Kennedy inherited a detailed invasion plan with many armed units poised throughout the Caribbean area. All that remained for Mr. Kennedy, these reports said, was to give the go-ahead signal.

But Gen. Eisenhower told a group of 38 freshman Republican Congressmen here yesterday:

"We had done nothing except to recognize that these Cuban refugees had a great desire to go back to Cuba. So we began organizing them and giving them weapons and training them. But beyond that we could not go, because at that time there was no recognized leader among the (refugee) Cubans."

He added, "I was not a consultant or adviser to the (Kennedy) administration in any way, of course."

A reporter went back to the question later, and Gen. Eisenhower amplified: "In March, 1960, we had a little meeting in my office as to whether to go ahead and train these people. I set up a little group to keep in touch. . . . It was never more than that."

The Central Intelligence Agency has been widely cited, without contradiction, in starting to line up the ill-fated invasion as much as a month before the landing.

Charges Secret A-Tests

Asked about his views on Russia's resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, Gen. Eisenhower said he believed the Soviet Union has been secretly testing nuclear weapons during the three-year moratorium which ended September 1 with the first shot in their new series.

He covered a wide range of subjects in a setting strongly reminiscent of the news conferences he used to hold in his White House days. One difference was that the first-term G. O. P. Congressmen asked most of the questions. Newsmen were allowed at the last minute to ask a few.

The luncheon program at the Gettysburg Hotel followed a morning in which Gen. Eisenhower was cast in the role of guide for the visiting Congressmen around the historic Gettysburg battlefield.

Gen. Eisenhower obviously enjoyed himself, and showed a deep knowledge of the tactics and strategy of the Confederacy's advance into Union territory. Even 90-degree heat didn't seem to faze the 70-year-old ex-President, though his younger visitors seemed to wilt.

A visit to the nearby Eisenhower farm and the lunch

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rounded out the day's excursion. The trip was billed as a way of showing the new Republican members that an elder statesman of the party was interested in them.

Denies Berlin Theory

After the luncheon, the first question Mr. Eisenhower was asked was about a recent State Department pamphlet called "Background Berlin—1961." The pamphlet implied that Gen. Eisenhower could have taken Berlin before the Russians at the end of World War II, but decided not to.

Republicans in Congress last week raised shouts of protest over this version of history.


Mr. Eisenhower replied mildly, but in great detail. In essence, he said, the political boundaries of post-war Germany were decided by higher-ups. He said he had sent his chief of staff to the Yalta conference to advise against dividing Germany, to no avail.

Besides, Gen. Eisenhower said it was not at all sure the allied forces he commanded could have reached Berlin first.

Dealing with the Berlin crisis, he said: "We shouldn't make nasty speeches like Khrushchev just to be nasty."

If the United States thought out positions on international questions properly, he said, "we would not have to respond to Mr. Khrushchev every time he says 'yap' or 'wow' or anything else."

Dr. Spick
DeLoach
Callahan



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UPI-19

(CUBA)

MIAMI -- PREMIER CASTRO CHARGED LAST NIGHT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PLOTTING NEW "AGGRESSION" AGAINST CUBA. IN A 2-1/4-HOUR SPEECH BROADCAST BY RADIO HAVANA, CASTRO SAID THE TOUGH TALK OF SOME AMERICANS AND THE "CAMPAIGNS OF THE FASCISTIC CLERGY" INDICATED A NEW ATTACK IS IN THE MAKING. IT WAS THE SECOND TIME CASTRO HAD "CRIED WOLF" IN AS MANY DAYS. LAST NIGHT'S SPEECH WAS MADE AT COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES FOR 750 ARMY POLITICAL COMMISSARS EDUCATED AT HAVANA'S OSVALDO SANCHEZ CABRERA SCHOOL. CASTRO SAID THE U.S. ¹MIGHT PROVIDE AIR AND TROOP SUPPORT FOR A NEW ATTACK BY REFUGEES LIKE APRIL'S ILL-FATED INVASION. AS A THIRD POSSIBILITY, HE SAID THE UNITED STATES MIGHT SMUGGLE CUBANS INTO THEIR HOMELAND TO WAGE A GUERRILLA WAR.

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COMMENT TODAY ON...
 HE WOULDN'T COMMENT
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
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UPI-262

(GUBA)

UNITED NATIONS--THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY STEERING COMMITTEE TODAY
RECOMMENDED A FULL ASSEMBLY DEBATE OF CUBAN CHARGES THAT THE UNITED
STATES IS PLANNING NEW AGGRESSION AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT.
THE VOTE CAME AFTER CUBAN AMBASSADOR MARIO GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI
CHARGED THAT "AT THESE VERY MOMENTS THE IMPERIALIST GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARING AND ORGANIZING A NEW MERCENARY
INVASION OF CUBA."

THE CUBAN POSITION WAS SUPPORTED BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR VALERIAN
A. ZORIN AND CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATE JIRI NOSEK.

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Clip Program of Anti Castro Activity - C.I.A. (U)

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WHAT TO DO SHOULD CASTRO FALL?

Cuban Exiles Bemoan Lack of U. S. Strategy

By CHARLES KEELY
Copley News Service

As Congress adjourned, the White House distributed a memo to Democratic senators and representatives detailing the policies and accomplishments of the Kennedy Administration. Under a section titled "Latin America" were the words:

"Objective . . . isolate communism and Castroism."

The tactics?

It has become apparent that the Administration hopes Fidel Castro's Cuban house of cards will fall of its own weight.

"Cuba" is a dirty word around the White House. Officials are doing their best to forget how they huffed and puffed, but failed to blow anything down during the April's abortive invasion attempt.

But hope for Castro's ouster is returning, and is apparently based on the increasing reports of civil unrest in Cuba.

U. S. PLAN

Did this growing optimism, however, there is no sense of a U.S. strategy event Castro does fall, also is no evidence of a front for the thousands of Cuban refugees in the U.S. Their ranks are swelling with 177 organizing for their allies.

Med exiles here in a witches' brew is

boiling on the Caribbean island. They point to underground terrorism, food shortages, executions, anti-government demonstrations, the deportation of Catholic priests and the bishop of Havana, further curtailment of travel.

If Castro does not get some of these problems off the fire, the exiles say, the situation could boil over.

"And what then?" they ask.

They warn that the United States and the feuding exile groups may be caught further off base than they were when Dictator Fulgencio Batista fled Havana.

Since the April invasion attempt, the U. S. has followed a "hands off" policy toward Cuba. It has curtailed programs involving exiles and there is no evidence of a direct link with the underground, despite Castro's ravings about "CIA plots."

WORRY


The rise of this underground concerns many of the exiles. U. S. officials admit they know little, if anything about the leaders and their motives.

Richard Goodwin, Latin American adviser to President Kennedy, believes the next leader of Cuba is a political "unknown."

"We hope he's not unknown because he hasn't been born," growled one disgruntled exile.

Others, however, center their criticism on the passive American strategy. They urge active support for the underground.

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CUBAN TELLS U. N. U. S. STILL PLOTS

But Roa Does Not Repeat New Invasion Charge

By RICHARD EDER
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.,
Oct. 10—Cuba told the General
Assembly today that the United
States was continuing to train
mercenaries and to smuggle in
arms and explosives to commit
"act of terrorism."

Foreign Minister Raul Roa
confined himself in a speech to
a general indictment of United
States policy for the most part
and failed to amplify or even re-
peat the charges of invasion
preparations issued yesterday in
Havana by the Foreign Min-
istry.

The Cuban delegation was
planning to present these
charges separately in a letter
to the President of the General
Assembly. This letter is expect-
ed in the near future, perhaps
tomorrow.

In a speech that was relative-
ly brief and somewhat less fiery
than had been expected, Senor
Roa said the United States was
simultaneously trying to isolate
his country in the hemisphere
while helping efforts to subvert
the Castro Government.

Adlai E. Stevenson, the chief
United States delegate, inter-
vened in the general debate to
deny that the United States was
planning or preparing interven-
tion against Cuba.

If there is any threat to the
Cuban Government, he said, "it
comes not from the United
States but from the Cuban
people."

Earlier Charges

The Cuban statement, issued
yesterday by Deputy Foreign
Minister Carlos Olivares,
charged that the United States
was preparing a new invasion
from bases in its territory and
in Central America.

However, Dr. Roa devoted
only a single sentence to these
charges, saying that "the terri-
tory of the United States, the
island of Vieques off Puerto
Rico, the plantations of Guate-
mala, the farms of Nicaragua,
the haciendas of the Dominican
Republic and the Canal Zone
of Panama were before, and
are now training camps and
dens for the mercenaries."

A point in Dr. Roa's speech
that was of considerable in-
terest to some Latin-American
delegates, was his statement
that "we advocate and we ac-
cept expressly the amicable
mediation of a number of
American Governments to ex-
plore the possibilities of worthy
and honest negotiations with
the Government of the United
States."

Although he implied that
these efforts had failed, Latin-
American sources said that this
was Cuba's first public accept-
ance of the idea of mediation.
United States sources here
saw little likelihood that the
references to mediation would
come to anything. The United
States takes the position that
its differences with Cuba are
not a bilateral matter but a
hemispheric one, involving the
question of Communist interven-
tion in the affairs of the
Americas.

Dr. Roa said that the United
States "is pressuring the Gov-
ernments of Latin America in-
dividually and collectively to
break off diplomatic relations
with the revolutionary Govern-
ment of Cuba." Among the
methods being used, he said,
was "the falsifying of docu-
ments attributed to the Cuban
Foreign Ministry."

Dr. Roa charged United
States participation in recent
plots to assassinate Premier
Fidel Castro and his brother
Raul. This charge was denied
by Mr. Stevenson, who labeled
it a "repulsive" accusation.

"Little as the United States
likes Fidel Castro and his as-
sociates," he said, "it abhors
assassination as a means of ac-
complishing political objectives."

The Cuban Foreign Minister
ended his speech with a plea
that seemed to be directed par-
ticularly at the other Latin
American nations, that the prin-
ciple of nonintervention be re-
spected in the case of his
country.

C. H. H. Dofaloe
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FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

EDITOR: JOHN B. OAKES

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL
MATTERS-CUBA

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Cuban Charges Denounced

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 (AP)

Cuban charges that the United States is training new invasion forces at twenty United States and nine Caribbean bases were denounced today as "totally unfounded" and "ridiculous" by the State Department.

Strong denials were also voiced at Fort Worth, Tex.; Norfolk, Va.; in three Florida counties and Fort Bragg, N. C., all named by Acting Cuban res as sites for the mounting of a new assault on Cuba.

An invasion by Cuban exiles failed last April. It was aided by the United States.

Lincoln White, State Department press officer, said no protest had been received from Cuba. But, noting press reports of Señor Olivares' statement before the Cuban diplomatic corps last night, he said:

"I am told that brevity is the essence of wit. I can only say that I assure you that the reported allegations are not only totally unfounded but are ridiculous."

Señor Olivares said the Florida training sites were West Palm Beach, Pompano, Fort Lauderdale, Hollywood, Opa-Locka, Hialeah, Homestead, Tavernier, Islamorada, Long Key, Marathon Key, Big Pine Key West, St. Petersburg, Sarasota and the Dry Tortugas, west of Key West.

"Castro's as wrong as can be about the Dry Tortugas," said Lieut. R. W. Willcox, commander of the United States Coast Guard Station in Key West. He has jurisdiction over the Tortugas.

Sheriff John M. Spottswood of Monroe County, which includes the Florida Keys, stated emphatically: "No such thing exists in the Florida Keys."



The New York Times
INDICTS U. S.: Dr. Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister, accuses U. S., at United Nations General Assembly, of training mercenaries and smuggling arms into Cuba.

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UPI-39

(CUBA)

NEW YORK--PREMIER CASTRO MAY BE PLOTTING A FAKE INVASION OF CUBA AS AN EXCUSE TO "LIQUIDATE" THE IMPRISONED LEADERS OF THE UNSUCCESSFUL APRIL 17 BAY OF PIGS ATTACK, EXILE LEADERS SAID TODAY. THEY SAID THEY WERE WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH AN INTRIGUE BY FRIENDLY LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATS IN SECRET DISPATCHES FROM HAVANA. CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL PRESIDENT JOSE MIRO CARDONA SAID ONE SUCH SOURCE QUOTED CASTRO PERSONALLY AS SAYING THERE WOULD BE AN "INVASION" OF CUBA "WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM THREE PLACES."

MIRO SAID IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT EXILES WERE NOT PRESENTLY IN A POSITION FOR AN "IMMEDIATE" ATTACK ON CASTRO. HE POINTED OUT THAT SIX GOVERNMENT HAD DENIED TO CUSED THIS WEEK BY CASTRO OF TRAINING INVASION TROOPS "IT WOULD BE CASTRO TO FAKE AN INVASION TO ENABLE HIM TO FIX THE MEN WHO LED THE APRIL 17 ATTACK WHOSE OBLIGED TO RESPECT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO MEMBERS OF WAR," MIRO SAID.

MIRO SAID ALSO THAT A FAKE ATTACK WOULD GIVE CASTRO AN OPPORTUNITY TO "DIVERT" PEOPLE'S MINDS FROM DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND ALSO SPUR CRUMBLING MORALE IN THE ARMED FORCES. INFORMED SOURCES IN WASHINGTON SAID ANY BOGUS INVASION STAGED BY CASTRO PROBABLY WOULD BE INTENDED MAINLY TO DISTRACT NATIONAL ATTENTION FROM THE PROBLEMS OF CUBA'S SHORTAGE-PLAGUED ECONOMY. THEY SAID THE PLIGHT OF THE AVERAGE CUBAN, ALREADY BAD, PROBABLY WILL GROW WORSE DURING THE CURRENT DRY SEASON.

A REPORT FROM UPI CORRESPONDENT BRUCE AGNEW IN GANDER, NEWFOUNDLAND, SAID THAT SOVIET RUSSIA IS DAILY MOVING "LARGE NUMBERS" OF MILITARY AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL BY AIR TO HAVANA. AGNEW QUOTED ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE SOURCES AS SAYING THERE HAD BEEN A "SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE" OF CUBANA AIRLINES FLIGHTS BETWEEN IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES AND CUBA THROUGH GANDER IN RECENT WEEKS. PASSENGERS WERE IDENTIFIED AS RUSSIANS, POLES, CZECHS AND RED CHINESE AS WELL AS CUBAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL.

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
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UPI-130

NY 1-4 (JUDD)

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.--REP. WALTER JUDD, R-MINN., TODAY CHARGED ADLAI STEVENSON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DELEGATE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH BEING LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CUBAN INVASION FIASCO.

JUDD ALSO TOLD AN ALL-DAY REPUBLICAN GATHERING THAT HE CONSIDERED PRESIDENT KENNEDY A WEAK AND INDECISIVE LEADER.

GEORGE ETZELL, REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEEMAN FOR MINNESOTA, WAS MORE PRONOUNCED. HE CALLED KENNEDY "EITHER DUMB OR SOFT ON COMMUNISM."

JUDD SAID STEVENSON WAS CAUGHT ON A LIMB BEFORE THE FINAL STAGE OF THE CUBAN INVASION WAS TO HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT. HE SAID THAT STEVENSON THOUGHT CUBAN PILOTS WHO COMPLETED THE FIRST PHASE OF THE INVASION BY BOMBING WITH B-52S WERE DEFECTORS FROM THE CASTRO REGIME.

JUDD SAID STEVENSON BECAME "INCENSED" WHEN HE LEARNED THEY WERE ACTUALLY EARLIER DEFECTORS FROM THE CUBAN AIR FORCE.

"IT WAS HIS PRESSURE AS FAR AS I CAN FIND OUT," JUDD SAID, "THAT CAUSED POSTPONEMENT OF THE SECOND AND CRUCIAL PHASE OF THE INVASION, THE KNOCKING OUT OF THE T33 PLANES WHICH WOULD LATER BOMB THE INVASION CRAFT."

JUDD SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BE CRITICAL OF THE PRESIDENT BECAUSE, "IN THESE DANGEROUS TIMES I WANT HIM TO BE A GREAT PRESIDENT." BUT HE SAID THAT INDECISION IS THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

"MR. KENNEDY WON'T LET OTHERS MAKE ANY DECISIONS AND HE WON'T MAKE ANY HIMSELF," JUDD CLAIMED.

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OCT 31 1961

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Alperts Thrived on Railway Loan

By Drew Pearson

This column has recently been in error in reporting on the \$14,700,000 Government-owned loan granted to the New Haven Railroad, which U. S. taxpayers had to make good. It was reported that loan included \$600,000 of salary and pension payments to George Alpert, president of the New Haven.



George Alpert, president of the New Haven.

I now find this was in partial error.

The column overlooked the fact that the Alpert law firm of Alpert & Alpert was also paid by the railroad, together with William A. Alpert, a member of the Alpert family.

Thus in 1957, in addition to \$60,000 paid to George Alpert, president, plus \$2150 in director's fees, there was also paid \$15,213 to William A. Alpert for services and disbursements. On top of this, \$76,800 was paid to Alpert & Alpert for services and disbursements.

In 1958, payments were even larger. In addition to \$60,000 salary to president George Alpert, plus \$1600 as director's fees, \$17,182 was paid to William Alpert, plus \$273,455 to Alpert & Alpert, the president's law firm.

In 1959, Alpert & Alpert was paid \$23,762, making a total for the three years of \$410,162, in addition to the \$600,000 salary and pension paid to president Alpert.

My apologies for underes-

timating the revenue of the Alperts.

Dancing President

President William Tubman of Liberia was solemn, sedate, and dignified when he was entertained by President Kennedy last week. The descendant of the Maryland slaves who founded a free republic in Africa before the Civil War enjoyed the White House hospitality, but it was a restrained type of enjoyment. It did not begin to match the manner in which President Tubman enjoyed his own inauguration when he was sworn in as President of Liberia in its capital, Monrovia.

Members of the diplomatic corps are still talking about that all-night reception, and how the President of Liberia cakewalked in top hat through the ballroom, then led the orchestra, then got out in the middle of the dance floor to do a Charleston.

Foreign ambassadors clad in white tie and tails, watched with mixed admiration and astonishment. Henry Cabot Lodge, the Boston blueblood, looking tall and dignified, edged toward the door. He was trying to escape unnoticed. By then it was 2 a. m. and most ambassadors figured they had danced long enough.

But the ebullient President of Liberia spied Lodge.

"The party isn't over yet," he admonished.

And, since this was a presidential command, Lodge had to stay.

Before the party broke up at 5 a. m., the ambassadors were treated to the unusual spectacle of the President of

Liberia on hands and knees imitating an animal dance in the jungle, a long cigar clenched between his teeth.

Finally, as the visiting ambassadors got back to their guest house at 5:30, the Japanese Ambassador asked the Chinese Ambassador: "Do you think we have to turn up at the military review at 8 a. m.?" "Yes," replied the Chinese. "We were sent here as special ambassadors for the ceremony, and we have to show."

Promptly at 8 a. m., President Tubman appeared in top hat, looking none the worse for his night of dancing.

Mission Accomplished?

Before Gen. Maxwell Taylor's departure for South Vietnam, he was sent on another secret presidential mission—to Time magazine for the purpose of straightening out publisher Henry Luce on the Cuban invasion. The general took with him a list of 17 alleged inaccuracies which he claimed had appeared in a Time report on the Cuban fiasco. Luce called in the author, Charles Murphy, who originally wrote the story for Fortune magazine. Gen. Taylor backed down in Murphy's presence and agreed that the article was substantially accurate, although he insisted it had been slanted.

The Taylor-Luce conference was the result of a long hassle between the White House and the Luce publishing empire over the Cuban affair. President Kennedy started it by calling the Time account inaccurate. Publisher Luce phoned the White House and demanded to be shown the in-

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accuracies. The President finally sent Gen. Taylor with the list of 17 alleged errors.

Headlines and Footnotes

The American Embassy in London flatly predicts that the next Prime Minister of England will be Iain Macleod, young new chairman of the Conservative Party. At 47, Macleod is on the way up and the popularity of Prime Minister Macmillan, 67, is on the way down . . . Joe de Silva, Southern California Labor leader, is urging Democrats to register Republican in order to defeat Nixon in the very hot primary battle with ex-Gov. Knight. De Silva predicts there'll be a big Democratic change-over—temporarily—to the Republicans.

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UPI-55

(VAN FLEET)

TAMPA, FLA.--THE TAMPA TRIBUNE HAS QUOTED GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET AS SAYING BERLIN AND LAOS ARE LOST TO THE COMMUNISTS AND SOUTH VIET NAM MAY BE LOST.

IN ITS TUESDAY EDITION, THE NEWSPAPER ALSO QUOTED VAN FLEET AS SAYING HE WOULD HAVE FIRED U.N. AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE CUBAN INVASION LAST APRIL.

THE TRIBUNE REPORTED VAN FLEET'S REMARKS WERE GIVEN IN A SPEECH LAST NIGHT AT LAKELAND, NEAR HIS HOME AT AUBURNDALE. THE 69-YEAR-OLD FORMER COMMANDER OF THE U.S. EIGHTH ARMY IN KOREA WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE TODAY FOR FORT BRAGG, N.C. IN CONNECTION WITH HIS NEW DUTIES AS ADVISER IN THE ARMY'S GUERRILLA WARFARE PROGRAM. PRESIDENT KENNEDY CALLED HIM FROM RETIREMENT TO THE POST EARLIER THIS MONTH.

VAN FLEET SAID BERLIN WAS LOST AFTER WORLD WAR II WHEN THE ALLIES DIVIDED GERMANY. HE SAID HE FAVORED PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S POLICY TO FIGHT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF BERLIN BUT SAID THE BRITISH TRADITIONALLY FEARED A STRONG GERMANY AND WOULD LIKE TO KEEP THE COUNTRY DIVIDED. "NEITHER WEST GERMANY NOR THE FRENCH WILL FIGHT WITH US IN BERLIN AND I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD FIGHT FOR THEM, THE NEWSPAPER QUOTED VAN FLEET AS SAYING.

VAN FLEET SAID LAOS WAS A LANDLOCKED NATION WITHOUT DIRECT ACCESS FOR AID AND THAT ITS PEOPLE WERE DIVIDED AND LACKED NATIONAL PRIDE. VAN FLEET, THE NEWSPAPER REPORTED, SAID THE PEOPLE OF VIET NAM HAD PLENTY OF PRIDE BUT THAT WHITE PERSONS SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HE SAID THE PRESENCE OF WHITE TROOPS IN VIET NAM WOULD GIVE THE COMMUNISTS TOOLS FOR PROPAGANDA.

THE TRIBUNE QUOTED VAN FLEET AS SAYING THE UNITED STATES SPONSORED THE CUBAN INVASION AND PLANNED TO PROVIDE AIR COVER, BUT WITHDREW THE PLANS WHEN STEVENSON REFUSED TO SUPPORT THEM.

"THAT'S WHEN I WOULD HAVE FIRED HIM," VAN FLEET SAID. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE INVASION PLANS BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

THE NEWSPAPER SAID VAN FLEET TOLD HIS AUDIENCE PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD OFFERED TO NAME HIM U.S. AMBASSADOR TO AUSTRALIA BUT THAT HE DECLINED IN FAVOR OF HIS PRESENT JOB.

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UPI-73

(VAN FLEET)

WASHINGTON--THE WHITE HOUSE SAID TODAY THAT GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET WAS EXPECTED TO BECOME A SPECIAL CONSULTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY DESPITE REPORTS THAT HE MADE SHARPLY CRITICAL REMARKS ABOUT ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

THE TAMPA, FLA., TRIBUNE REPORTED THAT VAN FLEET TOLD A LAKELAND, FLA., AUDIENCE LAST NIGHT THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY SHOULD HAVE FIRED STEVENSON AS U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS AFTER THE ABORTIVE CUBAN INVASION.

VAN FLEET IS SCHEDULED TO BECOME A PART-TIME CONSULTANT TOMORROW TO ARMY SECRETARY ELVIS J. STAHR WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON COMBAT READINESS OF CERTAIN NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE ARMY UNITS. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED VAN FLEET'S ASSIGNMENT ON OCT. 11.

ASKED ABOUT THE TRIBUNE STORY, ACTING PRESS SECRETARY JAY GILDNER SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW VAN FLEET WOULD TAKE ON THE ASSIGNMENT.

GILDNER SAID HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE VAN FLEET REMARKS EXCEPT WHAT HE READ IN A NEWS ACCOUNT. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER KENNEDY WAS AWARE OF THE REMARKS.


NEITHER THE ARMY NOR THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT WOULD COMMENT ON THE REPORT OF VAN FLEET'S REMARKS THAT BERLIN AND LAOS ARE LOST TO THE COMMUNISTS. VAN FLEET COULD NOT BE LOCATED IMMEDIATELY.

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UPI-23

(VAN FLEET)

FT. MONROE, VA.--GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET TELEGRAPHED ADLAI STEVENSON LAST NIGHT, RETRACTING AND APOLOGIZING FOR STATEMENTS HE MADE ABOUT THE U.N. AMBASSADOR'S ROLE IN THE ABORTIVE CUBAN INVASION.

VAN FLEET SAID THE STATEMENTS HE MADE MONDAY NIGHT IN FLORIDA WERE BASED ON ERRONEOUS INFORMATION.

HE HAD BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING HE WOULD HAVE FIRED STEVENSON LAST APRIL AFTER THE REBEL INVASION WHICH THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED.

THE TELEGRAM, RELEASED HERE LAST NIGHT, SAID:

"MY INFORMATION FROM SEVERAL SOURCES REGARDING CUBA WAS EVIDENTLY ERRONEOUS. IN VIEW OF YOUR TELEGRAM, WHICH I AM GLAD TO HAVE, I STAND CORRECTED AND AM SORRY FOR PRESS STATEMENTS WHICH WERE, IN FACT, NOT ACCURATE AND COMPLETELY OUT OF CONTEXT.

"I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE MEETING WAS A SMALL GROUP IN CLOSED SESSION AND REMARKS WERE MADE IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY PERSONAL FRIENDS AFTER MY MAIN ADDRESS COVERING WATER RESOURCES IN FLORIDA, AND I WAS ASSURED THERE WOULD BE NO PRESS COVERAGE."

THE TELEGRAM WAS RELEASED HERE BY LT. COL. GEORGE MONSARATT, WHO SAID HE WAS NOT ACTING IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY. HE SAID VAN FLEET HAD ASKED HIM TO RELEASE THE STATEMENT TO LOCAL NEWS MEDIA.

VAN FLEET TOLD REPORTERS AT THE AIRPORT AT NORFOLK LAST NIGHT THAT "IF A REPORTER ASKED ME HOW THE WEATHER WAS, I'D HAVE TO SAY NO COMMENT."

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
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UPI-172

(VAN FLEET)

WASHINGTON.--THE ARMY DISASSOCIATED ITSELF TODAY FROM REPORTED STATEMENTS BY GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET THAT U.N. AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIRED FOR HIS PART IN THE CUBAN FIASCO AND THAT BERLIN AND LAGS ARE BOTH LOST TO THE COMMUNISTS.

IN SO DOING, THE ARMY REVEALED THAT VAN FLEET WILL ACT AS A CONSULTANT ON THE SERVICE'S GUERRILLA WARFARE PROGRAM FOR ONLY 90 DAYS DURING THE NEXT YEAR, AND THAT HE WILL RECEIVE NO PAY FOR HIS SERVICES.

"WHEN NOT ACTING IN THIS ROLE (AS A CONSULTANT) THE GENERAL'S REMARKS ARE MADE IN HIS CAPACITY AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN," THE ARMY SAID.

"TO DATE HE HAS PERFORMED NO OFFICIAL DUTIES AS SPECIAL CONSULTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY."

THE 69-YEAR-OLD VAN FLEET; WAS A HERO IN THE NORMANDY LANDINGS AND LATER IN GREECE AND KOREA. HE IS A FORMER COMMANDER OF THE U.S. EIGHTH ARMY IN KOREA. VAN FLEET WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE TODAY FOR FORT BRAGG, N.C.; TO TAKE UP HIS DUTIES. PRESIDENT KENNEDY CALLED HIM OUT OF RETIREMENT TO TAKE THE ASSIGNMENT ON OCT. 11.

THE TAMPA TRIBUNE QUOTED VAN FLEET THIS MORNING AS SAYING HE "WOULD HAVE FIRED" STEVENSON BECAUSE HE SAID THE AMBASSADOR REFUSED TO SUPPORT AMERICAN AIR COVER FOR THE CUBAN INVASION LAST APRIL.

THE ARMY SAID VAN FLEET'S CONSULTANT DUTIES WILL CONSIST OF INSPECTING THE 32ND NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION OF WISCONSIN, WHICH WAS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY AT FORT LEWIS, WASH.; THE 49TH NATIONAL GUARD ARMORED DIVISION FROM TEXAS, WHICH IS AT FORT POLK, LA.; AND CERTAIN NON-DIVISIONAL RESERVE AND SPECIAL ANTI-GUERRILLA FORCES.

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UPI-174

ADD 1 VAN FLEET, WASHINGTON (UPI-172)

A DIRECTIVE RECENTLY SIGNED BY DEFENSE SECRETARY MCNAMARA STATED THAT "IN PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS, ALL OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONFINE THEMSELVES TO DEFENSE MATTERS."

THE DIRECTIVE ADDED THAT "THEY SHOULD PARTICULARLY AVOID DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS, A FIELD WHICH IS RESERVED FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE."


IN DESCRIBING VAN FLEET'S DUTIES THE ARMY SAID "HE WILL ACT AS A CONSULTANT FOR A TOTAL OF 90 DAYS DURING A ONE-YEAR PERIOD ENDING NOT LATER THAN OCT. 8, 1962. HE WILL RECEIVE NO COMPENSATION FOR HIS ASSISTANCE TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY."

PRESIDENT KENNEDY, IN ANNOUNCING VAN FLEET'S RECALL FROM RETIREMENT TO AID THE ARMY ESPECIALLY IN ANTI-GUERRILLA TACTICS, DID NOT MENTION THESE LIMITATIONS ON HIS SERVICES. HE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO RECEIVE RETIREMENT PAY.

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UPI-87

(CUBA)

HAVANA--PREMIER CASTRO CHARGED AGAIN TODAY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARING NEW AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA.

"IF THEY ATTACK," CASTRO SAID, "THEY WILL FIND ONCE MORE THAT THE CUBAN REVOLUTION IS MORE FIRMLY IN THE FATHERLAND ROOTS (AND) THAT IT HAS THE COURAGE AND WILL TO RESIST AND WIN."
 CASTRO MADE THE STATEMENT IN A MESSAGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL STUDENT UNION.

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
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UPI-80

(STEVENSON)

NEW IBERIA, LA.--LABOR COLUMNIST VICTOR RIESEL, HAS ACCUSED UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON OF MAKING "A LOT OF NOISE" AND THEN LYING ABOUT THE USE OF AIR COVER DURING THE CUBAN INVASION. RIESEL SAID STEVENSON "LIED WHEN HE SAID HE DID NOT INSIST ON THE REMOVAL OF AIR COVER."

THE BLIND COLUMNIST SAID THE CUBAN INVASION "FLOPPED BECAUSE STEVENSON MADE A LOT OF NOISE AND THREATENED TO RESIGN FROM THE UNITED NATIONS IF THE AIR COVER WAS NOT CALLED OFF."

RIESEL CHARGED THAT THE PEOPLE OF CUBA "WERE BETRAYED." HE SAID CASTRO MILITIA BEGAN DESERTING TO "OUR SIDE, BUT WHEN NO AIR COVER CAME, THEY REVERTED BACK TO THE SIDE OF CASTRO."

HE SPOKE TO 180 MEMBERS OF THE NEW IBERIA EXECUTIVES DINNER CLUB.
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Latin America Alarmed by New Invasion Threat Against Cuba

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REC-3

By JOSEPH NORTH

HAVANA — Storm signals are flying all over Latin America, not of Caribbean hurricanes, but of political storms and portents of new armed aggressions on Cuba.

The newspaper "Ultimas Horas" in Brazil has warned its readers and the nation that all Latin America's destiny is involved, and that all must defend Cuba's right to self-determination and freedom from intervention. It said a new invasion was imminent. Some think it is a matter of days.

The newspaper "Diario de la Tarde" of Mexico City and the Partido Popular Socialista Mexicano said the landings may be launched within the first two weeks of this month.

Julio Valladores Castillo, a Guatemalan deputy, denounced the Ydigoras government for "compromising" itself by helping the projected invasion which he said is directed by U. S. authorities.

All point out that the sovereignty of each Latin American country is at stake and that world peace is jeopardized.

A number of days ago word came from Central America that various ports facing Cuba have been closed to the public and that unprecedented activity was taking place on the docks where troop-ships are anchored.

Many Latin American observers in Havana believe that CIA and State Department officials are ready to explode this new aggression against world peace while the peoples have their attention focused on Germany.

Whatever the design and possible camouflage, one thing is

certain, Cuba is not letting its guard down. The government has said publicly many times that the architects of Playa Giron last April have refused to learn their lesson.

Well-grounded prediction is that the invasion this time may see puppet Central American governments in a more direct and open role. They may mount a phony attack on themselves, using airplanes painted with Cuban air-force markings, set some men clad in the olive-green uniforms marching in their own territories, and claim they are Fidel's Cuban forces. Faked confessions may be broadcast, followed by a declaration of war upon Cuba. This may take place in Guatemala or in Nicaragua or in any of the countries where stooge regimes maintain power.

It is felt that trigger-happy interventionists are stepping up their time schedule throughout

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the continent.

A few weeks ago it was Brazil. This week it was Ecuador. In both places the peoples handed the desperate counter-revolutionists and domestic reactionaries historic setbacks. Should Cuba be invaded, as all indications are that it will, the resultant political storm throughout Latin America will far surpass anything ever seen before, observers here are predicting.

The revelations over Cuba's television network this past week were carefully heeded throughout the continent.

A high-placed Cuban counter-revolutionist named Rehnol Gonzalez, arrested recently by the security forces, described in detail how arms and weapons of sabotage and terrorism arrive here from the states — by airplane, by ship and from the U. S. naval base at Guantanamo. He implicated the CIA, the State

Department and Guantanamo officials. He named as accomplices Jose Figueres, former president of Costa Rica; Munoz Mariz, of Puerto Rico; Haya de la Torre, of Peru; and Romulo Betancourt, president of Venezuela. In addition he told how most of the salangate clergy — "95 percent were in it up to their necks. He gave names and addresses where the stuff was stored and who was in charge.

Gonzalez told exactly who was responsible for burning down the big department store "El Encanto," and how new fires of big public places were being planned. Ten days ago an effort was made to burn down the national trade-union headquarters. Coolly, he told how the counter-revolution expected that Fidel Castro would call a mass protest meeting before the Presidential Palace on which the plotters would rain

hand grenades and explosives from weapons as big as the latest modern bazooka and how they planned the assassination of the prime minister at that time.

He confessed that an apartment had been rented in a building on the north side of the presidential square. The apartment was filled with arms sent by the CIA, he said — not only the bazooka but machine-guns, a supply of hand grenades, and even some faked militia and army uniforms were stored there for the conspirators to don and escape in the crowds during the expected tumult after the attempt on Castro's life. The security forces had raided the apartment and found the arms and materials in question.

The fact is, as Gonzalez admitted, the Cuban security knew all about this, followed his activities the previous six months. They not only rounded him up but scores of agents who were in the network formerly directed by Manuel Fay, a leading Cuban renegade. Fay, Gonzalez said, fell out with the CIA authorities because they appointed somebody they regarded as more "reliable" to head the inner works of sabotage. (They are all in jail now, Gonzalez said.)

All this was prelude to the forthcoming invasion, Gonzalez declared. He had been head of the Catholic youth organization here, but, as Cubans say, he not only betrayed his country but the millions of Catholics who are dedicated to support of the Castro government and the revolution.

Gonzalez sadly admitted that not only were the security authorities "scientifically efficient" but the civilian, voluntary "committees in defense of the revolution" had nipped every plot in the bud, gathering up the fire bombs before they exploded.

He said that the U. S. embassy personnel here — before the break in relations — were in-

volved in "guiding terrorist activities, paying the participants off and shielding them on embassy ground." And that the Venezuelan embassy, with the specific knowledge of president Betancourt, continued to work with the plotters after the U. S. officials packed up and left.

All this is on the record, names, places, dates. The proofs, Cubans say, are available to anybody who truly wants the evidence.

Several weeks ago Dr. Raul Roa, foreign minister, warned the world at the United Nations of preparations for another invasion.

TRAINING BASES

Dr. Carlos Oliveres, another leading foreign office authority, gave the names of twenty-nine specific sites in the U. S. as well as in other lands where training was taking place.

The Cuban people know the facts. It is a revelation to see how calmly they go about their daily rounds, fully aware of the dangers. They know that their government is doing all it can. They know that their army is totally dedicated and is part of the people. And that their army

is totally dedicated and is part of the people. But most of all they know they are a people in arms, through the popular militia formations which number in the hundreds of thousands.


So they work hard to step up production in the factories, with sights on the goals set forth by Fidel Castro in his recent speech on the four year plan.

This correspondent has seen the calm of the farmers busy on their cooperatives, state, and private holdings. He has seen the student at their books, studying into all hours to catch up fast, in science, in technology, in political economy, in the humanities, in the arts.

As this is written the employees of this hotel — elevator operators, waiters, chambermaids, black and white, young and old, women, and men, are on the street below marching and counter-marching in drill formation. Some do not yet wear the militia uniform, but drill in the clothes they wear at work. One waitress still has her apron on.

A people in arms, certain of their cause, knowing, most of the world is with them.

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UPI-27

(CUBA)

MOSCOW--MOSCOW RADIO CHARGED IN A BROADCAST BEAMED AT NORTH AMERICA TODAY THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARING TO "SUPPRESS THE CUBAN REVOLUTION BY FORCE OF ARMS."

"IT SEEMS THE AGGRESSORS HAVE LEARNED NOTHING FROM THE LESSON THEY WERE GIVEN IN THE SPRING OF THIS YEAR BY THE CUBAN PEOPLE," THE RADIO SAID.

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
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UPI-112

(BURKE)

CHICAGO--ADMIRAL ARLEIGH A. BURKE, FORMER CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, SAID TODAY THAT HE WAS RESTRICTED IN WHAT HE COULD SAY BEFORE HE RETIRED.

"I HAD SEVERAL SPEECHES THAT WEREN'T GIVEN," BURKE TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE, "BUT I DIDN'T PROTEST. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO HAVING SPEECHES CENSORED."

BURKE EXPLAINED THAT AN OFFICER OFTEN IS NOT IN A POSITION TO HAVE COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT A SITUATION. HE SAID AN OFFICER SHOULD SUBMIT SPEECHES TO OFFICIALS WITH MORE INFORMATION TO "MAKE SURE HE WASN'T SAYING SOMETHING DISRUPTING."

BURKE SAID THAT CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AT TOP POLICY-MAKING LEVELS WAS A GOOD THING, BUT ADDED THAT IT IS "IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE MILITARY AND POLITICAL THINGS."

SINCE THE KOREAN CONFLICT, BURKE SAID, THE NAVY HAS EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM TO MAKE FIGHTING MEN REALIZE WHAT OUR GOVERNMENT STANDS FOR AND WHAT DEMOCRACY MEANS. HE SAID THAT U.S. SOLDIERS IN KOREA "HAD NO STRONG CONVICTIONS," BUT THAT THE MORALE IS "MUCH BETTER" NOW.

BURKE, WHO HAD A PART OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ABORTIVE INVASION OF CUBA LAST APRIL, REFUSED TO COMMENT IN DETAIL ON THE FIASCO. HE DID SAY THAT U.S. JETS WERE IN THE AIR DURING THE INVASION, BUT THEY DID NOT FLY OVER CUBAN TERRITORY "EXCEPT FOR ONE SHORT PERIOD."

ASKED IF THE FULL STORY OF THE CUBAN INVASION IS GOING TO BE RELEASED, BURKE REPLIED: "NOT FROM ME IT AIN'T!"

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U.S. Investigators Checking Them

Records of Cuban Invasion Fought Over in Court Here

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

By DOM BONAFEDE
Herald Staff Writer

A legal battle for possession of complete records of the April 17 Cuban invasion, including information heretofore undisclosed, was waged at a Dade Circuit Court hearing Friday.

Some 13,000 pounds of documents sought in the court wrangle contains personnel records, intelligence data, sabotage background and counter-revolutionary information.

For the past several months, state Department investigators have been secretly combing through the mountainous material, kept under lock and key in a Miami warehouse by the anti-Castro Democratic Revolutionary Front.

The hearing, before Judge Lucien C. Proby Jr., involved action by the Front to retain possession of the files, which organization members maintain belong to them.

But Felix Gutierrez Fernandez, an ex-Cuban businessman and former officer in Batista's secret army intelligence corps, disputed the claim. The documents, he said, are his. He said they comprised his business records, as well as private data he collected on the anti-Castro movement.

Gutierrez, a heavyset, clean-shaven man, asked that the records be turned over to him. The request was denied by Judge Proby.

Cuban revolutionary leaders, led by Dr. Antonio de Vazquez, later declared that the material would be of inestimable value to Fidel Castro.

They said the records listed anti-Castro strongholds in Cuba, the names of underground members, and confidential intelligence which would enable the Cuban government to strangle the counter-revolutionary fight in Cuba.

Several witnesses, including members of the Front, testified that Gutierrez was a high-ranking member of the Front's intelligence service, working directly under Joaquin Sanjens, longtime chief of the section.

They said that Gutierrez leased a house on behalf of the Front at 3155 Ponce de

Leon, Coral Gables. The house was used as a records center and recruiting depot for the Cuban Liberation Army from Dec. 17, 1960, to shortly after the invasion last April, they said.

One witness, Candido Molinet, said that Gutierrez investigated recruits enlisted in the anti-Castro army prior to their departure for training in Guatemala.

Under questioning by Carlos Fernandez, attorney for the Front, Gutierrez vigorously de-

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
Date 12/19/61

FPM - CUBA
ANTI-CASTO ACTIVITIES
(BUfile 109-584)
(MMfile 105-1742)

Submitted by the
Miami Division

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nied that he had ever worked for the Front or Sanjénis.

"I never had anything to do with the Front," he declared.

He said that Sanjénis was a friend and that he had allowed him to use the office, which he (Guterrez) rented for his personal business.

He added that he collected counter-revolutionary information on his own initiative because he was interested in attempts to overthrow Castro "like any other Cuban."

The dispute over the records broke on April 21, 1961, four days after the invasion was launched, when Ernesto Despaigne was sent by the Front to take possession of the material stored at the house on Ponce de Leon.

Guterrez, however, charged Despaigne with trespassing and he was jailed for eight hours by police before being released.

Despaigne is presently the chief military adviser for the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the principal anti-Castro organization in Miami.

On May 3, Attorney Fernandez, armed with a sheriff's order, visited the house and attached the files and furniture. They have since remained in the warehouse, unavailable to anyone but the State Department investigators.

Efforts, meanwhile, to find Sanjénis, purportedly Guterrez's onetime boss, have been unsuccessful. According to Cuban revolutionary sources he has gone into hiding.

Owen Freed, attorney for Guterrez, said he will appeal the court's decision.

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Cuba Invasion Planned By Castro, Welch Says

BOSTON, Dec. 20 (AP)—The United States-supported invasion of Cuba was planned by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and his friends in our Government," Robert Welch, founder of the controversial John Birch Society, said in a copyrighted interview today in the Boston Herald.

The Herald quoted Welch as saying: "All we did in Cuba was help Castro. The Cuba invasion was planned by Castro and his friends in our Government to make Castro stronger throughout Latin America, to reduce United States prestige, and to expose prematurely thousands of patriotic Cuban citizens for the purpose of killing off future resistance."

"We butted in and we messed it up."

Welch offered no documentation for his statements.

"All we have to do to stop the Communists from taking over the world—and have it disappear—and have freedom revived, is to stop helping them," Welch said. "If our Government would stop, the Communist advance would be stopped in six months; in another six months, the Communist movement would blow up."

Welch admitted in the question-and-answer interview that the Birch Society hasn't attained its goal of one million members.

"While the Society is larger and stronger than a year ago, it hasn't increased in numbers over the past three or four months as it did in the preceding months."


He said his magazine "American Opinion," to which many Birch members subscribe, now has a circulation of nearly 20,000, while it had 4,000 paid subscribers 18 months ago.

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


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- The Washington Daily News _____
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
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UPI-37

(CUBA)

SAVANNAH, GA.--REP. ELLIOTT HAGAN, D-GA., SAID YESTERDAY HE
 WOULD SUPPORT A MILITARY INVASION OF CUBA TO OUST PREMIER CASTRO.
 "WE SHOULD BE FIRM AND POSITIVE AND REMOVE THIS FEVER BLISTER OF
 COMMUNISM FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE," HE SAID.

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Guatemala Admits Invasion Role Against Cuba, Hints U. S. 'Sequel'

GUATEMALA, Jan. 1 (AP) — President Miguel Ydigoras has acknowledged for the first time that Guatemala aided counter-revolutionaries who tried to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba last April.

In a New Year's message to the nation by radio and TV last night, he sharply criticized those who called the crushed April invasion a debacle, saying it frightened Castro so much "that his warlike activities outside Cuba ceased since that date." And, he added:

"President Kennedy still has the responsibility of a sequel."

He did not elaborate, but implied he was talking about something that may come from a meeting of Hemisphere foreign ministers in Uruguay later this month.

As to the April invasion, he said, "We encouraged thousands of exiled Cubans to fight to regain their own homeland instead of lamenting their ill fortune."

"This is the first time my government has spoken of training armed Cuban contingents of sound anti-Castro faith in Guatemala. We reached an understanding with exiled Cuban leaders and they entered into arrangements with a friendly government able to give arms and sustain training and a military campaign."

He said a secret training base was set up near the town of Retalhuleu and another operated openly, and when the "climactic hour ar-

ived Cuban troops were sent into combat on April 17, 1961, and the battle of Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) developed."

Ydigoras said the outcome of the fight at Bay of Pigs was a debacle only from the point of view of "pro-Communists embedded in the press and some public offices in the United States," but it was a great victory from the point of view of those who really has acknowledged for the first cause it scared Fidel Castro so much "that his warlike activities outside Cuba ceased since that date."


He also said the Guatemalan government maintained the reserve which is proper in such cases but the North Americans became "hysterical, as happens to them when they suffer a setback" and "their noisy press and the Gringo pro-Communists" stirred things up and created an atmosphere of "defeatism and debacle." This, he said led to ungentlemanly recriminations from journalists and officials and they forgot themselves to the point of naming Guatemala as the source of the invasion.

"Such brazenness had never been seen," Ydigoras said. "However, as was to be expected, President Kennedy, with the gesture of a great statesman, shouldered the responsibility, but President Kennedy still has the responsibility of a sequel neither cleared up nor fulfilled. The commitment made to Guatemala."

It is not clear what com-

mitment he meant, but presumably it is this:

"The Bay of Pigs was a victory, not a defeat, and he who begins under such auspices must go on with the great task of de-communicating that part of the American territory. There are signed commitments in South America."



- The Washington Post and Times Herald A-12
- The Washington Daily News _____
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- New York Herald Tribune _____
- New York Journal-American _____
- New York Mirror _____
- New York Daily News _____
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U. S. Denies Deal with Guatemala On British Honduras, Cuban Exiles

Associated Press
A State Department spokesman yesterday denied that the United States made a deal with Guatemala concerning British Honduras in return for Guatemala's help in training Cuban exiles for last year's invasion of Cuba.

State Department press officer Lincoln White issued the denial when asked about a press report quoting Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras as asking President Kennedy to comply with an agreement that he said had been made with Washington.

The question concerned a dispatch in the New York Times quoting Ydigoras as saying that in return for the Guatemalan aid in preparing for the unsuccessful Cuban invasion, the United States had agreed to offer its good offices in Guatemala's dispute with Britain over British Honduras. The Guatemalans call the territory Belize and say the Central American land should rightfully belong to them.

White said, "We have not made any offer of good offices." As to "whether, in turn for something Guatemala had done, we had undertaken

a commitment on our part, no we have not," White said.

White declined further comment on remarks attributed to Ydigoras in a New Year's radio-television message in Guatemala.

One such comment was a reported Ydigoras statement that Mr. Kennedy "still has the responsibility of a sequel" to the ill-fated Cuban invasion.

Other officials, speaking privately, said earlier that they do not consider the United States to have any unfulfilled duty regarding the Cuban situation.


[In Guatemala City, Foreign Minister Jesus Undamurillo said Tuesday he knew of no agreement with President Kennedy to mediate in the dispute with Britain; Reuters reported.]

In Palm Beach, Fla., Presi-

dential press secretary Pierre Salinger referred all questions on the matter to the State Department.

White said he was declining comment because the full text of Ydigoras' remarks has not been received by the Department—only press accounts that are not entirely in agreement.

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UPI-137

(CUBA)

MIAMI--THE FIDEL CASTRO REGIME TODAY ADMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME HEAVY LOSSES IN BEATING OFF LAST APRIL'S ABORTIVE PIG'S BAY INVASION ATTEMPT.

CUBAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJ. SERGIO DEL VALLE IN A SPEECH OVER HANA RADIO, MONITORED HERE, CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT'S DEFENCE AGAINST THE ATTACK FOR WHICH HE BLAMED "OUR HEAVY LOSSES." HIS TALK WAS SURPRISINGLY BLUNT.

"GOVERNMENT FORCES PLANNED (DEFENSE) VERY BADLY," HE SAID. "WE HAD HEAVY LOSSES BECAUSE OUR COUNTER-ATTACK PLANNING WAS BAD AND WE USED TOO MANY SOLDIERS."

"I'M SURE THAT IF THE INVADERS CAME TODAY THEY WOULD NOT LAST 24 HOURS."

IT WAS 72 HOURS LAST APRIL BEFORE LACK OF AIR SUPPORT, LOSS OF AN AMMUNITION SUPPLY SHIP AND A SHORTAGE OF DRINKING WATER FORCED THE MASS SURRENDER OF SOME 1,200 TROOPS IN THE INVASION FORCE.

MEMBERS OF THE INVASION FORCE WHO ESCAPED AND REACHED THE UNITED STATES ESTIMATED CASTRO'S LOSSES AT THE TIME AT AROUND 1,000. THE INVADERS LOST FEWER THAN 100.

CASTRO AT THE TIME MINIMIZED HIS LOSSES. YET GOVERNMENT PENSION LISTS PUBLISHED SINCE HAVE CITED SEVERAL HUNDRED FAMILIES AS DESERVING AID BECAUSE OF BATTLE CASUALTIES.

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
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UPI-137

(CUBA)

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Nixon Says U.S. Needs a Policy To Oust Castro

Richard M. Nixon said last night this country needs "a determination that Castro has to go, and a policy to bring that about."

In a 50-minute taped interview on the Jack Paar television show (NBC), the former Vice President ran the gamut of topics, from Castro to the John Birch Society to Robert Kennedy's Japanese visit, to his feeling about "muzzling" military brass.

At the end of his appearance, Mr. Nixon played the Missouri Waltz on the piano.

Asked to evaluate President Kennedy's action in Cuba, Mr. Nixon said criticism of the President for approving the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion last year was out of order. Mr. Kennedy's mistake, Mr. Nixon said, was that he did not "follow through as he could have with air support which would have insured success."

ONLY CHOICE: SUCCESS

"Once the U.S. had committed its prestige," Mr. Nixon said, "then there was no choice but to see that it succeeded."

The former Vice President said the United States needed a three-part policy to unseat Castro—legal means to stop the flow of arms and munitions into Cuba; a legal way of stopping flow of arms and Communist agents out of Cuba and into the rest of Latin America and a means to "bring the Monroe Doctrine up to date," to prevent other subversive inroads into the Latin American countries.

Mr. Nixon also said that John Birch Society members, Minutemen and others who embrace "totalitarian means" play into Communist hands.

He said those political candidates "who seek support from the John Birch Society are not serving America."

As for the Attorney General's goodwill trip and the attendant demonstrations, Mr. Nixon said: "A minority are embarrassing the great majority of Japanese." He said most Japanese were friendly to the U. S.

'TOUGH, INTELLIGENT'

He described the Attorney General as a "tough minded, quick and intelligent" individual with qualities which should make him, with experience, a good Secretary of State.

"He is one who has a tremendous will to win," Mr. Nixon said.

"Looking at Robert Kennedy you have here a man who, except for the lack of experience which he is now gaining, has many of the qualifications that would make him a very effective leader in the field of foreign policy," Mr. Nixon said.


Mr. Nixon said military officers should not speak on a "partisan" basis.

He said, however, that American soldiers "should be indoctrinated on the world struggle and on the dangers of Communism."

Touching briefly on his personal impression of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Mr. Nixon said he "uses his temper, doesn't lose it."

He said contrary to the opinion of many, Khrushchev was not a man apt to lose control of himself, but a cold, calculating leader.

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Nixon on TV Offers Ways To Beat Castro

NEW YORK, Feb. 8 (UPI). Richard M. Nixon said tonight this country needs "a determination that Castro has to go, and a policy to bring that about."

In a 50-minute taped interview on the Jack Paar television show (NBC), the former Vice President ran the gamut of topics, from Castro to the John Birch Society to Robert Kennedy's Japanese visit, to his feeling about "muzzling" military brass.

Asked to evaluate President Kennedy's action in Cuba, Nixon said criticism of the President for approving the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion last year was out of order. Mr. Kennedy's mistake, Nixon said, was that he did not follow through as he could have with air support which would have insured success.

"Once the United States had committed its prestige, Nixon said, then there was no choice but to see that it succeeded."

Nixon said the United States needed a three-part policy to unseat Castro—legal means to stop the flow of arms and munitions into Cuba; a legal way of stopping flow of arms and Communist agents out of Cuba and into the rest of Latin America; and a means to "bring the Monroe Doctrine up to date."

Nixon also said that John Birch Society members, Minutemen and others who embrace "totalitarian means... play into Communist hands."

As for the Attorney General's goodwill trip and the attendant demonstrations, Nixon said: "A minority are embarrassing the great majority of Japanese."

He said military officers should not speak on a "partisan" basis.

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Nixon Raps Kennedy On Invasion of Cuba

NEW YORK, Feb. 9 (AP).—Former Vice President Richard M. Nixon has attacked President Kennedy's handling of the abortive Cuban invasion—especially for failure to give the invaders air support.

Appearing for almost an hour last night on the nationally televised Jack Paar Show (NBC-TV), Mr. Nixon said he had been unable to discuss the Cuban situation as freely as he wanted to during the 1960 presidential campaign because he knew the United States was training rebels to mount last year's invasion.

Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Nixon said, apparently "took the advice of some people around him" when he failed to follow through with air support.

"Once the United States has committed its prestige to the overthrow of a Communist regime, and once the decision was made, and once the troops sailed, there was no choice but to make it succeed," Mr. Nixon said.

"Castro Must Go"

What is needed, he added, "is a determination: Castro must go, and the development of a policy to see that it happens."

In discussing the present administration's foreign policies, Mr. Nixon said: "If all the United States does is what the weak and timid will approve, we might as well cash in our chips right now."

Mr. Nixon discussed Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the President's brother.

"In looking at Robert Kennedy," Mr. Nixon said, "you have a man who, except for lack of experience which he is now gaining, has many qualities of leadership in foreign policy."

Mr. Nixon noted published reports hinting that the younger Kennedy is being considered for a foreign policy post—possibly even Secretary of State.

Raps Birch Society

Mr. Kennedy, currently in Japan, first foreign stop in a trip around the world, said in Tokyo he had no comment.

Commenting on the ultra-conservative John Birch Society and the Minuteman organiza-

tions, Mr. Nixon said that neither the Republicans nor the Democrats can afford candidates who seek the support of such groups.

"We need good, strong anti-Communists in this country," Mr. Nixon said, "but I realize that those who exaggerate, those who make a racket of it, hurt the cause. When you overstate your case, you are playing into their (Communist's) hands."

"I know from experience," Mr. Nixon continued, "that in fighting the Communists in this country, as they should be fought, one of the things that is most essential is that you have every regard for the use of American principles in fighting them."

Backs Troop Indoctrination

Concerning the current controversy over "muzzling" the military, Mr. Nixon said top-ranking officers must be well-informed on the menace of communism and that troops overseas should be indoctrinated.


Asked how he felt about the series of television debates between himself and President Kennedy during the last presidential campaign, Mr. Nixon said:

"That is moot at this point, and by that I mean if I was sorry I wouldn't say so."

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
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UPI-47

(U.N.)

UNITED NATIONS--THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES PLANNED TO ASK THE
 GENERAL ASSEMBLY TODAY TO IGNORE CUBA'S CHARGES OF U.S. AGGRESSION.
 INFORMED SOURCES SAID THE LATIN AMERICANS WOULD MOVE THAT THE
 ASSEMBLY TAKE NO VOTE ON A COMMUNIST RESOLUTION THAT WOULD GIVE NOMINAL
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
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UPI-32

(CUBA)

MOSCOW--THE SOVIET UNION CHARGED YESTERDAY THAT U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA IS A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.

ACCUSING THE U.S. OF PLANNING AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA, THE KREMLIN WARNED OF POSSIBLE RETALIATORY MEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN COUNTRIES WHERE U.S. MILITARY BASES ARE LOCATED.

THE STATEMENT, PUBLISHED BY TASS, SAID:

"IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THREATENS CUBA, LET IT DRAW THE PROPER CONCLUSION WITH REGARD TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE U.S. MILITARY BASES ARE SITUATED."

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Cuban Fiasco Poorly

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Dulles' Group Is First in

Line for Censure

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 N . Y. WORLD TELEGRAM
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 DATED 2/23/62
 PAGE 10
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 EDITOR: LEE B. WOOD
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 BY ANDREW TULLY
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One of the darkest chapters in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency is its role in the unsuccessful invasion of Cuba in 1961. Prize-winning writer Andrew Tully gives the full story today in the concluding installment from his newly published book, *"CIA: The Inside Story"* (William Morrow & Co.).

By **ANDREW TULLY** N.Y.

THE second guessers who ply their opinions so vigorously in Washington are always in agreement on one point: The April, 1961, landing at the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, was one of the most poorly planned and executed military adventures in history.

President Kennedy is prone to dismiss any discussion of a scapegoat with the curt suggestion that "There's enough blame to go around." After all, he did not get much of a performance either from the Pentagon or from his close White House advisers.

Nevertheless, the Central Intelligence Agency remains first in line for censure, for a variety of reasons. Chief among these is CIA's apparently traditional unwillingness to do business with any but the forces of the far right.

Because CIA insisted on maintaining that an invasion by 1400 men could seriously threaten a regime with a military force of upwards to 400,000, perhaps nothing could have saved the day. But at least the adventure would have had a better chance if Allen Dulles and his aides had availed themselves of a moderately liberal organization that not only had the most popular appeal among Cubans but also controlled the highly effective anti-Castro underground.

CIA now maintains that actually the invasion was designed exclusively for this purpose — the establishment of a guerrilla force in Cuba — but there is no record that Mr. Dulles explained it in this fashion to the President beforehand.

CIA Was Given Task Of Ousting Castro

To understand all the blunders which went into the manufacture of the Cuban fiasco, it is necessary to go back to the late spring of

1960 when the Eisenhower Administration decided to take a hand in the liquidation of the Castro regime. Castro had to go, and the CIA was given the assignment of sending him on his way.

The first step was to try to make sense out of the various warring factions organized by Cuban exiles to regain power in their homeland. Foremost among these were the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MRR), a moderately right-wing outfit composed of former Castro supporters and military officers and Cuban business and professional men, and Manolo Ray's People's Revolutionary Movement (MRP).

Mr. Ray, who had been Castro's Minister of Public Works, was the boss of the resistance movement inside Cuba. But to CIA, Mr. Ray was an anathema almost from the start.

In Miami, where the exile leaders spent their days in long-winded plotting, Mr. Ray became the target of reactionary Cuban businessmen and politicians, including the notorious Rolando Masferrer, who had been Batista's chief executioner in Oriente Province.

CIA did manage to get the exile factions united in something called the Revolutionary



JOSE MIRO CARDONA
Fated.

Democratic Front, which included Mr. Ray's effective and, among people of Cuba, highly popular MRP.

Farms Acquired For Training Grounds

Several isolated farms in Florida were leased or purchased and used as training grounds for recruits who flocked to the Liberation Army. CIA helped finance this training and so did various Cuban and American corporations with Cuban interests. In overall command was CIA's Richard M. Bissel, Mr. Dulles' top deputy.

The U.S. government worked out an agreement with Guatemala's President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes shortly after he broke relations with the Castro government by which Guatemala furnished training fields for the Liberation Army.

Airstrips were built and American pilots arrived to train the rebels' fliers.

The time was nearing when CIA had to pick a leader of the invasion force. CIA's choice was 29-year-old Manuel Artima Buesa, a one-time Castro soldier.

By January, 1961, Capt. Artima was ready to take over. After a series of speeches to

B. APPROX.

the freedom fighters, Capt. Artime changed a number of the commanders. The troops were shocked, but all of the some 1500 went along with the persuasive Artime except for about 200, who refused to fight under their new commander, Capt. Robert San Roman, because he had served as an officer under Batista.

List of 38 Names Submitted for Post

The stubborn 200 were arrested and isolated from the rest of the troops, under guard.

Just before Dr. José Miro Cardona was named chairman of the Joint Cuban Revolutionary Council, CIA submitted to the council a list of 38 names of Cubans for the post. The list contained the names of 12 former Batista supporters.

President Kennedy had issued an order excluding Batistianos from the Liberation Army, and in the last days of the preparation for the landing he ordered the Immigration and Naturalization Service to arrest Masferrer. But unknown to the President, CIA refused to put into effect Kennedy's Batistiano ban.

Meanwhile, Mr. Ray ordered his followers to report to the Guatemalan training camps, but they never got there. In Miami, 120 of them

were detained by CIA agents, along with some officers who had escaped from a Cuban prison in December, 1960.

CIA's plans were reviewed and indorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Kennedy could not be blamed if he felt he had to go along with the decision. His experts recommended it, and time was of the essence.

As envisaged by President Eisenhower, every effort was to have been made to avoid overt American intervention, except on a "contingency basis." That is, American planes would intervene if necessary to maintain control over the beachhead and prevent the destruction of the invaders.

Mr. Kennedy did not like the idea; instead he proposed and had adopted a plan for air strikes against the Castro air force by Cuban pilots flying from Guatemalan bases.

Then Mr. Kennedy ruled that under no circumstances whatever were American forces to become involved.

The Joint Chiefs advised Mr. Kennedy that without American air support the rebels might not be able to hold the beachhead. But in that case, they said, the invaders could make their way to the Escambray Mountains, 50 miles away, and form guerrilla bands to harass the Castro regime.

Fifty miles is a far piece for defeated soldiers to travel.

But this might have been possible had CIA not snubbed Mr. Ray's underground. For, although Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell relented in the last two weeks and sent supplies of explosives to the resistance movement, neither Mr. Ray nor any other leader of the underground was told the exact date of the invasion.

Dulles Favored Bay of Pigs Site

Consequently, the resistance movement was as surprised as Castro when the rebels hit the beach.

Mr. Dulles since has claimed that the swampy coast of Cienaga de Zapata in the Bay of Pigs was an ideal landing place, since it had three airstrips and was difficult to approach because it had only three bad roads. But Mr. Ray's military leader, Col. Ramón Barquin, had protested in vain the choice of the landing place.

By the time the troops took to their invasion ships, CIA was listening to nobody—and making sure that even the Cuban exile leaders would have nothing to do with the operation.

Beginning at midnight, April 16, five Liberty ships chartered by dummy operators for CIA disgorged the invaders in the Bay of Pigs. When dawn came, some C-54 and C-46 transport planes from Guatemala and Nicaragua flew over the beachhead and dropped paratroopers. The air cover was provided

by eight old B-26 bombers and a few obsolete P-51 Mustang fighter planes.

Without opposition to speak of, units of the invaders marched forward, penetrating 20 miles inland. But this column was halted by a battalion of Castro militia and then forced to surrender by the arrival of heavy reinforcements.

CIA had informed the President that the Cuban air force had been rendered ineffective. The information was not quite accurate. Three American T-33 jet trainers, originally shipped to the Batista regime, suddenly appeared over the beachhead and went into action. The slow and awkward B-26s did not have a chance and were shot down.

By noon of invasion day, the Castro planes had sunk the Liberty ship loaded with ammunition and a second one carrying all the communications equipment. Soviet tanks and heavy guns carried on trucks were transported over the roads which the underground had not been ordered to cut and wheeled into action to complete the debacle.

If Mr. Kennedy were to change his mind and permit American intervention, the time had come for action. On the night of Tuesday, April 18, the President was called from a formal dinner and joined a White House meeting whose conferees included Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell. The men stayed up all night, trying to decide whether

American forces should be sent to Cuba, but reached no conclusion. Next morning, a similar meeting was held, and Mr. Kennedy decided to do nothing, largely because it was too late.

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WILLIAM S. WHITE

Richard Bissell Takes the Rap

Finger of Blame Too Easily Pointed At One Involved in Cuban Fiasco

Twice in a long career of unselfish and courageous service to his country the name of Richard Bissell has been in the headlines.

The first time was last spring, in the aftermath of the patriots' invasion of Castro-Communist Cuba. On that occasion kind friends and associates in government, with those eager and girlishly gossipy leaks to certain sympathetic correspondents which typify a sort of civil servant who is strong most of all in the sterling quality of self-preservation, most kindly pointed the finger at Richard Bissell.

No sooner had the great search of "Who done it?" begun over the corpse of the lost action than there began to appear curious pieces in the papers, springing as from nowhere, in which the name "Bissell" led all the rest. What on earth had been wrong with the planning? Well, whatever it was, it was Bissell who was to blame. It was Bissell who had unwisely advised the administration to enter this hapless enterprise—and, of course, it was also pointed out that those who leaked this

deathless information, were themselves wholly blameless. They, of course, had opposed it all along.

From their standpoint the fall guy was well chosen. For Richard Bissell, apart from the natural personal reserve of a desperately shy man, was an old-fashioned professional in government who knew that civil servants at his level were supposed to keep their minds open and their mouths shut. They were intended to be advisers to superiors, not press contact men for themselves.

Moreover, Bissell's own particular job enjoined silence upon him in a special way. For he was a high—and up to this point a highly anonymous—official doing the most hush-hush sort of work in the Central Intelligence Agency. In a word, he would not have defended himself by counter-leaks if he could, being the kind of man he is, and he could not have even if he would.

John F. Kennedy himself sought no scapegoats for the failure in Cuba, rightly realizing that this action had been approved by the President of the United States and that the responsibility of that person can be shared by no one. Lesser people within the administration, however, were not so generous. Scapegoats had to be found; and so Bissell was there to fill the bill.

Thus, recently, his resignation was announced—and along with this, his appointment as executive vice president of the Institute for Defense Analyses, a university-supported group which is seeking to assist this Government in the cold war.

My small salute to the departing Richard Bissell is not intended to say that he did not make mistakes in his recommendations for the Cuban action. Nor is it intended to suggest even that in the hard, tough game of public affairs he should not have had to pay the price of error.

It is intended, however, to pay a left-handed compliment to the highly effective nature of the whispering campaign by leak which other bureaucrats so gladly and quickly loosed against the one man who had no means—or taste—to answer back.

And, finally, it is intended to raise a most melancholy point: Bissell, whatever his mistakes, was one bureaucrat who was repeatedly willing to risk mistakes—to risk his whole future, as in Cuba—in order actually to do something. Bureaucracy tends to play it safe, and let George do it—and take the rap. Bissell played it dangerous, and let Richard do it—and take the rap.

It hardly overstates the matter, does it, to suggest that it seems a pity that when the ghost does walk among the bureaucrats, handing out the spectral blue slips of dismissal, it walks so often among the men of decision and of courage—and of taste?

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By **WARD CANNEL**

One Year After Cuban Fiasco

THE FIRST anniversary of the mangled Cuban invasion nears. And two Cubans talking quietly over their coffee in a steaming lunchroom in Miami meet face to face a year late.

The young man, Fernandez, talks in a low, rapid monotone, as though he were trying to elude some omnipresent wiretap.

"I had great difficulty with your name," he said. "I am not a trained radio-operator. My specialty is demolition. But the radio-man was shot when we parachuted into Cuba. So the job fell to me. Your name is very hard for me in wireless code."


The other man, Casagrande, laughed. "If I had only known, I would have let a man with a shorter name volunteer for my job. But they told me that everything was fine and that I would be met on the beach by somebody who knew my name."

Fernandez nodded. "Yes. That is correct. We were ready. There were 100 in that town who knew your name. Perhaps 200. It was the best town our team ever worked. Everybody was with us from the minute we set up an underground headquarters. Even the police. I was sent once to burn a department store in the next town. I went both ways by police car. It was perfect."

Casagrande asked, "How perfect was it? It is never perfect for revolutionaries—even former revolutionaries." Casagrande had been a captain with Fidel Castro during the days of Batista.



Ward Cannel



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N . Y. WORLD TELEGRAM

EDITION 7th SPORTS

DATED 3/15/62

PAGE 21

FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

EDITOR: LEE B. WOOD

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-CUBA

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"I don't know about politics," Fernandez said. "I don't believe in politics. I don't take sides. I only do my job. Tactically it was perfect."

Casagrande shrugged. "Well, for us it was not so perfect. We were 200 men in 125 feet of boat. They say the man who rented that boat to the invasion is now rich. I can believe it. Even the dingy I took to the shore was too small and too wet. I am still a little surprised I made it back to the ship that night."

Fernandez said, "We had received no message. We knew nothing of that night. Except that a dead miliciano was found on the beach. He was yours?"

Casagrande nodded. "The second night, of course, the game was up. Only a blind man would not have seen us lying off shore all day in that convoy."

Fernandez said, "We got the message on the second night. There was no regular message period from any of our contacts. So I switched to the emergency frequency. I could have got the same news by tuning to radio Havana. Everybody seemed to know it was the invasion except the people who were supposed to know."

Casagrande laughed. "Yes. Our radio went out. We knew nothing. And so, for nine days, we patrolled the Cuba shore by day, and tried to stake out a beachhead by night. By then, of course, we were out of food and nearly out of water. Can you see it? Two hundred men dying of starvation and thirst in plain sight of their homeland?"

Fernandez said, "I would have traded places with you anyhow. All I could do was pack up my gear and begin to walk the 80 miles to Havana. You could not stop anywhere because the invasion had smoked out all your contacts. You simply had to keep walking."

Casagrande said, "Finally we made for Key West. But they turned us away—some reason about not interfering in Cuban affairs. They turned us away from Mexico, too. It was maddening. At least if I had been in your shoes I could have burned something or blown something up."

For the first time Fernandez smiled happily. "Oh, I did," he said. "Two tractors. Two trucks. A stretch of railroad track. I'm very good at that sort of thing. But there's not much call for it in the hotel kitchen where I'm working now."

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Quadros Claims U. S. Asked for Help on Cuba

SAO PAULO, Brazil, March 16 (AP) — Janio Quadros declared last night that a U.S. State Department official had implied to him that the United States wanted Latin American nations to join in some kind of military action against Cuba.

Quadros, in his first public address since he resigned the presidency last August, said the implication came from Adlai Berle Jr. a month before the abortive Cuban invasion last April. Berle was then the State Department's coordinator of Latin American affairs.

Quadros said Berle visited him last March and "he implied the United States was interested in joint action by the continental family of a political, economic and even military nature against the Caribbean nation. I rejected him politely but firmly."


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DISTRESSING CAMPAIGN

Nixon Says JFK Put Cuba Revolt in Peril

Richard M. Nixon says that President Kennedy endangered the secrecy of the Cuban invasion when he was campaigning for the White House.

Mr. Nixon, in his book, "Six Crises," wrote that the Central Intelligence Agency briefed Mr. Kennedy on plans for the invasion during the 1960 campaign.

INTERVENTION

But the former Vice President said his Democratic rival came out publicly on Oct. 20 for U. S. intervention in Cuba

"I thought that Mr. Kennedy, with full knowledge of the facts, was jeopardizing the security of a United States foreign policy operation," Mr. Nixon wrote.

The Republican candidate said this was the only time he personally got angry at Mr. Kennedy during the campaign. He said it particularly disturbed him because he had been advocating for nine months inside the Eisenhower Administration that the anti-Castro forces be aimed, but could not say so publicly.

Mr. Nixon's book, published by Doubleday and now on sale, recounts crises he faced during his Washington career, from the Hiss-Chambers case to his losing fight for the presidency.



RICHARD M. NIXON

OTHERS

Other crises he related were the political fund incident in 1952, President Eisenhower's heart attack, the attack on him by communist-led mobs in Latin America in 1958, and his "kitchen debate" with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1959.


Mr. Nixon's longest charter, on the 1960 campaign, includes these points:

• After his defeat, he vetoed a GOP move to demand recounts in Illinois and Texas, altho he felt there was "real substance" to vote fraud charges. He said if he had demanded a recount, the change in administrations would have become chaotic with "incalculable and lasting damage throuth the country."

• He refused his advisers' unanimous recommendation to make a late campaign speech about the religious issue engendered by Mr. Kennedy's Catholicism. He said Mr. Kennedy's associates accused him of "deliberate religious bigotry," but he does not regret keeping the lid on the "boiling cauldron of embittered anti-Catholicism."

• Mr. Nixon thinks he won the last three of the four televised debates with Mr. Kennedy, losing the first one because he was underweight, hurting his image. Nevertheless, he said, Mr. Kennedy gained more from the debates because 20 million persons who watched the first debate did not watch the last three. (UPI)

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
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(TEXT)

WASHINGTON--TEXT OF PRESS SECRETARY SALINGER'S STATEMENT ON
 FORMER VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S PUBLISHED COMMENTS ABOUT CUBA:

"THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS ARE
 PROPER SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DEBATE BUT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACCOUNT IN
 NIXON'S BOOK IT IS NECESSARY TO SAY THAT THE THEN SEN. KENNEDY WAS
 TOLD BEFORE THE ELECTION OF 1960 OF THE TRAINING OF TROOPS OUTSIDE
 CUBA OR OF ANY PLANS FOR 'SUPPORTING AN INVASION OF CUBA.'

"MR. NIXON'S ACCOUNT IS APPARENTLY BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING.
 KENNEDY RECEIVED TWO BRIEFINGS FROM MR. ALLEN DULLES OF THE CIA,
 FIRST ON JULY 23, 1960, AND THE SECOND ON SEPT. 19, 1960. THE TWO
 BRIEFINGS COVERED AN OVERALL REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION DURING
 CUBA WAS MENTIONED. BUT SEN. KENNEDY WAS FIRST INFORMED OF THE
 OPERATION TO WHICH MR. NIXON REFERS IN A BRIEFING BY ALLEN DULLES,
 RICHARD BISSEL OF THE CIA GIVEN IN PALM BEACH, FLA., ON NOV. 18, 1960.
 (END TEXT)

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
(IN WHITTIER, CALIF., NIXON WAS ADVISED OF THE PRESIDENT'S CHALLENGE WHILE ATTENDING A CHURCH CONVOCATION.

"I HAVE NO COMMENT AT THIS TIME, UNTIL I HAVE A CHANCE TO READ THE STATEMENT," NIXON SAID. "THERE WILL BE A LOT OF CONTROVERSY OVER THE BOOK, I IMAGINE.")

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ADD 3 NIXON, WASHINGTON

FORMER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES ALSO SAID IN A STATEMENT RELEASED THROUGH THE CIA THAT KENNEDY WAS NOT GIVEN ANY INFORMATION DURING THE CAMPAIGN CONCERNING ANY "OVERT OR COVERT" ACTION SUCH AS THE CUBAN INVASION.

DULLES SAID THERE APPARENTLY HAD BEEN "AN HONEST MISUNDERSTANDING" BY NIXON CONCERNING THE CONTENT OF THE BRIEFINGS GIVEN KENNEDY.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Nixon Replies To Kennedy's Cuba Denial

LOS ANGELES, Mar. 22 (AP).—President Kennedy says the issue is closed as far as he is concerned, but former Vice President Nixon has a final word on the secret preparations for a Cuban invasion attempt.

Mr. Nixon issued a statement yesterday in reply to the White House denial that Mr. Kennedy knew, during the 1960 campaign that the United States was training Cubans for the invasion.

Mr. Nixon's book, "Six Crises," says Mr. Kennedy was aware of the training and endangered United States security by advocating drastic opposition to Fidel Castro.

"President Eisenhower has authorized me to state that he gave instructions that Senator Kennedy was to be as fully briefed on our foreign problems as I was," Mr. Nixon's statement said.

"The statements in my book were based not only on public press accounts of the briefings President Kennedy received, but on personal conversations with responsible individuals who had knowledge of the facts.

"Because the Cuban issue was such an important one in the campaign, I personally researched the facts relating to it. Beyond that I have no further comment. My book speaks for itself."

The White House denial has been supported by Allen W. Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who briefed Senator Kennedy. He said Mr. Nixon was in error, but that he believes the charge was the result of "an honest misunderstanding."

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
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REPORT TO READERS

The Bay of Pigs

TEN DAYS BEFORE THE ANNIVERSARY of the abortive invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba—April 17, 1961—an incident took place which illuminates the obtuseness of Washington's policy toward Latin America. The National Broadcasting Co. had scheduled an hour-long debate April 7 on its program, *The Nation's Future*, on the subject: "How Can Progress Be Best Achieved in Latin America?" Participants were to be Richard N. Goodwin, Deputy Asst. Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, and Carlos Fuentes, one of Mexico's leading novelists whose books have been best sellers in the U.S. The debate, according to an NBC release, was "to focus on the controversy underlying the popular unrest in virtually all Latin American countries today."

On April 6 NBC announced that the debate had been canceled. The reason: The State Department had denied Fuentes a visa on the ground that his appearance on TV "was not in the national interest." Whether the department regarded its own representative as a poor match for Fuentes, or whether it was worried that the American public might learn some truths about Latin America, this fact emerges: Washington no longer adheres to the American tradition of a free exchange of opinion.

IT MAY HAVE BEEN COINCIDENCE, but a week before the anniversary also, the 1,179 invaders taken prisoner at the Bay of Pigs were found guilty after trial in Havana and each sentenced to 30 years in prison for treason. A collective fine of \$62 million was levied; if it is paid, all will go free. Immediately the fine was labeled "blackmail" and "ransom" in the U.S. press which for days had been forecasting sentences of death. "The feeling of revulsion" which the *New York Times* regarded as "the natural first reaction to the sentences" might with greater accuracy be attributed—but was not—to the actual invasion attempt.

What the Cuban government was saying in the sentences was this: Take your poor misled sons out of our country. We do not want them. Rather, we will take the fine money and buy food for our people whom you seek to starve into submission by economic blackmail. But remember one thing: If you try again, there will be no such mercy.


Will there be another attempt? At the United Nations, Ambassador Stevenson "for the eleventh time" on March 16 denied the U.S. was planning a new invasion, which Dr. Milton Eisenhower, on March 28, said "would be disastrous." But a year is not so long a time to forget Stevenson's first denial, even as the invasion was taking place. Add these items too: In Florida, Dr. Miro Cardona, U.S. candidate to replace Castro, openly describes new invasion plans; recruiting goes on in public and the *Chicago Daily News* says there are "unmistakable signs" that training centers are in operation in Guatemala and Colombia, with U.S. veterans of the Korean War on hand; in Guatemala, President Ydigoras, after denying for months that the Bay of Pigs invaders trained in his country, blithely concedes his lie and says: "President Kennedy has the responsibility for a sequel."

IN ITS RECAPITULATION of the April 17 fiasco last spring, the *GUARDIAN* reported the Soviet Union had warned it would take action if U.S. forces invaded Cuba. Last November Prof. Leo Szilard, the famed nuclear physicist, said it was reported to him on "good authority" that if America had intervened in Cuba with her own armed forces, Russia would have moved into West Berlin.

The consequences of such moves need no elaboration. Yet there is no evidence of a change of attitude—let alone policy—on Wash-

ington has made a mistake and there is no man. According to published accounts, an unnamed Justice Department spokesman quoted On April 8 the Washington Post quoted Helen I. Buttenwieser, et al's error. the contradiction was due to a research- typewriter. Nixon has since asserted that action in this case is co- orth that it never had possession of the

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Drubbing at Pigs Bay Dramatized Red Peril

By DOM BONAFEDE
Of Our Latin America Staff

WASHINGTON — "This is the day we would like to forget."

Speaking was a State Department official.

"After all," he added, "it's not a chapter in our history which we are proud of."

Throughout Washington, other officials from President Kennedy on down are agitated by the same thought: this first anniversary of the April 17 Cuban invasion.

But the historical debacle is being revived in their minds by 60 sick and disabled prisoners released by Fidel Castro last Saturday as part of a ransom deal whetted by his hunger for U.S. dollars.

As if to rub salt in the United States' wounds, the Soviet Union took this occasion to upgrade Castro's Cuba in the ranks of its Socialist satellites. In an official Communist Party communique, Cuba was rated ahead of Yugoslavia.

And just last week, Pravda called Castro "comrade" for the first time, indicating his rise in stature in the Communist hierarchy.

This, of course, gives birth to the notion that if the Bay of Pigs invasion had succeeded, Castro and his regime might not be around today to serve as Moscow's emissary in the Caribbean.

Yet, the invasion flopped with a thud heard around the world. Today, the argument still rages over who was responsible.

Inept judgment by the CIA? President Kennedy's withdrawal of air support? Faulty military advice by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Actually, the dispute has about as much significance now as a medieval debate

One Year
Ago
Today

among philosophers over how many angels can stand on the head of a pin.

It is conceded the invasion collapsed because of a host of errors rooted in military and political miscalculations. The expedition, unprecedented in U.S. history, was from our point of view masked in lies and deceptions and doomed to failure from the beginning.

The salient issue at the moment is: How has the fiasco affected U.S. policy?

Instead of ridding the hemisphere of Castro, it fattened his ego, distorted his image as a giant-killer throughout Latin America, and drove him deeper into the Communist camp.

As for the United States, it made the Colossus of the North appear as a clumsy, breast-beating bully. It punctured the invulnerability of President Kennedy, then a fresh hero in office.

Nonetheless, Kennedy in a show of courage assumed "full responsibility" for the defeat.

"There are," he said, "from this sobering episode useful lessons for all to learn."

A year later, Kennedy indicates he has learned his lessons.

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Miami Herald

Miami, Florida

Date 4/17/62

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The United States has regained its equilibrium in its attitude toward Castro and has convinced most of the other Latin American countries of the threat to all emanating from Cuba.

No longer is the United States so enraged by Castro that it waves its arms in all directions, hoping one blow will topple him. Instead, through economic and diplomatic pressures, it is gradually isolating Cuba from the hemispheric family of nations.

These measures are admittedly slower and less dramatic than military action. Another armed expedition is definitely ruled out at this time, providing Castro does not make the first wrong move, such as tinkering with the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo.


Some success for our side is reflected in Castro's waning popularity in Latin America and the internal troubles plaguing him at home.

This does not assure that the end of Castro is in sight. It merely means that the United States thinks it can proceed against Castro in a way befitting a great power. It also means that the Bay of Pigs is not forgotten, and the sacrifices of the invaders have not been in vain.

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(HARTKE)

NEW YORK--SEN. VANCE HARTKE, D-IND., SAID IN A BOOK RELEASED TODAY THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY GOT BAD ADVICE FROM CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ALLEN DULLES PRIOR TO THE ABORTIVE CUBAN INVASION.

THE BOOK, ENTITLED "INSIDE THE NEW FRONTIER," WAS WRITTEN BY HARE, HEAD OF THE SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE. HE WAS ASSISTED IN THE WRITING BY FORMER DEPUTY NATIONAL CHAIRMAN JACK REDDING.

"PRESIDENT KENNEDY, MISLED BY ALLEN DULLES AND OTHERS, HAD BEEN PLED TO BELIEVE THE ABORTIVE CUBAN INVASION WOULD BE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY A REVOLUTION," HARTKE SAID.

"THE BAY OF PIGS CHANGED THE ATTITUDE OF MANY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TOWARD THE NEW PRESIDENT. DULLES SAID THAT THE CIA EXPECTED THE CUBAN PEOPLE WOULD RISE AGAINST CASTRO WHEN THE INVADERS WADED ASHORE... THUS MISLED, KENNEDY SENT THE INVADERS OFF ON THEIR MISSION OF FAILURE.

"IT WAS AT THIS POINT THE PRESIDENT SHOWED HIS MATURITY AND HIS CHARACTER... KENNEDY SAID SIMPLY... 'IT WAS MY FAULT. THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY BELONGS TO THE PRESIDENT. I ACCEPT IT.'"

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Cuba's Progress Since The Invaders' Defeat

By JOSEPH NORTH *Cuba*

HAVANA—It is just about a year ago this week when I heard a strange booming noise, like thunder, which woke me.

Looking out the window toward the sea, the dawn had risen clear and bright like the Caribbean dawn will, and there was no place for thunder. I looked out the window and saw, several miles off, a plane wheeling at a right angle and nosing downward toward an area where thick black smoke was already rising.

Down below, on the pavement of my hotel, a young miliciano kneeled and pointed his rifle at the sky as another plane streaked overhead. He shot five times and then rose, running. He was running after the plane to get more shots at it. This was the air-raid on the eve of the invasion.

It was down at the place where the bombs had fallen, about twenty minutes afterward. They hit homes and killed non-combatants, seven in Havana. How many more in the other two cities bombed I don't remember now.

At the vast funeral of the seven, in the cemetery of Cristoforo Colon, Fidel said Cuba had entered the Socialist phase of the revolution. The army and the militias went into battle knowing that. They put on red kerchiefs before going into line.

It's a year now, since the invaders landed and suffered ignominious defeat. Many had come with sacks full of Lucky Strikes, chocolate bars, goodies of all sorts, as though they were going on a camping trip.

There is much to write about that has happened in this year. Vast experience has been gained. Headway was registered in the countryside; industrialization has begun, but like all beginnings, here are birth-pains. Cuba is a land of many beginnings today and has its share of the pain. The people know — what with the past to overcome, what with embargo piled on that, you don't stroll into socialism like you go to hear Benny More sing. No, it

is hard work, and you plan, and you make errors, you take some steps forward, and at times you slip back. But you're learning all the time.

That's about the way Carmen Garcia put it. She is 33 years old, a small, quiet, black woman with large, bright eyes who runs the elevator in our building.

She was reading today's copy of *Revolucion*, with the page opened to the article on *Pravda* about Fidel's recent speech ex-coriating wrong ways of building Cuba.


The waiter who brought me a cup of black coffee and a roll had a copy of *Hoy* opened to the article. I noticed a third person reading it on the way downtown. I got the impression it was generally read. I heard from others it was read with quiet satisfaction. Of course they liked it that the Soviet people understood and agreed with what Fidel had done. They had agreed with Fidel. And a fellow likes his best friend to understand him and to agree with what he's doing.

But it was all Cuban done, and along the lines that Cuba understands. Marxism-Leninism. It was just as Cuban as Fidel landing on the coast of Oriente on the leaky old *Granma* and heading up into the palm-covered mountains.

And Carmen Garcia liked it that the article concluded with another affirmation that Cuba, as Premier Khrushchev has said, can always count on the aid and support of the Soviet people.

Carmen Garcia, 33 years old, Negro, runs the elevator. She is in the nucleus of the ORI here. When she isn't reading the newspaper editorials, or the accounts of how things are going on the farms or in the factories, she is writing notes in one or another book she is studying. They include, as I have seen, Politzer's book on Marxist philosophy, a book on political economy, Blas Roca's "Socialism in Cuba" and other political science textbooks.

Carmen Garcia washed floors



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in the building before the revolution.

You might think running an elevator is a humble occupation. But she is up from washing floors.

And whoever thought—three short years ago—that the washerwoman would be studying dialectical materialism, surplus value, wages, prices and profits, the history of Cuba . . .

She is a quiet woman, doesn't say much, but what she lacks in garrulity she makes up in industry. She is an industrious student, and Carmen Garcia is Cuba. Go where you will, and you will find the same—this single year after Fidel said the revolution has headed toward socialism.

Talk to Carmen and she will know what's happening in Guatemala, in Venezuela, in Argentina, in Algeria. The initials OAS are no mystery to her. She follows everything that's happening, and she has her ideas about everything.

Cubans are people with decided ideas. Scratch a Cuban and you will find an editorial writer. He has opinions, and they are strong and often as not, obdurate. He is avid, parched, for learning.

Maybe, after a year since the speech at the funeral of the seven martyrs, on the eve of Playa Ciron, this is what strikes you most. You have heard of the homes springing up in the coun-

tryside; of the improved fare of the average citizen despite the shortages in this, or that, and the dislocations that are now being overcome.

I don't know if you read it, but Cuba reads more books than all the rest of Latin America combined.—It may sound incredible—but if you have a chance come and see for yourself. There may be plenty of problems as industrialization gets under way. But there is sure no lack of production over at Imprenta Nacional. The presses are rolling day and night and the people are clamoring for more.

In addition to technical books of every type, literary classics are being read by young and old alike. This week it was Balzac's "Papa Goriot" for the first time in popular editions. Last week it was Ostrovsky's "Tempering of the Steel."


I met four young artillery men, the oldest of whom was 20. We got to talking political economy, history, philosophy.

The 17-year-old said he had read Plato. "The Father of Idealism" he said. "There must have been materialists, too," he mused. "There's always an opposite tendency."

I mentioned Thales, Anaximander, Democritus and his atom. "Where can I find out about them?" he asked eagerly. Pulling a fountain pen and a notebook out of his green-olive jacket to jot down the names.

Artillery men who don't want to let it go at cannon.

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(CUBA)

NEW YORK--THE U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT SAID TONIGHT A POLITICAL DECISION BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO WITHHOLD AIR SUPPORT FROM THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION FORCE DOOMED THE VENTURE AND PERMITTED CASTRO TO DELIVER CUBA TO THE COMMUNISTS.

THE MAGAZINE MADE HIS STATEMENT IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "KENNEDY'S FATEFUL DECISION: THE NIGHT THE REDS CLINCHED CUBA." "AMERICAN MILITARY OFFICIALS WHO FOLLOWED THIS OPERATION CLOSELY SAY THAT IT CAME WITHIN A HAIR' BREADTH OF SUCCESS," THE MAGAZINE SAID: "THEY SAY: GIVEN EARLY AIR SUPPORT, THE INVADERS COULD HAVE DESTROYED CASTRO'S AIR FORCE AND TANKS.

"DEFECTIONS FROM HIS MILITIA, WHICH HAD STARTED, WOULD HAVE SPREAD. UNDERGROUND FORCES, WAITING FOR WORD OF SUCCESS BEFORE RISING AGAINST CASTRO, WOULD HAVE SPRUNG INTO ACTION. WHEN THAT WORD DID NOT COME, THE REMAINED UNDERGROUND.

THE MAGAZINE SAID THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAD RECOMMENDED THE USE OF U.S. AIR SUPPORT, BUT KENNEDY VETOED THE IDEA INSISTING THAT THERE WAS TO BE NO DIRECT AMERICAN PARTICIPATION.

"THE FATEFUL DECISION WAS A POLITICAL DECISION--NOT A MILITARY DECISION," THE MAGAZINE SAID.

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These Days The Bay of Pigs

By George E. Sokolsky

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IT IS NOW clear beyond doubt that the venture of the Bay of Pigs was an error. It should not have been started; if started it should have been carried to a logical conclusion which would have meant, ultimately if temporarily, an American occupation of Cuba. The Marines are more thorough than refugees, or even reserves.



Sokolsky

Ostensibly, we withdrew from the Bay of Pigs expedition after it had started because such an event would have been offensive to the Organization of American States and might have disrupted that body. It might even have been a violation of the Rio Treaty. Also, and this was the gamble, it might have resulted in Russian intervention. Although five American Ambassadors, reputable and able men, had informed the State Department of the Castro political orientation, neither the White House nor the State Department in either the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administrations acknowledged the Communist affiliation of the Castro Revolution.

Today, there is no doubt on that subject, except apparently in The New York Times, which obdurately defends an untenable position.

POLITICIANS rarely risk acknowledging errors. They

may be used against them. Nevertheless, President Kennedy must sooner or later recognize that his decision concerning the Bay of Pigs was a grievous error. It is true that Khrushchev might have said that if you object to my being 90 miles from your coast, I object to your being in Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and West Berlin—places even nearer to my border.

But had Khrushchev said that, our answer could have been that our propinquity to the Russian border is the result of World War II which we entered mistakenly to rescue Soviet Russia as well as other countries from the Nazi terror. On the other hand, the United States policy in Latin America is based on the Monroe Doctrine which Russia, as a continuing nation, has incontrovertibly accepted since 1823.

If such conversations ever occurred, they are not recorded. Instead, we appear to be on the verge of war with Soviet Russia over Cuba. One of the factors for optimism is that in the past, Soviet Russia has played on two fronts, expecting the West to fall into a trap. This happened during the Berlin Airlift when Soviet Russia established Red China as a satellite. It could be that in the Soviet mind, the United States can be led to compromise by giving up Berlin, or possibly Iran, on condition that Russia gave up Cuba.

THE AMERICAN difficulty arises from two phases:

1. It seems quite impossible for most Americans to

realize that although the Russians are not 10 feet tall, nor do they all have superior intellects, they have in 45 years achieved a remarkable current position and an even greater potential in industry, science and art. They have recognized a simple fact, well understood in the United States since the day of Horace Mann, that a nation cannot progress unless its people are adequately educated. It is in the field of education rather than in diplomacy or industry that Soviet Russia is giving us a race.

2. What is even more important is for Americans to realize that blaming Eisenhower or Kennedy will not solve any problems. The Russians have a political system which makes it possible for a decision to be made. Within the margins of realism, Russian foreign policy has been consistent and constant since about 1920.

The United States from the time of George Washington to Theodore Roosevelt had a fairly consistent and constant foreign policy:

1. No entangling alliances;
2. Freedom of the Seas;
3. Protective Tariff;
4. Monroe Doctrine;
5. Open Door Policy.

Then we became involved and our policy became uncertain and confused. Since Woodrow Wilson, the United States has been used by friend and foe and it is time to bring ourselves out of this situation by returning to a fixed and continuous policy.

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Letters To The Editor.

Cuban Freedom Fighter Backs Report Of Bungling By CIA

Editor, Pittsburgh Press:

I have read the magnificent article by Henry J. Taylor in the Nov. 21 Press on the editorial page about the secret but "hot" war between the Cuban freedom fighters and the CIA.

We, the Cubans, who have fought Castro's tyranny during three long years, know of the "deals" with this U. S. Government department and, as Mr. Taylor says in his accurate article, sometimes we are more afraid of them than of Castro's agents.

The frustrated Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961, is the



principal reason of this mistrust in the CIA by our side.

I was in Cuba in those unforgettable days waiting for weapons that never came just because at the last moment they changed their plans and left the Cuban powerful underground without any help and notice of the coming invasion.

The balance of this particular action of the CIA: more than 300,000 persons in jail, almost 100 shot before the Communist firing squads and the destruction of practically all underground groups.


Now we the Cubans who want to liberate our country are only dealing with our members inside Cuba and we will continue doing this until the Cuban people will arise in arms against Castro's dictatorship.

RAFAEL TORRES
Delegado Chairman,
Cuban Student Directorate
in Pittsburgh

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Pittsburgh, Pa.

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No U.S. Air Cover Pledge, Exile Says

By DOM BONAFEDE

Chief Latin America Correspondent

The controversy over whether the United States had pledged air support to the Cuban invasion brigade during the April 1961 Bay of Pigs operation flamed anew Friday.

In remarks made in the Washington office of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the military chief of Brigade 2056, Jose Perez San Roman, said his forces had never been promised aerial cover by the United States.

However, San Roman's statement runs counter to accounts given by other members of the invasion force and impressions gained by officials of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, then a coalition of anti-Castro political groups under which the brigade fought.

The failure of the invasion has frequently been attributed to the refusal of President Kennedy to give the go-ahead sign for air support.

"We had our own planes, but they were knocked out," San Roman said Friday.

Pressed by reporters whether he had received any indication that air cover for the invasion would be provided by the United States, he repeated, "No, we had our own."

Yet in a diary kept by one of the few invaders who escaped capture, Manuel Penabaz noted that on April 14, 1961, three days before the assault, San Roman briefed the entire brigade.

"We were told we would have an air umbrella over us at all times so as to guarantee that the sky would always be ours," Penabaz wrote.

On April 19 he wrote:

"Our situation on the beach was made even more desperate by the fact that all the .50-caliber machinegun ammunition had been exhausted. In headquarters, Jose San Roman, Oliva Ferrer (G-3 of the brigade), Morales (G-1), Andreu and Manuel Artime (highest civilian representative in the invasion), were trying desperately to get air support. The reply came over the radio in English:

"Don't worry. They will be here soon. Keep fighting."

"San Roman, indignant with rage, shouted into the radio in English, 'You are a s.o.b.'"

A rank-and-file member of the brigade told The Herald: "Our impression was that there would be air support. If there was not a written promise, there was at least an oral promise."

Carlos Hevia, who was then a member of the Front, commented:

"Our impression was that the United States would provide air cover."

He said that commitments were made only between U.S. officials and Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, president of the Front.

Hevia, an Annapolis graduate, added that prior to the invasion while he was touring the brigade's training camp at Retalhuleu, Guatemala, he noted there was no anti-aircraft practice.

"Apparently they were preparing for a fight in which they thought they would control the air," Hevia said.

Following their release from Castro's prisons and their return to the U.S. shortly before Christmas, several brigade members reported that the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise was in the area and ready to go into action if called.

Visiting the attorney general with San Roman were Eneido Oliva, Manuel Artime, Ramon J. Ferrer, Enrique Ruiz-Williams and Roberto A. Perez San Roman.

The resistance fighters gave Kennedy a medallion with a crest of the brigade on it in gratitude for his role in ransoming the invasion force.

During an hour and a half visit Kennedy personally escorted them to the offices of two of his aides who helped direct the ransom operation, Nicolas Katzenbach and Louis Oberdorfer.

Later, the brigade leaders and Kennedy had lunch in his office of sandwiches, soup and pie.

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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

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(CUBA)

MIAMI--THE MIAMI HERALD SAID TONIGHT IN A COPYRIGHTED INTERVIEW WITH U.S. ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY THAT "NO U.S. AIR COVER WAS EVER PLANNED OR PROMISED" TO THE INVADERS WHO STORMED CUBA'S BAY OF PIGS IN APRIL, 1961.

DAVID KRASLOW, CHIEF OF THE HERALD'S WASHINGTON BUREAU, SAID THE INTERVIEW FOR THE KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS "BROKE THE LONG SILENCE ON ONE OF THE MOST EMBARRASSING EPISODES IN AMERICAN HISTORY."

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL "MAJOR MISTAKES" IN THE PLANNING OF THE INVASION. HE SAID PERHAPS 10 TIMES THE 1,500 INVADERS WERE NEEDED FOR A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION.

THE PENTAGON AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BOTH OF WHICH APPROVED THE INVASION PLAN, VIRTUALLY IGNORED CASTRO'S ARSENAL, KENNEDY SAID.

"IT WASN'T GIVEN ENOUGH THOUGHT," HE SAID. "WE UNDERESTIMATED WHAT (CASTRO'S) T33 JET TRAINERS CARRYING ROCKETS COULD DO."

KENNEDY ALSO RAPPED SEVERAL NATIONAL MAGAZINE ARTICLES PURPORTING TO TELL THE "INSIDE STORY" OF THE ILL-FATED INVASION. HE IMPLIED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD USED CONSTRAINT BECAUSE OF THE 1,113 CAPTURED INVADERS WHO REMAINED IN CASTRO'S JAILS FOR 20 MONTHS.

NOW THAT THE PRISONERS ARE SAFE IN THE UNITED STATES, THE ADMINISTRATION APPARENTLY FEELS IT CAN REPLY TO WHAT IT REGARDS AS GROSSLY DISTORTED ACCOUNTS OF THE INVASION.

KENNEDY SAID SEVERAL MAGAZINES HAD CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. HAD PROMISED AIR COVER TO THE INVADERS.

"THERE WAS NEVER ANY PLAN TO HAVE U.S. AIR COVER," THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID. "THERE WASN'T EVEN A PROMISE. NOT EVEN UNDER EISENHOWER WAS AMERICAN AIR COVER IN THE PICTURE."

"FROM THE BEGINNING THE PRESIDENT SAID NO AMERICAN FORCES WOULD TAKE PART IN THE OPERATION," KENNEDY SAID. "IT CANNOT SIMPLY BE SAID THAT THE INVASION FAILED BECAUSE OF ANY SINGLE FACTOR. THERE WERE SEVERAL MAJOR MISTAKES. IT WAS JUST A BAD PLAN," THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID.

"VICTORY WAS NEVER CLOSE," HE ADDED. KENNEDY SAID A "GREAT DEAL" MORE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION WERE NEEDED.

"ALL 1,500 MEN FOUGHT BRAVELY," HE SAID, "BUT PEP SAN ROMAN (THE BRIGADE COMMANDER WHO RECENTLY VISITED KENNEDY IN WASHINGTON) SAYS THEY MIGHT HAVE SUCCEEDED IF THEY HAD 15,000 MEN INSTEAD OF

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1,500."

ONE OF THE MAJOR ERRORS, KENNEDY SAID, WAS THE BITTERLY IRONIC UNDERESTIMATION OF THE THREE OR FOUR T33 JET TRAINERS THAT EASILY OUTFOUGHT THE ANTIQUATED B26 BOMBERS PILOTED BY REFUGEES.

THE ROCKET CARRYING JETS WERE GIVEN TO FULGENCIO BATISTA BY THE UNITED STATES.

"WE UNDERESTIMATED WHAT A T33 CARRYING ROCKETS COULD DO," KENNEDY SAID. "THEY CAUSED A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE."

THE INVADERS GOT "ALL THE AIR COVER THE PLAN CALLED FOR," HE SAID. BUT THE SECOND OF TWO PLANNED ADVANCE RAIDS TO KNOCK OUT CASTRO'S AIR FORCE WAS POSTPONED, HE SAID.

THE FIRST RAID, ON SATURDAY, APRIL 15, "DIDN'T DO ANYWHERE NEAR THE DAMAGE HOPED FOR," HE SAID.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID THE FIRST RAID CAUSED AN INTERNATIONAL FUROR, AND THE PLANNERS, WITH THE SURPRISE ELEMENT LOST, POSTPONED THE SECOND. WHEN TWO B26S LIMPED BACK TO MIAMI FROM THE FIRST RAID, THE U.S. COVERED THE STRIKE BY SAYING THEY WERE PILOTED BY CUBAN AIR FORCE MEN DEFECTING FROM CASTRO.

HE SAID THE SECOND RAID FINALLY WENT OFF ON APRIL 17, THE DAY OF THE INVASION, "BUT IT DID NOT ACCOMPLISH MUCH."

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONFIRMED THAT THE INVADING FORCE, PINNED DOWN APPEALED TO U.S. NAVY SHIPS IN THE AREA FOR HELP. HE SAID THE SHIPS COULD NOT GIVE ASSISTANCE.

"THE DECISION WAS MADE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE GROUND RULES," KENNEDY SAID. "THERE HAD BEEN A FIRM UNDERSTANDING, ACCEPTED BY ALL, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO U.S. FORCES IN THE INVASION. WE STAYED WITH THAT."

HE SAID THE U.S. DID NOT ALLOW ITS OWN FORCES TO ENTER THE PICTURE BECAUSE OF THE BERLIN SITUATION.

"IF IT WAS JUST THE CUBAN PROBLEM ALONE, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO DIFFICULTY. WE WOULD HAVE ENDED IT RIGHT THERE," KENNEDY SAID.

KENNEDY SAID THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION HAD STARTED THE INVASION PLANS, BUT WHEN HIS BROTHER BECAME PRESIDENT "THERE WAS JUST A GENERAL CONCEPT. THE LOGISTICS AND THE DETAILS WERE WORKED OUT AFTER THE PRESIDENT TOOK OFFICE."

"THE PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS FAILURE AND THAT'S AS IT SHOULD BE," KENNEDY SAID.

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STORY DISPUTED BY GOLDWATER

Senator Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, today challenged Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's statement that no United States air cover was planned or promised for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April of 1961.

"I myself talked with President Kennedy at his request only a few days following the abortive invasion attempt," said Senator Goldwater. "And I certainly got the impression then that an air cover had been part of the original invasion plans."


"I am sure the entire American public has understood that the air cover was definitely in the invasion plans until the President was persuaded — by some still unidentified advisers — to cancel it. At the time of the invasion, stories printed in almost all American newspapers told of United States planes actually being in the air, ready for use, if the command should come. There were reports of an aircraft carrier standing off the invasion coast at the time of the landing."

"I suggest it is proper to inquire into this latest example of 'news management' by the New Frontier. Has this practice of the administration now been extended to the rewriting of history in an image acceptable to the men presently in charge of the national Government?"

"If there was never any plan to provide air cover for the Bay of Pigs invasion, why was this never brought to light before? Why did every Cuban exile leader with whom I spoke tell me that the United States had definitely promised to give such help? Why has the Government permitted the American people to labor for 21 months under the wrong impression?"

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Pigs Bay Story Errs, Robert Kennedy Says

David Kraslow of the Miami Herald Washington Bureau obtained the first official statement on the role of the United States in the Cuban invasion. The following account stems from an exclusive interview Kraslow had with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

By David Kraslow

Copyright, 1963, Knight Newspapers, Inc.

No. United States air cover was ever planned or promised for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April, 1961, Robert Kennedy says.

Nor was the inability to control the skies the only thing that doomed the U. S.-backed Cuban refugee brigade.

There were several "major mistakes." Perhaps 10 times as many men were required for a successful operation.

Kennedy insisted repeatedly that responsibility for the failure rests with the President. But it seems clear that the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, both of whom approved the invasion plan, virtually ignored what proved to be a crucial element in Premier Fidel Castro's arsenal.

These and other disclosures by the Attorney General, made in an interview requested by the Knight newspapers, broke the Kennedy Administration's long silence on one of the most embarrassing episodes in American history.

It must be presumed that Robert Kennedy had the approval of the President to

speaking for the record to acknowledge officially this Government's role in the attempt to liberate Cuba, and to explain finally what went wrong.

For some 20 months, while the Cuban refugees who were crushed at the Bay of Pigs languished in Castro's prisons, the President chose restraint rather than retort.

Now, largely because the ransomed prisoners are free in the United States, the Kennedy Administration feels it can reply to what it regards as grossly inaccurate accounts—published and spoken—of the Bay of Pigs disaster.

Autopsy Performed

Few people can match Robert Kennedy's knowledge of the affair. At the direction of the President, he and three others performed the autopsy. The report of their investigation led to shakeups in the CIA and the Pentagon.

During the interview, Kennedy referred critically to several national magazine articles that purported to tell the inside story.

One widely held belief is that the President reneged at the last moment on promised U. S. air cover for the invaders and that this guaranteed failure.

"There never was any plan to have U. S. air cover," Kennedy said. "There never was any promise. Not even under Mr. Eisenhower was American air cover in the picture."

Regan Under Ike

(The recruitment and training of Cuban refugees for an invasion of their homeland was begun in the Eisenhower Administration. A force was already in being when President Kennedy took office in January, 1961.)

"From the beginning the President said no American forces would take part in the operation. It was made absolutely clear that under no condition, under no condition whatsoever, would Americans be used in the invasion.

"And it simply cannot be said that the invasion failed because of any single factor. There were several major mistakes. It was just a bad plan. Victory was never close.

"A great deal more manpower and material was needed. Pepe San Roman (Jose A. Perez San Roman, the brigade commander who visited the Attorney General in Washington recently) says they might have succeeded if they had 15,000 men instead of 1500.

"And all 1500 fought bravely," Kennedy emphasized. "The investigation showed that they all fought with such determination and courage that

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is is how I became so committed to freeing them. These were not mercenaries. These were brave volunteers with a mission to free their country."

Role of Trainers
The bitterly ironic, and vital, role played by three or four T-33 jet trainers at the Bay of Pigs relates to one of the major errors in the American plan.

Ironic because these were American planes given to former Cuban dictator Fulencio Batista and inherited by Castro when the Batista regime collapsed.

Vital because the T-33s easily mastered the only air cover which Kennedy said had been planned for the invaders — antiquated World War II B-26 bombers piloted by refugees.

The T-33 is a training device. But armed with rockets proved to be a highly effective instrument of war at the Bay of Pigs.

"We underestimated what a T-33 carrying rockets could do," Kennedy said. "It wasn't given sufficient thought. They caused us a great deal of trouble."

Present in Vicinity

One possible explanation for the apparent misconception on the question of U.S. air cover was to do with the presence of American warships, including an aircraft carrier, in the vicinity of the Bay of Pigs.

If the ships transporting the invaders from Nicaragua were spotted by Cuban planes before they reached the target area, they had orders to turn back.

If the ships were attacked in the high seas on their way back to Central America, Kennedy said, the American forces in the area were under orders to give them protection.

Kennedy said the invaders got all the air cover the plan called for. But the second of two planned advance raids by B-26s intended to knock out Castro's air force on the ground was postponed, he said.

The first raid, on Saturday April 15, was not very successful, he said. It didn't do anywhere near the damage the planners had hoped for.

Story Distributed

(When the raiders landed their B-26s in south Florida after that day a "cover" story

was distributed through the Immigration Service in which the pilots said they had just defected from Castro's air force.)

Not only was the element of surprise now gone insofar as the second strike was concerned, but the repercussions from the first raid were loud and immediate.

"The President received one call (Robert Kennedy would not identify the caller) but said it was not United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson informing him that the first raid was causing us serious problems at the U.N. and elsewhere," the Attorney General said.

"It was suggested that the second raid be postponed. That raid was to take place early Monday morning (April 17—the day of the invasion).

Objections

"The President said that if those who had the responsibility for the plan had strong objections to postponing the raid, they should let him know. No strong objections were registered.

"The raid actually was made later on Monday, after the invasion was underway. It did not accomplish much.

Kennedy confirmed that the invading force appealed to the U.S. warships for help when they were pinned down on the beach. He declined to say whether the appeals were relayed to the President.

"The decision was made that there would be no change in the ground rules," Kennedy said. "There had been a firm understanding always, accepted by everyone, that there would be no U.S. forces in the invasion under any condition. We stayed with that."

Why, he was asked, since

the prestige of the United States was committed, did the President not also commit American forces from the beginning to insure success for the operation?

In Critical Stage

"If it was just the Cuban problem alone," Kennedy said, "there would have been no difficulty. We would have ended it right there."

"But the Berlin issue was in a critical stage at the time. And there were difficulties in Viet-Nam and Laos, among other places. We just could not commit our forces in Cuba. Even in retrospect, I think this was the wise decision."

Kennedy said no invasion plan had been completed during Mr. Eisenhower's term. "There was just a general concept," he said. "The logistics and the details were worked out after the President took office."

"The President has taken responsibility for the failure and that's as it should be. He approved the plan. But it's not true that he sat down with two or three civilians and worked out this plan at the White House."

"The plan that was used was fully cleared by the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was war-gamed at the Pentagon in whatever manner they do these things."

Accepted Advice

"The President inherited people with major reputations and he accepted their advice."

"There was not sufficient air cover at the beach. That was a mistake. There were not enough men and equipment. That was a mistake. Underestimating the T-33s—that was a serious mistake. The planning was inadequate, just inadequate."

ing the T-33s—that was a serious mistake. The planning was inadequate, just inadequate."

Kennedy might just as well have said that the entire plan was a mistake.

The strategy behind the invasion, Kennedy explained, was to establish a firm enough

beachhead so that a Cuban government-in-exile could function on Cuban soil. Kennedy did not say so, but presumably the United States later would have formally recognized that exiles government.

Kennedy also said that no Americans were killed in the invasion. (Reports circulated after the ransomed prisoners arrived in Miami that two Americans who had helped train the brigade died at the Bay of Pigs.)

This is not the whole story. Kennedy backed off from exploring various details.


He pondered a request for additional information for several moments. "I don't think so," he said finally. "It wouldn't serve the national interest."

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(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY SAID TODAY "THERE WAS NEVER ANY PLAN" TO PROVIDE U.S. AIR SUPPORT FOR THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

"THE AIR COVER AT THE BEACHES WAS DEFINITELY INADEQUATE BUT NOT BECAUSE OF SOME LAST-MINUTE DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT," THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID.

IN A COPYRIGHTED INTERVIEW WITH U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, KENNEDY SAID THE PLANS FOR THE INVASION WERE DRAWN UP BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BUT HE SAID THE PRESIDENT GAVE THE FINAL GO-AHEAD AND TOOK FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAILURE.

KENNEDY SAID AMERICAN FORCES WERE IN THE AREA, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT "AMERICAN MANPOWER, AMERICAN AIRPOWER AND AMERICAN SHIPS" WOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THE INVASION.

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Robert Kennedy Breaks Silence On Cuba Fiasco

David Kraslow of our Washington Bureau obtained the first official statement of the U.S. role in the Cuban invasion. His report is based on the official "autopsy" of the Bay of Pigs invasion tragedy. The following account stems from an exclusive interview Kraslow had with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. The attorney general conducted the coroner's inquest into the Cuban invasion fiasco on behalf of his brother, the President.

By DAVID KRASLOW

Of Our Washington Bureau

(Copyright, 1963, Knight Newspapers, Inc.)

WASHINGTON — No U.S. air cover was ever planned or promised for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961, Robert Kennedy says.

Nor was the inability to control the skies the only thing which doomed the U.S.-backed Cuban refugee brigade.

There were several "major mistakes." Perhaps 10 times as many men were required for a successful operation.


Kennedy insisted repeatedly that responsibility for the failure rests with the President. But it seems clear that the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, both of whom approved the invasion plan, virtually ignored what proved to be a crucial element in Fidel Castro's arsenal.

These and other disclosures by the attorney general, made in an interview requested by The Knight Newspapers, broke the Kennedy administration's long silence on one of the most embarrassing episodes in American history.

Comments Spoken for the Record

It must be presumed that Robert Kennedy had the approval of the President to speak for the record, to officially acknowledge this government's role in the attempt to liberate Cuba, to explain what went wrong.

For some 20 months, while the Cuban refugees who



were crushed at the Bay of Pigs languished in Castro's prisons, the President chose restraint rather than retort.

Now, largely because the ransomed prisoners are free in the U.S., the Kennedy administration feels it can reply to what it regards as grossly inaccurate accounts — published and spoken — of the Bay of Pigs disaster.

Few people can match Robert Kennedy's knowledge of the affair. At the direction of the President, he and three others performed the autopsy. The report of their investigation led to shakeups in the CIA and the Pentagon.

During the interview, Kennedy referred critically to several national magazine articles which purported to tell the inside story of the Bay of Pigs.

One widely held belief is that the President reneged at the last moment on promised U.S. cover for the invaders, and that this guaranteed failure.

"There never was any plan to have U.S. air cover," Kennedy said. "There wasn't any promise. Not even under Eisenhower was American air cover in the picture."

(The recruitment and training of Cuban refugees for an invasion of their homeland was begun in the Eisenhower administration. A force was already in being when President Kennedy took office in January 1961.)

"From the beginning the President said no American forces would take part in the operation. It was made absolutely clear that under no condition, under no condi-

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in whatsoever would American be used in the invasion," the attorney general said.

* * *

"And it simply cannot be said that the invasion failed because of any single factor. There were several major mistakes. It was just a bad plan. The strategy was never close.

"A great deal more equipment and material was needed. Pepe San Roman, Jose A. Perez San Roman, the brigade commander who led the attorney general (Washington recently) says they might have succeeded if they had had 15,000 men instead of 1,500.

"And all 1,500 fought bravely," Kennedy emphasized. The investigation showed that they all fought with such determination and courage at this is how I became so committed to freeing them. These were not mercenaries. They are brave volunteers on a mission to free their country."

The bitterly ironic, and vital role played by three or four T33 jet trainers at the Bay of Pigs relates to one of the "major" errors in the American plan.

It was ironic because these were American planes, given to the former Cuban Dictator Fulgencio Batista and inherited by Castro when the Batista regime collapsed.

It was vital because the T33s easily mastered the only air cover which Kennedy said had been planned for the invasion.

The T33 is a training plane, not armed with rockets. It proved to be a highly effective instrument of war at the Bay of Pigs.

"We underestimated what the T33 carrying rockets could do," Kennedy said. "It wasn't even sufficient thought. They used us a great deal of trouble."

One possible explanation for the apparent misconception on a question of U.S. air cover is to do with the presence of American warships, including an aircraft carrier, in the vicinity of the Bay of Pigs.

If the ships transporting the invaders from Nicaragua were spotted by Cuban planes before they reached the target area, they had orders to turn back.

If the ships were attacked on the high seas on their way back to Central America, Kennedy said, the American forces in the area were under orders to give them protection.

Kennedy said the invaders "got all the air cover the plan called for." But the second of two planned advance raids by B26s intended to knock out Castro's air force on the ground was postponed, he said.

* * *

THE FIRST RAID, on Saturday April 15, was not "very successful," he said. It didn't do anywhere near the damage the planners had hoped for.

(When the raiders landed their B26's in South Florida later that day, a "cover" story was distributed through the Immigration Service in which the pilots said they had just defected from Castro's air force.)

Not only was the element of surprise now gone insofar as the second strike was concerned, but the repercussions from the first raid were loud and immediate.

"The President received one call (Robert Kennedy would not identify the caller, but said it was not UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson) informing him that the first raid was causing us serious problems at the U.N. and elsewhere," the attorney general said.

"It was suggested that the second raid be postponed. That raid was to take place early Monday morning (April 17 -- the day of the invasion).

* * *

THE PRESIDENT said that if those who had the responsibility for the plan had strong objections to postponing the raid, they should let him know. No strong objections were registered.

"The raid actually was made later on Monday after the invasion was under way. It did not accomplish much."

Kennedy confirmed that the invading force appealed to the U.S. warships for help when they were planned down on the beach. He declined to say whether the appeals were relayed to the President.

"The decision was made that there would be no change in the ground rules," Kennedy said. "There had been a firm understanding always, accepted by everyone, that there would be no U.S. forces in the invasion under any condition. We stayed with that."

Why, he was asked, since the prestige of the U.S. was committed, did the President not also commit American forces from the beginning to insure success for the operation?

"If it was just the Cuban problem alone," Kennedy said, "there would have been no difficulty. We would have ended it right there."

* * *

BUT THE BERLIN issue was in a critical stage at the time. And there were difficulties in Viet Nam and Laos, among other places. We just could not commit our forces in Cuba. Even in retrospect, I think this was the wise decision."

Kennedy said no invasion plan had been completed during Eisenhower's term. "There was just a general concept," he said. "The logistics and the details were worked out after the President took office."

"The President has taken responsibility for the failure and that's as it should be. He approved the plan. But it's not true that he sat down with two or three civilians and worked out this plan at the White House."

"The plan that was used was fully cleared by the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was war-gamed at the Pentagon in whatever manner they do these things."

"The President inherited people with major reputations and he accepted their advice."

"There was not sufficient air cover at the beach. That was a mistake. There were not enough men and equipment. That was a mistake. Underestimating the T33s -- that was a serious mistake. The planning was inadequate, just inadequate."

* * *

THE STRATEGY behind the invasion, Kennedy explained, was to establish a firm enough beachhead so that a Cuban government-in-exile could function on Cuban soil. Kennedy did not say, but presumably the United States later would have formally recognized that exiled government.

Kennedy also said that no Americans were killed in the invasion (Reports circulated after the ransomed prisoners arrived in Miami that two Americans who had helped train the brigade died at the Bay of Pigs.)

This is not the whole story. Kennedy backed off from exploring various details.

He pondered a request for additional information for several moments. "I don't think so," he said finally. "It wouldn't serve the national interest."

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(GOLDWATER)

WASHINGTON--SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., CHARGED TODAY THAT ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO REWRITE HISTORY IN THE "LATEST EXAMPLE OF 'NEWS MANAGEMENT' BY THE NEW FRONTIER."

GOLDWATER WAS REFERRING TO A NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW (KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS) IN WHICH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID NO U.S. AIR COVER WAS EVER PLANNED OR PROMISED FOR THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS CUBAN INVASION ATTEMPT IN 1961.

THE ARIZONA REPUBLICAN SAID THE STATEMENT RAN COUNTER TO EVERYTHING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE FOR 21 MONTHS.

"I SUGGEST IT IS PROPER TO INQUIRE INTO THIS LATEST EXAMPLE OF 'NEWS MANAGEMENT' BY THE NEW FRONTIER," GOLDWATER TOLD THE SENATE. "HAS THIS PRACTICE OF THE ADMINISTRATION NOW BEEN EXTENDED TO THE REWRITING OF HISTORY IN AN IMAGE ACCEPTABLE TO THE MEN PRESENTLY IN CHARGE OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT?"

GOLDWATER SAID HE TALKED WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST SHORTLY AFTER THE INVASION FIASCO AND "I CERTAINLY GOT THE IMPRESSION THEN THAT AN AIR COVER HAD BEEN PART OF THE ORIGINAL INVASION PLANS." ALSO, HE TOLD THE SENATE, "I AM SURE THE ENTIRE AMERICAN PUBLIC HAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AIR COVER WAS DEFINITELY IN THE INVASION PLANS UNTIL THE PRESIDENT WAS PERSUADED--BY SOME STILL UNIDENTIFIED ADVISERS--TO CANCEL IT."

IF NO SUCH COVER WAS EVER PLANNED, "WHY WAS THIS NEVER BROUGHT TO LIGHT BEFORE?" THE ARIZONA SENATOR ASKED. "WHY HAS THE GOVERNMENT PERMITTED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO LABOR FOR 21 MONTHS UNDER THE WRONG IMPRESSION?"

GOLDWATER ALSO TOOK ISSUE WITH A SPEECH IN WHICH VICE PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON SAID THE "RATTLESNAKE IN CUBA" HAS BEEN DE-FANGED. "I SUGGEST IT IS A HIGHLY OPTIMISTIC VIEW AND ONE WHICH THE UNITED STATES CANNOT AFFORD TO ADOPT AS A MATTER OF POLICY," GOLDWATER SAID. "CASTRO'S CUBA IS STILL A MENACE TO FREEDOM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE."

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10 Times as Many Troops Needed

Bay of Pigs

'Autopsy'

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Miami, Florida

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Bobby Is Rewriting History With New Invasion Story

By HAL HENDRIX

Miami News Latin America Editor

Who is trying to kid whom in Washington these days?

In the current issue of U. S. News, & World Report magazine, U. S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy states in a copyrighted interview that the United States never promised any air support for the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion.



HENDRIX
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...tory the Kennedy Administration spokesmen, such as the brother of the President, seem to forget that all these people exist and have vivid memories of their abandonment at the last hour on Playa Giron.

Apparently, 21 months after the Cuban freedom fighters swarmed ashore at Playa Giron and discovered too late they were alone and stranded, the Kennedy Administration is determined to rewrite its history to suit itself.

Many courageous members of the brigade, top officials of the Cuban Revolutionary Council — in whose name the invasion was launched — fliers in the Cuban exile air force and a fairly sizable number of U. S. officials involved in the planning and training phase of the invasion, share a completely different recollection of the events and pledges leading up to the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961.

Inasmuch as Attorney General Kennedy has taken at least two of the brigade leaders — Manuel Artime and Jose A. Perez San Roman — under his wing with promises of help in the future, it is not too surprising that they have shown a willingness to go along quietly with the New Frontier alterations on what transpired during the sudden death of the invasion.

But judging from the increasing rumbles among the brigade's rank and file, future leadership of the brigade by Artime and San Roman now is very much in

question. There is much talk among the loyal freedom fighters that they have been "sold down the river."

There also is new bitterness being directed at the Revolutionary Council, which has been openly backed by the Kennedy Administration, for allowing the attorney general's "no-promised support" statements to go unchallenged.

It is pointed out by embittered Cuban exiles and U. S. officials alike that if both the New Frontier and the Revolutionary Council really knew at the time the invasion was launched that there would be no support for the relatively small landing force, why then did the U. S. and the Council dump the invaders on the beach in the first place?

Also, in view of Robert Kennedy's statements, if no U. S. support were planned, why did the U. S. have two carriers sitting off shore with jet fighters ready to take to the air? Why did U. S. Navy "frogmen" participate in pre-landing operations? Why were the liberated prisoners briefed on last month's freedom airlift to say nothing of the U. S. role in the tragic invasion? Why?

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Cuban Exile Insists U. S. Pledged Air Aid

MIAMI, Fla., Jan. 22 (AP). — A leader in the exile organization that mounted the 1961 Cuban invasion insists that the anti-Castro brigade was promised full air cover.

Manuel Antonio de Varona, of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, said he was obliged to "break silence" because of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's statement yesterday that no United States air cover was planned.

The Attorney General said President Kennedy couldn't have issued last-minute orders canceling air cover, as many administration critics have maintained, because there never were any plans for the United States to provide air support.

Senator Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, also disputed the Attorney General. In Washington Senator Goldwater said he talked with the President just after the invasion and "I certainly got the impression then that an air cover had been part of the original invasion plans."

Mr. Varona, a former Cuban Prime Minister who headed the leading Cuban democratic revolutionary front at the time of the invasion, said in a statement:

"The colonel, designated by the Government of the United States as head of the camp where the Cubans trained assured me in February, 1961, when I expressed concern over

the reduced number of troops, that the Cuban patriots would have 'full air control' during the invasion.

"The brave expeditionaries never had the promised air coverage.

"Neither was I informed of the date nor of the plans for invasion, which in any case would not have had my approval in view of the conditions under which it took place."

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
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Mr. Tolson
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Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

But The Trips Aren't Necessary

Bay Of Pigs, Revisited

THERE was never any promise of a United States air cover for the Bay of Pigs invasion of April, 1961. It couldn't have succeeded, anyway, with a force of only 1,500 Cuban invaders, even though the whole operation was "war-planned at the Pentagon."

This is the story behind the ill-fated event of nearly two years ago as it was told to our David Kraslow by Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy.

It purports to clear the air of charges that President Kennedy, perhaps influenced by United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, withheld from the Cubans the aid they needed to establish a beachhead.

It refutes the notion that U.S. armed might stood at the ready, where it was meant to stand, but never was called. That such standby aid did exist has been alleged by Bay of Pigs veterans, including one who is quoted in the current edition of a newsletter published by the Republican Congressional Committee.

According to Manuel Penabaz, "We were promised the support of the armed forces of the United States. Over you will

be air cover,' we were told, 'and back of you the Navy and land forces of the United States and other free nations of the Americas.'"

The source of publication is partisan and therefore suspect. Yet it is no less partisan than the attorney general, who wants to set the record straight.

In our opinion there were too few troops and there was inadequate air cover. Even so, you cannot "invade" by air alone. The full story someday may say that this undermanned force was mounted because intelligence erroneously believed there would be wholesale uprisings within Cuba in support of the invading force. In no other manner could 1,500 men take on 300,000.

Yet there's no profit and some harm in continuing to cry over spilt milk.

It has always been perfectly clear who organized, supported and directed the invasion. Taking continued blame for the fiasco has only the virtue of reiterating one's responsibility for a success which it is hoped may be yet to come.

The Bay of Pigs is behind us, and it is a sorry recollection that cannot be rationalized. What is before us?


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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida



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
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UPI-208

ADD 2 CUBA, WASHINGTON

SEN. MILWARD SIMPSON, R-WYO., COMPLAINING THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMENTS HAVE JUST ADDED "CONFUSION" TO THE BAY OF PIGS INCIDENT, SAID THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD TELL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE "HOW THE MILITARY, TECHNICAL AND INTELLIGENCE POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES COULD BE THWARTED BY THE DICTATOR OF AN ISLAND NO LARGER THAN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI."

DECLARING THAT "IT BEHOOVES THE ADMINISTRATION TO PROVIDE THESE ANSWERS THROUGH A SOURCE HIGHER THAN BROTHER BOBBY," SIMPSON CALLED FOR "A FULL BLOWN SENATORIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ENTIRE SORDID EPISODE AND A RESOLUTION DECLARING THE MONROE DOCTRINE AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY."

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Bay of Pigs, in Part

TO DAVID KRASLOW, of the Knight Newspapers Washington Bureau, Attorney General Robert Kennedy undened himself of a part of the Bay of Pigs story. Mr. Kennedy is one of those who conducted the post mortem on that disaster.

He didn't tell it all, to be sure. When Kraslow pressed him for certain details, the Attorney General—having pondered the request—said, "I don't think so. It wouldn't serve the national interest."

But what the interview did produce leaves America with ample to nervously wonder about. Our government was in on the planning. Yet a worse planned, more ill conceived military operation would be hard to imagine.

It wasn't simply lack of air cover, which Mr. Kennedy says we never promised. The disaster was produced by a series of miscalculations—not the least of which was the puny size of the invasion force put ashore at the Bay of Pigs.

The unanswered question is what men holding roles where they could participate in decisions permitted the affair to proceed. Either they had no conception of military operations and weapons, or they let the expedition go ahead despite patently predestined doom.

In either case it is something fit to shatter faith and engender fear. If our decision makers were that inept, what sort of a plight have we been in—and are we still in it?


The fault pretty clearly lay in the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, but at what level? And if not at the top, then why didn't the top perceive the improbability of a scheme devised somewhere down in the planning echelon?

There is still a lot to be told, and much to make America ask questions about how greatly it has been deceived. That it has been to some extent was left beyond doubt by Mr. Kennedy.

He told, let it not be forgotten, how a "cover" story was set up and given the Immigration Service for circulation after planes manned by invader-force pilots landed in Florida en route home from an unsuccessful pre-invasion raid.

It was that they were flown by pilots defecting from Castro's air force. If that story was planted, how many others have been planted? We know more than we did before Mr. Kennedy gave his Kraslow interview, but we still are obviously well short of the whole truth.

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 Detroit, Mich.



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 Author: Lee Hills
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Air Cover Promised, Cuban Says

By DOM BONAFEDE
Chief Latin America Correspondent

Antonio de Varona, No. 2 man of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, maintained Monday that U.S. military officials assured him prior to the April 17, 1961, Cuban invasion that the anti-Castro brigade would have "full air support."

Varona said he was obliged to "break silence" concerning the ill-fated venture because of statements made by Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

In an exclusive interview with David Kraslow, of The Herald's Washington Bureau, Kennedy said no U.S. air cover was ever planned or promised for the Bay of Pigs operation.

The administration of President Kennedy had assumed responsibility for the failure of the invasion, but had not issued public statements concerning the operation until the attorney general's interview.

Previously, President Kennedy had been criticized by leading magazines and newspapers as having withdrawn promised air support for the invaders.

In reply to Attorney General Kennedy, Varona said in a released statement:

"In so far as I was coordinator of the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front—the organization which called upon the Cubans to prepare for war—it is my inescapable duty to make known certain facts in order that truth may prevail.

"With no other purpose than that of avoiding erroneous interpretations, I assume full responsibility in stating the following: The colonel designated by the government of the United States as head of the camp where the Cubans trained assured me in February 1961, when I expressed concern over the reduced number of troops, that the Cuban patriots would have 'full air control' during the invasion."

Varona added that the colonel "promised" him that he would be invited to participate in the invasion plans and that he would be allowed to land with the liberation brigade.

"It is unnecessary for me to repeat that the brave expeditionaries never had the promised air coverage, and that neither was I informed of the date nor of the plans for invasion, which in any case would not have had my approval in view of the conditions under which it took place," Varona said.

As a member of the Revolutionary Front, Varona and other leaders of the anti-Castro organization, including Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, president, were secretly taken by U.S. agents from New York to closely guarded quarters at the Opa-locka base. They were kept there while the invasion was going on, unaware of the defeat being inflicted on the brigade.

They presumed that once the invaders secured a beachhead they would be flown into Cuba to set up a provisional government. With the failure of the operation, this plan, of course, was discarded.

Both Varona and Miro Cardona had sons among the invaders.

In his statement, Varona indicated he would not again make public utterances concerning the invasion, "which some day will require the full investigation which always precedes the just recording of historians."

He further implied that the exile movement is embarked on a plan of military action against the regime of Fidel Castro.

"Our present task is to coordinate the indispensable armed action to defeat the Communist forces which enslave Cuba and threaten the entire hemisphere," he concluded.

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
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
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UPI-148

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SENATE REPUBLICANS MOVED TODAY TO CONDUCT THEIR OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION FIASCO IN THE INTEREST OF GETTING THE "ENTIRE STORY" HISTORICALLY ACCURATE.

SENATE GOP LEADER EVERETT M. DIRKSEN, ILL. SAID HE PROPOSED MAKING SUCH A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY ON HIS OWN AND HEARD "NO DISSENT" WHEN IT WAS DISCUSSED AT A GOP POLICY MEETING TODAY.

THE GOP LEADER SAID HIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT PROMPTED BY SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., WHO EARLIER TOLD THE SENATE THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION SHOULD MAKE PUBLIC ALL OFFICIAL REPORTS ON THE ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION. GOLDWATER SAID THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD END ITS EFFORTS TO "TAMPER WITH HISTORY."

GOLDWATER AND DIRKSEN BOTH WERE REACTING TO A PUBLISHED INTERVIEW WITH ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, WHO CONTENTED THAT AN AIR STRIKE WHICH NEVER CAME OFF IN THE INVASION WAS NEVER PART OF THE INVASION PLANS.

DIRKSEN TOLD NEWSMEN HE FELT THE HISTORICAL RECORD WAS OF "SUCH IMPORTANCE THAT IT CANNOT BE LEFT IN DOUBT." HE SAID HE ALREADY HAD MADE SOME PHONE CALLS TO "PEOPLE WHO SHOULD KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT IT" AND PLANNED TO TALK TO OTHERS--PROBABLY INCLUDING SOME OF THE CUBAN INVADERS WHO HAVE BEEN RELEASED FROM PRISON BY CASTRO AND ARE NOW IN THIS COUNTRY.

"THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE OUGHT TO KNOW THE FACTS--ALL THE FACTS," DIRKSEN SAID.

HE SAID HE PLANS TO MAKE AN "EXPLORATION" OF HIS OWN, TAKE IT UP WITH THE GOP POLICY COMMITTEE STAFF, AND THEN DECIDE WHETHER THE MATTER SHOULD BE PUT UP TO A SENATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE FOR MORE FORMAL INVESTIGATION. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE LATTER MIGHT BE CONDUCTED BY THE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE OF WHICH HE IS A MEMBER.

DIRKSEN SAID HE SAW NOTHING UNUSUAL IN A POLITICAL PARTY GROUP CONDUCTING ITS OWN INQUIRY. HE SAID HE IS INTERESTED IN "PROTECTING THE RECORD OF U.S. HISTORY."

AS TO INTERVIEWING THE RELEASED CUBAN PRISONERS, DIRKSEN SAID: "I MAY GO AND SEE SOME--OR GET SOME OF THEM UP HERE." HE SAID FINDING THE NEEDED FUNDS TO DO THIS WOULD BE LIKE "ROLLING OFF A LOG."

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DAVID LAWRENCE

U.S. and the Bay of Pigs Fiasco

Question of Military Competence Or Civilian Interference is Raised

The American people are entitled to know whether the chiefs of their armed services are incompetent or whether, in strictly military operations, they are being interfered with by civilians in the Government.

A congressional investigation of just what happened before the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba took place in April, 1961, is more than ever necessary now, because of what is being disclosed as the "true story" of the fiasco. For unless the responsibility of the United States Chiefs of Staff during military operations is clearly fixed, the capacity of the United States to prevent or resist armed attacks in this hemisphere may be open to question.

More than 300,000 men of our armed services were mobilized last October inside the United States for a possible invasion of Cuba in order to get rid of the Soviet missile bases there. But there is no way to judge whether the military chiefs even then had the full authority to act and just what restrictions were placed upon them which could have affected the success of that expedition.

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who because he is a brother of the President is regarded as the administration's authoritative spokesman in many matters outside his own department, has just given two interviews on the Cuban fiasco—one to the Knight Newspapers and the other to United States News & World Report.

The two interviews dovetail, though they do not cover all of the same points. The Attorney General told David Kraslow, Washington correspondent of the Knight Newspapers, that there had been no invasion plan contemplated during Mr. Eisenhower's term. He said: "There was just a general concept. The logistics and the details were worked out after the President (Kennedy) took office."

Added interest has developed now in this whole subject, because many of the Cuban officers of the invasion force, who were recently ransomed have been telling Americans that the United States had assured

them of air cover. Attorney General Kennedy makes quite a point of the fact that "no United States air cover" was ever promised. Technically, this is correct. But the United States was fully cognizant of the air support the Cubans were supposed to have. Yet this was inadequate. Attorney General Kennedy said in his interview in United States News & World Report:

"The first point is that there was not United States air cover and none was withdrawn. In fact, the President didn't withdraw any air cover for the landing forces—United States or otherwise."

"What happened was this: One air attack had been made on Saturday on Cuban airports. There was a flurry at the United Nations and elsewhere and, as a result, United States participation in the matter was coming to the surface. This surfacing was contrary to the pre-invasion plan. There was supposed to be another attack on the airports on Monday morning."

"The President was called about whether another attack which had been planned should take place. As there was this stir about the matter, he gave instructions that it should not take place at that time unless those having the responsibility felt that it was so important it had to take place, in which case they should call him and discuss it further. And that's what was postponed. If wasn't air cover of the beaches or landings. And, in fact, the attack on the airports took place later that day."

The air cover provided was from a base in Central America. What part the United States government played in organizing it is not disclosed.

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In the middle of a military operation, however, you can't make a long-distance call to the White House and discuss the next move. The anti-Castro forces were sure air cover was coming from somewhere.

The Attorney General was asked who did the planning. He declared that "the plan that finally went into effect was approved by our military—the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Central Intelligence

Agency." He added that, while the Joint Chiefs "approved" the plan, "the responsibility for the planning lay primarily with the CIA," and that, since the President had to give final approval to the plan, he had accepted the blame.

In both interviews, the Attorney General said that United States air power was to have been used only if the ships transporting the Cuban invasion force had been detected by Castro before they reached the target area and were attacked on the high seas on their way back to Central America. This is the explanation given for the presence of United States warships, including an aircraft carrier, in the vicinity of the Bay of Pigs on the day of the invasion. Yet it is asserted that before the invasion the President had "made it clear" that United States armed forces, including air power, would not be used.

In the interview in the Knight newspapers, the Attorney General said, "The plan that was used was fully cleared by the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

But what does "cleared" mean? Do the Joint Chiefs take responsibility for any such plan as was employed? Listing the major "mistakes," Mr. Kennedy added:

"There was not sufficient air cover at the beach. That was a mistake. There were not enough men and equipment. That was a mistake. Underestimating the T-33s (Castro's airplanes)—that was a serious mistake. The planning was inadequate, just inadequate."

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But who did all this planning, and why wasn't someone in the United States Air Force able to say in advance whether the T-33s had the capacity to carry rockets? These were the United States planes originally given to the Batista regime in Cuba.

The important "details" have never been divulged, as there has been a constant cover-up. But if Congress now fails to make a searching inquiry, with testimony available to the public, another military fiasco could occur, especially if the same "military planners" are still in command at the Pentagon or elsewhere.

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(GOLDWATER)

WASHINGTON--SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., CALLED ON THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION TODAY TO MAKE PUBLIC ALL OFFICIAL REPORTS ON THE BAY OF PIGS DEBACLE AND END ITS EFFORTS TO "TAMPER WITH HISTORY."

GOLDWATER ALSO TOLD THE SENATE THAT CONGRESS "IS PERHAPS THE ONLY BODY THAT COULD PROPERLY WEIGH ALL THE EVIDENCE." THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, HE DECLARED, ARE ENTITLED TO A "FULL AIRING" OF THE ENTIRE CUBAN INVASION EFFORT.

IN RENEWING HIS ATTACK ON WHAT HE HAS DESCRIBED AS ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPTS TO DISTORT THE FACTS OF THE INVASION, GOLDWATER SAID:

"I CERTAINLY FEEL THAT IT IS LONG PAST THE TIME WHEN EVERY OFFICIAL REPORT BEARING ON THE INVASION ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC."

THE GOP CONSERVATIVE SAID ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY PRESENTED A "HIGHLY COLORED ACCOUNT" OF THE INVASION IN A RECENT EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW FOR KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS.

KENNEDY WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT AN AIR STRIKE THAT NEVER CAME OFF ACTUALLY WAS NEVER PART OF THE INVASION PLANS.

GOLDWATER ACCUSED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF A "MASSIVE READJUSTMENT OF FACTS CONCERNING THE INVASION ATTEMPT TO PLACE THE NEW FRONTIER IN A BETTER LIGHT."

HE QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WAS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S "PRE-EMINENT TASK TO TAMPER WITH HISTORY AND BRAINWASH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE INTO A BELIEF THAT THE NEW FRONTIER CAN DO NO WRONG?"

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
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(CUBA)

MIAMI--REFUGEE CUBAN EX-PREMIER MANUEL A. DE VARONA SAID LAST NIGHT A U.S. ARMY OFFICER ASSURED HIM BEFORE THE ILL-FATED 1961 INVASION OF CUBA THAT THE INVADER WOULD HAVE "FULL COMMAND OF THE AIR."

DE VARONA WAS COMMENTING ON ATTY. GEN. ROBERT KENNEDY'S STATEMENT IN AN INTERVIEW YESTERDAY THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT NEVER PROMISED THE INVADERS AIR SUPPORT.

INVASION LEADER JOSE PEREZ SAN ROMAN, IN A STATEMENT PRIOR TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S, ALSO SAID THE CUBANS WHO SOUGHT TO OVERTHROW FIDEL CASTRO NEVER HAD RECEIVED ANY FIRM PROMISE OF AIR SUPPORT.

~~MEMBERS OF A DISSIDENT INVADER FACTION~~

~~FIDEL CASTRO NEVER HAD RECEIVED ANY FIRM PROMISE OF AIR SUPPORT.~~

MEMBERS OF A DISSIDENT INVADER FACTION LED BY ENRIQUE LLACA DEMANDED THAT A GRAND JURY BE EMPANELED TO FIX BLAME FOR THE FAILURE OF THE INVASION, WHICH THEY SAID WAS "COSTLY TO THE CAUSE OF DEMOCRACY."

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
SEN. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, D-ARK., CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SAID THE DIRKSEN INVESTIGATION "HAS A VERY STRONG PARTISAN AURA."

HE SAID THAT "ANY CONCLUSION WOULD BE CONSIDERED QUITE PARTISAN." FULBRIGHT'S COMMITTEE HAS BEEN BRIEFED INTERMITTENTLY ON THE CUBA SITUATION, MOST RECENTLY BY SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK.

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(CUBA)

NEW YORK--FORMER PRESIDENT EISENHOWER SAID TONIGHT THE ILL-FATED PLAN TO INVADE CUBA AT THE BAG OF PIGS WAS NOT CONCEIVED DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THAT, INSTEAD, A "GUERRILLA TYPE OF ACTION" WAS CONTEMPLATED.

EISENHOWER DISCUSSED THE CUBAN SITUATION AND NUMEROUS OTHER DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TOPICS DURING A TAPED ONE-HOUR INTERVIEW WITH NEWSMAN WALTER CRONKITE ON CBS-TELEVISION.

WHEN CRONKITE ASKED THE FORMER CHIEF EXECUTIVE IF THE CUBAN INVASION PLAN HAD BEEN MADE UNDER HIS ADMINISTRATION, EISENHOWER REPLIED:

"NO, NO, NO..."

HE ADDED: "THERE WAS NO WAY. WE DIDN'T EVEN KNOW AT THAT TIME WHETHER WE COULD DO ANYTHING MORE, OR WHETHER THESE REFUGEES WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS AND STRONG TO DO MORE THAN GO INTO ME... EASTERN PART OF THE ISLAND, IN THE MOUNTAINS, AND START IN AND RETURN A COUNTER REVOLUTION..."

EISENHOWER NOTED THAT "WE MORE OR LESS WERE THINKING OF GUERRILLA TYPE OF ACTION UNTIL WE COULD GET ENOUGH FORCES TO DO MORE THAN THAT."

HE SAID THE PLANNING WAS TO FIND A LEADER FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE TO HELP THEM TO RISE UP AND OVERTHROW CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO BUT "HOW ARE YOU GOING TO FIND A MAN THAT WAS NOT A BATISTA MAN, AND NOT A CASTRO MAN, AND STILL BE A LEADER?"

HE POINTED OUT THAT BOTH CASTRO AND FORMER CUBAN DICTATOR FULGENCIO BATISTA "HAD GOTTEN RID OF THEM (THE POTENTIAL LEADERS.)"

EISENHOWER SAID DESPITE THESE EFFORTS BY HIS ADMINISTRATION "THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL PLAN DEVELOPED BEFORE I LEFT."

ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CUBA, DESPITE THE RUSSIAN BACKDOWN ON THE MISSILE BASES, EISENHOWER WARNED THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST STILL MAINTAIN CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE OVER THE ISLAND.

"I UNDERSTAND," EISENHOWER SAID, "THERE ARE STILL SOME THOUSANDS OF RUSSIAN SOLDIERS IN CUBA, AND UNQUESTIONABLY, THEY MUST BE MANNING SOME KIND OF EQUIPMENT. THEY MUST BE TRAINING THESE PEOPLE, AND IT'S STILL A VERY DANGEROUS SPOT IN OUR HEMISPHERE."

ON OTHER SUBJECTS THE FORMER PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE NOT ONLY FEELS THE NATION'S PRESENT DEFENSES ARE "ADEQUATE" AND "COMPLETE" BUT THAT "I THINK... PERSONALLY... WE'RE SPENDING TOO MUCH MONEY ON IT."

HE CALLED PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S PLANNED \$99 BILLION (B) BUDGET "A RECKLESSNESS THAT'S COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED IN THESE TIMES."

EISENHOWER ADMITTED THAT IN 1958-59 HIS ADMINISTRATION DEVELOPED A \$12.5 BILLION (B) DEFICIT, BUT SAID "IT WAS NOT PLANNED. IT WAS NOT PART OF A DEFINITE POLICY OF GOVERNMENT."

HE SAID PART OF THE UNPLANNED DEFICIT WAS BECAUSE OF THE RECESSION WHICH DEVELOPED AT THAT TIME.

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HOWEVER, EISENHOWER ADDED: "MAYBE I'M OLD-FASHIONED, AND MAYBE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO THINK LIKE I THINK ARE OLD-FASHIONED, BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT PAY OUR DEBTS AS WE GO ALONG--THAT WE ARE BUILDING UP A SITUATION THAT IS CERTAINLY GOING TO BE DIFFICULT FOR US, AND IS GOING TO BE A HUNDRED TIMES WORSE FOR OUR CHILDREN AND OUR GRANDCHILDREN, UNLESS WE STOP IT."

THE FORMER PRESIDENT SAID HE AGREED THAT "WE DO NEED, AT THIS MOMENT, A TAX CUT."

BUT HE SAID, "IF WE'RE GOING TO HAVE A TAX CUT, WE MUST HAVE SOME REDUCTION IN EXPENDITURES, SO THAT PEOPLE KNOW WE'RE SERIOUS ABOUT THIS THING."

EISENHOWER SAID HE FELT THE POLICIES OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WERE HELPING THE CHANCES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN MAKING A STRONG COMEBACK IN NEXT YEAR'S ELECTIONS.

"AS I SEE IT, OUR DOMESTIC POLICIES HAVE BEEN GUIDED BY PEOPLE WHO ARE THEORISTS, WHO HAVE IDEAS AND THEORIES OF THE ECONOMY THAT I THINK ARE COMPLETELY UNSOUND... AND I BELIEVE A GREAT MANY MORE PEOPLE... ARE BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THIS."

EISENHOWER SAID HE THOUGHT THE SPLIT BETWEEN PEKING AND MOSCOW WAS A GOOD THING, BUT THAT THE WESTERN WORLD SHOULD NOT BECOME COMPLACENT AND SAY "OH, NOW, WE HAVE GOT JUST WHAT WE WANT--THESE TWO BIG MONSTERS ARE FIGHTING EACH OTHER..."

INSTEAD, HE SAID, WE SHOULD, AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY, EXPLOIT THIS SPLIT AND TRY TO WIDEN IT.

THE FORMER PRESIDENT SAID HE FELT IT WOULD BE A "VERY GREAT TRAGEDY" SHOULD FRENCH PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE PREVENT BRITAIN'S ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET.

HE SAID DE GAULLE "REACHES HIS CONCLUSIONS APPARENTLY IN SORT OF A REMOTE CORNER OF HIS MIND, AND WHEN HE'S ONCE FORMED THEM, HE'S QUITE OBDDURATE IN HANGING ONTO THEM."

EISENHOWER ADDED THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW JUST WHY DE GAULLE WAS BLOCKING BRITAIN, BUT SAID "THERE'S NO TELLING WHAT HIS REAL MOTIVES ARE, BUT I HOPE THAT HE WILL TAKE A VERY LONG LOOK AT IT, BECAUSE ALL THE REST OF THE WHOLE WESTERN WORLD SEEMS TO SEE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT RIGHT NOW, OF GETTING BRITAIN INTO IT, MAYBE THE OPENING UP OF THE VISTA, UNTIL WE ARE ALL IN IT FINALLY, IN A GREAT FREE-WORLD COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY THE PRODUCTIVE NATIONS."

HOWEVER, EISENHOWER ADDED: "I DON'T THINK IT IS FAIR JUST TO ASCRIBE HIS ACTION JUST TO SHEER PERSONAL EGOTISM. I BELIEVE HE IS REALLY A BIGGER MAN THAN THAT, BUT I DO NOT THINK IT'S PROBABLY AN OVERWEENING SELF-CONFIDENCE THAT'S GUIDING HIM IN HIS BELIEF THAT HE CAN NOW BRING FRANCE UP TO GUIDING THE WHOLE WESTERN WORLD."

EISENHOWER DEPLORED ANY LEAK IN SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS AND NOTED THAT ON THE ONE OCCASION THIS HAPPENED WHEN HE WAS PRESIDENT A COLUMNIST QUOTED "EXACTLY" FROM A SECURITY COUNCIL PAPER.

"NOW, IN MY OPINION, WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THAT MAN AND TRIED OUR BEST TO PUT HIM PRISON..." HE SAID.

IN FACT, HE ADDED, BOTH THE COLUMNIST AND THE MAN WHO LEAKED THE DETAILS TO HIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED. HE DID NOT NAME NAMES OR GIVE FURTHER DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT.

HOWEVER, HE SAID THERE WAS ONE INSTANCE IN WHICH THE DEBATES WITHIN THE COUNCIL COULD BE MADE PUBLIC, AND THIS WAS WHEN THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF DECIDED TO DO SO.

"I THINK THAT...THE ONLY PERSON WHO HAS GOT ANY RIGHT TO EXPOSE THE THINKING OF THESE DIFFERENT PEOPLE (THE COUNCIL MEMBERS) WOULD BE THE PRESIDENT, HIMSELF, AND HE MIGHT WANT TO DO THIS FOR SOME REASON, AND IT MIGHT BE THE SORT OF OLD THEORY OF TRIAL BALLOONS," HE SAID.

HE ADDED: "YOU PUT UP AN IDEA AND SEE WHETHER IT WORKS, OR PEOPLE DON'T LIKE IT, BUT OTHERWISE, ANY ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OWES IT TO HIMSELF AND TO HIS COUNTRY AND TO THE PRESIDENT TO KEEP HIS MOUTH SHUT."

"NOW (THAT'S ALL THERE IS TO IT. I THINK THAT ANY ONE THAT GOES OUTSIDE THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF TO TELL THIS IS DOING A GREAT DISSERVICE TO THE UNITED STATES."

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Dirksen to Take Look At Cuba Invasion Facts

By the Associated Press

The Senate Republican Policy Committee gave clearance yesterday for an independent investigation by Minority Leader Dirksen of Illinois of the 1961 Cuban invasion disaster.

Senator Dirksen said the committee gave its assent to an inquiry into whether Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy had "told the entire factual story" in a recent review of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Previously Senator Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, had told the Senate that the Attorney General was attempting to lay blame for the invasion failure on the administration of former President Eisenhower.

While Senator Dirksen's remarks were interpreted as indicating the policy group would go ahead immediately with an inquiry, he said later in an interview this was not true.

Instead, he said he personally will "take a look-see" at the situation and report back to the policy group within two weeks. He said the group then will decide what it wants to do about the information he has gathered.

The news that the policy group was underwriting such an investigation brought charges by Democrats that the minority was injecting politics into foreign policy matters.

Chairman Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said the action has a strong partisan aura.

Senator Morse, Democrat of Oregon, who conducted previous hearings into the invasion's

failure, said "It is regrettable that Republican leaders propose to play politics with American foreign policy by suggesting that the Senate Republican Policy Committee conduct an investigation of the unfortunate Bay of Pigs invasion."


Senator Keating, Republican of New York, a G. O. P. Policy Committee member, said he, too, believes that any inquiry "shouldn't be a political matter at all."

Senator Dirksen turned aside a question as to whether he was setting out to protect the Eisenhower administration's record. He said he was acting to "protect the record of the United States of America and for historical guidance."

Senator Dirksen did not spell out any specific complaints about Mr. Kennedy's review of what the Attorney General called invasion mistakes. Mr. Kennedy presented the official administration version of the affair for the first time yesterday in a series of interviews.

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UPI-106

ADD 2 PIGS BAY, WASHINGTON

"IT IS TRUE, PRESIDENT KENNEDY MANFULLY ACCEPTED ALL THE BLAME FOR THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO," GOLDWATER SAID. "BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT HE NEVER GAVE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE A TRUE ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAD BEEN PLANNED AND WHAT ACTUALLY OCCURRED."

"NOW AFTER ALL THIS TIME, WE GET FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AN ACCOUNT WHICH DEFIES BELIEF AND RUNS COUNTER TO EVERYTHING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE AND CONTRADICTS THE UNDERSTANDING OF ALMOST EVERY MAN ENGAGED IN THE ABORTIVE INVASION ATTEMPT."

HE SAID NO ONE COULD BELIEVE THAT 1,500 MEN COULD SUCCEED IN AN INVASION OF CUBA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S RECENT STATEMENTS "CAST GRAVE DOUBTS ON THE ABILITY OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS."

GOLDWATER'S RESOLUTION SAID THE INVASION WAS "FOREDOOMED TO FAILURE" WITHOUT AIR PROTECTION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENTS HAVE LEFT THE PUBLIC IN "A STATE OF CONFUSION" AS TO THE TRUE FACTS.

THE RESOLUTION CALLED FOR EXPENDITURES OF UP TO \$100,000 FOR THE PROBE.

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
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UPI-100

(PIGS BAY)

WASHINGTON--SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., TODAY INTRODUCED
 A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A "FULL AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION" OF THE
 BAY OF PIGS CUBAN INVASION FIASCO.
 GOLDWATER'S RESOLUTION CALLS FOR A PROBE BY THE SENATE ARMED
 SERVICES COMMITTEE HEADED BY SEN. RICHARD RUSSELL, D-GA.
 IN A SENATE SPEECH, HE SAID SUCH AN INVESTIGATION WAS THE ONLY
 MEANS IN WHICH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD BE FULLY INFORMED
 ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INVASION IN APRIL OF 1961.
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UPI-102

ADD 1 PIGS BAY, WASHINGTON (UPI-100)

HE SAID A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION WAS MADE "MANDATORY" BY ATTORNEY GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT NEVER PLANNED AIR COVER FOR THE BAND OF INVADERS.

GOLDWATER SUGGESTED THAT LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, AND ALLEN DULLES, FORMER HEAD OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BE CALLED TO TESTIFY.

SEN. WAYNE MORSE, D-ORE., CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA, ROSE TO SAY THAT BEFORE ANY "PARTISAN" SPEECHES WERE MADE ON THE SUBJECT, SENATORS SHOULD READ SECRET TESTIMONY TAKEN BY THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. HE SAID STATEMENTS BY BOTH LEMNITZER AND DULLES WERE IN THE TRANSCRIPT.

GOLDWATER RETORTED HE HAD READ THAT TESTIMONY, BUT THAT IN HIS OPINION IT WAS "INCONCLUSIVE." MORSE ANSWERED HE WANTED A "JURY OF THE SENATE" TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WAS INCONCLUSIVE.


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UPI-119

(ADD 3 PIGS BAY, WASHINGTON
 RUSSELL TOLD NEWSMEN HE HAS AN OPEN MIND ON THE MATTER OF A BAY
 OF PIGS INQUIRY. HE SAID HE SEES NO PARTICULAR NEED FOR REHASHING
 WHAT HE CALLED "A VERY HUMILITATING EXPERIENCE IN OUR NATIONAL LIFE"
 BUT WOULD NOT OPPOSE AN INQUIRY IF IT WOULD SERVE THE NATIONAL
 INTEREST.

RUSSELL SAID HE HAS NOT READ THE RECENT ROBERT KENNEDY COMMENTS
 ALTHOUGH HE HAS DISCUSSED THE BAY OF PIGS INCIDENT WITH THE PRESIDENT
 AND OTHERS AND HAS LOOKED INTO IT IN CLOSED-DOOR HEARINGS OF THE
 SENATE'S SPECIAL CIA SUBCOMMITTEE.

"IT'S A LITTLE DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SEE WHAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 HAD TO DO WITH THE BAY OF PIGS," SAID RUSSELL, COMMENTING THAT THE
 PRESIDENT'S BROTHER HAD NO ROLE IN THE INCIDENT "IN HIS OFFICIAL
 CAPACITY."

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
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UPI-127

ADD 4 PIGS BAY, WASHINGTON
 QUESTIONED BY NEWSMEN ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR GOLDWATER'S
 PROPOSAL, CHAIRMAN RUSSELL SUGGESTED THAT GOLDWATER COULD ACHIEVE MUCH
 OF THE PURPOSE OF HIS INQUIRY BY QUESTIONING WITNESSES IN FORTHCOMING
 HEARINGS OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE NATION'S MILITARY
 POSTURE. GOLDWATER IS A COMMITTEE MEMBER.

RUSSELL SAID THE HEARINGS, STARTING AS SOON AS THE SENATE RULES
 FIGHT IS COMPLETED, WILL INCLUDE TESTIMONY BY DEFENSE SECRETARY
 MCNAMARA, JOHN A. MCCONE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AND MEMBERS
 OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

RUSSELL SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE REGULAR HEARINGS WOULD NOT NORMALLY
 HEAR SUCH WITNESSES AS LEMNITZER, WHOM GOLDWATER HAD SUGGESTED.
 RUSSELL SAID HE WOULD CALL LEMNITZER IF THE COMMITTEE SO DIRECTED AND
 WOULD ASK THE COMMITTEE TO VOTE ON GOLDWATER'S PROPOSAL IF GOLDWATER
 FORMALLY PROPOSED HIS INQUIRY.

AS TO THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE BAY OF BIGS INCIDENT,
 RUSSELL SAID: "I DIDN'T SEE THAT IT SERVED ANY USEFUL PURPOSE TO
 RE-LAUNDER THIS LINEN--THOUGH I'LL CONFESS IT HAD NEVER SEEMED TO
 BE REAL CLEAN."

RUSSELL SAID HE BELIEVES HE HAD "A PRETTY CLEAR PICTURE" OF WHAT
 HAPPENED ON APRIL 16, 1961 FROM DISCUSSING IT THE NEXT DAY WITH THE
 PRESIDENT, FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH GEN. MAXWELL TAYLOR, NOW CHAIRMAN OF THE
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND FROM FIVE HOURS OF TESTIMONY BEFORE THE
 CIA SUBCOMMITTEE.

THERE ARE, HE SAID, PROBABLY SOME DETAILS IN THE MATTER THAT HAVE
~~NOT BEEN DEVELOPED BUT HE QUESTIONED WHETHER IT~~
 NOT BEEN DEVELOPED BUT HE QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WOULD SERVE ANY
 PURPOSE TO GO INTO THEM.

"I WOULDN'T LIKE TO SEE THE COMMITTEE GET OFF INTO KICKING A DEAD
 HORSE...SOLVING A POLITICAL SITUATION," RUSSELL SAID.

AS TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AIR COVER WAS PROMISED THE BAY OF
 PIGS INVASION FORCE, RUSSELL SAID: "I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY DOUBT
 THAT THE PEOPLE WHO MADE THE INVASION THOUGHT THEY HAD AIR COVER
 ARRANGED." OTHERWISE, HE SAID, THEY WOULDN'T HAVE COMMITTED 1,500 MEN
 TO SUCH A VENTURE.

THE ONLY QUESTION, RUSSELL SAID, IS WHETHER THE PROMISED AIR COVER
 WAS TO BE PROVIDED BY REGULAR U.S. FORCES OR WHETHER IT WAS "CIA AIR
 COVER" OF THE TYPE THAT SUPPLIED THE BOMBING RAID ON HAVANA BEFORE
 THE INVASION.

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Goldwater Acts to Force Probe of Cuba Invasion

Senator Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, today introduced a resolution asking the Senate Armed Services Committee to make a full investigation of the controversy over whether this country ever promised an air cover for the Cuban refugees in the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.

The resolution followed two days of oratory by Republicans challenging the recent statement of Attorney General Robert Kennedy that air cover was not promised.

The Senate Republican Policy Committee gave clearance yesterday for an independent investigation by Minority Leader Dirksen of Illinois.

Senator Dirksen said the committee gave its assent to an inquiry into whether the Attorney General had "told the entire factual story" in a recent review of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Comment by Goldwater

Previously Senator Goldwater had told the Senate the Attorney General was attempting to lay blame for the invasion failure on the administration of former President Eisenhower.

While Senator Dirksen's remarks were interpreted as indicating the policy group would go ahead immediately with an inquiry, he said later in an interview this was not true.

Instead, he said he personally will "take a look-see" at the situation and report back to the policy group within two weeks. He said the group then will decide what it wants to do about the information he has gathered.

The news that the policy group was underwriting

an investigation brought charges by Democrats that the minority was injecting politics into foreign policy matters.

Chairman Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee said the action has a strong partisan aura.

Senator Keating, Republican of New York, a G. O. P. Policy Committee member, said he, too, believes that any inquiry "shouldn't be a political matter at all."

Morse Cites Secret Files

Senator Morse, Democrat of Oregon, chairman of the Senate Latin American Subcommittee, today advised Republicans to read secret testimony in the files of the Foreign Relations Committee before they make "any more partisan speeches" about the Bay of Pigs invasion.

He said they would find there testimony of Gen. Lemnitzer and former CIA chief Allen Dulles.

Senator Goldwater replied that he has read the testimony and found it "the most inconclusive I have ever seen."


Senator Morse insisted

gives clear and unequivocal answers to the questions Senator Goldwater is raising.

Senator Dirksen turned aside a question as to whether he was setting out to protect the Eisenhower administration's record. He said he was acting to "protect the record of the United States of America and for historical guidance."

Senator Dirksen did not spell out any specific complaints about Mr. Kennedy's review of what the Attorney General called invasion mistakes. Mr. Kennedy presented the official administration version of the affair for the first time Monday in a series of interviews.

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UP-031

ADD 1 CIA, WASHINGTON (UP-027)
 IN CALIFORNIA, THE SACRAMENTO BEE QUOTED A FORMER AGENT AS SAYING
 THREE MAFIA GANGSTERS SUPPLIED INFORMATION THE CIA USED TO PLAN THE
 BAY OF PIGS INVASION OF CUBA IN 1951.


THE BEE YESTERDAY QUOTED THE UNIDENTIFIED AGENT AS SAYING THAT IN
 RETURN FOR THE DATA THE MAFIA MOBSTERS WOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO
 RECOVER MONEY THEY LEFT BEHIND WHEN CASTRO TOOK CONTROL OF THE
 COUNTRY AND TO REOPEN THEIR CUBAN CASINOS -- IF THE INVASION
 SUCCEEDED.

THE FORMER AGENT SAID LAWRENCE HOUSTON, RETIRED GENERAL COUNSEL OF
 THE CIA, RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM THE THREE MAFIA MEMBERS AND
 ONE OF THEIR ASSOCIATES THROUGH TWO CIA EMPLOYEES WHO WERE DEALING
 WITH THE ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES.


HOUSTON TOLD THE BEE, "I DO NOT RECOLLECT SUCH A THING, BUT THAT
 DOESN'T MEAN IT DIDN'T HAPPEN. I WON'T DENY IT, BUT I DON'T REMEMBER
 ANYTHING LIKE THAT.

THE THREE MAFIA FIGURES WERE NAMED AS RUSSELL BUCCALINO, JAMES
 PLUMERI AND SALVATORE GRANELLO.

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UPI-232

(CUBA)

MIAMI--FOUR CUBAN EXILE PILOTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE AERIAL ACTION CONNECTED WITH THE PIGS BAY INVASION SAID TODAY FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS WERE SHOT DOWN IN COMBAT AND KILLED OVER CUBA ON APRIL 19, 1961.

THE FOUR AMERICANS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTORS FOR THE EXILE AIR FORCE AT THEIR SECRET AIR BASE NEAR PUERTO CABEZAS, NICARAGUA. THEY VOLUNTARILY FLEW TWO OF THE EXILE AIR ARM'S OBSOLETE B26S ON A SUPPORT MISSION BECAUSE SO MANY OF THE PILOTS OF THE WOULD-BE LIBERATION ARMY HAD BEEN KILLED IN THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF HOSTILITIES, THE CUBANS SAID.

THE AMERICANS WERE NOT IDENTIFIED. THEY WERE NOT BELIEVED TO BE MEMBERS OF ANY U.S. ARMED SERVICE.

THE FOUR CUBANS, GONZALO HERRERA, GUSTAVO VILLOLDO, ALFREDO CABALLERO AND JULIO GONZALEZ REBUEL SAID IN A STATEMENT TO UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL:

"THE AMERICAN INSTRUCTORS ASSURED US ON APRIL 17 (THE DAY OF THE INVASION) THAT WE WOULD HAVE AIR COVER. BUT THAT DID NOT HAPPEN AND WE LOST SIX AIRPLANES THAT DAY."

HERRERA, WHO SAID HE FLEW IN FORMATION WITH THE TWO AMERICAN-MANNED AIRPLANES, SAID THE CUBAN PILOTS HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO RADIO A NEARBY U. S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN CASE OF ANY KIND OF EMERGENCY.

"WE MADE SEVERAL DISTRESS CALLS. THEY WERE ALL IGNORED," HERRERA SAID.

HE SAID BOTH OF THE AMERICAN-CREWED BOMBERS CRASHED IN FLAMES INTO THE SEAS AS THEIR RADIOMEN WERE CALLING TO THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER FOR AIR-FITHER SUPPORT. BOTH PLANES HAD BEEN RIDDLED BY T-33 JETS OF THE CASTRO AIR FORCE, HERRERA SAID.

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
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Three Mafia mobsters funneled information to the Central Intelligence Agency that it used to prepare the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, the Sacramento Bee reported. The accusation was made by an unidentified former CIA agent. He told the newspaper that in return for the data the Mafia men would have been allowed to recover money they had left behind when Fidel Castro took control of Cuba and to reopen their Cuban casinos—if the invasion succeeded. The former agent said Lawrence R. Houston, retired general counsel of the CIA, had received the information. Houston told the Bee he did not remember the incident, "But that doesn't mean it didn't happen."



L. Houston

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[CIA Operations] ~~SECRET~~ (U)

Aide in Bay of Pigs Fiasco Outlines Views on Planning

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Staff Writer

The man who was inspector general of the CIA during the Bay of Pigs fiasco now believes it would have been wiser to have trained the invasion force at a military base inside the United States to preserve the security of the anti-Castro operation.

Prof. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., now on the faculty of Brown University, disclosed this view in a lecture delivered at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. The speech has been published in the current college review.

Kirkpatrick also said: "If the President makes the policy to get rid of Castro, that is about the last he should hear of it. If something goes wrong he can fire and disavow, which is what a President should do, not acknowledge and accept blame. Of course, I am being critical of the President (Kennedy) but I think this is essential."

The former CIA official said the control of "covert" opera-

tions like the Bay of Pigs exercise in 1961 should be at a much lower level of government than the President's office. Having covert operations run out of the White House or even out of the office of the secretaries of state or defense "makes absolutely no sense whatever in any society."

"Never Understood" Although he said he was speaking only his personal views, Kirkpatrick said the blame for failure of the Cuban exile invasion belongs to the CIA, not on the military where President Kennedy tried to place it.

"If can be concluded," said Kirkpatrick, "that the President never really fully understood that this proposal entailed a military operation in the true sense of the word. Instead of an assault landing consisting of some 1,500 men, Kennedy seemed to think this was going to be some sort of mass infiltration that would perhaps, through some mystique, become quickly invisible."

Kirkpatrick said it would have been more feasible to have used U.S. bases instead of those in Guatemala and Nicaragua for the invasion of Cuba because the United States could have isolated the brigade and trained the pilots without disclosure.

"The Bay of Pigs experience," he said, "does not mean that we should forget covert operations as a tool for implementing national policy. In fact, that's the last thing it means. The capability to mount a covert operation is an exceedingly important capability for our government to have."

Looking back over the Bay of Pigs operation, Kirkpatrick said the most vital lesson learned was from the operators' failure to secure accurate intelligence. He said inaccurate intelligence was the basis for the disaster adding, "there is no other place to put the blame for that than on the agency mounting the operating."

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**ALL BACKED JFK
 ON BAY OF PIGS,
 McNAMARA SAYS**


By United Press International

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara says he wants "the American people to know" that all of President John F. Kennedy's advisers were in favor of undertaking the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961.

"When President Kennedy assumed full responsibility for that action, he didn't say what he might have said, that every single one of his advisers, me included, recommended it."

"It is very much on my conscience," McNamara said yesterday on NBC. "And it was a serious error."

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Bad Guess on Castro Power Held Cause of 'Pigs' Failure

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Associated Press

A former high-ranking CIA officer says the major cause of the failure of the 1961 Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion was "a complete miscalculation by the CIA operators of what was required to do the job."

By the eve of the ill-fated landing, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr. adds, many were pessimistic about its chances—but went ahead anyway in belief a last-minute cancellation would have worse consequences than a failure.

As it turned out, he says, Havana's Red forces proved so much stronger and more loyal than the CIA operators had predicted that the 1443-man invading brigade would probably have lost even if Castro had not had airplanes or tanks.

Kirkpatrick, now a professor at Brown University, writes of his 2-year career in the cloak-and-dagger business in "The Real CIA" (Macmillan, \$6.95), one of the few books published

by senior officials with inside knowledge of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As CIA's inspector general for eight years, he was picked by the then intelligence chief, Allen Dulles, to conduct a thorough post-mortem within the agency.

Kirkpatrick concludes that the Bay of Pigs attempt met catastrophe not because of CIA itself, but failure to use what was available within CIA for an objective intelligence judgment divorced from those carrying out the operation.

It was essentially the same group of people processing the intelligence, planning the operation, "selling the project to the policymakers, and finally directing the final effort," he says.

"If there had even been a moment during the battle when the Cuban exile brigade had been near to achieving victory, then we might be able to


say that it had been close; in my opinion, the outcome was never close," Kirkpatrick writes.

Kirkpatrick absolves the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff from major blame.

He also shunts aside claims that Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and others opposed to the invasion had torpedoed it by persuading President Kennedy to call off a planned second air strike by the free Cubans.

When the air strike was called off just ahead, he writes, "the landing could have been recalled."

But the operators had a very strong conviction that if for any reason the operation did not go through, the Cuban brigade would either act on its own, or mutiny, or create such a disturbance that it would be more dangerous than even a failure of the operation.



Plush

Cuban Invasion

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The Washington Post

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**CUBA INVASION LOSS
 ATTRIBUTED TO C.I.A.**

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13 (AP) —A former high-ranking officer of the Central Intelligence Agency says the major cause of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 was "a complete miscalculation by the C.I.A. operators of what was required to do the job."

By the eye of the ill-fated landing, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr. says, many persons were pessimistic about its chances but went ahead with the operation anyway in the belief that a last-minute cancellation would have worse consequences than a failure.

As it turned out, Mr. Kirkpatrick says, Cuba's forces proved so much more stronger and loyal than the C.I.A. operators had predicted that the 1,443-man invading brigade would probably have lost "even if Castro had no airplanes or tanks."

Mr. Kirkpatrick writes of his 23-year career in "The Real C.I.A.," published by the Macmillan Company.

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REBUTTAL IS MADE BY SCHLESINGER

Explains Comment on Times but Editor Stands Firm

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. has challenged the assertion that he was mistaken in reporting that The New York Times suppressed a dispatch about the build-up for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961.

Mr. Schlesinger, author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning book, "A Thousand Days," and a former special assistant to President Kennedy, made his rebuttal in a letter to the editor of The New York Times. The letter, written from the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N.J., on June 9, read as follows:

"My attention has been called to a speech by Clifton Daniel, managing editor of The Times, in which he claims that I mistakenly wrote in the book 'A Thousand Days' that The Times had suppressed a dispatch from Tad Szulc describing the C.I.A.-Cuban refugee invasion build-up before the Bay of Pigs. I trust I may be permitted comment.

Denies Making Statement

"1. Actually my account of this episode on page 261 of 'A Thousand Days'—a passage quoted in its entirety by Mr. Daniel—does not say that The Times suppressed the Szulc dispatch. The account reports that James Reston "counseled [gains publication]" but at no point does it say that the piece was killed. [Mr. Reston, now an associate editor of The Times, was then its chief Washington correspondent].

"In short, Mr. Daniel's evidence does not sustain his charge; and, since one assumes that the managing editor of The Times knows how to read, I am at a loss to know what point he was making in quoting a passage which does not say what he claims it says. The only reference in the book to The Times having killed the story occurs in connection with the Cuban missile crisis.

"2. Mr. Daniel goes on to confirm my account of Mr. Reston's recommendation. He also concedes that The Times deliberately played down a story which its editors knew deserved a multi-column head and the never before had front-page play in The New York Times been changed for reasons of policy."

(U)

"He further concedes that The Times cut out the statement that the invasion was imminent, that The Times eliminated all reference to the C.I.A. [Central Intelligence Agency] and that The Times otherwise emasculated what would normally have been a dispatch of vital importance.

"It was this considered and purposeful emasculation by The Times of its own story which led President Kennedy subsequently to tell Turner Catledge, 'If you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake' and which led me to write in 'A Thousand Days,' 'In retrospect I have wondered whether, if the press had behaved irresponsibly, it would not have spared the country a disaster.' [Mr. Catledge, now executive editor of The Times, was managing editor at the time involved].

Apologizes for Error

"3. Mr. Daniel is correct in saying that I misstated the situation on 'Meet the Press.' Instead of saying that The Times was reprehensible in misleading the American people by suppressing the Tad Szulc story, I should have said 'by emasculating the Tad Szulc story.'"

"I am sorry for that and can only plead that unpremeditated oral comments are less considered than written testimony. In a common respect for accurate information, I would hope that Mr. Daniel will now modify the charge he made—and in a premeditated speech—against 'A Thousand Days.'"

Commenting on the letter, Mr. Daniel said yesterday:


"Mr. Schlesinger should read his own book—an excellent book—more carefully. Page 261 must be taken in conjunction with page 309, where, dealing with the Cuban missile crisis, Mr. Schlesinger wrote, '...once again The Times killed a story about Cuba.'"

Mr. Daniel's speech was delivered at the World Press Institute at MacAlester College in St. Paul, Minn., on June 1.

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EDITORS' DECISION ON CUBA RELATED

Kennedy Later Wished Times Had Printed All It Knew

ST. PAUL, June 1 (AP)—President Kennedy told an executive of The New York Times that if the paper had printed all it knew about preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion, the nation would have been saved from a "colossal mistake," a Times editor disclosed today.

The disclosure was made by Clifton Daniel, managing editor, in a speech at MacAlester College before a forum of the World Press Institute. The forum was held in honor of recent Pulitzer Prize winners and foreign journalists studying at the college.

Mr. Daniel recalled a number of difficult decisions at The Times before both the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis a year later, as to whether the paper's responsibility to publish the news conflicted with national security.

He traced in detail some strong differences of opinion among Times executives that led to the toning down of a dispatch describing plans for the invasion of Cuba.

The dispatch, by Tad Szulc, appeared on Page 1 of The Times in the edition of Friday, April 7, 1961. Invasion forces landed in Cuba on Monday, April 17, 1961.

Kennedy of Two Minds

Mr. Daniel depicted President Kennedy as apparently torn in two directions by the course The Times took during the Bay of Pigs buildup.

At one point, meeting with a group of editors after the incident, President Kennedy "ran down a list of what he called premature disclosures of security information," mostly in The Times, Mr. Daniel said.

"While he scolded The New York Times," he went on, "the President said in an aside to Mr. Catledge, 'If you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake.'"

Turner Catledge was then managing editor of The Times. He is now executive editor.

"More than a year later," Mr. Daniel said, "President Kennedy was still talking the same way."

Mr. Daniel said that in a White House conversation on Sept. 13, 1962, never made public before, the President told the late Orvil Dryfoos, publisher of The Times:

"I wish you had run everything on Cuba. . . . I am just sorry you didn't tell it at the time."

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A Historical Footnote

Mr. Daniel added another historical footnote to the Bay of Pigs invasion.

In both a television interview on Meet the Press and in his own book, "A Thousand Days," Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. said that The Times had suppressed an article giving "a fairly accurate account of the invasion plans," Mr. Daniel said.

Holding up a copy of the April 7, 1961, edition of The Times, Mr. Daniel said:

"Mr. Schlesinger, was mistaken, both in his book and in his appearance on 'Meet the Press.'"

Mr. Daniel told of detailed and heated exchanges among Times executives before the decision was made to give the controversial dispatch a smaller headline, eliminate a reference to an "imminent" invasion, and drop a reference to participation of the Central Intelligence Agency in invasion preparations.

Mr. Daniel said his own view today is that the Bay of Pigs operation "might well have been canceled and the country would have been saved enormous embarrassment if The New York Times and other newspapers had been more diligent in the performance of their duty."

He added, however, that James Reston, then chief of The Times's Washington Bureau and now an associate editor, disagrees.

'62 Article Withheld

"If I had it to do over, I would do exactly what we did at the time," Mr. Daniel quoted Mr. Reston as saying. "It is ridiculous to think that publishing the fact that the invasion was imminent would have avoided this disaster. I am quite sure the operation would have gone forward."

By contrast, Mr. Daniel said, when the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 reached a climax, The Times, at the personal request of President Kennedy, withheld an exclusive article until the Government had had an opportunity to complete plans to counter its effects.

Mr. Daniel also made public a letter from President Kennedy to Mrs. Dryfoos some time after the death of her husband in which the President praised the decision to withhold the article as having been in the interest of national security.

In describing The Times's decision on the Bay of Pigs dispatch, Mr. Daniel said that the recollections of some executives who took part still differed as to when Mr. Reston was consulted and where he was at the time.

No Records Kept

"None of those who took part . . . kept records of what was said and done," Mr. Daniel said. "That is unfortunate, and it should teach us a lesson. The Bay of Pigs was not only important in the history of United States relations with Latin

America, the Soviet Union, and world Communism; it was also important in the history of relations between the American press and the United States Government."

Mr. Daniel described a tense scene at The Times after the Bay of Pigs article was ordered toned down. He said:

"After the dummy for the front page was changed, Ted Bernstein, who was the assistant managing editor on

night duty at The Times, and Lew Jordan, the news editor sat in Mr. Bernstein's office fretting about it. They believed a colossal mistake was being made, and together they went into Mr. Catledge's office to appeal for reconsideration.

"Mr. Catledge recalls that Mr. Jordan's face was dead white, and he was quivering with emotion. He and Mr. Bernstein told the managing editor that never before had the front-page play in The New York Times been changed for reasons of policy. They said they would like to hear from the publisher himself the reasons for the change."

"Lew Jordan later recalled that Mr. Catledge was 'flaming mad' at this. However, he turned around in his big swivel chair, picked up the telephone, and asked Mr. Dryfoos to come downstairs. By the time he arrived, Mr. Bernstein had gone to dinner, but Mr. Dryfoos spent 10 minutes patiently ex-

plaining to Mr. Jordan his reasons for wanting the story played down.

"His reasons were those of national security, national interest and, above all, concern for the safety of the men who were preparing to offer their lives on the beaches of Cuba. He repeated the explanation in somewhat greater length to Mr. Bernstein the next day."

"I describe the mood and behavior of the publisher and editors," Mr. Daniel said, "only to show how seriously and with what intensity of emotion they made their fateful decisions."

Schlesinger Unavailable

Mr. Schlesinger could not be reached for comment. His secretary at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N. J., said he was in London and would be flying to Peru. She said he would not be available for several days.

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Excerpts From Speech on Coverage

of Bay of Pigs Buildup

Following are excerpts from an address delivered by Clifton Daniel, editor of The New York Times, before the World Press Institute in St. Paul—an address that adds information about events preceding the Bay of Pigs to what has been presented before by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and other observers:

This morning I am going to tell you a story—one that has never been told before—the inside story of The New York Times and the Bay of Pigs, something of a mystery story.

In its issue of Nov. 19, 1960, The Nation published an editorial under the heading, "Are We Training Cuban Guerrillas?"

I had never seen this editorial and had never heard it mentioned, until a reader of The New York Times sent me a letter to the editor. He asked whether the allegations in the editorial were true, and, if so, why hadn't they been reported by The New York Times, whose resources for gathering information were much greater than those of a little magazine like The Nation.

The Nation said: "Fidel Castro may have a sounder basis for his expressed fears of a U.S.-financed 'Guatemala-type' invasion than most of us realize. On a recent visit to Guatemala, Dr. Ronald Hilton, Director of the Institute of Hispanic-American Studies at Stanford University, was told:

"1. The United States Central Intelligence Agency has acquired a large tract of land, at an outlay in excess of \$1-million, which is stoutly fenced and heavily guarded. . . . It is 'common knowledge' in Guatemala that the tract is being used as a training ground for Cuban counter-revolutionaries, who are preparing for an eventual landing in Cuba. . . . United States personnel and equipment are being used at the base."

"2. Substantially all of the above was reported by a well-known Guatemalan journalist . . . in La Hora, a Guatemalan newspaper

"3. More recently, the President of Guatemala, forced to take cognizance of the persistent reports concerning the base, went on TV and admitted its existence, but refused to discuss its purpose or any other facts about it.

"4. We believe the reports merit publication; they can, and should, be checked immediately by all U. S. news media with correspondents in Guatemala."

Off to Guatemala

With that last paragraph, The New York Times readily agreed, Paul Kennedy, our correspondent in Central America, was soon on his way to Guatemala.

He reported that intensive daily air training was taking place there on a partly hidden airfield. In the mountains, commando-like forces were being drilled in guerrilla warfare tactics by foreign personnel, mostly from the United States.

Guatemalan authorities insisted that the training operation was designed to meet an assault from Cuba. Opponents of the government said the preparations were for an offensive against the Cuban regime of Premier Fidel Castro. Mr. Kennedy actually penetrated two miles into the training area.

His article was published in The New York Times on Jan. 10, 1961.

The Nation also printed another article in its issue of Jan. 7, 1961, by Don Dwiggins, aviation editor of The Los Angeles Mirror.

And now Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. takes up the story in "A Thousand Days," his account of John F. Kennedy's years in the White House.

"On March 31," Mr. Schlesinger says, "Howard Handelman of U.S. News and World Report, returning from 10 days in Florida, said to me that the exiles were telling everyone that they would receive United States recognition as soon as they landed in Cuba, to be followed by the overt provision of arms and supplies.

"A few days later Gilbert Harrison of the New Republic sent over the galleys of a pseudonymous piece called 'Our Men in Miami,' asking whether there was any reason why it should not be published. It was a careful, accurate and devastating account of C.I.A. activities among the refugees, written, I learned later, by Karl Meyer. Obviously its publication in a responsible magazine would cause trouble, but could the Government properly ask an editor to suppress the truth? Defeated by the moral issue, I handed the article to the President, who

instantly read it and expressed the hope that it could be stopped. Harrison accepted the suggestion and without questions—a patriotic act which left me oddly uncomfortable.

"About the same time Tad Szulc filed a story to The New York Times from Miami describing the recruitment drive and reporting that a landing on Cuba was imminent. Turner Catledge, the managing editor, called James Reston, who was in his weekend retreat in Virginia, to ask his advice. Reston counseled against publication: either the story would alert Castro, in which case The Times would be responsible for casualties on the beach, or else the expedition would be canceled, in which case The Times would be responsible for grave interference with national policy. This was another patriotic act; but in retrospect I have wondered whether, if the press had behaved irresponsibly, it would not have spared the country a disaster."

Article Was Not Suppressed

As recently as last November, Mr. Schlesinger was still telling the same story. In an appearance on "Meet the Press," he was asked about the article in The New York Times in which he was quoted as saying that he had lied to The Times in April, 1961, about the nature and size of the landing in the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Schlesinger replied that, a few days before he misinformed The Times, the newspaper had suppressed a story by Tad Szulc from Miami, giving a fairly accurate account of the invasion plans.

"If," he said, "I was reprehensible in misleading The Times by repeating the official cover story, The Times conceivably was just as reprehensible in misleading the American people by suppressing the Tad Szulc story from Miami. I, at least, had the excuse that I was working for the Government."

"I prefer to think," he said, "that both The Times and I were actuated by the same motives: that is, a sense, mistaken or not, that [it] was in the national interest to do so."

Mr. Schlesinger was mistaken, both in his book and in his appearance on "Meet the Press." The Times did not

suppress the Tad Szulc article. We printed it, and here it is, on Page 1 of the issue of Friday, April 7, 1961.

What actually happened is, at this date, somewhat difficult to say.

None of those who took part in the incident described in Mr. Schlesinger's book kept records of what was said and done. That is unfortunate, and it should teach us a lesson. The Bay of Pigs was not only important in the history of United States relations with Latin America, the Soviet Union and world Communism; it was also important in the history of relations between the American press and the United States Government.

We owe a debt to history. We should try to reconstruct the event, and that is what I am attempting to do today.

Late in March and early in April, 1961, we were hearing rumors that the anti-Castro

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forces were organizing for an invasion. For example, the editor of The Miami Herald, Don Shoemaker, told me at lunch in New York one day, "They're drilling on the beaches all over southern Florida."

Tad Szulc, a veteran correspondent in Latin America with a well-deserved reputation for sniffing out plots and revolutions, came upon the Miami story quite accidentally.

He was being transferred from Rio de Janeiro to Washington and happened to stop in Miami to visit friends on his way north. He quickly discovered that an invasion force was indeed forming and that it was very largely financed and directed by the C.I.A. He asked for permission to come to New York to discuss the situation and was promptly assigned to cover the story.

His first article from Miami—the one I have just shown to you—began as follows:

"For nearly nine months Cuban exile military forces dedicated to the overthrow of Premier Fidel Castro have been in training in the United States as well as in Central America.

"An army of 5,000 to 6,000 men constitutes the external fighting arm of the anti-Castro Revolutionary Council, which was formed in the United States last month. Its purpose is the liberation of Cuba from what it describes as the Communist rule of the Castro regime."

His article, which was more than two columns long and very detailed, was scheduled to appear in the paper of Friday, April 7, 1961. It was dummed for Page 1 under a four-column head, leading the paper.

While the front-page dummy was being drawn up by the assistant managing editor, the news editor and the assistant news editor, Orvil Dryfoos, then the publisher of The New York Times, came down from the 14th floor to the office of Turner Catledge, the managing editor.

He was gravely troubled by the security implications of Szulc's story. He could envision failure for the invasion, and he could see The New York Times being blamed for a bloody fiasco.

He and the managing editor solicited the advice of Scotty Reston, who was then the Washington correspondent of The New York Times, and is now an associate editor.

Recollections Conflict

At this point, the record becomes unclear. Mr. Reston distinctly recalls that Mr. Catledge's telephone call came on a Sunday, and that he was spending the weekend at his retreat in the Virginia mountains, as described by Arthur Schlesinger. As there was no telephone in his cabin, Mr. Reston had to return the call from a gas station in Marshall, Va. Mr. Catledge and others recall, with equal certainty, that the incident took place on Thursday and that Mr. Reston was reached in his office in Washington.

Whichever was the case, the managing editor told Mr. Reston about the Szulc dispatch, which said that a landing on Cuba was imminent.

Mr. Reston was asked what should be done with the dispatch.

"I told them not to run it," Mr. Reston says.

He did not advise against printing information about the forces gathering in Florida; that was already well known. He merely cautioned against printing any dispatch that would pinpoint the time of the landing.

Others agree that Szulc's dispatch did contain some phraseology to the effect that an invasion was imminent, and those words were eliminated.

Tad Szulc's own recollection, cabled to me from Madrid the other day, is that "in several instances the stories were considerably toned down, including the elimination of statements about the 'imminence' of an invasion.

"Specifically," Mr. Szulc said, "a decision was made in New York not to mention the C.I.A.'s part in the invasion preparations; not to use the date of the invasion, and, on April 15, not to give away in detail the fact that the first air strike on Cuba was carried out from Guatemala."

After the dummy for the front page of The Times for Friday, April 7, 1961, was changed, Ted Bernstein, who was the assistant managing editor on night duty at The Times, and Lew Jordan, the news editor, sat in Mr. Bernstein's office fretting about it. They believed a colossal mistake was being made, and together they went into Mr. Catledge's office to appeal for reconsideration.

Mr. Catledge recalls that Mr. Jordan's face was dead white, and he was quivering with emotion. He and Mr. Bernstein told the managing editor that never before had the front-page play in The New York Times been changed

for reasons of policy. They said they would like to hear from the publisher himself the reasons for the change.

Angry at Intervention

Lew Jordan later recalled that Mr. Catledge was "flaming mad" at this intervention. However, he turned around in his big swivel chair, picked up the telephone, and asked Mr. Dryfoos to come downstairs. By the time he arrived, Mr. Bernstein had gone to dinner, but Mr. Dryfoos spent 10 minutes, patiently explaining to Mr. Jordan his reasons for wanting the story played down.

His reasons were those of national security, national interest and, above all, concern for the safety of the men who were preparing to offer their lives on the beaches of Cuba. He repeated the explanation in somewhat greater length to Mr. Bernstein the next day.

I describe the mood and behavior of the publisher and editors of The New York Times only to show how seriously and with what intensity of emotion they made their fateful decisions.

Mr. Bernstein and Mr. Jordan now say, five years later, that the change in play, not eliminating the reference to the imminence of the invasion, was the important thing done that night.

"It was important because a multi-column head in this paper means so much," Mr. Jordan told me the other day.

Mr. Reston, however, felt that the basic issue was the elimination of the statement that an invasion was imminent.

Ironically, although that fact was eliminated from our own dispatch, virtually the same information was printed in a shirttail on Tad Szulc's report. That was a report from the Columbia Broadcasting System. It said that plans for the invasion of Cuba were in their final stages. Ships and planes were carrying invasion units from Florida to their staging bases in preparation for the assault.

When the invasion actually took place 10 days later, the American Society of Newspaper Editors happened to be in session in Washington, and President Kennedy addressed the society. He devoted his speech entirely to the Cuban crisis. He said nothing at that time about press disclosures of invasion plans.

Appeal by President

However, a week later in New York, appearing before the Bureau of Advertising of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the President asked members of

the newspaper profession to re-examine their own responsibilities.

He suggested that the circumstances of the cold war required newspapermen to show some of the same restraint they would exercise in a shooting war.

He went on to say, "Every newspaper now asks itself with respect to every story, 'Is it news?' All I suggest is that you add the question: 'Is it in the interest of national security?'"

If the press should recommend voluntary measures to prevent the publication of material endangering the national security in peacetime, the President said, "the Government would cooperate wholeheartedly."

Turner Catledge, who was the retiring president of the A.S.N.E., Felix McKnight of The Dallas Times-Herald, the

incoming president, and Lee Hills, executive editor of the Knight newspapers, took the President's statement as an invitation to talk.

Within two weeks, a delegation of editors, publishers and news agency executives was at the White House. They told President Kennedy they saw no need at that time for machinery to help prevent the disclosure of vital security information. They agreed that there should be another meeting in a few months. However, no further meeting was ever held.

That day in the White House, President Kennedy ran down a list of what he called premature disclosures of security information. His examples were mainly drawn from The New York Times.

He mentioned, for example, Paul Kennedy's story about the training of anti-Castro forces in Guatemala. Mr. Catledge pointed out that this information had been published in La Hora in Guatemala and in The Nation in this country before it was ever published in The New York Times.

"But it was not news until it appeared in The Times," the President replied.

While he scolded The New York Times, the President said in an aside to Mr. Catledge, "If you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake."

'Sorry You Didn't Tell Us'

More than a year later, President Kennedy was still talking the same way. In a conversation with Orvil Dryfoos in the White House on Sept. 13, 1962, he said, "I

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wish you had run everything on Cuba. . . . I am just sorry you didn't tell it at the time."

Those words were echoed by Arthur Schlesinger when he wrote, "I have wondered whether, if the press had behaved irresponsibly, it would not have spared the country a disaster."

They are still echoing down the corridors of history. Just the other day in Washington, Senator Russell of Georgia confessed that, although he was chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, he didn't know the timing of the Bay of Pigs operation.

"I only wish I had been consulted," he said, in a speech to the Senate, "because I would have strongly advised against this kind of operation if I had been."

It is not so easy, it seems, even for Presidents, their most intimate advisers and distinguished United States Senators to know always what is really in the national interest. One is tempted to say that sometimes—sometimes—even a mere newspaperman knows better.

My own view is that the Bay of Pigs operation might well have been canceled and the country would have been saved enormous embarrassment if The New York Times and other newspapers had been more diligent in the performance of their duty—their duty to keep the public informed on matters vitally affecting our national honor and prestige, not to mention our national security.

Perhaps, as Mr. Reston believes, it was too late to stop the operation by the time we printed Tad Szulc's story on April 7.

"If I had it to do over, I would do exactly what we did at the time," Mr. Reston says. "It is ridiculous to think that publishing the fact that the invasion was imminent would have avoided this disaster. I am quite sure the operation would have gone forward."

"The thing had been cranked up too far. The C.I.A. would have had to disarm the anti-Castro forces physically. Jack Kennedy was in no mood to do anything like that."

Prelude to Graver Crisis

The Bay of Pigs, as it turned out, was the prelude to an even graver crisis—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

In Arthur Schlesinger's opinion, failure in 1961 contributed to success in 1962. President Kennedy had learned from experience, and once again The New York Times was involved.

On May 28, 1963, the President sat at his desk in the White House and with his own hand wrote a letter to Mrs. Orvil Dryfoos, whose husband had just died at the age of 50. The letter was on White House stationery, and the President used both sides of the paper.

The existence of this letter has never been mentioned publicly before. I have the permission of Mr. Dryfoos's widow, now Mrs. Andrew Heiskell, to read it to you today:

"Dear Marian:—
"I want you to know how sorry I was to hear the sad

news of Orvil's untimely death.

"I had known him for a number of years and two experiences I had with him in the last two years gave me clear insight into his unusual qualities of mind and heart. One involved a matter of national security—the other his decision to refrain from printing on October 21st the news, which only the man for The Times possessed, on the presence of Russian missiles in Cuba, upon my informing him that we needed twenty-four hours more to complete our preparations.

"This decision of his made far more effective our later actions and thereby contributed greatly to our national safety.

"All this means very little now, but I did want you to know that a good many people some distance away, had the same regard for Orvil's character as did those who knew him best.

"I know what a blow this is to you, and I hope you will accept Jackie's and my deepest sympathy.

"Sincerely, John F. Kennedy."

In the Cuban missile crisis, things were handled somewhat differently than in the previous year. The President telephoned directly to the publisher of The New York Times.

He had virtually been invited to do so in their conversation in the White House barely a month before.

That conversation had been on the subject of security leaks in the press and how to prevent them, and Mr. Dryfoos had told the President that what was needed was prior information and prior consultation. He said that when there was danger of security information getting into print, the thing to do was to call in the publishers and explain matters to them.

In the missile crisis, President Kennedy did, exactly that.

Ten minutes before I was due on this platform this morning Mr. Reston telephoned me from Washington to give me further details of what happened that day.

A Call From Kennedy

"The President called me," Mr. Reston said. "He understood that I had been talking to Mac Bundy and he knew from the line of questioning that we knew the critical fact—that Russian missiles had indeed been emplaced in Cuba."

"The President told me," Mr. Reston continued, "that he was going on television on Monday evening to report to the American people. He said that if we published the news about the missiles Khrushchev could actually give him an ultimatum before he went on the air. Those were Kennedy's exact words.

"I told him I understood," Mr. Reston said this morning, "but I also told him I could not do anything about it. And this is an important thought that you should convey to those young reporters in your audience.

"I told the President I would report to my office in New York and if my advice were asked I would recommend that we not publicize it was not my duty to decide. My job was the same as that of an ambassador—to report to my superiors.

"I recommended to the President that he call New York. He did so." That was the sequence of events as Mr. Reston recalled them this morning. The President telephoned the publisher of The New York Times; Mr. Dryfoos in turn put the issue up to Mr. Reston and his staff.

And the news that the Soviet Union had atomic missiles in Cuba only 90 miles from the coast of Florida was withheld until the Government announced it.

What conclusion do I reach from all these facts? What moral do I draw from my story?

My conclusion is this; Information is essential to people who propose to govern themselves; it is the responsibility of serious journalists to supply that information—whether in this country or in the countries from which our foreign colleagues come.

Still, the primary responsibility for safeguarding our national interest must rest always with our Government, as it did with President Kennedy in the two Cuban crises.

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Associated Press
CLIFTON DANIEL
... on Bay of Pigs

JFK Quoted: 'Colossal Mistake' News Might Have Barred Bay of Pigs Invasion

ST. PAUL, Minn., June 1 (AP)—The late President Kennedy told a New York Times executive that if the Times had printed all it knew about the pending Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the United States would have been saved from a "colossal mistake," a Times editor disclosed here today.

Managing editor Clifton Daniel revealed — for the first time, he said — some painful decision-making at the Times before both the Bay of Pigs invasion and the later Cuban missile crisis.

The Times editor spoke at the MacAlester College World Press Institute Forum honoring 1966 Pulitzer Prize winners and foreign journalists studying at the college.

Daniel painted a picture of a President apparently torn in two directions by the course the Times took during the Bay of Pigs buildup.

Premature Disclosures

At one point, meeting with a group of editors after the incident, President Kennedy "ran down a list of what he called premature disclosures of security information," mostly from the Times, Daniel said.

"While he scolded the New York Times," Daniel went on, "the President said in an aside to Mr. Catledge, 'if you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake.'"

(Turner Catledge was then managing editor of the Times and is now executive editor.)

In a White House conversation on Sept. 13, 1962, never made public before today, Daniel said, the President talked with the late publisher of the Times, Orvil Dryfoos.

"I wish you had run everything on Cuba . . . I am just sorry you didn't tell it at the time," Daniel quoted the President as telling Dryfoos.

Exchanges Heated

Daniel told of detailed and heated exchanges among top Times executives before the decision was made to give the controversial dispatch a lesser headline, eliminate reference to an "imminent" invasion, and drop reference to participation of the Central Intelligence Agency in invasion preparations.

Daniel said his own view today is that the Bay of Pigs operation "might well have been canceled and the country would have been saved enormous embarrassment if the New York Times and other newspapers had been more diligent in the performance of their duty."

He added, however, that James Reston, then chief of the Times Washington Bureau and now an associate editor, who was in on the decision-making, disagrees.

By contrast, Daniel added, when the crisis of Russian missiles in Cuba came to a head, the Times, at the personal request of President Kennedy, withheld its exclusive story until the Government had had an opportunity to complete plans to counter it.


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SCHLESINGER BACKS CUBA 'COVER STORY'

WASHINGTON, Nov. 28 (AP) — Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. said today that perhaps he should have resigned from the Government "rather than mislead" the New York Times about the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

But, Mr. Schlesinger went on, he wanted to continue working with the Kennedy Administration and deliberately gave The Times misinformation about the invasion.

The former Special Assistant to President Kennedy made his remarks in an interview on "Meet the Press," a radio-television program of the National Broadcasting Company.

Mr. Schlesinger was asked about an article in The Times "in which you said that you had lied to the press at the time of the Bay of Pigs about the size of the men and people who were there, and you regretted that you had passed along the cover story."

Mr. Schlesinger said that, a few days before he misinformed The Times, the newspaper had "suppressed a story by Tad Szulc from Miami, giving a fairly accurate account of the invasion plans."

"If I was responsible in misleading The Times by repeating the official cover story, The Times conceivably was just as reprehensible in misleading the American people by suppressing the Tad Szulc story from Miami. I, at least, had the excuse that I was working for the Government."

"I refer to think," he said, "that both The Times and I were actuated by the same motives; that is, a sense, mistaken or not, that this was in the national interest to do so."

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Ydigoras Says He Talked JFK Out of Canceling Cuba Action

MIAMI, Sept. 18 (UPI)—Former President of Guatemala Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes claims he helped dissuade the late President Kennedy from calling off the abortive 1961 Cuban invasion by sending him a note by personal envoy. Ydigoras, living in San Salvador, El Salvador, since his 1963 ouster in a military coup, made his claim in a statement sent here. Ydigoras said his interest grows from recent articles by former Kennedy confidants touching on the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 17, 1961.

According to Ydigoras, two delegates were sent to Guatemala City in March of 1961 to inform him that President Kennedy had called off the planned invasion.

[In their accounts of the Bay of Pigs episode published this year, neither Theodore Sorenson nor Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. made reference to any decision by President Kennedy to cancel the invasion plan.]

Some 2000 Cuban exiles were training secretly in Guatemala for the invasion, Ydigoras said in his statement this was the result of arrange-

ments he made with the Eisenhower Administration in 1960.

Ydigoras said he wrote a personal note to Mr. Kennedy, asking that he go ahead with the invasion; and sent it by a special representative.

He said Mr. Kennedy received the Guatemalan envoy and told him: "Your President is one of the few who inspire

me to continue with this operation... there are many who are opposed to it and one of them is Mr. (Thomas C. Mann, my adviser for affairs in this area."

According to Ydigoras, Mr. Kennedy then informed the envoy: "Tell your President that the operation will be carried out."

M. P. Sullivan

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
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Cuba *President*

(CAR DONA)
 SAN JUAN, P.R. -- JOSE MIRO CARDONA, PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN
 REVOLUTIONARY AT THE TIME OF THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION, TODAY
 CRITICIZED HISTORIAN ARTHUR SCHLESINGER'S RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOK
 ON THE ABORTED INVASION ATTEMPT.
 MIRO CARDONA REFERRED TO SCHLESINGER'S VIEWS AS "SCANDAL, NOT
 HISTORY... THEY SERVE ONLY AS PROPAGANDA FOR THE ENEMY TO USE IN
 ATTACKING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WHICH TODAY IS ENGAGED IN A
 DEADLY STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNIST WORLD DOMINATION..."
 THE CUBAN EXILE LEADER, NOW TEACHING HERE, ACCUSED SCHLESINGER
 OF TRYING TO "BELITTLE" PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AND OF PRESENTING THE LATE
 PRESIDENT KENNEDY AS "UNCERTAIN, INSECURE (AND) ONE TRUSTING TO LUCK...
 HE BLURS THE IMAGE OF THE LEADER AND STATESMAN..."
 MIRO CORDONA FLATLY DENIED THE SCHLESINGER STATEMENT OF ANY PRE-
 SIDENTIAL DECISION TO WITHDRAW AGREED (U.S.) SUPPORT FOR THE INVASION.
 "THAT IS FALSE, TOTALLY AND ABSOLUTELY FALSE," THE CUBAN SAID.
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
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(BAY OF PIGS)

NEW YORK--THE NEWLY-ESTABLISHED ~~LATIN AMERICAN TIMES~~ TODAY
 BEGAN PUBLICATION OF A THREE-PART SERIES BY ITS WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT,
 JOHN T. SKELLY, ENTITLED "INSIDE STORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS."
 IN AN EDITORIAL BOX ACCOMPANYING THE FIRST ARTICLE, THE TIMES
 SAID: "MANY QUESTIONS DEALING WITH MAJOR MISCALCULATIONS OF THE
 ADMINISTRATION IN THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS FIASCO HAVE REMAINED LARGELY
 UNANSWERED UNTIL NOW...MANY PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN ASPECTS OF THE BUNGLED
 CUBAN INVASION ATTEMPT ARE DISCLOSED BY CUBAN EXILE LEADERS WHO WERE
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Today in National Affairs

More Revelations on Bay of Pigs

By David Lawrence

WASHINGTON

These are times when it seems to be a fad to downgrade the military mind and to arrogate to the civilian a superior capability in dealing with purely military operations.

"The late President Kennedy, to the day of his death, felt the CIA and his military advisers led him into making the worst mistake of his career—the Bay of Pigs disaster, according to a close Kennedy aide.

"While publicly and privately assuming full blame for the tragedy, Kennedy was aghast at the enormity of his error and bitter at having been badly misled by his advisers.

"Kennedy's aide, Theodore Sorensen, revealed the late President's personal reaction in an article published yesterday in Look magazine.

"How could I have been so far off base?" Sorensen said Kennedy remarked. "All my life I've known better than to depend on the experts. How could I have been so stupid to let them go ahead?"

"Sorensen said the key to Kennedy's error lay in the fact he approved an invasion plan bearing little resemblance to what he thought he had approved.

"That so great a gap between concept and actuality should exist at so high a level on so dangerous a matter reflected a shocking number of errors in the whole decision-making process," Sorensen said. "Errors that permitted bureaucratic momentum to govern instead of policy leadership."

Perhaps the most authoritative explanation thus far available about what did happen was given by Robert Kennedy, Attorney General at the time. As the brother of the President and a participant in the secret conferences beforehand at the White House, he was familiar with the whole Bay of Pigs operation. In an interview published in the Jan. 28, 1963, issue of "U. S. News & World Report," the Attorney General said that it was never contemplated there would be U. S. air cover for the invasion. Excerpts from the interview—the text of which was approved by the Attorney General before publication—are as follows:

"What happened was this: One air attack had been made

on Saturday on Cuban airports. There was a flurry at the United Nations and elsewhere and, as a result, U. S. participation in the matter was coming to the surface. This surfacing was contrary to the pre invasion plan. There was supposed to be another attack on the airports on Monday morning.

"The President was called about whether another attack which had been planned should take place. As there was this stir about the matter, he gave instructions that it should not take place at that time unless those having the responsibility felt that it was so important it had to take place, in which case they should call him and discuss it further.

"And that's what was postponed. It wasn't air cover of the beaches or landings. And, in fact, the attack on the airports took place later that day.

"Q. Wasn't there to be air cover of the beaches from Central America?"

"A. That is correct—and that was not disturbed. All of the planes that were supposed to be utilized were utilized—all in the planning. I might say they proved to be inadequate. The air cover at the beaches was definitely inadequate—but not because of some last minute decision by the President or anyone else.

"Q. Who did the planning?" "A. Now, that's the third point. The President has

taken responsibility for this whole matter.

"Q. Well, was the planning by the military, or somebody else?"

"A. The plan that finally went into effect was approved by our military—the pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency. This wasn't something that was planned by a few fellows over at the White House and then put in operation. However, the President had to give approval to the plan and he quite properly has accepted the responsibility.

"Q. There have been many reports that the military did not approve the thing—"


"A. As Gen. Lemnitzer, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said, they did approve it. Although responsibility for the planning lay primarily with the CIA.

"The President had made it clear from the beginning, prior to the approval of this operation, American manpower, American Air power and American ships would not be used.

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The National Observer
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"And this plan had to go into effect without that. The military approved the plan that finally went into operation on that basis.

"Q. What accounts for the miscalculation here? You say the forces that went in were not adequate—

"A. I think it's a difficult question to answer—the plans and the recommendations obviously were not adequate.

"Q. Why were American forces there if they were not used?

"A. The plan was that, if the invasion ships starting from Central America were sighted by a Cuban plane, or in some fashion the Communists learned about the invasion, they were going to turn around. Our forces had permission to protect them from attack as they returned.

"Q. You have quoted the President as saying, 'I want it understood that American forces are not going to be used, and if you still think this plan is good enough, we'll go ahead.' Is that right?"

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Who was it he was talking to?

"A. To all those who were involved in the planning. All those involved in the planning understood that American forces would not be used."

What the episode proves is that American military men should not be asked to assume any responsibility for operations which they neither command nor control.

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UPI-36

(BAY OF PIGS)

NEW YORK--THE LATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY, TO THE DAY OF HIS DEATH, FELT THE CIA AND HIS MILITARY ADVISERS LED HIM INTO MAKING THE WORST MISTAKE OF HIS CAREER--THE BAY OF PIGS DISASTER, ACCORDING TO A CLOSE KENNEDY AIDE.

WHILE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY ASSUMING FULL BLAME FOR THE TRAGEDY, KENNEDY WAS AGAST AT THE ENORMITY OF HIS ERROR AND BITTER AT HAVING BEEN BADLY MISLED BY HIS ADVISERS.

KENNEDY'S AIDE, THEODORE C. SORENSEN, REVEALED THE LATE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REACTION IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED YESTERDAY IN LOOK MAGAZINE. THE ARTICLE IS THE FIRST INSTALLMENT OF A SERIES BASED ON SORENSEN'S FORTHCOMING BOOK "KENNEDY" TO BE PUBLISHED IN OCTOBER.

THE FULL EXTENT OF KENNEDY'S BITTERNESS WAS EXPRESSED TO SORENSEN DURING A WALK AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE CUBAN INVADERS HAD BEEN DEFEATED.

"HOW COULD I HAVE BEEN SO FAR OFF BASE?" SORENSEN SAID KENNEDY REMARKED. "ALL MY LIFE I'VE KNOWN BETTER THAN TO DEPEND ON THE EXPERTS. HOW COULD I HAVE BEEN SO STUPID TO LET THEM GO AHEAD?"

SORENSEN SAID THE KEY TO KENNEDY'S ERROR LAY IN THE FACT HE APPROVED AN INVASION PLAN "BEARING LITTLE RESEMBLANCE TO WHAT HE THOUGHT HE HAD APPROVED."

"THAT SO GREAT A GAP BETWEEN CONCEPT AND ACTUALITY SHOULD EXIST AT SO HIGH A LEVEL ON SO DANGEROUS A MATTER REFLECTED A SHOCKING NUMBER OF ERRORS IN THE WHOLE DECISION MAKING PROCESS," SORENSEN SAID. "ERRORS THAT PERMITTED BUREAUCRATIC MOMENTUM TO GOVERN INSTEAD OF POLICY LEADERSHIP."


THE FORMER WHITE HOUSE AIDE SAID KENNEDY HAD "GRAVE DOUBTS" ABOUT THE INVASION'S SUCCESS FROM THE MOMENT HE WAS BRIEFED ON THE OPERATION AS PRESIDENT-ELECT IN PALM BEACH.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Feared Exile Attack on Central America CIA Man in Bay of Pigs

Gave Warning

By David Wise
Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON

Richard M. Bissell Jr., who ran the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion for the Central Intelligence Agency, said yesterday that the armed Cuban exile brigade might have tried to seize territory in Central America if it had not been sent to invade Cuba.

The suggestion that the CIA might have lost control of the Cuban exiles if President Kennedy had canceled the invasion, and that the intelligence agency warned of this possibility, had not been made publicly before. Mr. Bissell spoke out in a lengthy copyrighted interview in The Washington Evening Star.

The account was the latest in a spate of stories that have revived debate over the disastrous Cuban invasion, the worst setback of the Kennedy administration. On Monday, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., wrote about the Bay of Pigs in Life magazine. Tomorrow Theodore C. Sorensen will give his version in Look magazine. Both men are former assistants to Mr. Kennedy, and both accounts are taken from books they will publish this fall.

In the Star interview, Mr. Bissell said: "We did warn more than once that there would be a very difficult problem with this armed, highly motivated unit in case the operation were canceled. We had no final plan of what would become of it."

"They (the exiles) were the most powerful military force between Mexico and Panama, and it is entirely possible that they might have tried to seize a base in Nicaragua, Honduras or Guatemala. There is not the slightest doubt that they could have defeated any Guatemalan force."

It was the second time Mr. Bissell had broken silence since he resigned from the CIA in February, 1962, during the shakeup that followed the Bay of Pigs invasion. On May 4, he was interviewed on an NBC-TV documentary "The Science of Spying."

The former CIA Deputy Director for Plans, who directed the U-2 program for the intelligence agency, was interviewed in Hartford where he is an executive of the United Aircraft Corp.

The exile force he spoke of was trained clandestinely in Guatemala by the CIA, and dispatched by President Kennedy on April 17, 1961, to invade the south coast of Cuba

at the Bay of Pigs. Training of the exiles had commenced under President Eisenhower.

According to the Star interview, Mr. Bissell feels that President Kennedy's decision to cancel a second air strike by exile B-26 bombers against Premier Castro's airfields might have made a "critical difference" in the outcome of the invasion.

"If we had been able to dump five times the tonnage of bombs on Castro's airfields, we would have had a damned good chance," he said in the interview. Mr. Schlesinger wrote that the President's decision to cancel the second strike was "an error," but not

The Exile B-26 Bombers took off Nicaragua and attacked Castro's Air Bases in the first strike. A CIA "cover story," announced in Miami, said it was the work of pilots defecting inside Cuba. President Kennedy canceled the second strike, scheduled for the day of the invasion, be-

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cause the U. S. role was seeping out.

In the Star interview, Mr. Bissell is quoted as saying U.S. officials miscalculated the chances of keeping the U. S. role in the invasion secret. "The hope existed that it could be plausibly disclaimed by the U. S. government," he said.

The star said Mr. Bissell is "convinced that the U. S. will have to intervene in the affairs of other countries with some frequency in the future."

The Star also published for the first time a picture of Mr. Bissell receiving the national security medal from President Kennedy in April, 1962. It had previously been reported that Mr. Bissell received a medal when he left the CIA, but there was no announcement at the time.

White House officials said 12 national security medals have been awarded since 1953, but that only about half of the recipients have been publicly identified.

Cuban Invasion: 3 in Kennedy Administration Review '61 Failure

TOM WICKER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 21

Three new accounts of the Bay of Pigs invasion, provided by former Kennedy Administration officials, agree that President Kennedy's political misgivings about the project materially reduced whatever chances of success it had.

Two of these accounts, by Theodore C. Sorensen and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., also agree that the ill-fated invasion of Cuba never had much chance of success.

"How could everybody involved have thought such a plan would succeed?" Mr. Kennedy exclaimed after it was all over, according to Mr. Sorensen. "How could I have been so far off base? All my life I've known better than to depend on the experts. How could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead?"

Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Schlesinger also agree that President Kennedy's decision to cancel a scheduled air strike on the morning of the invasion, April 17, 1961, probably was mistaken and unnecessary, but that it had little to do with the failure of the Cuban force.

The third account, however, by Richard M. Bissell Jr., suggests that the operation would have had "a damned good chance" had there been sufficient air support for the Cuban volunteers.

Parts of Forthcoming Books

Mr. Sorensen was Mr. Kennedy's special counsel in April, 1961, when the Cuban volunteer brigade was defeated and captured by Fidel Castro's forces after a three-day fight. Mr. Sorensen's version, a part of a book to be published next fall by Harper & Row, appeared in Look this week.

Mr. Schlesinger was a special assistant to the President in 1961. His account, also part of a forthcoming book, was published in Life this week. Yesterday The Washington Evening Star published a copyright interview with Mr. Bissell, who was in charge of planning the invasion for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Schlesinger make it plain that President Kennedy, finding the invasion plan well advanced when he took office, had grave misgivings about it and gave consideration to abandoning it. Ultimately, he felt he had no

choice but to proceed within the limitations he had

U.S. Military Move Barred

The primary limitation was that there was to be no overt United States military participation.

This decision, Mr. Sorensen wrote, "led to other restrictions designed to make the operation more covert and our involvement more concealed, restrictions that in fact impaired the plan's military prospects."

Among other things, the decision sharply limited the amount of air support available to the invaders. They had to rely on outdated B-26 aircraft piloted by refugees and based in Nicaragua.

"Since [President Kennedy] was unwilling to conduct an overt operation through the Defense Department," Mr. Sorensen wrote, "he should have abandoned it altogether as beyond the C.I.A.'s capability."

Restriction on Landing Site

Mr. Kennedy also made a political decision against attempting the landing at Trinidad, at the foot of the Escambray Mountains. That site had been selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from alternatives presented by the C.I.A., as the most likely for success.

Mr. Sorensen wrote that Trinidad was "ruled out as being too conspicuous." Mr. Schlesinger wrote that Mr. Kennedy considered the proposed operation at Trinidad "too spectacular... he wanted a quiet landing, preferably at night."

The Joint Chiefs then named the Bay of Pigs as the best of the remaining alternatives. But it was separated by 80 miles of swamp from the Escambray Mountains, and thus it was impossible for the invaders to scatter into the mountains as guerrillas, as Mr. Kennedy had expected.

Both authors make it clear that this difficulty was never explained to the President. Mr. Sorensen wrote: "The vast majority of the [invaders] had not been given any guerrilla training." A guerrilla operation, he added, was "never a realistic alternative."

"It was never even planned by the C.I.A. officers in charge of the operation," he added, and they neither told the President that they thought this option was out nor told the exiles that this was the President's plan.

Where Accounts Differ

Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Schlesinger differ sharply on one point about the shift in the invasion site.

Mr. Sorensen wrote that when the Joint Chiefs learned that Trinidad had been ruled out, "they selected the Bay of Pigs as the best of the alternative sites offered without informing either Kennedy or [Secretary of Defense] McNamara that they still thought Trinidad preferable."

Mr. Schlesinger, after writing that it was the President who ruled out Trinidad, said the Joint Chiefs agreed that the Bay of Pigs "seemed the best of the three alternatives, but added softly that they still preferred Trinidad."

A source involved in the decision said privately that his recollection was clear that the Joint Chiefs' continuing preference for Trinidad had been expressed in an official paper. He said he could not say whether this paper had gone to the President or had been closely studied by him.

Mr. Bissell was quoted in the interview as having said he believed that the invasion plan "can be criticized for allowing this chipping away to go on without insisting on the

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Theodore C. Sorensen

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- The Worker _____
- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
- The National Observer _____
- People's World _____
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the whole decision-making process, errors that permitted bureaucratic momentum to govern instead of policy leadership."

For that reason, Mr. Sorensen wrote, "the whole project seemed to move mysteriously and inexorably toward execution without the President's being able either to obtain a firm grip on it or reverse it."

He said Mr. Kennedy, new in office, hesitated to overrule "renowned experts" who had the project well under way. He did not know these experts well, failed to realize that the operation could not be kept covert in an "open society," and accepted the advice of "experts" over his own political doubts, the skepticism of some aides like Mr. Schlesinger and the open opposition of Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas.

Mr. Schlesinger wrote that Mr. Kennedy never saw the written protest of Chester Bowles, then Under Secretary of State and now Ambassador to India. He said that he himself was advised by Robert F. Kennedy, then the Attorney General: "You may be right or you may be wrong, but the President has made his mind up. Don't push it any further."

How C.I.A. Viewed Operation

Mr. Sorensen said that the C.I.A. presented the plan to President Kennedy as a question "whether he was as willing as the Republicans to permit and assist these exiles to free their own island from dictatorship, or whether he was willing to liquidate well-laid preparations, leave Cuba free to subvert the hemisphere, disband an impatient army in training for nearly a year under miserable conditions, and have them spread the word that Kennedy had betrayed their attempt to depose Castro."

Mr. Bissell, who now lives and works in Hartford, Conn.,

raised another point in the Evening Star interview. [The exiles], he said, "were the most powerful military force between Mexico and Panama and it is entirely possible that they might have tried to seize a base in Nicaragua, Honduras or Guatemala; there is not the slightest doubt that they could have defeated any Guatemalan force."

There was no "final plan," he said, of how to dispose of this unit and "we did warn more than once that there would be a very difficult problem with this armed, highly motivated unit in case the operation were canceled."

Mr. Schlesinger's account of the pressures on Mr. Kennedy coincided substantially with Mr. Sorensen's. All three accounts picture an operation almost impossible to reverse once in motion.

Mr. Bissell appeared, however, to believe still that there had been a chance for success. He said there were two possibilities — an established beachhead around the Bay of Pigs airstrip, which would have permitted the rebel air force to bomb Cuban military targets, and brought down the Castro Government; or an impasse, with neither side winning or losing, which might have led to negotiations and free elections.

He did not mention guerrilla operations. But he said: "If we had been able to dump

five times the tonnage of bombs on Castro's airfields, we would have had a damned good chance."

Mr. Bissell also said the exiles had been told clearly that there would be no United States military intervention. Mr. Sorensen asserted the opposite. "Most members of the brigade were in fact under the mistaken impression, apparently from their C.I.A. contacts, that American armed forces would openly and directly assist them, if necessary," he said.

Views on Air-Strike Decision

One strike on Cuban air bases had already had carried out by the refugee airmen when President Kennedy decided to cancel a second air strike. In discussing that decision, Mr. Sorensen says:

"The first strike, designed to be the key, turned out later to have been remarkably ineffective, and there is no reason to believe that Castro's air force, having survived the first air strike and then been dispersed into hiding, would have been knocked out by the second one."

whole plan or on cancellation."

"Because we were so involved in seeing it go ahead," he said is quoted as having said, "we did not insist on as great freedom of action as needed."

But the Sorensen and Schlesinger articles assert that the invasion play had never had any realistic chance to succeed and that President Kennedy came to believe this after the event.

'Wild Misjudgment'

Assurances that the operation could succeed without United States military involvement, Mr. Sorensen wrote, were "a wild misjudgment." The project was "diplomatically unwise and militarily doomed from the outset"; that so great a gap between concept and actuality should exist at so high a level on so dangerous a matter reflected a shocking number of errors in

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Says JFK Inherited Problem

Schlesinger Ties Bad Advice to Cuba Disaster

The 1961 Bay of Pigs disaster was caused by President Kennedy's unwillingness to refuse bad advice, according to former Special Assistant to the President Arthur M. Schlesinger.

Mr. Schlesinger, as quoted by Henry Brandon in the July issue of Harper's Magazine, said Mr. Kennedy inherited a Government apparatus "more or less committed to this project" and allowed it to go ahead because "the problem of disengagement" seemed more difficult to overcome.

SKEPTICAL

After the disaster, Mr. Schles-

inger said, Mr. Kennedy became skeptical of the advice he received from some of the "most distinguished and eminent" men around him, and wary of the quality of information from the military, diplomatic and intelligence establishments.

It was then, according to Mr. Schlesinger, that Mr. Kennedy began to rely more on his White House staff.

The White House staff responded, said Mr. Schlesinger, by becoming more aggressive in defending the President's interests.



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West

Bay Of Pigs Stamp Bold Jab At U.S.

By JON VAN DYKE
Reporter of The Miami News

Castro's exultation over his Bay of Pigs Victory on April 17, 1961, seems to increase as the years ago by.

The Cuban stamp issued to commemorate the third anniversary of this battle, received here today, is the most blatantly anti-American stamp of the series.

In bold, contrasting colors, the stamp shows an eagle — traditional symbol of American might — falling from the air after having been shot. An image of a rifle's sighting mechanism is superimposed on the dead eagle's breast.

Like the stamp celebrating the second anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion, this stamp is obviously designed for U.S. consumption. Its value is 13 cents — the cost of Cuba-U.S. airmail.

Last year's stamp showed a battle, with forces from South America meeting North Americans at Panama. Cuba was shown as a lighted beacon, surrounded by sinking ships and

planes — presumably those of defeated invaders.

The stamp of two years ago was much simpler. It showed two Cuban soldiers clutching each other in friendship, watching an enemy plane plunge to its destruction.

This year's anniversary issue like the earlier stamps, seems to forbode future military action. This is the first time, however, that the action has been so obviously directed at the United States.



New Cuban Stamp,

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MIAMI, FLORIDA

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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 9: 'Infamy

The 1,500 Cuban patriots of brigade 2506 were trapped on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs. Their supply ship was sunk, promised air cover never came and they were running out of ammunition. In earlier installments, the leaders of the brigade gave formerly unknown facts about how the group was organized and trained by the CIA. They told how they hit the beaches at night and came under fire immediately, due to a series of CIA miscalculations.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, José Pérez San Roman, Erneldo Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)



Castro militia on the Playa Giron front.

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On the third day of the battle, Wednesday, April 19, 1961, everyone knew the invasion had failed—except the members of Brigade 2506. Until the end, they did not know they were beaten. It was a day in which a gallant, forlorn and fool-hardy attack made Castro's superior forces break and run.

The desperate pleas for protective jet air power continued. The messages filtered back from the battlefield to the American destroyer operating off the Cuban coast, then to the Washington command group, and then to their final destination, the White House.

For the President, who was also commander in chief, those must have been searing hours. The nature of John F. Kennedy's personal feelings is reflected in part by the orders that went out from Washington that day. They indicate how close the United States came to a total commitment.

Evacuation Ordered

First, CINCLANT (Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic) was instructed to fly reconnaissance missions over the beach and to send two destroyers to positions off Playa Giron to determine the possibilities for evacuation. Two hours and 52 minutes later, in mid-afternoon, CINCLANT received these instructions: "Have destroyers take Brigade personnel off beach to limit capture. Navy use Brigade boats and craft as practicable and provide air cover. Destroyers authorized return fire if fired on during this humanitarian mission."

"All of a sudden we get the order that we're going in and this time we get no opposition from anybody," Andy Prunick said. "When the final order comes that we're going in, even the ones that were trying to mutiny were ready to go."

The Blagar, the Barbara J., the Atlantico, the three LCUs formed a line. Moving up alongside them came the American destroyers. "So now we know that we are going in," said one aboard ship. "These destroyers are not going in for nothing. And they are going full speed ahead right beside us. And it is a wonderful sight. Everybody is ready to die. Everybody is ready to go."

(But the destroyers arrived too late. Some survivors on the beach said that when the ships came under Castro's artillery fire, they turned away.)

Pepe San Roman (the young commander of the Brigade) continued to send his battle reports and appeals for assistance during the day. Better than anything, the stark words sent out over the airwaves told the story of the disaster that was overtaking the invaders. The radio log read as follows:

5:00 a.m. Do you people realize how desperate the situation is? Do you back us or quit? All we want is low jet air cover. Enemy has this support. I need it badly or cannot survive.

6:13 a.m. Blue Beach under attack by B-26. Where is promised air cover? Pepe.

6:42 a.m. C-54 dropped supplies on Blue Beach. All went into sea. Send more. Pepe.

7:12 a.m. Enemy and trucks coming from Red Beach are right now 3 km. from Blue Beach. Pepe.

7:50 a.m. We are fighting in the west flank of Blue Beach with tanks. Pepe.

8:15 a.m. Situation critical left flank west Blue Beach. Need urgently air support. Pepe.

8:40 a.m. Blue Beach is under air attack. Pepe.

9:14 a.m. Blue Beach under attack by 2 T-33 and artillery. Where the hell is jet cover? Pepe.

9:25 a.m. 2,000 militia attacking Blue Beach from east and west. Need close air support immediately. Pepe.

9:55 a.m. Can you throw something into this vital point in the battle? Anything. Just let jet pilots loose. Pepe.

(Red Beach was Playa Larga at the head of the Bay of Pigs. Blue Beach was Giron, the center of the invasion landings.)

'Enemy Closing In'

Toward the end, messages came quickly: "In water. Out of ammo. Enemy closing in. Help must arrive in next hour." "Fighting on beach. Send all available aircraft now."

Through all the chaos and despair of defeat, Pepe retained the calm that was his hallmark. Even his anger was quiet. He was not a pounder or a shouter. Those who heard him on the radio that day, and many on

the convoy of the Bay of Pigs did, heard the quiet voice sounding. Tired, edged more with anger and bitterness but still determined and still calm.

From the north, the west, the east and from the air, the Brigade was under heavy attack. To the south, at their backs was the sea—both a barrier and the last hope. Gray (the American receiving San Roman's messages) kept saying to hang on, that help was coming from the sea.

There were many heroes to pick from that day. One was Alejandro del Valle, 22 years old, handsome, blond, athletic and cocky, an inspiration to his men.

Del Valle organized a counterattack with his paratroopers and the Third Battalion.

Standing on top of one of his two tanks, Del Valle signaled for the attack. The men moved forward under a heavy artillery barrage, some walking dazedly, others running, but all going ahead. To the forward observers, watching through binoculars, it was like a picture: the lines of men, the bright blue sky and the early morning sun, the puffs of smoke and earth rising from the craters, the flash of small arms fire and the blue uniforms of the enemy. Del Valle was hit and knocked from the tank. He immediately climbed back and the tank moved ahead in the vanguard of the troops.

It was a gallant, forlorn even fool-hardy attack—and yet it was succeeding. Castro's vastly superior forces broke and ran. Some enemy soldiers tore off their shirts and waved them in surrender. That moment marked a crest for the Brigade. For a few fleeting seconds the liberation army felt victorious. And then the attack faltered and stopped, first with the Third Battalion on the right flank, and then on down the line, and men began moving to the rear. They were running out of ammunition.

The Third Battalion retreat became disorganized. A few of the paratroopers joined their ranks and the retreat threatened to become a rout. In rage and with tears in his eyes, Del Valle ran among the men trying to stop them, shouting: "All paratroopers back to the line!"

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and die there." He repeated it over and over.

His men regrouped and formed a line on the sides of the road, placed their bazookas, and waited, two miles south of San Blas, at a junction called Berméja. As they were forming their position the paratroopers were astonished to see a jeep driven by a captain in Castro's militia come racing straight into their lines. Slitting beside the captain was Maj. Duque Estrada, one of the top enemy commanders.

The major had been in charge of the troops at Yaguaramas, and in the mistaken belief that the forces coming from Cavadonga already had taken San Blas and moved south, he took a short cut—straight into the lap of the Brigade.

Speaks Up Boldly

The captain was frightened but Maj. Estrada spoke up boldly: "Men, you don't know what's coming toward you. I have 5,000 men and 14 tanks. You'd better surrender. You know you're going to lose this war."

Cocky as ever, Del Valle snapped back: "You don't know what Del Valle can do with a hundred paratroopers."

A Brigade soldier called out, "Let's hang these Communists."

The major, still unperturbed, answered: "I am a Socialist but I am not a Communist. You are Cubans and you are harming your country."

With that, Del Valle personally took the major back to Giron and reported to Pepe San Roman.

(The Brigade commanders were never informed of the alternative plan drafted by the high command in Washington for use if the frontal assault should fail. This called for escape to the Escambray Mountains and operation as a guerrilla force; but the Central Intelligence Agency withheld it from the Cubans.)

Erneido Oliva, commander of the armored battalion, after studying the situation on Tuesday morning, proposed the alternative plan on his own initiative. In his opinion, the forces approaching were so large that the Brigade would be unable to resist. He suggested

that the troops be pulled back, re-united with the Brigade and its five tanks, and "an arrow-head strike" be launched to the east and into the mountains.

San Roman, the Brigade commander, not knowing that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had indorsed such a plan, overruled it. There was not enough transportation and ammunition, he told Oliva, and no communications to let the support ships know where they would be. At that time, he was still certain of support from the sea.

Still Confident

In the end, Pepe's decision was based on his confidence in the Americans—confidence, as he expressed it, that something was coming and "if we could hold this position for two or three days everything was going to be all right. We didn't feel demoralized. I knew that we were in a very rough situation, very dangerous, but I felt optimistic about everything."

Had Pepe and his officers been prepared from the beginning to take alternative action, had they known that the Americans had drafted such a plan for use at such a time, perhaps the Bay of Pigs would have had a different ending. No one will ever be able to say for certain.

Oliva's forces on the first night, numbering less than 370 men, had faced—and defeated—2,100 Castro soldiers, plus 20 tanks, including Sherman and Stalin tanks. The best available estimate of Castro's casualties that night, from a Castro doctor who later defected, places the dead at 500, with over 1,000 wounded. Oliva's men suffered only 10 to 20 dead, 40 to 50 wounded.

They were well trained, they massed their fire brilliantly and they were superbly led. After that battle, the men began calling Oliva "Maceo," after Antonio Maceo, the great Cuban hero of the Wars of Independence against Spain. Maceo, like Oliva, was a Negro. At one time Oliva had wanted to become an architect, but those who saw him in the battles of Playa Larga never doubted where his true talent lay. He exhibited complete steadiness under fire and a quality of strength and decision that made men want to follow him.

In the last hours, the men of the brigade remembered Oliva standing the beach and shaking his fist at the sea. He believed that he and his men had been betrayed by the Americans. He shouted to 300 men of the Second and Sixth Battalions surrounding him that he would not abandon them.

"I can still see Oliva standing there shaking his fist," one said long after.

Young Amado Gayol, who had fought magnificently on the San Blas front, drew a pistol. He was going to shoot himself "because I didn't want my parents to suffer knowing I had

been captured and then executed."

But Oliva yelled at him: "No. You are a man. Not like those at sea."

Several yards down the beach the wounded Maximo Cruz crawled out of the infirmary and saw the American destroyers still moving toward the coast. He yelled to Padre Lugo who was walking away, "Father, Father. Don't leave. Here are the Americans. They have come to save us." As he was speaking, two artillery shells landed in front of the ships. The ships turned and left.

Rage Pours Out

The frustration and rage poured out. Soldiers ran to a tank to try and shoot at the destroyers. Their hatred spilled over onto their own men. Brigade soldiers fired rifles trying to hit the men on the sailboat and also those who were leaving on rubber rafts. They were the final shots in the Bay of Pigs invasion. A soldier watching the last American ship said: "In the wake of that ship goes 200 years of infamy."

Oliva and his men blew up their tanks, shot their truck tires and destroyed their heavy equipment. Then they began marching in a column to the east. They had walked only five hundred yards when two T-33s and a Sea Fury attacked them. When one of the planes dived low, a soldier saw the Cuban flag on its wings. He felt—horribly—like an outlaw in his own land. The column broke and the men ran into the jungle. It was every man for himself.

Tomorrow: The Last Battle.

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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 8

The leaders of the Cuban liberation force told in earlier installments how the Central Intelligence Agency organized and trained their brigade at a secret base in Guatemala. They were led to believe they would get plenty of support from the air and from civilians rising up against Castro within Cuba. Nothing went as planned at the Bay of Pigs. The invaders were in a dire situation, deserted by their support ships, their supply ship sunk and Castro's planes strafing them as the story continues 24 hours after the landing.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, José Pérez San Roman, Ernesto Olive and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

It must have been a day of frustration and anguish for John Fitzgerald Kennedy. The news from the front continued to grow blacker. Not a single element of the invasion plan had proved successful and now the total disaster that he and his top officials had been assured could not happen was imminent.

(It was Tuesday, April 18, 1961, and 24 hours since 1,500 Cubans, trained as an invasion force under orders issued by President Eisenhower in March, 1960, had begun a desperate attempt to establish a beachhead at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's southern coast. It had been a night for heroes, but dreadful miscalculations had doomed the effort almost from the start.)

There was the threat that Russia might act. Soviet Premier Khrushchev had made that clear in a special message to the President that morning. It stated the Soviet position in chilling terms. The Cuban government would be given "all necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack on Cuba."

Temperate But Firm

The President's reply was temperate but firm. He had stated before and he stated again that the United States intended no military intervention in Cuba. But should an outside force intervene, "We will immediately honor our obligations to protect this hemisphere against external aggression."

At 10 o'clock, the President, in his office, ordered his cabinet members to prepare for his cabinet meeting and guests. At the put on white at 10:15 he and the entrance



A Castro soldier stands on the tail section of a Brigade B-26 downed during the invasion.

were to be given American air protection, the exhausted Cubans in two of the bombers were relieved by four American pilots. Four bombers in all took off from Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, early Wednesday for the three-hour and 20 minute flight to the Bay of Pigs, but one turned back because of engine trouble.

In the first light of the day, the B-26s were approaching their target—nearly one hour before their jet support was supposed to arrive at 6:30. Why they arrived an hour early is not clear, but the result was disastrous: the United States jets were still on the carrier deck when the planes flown by the Americans were attacked by Castro's jets.

One B-26 was shot down and crash-landed in flames on the air strip at the Central Australia sugar mill. The other fell into the sea enveloped in flames and smoke. The four Americans died. By the time the mournful word was passed to the carrier, the bombing mission had ended.

Gonzales Herrera, one of the Cuban pilots, who had heard his American comrades vainly calling the distress signal "Mad Dog Four! May Day! May Day!" to get carrier support, proceeded on to his target: enemy troop and artillery concentrations massed in front of San Blas. The Brigade troops had been under heavy artillery fire all night and Castro's forces were ready for a massive attack when Herrera's plane dived, strated the position with machine guns, turned, made a second pass and dropped two napalm bombs. After a tremendous explosion,

as far as 218 miles south of the Bay of Pigs. The Cuban crews on some of the ships refused to go back.

"We are lost, this is a disaster," they said. "We have been betrayed and we are not going back unless the American destroyers come with us."

By midnight, Pepe San Roman, "mad as hell," took a 25-foot boat and left for the open sea to search for the ships. He went nearly six miles offshore in the darkness, calling in vain for the ships. There was no answer. For hours, the radio calls went out, in code, to the missing fleet: "Dolores, this is Beach. Dolores, this is Beach. I am trying to find you. We need you. We need you." There was no answer.

On Tuesday morning, radio contact was established with one of the ships, the Blagar. The first words from the sea were congratulations to the Brigade for its "victory." The message was given in the name of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

Pepe's profane reply to the voice on the radio was that the "victorious" troops had run out of ammunition; that ammunition, medical supplies and support was needed, not congratulations. Then he asked to speak directly to the American "last force" commander. This is how Pepe remembers the conversation:

Commander: "Hello, Pepe, how are you?"

Pepe: "Where have you been, you son of a bitch? Where the hell have you been? You have abandoned us."

Commander: "I know that you have your problems, but

heavy artillery fire. By this time, he had 20,000 troops massed in the area, a superiority of about 20 to 1, but he did not attack the tiny force defending on the northern front. This failure to act saved many lives but also prolonged the battle.)

A Coincidence

The failure of Castro's large force to deliver the decisive blow was due to a curious coincidence. Two paratroopers, in the advance guard at Covadonga, were captured that morning and immediately questioned about their strength. One man, Carlos Onetti, bravely said that he was part of a force of more than one thousand men holding the road from Covadonga to San Blas. The other, less brave and more practical, told the truth: the invaders' positions had been defended by only 19 men.

A militia captain cursed the second paratrooper as a liar trying to lead them into a trap. It was impossible for 19 men to hold that outpost for more than 24 hours, the captain said. To soften up the "large" force ahead of them, four batteries of 122-mm. artillery began pounding San Blas, but the troops were withheld.

(The outside world, meanwhile, was led to believe that the invasion was succeeding. In New York City, a press agent named Lem Jones, head of a public relations firm bearing his name, was issuing cheering bulletins on behalf of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. On Tuesday afternoon, he reported "peasants, workers and militia joining the freedom front and adding the rapidly expanding area already liberated by the revolutionary command." Miami newspapers reported even more extravagant claims of invasion victories.)

Apparently there was misinformation in official quarters also. In Guatemala, at Homestead Air Force Base outside Miami and at Key West, additional Cuban recruits were told that the Brigade was winning and that they were to prepare and wait to join the victorious fight.

Since his angry exchange with the American, Gray, on the supply ship that morning, Pepe had been on a radio con-

put on white at 10:15 he and the entrance and, resplendent in uniforms, played "Mr. Wonderful," the President and First Lady whirled around the ballroom, the picture of youth and confidence.

Shortly before midnight, the President left the reception and went immediately to his office. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Richard Bissell, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, were present. Bissell quietly and calmly presented the case and the request: the Cuban brigade had only one hope left — United States airpower.

Of those hours of deliberation from midnight until 2 a.m. there have been several accounts. It can be stated from the highest sources, however, that the essence of the debate was this: Dean Rusk vigorously opposed the use of American power; Arleigh Burke strongly backed Richard Bissell; and John Kennedy ruled out any major use of American arms.

The President did, however, for the first time, alter his policy on the use of United States forces. In a compromise, but one with a reasonable chance of success, he gave the authority for jet fighter planes from the carrier U.S.S. Essex, on duty in the Caribbean off the Bay of Pigs, to provide an "air umbrella" Wednesday at dawn while the B-26s from Puerto Cabezas struck hard at Castro's forces and the B-26s, the Barbara J. and the three LCUs unloaded the vital supplies at Giron.

The military order went out. It clattered over the teletype machine in the small operation room at Puerto Cabezas: "On D+2 (Wednesday) from 0630 to 0730 the sky will be clear." The jet air cover request was granted.

His decision made, and the orders given, Kennedy walked alone into the White House garden.

Round Clock Flying

Since Sunday night, the Cuban pilots manning the Brigade's B-26 bombers had been flying round the clock on what had become virtual suicide missions. Nine of the original force of 16 had been shot down.

(The President, acting partially on false reports that the first air strike on Saturday morning, April 14, had virtually destroyed Castro's air force, had canceled a second strike which was to have coincided with the invasion on Monday morning. As a result, Castro's planes had sunk two ships and sent the remaining vessels to headlong flight.)

Now that the Cuban B-26s

plane dived, strafed the position with machine guns, turned, made a second pass, and dropped two napalm bombs. After a tremendous explosion, there was deep silence.

Makes It Home

Herrer headed toward the sea but was attacked and hit. With one engine out and 37 hits in his fuselage, he skimmed low over the water all the way back to Nicaragua and landed safely at Puerto Cabezas. His was the last shot fired by the Brigade air force. Since their mission was to provide an "umbrella" for the Brigade B-26 bombers, after the bombers were shot down the American jets never left the Essex. Without the protective air cover, the supply ships did not hazard the unloading at dawn. And no more bombing missions were scheduled.

(The American pilots who died were Riley W. Shamburger, jr., Wade C. Gray, Thomas W. Ray and Lee F. Baker. The crash-landing of one plane led to various accounts. From civilians who lived in the area came a story that one of the Americans ran from the plane with a pistol and fought a fierce but brief battle with militia until he was shot to death. The other American, either wounded or dead when the plane landed, remained inside and was also shot.

(The accounts cannot be verified, but it is interesting that Castro, so quick in every other instance to prove and gloat over American involvement, however slight, never mentioned the death of the Americans. That story was not made public until March 3, 1963, and then only in the United States press. President Kennedy later acknowledged, at a news conference, that the men died in the service of their country. He did not say how they died or for whom they were working.)

On Tuesday, six B-26s, freed from the restrictions imposed by President Kennedy's cancellation of the Monday strike, had made the long flight from Nicaragua, carrying full bomb loads to be dropped on the Cuban airfield at San Antonio de los Baños. Fate, destiny, an act of God or simply bad luck intruded; for the target was covered by heavy haze and thick, low-lying clouds. The mission "aborted." Castro's small air force was still intact—and still able to range at will over the brigade.

The disordered flight of the invasion fleet from Castro's planes on the first day of the invasion had brought on one of the bitterest moments of the invasion for Pepe San Roman, the young commander of the Brigade.

"The night (of the first day) came and we were expecting the ships," Pepe said. "Everyone turned their faces to the sea waiting for the ships. We knew that without the ships we could not make it."

What Pepe did not know was that the ships had scattered

you sort of a bitch? Where the hell have you been? You have abandoned us."

Commander: "I know that you have your problems, but I've had mine."

Then Gray, the American frogman, came on the air and said: "Hello, Pepe, I want you to know that we will never abandon you, and if things are very rough there we will go in and evacuate you."

'Will Fight to End'

Pepe's exact words, both as written down and as recorded on tape at that time, were: "I will not be evacuated. We will fight to the end here if we have to."

Gray asked what Pepe needed and Pepe replied, "Weapons, bullets, communications, medicine and food." He elaborated and specified the kind of ammunition and supplies most urgently needed.

Gray said, "We will get you all those things tonight. We will go in tonight."

"That's what you said yesterday and you didn't come," Pepe said.

But this time, Gray answered, they were coming for sure. In the next sentence Gray uttered the words that Pepe cannot forget: "Jets are coming." Gray said six jets and several B-26s would be arriving within two hours to support the Brigade; and before the ships returned that night, C-54s would drop supplies. Gray warned that the jets would not bear any United States insignia or identifying marks and he cautioned the Cubans not to fire at them by mistake.

Pepe turned to the men around him and gave the good news. "Now we will hit them!"

From Pepe's conversation with Gray stems the controversy over the use of United States air power in the Bay of Pigs invasion. Since Pepe immediately informed his battalion commanders that jets were coming and ordered them to place panels to mark the front lines for the planes, everyone in the Brigade soon learned the news. Many soldiers mistakenly interpreted that promise for an even greater commitment and assumed — understandably, but incorrectly — that the United States had pledged its air power from the beginning.

In time it came to be accepted as fact that the United States had withheld its power and reneged on its promises. In fact, there is no way of determining by what authority Gray made such a promise: the highest authority holds that it did not come from Washington.

When Pepe turned from the radio, Oliva got in a jeep with Manuel Penabaz and returned to where the Second Battalion was resting. Along the way they talked about the fighting and the jets that were coming. Oliva told his men the good news. They cheered, "I told them to rest because maybe that afternoon we would go back to fight."

(Castro's troops kept up a

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Blast, Then Smoke

Neither at San Blas nor at Giron did any one see the planes fire. But to the west, on the road to Playa Larga, immediately after the jets flew over there was an explosion about five miles ahead and black smoke rose into the air. "I don't know if they did that or some of our B-26s did it," Williams said, "but I saw the explosion and the big smoke and in fact I got up in a tree to find out what happened." He was unable to see far enough. Castro has stated that on Tuesday afternoon United States jets, flying from a great height, attacked a column advancing from Playa Larga and caused "a lot of casualties."

Whether the American planes attacked or not, Pepe's information was that they did not. He immediately took the radio again and told Gray the jets did not support them. Gray replied, "The planes are there to give you support against enemy aircraft. They are not going to give you land support."

Pepe exploded. "How in hell are we going to get land support? We have nothing to fight with on the ground."

While he was talking a messenger arrived, giving exact coordinates of a large enemy concentration. Pepe gave the exact position to Gray. "And then Gray came on the radio and said that the planes were overhead at that moment. I don't remember how many C-54s, how many C-46s, how many B-26s, how many F-51s. Lots of planes, about 20 all together. They were coming to us, some loaded with ammunition and supplies, and the others carrying bombs."

"Two years later," Pepe said "I am still waiting for them." Throughout the afternoon planes swept over Giron—but they were Castro's. Then, at 6 o'clock, artillery began to hit the small town and on the east and west advance guards of Castro's troops began to engage the Brigade.

At San Blas, where the enemy was attacking heavily, only two tanks and acts of individual heroism saved the Brigade from annihilation. The perimeter was narrowing and the pressure was expanding.

Without supplies, it was only a matter of time before the end came.

Tomorrow: Every Man for Himself.

Adapted from the book, "The Bay of Pigs," with the permission of W. W. Norton & Co., publishers. Copyright 1964, by Harvey Johnson.

The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 15: The Summing Up

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

The heartbreak at seeing their country crushed under Communist rule, their training and tense preparations to try and free the land, the bloody nightmare of the battle, the months in dismal prisons near starvation—all were over now for the men of Brigade 2506. Now would come the hollow task of mulling over defeat and trying to find out who or what to blame. Here is the last of the 15 chapters excerpted from "The Bay of Pigs."

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, Jose Perez, San Roman, Erneldo Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams.)

When the battle was over, what Churchill calls the "terrible ifs" began to accumulate.

If the underground had been alerted in time and had launched a major sabotage campaign (instead of not being informed about the invasion until after Castro had rounded up thousands of suspects);

If Nino Diaz had landed and fought his diversionary action in Oriente (instead of failing in his mission two nights in a row);

If the second bombing raid on Monday had not been canceled (by President Kennedy, partly on the basis of false reports that the B-26s had virtually destroyed Castro's air force on Saturday);

If the landing area had been explored and charted in advance (disclosing coral reefs and waiting Castro troops instead of a deserted, isolated area);

If military landing craft had been used instead of boats with outboard motors (many of which failed to work);

The Damaging Jets

If the military experts had recognized how damaging an unopposed T-33 jet trainer could be when armed with rockets (two ships were sunk by such planes);

If fighter planes had accompanied the B-26s;

If the Brigade had been trained to take alternative action as guerrillas;

If the landing area had been adaptable for guerrilla action;

If President Kennedy had not publicly stated that the United States would not intervene;

If clouds had not obscured the target over Castro's air base (when the invaders' B-26s arrived Tuesday morning);

If the B-26s had not arrived an hour early on Wednesday morning (before planes from the United States carrier Essex, finally ordered to provide protective cover, could take off);

If so vast a majority of the mandatory supplies had not been loaded on the Houston (a supply ship sunk by Castro's air force on the first morning of the invasion);

If the ships had succeeded in unloading the supplies;

If the convoy had not fled so far and had been in time to land help (American destroyers came rushing in at the last moment but turned away);

And the final, tantalizing "if"—if all these had taken place, would the brigade have won?

At the moment of defeat, there were no answers—only questions. President Kennedy, appearing grim and rather determined, addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington on the day after the final rout at the Bay of Pigs, when the invaders were still being hunted in the Zapata swamps.

There were useful lessons for all to learn from "this sobering episode," he said. "We intend to profit from this lesson."

He closed dramatically, "Let me then make clear as the President of the United States that I am determined upon our system's survival and success, regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril."

The eloquent words and the fighting stance did not alter the embittering fact that the Bay of Pigs had been a devastating defeat for the United States.


And for Mr. Kennedy, who hated to lose even more than most, it also was a deep personal defeat. As the President remarked ruefully to reporters later, "There is an old saying that victory has 100 fathers and defeat is an orphan." The orphan was on his doorstep.

On April 23, the President appointed his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to head a committee to find out what happened at the Bay of Pigs. Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, were the other members of the committee.

They began working immediately, going back into the documents in existence and talking to the men who had planned the operation. It was an investigation of far-reaching significance, and it came at a time when United States prestige had dropped to its lowest point in the Cold War era.

It has never been reported to whom the committee talked or what its finds were; everything was conducted in secrecy. The investigation was not a means to develop political careers. Also, there was no attempt to find a convenient scapegoat, for the President had stated firmly, both publicly and privately, that he assumed full responsibility for the invasion.

That something was seriously wrong, and that the Nation's very survival might depend on uncovering and correcting



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weaknesses, was apparent to everyone involved. Yet from the outset the investigation was handicapped by one crucial lack: few of the invaders were available, and none of the top leaders.

'Damaging to All'

(When Gen. Taylor was called before a congressional committee in executive session, he pleaded executive privilege in refusing to disclose his findings. They would only divide the country, arouse controversy, and "be damaging to all parties concerned.")

Roberto San Roman, brother of Pepe San Roman, the Brigade commander, and four other Brigade members who had escaped capture were called before the special committee. In Washington, they met "Frank," one of the CIA agents who had trained them at the mountain base in Guatemala. Frank was "very mad" about what had happened.

"He said he had gone before the committee already and that it had been rough," said San Roman. "He told me this would be my only chance and that I should say everything—feel free to talk and to ask. And that is exactly what I did!"

The five Cubans were taken to the Pentagon, where Gen. Taylor and Robert Kennedy were leading the questioning. Behind the two was a large map with the area of operations at the Bay of Pigs.

"They wanted to know," Roberto said, "the reaction of the enemy, how soon they reacted with tanks and artillery. How much did they fire and how much did we fire? How many did we kill and how many men of ours died? The reaction of the population—and this was a question of Mr. Kennedy—he wanted to know the reaction of the people.

"They wanted to know if we thought we could have won the battle. What did we need to win the battle? I told them we needed only three or four jet planes, that's what we needed to win. Three or four jet planes that could knock out the little air force that Castro had at that time. I told them I didn't know how they could do this to us. Our troops were so good—because they involved people from every class, rich and poor, rebels, and soldiers and everybody together against the common enemy—and they didn't answer those questions."

It was Robert Kennedy, Roberto said, who asked what had been promised the Cubans in the way of American support.

"I said that we were never told by any uniformed man of the United States armed forces that we would have this battalion or this air force squadron supporting us but that during the briefing, as in the training, they let us to believe things."

Roberto spoke at length about what Frank had said to them and how "we thought if we needed air fire support, we would have it." When he first mentioned Frank, Gen. Taylor asked, "Who is this Frank?" and Allen Dulles said, "Col. Frank—."

For several hours Roberto told his story, and by the time he was finished a number of colored pins had been placed on the big map, indicating the combat lines.

The other Cubans were called in one by one, but for much briefer periods of time. When Blas Casares, a frogman who had been on the flagship Bagar, was questioned, the committee seemed particularly interested in the Cuban fleet.

"They asked me if ships had gone back any time," Blas said. "Apparently that had been worrying them. And I told them that we had started going back to resupply the people on the beach when they said they didn't have any ammunition. We did start back, of course, and in one of our messages that we sent we asked for support, for the Santiago and the Tampico (code names for American destroyers) to escort us, because if they didn't we believed we would lose all our ships. But we turned back when they (the Americans) gave us the order to turn back. They (the committee) were very interested in that.

"At the end," Casares said, "they asked me if I wanted to say anything of my own, and at that moment I felt very bitter, and I told them I didn't know who planned the invasion, but whoever planned it, I believed he was crazy. They laughed a little bit, all except Dulles. He just looked right through me. That is the only way I can describe it."

From the Cubans and from the Americans who had been off the scene, the committee quickly determined that Brigade 2506 had fought with extraordinary courage under extremely difficult conditions. Yet the very courage and determination of the men tended to obscure some more basic aspects of the invasion. The deeper the committee delved, the more apparent it became that the entire operation had been poorly planned.

Two of the most glaring miscalculations concerned Castro's air and ground forces. Castro's army was far stronger and fought more fiercely than anyone had anticipated. Consequently, the Brigade would have needed many more men—perhaps 10,000, perhaps 20,000—to accomplish its mission. Added to this was the erroneous belief that the Brigade B-26s would control the air and enable the men to operate at will on the ground.

Obvious Miscalculation

Another miscalculation was obvious: There had been no uprising, no mass defections from Castro's forces. And the CIA's alternative plan for the Brigade had not been employed.

None of the Cubans knew anything about an alternative plan. It was discovered that the plan had not been given them at their briefing in Puerto Cabezas. At the time of the investigation in May of 1961, the CIA contended that Pepe and Oliva had been told privately by Frank about the guerrilla option just before the ships left. Since Pepe and Oliva were then in prison, the committee had no way of establishing the real facts in the case. Examination did show that the CIA had shied away from any talk of guerrilla warfare or alternative action because it might weaken the resolve of the Cubans to keep fighting.

In any event, the committee's investigation led to a further

conclusion: That even if the Cubans had been given an alternative plan and even if they had been trained as guerrillas, as the CIA claimed before the invasion, the invasion site itself was totally unsuited to guerrilla warfare. It was completely unrealistic, given the terrain of the Zapata Swamps, to think the Brigade could have reached the Escambray Mountains 80 miles away. Yet, from the beginning, that guerrilla alternative and the escape valve in the Escambray had been a key element in the planning, and of great influence in the President's decision to approve the invasion.

Upon closer scrutiny, other aspects of the planning that once had seemed so plausible were seen to be faulty. An operation that had started out as a clandestine covert action had changed drastically to a full-fledged overt military campaign. This was such a basic change in concept, that if it were to succeed, the entire plan would have had to have been altered.

Launching an invasion is quite different from putting ashore some guerrillas in the middle of the night. The military plans, nevertheless, remained the same. Incredible as it seemed in retrospect, no one appeared to have recognized the implications of this change in operations.

There were other serious handicaps: messages from the fighting zone at the Bay of Pigs took too long to reach the top level at Washington, the ships provided for the invasion were inadequate, the number of planes was inadequate, the Bay of Pigs itself was inadequate.

How was it possible that such

a plan could have been approved by the leading military minds of the country? How was it possible that some of the most intelligent men in the executive department failed to spot and counsel against such obvious shortcomings? The implications were grave.

Everywhere President Kennedy turned he could find those responsible: the military had failed; his own advisers had failed and he himself had failed, after only 90 days in office.

Throughout the entire planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion there had been an air of unreality, of vagueness, of unjustified confidence. The desire to conceal the fact of United States support led to a number of compromises: the landing at night, the canceling of the second air strike on Monday, the reluctance to act decisively when disaster approached and an apparent refusal to recognize how disastrous a defeat would be—not only to the cause of Cuban freedom and democracy in the hemisphere, but to the United States and its role as the leader of the West.

The Bay of Pigs has been surrounded by so much partisan controversy that a number of assumptions have come to be accepted as fact by otherwise responsible citizens. Depending on the point of view, the failure has been attributed to leftwingers in the State Department, to the young professional amateurs in the White House, to a weak President, to the CIA or to the military.

Sometimes a more sinister explanation for the failure is given: "someone" wanted the Cubans to fail and deliberately scuttled a good plan with a good chance of success. This

assumption is equally spurious for, if anything, the Bay of Pigs was a classic tragedy of good intentions.

Where Blame Rests

No one wanted the invasion to fail but fail it did. The fault was shared by all who had a hand in it, but principally and finally the blame must rest with the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA, by its nature, remains in the shadows: it lends itself to the role of the villain, however frayed the cloak and however bent the dagger. Even this is not a fair generalization: the CIA has brilliant, dedicated men and women who perform thankless and dangerous jobs throughout the world that help to safeguard the United States and the free world. It is a cliché of the agency that its successes never got reported and its U-2 flights and Bay of Pigs invasions become causes celebres.

The CIA is necessary to the survival of the United States and it will remain necessary for as long a time as can be anticipated. Acknowledging these as truths, however, does not make the CIA sacrosanct, or does it relieve the agency of its responsibilities or hide the dangers that are inherent in such an organization.

The gathering of intelligence, with all that is implied in that general term, is the lifeblood of the agency. However, in the Cuban invasion the CIA went far beyond this function. The CIA's men in the field tended to take matters into their own hands, to cross over the line from intelligence gathering to the formation of policy.

They did this in Miami when

they picked and groomed men and then dictated of the Frente. They acted for the United States—or implied that they were—when dealing with the Cubans and led them to believe much that was not true. Later there was no way for the Cubans to prove they had been promised anything. In the American terminology, they were left holding the bag.

In Guatemala, the CIA—or at least its agents—was acting at times contrary to established United States policies and even contrary to the wishes of the President. The agents came dangerously close to taking things into their own hands. When Frank told the Cuban leaders to proceed with the invasion, even if orders came from Washington to stop it, he was exhibiting, at its most extreme, the potential threat of a powerful organization with virtually unlimited funds, accountable for its actions only to a few, and operating beyond established guidelines in sensitive areas throughout the world.

Understandably, the CIA would like to bury its Cuban past and conceal its shape in the cloak of "national interests" or "national security." This writer will not soon forget traveling through the Sierra Madre Mountains in Guatemala in the summer of 1963 with one of the leaders of Brigade 2506 in search of Base Trax. High above the Helvetia plantation, in sight of the volcano, with the sound of River Nil far below, we reached a place where the road should have been. It had vanished.

Eventually, from fearful Indian peasants in those mountains and later from Cubans who were the last to leave the

camp, the story came out. Two weeks after the invasion, all of the records at the camp were placed into a freshly dug hole and a bulldozer covered the hole with earth. Soon after that, Guatemalan soldiers and laborers came. They broke up the camp and carried away every vestige—including the cement foundations for the barracks. Then the road itself was bulldozed and covered. Now the jungle has taken over and all that one might find to link that territory with the Bay of Pigs is a stray shell or perhaps a rusting can.

Despite attempts to cover the facts, the Bay of Pigs remains an ominous page in our history.

It was more than a mock-heroic tragedy, a footnote to history. It was perhaps the most heavily publicized of the many bungled, poorly planned operations since the Light Brigade charged into oblivion at Balaklava.

It seems clear now that the disaster in the Zapata Swamps led almost inevitably to the confrontation with Russia. From a period of seeming indecision, inexperience, weakness and defeat, the United States, in October of 1962, drew an essential lesson.


It is seven years since another small band of freedom fighters was crushed and the light went out in Hungary. Today, in their moments of despair and bitterness, the Cuban exiles often refer to what their future holds, but they are determined they are not going to live a lifetime in exile, in the manner of the White Russians and the Hungarians. Each is waiting to return to Cuba.

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 Belmont ✓
 Mohr ✓
 Casper ✓
 Callahan _____
 Conrad ✓
 DeLoach ✓
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 Gale _____
 Rosen ✓
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The Bay of Pigs--

Chapter 14: A Bittersweet

Reunion Party



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The bargaining with Fidel Castro for the lives of the more than 1,000 men of Brigade 2506 held in Cuba prisons was bogging down. On the advice of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Enrique Ruiz-Williams contacted James B. Donovan, New York lawyer. Mr. Donovan agreed to help. Under his impetus, and with major co-operation of the United States Government, negotiations moved forward. On Sunday, December 23, the initial shipment of ransom drugs was accepted by Castro and, as the sun was setting, the first plane carrying 108 of the haggard survivors of Brigade 2506 landed at Homestead Air Force Base, Fla.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artimo, José Pérez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams.)

On a Saturday morning at the end of November, 1962, an operation was launched without precedent in American history—an operation in which the United States Government threw its power and its prestige into raising millions of dollars to ransom 1,100 prisoners from a foreign nation.

The negotiations with Fidel Castro, begun in April, had been dormant since the October missile crisis. James B. Donovan, the man who had arranged the exchange of Soviet spy Rudolph Abel for U-2 pilot Gary Powers, had continued to explore the possibility of obtaining contributions of more than \$50 million worth of drugs, chemicals and baby food demanded by Castro.

But little progress had been made. According to reports from Cuba, many of the prisoners, after 19 months in dungeons, were near death. It was at this point that Attorney General Kennedy, with the full knowledge and backing of the President, began using his powers to accelerate the pace of the negotiations.

Mr. Kennedy on November 30 had lunch with Louis E. Oberdorfer, the assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department tax division. The Attorney General stressed the importance the administration attached to the prisoner exchange. The goal was to liberate the prisoners by Christmas. "Lean on it," Mr. Kennedy said. Oberdorfer, quiet, tough-minded and efficient, worked full time thereafter to coordinate all activities.

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- New York Herald Tribune _____
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- The New Leader _____
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For the first time, it was suggested that drug manufacturers could make direct contributions in goods with assurance that these contributions would be considered as tax-deductible gifts. The drug companies would have to work together and they wanted assurance that they would not be subsequently accused of anti-trust action. Nor should they be required to disclose their cost and markup data, they noted, in order to secure tax deductions.

The entire board of directors of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association would meet in New York December 11. That date immediately became a target for the formulation and presentation of the final plan to the manufacturers. Internal revenue and Justice Department officials worked intensively on their tax and antitrust rulings.

It became apparent that the Cuban Families Committee did not have an administrative organization to carry through such a large endeavor. John Wilson, executive vice-president of the American Red Cross, agreed to co-ordinate the transportation of the goods to Miami and then to Cuba. The Red Cross was, in effect, pledging to stand behind a payment on \$53 millions.

On December 7, Robert Kennedy met with the top officials of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. He told them that the prisoners, in their attempt to liberate their country, had been assisted by United States personnel and supplies; that the plans had been initiated in the Eisenhower administration and continued in the present one; that the Kennedy administration felt a moral obligation to assist the men.

On December 11, the board of directors of the Pharmaceutical Association were presented with a ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue permitting them to deduct contributions of merchandise at a value measured by the lowest wholesale catalog price at which the products were customarily sold. They also were guaranteed that no antitrust action would be taken.

The list of drugs requested by Castro, now 237 pages long, typed and single-spaced, was submitted. It contained 10,000 items, specified by brand name and manufacturer. Only co-ordinated action of the entire drug industry could meet these requirements.

If the newspaper strike, then under way in New York, secrecy could be preserved. Less than nine days later, the 40 manufacturers represented at the meeting had put together a \$12 million drug shipment.

Because of the high markup for drugs, it was possible for some manufacturers to realize a "windfall", the tax benefit realized by a corporate contributor (amounting to 52 per cent of the wholesale price) might exceed the actual cost of

the product. The government suggested that such profits be contributed to charity. The decision, of course, was left to the individual companies.

As problems arose, the government and the lawyers solved them. In two hours the Civil Aeronautics Board handed down a ruling permitting airlines to donate their planes to haul prisoners and freight. The railroads and the truckers received a similar ruling from the Interstate Commerce Commission. Immigration and Naturalization officials conferred with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the CIA and the Air Force to coordinate the reception and processing of the prisoners. The Commerce Department issued export licenses for the shipment of merchandise.

The Last Hurdle

The last hurdle before the negotiations could resume was to meet Castro's demand for an "irrevocable" letter of credit to guarantee all the shipments. Fidel wanted cash backing so that if any part of the deal fell through, the remainder of the ransom would be paid in dollars.

The Royal Bank of Canada insisted on formal guarantees from American banks. Three things were needed: A commitment of \$53 million from an American bank or banks to the Canadian bank on the application of the Red Cross; a commitment from the Red Cross to be bound by such a letter of credit; and a surety bond from an accepted insurance company, which would guarantee to the American banks that the Red Cross would meet its obligations.

By Monday, two \$26.5 million letters of credit had been obtained from the Bank of America and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York. Bonds were issued on behalf of the

Red Cross by Continental Insurance Company, thus securing the deal. Mr. Donovan was attorney for Continental.

The supplies were piling up at various locations but no action had been taken to move them to Florida. On December 16, Mr. Oberdorfer gave the order for the first shipment of drugs to be transported to Florida and loaded at Ft. Everglades on the S. S. African Pilot, a freighter made available by the Committee of American Steamship Lines.

All that remained was Castro's acceptance of terms. On December 18, Mr. Donovan flew to Havana. Castro was suspicious about the value and size of the first shipment, containing 20 per cent of the ransom.

Mr. Donovan suggested that Castro send his own inspectors to examine what was being loaded on the African Pilot. He called Washington and permission was given for the Cuban technicians to enter the United States and inspect the goods. Their trip, however, was not to be made public.

Pivotal Day

Friday, December 21, was the pivotal day. Just before noon, the vital letter of credit from the Royal Bank of Canada was issued formally and delivered to the Cuban purchasing agent in Havana. It was immediately confirmed by Castro's government.

Mr. Donovan reported to Washington that he and Castro had signed the memorandum of agreement. He felt it vital to give some added proof of America's good faith. The down payment was "sweetened" by about \$500,000 worth of prime goods.

That night, Enrique Ruiz-Williams received a call in Miami from the Attorney General.

"You got it, Enrique," Mr. Kennedy told him. "This is it. The guy with the beard has accepted. Now what you've got to do is move fast."

In Cuba, Castro, bringing a bottle of Scotch, staged an impromptu celebration with Mr. Donovan and others. It was a moment of good will and they talked at length about communism, democracy and Catholicism.

In Miami at the Opa-Locka Airport where the goods were pouring in, one incident that day exemplified the determination of those behind the operation. Mr. Oberdorfer wanted some supplies of a better quality loaded on an Air Force plane for the first shipment. The plane would have to be unloaded and packed again. The Air Force colonel in charge objected, saying he had neither the manpower nor the time.

Mr. Oberdorfer, quietly but firmly, said, "Colonel, do you want to order these men to load that plane, or do you want the Secretary of the Air Force to order it?"

Donovan's Humor

Sunday morning, December 23, the prisoners in Principe Castle and on the Isle of Pines were taken from their cells, shaved and given haircuts, shoes and fresh uniforms. They still feared another cruel hoax.

They were transported to the San Antonio de los Baños airfield in Havana province. The airport was alive with activity. Castro militiamen were everywhere, all carrying loaded weapons.

No matter how strained the situation, Mr. Donovan's sense of humor never left him. Perhaps that was the quality that Castro admired most—or, at least, Castro certainly appreciated it. Once that afternoon while Castro, Mr. Donovan and a large group were standing together on the air strip, four MIG jets unexpectedly roared low over the field, making a deafening sound. Instinctively, everyone ducked. One of the Cubans shouted, "What is it?" and Mr. Donovan, still in a crouch, instantly replied, "It's the invasion." Fidel laughed uproariously.

At 2 o'clock, the African Pilot from Miami docked and a tense waiting period began. At 5 p.m. Mr. Donovan gave the signal for the ship to be unloaded. Castro had been waiting for the other to make the first move. The prisoners were permitted to begin boarding the first plane. It took off with 108 men.

At exactly 6:06 p.m., as the brilliant winter sun was setting, the first plane landed at Homestead Air Force Base and taxied slowly toward a ramp while fire trucks and ambulances followed. A Cuban woman clutched at her throat, screamed, "My God, they're really here," and fainted. An Air Force lieutenant colonel announced that the second plane was already on its way. A cheer went up from the large crowd of newsmen and television

technicians and Red Cross and Immigration officials. It was dark by the time the plane stopped and the engines were cut off. Spotlights played about the field. One by one the men came out.

By 8:55 p.m., the fourth flight had landed at Homestead, bringing the number of prisoners liberated to 426. Then it was announced that no more planes would arrive that night.

Castro brought up the old debt. He said he still had not received the \$2,925,000 that the Cuban Families Committee had pledged to pay in April when the 60 wounded prisoners came out. It was a cash debt and the committee was clearly obliged to pay it.

So far, no cash payments had been made to Castro and there was hope that Mr. Donovan might be able to perform another miracle and persuade Castro to accept more goods in place of dollars. But Castro insisted that money had to be raised—and raised immediately. He was specific—no cash, no more prisoners.

John E. Nolan, Jr., (an attorney recruited for volunteer services in the ransom drive), flew from Havana to Miami that night and at 5 a.m. called the Attorney General.

The money had to be raised by 3 p.m. December 24 or the deal was off. Bob Kennedy took over. With one phone call to Cardinal Cushing in Boston, Mr. Kennedy raised a million dollars. The Cardinal, one of the sponsors of the Families Committee, long before had promised that when the time came he would do as much as anyone for the prisoners. Bob Kennedy

then called General Lucius Clay, also a sponsor.

Castro permitted two more planes to leave Havana in the morning, bringing the number of men liberated to 643.

Hours passed and the 3 p.m. deadline approached. The problem of raising such a sum was formidable enough, but, to make things even more difficult, the banks closed at noon the day before Christmas.

Gen. Clay borrowed money against future pledges and signed a note on his own signature. The note was deposited in the Royal Bank of Canada, just before noon, but it took several more hours to obtain the necessary documents from banks in New York, Washington and Montreal. At almost 3 o'clock the Royal Bank notified Havana that the \$2.9 million could be released on written authorization from Mr. Donovan. Castro, Mr. Donovan and Mr. Nolan met in the Canadian Consul's office where the final document was signed.

At the airport the last three planes received the signal to leave and the leaders of the Brigade were put on board.

The last plane landed at Miami at 9:35 p.m. Christmas Eve. Pepe San Roman, the young Brigade commander, was asked to leave first so that members of the Brigade could salute him. Erneido Oliva, second in command, and Manuel Artime, civilian commander of the invasion, followed.

In the Dinner Key auditorium, their families awaited them, together with escaped members of the Brigade and other left behind in Guatemala.

"I saw my mother and then

my wife," said San Roman, "and I ran to them but the crowd wouldn't let me get to them. The same thing happened to Erneido and Manolo. Finally I got to them and I almost killed my mother and my wife and my kids with the embraces I gave them. It was a very great moment because I never thought I would see them again. And then they came and took us, Erneido and Manolo and myself, to the microphones, and Manolo spoke for us and I don't remember what he said because I was just crazy with happiness. And when he finished we were taken on the shoulders of our men and they walked around with us until I had a chance to get down and I went back to my family."

Two days after Christmas, the leaders drove to Palm Beach where President Kennedy had invited them. He told them he was sorry for what had happened at the Bay of Pigs. He asked if they really had expected jet air support.

San Roman said they had not been told at the briefings that they would have jets but because of the way things were handled and the obvious backing of the United States, "naturally we expected it because we had been told the sky would be ours and we knew the B-26s were not enough." The President looked serious. "It was very easy to see," Oliva said, "that he felt responsible for what had happened to us and for our long time in prison."

On Saturday, December 29, the President inspected the Brigade in the Orange Bowl in Miami. He was presented with the Brigade flag which had

flown over the command post during the three days that the Bay of Pigs battle was waged.

There never had been a ceremony quite like it. A deafening roar went up from the thousands in the stadium when the white convertible carrying the President and his wife, Jacqueline, entered the Orange Bowl. A thousand flags many of them homemade, waved in the warm Miami sunshine.

"We know how precious liberty is and we know that Cuba has no liberty," San Roman told the great crowd. "The 2506 Brigade, we offer ourselves to God and to the free world as warriors in the battle against communism."

He turned to the President. "Mr. President, the men of the 2506 Brigade give you their banner—we temporarily deposit it with you for your safekeeping."

"I can assure you," said the President, in return, his voice rising emotionally, "that this flag will be returned to this Brigade in a free Havana."

The Brigade rose and cheered wildly. Shouts of "Guerra! Guerra!" and "Libertad! Libertad!" came from 40,000 throats. Some men wept.

"I can assure you," the President continued, "that it is the strongest wish of the people of this country, as well as the people of this hemisphere, that Cuba shall one day be free again and when it is, this Bri-

gade will deserve to march at the head of the free column."

Jacqueline Kennedy stopped to the microphone and, in Spanish, said:

"It is an honor for me to be today with a group of the bravest men in the world. I feel proud that my son has met the officers . . . It is my wish and my hope that some day he may be a man at least half as brave as the members of Brigade 2506. Good luck."

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

The Bay of Pigs--

Chapter 13: Bargaining

for Life Begins

The burden of responsibility for the 1,179 Cubans captured by Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs hung around the neck of the United States—put there by a series of miscalculations in organizing and training the liberation army. Here, in today's installment, is a step-by-step account of how the administration reacted to Castro's demands for a \$62 million ransom.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, José Pérez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

James Britt Donovan had been involved in mysterious affairs since youth. He became a public figure in 1957 when appointed by a New York court to defend Rudolph Abel, indicted as chief of Soviet espionage in the United States.

Later, in 1962, he was the man chosen by the United States government to negotiate the exchange in West Berlin between Abel and U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers.

Fresh out of Harvard law school in the early 40s, he had worked under Dr. Vannevar Bush with the United States Office of Scientific Research and Development, the agency that developed the atom bomb and


radar. After being commissioned in the Navy, he served through World War II as general counsel of the Office of Strategic Services which preceded the Central Intelligence Agency. He assisted in the prosecution at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. Later, he became an eminently successful insurance lawyer representing a string of important and profitable clients.

Tough, Gregarious

Obviously, Jim Donovan's credentials suited him for the mission the Cuban families committee asked him to undertake—the raising of \$62 million in ransom to free 1,179 members of the Cuban brigade who were captured at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961.

Donovan's most important asset was his versatility. He could be gregarious, relaxed and disarming in his conversation. He could also be tough and blunt and discuss realities of politics, domestic and international, with the coldest clarity. Donovan, in short, was a

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- The New Leader _____
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- The National Observer _____
- People's World _____
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Three men who were vital to the liberation effort: (left to right), Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Enrique Ruiz-Williams and James B. Donovan.

complex, shrewd, ambitious and fascinating person—and so was the man he had to deal with, Fidel Castro.

The committee had an impressive sponsorship — prominent men and women representing the arts, industry, education, labor and religion and its efforts had reaped wide publicity. But the ransom goal remained distant.

Fidel Castro had startled everyone with a sudden offer to prove his good faith: he would release 60 of the most seriously wounded prisoners and let them go back to the United States; when the committee had collected the ransom for these wounded men (\$2,925,000), it should deposit the money in the Royal Bank of Canada.

On April 14, 1962, exactly one year after the Cubans had sailed from Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, to begin the invasion, Castro kept his pledge. The wounded were flown to

Miami International airport to be greeted by 20,000 singing the Cuban national anthem. The scene was witnessed by millions of Americans watching on television.

Since that time, in the charge of Enrique Ruiz-Williams, who had received 70 shrapnel wounds in the engagement, they had appeared at more than one hundred luncheons; had held conferences in a number of cities; had met with governors, politicians and well-known public figures; had appeared on radio and television and been the subject of articles in the daily press and national magazines.

Donovan Selected

But not enough money had been collected to ransom even one of the 60 wounded prisoners, to say nothing of the men in Cuban prisons.

On June 19, Williams had told

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy of the difficulties. He said the committee needed a prominent American citizen to serve as chairman. But no one wanted the job.

"Enrique," Kennedy said, "you don't need a chairman. You can get a chairman under any rock in the trail. What you need is a man who knows how to deal with Castro. You need someone who can represent you. I think I know a lawyer who might help."

"Who is he?" Enrique asked. "Donovan."

Williams flew to New York and reported to committee members. Donovan gave them an immediate interview. They found him a stocky man of medium height, with white hair, pale blue eyes, a ruddy complexion and an extraordinarily prominent forehead.

After two hours of discussion, Donovan agreed to represent the committee without fee. He

said he would have to study Castro's personality intensively.

President Kennedy endorsed the committee's efforts at a press conference. A lengthy memorandum went to Mrs. Berta Barreto (mother of one of the prisoners), the committee's liaison in Havana, for transmission to Castro. Its key item was a five-page letter from Donovan to Mrs. Barreto, intended for Castro's eyes.

"It is my personal opinion," Donovan wrote, "that in his heart Fidel Castro is proud of his fellow-Cubans now imprisoned for their participation in the invasion of April 17, 1961. Fidel is a Cuban before he is a Marxist and he must have pride that fellow Cubans—however misguided or misled he may believe them to be—would risk their lives for what they thought to be in the best interests of Cuba. If reasonable conditions can be brought about, in the interests of the Cuban people, I believe he will carry out his pledge with respect to these fellow-Cubans and demonstrate not only to Latin America but to the world that he wishes to be regarded as the compassionate leader of all the Cuban people. It is in this belief that I have agreed to assist your cause toward a prompt accomplishment of its objectives."

Meeting With Castro

The next move was up to Castro. There was the question of whether Donovan had judged Fidel's personality correctly.

On August 30, Donovan boarded a plane for Havana. The next afternoon, he had his first interview with Castro.

Donovan, who does not speak Spanish, had asked Alvaro Sanchez to be his translator. He had instructed Sanchez to translate literally every word that was said, neither adding nor deleting nor interpreting. From the beginning Donovan was the sole negotiator with Castro. The members of the Families Committee, all of whom had relatives in prison, had asked him to make the decisions for them, fearing that their emotions might influence their judgment.

In addition to this responsibility, Donovan began the negotiations under a singular handicap: he was not a posi-

tion to offer cash. The Cuban tribunal had imposed a ransom sentence of \$62 million in cash, and Castro had made it clear to the Families Committee earlier that he intended to get just that: he wanted Yankee dollars. For practical and political reasons, however, the Kennedy administration would have no part of a deal in which cash was paid to Castro. (There is even some indication that the CIA had pledged to certain Senators that no American dollars would be sent to Castro.) Even if the administration had approved the ransom in cash, it is mostly unlikely that such a sum could have been raised—either through public or private subscription. Donovan had to get Castro to agree to accept the ransom in some other form.

List Approved

At the outset, Donovan conceded that the transaction would be an indemnification—something that previous American negotiators had refused to admit. He won from Castro a promise to consider payment of the indemnification in food products and medicines. It was not victory but it was a great step forward.

The next day, at another meeting, Castro was cordial, ordering coffee and lemonade, and talking expansively of education and real estate; he and Donovan exchanged pleasantries and seemed to enjoy each other's company. Then Castro got down to business. His government, he said, had approved the basic proposals of the day before, including acceptance of food products and medicines as ransom. Using the world market as a basis for prices, the Minister of Health and Welfare and the Minister of Commerce would prepare a list of products most necessary to the Cuban people and submit it to Donovan.

The list which Donovan received, after returning to the United States, mentioned products in seven different categories. A list of medical products was to follow. From 30 to 68 ships would be required to transport the food alone, too many for the American Government or public to accept in view of the rapidly deteriorating Cuban-American situation.

On October 3, Donovan flew back to Havana and reported that it was impossible to transport the food products by sea. However, two major private pharmaceutical corporations had agreed to donate large quantities of medical products. He had also established two letters of credit with the Royal Bank of Canada, one covering the debt of the 60 wounded prisoners, and another guaranteeing delivery of drugs and medicines in sufficient quantity to cover the ransom.

By this time Donovan and Castro had established both a working and social rapport. Fidel seemed to respond when Donovan would tell wry jokes or say, with a smile, "You know, Fidel, when I get out of here and you talk about me, please attack me very hard because with a few friends like you I don't need any enemies."

Castro indicated that drugs and medicine would be acceptable in place of food but he wanted the products at wholesale prices, thereby increasing the quantity for the same amount of money.

On October 10, however, Donovan found a changed and hostile atmosphere. No longer cordial and accommodating, Castro had a new list of products. Donovan turned, said, "That's it!" and walked out. The negotiations were broken. His second trip to Havana had lasted eight days.

Missile Crisis Brakes

On October 19, the new list of drugs and medicines was presented. Donovan, back in New York scanned it quickly and said, "Impossible! They want to break the negotiations." The new list quoted drug prices from Japan and Italy which were far lower than those of United States firms.

On October 22, 1962, national attention was focused on another matter. President Kennedy told the Nation that Russian missiles had been planted in Cuba. Russia and the United States, the two great nuclear powers, seemed on the verge of world conflict.

Donovan, asked to comment on the President's speech, knew that Castro would read what he said and that he ran the risk of destroying his mission. But he declared:

"In my opinion, if the President firmly adheres to the position set forth in his speech, the missiles will be removed, the Russians will leave, and not a shot will be fired."

That it did not destroy the mission is a matter of history.

Perhaps the most astonishing aspect of the Cuban crisis is that the negotiations for the Bay of Pigs prisoners remained open during all those searing hours.

By the end of November, tensions had eased. Alvara Sanchez of the Cuban Families Committee told Attorney General Kennedy: "Now is the time to free these men. Bring them home to their families by Christmas. If there is any more delay, it will be too late."

To Isle of Pines

Sanchez meant that many of the prisoners soon would die.

In May, six months earlier, 211 prisoners, those with \$100,000 fines on their heads, had been taken from the Principe Castle prison in Havana, and flown to the Isle of Pines.

The Isle of Pines lies fifty miles from the Cuban mainland, directly in the path of the hurricanes that boil up in the Lesser Antilles to the southwest and whirl their way northeast. The island itself measures about 1,200 square miles. Its sandy soil is unsuited for agriculture, and a large swamp covers a third of the island. By location and by terrain, the Isle of Pines is not fit for human habitation, but for Castro's purpose it serves well. Overlooking the water, next to a marble quarry, stands the Modelo prison. There, all political prisoners and other enemies of the people are imprisoned.

The life in this prison was an endless hell of starvation and degradation. The men knew they were slowly dying; they could see it in each other's emaciated faces and feel it as their strength ebbed away. When they fainted from hunger, medical attendants gave them intravenous glucose injections and kept them just at the point of death.

Treatment of the 900 men who remained at the Principe castle became more harsh. Their daily food consisted of coffee and bread in the morning, macaroni and soup for lunch and noodle soup at dinner.

"If you are going to rescue these men," Sanchez told Kennedy, "this is the time, because if you wait you will be liberating corpses."

Tomorrow: A Bittersweet He-
union Party.

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as it was toward reaching republican voters in general. The result: The Senator's appearances each day have been limited, and a heavy proportion of them have been before audiences composed of his workers. A second result: a campaign will not cost as much as the published polls for Goldwater aides believe primary is still in doubt and will be decided by the undecided voters consistently turned out in the private polls they conducted.

With the undecided in mind with the hope that Gov. Rockefeller's massive exposure will backfire against him, the Goldwater camp decided to spend its final campaign step to a minimum. Except for the election eve press conference and several television showings—at a cost of \$5,000—a new 15-minute campaign film narrated by actor John F. Kennedy, the Goldwater campaign of a few weeks ago have remained intact.

The main elements:

A committee was formed to raise money to specifically meet the expenses of that media. Eleven Los Angeles radio stations, for example, are carrying 265-minute and half-minute Goldwater spots in the five-days preceding the election.

An hour television program will be made at tomorrow night's Orange County Goldwater rally and telecast, beginning Sunday, over 11 television stations around the State. Sponsored by the Orange County Goldwater organization, bills for the show's distribution—which reportedly will total \$10,000—are being sent to the American Forum, Inc., a Los Angeles conservative organization that is producing the program.

On election eve, there will be a State-wide six-city half-hour telecast made up of edited film clips taken during the Goldwater California campaign. The cost: \$12,000 to \$15,000.

The Goldwater organization has also gone in heavily for billboards. The program cost \$110,000.

Nam and Cambodia, as we discuss the immediate problems arising out of the Communist offensives.

Expanded military action by the United States is another of the possible courses to be considered.

Secretary of State Rusk said in a speech a week ago that, if Communist aggression continued, the result could be "to expand the war."

Review of Entire Area

Mr. Johnson announced the Honolulu meeting yesterday, saying the purpose of the cabinet-level talks would be "to review the situation in the entire area" of Southeast Asia.

Officials said the talks would be secret, and that recommendations would be reported only to the President.

Secretary Rusk, after attending Prime Minister Nehru's funeral in India, is scheduled to visit Bangkok, Thailand, and Saigon, South Viet Nam, this week end on his way to Honolulu. Others who will participate in the conference will be Am-

though not as well as you are. You're heavier than you were in La Sierra."

He asked Artime what he was expecting and Artime told him, "Death." Castro drew out the conversation by praising the revolution and saying Artime should know better—the revolution did not do things that way.

Trial Brings Unity

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BY HAYNES JOHN

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THE EVENING STAR
Washington, D. C., Friday, May 29, 1964.

Bay of Pigs--Chapter 12: The Dungeons

The survivors of the Bay of Pigs invasion now begin their long ordeal in dark dungeons in Castro's Castillo Del Principe prison and are finally tried in the largest mass trial in Cuba's history. Strangely, the trial turns into a "victory" for the brigade and brings a new spirit of unity among the prisoners.

By HAYNES JOHNSON
(With Manuel Artime, Jose Perez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

The Castillo del principe stands on the western edge of the Principe plateau on the highest point overlooking the city of Havana and its harbor. Work on the fort was completed in 1794. It remains a Spanish fortification of the 18th century and for generations prisoners have been housed there.

Nine hundred men of the brigade were confined there for 18 months. They were placed in the depths of the prison, in dark and musty dungeons, four of them holding 100 men each. The floors and walls were black stone and water dripped from the ceiling. High up on the walls were small windows with guards.

From May 13 to July 17, the prisoners had been kept in the naval hospital, a five-story building in Havana, where they slept, 20 to a room, on mattresses on the floor, and were given soap and toilet articles. On May 18, Castro told the leaders of his proposal to exchange them for 500 bulldozer tractors costing \$23 million. Their spirits rose but the efforts of the "traitors for freedom" committed in the United States, led by Milton Eisenhower, Walter Reuther and the late Eleanor Roosevelt, broke down late in June.

Reunited With Men

Manuel Artime, Pepe San Roman and Ernesto Oliva, the three leaders, were first placed in the worst cells in the prison. The cells were dark and filled with rats and cockroaches. The toilet was an uncovered hole in the middle of the floor. Later, they were reunited with their comrades in the large dungeons.

Artime's interrogation had been by far the most difficult and barbarous of any man in the brigade. He was the only one in the invasion who had dealt directly with the Americans in the United States. His captors wanted to know who those Americans were and what they had said.

During the interrogation, which may have been as long as three days, he was not permitted to sleep. Twice his captors said they were going to shoot him. The muzzle of a pistol was placed in his mouth and the trigger pulled; the hammer fell on an empty chamber.

When he passed out, he was brought back to consciousness by ice water or with lighted cigarettes. He carries scars with him today.

But when he was reunited with his men, many felt a great resentment toward Pepe. They believed that he had left them to fight on alone. As the truth gradually was learned, it be-



Capt. Pedro Luis Rodriguez of Castro's forces testifies against the brigade at the biggest mass trial in Cuba's history.

came apparent that San Roman was a brave officer and a good soldier.

(Ten prisoners had been paroled by Castro, and permitted to go to the United States in the futile attempt to negotiate the tractor deal. On July 31, eight returned to Cuba. Two refused to go back.)

Hopes Fade

On the 17th of each month, the entire brigade stood at attention for a minute of silence in memory of the invasion and those who had died. They knew that a "Cuban families committee" had been organized in the United States to ransom the prisoners. They kept their hopes up by dreaming of going home for Christmas. But Christmas passed and the New Year began bleakly in Havana.

The food in prison became worse and the treatment more severe. Twenty-two of the "most dangerous" prisoners were isolated. On March 22, a Cuban government radio broadcast broke the news to the world. Time had run out for an exchange of the prisoners for tractors and the "mercenaries" would be tried as war criminals.

In the week before the trial, the brigade drew together into almost perfect unity. The most remarkable thing about their attitude was their decision not to speak against the United States, no matter how grave the consequences, and in spite of everything that had happened to them. One soldier explained it this way:

"The only ally that we have in fighting communism is the United States. And how are we going to go against the only ally we have?"

It was the largest mass trial in Cuba's turbulent history. In size, it recalled Stalin's purge trials of the early 1930s. But there the resemblance ended.

On Thursday morning, March 29, 1962, the men left their cells and walked to the courtyard in the center of the prison as if they were going to a party. There were jokes and laughter and shouts of vivas to comrades from other galleries whom they

had not seen in months. When Artime, San Roman and Oliva were brought in, the men stood at attention without command and sang the national hymn. Oliva stepped to a microphone and said, "If we are going to die, we are going to die with dignity. When they shoot us, we will sing the national hymn. This is not the time."

Pepe Sets Example

From the bench where the five-man tribunal sat in the shade facing the prisoners, Augusto Martinez Sanchez, the president of the tribunal, called out: "Jose Perez San Roman. Do you have something to declare?"

Pepe came to attention, walked briskly from his bench to a position directly in front of Sanchez, halted, with exaggerated clicking of heels and held loudly, "Me abstengo." (I refuse to answer.)

Other leaders followed San Roman's example. Silence followed when the brigade was asked if anyone wanted to speak. Finally, in one of the last rows, a tall Negro named Luiz Gonzales Lalony raised his hand.

"What have you to say?" asked Sanchez.

"I want to go to the bathroom," the prisoner replied. The brigade broke into laughter. The tension was broken.

Instead of the mass declarations accusing the United States that the Communists had hoped for, the trial was taking an unplanned and unwanted turn. It was not the propaganda show they expected. Around the top of the prison, cables and television cameras had been stationed, ready to show Cuba and the world how the worms (Castro's favorite word for the invaders) reacted. But from the first moment when the fighting developed, the trial was not shown on television or broadcast on radio, and no Western newsmen were ever permitted inside the fortress.

As witnesses recited the crimes of the accused men, they sal all day in the sun without food or water. Photographers waited to take pic-

tures when a man-dropped his head or looked dejected. It became something of a game among the men to see if they could keep holding their heads up in the direct rays of the sun.

'Confessions' Read

A brief statement over Havana radio, on the night following the first day of the Secret trial, merely said that the 1,180 prisoners had "confessed" their crime of "treacherous attack" against the Cuban people at the "direct instigation of the imperialistic government of the United States." No details were given the press.

Artime and the other leaders had been kept awake all night and urged to sign statements attacking the United States. On the second day of the trial, Artime was confronted with the statement and stood listening while it was read. He was asked to acknowledge it as his own.

"This is a complete lie," Artime answered. From the ranks of the brigade came catcalls and laughter.

Several brigade members who had earlier given long statements accusing the United States during the first days of captivity were called to stand as those statements were read. All but two men denied their statements. Out of the entire brigade only two men made statements.

(In Bayfront park in Miami, more than 1,000 women melted at night in a vigil for the prisoners.)

On the third day of the trial, the government summoned Maj. Jose Fernandez, a Castro officer who gave a lengthy account of the battle at Giron. It was Fernandez who publicly stated for the first time that American destroyers had been spotted coming toward the beach Wednesday afternoon toward the end of the fighting. He said the ships approached to within three or four miles of the shore, picked up survivors in small boats and left at high speed.

In everything that was said, there was a blend of fact and fiction; but the principal purposes of all the testimony seemed to be to demoralize the brigade by depicting it as cowardly and to place the blame for the invasion on the United States.

As witnesses recited the crimes of the accused men, they sal all day in the sun without food or water. Photographers waited to take pic-

summation termed the leaders traitors and the rest of the brigade "pawns," rich men and cowards. He asked for "the most severe punishment our laws permit"—from death and life imprisonment to 20 years in jail.

The final mockery in the trial came next. Antonio Cejas, the "defense" counsel, spoke for 90 minutes. He called his "clients" mercenaries and traitors and cowards, quoted from Fidel's speeches, and admitted that it was difficult for him to fulfill his duties as defense counsel because he was a revolutionary and the "participation of the defendants in the events they have been accused of has been proven amply." He asked the tribunal to render "a just and generous sentence."

Strangely many men experienced first a sense of release, and then a state of exultation, over the trial. "We did something there that was never done in the history of the world," one soldier said. Another, a man who had lost his arm, said, "The trial brought a very great spirit of unity. Nobody can feel what spirit we had unless he was there. When you are in prison with one foot in the grave, you know that it cannot be worse. But the ideals make you feel strong enough to defeat anything."

No matter what happened next, they had defeated their enemies in the trial, and that gave them all a sense of pride. As Pepe said, "A spirit has been born. We felt very happy for destroying the show that Castro had prepared. We beat them on the trial and they were mad."

Some time after midnight, Sunday morning, April 8, Castro paid a visit to San Roman and Artime in their cells. To the first, Castro was violent and profane. Tugging at his beard, he shouted:

"San Roman, what kind of guy are you? I don't understand you. I don't understand what kind of people you are." Then he became conciliatory and said he recognized that many men in the brigade were valiant. But he became incensed again until he finally shouted: "San Roman, you don't deserve to live!"

"Major," Pepe said, "that is the only thing that we agree about. I don't want to live any more. I have been played with by the United States and now you are playing with me here. I am tired of being played with, kill me, but don't play with me any more."

Castro turned and walked away without saying another word—and without telling the Pepe why he had come.

Learns Castro's Aim

Artime was the first to learn Castro's real purpose.

Fidel went directly to Artime's cell.

"I thought he was coming to see me before they killed me," Artime said, "just to make a fool of me, because I knew he had done that before to other people. He came with about 20 people around him and looked at me very deeply. Then he said, 'How are you, Artime?'"

"I told him, 'Very well, though not as well as you are. You're heavier than you were in La Sierra.'"

He asked Artime what he was expecting, and Artime told him, "Death." Castro drew out the conversation by praising the revolution and saying that he should know better that way.

Trial Brings Unity

On the fourth and last day of the trial, Santiago Cubas, the secretary, in a 40-minute

tion did not do things.

The Bay of Pigs - Chapter

With Defeat Came Deep Despair

The brutal battle of the Bay of Pigs was over at last. The 1,500 Cuban patriots who attacked Fidel Castro's tight little island in April, 1961, were beaten and demoralized. Here is their account of what happened after they scattered in desperate retreat from the beaches.

By HAYNES JOHNSON.

(With Manuel Artimis, Jose Perez San Roman, Erneldo Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

In small groups they crawled through the swamps, afraid to stop, almost too tired to go on, numb and bitter from defeat. For three days they had fought without rest and with little food or water. They tried to get through to the mountains, to a town, or finally to firm ground. A very few made it.

Time itself became a haze and the hours of daylight and darkness blurred into one. The more religious prayed constantly. Some said their prayers were answered. Others tried and gave up in despair. For the lucky ones, water was found—under a smooth white stone or in a small pond. The maddening thirst and gnawing hunger drove the rest to desperation—to drinking urine, to eating insects from under the bark of trees, to chasing lizards and snakes and eating them raw and drinking the blood.

Constantly overhead was the whirring sound of Castro's helicopters and the monotonous and continual burst of his machine guns firing aimlessly into the woods, everywhere and anywhere. Artillery shells raked the area and the few roads through the swamps were swarming with patrols. Castro's men made no effort to go after the Brigade. The Brigade had to come to them.

Each man was certain he would be shot if captured. But as the days passed, even that fear was changed until many didn't care what happened.

Objects of Scorn

Giron was a scene of confusion: long lines of soldiers, jeeps and trucks and buses; nurses and officers; newspapermen, television cameramen and photographers; and Chinese, Czechs and Russians in civilian clothes—all moving about with a sense of importance. The center of attention, the objects of scorn and shouts, were the prisoners. Dirty, disheveled, gaunt, unshaven, most wearing only the T-shirts and pants their captors had left them, they came into the town in long lines, bound together, poked by bayonets. They were silent and grim.

Enrique Ruiz-Williams, second in command of the armored battalion, carrying 70 shrapnel wounds, was one of the first to be captured. In the house near the sea where he and other wounded lay, they were suddenly confronted by the person of Fidel Castro. Williams recognized him at once. He groped under his thin mattress and tried to reach a .45 pistol he had concealed there earlier in the afternoon. Williams does not know whether he really drew the gun and pulled the trigger and the pistol did not go off, or whether he simply made the gesture and failed to get the weapon. Those lying there with him are certain only that he made such a gesture. All agree, however, on what happened next.

Castro said, "What are you trying to do, kill me?" and Williams replied, "That's what I came here for. We've been trying to do that for three days." Castro was not angry.

A militia police captain reached down and patted Williams and said, "Take it easy. Take it easy. You're in bad shape."

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Resentment

But the prisoners were bitter towards the United States.

"Everybody was very resentful of the United States Government," said Dr. Juan Sordo. "Everyone thought we had been stranded and left to die, for Fidel to kill us all and have a piece of Hungary for himself. I myself felt resentful and very bitter, because of the lost opportunity of freeing Cuba. I took it for granted I was going to be shot."

Of all the prisoners, Negroes received the worst treatment. Their presence in the invasion force infuriated Castro. It was contrary to the impression united, happy Cuba that

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assiduously trying to culti-

One morning, the prisoners were lined up to get aboard a large trailer truck for the trip to Havana. In charge of the operation was Osmani Cienfuegos, the minister of public works, a stocky, pudgy man. The truck was American made, the kind used on express highways—aluminum, plywood stripping inside, and only two doors, one on each side in the middle of the truck.

By the time 100 men had been packed into the truck, the prisoners were shouting. "No more. No more. We can't breathe." Cienfuegos was unmoved.

"Let them die!" he shouted. "It will save us from shooting them." He waved his hand and ordered "forty more pigs" put on the truck.

Tragic Journey

When there were 149 men on the truck, the two doors were closed and bolted and the trip began. It was one o'clock of a hot, sunny afternoon. In the total darkness inside there was panic: men shouting, packed solidly against each other, desperately struggling for air. "It was the terrible heat," one man said. "Sweat ran like a river."

Terrified, the men ripped off their clothes and beat on the

walls with their fists and rocked the truck, vainly trying to turn it over—anything to stop it. From everywhere came shouts and screams.

Eight hours after they left Giron the truck stopped. When it did the pounding and shouting increased. From outside the prisoners heard voices ordering them to be quiet or the doors would not be opened. For what seemed an eternity they were quiet. Then the doors were opened. The prisoners staggered out, falling "like leaves," stumbling over their comrades, their faces turned black, yellow, gray. Nine men were dead. Another died after he was taken outside.

Ordeal in Havana

The Brigade had reached Havana.

(Among the few who escaped capture were 22 men, most of them paratroopers, who followed their commander, Alejandro del Valle, 22 years old, aboard a 22-foot sailboat which they found on the beach. Ten of them were to die before they were picked up at sea 15 days later in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico, 178 miles from the mouth of the Mississippi River.)

(Under the burning sun, without drinking water after the first days, almost totally with-

out food during most of the journey, the men were barely recognizable as human beings when found. Del Valle was one of the dead.)

The plight of the red was not much better. Red, angry, bitter, the prisoners were brought to El Palacio de los Deportes (the sports palace) in the center of Havana. There in the amphitheater they sat in rows of hard, small chairs for more than 21 hours a day, 1,000 men from the demoralized Brigade. It was the low-point.

Throughout night and day, loudspeakers blared out the names of the prisoners, ordering them to come forward for questioning. The continued lack of sleep made them numb and dizzy. From 3 to 6 in the morning, they were permitted to lie on the floor on dirty mattresses.

Their captors played on their fears and bitterness (toward the United States) and planned on extravaganzas that would prove American duplicity to the world. Carefully selected prisoners were to be questioned before a television panel.

For four nights, the parade of prisoners on television continued until 37 men had been interrogated at length. The propaganda show proved to be a mixed blessing for Castro. Some of the prisoners were abject but others spoke up bravely.

The most notable interrogation involved Felipe Rivero. Thirty-seven years old, an aristocrat and dilettante, he had never had to work for a living. He seemed exactly the type of person for Castro to parade before the world: He was a wealthy man with Batista connections and a perfect example of the complacent and corrupt aristocracy in contrast to the nobility of the revolution's workers.

Rivero was one of the last to appear. The panel members soon discovered they had been mistaken about him. Instead of a pliant prisoner, they were confronted with a man who behaved candidly and courageously.

Castro Gloats

He had joined the invasion, he said, "because this country has been dominated by a series of foreign powers and has come out of one form of imperialism to fall into another." He would not concede that the Brigade was composed of "mercenaries and murderers."

On the final night of the show, Castro stood in the center of the amphitheater under the klieg lights and gloated over the defeated Brigade. Despite the prisoners' hostility to Americans, the long harrangue back-

fired. As one man said later, "I admired Fidel in many ways before that, but when I heard him making such a propaganda show with the lives of our men, I realized what a monster he was. We were in the hands of a maniac."

Pepe San Roman, commander of the Brigade, was personally questioned by Castro, who alternated between anger and a conciliatory attitude.

President Kennedy was a madman, Castro said. The President had betrayed them.

Becomes Friendly

"How can it be that you are involved in this, San Roman?" he asked.

"All I have to say to you is my name and my serial number and my unit."

Pepe said later, "Castro got mad as hell. He threw something that he was holding in his lap and said, 'How in the hell can you come here attacking your own country, helped by our enemies? You are a traitor to your country. You have gone against all the rules and all the laws of the world. And now you say you are not going to talk.'"

After shouting and raging for several minutes, Castro abruptly became friendly. "Let's talk, San Roman," he said. "Don't feel that you are the Brigade

commander and that I am Fidel. Let's talk like two people. Why did you come back to your country this way? Why did you do it? Explain it to me."

Pepe said he wouldn't argue. "I don't know how to speak very well. I know that you will beat me on that field. The only thing I know is weapons and that is the field I took."

After several days, Castro came again. He offered Pepe a cigar.

"He was very kind as if he was my father. He stayed about an hour, explaining everything about the revolution and asking me the reasons why I had come to fight him."

Anger Shifts

During those days alone, Pepe brooded. Much later he said:

"I hated the United States, and I felt that I had been betrayed. Every day it became worse and then I was getting madder and madder and I wanted to get a rifle and come and fight against the United States. Many times I had the feeling that we were thrown there to see what happened, because they were sure that Fidel was going to capture us and put all of us in the firing squad and we would be killed and there would be a great scandal in the whole world. And

sometimes I felt that they changed their minds at the last moment, and they didn't have time to give us the order to come back. But anyhow I felt that if they had organized us and taken us through a whole year of that training, even if the world was going to fall to pieces, they should not have forgotten us."

He thought about Frank and Gray (the American agents for the Central Intelligence Agency) and the faulty intelligence information that had been supplied the invaders.

"How could they say that all the Castro planes were destroyed (Saturday, April 15)? They didn't have proof of that. Intelligence cannot work like that."

The more he thought, the more bitter he became. But weeks later, he learned of the 10 men in the brigade who died on the trailer truck ride from Giron to Havana.

"I tell you," Pepe said, "That made me sick at my stomach, knowing how those fellows died." From that moment on, "I didn't think any more about hating the United States. All my hate went back to Castro."

Tomorrow: Inside Castro's Red Prison.

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


The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 7:

"The Nightmare Begins"

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The men of Brigade 8506, confident of American air support, certain they would have the assistance of civilian uprisings, sure that the 1,500 men of their outfit formed but a part of the invasion plan, began their unprecedented night amphibious landing at the Bay of Pigs. They were doomed before they started. Nothing went right from the moment they started ashore: in their pitiful little open boats. Here is the story of that nightmarish landing and the battle on the beach that wasn't supposed to happen, as told by the men who led the "Cuban liberation army."

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artima, José Pérez San Roman, Erneido Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

At 3:15 in the morning of April 17, 1961, Fidel Castro was awakened in Havana. He was told that the enemy was landing at Playa Larga and Playa Giron (on the Bay of Pigs) and that his troops in those areas were resisting.

Castro alerted the forces he had in that section—a battalion of 900 men, and several platoons of armed militia. Orders went to Castro's air force to take off at dawn and attack the ships facing the landing area.

(The Castro air force reportedly had been destroyed by an air strike of B-26 bombers two days earlier. Partially as a result of this false report, President Kennedy had cancelled a second air strike, scheduled to coincide with the invasion. The invaders had also been given assurance by the Central Intelligence agents who trained them that Castro could not get troops to the "isolated area" for 72 hours.)

In the confusion of that first morning, which found the invasion already foundering at 4 a.m., Erneido Oliva, 28-year-old commander of the armored battalion, landed with the early waves of troops. The men on his ship the Houston, were a little nervous; they hadn't expected the shooting to start so soon.

Sounds of Battle

Oliva climbed down the rope ladder, followed by a radio operator and several assistants. But in jumping from the ladder to the small boat below, one of the men struck the pilot and knocked him into the water. The boat drifted away. None of the seven men aboard knew how to operate the outboard motor and so they floated helplessly for 55 maddening minutes, while they heard the sound of battle on the shore, they drifted in the midst of the Bay of Pigs awaiting a launch from the Houston. Finally it came and Oliva ingloriously reached the shore. By then only sporadic firing was heard.

Oliva, headed toward the front, made an alarming discovery: "I saw the antenna of a micro-wave station and we captured it at once. You could see that they had transmitted from there recently." It was another crucial failure in intelligence, the plan was predicated on the inability of the enemy to communicate with larger forces.

Oliva instantly recognized the seriousness of the situation; but of more immediate concern was the landing itself. The outboard motors on the eight fiberglass landing boats were not working. Two of them went out of service immediately (on one the propeller fell off and into the sea as soon as the boat was launched). One after the other the other six failed in the middle of the Bay. Although there were only 185 men in the second battalion, by 5:30 in the morning the last of the men still had not come ashore. Also left to be unloaded were the entire Fifth Battalion and most of the supplies, including ammunition, for the area. Oliva is convinced that had they had only three LCUs, both battalions and the supplies would have reached the beach by three o'clock.

At 6 a.m., the Cuban frogmen reported that they had cleared a path through the coral reefs (unreported in CIA intelligence) which had handicapped the landing efforts. At 6:25, landing craft carrying tanks and the men of the heavy weapons battalion began arriving at the beaches.

Easy Targets

A B-26 flew over. Thinking it was one of their own, the men on the beaches waved at it. Then the plane opened fire. Following it was another—and then another. Soon they were joined by Sea Fury fighters and T-33 jets. The remainder of the Heavy Weapons Battalion and all of the Sixth and Third Battalions had to land under fire.

"I saw those planes pass over our heads three times going to the beach," said Jose Sosa, a 51-year-old cattleman who had a son and two nephews in the Brigade. "I saw the red tongues of the flames and the machine guns shoot, shoot, shoot. Bupbup, bupbup, bupbup!"

The slow landing craft were easy targets at best but to make it worse, they were stopped 15 yards short of the beach by impassable coral. Men waded through water chest-high, carrying their weapons — including even the 4.2 mortars, weighing 640 pounds each—and boxes of ammunition on their shoulders.

When the planes passed over, they ducked under the water.

Consequently, most of the small radios were wet and could not be used that first day of fighting.

It was a nightmare. Immediately, the doctors began receiving casualties and treating men on the beach, under fire.

The first attack ended with one of Castro's B-26s shot down. In the momentary lull C-46 transport planes carrying the Brigade paratroopers flew over Giron on their way inland. One of the planes dipped low to salute the invaders and as it did the men on the ground opened fire. Bullets passed through the fuselage. "What the hell's going on?" one paratrooper yelled. "They've gone crazy."

Plane Shot Down

The fifth battalion, greenest in the brigade with only a few days of training, was still aboard the Houston. Rip, an American in charge of the frogmen, went to the Houston to assist in their landing. The men were reluctant to leave.

In anger he shouted: "It's your war, you bastards. Get off!" Ten men got off and headed for the beach. From behind they heard the motors of an airplane. It was a B-26 and they, too, thought it was one of theirs. The plane attacked them as it turned toward the horizon and came back. Rip stood up and shouted: "Everybody fire at the . . . thing!" This time they hit it, and when it made a third pass it went down in flames.

More aircraft were on the way—first a Brigade B-26 to provide cover for the invaders and then three of Castro's planes, two T-33 jets and a "Sea Fury." The slower Brigade plane didn't have a chance. (The Brigade B-26s flew without tail guns to permit them to carry more fuel for the 14-hour round-trip flight from Nicaragua.)

The Houston was defenseless. Two planes came low over the mangroves and one made a direct rocket hit. There was a hollow clang and the ship started taking in water. Miraculously, the rocket had passed through the deck and on through the bottom of the ship without exploding. Laden as it was with ammunition and gasoline, the Houston would almost certainly have blown to bits had the rocket detonated. And almost all her troops were still on board!

More Disasters

A small fire broke out below decks but as Alberto Pico said, "God was with us." The water coming through the hole that the rocket had made extinguished the fire. Luis Morse, the captain, headed the stricken ship toward the coast and succeeded in grounding it 300 yards from shore. There it stayed—a broken vessel, oil oozing from its holes, a sitting target for the planes. Without weapons, some stripped to their underwear, the men jumped into the oily water and were strafed by Castro's planes. Some drowned, some were attacked by sharks. At least 28 men died in the sea. Those who got ashore were dispirited and defeated. They huddled under the trees and awaited orders from the commanders.

Minutes after the loss of the Houston a second, even greater disaster overtook the Brigade. It was shortly after 7 o'clock when a T-33 jet, diving out of the sun, made a direct rocket hit on the Rio Escondido. Those who survived the enormous blast jumped into the sea where they, too, were strafed by the planes.

It was an irreparable loss for the Rio Escondido carried the supplies for the first 10 days of fighting — ammunition, food, hospital equipment and gasoline. Also lost was the Brigade's communications trailer — the primary method of communications with the battalions in the combat zones, as well as with the flagship and the rear base in Nicaragua. Why such a vast majority of all the supplies needed for a success whatsoever was committed to one ship is a question still unanswered by the CIA.

The remaining ships, the Elagar and Barbara J., were forced to withdraw because of the air attacks (from the Castro air force declared "non-existent" by the CIA).

The operation had called for paratroopers and heavy equipment to be dropped on the road

to the area called Central Australia at the northernmost point of the Bay of Pigs. The heavy equipment was dropped first, the paratroopers followed. They never saw their equipment again — it was lost in the swamps. In addition, an advance group was lost in the swamps, another badly missed its drop zone, with some landing behind the enemy lines. They landed under heavy fire. When they reached the ground they found one of their men dead, dangling from a tree by his parachute. Another had been shot and killed before he hit the ground.

In the confusion one unit, unable to make radio contact with headquarters, was driven back and forced to retreat, having the road to Playa Larga open. The main road to Central Australia, where paratroopers were lost in the swamp, also was open.

Lost Contact

On the eastern front the paratroopers fared better. The various units landed successfully, without strong opposition, and moved to assigned forward positions. Each of these assigned strong points was manned by 19 men armed with one 57 mm. cannon, one 30-caliber machine gun, one bazooka, an automatic rifle squad and a forward observer to direct mortar fire. These strong points bore the brunt of the first attacks on the eastern front.

At Brigade headquarters, when Pepe San Roman made the first faint contact with Olivera at Playa Larga, the report was

discouraging. It was 10 o'clock in the morning. Oliva said his situation was difficult and that his men had been in continuous combat since landing. He had lost contact with the 5th Battalion and had been unable to reach the paratroopers forward of his position.

Even with his supply lines cut, his back to the sea and no communications, San Roman and his commanders were not in despair. It was not false heroism, or naivete, but an unshakable conviction that they would not be let down; that victory therefore was inevitable. It was inconceivable that they would be stranded.

They could not know of another failure that day—the failure to alert the Cuban underground to the invasion. From the beginning, the underground had been a vital part of the CIA plan. It was to support and join the invasion, create confusion, sow discord and fashion an environment in which the populace would join the liberators. For the purpose, infiltration teams had been landed long in advance of the invasion.

Shortly afterward, one of the brigade infiltration teams received a message with the identifying code marks, "QSP," meaning very, very urgent. Immediate action was to be taken if such a message ever arrived. Decoded, the message read: "A large, well-armed force has landed in southern Las Villas province. Interrupt communications, blow bridges." The recipients were urged to "rise."

All over Cuba that day similar CIA messages arrived. But it was too late. A reign of terror had begun. In Havana, more than 200,000 were arrested. In theaters and ballparks, auditoriums and public halls, men, women and children were packed together.

"Impossible to rise," was the sardonic message one team returned. "Most patriots in jail. Thanks for your help. Closing transmission."

Invasers Stand Alone

The delay in these messages was one of the most damaging and certainly the most baffling of all the failures that day. The underground had no idea that the invasion was coming.

Now, the invaders stood alone. They were desperately short of ammunition. Before the day was out, they faced everything that Castro could throw at them—and held their positions. That they did so was due partly to the lack of leadership, morale and egregious errors of Castro's men. Partly, it was due to the quality of the Brigade's training. But principally it was due to their nerve.

On the surface, they were not particularly impressive men. One of them was Maximo Cruz, 23, dark hair, dark eyes, five-foot-five, weighing 120 pounds, quiet, not well educated. He was distinguished by his large nose and for months there had been jokes in the training camps that he would not be able to get his nose out of the way of the bullets.

Cruz told the story of what came to be known in Cuba as the "battle of the lost battalion"—the 339th Battalion of Castro militia leaders from Mantanzas. The name today carries the connotation of scandal for when the battle was ended, there had been unnecessary slaughter.

Cruz was in command of a company flanking both sides of a road through the swamps.

Mound of Dead

"My scouts came back and told me the enemy was advancing in a column," he said. "They were coming through the center of the highway, straight on it, in a close formation. These people were crazy coming that way down the hill in the middle of the road. . . . When I gave the order to fire, you could see them flying up in the air. I threw everything at them with all the weapons we had. In 10 or 15 minutes, there was a big mound of dead men all over the road."

For the first time that day, the Brigade had made contact with its air support and two B-26s made passes over the remainder of the battalion marching in the road. Rockets and bombs were dropped. The carnage was horrible. The road was a solid wall of flames. Out of nearly 900 men in that battalion, only a handful survived. This, indeed, was air support.

The planes had been supporting the Brigade for 25 minutes; and no Castro fighters had appeared. On the ground Oliva heard, by radio, one of the pilots say to the other: "Let's go because I've finished my ammunition and don't have much gasoline!"

"No," the reply came back, "there's an s.o.b. in there that shot at me and I'm going to get him."

The men watched as one plane circled over Playa Larga and the other headed toward Central Australia.

"I hit him, I hit him," came the cry of the pilot.

At that moment a T-33 jet and a Sea Fury appeared.

"I've got a T-33 on my tail. Shoot at him! Shoot at him!"

The second Brigade pilot answered: "I don't have any ammunition."

"They hit me. They hit me," were the last words. Both Brigade planes were shot down.

As the sound of the battle ceased, a soldier at Playa Larga squinted into the sun toward the front. "There were crowds of vultures flying to the battlefield and it made me think how quickly the human body can corrupt itself."

Two Elements Missing

For the Brigade to hold on that day against overwhelming odds and with such slight casualties—less than 100 died that day—was a tribute to the men, also, to the invasion area. In that important respect, the plan proved to be correct: Castro's troops had no choice but to come down the highway through the swamps. With tanks, heavy mortars, cannon and bazookas the positions were relatively easy to defend. Only two elements were missing—air cover and sufficient ammunition to keep going.

Tomorrow: Jets Are Coming.
Adapted from the book, "The Bar of Pigs," with the permission of W. W. Norton & Co., publishers. Copyright, 1964, by Haynes Johnson.



Castro militiamen counterattack on the Playa Larga front.

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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 6: 'Turn Left to Havana'

For better or for worse, the Cuban liberation forces were committed now. The ships carrying the 1,500 men of Brigade 2506 plowed toward the Bay of Pigs. Brigade attack bombers swooped in on Cuba and were met by anti-aircraft fire. Two of the B-26s were forced to land in Florida, riddled with bullets. The first five installments of "The Bay of Pigs" told of the difficulties in forming and training the brigade and of the scheming and duplicity of the CIA. It is now too late for brigade leaders to voice their many doubts.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, Jose Perez San Roman, Erneldo Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

"You will be so strong. You will go straight ahead. You will put your hands out, turn left, and go straight into Havana."

The speaker made a sweeping gesture with his arm that no man present that day will ever forget.

Fifteen hundred listening Cubans raised a great shout. Some had tears in their eyes.

The date was April 14, 1961, the place was Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, and Brigade 2506, after long and arduous training at a secret base in the mountains of Guatemala, was

about to take ship for a three-day cruise northward to the southern coast of Cuba.

Their mission was to land at the Bay of Pigs and establish a beachhead for revolutionary overthrow of Fidel Castro's Communist rule. They were headed for disaster--almost immediate defeat, accompanied by death, imprisonment, and torture.

But on that day, their American leaders--agents of the Central Intelligence Agency--assured them that failure was inconceivable.

"Dave," an intelligence expert for the CIA, told them that Castro "could not react for at least 72 hours." He had no big forces nearby, no communications. The landing area was isolated.

Dave also gave them this intelligence:

Castro would have no tanks and no air force. Finally, there were supposed to be more than five hundred guerrillas nearby waiting to help the Brigade. On the ships were weapons for 4,000 men, and the intelligence estimate was that in the first two days 5,000 men would join the Brigade in a voluntary uprising. In addition, Brigade planes would drop thousands of weapons to the Cuban people who wanted to join the rebellion.

There was no question they would have air

superiority. Nothing was said about United States air support, or about jets. It was said that the enemy would not be able to get to the Brigade; that it would be destroyed from the air; that no trucks or troops would be able to get through the roads because all the roads would be bombed; that "every five minutes there will be a plane over all the major roads of Cuba." The Brigade cargo ships were loaded with thirty to forty thousand gallons of gasoline so its air force could begin immediate missions once the field at Giron was seized. The air missions were already planned for that moment; the operations order called for them to destroy the main railroad and highway bridges in "the zones of Havana, Matanzas, Jovellanos, Colon, Santa Clara, and Cienfuegos in order to isolate said areas from enemy operations."

Operation Pluto also included plans for a diversionary landing in Oriente Province by a commando group of 168 men, led by Nino Diaz, and a simulated attack, or "feint," in the vicinity of Santa Fe. The "feint" would be accomplished with special sound equipment that made it sound as if a great battle were being waged.

The plan sounded so good, the Cubans

were so confident that no one asked any questions.

Nothing was said to the Cubans about an alternative plan (formally approved in Washington) for use in case the invasion failed. This plan called for escape to the Escambray mountains, where the Cubans would operate as a guerrilla force.

As this is written, only one of the four leading Cubans knows that such a plan existed; he learned of it two years after the invasion.

Later, in a secret top-level administration investigation that followed in the wake of the invasion, it was learned that the CIA decided on its own, not to give the Brigade the alternative plan. The explanation was given that it might weaken the Brigade's resolve to keep fighting, that they might choose the alternative plan when the going became rough, even though the invasion still had a chance of success. The most charitable explanation that can be placed on this reckless action is that the CIA assumed such terrible responsibility with the best of intentions; it was convinced the Cubans would win and

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Bay of Pigs: Message on Air Strike Caused Miscalculation

Continued From Page A-1
therefore in the classic sense the end would justify the means:

Mission Aborted

The "diversionary landing," a vital factor in Operation Pluto, never took place. In the early hours of Saturday, April 15, a reconnaissance platoon set out for the shore thirty miles east of Guantanamo in the darkness. The Cubans reported they saw militia waiting for them and stationary lights set to shine on them. They moved out to sea. The next night, the 168 commandos tried again and, after a long wait, returned to their ship. The mission, in the words of the accompanying Americans, "aborted primarily because of bad leadership."

The simulated attack, where rubber rafts were floated ashore containing radio equipment simulating the sound of battle, was, ironically, a success. Castro hurried to the Bay of Pigs when he first heard reports of an invasion there but was told it was only a feint and that the genuine landing was being made at Pinar del Rio province. He rushed there to find only rafts with radios blaring battle noises.

Castro's reaction here and the initial disorganization of his troops in the field lead to the unanswerable question: What might have happened had Nino Diaz's men carried out their assignment to land in Oriente and created a genuine diversionary movement?

(No dismal thoughts of this nature disturbed the Cuban invaders, as they boarded ship

in Puerto Cabezas. They lined the railings, singing, cheering, and waving gaily colored scarves as the ships steamed out to sea.)

On board the five transports and two escort ships, living conditions were bad. Men slept where they could, on deck, in lifeboats, in hammocks strung in holds loaded with ammunition and gasoline—and ate C-rations, either cold or heated by sterno lamps, and bathed with salt water. Smoking was prohibited; a stray match or spark could touch off an explosion.


Cheers and Singing

On the horizon was the comforting sight of the American Navy—several destroyers and one or two larger ships. On the first night out the men aboard the Houston watched an American submarine circling the ship.

By Saturday afternoon the entire brigade knew its mission. The officers had made their speeches, outlining the battle plan. The troops were asked to respect prisoners, as fellow Cubans. The men responded with cheers and singing.

(There was additional cause for jubilation when a radio message was received, telling of the successful accomplishment of the first air strike on Cuba. The B-26 bombers, based in Nicaragua, it said, had destroyed nearly all Castro's enemy aircraft.)

That message resulted in one of the great miscalculations of the invasion. The Brigade air force report stated that 8 to 10 planes had been put out of service at the San Antonio base; 6



Adlai Stevenson shows the United Nations a picture of a bomber that landed in Florida after supposedly deflecting from Castro Cuba.

to 8 at Ciudad Libertad; and 12 planes at Santiago de Cuba—all of which would have left Castro with almost no air power. While the attack did inflict considerable damage, he actually still had four fighters, two "Sea Furies" and two jet T-33s, as well as two B-26 bombers.

Two of the B-26s, bullet-riddled by anti-aircraft fire, made emergency landings at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station airport in Key West. The world awoke to the fact that Saturday morning Cuba was under attack but American immigration authorities hustled the Cuban pilots into custody and announced they had identified themselves as defectors from Castro's air force in stolen planes.

At the United Nations, Dr.

Raul Roa, the ambassador from Cuba, supported by Valerian A. Zorin of the Soviet Union, demanded an emergency meeting to consider "the aggression" against Cuba. Roa charged that the attacks were the prologue to a large scale invasion being planned by the United States and some Latin American countries.

When he finished, Adlai E. Stevenson, the United States Ambassador to the U. N., began his reply. It was to be the most humiliating moment in his distinguished career. He was trapped by a tangle of lies. He had been assured by the State Department that the story told by the Cuban pilots was true and he believed it.

"No United States personnel participated," Stevenson declared. "No United States aircraft, of any kind participated. These two planes, to the best of our knowledge, were Castro's own air force planes."

In Washington, Pierre Salinger, the presidential press secretary, said the United States had no knowledge of the bombings except what had

appeared in news reports. At the Pentagon and State Department, there was no official comment. But, in the later words of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, "things were beginning to surface."

If President Kennedy was concerned about the "surfacing," he did not show it. Late in the morning, he left the White House and flew by helicopter to join his wife and children at Glen Ora, their rented estate in the rolling Virginia hills.

By twelve noon of Sunday, April 15, the brigade forces in the little fleet at sea were committed. It was then too late to stop the invasion. Sometime after this hour had passed, President Kennedy made one of the most difficult decisions of his administration.

Forced Committed

While he had shown no outward concern over the "surfacing" Saturday, by Sunday the situation had become more complicated. Russia and China were threatening action—if not

in Cuba, then perhaps in Berlin or Laos or Viet Nam.

The realities of the cold war, the life-and-death stakes involved, the gamble Cuba represented, the apparent success of the brigade air attack on Saturday, the President's pledge against direct American intervention in Cuba, and the assurance of his advisers that the invasion had a chance of success without such American support, led him eventually to a decision: the second air strike, scheduled for dawn Monday to coincide with the invasion, was cancelled. Retrospect or hindsight does not alter the central fact about that decision: it was consistent with the late President's policy, stated unequivocally both publicly and privately, that the Cuban affair must not be allowed to jeopardize larger United States interests.

When Richard Bissell (deputy CIA director) was informed he and an assistant, Gen. Charles Cabell, an airman, urged Secretary of State Dean Rusk to reconsider the decision. Rusk, who was acting for the President, did not agree with them. He asked if they wished to appeal directly to the President. Neither did. The order went out to Puerto Cabezas to cancel the attack.

(All unknowing of this decision, which would deprive them of needed air protection the following morning, the Cuban invaders, on that Sunday afternoon, lounged on their ships, plowing the seas to a rendezvous off the Cuban coast.)

They listened to the radio, talking, trying not to appear nervous. They fussed with their new camouflage uniforms, packs and cowboy hats and joked about their return to Cuba. Some played poker; some took sunbaths; still others talked quietly about their families. For many it was, as one soldier said, "like a Caribbean picnic." Yet the jokes and

shouts, could not hide the inward nervousness. Everyone was afraid of acting afraid, and most adopted the philosophy that they were going to win or die. No one voiced doubt.

Sunday: The Nightmare Begins.

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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 5: CIA's Orders

The Cuban leaders of Brigade 2506 were still bewildered by the plans which their Central Intelligence Agency instructors called Operation Pluto. They believed the United States was going to help them, but they had no firm commitment. In fact, President Kennedy said emphatically that no American forces would be used in the invasion. At first they had been a small group training as guerrillas at the secret base in Guatemala. Then they began training as conventional troops for frontal assault, and the brigade grew to 1,500 men. They had high hopes, but not for long.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, Jose Perez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

"Frank," the mysterious American, had startling news. He imparted it early in April, 1961, to the stunned leaders of the "liberation army" being prepared for an imminent invasion of Cuba at a secret training base in the mountains of Guatemala.

There were forces in the administration trying to block the invasion and Frank might be ordered to stop it.

If he received such an order, he said, he would secretly inform Pepe San Roman, military commander of the invasion force, and

Erneido Oliva, second in command. Pepe remembers Frank's next words this way:

"If this happens, you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisors, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners."

(Frank was the top man for the Central Intelligence Agency who had been in charge of training 1,500 Cuban refugees for the invasion since November, 1960. Obviously a man of great military skill and commanding presence, he had gained the complete trust of the Cubans.)

Frank was quite specific: They were to place an armed brigade soldier at each American's door, cut communications with the outside, and continue the training until he told them when, and how, to leave for Trampoline base. (The code word for Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, where the invasion force was to board ship for the three-day passage to Cuba).

Frank then laughed and said: "In the end, we will win."

Pepe and Oliva were disturbed by this plan, but they had such faith in the Americans that

they agreed to follow it if necessary. They knew that they would have difficulty with the Brigade, because as Pepe said: "Most of the Cubans were there because they knew the whole operation was going to be conducted by the Americans, not by me or anyone else. They did not trust me or anyone else. They just trusted the Americans. So they were going to fight because they knew the United States was backing them."

Frank then called in Manuel Artime, civilian representative of the Cuban revolutionary council, and privately told him the same thing.

Artime was as stunned as the others. Frank never said who opposed the invasion—it was just "forces in the administration," or "politicians," or "chiefs above." He did say that if he received the order to stop the invasion, "I have also orders from my bosses, my commanders, to continue anyway." It cannot be determined what bosses, if any, gave Frank such instructions. But Artime, San Roman and Oliva never doubted that he was speaking for his superiors. It seemed obvious to them that the Brigade could not be transported to another unknown base, and then placed aboard ships to go to Cuba without the knowledge and assistance of a great organization.

Out of more than 10 secret meetings with

Frank at Base Trax came several dominant impressions. Oliva summed them up. First, the forces that would land in Cuba were much larger than the Brigade's 1,500 men. Second, the Cubans would have the complete support of the United States Government, including United States military and air support. Third, the invasion was going to take place even if Washington tried to stop it. And last, most important to the Cubans, the invasion was going to succeed and they would liberate their country.

In the next busy days, nothing more was said about putting the Americans under "arrest." When Artime later asked Frank about "the trouble in Washington," the answer was: "There is no trouble at all. We have orders for the invasion!"

Just before sailing, on April 14, Frank took Pepe aside. He told him that if he were ordered to halt the invasion while the ships were at sea, he would send Pepe a radio message saying, "Come back, don't go ahead."

That meant the opposite: It was really clear they were to go ahead.


"But if I send you a message in code that says 'The quetzal—a Guatemalan bird—is on

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Bay of Pigs: High Hopes Deflated at Docks

Continued From Page A-1
the branches of the tree,—that means Fidel is waiting for you so you will have to come back.”

(Neither message was ever sent. The whole astounding incident was never clarified to the Cubans. Its plain implications—that the CIA was prepared to countermand even a White House decision to call off the invasion—must be recorded as an astounding indication of the extent to which this super-secret organization had advanced its operations into the policy-making field.)

Frank told the Cubans that ships and landing craft had been procured for the invasion and that their air force would include fighter planes as well as B-26s. The United States Marines, he added, would “be close when needed.”

The brigade leaders learned that they were going to have to establish and hold a beachhead until the civil government arrived, set itself up, and asked for help from the United States and other Latin American countries. There would be no problem, Frank assured them, because everything had already been arranged by the Americans. Inside Cuba, the underground was ready and a general offensive would be ordered soon. The invasion would be the final blow.


Brigade Moves Out

On April 10, one week before the invasion date, San Roman assembled the brigade for its last formation at the Guatemala base. Everyone was joking. It was raining and the men were singing the Cuban national anthem.

“It was a great spectacle,” Oliva said, “very touching. Playing music, the charanga, singing, people saying vivas.”

At 5 o'clock, the trucks moved out to transport the men to the air base at Retalhuleu. Indian peasants cheered and waved. The liberation army boarded transport planes for “Trampoline,” still not knowing their destination. They found it to be Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, where the ships were waiting.

They saw the ships, hulking old cargo vessels, unpainted and in bad condition. Enrique Ruiz-Williams, second in command of the heavy weapons battalion, had what he describes as “a cold feeling.” He didn’t feel better when he inspected



The three-landing points targeted for the Cubans in the Bay of Pigs.

the loading machines. They were rusting and in even worse condition than the ships.

“I felt a great deception when we got over to the ships,” Oliva said. “It was something we didn’t expect. That was not what we were waiting for.”

What put the “icing on the cake,” as Pepe said, were the landing craft. They were 14-foot open boats, powered by outboard motors. They had no protection. How were the Cubans to land in those?

Operation Pluto

The next morning, April 13, two wooden tables and a blackboard were set up near the pines. Soon Frank and a number of Americans arrived. The brigade staff, all the battalion commanders and their assistants, sat down at the tables and waited for the briefing. It was hot and sunny and some men wore shorts while others took off their shirts.

Frank spoke in general terms that morning. As he spoke, he glanced from time to time at several of the Americans, as if for confirmation of what he was saying. The Cubans particularly noticed one man who appeared to outrank everyone else. He was tall and thin, with glasses and slightly graying hair. He was called “Dick.” The description of the man and his current responsibilities suggest that he might have been Richard Bissell (the CIA master-mind of the entire operation).

When San Roman told Frank his impression of the ships, he was assured that the Cubans “were going to have protection

by sea, by air, and even from under the sea.”

The Cubans understood that to mean the United States Navy.

On April 14, before the sun had risen, Oliva left his tent and walked out of the base, thinking about the mission that was about to begin. He met Artime. Both were optimistic and happy.

Copies of “Operation Pluto,” as the invasion plan was called officially, were distributed at 9 o’clock. The Cubans read:

Commencing at H-Hour of D-Day, the Brigadé is to engage in amphibious and parachute landings, take, occupy and defend beachheads in the areas of Cochinos Bay and Playa Giron of the Zapata Swamps in order to establish a base from which ground and air operations against the Castro government of Cuba may be carried out.

Target Pinpointed

So it was to be the Bay of Pigs, where years ago Cuban engineers had dreamed of cutting a canal seventy-five miles to Cardenas Bay on the northern coast, shortening the route from the Pacific Coast ports and the Panama Canal to the Atlantic.

The Bay of Pigs has a width of 10 to 12 miles at its mouth and tapers gradually inland for 18 miles from the Caribbean. At its northernmost point, not far from a lake called “El Tesoro” (Treasure Lake) is Playa Larga, or Long Beach. To the west is the Zapata Peninsula. To the southeast the coastline runs

smoothly for twenty miles until it reaches the town of Playa Giron. Along the shore there is hard, rocky soil, and then for about a mile inland the land is smooth and firm. Immediately after that begins the Cienagade Zapata, sometimes called the “Great Swamp of the Caribbean,” extending sixty-five miles from east to west and twenty miles from north to south. The Zapata Swamps are covered with hardwood timber growing in a vast expanse of marshy terrain.

Enormous deposits of peat and black muck, as well as many reptiles, are found within the Zapata Swamp boundaries. Further along the coast, between the Bay of Pigs and the City of Cienfuegos to the east, is a large forest of valuable timber. Its potential for lumber has never been realized because of the sharp limestone rock, known to the Cubans as “dog teeth rock,” which juts out of the ground. The rock is so sharp that iron shoes are insufficient protection for draft animals hauling timber.

3 Landing Points

The Bay of Pigs-Zapata area had been virtually impassable before Castro built three major highways across the swamps and began transforming the area into a public vacation resort. At Giron alone (a main landing point in the invasion plan) 180 buildings, resembling American motels and able to accommodate 1,000 persons, were nearing completion by that April.

Operation Pluto, called for landings at three points—Playa Larga, called “Red Beach”; Giron, “Blue Beach”; and “Green Beach,” a point 20 miles to the east of Giron cutting the road to Cienfuegos. Giron was the center of the invasion. There, at Blue Beach, San Roman would land and estab-

lish his command post. From Red Beach to Green Beach, the Brigade would control 40 miles of Cuban coast line. The first battalion of paratroopers would be “dropped” in three places—along each road crossing the swamps. Thus the Brigade’s initial holdings would extend inland for more than twenty miles.

Oliva would land at Playa Larga with the Second and Fifth Battalions of infantry. San Roman would land at Giron with the Sixth Battalion of infantry, the Fourth or Armored, Battalion, and the Heavy Weapons Battalion. The Third Battalion of infantry was to land at Green Beach.

The invasion plan carefully allocated supplies from D-Day to D-Day plus 10; then from the tenth day after the invasion, to the twenty-first day, and on to the 30th day. On D-Day itself 72 tons of arms, ammunition and equipment, enough to support 4,000 men, would be unloaded. In the next 10 days, 415 tons more were to be unloaded, and then 530 more, and then 867.8 tons. Everything was worked out, ton by ton, day by day. The plan seemed superb.

TOMORROW: Turn left to Havana.

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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 4: 'Let 'er Rip'

Three leaders of Brigade 2506 who survived the April, 1961, blood bath at the Bay of Pigs related in the first three installments how they were led to believe that their 1,500 men would have plenty of support when they invaded Cuba. But they had nothing concrete, only the veiled hints of Central Intelligence Agency instructors. No one seemed to know (or else they were unwilling to tell) who was actually planning the operation. The same confusion apparently extended to the highest government offices in Washington, as detailed in today's installment of "The Bay of Pigs."

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, José Peres San Roman, Enrique Oltus and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

Soon after his inauguration on January 20, 1961, John F. Kennedy began meeting with his advisers on the problem of Cuba.

Allen Dulles, director, and Richard Bissell, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, were urging action. Time was running out, they warned: if Castro were to be overthrown, it had to be done shortly. Intelligence reports indicated that even the month of May would be too late.

By then, more and more weapons and planes—Soviet MIG jet fighter planes, and

pilots to fly them—would be arriving in Cuba from Czechoslovakia and other countries behind the Iron Curtain. The CIA was certain that an invasion would succeed if undertaken soon; but the longer the decision was postponed the smaller would be the margin of safety. Dulles and Bissell not only indorsed the plan for an invasion; they strongly advocated it.

The President asked for the opinion of his professional military men. The outline tactical plan for the invasion was sent to the Pentagon, approved at a subordinate level and then reviewed by Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Nation's supreme military authority, and Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations. On February 3 they, too, indorsed it and predicted success.

At this time the plan called for an invasion in March near Trinidad, a city of 20,000 on the southeast coast of Cuba at the foot of the Escambray Mountains.

Kennedy told the CIA to continue preparing for the invasion, but made it clear that he still might call it off. The President's doubts stemmed not only from the danger of conflict

with Russia, but also a major concern was that it might damage the relations of the United States with the neutral countries, as well as with its allies.

It was vital, then, for the American involvement to be kept both secret and at a minimum in the actual landing and fighting. The reasoning was logical—and yet, with hindsight, it contained major flaws. For, in fact, the operation had long since ceased to be secret, and the United States would have to bear the responsibility for whatever resulted.

The original target date came and went—and so did the target itself. The reason for the change was complex, a jumbled mixture of political and military considerations. When the training resumed in February, the Pentagon dispatched a special team to inspect the Brigade. The inspection was made from the 24th to the 27th of February. A report praising the combat readiness and morale of the Brigade was formally approved by the Pentagon on March 10. On the next day the National Security Council met and considered the Cuban venture. Out of that meeting and other high-level administration conferences in the middle of March, emerged a new

landing area, and a modified invasion plan.

As one man explained the changes, "The Trinidad plan was too big, too open, too big a deal. There was a kind of schizophrenic approach to the invasion: we wanted it to work, but it had to be kept under wraps so we wouldn't be implicated."

In keeping with the political-military reasoning one more change was made; instead of landing at daybreak, as originally planned, the Brigade would storm ashore at night and present the world with a fait accompli by dawn.

By March 22 the new invasion site had been selected and the plan had taken its final form. The Brigade would land 100 miles west of Trinidad at the Bahía de Cochinos, the Bay of Pigs. The new target date was first set for April 5; then it was postponed to April 10, and then a final date was selected—Monday, April 17.

More than a dozen meetings, conferences and briefings on the Cuban invasion were held in Washington between November 29, 1960, and April 12, 1961. All the meetings with the President were attended by one or more members.


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Bay of Pigs: There Was No Opposition to Plan

Continued From Page A-1 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps the most important of the meetings took place April 4 with the President presiding in the conference room of the new wing of the State Department. Seated around the long table were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and three presidential advisers and specialists on Latin America: Adolph A. Berle, jr., Richard Goodwin and Arthur M. Schlesinger, jr., Dulles, Bissell, and Lemnitzer also were present.

Richard Bissell, the man who had masterminded the U-2 flights over Russia, was the first to speak. It was his final review of the Cuban operation. The Brigade would land and hold its territory until the Cuban Revolutionary Council declared itself a "government in arms" and rallied internal support to it. The situation inside Cuba was ripe for rebellion. The Brigade air force would control the skies and operate from the captured field near the Bay of Pigs. Castro's planes would be wiped out by a Brigade air attack before the invasion.

The clinching argument came when the question was asked: What would happen if the invasion failed to bring down the Castro government?

An alternative plan had been prepared for use in the event of a total disaster. The Cubans would be told that if, somehow, the invasion foundered, they would move inland to the Escambray Mountains as a guerrilla force. The Brigade leaders themselves would have the option of deciding when to use the alternative plan. And, it was agreed, a guerrilla force of nearly 1,500 men—well armed, trained, and equipped—would be more than a thorn in Castro's side, as well as a major rallying point for further action.

Given Assurances

From the beginning, the alternative plan had been a major element in the planning process. After Trinidad was eliminated as the target, the President and other important officials were repeatedly assured that the Bay of Pigs area was good guerrilla country and that the entire force could operate there. The President had also been assured that the brigade had been trained as guerrillas when, in fact, there is no evidence that the brigade received any guerrilla training after November 4, 1960. Until that date, the Cuban force consisted of only 300 men.



PRESIDENT KENNEDY



GEN. LEMNITZER



ALLEN DULLES



RICHARD BISSELL

The alternative plan, then, seemed to minimize a disaster on the beach. As the CIA put it, if the brigade can't do it one way (invasion) they will do it the other (guerrilla).

One who was there says Bissell gave the plan his unqualified support. Mr. Dulles, who already had told the President he thought the Cuban venture was going to be easier than Guatemala, spoke briefly and also backed the plan.

(In a similar venture, six years earlier, the CIA had organized an overthrow of the Communist regime in Guatemala.)

The President pointed around the table, man by man, asking for approval or disapproval.

No one opposed the invasion. "Let'er rip," one man said.

Doubters Silent

Senator Fulbright's position is ambiguous. Although the Senator had reservations, the author has been told authoritatively that he did not—as has been written—oppose the invasion at the April 4 meeting. Later, he asked for, and received, a more detailed briefing. While he remained unconvinced, he did say he had not been aware of certain aspects of the plan that gave it a greater chance of success.

It should be said, also, that Secretary of State Rusk, who also later was represented as harboring doubts, did not express them at the meeting.

On one point President Kennedy was clear: Under no conditions were American forces to be committed to the invasion. It was a firm decision, one which was impressed on everyone, whether civilian, military, CIA or Cuban politician.

The CIA, principal architect of the invasion, was not distressed by the President's decision: It was so confident of success it believed that American manpower—and airpower—would not be needed. Air cover was one of the key elements in the CIA's invasion plan—but

Cuban, not American, air cover. The CIA assumed that the Brigade would have the total domination of the sky and thus would be invincible. Its invasion plan was based on its intelligence estimate of Castro's air force. In the official operations order for the invasion that estimate read:

The Cuban Air Force is entirely disorganized and lacks experienced pilots and specialists trained in maintenance and communications. The planes are for the most part obsolete and inoperative, owing to inadequate maintenance and the lack of spare parts. The few planes that are operational are considered to be in flying condition but are not in combat condition. The combat efficiency of the air force is almost nonexistent; it has limited capability of early warning to oppose naval and air units, and could make raids against lightly armed invaders, but in general terms it is limited to the transport of troops and material, strafing attacks, and reconnaissance patrols.

Two Air Attacks

When the CIA spoke of air cover, as it did at the Washington briefings and in Guatemala, it meant sixteen World War II B-26 attack bombers. The agency was certain these lumbering, veteran planes were all that was needed to control the air, without the support of fighters, either propeller-driven or jet. To deal with Castro's air force, the CIA plan called for two bombing attacks on Cuba—one two days before the invasion, and the other the morning of the invasion. When its bombers had finished their attacks, Castro's "almost nonexistent" air force would be totally destroyed.

Only one thing seemed to worry the CIA: the President had said he still might call off the entire operation. The point of no return for the invasion was noon of Sunday, April 16.

After that it would be too late to stop—the Brigade forces would be committed.

On Wednesday afternoon, April 12, President Kennedy walked briskly into the new State Department Auditorium for his weekly press conference. The first question at the conference was about Cuba. The President in his reply, ruled out "under any condition, an intervention in Cuba by the United States armed forces."

"The basic issue in Cuba," the President said, "is not one between the United States and Cuba, it is between the Cubans themselves. And I intend to see that we adhere to that principle, and as I understand it, this administration's attitude is so understood and shared by the anti-Castro exiles from Cuba in this country."

Glowing Report

Why the President felt compelled to insist so firmly and so publicly that the United States would not use its force to aid the Cubans is not clear. The result was clear to all, however; the United States had tied its hands in advance.

The day after the press conference a cable was sent to a special emissary of the President in Guatemala, informing him of the President's statement. The emissary, a personable, professional military man then working with the CIA, was asked to reply by "emergency procedure" if in any way he had changed his evaluation of the brigade. He immediately replied:

"My observations have increased my confidence in the ability of this force to accomplish not only initial combat missions, but also the ultimate objective, the overthrow of Castro. The brigade and battalion commanders now know all details of the plan and are enthusiastic. These officers are young, vigorous, intelligent and motivated by a fanatical urge to begin battle. Most of them have been preparing under rugged conditions of training for almost

a year. They say they know their own people and believe that after they have inflicted one serious defeat upon the opposition forces, the latter will melt away from Castro, whom they have no wish to support. They say it is a Cuban tradition to join a winner and they have supreme confidence they will win against whatever Castro has to offer. I share their confidence."

A person who is able to speak with unquestioned authority said that that glowing report overcame the last of the President's doubts. The emissary was a Marine colonel with a brilliant combat record.

When the author showed Pepe San Roman (Military commander of the brigade) this passage, he commented: "This conversation never took place with me or any of my commanders. He says we knew all the details of the plan. Actually, we knew nothing."

TOMORROW: "You Will Take Us Prisoner."

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The Bay of Pigs Camp

Official secrecy still shrouds the planning that was done on the Bay of Pigs invasion, which ended in a bloody nightmare for the 1,500 men of Brigade 2506 who hit the beach to fight Fidel Castro. This book tells, for the first time, the invasion leaders' version of what actually happened. The stories told by Pepe San Roman and Manuel Artime in the first two installments are supported here by Erneido Oliva.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

With Manuel Artime, José Pérez San Roman, Erneido Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams

Erneido Oliva had just celebrated his 28th birthday when he first heard of the plan to invade Cuba and overthrow the Communist regime of Fidel Castro.

(This young Negro, who had held high office under Castro, was to become commander of the armored battalion which landed at the Bay of Pigs in March, 1961. In the inferno that followed, he was one of the last to acknowledge defeat and his heroic exploits, to be recounted in later chapters, are a testimonial to human courage against overwhelming odds.)

Early in the summer of 1960, two Cuban underground workers told Oliva in Havana that troops were being trained in a camp in Latin

American defection caused Castro more harm than did the flight of many men of greater reputation. In Miami, Oliva went through the recruiting process set up by the Frente, the Cuban work-volunteer exile structure that had been created with the assistance of the CIA. Oliva was questioned and tested in various offices throughout the city.

"They asked me if I thought a guerrilla force could overthrow Fidel," Oliva recalls, and I said no, because I knew the regular army. Fidel had been too long in power and was too strong.

"They told me I was going to a secret place and from there I was going to fight Fidel. They said 800 men were there and that I would have all types of weapons, including artillery.

"I asked what backing we had and I was answered, 'We have all the backing necessary.' I asked what the United States was going to do and they didn't answer, but I believed they had official Government backing because they had the green light of authority to operate as they did. Everybody was convinced that the United States was behind us."


(Late in August, 1960, Oliva and 12 other

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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 3: 'The Secret Camp'

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Early in the summer of 1960, two Cuban underground workers told Oliva in Havana that troops were being trained in a camp in Latin

America for the invasion, with recruiting offices in the United States, and asked him to join.

Oliva agreed. He had already decided to work against Castro. It had not been an easy decision, for Oliva was a loyal and dedicated officer, a graduate of the (Cuban) cadet school, who at that time was serving the Castro government as a general inspector of agrarian reform throughout the island.

For Oliva, a Negro, to turn against the revolution was a contradiction of everything Castro represented. The question of race was important to Fidel; he capitalized on it and profited by it.

"I really believed at the beginning that Fidel was working for the real solution of the race problem—and not as a Communist," said Oliva.

"As a colored man, I sympathized. I discovered, however, that it was just another of Fidel's moves to divide and weaken. He was using the colored people as a symbol to divide the country.

"Beyond all that, however, was the fact that as a lifelong Catholic, I could not support communism."

Oliva's final break came when, as an expert artillery instructor, he was ordered to train Cuban soldiers in the use of a number of new 105-mm. howitzers from Italy. He refused.

"I was sure," he said later, "that some day I would fight Fidel and those weapons would be used against me."

On August 15, Oliva resigned from the army to avoid being a deserter, but his resignation was not accepted. It wasn't the proper moment, he was told; Castro might think he was against the regime. With the assistance of the underground, he obtained a seat on a plane and on the morning of August 18 flew from Havana to Miami, leaving behind his wife and month-old daughter.

After he left there were recriminations. Castro's brother Raul, in an unusual move, publicly attacked the G-2—the government intelligence force—for permitting an officer to leave without a permit.

Fidel had erected what the United States called a "Cana Curtain" to isolate his people from the West. Oliva was only one of thousands who pierced it that summer, but in time his

defection caused Castro more harm than did the flight of many men of greater reputation.

In Miami, Oliva went through the recruiting process set up by the Frente, the Cuban civilian exile structure that had been created with the assistance of the CIA. Oliva was questioned and tested in various offices throughout the city.

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BAY OF PIGS

Brigade Takes Shape In Guatemalan Hills

Continued From Page A-1
recruits were transported in locked trucks to a place called "The Little Farm" near Miami where they were issued khaki uniforms. They were joined by a second group of recruits, Cuban pilots and aviation mechanics. They boarded a plane at the abandoned United States military airport of Opa-Locka in North Miami. The windows were taped but the men stripped away the tape. Hours later, at dawn, they saw the waters of the Pacific and landed at the San Jose airport in Guatemala.)

Loaded into two buses, the recruits were driven inland through rolling fields of sugar cane.

They drove on, climbing higher and higher, through the tropical foliage of the Guatemala mountains. The road finally leveled off, and ahead they saw a cluster of red and yellow buildings set on the side of the mountain overlooking a deep valley. Minutes later the buses stopped in the midst of a large coffee plantation.

They Meet Carl

An American who limped approached them and introduced himself as Carl and took them to a large wooden warehouse where they found another group of their countrymen. This would be their quarters for the time being, Carl said, as he gestured toward the hammocks strung about the building. A lot of work would have to be done before their training could begin.

When the American left, the Cubans met another group of their countrymen who had come in July and questioned them eagerly: Where were the rest of the Cubans? Where was the liberation army of 800 to 5,000 men? Where were the weapons and artillery? Where was the training camp?

"They told me that higher in the mountains there was another group of men, but there were only about 100 in all," Oliva says. "They didn't have weapons, they didn't have uniforms, they didn't have good food, they didn't have water, and there were no barracks to live in. We felt very sad."

That first night, August 27, the rosary with

and trained to infiltrate into specific sections of each province of Cuba. Since they were going to be guerrillas they would have to become accustomed to difficult conditions, but before they could begin training full-time Base Trax had to be completed. September 19 was the date set.

(Tragedy struck in the accidental death, by a fall down a mountainside, of Carlos Santana, an idealistic young student and the most popular man in the camp. The Brigade adopted Santana's serial number, 2506, as its official designation.)

The food was bad, the rain was incessant, the living conditions were crowded, tempers were short and morale was low. But the camp was beginning to take form. On September 19, the liberation army cheered the news that "weapons were arriving."

A truck arrived with the weapons which were placed under lock and key. They had received 13 Springfield rifles, vintage World War I, and a few pistols!

Instructors Arrive

Days later about 20 men arrived in Base Trax. Europeans, Chinese, Mexicans and a few Americans, they had been brought together in some fashion by the CIA as guerrilla instructors. The Cubans called them the "Halcones" or "Hawks," after a comic strip depicting adventurers from many lands. A number of the instructors were from countries behind the Iron Curtain—Czechoslovakia, Latvia and Poland, and there was even a Russian called "Nick."

They often talked of what it was like to live inside a Communist country, but they never referred to the CIA; it was always the "group" or "organization," and sometimes the "company." Their arrival signaled the beginning of training, but it was far from the kind of training the Cubans had expected.

"The training was so bad," Oliva said. "For example, a man came to talk about Cuba to us, giving us Cuban geography, and he said Trinidad was the second largest city in Cuba. Everybody laughed out loud at him."



ERNEIDO OLIVA

Pepe named Alejandro del Valle to command the First Battalion of paratroopers, while Hugo Sueiro headed the Second Battalion of infantry, Oliva led the "homblene," or Armored Battalion, and Roberto San Roman, Pepe's brother, was in charge of the Heavy Gun Battalion. In keeping with Frank's "skeleton" outline, the Brigade at full strength would be only 800 to 900 men. Its battalions would be the size of companies and its companies actually small platoons.

Skirmishing day and night up and down the mountains, the Brigade was being whipped into an army under the close supervision of Frank and his American instructors. Although the Cubans knew the Americans only by their first names, a sense of camaraderie quickly developed.

"Gordon," "Seabee," "Pat," "Big John," "Sonny," "Bob," "Jim" and the rest of the Americans were enthusiastic and seemed genuinely to believe in the Cuban cause. Most important to the Cubans, the Americans, unlike the "Hawks," knew their business. They were excellent instructors.

"I could never make up my mind just what was behind us," said Ramon Ferrer, whom Pepe appointed Brigade chief of staff. "I knew it was the United States but I didn't know exactly what. But when Frank and the other Americans came I knew that we were under the supervision of the American military."

Morale in the camp was high and the men responded eagerly to the training. They were happy, and so was Frank. As he watched the Brigade become more proficient, he told Pepe San Roman they were developing a unit that would "sweep Cuba."

Tells of Others

He asked God
them in their mission.

'Secret' Camp

(This was the "secret training camp," already the subject of wide gossip and speculation that it housed 5,000 men, which had been established by the Central Intelligence Agency with the assent of the Guatemala government. It was a vast coffee plantation, a self-contained city carved out of the mountains at an altitude of 5,000 feet, with a hydroelectric plant and some 2,000 Indian workers. It was owned by Roberto Alejos, brother of Carlos Alejos, the Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States, who lived in an imposing home with a swimming pool, television, two or three cars, and many servants.)

(As more recruits arrived, they showed the same surprise and disappointment at the small size of the training unit. The recruits were told that a camp was to be built 2,000 feet higher. An airstrip was being built next to the town of Retalhuleu on the plains below.)

"When we finally arrived at the camp, we found it worse than we had guessed," Oliva said. With the new arrivals, the liberation army numbered 160 men.

Base Trax, as the camp was called, was on volcanic soil that became spongy and swamplike in the rains. In the distance was the towering volcano Santiaguito; it was still active. In some areas of the camp the soil was covered by six feet of volcanic ash. In that terrain and handicapped by the heaviest rainy season in years, the Cubans worked to build their camp.

Training Begins

Oliva himself, who thought he had come to train an army, began working as a carpenter. By day the men built barracks, drainage fields, and attempted to pour cement foundations in the rain. At night they began receiving military instruction from the Cuban cadre. In their first-class they met Col. Vallejo, who was in over-all charge of the camp and the training.

Col. Vallejo, a Filipino, told them he was an expert in guerrilla warfare and claimed to have been famous in the Philippines against the Japanese during World War II.

Briefly he outlined their training program: they would be divided into 12 small teams

(The Washington planners in the White House, Pentagon, State Department and CIA had, during all this period, been unable to make up their minds about the form of the invasion operation. Early in November, however, the decision was reached to drop the idea of a guerrilla operation and plan for an assault landing. The effects were felt immediately at the training camp. An American known as "Frank" took charge of Base Trax and the "Hawks" departed as silently as they had arrived.)

Energetic Start

Frank (not to be confused with Frank Bender), a florid, sandy-haired, aggressive and commanding figure, went to work energetically.

First, he inspected the men and their quarters and saw how some shared knives and forks. The men were too crowded, he said briskly, they would build more barracks immediately. After observing the lack of weapons, he said that, too, would change: Every man must have a rifle. Soon all types of weapons—all new—and ammunition began arriving at the base. With the weapons came new equipment: beds, mattresses, uniforms. A fully equipped kitchen was built. An electric plant was installed. Base Trax finally became a true military camp.

But the greatest change was in the concept of the liberation army itself. Frank had brought with him plans for creating an assault brigade. As he explained it, the brigade would be only a skeleton force, but once it went into combat it would expand rapidly because more Cubans would join it.

Of the 430 men now in the camp, 60 were separated to receive further training as guerrillas. Their mission would be to infiltrate into Cuba and prepare the way for the brigade when it landed. Carl, the American who limped, took charge of those men and they left Base Trax to receive guerrilla training in Panama.

Left behind was the Brigade, the force that would defeat Castro. From that time on it was the principal concern of the Americans.

Officers Named

Pepe San Roman was appointed Brigade commander and four battalions were formed.

"Frank always referred to our part in the combat, or our part in the armed forces," Pepe said. "This thing was much bigger and we were just a piece there—one of the most important pieces—but he said there were many, many groups being organized like ours, and they were all going to be under us. We were only one-tenth of the force. He also talked about having the Guatemalan army with us, to help us in the rear."

The Cubans did not question Frank closely; they trusted in him and in the Americans who so obviously were behind them.

(Recruiting in Miami, meanwhile, slowed up because of rumors that as many as 20,000 Cubans were in training in Guatemala. On New Year's Day, 1961, in Havana, Castro spoke hysterically about an imminent American invasion. On January 3, President Eisenhower severed diplomatic ties with Cuba. On January 20, Mr. Eisenhower, the oldest President in United States history, stepped aside for John F. Kennedy, the youngest ever elected to that office.)

(The tension was mounting and in February, the first of the Brigade's infiltration teams landed in Cuba. It was an inauspicious beginning and a portent of the disaster to follow little more than two months later.)

These teams had been trained by the CIA in Florida, Louisiana and even in Maryland, near Fort Meade, 20 miles north of Washington, D. C., to operate in Cuban provinces and cities.

Key to Success

Composed primarily of young intensely idealistic students, they were to prepare the way for the invasion by creating internal strife and fomenting popular uprisings. Their job was a key to the success of an invasion mounted by a small force.

A five-man team left the Florida Keys in a small boat powered by an outboard motor on January 27. When they reached the Cuban coast and flashed their lights in the prescribed manner, there was no return signal.

In a second attempt six days later, all the invaders became sick because of a defective gas pipe. They were picked up by an American patrol vessel and returned to the United States.

On the third attempt, heavy seas buffeted the ship until it capsized. The men swam ashore

practically naked, without weapons, money or radio equipment.

Other infiltration teams followed, but they encountered problems. Supplies failed to arrive on time and when they did, they often fell into the hand of the enemy. The teams set up radio nets in operation between Cuba and the United States, but they found that the CIA did not seem to trust them. Many messages sent from Cuba to the CIA never were acted upon.

Tomorrow: Let'er Rip.

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 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____

The Bay of Pigs--Chapter Two: 'The Die Is Cast'

Yesterday Jose Perez San Roman, leader of Brigade 2506 told of the rugged training the CIA gave the anti-Castro Cubans at a secret base in Panama. The Cubans then went to Guatemala where they were trained on part of a vast coffee plantation owned by Robert Alejos, brother of the Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States.

Here is Manuel Artime's story of how Brigade 2506 was formed and the events leading to its disaster in April, 1961, at the Bay of Pigs.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, Jose Perez San Roman, Ezequiel Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

The phone rang in the Rio de Janeiro Hotel room occupied by Dr. Manuel Francisco Artime. The caller identified himself as "Jaime Castillo." The name was familiar although the voice was not.

On a speaking tour of Central and Latin America, financed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), America's super-secret espionage network, Artime had received calls from "Jaime" in each city he visited. In each country, "Jaime" had a different voice but always asked if there was anything he could do to help Artime.



Members of Brigade 2506 training in Guatemala.

This time, the caller wanted to see Artime urgently; he was in the hotel lobby and asked to come up immediately. "Jaime" turned out to be an American who spoke Spanish fluently. He insisted that Artime fly immediately to New York to meet some "friends" who wanted to talk to him. It was, he said, vital to the future of Cuba.

(The time was late in March, 1960. Artime did not know it but President Eisenhower, two weeks earlier, had authorized the CIA to organize, train and equip Cuban refugees as a guerrilla force to overthrow Fidel Castro;

Communist dictator of Cuba. Artime had been spirited by the CIA out of Cuba in December, 1959, after he had publicly defied Castro. He had, since that time, been seeking to rally support in Latin America for action against Cuba.)

"Jaime" told Artime to go to New York, to the Statler Hilton Hotel, and ask for a room reserved in the name of George L. Ringo. He flew to New York and checked in at the hotel. He had been in his room only a few minutes when the phone rang.

"Mr. Ringo?"

"Yes, I am Mr. Ringo."

But the caller was speaking in English and Artime could not understand him well. The caller hung up, and the phone rang again.

"Mr. Ringo."

This was a voice Artime understood and recognized. It was Oscar Echevarria, a friend from Cuba who had studied with Artime in college. Echevarria and another Cuban whom Artime knew and trusted, Angel Fernandez Varela, came to the room. They explained that some prominent Cubans who had opposed Batista wanted to contact Artime to see if he would join them in a common cause against Castro.

Artime said he opened his arms to them; then he asked what the Americans had to do with this. His friends told him an important American wanted to meet him now and explain that himself. They parted with an abrazo, or embrace, and Artime waited. There was a knock on the door and when Artime opened it he saw a tall man, expensively dressed, accompanied by one of his Cuban friends. The American introduced himself.

"It was the first time I heard his name," Artime said later. "I was going to hear that name until the Bay of Pigs, Frank Bender. The great Frank Bender. All right.

See BAY OF PIGS, Page A-8

New York Herald Tribune _____
 New York Journal-American _____
 New York Mirror _____
 New York Daily News _____
 New York Post _____
 The New York Times _____
 The Worker _____
 The New Leader _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The National Observer _____
 People's World _____
 Date 5/18/64 _____

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BAY OF PIGS

Exile Artime Told Anti-Castro Effort Was Backed by 'Company of Wealthy People'

Continued from Page 1
Manolo, Bender said, "we've got lots to talk about. I am the man in charge of the Cuban case."

Bender repeated the explanation that Artime had heard so often: The great company of wealthy people he represented had directed a large part of its money and effort toward the solution of the Cuban problem, and the defeat of communism everywhere. They had nothing to do with the American Government, Bender told him, but they did have influence. Then he asked for Artime's thoughts on the future of Cuba.

"I told him that Cuba could return to the old corrupt government," Artime said, "that a return to a military dictatorship would lead once more down the road to communism. I told him I believed we needed a genuinely democratic government. We needed social justice."

Bender apparently was impressed. He listened quietly as Artime discussed his ideas for a guerrilla uprising in Oriente Province and then Bender asked, "Why not an uprising all over the island?" Artime said he didn't have enough men or weapons for that.

"Well, Artime, what if I told you that we have men who will help you to prepare for guerrilla warfare and others who will prepare men to fight in a conventional war with army training?"

"And you will give us the weapons?"
"All the weapons you need," Bender replied. "And also we will train radio operators so you can be in contact directly with Cuba."

Bender wanted to know if Artime could get men out of Cuba to be trained for such an operation. Artime replied that he could.

"Fine," Bender said, as he got up and handed Artime a piece of paper. "Call this number whenever you need me. Just say 'To Frank Bender from Manolo and I will come to the phone.' He instructed Artime to go to Miami where more friends would be in touch with him, and said he had reserved a plane ticket for him. Artime could pick it up at the hotel. "When you leave," the American said, "Don't bother about paying the hotel bill. Just throw the key on the desk in the lobby."

'Powerful Company'

As he left the room, Bender shook hands and said, "Remember, Manolo, I am not a member of the United States Government. I have nothing to do with the United States Government. I am only working for a powerful company that wants to fight communism."
(In this manner, Artime was



Castro's peasant "militianos" remained loyal.

picked by the CIA to help organize his fellow refugees in a counter-revolutionary movement that led to tragedy in the Bay of Pigs. He was to become the civilian leader of Brigade 2506, the band of 1,500 Cubans trained at a secret base in the mountains of Guatemala.)
As a man destined to play so important a role in the counter-revolution, Artime was in many respects an unlikely candidate for history. He was then only 28 years old and he spoke no English.

His career itself was one of contradictions. The son of a Communist, he was a devout Catholic, a product of the Jesuits. Although he had a degree as a medical doctor and was trained as a psychiatrist, he had been working with the peasants to improve agricultural production. He was a revolutionary but neither lean nor hungry. He was short, stocky, black-haired and possessed a rasping voice. He also was fairly naive and trusting. He liked to express himself in sentimental verse and had a strong sense of dramatics.

As the manager in Oriente province of the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), managers of Cuba, he had heard Castro personally outline a plan to communize Cuba within three years.

"I realized," Artime said, "that I was a democratic infiltrator in a Communist government."

Underground Work

He took a leave of absence and, with a group of college students, began organizing an underground movement among the peasants. When Castro's G-2 began searching for the leaders, Artime took refuge with the Jesuits in Havana. His open letter of resignation from the rebel army, addressed personally to Castro, was the sensation of the day.

After it appeared, a Jesuit priest said he would put Artime in touch with an American who could get him out of the country. Dressed as a priest and carrying a pistol hidden inside a missal, Artime walked up the steps to the American Embassy and met an American, a man he knew as "Williams."

While the American hid Artime in his own apartment, he asked many questions about Castro and Communist infiltrators. The information, Williams said, was being passed on to the

United States; he thought the government would be interested in talking to Artime.

On the night of December 14, 1959, Williams and two other Americans took Artime to a bar on the Havana waterfront where they met the captain of a Honduran freighter. The captain escorted Artime to his cabin aboard ship, moved a steel cabinet to one side, opened a trap door, and told him to get in. At midnight an hour Artime will never forget, the ship began to move. It was raining heavily, the seas were high and lightning was flashing outside.

Artime's escape from Cuba followed what came to be the standard CIA procedure. When the freighter carrying him from Cuba docked in the bright morning sunshine at Tampa, Fla., Artime was met on the pier by a tall, white-haired American with glasses who introduced himself as "Mr. Burnett, a friend of Williams." There on the dock Artime heard for the first time the story that would be repeated again and again: Burnett did not work for the United States government, but he was employed by a large group of wealthy capitalists who were fighting communism and who had influential friends in the government and in Washington.

Quizzed Closely

Artime and Burnett left for Miami, and from that time on the young Cuban doctor was in the hands of the CIA. More "friends" of Williams and Burnett appeared in Miami. They, too, said they were interested in helping Artime get weapons for the Cuban underground, but first they had to be certain of Artime's motives.

They questioned him extensively about his life and his thoughts for the future. "After hours of interrogation in an obscure motel while another American 'friend' took stenographic notes, formal testing began: First the Rorschach ink blot test, and then they explained they were going to give him a lie detector test. When Artime strongly objected that such a test was only for criminals, the Americans assured him that they all had taken it; all the top men in the Pentagon had taken it; in the United States it was a common test. Besides, they said, they were risking jail themselves in considering giving him weapons, so

Grudgingly Artime agreed, and the questions were asked: How many times had he seen Castro? Was he serving another country or power at that moment? Had he told the truth about the INRA meeting and Castro? Did he have any intention of harming the United States? Was he certain his father had broken with the Communists? Had his father suggested he try to come to the United States? Was Artime himself a Communist?

After the test was over, the Americans withdrew to another room. It was late at night when they returned. He remembers their words: "O.K., Artime, you are our friend and we are going to be very close friends of yours."

From the beginning, the Cuban counter-revolutionists viewed their new American friends with blind trust. Artime was no exception. He, and later virtually all of the Cubans involved, believed so much in the Americans—or wanted so desperately to believe that they never questioned what was happening or expressed doubts about the plan.

Feeling of Kinship

To Cubans, the United States was more than the colossus of the North; for the two countries were bound closely by attitudes, by history, by geography and by economic ties. The United States was great and powerful, the master not only of the hemisphere but of the world, and it was Cuba's friend. One really didn't question such a belief. And the mysterious, anonymous, ubiquitous American agents who dealt with the Cubans managed to strengthen that belief. As Artime himself said later:

"I don't know why, but in the bottom of my heart I believed those people would help me. I was impressed by the way they got me out of Cuba and took me through immigration with no problem at all. And I thought about that lie detector—you couldn't buy that in a ten-cent store. And besides that, it came to my mind that they were obviously more than a group of rich men. The kind of questions they asked, what they

decisions had still made the final decision on what to do or how to do it.

A group of top officials of the State Department, Pentagon, CIA and White House met periodically. At first their plans were based on a guerrilla operation. In August, it was suggested that the guerrilla campaign be scrapped for an invasion of two or three hundred men with tactical air support by planes piloted by Cubans. Finally, a decision was reached. It would be a plan to overthrow Castro by invasion and direct action.

On November 4, four days before the presidential election, the CIA sent a long cable to Guatemala informing its men there of the decision. The CIA ordered a reduction of the guerrilla force to a strength of sixty; "use conventional arms and training for everyone else." The cable spelled out, from A to Z, how the change in training was to take place, employing World War II infantry assault landing tactics. It became the Bible of the training camp. From that date any talk in the camp of guerrilla warfare was regarded by the CIA as a sign of weakness.

Decision Delayed

The idea that a few hundred men would overthrow Castro in a frontal assault is all the more astonishing in view of the known facts of Castro's forces then. On November 18, for example, the State Department made public details of military aid to Cuba from the Soviet bloc. At that time, the department said Castro's army was judged to be 10 times the size that Batista's had been. And from January, 1959, to mid-November, 1960, some 28,000 tons of military supplies had been shipped into Cuba.

In attempting to reconstruct the process by which the "special group" made its decision, one impression comes through strongly: Dwight D. Eisenhower was not a major participant. Eisenhower himself had said publicly that there was no plan for an invasion while he was in office; that the only plan then was to train guerrillas.

It was clear that the final decision on Cuba would have to be made by a new administration.

On November 18, President-elect Kennedy, resting at Palm Beach after his victory over Nixon by slightly more than 100,000 votes, was visited by Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, and Richard Bissell, the chief CIA architect of the Cuban training plans, and told of the existence of the camp in Guatemala.

Immediately, he was faced with making the first of many decisions involving Cuba that would mark his brief administration.

Democracy: The Secret Camp
Excerpted from the book with the permission of W. W. Norton & Co., Publishers. Copyright 1964, by HARVEY JOHNSON.

"Fine," Bender said, as he got up and handed Artime a piece of paper. "Call this number whenever you need me. Just say 'To Frank Bender from Manolo' and I will come to the phone." He instructed Artime to go to Miami where more friends would be in touch with him, and said he had reserved a plane ticket for him; Artime could pick it up at the hotel. "When you leave," the American said, "Don't bother about paying the hotel bill. Just throw the key on the desk in the lobby."

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He felt even more assured when the Americans arranged for him to leave the country and go into hiding until their plans had been completed. Artime was flown from Miami to New Orleans, accompanied by still another American known only by his first name, given a passport, and again cleared through immigration without question.

On Christmas Eve, 1959, Artime flew to Mexico City. In Havana Castro was warning of a Yankee invasion, and Cubans were receiving television lessons on fighting the imperialists. The year that Fidel had proclaimed as "The Year of the Revolution" was coming to an end.

Election Issue

(Artime spent the next three months touring Central and Latin America in a CIA-financed search for support of an anti-Castro movement, although President Eisenhower had not yet approved the order authorizing the CIA to organize the invasion army. Late in March, 1960, after the interview with "Frank Bender," Artime began active recruiting.

(It was a presidential campaign year and two young candidates for the seat to be vacated by Eisenhower had made Cuba the dominant international issue. Vice President Richard M. Nixon knew of the secret training plans but was bound by security regulations from referring to them. Senator John F. Kennedy called for support of a revolution against Castro. Castro repeatedly charged that the "Yankee imperialists" were training "mercenaries" for an invasion. On October 30, La Hora, a newspaper published in Guatemala City, printed a story about the training camp and described the preparations for an invasion as well under way.)

Many months had passed since Eisenhower had approved the forming of a liberation army but the administration

strongly. Dwight D. Eisenhower was not a major participant. Eisenhower himself had said publicly that there was no plan for an invasion while he was in office, that the only plan then was to train guerrillas.

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Tomorrow: The Secret Camp

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 Evans _____
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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter One: 'Tigers From the Sea'

On the night of April 16, 1961, a small fleet of vessels carrying 1,500 men in jungle camouflage uniforms arrived off the southern coast of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.

On one of those ships was José Pérez San Roman, familiarly known as "Pepe," the 29-year-old commander of Brigade 2506, as the Cubans called their army. San Roman ordered the Cuban flag raised, signalling the invasion.

The nightmare which followed marks a dark period in American history. Today, *The Star* begins publication, in condensed form of a new book "The Bay of Pigs" by Haynes Johnson. Based on sources hitherto unavailable, "The Bay of Pigs" lifts the protective cover of secrecy that has surrounded a disastrous defeat. This is the first of 15 installments.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artimo, José Pérez San Roman, Ernesto Olliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

Pepe San Roman first began to doubt the intelligence information when his flagship arrived at Playa Giron (one of the three beaches marked by the United States Central Intelligence Agency for landing operations).

Back in the camp at Base Trax, in Guatemala, when the invasion plan had first been revealed, "Bill," the intelligence expert (all CIA agents were known by assumed



Some of Fidel Castro's First Prisoners—AP Photo.

names only), had assured them the area would be deserted and undefended.

"He told us that Castro could not react for at least 72 hours," Pepe said. "And also that Fidel didn't have any big forces close to the place. The closest were in Santa Clara and that was far away. And from his information, they were so disorganized it would take them time to get together and come and give us a fight.

"He also said that there were no communications between Castro's troops in the area and if they saw us landing they would have to take a car and go sixty kilometers to Covadonga to telephone. He said there were no

civilians in the zone. They were constructing a resort for tourists there but it was still a very isolated area."

Now, instead of the deserted resort houses the CIA had said he would find, the shore was ablaze with lights.

At eleven o'clock, five Cuban frogmen prepared to leave the *Blagar* in two rubber rafts to place white and red lights on the beach to mark the landing zone at Giron. The frogmen, weighted down by their Browning automatic rifles and ammunition, their signal lights and black rubber suits, masks and flippers, entered their inflated rafts and silently moved toward Cuba. There was no moon to light the way. Gray, the American who had

trained them, was with them and Gray, the American, was the first to land in the invasion—despite the insistence of President Kennedy that no Americans participated in the action.

Instead of the smooth approach and sandy beach they had expected to find, it was rocky terrain with razor-sharp coral reefs offshore, poorly suited to an amphibious operation. By the time they had succeeded in placing the first landing light, it was fifteen minutes before midnight. The light flashed on the beach, from beside a concrete pier, and as it did the men aboard the *Blagar* saw other lights; a small vehicle was moving rapidly toward the beach from Giron, a half mile to the east. It was a jeep. It stopped, backed up, and turned its lights toward the sea. The frogmen, led by Gray, opened fire with their automatic rifles; but the alarm had been sounded and now a truck carrying Castro militiamen was heading toward them.

As the firing began, the lights of Giron went off. By radio the frogmen called for support from the *Blagar* and soon the shooting was intense. Near the northernmost point of the Bay of Pigs, the soldiers saw red and orange tracers lighting the sky over Giron. It was, one said later, "a very emotional moment for us, because they were the first shots fired toward Cuba."

While the shooting continued, the first landing craft edged toward the coast line carrying men of the Fourth Battalion from the Caribe. Because of the unexpected op-

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 The New York Times _____
 The Worker _____
 The New Leader _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The National Observer _____
 People's World _____
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Bay of Pigs: Faulty Intelligence Shows Up Early

Continued From Page A-1

position, San Roman decided to go ashore in that boat to direct the fighting. Accompanied by Ramon Ferrer, his chief of staff, and two radio operators, San Roman boarded the landing craft. In the darkness and confusion they headed in the wrong direction. When the pilot moved back on course, the boat was caught in a spotlight from the beach and the men came under direct fire. The pilot veered sharply, landed where he could, and San Roman and the men jumped into the water and waded ashore.

Pepe, the calm and quiet soldier, yielded to the emotion of the moment when he reached the beach: He knelt, under fire, took a piece of earth and kissed it; then he organized a small beachhead and began fighting the militia. Seventy-five millimeter cannons from the *Blagar* found the range. Twice the cannon boomed out. There was no answering fire; everything was quiet, everything seemed well.


Miscalculation

Now the trouble began. It stemmed from an almost incredible miscalculation by Americans who, by record, by reputation and by experience were the unsurpassed experts at amphibious operations.

During World War II, not one assault landing had been attempted at night. Yet, in the first such landing planned by Americans, well-known coral reefs had been ignored or forgotten. Certainly the reefs were unknown to the invasion troops—until their boats struck. Some were sunk, some merely delayed. The invasion schedule was set back and surprise, the only advantage of attempting a risky landing at night, was lost.

A way had to be found through the reefs—especially a channel wide enough for the large LCUs (Landing Craft Utilities) carrying the tanks. Jose Alonso, commander of the frogmen, began working with his men to chart a path for the invaders.

While the frogmen were in the water, the Fourth Battalion began landing, cursing the darkness and the small boats. On the beach their commander, Valentin Bacallao, was ordered to Giron with part of his men and another group was dis-



Pepe San Roman (second from left) and Manuel Artime (second from right) salute as the Cuban flag is

raised on the flagship *Blagar*, signaling the beginning of the Bay of Pigs invasion on Sunday, April 16, 1961.

when San Roman attended a group meeting where he and other Cuban army officers met with Dr. Manuel Francisco Artime in an old house in Miami overlooking Biscayne Bay. Artime, 28, had been spirited out of Havana by CIA agents in December, 1959, after he had openly defied Castro and resigned from the army. He and San Roman were to share leadership of the brigade.)

Although Artime had requested the meeting, he was late. When he arrived, he was in a rush and obviously excited. He paced up and down and told them what he knew: They had an opportunity given to few men, they had a chance to liberate their country. He told of his meetings with the Americans and the promise of large-scale assistance.

Even though the Americans he had talked to claimed they had no official connection with

green eyes and walked with a limp. Artime introduced him as "Carl" and said that he would take them to their first destination.

Each man had brought a pistol.

"That's the way the thing started," said Pepe. "We distrusted each other but we had confidence in the Americans."

But when Carl asked them to turn over any weapons they had, they said they had none.

A three-hour ride through the night brought them to the west coast of Florida, somewhere near Fort Myers. There, they were taken to a waterfront area where they saw a power cruiser tied up at a pier with the motor running and two Americans aboard. Again the Cubans were told they must turn over their weapons; again they said they didn't have any.

As soon as they were aboard, the cruiser headed for the open

cruiser pulled alongside a wooden dock, there they saw three more Americans carrying carbines and pistols. It was one o'clock in the morning.

Carl led them from the pier to a small truck. The driver also was an American, blond, young and smiling. He said he was glad they had come. He drove them across the sand and up a small hill, and there through the orange and grapefruit trees they saw the lights from a large building shining on smaller structures scattered across what seemed to be a golf course. They had arrived at the headquarters of the Americans.

Carl said: "Now give us your guns." They gave him their guns.

Before they went to bed, Carl gave them their first briefing. He began by telling them that everything was top secret. While they were on the island they must stay away from the

—until their boats struck. Some were sunk, some merely delayed. The invasion schedule was set back and surprise, the only advantage of attempting a risky landing at night, was lost.

A way had to be found through the reefs—especially a channel wide enough for the large LCUS (Landing Craft Utility)—carrying the tanks. José Alonso, commander of the frogmen, began working with his men to chart a path for the invaders.

While the frogmen were in the water, the Fourth Battalion began landing, cursing the darkness and the small boats. On the beach their commander, Yallentin Bacallao, was ordered to Giron with part of his men and another group was dispatched to the Giron Airport. The airport was the principal objective, and at the briefing the brigade leaders had been told they would have to do some work with heavy equipment before their planes could land. Bulldozers and graders and an electric saw to cut trees had been brought from Nicaragua especially for that job.

Soon the word came back to San Roman. "This strip was ready. It was a perfect strip, very long, very nice and very clean, and there were no piles of sand as we had been told." Another, more serious difference between intelligence forecast and actuality was all too apparent: the area was not deserted—civilians who were constructing the resort houses were living at Giron with their families.

Tigers From the Sea

Soon San Roman himself was on his way to Giron to select his headquarters. Along the way an old peasant, one of the charcoal workers in the swamps, saw the Brigade passing. He shrank in terror beside the road and asked fearfully, "Who are you?" He was reassured to learn that they, too, were Cubans. With their faces painted black and their spotted camouflage uniforms, the old man thought they looked like tigers from the sea.

(Thus, in the first hour of the invasion, San Roman had occasion for alarm about the faulty intelligence supplied the invaders by CIA agents to whom they had given their complete trust. His thoughts unquestionably went back to a meeting 11 months earlier when he was first enlisted in an adventure which took him into the shadowy world where the counter-revolution was being engineered by Americans who never acknowledged their true identities. (It was on a day in May, 1960,



ERNEIDO OLIVA
Brigade Second in Command

out of Havana by CIA agents in December, 1959, after he had openly defied Castro and resigned from the army. He and San Roman were to share leadership of the brigade.)

Although Artime had requested the meeting, he was late. When he arrived, he was in a rush and obviously excited. He paced up and down and told them what he knew: They had an opportunity given to few men, they had a chance to liberate their country. He told of his meetings with the Americans and the promise of large-scale assistance.

Even though the Americans he had talked to claimed they had no official connection with the government, Artime said he was convinced they did. Already, he said, the Americans were helping him to bring men out of Cuba and to transmit messages back to the underground. At length, he outlined the help the United States was going to give; Arms, tanks, airplanes, everything they needed.

Calls for Volunteers

Only a few days before, he went on, a group of his students had left for a secret camp where they were beginning their training. The Americans had said they needed professional Cuban officers to train and lead the liberation forces. Artime urged them to volunteer. Within six months, he told them, they would have five thousand men trained and ready to move. When that time came, they would be so strong that Fidel would be overthrown in a week.

Although Artime's men and the officers in San Roman's group had been enemies in Cuba and still distrusted each other, the officers believed that such a military force as Artime had outlined would certainly defeat Fidel. Despite their personal differences, Pepe remembers that they were unanimously confident. For them it was more than a matter of faith; they knew their country's history. Small groups of men always had triumphed over larger forces in Cuba. Batista proved that, and Fidel himself—he had started with only twelve men!

(Ten of the Cuban officers decided to go to the secret camp. Those who had families knew they would not starve. The United States would pay each man \$175 a month, plus \$50 for his wife and \$25 for other dependents.)

Nevertheless Pepe San Roman found it difficult to explain to his wife. He waited until his three children were in bed and then began to talk as he and his wife sat down at the kitchen table.

"I told her that for her and my kids I had to fight Castro. And I told her I had found a way to fight him now, and it was a very sure way, and I was going to leave her for the camp, but she could be sure that in six months it would be over and we would be back in Cuba, happy with the family. I told her I wanted to go because it was my duty as a Cuban. I didn't want my kids to ask me after Cuba was free what I had done and was unable to give them a good answer. I promised it was going to be successful and that we would have a home in Cuba near her family that she loves very much."

Pepe Meets 'Carl'

On June 2, the day of their departure for the camp, Pepe San Roman for the first time met one of the Americans involved in the affair. He was a man in his 30s, obviously strong, dressed in sports shirt and slacks, but with the bearing of a professional soldier. Pepe remembers noticing that he had

"That's the way the thing started," said Pepe. "We distrusted each other but we had confidence in the Americans."

But when Carl asked them to turn over any weapons they had, they said they had none.

A three-hour ride through the night brought them to the west coast of Florida, somewhere near Fort Myers. There, they were taken to a waterfront area where they saw a power cruiser tied up at a pier with the motor running and two Americans aboard. Again the Cubans were told they must turn over their weapons; again they said they didn't have any.

As soon as they were aboard, the cruiser headed for the open sea. The Cubans talked quietly among themselves in Spanish. "We were afraid maybe they were taking us to a Fidelista boat," Pepe said. "We said if we are going to Fidel we will shoot the four Americans even if Fidel gets us. Well, we had a compass. So we saw that we were going west, always west. So we said, West, we cannot go to Cuba."

Reach Headquarters


After a tense hour the Cubans saw a long shadow ahead in the moonlight. As they drew closer they made out a wide, beautiful beach. It was very white under the full moon and they could distinguish what appeared to be a number of small cabins. The

also was an American, blond, young and smiling. He said he was glad they had come. He drove them across the sand and up a small hill, and there through the orange and grapefruit trees they saw the lights from a large building shining on smaller structures scattered across what seemed to be a golf course. They had arrived at the headquarters of the Americans.

Carl said, "Now give us your guns." They gave him their guns.

Before they went to bed, Carl gave them their first briefing. He began by telling them that everything was top secret. While they were on the island they must stay away from the shore to avoid being seen by boats and planes; they must not swim for the waters around the island were alive with sharks. They would be permitted to write one letter saying they were well and happy, but they could say neither where they were nor what they were doing. They were told that they would be given various tests, and that those chosen for the cadre would go to another secret base to learn to train others in the liberation army; the rest would stay on the island for a radio communications course.

When Carl finished, it was nearly 2 o'clock in the morning. For a moment there was silence, and then Pepe San Roman asked the question in



Brigade leaders show the effects of their invasion ordeal in these pictures taken before and after the invasion. Above is Pepe San Roman, in Guatemala in February, 1961 (left) and in prison in Havana two months later. Below is Manuel Artime in Guatemala and later after his capture in the swamps surrounding the Bay of Pigs.



every man's mind. "What is the United States going to give?"

"We are here to help Cuba, and if you are here for that reason we will get along well," Carl replied. Eventually, as it was, Carl's answer satisfied the eager Cubans.

On Resort Island

For the next three weeks the Cubans lived in comfort in the rustic golf club. They were on the resort island of Useppa, an island a Cuban named Freddie Goudie had leased on behalf of the CIA. The papers were made out in Goudie's name and there was nothing to indicate the American involvement—except for the presence of the Americans themselves.

Aside from the Cuban recruits, everyone on the island was American. After Carl, the key people seemed to be "Jimmy," a towering, black-haired man who spoke Spanish; "Walter," who had an artificial eye; and "Gordon," quiet and diplomatic. There was a psychologist with blond hair who said he was from Nashville, Tenn. and there were others whose names have been forgotten. "Max," the psychiatrist, has not been forgotten. He was genial, short, bespectacled and German. Max was in charge of testing.

Each man received a physical examination, and intelligence, psychological and general aptitude tests. As Artime had discovered months before, the lie detector was regarded as one of the most important testing devices.

The Americans always tried to give the impression that a Cuban millionaire was paying the bills, and that the United States Government had nothing to do with the operation. The Cubans figuratively winked at the claim, and privately joked about the "Cuban millionaire" and referred to him as "Uncle Sam." "At that time we were so stupid," one of the men said later. "We thought Uncle Sam was behind us. He wanted to do this secretly. That was all right because he was Uncle Sam, and he is strong."

On June 22 Carl assembled the Cubans and introduced "Dick," a tall man in his 50s, quiet and pleasant. Dick told them that the 28 men who had been chosen as the cadre would leave immediately for the next base. The others would stay until their radio course was finished and then they all would be reunited with the liberation army.

Pepe San Roman was among the 28. With the others, he was taken back to the mainland on two cruisers. When they reached the pier near Fort Myers, they were told to run to a large truck backed up to the dock with its rear doors open. The doors slammed shut and they drove off, unable to see outside.

Several hours later they got out in the middle of a deserted farm where they waited until the sun set; then they continued their trip in the closed truck. When it stopped again, they saw a C-54 transport plane directly in front of them. Again they were ordered to run. They were able to catch only a glimpse of a few scraggly pines and untended fields before they got on the plane, the windows of which were masked from the outside. The engines started immediately, and they took off. Eventually,

nearly 1,500 more would follow them.

Deep in a Jungle

Some six or seven hours later their plane landed in darkness, and they were herded to a waiting truck. Again the doors slammed shut and they traveled for another hour in darkness. They were herded to a waiting truck. Again the doors slammed shut and they traveled for another hour in darkness. They were deep in a tropical jungle. From far away they heard a sharp, shrill whistle. It could have been a factory—or perhaps a ship.

An American of medium height and weight, with a scar on his face, who called himself "Peter," greeted them and introduced John, Dave, Wally and the rest of their American instructors. All of the Americans were in civilian clothing. Because they had arrived so late, Peter said, they would not have to get up early that morning, but after that each day would begin at 5 o'clock. They went to bed in nearby wooden barracks, tired and excited, hopeful and fearful.

Later in the morning Peter gave them a more formal briefing. Just as on Useppa Island, everything was top secret. Then he defined the camp boundaries.

"He said that we could not go to the top of the hill that was in back of the mess hall," Pepe said. "It was off limits. And we could not go around the road. And he said that if we see anybody we shouldn't say anything. Also, he said that sometimes there were hunters in that zone, so possibly we might hear some guns fired from time to time."

Peter explained that they would be trained at the base for eight weeks, and after that they would leave to instruct the Cuban liberation army. The training would be rugged, but when they finished they would be experts in guerrilla warfare.

'Off Limits' Explored

Despite precautions, including cigarettes bearing labels from a variety of American countries; the removal of labels from the uniforms they were issued; the obvious scratching out of "USA" on their weapons, the Cubans soon discovered where they were, and in whose hands.

On Sunday, their first day off from training, Rafe Ferrer, later the Cuban chief of staff, explored the off-limits territory. When he got to the top of a hill he clearly saw the Panama Canal. Not long after his discovery, the men noticed one of their instructors carrying a Panama City newspaper. In fact, they were in the United States' army jungle warfare training camp area of Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone.

The training was rugged. "We were taught how to fight as guerrillas," Pepe says. "Sometimes they would make us walk a long way through the jungle to get the feel of it—to be wet, without food and to experience danger. There was the danger of getting lost, and there were snakes. It was a very deep jungle."

"The equipment and living conditions were poor, but we did not really mind. At that point we believed that we were going to train a large number of Cubans for guerrilla war, that we were going to Cuba, and that we would always have what we had then—organization and control, good control. We

might die in Cuba, but we are doing something organized by people who really cared. Those instructors did a good job with us. We never thought things were going to be handled the way they eventually were."

Guerrillas Tested

In the middle of August, in their seventh week of training, the men began a long, tactical field problem, with Pepe heading a guerrilla force that was supposed to attack the "army" back at the base. The mission went smoothly and everyone was pleased—especially the Americans.

As a reward for their arduous training, the Cubans were given a farewell party with beer and a big cake. In the convivial atmosphere, the Americans and Cubans drank and talked while a record player played Latin songs. As the party progressed a short, stocky American brought out a Spanish guitar and began to play flamenco. The Cubans were delighted, and rather amazed, to see an American playing their music so well. As they sang together, one of the Americans said: "Well, we'll meet in a free Cuba." Another American told Pepe they were going to a new base the next day, "where here were five thousand men, and everything was ready." The next evening, August 22, 1960, they again boarded a C-54 and flew off into the night.

The base to which they were flown was in the Sierra Madre mountains in Guatemala, part of a vast coffee plantation, called Helvetia, owned by Roberto Alejo, brother of the Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States. Months earlier, the ambassador had been approached about the massing of arms and training of Cuban anti-Castro forces on Guatemalan soil.

The details of the final oral agreement between the CIA and Miguel Ydigoras, then president of Guatemala, never have been made public. Mr. Ydigoras has stated that the United States pledged to mediate Guatemala's claim to British Honduras territory but the United States has denied it. Whatever the terms, a bargain was made.

When San Roman and his companions arrived in the secret training camp, they found only 160 men instead of the 500 promised by the CIA. Seven months later, as DDT approached, the number was 500.

Tomorrow: The die is cast. Manuel Artime's dramatic story. Adapted from the book by permission of W. W. Norton & Co. Publishers. Copyright 1964 by W. W. Norton & Co.

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An Absorbing Account of Fiasco That Was the Bay of Pigs Invasion

THE BAY OF PIGS. By Haynes Johnson. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 368 pages. \$5.95. *Book*

Cuban exiles are the heroes and the Central Intelligence Agency is the villain in this absorbing and important work of current history.

Haynes Johnson took a year's leave of absence from the Washington Star to get and write this narrative account of the abortive attempt to invade Cuba in 1961. He interviewed many of the members of the invasion brigade in the months after the United States ransomed them from prison in Cuba. His four collaborators in the book—Manuel Artime, Jose Perez San Roman, Erneido Oliva, and Enrique Ruiz-Williams—had been handpicked by the CIA as leaders of the invasion force.

With their help, he pieced together the story of the creation of the secret exile training camps in Guatemala in the Eisenhower Administration, the accelerated training under President Kennedy, the embarkation at a Nicaraguan port with Dictator Luiz Somoza bidding goodby, the night landing on a beach unexpectedly girdled with reefs, Fidel Castro's disastrous control of the air, the sinking of a ship carrying precious supplies, three days of bitter fighting on the beach, the final defeat, and the long denouement of imprisonment and eventual release. Much of the detailed account is new.

Allegations about the CIA are numerous and serious, Mr. Johnson says the agency underestimated the Cuban air force, overestimated the readiness of the Cuban people



Star Staff Photo
HAYNES JOHNSON

to revolt, reconnoitred the beach poorly, failed to tell the exiles they should move into the mountains as a guerrilla force if the invasion stalled, and failed to tell President Kennedy that the exiles' guerrilla training had been dropped long ago.

The most sensational charge is that the top CIA agent in Guatemala told the exile leaders to go ahead with the invasion even if the President tried to halt it. Three of the leaders are quoted as saying the agent, a United States Army colonel known only as "Frank," told them if necessary to take the Americans prisoners, cut communications with the outside, and proceed with the plan.

The CIA has followed its customary pattern of dealing with criticism in dealing with this one. It refused any direct comment but immediately began benefiting from official-sounding denials attributed to well-informed sources.

"Frank" is said to have written a letter denying the story categorically. But other sources, also well-informed, say his letter told of fears that the powerful exile brigade, the strongest military force in Central America, might go ahead anyhow as an army out of control if the President tried to call a halt. The officer is said to have told of communicating those fears to the exile leaders.

Predicting something may happen can be not much different from giving it a green light, and they can have the same effect on the hearer. CIA officials were singing the same tune in Washington, warning that the invasion plan had a momentum of its own and could not be canceled without grave consequences.

Looking back at the fighting, Mr. Johnson's Cuban informants may have exaggerated their own successes. One might conclude from this account that they could have won with air support. This would neglect the wild optimism of CIA's assumption that two air strikes could have knocked out Castro's air force and that aerial bombing could cut all three of the causeways on which Castro's tanks and troops would have to cross a swamp to reach the beach.

Anyhow, as Mr. Johnson says, "The real question posed by the Bay of Pigs is not whether the Cubans would have won had they had sufficient support, but whether they could have fashioned a political triumph after their military victory."

—RICHARD DUDMAN.


Mr. Dudman is a member of the Washington Bureau of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

Did CIA Mislead JFK in Bay of Pigs?

By Ray Erwin

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Mohr _____
- Mr. Casper _____
- Mr. Callahan _____
- Mr. Conrad _____
- Mr. DeLoach _____
- Mr. Evans _____
- Mr. Gale _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Sullivan ✓
- Mr. Tavel _____
- Mr. Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Miss Holmes _____
- Miss Gandy _____

REC-18

THE BAY OF PIGS: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506. By Haynes Johnson with Manuel Artime, José Peréz-San Román, Erneido Oliva, and Enrique Ruiz-Williams. W. W. Norton & Co. May 18. 368 pages. Illustrated. \$5.95.

Most new books must rely for publicity upon whatever book review space they merit or obtain. This is not true of startling revelations made in "The Bay of Pigs," by Haynes Johnson. *Washington (D. C.) Star*, with the aid of the four principal leaders of the abortive invasion of Castro's Cuba.

Front-Page Headlines

The book and its heady documentary evidence instantly grabbed front-page headlines. For example, the *New York World-Telegram & Sun* on May 5 had this front-page, four-column headline: "CIA Accused of Plot to Defy Kennedy in Bay of Pigs Fiasco." The story was written by Richard Starnes, the newspaper's former managing editor and now a United Feature Syndicate columnist.

Other columnists already have predicted that this blockbuster book will be partly instrumental in an expected overhauling and reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency within a few months. Incidentally, printers' proofs of the book were submitted to the CIA well in advance of publication with a request for officials to refute serious charges therein or correct any errors. There was no denial and no comment from an agency whose policy negates denial or comment.

Eric P. Swenson, vicepresident and executive editor of W. W. Norton & Co., the publishers listed some of the revelations of the book in advance of publication in a letter to Representative Leslie C. Arends, Minority Whip:

Five Revelations

"1) In the management of the Bay of Pigs operation, the CIA in Guatemala told the leaders of the Cuban Brigade that if the President decided to cancel the operation, they, the Cubans, were to take the unresisting CIA operatives prisoner and proceed with the invasion. This preparation to countermand an

expected presidential order is of course preparation for mutiny.


"2) The CIA assured the President that it had complied with his instructions that the Cubans be given an alternative battle plan in case the original one ran into trouble. In fact, the CIA had done no such thing. On the contrary, they had told the Cubans that if they should run into trouble, the Americans were going to come ashore to support them.

"3) The CIA assured the President that no Americans would land; in fact, the first men ashore were American frogmen.

"4) The CIA assured the President, prior to the invasion, via the President's special emissary to Guatemala, that the Cubans knew all the details of the proposed invasion plan. In fact, the Cubans had been told nothing—neither the actual plan nor the one reported to the President.

"5) The CIA still claims, and so informed the President, that the plan was only to establish a beachhead in which to set up a provisional government which could then call for American help. In actual fact, the CIA orders to the Brigade were to land, travel up the swamp roads to the main highway, and turn left to Havana. They were to take Havana and Castro."

This book probably will make news, incite editorials, be a historical source, generate changes in the policies and practices of the CIA.



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New York, New York
May 16, 1964
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Meet the Author

The newsman-author worked from hundreds of thousands of words of recorded interviews with the Cuban leaders and hundreds of their men. His information about the key decisions in Washington are from unimpeachable sources.

Haynes Johnson was born in New York (1931), the son of Malcolm Johnson, executive of the public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton, who won a Pulitzer Prize as a *New York Sun* reporter. Haynes Johnson was graduated from the School of Journalism of the University of Missouri and earned a master's degree in American history from



Haynes Johnson

the University of Wisconsin. He was in the Army three years and worked for the *Wilmington* (Dela.) *Journal* before joining the *Star*. He took a year's leave for research among Cuban refugees in Miami for the new book.

An earlier book by Haynes Johnson was a perceptive and penetrating study of the Negro in Washington (E&P, Jan. 12 1963, page 36) under title of "Dusk at the Mountain" (Doubleday, 273 pages, \$4.50).

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CIA Plot Revealed To Defy JFK During 1961 Cuba Invasion

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY conspired to go ahead with the April, 1961, invasion of Cuba even if President Kennedy called off the attack at the last minute. This was revealed by four Cuban agents of the CIA, who were among the top organizers of the ill-fated attempt.

Their disclosure was reported in a new book, entitled "The Bay of Pigs," by Haynes Johnson, Washington reporter. It was published by W. W. Norton.

The CIA has remained silent on these revelations of an anti-Kennedy plot, despite the fact that it had the proofs of the book for some time before it was put on sale.

The doublecrossing role of the CIA was exposed by four leaders of invasion: Brigade 2506, Manuel Artino, Jose Perez Roman, Enrique Olivia and Enrique Ruiz-Williams.

The book's revelations give emphasis to the charges in Congress and elsewhere in Washington and in the nation that the CIA has become a government above the government of the U.S., with the power to develop its own foreign and domestic policy and to carry out actions, independent of and even in defiance of the will of the Presidency and Congress.

Allen W. Dulles, an old hand at intrigue, was chief of the CIA, when this conspiracy was proposed.

According to the Johnson book, in April, 1961, on the eve of the invasion, Olivia and San Roman were ordered to a secret parley at Base Trax, a CIA training base for the invasion, in Guatemala. At this meeting, they were briefed by a CIA agent, whom the two Cuban renegades knew only as "Frank."



DULLES

there were people in the Kennedy administration who were aiming at calling off the Cuban invasion. He claimed that he, "Frank" might be ordered to cancel the invasion attempt. "Frank" then told San Roman and Olivia that he would let them know at once secretly if he received such orders from Washington. Then, the Johnson book reports San Roman as recalling "Frank's instructions thus:

"If this happens you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisers, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners."

As San Roman recalled it, "Frank" gave explicit instructions as to how to proceed, detailing an armed guard to each American's door, halting communications with the outside world, until he gave the orders for leaving for the advance base for the invasion.

asked "Frank" who were those opposed to the invasion, he was vague, calling them "forces in the administration," or "politicians," or "chiefs above."

"Frank" gave the Cuban renegades the shock of their lives when he declared that if the Kennedy administration gave him the order to cancel the invasion, "I have also orders from my bosses, my commanders, to continue anyway."

Johnson declares in his book that the Cuban chiefs of the invasion attempt "never doubted that he ("Frank") was speaking for his superiors."

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'Bay of Pigs' Sweeps Away Myths About Cuban Invasion

Reviewed by Karl E. Meyer

An editorial writer for The Washington Post, Meyer is co-author of "The Cuban Invasion: THE BAY OF PIGS. By Haynes Johnson. Norton, 368 pp. \$5.95."

THIS VOLUME admirably closes a gap in the public record concerning what Haynes Johnson rightly calls the most badly bungled military operation since the Light Brigade charged into Balaklava. While it doesn't wholly explain the reason why it sweeps away many of the myths that still cling to the Cuban invasion.



Johnson

Johnson is a competent staff writer for The Washington Star. He and his publisher had the enterprising idea of interviewing leaders and survivors of the invading force to establish what happened while memories were fresh.

Though Johnson had a free hand in writing the book, the story he relates is endorsed by four of the prominent leaders of Brigade 2506: Manuel Artime, Jorge Perez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams. This, then, is Brigade of officers' own version of the grotesque debacle on the Bay of Pigs, and as such the book will be a primary source for historians in years to come.

What is their story? In its salient aspects, it does not contradict previously published accounts. It does add devastating detail all the more credible since the tone is calm and since the four leaders have little to gain by taking on the CIA. And it is the CIA that emerges as the principal architect of the disaster which had its genesis in March, 1960, when President Eisenhower authorized the agency to train a force of Cuban exiles for use against the Castro regime.

THE CUBANS were recruited in Miami and sent to camps in Guatemala, where the force grew and so did the plan. But not wholly with presidential assent. It was Mr. Eisenhower's understanding that he was authorizing only guerrilla training. But according to Johnson, the CIA decided to drop the guerrilla approach and train an army along conventional lines and sent out the order for this four days before the 1960 election apparently without troubling to inform the President.

That is the first depth-charge in the book. Others include:

At the end of March, 1961, after President Kennedy had taken office, an army colonel working for CIA told the Cubans that "politicians" or "chiefs above" or "forces in the Administration" were opposing the invasion. If the invasion was not approved, San Roman was informed, "you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisors, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we

have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners."

Contrary to explicit assurances to the President, the CIA never informed the Cuban leaders of the detailed battle plan, or of the alternative strategy devised in the event the plan misfired. Mr. Kennedy also was assured that no Americans would take part; the first man ashore was an American frogman.

These are only a few of the unsettling revelations in a tale of incompetence, egregious stupidity, and even insubordination in strong words, surely, but supported by a narrative that should be read by every member of Congress.

The tale is not without a brighter side. Though the book is manifestly sympathetic to Brigade 2506 (named after the serial number of a Cuban who died in training camp), it convincingly lays to rest the canard that the Cubans were mere cowardly mercenaries.

They fought well, they stuck together in Castro's prison until the United States paid for their release, and whatever their faults they were more victims than free agents. One vignette is especially moving: the hitherto untold story of the 22 Cubans who drifted without food or

water for 15 days until their sailboat neared New Orleans. Only 12 survived.

THE CHIEF FAULT of the book is that it fails to place the entire mad venture into historical and political context. Many anti-Castro Cubans were opposed to the entire approach implicit in the CIA scheme; their views are not represented in these pages. Nor is it fair to fault Sen. J. W. Fulbright for a supposedly equivocal stand in opposing the invasion without mentioning his memorandum to Mr. Kennedy which was hardly equivocal.

These are blemishes in an otherwise first-rate piece of reporting. The great question posed by the "Bay of Pigs," Johnson writes, "is not whether the Cubans would have won had they sufficient support, but whether they could have fashioned a political triumph after their military victory."

On the evidence of this book the answer must be negative. Throughout, the real offense of the CIA was that it treated all-too-credulous Cubans as stooges and puppets to be manipulated by shadowy masters.

It was not lack of the mythical "air cap" that doomed the invasion—it was total lack of respect for either principles or people.


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Book Says CIA Defied JFK in Cuba Invasion

A new arrage of evidence purporting to prove that President Kennedy was deceived by Central Intelligence Agency operatives during the Bay of Pigs fiasco has official Washington sizzling.

Four leaders of the 1961 invasion have revealed to a Washington newsman-author that the CIA mapped secret plans to countermand White House decisions and misled the President regarding details and objectives of the operation.

Results of a one-year investigation of the disaster appear in a book by Haynes Johnson, Washington Star reporter. "Bay of Pigs" was written with the cooperation of the four leaders of Brigade 2506—Manuel Artime, Jose Perz San Roman, Erneldo Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams.

Advance copies of the book, due for publication May 18 by the W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., of New York, have already produced some sharp glances by Congress in the direction of the super-secret CIA.

Johnson asserts that preparation to ignore a presidential order was made by an agent who commanded Base Trax in Guatemala, a pre-invasion training camp. The agent is identified only as "Frank," a U.S. Army colonel serving with the CIA.

In early April, 1961, according to the book, he summoned San Roman and Oliva and advised them that "forces in the administration" were trying to block the invasion and he might be ordered to stop it. Should that happen, the agent said, he would secretly inform the Cubans.

San Roman recalls the CIA instructions: "If this happens you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were

...you go ahead with ... we have talked about it and we will give you the whole plan even if we are your prisoners.

The presidential orders to halt the operation were not issued, but the author concludes that the CIA "or at least its agents — was acting at times contrary to established United States policies and even contrary to the wishes of the President of the United States."

Johnson contends that the CIA assured the President that it had complied with his instructions to give the Cubans an alternate battle plan in case the original plan was unsuccessful.

It was later learned in a secret top-level administration probe that the CIA had decided on its own not to issue the second plan.

Another alleged violation of presidential instructions came in the landing itself. Describing the landing by frogmen at Playa Giron, Johnson writes: "Gray, the American who had trained them, was with them and Gray, the American, was the first to land in the invasion — despite the insistence of President Kennedy that no Americans participate in the action."

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12 BOSTON GLOBE
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BOSTON TRAVELER
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
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RECORD AMERICAN
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Date: 5-7-64
Edition: Morning
Author:
Editor: Victor O. Jones
Title: CUBAN MATTERS

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The writer says that prior to the invasion the CIA assured President Kennedy, via the President's special emissary to Guatemala, that the Cubans knew all the details of the proposed invasion plan.

The leaders now dispute this, stating they had been told nothing until the day of departure, and even then the information was sparse and erroneous.

In another blast at the CIA, the book asserts, the orders

issued to the Brigade differed from the objective stated by the CIA to the President.

That agency claimed that the plan was only to establish a beachhead in which to set up a provisional government which could then call for American help. But in the pre-departure briefing, the top CIA agent told the leaders:

"Hold the beach for 72 hours. We will be there with you for the next step. But you will be so strong, you will be getting so many people on

your side, that you won't want to wait for us.

"You will go straight ahead. You will put your hands out, turn left, and go straight into Havana."

Eric P. Swenson, vice president and executive editor of the publishing firm, asserts that proofs of the book have been read by the CIA and comments solicited.

"There has been no denial," he says.

CUBANS UNCOVER WEAPONS CACHE; U.S. SAYS IT'S OLD

Havana Charges New Plot— Washington Asserts Arms Were Dropped in 1961

By United Press International
HAVANA, May 5—The Castro regime announced today the discovery of an "enormous" arms cache it said had been hidden in the waters off Pinar del Rio's north coast by United States agents.

Newspapers reported that United States-made rifles, pistols, explosives and Cuban currency worth \$15,000 had been found in nine metal boxes and eight waterproof drums that were lashed together and left in the shallows, secured by a line to a tree on the shore.

According to the press, the weapons were for use of anti-Castro saboteurs, commandos and guerrilla forces.

[In Washington, qualified sources said the weapons had been dropped for the underground in 1961. It was believed that the announcement of the discovery at this time indicated that Cuba feared a new attack from the United States.]

Fisherman Gets Credit

The Cuban press said a fisherman had discovered the cache. The fisherman mentioned is 25 miles from the capital city of Havana, 60 and 100 miles from the coast.

The fisherman has proved in the manner that the weapons and explosives were made and put in the U.S.A., a Government statement said, "and transported to the place of discovery through methods customary to infiltration operations directed by Yankee espionage agencies."

The contents of the boxes and drums were listed as 15 Garand rifles, 12 Browning pistols, 4 packets of C-4 explosive, 10 antipersonnel mines, 16 packages containing 260 time detonators and a package containing \$15,000 Cuban pesos in denominations of 5, 10, and 20 pesos.

The source of these arms and materials for uprisings, terrorism and sabotage along with their unmistakable North American origin and the method of infiltration employed shows the responsibility and direct participation of the Government of the United States in this new act of subversive nature, and open interference in Cuban affairs," the communique said.

Special Manufacture Seen HAVANA, May 5 (AP)

The newspaper reports on the discovery of the arms cache that characteristics of the cache had been made "exclusively" espionage and subversion agencies of the Government and that they are available only to agents chosen by the United States to realize its aggressive plans.

"Although these criminal activities have been systematically happening," one report said, "the new fact has special importance as it has happened at a time when piratical, irresponsible actions of the United States Government endanger the peace."

The "piratical, irresponsible actions" were taken to mean the reconnaissance flights made over Cuba periodically since the missile crisis in the fall of 1962.

Premier Fidel Castro has declared Cuba will use all means at her disposal to stop the flights. President Johnson's Administration has announced the flights will continue as a precaution against another secret missile build-up.

U.S. Sees Invasion Fears

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 5 — Fears of an impending attack from the United States were believed today to have motivated Havana's announcement of discovery of a cache of arms and explosives.

Qualified sources indicated that the cache, which the Cuban regime said was intended to spread sabotage, had been actually dropped for the underground early in 1961.

The State Department had no comment on the charges. But, informed quarters said, the Castro regime may have found it timely to make it appear that the arms constituted a new shipment and incorporate the accusation in its mounting campaign to make the United States again appear as an aggressor.

The opinion here is that Dr. Castro has his eye on the May 20 date that Manuel Ray, a leading anti-Castro leader, set publicly late last year for a landing in Cuba and a revolutionary campaign.

Mr. Ray, who was Minister of Public Works in the

Castro regime in 1959, was a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which was nominally the group leading the invasion in 1961. He subsequently resigned from the council and later organized his own group, the Revolutionary Junta.

Qualified quarters here described as "extremely interesting" the fact that the Cuban announcement today spoke of sabotage, guerrilla subversion and terrorism.

It was surmised here that the Castro regime had used the discovery of the old cache of weapons and explosives activities by the Ray group to lead the population to believe they were facing a new United States conspiracy.

Informed sources said that the arms cache appeared to be one that had been dropped for use by the now defunct "Revolutionary Unity" group and the "Movement of Revolutionary Recuperation," which were in 1961, operating around Pinar del Rio.

Specialists said that the method of hiding arms and explosives underwater, near coastal pick-up points, was abandoned at least two years ago.

The weapons and explosives described by Havana are of standard types and have been used in assisting the anti-Castro

tro underground both before and after the 1961 invasion. They can be purchased directly by anti-Castro groups on the flourishing clandestine arms market in the United States in the Caribbean.

In the view of officials here, some of the Castro regime's apparent nervousness may relate to his unclear relationship with the Soviet Union.

Highly qualified informants said that the Soviet Union had in the last several months withdrawn from the island radar tracking equipment installed in 1963 for use with ground-to-air missiles.

This equipment, they said, is particularly difficult to jam from the outside and can be used to track low-flying aircraft. However, it was said, the radar that remains in Cuba has the required capability to track high-flying aircraft, such as the U-2 plane, and is as efficient as the equipment that was in operation during the 1962 crisis.


The opinion of experts was that the Soviet Union took out the more elaborate equipment because it was considered unnecessary.

However, it was said, the Castro regime may have resented the move, particularly if it fears a new attack.

Recent reports have also said that the withdrawal of Soviet

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troops from Cuba is continuing at a slow but constant rate and that the best estimate is that 2,000 to 4,000 Soviet military personnel remain.

Meanwhile, official sources here denied allegations in a recent book about the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. The book said that agents of the Central Intelligence Agency had ordered the commander of a rebel brigade to proceed with the attack that April even if the Kennedy Administration counter-

manded the plans at the last moment.

An account, which said the orders were issued at a training camp in Guatemala, appears in "The Bay of Pigs" by Haynes Johnson, written in cooperation with four commanders of a rebel brigade.

The book said that the C.I.A. operative, identified as "Frank," had told the brigade commanders that if President Kennedy should order the invasion halted, the Cubans should "imprison"

the C.I.A. personnel in the camp and try to proceed on their own.

However, sources here said that even if such orders had been given by individual agents—and they said that the agent identified as "Frank" had denied it—the orders had no basis in any directive from Washington. Also, it was said, the Cuban rebels would not have been in a position to get themselves from the Guatemalan camps to Cuba without United States assistance.


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(BAY OF PIGS)

NEW YORK--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS THE CHIEF ARCHITECT OF THE BAY OF PIGS DISASTER AND DECEIVED AND BETRAYED THE LATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY. IT WAS CHARGED TODAY IN A BOOK WRITTEN BY A WASHINGTON REPORTER.

DC - NY

THE BOOK, "~~THE BAY OF PIGS~~" BY HAYNES JOHNSON OF THE WASHINGTON STAR, WAS WRITTEN IN COLLABORATION WITH CUBAN INVASION COMMANDERS MANUEL ARTIME, JOSE PEREZ ARMAN, ERNEIDO OLIVA AND ENRIQUE WILLIAMS. THE BOOK WILL GO ON SALE MAY 18.

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JOHNSON QUOTED THE BRIGADE COMMANDERS AS SAYING THE CHIEF CIA INSTRUCTOR AT THE BASE TRAX, THE SECRET INVASION TRAINING CAMP IN GUATEMALA, TOLD THEM SHORTLY BEFORE THE INVASION WAS LAUNCHED THAT THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION MIGHT ORDER THE INVASION HALTED AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR.

THE INSTRUCTOR, KNOWN ONLY AS "FRANK," TOLD THE MEN THAT IN EVENT OF CANCELLATION THEY WERE TO "MAKE SOME KIND OF SHOW, AS IF YOU WERE PUTTING US, THE ADVISORS, IN PRISON, AND YOU GO AHEAD WITH THE PROGRAM AS WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT IT, AND WE WILL GIVE YOU THE WHOLE PLAN, EVEN IF WE ARE YOUR PRISONERS." THE BOOK SAID. FRANK SAID HIS CIA SUPERIORS WOULD GIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW AND WHEN TO UNDERTAKE THE INVASION EVEN THOUGH IT WAS CANCELLED.

ERIC P. SWENSON, EXECUTIVE EDITOR OF W.W. NORTON & CO., PUBLISHERS OF THE BOOK, SAID PAGE PROOFS OF THE BOOK WERE SENT TO THE CIA TWO MONTHS AGO WITH COMMENT INVITED. HE SAID THE CIA OFFERED NO COMMENT.

NY

JOHNSON ALSO CHARGED THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S INVESTIGATION OF THE 1961 FLASCO REVEALED THAT THE CIA DELIBERATELY FAILED TO TELL THE BRIGADE COMMANDERS ANYTHING ABOUT AN ALTERNATIVE EMERGENCY PLAN DRAWN UP ON THE SPECIFIC ORDERS OF THE PRESIDENT. THE PLAN CALLED FOR DISPERSAL OF THE INVASION BRIGADE IN THE MOUNTAINS TO CONDUCT GUERRILLA WARFARE IN CASE THE LANDING WAS UNSUCCESSFUL.

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NEW BOOK MAKES A DISTURBING CHARGE

Did CIA Masterminds Prepare to Spin JFK at Bay of Pigs?

By RICHARD STARNES



FOUR Cuban leaders of the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion have reported that Central Intelligence Agency personnel gave them detailed instructions to go ahead with the attack even if President Kennedy ordered a last-minute cancellation.

All four charged that a CIA agent in charge of training the assault brigade told them on the eve of invasion that there was some reason to believe the President might call off the attack, and if that happened the Cubans were to make "prisoners" of the CIA agents and go ahead with the invasion as scheduled.

This charge leveled in a book written by Haynes Johnson, a respected Washington newsman, in collaboration with the leaders of the ill-starred Brigade 2506—Manuel Artime, José Pérez San Roman, Erneldo Oliva and Enrique Ruiz Williams.

The book (*The Bay of Pigs*, published by W. W. Norton & Co.) is the product of a year's research. Proofs of the book were early made available to the CIA, but have elicited no reply.

"They asked to see it," Mr. Johnson said, "and we sent it to them. I told them if they could show me where anything in the book was wrong, I'd correct it." Up until yesterday, by which time the book was on sale in Washington bookstores, the CIA had remained mute.

At "Base Trax," a not-so-secret CIA training facility in Guatemala, "Pepe" San Roman and Oliva were summoned to a secret briefing in April, 1961, just prior to the brigade's scheduled departure for a forward invasion staging area. They were briefed by a CIA operative they knew only as "Frank." This is the shocking proposal they assert Frank made to them:

"... There were forces in the Administration trying to block the invasion, and Frank might be ordered to stop it. If he received such an order, he said he would secretly inform Pepe and Oliva. Pepe remembers Frank's next words this way:


"If this happens you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisers, in prison, and you go ahead with the program, as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners.

Frank was quite specific: they were to place an armed Bri-

gade soldier at each American's door, cut communications with the outside, and continue the training until he told them when, and how, to leave for Trampoline (advance) base. Frank then laughed and said: "In the end we will win."

The book continues that the CIA's plan "disturbed" Pepe and Oliva, but they agreed to go ahead with it because they trusted the Americans who had trained, equipped and financed them. The book added:

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Frank then called in Artime and privately told him the same thing. Artime was as stunned as the others. Frank never said who opposed the invasions—it was just 'forces in the Administration,' or 'politicians,' or 'chiefs above.' He did say that if he received the order to stop the invasion, 'I have also orders from my bosses, my commanders, to continue anyway' ..."

Artime, San Roman and Oliva "never doubted that he was speaking for his superiors. It seemed obvious to them that the Brigade could not be transported to another unknown base, and then placed aboard ships to go to Cuba without the knowledge and assistance of a great organization."

Thus, the book charges, did the CIA issue detailed instructions to the Cuban invaders to violate Mr. Kennedy's orders, should he have decided to call off the invasion.

The book, which is carefully annotated and indexed, and which bears the unmistakable stamp of thoro research, makes these additional disclosures of the CIA's role in the disaster at the Bay of Pigs:

The battle plan, drawn up by the CIA and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was based on fatally defective intelligence data. Underwater terrain was incorrectly mapped, Castro's air-power was woefully underestimated, as was his ability to react swiftly to invasion. President Kennedy had been assured that Americans would not take part in the actual landings, but American frogmen were the first ashore.

Brigade 2506 fought bravely against insuperable odds, but Mr. Johnson's well-documented history makes it clear that defeat and humiliation were inevitable. The survivors were, of course, held for nearly two years in Castro prisons until the United States ransomed them. "The Bay of Pigs," which is certain to become an important historical source book as well as a taut, suspenseful narrative, is the distillate of hundreds of thousands of tape-recorded words with the freed survivors of the tragically maladroit invasion. It has the clear ring of historical authenticity.

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THREE YEARS AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS, HERE IS THE

FIRST FULLY DOCUMENTED STORY OF A KEY EVENT IN THAT DISASTER: THE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

by ANDREW ST. GEORGE

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
7-17-96

This week will mark the anniversary of the ill-fated disaster at the Bay of Pigs. It is exactly three years since Fidel Castro's regime threw back an exile-manned, U.S.-supported attempt to invade Cuba.

The story of that debacle has been repeatedly discussed since. It has been the subject of Congressional and executive investigations and of partisan political recrimination.

Yet one of the most important details of that Cuban defeat has not previously been revealed. It is an event that may have been the whole key to the Bay of Pigs tragedy, and its occurrence—or failure to occur—had a profound effect on the invasion itself and on subsequent history. And although it has not publicly been acknowledged, long and painstaking investigation by this reporter has documented this event.

Carried out on the highest levels of Cuba's revolutionary government, it was an attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro. And it came within a cat's whisker of

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- The Washington Post and Times Herald _____
- The Washington Daily News _____
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- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
- The National Observer _____
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This plot, of course, was not the first against Castro's life, nor has it been the last. One of the records of which the bearded revolutionary leader is least proud is the number of times he has been the target of nearly successful assassination attempts. Before detailing that most important plot, let's look



Plotter of Castro assassination attempt, Sori Marin (in glasses and uniform) stands next to leader at parade.

at a few others. The most recent try came just before the celebrations in Havana last January commemorating the victory over Batista. U.S. security boats intercepted two speedboats crammed with anti-Castro conspirators and hundreds of *petacas*, plastic bombs to blast Castro from his reviewing stand.

The U.S. government, worried about the Caribbean aftermath of a successful assassination, is not happy about such attempts. But American nervousness has not been able to do too much about it. Some of the attempts have come so close to success that Castro has

been left with the apprehensive wariness of a lone fox in a hunting preserve.

An early try at an ambush was engineered by the sinister Col. Johnny Abbas, formerly intelligence chief of the Dominican Republic. Abbas, working on orders of Dominican strongman Rafael Trujillo—himself the victim of assassination—hired a swashbuckling American adventurer, Alex Rorke, son-in-law of New York's famed restaurateur, Sherman Billingsley, to pilot a speedboat that landed eight men before dawn in eastern Cuba. The plan was to ambush Castro on his way to speak at a service at the Santiago cemetery.

Through a pouring rain, Trujillo's Tommy gun team spotted Castro's chief bodyguard, Capt. Alfredo Gamonal, in the second jeep of a caravan.

The killers assumed Castro was in the back seat, and their bullets chewed up Gamonal, the superintendent of cemeteries and the jeep driver. Castro, riding in the next-to-the-last jeep, was unhurt.

"He may have nine lives," Abbas told Rorke, who returned to Ciudad Trujillo complaining of Castro's charmed life. "But if so, I'll try a tenth time."

Abbas acquired an apartment in Havana overlooking the CMQ television studios, where Castro appeared frequently to deliver his nation-wide harangues. Another American adventurer, a one-time top competition sharpshooter, was retained by Trujillo on a down payment of \$25,000 and the promise of a cool million if he managed to score a clean hit on his moving target.

The marksman said he could do it, but demanded a special weapon—a bench-adjusted telescopic carbine with a nondeflecting muzzle silencer.

SAVED BY TRUJILLO

"Dominican ordnance experts immediately went to work to produce the rifle," former Dominican State Security Minister General Arturo Espaillat recalls. "The weapon was completed and en route to Cuba, when Trujillo canceled the project. . . He was afraid of Washington's fury. I really think that Fidel would be dead today if the plot had not been called off."

Prior to that attempt, another American, Alan Robert Nye, a 31-year-old Chicagoan, was convicted in Havana for conspiring to kill Castro. Fee: \$100,000. Although a Cuban court had signed, sealed and delivered the order for his execution, Nye was allowed to leave the country for the U.S.

There have been far too many of these attempts to detail here; although men like Alex Rorke, and Paul Hughes, a former American Navy jet pilot, have lost their lives because of them, Castro cannot rest easy.

Before embarking on an airplane trip, he usually inspects the plane from tip to tail. During the warm-up, he once spotted flames belching from the engine exhaust. Castro ordered the ignition cut and both pilots back into the cabin, where they explained for a half-hour that burning exhaust was normal and that it did not prove the plane booby-trapped.

During his visit to New York to attend the United

Nations in 1960, Castro's food problems were magnified by his methods of selecting restaurants. A brace of bodyguards was ordered to go out and buy food from a restaurant—but never from the hotel kitchen or from the restaurant nearest the hotel. On each occasion, Castro would call out a number to his two messengers—say, "Three!" or "Five!" which meant they had to count off three or five restaurants before they could enter the next one, thus having presumably eluded the potential poisoners.

His security chief also carried sensitive white mice

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Conspirator Alan Robert Nye of Chicago was found guilty of trying to kill Fidel Castro, then allowed his freedom.

—“to detect assassination attempts by radiation or nerve gas,” chief bodyguard Gamonal explained.

But the only security measure Castro really has faith in is the one he learned in his two years of guerrilla warfare: never let anyone know where you'll show up next. In the Sierra Maestra, when Castro and his little band were making their revolution against Batista, no one but Fidel knew exactly where the day's march route would end.

The habit persists. When he made his first visit to Moscow, he left Havana and returned to it as secretly as an enemy infiltrator. No one in Cuba knew when to expect the Premier home. When his Russian airliner finally landed, there was nobody to welcome him except some startled airplane mechanics. Grinning, Castro borrowed a coin, dropped it into the nearest pay phone to let Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos know he was back.

But it was the assassination attempt just before the Bay of Pigs that was the most significant of all. It involved several senior commanders of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces as well as key civilian leaders.

The Central Intelligence Agency, which had received absolutely reliable reports that a conspiracy to assassinate Castro was developing among his top lieutenants, decided to contact the plotters, because the U.S. was already training its own anti-Castro

force in Guatemala. CIA agents discovered the conspiracy had a wealthy contact man in Miami, a former sugar cane grower, Alberto Fernandez.

With CIA's tacit approval, Fernandez bought a converted subchaser, the *Texana III*, and had it outfitted with concealed deck armaments, 50-cal. machine guns, two 57-mm. recoilless rifles and a pair of small speedboats with muffled interceptor engines.

OPERATIONS BEGIN

Now began one of the most daring and extraordinary secret intelligence operations ever attempted. Shuttling in the dark of night between Marathon Key and the north coast of Cuba, the *Texana III* was the link between the Cuban conspirators and the U.S.


Its two deck boats skimmed up to shore less than a dozen miles from Havana to pick up their unusual passengers: Cuban rebel *comandantes* in full uniform and government functionaries carrying brief cases.

Before the sun came up, the travelers were in U.S. waters, where they held quick conferences with American agents, sped back to Cuba the next night.

The tricky and hazardous process went on for a couple of months, and the U.S. learned more and more about the murder conspiracy headed by cool, brainy Comandante Humberto Soriano Marin, a hero of the Castro revolution. Other top-level men involved astounded the Americans: Secret Police Chief Aldo Vera; Comandante Julio Rodriguez, deputy commandant of the San Antonio de los Baños air base; several Navy flag officers; the military superintendent of Camaguey Province; the president of the Cuban Sugar Institute; and the undersecretary of finance. They were determined to act early in 1961. The plot was to kill both Castros and touch off a general uprising.

Convinced that, regardless of what the U.S. did, the conspirators meant business, the CIA decided to capitalize on the plot without actually participating.

Dominican plotter Col. Johnny Abbes arranged at least two nearly successful attempts to assassinate Castro.



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in it. Officials readied the landing forces to go ashore at the same time. Agents began a series of secret meetings in Havana with the conspirators to coordinate their plans.

Then, just before the target date, there occurred one of those impossible mistakes nobody ever believes. A crucially important secret conference was being held with most of the top conspirators. They met in a house of known safety in Havana's Miramar suburb on a tranquil street, Calle Onze. It was a large, yellow, somnolent building, lived in and owned by a respectable retired sugar engineer and his wife.

In the front patio, the engineer played gin rummy with his wife and led by many points. In the back of the house, the plotters gathered around a heavy refectory table covered with street maps, pinpointing the massive incendiary attack against the crowded downtown district of "Old Havana," which was to touch off the uprising. The *Texana III* had already shipped in hundreds of *petacas*.

Several blocks away, a militia security patrol stopped in front of another house, then entered to search it. A nervous woman in a back room fled from a rear door with her small daughter. She ran beneath garden walls and ducked into the rear entrance of the large yellow house of the engineer, an old friend.

The street was deserted. But one militiaman watched as she ran to the yellow house. So, under the blazing sky of a spring afternoon, in Miramar, the security unit walked down the street to that yellow house, that sleepy, yellow house. . . .

The pity of it was that the nervous woman who ran did not have to. The security police were on a routine search. She was suspected of nothing; if she had remained, nothing would have gone wrong.

The 11 key figures of the Sori Marin conspiracy were caught in a single sweep. The four men who had been sent in by the CIA might have gotten away; they were all Cubans and carried such perfectly forged papers that two were subsequently shot under their assumed names.

But Sori Marin had no chance whatever. As the *milicianos*, burst into the room, his pistol leaped into his hand. But the security men's snub-nosed Czech Tommy guns chattered and Sori Marin crumpled as he tried to crash through a window.

And it was all a mistake. The militia walked in by mistake. The woman ran away by mistake.

TOO LATE TO STOP INVASION

Washington, working with fragmented information, decided it was too late to halt the invasion troops staging for departure in Guatemala. There was no way to know just how badly the conspiracy had been crippled; there was a possibility that many of its members had not been identified and would thus be able to carry out the plans.

It was a forlorn hope. April 17, at dawn, the first of the invasion troops splashed through the surf onto



Cluster of bodyguards surround assassination-conscious Castro (back to camera) at a recent parade in Havana.

Giron Beach. April 17, at dawn, the seven top conspirators, led by Sori Marin, wounded, and supported by his guards, but still wearing his uniform, were executed in Havana. Within the next few hours they were followed to the wall by the captured CIA men. The rest, the slaughter at the Bay of Pigs, is history.

U.S. security and intelligence agencies are now more worried about the possibility of a successful assassination. For Washington—which once gave tacit support to Sori Marin—now feels that a real explosion involving Castro could trigger the most unpredictable chain reaction of the coming year, a chain reaction that conceivably could turn into World War III.

The current approach was pointed up in a quiet sort of way the day Allen Dulles—whose own job as head of the CIA ended a short time after that ill-starred invasion—appeared in public for the first time to talk about it on *Meet the Press*.

"Mr. Dulles," the moderator asked, "in launching the Bay of Pigs invasion, you were obviously expecting a popular uprising to support it. Yet none occurred. How could you have been so wrong?"

"A popular uprising?" Mr. Dulles puffed on his pipe. "That's a popular misconception—but no, I wouldn't say we expected a popular uprising. We were expecting something else to happen in Cuba... something that didn't materialize."

As this is written, U.S. intelligence is still expecting it to happen, but the expectation has now turned to a nervous and gnawing worry.

■ While Castro was making his revolution, Andrew St. George spent more time with him in the mountains than any other American journalist. They were close friends—Castro once awarded him a medal, ordered him released when he was arrested. Since Castro's open avowal of Communism, however, St. George has maintained close contact with anti-Castro Cuban groups.

TV views

Cuban History Lesson

by Ben Levine



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TWO NBC White Papers on Cuba, one on the Bay of Pigs invasion, and one on the missile confrontation, gave us a good lesson in history.

Chet Huntly, the commentator, presented a convincing picture of what the U.S. officials in charge of the invasion hoped to accomplish and why they failed.

We learned that the exiled adventurers who were trained in Guatemala and were thrown hastily into the Bay of Pigs (hastily because the Guatemalans themselves wanted them out) were given false promises by the CIA.

They were told the people in Cuba would rally to them. The CIA knew better.

They were told the U.S. Airforce would give them air cover. This, also, the CIA knew was false.

★
THE PLAN, we learned, was to be as follows:

The Cuban jets were to be destroyed by a surprise B-26 attack, in the style taught us by

the Japanese at Pearl Harbor.

Then the invaders were to set up a beachhead. If they could hold it for 72 hours, they would be recognized as a government and get official U.S. Army and Navy and Airforce aid.

The plan failed, we were told, because three Cuban jets escaped, and because the armed Cuban people wiped out the beachhead before it could solidify.

★
WE SAW the Cuban people being armed to meet the invaders, Castro was giving arms, said Chet Huntley "to everyone he could trust." Castro trusted an awful lot of Cubans.

The CIA, on the other hand, put its trust in hardly any Cuban. They told lies to their Cuban trainees about the U.S. air cover. They didn't trust their Cuban saboteurs in Camaguey, said Huntley, because these groups were considered too left-wing. And they didn't trust the Cuban leaders of the counter-revolution, whom they locked up in a N. Y. hotel room the day the invasion was launched.

And they didn't even trust

Adlai Stevenson who as U.S. ambassador to the UN was passing on the CIA's falsehoods to the world.

A good title to this first NBC White Paper on Cuba would have been "Who Do You Trust?"

★
IT WAS A DRAMA with as happy an ending as we could wish. Americans in particular ought to hail a fellow-citizen of the world like Castro who dared with the House UnAmericans only 90 miles away and without the benefit of the Fifth Amendment or the First, to assert his belief in the future of communism.

And Castro dared even more. He applied the laws of his country to Standard Oil. This, as the NBC White Paper emphasized, was his cardinal sin, yet Cuba

came through smiling.


This was the main history lesson of the TV show.

Yet some people never learn. The adjoining article by Mike Newberry tells us how the U.S. is training invaders in Panama against all Latin American nations even as they were trained in Guatemala against Cuba.

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- Miss Holmes _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Another Rehash On Bay Of Pigs

The Central Intelligence Agency was so thoroughly chewed up in the NBC television special the other night about the Bay of Pigs invasion that the spy agency may have come out ahead after all.

It was hard to see and hear the CIA denounced so vigorously by the Cuban exile leaders without feeling resentment against the detractors and sympathy for the U. S. agents, who are denied a chance to speak in their own defense by the nature of their job.

The fact is that somebody had to run the show, and the exile leaders, then as now, had proved themselves incapable of providing anything remotely resembling unified leadership.

We don't know what NBC hoped to prove by all this, except that the Bay of Pigs was a disaster, as everyone has known for nearly three years.

With the exception of some combat action pictures on the beach, Americans, and certainly Miami-ans, neither saw nor heard anything they hadn't seen and heard many times before.

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6-A

MIAMI NEWS

MIAMI, FLORIDA

(BEING FOLLOWED)

Date: 2/6/64

Edition:

Author:

Editor: WILLIAM C. BAGGS

Title: CIA

Character:

or

Classification: MM 62-3573

Submitting Office: MIAMI, FLA.

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- Tele. Room.....
- Miss Holmes.....
- Miss Gandy.....

NBC Show Blasts CIA

By AGNES ASH

Miami News Radio and TV Editor

Last night the Torch of Freedom in Bayfront Park must have dimmed a little as Cuban exiles relived the Bay of Pigs invasion through a program presented on Channel 7.

Titled, "Cuba: Bay of Pigs," the documentary was narrated by NBC's Chet Huntley and produced by Fred Freed.

The first part of the program traced the forming of the invasion forces in Guatemala during the Eisenhower administration. Here the show was confusing because it did not follow the chronological order in which the military activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the policy statements of the Eisenhower administration occurred.

It was not clear, until later in the program, that Richard Nixon, in his campaign speeches, declared the United States would have no part of military action against Fidel Castro.

Meanwhile, Eisenhower had already approved the establishment of training bases in Guatemala. Nixon knew the go sign had been given to CIA officials to form a Revolutionary Council.

The show was a devastating indictment of the CIA. It implied, through statements by Cuban leaders that CIA officials had mistrusted the very leaders they had hand-picked to head the Revolutionary Council.

It pointed up the fact that the CIA did not give the signal for guerrillas, inside Cuba, to complete acts of sabotage to assist the invaders.

The suffering of the valiant Brigade fighters and their futile but brave struggle against Castro's tanks and heavy artillery were vividly portrayed.

Navy cruisers were shown standing idly by in neutral waters just in sight of the fighting on the beach.

It was obviously no token landing and easy surrender, if NBC films are completely accurate.

The NBC program stated that the Nation was not paying much attention to the preparation for the invasion. That all news sources were focused on the U-2, Gary Powers incident while the brigade was training in Guatemala.

This was not entirely accurate as any one who lived in Miami during 1960 knows very well.

The Miami papers, (particularly The Miami News) were full of stories concerning the invasion, preparation although these facts were never confirmed by the CIA.

In the final analysis the NBC program was a good one, especially when it depicted Adlai Stevenson avidly and sincerely denying the fact that bombers which blew up much of Castro's air force were in no way connected with the U.S. government.

The CIA was illustrated as dictatorial and almost stupidly wrong in its judgment. It was pictured as an organization that trusted nobody - even keeping the leaders of the Revolutionary

Council under house arrest on the eve of the invasion.

The program was not well balanced. The CIA can't tell its story. It can't answer the accusations by Cuban leaders because of national security. Chet should have gone a little easier on the CIA. History may still prove that organization to have been perfectly right in its decisions.

The next segment of The Bay of Pigs will be called "Cuba

The Missile Crisis." It will be Sunday at 10 p.m. on Channel 7. These shows are part of a series of "NBC White Papers."

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MIAMI NEWS

MIAMI, FLORIDA

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Date: 2/5/64
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title: CIA
Character:
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Classification: MM 62-3573
Submitting Office: MIAMI, FLA.

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
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UPI-58

(CUBA)
WASHINGTON--GOV. NELSON ROCKEFELLER DISCLOSED TODAY HE ONCE
OUTLINED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY A PLAN TO "RETRIEVE THE DISASTER OF
THE BAY OF PIGS" AND ESTABLISH A FREE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.
"HE WAS EXTREMELY COURTEOUS, BUT TO MY KNOWLEDGE NOTHING WAS EVER
DONE IN RELATION TO IT," ROCKEFELLER SAID IN A COPYRIGHTED INTER-
VIEW IN U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT.

ROCKEFELLER SAID HE WENT TO SEE KENNEDY THE WEEK AFTER THE
ABORTIVE 1961 CUBAN INVASION ATTEMPT WITH A PLAN DEVELOPED WITH THE
HELP OF "VERY CLOSE POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FRIENDS OF MINE IN
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE."

ROCKEFELLER DID NOT DISCLOSE DETAILS OF THE PLAN BUT SAID HIS VIEW
NOW IS "I THINK WE HAVE GOT TO ISOLATE THIS COMMUNIST INFECTION FROM
THE REST OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE."

HE REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS CRITICISM OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRA-
TION'S ACTION IN 1961 AND IN "LEAVING CUBA AS AN ARMED COMMUNIST
FORTRESS" AFTER THE 1962 BLOCKADE.

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- Mr. Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Miss Holmes _____
- Miss Gandy _____

CLIP PROGRAM IS ANTI-CASIRA ACTIVITY - CIA
(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Bay of Pigs Held Possible

U. S. Break

By Lon Savage

M-D Education Editor

The United States may have been lucky, in a way, when the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba failed; the publisher of the Times of Havana said here last night.

Moreover, Clarence W. Moore told the George Wythe High School Parent-Teachers Association, the United States now appears to be doing just about all it can concerning the Cuban problem.

The United States missed its chance to avert the Communist takeover in Cuba in early 1959 immediately after the Castro revolution, he said.

Moore is publisher of the South Pacific Mail at Santiago, Chile; the Montevideo at Montevideo; Uruguay; and the Times of Havana, which was forced to close in Havana. The Times is now published as a weekly in Miami. He also is a former FBI agent and, United States foreign officer. A Michigan native, he is brother of Paul C. Moore of 5118 Evelyn Blvd. rd., president of the George Wythe P-TA.

The Times was cited, while still in Havana, for its stand against Castro by the Inter-American Press Association, he said.

If the Bay of Pigs invasion had succeeded, Moore said,

the United States would have been instrumental in killing a Cuban hero, since Fidel Castro was popular in his country then.

"We didn't kill him," Moore said. "He killed himself."

"I'm certain that economically, Cuba is falling apart," he added. In Havana, "there simply isn't anything to buy."

In fact, he said, "I'm not so sure we're not fairly wise to let Russia support Cuba for a while. It's a wonderful showcase of what communism can do." His sarcasm drew a laugh from a crowd of about 150.

As for United States policy toward Cuba, he said, "I buy it, I don't find anything too much that could be done that's not being done."

Cuba's failures, he said, may help the United States win Latin America.


"We read we're losing the Western Hemisphere," Moore said. "I submit we've never had Latin America. But now I maintain we have a chance to win Latin America, and the thing that will help us win in Cuba."

"Had we not had Cuba in 1959, we might have had Brazil in 1960 or Venezuela in 1961," he said.

Cuba's standing in Latin America was demonstrated

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

1 RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
RICHMOND, VA.



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b7c

Date: 4-26-63
Edition:
Author: LON SAVAGE
Editor: VIRGINIUS DABNEY
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(Staff photo)

Clarence W. Moore
"Wonderful Showcase"

at Punta del Este, he said. "No country voted with Cuba on any single measure."
The United States missed its chance in early 1959, he said, immediately after the Cuban revolution. He thought this country should have given Cuba every possible aid to make the revolution a success — "to make the Cuban revolution our revolution."
"We should have filled that country up with tractors and

experts whether they liked it or not," he said.
Instead, he said, the answer in Washington was: "But this may be communism. We've got to wait and see."
Because of the delay, he said, Cuba finally "fell over" into the Communists' hands in late 1959.
"If there can be a single cause of the Cuban revolution," he said, "I think it is in the failure of democracy."
The Cuban leaders, the wealthy and the literate left the provinces for the provincial cities; then left those cities for Havana and, if they were wealthy enough, left Havana to travel in Europe and the United States. In the United States, he said, "wealth carries responsibility; in Cuba, it carried irresponsibility."
There are many misconceptions about the revolution in this country, he said.
The revolution was not a peasant revolution, he said, but a revolution of the upper and middle classes against an evil — and the evil was Batista.
It was not a revolution caused by poverty, he said. "Cuba was probably the wealthiest and most literate nation in Latin America . . . and it was a middle class nation."
Cubans were not opposed to Americans, he said. "Cuba owed its wealth to the United States. . . . The Cubans loved the Americans. . . . There isn't a thing the United States has to apologize for in its history with Cuba."
Moreover, he said, Cubans "had a great feeling for democracy and a great hatred for communism. This was the state of things when Castro came in."
Moore said he still does not think there is a Communist threat in Latin America. "I think there's a threat from lack of democracy — entirely a different thing. . . . communism in the Western Hemisphere in my opinion has been an abject failure."
Communists have spent more money to win Latin America than the United States has, he said, without notable success.
As for Castro, he said, "I personally don't think he's a Communist" despite his reported statements. In college, Moore said, Castro studied Mussolini and Hitler. "I think he's a totalitarian. . . . He's attracted by power. . . . He could just as well have turned to the right as to the left."
The matter of Castro's being or not being Communist, he said, is "academic. . . . I do not think it's frightfully important."

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
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CLIP ANTI CASTRO ACTIVITIES - CIA

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(BODY)

JACKSONVILLE, FLA.--THE MOTHER OF ONE OF THE FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS
KILLED IN THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION SAID TODAY SHE WOULD LIKE
TO GO TO CUBA AND "BRING BACK MY SON'S BODY FOR A DECENT AMERICAN
BURIAL."

~~IF RILEY SHAMBURGER'S BODY IS THERE, THEN MY SON'S MUST BE ALSO,~~
SAID MRS. ~~GEORGE GRAY~~ OF JACKSONVILLE, MOTHER OF WADE ~~G. GRAY~~ OF THE ^{DeL. Area}
BIRMINGHAM, ALA. AREA. "MY SON AND SHAMBURGER WERE FLYING TOGETHER
AND DIED TOGETHER."

GRAY AND SHAMBURGER WERE FLYING WITH TWO OTHER BIRMINGHAM AREA
MEN WHEN THEIR PLANE CRASHED ON OR ABOUT APRIL 19, 1961. THE OTHER
MEN HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THOMAS RAY AND LEE F. BAKER.

"I HAVE TWO OTHER SONS WHO LIVE IN THE BIRMINGHAM AREA AND WHO WANT
TO GO WITH ME TO CUBA TO GET WADE BACK," MRS. GRAY SAID.
THE MOTHER SAID SHE HAD "WRITTEN DOZENS OF LETTERS" TO THE STATE
DEPARTMENT AND TO FLORIDA CONGRESSMEN "BUT THEY DON'T SEEM TO BE
ABLE TO DO ANYTHING."

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CAPITAL REPORT: By FULTON LEWIS, JR.

The Bay of the Greased Pig

WASHINGTON, April 16. — Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. won a Pulitzer Prize for history at age 28. He is advised here to acquaint his boss, the President, with the case of Major General Arthur St. Clair, for there are lessons to be learned.

St. Clair was sent into the wilderness by President Washington in 1791, with orders to bring an end to a series of Indian raids along the Ohio-Indiana border.

On November 3, 1791, St. Clair was ambushed by Indians who wiped out nearly half his contingent of 1,400 troops.

Several months later, in the Spring of 1792, Congress named a special committee to investigate fully the humiliating, disastrous defeat. The committee demanded of President Washington all relevant papers and reports.

For several days the President and his Cabinet mulled over the request, well aware of the important precedent they would set. In the end, they agreed to cooperate fully with Congress. After a thorough investigation, the investigators discovered that mismanagement and a breakdown in supply lines had led to the defeat.



Taylor refused to budge. He did not say that disclosure of the information would violate security. He said instead that it would "result in another highly controversial divisive public discussion which would be damaging to all parties concerned." He acted on instructions from President Kennedy, who calls the case "closed."

To date, there is one official version of the disaster, that given by Attorney General Robert Kennedy to the Knight Newspapers and to "U.S. News and World Report" in January. That version is hotly disputed.

Several people in the know have labeled untrue Robert Kennedy's assertion that air support was never promised to the rebels. An Alabama pilot, Albert Persons, who was involved in the invasion, said air support was promised, then withdrawn: "The results, of course, were disastrous."

The complete story is not and cannot be known until President Kennedy takes a leaf from history and learns, as did George Washington, that frankness is the best policy.

(Copyright 1963, King Features Syndicate)

MORE THAN 170 YEARS later, the Congress of the United States is interested in another military fiasco, the Bay of Pigs invasion of April, 1961. But the present Administration has declined to cooperate and has refused to give Congress any information about the invasion. The truth about this military flop has been running around the capital like a greased pig—no one can catch it.

Congressional leaders have attempted without success to question General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the Bay of Pigs. Taylor, points out Congressman Gerry Ford, should know more about the invasion than anyone else. At the President's request Taylor directed a top-level investigation into all phases of the operation. He had the cooperation of every branch of government.

On Feb. 7, Congressman Ford, ranking Republican on the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, asked Taylor about the invasion. He received no response.

Ford explained that he was only trying to do his job: "To get the facts, study them, and help pass laws and appropriate funds for the government's operation."

Wannell

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HAVANA--HAVANA NEWSPAPERS SAID TODAY THE CUBAN RED CROSS WILL RETURN TO HIS FAMILY THE BODY OF PILOT RILEY W. SHAMBURGER, ONE OF FOUR AMERICANS KILLED IN THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION. THE PRESS REPORTS ADDED THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAD INVITED THE MOTHER OF THE PILOT, MRS. RILEY W. SHAMBURGER SR. OF BIRMINGHAM, ALA., TO COME TO CUBA TO IDENTIFY THE REMAINS OF HER SON.

(IN BIRMINGHAM, MRS. SHAMBURGER BECAME HYSTERICAL ON HEARING THE HAVANA REPORT. A NEIGHBOR SAID THE MOTHER "WOULD NEVER ACCEPT" THAT HE HAD BEEN KILLED. "SHE'S JUST IN A TERRIBLE STATE," THE NEIGHBOR SAID.

(SHAMBURGER WAS FLYING WITH THREE OTHER BIRMINGHAM AREA MEN WHEN THEIR PLANE CRASHED ON OR ABOUT APRIL 19, 1961. THE OTHER MEN WERE LATER IDENTIFIED AS WADE C. GRAY, AN ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN; THOMAS RAY AND LEE E. BAKER.

(SHAMBURGER, A TEST PILOT, WAS APPARENTLY AT THE CONTROLS OF THE PLANE WHEN IT WENT DOWN DURING THE ILL-FATED INVASION. THEY WERE FLYING A C46 CARGO PLANE WHEN ONE ENGINE WENT OUT.)

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ANNIVERSARY APPRAISAL

The Total Disaster

That Was the Bay of Pigs

By BEM PRICE and THEODORE A. EDIGER
Associated Press Staff Writers

For the waiting, watchful Cuban troops of Prime Minister Fidel Castro, the sudden appearance of the United States warship in the glare of the Cayo Guano light was the final tipoff.

Cayo Guano is at the head of the Bay of Pigs and southeast of Havana.

Obviously, the long awaited invasion was about to begin. Cuban radios began drumming out the alert order in Morse code:

"Place yourself on a work status. Urgent."

And so the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs by 1,500 armed opponents of Fidel Castro on April 17, 1961—two years ago next Wednesday—was doomed.

The now known facts indicate that it was a failure from the outset.

Assertions of U. S. Betrayal

Bitter survivors of that ill-fated expedition, claiming betrayal by the United States, assert:

A United States Navy aircraft carrier operating under the code name "Santiago" was within 20 miles of the invasion beach with jets and propeller driven fighters aboard painted with the blue identifying stripe of the anti-Castro brigade.

While some of these airplanes were airborne during the critical assault phase, none attacked. Qualified sources in Washington identify this carrier as the USS Boxer.

There was ample, though unused, gunt support available.

among the United States warships within sight of the landing beach. These ships—a cruiser, at least one frigate and several destroyers—had escorted the invaders' convoy from Nicaragua to Cuba.

Until the landing craft actually started ashore there had been no final selection of a beach-head area—and no reconnaissance either.

Began in May, 1960

Neither the invaders' mission nor immediate objectives had been defined. They just hoped the United States would straighten things out once they got ashore.

The whole business began in earnest in May, 1960. It set in motion a train of events the end of which is not yet in sight—and it was costly.

It cost the lives of 81 of the invaders, not including four American flyers who piloted two B-26 light bombers, and resulted in the wounding of 60.

It cost \$45 million to execute, the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, reportedly told a Senate committee.

It cost upwards of \$53 million to ransom the invasion survivors from Cuban prisons.


It has cost \$75 million to date to support 200,000 Cuban refugees whose homeland is now closed to them because the invasion failed.

It cost the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which masterminded the operation, a considerable portion of its reputation for competence.

Our Image Tarnished

And it tarnished the image of the United States as a Nation of high moral persuasion in its conduct of international

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coming as it did within a year of the U-2 spy plane affair with the Soviet Union.

Just when the invasion scheme was hatched first is not yet clear, but it apparently began germinating sometime early in 1960 shortly after Mr. Castro began expropriating United States-owned properties in Cuba.

By August 24, 1960, Mr. Castro was charging that the CIA was organizing adherents of the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, in Guatemala for an invasion of Cuba.

And Mr. Castro was at least partially right, for the organization had begun in May — and there were some Batista followers in the group.

After a series of diplomatic humiliations in which the movements of United States Ambassador to Cuba Philip Bonsal were restricted to a small area of Havana and all but 11 United States Embassy employes ordered to leave, former President Eisenhower severed relations with Cuba on January 4, 1961.

The Rumors Roll Out

Now reports of military activities began flowing out of the gossipy refugee colony in Miami with the persistence of truth.

These reports—later confirmed—said anti-Castro refugees were training in Guatemala; paratroopers and pilots at the 5,000-foot-long airstrip at Retalhuleu; infantry at Trax, La Finquita and Garrapatnango.

During January, 1961, unmarked planes began making frequent night flights from long unused airfields at Clewiston and Opa-Locka, Fla. As it turned out, they were carrying volunteers to Guatemala.

And it was in January that four

members of the Alabama National Guard, all former pilots of the World War II light bomber, the B-26, were recruited.

These men were paid \$2,250 a month each, plus \$200 monthly for expenses, so their survivors reported.

In all, apparently, about 21 pilots were hired to train Cubans. Gov. Orval Faubus of Arkansas disclosed just this year that most came out of his State's Air National Guard.

The Man Who Hired Pilots

The Alabama flyers were hired by a man who identified himself as Alex E. Carlson of the Double Check Corp., of 1045 Curtis Parkway, Miami Springs, Fla.

Double Check was formed May 12, 1959, by Mr. Carlson with a capital of \$500 to engage in a wide variety of business activities. After the invasion, Mr. Carlson said he was simply acting as an employment agency for an unidentified Latin American concern.

While the United States pilots were taking their Cuban counterparts in tow, the infantry was being trained under the over-all direction of a man identified by the refugees as a Filipino who went by the name of Col. Vallejo.

There were American officers, too, men known by the cover names of "Frank," "Jimmie" and "Charles."

From May, 1960, to November, the anti-Castro Cubans were given guerrilla training. In November the training was shifted to straight World War II infantry tactics.

After the invasion Gen. Lemnitzer and Mr. Eisenhower said the operation was intended primarily as a guerilla reinforcement. Mr. Eisenhower said that

when he left office January 20, 1961, no firm plan for the employment of the refugee Cuban force had been determined.

Castro Knew It Was Coming

This fact goes to the heart of the mission, what the invaders were supposed to accomplish and how.

Guerillas would need neither air cover nor tanks, trucks nor jeeps. Regular troops for a stand-up battle with Mr. Castro would.

Throughout the training period, Mr. Castro's radios were trumpeting charges of an impending invasion. Mr. Castro even had motion pictures of the refugees in training.

By now it was April, 1961, and the preliminaries began.

On April 2, bombs exploded in the Cuban Army's magazine publishing plant and in a government-owned soft-drink plant.

April 5: Fire destroyed a sugar warehouse.

April 7: Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council in Miami, predicted a Cuban uprising.

April 8: A large water main was blown up and sections of Havana were left waterless for 48 hours.

April 10: Mr. Castro abruptly clamped a radio blackout on all invasion scare talk.

April 12: A bomb exploded in the Havana railway station, injuring no one.

April 13: Fire destroyed a paper warehouse and a department store.

April 13: Mr. Castro concentrated 45,000 heavily armed troops in Pinar del Rio Province.

Two things are apparent: (1) Mr. Castro knew an invasion was about to take place, though uncertain as to precisely where or when, and (2) in all the sabo-

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tage operations none was directed toward military objectives—roads, bridges, fuel and ammunition dumps, airfields or motorized equipment.

On April 15, three rocket-firing B-26s struck at three Cuban air bases, two just outside Havana and the third at Santiago de Cuba.

The planes were to have knocked out Castro's air force, consisting of United States-made T-33 jet trainers, British Seafuries and B-26 bombers.

They failed, but there was no followup air strike on April 16—and no news either.

Now it was April 17. All day Havana, Radio, played soothing music, interspersed with soap operas and a lecture on how young lovers should behave.

From time to time, however, the programs were interrupted by urgent orders for all militia to report to their duty stations.

Radio Silent on Invasion

Throughout April 18 Havana Radio was exasperatingly silent on the subject of the invasion though the previous night it had appealed for blood donors.

Diplomats and correspondents from Iron Curtain countries reported on April 19 that Cuba had been attacked by planes and troop-carrying ships.

Late that same day, Havana Radio said Mr. Castro had reported an invasion attempt and was now mopping up survivors. This was followed by the grim announcement that two Americans and seven Cubans had been executed as United States agents.

On April 20, Havana Radio announced the invasion attempt had been crushed. Meanwhile, a dragnet was out for anyone suspected of harboring the slightest anti-

Castro sentiments. In Havana alone, some 200,000 were rounded up and stuffed into any place with a wall around it.

Any possible sympathy uprising was thus crushed at the outset. What had happened?

On April 10-11, the brigade had sailed from Puerto Cabezas on Great Corn Island, Nicaragua, a tiny port to which they had been ferried from Guatemala.

Guatemala could not assert truthfully that the invasion had not been staged from her soil.

Dagoberto Darias, 49, once wealthy Cuban businessman and a coffee expert, was chief officer of the Rio Escondido, one of the ships in the invasion force. In an interview in Miami, Mr. Darias said:

"We left Puerto Cabezas on April 12. Five Liberty-type transport vessels, the Rio Escondido, Atlantico, Caribe, Houston and Lake Charles. The Lake Charles was the 'Operation 40' (code name for the command ship) ship. It remained behind and was to land later for mop-up operations.

Two Small Boats

"Aboard the transports were two small boats, the Blagar with 14 machine guns and the Barbara J. with nine. These were small converted coasters.

"Seven landing craft were present for the invasion—three LCU's (landing craft, utility) and four LCVP's (landing craft, vehicle-personnel). Also 30 outboard motor-communication launches, six aboard each (Liberty) ship. Also five tanks.

"The landing craft with the tanks aboard were escorted to a point near the Cuban coast by an American-type ship. I only saw its silhouette. That was the evening of April 18.

"We could see the lights of Cayo Guano. There, at what was called our convoy point, an American cruiser was visible, in the tower light.

"Why that spot in front of the tower was selected for the cruiser, I don't know. Nor do I know why the general site was selected for the invasion.

"It was not until about four in the morning that a landing place was found. It was difficult for there was a violent sea.

Enemy Prepared

"But by the time the small landing beach was decided upon, the enemy had time to get ready for us. I don't know why the spot wasn't selected beforehand.

"The Houston went in first. It was received by artillery fire directed from the Bay of Pigs airfield. There was a cross fire which was marvelous....

(The Houston with the communications gear aboard was damaged and beached.)

"... When disembarkation began it was under an aerial battle between our planes and Fidel's.

"Then Seafuries hit the wooden bridge of the Rio Escondido. Our ship blew up and sank in five minutes . . . we swam to the Blagar.

"On April 18 we received a radiogram from the American aircraft carrier 'Santiago,' telling us that at 2:30 p.m. that day we would get air support from six P-51 planes (World War II fighters)....

"At 2:30 we saw two planes cross. A minute later two others went towards Cuba. Immediately afterward the first two planes returned . . . the others followed.

"From that moment we knew the war was lost for us and that

we had been the victims of a great betrayal.

"We had 16 planes. It took them three hours to fly from Puerto Cabezas. They would fight for about three quarters of an hour and then fly back for supplies. Then they would come back. It was most gruelling. I had a friend, Joaquin Varela, who went 46 hours without sleep.

Paratroopers Take Airstrip

"On April 19 when the Cuban pilots were played out, four Americans stepped in to relieve some of them. The Americans in two B-26s were the ones from Alabama who were shot down. They were killed."

As for the paratroopers, there were 185 of them, Mr. Darias said, and they captured the Bay of Pigs airstrip, but couldn't hold it because of strafing from Mr. Castro's aircraft.

Were the Cuban invaders ever promised air cover? Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, brother to the President, said in a magazine interview this year that at no time had the United States ever promised military air support.

The key work is "military," that is, uniformed pilots in United States-marked planes.

Dr. Enrique Llacá, one of those captured and ransomed, said:

"We were told there would be air cover. Not officially. But it might as well have been official. We all knew the United States had a hand in the matter. We were transported to the training area in United States planes. We were trained by Americans. Our weapons and planes were American. What else could our conclusion be? We are not morons. No one wanted to commit suicide."

Straight-Ahead Attack

The invading troops were landed on Giron Beach, which is approached by land via a single road, flanked on both sides by impassable marshes and mangrove swamps. There was only one way to attack and that was straight ahead into Mr. Castro's 45,000 men.

By the morning of the 19th, the men were giving up the hopeless fight. They were out of ammunition and Mr. Castro's planes dominated the air.

Of the 16 planes in anti-Castro operation, eight were shot down and the remainder arrived back in Nicaragua full of holes.

Mr. Elaca reported that the invaders managed only to progress from the beachhead to a road junction designated as "Central Australia." This was 10 to 12 miles inland.

That was that. It was a total disaster.

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On April 24, White House Press secretary Pierre Salinger read Washington newsmen a statement in which President Kennedy accepted "... full responsibility for the events of the past few days."

On June 28, 1961, Mr. Kennedy told a news conference he was considering changes in the intelligence setup. Some revisions were later made though how extensive they were is unknown.

Since the invasion, the top echelon of the CIA at the time has retired: Allen Dulles, director; Air Force Gen. C. F. Cabell, deputy director, and Richard M. Bissell Jr., deputy director for plans.

It was a gradual process spread over a year. There was no hint that their departure had anything to do with the Bay of Pigs disaster.



Members of Castro's militia in action in the Treasure Lagoon zone southeast of Havana on the day of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The photo came from Cuban government sources.—AP Photo.

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CLIP PROGRAM OF ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITY
C.I.A.

The Battle of Playa Giron

By JESUS COLON

THE FOLLOWING are excerpts from a statement by the Cuban government on the attempted invasion of Cuba in April, 1961:

On April 17, at 2:30 a.m., a brigade of mercenary troops numbering approximately 1,500 men, trained, armed and directed by the government of the U.S. and proceeding from Puerto Cabezas, began landing on the southern coast of Las Villas province in the area known as Ciénaga de Zapata (the Zapata Swamps). The mercenary fleet was composed of five armed merchant vessels, two LCI boats of the type used by the U.S. Navy, but modified and armed, three LCU barges for transport and unloading of heavy equipment, tanks and armored trucks, and four LCVF barges for landing of troops. The brigade was made up of five infantry battalions, one heavily armed battalion (with mortars, bazookas and anti-tank cannons), one tank company, one parachute battalion, one underwater demolition team, and an air force consisting of 16 B-26 bombers, eight C-46 and six C-54 transports.

The plan was to cut off the area of operations from its surroundings, to fortify it, to establish a provisional government there, to begin a war of attrition and to create conditions leading to a civil war facilitating the direct intervention of imperialism. Their operations

were supported by 16 B-26 bombers painted with the colors and insignia of the Cuban Air Force in order to surprise our troops.

On the 19th, enemy C-54 planes dropped supplies to the mercenaries to make up for losses suffered by the sinking of the supply vessel Blagar. The Cuban Air Force destroyed five armored trucks and the air strip and water tank at Playa Giron.

DURING the same day the enemy withdrew its tanks to the immediate vicinity of Playa Giron and reinforced this area with a battalion withdraw from Playa Larga. In the morning hours an enemy C-46 plane had tried to evacuate the General Staff of the mercenary forces but Cuban planes put it to flight.


Finally, at 5:30 p.m. April 19, the Cuban Armed Forces took Playa Giron, seizing a great number of enemy weapons. Of the defeated and demoralized enemy troops some were able to escape by sea, some surrendered on the spot and the rest fled to the nearby woods and swamp where they were quickly rounded up. The prisoners were treated in a humane manner from the first day.

Thus, the criminal attack sponsored by U.S. imperialism was smashed in less than 72 hours.

To understand the "ideals" that the invaders fought for is enough to examine the brigade's composition and to take

a look at the property they tried to recover. The invading brigade included:

- 100 landowners
 - 24 large proprietors
 - 67 landlords
 - 112 big businessmen
 - 194 ex-soldiers and "thugs" of the Batista dictatorship
 - 179 sons of the wealthy
 - 35 industrial magnates
- All together, they tried to recover the following:
- 835,000 acres of land
 - 9,666 houses and apartment buildings
 - 70 factories
 - 10 sugar mills
 - 3 banks
 - 5 mines
 - 12 cabarets and bars and much other property.



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- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
- The National Observer _____
- Date: 4/14/63

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CLIP ANTI CASTRO ACTIVITIES CIA
(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

FBI Had to Look the Other Way Before Pigs Bay

By DAVID KRASLOW

WASHINGTON (CDN)—The Federal Bureau of Investigation must find the crackdown on Cuban exile raiding activity a bit ironic.

The story has yet to be told and much of it probably never will be known. Involved were secret discussions, arguments might be a better word) at the highest levels of government. It is doubtful that a complete record—if indeed any record—has been preserved.

In the last months of the Eisenhower administration—during the Summer of 1960—the United States began to recruit and train Cuban exiles for action against the Fidel Castro regime. The concept was rather vague. It did not harden until after President Kennedy took office in January, 1961.

The task fell to the Central Intelligence Agency. It financed Cuban exile groups. It supported "basic" training camps in the United States.

Americans who lived near one such camp in a rural area south of Miami could hear drill orders barked over a loud-speaker. They reported seeing young Cubans in marching formation.

There was a shooting incident during that Summer of 1960. Some American youths tossed firecrackers into the camp. Thinking they were being attacked by Castro supporters, the Cubans came running with carbines blazing. One of the American youths was wounded.

Federal officials quietly urged local authorities to let the incident slide by.

The FBI was not happy. It has major responsibility for enforcing the neutrality act, which makes it a crime for anyone to aid, prepare, or participate in a military expedition from the United States against a foreign state with which this country is at peace.

The FBI knew what was going on. It knew the neutrality act was being violated. It knew the violations had the blessing of the CIA. FBI agents

made their reports to Washington.

The CIA-sponsored activity on U.S. soil became a concern of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Atty. Gen. William Rogers. How could persons doing the bidding of an arm of the U.S. government be prosecuted for violating a U.S. law? What were the implications for agents sworn to uphold the law and for a free society as a whole of an official policy of selective enforcement of the law?

Whatever the justification, these were the facts, and the facts added up to a serious moral dilemma for Hoover and Rogers.

(When Fulgencio Batista was in power and Fidel Castro fought him from outside Cuba and later from the Sierra Maestra, there were numerous neutrality act prosecutions of Cuban nationals in the United States. Both Batista and Castro supporters were arrested.)


Hoover and Rogers made their arguments at Cabinet-level and White House discussions. The argument was made to find a location outside the country for such CIA acts.

These discussions were behind the shift of Cuban exile training to Central America.

Now the government is getting tough with Cubans for violating a law in 1963 that they were invited to violate in 1960.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

- 13 BOSTON GLOBE
Boston, Mass.
- BOSTON HERALD
Boston, Mass.
- BOSTON TRAVELER
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- CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Boston,
Mass.
- RECORD AMERICAN
Boston, Mass.



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Date: 4/10/63
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Editor: Victor O. Jones
Title: FBI Had To Look The Other Way.

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
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UPI-36

(PIGS BAY)

WASHINGTON--CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY DISCLOSED TODAY THAT
REPUBLICANS ON THE HOUSE DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE TRIED
TO CONDUCT THEIR OWN INQUIRY INTO THE ILL-FATED CUBAN BAY OF PIGS
INVASION, BUT FAILED TO FIND OUT MUCH.

THE GOP MEMBERS, LED BY REP. GERALD FORD OF MICHIGAN, WERE
ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN A PRESIDENTIAL INVESTIGATION WHICH WAS MADE OF
THE EVENTS IN CUBA DURING 1961.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY APPOINTED A FOUR-MAN BOARD, INCLUDING HIS BROTHER
ROBERT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, TO MAKE THE INQUIRY. HOWEVER, ITS REPORT
HAS NEVER BEEN MADE PUBLIC.

GEN. MAXWELL TAYLOR, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ALSO WAS
A MEMBER OF THE GROUP BEFORE HE ASSUMED HIS PRESENT POST.

WHEN REPUBLICANS BEGAN TO QUIZ HIM ON THE SUBJECT DURING RECENT
CLOSED-DOOR HEARINGS, TAYLOR REFUSED TO DISCLOSE ANY DETAILS OF THE
BOARD'S FINDINGS ON GROUNDS OF "EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE." HE SAID HE WOULD
HAVE TO REMAIN MUM UNLESS HE RECEIVED "FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE
PRESIDENT."

REP. WILLIAM MINSHALL, R-OHIO, ASKED TAYLOR IF HE THOUGHT "AT THIS
LATE DATE ANY BREACH OF SECURITY WOULD COME ABOUT IF WE HAD A FULL
DISCLOSURE OF WHAT TOOK PLACE AT THE BAY OF PIGS."

"I THINK IT WOULD BE HIGHLY UNFORTUNATE TO OPEN UP THIS QUESTION,"
TAYLOR SAID.

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Sen. Sparkman Demands Truth on CIA Cuban Role

By DANIEL MASON

SEN. JOHN SPARKMAN (D-Ala) last Saturday demanded a "full disclosure" of the Central Intelligence Agency's activities in the Bay of Pigs fiasco of April 19, 1961. In a taped TV program, Sparkman, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, charged that Allen W. Dulles, former CIA head, "had misjudged the spirit of the Cuban people" in telling the mercenaries that "the Cuban people would rise up and support them."

Sparkman then continued: "When the Cuban refugees landed there, instead of the Cuban people rising up to support them and to meet them, they were met by militia, Cuban militia, and they were never able to get an effective foothold."

A day earlier Sen. George S. McGovern (D-SD) warned in the Senate, "We have had too many who are willing to shed the blood of our soldiers in an invasion of Cuba."

McGovern, surprise victor in the 1962 elections, attacked the entire concept of the Bay of Pigs invasion, charging: "We had no more legal right to undertake air cover or any other military aggression against Cuba than the Russians would have in invading Turkey. We have offensive nuclear weapons, not 90 miles from Russian territory but in Turkey on the Soviet border, capable of pulverizing Russian cities in a matter of minutes."

The Cuban invasion, originally conceived in the previous administration, was a tragic mistake, both in conception and execution, for which President Kennedy has bravely taken the

blame. Why compound the error by probing the ruins of a mistaken venture, and then calling for a repeat performance?"

Noting the recent Gallup poll which revealed that the nation overwhelmingly opposed a Cuban invasion, McGovern declared:

"The people understand better than some political figures that such an effort misses the real nature of the challenge before us."

Responsibility of Washington for the invasion attempt was underscored by Sen. George A. Smathers (D-Fla), when he admitted on the Senate floor March 15:

"This plan for the invasion of the Bay of Pigs had not been some new development of the new administration because we know that, as a matter of fact, these men were gathered and sent to Guatemala for training in 1960, before the change of administration."

Smathers warned Congress on new action against Cuba:

"When we talk about strong measures today, particularly when we imply force even though we may not say it, we are in reality talking about a direct confrontation of the military forces of the Soviet Union, unless we first are successful in getting these forces out of Cuba. Such a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States forces we have not had thus far in our history."

He made clear that an invasion of Cuba, even if the Cuban nation had to fight alone, would be disastrous for the U.S. declaring:

"How many casualties, American casualties, would it cost to subdue Cuba?"

"I have no access to contingency plans but we hear figures, such as a month and 100,000 casualties. I gather that our military planners see no quick, glorious charge up San Juan hill now. Rather they envision a long,

grueling and bloody war waged in the most exhausting and savage tradition of the 20th century world wars."

And he added: "How do we know that the war to liberate Cuba will not really touch off the total thermonuclear conflict which each of us prays daily will not occur. Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky says it will. Can we assume he does not mean it?"

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- The Wall Street Journal _____
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
As if the bombing of his King Arthur Pub wasn't trouble enough, Arthur Lieberman also suffered the loss of 17 cases of liquor. Thieves made off with the haul during the confusion over the weekend. . . .

KURCINET

ATTY. GEN. ROBERT KENNEDY'S visit here Tuesday was in keeping with a policy he established when he took office — to visit district U.S. attorneys and FBI offices in the field for firsthand briefings on organized crime and subversive activities. He has made similar visits in some 30 cities since taking office. . . . Kennedy never mentions Jimmy Hoffa by name, "because he's under indictment," but the attorney general doesn't mind pointing to the box score: 108 indictments against Hoffa and top teamster union officials; 48 convictions; 7 acquittals, the rest pending.

YOUNG KENNEDY ALSO CLEARED UP some misunderstanding about his statement concerning air cover for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, which caused such a furor. He repeated that no "U.S." air cover was ever intended, either by the Eisenhower or Kennedy administrations, despite statements to the contrary by former Vice President Nixon and others. The attorney general pointed out that he did not, in his speech, include "volunteer" air cover. Quote and unquote from UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson: "The American ship of state is the only vessel that ever leaked from the top!"

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(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

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38 CHICAGO SUN-TIMES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Date: March 20, 1963
Edition: 5 Star Final
Author:
Editor: JOHN G. TREZEVANT
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
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UPI-199

(RELEASE AT 6:30 P.M. EST)

ADD 2 CUBA, WASHINGTON

SEN. JOHN J. SPARKMAN, D-ALA., CALLED ON THE ADMINISTRATION
 TO REVEAL ALL THE DETAILS ABOUT THE DEATHS OF FOUR
 AMERICAN FLYERS IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

IN A RADIO INTERVIEW, SPARKMAN SAID THE DEATH OF THE
 ALABAMA FLYERS CONTINUED TO BE A SUBJECT OF CONTROVERSY "BECAUSE
 THE WHOLE STORY HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY TOLD."

SPARKMAN SAID DISCLOSING THE DETAILS WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
 ON NATIONAL SECURITY.

"WE ALL KNOW THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS
 INVOLVED IN THE INVASION," HE SAID. "IN FACT, I THINK THE COUNTRY
 KNEW MONTHS BEFORE THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS
 INVOLVED."

AS EARLY AS 1960, SPARKMAN SAID THE CIA TOLD THE SENATE
 FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THAT IT WAS HELPING THE CUBAN EXILES
 BUT WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE RAID.

SPARKMAN SAID THAT RECENT TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE SHOWED
 THAT AT NO TIME WAS AIR SUPPORT PROMISED FOR THE INVASION
 AND IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO THE CUBANS THAT THE AMERICAN AIR FORCE
 WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE.

SPARKMAN SAID "THERE OUGHT TO BE GREATER DISCLOSURE" AND SAID THE
 NEED FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CIA WAS AMPLE
 REASON FOR A CONGRESSIONAL WATCHDOG COMMITTEE.

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
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UPI-86

(MCGOVERN--CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SEN. GEORGE MCGOVERN, D-S.D., SAID TODAY "SELF-STYLED EXPERTS" SHOULD STOP ADVOCATING "AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA" AND CONCENTRATE INSTEAD ON DEFUSING THE "SMOULDERING BLOCKBUSTER" OF POVERTY AND BACKWARDNESS IN LATIN AMERICA.

THE FORMER FOOD FOR PEACE DIRECTOR, IN HIS FIRST SENATE SPEECH, SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD "NO MORE LEGAL RIGHT TO UNDERTAKE AIR COVER OR ANY OTHER MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA THAN THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE IN INVADING TURKEY."

MCGOVERN SAID PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD "BRAVELY TAKEN THE BLAME" FOR THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION FIASCO. "PROBING THE RUINS" AND "CALLING FOR A REPEAT PERFORMANCE" WOULD ONLY COMPOUND THE ERROR, MCGOVERN ARGUED.

"WE HAVE HAD TOO MANY POST-MORTEMS OVER THE ILL-CONCEIVED BAY OF PIGS INVASION, WHICH MIGHT HAVE DAMAGED OUR STANDING IN THE HEMISPHERE MORE IF IT HAD SUCCEEDED THROUGH AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION," HE SAID IN HIS PREPARED SPEECH.

CALLING FOR EFFORT TO SUPPORT THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA, MCGOVERN SAID THERE HAVE BEEN "TOO MANY WILLING TO SHED THE BLOOD OF OUR SOLDIERS IN AN INVASION OF CUBA, AND NOT ENOUGH COURAGEOUS AND THOUGHTFUL MEN GIVING THEIR ATTENTION TO THE REAL PROBLEMS" OF LATIN AMERICA.

THE "REAL BOMBSHELLS" OF THE AREA, HE SAID, ARE FUSED TO CONDITIONS OF POVERTY, MISERABLE SHELTER, ILLITERACY, FEUDAL CONDITIONS, ONE-CROP ECONOMIES AND "UNJUST TAX STRUCTURES."

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W. W. Sullivan

UPI-237

(CUBA)

7-13-63 Wisc

MILWAUKEE, WIS.--AMERICANS FLYING IN THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION OF CUBA CURSED U.S. NAVY CARRIERS FOR NOT SENDING AIR COVER WHILE THEY WERE UNDER ATTACK BY CASTRO AIR AND GROUND FORCES.

A FORMER CUBAN FLIER MADE THIS STATEMENT TODAY IN AN INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT W. WELLS, A MILWAUKEE JOURNAL REPORTER.

"YOU S.O.B.'S, WHY DON'T YOU SEND THE PLANES," TIMOTEO A. CABRERA, 38, A FORMER CUBANA AIRLINES PILOT QUOTED AMERICAN FLIERS AS SAYING IN RADIO PLEAS TO A NAVY CARRIER WHILE THE PILOTS WERE UNDER ATTACK. *B. APPROX 1925*

CABRERA, WHO CAME HERE RECENTLY FROM MIAMI IN SEARCH OF WORK, IS A WIDOWER AND HAS TWO YOUNG SONS STILL IN CUBA.

AMERICANS IN CHARGE OF THE NICARAGUAN BASE FROM WHICH THE PLANES TOOK OFF "KEPT ASSURING US WE WOULD GET AIR COVER," HE SAID. "THAT LAST DAY (APRIL 20) THEY SAID THEY'S JUST RECEIVED A CABLE FROM WASHINGTON RELEASING FIGHTER PLANES FROM A CARRIER."

AFTER THE INVASION WAS OBVIOUSLY A FAILURE, CABRERA SAID THE AMERICAN IN CHARGE CALLED THE FLIERS TOGETHER.

"HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY EXPLANATION OF WHY THE PROMISED AIR SUPPORT DIDN'T COME," CABRERA SAID. "EITHER HE DIDN'T KNOW OR HE COULDN'T SAY. I DON'T KNOW IF HE WAS THE ONE WHO FOOLED US OR IF IT WAS SOMEONE ELSE."

CABRERA, WHO FLEW A TRANSPORT PLANE DROPPING AMMUNITION AND MEDICINE TO THE INVADERS, SAID HE SAW SIX AMERICAN FLIERS TAKE OFF IN THREE B-26 BOMBERS THE NIGHT OF APRIL 18. HE SAID HE HEARD THAT TWO OF THE PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN, KILLING FOUR OF THE SIX.

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Racists Boast They Lent Pilots for Bombing Cuba

By DANIEL MASON

THE SOUTHERN white supremacists last week claimed the dubious honor of having provided the pilots who bombed and strafed the Cuban people during the shameful Bay of Pigs invasion attempt, April 19, 1961. Boasting loudly about this was Arkansas Gov. Orval Faubus, who, at the same time, attacked the people in the rest of the nation for having refused to become a part of this disgraceful episode in American history.

Already infamous for his role in the attack on Negro children during the school integration fight, Faubus asserted that pilots from the Arkansas National Guard had been secretly recruited to fly combat missions after the Kennedy administration had failed to get volunteer aviators from the North.

He declared that federal officials had taken a plane from the Arkansas National Guard with the excuse that it had to be taken out of service. He fur-

ther claimed that later the same plane, now armed with cannon, was seen in Nicaragua by Arkansas guardsmen.

"We have a dozen National Guardsmen in Nicaragua," Faubus said, "and some of them flew combat. This whole thing is a disgrace in American history. They tried to recruit some men in the North and couldn't do it, so they came down South, where they still have some patriotism and got volunteers among the National Guard."

Faubus did not explain how the Arkansas National Guardsmen got down to Nicaragua, who sent them, or why they were there.

If Kennedy needed any lesson to show him how foolish his policy of capitulation to the Southern white supremacists really is the Arkansas governor provided it for him. Faubus, expressing obvious pleasure, declared:

"If this thing doesn't beat him (Kennedy) in 1964, nothing will."

In N.Y. last Friday night the

twice-rejected Richard M. Nixon apparently still did not realize why the American people do not want any part of him. Speaking on the Jack Paar show, over NBC-TV, Nixon made an ominous call for an oil blockade of Cuba, removal of Soviet "troops" from the island republic, violation of Cuba's sovereignty by on-site inspections and denial of aid to countries which dared to have dealings with the legally constituted government of Cuba.

This appeared to be the answer of the ultra-Right and the Republican leadership to the warning uttered by President Kennedy in his press interview in Washington last Thursday. Kennedy said that "to deny the oil would require, of course, a blockade, and a blockade is an act of war, and you should be prepared for it."

"You should not be under any impression that a blockade is not an act of war, because, when a ship refuses to stop, and then you sink the ship, there is usually a military response on the country involved."

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- The New York Times _____
- The Worker P. 4 (midweek)
- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
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
(CUBA)

WACO, TEX.--A MEMBER OF THE UNSUCCESSFUL BAY OF PIGS INVASION FORCES TOLD THE WACO ROTARY CLUB YESTERDAY THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT "LACKS THE GUTS" TO REMOVE THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT FROM CUBA.

DR. ORLANDO M. HEROS SAID THE U. S. GOVERNMENT HAS NO WAY OF KNOWING THE SOVIET UNION HAS REMOVED ITS MISSILES FROM CUBA. HEROS SAID THERE WERE 40,000 RUSSIANS, CZECHS, POLES AND YUGOSLAVS STILL IN CUBA.

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Poll Shows 64% Against A U.S. Attack on Cuba

By Fred Halstead

MARCH 5 — In spite of the unprecedented barrage of anti-Cuba propaganda hitting the U.S. public since last fall, a majority of the American people are opposed to an invasion of Cuba. More are opposed now than were before the Cuban crisis, according to the Gallup poll published Feb. 26.

When asked if the U.S. should "send our armed forces into Cuba to help overthrow Castro," 64 per cent said no. Only 20 per cent said yes, and 16 per cent had no opinion. The same question had been asked last October just before Kennedy's brink-of-nuclear-war speech. At that time 63 per cent said no, 25 per cent yes, and 13 per cent had no opinion.

Similar sentiments have been reported by newsmen across the country. It is clear there is considerably less hysteria about Cuba in the country as a whole than there is in Washington. Senator Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) declared on the Senate floor Feb. 18 that he suspected the CIA was responsible for many of the hysterical allegations by Congressmen that tiny Cuba is a military threat to the mighty U.S.

Morse revealed that the editor of the Cuban counter-revolutionary magazine, *Bohemia Libre*, had offered him "a sensational collection of photographs" on the "Cuban military buildup." Said Morse, "One must assume that other members of Congress have been offered not only pictures, but countless allegations as well by the Cuban refugees, their political organs and their publicity organs."

Morse said the fact that the CIA subsidizes these organs "raises the suspicion that the taxpayer's money is being used to promote a particular policy favored by the Agency." Morse also reported that *Bohemia Libre* has recently ceased

publications. According to the Feb. 8 *Washington Daily News*, "reports from Miami's Cuban colony are that the Central Intelligence Agency had been subsidizing it, and a couple of weeks ago, got tired." Among reasons cited for the CIA's dumping of the magazine was: "that if the actual size of the CIA's subsidy of *Bohemia Libre* got into the hands of Congress, it would embarrass the Kennedy administration — and the CIA — just about as thoroughly as the Bay of Pigs disaster itself."

Senator Morse expressed alarm

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The U.S.-Cuban Situation

(Continued from Page 1)

at the extent to which the Cuban counter-revolutionary activity has inflated the CIA. He said: "In effect the CIA exercises police-state powers . . . I cannot reconcile some of the activities of the CIA with the maintenance of precious rights of freedom to the American people."

Morse, himself, however, supports Washington's campaign to crush the Cuban Revolution. It is this campaign, carried out in violation of international law, U.S. law, and the rules of simple human decency, that is strengthening the police-state apparatus and creating an atmosphere of frustration, hysteria, and cynicism within government circles.

Another example of this is the affair of the four American flyers, whom Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield admitted last week had been killed flying combat missions in the April, 1961, Cuban invasion.

The papers around Birmingham, Ala., then carried stories of four Birmingham women whose husbands had disappeared shortly before April, 1961 and who have each been receiving checks of \$225 every two weeks since then. The husbands had all worked for the Hayes Aircraft company of Birmingham, and had been recruited for "secret" duty by an agency in Florida called Double Check.

Interviewed by newsmen, the women revealed that their husbands had left around Jan., 1961, on what the women were told was some kind of secret government work. In late April, 1961, a lawyer

representing Double Check informed them that their husbands had been killed on April 19 — a date coinciding with the Cuban invasion.

The women are angry because people say their husbands were soldiers of fortune, who went for the money. One of the widows, Mrs. Wade Carroll Gray, said her husband received a \$1,900 per month salary on the secret job.

The mother of one of the flyers, Mrs. Riley W. Shamburger Sr. is not sure her son, Riley Jr., is dead and insists on an honest statement of what happened to him. She said she has written the CIA and President Kennedy. In her letter to Kennedy, she quoted him as saying after the invasion that no Americans were involved. "If no Americans were involved," she asked, "where is my son?" "But he evaded my question," Mrs. Shamburger said. So did the CIA.

Vowing she won't give up until she gets the truth she declared: "They take your boy away and never let you know what happened. Some people have even said he sold out to the Cubans. This thing is not fair. It makes me so mad."

The U.S. government is reduced to subterfuge, hiring private agencies to recruit mercenary soldiers, cruelly keeping the relatives in the dark, because it is involved in a business so dirty and illegal that it cannot be formally admitted. There is no glory for the Americans it has sent into battle. The attempt by Washington to crush the Cuban Revolution drags the U.S. ever deeper into moral decay.

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Va. Guard Officer Allegedly Rejected Offer to Fly in Bay of Pigs Invasion

RICHMOND, March 8 (AP) — At least one Virginia Air National Guard pilot rejected an offer to fly in support of the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, it was reported today.

The unidentified pilot was offered \$2250 monthly for 60 days plus \$200 per month in expenses, a source said.

The source said no mention was made of combat flights during the invasion. Instead, the pilot was to fly gun-running missions but the locale wasn't specified.

The man making the offer didn't identify himself.

Meantime, Maj. Gen. Paul M. Booth, Virginia's Adjutant General, said no guard pilots participated in support of the invasion.

Booth said, however, he couldn't say whether the Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency had sought to recruit any guard pilots.

Rumors of the offer to fly the gun-running missions circulated among a select group of air guardsmen in Virginia during the period immediately following the Cuban invasion, it was reported.

The Virginia ANG development came to light in a report Thursday night which said that guard pilots from Virginia, Alabama and Arkansas were sought by the CIA to take part in the invasion.

"We stay in close contact with the air group and I have heard nothing of this," said Booth.

(A report of the pilot's story appeared in yesterday's editions of the Washington Star under the byline of Brian Kelly, a staff reporter. Kelly also is public information officer of the 192d Tactical Fight-

er Group of the Virginia Air National Guard. Kelly said that in his capacity as a public information officer he had "no information about the report and no official verification.")

Pilots from Virginia, Arkansas and Alabama were approached because guard units in those states were the last to fly the B26 bombers used in the invasion, the report said.

"We had converted to jets by that time (of the invasion) but it is true we were the last to fly the B26," said Booth.

Other sources said CIA agents approached a number of National Guard flyers in Virginia, Arkansas and Alabama, seeking men who had experience with B26s.

The CIA in Washington declined to comment.

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
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(PIGS BAY)

CHICAGO--ALABAMA PILOT ALBERT C. PERSONS SAID TODAY THAT UNITED STATES CARRIER-BASED PLANES WERE PROMISED AND THEN WITHDRAWN AT THE LAST MOMENT IN THE CUBA BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

PERSONS MADE THE STATEMENT IN THE SECOND OF TWO DISPATCHES BY HIM PUBLISHED IN CHICAGO AMERICAN.

PERSONS, WHO SAYS HE WAS ONE OF 18 AMERICAN PILOTS WHO TOOK PART IN THE CAMPAIGN, SAID ALSO THAT THERE WAS A 48-HOUR LAG BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND AIR STRIKES IN THE INVASION ATTEMPT.

"THIS DELAY WAS ORDERED FROM WASHINGTON," HE WROTE. "IT HAS NEVER BEEN REVEALED WHO ORDERS THESE WERE, NOR WHAT PURPOSE WAS EXPECTED NEVER BEEN REVEALED WHO ORDERS THESE WERE, NOR WHAT PURPOSE WAS EXPECTED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. THE RESULTS, OF COURSE, WERE DISASTROUS."

PERSONS SAID SIX AMERICAN PILOTS TOOK PART IN THE THIRD AND LAST STRIKE AND FOUR OF THEM LOST THEIR LIVES. BEFORE THE FINAL STRIKE, HE SAID, "A REQUEST WAS MADE TO WASHINGTON FOR SUPPORT FROM CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT..."

"THIS REQUEST WAS GRANTED," PERSONS SAID. "THE PROMISE WAS CONFIRMED AND RECONFIRMED. HERRERA (CUBAN PILOT GONZALEZ HERRERA) AND THE AMERICAN PILOTS WHO TOOK OFF ON WEDNESDAY MORNING DID SO WITH THE FULL ASSURANCE THAT UNITED STATES NAVY AIR SUPPORT FROM CARRIERS IN THE AREA WOULD BE AVAILABLE."

"THE ORDER WHICH PROMISED THIS AIR SUPPORT WAS RESCINDED WHILE THE AIRCRAFT WAS EN ROUTE FROM PUERTO CABEZA TO THE BAY OF PIGS..."

"IT IS KNOWN WHO PROMISED THIS AIR SUPPORT. IT IS KNOWN WHO RESCINDED THE ORDER. IT IS KNOWN WHO ORDERED THE 48-HOUR STAND-DOWN FOLLOWING THE FIRST AIR STRIKE ON SATURDAY. IT IS KNOWN THAT CONTROL OF THE MILITARY OPERATION WAS TAKEN OVER IN WASHINGTON AT THE LAST MINUTE FOLLOWING WHICH THE FAILURE OF THE MISSION AT THE BAY OF PIGS WAS INSURED."

PERSONS SAID MAJ. GEN. GEORGE REID DOSTER OF THE ALABAMA NATIONAL GUARD, IDENTIFIED AS TACTICAL AIR CHIEF OF THE PIGS OPERATION, "DID NOT PARTICIPATE...ON ORDERS OF ANY HIGHER COMMAND."

"GEN. DOSTER, AS FAR AS THE PERMANENT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS CONCERNED, IS A CIVILIAN," PERSONS WROTE IN THE AMERICAN. "IT WAS AS A CIVILIAN THAT GEN. DOSTER CONTRIBUTED HIS TALENTS TO THE EFFORT TO OUST CASTRO FROM CUBA."

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'Reckless' Cuba Talk Scored by Mansfield

Senate Democratic Leader Mansfield today said congressional critics of President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban situation have engaged in "reckless inflaming of public emotions."

He was referring primarily to Republican inquiries into the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961.

As a part of these inquiries, Republicans recently called attention to the death of four American flyers who were employed by the anti-Castro forces at the Bay of Pigs. Senator Mansfield last week confirmed this report.

But today he told the Senate it was not a new disclosure he had ferreted out of the White House. He said he got his information from a newspaper story published on May 5, 1961, under a Birmingham (Ala.) dateline, disclosing the same information that Republicans have recently heralded as a new revelation.

Critics Chided

The Democratic Leader suggested that "those who have a penchant for playing CIA chief or Secretary of State" should know what they are about. He suggested that lawmakers who want to "play sleuth" should try to find out what is wrong with the economy and get on with their legislative business.

Senator Mansfield said that "no matter how discouraging this political prowling over the dead may be," he has no objection

to discussion of foreign policy matters in the Senate.

But he said members of Congress do have an obligation to consider their words and speak in a wise and constructive manner on foreign affairs.

Dirksen Replies


In a brief reply to the Democratic leader, Senate Republican Leader Dirksen insisted that he had been "most circumspect" in referring recently to the deaths of the four flyers. He said he had made no attempt to pre-judge anything but thought all the facts should be placed on the record.

Senator Dirksen said he did not ask anyone for confirmation of the story at the time and was not a party to any conference at the White House where this may have been discussed.

He also reminded Democrats it was Attorney General Robert Kennedy who revived discussion of the Bay of Pigs invasion earlier this year in an interview during which he said United States air cover was not promised the anti-Castro invaders.

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
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(PIGS BAY)

WASHINGTON--THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SAID TODAY IT HAD ESTABLISHED THAT NO NATIONAL GUARD MEMBERS OUTSIDE OF ALABAMA TOOK PART IN COMBAT OPERATIONS DURING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION IN 1961.

A SPOKESMAN SAID THE IMPLICATION WAS CLEAR THAT "SOME FIRM" HAD RECRUITED THE FOUR ALABAMANS NOW KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE CUBAN OPERATION. AT LEAST ONE OF THE FOUR WAS A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER ANY NATIONAL GUARDSMEN HAD TAKEN PART IN NON-COMBAT ASPECTS OF THE INVASION, SUCH AS TRAINING OR OTHER PREPARATIONS.

THE DEPARTMENT PREVIOUSLY HAD STATED FLATLY THAT NO U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL TOOK PART IN THE INVASION.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID THIS MEANT PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY. GUARDSMEN ARE ON ACTIVE DUTY ONLY WHEN CALLED UP FOR EMERGENCIES AND DURING THEIR TWO WEEK SUMMER TRAINING CAMP SESSION.

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
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ADD 6 CUBA, WASHINGTON
 SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE MANSFIELD ACCUSED SENATE REPUBLICANS OF "PANIC POLITICS" AND OF "PROWLING OVER THE DEAD" IN RAKING OVER NEWS THAT AMERICAN PILOTS DIED IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.
 HIS SHARP ATTACK WAS AIMED GENERALLY AT SENATORS WHO HE SAID HAVE DISCUSSED CUBA "WITHOUT RESTRAINT"--BUT PARTICULARLY AT SENATE GOP LEADER EVERETT DIRKSEN WHO BROUGHT UP DISCUSSION OF THE LOST PILOTS.
 MANSFIELD TOLD THE SENATE HE HAD "CONFIRMED" DIRKSEN'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT FOUR CIVILIAN PILOTS LOST THEIR LIVES IN THE ILL-FATED INVASION EFFORT BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN PUBLISHED ALMOST TWO YEARS EARLIER IN THE NEW YORK TIMES.
 HE SAID CRITICS OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS' CUBA POLICY PERMITTED THE IMPRESSION TO "GAIN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CREDENCE" THAT "THIS TRAGIC NEWS HAS BEEN SUPPRESSED BY THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION."
 "IS THIS THE SORT OF THING THAT HELPS THE NATION?" HE ASKED.
 "OR IS IT A GLARING EXAMPLE OF IRRESPONSIBLE POLITICS -- OF PANIC POLITICS AT ITS WORST?" HE ASKED.
 MANSFIELD SAID THE REDISCUSSION OF THE LOST FLIERS FROM ALABAMA, WHO APPARENTLY CRASHED IN THE CARIBBEAN, WAS A "CRUEL THING TO DO" TO THEIR FAMILIES AND WAS A "RECKLESS THING TO DO TO FOREIGN POLICY."
 HE ADDED: "IT SEEMS TO ME THEY OWE AN APOLOLOGY TO MR. KENNEDY, EVEN MORE, THEY OWE AN APOLOLOGY TO THE PEOPLE OF THE NATION."
 THE MONTANA DEMOCRAT CALLED FOR "RESTRAINED" DISCUSSION OF THE CUBAN PROBLEM, WITH CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS, FROM WHICH HELP FOR THE PRESIDENT MIGHT EMERGE.
 BUT HE DENOUNCED WHAT HE CALLED "POLITICAL PROWLING OVER THE DEAD" AND A "RECKLESS FLAMING OF PUBLIC EMOTIONS." HE SAID THOSE WHO DO THIS SHOULD "AT LEAST ACKNOWLEDGE WHAT THEY ARE ABOUT."
 TO CONTINUE IN THIS FASHION, HE SAID, IS TO "TOY WITH THE LIFE OF OUR NATION."
 MANSFIELD SAID HE SEES "NO NATIONAL PURPOSE" SERVED BY LOOSE DISCUSSION OF CUBA AND THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.
 DIRKSEN RAISED THE BAY OF PIGS ISSUE WHEN HE SAID A GOP POLICY COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION OF THE 1961 INVASION EVENTS HAD DISCLOSED THAT FOUR AMERICAN FLIERS HAD DIED FLYING FOR THE CUBAN REFUGEE FORCES. HIS REPORT ON THE BAY OF PIGS INCIDENT IS EXPECTED TO BE MADE NEXT WEEK.

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ADD 7 CUBA, WASHINGTON

MANSFIELD SAID THERE HAS BEEN DISCUSSION OF CUBA BUT THAT "LITTLE HAS BEEN DISPASSIONATE AND LESS HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE." POLICIES HAVE BEEN TRIED INSTEAD THROUGH "PRESS RELEASES," HE CHARGED. "THE SIZE AND ATTENTION OF THESE HAS BEEN 'JUDGE AND JURY.'" SUCH ACTIVITY, HE SAID, IS "NOT HELPING" BUT "HURTING" BOTH THE COUNTRY AND THE PRESIDENT. HE APPEALED FOR SENATORS TO HELP THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND TO HELP THE NATION IN SO DOING.

REFERRING TO DIRKSEN'S STATEMENT, MANSFIELD SAID THE BAY OF PIGS SUBJECT HAS BEEN "PRESSED AND PRESSED--AND TO WHAT END?"

"ARE WE GOING TO GET A CLEARER SOLUTION IF WE KNOW EVERY GRUESOME DETAIL OF THIS MATTER?" HE ASKED. "WHAT NATIONAL PURPOSE IS SERVED BY THIS MACABRE FIXATION?"

MANSFIELD SAID THE EARLY STORY ON THE LOST FLIERS WAS PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES ISSUE OF MAY 5, DATED MAY 4, 1961 "ONE YEAR AND NINE MONTHS AGO."

HE URGED THOSE WHO HE SAID HAVE A "PENCHANT TO PLAY CIA CHIEF, OR SECRETARY OF STATE," TO TEND TO THEIR LEGISLATIVE CHORES.

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ADD 8 CUBA, WASHINGTON
 ANSWERING MANSFIELD, DIRKSEN SAID HE BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT ONLY AFTER ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY REOPENED IT "AFTER IT HAD LANGUISHED FOR 20 MONTHS."

BUT ONCE BROUGHT UP, HE SAID, HE FOUND THERE WAS A "TREMENDOUS PUBLIC INTEREST" IN IT.

"I DO NOT LIKE TO SEE A GAP IN CURRENT HISTORY THAT MAY SOME DAY BE REFERRED TO AS THE BAY OF PIGS GAP," DIRKSEN SAID. "LET'S LAY THE WHOLE RECORD OPEN."

HE NOTED THAT THE SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEADED BY JOHN C. STENNIS, D-MISS., ALSO WAS INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT. DIRKSEN SAID HE WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO "PREJUDGE" THE CASE "UNTIL THE APPROPRIATE GROUP OF THIS BODY CAN GO INTO IT FURTHER."

DIRKSEN SAID HE MENTIONED THAT FOUR AMERICAN FLYERS WERE KILLED ONLY AFTER ANOTHER SENATOR, WHOM HE DID NOT NAME, ACCUSED REPUBLICANS OF "CRYING OVER SPILLED MILK."

"I SAID THAT SPILLED MILK IS ONE THING AND SPILLED BLOOD IS ANOTHER," DIRKSEN SAID. HE THEN COMMENDED MANSFIELD FOR CONFIRMING THAT FOUR AMERICANS HAD BEEN KILLED IN THE INVASION.

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
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(PIGS BAY)

CHICAGO--AN ALABAMA PILOT AND EDITOR SAID TODAY HE WAS ONE OF 18 AMERICAN AIRMEN WHO "RESPONDED TO A PERSONAL INVITATION" TO TAKE PART IN THE CUBAN BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

ALBERT C. PERSONS, IN A DISPATCH IN CHICAGO'S AMERICAN, SAID FIDEL CASTRO HAD 48 HOURS' ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE INVASION AND WAS THUS "ALLOWED ALL THE TIME HE NEEDED TO SUCCESSFULLY DISPERSE AIRCRAFT, TANKS AND TROOPS."

THE AMERICAN, IN A SEPARATE STORY, NAMED BRIG. GEN. G. REID DOSTER OF THE ALABAMA AIR GUARD AS THE MAN IN CHARGE OF TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN THE INVASION. THE NEWSPAPER SAID DOSTER WAS IDENTIFIED AS TACTICAL AIR CHIEF BY RETIRED MAJ. GEN. DAVID W. HUTCHINSON OF OKLAHOMA CITY.

DOSTER, THE AMERICAN SAID, REFERRED THE NEWSPAPER TO PERSONS, 47, A FORMER WORLD WAR II PILOT AND NOW MANAGING EDITOR OF THE WEEKLY BIRMINGHAM EXAMINER.

PERSONS, IN A DISPATCH BANNERED IN TODAY'S AMERICAN, SAID THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS NOT TO BLAME FOR THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO AND "HAS BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT THE SCAPE GOAT ROLE IN SILENCE."

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PERSONS SAID ALSO THAT:

--"MIRO CORDONA, WHO HAS BEEN WIDELY QUOTED AS SAYING HE WAS HELD INCOMMUNICADO BY THE CIA AND NEVER INFORMED WHEN THE INVASION WAS TO BE LAUNCHED, WAS ACTUALLY IN GUATEMALA FOR A LAST-MINUTE PEP TALK TO HIS TROOPS--WHO WERE EVEN THEN BEING AIRLIFTED TO NICARAGUA WHERE INVASION TRANSPORTS LAY AT ANCHOR OFF PUERTO CABEZA."

--PRESIDENT KENNEDY REPORTEDLY VETOED A PLAN TO SAVE THE INVASION FROM FAILURE BY THROWING U.S. TROOPS INTO THE OPERATION. THE U.S. WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN A "CASUS BELLI," PERSONS SAID, BY A FAKE BOMBING OF THE GUANTANAMO NAVAL BASE.

--THE PRESIDENT NEVER MADE A DECISION TO WITHDRAW U.S. AIR SUPPORT FROM THE INVASION FORCES "FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH SUPPORT WAS NEVER A PART OF THE ORIGINAL PLANNING OF THE OPERATION."

PERSONS SAID HIS ROLE WAS CONFINED TO NON-COMBAT ACTIVITIES DURING THE INVASION. HE WAS RECRUITED BY A TEST PILOT WHO ASKED HIM "IF I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN A JOB--LASTING FROM 30 TO 90 DAYS; A JOB WHICH WOULD BE HAZARDOUS; WHICH WOULD INVOLVE SOME 'SHOOTING'; WHICH WOULD BE OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL LIMITS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THIS HEMISPHERE; AND WHICH, AS HE PUT IT, WOULD BE 'IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST'."

PERSONS SAID HE AND THE OTHER RECRUITS WERE BRIEFED TWICE BY FOUR MEN WHO GAVE ONLY THEIR FIRST NAMES AND "REPRESENTED THEMSELVES AS BEING WITH A COMPANY UNDER CONTRACT TO ONE OF THE CUBAN EXILE GROUPS."

PERSONS SAID THE FOUR AIRMEN WHO DIED WERE KILLED APRIL 19, 1961, "IN A VAIN EFFORT TO STEM THE TIDE OF ADVANCING CASTRO FORCES ALERTED FIVE DAYS EARLIER."

THE AMERICANS "WERE HIRED TO REPLACE INEXPERIENCED CUBAN AIR CREWS," PERSONS SAID. HE WROTE THAT "THE FIRST TWO AIR STRIKES WERE MADE BY CUBAN CREWS. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS PROVED THESE FIRST MISSIONS WERE NOT COMPLETELY EFFECTIVE. A LAST MINUTE DECISION TO USE AMERICAN PILOTS ON THE THIRD AND FINAL STRIKE CAME TOO LATE TO SAVE INVASION TROOPS...."

WHEN FAILURE OF THE INVASION APPEARED SURE, PERSONS SAID, ONE OF THE AMERICAN PILOTS PROPOSED A PLAN TO BRING THE UNITED STATES INTO THE CONFLICT.

AIRCRAFT WITH CUBA MARKINGS WOULD "STRAFE RUNWAYS AND DROP A FEW BOMBS ON AREAS INSIDE THE NAVAL BASE AT GUANTANAMO. ALL PERSONNEL, NATURALLY, WOULD HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THESE AREAS AHEAD OF TIME."

PERSONS SAID "I WAS TOLD THAT THIS PROPOSITION WAS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I CANNOT, OF COURSE, CONFIRM THIS. IF SO, HE TURNED IT DOWN."


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UPI-213

(BAY OF PIGS)

BIRMINGHAM, ALA.--A RADIO STATION SAID TODAY "AT LEAST EIGHT AND
 POSSIBLY 12" LOCAL MEN PARTICIPATED IN THE ABORTIVE BAY OF PIGS
 INVASION IN 1961 INCLUDING FOUR WHO WERE KILLED.

ELVIN STANTON, NEWS DIRECTOR OF STATION WSGN, SAID HE HAD "PERSONAL
 KNOWLEDGE OF EIGHT BIRMINGHAM AREA MEN INVOLVED AND THERE WERE
 INDICATIONS THAT POSSIBLY 12 WERE INVOLVED.

STANTON SAID HE LEARNED "FROM UNDISCLOSED SOURCES THAT THOSE
 PARTICIPATING WERE PAID WITH FUNDS THEY CLAIMED CAME FROM THE CENTRAL
 INTELLIGENCE AGENCY."

AT LEAST FIVE LOCAL MEN WERE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INVOLVED. RILEY
 SHAMBURGER, WADE C. GRAY, THOMAS RAY AND LEE BAKER WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE
 BEEN KILLED WHEN THEIR PLANE CRASHED. ALBERT PERSONS, A BIRMINGHAM
 NEWSPAPERMAN, SAID HE WAS ONE OF 18 AMERICANS WHO TOOK PART IN THE CUBAN
 INVASION.

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
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UPI-107

ADD PIGS BAY, LITTLE ROCK (UPI-102)
 FAUBUS SAID THE ARKANSAS AIR GUARD FLIERS WERE "SWORN TO SECRECY."
 HE SAID AT LEAST A DOZEN ARKANSAS GUARD FLIERS WERE IN NICARAGUA
 TO FLY FOR THE INVASION AND "SOME" DID FLY. HE SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE
 KNEW, NO AIRMEN FROM ARKANSAS WERE CASUALTIES, BUT ONE PLANE FROM
 ARKANSAS WAS SHOT DOWN.

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Fliers Paid by Latins' Including Four Lost Over Cuba

BY DOM BONAFEDE, Chief-Latin America Correspondent

The Miami counsel for an organization which recruited pilots for combat missions against Fidel Castro—including four Birmingham, Ala., airmen killed in the 1961 Cuban invasion—said Monday it was privately supported and financed by a "Central American anti-Castro group."

Alex E. Carlson, attorney for Double Check Corp., 145 Curtis Pkwy., Miami Springs, also said "it was possible" the group received assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency.

"But I don't know for certain. It was merely reported to me that it received aid," Carlson said.

Carlson said "several" U.S. airmen had been enlisted by American recruiters employed by Double Check to fly anti-Castro missions. He declined to say how many were recruited or to disclose the identity of the sponsors of Double Check.

He said his clients asked him to set up a corporation shortly after Castro assumed power in January 1959 and to act as counsel.

"To my knowledge," Carlson said, "neither the U.S. nor any other governments were involved. I know personally that a lot of rich exile Cubans contributed."

He said the four Birmingham airmen crashed in the Caribbean on April 19, the final day of the three-day invasion operation, while flying in a C46 aircraft. It is believed that the plane, normally used for cargo ferrying, had been converted for low-level strafing duty.

"The last was heard from them they were losing altitude and one engine was out," Carlson said. "Some wreckage was later found."

He said that "after all hope had been abandoned" the Central American group authorized Double Check to set up a professional trust fund from which to make twice-a-month payments of \$225 to the widows of the four dead fliers.

(In Washington, Sen. Everett M. Dirksen (R., Ill.) said a Senate committee will be asked to determine the source of the checks, now issued by the Bankers Trust Co. of New York.)

Carlson said Double Check remains in existence but is inactive. Records in the secretary of state's office in Tallahassee showed Double Check paid a

\$30 capital stock tax last Jan. 23.

Carlson denied that the mysterious Central American group was the anti-Castro Democratic Revolutionary Front (now called the Cuban Revolutionary Council) headed by Dr. José Miró Cardona. It was under the banner of the Revolutionary Front that the invasion was launched.

"It (the Central American group) was associated in some way with the Front but it was smaller," Carlson said.

Carlson, who speaks Spanish and attended the University of Concepcion in Chile for one year as a scholarship student, said he did not believe his background had anything to do with his appointment as counsel for Double Check.

"It is just that my office is near the airport and I do a lot of airline work," he said.

He said he had disclosed almost all the information about the four dead airmen in 1961 and that the present furor is politically motivated.

He was not divulging more data, he said, because it would breach lawyer-client relationship. The U.S. government had not instructed him as to what he could say, he said.

Tallahassee records showed that Double Check was incorporated on May 14, 1959, as a "brokerage" company. Current officers were listed as Carlson, president; Earl Sanders, vice president; Margery Carlson, secretary-treasurer, and Wesley R. Pillsbury, resident agent.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

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The MIAMI HERALD
Miami, Florida

Date: 3/5/63
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Editor:
Title: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES (MM 105-1742)
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Submitting Office: Miami

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UPI-213

(CUBAN)

MIAMI--A MIAMI ATTORNEY SAID TODAY THAT "AFTER ALL HOPE WAS
 ABANDONED," A CENTRAL AMERICAN ANTI-CASTRO GROUP SET UP A TRUST
 FUND FOR FOUR BIRMINGHAM, ALA., WOMEN WIDOWED IN THE CUBAN
 INVASION.

THE TRUST FUND GAVE THE FOUR WOMEN \$225 EACH EVERY TWO WEEKS AFTER
 THEIR AIRMEN HUSBANDS WERE KILLED APRIL 19, 1961, THE LAST DAY OF THE
 ILL-FATED ATTACK AT THE BAY OF PIGS.

ALEX E. CARLSON, ATTORNEY FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICAN GROUP, SAID A
 NUMBER OF FLIERS WERE RECRUITED TO FLY COMBAT MISSIONS AGAINST
 CASTRO DURING THE INVASION.

THE ATTORNEY WOULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CENTRAL AMERICAN GROUP, AND HE
 SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION THAT THE GROUP WAS AIDED BY ANY GOVERNMENT.
 HE DID SAY HE KNEW OF SEVERAL WEALTHY CUBAN EXILES WHO CONTRIBUTED
 TO THE GROUP.

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
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UPI-81

ADD 1 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-55)
 MEANWHILE, SENATE GOP LEADER EVERETT DIRKSEN CHARGED THAT
 SOMEBODY HAD BEEN PUTTING "GENTLE PRESSURE" ON POSSIBLE WITNESSES
 WHO MIGHT BE CALLED IN A NEW INVESTIGATION OF THE BAY OF PIGS
 INVASION FIASCO.

THE ILLINOIS REPUBLICAN DECLINED TO AMPLIFY HIS ASSERTION BUT
 APPEARED CONFIDENT THAT HIS OWN REVIEW OF THE INVASION WILL BE
 EXPANDED INTO A FORMAL SENATE COMMITTEE INQUIRY.

"THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INDICATIONS OF GENTLE PRESSURES ON PEOPLE
 WHO WOULD BE SUMMONED BEFORE A COMMITTEE IN DUE TIME," HE TOLD A
 NEWS CONFERENCE.

THE GOP LEADER SAID HE WAS GLAD TO SEE SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER
 MIKE MANSFIELD CONFIRM HIS OWN REPORT THAT FOUR CIVILIAN AMERICAN
 FLIERS HAD DIED IN THE APRIL 1961 CUBAN INVASION EFFORT. DIRKSEN
 SAID THAT, UNLIKE MANSFIELD, HE HAD NOT BEEN TOLD PREVIOUSLY
 THAT THE FOUR AMERICANS HAD BEEN KILLED. MANSFIELD SAID HE HAD
 BEEN GIVEN THE INFORMATION ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS.

DIRKSEN REFUSED TO DISCLOSE WHAT SENATE COMMITTEE HE WOULD SEEK
 TO HAVE PICK UP HIS INVESTIGATION. HE PLANS TO SUBMIT HIS OWN REPORT
 TO FELLOW REPUBLICANS PROBABLY NEXT WEEK AND ADDED:

"I EXPECT TO SEE IT LAND IN THE HANDS OF A COMMITTEE OF DEMOCRATS
 AND REPUBLICANS FOR THOROUGH EXAMINATION, USING SUBPOENA POWERS IF
 NECESSARY, SO IT WILL NOT BE IMPEACHED AS A PARTISAN DOCUMENT."
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Bobby Started It

The Kennedy administration has only itself to blame for the political controversy aroused by the revelation that four American airmen were shot down during the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion.

It was the President's brother, Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy, who contended in January that the United States never had planned to provide air cover for the Cuban invasion attempt. Therefore, he said, it was an error to charge that President Kennedy had withdrawn the air cover.

Prompted by Bobby's interview, the Senate Republican leadership began its independent investigation of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, reviving the dormant issue.

The Republican charge that four Americans died in the invasion attempt has been verified by Majority Leader Mansfield (D-Mont.). GOP Leader Dirksen (Ill.) has said that he will make public the full story. We hope this will prompt the Kennedy administration to give its side. The public is entitled to as complete a picture as possible of what really happened and the extent of U.S. participation, even though the super-secret CIA planned the invasion.

So far as we know now, the men were not flying an air cover provided by U.S. Armed Forces. Instead, they apparently were American fliers who were employed to train Cuban pilots, navigators and radio operators and who volunteered to fly combat missions because of the exhaustion of the Cuban pilots.

So Bobby Kennedy's contention that the United States never had promised air cover for the invasion does not seem to have been disproved. But the deaths of the four Americans certainly does raise a question about Bobby's additional contention that the President had made it clear that "American manpower, American air power and American ships would not be used." Planned or not, American manpower certainly was used.

In our opinion, however, it would be unfortunate if this story were seized upon to try to force the Kennedy administration into unwise military actions against Cuba.

Like all Americans, we regret the loss of the lives of the four airmen in the invasion attempt. But, as a self-proclaimed spokesman for the four contended, "These men knew what they were getting into. If they came back they had a nice nest egg."

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12B Detroit News
Detroit, Mich.
Martin S. Hayden



Date: 2/27/63
Edition: Final 4 Star
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Editor: Martin S. Hayden
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
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UPI-148

ADD 4 CUBA, WASHINGTON

A REPUBLICAN CONGRESSMAN ACCUSED THE ADMINISTRATION TODAY OF PRESSURING INTO SILENCE AMERICANS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

REP. WILLIAM G. CRAMER, R-FLA., SAID THE SAME TYPE OF PRESSURE WAS APPLIED TO THE FAMILIES OF THE AMERICAN FLYERS ABOARD A B26 HE CLAIMED WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE WANING HOURS OF THE INVASION.

THE FLORIDA CONGRESSMAN ASKED THE ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FULL FACTS ABOUT THE INVASION AND RELEASE THE NAMES OF ALL AMERICANS WHO WERE KILLED.

CRAMER SAID THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REFUSED TO FURNISH HIM WITH NAMES TODAY. HE ADDED THAT THE CIA ALSO REFUSED TO CONFIRM OR DENY THAT FOUR AMERICANS REPORTEDLY LOST WHILE FLYING A CARGO PLANE WERE REALLY FOUR ABOARD THE B26 WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN.

"THE REFUSAL OF THE CIA TO EVEN DISCUSS THE MATTER," HE SAID, "RAISES GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE IDENTITY, THE CIRCUMSTANCES, OR THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF AMERICANS KILLED INCIDENT TO THE INVASION."

CRAMER SAID AMERICAN FLYERS WERE REPORTEDLY KILLED ON WHAT HE CALLED SUICIDE MISSION BECAUSE OF INEPT PLANNING WHICH INCLUDED THE REMOVAL OF TAIL GUNS ON THE B26S.

"THIS," HE SAID, "MADE THESE PLANES SITTING DUCKS FOR THE COMMUNIST FIGHTERS."

CRAMER SAID IT WAS A NATIONAL DISGRACE THAT THE DEATH OF THE FLYERS WAS SUPPRESSED "AND THAT THEIR PART IN THIS FIGHT FOR FREEDOM... IS BEING PURPOSELY DISCREDITED."

"THE PLANTED STORIES THAT THEY WERE ONLY SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE, INTERESTED ONLY IN THEIR PAY," CRAMER SAID, "IS A DESECRATION OF THE HEROIC SACRIFICES OF THESE HEROES WHO GAVE THEIR LAST FULL MEASURE OF DEVOTION TO FIGHTING FOR ALL OUR FREEDOMS."

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UPI-176

(AMERICANS)
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.--A BIRMINGHAM WOMAN SAID TODAY HER SON WAS ONE OF
FOUR AMERICANS WHO DISAPPEARED DURING THE ABORTIVE BAY OF PIGS
INVASION IN 1961 AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD "JUST EVADED THE
QUESTION" WHEN SHE SOUGHT MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE MEN.

MRS. RILEY W. SHAMBURGER, SR. SAID HER SON, MAJ. RILEY W.
SHAMBURGER, JR., AN AIR NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER, AND THREE OTHER
BIRMINGHAM AREA MEN WERE ABOARD A CARGO PLANE THAT LEFT AN
UNIDENTIFIED SOUTH AMERICAN AIRFIELD ON THE DAY OF THE INVASION.
THE PLANE, A C46, WENT DOWN APRIL 19, 1961, THE DAY OF THE
INVASION AND MRS. SHAMBURGER SAID HER EFFORTS SINCE THEN TO FIND
OUT MORE ABOUT THE MEN'S FATE MET WITH NO SUCCESS.

SHE SAID SHE WROTE PRESIDENT KENNEDY:

"IF NO AMERICANS WERE INVOLVED (IN THE INVASION) WHERE IS MY SON?"

"I TRY TO HAVE HOPE AND TRY TO CLING TO IT. YOU KNOW THE
GOVERNMENT NEVER HAS NOTIFIED US. SOME LAWYERS CAME OUT AND TOLD
US ABOUT IT." SHE SAID.

SHE APPARENTLY REFERRED TO A PRIVATE ATTORNEY FROM MIAMI, ALL ALI
WHO DECLINED TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF, WHO TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE HERE IN
MAY OF 1961 THE FOUR MEN WERE HIRED BY "PRIVATE SOURCES."
"WE'VE HEARD SO MANY THINGS SINCE THEN TO MAKE US THINK THEY WERE
ALIVE," SHE SAID. SHE DECLINED TO ELABORATE.

ON THE PLANE WITH SHAMBURGER WERE THOMAS W. GRAY, CO-PILOT; LEE
F. BAKER, ENGINEER; AND WADE C. GRAY, RADIO OPERATOR. GRAY IS
FROM NEARBY PINSON WHILE THE OTHERS LIVED IN BIRMINGHAM.
THE MEN, WITH SHAMBURGER PILOTING, ALLEGEDLY LEFT SOUTH AMERICA WITH
THE CARGO WITH STRICT ORDERS NOT TO BREAK RADIO SILENCE UNLESS
ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

MRS. SHAMBURGER SAID SHE HAD BEEN TOLD, APPARENTLY BY THE
UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEYS, THAT THE PLANE WENT DOWN ON THE DAY OF
THE INVASION WHEN ITS ENGINES FAILED.

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
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
UPI-205

ADD AMERICANS, BIRMINGHAM (UPI-176)
 (ACTING WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY ANDREW T. HATCHER SAID THE WHITE
 HOUSE MAIL ROOM WAS CHECKING FOR ANY CORRESPONDENCE FROM MRS.
 SHAMBURGER.)

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U/I-231 ADD AMERICANS BIRMINGHAM (UPI-205)
 LATER THE WHITE HOUSE SAID THE GOVERNMENT "UNFORTUNATELY"
 COULD NOT GIVE MRS. SHAMBURGER MORE INFORMATION ON A REPORT THAT HER
 SON WAS ONE OF FOUR AMERICAN FLIERS KILLED IN THE ABORTIVE 1961
 CUBAN INVASION.
 ACTING PRESS SECRETARY ANDREW T. HATCHER, COMMENTING IN RESPONSE TO
 MRS. SHAMBURGER'S CHARGE THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY "JUST EVADED
 THE QUESTIONS" WHEN SHE APPEALED TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE FOR MORE DETAILS
 ABOUT HER SON, SAID:
 "MRS. SHAMBURGER WROTE TO THE PRESIDENT THE LATTER PART OF 1962.
 THE LETTER WAS ANSWERED BY BRIG. GEN. GODFREY MCHUGH, AIR AIDE TO
 THE PRESIDENT. AT THE DIRECTION OF THE PRSIDENT THE GENERAL EXTENDED
 THE PRESIDENT'S HEARTFELT SYMPATHY AND EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENT
 HAD, UNFORTUNATELY, NO INFORMATION TO ADD TO THAT WHICH HAD BEEN
 CONVEYED BEFORE."
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UPI-220

(PILOTS)

MIAMI--CUBAN PILOTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ABORTIVE 1961 CUBAN BAY OF PIGS INVASION SAID TODAY THAT SEN. EVERETT DIRKSEN'S REPORT THAT FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS WERE KILLED IN THE ATTACK IS NOT NEW. THEY REPORTED IT HERE A MONTH AGO.

A UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL STORY FROM MIAMI LAST JAN. 22 QUOTED THE FOUR CUBANS--GONZALO HERRERA, GUSTAVO VILLODO, ALFREDO CABALLERO AND JULIO GONZALEZ REBULL--AS SAYING THE AMERICANS, IN TWO B-26S, WERE SHOT DOWN ON APRIL 19, 1961, THE THIRD DAY OF THE INVASION.

THE NAMES OF THE AMERICANS WERE NOT KNOWN BECAUSE ALL AMERICANS CONNECTED WITH THE INVASION USED PSEUDONYMS OR NICKNAMES SUCH AS "JOE," OR "BOB," THEY SAID.

ALTHOUGH DIRKSEN SAID HE DID NOT HAVE MORE DETAILS, THE CUBANS GAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LAST JAN. 22 IN THEIR INTERVIEW WITH UPI HERE.

HERRERA SAID HE FLEW IN FORMATION WITH THE TWO B-26S WHICH WERE LOST. THE OTHERS CORROBORATED HERRERA'S REPORT.

HE SAID CUBAN PILOTS HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO CALL BY RADIO TO A U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER STATIONED NEARBY THE INVASION AREA "IN CASE OF ANY EMERGENCY." THE NAME OF THE CARRIER WAS NOT KNOWN.

"WE MADE VARIOUS CALLS BUT THEY WERE IGNORED," HERRERA SAID. "ONE OF THE AMERICAN PILOTS CALLED THE CARRIER SUDDENLY SAYING HE WAS BEING ATTACKED BY ONE OF THE CASTRO AIR FORCE T-33 JET TRAINERS AND THAT ONE OF HIS MOTORS WERE AFIRE AND HIS AMMUNITION WAS GONE," HERRERA CONTINUED.

"TEN SECONDS LATER THE OTHER B-26 ALSO CALLED THE CARRIER FOR HELP. HIS CALL WAS PUNCTUATED BY THE EXPLOSION OF HIS PLANE. THEN THE FIRST PLANE WHICH HAD CALLED PLUNGED INTO THE SEA IN FLAMES."

HERRERA, ALSO FLYING A B-26, SAID HE SUBSEQUENTLY FLEW TO NICARAGUA ALTHOUGH HIS PLANE HAD BEEN HIT 37 TIMES BY BULLETS AND ONE OF HIS MOTORS WAS KNOCKED OUT. HIS CALLS, EN ROUTE TO THE MYSTERY CARRIER, ALSO WENT UNANSWERED, HE SAID.

OTHER PILOTS HERE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVASION, SAID IT WAS "WELL KNOWN" THAT FOUR AMERICAN FLIERS WERE KILLED IN THE INVASION. BUT THEIR NAMES WERE A MYSTERY.

ONE PILOT TOLD UPI TONIGHT THAT HE ALSO FLEW A B-26 ACCOMPANIED BY AN AMERICAN WHO GAVE HIS NAME ONLY AS "BOB" WHO SAID HE WAS A VETERAN OF THE KOREAN WAR. THE CUBAN, WHO DID NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED, SAID HE NEVER SAW THE AMERICAN AGAIN AFTER THEY RETURNED TO NICARAGUA AND KNOWS NOTHING MORE ABOUT HIM "EXCEPT THAT HE WAS MY COMPANION DURING THE INVASION ATTACKS."

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
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UPI-41

(DIRKSEN-CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SENATE GOP LEADER EVERETT DIRKSEN SAID TODAY HE HAS INFORMATION THAT FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS, PRESUMABLY CIVILIAN, WERE KILLED IN THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS INVASION ATTEMPT.

DIRKSEN TOLD NEWSMEN THE INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED BY THE GOP STAFF INVESTIGATING THE 1961 CUBAN INVASION AND, HE ASSUMES, IS KNOWN TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

DIRKSEN DECLINED TO ELABORATE ON THE INFORMTION BUT INDICATED HE WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY IN A SPEECH HE WILL MAKE, PERHAPS LATER THIS WEEK, AND IN A REPORT TO SENATE REPUBLICANS. HE ANNOUNCED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO HE WAS ASSEMBLING DATA ON THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION IN TE INTEREST OF HISTORICAL ACCURACY AFTER ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY MADE A STATEMENT ON THE MATTER.

DIRKSEN SAID HE FELT CERTAIN THE REPORTED DOWNING OF FOUR U.S. PILOTS HAD BEEN "VERIFIED" BY HIS STAFF. HE SAID HE COULD NOT SAY MORE AT THIS TIME, BECAUSE THIS INFORMATION WAS BUT PART OF THE DATA HE IS ACCUMULATING FOR HIS REPORT.

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ADD DIRKSEN-CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-41)

DIRKSEN SAID LATER HE PLANS TO REPORT FIRST TO FELLOW REPUBLICANS, PROBABLY AT THEIR REGULAR WEEKLY LUNCHEON MEETING NEXT TUESDAY, THEN DELIVER HIS SENATE SPEECH.

THE U.S. PILOTS TO WHOM DIRKSEN REFERRED WERE DESCRIBED AS UNDER CONTRACT TO THE CUBAN REFUGEE FORCE WHICH WAS REPULSED BY CASTRO'S GROUND AND AIR UNITS WHEN IT MADE ITS BEACHHEAD EFFORT AT THE BAY OF PIGS IN APRIL 1961.

THE ILLINOIS REPUBLICAN HAS TAKEN ISSUE WITH THE CONTENTION OF SOME DEMOCRATS THAT THE BAY OF PIGS DEBACLE IS "SPILLED MILK" ABOUT WHICH NOTHING NEEDS TO BE DONE. DIRKSEN SAID TODAY THERE IS "SPILLED BLOOD" INVOLVED AND THAT THE WHOLE RECORD SHOULD BE ACCURATELY PRESENTED BECAUSE THE CUBAN SITUATION WILL BE "WITH US FOR SOME TIME TO COME."


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UPI-217
(PILOTS)

WASHINGTON--SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE MANSFIELD TONIGHT
CONFIRMED A GOP REPORT THAT FOUR CIVILIAN AMERICAN PILOTS WERE
KILLED IN THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

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UJI-218

ADD 1 PILOTS WASHINGTON

THE MONTANA DEMOCRAT SAID IN A STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. FLIERS, FLYING AS VOLUNTEER SUBSTITUTES FOR EXHAUSTED CUBAN PILOTS, "LOST THEIR LIVES" IN THE BATTLE FOR THE CUBA BEACHHEAD.

MANSFIELD'S STATEMENT WAS ISSUED FOLLOWING THE CLAIM OF SENATE GOP LEADER EVERETT M. DIRKSEN THAT HE HAD INFORMATION TO THE EFFECT THAT FOUR CIVILIAN U.S. PILOTS HAD DIED IN THE BAY OF PIGS EFFORT.

THE CONFIRMATION ALSO CAME AFTER CUBA, IN A NOTE DELIVERED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, DENIED ATTACKING AN AMERICAN SHRIMP BOAT LAST WEEK. THE NOTE, IN REPLY TO A U.S. PROTEST OF THE INCIDENCE, ALSO RAISED NEW CHARGES OF U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST CUBAN FISHING VESSELS.

MANSFIELD GAVE NO SOURCE FOR HIS INFORMATION, OTHER THAN TO SAY IT WAS HIS OWN STATEMENT. BUT THERE WAS LITTLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS MAKING PUBLIC INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM BY GOVERNMENT SOURCES.

HIS STATEMENT SAID:

"ON SUNDAY, FEB. 3, A STORY BY ALBERT C. PERSONS, HEADLINED 'U.S. FLIERS DIED AT BAY OF PIGS,' APPEARED IN THE BIRMINGHAM, ALA., EXAMINER.

"IT IS KNOWN THAT A FEW EXPERIENCED AMERICAN AIRMEN WERE EMPLOYED TO TRAIN CUBAN PILOTS, NAVIGATORS AND RADIO OPERATORS.

"BECAUSE OF THE EXHAUSTION OF THE CUBAN PILOTS, SEVERAL OF THESE AMERICANS VOLUNTEERED TO FLY COMBAT MISSIONS. APPARENTLY A DECISION WAS MADE ON TUESDAY NIGHT, APRIL 18, 1961, BY THOSE DIRECTING THE OPERATION TO ACCEPT THIS OFFER. ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING, SEVERAL PLANES WERE ATTACKED AND FOUR OF THESE AMERICANS LOST THEIR LIVES."

THE CUBAN DENIAL OF ANY ATTACK ON THE U.S. SHRIMP BOAT WAS DELIVERED AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT BY CZECHOSLOVAKIAN AMBASSADOR MILOVAN RUZEK, WHO HANDLES CUBAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN WASHINGTON.

2/25--N926PES

4 U. S. Flyers Killed in Cuba, Dirksen Says

Senator States All Were Shot Down At Bay of Pigs

By JACK BELL

Associated Press Staff Writer

Senate Republican Leader Dirksen said today he has uncovered evidence that four American flyers were killed in the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba.

Senator Dirksen said in an interview he has completed a one-man inquiry into the Bay of Pigs disaster and is ready to turn his findings over to Senate investigators.

Other than to report the belief that four American lives were lost, he declined to discuss the evidence he has assembled. Some of it came from participants in the invasion and some from United States military personnel operating in the area at the time.

The Republican leader said the four flyers were shot down in invasion planes which did not carry United States markings. He gave no details but presumably they were in B-26 bombers downed by jet trainers inherited by Fidel Castro from the overthrown Batista regime.

To Talk With Stennis

News stories at the time mentioned that one United States civilian flier might have been shot down. This report later was labeled erroneous.

Senator Dirksen said he plans to discuss his findings with Senator Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, chairman of the Senate's Preparedness Subcommittee.

A subcommittee inquiry into the current military strength of Soviet-dominated Cuba is expected to get under way this week. Senator Stennis has indicated he regards the 1961 invasion as "spilled milk" to which the group would not be justified in devoting much time at this point. Senator Dirksen disagreed.

"It seems to me it becomes a matter of some importance when even four American lives are lost," he said.

Scott Claims He Warned

Senator Dirksen and other Republicans have contended that Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy opened the whole matter up to investigation with a statement that no United States air cover had been promised the invaders.

Senator Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, accused Mr. Kennedy of trying to make a "readjustment of facts" to lay a major share of the blame for the invasion's failure on the Republican administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Senator Scott, Republican of Pennsylvania, contended on a television program yesterday that he and other Republicans had warned in advance what would happen in the Bay of Pigs.

Senator Clark, Democrat of Pennsylvania, who appeared on the program with Senator Scott, said his colleague was engaging in "Monday morning quarterbacking."

"All of your talk about the Bay of Pigs was after the event," he told Senator Scott, "It was hindsight."

He went on to say that by advocating drastic action against Cuba now, Senator Scott was "trying to do some Friday afternoon quarterbacking . . . and you don't know the signals."


"On the contrary," Senator Scott replied, "what we said before the Bay of Pigs was that there should be, if necessary, an invasion of Cuba. We have never advocated an invasion since the President lost that one."

Urges Ultimatum

Senator Scott went on to urge an ultimatum to the Russians to get their troops out of Cuba. He said the United States should get its Latin American neighbors to join in a "total Western hemisphere blockade" of Cuba.

Senator Dirksen's decision to push ahead with the Bay of

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Pigs inquiry was in line with his reported warning to President Kennedy last week that Republicans intend to continue to "pumme!" him about Cuba.

As for Senator Scott's suggestion that the United States get its Latin American neighbors to join in a hemisphere blockade of Cuba, the chairman of the Organization of American States said last night he thought the OSA would support another blockade.

OAS Chairman Gonzalo J. Facio noted that the organization voted unanimously last October to support the United States quarantine on offensive arms shipments to Cuba.

He said the OAS could take "defensive action" against Cuba "but the United States is the only one which can judge when to take (direct) action." He added, "In matters of cold war . . . the OAS can only play a secondary role." Mr. Facio expressed his views in a television interview (NBC—Meet the Press).

Labor Council Concerned

In Miami Beach, the AFL-CIO executive council called for an end to "partisan political criticism" of President Kennedy's policies in dealing with Cuba.

The council released a statement yesterday saying valid exchange of opinions is part of the democratic process but "the intense partisanship injected into the debate over Cuba by some opponents of the administration" had to be viewed with concern.


The council's statement urged bipartisan support for Mr. Kennedy's "courageous and capable" foreign policy leadership and said his pressure on Moscow to withdraw Soviet troops from Cuba has begun to show results.

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UPI-83

ADD 2 DIRKSEN-CUBA, WASHINGTON

A DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO
 SUBSTANTIATE DIRKSEN'S REPORT. HE SAID HE WAS "NOT AWARE" OF
 ANY AMERICAN DEATHS IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION BUT SAID HIS "CHECK
 IS NOT COMPLETE."

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UPI-204

(ARTIME)

WASHINGTON--~~MANUEL~~ ARTIME, A LEADER OF THE RECENTLY RELEASED CUBAN
 INVASION BRIGADE, TODAY DENIED MAKING A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO
 HIM ABOUT THE CONTROVERSIAL AIR COVER ISSUE.

ARTIME WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT "NO U.S. AIR SUPPORT HAD BEEN
 PROMISED" TO THE INVASION BRIGADE IN THE CURRENT ISSUE (FEB. 1) OF
 A NATIONALLY CIRCULATED NEWS MAGAZINE (TIME).

WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE MAGAZINE BY NAME, ARTIME SAID:
 "SINCE MY RETURN FROM THE CASTRO PRISONS I HAVE MADE NO
 COMMENT OF ANY KIND TO ANY NEWSPAPERMAN REGARDING (THE AIR COVER
 PROBLEM) NOR ANY OTHER RELATED TO THE LANDING."

ARTIME SAID SUCH AN ISSUE WOULD BE USEFUL ONLY IF IT HELPED
 "THE CAUSE OF THE LIBERATION OF CUBA AND THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE
 WORLD."

"I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR," HE SAID, "THAT UNTIL NOW I HAVE MADE
 NO STATEMENT ABOUT THE MATTER."

BOTH PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY SAID
 RECENTLY THAT NO U.S. AIR SUPPORT WAS PROMISED TO THE BRIGADE.

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
ADD 1 PIGS BAY WASHINGTON (UPI-105)
REP. RALPH HARVEY, R-IND., JOINED COLLEAGUES SEEKING A
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ILL-FATED INVASION ATTEMPT
IN CUBA'S BAY OF PIGS TWO YEARS AGO.

IN A BRIEF SPEECH PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BEFORE THE HOUSE, HARVEY
QUOTED A LETTER FROM JACK GORE, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER OF THE FORT
LAUDERDALE, FLA., NEWS. GORE, IN A FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL JAN. 24,
ACCUSED THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OF "TRYING TO MANAGE HISTORY," AND
TOOK ISSUE WITH ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S STATEMENT THAT NO
AIR COVER EVER WAS PLANNED FOR THE INVADERS.

"IT HAS ALWAYS SEEMED STRANGE TO ME THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND HIS
BROTHER WOULD GO SO FAR OUT ON A LIMB TO RANSOM THE CUBAN PRISONERS,
AND NOW MORE OR LESS PROMISE THEM A G-I BILL OF RIGHTS, UNLESS THEY
HAD A GUILTY CONSCIENCE ABOUT PULLING BACK THE AIR COVER WHICH HAD BEEN
PROMISED AND WHICH, IF IT HAD BEEN USED THEN, COULD WELL HAVE SAVED THE
WHOLE SITUATION," HARVEY QUOTED GORE'S LETTER.

"SINCE ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN CHOOSE TO KEEP BRINGING UP THE
MATTER, IT IS ONLY PROPER TO SEE IF THE TRUTH CAN BE LEARNED ABOUT THE
CUBAN FIASCO BEFORE TOO MUCH HISTORY IS FALSELY RECORDED," HARVEY
SAID.

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UPI-105

(PIGS BAY)

WASHINGTON--THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND CONGRESS ARE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PUBLIC SECRET 1961 TESTIMONY BY SECRETARY RUSK AND OTHER OFFICIALS ON THE DISASTROUS "BAY OF PIGS" INVASION OF CUBA.

PRESS OFFICER LINCOLN WHITE SAID TODAY THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS CONSULTING ON THE MATTER WITH THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS HEADED BY SEN. WAYNE MORSE, D-ORE. THE INVASION ATTEMPT OCCURRED APRIL 19, 1961, AND RUSK GAVE HIS TESTIMONY THE FOLLOWING MONTH.

WHITE SAID THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER RELEASE OF SOME OF THE TESTIMONY WOULD BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST.

OTHER OFFICIALS SAID THE QUESTION WAS RAISED BY MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE WHEN RUSK TESTIFIED LAST FRIDAY ON CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS.


IT WAS SUGGESTED THEN, IT WAS SAID, THAT RECENT PUBLIC DEBATE OVER THE EXTENT OF THE AIR COVER PROMISED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE AFFAIR MIGHT MAKE IT ADVISABLE TO RELEASE SOME OF THE TESTIMONY IF THIS COULD BE DONE WITHOUT HARM.

RUSK WAS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE SAID THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE GLAD TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER AND GIVE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ITS RECOMMENDATIONS.

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'Come Back, Come Back,' They Shouted

By VIRGINIA PREWETT

The revived controversy over U. S. promises of air support at the Bay of Pigs invasion is causing many Latin Americans—and not a few North Americans—
anxiety over the role of the recently freed Cuban Invasion Brigade.

The Kennedy Administration apparently is attempting to establish that there was no promise of U. S. air cover for the invasion. Dr. Antonio de Varona, a Cuban Revolutionary Council member from the time when it was first organized as the Democratic Revolutionary Front, and others close to the drama, say that U. S. air cover was promised.

CLOSE

Obviously, the Kennedys have a tremendous asset in their close relations with the Invasion Brigade's top officers. The brigade's future and its usefulness in freeing Cuba may depend on what the Kennedys decide to do about it.

In Attorney General Kennedy's anteroom, Comdr. José San Roman said: "We had our own planes." Later at New York's Overseas Press Club, he declined, on behalf of the six top officers, to discuss the question.

Will these young men now have to justify for the Kennedy version? They have returned from their agonizing experience burning with a desire to make any sacrifice to help their occupied country.

Comdr. Eneido Oliva, third in command, describes the

picture that obsesses the brigade leaders:

"Somehow, the thousands of political prisoners at the Isle of Pines learned we were leaving," he says. "When the guards led us out, suddenly at every barred window in all those great circular cell blocks, thousands of handkerchiefs were waving. In spite of the communist guards, the prisoners set up a chorus—'Return and free Cuba!'

ROUNDABOUT

"They put us in busses," he says, "and to prevent public demonstrations, they took us to the Havana airport by a round-about way. But the people knew who we were.


"And the farmers came running to the roadside from the fields to shout 'Return! Return!' In every little village the people braved the communist political police to crowd by the hundreds to cheer us and take up the cry, 'Come back again!'

"The communists even hurriedly got up a few people to throw stones at us. But the crowds still pushed forward to call, 'Come back, we'll be waiting!'"

If the Brigade officers were made to feel pressure to support the Kennedy version of the assault, and if their chance to free their country was involved, their dilemma would be terrible.

The Invasion Corps belongs to the Free World. Whatever happens to them in the current controversy will not reflect on the brave young fighting men, but on their more powerful elders in the United States Government.

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- The Washington Post and Times Herald
- The Washington Daily News
- The Evening Star
- New York Herald Tribune
- New York Journal-American
- New York Mirror
- New York Daily News
- New York Post
- The New York Times
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A Common Sense Approach *21* By Peter Edson



REPUBLICANS on both sides of the Capitol, clamoring for an investigation of the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba two years ago, might well take a leaf from the book of their late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

He had a rule on operations policy which went something like this, tho it was never recorded on tape or put down on paper in quotation marks:

Don't bother about the details of what went wrong yesterday. If mistakes were made, learn what you can from them for future guidance. But yesterday's mistakes are part of the situation as it exists today. That's what we have to concentrate on, to decide what we're going to do about it tomorrow. Don't spend too much time looking backward or refighting yesterday's battles. Keep your eyes on what's ahead.


The common sense of this approach might have some moral value in it for the Democrats, too. What stirred up this furore as much as anything else was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's interview denying there had been any promise of U. S. air support for the Cuban invasion fiasco.

President Kennedy now confirms no U. S. air cover was planned. If there had been U. S. air cover, says the President, it might as well have been an American invasion.

Sen. Wayne Morse's Foreign Relations sub-committee on Latin America investigated all this soon after it happened. He has been offering his colleagues a look at his closed hearings record of two years ago, but he has had few takers.

But even if the Attorney General had not reopened this old sore, the Cuban controversy might have been revived by New York GOP Sen. Kenneth B. Keating. He insists

W. Morse
John F. Dulles



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Russia is continuing its military buildup on the island, ~~and the missiles and the jet aircraft have been removed.~~

The President in his last press conference tried to give reassurance that this situation was under constant surveillance. He says that only one Soviet supply ship has arrived in Cuba since the withdrawal of offensive weapons. It may have brought arms. The President also admits that there are still 16,000 to 17,000 Russians in Cuba.

This is of course a legitimate subject for investigation. It is focused on what might happen next, not on past mistakes.

Sen. Morse again moved quickly into this situation, calling Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA officials to testify in closed hearings. This may head off further full dress washing of dirty American linen in public, but probably not.

To see the Senate or House or both of them in a joint committee investigation of what went on two years ago might be just another exercise in futility.

It recalls the Pearl Harbor investigation of 1947 which ran for seven months and the Senate investigation of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's dismissal by President Truman, which ran for four months in 1951. The latter ended with only a minority report signed by eight Republicans, the majority voting not to issue any formal findings.

There was political motivation in these investigations, just as there is in today's pressure for dredging the muddy Bay of Pigs bottom once more. It is hard to see how this will contribute anything to getting Castro and communism out of Cuba, which is the major objective ahead.

Political observers also wonder what the Republicans can gain from it. The probe would be all over and forgotten long before the 1964 elections. It is also recalled that former Sen. Homer Capehart (R., Ind.), tried to make Cuba the big issue in his campaign for re-election. He was defeated.

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**Cuba
New Danger?**

Attorney General Kennedy said last week the United States neither planned nor promised air cover to the Bay of Pigs assault force. Republicans urged an inquiry into the 1961 Cuban fiasco.

President denied reports of new Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, but Stennis committee will investigate.

After his successful handling of the crisis brought on by the establishment of Soviet ballistic missile bases in Cuba, President Kennedy warned that the Communist-dominated island represented a continuing danger.

He might have added that it would be a continuing bone of contention in domestic politics. His brother, the Attorney General, saw to that last week.

In a move which even friendly political observers regard as a tactical error, Robert Kennedy granted two "exclusive" interviews in which he broke the administration's long silence on the abortive Cuban invasion. The principle point he made was that the President had never planned nor promised to lend United States air support to the Cuban rebels while they stormed the beaches at the Bay of Pigs.

After the Attorney General's interviews hit the newsstands, a high Cuban rebel leader took issue with him, saying that the invaders were definitely led to believe they would be provided with adequate air cover. And two editors who participated in a discussion at the White House a month after the Bay of Pigs—that is, in May, 1961—said that they understood from the President that the United States planned to support the Cubans with fighter planes.

Two Republican leaders in the

Senate immediately moved into the opening created by the younger Kennedy.

Senator Goldwater of Arizona accused the Attorney General of engaging in "one of the most deliberate and flagrant uses of the 'news management' devices" and called for a Senate investigation.

Senator Dirksen of Illinois, oozing impartiality, announced that he was conducting a preliminary investigation to see whether the Attorney General was giving "the entire story" of the Bay of Pigs operation.

Backs Brother

Some steam may have been taken out of Republican prospects for public hearings, however, when the President at his news conference backed his brother 100 per cent on the United States air cover question.

There was another controversy over Cuba last week which touched off one quickie congressional inquiry and the calling of another full and formal one. The issue: News reports stating that the Russians were engaged in a fresh military buildup in Cuba.

Senator Morse, chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on Latin America, called Secretary of State Rusk and John A. McCone, director of Central Intelligence, to brief his group on Friday.


But on Thursday, the President gave the administration's evaluation of the Soviet "buildup" at his news conference. Largely discounting the stories, he said:

"The best information that we have is that one ship has arrived since the October crisis, which may have arms on it. . . . But there has not been a military buildup in the sense of equipment coming in from outside Cuba. There is no evidence that this ship carried any offensive weapons. . . . and, as I say, our scrutiny of Cuba is daily."

But Chairman Stennis of the Senate Preparedness subcommittee, announced on Friday that his group would hold "formal hearings" on current military strength in Cuba and the nature of the weapons located there.

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W. F. Sullivan



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
Autopsy

Attorney General Robert Kennedy's off-the-cuff disclosures about the Bay of Pigs disaster have invited the outcry on Capitol Hill for a full formal inquiry into an ignoble failure. Until Mr. Kennedy reopened the Pandora's box in interviews with a Miami newspaper and a news magazine, the Cuban invasion had receded from memory. The Administration's sorry showing had been redeemed by the brilliant handling of the missile crisis.

Now the lid is open and mischief will fly out. Two defensible courses were open to the Administration after the failure of the invasion. Full disclosure was the first, but this path was not chosen because of the divisive effects it might have had. The second was to keep official lips sealed and leave the verdict to history—the policy which was followed until the Attorney General's selective disclosures.

The trouble with the Attorney General's remarks is that he said enough to raise partisan hackles but not enough to satisfy an impartial jury. It may be that no air cover was ever contemplated for the invaders, but Mr. Kennedy brushes under the carpet a whole range of related considerations that doomed the venture. There was an absence in his remarks of any reflective wisdom on the soundness of a military enterprise in which United States complicity could not be concealed or on the wisdom of using a handful of invaders who lacked any underground support in an operation of this scale.

The inescapable impression is that his remarks are self-serving, and it is surely understandable that Republicans in Congress have interpreted them in this light. Whether the full inquiry by the Senate Armed Forces Committee that Senator Goldwater proposes would serve any useful purpose is a separate question. It is arguable that once the Pandora's box is open a fairly conducted inquiry could serve a purgative purpose by answering nagging questions once and for all. But a patently partisan inquiry of the kind some Republicans are talking about would only vent emotion and make the Bay of Pigs a disaster without end. This is an instance when one wrong turn does not deserve another.



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
Walt

Air Cover Denial

Attorney General Robert Kennedy denies that the United States planned any air cover during the ill-fated Cuban invasion. But, why would the Kennedy administration wait 21 months to report this? And why should the head of the Justice Department be the one to deny it instead of one of President Kennedy's military advisers, the Pentagon, or the CIA? This only leads one to believe that the administration either has something to hide or the Attorney General's statement is unfounded.

Peter A. Cavanaugh

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
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JACKSONVILLE, FLA. --SEN. GEORGE A. SMATHERS SAID TODAY THERE WAS "NO CONVERSATION" ABOUT AIR COVER FOR THE CUBAN INVASION PLAN AT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S 1961 LUNCHEON WITH FLORIDA NEWSPAPER EXECUTIVES.

THE FLORIDA DEMOCRAT'S STATEMENT WAS A DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO AN ACCOUNT OF THE LUNCHEON YESTERDAY BY FORT LAUDERDALE PUBLISHER JACK W. GORE, WHO SAID THE PRESIDENT TOLD EDITORS HE PERSONALLY CANCELLED AIR PROTECTION FOR THE CUBAN INVASION.

SMATHERS SAID IN AN INTERVIEW, "I WAS SITTING RIGHT ACROSS THE TABLE FROM THE PRESIDENT AT THE MEETING AND WAS IN A POSITION TO HEAR ALL OF THE CONVERSATION THAT WENT ON."

"I AM CERTAIN THERE WAS NO CONVERSATION OF THE CHARACTER DESCRIBED BY MY GOOD FRIEND JACK GORE. THE ONLY REFERENCE I REMEMBER AT ALL TO THIS MATTER WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE AIR COVER THE CUBANS WERE TO HAVE FLOWN IN TH B26S HAD NOT BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE."

SMATHERS CONCEDED THE CONVERSATION WAS TWO YEARS AGO "AND MEMORIES ARE NATURALLY NOT AS FRESH AS IF THIS HAD HAPPENED MORE RECENTLY."

THE LAWMAKER, A CLOSE FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT, SAID, "DURING THE INTERIM THE OTHER STORY ABOUT THE SUPPOSED CANCELLATION OF AN INTENDED UNITED STATES AIR COVER HAS DEVELOPED AND IT IS OBVIOUSLY VERY EASY TO GET THE TIME OF DEVELOPMENT OD DATES AND FACTS CONFUSED."

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Govin Calls For Unity

Forget Bay of Pigs, Ex-Captive Urges

By JEAN WARDLOW
Herald Staff Writer

There's been enough criticism of the Bay of Pigs invasion, a Cuban ex-prisoner told a New York City service club Thursday.

What's needed now is "unity of action" for "the ultimate objective... the overthrow of the Bearded. One and everything he represents," said Jorge Govin Throckmorton, on whose life Castro once put a \$50,000 price tag.

Govin, whose parents now live in Miami and who makes his own temporary home in Fort Lauderdale, was speaker at the Rotary Club of New York at the Commodore Hotel.

Even while the pros and cons of Attorney general Robert Kennedy's postmortem on the U.S. role in the invasion still swirled in Washington, young Govin told the club:

"Now I believe enough derogatory criticism has been heaped upon this operation from its inception to its culmination. Errors were committed; mistakes made."

The suntanned Cuban, who has a diplomatic law degree from the University of Havana and bazooka experience from the ill-fated invasion, ticked off some of the mistakes:

"One air strike on airfields two days prior to our invasion served the purpose of warning the military in Cuba to place all units on immediate alert.

"Miscalculations on the rapidity with which the Communist government moved their forces to meet our onslaught—the failure to inform the underground of the invasion date—all these conditions contributed to the Bay of Pigs fiasco," he said.

"But as this is true," he continued, "so do I believe that in the future the political, military and economic factors will be more thoroughly studied, and that there will be closer and more careful liaison between political and military planning that is absolutely necessary to strategic success."

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Philip


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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida



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'Mystery Agent' Blamed

By ROBERT S. BOYD
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—An embittered Cuban veteran of the Bay of Pigs disaster Thursday blamed a mysterious CIA agent for promising the anti-Castro invaders U.S. air and naval support that never materialized.

Manuel Penabaz, one of 52 members of the ill-starred Freedom Brigade, who escaped from the beachhead, identified the CIA man as "Frank Bender," a German-born guerrilla expert who reportedly was in charge of the April, 1961, operation.

Penabaz said Cuban ex-pilots recently have seen "Bender" in the Congo "fixing something new."

"I don't know what he's doing, but I'd like to," Penabaz told a press conference he called to "set the record straight" on the troublesome air cover question.

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who conducted the official autopsy into the failure, told the Knight newspaper Sunday that no U.S. air cover ever was promised the invaders.

"Are you calling Robert Kennedy a liar?" Penabaz was asked Thursday.

"I don't say that," the Cuban said. "Being wrong doesn't mean that you're a liar. Maybe he (Robert Kennedy) doesn't have enough information."

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
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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida



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Others Didn't Hear

Editor Says JFK Nixed Air Cover

FORT LAUDERDALE — (UPI) — President John F. Kennedy told eight Florida newspaper executives that U.S. air cover was available for the ill-fated Pig's Bay invasion of Cuba but he had decided against supplying it, Jack W. Gore, editor and publisher of the Fort Lauderdale News, said Thursday.

Gore, said the President made his remarks at an off-the-record White House luncheon May 10, 1961.

"On that day, less than a month after the invasion had failed miserably," Gore wrote in his newspaper, "the President told us air cover was available to protect the invaders, but that he had made the decision not to use air power."

"The President said one reason he decided against supplying air cover was because U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had complained that any such action would make a liar of him in the U.N.," the publisher reported.

Gore said a statement of the President's brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, that no U.S. air cover was ever planned or promised for the Bay of Pigs invasion had removed the need for

keeping the President's luncheon remarks on May 10, 1961, off the record any longer.

He identified the other Florida newspaper executives present at the luncheon as John S. Knight of The Miami Herald and other Knight newspapers, James Cox of The Miami News, Nelson Poynter of The St. Petersburg Times, R. C. Millar of The Jacksonville Journal and Florida Times-Union, Martin Andersen of the Orlando Sentinel

and Star, J. C. Council of The Tampa Tribune and Times and John H. Perry Jr. of the West Palm Beach Post-Times and other Perry newspapers.

Knight, reached in New York, said: "I do not recall the statement attributed to the President by Mr. Gore. The May 10, 1961 luncheon conversation was of an informal nature, and as I understood it, not subject to public discussion."

Cox of The Miami News said he had "no recollection of the mention of Ambassador Stevenson's name in any of the conversations, nor do I recall any reference to U.S. air cover even being promised or withdrawn."

Perry said his recollection was that Gore's account "is substantially correct."

"That's why President Kennedy took the blame himself for the failure of the invasion," Perry added. "I admired him for admitting his mistake."

Andersen said he recalled the luncheon conversation and added, "The President said the air cover was canceled about 3 a.m. the day of the invasion."


In Tampa, Council said he had "no comment" on the reported luncheon and remarks.

In his report on the luncheon, published on The Fort Lauderdale News' front page Thursday, Gore accused the Kennedy administration of attempting to "manage history . . . of one of the most embarrassing episodes of these times."

He said the attorney general presumably "had the approval of his brother to speak for the record when he made his comments" earlier this week

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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

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President Explains Bay of Pigs Plan

U. S. Air Cover Pledge Denied

By Carroll Kilpatrick
Staff Reporter

President Kennedy yesterday entered the new controversy over the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion with the assertion that no United States air cover was ever planned to help the Cuban attackers.

What was planned, and what proved to be a failure, he said, was a strike by B-26 bombers flown by pilots not based in the United States.

The invasion brigade thought that this attack would give it protection on the beach, but Cuban jets "were very effective" and the invasion brigade "was not able to maintain air supremacy on the beach," the President said.

He replied to questions raised at his news conference following moves by Senate Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen (R-Ill.) and Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) for an investigation on the question of air cover.

The controversy was heightened yesterday when a Florida editor and a brigade member claimed that United States air cover was promised but was withdrawn when it was most needed.

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy said in an interview last week that no air cover was ever promised, and the President said his brother's report was correct. Instead of ending a controversy, however, the Attorney General's comment spurred the critics on to new demands for a full scale inquiry.

President Kennedy also replied to questions about a re-

ported new buildup of Soviet weapons in Cuba. He said one Soviet ship has arrived in Cuba since the October crisis, which may have arms on it, possibly military cargo.

But he said that there was no military buildup in the sense of equipment coming in from outside Cuba. "There is no evidence that this ship carried any offensive weapons," the President said.

Some 4500 Soviet technicians have been withdrawn from Cuba since October, he said, and there are 16,000 or 17,000 Russians still there, operating technical equipment and building barracks. Some of the Russians are in organized military units, he said.

"Our scrutiny of Cuba is daily," the President said.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk is scheduled to testify today before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee inquiring into the reports of a continuing Soviet buildup in Cuba.

Sen. Kenneth B. Keating (R-N. Y.) said yesterday the buildup consists of tanks, guns, fighter planes and other weapons but not long-range missiles and bombers.

Keating said he had learned from refugee sources that Soviet military activity on Cuba is 10 times greater than it was

last July 1 before the missile crisis.

In the House, Rep. William E. Minshall (R-Ohio) introduced a resolution calling for creation of a Joint House-Senate Committee to make a full scale investigation of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Referring to the Attorney General's comment that no air cover was promised, Minshall said "this tremendously important controversy transcends political parties and partisan motivations. At this late date, an honest, accurate report of events leading up to and including the invasion would not break security."

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and other Pentagon officials are expected to be questioned about reports of a new Cuban buildup when they appear before the House Armed Services Committee for an annual military review next Wednesday.

Chairman Carl A. Vinson (D-Ga.) said he had no information to support Keating's assertion, but he said: "We'll ask all about that."

Shortly before President Kennedy's news conference, Cuban exile fighter Manuel Penabaz said at a press conference here that "all our brigade leaders and fighters believed that air cover would be furnished by U. S. air and naval forces."

Penabaz called the Attorney General ill-informed when he

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said air cover was not promised.

Certainly we in the brigade were assured by our American military instructors that we would be given air cover sufficient to succeed in our mission," Penabaz insisted.

If there was to have been United States air cover, the President said, "you might as well have a complete United States commitment, which would have meant a full-fledged invasion."

The other assertion that air cover was promised came from Jack W. Gore, editor and publisher of the Fort Lauderdale News. Gore and six other Florida editors visited the President at the White House on May 10, 1961, the editor said.

Gore said the President told them he canceled the plan for air cover. The President related that Ambassador Adlai P. Stevenson was concerned that any such action would make a liar out of him in the United Nations.

Noting that the meeting with the President was off the record, Gore said he felt released from his pledge when the Attorney General commented on the issue.

"What Robert Kennedy hoped to accomplish by coming out at this late date and denying that any air cover had ever been planned, The News cannot fathom," Gore wrote.

The President said there was no such conversation of the kind Gore related.

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
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Editor: GUY L. SMITH
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MIAMI ACCOLADE FOR FORMER BATISTA HATCHETMEN AND THE LANDED GENTRY

Kennedy's heroes: A look at the Bay of Pigs boys

By Carleton Beals
 Special to the Guardian

AT THE ORANGE BOWL in Miami Dec. 29, President Kennedy and his wife, Jacqueline, spoke to the released invaders of Cuba, seized at the Bay of Pigs (Playa Giron) April 17, 1961. From José Alfredo Perez San Roman, commander of invading Brigade 2506, the President received the flag of that unit, allegedly smuggled out of Cuba after the defeat, and Kennedy promised that the flag would be returned to the invaders "in a free Havana."

The President, in his oath of office, had pledged himself to uphold the laws of the United States, which include all foreign treaties. But in this Miami ceremony, he honored as heroes the motley group which, at his behest, had violated U.S. neutrality laws as well as Cuban sovereignty.


Who are these men Kennedy called "the bravest in the world?" The stories and backgrounds of their leaders can be pieced together from statements they themselves made in Cuba after their capture, from testimony at trials, from interviews on TV and from letters.

FOR EXAMPLE: Take San Roman, the commander who handed his brigade's banner to Kennedy. For ten years he was an officer in the Batista army. After the revolution he got a job with INRA, the

The following is an excerpt from an editorial in the Jan. 1 San Francisco Chronicle as it appeared in L. F. Stoner's Weekly Jan. 14:

"AS A MAN who does not ordinarily betray his emotions, President Kennedy presented a rather surprising televised figure who visited the returned Cuban prisoners of war in Miami. His fire in declaring that they would deserve to march at the head of the column that should one day liberate Havana was hardly in keeping with the often-remarked Kennedy coolness. No one reading the speech would find in it any precise commitment. But... it is a good bet that the exiles have taken it as an implicit promise of American help in the physical overthrow of the Castro regime by revolt... The day may come when President Kennedy will regret his fiery exuberance in his speech to the Cubans.

institute handling agrarian reform. For helping his brother Roberto (also a Batista officer, but being hunted for war crimes), escape to the U.S., José Alfredo spent several months in prison; then also fled to Florida. In March, 1960, he and his brother, with 60 other ex-Batista militarists, were taken to Fort Meyer, Fla., to be trained by the CIA for the Cuban invasion. Later, San Roman got special guerrilla training in Panama and Guatemala.



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Captured in the invasion and taken to Havana, he wrote to Premier Castro (May 11) that it had been impossible to learn the truth about Cuba behind "the curtain of gold." The volunteers had been told, San Roman wrote, that the Cuban people were ready to revolt; that the invaders would be fighting Czechs and Chinese; that the Cuban air force had been destroyed; that they would get reinforcements and air support. All this had been false. The invaders were, he concluded, "1,400 idiots."

San Roman had been told Cuba was on the brink of economic collapse; he was astonished by the elimination of slums, the diminution in unemployment, the improvement in living standards, the campaign against illiteracy. He said he regretted that before he could get his eyes opened, "he had had to sink into the opprobrium and contempt of his fellow citizens and nearly all Latin Americans"; that he "first had to lose his brother (killed in action) and more than 100 comrades who thought as you do; that

it was first necessary to make mothers, wives, sisters and sweethearts of the hundreds of other Cubans who fell before our fire, put on mourning; that it had been necessary for this whole spectacle of horror, blood, tears, useless sacrifices, and irreparable injuries to fall upon my shoulders.

"I have sunk so deep into the slime that no human force can ever get me out."

President Kennedy did his best, and in the Miami Orange Bowl, San Roman was knighted, and ready for a new bloody crusade of "idiots."

A DIFFERENT SONG: Manuel Artime Buena, civil affairs co-chief for the invasion forces, was one of the spokesmen for the released prisoners. A few days before the Miami Bowl reunion, he told a meeting of 4,000 Cuban exiles, "Today we want no tears. We call everybody to war."

Artime had spoken differently in a press conference in Havana in May, 1961, after his capture at Playa Giron. He spoke bitterly about the U.S. government, whose officials "had planned, trained, subsidized and directed" the invasion. "What was done with the brigade was a real crime," he said. "They just played with the lives of 1,400 men. . . . I am ready to tell the world before the UN all about the U.S. participation in the invasion."

Artime has told how, in Cuba after the revolution, he was accused of stealing funds intended for peasants, and was helped by a U.S. secret agent to escape to Florida. He said he was met in Miami by another agent in charge of financing the planned invasion and sabotage on the island. He was passed through a chain of agents to make a tour of Latin America to contact Catholic and ultra-conservative groups in the fight against Castro. He purchased boats for transporting saboteurs, bombs and arms to terrorists in Cuba, contact with whom was strictly in the hands of CIA agents.

THE BRAVE ONES: Mrs. Kennedy told the throng at the Orange Bowl she was going to teach her little son, as soon as he was old enough, to be at least half as brave as the "fighters for freedom" and to emulate them.

Freedom Fighter Jorge King Yun perhaps? To get to the U.S., he killed the custodian of a Cuban army boat, knifing him in front of his wife and children. He kidnaped the woman and children as hostages and reached Florida, where the authorities gave him asylum.

Or perhaps Ramon Calvino Insua, a Batista police sadist who tortured and raped, along with others, prisoner Angela Gonzalez? He murdered young Marcelo Salado on a street in Havana April 9, 1958. He killed another prisoner in the police station July 2, 1958. The bodies of his victims were scattered in the streets of Havana, after they had been tortured, mutilated and killed, their heads suspended in a noose hanging from a small Christian cross.

There are others: Emilio Soler Eug

was sent to prison during Prio Socarras administration for murdering labor leaders and Dominican exiles; Antonio Valentin Padron, operating under the Batista Colonel Fermin Cowley, dragged youths from their homes, tortured them and hung their mutilated bodies in the public plaza of Holguin. Roberto Perez Cruzada is an excellent model for a young American boy. He machine-gunned Dr. Rafael Escalona in his cell, but he escaped from Cabana prison and fled to asylum in the U.S. Scores of others like these joined the Bay of Pigs expedition to be shot or later to be honored at the Orange Bowl.

LAND OWNERS: In all, the invaders included 194 former Batista military men and policemen, most having positions of authority. The aims of the invasion were (1) to restore private property (2) to restore the 1940 Batista constitution (3) to hold elections within 18 months. The volunteers were closely screened by the CIA with respect to land reform and restoration of estates. Anybody with progressive or reform ideas was eliminated. More than half the invading force consisted of property owners. Doubtless they believed that the U.S. would see that everything went smoothly, that there was little danger in the attempt to get back their lost properties and their positions as exploiters. Besides, they would be favored in any new regime set up by the CIA.

Almost half the land of Cuba had been owned by absentee foreign corporations, and they controlled much of the rest. What was not owned by the United Fruit et al was held by big native landowners. Ninety percent of the rural population owned no land at all. They survived by working a few months every year during sugar cane or tobacco cutting time for the \$1.50 or less a day, and scrounging in garbage pails the rest of the year.

The 1961 invasion force included 124 proprietors of large estates. One hundred of them owned more than 800,000 acres and most were members of families owning even more. For instance, young Albert Fowler owned 63,000 acres in central Narcisa. His father was one of the wealthiest landowners on the island. Carlos Lopez-Ona of the expedition owned 66,000 acres; two sugar centrales (Santa Lutgarda and Nazbal), also dozens of apartment houses. Fabio Freire owned 50,000 acres, the refinery Santa Isabel, three shipping companies, 12 houses and various apartment buildings.

Omar and Lincoln Babun were lumber merchants in Oriente, owners of a fleet of ships, a cement factory and a construction company. Like all the others, they enjoyed favors from the Batista dictatorship. Eduardo Zaya Bazan owned 10,000 acres, had a fleet of shrimp boats

and dozens of houses and apartments. Jose Andreau Santos, owner of 12,000 acres, was son of a minister of Public Health who became a millionaire through public works, an owner of land and houses.

MERCHANTS, SPECULATORS: In addition to such large landholders, there were 67 owners of apartment houses and sium rentals. There were 112 big merchants, some of them sugar and molasses speculators; 35 industrial magnates and 179 wealthy persons living off income, but often with lucrative political jobs.

Several of the invaders owned big gambling casinos, tied in with Batista and the U.S. syndicate. Others were well-known dope distributors. Oscar Diaz was the son of the owner of the Montemarte Cabaret, tourist vice spbt, and a nephew of the owner of the Marianao Hippodrome.


Some had been members of "unofficial" Batista terror and murder gangs, such as that of Senator Masferrer. Jose Ramon Gutierrez is the son of Batista's radio censor. Salvador Ziegenhirt is brother-in-law of Batista's Prime Minister Santiago Ray Fernas. At least four priests joined the expedition. All were Spanish Falangists or Fascists. One, Father Ismael de Luge, had been a Franco officer in the Spanish civil war.

There were half-a-dozen labor leaders belonging chiefly to the Eusebio Mujal clique. Mujal had been given control of the Cuban Confederation of Labor by the army under President Prío, continued in the post under Batista and in a short period became a millionaire owning newspapers, a radio station, apartment buildings, hotels, and a \$4 million estate.

TERROR CAMPAIGN: Operation Pluto (the invasion) was preceded by CIA Operation Preparation, started soon after the revolution to soften up the island for the invasion. In Cuba it is known as Operation Mad Dog. Mercenaries staked out in Pinar del Rio and the Escambray Mountains were supplied by air and sea with U.S. army munitions, but were soon suppressed. The operation included propaganda leaflets by air, bombings, straf-

ings, burning of cane fields and sugar
centrals, attacks on oil refineries, dyna-
miting of power lines, sabotage of rail
and bus service, sinking of boats, the
dynamiting of stores, etc. In one air at-
tack four persons were killed and about
50 wounded in Havana. I was in Havana
when a department store was bombed,
killing and wounding women.

Kennedy, who took full responsibility
for the bloody Bay of Pigs fiasco, assured
the Orange Bowl crowd that his anti-
Castro policy would be continued. Follow-
ing the invasion, Mad Dog operations
have been resumed.



KIMB

Kamb in Humanite, Paris
"How can they say we constitute a
menace to peace?"



PRESIDENT KENNEDY IS HOST TO FREEDOM FIGHTERS AT PALM BEACH
Roberto San Roman (left); Jose San Roman and Manuel Artime are guests.

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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

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Cuban Invasion

Bobby's 'Clarification' Needs Clearing Up

Almost anyone could think of a dozen matters more deserving of the national attention right now than the two-year-old episode at the Bay of Pigs, but unfortunately, the subject came up in an interview with Robert Kennedy, and Bobby's attempt to "clear up" a few things has been remarkably unsuccessful.

The U.S. attorney general was one

of a three-man committee which ran a microscope over the misadventure, from planning to final fiasco, so he should know the facts. Assuming he does, he will have to reveal them in much greater detail if the public is to be convinced that no air cover was planned for the invaders, as he claims.



BOBBY

Whether air cover was promised by the highest authorities or not, the fact is that members of the invasion brigade here in Miami recall quite vividly that air support was a part of

the plan which was presented to them.

Far from clarifying anything, Mr. Kennedy so far has accomplished only two things, both of them bad: First, he aroused resentment among the Bay of Pigs survivors, who until now seemed willing to reserve their fire for Castro and not ask embarrassing questions of the U.S. government.


Second, he has exposed the entire Cuban invasion question to partisan political attack, which was not long in arriving: Republicans want to investigate the invasion in the Republican Policy Committee, of all places.

We suggested months ago that one day the invasion would be a fit subject for a thoroughgoing investigation by the Congress. President Kennedy has rightfully assumed responsibility for the blunder, but the public still has a right to know how it happened.

Furthermore, it would seem that such an investigation could be free of political bias, since the affair cut across both Republican and Democratic administrations. But maybe that is hoping for too much.

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Goldwater Asks \$100,000 for 'Impartial' Investigation

Hill Probe of 'Bay of Pigs' Is Uncertain

By MARSHALL McNEIL
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

Sen. Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.) may not get his desired \$100,000 "impartial" investigation of the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion failure 21 months ago. But he will have a chance soon to quiz top military and civilian officials involved in the fiasco.

Sen. Goldwater's opportunity will come when the Senate Armed Services Committee of which he is a member holds its annual hearings on our military preparedness.

Thereafter Sen. Richard Russell (D., Ga.) may ask the committee, which he heads, to decide whether the Goldwater inquiry should be held.

'OPEN MIND'

Sen. Russell has an "open mind" on the proposed probe.

But he sees no need to "re-laundry this linen" which, he says, "has never seemed to be real clean." He is not anxious to "re-hash a very humiliating experience in our national life." However, he would not oppose the inquiry if he thinks a national purpose would be served.

The Bay of Pigs already has been investigated at least twice by Senate committees and touched on in House hearings, too.

One inquiry was by a Foreign Relations sub-committee headed by Sen. Wayne Morse (D., Ore.); another by the Senate's committee that keeps tabs on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Both were secret; there was no official public report on either.

But Sen. Morse mentioned his investigation briefly in a TV debate during his 1962 re-election campaign. He said, in effect, the President never refused air cover for the invasion because "none was promised."

STATEMENT

It was the statement by Attorney General Robert Kennedy in a newspaper interview this week that no air support was contemplated in the invasion plan that sud-


denly caused Republicans to seize on the Bay of Pigs incident and demand an investigation.

Sen. Goldwater, an Air Force reserve major general, introduced his resolution for

the investigation yesterday. He said only by such a move could the people be "fully informed about the events attendant to one of the most inglorious adventures this nation has ever been involved in."

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THE POLITICAL MILL

By GOULD LINCOLN *N 10*

Once More Into the Bay of Pigs

The Bay of Pigs issue has been revived. This time by the President's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. The President blunted it as a political issue in 1962 when a couple of weeks before the elections he firmly told Nikita Khrushchev he would have to remove long-range missiles from Cuba, or else, and the Russian premier complied. The country was inclined, it seemed, to forget about the Bay of Pigs fiasco, in which the American-sponsored invasion of Castro's Cuba by the Freedom Fighters became a shambles when air support was not forthcoming. The President had immediately taken the blame on his own shoulders for letting the invasion go ahead. It was a bitter pill — and all the facts attendant on the action and lack of action have never been produced.

Purpose Not Clear

Now the President's brother, the Attorney General, in interviews with the Miami Herald and U. S. News & World Report, has made the flat statement that no United States air support had been promised or expected. Reports that orders had been issued from the White House to call off air support, including a second strike by planes piloted by anti-Castro Cubans, have been widely published. The Attorney General said in his interviews he was undertaking to set the record straight. Also the administration has said there never was any intention to give military support to the invaders. Just why the Attorney General chose to raise this issue again and, by inference at least, to put the blame on the Eisenhower administration is not clear.

It is a fact, however, that some Republicans in Congress and outside have begun another drumfire of charges that President Kennedy has not really dealt a death blow to international communism in Cuba, but has left that island still firmly in the hands of the Communists and with an implied promise

that the United States would not invade unless Castro should start aggression or the Russians try to return long-range missiles to him. Senator Barry Goldwater, Arizona Republican, who served in the Air Force during World War II, has been one of the severest critics of the administration's handling of the Cuban situation. He immediately took issue with the Attorney General's statements.

Senator Goldwater said it was strange 21 months after the invasion, the Attorney General should make a claim that his brother, the President, never saw fit to make at the time he was assuming the blame for the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs. The Senator said he had visited the President at his request a few days after the invasion attempt and he added: "I certainly got the impression then that an air cover had been part of the original invasion plan... I suggest it is proper to inquire into this latest example of 'news management' by the New Frontier. Has this practice of the administration now been extended to the rewriting of history in an image acceptable to the men presently in charge of the national government?" In fact, Senator Goldwater charged that the most recent Kennedy statements were motivated by political reasons, the purpose being to attach a major portion of the blame to the Eisenhower administration.

The Arizona Senator told the Senate he believed that a Congressional investigation should be made. His suggestion was later adopted by the Republican Policy Committee of the Senate on motion of Senator Dirksen of Illinois. Republican leader of the Senate, Mr. Dirksen has said that he personally will take a preliminary look and report to the committee. It is difficult for a minority party in the Senate and House to conduct a full-fledged investigation of an antagonistic administration, or to force a committee of the Senate to conduct such an inquiry. It has been done on occasion,

however. For example, the investigation of the Teapot Dome oil scandals by the late Senator Tom Walsh of Montana, Democrat, during the Harding administration.

Much to be Cleared Up


There remain a lot of things to be cleared up — and not brushed under the rug — in the Bay of Pigs abortive invasion of Castro's Cuba. If reports are correct, the United States gathered a great array of naval and air strength in the vicinity of the Isle of Pines and Cuba at the time set for the invasion. For what purpose if it had not originally been intended to use it? When and for what reason were the original plans changed? President Kennedy, himself, in discussing his first two years in the White House on a television program on December 17, freely admitted that the advice he received from those called in on the Cuban invasion had been "wrong." He was contrasting the handling of the Bay of Pigs affair with the successful naval blockade of Cuba in 1962. He said: "In the Cuba of 1961, the advice of those brought in on the Executive branch was also unanimous, and the advice was wrong. And I was responsible." It has still to be disclosed who were all of those brought in and just what they advised. It is time the whole story were told the American people.

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DORIS FLEESON

Political Angles in Cuban Issue

Attorney General's Discussion Is Called A Mistake, Giving Dirksen an Opening

That able political craftsman, Senate Republican Leader Dirksen, has seized the opening afforded him when Attorney General Kennedy reopened discussion of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Senator Dirksen will make his own inquiry into what really happened.

What the Senator quickly perceived was the fortuitous conjunction of a legitimate reason for inquiry and a handful of political targets.

The legitimate reason is the confusion over what really happened in Cuba both with respect to the original fiasco and the recent success. When the President opened the doors to favorite reporters for supposed "inside" accounts, he helped create that confusion and handed Republicans the managed news issue.

The Attorney General has obliged them further by calling attention to the original fiasco which the later triumph had done so much to erase. It is also a personal political mistake on his part.

Republicans darkly suspect that he is being set up to run for President in 1968 to succeed his brother and in

that, they are not alone. Senator Dirksen is only the first of many who will seek to embarrass Robert Kennedy while there is yet time, the general opinion here being that it is too late to stop the President's re-election.

Merely to have any Kennedy on the firing line will soothe a lot of Republican frustration. Senator Edward is behaving much too modestly to serve the purpose, and it is politically unwise when foreign affairs seem to be going well to attack the President on that score.

Republicans believe, maybe wrongly but sincerely, that in the wide area between the East and West coasts many voters feel there are too many Kennedys. It is this area they look to for substantial congressional gains in 1964 even should the winner-take-all framework of the electoral college re-elect the President.

Few would argue with Chairman Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Dirksen proposal has a "very strong partisan aura." So will this entire session of Congress. To meet it the President will

have to work unceasingly to spread his own aura, and he will need the help of some shock troops of Democrats willing to risk expending a reputation for the statesmanlike approach to all questions.


There is, after all, a great deal of hypocrisy in the proposed inquiry. The White House always manages the news, more or less, and never so much as in the recent Eisenhower years when Press Secretary Hagerly shaped the propaganda that his employer was a hard-working ball of fire despite age, operations and heart disease.

The country, if must be said, enjoyed the fable, just as it now seems willing to relax about Cuba, though the Castro regime remains in power.

Adlai Stevenson must view the present carnage with a deep sense of irony. Saturday Evening Post writer Stewart Alsop, who is still insisting that the United Nations Ambassador was an appeaser in the Cuban triumph, wrote months ago attributing blame to him for withdrawing of air cover from the Bay of Pigs invasion. Now the Attorney General says that an air strike was never part of the invasion plans.

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(PIGS BAY)

NEW YORK--FORMER PRESIDENT EISENHOWER SAID LAST NIGHT HIS ADMINISTRATION PLANNED FOR A "GUERRILLA TYPE OF ACTION" AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO AND NEVER CONSIDERED AN INVASION SUCH AS THE BAY OF PIGS ATTACK.

EISENHOWER'S STATEMENT IMPLIED THE ENTIRE PLAN FOR THE ILL-FATED APRIL, 1961 INVASION OF CUBA WAS FORMULATED IN THE THREE MONTHS AFTER PRESIDENT KENNEDY TOOK OFFICE.

THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, IN A TAPED ONE-HOUR INTERVIEW WITH NEWSMAN WALTER CRONKITE ON CBS-TELEVISION, APPEARED TO CONFLICT WITH A STATEMENT ON THE BAY OF PIGS AFFAIR MADE EARLIER THIS WEEK BY ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY.

ASKED BY CRONKITE IF AN INVASION PLAN WAS MADE WHILE HE WAS IN OFFICE, EISENHOWER REPLIED:

"NO, NO, NO..."

"THERE WAS NO WAY," HE DECLARED. "WE DIDN'T EVEN KNOW AT THAT TIME WHETHER WE COULD DO ANYTHING MORE, OR WHETHER THESE REFUGEES WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS AND STRONG TO DO MORE THAN GO INTO THE EASTERN PART OF THE ISLAND, IN THE MOUNTAINS, AND START IN AND RETURN A COUNTER REVOLUTION..."


"WE MORE OR LESS WERE THINKING OF GUERRILLA TYPE OF ACTION UNTIL WE COULD GET ENOUGH FORCES TO DO MORE THAN THAT," HE SAID.

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'NO, NO, NO...'

Bay of Pigs Invasion Is Disclaimed by Ike

NEW YORK, Jan. 24 (UPI)—Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower said last night his administration planned for a "guerilla type of action" against Fidel Castro and never considered an invasion such as the Bay of Pigs attack.

fer Cronkite on CBS-television, appeared to conflict with a statement on the Bay of Pigs affair made earlier this week by Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy who said the "general concept" of the invasion arose during Eisenhower's administration and "the logistics and the details" were worked out later.

Mr. Eisenhower's statement implied the entire plan for the ill-fated April, 1961, invasion of Cuba was formulated in the three months after President Kennedy took office.

Asked by Mr. Cronkite if an invasion plan was made while he was in office, Mr. Eisenhower replied:

"No, no, no. There was no way," he declared. "We didn't even know at that time whether we could do anything more, or whether these refugees would be sufficiently numerous and strong to do more than go into the eastern part of the island in the mountains and start in and return a counter revolution."

The former President's remarks in a taped one-hour interview with newsmen Walter


Mr. Eisenhower said the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba makes it necessary to continue constant surveillance over the island.

"I understand there are still some thousands of Russian soldiers in Cuba," he said, "and unquestionably they must be manning some kind of equipment. They must be training these people and it's still a very dangerous spot in our hemisphere."

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
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UPI-99

ADD 2 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-87)

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID LATER RUSK WOULD APPAR BEFORE THE
 GROUP A TOP CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ALSO MAY TESTIFY.
 MEANWHILE, REP. WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, R-OHIO, INTRODUCED A
 RESOLUTION IN THE HOUSE CALLING FOR THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL JOINT
 CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO MAKE A FULL INVESTIGATION OF WHAT HE
 DESCRIBED AS "THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO."

"NATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY TO COPE WITH THE CUBAN
SITUATION IS AT A LOW EBB," MINSHALL TOLD THE HOUSE.

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
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UPI-87
 ADD 1 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-46)
 SECRETARY RUSK IS EXPECTED TO TESTIFY IN PERSON TOMORROW WHEN
 THE SUBCOMMITTEE BEGINS ITS INQUIRY.
 KEATING ENDORSED THE IDEA OF MORSE'S SUBCOMMITTEE LOOKING INTO
 THE REPORTS RATHER THAN HAVING THE SENATE LAUNCH ANOTHER FULL-
 BLOWN INVESTIGATION OF THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS INVASION.
 KEATING SAID "IF THERE IS GOING TO BE AN INVESTIGATION, IT
 SHOULD BE BY AN AUTHORIZED SENATE COMMITTEE," SUCH AS MORSE'S
 GROUP.
 "I'M MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN THE PRESENT SITUATION THAN IN REVIEWING
 PAST HISTORY," KEATING SAID.

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Senate Group Urged to Probe Cuban Invasion

Associated Press

Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) proposed yesterday a full Senate Armed Services Committee investigation of the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), the committee chairman, said if military and defense issues and not politics are involved the committee would look into them.

"It's not our function to set political matters," he said. Sen. Wayne Morse (D-Ore.), whose Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs has already investigated the invasion, told the Senate its members should read the still-secret transcript of those hearings before making "partisan speeches."

Goldwater fired back that he had and "it's the most inconclusive testimony I've ever read."

His resolution asking the inquiry was sparked by the denial of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy that any United States air cover was ever planned for the Cuban exiles' invasion and therefore could not have been withdrawn, as some Republicans charge, by the Administration of his brother, President Kennedy.

And it followed an announcement yesterday by Senate GOP Leader Everett M. Dirksen (Ill.) that he would make an investigation of his own.

Goldwater proposed that were ignored.

the Armed Services Committee have \$100,000 to finance its inquiry and report no later than March 31. Goldwater is a committee member.

The Senator said the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, and Allen Dulles, then Central Intelligence Agency chief, should be called to testify.


Last night in Miami four Cuban refugees said that four Americans fliers were killed in combat over Cuba during the ill-fated 1961 invasion.

[In a statement to United Press International the refugees said that the two obsolete B-26 bombers flown by Americans were riddled with bullets by converted T-33 jet trainers of Fidel Castro's air force and crashed in flames in the sea.

[The four Americans were not identified. So far as was known, they were not members of the U. S. armed forces. The statement was issued by Gonzalo Herrera, Gustavo Villoldo, Alfredo Caballera and Julio Gonzalez Rebull, identified as pilots with the invasion force.

[The four Cubans said the invasion airmen were told a U. S. aircraft carrier was standing by to provide support if they needed it. One made several distress calls, Herrera said. "They were ignored."

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UPI-196

ADD 4 CUBA, WASHINGTON
 ANTI-CASTRO REFUGEE LEADERS, INCLUDING ANTONIO DE VARONA, VICE
 PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WHO TOOK PART IN THE
 INVASION, ALSO CHARGED THAT THE AIR COVER WAS PROMISED BUT THEN
 WITHDRAWN.

IN ADDITION, JACK W. GORE, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER OF THE FORT
 LAUDERDALE, FLA., NEWS, REPORTED TODAY THAT A MONTH AFTER THE INVASION,
 KENNEDY TOLD AN OFF-THE-RECORD WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON GROUP THAT AIR
 COVER HAD BEEN AVAILABLE BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED AGAINST
 USING IT.

THE PRESIDENT, ASKED TO SET THE SITUATION STRAIGHT, ACKNOWLEDGED
 THAT AN AIR STRIKE ON BEHALF OF THE INVADERS HAD BEEN POSTPONED
 FROM MORNING TO AFTERNOON, BUT HE SAID THESE "WERE FLOWN BY
 PILOTS...BASED NOT IN THE UNITED STATES, NOT AMERICAN PLANES.

HE CONCEDED THAT THE INVASION FORCES "WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION"
 THAT THE B26 BOMBERS WERE AVAILABLE AND "WOULD GIVE THEM PROTECTION
 ON THE BEACH."

"THAT DID NOT WORK OUT," THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE ADMITTED. "THAT
 WAS ONE OF THE FAILURES."

HE OBSERVED THAT JETS SENT UP AGAINST THE B26'S WERE "VERY EFFECTIVE
 AND, THEREFORE...THE BRIGADE WAS NOT ABLE TO MAINTAIN AIR SUPREMACY
 ON THE BEACH."

THE PRESIDENT TWICE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THE AIR COVER PLANES WERE
 "NOT FROM THE UNITED STATES."

KENNEDY TOLD HIS NEWS CONFERENCE THAT MUCH OF THE CONFUSION STEMS
 FROM THE USE OF THE WORD "AIR COVER."

HE DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN UNITED STATES AIR COVER "AS OPPOSED TO
 AIR COVER WHICH WAS ATTACHED TO THE (INVASION) BRIGADE, SOME OF WHICH
 FLEW FROM VARIOUS PARTS OF THIS CONTINENT, NOT FROM THE UNITED
 STATES."

OF GORE'S ACCOUNT OF HIS LUNCHEON REMARKS, THE PRESIDENT SAID
 THERE WAS "NO SUCH CONVERSATION OF THE KIND...THAT HAS BEEN
 READ TO ME."

HE COMMENTED: "THE PROBLEM OF AIR COVER AND ONE OF THE REASONS
 THAT THE INVASION FAILED MAY HAVE WELL BEEN DISCUSSED BUT ONLY
 IN THE TERMS THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED BECAUSE WHAT I HAVE DESCRIBED
 ARE THE FACTS."

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
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WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT KENNEDY SAID TODAY THERE NEVER WAS ANY
PLAN TO USE U.S. AIR COVER FOR THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

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WPI-158

ADD 2 CUBA, WASHINGTON

IT WAS PENABAZ, A PARTICIPANT IN THE INVASION, WHO FIRST CLAIMED, FOLLOWING RELEASE OF THE INVASION PRISONERS, THAT THE UNITED STATES LEFT THE INVADERS WITHOUT PROMISED AIR SUPPORT. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL LATER SAID NO SUPPORT WAS PLEDGED, AND THE PRESIDENT BACKED HIM UP TODAY.

THE PRESIDENT SAID NO U.S. AIR COVER WAS PLANNED AND THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT WAS CORRECT.

IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WERE GOING TO PROVIDE AIR COVER FOR THE CUBAN EXILE INVADERS, HE SAID, THIS NATION MIGHT AS WELL HAVE UNDERTAKEN THE INVASION ITSELF.

WHAT WAS TALKED ABOUT, THE PRESIDENT SAID, WAS THE USE OF B26 PLANES WHICH WERE NOT MANNED BY U.S. PILOTS OR FLOWN FROM U.S. TERRITORY. HE SAID A STRIKE BY THOSE PLANES WAS POSTPONED ON THE DAY OF THE INVASION.

THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EXILE BRIGADE MUST HAVE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE B26'S WOULD PROVIDE AIR COVER FOR THE INVASION FORCE AND THAT THIS MISTAKEN BELIEF WAS THE CAUSE OF CONFUSION.

KENNEDY REITERATED THAT THE INVASION WAS A FAILURE AND SAID AGAIN THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY RESTED WITH THE WHITE HOUSE.

HE SAID THE OPERATION WAS REVIEWED AND THAT THE HANDLING OF THE CUBAN CRISIS LAST FALL INDICATED THAT "A GOOD MANY LESSONS WERE LEARNED" FROM THE EARLIER FAILURE.

KENNEDY ALSO WAS ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN INTENSIFIED SOVIET ARMS BUILDUP IN CUBA SINCE SETTLEMENT OF THE MISSILE CRISIS. HE SAID CONTINUAL SURVEILLANCE BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE ISLAND HAS SHOWN "NO INFLUX" OF RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS THERE.

TWO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES HAVE ARRANGED TO QUESTION STATE AND DEFENSE OFFICIALS ABOUT REPORTS OF A RUSSIAN BUILDUP ON THE ISLAND. SEN. KENNETH B. KEATING, R-N.Y. SAID HE LEARNED OF THE REPORTED BUILDUP FROM CUBAN REFUGEE SOURCES.

KENNEDY SAID THAT SINCE THE CRISIS AND REMOVAL OF RUSSIAN MISSILES AND BOMBERS, ONE SOVIET SHIP HAS ARRIVED THAT MAY HAVE HAD ARMS ON IT. BUT HE SAID THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT IT CARRIED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS THAT MIGHT POSE A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES.

HE ESTIMATED THAT THERE ARE STILL BETWEEN 16,000 AND 17,000 RUSSIANS IN CUBA AND SAID THAT THE SOVIET PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO OPERATE DEFENSIVE MISSILE SITES AND OTHER MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. THEY ALSO, KENNEDY SAID, ARE BUILDING SOME BARRACKS.

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ADD 3 CUBA, WASHINGTON

PANABEZ EARLIER TODAY REPEATED CHARGES THAT THE U.S. AIR
 AIR SUPPORT TO THE BAY OF PIGS INVADERS AND THEN WITHDREW IT.
 HE ASSERTED: "I KNOW THAT ALL OUR BRIGADE LEADERS AND FIGHTERS
 BELIEVED THAT AIR COVER WOULD BE FURNISHED...BY U.S. AIR AND NAVAL
 FORCES."

AT HIS NEWS CONFERENCE, HE SAID ATTY. GEN. KENNEDY WAS ILL-INFORMED
 WHEN HE SAID IN TWO WIDELY PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS THAT U.S. AIR COVER
 FOR THE INVASION WAS NEVER PROMISED OR PLANNED.

"CERTAINLY WE IN THE BRIGADE WERE ASSURED BY OUR AMERICAN MILITARY
 INSTRUCTORS THAT WE WOULD BE GIVEN AIR COVER SUFFICIENT TO SUCCEED
 IN OUR MISSION," PENABAZ INSISTED.

HE SAID A MAN NAMED FRANK BENDER, WHOM HE IDENTIFIED AS THE
 U.S. OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF THE INVASION OPERATIONS, TOLD HIM ABOUT
 THE ALLEGEDLY FORTHCOMING U.S. AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT.

PENABAZ SAID, THAT "BENDER TOLD ME THAT AMERICAN AIRCRAFT
 WOULD BE 100 MILES BEHIND US AND THAT 6,000 U.S. MARINES WOULD BE
 READY TO LAND AFTER US." PENABAZ WAS THE TOP LEGAL OFFICER OF THE
 INVASION BRIGADE.

HE MADE THE REMARKS AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB AS REPUBLICAN
 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS CALLED FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF U.S. ROLE
 IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

PENABAZ REPEATED HIS CHARGES THAT THE INVASION BRIGADE, WAS
 "BETRAYED."

HE ALSO CHARGED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO "CLOSE
 DEFINITELY THE CUBAN CASE" NOW THAT THE 1,100 INVASION PRISONERS
 HAD BEEN FREED AND THAT THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION HAS ACCEPTED
 THE BALEME FOR THE INVASION FAILURE.

PENABAZ SAID THAT INVASION PLANNER BENDER WAS SEEN RECENTLY
 IN THE CONGO BY ONE OF THE CUBAN REFUGEE PILOTS WHO TOOK PART
 IN THE INVASION.

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
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UPI-172

(CUBA)

FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA.--A FLORIDA NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER SAID TODAY THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY TOLD HIM LESS THAN A MONTH AFTER THE CUBAN INVASION THAT U.S. AIR COVER WAS AVAILABLE AT THE BAY OF PIGS, BUT HE DECIDED AGAINST USING IT. *7/10*
 JACK W. GORE, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER OF THE FORT LAUDERDALE NEWS, QUOTED THE PRESIDENT AS SAYING THAT ONE REASON FOR HIS DECISION WAS A COMPLAINT FROM U.N. AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON THAT USE OF U.S. FORCES WOULD MAKE A "LIAR" OUT OF HIM IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

GORE SAID THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS REMARKS AT AN OFF-THE-RECORD WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON FOR EIGHT FLORIDA NEWSPAPER EXECUTIVES ON MAY 10, 1961.

"ON THAT DAY, LESS THAN A MONTH AFTER THE INVASION HAD FAILED MISERABLY," GORE WROTE IN HIS NEWSPAPER, "THE PRESIDENT TOLD US AIR COVER WAS AVAILABLE TO PROTECT THE INVADERS BUT THAT HE HAD MADE THE DECISION NOT TO USE AIR POWER."

"THE PRESIDENT SAID ONE REASON HE DECIDED AGAINST SUPPLYING AIR COVER WAS BECAUSE UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON HAD COMPLAINED THT ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD MAKE A LIAR OF HIM IN THE UNITED NATIONS," THE PUBLISHER REPORTED.

GORE SAID A STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S BROTHER, ATTY. GEN. ROBERT KENNEDY, THAT NO U.S. AIR COVER WAS EVER PLANNED OR PROMISED FOR THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION HAD REMOVED THE NEED FOR KEEPING THE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON REMARKS OFF THE RECORD ANY LONGER.

IN HIS REPORT ON THE LUNCHEON, PUBLISHED ON THE FORT LAUDERDALE NEWS' FRONT PAGE TODAY, GORE ACCUSED THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OF ATTEMPTING TO "MANAGE HISTORY... OF ONE OF THE MOST EMBARRASSING EPISODES OF THESE TIMES." HE SAID THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PRESUMABLY "HAD THE APPROVAL OF HIS BROTHER TO SPEAK FOR THE RECORD WHEN HE MADE HIS COMMENTS," EARLIER THIS WEEK.

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