



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

September 25, 2024

MR. JOHN R. GREENEWALD, JR.
SUITE 1203
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request No.: 1363958-000
Subject: FBI Intelligence Assessment, The Foreign
Intelligence Threat in the United States
(November 28, 2008)

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

We consulted with other government agencies concerning information located as a result of your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request.

This consultation is complete and the enclosed material is being released to you with the appropriate exemption noted next to the redacted information pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section(s) 552/552a as noted below. Below you will find checked boxes under statute headings indicating the appropriate exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold the information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552

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Section 552a

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100 pages were reviewed and 97 pages are being released.



The appropriate redactions were made by Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Army, Department of Energy, and Department of State.

Based on the information you provided, we conducted a search of the places reasonably expected to have records. For more information about records searches and the standard search policy, see the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum General Information Section.

This is the final release of information responsive to your FOIPA request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **“Part 1”** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **“Part 2”** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **“Part 3”** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Additional information about the FOIPA can be found at www.fbi.gov/foia. Should you have questions regarding your request, please feel free to contact foipaquestions@fbi.gov. Please reference the FOIPA Request number listed above in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." If possible, please provide a copy of your original request and this response letter with your appeal.

You may seek dispute resolution services by emailing the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison at foipaquestions@fbi.gov. The subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Confidential Informant Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of confidential informant records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F) [5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F)] and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552a (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records would reveal confidential informant identities and information, expose law enforcement techniques, and endanger the life or physical safety of individuals. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches and Standard Search Policy.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems, such as the Central Records System (CRS), or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. The CRS is an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. The standard search policy is a search for main entity records in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include a search for reference entity records or administrative records of previous FOIPA requests.
 - a. *Main Entity Records* – created for individuals or non-individuals who are the subjects or the focus of an investigation
 - b. *Reference Entity Records*– created for individuals or non-individuals who are associated with a case but are not known subjects or the focus of an investigation
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Foreseeable Harm Standard.** As amended in 2016, the Freedom of Information Act provides that a federal agency may withhold responsive records only if: (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the nine exemptions that FOIA enumerates, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law (5 United States Code, Section 552(a)(8)(A)(i)). The FBI considers this foreseeable harm standard in the processing of its requests.
- (iv) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOI/PA

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
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FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [Redacted Box]
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2033
DATE: 08-09-2017

(U) The Foreign Intelligence Threat in the United States

25 November 2008

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(U) Administrative Note

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(U) Scope Note

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
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
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(U) The Broad View:
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
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
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
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




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
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
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(U) X or other export control laws after attempting to smuggle proprietary or export-controlled information and technology to China.

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
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- (U) During 2007 there were several significant cases involving scientists, engineers, and companies who were either charged or convicted under the Economic Espionage Act

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


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(U) Near-Term Counterintelligence Outlook

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

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
^h (U) Steganography includes the concealment of digital information within computer files. For example, the sender might start with an ordinary-looking image file, then adjust the color of every 100th pixel to correspond to a letter in the alphabet—a change so subtle that no one who is not actively looking for it is likely to notice it.

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

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


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


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


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


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b3
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X (U)

X (U)

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- (U) On 1 August 2007, Yang Fung, president of Excellence Engineering Electronics, pleaded guilty in San Francisco to illegally providing microwave integrated circuits to China, in violation of DOC regulations.⁸

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
- (U) On 1 August 2007, Xiaodong Sheldon Meng pleaded guilty in California to violating the Economic Espionage Act to benefit China's Naval Research Center. He exported source code for simulation software for the precision training of fighter pilots.⁹
- (U) On 26 September 2007, Lan Lee and Yuefei Ge were charged in California with economic espionage and theft of trade secrets from two companies on behalf of a Chinese military program.¹⁰
- (U) On 26 October 2007, Noshir Gowadia was charged in Hawaii with transmitting information to China related to making cruise missile exhausts hard to detect.¹¹
- (U) On 3 December 2007, Philip Cheng was sentenced in California to two years in prison for brokering the export to China of Panther series infrared cameras, which have night vision technology.¹²

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
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


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
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
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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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



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



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

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


b3
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X (U)



X (U)

X (U)

b1 per DOE

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X

X (U)

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X

(U)

(U) X

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
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b1 per DOE

X (U)



(S)

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

b1 per DOS

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
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b1 per DOS

X (U)

X (U)

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X (U)

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X (U)


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X (U) X


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X (U)

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X (U)

X (U)




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
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
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
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X (U)

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X (U)

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X (U)

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
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
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
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
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

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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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



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


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
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


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



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


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



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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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

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
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(X) (U)


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


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
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


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
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b7E



b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

b3
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X (U)


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
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63 b3
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


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


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
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b1
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
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b7D




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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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S)

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b1 per FBI, Army
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b3 per FBI

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(X) (U) (X)

b1 per FBI, DOE
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(X)

(X) (U)

b1 per DOS, AFOSI



b3
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b1 per DOS, AFOSI

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
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
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


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

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

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~~(S)~~ (U) ~~(S)~~

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X (U)

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

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
"(U) The "suitcase scandal" refers to the incident that occurred on 3 August 2007 in Argentina where almost \$800,000 of undeclared cash from Venezuela was discovered by Argentine customs officials. The money was transported from Venezuela to Argentina on a PDVSA aircraft carrying several passengers that included GOV and Government of Argentina officials.



b3
b7E




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
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
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(U) Appendix B: Overall Threat Rating Definitions



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b3
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
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
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
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
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(U) Endnotes

1 [redacted] b7E
UNCLASSIFIED.

2 [redacted]
UNCLASSIFIED.

[redacted]
UNCLASSIFIED.

3 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 18 January 2007; ~~SECRET~~.

4 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 16 July 2007; ~~SECRET~~.

5 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 28 August 2007; ~~SECRET~~.

6 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 6 December 2007; ~~SECRET~~.

7 (U) FBI; Letterhead Memorandum; 23 July 2007; ~~SECRET~~.

8 [redacted] b7E
9
10

11 [redacted] UNCLASSIFIED.

12 [redacted] UNCLASSIFIED.

13 (U) FBI [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

14 [redacted]
15 [redacted] b1
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b7E
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16 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 30 April 2007; ~~SECRET~~.

17 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 25 May 2007; ~~SECRET~~.

18 [redacted] b1
b3
19 [redacted] (U) S
b1

20 (U//FOUO) FBI [redacted] ~~SECRET~~ [redacted] b3
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21 [redacted] b1

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b3
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2 [REDACTED] b1 (U)
[REDACTED] b1 (U) (S)
2 (U) FBI; [REDACTED] SECRET
25 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 20 November 2007; SECRET b7E
26 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 3 January 2007; SECRET
27 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 14 September 2007; SECRET
28 (U) FBI [REDACTED] SECRET
29 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 7 March 2008; SECRET
30 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 7 March 2008; SECRET
31 [REDACTED] b1 (U)
31 [REDACTED] b1 (U) (S)
31 [REDACTED] b1 (U) (S)
35 [REDACTED] b1 b3 b7E b7D
34 [REDACTED]
35 (U) FBI; Electronic Communications; 6 October 2006, SECRET; 14 September 2006, SECRET; 6 November 2006,
SECRET; 9 November 2006, SECRET; 15 November 2006, SECRET; 14 November 2006, SECRET.
36 (U) FBI; [REDACTED] SECRET b3
[REDACTED] b7E
37 (U) FBI; [REDACTED] SECRET b7D
[REDACTED] b1 b3
38 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 22 May 2007; SECRET b7E b7D
X
b3 39 (U) FBI; [REDACTED] SECRET b7E
b7E
40 X b1 (U)
b1
b3
b7E
b7D
X
X
b1 b3 b7E b7D
X b1 (U)
X b1 (U)
b1 b3 b7E b7D
X b1 (U)
X b1 (U)

[redacted]
b3
b7E

[redacted] X [redacted] b1
[redacted] X [redacted] b3
[redacted] X [redacted] b7E
[redacted] X [redacted] b7D
[redacted] X [redacted] b1
[redacted] X [redacted] b3
[redacted] X [redacted] b7E
[redacted] X [redacted] b7D
[redacted] X [redacted] b1
[redacted] X [redacted] b3
[redacted] X [redacted] b7E
[redacted] X [redacted] b7D
46 (U) FBI; [redacted] SECRET [redacted] (U) [redacted] SECRET [redacted] SECRET; [redacted] b1
[redacted] SECRET [redacted] SECRET [redacted] SECRET; [redacted] b1
47 X [redacted] b3
[redacted] X [redacted] b7E
[redacted] X [redacted] b7D
48 X [redacted] (U) [redacted] b1
49 UNCLASSIFIED. [redacted] UNCLASSIFIED. b7E
50 [redacted] b1
51 [redacted] b3
52 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 18 September 2007; [redacted] SECRET b7E
53 [redacted] b1 per FBI, DOE
b3
[redacted] b7E X (U)
54 [redacted] b1
b3
b7E X (U)
55 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 1 March 2007; [redacted] SECRET b1
b3
b7E X (U)
56 X [redacted] b7E
[redacted] X [redacted] b7D
57 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 17 July 2008.
58 X (U) [redacted] b1
b3
b7E
59 X [redacted] b1
b3
b7E
60 X [redacted] b1
b3
b7E
61 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 12 October 2007; [redacted] SECRET b1
b3
b7E
62 X [redacted] b1
b3
b7E

[Redacted]
b1 per FBI, DOE
b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

63 [Redacted] b1 (U)
64 [Redacted] b1 (U)
65 [Redacted] b1 (U)

66 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 15 June 2007; ~~SECRET~~

67 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 24 May 2007; ~~SECRET~~

68 X [Redacted] b1 (U)
X [Redacted] b1 (U)
[Redacted] b1 b3 b7E

69 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 19 October 2007; ~~SECRET~~

70 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 21 February 2007; ~~SECRET~~

71 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 22 March 2007; ~~SECRET~~

72 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 21 December 2007; ~~SECRET~~

73 X [Redacted] b1 (U)
[Redacted] b1 b3 b7E

75 (U) FBI [Redacted] b1 (U) b7E

76 X [Redacted] b1 (U)
X [Redacted] b1 (U) b1 b3 b7E b7D

78 (S/NF) DOS State 11331; 30 January 2007; ~~SECRET~~

(S/NF) DOS State 51378; 18 April 2007; ~~SECRET~~

(S/NF) DOS State 17710; 21 February 2008; ~~SECRET~~

79 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 19 January 2007; ~~SECRET~~

80 X [Redacted] b1 (U)
X [Redacted] b1 b3 b7E b7D

b1 per AFOSI

81 X [Redacted] b1 (U)
X [Redacted] b1 b3 b7E b7D

82 X [Redacted] b1 (U)
X [Redacted] b1 b3 b7E b7D

[Redacted]

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[redacted]
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84 [redacted] (U) X

85 (U) FBI; SECRET. SECRET. SECRET. SECRET. SECRET. SECRET. SECRET.

b7E

b1 per AFOSI

86 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 10 December 2007; SECRET. [redacted] X

87 [redacted]

88 (U) FBI [redacted] SECRET X

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b3
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[b7D]

X (U) b1

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(U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 30 August 2005; SECRET. [redacted] X
(U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 23 September 2005; SECRET. [redacted] X
(U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 7 October 2005; SECRET. [redacted] X
(U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 21 September 2006; SECRET. [redacted] X

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b3
b7E
b7D

99 X (U) b1
1 X (U) b3
b7E
b7D

101 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 17 January 2007; SECRET. [redacted] X
102 X (U) b1
10 X (U) b3
b7E
b7D
1 X (U) b7D

b1
b3
b7E
b7D

[redacted]
b3
b7E

b1
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b7D

105 X

106 X

107 X

b1
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b7E
b7D

108 X

109 X

110 (U//FOUO) FBI; [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

X (U)

111 (U) FBI investigations and FBI [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

b3

112 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication, 1 May 2007; ~~SECRET~~

b7E

113 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication, 22 February 2007; ~~SECRET~~

114 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication, 30 May 2007;

(U) FBI; Electronic Communication, 15 June 2007; ~~SECRET~~

115 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication, 22 September 2006; ~~SECRET~~

(U) FBI [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

116 (U) FBI; Electronic Communications, 30 May 2007 ~~SECRET~~; 18 September 2007 ~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
b7E
b7D

117 X

118 (U) FBI [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

X (U)

119 (U) FBI; Electronic Communications, 1 May 2007, ~~SECRET~~; 10 October 2007, ~~SECRET~~

120 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication, 18 September 2007; ~~SECRET~~

121 (U) FBI [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
b7E
b7D

122 X

123 X

124 X

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b7E
b7D

X (U)

125 X

126 X

127 X

128 X

129 X

130 X

131 X

132 X

133 X

134 X

135 X

136 X

137 X

138 X

139 X

140 X

(U)

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[redacted]
b3
b7E

- 132 (U) FBI; [redacted] ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]
[redacted] b3
133 (U) FBI; [redacted] ~~SECRET~~; [redacted]
[redacted] b7D
[redacted] b1
134 [redacted] b3
135 (U) FBI; [redacted] ~~SECRET~~; [redacted]
[redacted] b7D
[redacted] b1
136 [redacted] b3
137 [redacted] b7E
138 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication, 9 May 2007; ~~SECRET~~.
139 [redacted] b1
[redacted] b3
140 [redacted] b7E
141 [redacted] b7D
142 [redacted] b3
143 [redacted] b7E
144 (U) FBI [redacted] ~~SECRET~~; 31 December 2007, ~~SECRET~~
145 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication, 3 July 2007, ~~SECRET~~
[redacted] b7E
146 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication 21 December 2007; ~~SECRET~~
147 [redacted] b1
[redacted] b3
[redacted] b7E
[redacted] UNCLASSIFIED.

[redacted]
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[redacted]
UNCLASSIFIED.

14

X (U)

14

150

X

151

(U) FBI letterhead memorandum, 30 November 2007; SECRET.

X (U)

152

X

153

(U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 10 October 2007; SECRET.

X (U)

154

(U) FBI letterhead memorandum; 10 October, 2007; SECRET.

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155

(U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 18 January 2008; SECRET.

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b7D

156

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157

X

158

(U) FBI letterhead memorandum; 17 September 2007; SECRET.

X (U)

b1

b3

159

X (U)

b3 per Army
b7E per Army

160

X

161

X

b3

162

X

b7E

X (U)

b7D

X (U)

b1

X (U)

b3

X (U)

b7E

X (U)

b7D

X (U)

b3 per FBI, Army
b7E per FBI, Army

163

(U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 16 February 2007; SECRET.

SECRET

SECRET

164

(U) FBI; electronic communications; 30 October 2007, SECRET; 30 July 2007, SECRET.

FBI

SECRET

[redacted]
b3
b7E

165 [X] (U)
166 [X] (U)

b3
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(U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 16 February 2007; ~~SECRET~~

X 16 [X] (U) X

b1
b3
b7E
b7D

X (U) (U) SECRET SECRET SECRET

(U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 26 April 2006; ~~SECRET~~

X (U) X

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169 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 21 July 2008; ~~SECRET~~

170

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171

X (U) X

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172

173

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174

X (U)

X (U)

b3 per DOS

175

b1 per AFOSI

176

X

b1
b3
b7E

177

X

(U//FOUO)

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b3
b7E
b7D

178

(U) FBI; Electronic Communications; 28 March 2007 ~~SECRET~~; 16 April 2007 ~~SECRET~~; 27 July 2007 ~~SECRET~~

X

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b7E

[redacted]

(U) FBI; Electronic Communication, (U) FB [REDACTED] SECRET;

(U) FBI: [REDACTED] SECRET;

(U) FBI [REDACTED] SECRET [REDACTED] SECRET [REDACTED] SECRET;

[REDACTED] SECRET [REDACTED] SECRET [REDACTED] SECRET;

X [REDACTED]

X [REDACTED] X (U) [REDACTED]

180 (U) FBI; Electronic Communications; 11 January 2007, SECRET; 27 March 2007, SECRET; 1 May 2007,
SECRET; 6 June 2007, SECRET; 29 October 2007, SECRET

(U) FBI [REDACTED] SECRET.

(U) FBI [REDACTED] SECRET.

(U) FBI [REDACTED] SECRET.

X [REDACTED]

b1 per FBI, DOS
b3

b7E
b7D

X [REDACTED]

X [REDACTED] (U) [REDACTED]

182 (U) [REDACTED] UNCLASSIFIED.

X [REDACTED]

X [REDACTED] (U) [REDACTED]

183 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 22 February 2007, SECRET

X [REDACTED]

X [REDACTED] (U) [REDACTED]

X [REDACTED]

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b7D

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b7D

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b3

b1
b3
b7E

195 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication, 3 August 2007; ~~SECRET~~

196 (U) FBI [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

197

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~~b7E~~

198

199

UNCLASSIFIED.

b7E

200 (U) [REDACTED] X
~~SECRET~~

201 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 18 May 2007; ~~SECRET~~

202 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 15 October 2007; ~~SECRET~~

203 (U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 8 August 2007; ~~SECRET~~;

(U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 31 July 2007; ~~SECRET~~

(U) FBI; Electronic Communication; 3 April 2007; ~~SECRET~~

204 X

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X (U) [REDACTED]

FBI Customer Satisfaction Survey

Please take a moment to complete this survey and help evaluate the quality, value, and relevance of our intelligence product. Your response will help us serve you more effectively and efficiently in the future. Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Production Services Unit

Washington, DC 20535

b7E

Customer and Product Information

Intelligence Product:

Title: (U) The Foreign Intelligence Threat in the United States

Dated: 25 November 2008

Customer Agency: _____

Relevance to Your Intelligence Needs

1. The product increased my knowledge of an issue or topic. (Check one)

- 5. Strongly Agree
- 4. Somewhat Agree
- 3. Neither Agree or Disagree
- 2. Somewhat Disagree
- 1. Strongly Disagree

PSU INTERNAL USE ONLY

Product Tracking #: _____

Return To: _____

[Redacted]

Actionable Value

2. The product helped me decide on a course of action. (Check one)

- 5. Strongly Agree
- 4. Somewhat Agree
- 3. Neither Agree or Disagree
- 2. Somewhat Disagree
- 1. Strongly Disagree

Timeliness Value

3. The product was timely to my intelligence needs. (Check one)

- 5. Strongly Agree
- 4. Somewhat Agree
- 3. Neither Agree or Disagree
- 2. Somewhat Disagree
- 1. Strongly Disagree

Comments (if any):

[Redacted]
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