



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

December 10, 2021

MR. JOHN R. GREENEWALD JR.
SUITE 1203
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD
CASTAIC, CA 91384-4520

FOIPA Request No.: 1511351-000
Subject: 062-HQ-81484

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed 335 pages of records were determined to be responsive to your subject and were previously processed and released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Please see the selected paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☐ In an effort to provide you with responsive records as expeditiously as possible, we are releasing documents from previous requests regarding your subject. We consider your request fulfilled. Since we relied on previous results, additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may request an additional search for records. Submit your request by mail to **Initial Processing Operations Unit, 200 Constitution Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, or by fax to (540) 868-4997**. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence.
- ☒ Please be advised that additional records responsive to your subject exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you must advise us that you want the additional records processed. Please submit your response within thirty (30) days by mail to **Initial Processing Operations Unit, 200 Constitution Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, or by fax to (540) 868-4997**. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence. **If we do not receive your decision within thirty (30) days of the date of this notification, your request will be closed.**
- ☐ One or more of the enclosed records were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession.

If this release of the previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may file a FOIPA request with NARA at the following address:

National Archives and Records Administration
Special Access and FOIA
8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500
College Park, MD 20740-6001

- ☐ Records potentially responsive to your request were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and they were not previously processed pursuant to the FOIA. You may file a request with NARA using the address above.

- ☐ One or more of the enclosed records were destroyed. Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) , Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.
- ☐ Records potentially responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) according to Title 44 United States Code Section 3301, Title 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Chapter 12 Sub-chapter B Part 1228, and 36 CFR 1229.10.
- ☒ Documents or information referred to other Government agencies were not included in this release.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **"Part 1"** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **"Part 2"** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **"Part 3"** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

Please be advised that if you are seeking a new search for records, you may wish to narrow the scope of your request based on material that you have already received, e.g., timeframe or locality. Additionally, be advised that "unusual circumstances" may apply. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B)(iii). These "unusual circumstances" will delay our ability to make a determination on your request within 20 days. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B). Additionally, the payment of pertinent fees may apply to your request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(A)(viii). The application of "unusual circumstances" is not a determination of how the FBI will respond to your substantive request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

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RECORDS SECTION

FBI - JUSTICE
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DATE 2/13/87 BY SSA/SSA
ON envelope # 255825


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ENCLOSURE

to Internal Security tickler
Enclosure/memo from Belmont to Boardman, 5/19/55, captioned:
**DISASTER PLANNING AND SECURITY PRINCIPLES FOR THE
PETROLEUM AND GAS INDUSTRIES.**

TO:

Mr. A. K. Bowles

Identification Div.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington 25, D.C.

The attached document is forwarded for your information and retention.

Any material, additional bibliographic references or information in support of this research will be appreciated.

Additional copies of this bibliography will be supplied upon request.

June 12, 1964

TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM

From:

Research Information Center and
Advisory Service on Information Processing
Information Technology Division
National Bureau of Standards
Washington, D.C. 20234

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Subject: Unconventional Warfare: A Selected Annotated Bibliography of Bibliographies (including Counter-insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, Special Warfare, and Psychological Operations).

This selected, annotated bibliography of bibliographies (48 references) on unconventional warfare includes counter-insurgency, guerrilla warfare, special warfare and psychological operations.

The bibliography has been generated as a result of interest shown by the Special Warfare Working Group at the 13th Military Operations Research Symposium. The Symposium was sponsored by the Office of Naval Research and was held in Washington, D.C., on 28, 29, and 30 April 1964.

The bibliography has resulted from the writer's long-term personal research interest in the problems of unconventional warfare operations and the documentation of these activities. Unconventional warfare operations material is being used as the content for on-going research on the problems of information storage and retrieval. It should be noted that this bibliography owes much to the pioneering bibliographic work of the Special Operations Research Office, The American University.

Whenever possible, the abstracts have been utilized from the Defense Documentation Center (DDC) Technical Abstract Bulletin (TAB). The remaining abstracts, except for one from the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), were prepared specifically for the present bibliography. Several abstracts, i.e. (FCR), were prepared by Mr. F. C. Rose. The entries have been placed in alphabetical order by author, personal when available and otherwise corporate. Note that "U.S." has not been considered in the alphabetical arrangement. Copies of the referenced documents are available for inspection by qualified personnel.

62-81464-187

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009070

Air Force Academy, Colo.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE. PART I. GUERRILLA WARFARE

Special Bibliography series no. 21, May 62, 39p.,
refs.

AD-277 053

A bibliography representing a selected portion of the holdings of the Air Force Academy library on the subject of guerrilla warfare is presented. The list includes books, reports and periodicals covering the following topics: theory, strategy, and tactics; history of guerrilla operations; partisan and resistance operations; underground activities; and tactical training. A glossary of definitions relating to unconventional warfare is included. (DDC)

009075

Air Force Academy, Colo.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE. PART II. PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE

Special Bibliography series no. 22, Dec 62, 37p.,
refs.

AD-296 073

Contents:

Historical and general background

Psychological activities in peacetime or outside
combat areas

General combat tactics, operations and training

European War, 1914-1918

World War II, 1939-1945

Korean War, 1950-1953

Brainwashing

(DDC)

009093

Air Force Academy, Colo.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE. PART III. ESCAPE AND
EVASION

Special bibliography series no. 23, Feb 63, 26p., refs.

AD-401 415

This is the third bibliography in a series dealing with

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the general topic of unconventional warfare. Part I dealt with guerrilla warfare, while Part II treated psychological warfare. Items listed in previous parts of the series have not been relisted. A fourth bibliography dealing with propaganda will be published shortly. The bibliography represents a selected portion of the holdings of the Air Force Academy Library on this subject. There are six sections: World War I escapes; World War II - German prison camps; World War II - Japanese prison camps; World War II - Allied prison camps, Korean war; and General references. (Author) (DDC)

009084

Air U., Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
BIBLIOGRAPHY (ANNOTATED) INSURGENCY AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY 2D EDITION
Jan 63, 94p.
Proj. AU411 62ASI
AD-417 105

This bibliography has been compiled for the use of the Aerospace Studies Institute in the preparation of studies on insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. The purpose of these studies is to identify and document the role of airpower in guerrilla warfare, Partisan activities, and resistance movements, within the scope of insurgency and counterinsurgency. (Author) (DDC)

009063

U. S. Air University Library,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
COUNTERINSURGENCY: SELECTED REFERENCES
Special Bibliography no. 189, 1 Mar 63, 62p.

Selected references on counterinsurgency in the Air University Library collection. Subjects covered include: unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, roles and missions in counterinsurgency, Air Force and Army in counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare, counter-guerrilla warfare, civic action, country teams, foreign aid, psychological warfare and the newly developing countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the middle East.

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009120

American U., Washington, D. C.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE: AN INTERIM BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mar 61, 288p.

AD-404 755

This bibliography is published in its present informal format and at this time so that the current and immediate interest in the subject of unconventional warfare can be supported. Recognizing the problem, the Department of the Army several years ago authorized the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) to set up a system whereby references to unconventional warfare would be located, cited, catalogued, and systematically exploited. This work has been going on in this Office for several years. A unique feature of the SORO bibliography is that each reference has been catalogued according to a 57-category Key comprising the subject matter of unconventional warfare. In both its general and specific aspects this volume, although an interim publication, should provide the Army with a useful bibliography until SORO's more definite publication appears. (Author) (DDC)

009078

Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill,
Okla.

GUERRILLA WARFARE. AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Special bibliography no. 27, 21 Feb 62, 29p.

AD-273 166

An annotated bibliography of 282 books, pamphlets and magazine articles on guerrilla warfare, in the USAAMS Library collection.

009071

Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill,
Okla.

JUNGLE WARFARE. AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Special bibliography no. 28, Sep 61, 16p., 156 refs.

AD-263 549

A list of 156 items (books, pamphlets, magazine articles, and microcards) in the USAAMS Library.

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009064

U. S. Army Artillery and Missile School Library
COUNTER INSURGENCY: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Special Bibliography no. 28a, Apr 62, 14p.

This is a listing of 174 books and pamphlets, in the USAAMS Library, on the general subject of counterinsurgency.

009089

Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.
AFRICA. ITS PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS. A
BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY
DA Pamphlet no. 20-62, 27 Sep 62, 195p., refs.
AD-290 276

The analysts of the Army Library endeavored to select materials (both friendly and unfriendly) in such a manner that the bibliography would reflect the strategic, political, and economic factors that are emerging in Africa along with the upsurge for independence. There are approximately 500 original titles, some of which have been duplicated and used in various sections of the bibliography when the subjects of the abstracted document were so broad as to overlap into another topic or area. For the most part the materials included are available in the holdings of the Army Library, The Adjutant General's Office, Headquarters, Department of the Army. (Author) (DDC)

009074

U. S. Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.
COMMUNIST CHINA: RUTHLESS ENEMY OR PAPER TIGER? --
A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY
DA Pamphlet 20-61, Jan 62, 137p.
AD-279 580

An unclassified bibliography presenting materials on Communist China under the following headings: Chinese Communist state: government and party; national policy, strategy, and objectives; sources of strength and weaknesses; armed forces; other significant factors contributing to success or failure; progress and failures as reported by visitors and eye-witnesses; U. S. actions and proposed measures to contain Chinese Communist ambitions; historical factors; and bibliographies, indexes, and other documentation.

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009065

U. S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N. C.
LIBRARY HANDBOOK AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES (PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, LATIN AMERICA &
SOUTHEAST ASIA)
1 Jul 62, 93p.

A listing of books, periodical material and pamphlets in the Special Warfare School Library. Subjects covered include: psychological warfare (19 pages), counterinsurgency and related matters (13 pages), guerrilla warfare (broken down geographically) (23 pages); and separate bibliographies on Latin America (12 pages) and Southeast Asia (18 pages).

009067

U. S. Army Special Warfare School, Unconventional Warfare Dept., Fort Bragg, N. C.
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS ON UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
n.d., 39p.

This annotated bibliography lists 138 of the better known readings in unconventional warfare which are in the library of the U. S. Army Special Warfare School. References listed on pages 1-34 have been categorized according to the 55-category key which is also utilized in the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) bibliographies. These entries also have SORO annotations. Appendix B contains a list of 18 additional annotated readings.

009090

U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
UNCLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY, COUNTERINSURGENCY (ANNEX B TO COURSE DIRECTIVE FOR SENIOR OFFICER COUNTERINSURGENCY COURSE)
14 May 62, (1961-62 Curriculum), 45p.

This unclassified bibliography was prepared for internal staff, faculty and student use. It was intended to assist students in the study of counterinsurgency during the course and to provide a ready reference for future reading in the general field of low intensity conflict. There are four

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parts to the bibliography: (1) counterinsurgency reading list (69 references), (2) a national program for counterinsurgency (57 references), (3) machinery at the national level for coordinating counterinsurgency activities (41 references), and (4) a general counterinsurgency reference list (226 references) with a graphical index with 15 categories including geographical areas, political-economic, counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare and sociology-psychology. The list of pamphlets and periodical references includes 157 items.

009086

Berger, Carl, Reese, Howard C., and others
American U., Washington, D. C.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sponsored by Dept. of the Army, May 60, 174p.,

1041 refs.

AD-241 434

This bibliography is intended to assist military and research personnel and those concerned with psychological operations by listing and annotating literature in the field. It includes items pertaining to relevant developments over nearly the past 50 years. Applicability to military psychological operations, whether direct or indirect, was the principal standard for inclusion or rejection of items. The heart of the bibliography is psychological warfare in the two World Wars and the Korean War. From the items on these topics one acquires a view of psychological warfare under the conditions of positional war and a war of movement. Although the main emphasis is on psychological warfare, tangential subjects are also treated. Propaganda, for example, is discussed not only as a subject by itself, but as a facet of others. The Cold War introduced its own areas of interest -- studies on the Soviet Union and Communist China. Reports on brainwashing also occupy a significant place among the items included. The introduction provides a selective view of the literature on psychological operations in World War I and II, the Korean War, other limited wars since 1945 and the Cold War. (Author) (DDC)

009124

Biderman, Albert D., Heller, Barbara S. and
Epstein, Paula

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Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc.,
Washington, D. C.

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CAPTIVITY BEHAVIOR

BSSR research rept. no. 339-1, Feb 61, 46p., 630 refs.

Contract AF 49(638)727; AFOSR-295

AD-253 964

This bibliography lists titles reviewed during a study of the implications for the social sciences of knowledge developed in studies of prisoners of war, political prisoners, concentration camp prisoners, and civilian internees. The bibliography attempts comprehensive coverage of scientific and scholarly material relating to Americans captured during the Korean War, and of other events since 1940. Significant studies of earlier events and illustrative autobiographical, journalistic, and propagandistic accounts are also listed. (Author) (DDC)

009126

Brown, Clement R.

Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BIBLIOGRAPHY

Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Directorate
of Information Sciences

Project 9769(805A), Grant ISSA 62-4

(In preparation, May 1964)

Comprehensive, authoritative bibliographic tools are a necessary information input device for the research scientist. Too frequently, such compilations are begun and left incomplete and unpublished -- a composite of wasted effort and an information vacuum. This effort provides funds for the completion of a bibliography in a significant subject area which was begun several years ago under sponsorship of another agency and discontinued for lack of funds. This effort will update the compilation and carry it to publication. About 1000 entry items are anticipated. (AFOSR)

009122

Butler, Barbara Reason and Owens, Gail

American U., Washington, D. C.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY SUPPLEMENT

NO. 1

Rept. no. RM64-3, Feb 64, 51p.

AD-430 682

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This bibliography includes 127 abstract entries under two primary headings: I. Fundamental elements of psychological operations and II. Historical aspects of psychological operations. Part I topics include: background, policy and strategy, administrative matters, propaganda operations, propaganda sources, media and related subjects. In Part II the historical aspects are arranged both chronologically and geographically.

009077

U. S. Central Intelligence Agency Library
BIBLIOGRAPHY: GUERRILLAS, UNDERGROUNDS, AND
RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS
24 May 50, Uncl., 13p., Official Use Only.

A bibliography of 298 published books on guerrillas, undergrounds, and resistance movements, from materials available (1950) in the CIA Library and in the Library of Congress. A large number of foreign language titles are included.

009073

U. S. Central Intelligence Agency Library, Washington,
D. C.
A SELECTED READING LIST ON GUERRILLA WARFARE AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY
Bibliography CR-L-3, 025, 212, 1 May 62, 11p.
OCR-Curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection

This annotated list of 15 publications is for preliminary reading in the fields of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. "This (listing) does not mean that much cannot be learned from reading earlier writings in the field; it merely means that some good over-all studies have recently been produced, some "classics" have been republished, and the most modern tactics and experiences, both in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, have been organized into publishable form.

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009092

Columbia U., New York

THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT IN WORLD WAR II:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS WITH SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND GLOSSARY

Research memo. no. 26, Vol. 2, Jan 54, 46p.

Proj. "Alexander" General Series; Contract AF 18(600)1

AD-74 033

A bibliography of 50 unclassified sources on the Soviet partisan movement in World War II is appended to the volume which summarizes the findings of the case-studies and monographs in a series studying Soviet partisan warfare in World War II. In support of military planning, this series was concerned with the discovery of basic Soviet patterns: military, social, political and psychological.

009087

Condit, D. M.

Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins U.,

Chevy Chase, Md.

A SYSTEM FOR HANDLING DATA ON UNCONVENTIONAL
WARFARE; INCLUDING A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF OPEN SOURCES

Technical memo. no. ORO-T-339, May 56, 185p., 970 refs.

AD-105 860

A system is described for handling data on unconventional warfare for quick mobilization for immediate research on often-changing current problems. In using the Addressograph machine (model 1910), the system provides a permanent means of storing data and of making immediately accessible a printed list of data on unconventional warfare. The system is capable of holding at least 200 letter spaces of written information and a minimum of 50 separate categories into which data could be stored. It is permanent, immediately usable, expandable, and economical. The system was preferred to card-catalog, Keysort, and IEM techniques for groups of about 1000 items. The system provides a printed list of references and may be used constantly by several researchers. The system can be modified and adapted to other subjects. References on unconventional warfare, their categorizations, and a list of the subject categories are appended. (DDC)

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009041

Condit, D. M., Reason, Barbara and others
American U., Washington, D. C.
A COUNTERINSURGENCY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jan 63, 332p.
AD-294 857

Contents:

Fundamental elements of counterinsurgency
 The insurgency problem
 Strategic theory
 US posture
 Administrative matters
 Intelligence and counterintelligence
 Population management
 Antiguerrilla warfare
 Legality and morality
Historical models of counterinsurgency
 Pre-World War II experiences
 World War II: Axis counterinsurgency
 Post-World War II cases
(DDC)

009035

Condit, D. M., Reason, Barbara, Mughisuddin, Margaret,
Park, Bum-Joon Lee and Geis, Robert K.
American U., Washington, D. C.
A COUNTERINSURGENCY BIBLIOGRAPHY
1963, 269p.
AD-409 100

The purpose of this bibliography is to provide, in an ordered and evaluated form, a selective list of the open-source English-language writings on counterinsurgency. This purpose could not be fulfilled until two major instrumental problems had been overcome. First, counterinsurgency had to be analyzed and its components delineated. Second, standardized criteria had to be developed to provide a systematic basis for the location, selection, and analysis of bibliographic items. These two main tasks constituted the team's research methodology. This introduction will discuss in turn the matters of definition and of research procedures, and finally of focus and bias in this bibliography. (Author) (DDC)

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009076

Foster, Robert J.
Human Resources Research Office, George Washington U.,
Washington, D. C.
HUMAN FACTORS IN CIVIC ACTION. A SELECTED ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jun 63, 91p.
Contract DA44 188AR02
AD-412 657

This bibliography is designed to aid in educating and training United States personnel who will assist the military personnel of developing nations to play an active role in the socioeconomic advancement of their countries. It should also be of interest to personnel of agencies that are concerned with providing technical assistance to the developing nations. The chief goal of the compilation is to provide a selected list of items which a busy officer could reasonably expect to read in entirety within a few weeks before going overseas. Priority has been given to items that are nontechnical and thought-provoking, have relevance to most underdeveloped areas, are of article rather than book length, and emphasize the problems of working across cultural barriers. Basic divisions of the bibliography are -- Philosophy of Civic Action and Foreign Aid, The Nature of Underdeveloped Countries, The Techniques of Planned Change, and Individual Effectiveness. (DDC)

009121

Gardner, Nancy Ann
American U., Washington, D. C.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
Bibliography supplement no. 1, rept. no. RM64-1,
Jan 64, 36p.
Supplement no. 1 to AD-404 755. (9120)
AD-429 209

This bibliography includes 96 abstract entries along with an author-title index to the entries. The two primary divisions of the bibliography are: I. Fundamental elements of unconventional warfare, and II. Historical models of unconventional warfare. Part I includes the following topics: background, military strategy, legality, administrative problems and operational concepts.

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009128

GUERRILLA WARFARE

Military Review, 42:5 (May 1962) 73-82, 49 refs.

This annotated bibliography of 49 references covers "some of the most significant studies on unconventional warfare which the MILITARY REVIEW has published in the last six years." It references primarily articles by individual authors who reported on espionage and guerrilla/special forces activities in specific campaigns throughout the world from post-World War I to date. Lesser emphasis is on the use of agents and unconventional warfare techniques in general. (FCR)

009088

Hanrahan, Gene Z. and Saltzman, Allen N.
Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins U.,
Chevy Chase, Md.

ASIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF SOURCE MATERIALS ON GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN
EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Technical memo. no. ORO-T-244, 22 Jul 53, 117p.
AD-22 149

This annotated bibliography includes guerrilla texts, personal narratives, independent studies, and Japanese occupation documents relating to various East and Southeast Asian guerrilla movements during the 1931-1952 period. A politico-military analysis of guerrilla source materials is presented. The titles are arranged geographically in each of the 2 chronological divisions, WWII and post-WWII. (DDC)

009079

Johnstone, John H. (Major, USMC)
U. S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES
MARINES IN GUERRILLA, ANTI-GUERRILLA, AND SMALL WAR
ACTIONS
Marine Corps Historical Bibliographies No. 5,
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, revised 1962, 17p.

An annotated bibliography, with 156 items, of the
U. S. Marines in guerrilla-type actions, including

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guerrilla, anti-guerrilla, and small war operations.

"The entries are restricted to those actions in which Marine units or individual marines participated or to writings by marines for Marine Corps use."

There is a rough breakdown to the early years, the Banana Wars and the recent years.

009072

U. S. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Washington, D. C.

PARTIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ON COUNTERINSURGENCY AND RELATED MATTERS

Memorandum SACSA-M 44-62, Pt. I and Pt. II, 19 Mar 62, 30p.

Part I of this bibliography includes 321 items and emphasizes the military and political considerations of counterinsurgency. There are examples of insurgency, resistance, revolution, and guerrilla warfare; and also the strategy, tactics, and experience involved in counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations in a variety of environments, with emphasis on the underdeveloped countries. Part II, with 34 references, covers economic factors and underdeveloped areas.

009066

U. S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
SELECTED, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON COUNTERINSURGENCY
Marine Corps Bulletin 1500, 10 Apr 62, 57p.

This selected, annotated, and unclassified bibliography presents about 565 references in three parts. Parts I and II include citations of books and articles, respectively, pertaining to the military aspects of counterinsurgency. Part III is taken completely from the Joint Chiefs of Staff bibliography (No. 9072) and includes citations of works on economic factors, especially in regard to the underdeveloped areas of the world.

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009080

U. S. Marine Corps Educational Center, Quantico, Va.
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GUERRILLA WARFARE AND ANTI-GUERRILLA
OPERATIONS
6 Jun 61, 19p.
Mimeo, with addendum of Oct 18, 1961, 5p.

An annotated bibliography of 161 items (books, magazine articles, and documents) on guerrilla and anti-guerrilla operations in the James Carson Breckinridge Library at the Marine Corps Educational Center, Quantico Virginia. Some unclassified titles to security materials are included.

009131

The Military Assistance Institute, Library,
Arlington, Va.
SUGGESTED READING LIST ON VIETNAM
6th Rev., 11 Feb 63, 36p.

This list was compiled from material in the MAI Library. The list includes those periodicals which frequently contain information on Vietnam; and a selection of books, documents, pamphlets and periodical articles on specific subjects relative to Vietnam, i.e. history, politics and government, public administration, economic conditions, agriculture, education, religion, social conditions, etc.

009094

Miller, Hope, Lybrand, William A., and others
American U., Washington, D. C.
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE.
PART I
Sponsored by the Dept. of the Army, Oct 61, 137p.
AD-265 056

Unconventional warfare by United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army definition consists of the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion-and-escape, and subversion. Part I of this bibliography (the present volume) encompasses these three fields; Part II (to be published later) will cover unclassified sources in the

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field variously labeled counter guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency warfare, or operations against irregular forces. Inasmuch as the 400-odd entries in this volume were selected from over 1,800 entries in the SORO information storage system, the bibliography is not comprehensive. Rather, it presents a cross section of available literature on the various unconventional warfare subjects included. Because entries were selected to provide this cross sectional view, users of the volume can feel confident, after reading all of the sources referenced under any subject, that they have been exposed to a fairly complete picture of the understanding of the subject as it exists in the unclassified literature. It is anticipated that later SORO bibliographies of classified sources will complete the picture for qualified users with respect to important aspects of unconventional warfare activities which, primarily because they are clandestine in nature, tend to be written about only in classified documents. (Author) (DDC)

009151

Mughisuddin, Margaret
American U., Washington, D. C.
COUNTERINSURGENCY BIBLIOGRAPHY SUPPLEMENT NO. 2
Rept. no. 64-4, Mar 64, 38p.
Supplement to AD-409 100. (9035)
AD-433 158

This bibliography includes 106 entries under two primary divisions: I. Fundamental elements of counterinsurgency, and II. Historical models of counterinsurgency. Part I includes the insurgency problem, strategic theory, United States posture, administration, population management, antiguerrilla warfare and legality and morality.

009150

Mughisuddin, Margaret, Butler, Barbara Reason and Gardner, Nancy Ann
American U., Washington, D. C.
JUNGLE WARFARE BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rept. no. RM64-2, Jan 64, 46p.
AD-431 929

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Information on jungle terrain and climate, as they affect tactics, materiel, and manpower, is of interest to the U. S. Army because U. S. troops are daily involved in training for and advising on the conduct of warfare in the jungles of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This bibliography presents articles and books containing information on experiences in jungle campaigns, suggestions for tactics tailored for use in jungles, and ways of training troops in jungle warfare. This material should be of use to Army schools. The items contained in this bibliography were reviewed in the course of maintaining a bibliographic survey of the unclassified, English-language sources of information on counterinsurgency. They are divided according to geographic area, and there is an Author-Title index to aid the reader in locating items. (Author) (DDC)

009069

U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I.
PARTISAN AND GUERRILLA WARFARE
A mimeo-bibliography, 10 Dec 51, 3p.

A bibliography of 54 items on partisan and guerrilla warfare, including both library and archival material.

009068

U. S. Navy, Dept of. Library
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GUERRILLA AND ANTI-GUERRILLA WARFARE,
1942-1962, IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE NAVY
May 62, 6p.

A listing of 91 references relative to the title description.

009127

Ney, Virgil
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GUERRILLA WARFARE
Military Affairs, 24:3 (Fall 1960) 146-49, refs.

This selected, general bibliography of 123 English and foreign language books, public documents, report

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literature, and periodical articles references primarily material in both the popular and historical vein, including memoirs. It covers periods of publication from 1927 to 1959, with the emphasis being to give a sufficiently comprehensive set of references that they should afford a basic understanding of guerrilla operations as used in revolution and rebellion, and underground and partisan activities alone, as well as when used in conjunction with conventional military forces. (FCR)

009129

Ney, Virgil

GUERRILLA WARFARE: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Military Review, 41:11 (November 1961) 97-112, refs.

This selected, annotated bibliography of 77 "readily available books" (two in French) is referred to as "a comprehensive bibliography on guerrilla warfare for use by professional soldiers and researchers... No attempt has been made to include ... current ... periodical literature ... on unconventional operations ..." In addition to general material, the bibliography covers Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Cuba, Europe and the USSR, and the Pacific with books published between 1927 and 1961. The subject matter covers the gamut of warfare strategy (including political considerations), guerrilla and civil warfare, special forces activities, psychological operations, sabotage, assassination, espionage, and modern revolutionary techniques, and (as appropriate) in open, underground, and jungle environments. (FCR)

009081

Osanka, Franklin Mark

Human Resources Research Office, George Washington

U., Washington, D. C.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN GUERRILLA AND COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Research memo. rept., Nov 62, 5p.

Contract DA 44-188-ARO-2

AD-295 020

A bibliography of 70 references which deal with various aspects of air power in guerrilla and counter guerrilla

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operations is presented. The most commonly known roles of air power in such operations are troop and equipment movement by helicopter and fixed wing aircraft, close air support, psychological warfare, and deployment of parachute forces. Other activities covered in this bibliography are observation, reconnaissance, survey, intelligence; command, liaison, communications, infiltration and exfiltration of operatives; and air installation security measures. (Author) (DDC)

009085

Osanka, Franklin Mark
Human Resources Research Office, George
Washington, U., Washington, D. C.
COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING. A SELECTED SUBJECT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Research memo. rept., Nov 62, 18p., refs.
Contract DA 44-188-ARO-2
AD-295 021

A bibliography concerning the various aspects of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare is presented. For the most part, the items cited have been published recently. Sometimes not so recent items are included when any of the subject categories are exceptionally weak. While individuals may find many different uses for this bibliography, it is designed primarily for individual study and unit training. The majority of the items in this bibliography are available in average-sized Service libraries and in many of the larger public libraries. Items not available in a given library can often be obtained through inter-library loan. (Author) (DDC)

009082

Osanka, Franklin Mark
Human Resources Research Office, George Washington
U., Washington, D. C.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE. AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF PAPERBACK BOOKS
Research memo. rept., Aug 62, 13p.
Contract DA 44-188-ARO-2
AD-295 022

This bibliography of paperbound books covers the various aspects of unconventional warfare. Most of the items

Unconventional Warfare
A Bibliography of Bibliographies
[] - June 12, 1964 - Page 20

b6
b7C

are both educational and easy to read and should prove particularly useful for lower echelons. The majority of these inexpensive books appeared originally in clothbound editions. There are various definitions of the term 'unconventional warfare' but we have adhered to the following: Unconventional warfare consists of the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, escape and evasion, and subversion against hostile states (resistance). Unconventional warfare operations are conducted in enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. Extensive and detailed annotations have been given to the time-tested and more serious books included in this bibliography. The brief annotations given to many of the books indicate the superficial nature of their treatment of the subject. (Author) (DDC)

009097

Owens, Gail

American U., Washington, D. C.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY SUPPLEMENT NO. 2
Rept. no. RM64-7, May 1964, 29p.

This bibliography includes 75 abstract entries under two primary headings: I. Fundamental elements of psychological operations and II. Historical aspects of psychological operations. Part I topics include: background, psyops organization and personnel, psycho-political warfare, military psychological operations, psyops techniques, media and support and psyops analysis. In Part II the historical aspects are arranged both chronologically and geographically.

009125

Reason, Barbara, Mughisuddin, Margaret B. and Park, Bum-Joon Lee

American U., Washington, D. C.

CUBA SINCE CASTRO. A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

Nov 62, 25p.

AD-292 900

From sources dating back to 1950, approximately 300 leads to books and articles were gathered. These leads

Unconventional Warfare
A Bibliography of Bibliographies
[] = June 12, 1964 - Page 21

b6
b7C

were scanned for pertinence and generality, and from this review 186 were selected for inclusion. Each selected item was categorized into the one of five sections of the bibliography to which the item bore greatest relevance. The sections are: (1) the 26th of July Movement and its origins; (2) the major persons in revolutionary Cuba and their dominating ideas and philosophies; (3) the form that anti-Castroism, both within and outside of Cuba, has taken; (4) the growing importance of Russian influence in Cuba and the establishment of missile bases; and finally, (5) the response of American States to the changing and increasingly menacing posture of Cuba. Items have been categorized according to the above breakdown, but an author-title index included at the end of this work will help the reader to locate items easily. (Author) (DDC)

009083

Vigneras, Marcel

Research Analysis Corp., Bethesda, Md.

PRELIMINARY BIBLIOGRAPHY ON COUNTERINSURGENCY AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

Technical paper no. RAC-TP-73, Nov 62, 55p.

AD-298 229L

The areas covered comprise the manifold aspects of counterinsurgency, including those more commonly identified as revolutionary war, unconventional warfare, guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations, civic action, psychological warfare, and the like. Entries relate principally to developments occurring during and since WWII. They present a cross section of readily available reference words -- articles, books, studies, and official reports, US as well as foreign -- published prior to August 1962. Most of the documents listed are unclassified. (Author) (DDC)

009091

Weinberg, Gerhard L., Editor

Columbia U., New York

SELECTED SOVIET SOURCES ON THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT IN WORLD WAR II

HRRI Research Memo no. 26, Vol. 1, Jan 54, 170p.

Unconventional Warfare
A Bibliography of Bibliographies
[] - June 12, 1964 - Page 22

b6
b7C

Proj. "Alexander" General Series, Vol. 1; Contract
AF 18(600)1
AD-34 307

A number of documents concerning Soviet partisan activities are presented which originally were captured by the Germans in their World War II operations on the Eastern front. The translated documents are grouped with brief introductions into the following topical chapters: the organization of the partisan movement in 1941, Soviet directives to partisans, partisan tactics and reports, appeals to collaborators, partisan propaganda and relations with the local population, the Grishin and Kovpak regiments, and partisan diaries. A few interrogations of selected partisans are appended. (DDC)

009123

Zimmer, Herbert and Meltzer, Malcolm L.
Georgetown U. Medical Center, Washington, D. C.
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LITERATURE RELEVANT
TO THE INTERROGATION PROCESS
Dec 57, 173p.
Contract AF 41(657)127
AD-220 465

A compilation is presented of bibliographic material which may contribute to an increased understanding and control of the interrogation process. The bibliographic items are divided into 10 sections as follows: (1) interpersonal observation and evaluation; (2) deception and the accuracy of reported information; (3) communication and interaction between 2 persons; (4) communication and interaction methodology; (5) authority and its internalization; (6) reactions to coercive pressures; (7) manipulation of the source's conscious controls; (8) ideological compliance, conformity and conversion; (9) morale in combat and captivity; and (10) the group as a source of support or conflict for the individual. Annotations are included for most of the items.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FOI/PA# 1511351-0

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 22, 1946

FROM : Mr. D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: *United States*
U.S. WAR PLANS

Referral/Consult

| | |
|----------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson | ✓ |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm | |
| Mr. Clegg | |
| Mr. Coffey | |
| Mr. Glavin | |
| Mr. Ladd | |
| Mr. Nichols | ✓ |
| Mr. Rosen | |
| Mr. Tracy | |
| Mr. Carson | |
| Mr. Egan | |
| Mr. Gurnea | |
| Mr. Harbo | |
| Mr. Hendon | |
| Mr. Pennington | |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | |
| Room | |
| Mr. Nease | |
| Mr. Egan | |
| Mr. Gandy | |

LW: edm

SE 7

62-81484-X

RECORDED

19 APR 26 1946

EX-19

7 MAY 1946

American War Plans

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

4923

194

6

✓ The Director

Mr. Tolson

Mr. Ladd

Mr. Harbo

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Clegg

Mr. Glavin

Mr. Nichols

Mr. Tracy

Mr. Hendon

Mr. Pennington

Mr. Quinn Tamm

Mr. Nease

Mr. Welch

Miss Gandy

Records Section

Personnel Files

Send File

Bring file up-

to date E. A. Tamm

Search, Serial-

ize, and route

Reading Room

Mechanical Section

Mr. Tracy

Mr. Carson

Mr. Egan

Call Mr. Cerny

Note and return

Mr. Hendon

Mr. Pennington

Mr. Quinn Tamm

Mr. Nease

Miss Gandy

Miss Stalcup

Miss Gray

Miss Butcher

Stamp and mail

Prepare tickler

Call these files

File

See Me

Edward A. Tamm

5734

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

14376

DATE: July 12, 1946

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : C. H. Carson

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Tolson ✓
 Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
 Mr. Clegg ✓
 Mr. Coffey ✓
 Mr. Glavin ✓
 Mr. Ladd ✓
 Mr. Nichols ✓
 Mr. Rosen ✓
 Mr. Tracy ✓
 Mr. Carson ✓
 Mr. Egan ✓
 Mr. Gurnea ✓
 Mr. Hendon ✓
 Mr. Pennington ✓

Russia-Pols. Mat. ✓

American War Plans
 10

Referral/Consult

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162-81484-1
F B I

RECORDED & INDEXED

31 JUL 16 1946

357

08 - XE

DVH:KK

57 JUL 26 1946

New York, N. Y.
July 3, 1946.

Mr. Hoover:

On June 27, 1946, Dudley Roberts related the details of a conversation he had had with Juan Trippe, President of Pan American World Airways. Trippe told Roberts that he had made a short visit to Vienna about mid-June and while there was the dinner guest of General Mark Clark. General Clark told him that two days prior to Trippe's arrival, Russian fighter planes had completely shot up the American airfield, severely damaging the control tower and killing three American Army men. Clark went on to say that he entered a very strong protest to the Russian military authorities which was explained away by them as "a mistake." Clark stated that he was faced with an incredible military problem inasmuch as he had 40,000 men deployed throughout Austria and at least one-half of them were pocketed by Russian road blocks and other strategic measures. Howard B. Dean, Vice-president of Pan American, who accompanied Trippe, told Roberts that he had inquired of General Clark as to how long the American authorities would allow such iniquities to continue and Clark

5 JUL 23 1946

stated in answer that if there were a repeat performance such as the airfield incident, an atom bomb would probably be dropped on some Russian territory. Howard Dean asked Clark if the American military had any atom bombs in Europe and to this Clark replied, "Yes, we have plenty of them."

Trippe went on to relate that while he was conversing on a Vienna sidewalk with the local manager of the Pan American office, a company of Russian soldiers marched down the sidewalk. The manager, who had perhaps had previous experience with the Russians, immediately entered the building and Trippe merely moved out of the line of march, whereupon the Russians deviated from the straight course so that they jostled Trippe into the building. Afterwards, the local manager told Trippe that this was a regular occurrence in Vienna and that it seemed to be the definite policy of the Russians to discredit and humiliate American civilians and military personnel whenever and wherever possible.


E. E. CONROY

FROM

DO-7

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO
OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson _____ ()
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____ ()
 Mr. Clegg _____ ()
 Mr. Glavin _____ ()
 Mr. Ladd _____ ()
 Mr. Nichols _____ ()
 Mr. Rosen _____ ()
 Mr. Tracy _____ ()
 Mr. Carson _____ ()
 Mr. Gurnea _____ ()
 Mr. Harbo _____ ()
 Mr. Hendon _____ ()
 Mr. Nease _____ ()
 Miss Gandy _____ ()

See Me _____ ()
 Note and Return _____ ()
 For Your Recommendation _____ ()
 What are the facts? _____ ()
 Remarks: _____

Handwritten notes and signatures:
 [Large signature across Tolson, Tamm, Clegg, Glavin, Ladd, Nichols, Rosen, Tracy, Carson]
 [Signature across Gurnea, Harbo, Hendon, Nease, Miss Gandy]
 [Signature across See Me, Note and Return, For Your Recommendation]
 [Signature across What are the facts?]
 [Signature across Remarks]
 [Signature: Harvey with]
 [Signature: Pletzer]
 [Signature: M. J. M.]
 [Signature: 7-1-50]
 [Signature: C. P. R.]
 [Signature: J. J. J.]

Communist War Plans

col

CC-247

Mr. Tolson ☒
 Mr. E. A. Tamm ☒
 Mr. Clegg ☒
 Mr. Coffey ☒
 Mr. Glavin ☒
 Mr. Ladd ☒
 Mr. Nichols ☒
 Mr. Rosen ☒
 Mr. Tracy ☒
 Mr. Carson ☒
 Mr. Egan ☒
 Mr. Hendon ☒
 Mr. Pennington ☒
 Mr. Quinn Tamm ☒
 Mr. Nease ☒
 Miss Gandy ☒

August 16, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Special Agent S. W. Reynolds advised that he has become cognizant of an extreme concern within G-2 over a pending conflict with Russia. It is known that the Military Intelligence Division is rapidly bringing up to date its "grab list" of Communists within the armed forces. They are making plans to establish certain special organizations into which all Communists and suspected Communists will be placed.

Colonel L. R. Forney of MID has indicated to Reynolds that he wanted the Bureau to be cognizant of the possibility of this conflict in the near future so that the Bureau would be prepared to act. Mr. Reynolds indicated to Colonel Forney that he felt the Bureau was cognizant of this possibility and was taking the necessary steps along these lines.

Colonel Forney also indicated to Mr. Reynolds that he was concerned whether or not the Department of Justice was taking steps to provide legislation which would enable the internment of citizens. Mr. Reynolds indicated to Colonel Forney that it was his understanding this problem had been made known to the Attorney General by the Bureau and that the Attorney General had the matter under study and advisement at this time.

RECORDED
 Respectfully,
 INDEXED
 162-81484-3
 37 SEP 5 1946
 E. G. Fitch

1. G. C. L. G. will have responsibility for all abroad & that includes subversive activities with leads into U.S. I think we ought to be on record to C. L. G. re our need & desire for such information & their responsibility for getting it now that they have exclusive jurisdiction for foreign coverage.

58 SEP 6 1946

THIS MEMORANDUM IS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES
 TO BE DESTROYED AFTER ACTION IS TAKEN AND NOT SENT TO FILES

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Room 5744

9-9

1946

TO:

☒ Director
☐ Mr. Edward Tamm
☐ Mr. Clegg
☐ Mr. Glavin
☐ Mr. Ladd
☐ Mr. Nichols
☐ Mr. Rosen
☐ Mr. Tracy
☐ Mr. Harbo
☐ Mr. Hendon
☐ Mr. Jones
☐ Mr. Nease
☐ Miss Gandy
☐ Personnel Files
☐ Records Section
☐ Mrs. Skillman

Mr. Tolson.....
 Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
 Mr. Clegg.....
 Mr. Glavin.....
 Mr. Ladd.....
 Mr. Nichols.....
 Mr. Rosen.....
 Mr. Tracy.....
 Mr. Carson.....
 Mr. Egan.....
 Mr. Gurnea.....
 Mr. Harbo.....
 Mr. Hendon.....
 Mr. Pennington.....
 Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
 Miss Gandy.....

See Me

For Appropriate Action

Send File

Note and Return

Clyde Tolson

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON ✓

FROM : L. E. Nichols

SUBJECT:

DATE: September 9, 1946

Referral/Consult

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. E. A. Tamm
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Carson
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Gurnea

JJM:RC

RECORDED
 &
 INDEXED
 70

100-81484-46
 29 SEP 13 1946

70 SEP 15 1946

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR


DATE: August 20, 1946

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

Referral/Consult

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Jones
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Mr. Gandy



DML:da

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EX-29

32 SEP 9 1946

162-81484-5

8/20/46

See
L
Fleming

70 SEP 17 1946

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6-3-43

FROM : SAC, ANCHORAGE

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Recently it has been necessary for me to visit various points in the Territory, even though for a short period of time, in connection with the regular office investigative work. An occasion has presented itself for me to meet Commander LLOYD C. KERSEY, Director of Naval Intelligence in the 17th Naval District, and to meet on various occasions with Colonel L. E. TOOLE, Director of Security and Intelligence in the Alaskan Department, Fort Richardson, Alaska. Various items of information have been developed and the Bureau should not make this matter known to any outside sources.

Referral/Consult

o United States was planned

Harvey
Fisher
meelgm

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62-81484-6

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211 NOV 17 19

59 JUN 27 1946

John
Fitch
Carson

Referral/Consult



As soon as any additional information in regard to the above matters are known to this office, the Bureau, of course, will be advised.

LOT:MW

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: September 20, 1946

FROM : C. H. Carson

SUBJECT: *Jeld* MARSHAL MONTGOMERY

Referral/Consult

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | _____ |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm | _____ |
| Mr. Clegg | _____ |
| Mr. Coffey | _____ |
| Mr. Glavin | _____ |
| Mr. Ladd | _____ |
| Mr. Nichols | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen | _____ |
| Mr. Tracy | _____ |
| Mr. Carson | _____ |
| Mr. Egan | _____ |
| Mr. Gurnea | _____ |
| Mr. Hendon | _____ |
| Mr. Pennington | _____ |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This memorandum is prepared for your information. It is requested, however, that it be circulated in the Internal Security Section.

RECORDED 62-31484-7
F B I
32 SEP 23 1946

51
SEP 23 1946
AEP:K

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cc: Mr. Mumford

THE DIRECTOR

September 20, 1946

D. M. LADD


Referral/Consult

DETENTION OF PERSONS DEEMED DANGEROUS IN THE EVENT OF WAR

American War Plan

Pursuant to a call received from the Department I went to the office of Mr. Peyton Ford and Mr. Graham Morison, accompanied by Mr. Mumford of my office to review and discuss the newest proposed draft of action to be taken by the Government. Mr. Ford was present only briefly because of other commitments, but Mr. Morison showed us the drafts and our comments were furnished to him and later to Mr. Ford. They could not give us copies as they did not have extra ones available, but stated they would furnish copies for you as soon as the points we raised had been discussed and the proposals were drafted in semi-final form.

The plan now proposed envisages the following steps in the order listed to receive action immediately upon attack against the United States or our actual involvement in a state of hostility:



RECORDED 162-31434-8
F B I

76 SEP 27 1946
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 3

Very unsure certainly to give such powers to Sec. of War & Navy. The Bureau later would discuss it and discuss it.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

JKif:mod

Messrs. Ford and Morison stated that further consideration would be given this matter along the lines of our discussion, that it would then be discussed with the proper personnel in the office of the Secretary of War to secure the concurrence of that department and assure that there is no conflict with their plans. Thereafter, when the proposed final form is agreed upon, copies will be prepared for you, the Secretary of War and other interested executive officers of the Government. It will thereafter undoubtedly be discussed with the President and presented for discussion at a Cabinet meeting. Mr. Ford and Mr. Morison at the same time expressed full understanding of the necessity of keeping this contemplated action strictly confidential until and unless the emergency requiring its enactment should arrive. We were advised that as soon as further consideration had been given and proposed redrafts drawn, I would be called to again consider the suggestions.

Just why does everyone think he has to "boot lick" the War Dept.? Unless a military fascism is to be set up the farther they stay away from the "brass" the better.

H.

Director, FBI ~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/23/46

SAC, Anchorage

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Referral/Consult

Correspondence has been previously directed to the Bureau
that Army [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In recent conversations with Naval personnel, information has
been received that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The information set forth above has been confidentially obtained
and should be so held by the Bureau.

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EX-10

100-51484-10
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75 OCT 1 1946
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

55 OCT 15 1946

ou S. War Plans

War Plans

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI


DATE: November 18, 1946

B FROM : SAC, Oklahoma City

SUBJECT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Referral/Consult



The above is furnished for the information of the Bureau.

JCR/ms

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0 American War Plans

COPY: FQ

FBI INFORMATION ONLY

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

DATE 10-05-2010

June 5, 1947

~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

b6
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Special Agent [redacted] of the Liaison Section while at the War Department on June 4, 1947, learned the following items of information confidentially which might be of interest to the Bureau:

[redacted]

X

X

X

[redacted]

[redacted]

X

Classified by: SPL GSK/ALP
Declassify on: OADR
10/17/83

Referral/Consult

RECORDED 62-81484-14
F B I
JUN 18 1947

ORIG

0 Liaison War Plans
15

Referral/Consult

Memorandum for Mr. Ladd

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Redacted content]

It should be noted that all of the above information was obtained by Special Agent [redacted] from [redacted] in extreme confidence and should be handled with the utmost caution in the Bureau and disclosed to no one outside of the Bureau.

b6
b7C

Respectfully,

E. G. Fitch

SWR:AJB

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

file

5

13

U.S. Military

American War Plans

✓ **U.S. ARMY TRAINS OFFICERS FOR BUSINESS**

Moscow, Soviet Home Service, May 12, 1947, 2:10 p.m. EST--1

(Text)

"New York--BUSINESS WEEK writes that the U.S. Army has introduced a system of training some specially selected officers in business and industrial enterprises so that they can master the technique of business operations and be able to organize the material side in future wars. These officers will attend universities and colleges, study the technique of business operations, administration, and so forth. In industrial enterprises, the officers will work as assistant managers of various departments."

"The periodical says that 40 large firms, including General Motors, Ford, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey have been selected for the training of officers."

SOVIET GEOLOGISTS BEGIN SUMMER WORK

Moscow, Soviet Home Service, May 12, 1947, 11:00 p.m. EST--1

(Text)

"Leningrad geologists are starting out on their expeditions. This year more than 50 such expeditions and separate groups will leave for various parts of the Soviet Union."

Foreign Radio Broadcast # 58

5/14/47

INDEXED

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O W. S. Military. B. P. P. P. P.

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60 JUL 10 1947

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ALASKAN COAST IS NOW ARMED FORTRESS

Moscow, in German to Europe, May 11, 1947, 1:00 p.m. EST--W

(Text)

"New York--The Associated Press reports that the Secretary of the New York Council of Religious Mission of North America, (Albers), who recently returned from a tour through Alaska, declared that the Government of the United States had transformed the western coast of Alaska into an armed fortress. He indicated that along the whole coast from Nome to Point Barrow, military preparations are under way and that in the rocky and deserted regions enormous reinforced concrete constructions for air bases have been built."

U.S. military

*clipping from CIO Radio Broadcast
#57 5/13/47*

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Oliver

*83
JUL 22 1947*

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file

0
American War Plans

US - military

TESTIMONY ON THREAT OF ARCTIC WAR NOTED
Moscow Soviet Far East Service, in English to Japan, June 2, 1947, 6:00 a.m. EST--T
(Text)
"In Washington, the House Appropriations Committee has published a collection of statements made by various officials in support of the War Department's request for military appropriations. Some of the statements claim there is a danger of Trans-Arctic hostilities. Certain military demand the financing of large-scale maneuvers in the Arctic and the development of jet-propelled rockets. The collection includes an openly anti-Soviet remark made by Lieutenant General Hodge, the American Commander in Chief in Korea."

Foreign Radio Broadcast #72 6/4/47.

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EX-13

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file

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
940 First National Building
Oklahoma City 2, Oklahoma
August 13, 1947

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Referral/Consult

Director, FBI

RE: RECONVERSION OF AIRPLANES

Dear Sir:

AIRPORT

H.A.

2

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211 NOV 17 1964



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EX-30

162-81484-17
36 AUG 27 1947


254
6 1947

To the Director
From SAC, Oklahoma City
August 13, 1947


Referral/Consult



Very truly yours,


D. A. BRYCE
SAC

DAB/ms



Mr. D. M. Ladd

September 30, 1947

J. P. Coyne

[Redacted]

Department of State
Source of Information

b6
b7C


Pursuant to prior authorization, Supervisor Lish Whitson of the Internal Security Section called on [Redacted] in his office at Room 2008, State Department Annex No. 2 (former Temporary Building F) on 23d Street between C and D, N. W. [Redacted] stated that he might be leaving the European Desk in the near future to teach in the Foreign Service School of the Department of State. He is [Redacted] the Office of European Affairs. Referral/Consult

He advised that it was his opinion that the Department of State had


United States War Plans

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Penning
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

Referral/Consult



ACTION

 will be contacted again periodically regarding matters relating to Communists and Soviet activities.

b6
b7C

Attachment

U.S. MILITARISTS PLAN WORLD DOMINATION

Moscow, Soviet Overseas Service, in English to North America, Aug. 7, 1947, 6:35 p.m. EST-W

(Commentary by Analyzer: "The Growth of the Influence of American Militarists on U.S. Foreign Policy"--Part III. For Parts I and II, see MILITARISM SEEN GAINING CONTROL IN U.S. on Page CC-9 in the Aug. 5 DAILY REPORT)

(Text)

"If anyone were studying the post-war world from Mars he could not help noticing one well-known fact. Everywhere, in Athens, Ankara, in the Capital of Portugal, in the Capital of China, he would find men in American uniforms. And indeed, American military representatives and (troops) operate today on the territory of Europe and Asia (between Africa and the Continent.)

"Let me quote a few recent press reports which confirm all this. A few days ago, Secretary of War Kenneth Royall returned to the United States from Berlin. While in Germany, according to the BBC, the War Secretary conferred with leading American military executives from Greece, Italy and Austria.

"The French press agency said that recently 20 American officers were to leave for Portugal to train the Portuguese Army to use ultramodern American weapons. The American general Wedemeyer is still conferring with representatives of the Kuomintang.

Munitions for Turkey

"The Ankara radio reports that on the 30th birthday of the American Air Force, the American Air Attache in the Turkish Capital gave a cocktail party, and the guests included the Turkish Minister for Defense, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, and various Turkish Generals. A few days earlier, the chief of the U.S. military mission in Turkey, General Oliver, said that he was recommending that Turkey should be supplied with various American munitions.

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EX-46

Foreign Radio Broadcast # 118- August 8, 1945

5100120

These are just a few of the latest reports about the activities of the American military in Europe and Asia. I could cite many more from the world press relating to Japan, Greece, the Near East, Iceland, and the other parts of the world, but I think the picture is clear without these.

In my last two talks I quoted some statements of American observers and public personalities about the unprecedented powers of military circles in their country, about some of the measures the American militarists are carrying out in various parts of the North American Continent, in Washington and in Alaska, to intensify their influence on U.S. policy. And anyone can see that representatives of military circles, the "Military Party," as some American commentators say, are also feverishly active in the Eastern Hemisphere. Have not the American militarists seized key positions in Athens and Ankara?

Rebuilding Germany

"Not so long ago in a survey of American policy, the publication the (UNITED STATES) said quite candidly that such a policy in Europe would begin with the economic development of western Germany. Lately nearly the whole world press has been saying frankly that the unrestricted development of German industry, as envisaged by the fathers of American policy, is to serve as the economic basis of the western bloc.

And just the other day, the CHICAGO SUN correspondent in Washington called the United States the "banker of the western bloc." ... military circles is mapping plans for an unrestricted increase in the output of German heavy industry as the basis for the notorious western bloc. A REUTERS correspondent in Washington emphasized that a plan relating to the level of German industry has been drawn up by Lieutenant General Clay, American Military Governor in Germany, together with the British.

"How far-reaching are the plans of American military circles with regard to the eastern hemisphere is indicated, for one thing, by information appearing in the French paper, FRANCE-SOIR, about a secret report of the American staff to Marshall. In this report, according to the paper, the American militarists map plans for a war for Europe from Africa and for this reason express unconcealed interests in Morocco.

"The Americans are also very much interested in Iceland and Greenland and to some extent Ireland. Further, the point is made that U.S. military circles want to convert Spain into an air base for attack. Sicily, too, is regarded as a base for attack with jet-propelled missiles.

The paper underscores that the Americans would like to win over the Moslems in North Africa and the Middle East, while Continental Turkey, in the opinion of American strategists, might serve as a base for prolonged defense. The report also mentions, Greece, and France, Italy and Portugal, and other countries.

Domination of Arms Presupposed

"In short, the plans of American military circles presuppose the domination of American arms in all countries of western Europe, Africa, and Asia and all on the pretext of defense of the European Continent. And one is reminded of the huge funds the militarists in the United States are expending for propaganda. They want to give the impression that America is some other country--and menaced--and thereby try to justify the mad armaments race and military preparations in which American military circles are engaged.

"Of course the fact about the report to Marshall has to be accepted on the word of the French *FRANCE SOIR*, but isn't it a real and obvious fact that American military representatives are presently active in all quarters of Europe which they have managed to penetrate? Are not American Generals guiding the civil war in China? Do not American militarists threaten Europe with an atomic bomb? All this well illustrates the activity of American militarists in the Eastern Hemisphere and their influence on America's whole policy.

"Of course the propagandists, who feed from the hands of the American military circles, let no chance slip to shout about a menace to America on the part of the Soviet Union, but all this is such obvious nonsense that no fair-minded person can believe it. The military measures of the United States are being carried out under pressure from American military circles, which do the bidding of the American monopolies, and the monopolies would like to become masters of the whole world."

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9-22-47

FROM : SAC, ANCHORAGE

SUBJECT: GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
ANCHORAGE OFFICE

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm | |
| Mr. Clegg | |
| Mr. Glavin | |
| Mr. Ladd | |
| Mr. Nichols | |
| Mr. Rosen | |
| Mr. Tracy | |
| Mr. Egan | |
| Mr. Gurnea | |
| Mr. Harbo | |
| Mr. Mohr | |
| Mr. Pennington | |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | |
| Mr. Nease | |
| Miss Gandy | |

This is to advise the Bureau that a recent congressional committee which was in the Territory of Alaska was the Security committee of the Foreign Service Committee of the United States Congress. Members of this party visiting the Territory of Alaska included Congressman CHIPPERFIELD (R), Chairman of the Committee, from Illinois, Congressman LONKMAN (R) of Michigan, Clerk of the General Committee Mr. CRAWFORD, Mr. SHILLCH of the State Department, Colonel DEERWESTER of the headquarters of the War Department in Washington, and a Canadian Army Major, Major ACKERLY, in addition to JOSEPH FLACKNE of the Interior Department.

This party left Chicago, Illinois, stopping at various points in Canada and coming to Anchorage on September 19, 1947. They left on the morning of the 20th and were to remain in Fairbanks for one day and then proceed to Whitehorse and return through Canada to the States. Apparently all of the above men were being escorted by military personnel and they did not make any effort to contact this office or any members of the naval service. I wanted to point this out to the Bureau inasmuch as it may be entirely possible that upon their return to Washington they will make a number of recommendations as to what is and what is not proper to be done in the Territory of Alaska and I wanted the Bureau to have the benefit of the knowledge that they will have probably spent three days in the Territory and will have contacted but very few people and did not contact this office.


As a point of information for the Bureau, I wanted to set forth information that from a observation of the numerous air bases that are being placed in the Territory of Alaska it is obvious that a tremendous amount of construction and defensive-offensive military bases are being built in the vicinity of Fairbanks, Alaska. It is interesting to note from a map of the Territory that there are presently air bases through Canada, the points of which are known to the Bureau, and at Snag on the Canadian-Alaskan border. There are also bases at Northway, Tanana, Big Delta, 26 Mile, Ladd Field, Clear and Nenana. It will be noted that Nenana Airfield, or Clear, as it is commonly referred to, and 26 Mile are very close to Ladd Field in Fairbanks. Clear is approximately 40 miles from Fairbanks in a south-westerly direction and 26 Mile is 26 miles from Fairbanks in a south-easterly direction. Both of these bases are made especially for the heaviest of the heavy bombers made by the military forces. One of the runways

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LOT:MR
65-35

Director, FBI

November 7, 1947

SAC, Miami

WAR DEPARTMENT AFFILIATION PROGRAM

For the information of the Bureau, [redacted]

[redacted] telephonically advised the Miami office on October 30, 1947, that the War Department has a representative by the name of [redacted] presently working among various contractors in the Miami area. [redacted] secured his information concerning [redacted] through [redacted]

[redacted] has contacted [redacted] during recent weeks and states that he is making a survey for the War Department to determine the amount of contracting equipment that each contractor has, along with its mobility, so that in the event of an emergency, the War Department will be able to move contractors and equipment to various sections of the country to repair war damage and defenses.

CHC:JHK

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Tuzoff

U.S. POLICY AIMS AT CONTROL OF ARCTIC

Moscow, TASS, Soviet Overseas Service, in English Morse to North America, Sept. 3, 1947, 9:26 a.m. EST-W

(Text) In an article entitled "The USA and the Arctic", IZVESTIA writes: "About a year ago when the Soviet press published reports on the military measures taken by the United States in the Arctic, many foreign newspapers, and first of all the American press, expressed indignation and denied the 'Moscow reports.' These denials, however, were nothing but attempts to camouflage the actions of the American War Department in the Arctic and to lend them a more or less presentable aspect."

"It did not take long, however, for these attempts to be unmasked by life itself: The aims of American expansion in the Arctic regions become increasingly obvious, and now it is no secret to anybody that the inordinate interest of the USA in the 'development' of the Arctic is due to a desire to occupy the most advantageous military and strategic positions in preparation for the implementation of plans for world domination."

"The magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS writes: 'The shortest cuts between many important points of the old and new world go across the Arctic and the North Poles. Consequently he who wants to hold sway over two continents must occupy advantageous positions in the Arctic regions.'"

"Hearst's NEW YORK JOURNAL AND AMERICAN was even more outspoken as to the aims of U.S. expansion in the Arctic. Regarding the Arctic as a 'new Mediterranean Sea,' the newspaper insists on subjecting it to American control, since this would insure U.S. predominance over the world. ... (TASS asterisks - Ed.)"

B

U.S. American WAR Plans

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31 NOV 19 1947

Clifford

EV-380

Foreign Radio Broadcast # 135 - September 4, 1947

55 NOV 22 1947

Preparations intensified

"Preparations for the materialization of these plans became particularly intense during the past few months, and developed along three main lines. First, it implies the establishment of American control over the Arctic regions of Canada. Secondly, the USA strives to consolidate and expand American bases in the North Atlantic, first of all in Iceland, and also to create its bases on Scandinavian territory. Thirdly, it "modernizes" Alaska very energetically, converting it into the main base of the American military and strategic program in the Arctic.

"During the war the United States built the so-called Alaskan Highway across Canada. This military and strategic road is serviced and guarded by the American War Department, which fact formally justifies the location of American troops in certain districts of Canada. Work conducted by the United States for the expansion and improvement of "Arctic defense" constitutes another pretext for the infiltration into Canada of increasingly growing numbers of American troops.

"Representatives of the U.S. Air Forces stay in a number of points in Canada. In some of these points war bases have been created. The erection of American and Canadian-American weather stations in the Arctic regions of Canada is conducted on an extremely large scale.

"All this has resulted in the rapid growth of the numerical strength of the American Armed Forces stationed in Canada, a fact which naturally is fraught with serious dangers for Canada and, at any rate, means violation of Canadian sovereignty. That is exactly how the representatives of Canadian public opinion appraise the presence of American troops in the territory of Canada. ... (TASS asterisks--Ed.) The Canadian authorities, however, turn a deaf ear to the sober warnings of those who object to Canada being converted into one of the northern bases of American troops, under the pretext of "Arctic defense."

Danish Sovereignty Menaced

"Passing over to the Scandinavian countries, IZVESTIA states that for one of these countries--Iceland--American expansion has already meant an infringement upon her State sovereignty; Contrary to the will of the people of Iceland, the USA has preserved its main base at the Keflavik Airport and keeps Iceland's economy under its control.

"U.S. expansion in the Arctic is fraught with serious consequences for Denmark, which is confronted with the danger of losing her sovereignty over Greenland, at least partially if not completely. Emphatic statements of the press and official spokesmen in the USA to the effect that Greenland is situated in the 'Western Hemisphere' prove the strong reluctance of the reactionary circles of the USA to satisfy the legitimate Danish demand that the American war bases in Greenland should be liquidated.

"In connection with the decision of the Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro on the inclusion of Greenland into the American 'Security Zone,' the Danish newspaper EXTRABLADET writes: 'Denmark has been practically robbed of her sovereignty over Greenland'

Interest in Scandinavian

"Inspired by Arctic expansion of the USA stretch their hands even to Scandinavia itself. This is brought out both by American penetration into the economy of Sweden and Norway and by the U.S. desire to make these countries cooperate with the American War Department and, under various outwardly plausible pretexts, to acquire bases for American aviation in Norwegian and Swedish territories.

Activities in Alaska

"Referring to the activity of the American War Department in Alaska, the newspaper cites the NEW YORK TIMES report to the effect that the 'world's first' airfield for superheavy bombers is under construction in Alaska. According to an AP report, most up-to-date grounds and bases for jet-propelled projectiles and planes are being created there. The training of American troops to operate under Arctic conditions and corresponding tests of equipment are conducted on a mass scale.

"Undoubtedly all these outspoken statements of the American press to a large extent represent publicity. But even taking this into account, one must admit that the U.S. War Department is developing many-sided activities in Alaska. The recent inspection tour of Alaska undertaken by the Chief of Staff of the American Army, Eisenhower, may bear evidence to this.

"It is also obvious that the immediate task of this activity is the testing of Army equipment and the training of men under Arctic conditions, on the one hand, and the accumulation in Alaska of a powerful force of American troops, on the other. These aims reach far beyond the limits of the American Continent and are connected with expansionist aspirations of the most reactionary forces in the United States.

World Supremacy Aim Seen

"General Spaatz, in the course of a discussion of the War Department budget, insisted on the complete satisfaction of the War Department demands with regard to expenditures on activities in Arctic. He emphasized that these activities are intended to enhance the efficiency of modern American arms and to bring within its range all parts of the Eurasian Continent. This goes to show that we deal with efforts to establish world supremacy by means of... (Tass asterisks--Ed.) armed force.

"Those who inspire these efforts realize perfectly that they will not receive the approval of the American people. Therefore, they continue camouflaging their expansionist plans by talk about defense of the Western Hemisphere. The number of simpletons, who would allow themselves to be hoodwinked with fables of this sort, or with deceitful fabrications about danger threatening the American Continent, dwindles rapidly."

14380

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

November 22, 1947

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETENTION OF COMMUNISTS IN THE EVENT OF
SUDDEN DIFFICULTY WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Reference is made to my memoranda to you of March 8, August 5 and September 5, 1946, concerning the captioned matter and also to my memorandum of October 20, 1947, in which I pointed out the necessity for for detailed planning on the subject of detention of Communists in the event of an emergency involving the Soviet Union and this country.

The international situation has further deteriorated since the last referenced memorandum on this subject. You will recall my suggestion that appropriate legislation be in readiness for the next session of Congress. Congress has now convened in Special Session to handle certain domestic and foreign aspects of this country's basic relationship with those other nations faced with expanding Soviet and Communist encroachment.

It is suggested that appropriate plans and procedure which shall be followed in the event of an emergency involving the United States and the Soviet Union be prepared so that those individuals responsible for the carrying out of such procedure may be appropriately instructed.

(LW:mae)
LLT:edm

cc - Mr. D. M. Ladd
Mr. J. P. Coyne
Mr. L. Whitson

*Declaring 2040
8-17-74 EJA*

*offices advised
LH/S 8-17-74
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American War Plans

100-917

November 28, 1947

Referral/Consult

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. LADD
MR. TOLSON

There are, no doubt, other areas mentioned in the Air Force survey which are probably high in the point of being strategic and we should very carefully check these now and take steps to see immediately that we have adequate coverage as to subversive and security measures in these areas. This is vitally important.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.
John Edgar Hoover
Director

RECORDED
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15 NOV 29 1947

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 5, 1947

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

| | |
|----------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson | ✓ |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm | |
| Mr. Clegg | |
| Mr. Glavin | |
| Mr. Ladd | ✓ |
| Mr. Nichols | |
| Mr. Rosen | |
| Mr. Tracy | |
| Mr. Carson | |
| Mr. Egan | |
| Mr. Gurnea | |
| Mr. Harbo | |
| Mr. Hendon | |
| Mr. Pennington | |
| Tele. Room | |
| Mr. Nease | |
| Miss Holmes | |
| Miss Gandy | |

STYLES

While talking to Senator Bridges on other matters, he stated that while he was in Europe the past summer that he had had a private conference with Churchill, that Churchill was very much concerned about the Russian picture and stated that the only salvation for the civilization of the world would be if the President of the United States would declare Russia to be imperiling world peace and attack Russia.

He pointed out that if an atomic bomb could be dropped on the Kremlin wiping it out, it would be a very easy problem to handle the balance of Russia, which would be without direction. Churchill further stated that if this was not done, Russia will attack the United States in the next two or three years when she gets the atomic bomb and civilization will be wiped out or set back many years.

WINSTON

Bridges stated that he concurs in Churchill's views and that he sincerely hopes that our next President will do just that before Russia attacks the United States.

DML:da

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54 DEC 9 1947

American war plans

Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. H. Ladd

DATE: 11-1-47

FROM : Mr. J. P. Coyne

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - TURKEY
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

There is being set forth hereinafter an analysis of the present international situation as set forth by Turkish Minister Baydur in a message to his Foreign Ministry in Turkey as furnished by [redacted]. This analysis is believed of interest in view of the succinct manner in which it is made and the personal observations set forth by Baydur.

Referral/Consult

ea

Shag

Referral/Consult

Mr. D. M. Ladd

[Redacted Box]

RECOMMENDATION:

No action. This is being set forth for informational purposes only.

RJL:esb

esb

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: March 9, 1948

FROM : V. P. Keay

Referral/Consult

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MATTERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington

white

American War Plans

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Field HAS BEEN
THREATENED
UP TO DATE EACH
6 MONTHS. En

SWR:AM

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M.F.V.

62-81484-29
F B
31 MAR 13 1948

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Shouldn't we again with
Dept re what its plans
are?

Follow-up on detention
program to A.G. 3-10-48.
LW

62 MAR 16 1948

5-AM

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

DATE: March 5, 1948

FROM : J. P. Coyne

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Reference is made to the memorandum which you submitted to the Director earlier this afternoon recording information received from a confidential source indicating that during the past 24 hours relations with Russia have deteriorated very badly and that the Chiefs of Staff are very worried at the moment.

The following action has been taken on the basis of the afore-mentioned information:

1. I called Supervisor [] of the Washington Field Office to my office at 5:30 pm and furnished him with the afore-mentioned statement, instructing that the personnel who are handling our technical coverage on the Russian Embassy should be alerted and that personnel should be kept on continuously so there will be no break in that coverage. I indicated that the Bureau should be telephonically advised immediately should there be any unusual developments with respect to Embassy personnel.

2. At 5:45 pm, while in conference with you, you telephonically communicated with the Assistant SAC, Mr. Belmont, in New York City and furnished him with the same information and with the same instructions as regards the Russian New York Consulate. You indicated that substantial personnel should be assigned to sutec on a continuous basis in order to insure round-the-clock coverage and that said personnel should be alerted in order that the New York Office and in turn the Bureau will be telephonically advised immediately of any unusual development. You likewise indicated that Belmont should advise Mr. Scheidt of the foregoing immediately. You then inquired as to the coverage on Amtorg and Tass and Belmont indicated that we do not have any technical coverage on either establishment.

3. At 6:05 pm, I telephonically communicated with ASAC William Hinze of the Philadelphia Office and furnished him with the afore-mentioned data, instructing that it be immediately ascertained whether there are any Russian vessels in the Philadelphia Port. Should there be such vessels, Hinze was instructed to place a continuing surveillance on them and advise the Bureau telephonically and immediately of any unusual activity noted.

4. At 6:10 pm, I telephoned SAC Fred Hallford in Baltimore and furnished him with the same information and the same instructions as were given the Philadelphia Office.

5. At 6:15 pm, I telephonically communicated with ASAC Belmont at New York with respect to the Russian vessels there. I observed that as of March 2, 1948, the New York Office reported that there were three Russian vessels

JPC:esh
54 MAR 17 1948

Mr. D. M. Ladd

in the New York Harbor and that a fourth was reportedly scheduled to arrive on March 15, 1948. I advised Belmont that these vessels should be placed under discreet observation on a continuing round-the-clock basis and that the Bureau should be immediately and telephonically advised of any unusual activity observed. Mr. Belmont stated on the occasion of this call that he has already assigned Russian-speaking Agents to the Embassy lines on sutec on a 24 hour basis and that he has assigned Polish speaking Agents to the lines coming into sutec from the Polish Consulate on a 24 hour basis. I then requested Mr. Belmont to advise SAC McKee at Newark of the original information which you furnished to Belmont at 5:45 and of the subsequent information which I furnished to him at 6:15, with instructions that the same attention be devoted to any Russian vessels on the Newark side of the Harbor as is being devoted to such vessels on the New York side.

6. At 6:10 pm, Mr. H. B. Fletcher telephonically communicated with SAC Kimball and furnished him with the above report, instructing that 24 hour coverage be afforded the Russian Consulate at San Francisco and instructing at the same time that competent personnel be assigned thereto. Kimball was likewise advised of the afore-mentioned instructions with respect to the coverage on Russian vessels that might be docked at San Francisco and he was instructed to maintain close contact with both situations, advising the Bureau immediately of any unusual developments. Kimball was then advised to telephonically furnish the same information immediately to the Special Agents in Charge at Los Angeles, Portland and Seattle in order that the same type of coverage might be afforded any Russian vessels now in or docking at the ports in those respective divisions. They, in turn, are to advise the Bureau of any unusual type of activity immediately.

For your information, we have technical coverage on the Russian Embassy in Washington, D. C. and the Russian Consulates in New York and San Francisco. We do not have technical coverage on the Tass and Amtorg Offices in either New York or Washington. The coverage on the Russian Embassy includes coverage on the offices of the Russian Military and Naval Attaches.

As regards our coastal offices, you are advised that periodically Russian vessels dock at New York, Newark, Baltimore, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Portland and Seattle. All of these offices have been and are instructed to advise the Bureau of the movement of any Soviet vessels in or out of ports in their divisions. As of March 2, 1948, no Russian vessels were reported to have been in the Port of San Francisco since January 18, 1948. As of March 2, 1948, the New York Office reported that the following three vessels were then

Mr. D. M. Ladd

docked in New York Harbor: Vilnius, Murmansk, and Chukotka, with the Soviet vessel Rossia reportedly scheduled to arrive in New York Harbor on March 15, 1948. (The Rossia is the largest passenger ship in the Soviet Merchant Marine.)

The Baltimore Office reported that the Russian vessel Akademic Krilov had been at the Baltimore Port but that it departed for Cuba on February 28, 1948.

We have no information indicating the presence of any Soviet vessels in any of our other ports at this time.

All of the offices contacted were impressed with the confidential nature of this information and with the necessity of retaining it so, advising only those Agent personnel who should be alerted in order to carry out the instructions furnished.

ACTION:

Any information which is received with respect to the foregoing will be called to your attention immediately.

ADDENDUM: JPC:esb 3-5-48

Night Supervisor Milnes will be advised of this information, as will the Midnight Supervisor, and both will be instructed to immediately contact the appropriate representatives of the Bureau should any information of relevancy be developed regarding this matter.

ADDENDUM: JPC:esb 3-5-48

At 7:10 pm, Mr. Hallford called from Baltimore to advise that there are no Russian vessels in that Port at this time. He stated that on occasion, but very rarely in the past, Norfolk has been able to furnish advance information to Baltimore upon Soviet vessels traveling from Norfolk to Baltimore. I accordingly requested Mr. Hallford to immediately communicate the previous information and instructions to the SAC at Norfolk which I had earlier this evening furnished to him.

Addendum: A wire has been sent to Anchorage & Honolulu furnishing above info & alerting them to observe unusual movement & activity of Russ. ships in their territories.

Addendum: A wire has been sent to Anchorage & Honolulu, furnishing above info. & alerting them to observe unusual movement & activity of Russ. ships in their territories. J.P. Coyne

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Coffey _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

Referral/Consult

FROM HONOLULU 3-13-48 NR 130535 11-16 AM EST

DIRECTOR ----- URGENT -----

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND USSR.

UNDERLINED PORTION OF THE ABOVE MESG. PENDING CORRECTION.

RECEIVED, 3-13-48

2-03 AM EST

RECORDED

& INDEXED

MFV

cc

19 MAR 18 1948

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems:

54 MAR 18 1948

The Attorney General

March 25, 1948

Director, FBI

GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM IN THE EVENT OF
SUDDEN DIFFICULTY WITH THE SOVIET UNION

American War Plans

Reference is made to my memorandum of March 10, 1948 on the subject "Detention of Communists in the Event of Sudden Difficulty with the Soviet Union". Because of the effect which certain necessary programs might have upon the investigative responsibility and activity of this Bureau, I would appreciate any comments which you might wish to furnish at this time concerning any of the following programs which you undoubtedly have under consideration:

1. Reestablishment in the event of war of censorship of international communications.
2. The freezing of certain foreign funds.
3. The establishment of a visa and exit control program.
4. The listing of certain items as contraband.
5. The restriction of travel by certain types of aliens within the United States.
6. The registration of alien enemies.

APR 26 8 58 AM '48
FBI
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

LT:VLC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 6:15 PM
DATE 3-27-48
BY CLK

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

62 APR 3 1948

COPY: EMC

TO : MR. KEAY

DATE: March 15, 1948

FROM : S. W. REYNOLDS

SUBJECT: // DETENTION OF COMMUNISTS IN EVENT OF SUDDEN DIFFICULTY
WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Reference is made to the memorandum to Mr. Ladd from Mr. J. P. Coyne in the above-captioned matter dated March 11, 1948,

The referenced memorandum indicates a request that a check be made with the Army, Navy and Air Force to determine the size of their so-called "Grab" lists and to determine whether these lists include civilian members of the Department of Defense and its components, as well as the Military and Naval personnel. It indicated that it should also be determined what the respective military establishments intend to do with respect to furnishing the Bureau with the identity of the civilians included in their lists, together with the data for referral to the Attorney General.

Referral/Consult

SWR:tlc

RECORDED & INDEXED

62-51484-33
E B
43 MAR 31 1948

41
59 APR 5 1948

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice
San Francisco 2, California
March 6, 1948

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY
REGISTERED

| |
|---------------------|
| Mr. Tolson..... |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm..... |
| Mr. Clegg..... |
| Mr. Glavin..... |
| Mr. Ladd..... |
| Mr. Nichols..... |
| Mr. Rosen..... |
| Mr. Tracy..... |
| Mr. Carson..... |
| Mr. Egan..... |
| Mr. Gurnea..... |
| Mr. Harbo..... |
| Mr. Hendon..... |
| Mr. Pennington..... |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm..... |
| Mr. Nease..... |
| Miss Gandy..... |

Director, FBI

Attention: Assistant Director D. M. Ladd

Re: RUSSIAN MATTERS
SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

Dear Sir:

This will confirm the telephonic advice received at 3:00 p.m., March 5, 1948, from Inspector HOWARD FLETCHER at the Bureau, instructing that in view of the fact the Bureau has received information that relationships between the United States and Soviet Governments are deteriorating rapidly, our coverages of Russian matters should be such that we will be able to furnish to the Bureau information concerning any unusual Russian activities in this area. Mr. FLETCHER stated there should be twenty-four-hour surveillance coverage of the Russian Consulate at San Francisco and that we should be particularly alert to any unusual Russian shipping activities here. Mr. FLETCHER further instructed that I furnish this information to the Special Agents in Charge at Seattle, Portland, and Los Angeles.

This is to record that the above information was furnished to ASAC DANIEL CURRIE at Seattle, in the absence of SAC WILCOX, at 3:30 p.m. I also took the liberty of furnishing the information to Inspector GURNEA, who was at Seattle at the time. SAC BOBBITT, at Portland, was advised at 3:50 p.m., and SAC HOOD, at Los Angeles, was advised at 4:30 p.m. Each office was requested to confirm the receipt of the instructions to the Bureau and to advise the Bureau what action was being taken to assure full coverage.

With reference to technical coverage, the San Francisco Office, through [redacted] has complete technical coverage of the Russian Consulate. Consul General KONSTANTIN EREMOV resides in the Consulate building. [redacted] furnishes us with complete technical coverage of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, 24 California Street, San Francisco. These are the only two official Soviet Government agencies in the San Francisco territory.

In addition, the following technical coverages are maintained on Russian matters by this office:

[redacted] furnishes us with information concerning activities at the residence of IVAN A. TARASOV, Vice Consul, 1501 Lincoln Way, Apartment 3,

Director, FBI
Re: RUSSIAN MATTERS
SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

March 6, 1948

San Francisco. At the present time this consists of microphone coverage only. There are no facilities for technical coverage at present, but it is believed this difficulty will be removed in the next several days.

~~CONF. INFO~~ [] furnishes technical coverage at the American Russian Institute, 101 Post Street, San Francisco.

~~CONF. INFO~~ [] furnish technical and microphone coverage at the Communist Party headquarters at Oakland, California, and [] and [] furnish microphone and technical coverage at the Communist Party headquarters in San Francisco.

~~CONF. INFO~~ [] furnishes technical coverage at the "People's World" newspaper office at San Francisco, and ~~CONF. INFO~~ [] furnishes similar technical coverage at the "People's World" newspaper office at Oakland, California.

~~CONF. INFO~~ [] furnishes technical coverage on the residence of WILLIAM SCHNEIDERMAN, State Chairman, District 13, Communist Party, at San Francisco.

~~CONF. INFO~~ [] furnishes technical coverage on XENIA ZYTOMIRSKA, 1845 Berryhill, Berkeley, she being registered with the State Department as an agent of the Polish Government, and who is known to closely associate with Russian Consulate officials.

In addition to the technical and microphone coverages mentioned above, we have arranged trash coverage on the Russian Consulate and trash coverage continues at the Communist Party headquarters in San Francisco and Oakland.

A separate letter is being forwarded to the Bureau recommending a reinstallation of technical coverage on JAMES WALTER MILLER, 1833 Sumnydale Avenue, San Francisco, who is known to be in close contact with Soviet consular officials and is associated with Fisherman, Incorporated, in conjunction with these officials.

The Bureau has recently authorized the installation of microphone and technical coverage on the residence of ANNA LOUISE STRONG, subject of the case entitled, "ANNA LOUISE STRONG; Internal Security - R; Registration Act," who is strongly believed to be a Russian Agent and who is returning to her home in Palo Alto, California, in the near future. Information recently received from the New York Office indicates that upon her return to Palo Alto she will be primarily engaged in endeavoring to set up a short-wave

Director, FBI
Re: RUSSIAN MATTERS
SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

March 6, 1948

radio station somewhere in the Bay Area, which it is reported she will use to communicate with the Communist forces in China. It will be recalled that she recently returned from China, and on her return trip is reported to have been in Prague, Czechoslovakia, shortly before the overthrow of the Czech Government by a Communist coup.

With reference to ANNA LOUISE STRONG, it will be necessary to assign six Special Agents to handle the physical and technical surveillances to be maintained in connection with her activities.

The Bureau's attention is respectfully called to my letter dated March 3, 1948, requesting the assignment of twenty-five additional Special Agents sufficiently experienced to handle security work in this office. In that letter, I pointed out that it was my opinion that additional physical surveillances should be established in connection with the Russian Consulate in order to assure complete coverage so that we might be advised of all unusual activities.

In view of the referenced telephone call from Inspector FLETCHER, I have now increased the Russian Consulate physical surveillance coverage from three Special Agents to seven men during the daytime and have added five men on the swing shift and three men on a midnight shift, which is an increase of twelve men in this coverage.

The Bureau's attention is further called to the fact that the recent closing of the Russian Consulate at Los Angeles has increased the number of surveillances which it has been necessary to put on in connection with visitors to the Russian Consulate from time to time during each week. It is conservatively estimated that the services of six additional Agents are used for a day or two at a time on spot checks in this connection each week. Consequently, it is urgently recommended that favorable consideration be given at the earliest possible moment to my request for the services of twenty-five additional Special Agents for assignment to security work in this office.

As pointed out in my letter dated March 3, 1948, the AEA and Loyalty program work in this office has continued to increase. I have cut the personnel of other squads to an absolute minimum in order to meet Bureau deadlines. I do not feel that I can safely cut any additional men from these other squads on a permanent basis and yet continue to operate the office efficiently and to meet Bureau deadlines. Due to the emergency

Director, FBI
Re: RUSSIAN MATTERS
SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

March 6, 1948

conditions which have arisen, I have necessarily taken ten men from these other squads on a temporary basis and have also drawn this number of men from the regular work on the Russian and Communist Squads to handle the increased surveillance coverage. It is my hope that the Bureau will be able to furnish the additional personnel in the near future in order that the work on these squads will not suffer for any extended period of time.

*3/18/48
This has
been handled
we have
adequate
coverage
2-7-48*

The Bureau's attention is called to my teletype dated March 5, 1948, indicating that Radio Station TEU, which was in operation in the Russian Consulate during the last war, has never been removed. There has been no indication that the station has been in operation since the war. However, reactivation of this station is possible in the event of emergency. I suggested the Bureau consider the setting up of a remote control aperiodic receiver to be monitored from the San Francisco Office, similar to the set-up utilized by this office in monitoring Station TEU during the last war. It is my recommendation that this action be taken. In the event the Bureau is in agreement, two Kann aperiodic receivers and one good communications receiver, together with remote control equipment for the aperiodic equipment, would be needed here. Further, the services of three monitoring officers would be necessary to maintain twenty-four-hour coverage.

*Covered
Radio
more in SF
2-24-48*

By teletype dated March 6, 1948, I inquired of the Bureau concerning the status of the installation of the 250 watt FM radio transmitter to be installed in this office. The equipment has arrived and we are awaiting the Bureau technical experts to make the installation. With the increased physical surveillance coverage on Russian matters, the services of this radio station would be of material advantage. At present we are operating solely with a 60 watt portable transmitter and walkie talkies, together with our regular two-way FM transmitters in Bureau automobiles. The present arrangement does not give us central control from the office and is only of a temporary nature. It is urgently requested that the installation of this radio station be completed at the earliest possible moment in the immediate future.

*Minimum 12
- 2 -*

In connection with the increased physical surveillances, it should be pointed out that this office at the present time has but sixteen Bureau automobiles equipped with two-way FM radios. This number of two-way cars will be insufficient to handle the increased activity. Accordingly, I have directed a teletype to the Bureau today, requesting the transfer of fourteen Bureau automobiles equipped with two-way FM equipment to this office as soon as possible. I feel that a minimum of thirty two-way cars will be necessary.

With further reference to communications coverage of the Russian activities, I desire to respectfully call the attention of the Bureau to

Director, FBI

March 6, 1948

Re: RUSSIAN MATTERS

SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

14383

*3/10/48
Decoding, advise
only get samples (from Press Wireless)
in code
use of code
in working
with the code
see no
print in
covering office
wireless
a break the
code*

the facilities of the Western Union Telegraph Company, Press Wireless, Mackay Radio, as well as the Radio Corporation of America. It will be recalled that the communications to and from the Russian Consulate have been in code. During the war years this office was obtaining copies of such communications. However, by letter dated September 24, 1947, the Bureau directed the San Francisco Office to obtain copies of messages from Press Wireless and arrangements have been made to obtain these messages. This arrangement is still in effect and it is presumed that the Bureau is receiving copies of such messages from other companies through other sources or are otherwise not desired by the Bureau. However, it is to be stated that should the Bureau desire copies of such wires, efforts will be made to obtain them.

With reference to the Bureau's particular interest in shipping activities, it is to be pointed out that the Moore-McCormack Lines have acted as agents on the West Coast for all Russian shipping and through [redacted] this office has been in a position to be completely advised concerning such activities. Further, we have a close liaison with the Office of Naval Intelligence as well as with the Customs Bureau and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

With further reference to the coverage of Russian activities, the Bureau's attention is also called to [redacted] who continues to be closely associated with officials of the Russian Consulate and who furnishes us with information concerning their activities several times each week.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [redacted] also continue to furnish us with valuable information concerning Russian activities.

You may be assured that this office will continue to be alert to any unusual Russian activities and the Bureau will be kept fully and promptly advised of all developments.

Very truly yours,

Harry M. Kimball
HARRY M. KIMBALL
SAC


HMK:mes
67-69

*Not mailed
at this time
3/17*

b2
b7D

b2
b7D

my




Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
Mr. Clegg ✓
Mr. Glavin ✓
Mr. Ladd ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tracy ✓
Mr. Egan ✓
Mr. Gurnea ✓
Mr. Harbo ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Pennington ✓
Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓
Mr. Nease ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

Referral/Consult

March 31, 1948

July

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR



Subsequently, the radio reported that all trains leaving Berlin for Frankfort had been stopped by the American authorities until the travel regulations are straightened out, however, [redacted]

[redacted]. The radio, of course, made no comment as to the orders that had been issued inasmuch as this is highly secret at the present time.

As previously advised, [redacted] stated that it should never be disclosed that he had furnished this information to the Bureau.

Respectfully,

Gab
D. M. Ladd

D. M. Ladd

SWR:esb

RECORDED

162-81484-35

FBI
31 APR 3 1948

54 APR 3 1948

THIS MEMORANDUM IS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES
TO BE DESTROYED AFTER ACTION IS TAKEN AND NOT SENT TO FILES

American War Effort

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 31, 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

Referral/Consult

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy

Mr. Belmont
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy

[redacted] and accordingly I called ASAC Belmont of New York at 1:00 PM and advised him of the above. I instructed that he alert the personnel on the techs in New York, that he review his coverage to be sure that he has ample coverage and that any information is immediately called to his attention and to the Bureau's attention.

I also called ASAC Hennrich in the absence of SAC Hottel, gave him the same information and instructed him to also include in this coverage the satellite countries.

A call is also being made to the San Francisco Office to likewise alert them with reference to the coverage of the Russian Consulate in that city.

It would appear from the above that there is some indication of a possible break in diplomatic relations with the Russians or possibly even something of a more serious nature.

DML:da

of course we will protect source but it is one hell of a situation where FBI charged with Int. Security has to be advised immediately

RECORDED

162-81484-36

FBI

31 APR 3 1948

FBI

54 APR 3 1948

American War Plans

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

March 19, 1948

DIRECTOR, FBI

CLANDESTINE RADIO TRANSMITTERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Attached hereto is a letter which you may desire to furnish the Secretary of State. This letter points out the seriousness of the present international situation. It suggests that the Secretary of State may wish to ask the Federal Communications Commission to completely monitor this country or monitor certain establishments in this country now occupied by nationals of the Soviet Union and its satellites in order to ascertain if any clandestine radio transmitters are in operation.

Attachment

JJM:jmm

E.I.R.-6

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 4 40 PM
DATE 3-22-48
BY [Signature]

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease

APR 28 1948

March 22, 1948

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Honorable George C. Marshall,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Inasmuch as relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are undoubtedly worse at this moment than they have ever been and as the international situation in general is apparently growing more tense daily, it would appear logical for us to expect the Soviets in this country to be particularly solicitous concerning the security of their communications to Moscow. In order to protect their communications they are possibly installing and testing clandestine radio transmitters in this country.

It is suggested that you request the Federal Communications Commission to monitor the establishments hereinafter listed in order to definitely determine if the Soviet Union or any of its satellite members have installed any clandestine radio transmitters in these establishments. It should also be noted that it is quite possible clandestine radio transmitters may be installed and operated from secret locations in this country or from secret locations in any of our territories outside the continental limits, and therefore you may desire to request the Federal Communications Commission to completely monitor the United States and its territories for clandestine radio transmitters where such activity will not conflict with any similar activity now being performed by the Armed Forces.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation would of course appreciate receiving any information you may decide to request of the Federal Communications Commission.

Following is a list of specific establishments which you may desire to have monitored by the Federal Communications Commission:

Bureau copy
JJM:mcm

ENCLOSURE

12-81424-37

SOVIET UNION

Washington, D. C.

Soviet Embassy,
1115-25 16th Street, N. W.

Office of the Soviet Naval and Military Attaches,
2552 Belmont Road, N. W.

~~/~~ Far Eastern Commission,
2016 Wyoming Avenue, N. W.

~~/~~ U. S. S. R. Information Bulletin,
2112 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.

Soviet Private School,
1304-06 21st Street, N. W.

~~/~~ Tass News Agency,
Room 969-970,
National Press Building.

New York City

Soviet Consulate,
7 East 61st Street.

~~/~~ Amtorg Trading Corporation,
210 Madison Avenue.

Soviet Private School,
6 East 87th Street.

Headquarters of Soviet Delegation to the United Nations,
680 Park Avenue.

~~/~~ Amtorg School,
32 East 35th Street.

~~/~~ Pratt Estate,
Glen Cove, Long Island.

Hotel Ramsby,
324 West 84th Street.

Tass News Agency,
Room 501,
50 Rockefeller Plaza

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____

San Francisco

~~Soviet Consulate,~~
2503 Divisadero Street.

~~Soviet Private School,~~
1914 Golden Gate Avenue.

BULGARIA

Washington, D. C.

~~Legation of the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria,~~
2041 McGill Terrace, N. W.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Washington, D. C.

~~Czechoslovakian Embassy,~~
2340 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.

HUNGARY

Washington, D. C.

~~Hungarian Legation,~~
2129 Leroy Place, N. W.

Washington, D. C.

~~Polish Embassy,~~
2040 16th Street, N. W.

New York City

Consulate General,
149 East 67th Street.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan

~~Polish American Supply Corp.,~~
39 Broadway.

~~Polish Research and Information Service,~~
230 West 37th Street.

~~Polish Delegation to the United Nations,~~
151 East 37th Street.

RUMANIA

Washington, D. C.

Rumanian Legation,
1601 23rd Street, N. W.

YUGOSLAVIA

Washington, D. C.

Yugoslavian Embassy,
1520 16th Street, N. W.

Commercial Attache's Office,
1616 24th Street, N. W.

New York City

Yugoslavian Consulate,
745 5th Avenue.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Tom G. Clark

Attorney General.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____

MAR 25 1948

(By Messenger)

Page one rewritten.

by the Department

*I think deletion
was wise.*

H, 58m

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Glavin.....
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Rosen.....
Mr. Tracy.....
Mr. Egan.....
Mr. Gurnea.....
Mr. Harbo.....
Mr. Mohr.....
Mr. Pennington.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
Mr. Nease.....
Miss Gandy.....

B. J. C. P. L.

ENCLOSURE

62-81484-37



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

March 22, 1948

Honorable George C. Marshall,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Inasmuch as relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are undoubtedly worse at this moment than they have ever been and as the international situation in general is apparently growing more tense daily, it would appear logical for us to expect the Soviets in this country to be particularly solicitous concerning the security of their communications to Moscow. ~~With this thought in mind we may assume that the Soviets and their satellite members are looking ahead to the possible eventuality of open conflict with this country.~~ In order to protect their communications they are possibly installing and testing clandestine radio transmitters in this country.

It is suggested that you request the Federal Communications Commission to monitor the establishments hereinafter listed in order to definitely determine if the Soviet Union or any of its satellite members have installed any clandestine radio transmitters in these establishments. It should also be noted that it is quite possible clandestine radio transmitters may be installed and operated from secret locations in this country or from secret locations in any of our territories outside the continental limits, and therefore you may desire to request the Federal Communications Commission to completely monitor the United States and its territories for clandestine radio transmitters where such activity will not conflict with any similar activity now being performed by the Armed Forces.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation would of course appreciate receiving any information you may decide to request of the Federal Communications Commission.

Following is a list of specific establishments which you may desire to have monitored by the Federal Communications Commission:

ENCLOSURE

62-81484-37

Handwritten signatures and initials:
M. J. [unclear]
50m

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ladd

DATE: March 13, 1948

FROM : J. P. Coyne

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Since the international situation is apparently growing more tense daily and inasmuch as relations between the U. S. and the USSR are undoubtedly worse at this moment than they have ever been, it is only natural for us to expect the Soviets in this country to be particularly solicitous these days about the security of their communications to Moscow. They rightfully should expect the U. S. Government to bear down and more closely scrutinize and surveill their various avenues of communication and at the same time, looking ahead to the possible eventuality of open conflict between the U. S. and the USSR, they would of course be interested in increasing their clandestine systems of communication.

Radio communication is one field of obvious and special import. It is my suggestion with respect to this field that we immediately request the Federal Communications Commission to monitor the following facilities for the purpose of ascertaining whether there may be in operation at any of those facilities clandestine radio communications between them and the Soviet or satellite states:

1. The Russian Embassy, Washington, D. C.
2. The Soviet Consulate, New York City (In a separate communication we are recommending that our own Laboratory men monitor the Soviet Consulate at San Francisco since we have had a concrete showing of possible active communication.)
3. The Soviet Private School, New York City.
4. The Green Cove Estate, Long Island, New York.
5. The headquarters of the Soviet Information Bulletin, Washington, D. C.
6. The headquarters of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, New York City.
7. Amtorg, New York City.

JPC:EW

Secy of State
3-22-48
JPM

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

162-81484-37
137 15 APR 5 1948

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588m

Memorandum to Mr. Ladd

8. Similar installations of the satellite nations such as Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Roumania.



No effort has been made to dig out the exact addresses of the various entities mentioned hereinbefore and a letter has not been prepared for FCC pending a determination by interested Bureau officials as to whether they agree in the action. It is my recommendation that this matter be referred to the Executive Conference, subsequent to which time we will prepare a suggested letter to FCC provided the Executive Conference approves the recommendation that we refer the matter of monitoring the above installations to FCC.


Addendum

The above matter was discussed at the Executive Conference on March 15, 1948, at which time Messrs. Tamm and Mohr recommended that the Bureau request the State Department to ask FCC to monitor possible radio transmissions from the various Russian installations in this country, and that the State Department be requested to ask FCC to furnish both the State Department and the FBI with any information they developed.

Messrs. Harbo, Rosen, Nease, Quinn Tamm, Norman McCabe and Ladd recommended that the Bureau direct a specific request to FCC asking them to monitor and furnish the results thereof to the Bureau. Inasmuch as this coverage would be of primary interest to the FBI, it was felt the Bureau should take the initiative and should make the results thereof known to the State Department, White House or any other interested agency.

DML:cmwv

 
I think we should make
the suggestion to the
Dept of State by letter
for a. h.'s signature

3/16


The Attorney General

April 7, 1948

Director, FBI

GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM IN THE EVENT
OF SUDDEN DIFFICULTY WITH THE
SOVIET UNION

RECORDED
70-1111-38

Reference is made to my memorandum of March 25, 1948, regarding six programs enforced during World War II which might of necessity be reinstituted in the event of sudden difficulty with the Soviet Union.

Regarding this memorandum you noted "We should develop programs on each. If you will get up proper papers I will have them approved by proper parties."

It is my suggestion that you might desire to have your attorneys in the Department examine the legislation and the executive orders on which the World War II programs were predicated with a view toward preparing the appropriate legislation and executive orders to be used in the event of a new emergency.

With regard to the freezing of certain foreign funds, the Department's attorneys might wish to confer with the appropriate representatives in the Treasury Department. With regard to the establishment of a visa and exit control program, the Department's attorneys might wish to confer with the appropriate representatives of the Department of State and of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The same might be true in connection with any program restricting travel of certain types of aliens within the United States and regarding the registration of alien enemies.

LW:TD

R
50 APR 13 1948

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

The Attorney General

March 25, 1948

Director, FBI

14384

GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM IN THE EVENT OF
SUDDEN DIFFICULTY WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Reference is made to my memorandum of March 10, 1948, on the subject "Detention of Communists in the Event of Sudden Difficulty with the Soviet Union". Because of the effect which certain necessary programs might have upon the investigative responsibility and activity of this Bureau, I would appreciate any comments which you might wish to furnish at this time concerning any of the following programs which you undoubtedly have under consideration:

1. Reestablishment in the event of war of censorship of international communications.
2. The freezing of certain foreign funds.
3. The establishment of a visa and exit control program.
4. The listing of certain items as contraband.
5. The restriction of travel by certain types of aliens within the United States.
6. The registration of alien enemies.

ENCLOSURE

62-71484-38

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


3/31/48

SAC, Anchorage

CONFERENCES WITH MILITARY AUTHORITIES

Referral/Consult

On 3/30/48, ASAC GEORGE FLETCHER and myself conferred with




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62-81454-39
F B I

55 APR 17 1948

100-461523

AN File 66-82



For your information, there is currently visiting in Alaska, a group of newspaper correspondents, approximately 20 in number, who are the guests of the Army and Navy and will make a tour of the Alaskan bases, including the Aleutian Islands. Unquestionably, a great number of articles will appear in papers throughout the United States upon the completion of this trip.

It is planned to hold a weekly conference on 4/13/48 at Kodiak, where Captain GAZZE will be the host.

GWS:LMR
66-82

The Attorney General

April 21, 1948

Director, FBI

14385

~~CUSTOMS SEARCHES~~

It is believed logical to assume that the Soviet and satellite governments will make every effort to organize clandestine espionage and sabotage underground networks in the United States in anticipation of a break in relations between this country and Russia. It is also believed that attempts may be made to send into the United States sabotage materials and also by courier to send instructions to the clandestine underground groups.

It is therefore suggested that you may desire to suggest to the Bureau of Customs that every effort be made to tighten up on searches of individuals entering into the United States and vessels arriving at United States ports in order to eliminate in so far as possible the bringing into this country of material which may be used against the internal security.

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 4:45 PM
DATE 4-27-48
BY 120

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

APR 22 4 45 PM '48

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U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

162-81484-48
FBI
31 APR 28 1948

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F B I
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U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

ETT:ESB

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

MAY 1 1948

0 American War Plans

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : The Executive Conference

SUBJECT: *Amendments to the*

DATE: March 27, 1948

At a meeting of the Executive Conference on March 27, 1948, attended by Messrs. Tolson, Tamm, Clegg, Tracy, Harbo, Nichols, Rosen, Glavin and Ladd, the various suggestions which were contained in the Memorandum of March 15, 1948, for your use in the event of a conference with Secretary Forrestal were discussed.

It was suggested that a memorandum be prepared for the Attorney General outlining to him the following problems:

1. It is recognized that the suspension by the President of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is the most effective means whereby the detention of individuals dangerous to the security of the United States can be assured. An appropriate proclamation should be ready for release in an emergency.
2. There must be definite responsibility placed in the attorney General for designating dangerous persons for detention.
3. There must be a clear-cut ruling by the Attorney General regarding the various categories of dangerousness. In this regard, he might wish to confer with the Secretary of Defense.
4. There must be a clear-cut procedure definitely placing responsibility and authority for the arrest, temporary detention, transportation and ultimate detention of persons dangerous to the national security in the United States, its territories and possessions.
5. The mechanics and operational details of any administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings for continued detention or parole of dangerous persons must be formulated.
6. The Armed Services should make immediate recommendations to the Attorney General for the arrest and detention of such of their civilian employees as may be classified as dangerous in the event of war, together with such factual information as necessary for the Attorney General to make intelligent designation.
7. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State should immediately inform the Attorney General of the manner in which it is desired by them that diplomatic and other official representatives

DML:da

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76 MAY 1 1948

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Memorandum for the Director

of hostile nations should be handled. This should include not only recommendations as to the official diplomatic establishments with headquarters in Washington, D. C., but also the diplomatic representatives attached to the United Nations and such other official representatives as may be residing in the United States or in transit through the United States at the time of the emergency.

OK. The conference unanimously approved the preparation of a memorandum H. to the Attorney General outlining the above problems.

The Executive Conference considered the recommendation "That some system be set up whereby this Bureau has some voice as to who is to be allowed to enter this country as well as persons leaving this country. Our authority in this connection should be more commensurate with our responsibilities. At the very least the Bureau files, as well as those of other intelligence agencies, should be checked against the names of all persons who apply for visas to enter this country prior to the issuance of such visas".

The Executive Conference was unanimously opposed to this recommendation feeling that it was not the Bureau's problem to recommend to the State Department that they would have to search the names of visa applicants through the Bureau's files, that this was basically a State Department problem and should be left entirely to them.

It was also suggested to the conference that "We should recommend to the State Department that restrictions be placed upon the travel of Soviet and satellite officials in this country, and in specific instances where information has been obtained that an official is engaged in intelligence activities, we should recommend that he be recalled by his government. In addition, we should recommend to the Immigration and Naturalization Service that persons who represent a threat to the internal security should be deported".

I think we at least should call to A. G.'s attention this situation of allowing visas without even a check against our files as is Joliet - Currie Case.

H.

← Memo to A.G. 2-8-48 requesting advice as to result of Conference between Dept. of State and Justice. A.G. wrote letter to Sec. State 1/29/48 suggesting conf. after Bur. had specifically called his attention to this problem and expressed the belief that some system should be set up to check intelligence agency files prior to issuance of visas.

see 105-9746 EAT.

I share this view but it
should be by memo to A.G.

H.

Messrs. Glavin and Tracy were of the opinion that the Bureau should take some positive action with reference to the above recommendation and should make such positive recommendations to the State Department and to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Messrs. Tolson, Tamm, Glegg, Harbo, Nichols, Rosen and Ladd were of the opinion that the Bureau's policy of furnishing the information to the State Department and INS without making any recommendations should be followed. These members felt that the Bureau was discharging its responsibilities properly when it did this.

The Executive Conference considered the recommendation that the Bureau "Recommend to the State Department that all Soviet officials attached to Amtorg Trading Corporation should be recalled and in the future the Soviets should not be allowed to have official representatives attached to this organization. It is incorporated in the United States and it provides an excellent cover for espionage activity. The trade negotiations between this country and Russia should be handled by a Commercial Attache attached to the Embassy".

It was the unanimous opinion of the Executive Conference that the Bureau should make no such recommendation. The conference was advised that information concerning Amtorg, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, has in the past been furnished to the Attorney General and that a lot of this information has been furnished to the State Department, but it was not felt that the Bureau should make any positive recommendation but should merely submit the information to these agencies for their information and whatever action they desired to take.

→ I do not agree. A memo should be sent A. G. H.

The Executive Conference considered the recommendation that "This Bureau should be definitely consulted prior to invitations being extended to groups of "visiting firemen" by the Army, Navy, or any other Government agency to come to this country for the purpose of visiting strategic installations. For example, the group previously cited which visited the major cities in 1946."

The Executive Conference was opposed to this recommendation. It was pointed out to the conference that the dangerousness of such visits has previously been called to the Attorney General and in some individual instances to the attention of the State Department; that it has been recommended in the past to the Attorney General that he discuss this matter with the State Department. It is not believed that the Bureau should take any further action inasmuch as this is not basically the Bureau's responsibility.

→ I do not agree. Send another memo to A.G. H.

The Executive Conference considered the recommendation that "Some coordinated program should be worked out for the utilization of defectees and to encourage defections of persons attached to the Soviet and satellite governments".

It was pointed out to the conference that this had previously been discussed at the conference and the conference and the Director had pointed out that the plan had some merit but that the policy of the intelligence agencies would bring about endless discussion, arguments and leaks to the detriment of the FBI.

→ I agree. H.

OK.
H.

The Conference was unanimously opposed to any general plan, but recommended that the handling of any defected persons be taken up on an individual basis.

The Executive Conference considered the suggestion that "Arrangements should be perfected whereby the Armed Services advise us as to what plants and installations are engaged in work on classified contracts and/or what installations are considered vital and strategic. The most important and irreplaceable installations should be listed first so that effective coverage may be given by the FBI to individuals identified therewith who might meet the Attorney General's dangerousness classification".

The Executive Conference pointed out that this in effect amounted to the development of plant informants in a large number of plants throughout the country. It was further pointed out that such informants were developed during the last war and that a great deal of time and effort was expended on it but that the informants produced little or nothing of any value.

I think we should request such a list & then evaluate it as to need for informant coverage. H.

The conference was unanimously opposed to this recommendation.

The Executive Conference considered the suggestion that "The Bureau of Customs should be requested by the FBI and other intelligence agencies to tighten up on searches of individuals coming into the United States in order to obviate if possible the bringing in of sabotage materials".

It was pointed out to the Executive Conference that on April 1, 1946, we called the Attorney General's attention to the inadequate coverage by Customs and INS, and that thereafter a conference was held by those agencies for the purpose of working out a more effective coverage and this was put into effect, however, due to a shortage of personnel, it was not possible for those agencies to increase their coverage as effectively as was desired.

The Executive Conference was unanimously opposed to making any further suggestion feeling that the Bureau could not recommend that INS and Customs should get additional personnel.

I do not agree. Send another memo to A. G. H.

The Executive Conference considered the suggestion that "We should be permitted to seek to determine who is engaged in espionage rather than wait until we receive allegations. For example, men should be exclusively assigned to attempt to develop double agents or informants within the Soviet establishments in this country since it is believed that our only chance of determining how widespread the Soviet Intelligence is will be through the use of double agents who are attached to that service."

The Executive Conference was unanimously opposed to the assignment of a squad of Agents exclusively to such a program, it being felt that there would be too much danger of an international incident in the event an Agent so assigned made an improper approach to any member of the diplomatic staff and that the risks involved in such an attempt would be too great.

I generally agree but Security Div. should be alert to develop such when occasion arises. H.

In the event you approve of the recommendations of the Executive Conference, an appropriate memorandum will be prepared for the Attorney General outlining those matters recommended and approved herein.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

E. A. Tamm

DML:da

The Attorney General

April 30, 1948

Director, FBI

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

CUSTOMS SEARCHES

RECORDED
126

65-81484-42

Reference is made to your memorandum of April 23, 1948, requesting that I draft an appropriate letter for your signature along the lines suggested in my memorandum of April 21, 1948, to the effect that the Bureau of Customs should make every effort to tighten up on searches of individuals entering into the United States and vessels arriving at United States ports, in order to eliminate in so far as possible the bringing into this country material which may be used against the internal security.

You will appreciate that very little good could come of a request which was only generally phrased to the Bureau of Customs. We should try to be specific in our suggestion regarding searches. You will recall that in my memorandum of January 27, 1948, regarding detention of Communists in the event of sudden difficulty with the Soviet Union, it was pointed out on Page 7 that consideration must be given to the apprehension of those persons in the possession of contraband and that contraband should be clearly defined.

It is my thought that those items which you and your assistants may have decided to include as contraband in any program for the detention of Communists in the event of sudden difficulty with the Soviet Union, might well be materials which should now be brought to the attention of the Bureau of Customs in connection with any tightening up of searches which we may suggest. Accordingly, I would appreciate an expression from you regarding this matter of contraband so that the letter which you request can be prepared appropriately.

LW:IGS

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 12:16 PM
DATE 5-4-48
BY [Signature]

59 MAY 12 1948

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

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MAY 3 11 48 AM '48
DIRECTOR

Director's Notation:

"A very good example of why subversive coverage should never have been divided.
H."

THIS OFFICE HAS FURNISHED [REDACTED]
ALL KNOWN PERTINENT DETAILS RELATIVE TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS
WITHIN THIS DIVISION. BUREAU REQUESTED IF DEEMED ADVISABLE TO
FURNISH ANY INFORMATION REGARDING SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS IN OLD MEXICO
TO THIS OFFICE FOR TRANSMITTAL TO [REDACTED]. THIS INFORMATION

Director's Notation:

"No this is CIA function.
H."

RECORDED - 831 62 - 81484-43
FBI
41 MAY 28 1948

INTERNAL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

26 MAY 31 1948

COPY: A-2

Director's Notation:

"Another instance of Army here
not alerting us.
H."

F.B.I. TELETYPE

DECODED COPY

FBI EL PASO 3-16-48 3:02 PM MST FCC

DIRECTOR, FBI U R G E N T

ATTENTION MR. D. M. LADD

DETENTION OF COMMUNISTS IN THE EVENT OF SUDDEN DIFFICULTY WITH
THE SOVIET UNION, INTERNAL SECURITY - C.

Referral/Consult

F.B.I. TELETYPE

DECODED COPY

PAGE 2 CONTINUED

WAS FURNISHED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE TO AGENT CLARIDGE. SUTEL.

SURAN

RECEIVED: 3-16-48 5:26 PM MW

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: April 22, 1948

FROM : H. B. FLETCHER

SUBJECT: ARMY MANEUVERS
RICHLAND, WASHINGTON
ATOMIC ENERGY INSTALLATION

Referral/Consult

SAC Wilcox, Seattle, called at 2:00 P.M. and stated that he had
been contacted this morning by


RECORDED - 41

HBF:mk

11 MAY 20 1948

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

MEMORANDUM TO MR. LADD

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SAC Wilcox be instructed not to participate in these maneuvers in any manner. He should inform Major Gustorf that G-2 had been fully informed as to all subversive organizations and individuals in the Richland area. Having in mind the needs of the Bureau to maintain its coverage not only during the maneuvers but afterwards, the Bureau will not consent to any waiver of the provisions of the Delimitation Agreement.

Addendum:

SAC Wilcox was advised at 5:10 p.m. today that Agents are not to participate in these maneuvers in any manner. He was further informed that the Bureau will not consent to the waiver of the provisions of the Delimitations Agreement for the purpose of this maneuver. I further advised him that G-2 Headquarters in Washington, D. C., had expressed the opinion that this was in fact ridiculous and they were communicating with Army authorities on the West Coast.

HBF:cmv

Director's Notation:

"I most heartily agree.
See that G-2 puts a stop
to this atrocious plan.
H."

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

940 First National Building
Oklahoma City 2, Oklahoma
May 4, 1948

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI

Dear Sir:

0 American War Plans

RE: ~~X~~ CONVERSION OF AIRPLANES

Referral/Consult

Remylet dated August 13, 1947, captioned as above.

| | |
|----------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson | ✓ |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm | ✓ |
| Mr. Clegg | ✓ |
| Mr. Glavin | ✓ |
| Mr. Ladd | ✓ |
| Mr. Nichols | ✓ |
| Mr. Rosen | ✓ |
| Mr. Tracy | ✓ |
| Mr. Egan | ✓ |
| Mr. Harbo | ✓ |
| Mr. Mohr | ✓ |
| Mr. Pennington | ✓ |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | ✓ |
| Mr. Nease | ✓ |
| Miss Gandy | ✓ |

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52 JUN 11 1948
Lead
See 11-948

RECORDED - 41 62-81484-45
INDEXED - 41 22 JUN 2 1948

Referral/Consult

Letter to the Director - May 4, 1948



Very truly yours,

DRS:GAC
67-

D. A. Bryce
D. A. BRYCE
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Room 5744

5720

1948

TO: ☒ Director
☐ Mr. Edward Tamm
☐ Mr. Clegg
☐ Mr. Glavin
☐ Mr. Ladd
☐ Mr. Nichols
☐ Mr. Rosen
☐ Mr. Tracy
☐ Mr. Harbo
☐ Mr. Jones
☐ Mr. Mohr
☐ Mr. Nease
☐ Miss Gandy
☐ Personnel Files Section
☐ Records Section
☐ Mrs. Skillman

Mr. Tolson.....
 Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
 Mr. Clegg.....
 Mr. Glavin.....
 Mr. Ladd.....
 Mr. Nichols.....

See Me For Appropriate Action

Send File Note and Return

Mr. Rosen.....
 Mr. Egan.....
 Mr. Harbo.....
 Mr. Mohr.....

Mr. Pennington.....
 Mr. Quinn Tamm.....

Mr. Nease.....
 Miss Gandy.....

Clyde Tolson

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: May 19, 1948

FROM : V. P. KEAY

Referral/Consult

SUBJECT: ~~DETENTION OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES~~*American War Plane*

The Special Agent in Charge at Oklahoma City has advised the Director by letter dated May 4, 1948, entitled "Conversion of Airplanes" that it had been ascertained that plans have been formulated for the detention of employees at the Oklahoma City Air Depot who are considered to be Communist Party members or sympathizers.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

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162-81484-46
22 JUN 2 1948

INDEXED - 41

52 JUN 11 1948

RECEIVED

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: August 18, 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson ☒
 Mr. E. A. Tamm ☒
 Mr. Clegg ☒
 Mr. Glavin ☒
 Mr. Ladd ☒
 Mr. Nichols ☒
 Mr. Rosen ☒
 Mr. Tracy ☒
 Mr. Carson ☒
 Mr. Egan ☒
 Mr. Gurnea ☒
 Mr. Harbo ☒
 Mr. Hendon ☒
 Mr. Pennington ☒
 Mr. Quinn Tamm ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Mr. Nease ☒
 Miss Holmes ☒
 Miss Gandy ☒

General Chamberlin called me on the afternoon of August 17 with reference to the War Department's proposal that they establish liaison with the Police Departments at the strategic areas for the purpose of being advised of the landing of commando troops, etc. He stated that he wanted to find out whether he was correct in believing that the FBI had agreed to have Agents at the location of such strategic points in order that they might make the necessary contact with the police departments. I advised him that this was correct.

He stated that Secretary of the Army Royall had indicated that he had talked to the Attorney General about this matter and appeared not to be in favor of the War Department's proposal.

General Chamberlin stated that he was going to endeavor to change the Secretary's decision with reference to this matter.

I advised him, of course, that this was his prerogative.

DML:dad

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8/17/48
 12-81484-68
 34 AUG 20 1948

71 SEP 9-1948

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : H. B. FLETCHER

DATE: September 27, 1948

Referral/Consult

SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY
September 27, 1948ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISEMr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. MohrMr. Tamm
Mr. Tamm

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52 OCT 14 1948

~~SECRET~~American War Plans

0

8

Referral/Consult

Memo for Mr. Ladd

~~SECRET~~



HBF:LW:cmv

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR

DATE: 9/17/48

FROM : CLYDE TOLSON

SUBJECT:

Referral/Consult

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | _____ |
| Mr. Clegg | _____ |
| Mr. Glavin | _____ |
| Mr. Ladd | _____ |
| Mr. Nichols | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen | _____ |
| Mr. Tracy | _____ |
| Mr. Egan | _____ |
| Mr. Gurnea | _____ |
| Mr. Harbo | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr | _____ |
| Mr. Pennington | _____ |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Mr. Nease | _____ |

Attached is a copy of a confidential memorandum

COPIES DESTROYED:

211 NOV 17 1964

50 OCT 18 1948 9

33 OCT 6 1948

INDEXED 62-81484-73
 FEB 1
 33 OCT 6 1948
 B

American War Plans

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR

DATE: 9/17/48

FROM : CLYDE TOLSON

Referral/Consult

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson ✓
 Mr. E. A. Tamm
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Glavin ✓
 Mr. Ladd ✓
 Mr. Nichols ✓
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Carson
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Gurnea
 Mr. Harbo
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Pennington
 Mr. Quinn Tamm
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Nease
 Miss Holmes
 Miss Gandy

G. I. R. 3

Handwritten notes:
 w/ [unclear]
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CT:DSS

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62-81484-74
 33 OCT 16 1948

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50 OCT 18 1948 9

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F.B.I. TELETYPE

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | _____ |
| Mr. Clegg | _____ |
| Mr. Glavin | _____ |
| Mr. Ladd | _____ |
| Mr. Nichols | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen | _____ |
| Mr. Tracy | _____ |
| Mr. Egan | _____ |
| Mr. Gurnea | _____ |
| Mr. Harbo | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr | _____ |
| Mr. Pennington | _____ |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Mr. Nease | _____ |
| Miss Holmes | _____ |
| Miss Gandy | _____ |

DECODED COPY

FBI MOBILE 9-23-48 3:38 PM MD

DIRECTOR URGENT

ATTN INSPECTOR HOWARD FLETCHER

AMERICAN WAR PLANS

CONFERENCE, AIR UNIVERSITY, MAXWELL FIELD, ALABAMA, ~~TOP SECRET~~.
RE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION MOBILE WITH INSPECTOR FLETCHER 22 AND
23 INSTANT. MAJOR P.F. O'DONNELL, OSI, MAXWELL FIELD, ON IN-
STRUCTIONS MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT W. HARPER, COMMANDANT, AIR
UNIVERSITY, REQUESTED QUALIFIED BUREAU PERSONNEL AS MATTER OF
COOPERATION COMPLETELY EXAMINE CONFERENCE ROOM THAT PLACE, SIZE
50 BY 80 FEET, PRIOR TO OCTOBER 7 NEXT FOR PURPOSE OF INSURING
THAT NO PLANTS OR TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES ARE BEING EMPLOYED ON
CONFERENCE ROOM, STATING THAT DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION OR
PROCEEDINGS DURING CONTEMPLATED CONFERENCE WOULD BE SERIOUS
BREAK IN NATIONAL SECURITY. SPECIFIC DATE OF CONFERENCE NOT
STATED BUT TO BE COMPOSED OF 82 HIGHEST RANKING OFFICERS IN
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE FROM VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD FOR
PURPOSE OF FORMULATING AND DISCUSSING WAR PLANS. FACT THAT SUCH
CONFERENCE IS TO BE HELD IS ALSO CONSIDERED ~~TOP SECRET~~. GENERAL
HARPER DESIRED FBI ASSISTANCE IN INSURING SECURITY OF ROOM
BECAUSE DID NOT WISH TO MAKE KNOWN EXISTENCE OF CONTEMPLATED
CONFERENCE TO ANYONE AT MAXWELL FIELD OTHER THAN FEW HIGHEST
RANKING STAFF OFFICERS. IN CONFORMITY WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS,
RESIDENT AGENT AT MONTGOMERY ADVISING MAXWELL AUTHORITIES
PERSONALLY TODAY BUREAU UNABLE TO CONFORM WITH REQUEST. FOR
BUREAU INFORMATION NEWS ARTICLE ALABAMA JOURNAL, MONTGOMERY,
21 INSTANT, ADVISES OF TRANSFER OF GENERAL GEORGE C. KENNEY TO
AIR UNIVERSITY, MAXWELL FIELD, REPLACING MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT
W. HARPER, PRESENT COMMANDANT.

RECEIVED: 9-23-48 6:46 PM

RECORDED - 40 GOOD
MW162-81484-75
F B I

59 OCT 5 1948

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

58 OCT 1

9

ORIGINAL FILE IN 62-88465-2

Moc

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD *DL*

DATE: September 24, 1948

FROM : V. P. KEAY *VPK*Referral/Consult *76*SUBJECT:

| | |
|----------------|--|
| Mr. Tolson | |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm | |
| Mr. Clegg | |
| Mr. Glavin | |
| Mr. Ladd | |
| Mr. Nichols | |
| Mr. Rosen | |
| Mr. Tracy | |
| Mr. Carson | |
| Mr. Egan | |
| Mr. Gurnea | |
| Mr. Harbo | |
| Mr. Hendon | |
| Mr. Pennington | |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | |
| Tele. Room | |
| Mr. Nease | |
| Miss Gandy | |

Pursuant to your direction, Mr. Reynolds advised In accordance with your instructions,

SWR:tlc

RECORDED - 61

162-714-84-77
34 OCT 8 1948

INDEXED

959 OCT 15 1948

Mr. Reynolds also advised Gen Bolling condition that Dir's condition would not be met at this time

Freeberg

Fleg

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: September 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

Referral/Consult

Mr. Tolson ☒ 1948
 Mr. E. A. Tamm ☒
 Mr. Clegg ☒
 Mr. Glavin ☒
 Mr. Ladd ☒
 Mr. Nichols ☒
 Mr. Rosen ☒
 Mr. Tracy ☒
 Mr. Carson ☒
 Mr. Egan ☒
 Mr. Gurnea ☒
 Mr. Harbo ☒
 Mr. Hendon ☒
 Mr. Pennington ☒
 Mr. Quinn Tamm ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Mr. Nease ☒
 Miss Holmes ☒
 Miss Gandy ☒

I would suggest that liaison orally advise G-2 that by reason of your illness, you will not be available for such briefing during this week.

It is believed it would be helpful to the Bureau to know the area considered by the military forces as the most vulnerable.

If you approve, this will be handled orally by the liaison section.

DML:dad

RECORDED - 61

INDEXED - 61

162-81484-78
 FBI
 34 OCT 8 1948

6206P15-48
 memo 9-2-48

OK
 9/20

W. B. Baumgardner

October 27, 1948

RECORDED-2

62-81454-81


Mr. J. K. Mumford
Federal Bureau of Investigation
206 Dillingham Building
Honolulu 16, Hawaii

Dear Mr. Mumford:

I have received your letter of October 18, 1948, and want to thank you for advising me of the security matters you mentioned. The facts contained in your letter are being given careful consideration and I appreciate your writing me concerning the current situation in your territory.

Sincerely yours,

9 27 AM '48
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE



RECEIVED
MAIL ROOM
OCT 27 1948
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

69 DEC 21 1948

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
206 Dillingham Building
Honolulu, T. H.

October 18, 1948.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

J. Edgar Hoover, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D. C.

Referral/Consult

Dear Mr. Hoover:

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson..... | ✓ |
| Mr. Clegg..... | |
| Mr. Glavin..... | ✓ |
| Mr. Ladd..... | ✓ |
| Mr. Nichols..... | ✓ |
| Mr. Rosen..... | ✓ |
| Mr. Tracy..... | ✓ |
| Mr. Egan..... | |
| Mr. Gurnea..... | |
| Mr. Harbo..... | |
| Mr. Mohr..... | |
| Mr. Pennington..... | |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm..... | |
| Mr. Nease..... | |
| Miss Gandy..... | |

HBT
Hitcher
Road
Edwards
W. F. M.

I might note this is a fact and that except for members of
the military, no one in the Islands seems to have any feeling of
urgency about world conditions.

Cominial War Plans

RECORDED - 2/62-81484-81
INDEXED - 2 12 NOV 1948

FIVE
15
ONE

COPIES DESTROYED
211 NOV 17 1964


Mr. Hoover..

October 18, 1948.

The above matters are undoubtedly in line with information you have in Washington but I am sending them on as they are comparatively startling here from any source other than your own admonitions to "be ready." Actually, the press, radio, and the general public here are completely oblivious to any such feeling as reflected above. There is no feeling whatever of urgency or even concern.

This office, of course, is extending every effort to comply with your instructions but being extremely discreet because of the lackadaisical attitude of local press and officials, which would make any unusual activity on our part all the more noticeable.

Very truly yours,


J. K. MUMFORD,
Special Agent in Charge.

JKM:PB

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. V. P. KEAY *VPK*

DATE: November 12, 1948

FROM : MR. R. W. LAWRENCE *RWL*SUBJECT: *W* *W-1*

Referral/Direct

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | _____ |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm | _____ |
| Mr. Clegg | _____ |
| Mr. Glavin | _____ |
| Mr. Ladd | _____ |
| Mr. Nichols | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen | _____ |
| Mr. Tracy | _____ |
| Mr. Egan | _____ |
| Mr. Gurnea | _____ |
| Mr. Harbo | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr | _____ |
| Mr. Pennington | _____ |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | _____ |
| Room | _____ |
| Case | _____ |
| Sandy | _____ |

It appears that nothing contained therein is of particular interest to the Bureau and, therefore, no action should be taken in connection with the attached instructions.

Attachment

RWL:arm

G. I. R. - 7

RECORDED - 34
INDEXED - 34

162-81484-82 *mk*
FBI
6 NOV-16 1948

63 DEC 1-1948

EX-25

EX-25

ENCLOSURE

American War Office

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11-30-48

FROM SAC, ANCHORAGE

Referral/Consult

SUBJECT: CONFERENCES WITH MILITARY AUTHORITIES

AMERICAN WAR PLANS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Glavin ✓
Mr. Ladd ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tracy ✓
Mr. Egan ✓
Mr. Gurnea ✓
Mr. Harbo ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓

Mr. Pennington ✓
Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓
Mr. Nease ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

Mr. Fletcher ✓

Mr. Artlett ✓

Mr. Coffey ✓

Mr. Gads ✓

Mr. Hendon ✓

Mr. Jones ✓

Mr. Lester ✓

Mr. Quinn ✓

Mr. Nease ✓

Miss Gandy ✓

Mr. Fletcher ✓

Mr. Artlett ✓

Mr. Coffey ✓

Mr. Gads ✓

Mr. Hendon ✓

Mr. Jones ✓

Mr. Lester ✓

Mr. Quinn ✓

Mr. Nease ✓

Miss Gandy ✓

Mr. Fletcher ✓

Mr. Artlett ✓

Mr. Coffey ✓

Mr. Gads ✓

COPIES DESTROYED

211 NOV 17 1964

57 JAN 3 1949

RECORDED - 43

EX-117

162-81987-84

F B I

5 DEC 21 1948

Referral/Consult



Colonel IRVINE advised me that should there be any change in these plans, he will inform me.

CWS:MR
66-82

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TELETYPE

WASHINGTON 2 FROM PHILA

3-3-49

DIRECTOR

INTERNAL SECURITY DASH R. [REDACTED] FORMER SA, NOW OFFICIAL OF
RCA PLANT, CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY, TELEPHONED TO ADVISE THAT HE HAD RECEIVED
INDIRECTLY A RUMOR WHICH ORIGINATED TO HIS KNOWLEDGE WITH A MAN NAMED

[REDACTED] OF THE RELIANCE FOUNDRY COMPANY, CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY,
THAT THE ~~FRANKFORD~~ ARSENAL, PHILA, ^{CO} HAD BEEN PLACED ON QUOTE ~~M DAY~~ UN-
QUOTE ALERT. [REDACTED] WAS ALSO NOTIFYING NAVY INTELLIGENCE. INQUIRY
BY THIS OFFICE OF [REDACTED] FRANKFORD
ARSENAL, REVEALED THAT NO SUCH ALERT HAS BEEN PLACED. THE ARSENAL HAS
RECENTLY DISCUSSED PLANS FOR POTENTIAL M DAY AND HAD STARTED TO WRITE
UP SUCH PLANS. A REPRESENTATIVE OF RELIANCE FOUNDRY COMPANY VISITED
ARSENAL RECENTLY, AND WAS APPARENTLY TOLD INDISCREETLY OF THE PREPARA-
TIONS OF ~~M DAY~~ PLANS. ARSENAL MAKING ADDITIONAL INQUIRY AS TO EXACT
SOURCE OF RUMOR AND WILL ADVISE OF RESULTS. THIS FURNISHED TO BUREAU
FOR INFO PURPOSES.

BOARDMAN

HOLD
MAR 20

RECORDED - 130

EX-125

INDEXED - 130

13 MAR 8 1949

EX-31

| | |
|-------------|--|
| Mr. Tolson | |
| Mr. Clegg | |
| Mr. Glavin | |
| Mr. Ladd | |
| Mr. Nichols | |
| Mr. Rosen | |
| Mr. Tracy | |
| Mr. Egan | |
| Mr. Gurnea | |
| Mr. Harbo | |
| Mr. Hendon | |
| Mr. Jones | |
| Mr. Mumford | |
| Mr. Quinn | |
| Mr. Nease | |
| Mr. Tamm | |

Frankford
Look
1208 PM
Mr. Nease
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Jones
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Mr. Tamm

b6
b7c

Change in plans

NA now
await results
OK

5
10

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

F-19a

Supervisor Messing Room 1738

Subj: Rex Vincent

☐ Exact Spelling

☐ All References

☐ Subversive Ref

☐ Main File

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____

Searchers

Initial _____

Date _____

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

N.R.

jmey

Initialed

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ATOMIC ENERGY - LIAISON

Date 6/21, 1949

| | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <u>Director</u> | <u>Mr. Wall</u> |
| <u>Mr. Tolson</u> | <u>Mr. Baumgardner</u> |
| <u>Mr. Ladd</u> | <u>Mr. Whitson</u> |
| <u>Mr. H. B. Fletcher</u> | |
| <u>Mr. Laughlin</u> | |
| <u>Mr. Keay</u> | |
| <u>Mr. Weatherford</u> | |
| <u>Mr. _____</u> | <u>Miss Dean</u> |
| <u>Room _____</u> | <u>Mr. Frost</u> |
| <u>Mr. Amma</u> | <u>Miss Reddy</u> |
| <u>Mr. Bailey</u> | <u>Mrs. Schwab</u> |
| <u>Mr. Bates</u> | <u>Mr. Scott</u> |
| <u>Mr. Bock</u> | <u>Miss Waldrep</u> |
| <u>Mr. Brooking</u> | <u>Miss _____</u> |
| <u>Mr. Conroy</u> | <u>Room _____</u> |
| <u>Mr. DeLoach</u> | |
| <u>Mr. Dinsmore</u> | <u>Mr. Bromwell</u> |
| <u>Mr. Dissly</u> | <u>Identification Division</u> |
| <u>Mr. Ferris</u> | <u>Miss Harrington, Room 7229</u> |
| <u>Mr. Fipp</u> | <u>Mail Room, Room 5533</u> |
| <u>Mr. Foley</u> | <u>Reading Room, Room 5531</u> |
| <u>Mr. Hartley</u> | <u>Statistical Section</u> |
| <u>Mr. Lawrence</u> | |
| <u>Mr. Linberg</u> | <u>Records Section</u> |
| <u>Mr. Malone</u> | <u>Reviewers</u> |
| <u>Mr. Reger</u> | <u>Routing Unit</u> |
| <u>Mr. Reynolds</u> | <u>Send file, up to date</u> |
| <u>Mr. Roach</u> | <u>Send reference</u> |
| <u>Mr. Sanders</u> | |
| <u>Mr. VanNoy</u> | |
| <u>Mr. Wood</u> | <u>See Me</u> |
| | <u>Phone Me</u> |
| | <u>Please Handle</u> |

FBI.

We gave same info. to
AF 3 1/2 hrs ago. No
action necessary.

E. S. SANDERS

Director, FBI

May 17, 1949


SAC, Atlanta

14388

LIAISON RELATIONS, G-2, THIRD ARMY.

Referral/Consult

For the information of the Bureau and interested offices,



JTS:CM
66-707

cc: Birmingham
Charlotte
Knoxville
Atlanta
Miami
Mobile
Savannah

68 JUL 14 1949

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

162-81484-
NOT RECORDED
84 JUL 14 1949


ORIGINAL C

177-2148

0 American War Prison

AT 66-707

Referral/Consult



For the information of the Bureau and other offices this planning group will run a test run on a proposed plan on July 6 and 7, and the last week in July.

The Atlanta office has again been invited to be present as observer during the running of this plan.

12-81-434
7-14-49

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

RECORDED
INDEXED
gm
Date: August 19, 1949

To: Atomic Energy Commission
Building T-3
16th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Francis B. Hammack
Acting Director, Security Division

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI

Subject: * ATOMIC BOMBS ON MALTA

Information was received from another governmental agency handling intelligence matters as follows:

"On approximately 22 June 1949, during the course of a conversation between two civilians at the Continental Bus Station, 300 Travis Street, Houston, Texas, it was alleged by one of the civilians that he had received a letter from a relation who is in the service of the U. S. Army at Malta. The letter stated that advanced atomic bombs are being stored on the island of Malta by United States forces in readiness for a war with Russia.

"The informant could not ascertain the identity of the persons participating in the conversation, and further investigation in the vicinity of Houston, Texas, failed to reveal any other information."

No investigation is being conducted by this Bureau.

The above information is furnished for your ~~confidential~~ use and should not be distributed outside of your agency.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____



58 SEP 6 1949

Wof
LW
D

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: October 18, 1949

FROM : SAC, New York

14389

SUBJECT:

AMERICAN WAR PLANS

INFORMATION CONCERNING

Referral/Consult

Fletcher
Reynolds
Fletcher

The above is being brought to the attention of the Bureau for information purposes in view of the contemplated radar screen. No further action is being taken here in this matter.

CAD:MEW

RECORDED - 69

INDEXED - 69

EX-17

162-812843-92

19 OCT 26 1949

FIVE

Wassburg

4
20 NOV 1 1949

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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FOI/PA# 1511351-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 50

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Page 148 ~ Referral/Direct;
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Page 175 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 177 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 178 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 179 ~ Referral/Consult;
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JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-09-2010



Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

January 5, 1950

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. LADD


Referral/Consult



Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director


JEH:mpd



ED-6

100-1587-94

YELLOW



74 JAN 8 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 2-14-50

FROM : ASAC, Little Rock

SUBJECT: RICHARD KNAUST
Information Concerning*Am. Legion W. 1st Div.*Press-Release

Transmitted herewith is a ~~letter~~ captioned "WANTS TRUMAN MOVED TO ARIZONA", which was forwarded to this office by Mr. BERT PRESSON, Editor, "The Arkansas Legionnaire", an American Legion magazine, at Little Rock, Ark *ab*

While it is felt that the Bureau probably has received a copy of this letter, it is being forwarded for appropriate attention.

EJF:HHP
Enclosure

RECORDED - 20

INDEXED - 20

162-41484-97

FEB 14 1950

12

EX-103

*M. J.**m. nichols*

MAR 1 1950

EX-103

PRESS RELEASE

For Release February 13th, 1950

FEB 9 1950

14359

WANTS TRUMAN MOVED TO ARIZONA

Says A-bomb can be detonated by alarm clock

Washington, Feb. 13th. - A proposal to move the President from Washington to either Arizona or Tennessee, first advanced by Richard Knaust of New York in 1947, when he informed Congress that Russia had the formulae for the A-bomb, is again being revived and is being carefully considered by Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona and by Senator Kenneth McKeller of Tennessee.

According to Richard Knaust, Washington is the number one target in the Russian plans for a sneak atomic attack, for in Washington are housed the President and his legal successors, the Members of Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All these officials are assembled in Washington on the days the President has his weekly Cabinet meeting, and it is on such a day that the Bombs would be exploded. While one Bomb might be sufficient it is expected that Russia may use as many as four. The uranium and other elements needed in the construction of the Bomb can be brought into Washington, without detection, in the mail pouch of diplomatic couriers or other diplomatic officials, where they can be assembled by a technician accredited here for some other purpose. The explosive elements can be brought together by a conveyor-belt arrangement controlled by an ordinary alarm clock.

The destruction of Washington would be the signal for the detonation of other similarly constructed A-bombs in the holds of so called friendly ships in the ports of New York, New Orleans, San Francisco and other seaports. These attacks would be followed by air-borne attacks on Detroit, Pittsburgh and other industrial areas.

Modern atomic warfare is based on the premise of an initial knock-out blow. The death of the President, his legal successors, the Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be such a knock-out blow, and conceivably might make ultimate victory for us impossible.

Under pressure of attack we could not re-establish a civil government. We would have to permit the military to establish a military dictatorship under a man of their choice.

The selection of such a Dictator would take many precious days, and during this period Russia would have occupied and entrenched herself in weakly defended Alaska and perhaps Seattle. If under these handicaps we should succeed in winning the war we would still have our own military Dictator with us. There is no way of foretelling when and under what conditions any Dictator will relinquish his powers.

It is to protect our civil government and our civil liberties that Senator Hayden is considering the introduction of a Bill moving the

62-81484-97

FILED

| |
|-------------------|
| FBI - LITTLE ROCK |
| FEB 10 1950 |
| AAA |

President to Arizona, while Senator McKellar is considering the introduction of a similar rival Bill moving the President to Tennessee.

The discussion resulting from the introduction of two similar but rival Bills by two such able proponents would enable the Congress to make the wisest choice in the selection of a new home for the President, and would enable Senators and Representatives from the South and Southwest to espouse the cause of their several States as a place of safety for the private citizen and as offering opportunities to business for industrial and commercial development.

It is expected that Senator Pat McCarron of Nevada and Senator James O. Eastland will introduce rival Resolutions moving the Vice-President and the Senate to their respective States of Nevada and Mississippi, while Representative William S. Hill of Colorado and Representative John E. Miles of New Mexico will introduce rival Resolutions moving the House of Representatives to one of these two States. An effort is being made to have the Department of Defense, together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff moved to either Kansas or Texas and the Justice Department including the FBI to either Arkansas or Utah.

With the removal of these officials from Washington this city would cease to be a military objective and the Secretary of State could safely move into the White House.

Richard Knaust
P. O. Box 37
Radio City Station
New York 19, N. Y.

62-81484-97

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. V. P. KOAY

Referral/Consult

DATE: February 17, 1950

FROM : S. W. REYNOLDS

SUBJECT: ARTICLE IN U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
2-10-50, ENTITLED, "U.S. TESTS GERMAN STAFF IDEA"

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

SWR:mkc

RECORDED - 62

INDEXED - 62

37

62-81454-98
2 1950

Smh.
Sounds like some more
empire building.
H: J

SWR
HGF

U.S. TESTS GERMAN-STAFF IDEA

~~Military~~ Military Would Be All-Powerful in Wartime

U. S. civilians will have a lot less to say about running another war if a new military plan is adopted.

Idea of a German-type General Staff is under study now. President, as civilian Commander in Chief, stays at the top.

But men in uniform take over from there, see that everything fits one big plan, direct the war front and home front together.

Military officials in U. S. are giving serious attention to the concept of a General Staff to run any future war. This concept, based on the German wartime pattern, is of an all-powerful military top command to direct a war effort.

The blueprint for a U. S. General Staff has been prepared, at the request of the U. S. Army, by Gen. Heinz Guderian, former Chief of Staff in the German high command. General Guderian's blueprint is designed to remove defects in a staff plan under which the Germans lost two world wars. It is being studied by military planners here for the solution it might offer to problems of unification.

Centralization of power in professional military hands "is at the heart of the Guderian plan. There would be no layers of civilian authority between the military and the President as Commander in Chief. Top military command would exercise authority over every activity related to the military services. The give and take of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also would be replaced by a single chain of command. Army, Navy and Air Force all would jump at the word from above.

The chart on page 27 shows just what the Guderian plan proposes for U. S. Many of the changes suggested from the U. S. wartime setup already have been made, through unification. Others can be made with no further action by Congress. But the basic change of replacing civilian control with military control at the top must get congressional approval if the plan is to be followed through.

This plan, revealed in broad outline by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (Rep.), of Wisconsin, and disclosed here in detail for the first time, is important as an

indication of the trend in U. S. military planning. It is not to be adopted now by Congress. But it shows the direction of present thinking, the possible end result of more and more centralization in the defense structure. It is a wartime plan, with its chances for enactment varying in direct proportion to the nearness of war.

How it would work is shown in what follows:

The President, under the plan, is to continue his present status of Commander



GENERAL GUDERIAN
... a blueprint

in Chief of the armed forces. He will have the final say on broad strategy, just as Franklin D. Roosevelt did in World War II. General Guderian warns, however, that Congress must retain its power to impeach any wartime President, if that becomes necessary to avoid the "licentious dictatorship" practiced by Hitler.

A supreme military commander, directly under the President, then is to replace Defense Secretary Louis Johnson as acting head of the armed forces. Theory here is that, as warfare becomes more of a technical matter of using joint

air, sea and land combat teams, only a professional military man should direct use of those forces.

This is a far step from the position of the present top U. S. military man, Gen. Omar N. Bradley. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he has no vote but merely arbitrates issues affecting all three services and advises the Defense Secretary. Mr. Johnson, a civilian, now makes final command decisions.

A General Staff, under the proposed plan, then is to administer the armed forces much as the Army's General Staff now runs the Army. Reporting only to the supreme military commander, the planned staff would be set up like this:

An operations branch, composed of especially trained five-star officers, is to be substituted for the present Joint Chiefs, but with far more authority over the training, weapons and use of the combined land, sea and air forces.

A central intelligence agency will be set up within the General Staff, instead of under the National Security Council as at present. That agency also is to direct U. S. military attaches abroad.

A new central procurement agency also is proposed, to replace the present system under which each service buys for all of the armed forces those things which it uses most. Thus the General Staff would, in effect, decide on and buy the weapons and equipment for each of the armed services. To date, the decision is against a central supply service and for buying of weapons by each branch.

Home-defense installations are to be directed by another General Staff officer. This means a single command system of coast-artillery fortifications and air-defense installations around military posts, arms factories, cities and communication centers.

A joint press office also is provided under the top military staff, like the present joint press office under Secretary Johnson. But the new press office would control wartime censorship and be charged with "the uniform direction or influencing of the press." In other words, a propaganda job is added.

Members of the General Staff are to be trained in a special armed-forces academy, one which would give a three-dimensional education for running a modern war. That appears to be a cross between the present National War College in Washington and the new Armed Services Staff College at Norfolk, Va.

The **Armaments Office**, under General Guderian's plan, is to be set up on par with this General Staff organization to handle jobs now done largely by civilian commissions in and outside the defense establishment. Also directly under the supreme military commander, its functions are these:

Allocating the defense dollars is to be done by its budget office, headed by a military man, instead of by the civilian Defense Secretary on the advice of the Joint Chiefs, as at present. This would tend to give the military a freer rein in deciding how many dollars they need and for what purpose.

Weapons development will be done by an office similar to the present Munitions Board but with more power to select weapons, more control over the armaments industry. For example, it would quickly settle any argument over the merits of B-36 bombers, supercarriers or hydrogen bombs.

Drafting and recruiting men for the armed service also becomes a job of the Armaments Office. An independent Selective Service would be abolished. So would individual recruiting by the Army, Navy and Air Force.

War industry, under the Guderian plan, comes at least partly under the thumb of this Armaments Office. A branch of the Office is to control procurement of raw materials required by war industries, the development of factories working on armed forces' contracts, priorities and stockpiling for war.

Other functions of the powerful armaments office are management of the armed forces' civilian employees, real estate, research and development. It also takes over the work of the multibillion-dollar Veterans' Administration.

The fighting forces, in this proposed plan, are to remain three separate services, each commanded in the U. S. by its own Chief of Staff. Units overseas, however, will come under unified field commands, like General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower's headquarters in the European campaign of World War II.


Air Force, in the General Staff blueprint, is to contain all flying units, including the tactical air support for the Army and the Navy's carrier planes, plus the antiaircraft units now under Army command.

Navy will contain all seagoing combat forces, including Army transports and aircraft carriers.

Army is to contain all ground combat forces, presumably including most of the present Marine Corps.

That's the plan as drawn up by General Guderian and now being studied by U. S. military officials. It may show what is in store for this country's defenses if war comes again.

Guderian Plan for a U. S. General Staff



Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

300 American Life Building
Birmingham 3, Alabama
February 18, 1950

REGISTERED MAIL

Director, FBI

Dear Sir:

I am enclosing, herewith, a letter directed by Mr. ROBERT W. SHORTNACY, 1428 Tuscaloosa Avenue, Birmingham, Alabama, to General ANTHONY McCauley, Department of Chemical Warfare, Washington, D. C., which Mr. SHORTNACY desires delivered to General McCauley or the person directly in charge of Chemical Warfare.

As will be noted, Mr. SHORTNACY sets forth an idea concerning the use of chemicals in the repelling of possible paratroop landings in the United States in the event of war.

Mr. SHORTNACY advised when he delivered this letter to the Birmingham Office that while working in Tampa, Florida at a ship-building yard he had had some rather unpleasant experiences with members of the Russian Navy who were there to accept delivery of certain ships built by the Government of the United States and given to Russia on lend-lease, and in view of recent publicity concerning leaks of confidential information he did not desire to have his letter "bouncing around" the War Department. He, therefore, requested that his letter be handled by the FBI, as he was certain that it would then be delivered into the hands of some reliable individual for study. Mr. SHORTNACY stated that he did not know whether his idea had any merit or not, but that he desired the information called to the attention of the proper authorities in order that they might give it consideration.

Mr. SHORTNACY explained that the mysterious disintegration of ladies Nylon hose at Jacksonville, Florida, was reported in the "Times Union" newspaper at Jacksonville, Florida, sometime about one year ago.

INDEXED - 64

The Bureau is requested to see that Mr. SHORTNACY's letter is delivered to the proper authorities in the Department of the Army.



ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ENCL

enclosure

62-0

WHO:fmb

letter delivered to Major Michael 1 DA 3-1-50 curB

EX-9 Very truly yours,

D. D. King
G. D. KING, SAC

W. H. H. H.

Blair

7.5 MAR 31 1950

ORIGINAL - WAR PLANS

M. E. King

ENCLOSURE

62-81484-99

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 20, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd *DL*

SUBJECT:

Tolson ☒
 Ladd ☒
 Clegg ☐
 Glavin ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Rosen ☐
 Tracy ☐
 Harbo ☐
 Mohr ☐
 Tele. Room ☐
 Nease ☐
 Gandy ☐

Mr. Pat Coyne telephonically advised me that the President had requested a report on the commitments and risks of the United States in view of the status of the cold war. According to Mr. Coyne, apparently the President feels that we are approaching the end of the cold war and nearing the real thing. He based his request on the following three items: (1) The fact that the Soviet Union now has the atom bomb; (2) The fact that Fuchs allegedly gave information on the H-Bomb and (3) The fact that the Communists are overrunning Asia. He stated that all they wanted was a bare outline, very brief, and he was preparing to give to the President through the National Security Council the following outline on internal security:

I. The United States should continue to accelerate and maintain that the highest state is its domestic intelligence. (Mr. Coyne had not had the word "continue" in this. I advised that this should be included to eliminate any indication of possible criticism.

II. The essential requirements:

- (a) Establish more effective control of illegal entry of aliens.
- (b) A more adequate control of the import and export of materials and prevent the removal of materials that might effect this country's internal security.
- (c) Establish more effective medium for the removal and exclusion of dangerous persons from employment by the Federal Government.
- (d) Establish protective safeguards for Government facilities. (plant protection)
- (e) Establish a more adequate legal basis for U. S. Security (Mr. Coyne explained he meant here the passage of the internal security bill and similar legislation).
- (f) Insure proper development and distribution of foreign intelligence as it relates to internal security.

60 MAR 28 1950
77

RECORDED

162-81454-100

DML:dad

LAB

Mr. Coyne stated that the fact that he had informed the Bureau of this should be kept extremely confidential and should never be disclosed to anyone or he would be in serious trouble. He stated this report was being prepared only for the President's information and would not be disseminated elsewhere.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson *V.*

DATE: June 27, 1950

FROM : Mr. Nichols

SUBJECT:

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | _____ |
| Mr. Clegg | _____ |
| Mr. Glavin | _____ |
| Mr. Ladd | _____ |
| Mr. Nichols | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen | _____ |
| Mr. Tracy | _____ |
| Mr. Egan | _____ |
| Mr. Gurnea | _____ |
| Mr. Harbo | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr | _____ |
| Mr. Pennington | _____ |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Mr. Nease | _____ |
| Miss Holmes | _____ |
| Miss Gandy | _____ |

g Blair Moody of the Detroit News called. He was all upset over the war scare and the potentialities in Detroit. He was wondering if it would not be an excellent idea to get labor and management together so that when the time came when it was necessary to fire communists from a plant handling war contracts, the union would not be kicking up its heels.

I told him that it would appear to be premature at this time to start going into any plans such as this, since any action required would have to be determined by the conditions and situations. He wasn't looking for anything to write, but thought that since he was going to be in Detroit tomorrow, that he might talk to the Editor of the paper and possibly Victor Reuther, to get their views. I told him that, of course, if a war started and conditions warranted emergency action, we were prepared to move.

LBN:MP

American War Plans

RECORDED - 57

EX - 25

1162-51454-101

5- [signature]

56 JUL 13 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 7, 1950

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: WAR ACTIVITIES

Referral/Consult

Tolson ☒

Ladd ☒

Clegg ☒

Glavin ☒

Nichols ☒

Tracy ☒

Harbo ☐

Belmont ☐

Mohr ☐

Winterrowd ☐

Tele. Room ☐

Nease ☐

Gandy ☐

1

ERR:hke

12-81484-104

454

EX-16

RECORDED - 105

INDEXED - 105

12-81484-104

454

EX-16

RECORDED - 105

INDEXED - 105

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: July 14, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd

Tolson ✓

Ladd ✓

Clegg ✓

Glavin ✓

Nichols ✓

Rosen ✓

Tracy ✓

Harbo ✓

Mohr ✓

Tele. Room ✓

Nease ✓

Gandy ✓

SUBJECT: PROTECTION OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND BASES OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/11/87 BY SP-8/BJA
#875825PURPOSE:

1. To advise that our field offices have been alerted relative to this problem.

2. To recommend that a chart showing the location of our field offices and resident agencies in relation to these strategic air bases be furnished to Mr. Finletter and General Carroll.

BACKGROUND:

Reference is made to your memorandum to Mr. Tolson, dated July 11, 1950, reporting the results of the conference attended by you and other Bureau officials in the office of the Secretary of the Air Force, relating to the protection of strategic air command bases of the United States Air Force.

In accordance with your instructions, the following action has been taken:

Letter to Field Offices:

General Carroll, in a letter dated July 12, 1950, furnished a list of 15 strategic air command bases which the Air Force considers of prime importance for protection from sabotage. In a letter dated July 13, 1950, the respective field offices were advised of the location of the strategic air bases and instructed as follows:

1. To immediately contact the ranking OSI or strategic air command officer in the various bases.
2. To take immediate steps to close any gaps which may exist in their present coverage on or surrounding the various bases.

KWD:mes
AttachmentsRECORDED - 105
INDEXED - 105

JUL 19 1950

3

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE EX-16

EX-16

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-6200-98

3. To insure that there is no delay in furnishing pertinent information relative to sabotage to appropriate officials at the strategic bases.

4. To consider establishment of resident agencies near bases located a considerable distance from field offices.

In connection with Instruction #4, an examination of charts which have been prepared indicates that all bases are located in the vicinity of field offices or resident agencies.

Letter to Mr. Finletter:

A letter dated July 13, 1950, was directed to Mr. Finletter, expressing appreciation for the briefing on July 11, 1950. He was informed generally of the steps taken to alert our field offices and effect the closest cooperation between the Bureau and the Air Force in the protection of strategic bases. It was pointed out that the Air Force may desire to institute some type of screening program in the event such a program had not already been instituted. In addition, it was suggested that the names of all personnel stationed at various strategic bases or having access thereto, be checked through the indices of the Bureau.

Chart

The Cartographic Section has prepared a chart showing the location of our field offices and resident agencies in relation to the strategic air bases identified by the Air Force. Copies of this chart are attached for your information.

Electronic Plants

The Air Force advised the Liaison Section on July 13, 1950, and again on July 14, 1950, that they have been unable to compile a list of strategic electronic plants which the Air Force considers also of prime importance. The Air Force is being closely followed with regard to this list in order that the field offices may be alerted immediately upon its receipt.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that a copy of the chart reflecting the location of our field offices and resident agencies in relation to strategic air bases be furnished to Mr. Finletter and General Carroll. Since the location of the strategic air command bases have been designated "~~top secret~~" it is recommended that no further dissemination be given to this chart. If you approve, there is attached a letter to Mr. Finletter and General Carroll, attaching a copy of the above chart.

✓
OK.
H.

ackd 7-25-51
from TG Finletter, ONB

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 6, 1950

FROM: SAC, Oklahoma City

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~SUBJECT: SPECIAL PROJECT
TINKER FIELD
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMAJUNE

A Confidential Source of known reliability has advised that there is at this time a special three day project going on at Tinker Field. He stated a Major and two Captains are in charge of this project here and made arrangements for the use of thirty Tinker Field guards to be posted approximately one hundred feet apart to guard the outer perimeter of an area at Tinker Field assigned especially for the project; and that within this perimeter are military guards armed with carbines stationed every ten feet. He stated B-29s and B-50s are being flown into Tinker Field, bringing their own personnel, and presumably material, and certain work is being done on these planes at Tinker Field, beginning at 5 a.m. in the morning and ending at 5 p.m. He stated the nature of the work being done has not been disclosed to his knowledge; and that each of the persons doing the work, the military guards and the civilian Tinker Field guards were previously cleared as to security; and that each wears a special badge issued only for that project. He stated no one not wearing a special project badge may even pass through the outer perimeter and anyone coming within two hundred feet of the inner military guard is immediately accosted by the Military Guard, who brings his carbine to "ready." He stated that none of the civilian or military guards, or the employees doing the work, are permitted to leave the area for food, food being delivered to them. He stated he does not know whether each plane that is flown in brings a separate group of workers or whether the same workers are being used on each plane. He stated it has not been made known where these planes are coming from or flying to. He stated one portable hangar has been made available to the special project, and all windows of same have been blacked out.

It has been rumored for some time that a special atomic energy project was to be engaged in at Tinker Field, but to date no corroboration of this rumor has been received by this office.

The Confidential Source stated he has been at Tinker Field for the past eight years and he has never previously seen security measures to the above extent used before.

No inquiry concerning this special project is being made by this office, and the above is furnished only for the information of the Bureau.

DRS
JCR/ms

AIR MAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY

55 APR 11 1960

RECORDED - 27
INDEXED - 27

62-81484-108

thus, aec knows
of no aec project which
might be above
6-28-50
can be 7-5-50
concern OSI
planes produced
altered to carry
special projects
regarding
info regarding
Director

Communication was Phases

F.B.I. TELETYPE

Tolson ☒
 Ladd ☒
 Clegg ☒
 Glavin ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tracy ☒
 Harbo ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Nease ☒
 Gandy ☒

DECODED COPY

WASHINGTON 3 FROM LOS ANGELES 10 11:40 AM

DIRECTOR URGENT

ATTENTION MR. LADD

WAR SITUATION. FOLLOWING FOR INFORMATION. INFORMATION CONFIDENTIALLY RECEIVED THAT CASTLE AIR FORCE BASE, MERCED, CALIFORNIA HAS ORDERED ALL PERSONNEL TO REPORT BACK FROM LEAVE AND THAT AIR FORCE SQUADRONS ASSIGNED THAT BASE WILL DEPART JULY 11 NEXT, DESTINATION UNKNOWN. THESE SQUADRONS ARE BOMBER GROUPS HANDLING ATOM BOMBS.

HOOD

LA R 3 WA NRJ

RECORDED - 85

RECEIVED:

7-10-50

3:06 PM

MW

JUL 12 1950

cc: Mr. Ladd
Mr. Belmont

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Richmond

SUBJECT: WAR PLANS - VIRGINIA

DATE: 7/10/50

| | |
|-------------|--|
| Mr. Nichols | |
| Mr. Rosen | |
| Mr. Tracy | |
| Mr. Harbo | |
| Mr. Belmont | |
| Mr. Mohr | |
| Mr. Tamm | |
| Mr. Nease | |
| Mr. Gandy | |

Colonel C. W. WOODSON, JR., Superintendent of the Virginia State Police, has advised me that the following functions perhaps should come under the office of the Superintendent of the State Police:

- (a) EVACUATION AUTHORITY: This authority deals primarily with the advanced planning for orderly evacuation of congested areas. It works closely with representatives of the Federal Government.
- (b) CIVIL PROTECTIVE MOBILIZATION PLAN: This plan has to do with the pooling of certain police personnel and equipment in Virginia to handle unusual situations as a result of an attack or disaster. During World War II, the Governor requested the sheriffs, city police, county police, state police, A.B.C. police, and others, to make commitments as to how many men and what equipment they could spare for this effort in cases of emergency.
- (c) HIGHWAY TRAFFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT: During World War II, representatives of this office worked very closely with the Military in the routing and handling of convoys.
- (d) AIR RAID WARNING SYSTEM: This has already been set up and is functioning smoothly under the direction of Mr. Raymond V. Long.
- (e) DISASTER PLAN: This Department has a Disaster Plan which can be closely coordinated with the Department of Highways, the Department of Health, the American Red Cross, the Military or State Guard, and other agencies. A copy of the Plan is enclosed.
- (f) EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS: The forty-five police teletypewriter stations, in conjunction with the five State Police radio stations, and all municipal and county radio stations, as well as mobile equipment, will prove of great value if made available to the Director of the Office of Civilian Defense, the Military charged with the defense of Virginia, the Civil Air Patrol, and the Virginia State Guard, (formerly Virginia Protective Force).
- (g) CIVIL AIR PATROL: This is functioning under the office of Colonel Allan Perkinson, Aeronautics Division, State Corporation Commission.
- (h) VIRGINIA STATE GUARD: (Formerly Virginia Protective Force). If again activated, this function will naturally come under the office of the Adjutant General.

RECORDED - 85

INDEXED - 85

EW

AUG 7 1950

110

Director

Re: WAR PLANS - VIRGINIA

7/10/50

For the information of the Bureau, Governor COLGATE DARDEN issued an executive order when he was Governor to the effect that no employee of the Virginia State Government would be exempt from military duty. The Virginia State Police adopted a policy after the termination of World War II that all applicants would have to be veterans of World War II. As a result of this policy, the nucleus of the force is primarily composed of Reserve Officers, who will be among the first to be called.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. V. P. KERRY

DATE: July 25, 1950

FROM : S. W. REYNOLDS

SUBJECT: Atomic WAR PLANS

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

SWR:lae

RECORDED - 2

INDEXED - 2

JUL 27 1950

12

71 AUG 7 1950

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 19 1950

LP
TELETYPE

| | |
|-------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson | ✓ |
| Mr. Ladd | ✓ |
| Mr. Clegg | ✓ |
| Mr. Glavin | ✓ |
| Mr. Nichols | ✓ |
| Mr. Rosen | ✓ |
| Mr. Tracy | ✓ |
| Mr. Harbo | ✓ |
| Mr. Belmont | ✓ |
| Mr. Mohr | ✓ |
| Tele. Room | ✓ |
| Mr. Nease | ✓ |
| Miss Gandy | ✓ |

FBI SAVANNAH

7-19-50

1-48 AM EST

JES

~~DIRECTOR~~, FBI

D E F E R R E D

Referral/Consult

ATTENTION MR. BELMONT

END PAGE ONE

NOV 1 1950

Handwritten signature

Referral/Consult

PAGE TWO

MASON

END

2-57 AM OK FBI WA LRP

cc; Mr. Belmont

V

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: July 25, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Peyton Ford called on July 21 and advised that he had been contacted by General Bob Landry, Air Attache at the White House, that he wanted to talk with someone in the Bureau with reference to White House and Government war plans.

I told Mr. Ford that someone from the Bureau would contact General Landry and subsequently, Special Agent Ralph Roach was instructed to see him.

DML:dad

*memo from Ladd
 7/21/50
 (2)*

RECORDED - 111

62-81487-113

JUL 26 1950

14

F. J. R.

56 AUG 4 1950

Office in War Room

| | |
|-------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | _____ |
| Mr. Ladd | _____ |
| Mr. Clegg | _____ |
| Mr. Glavin | _____ |
| Mr. Nichols | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen | _____ |
| Mr. Tracy | _____ |
| Mr. Harbo | _____ |
| Mr. Belmont | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Mr. Nease | _____ |
| Miss Gandy | _____ |

May 31, 1950.

Memo to Mr. Ladd

From E. S. Sanders.

Referral/Consult

Pursuant to our conversation, I am submitting this memorandum for your information.

[Redacted Content]

American War Plans

RECORDED - 2 62-81484-115
 AUG 21 1950
 5-2-5 E 19

51 AUG 22 1950

July 5, 1950

THE DIRECTOR

D. M. Ladd

KOREAN SITUATION

SAC Auerbach advised that Senator Bridges attended a briefing at the War Department by the Joint Chiefs of Staff last night. At this briefing the Military advised that they are sending over everything to the Korean theater, including experimental submarines using guided missiles. They stated at the present time there is no plan for general mobilization unless the situation becomes more serious; that, however, they are going to start today calling a selected group of active Reserve Officers back to active duty, concentrating on Navy and Air Force personnel.

DML: CSH

Director's Notation: "What is situation re our men who are in Reserves? Let me see "break-down". H.

RECORDED - 27 117
AUG 24 1950
43

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

| | |
|-------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | _____ |
| Mr. Ladd | _____ |
| Mr. Clegg | _____ |
| Mr. Glavin | _____ |
| Mr. Nichols | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen | _____ |
| Mr. Tracy | _____ |
| Mr. Harbo | _____ |
| Mr. Belmont | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Mr. Nease | _____ |
| Miss Gandy | _____ |

London, England
November 2, 1950

Dear Mr. Ladd:

I thought you would be interested in knowing, on a confidential basis, that the situation in Europe is considered very critical indeed. I have just been confidentially informed by a contact in the 3rd Air Division that there are presently sixteen thousand American air personnel in this country. By the end of this month, this will be increased to thirty-two thousand, and by the end of December, it is planned to have sixty-four thousand men based in England. The A Bomb is also here; how many, I don't know. They are also being sent from here to bases in Germany.

Please treat this as strictly confidential. I am merely passing it on to you for possible use in evaluating the seriousness which the situation in Europe is being given by British and American authorities.

Sincerely,

John
(CINPERMAN)

JAC:AB

RECORDED - 2

62-81154-120

NOV 18 1950

3

152

NOV 21 1950

2
5 NOV 25 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: December 5, 1950

FROM : SAC, New York

SUBJECT: ~~UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT (USA)~~
SUGGESTION CONCERNING

[] who is known to the Bureau as a former Czech newspaperman who immigrated to the United States with his British wife after the last war, recently came to the New York office with the enclosed documents which he had prepared.

He stated that he only wished to call to the attention of the proper United States authorities the experience of European countries in having to set up underground networks during the war, so that the United States might consider such action now while there is time to establish such a system more thoroughly and more safely.

b6
b7C

[] explained the enclosed were mere rough drafts of communications he intended to send and wanted to know to what branch of government he should properly address his suggestion.

It was suggested that the memos he had prepared would be sufficient to forward to the Bureau for proper channeling.

[] served with the underground in Czechoslovakia and later did work for British Intelligence. He has furnished information to the New York office on prior occasions.

Encs. 2

RECORDED - 97

INDEXED - 97

JHG:MRF
62-10144



62-81484-121

2 Enclosures to Bureau
NY 62-10144

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd *lb*
 FROM : Mr. E. H. Winterrowd *EW*
 SUBJECT: *AIR RAID ALERT

DATE: December 6, 1950

Referral/Consult *1*

Wilson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Nease ✓
Gandy ✓

Approved 12-11-50

EHW: WMJ

RECORDED - 2
 INDEXED - 2

100-81454-122
 DEC 9 1950
3

54 DEC 12 1950

WPK

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 6, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd *ph*

SUBJECT:

I took a call through the White House Emergency Switchboard at 12:18 PM today. Sgt. stated that the all clear signal has been given for the Washington area.

He had no further information.

DML:dad

ph

| | |
|------------|-------------------------------------|
| Tolson | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Ladd | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Clegg | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Glavin | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Nichols | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Rosen | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Tracy | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Harbo | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Tele. Room | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Nease | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Gandy | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

b6
b7C

RECORDED - 2

162-81484-123
DEC 9 1950
3

WPK

235
54 DEC 12 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: December 6, 1950

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: UNIDENTIFIED PLANE APPROACHING EAST COAST
DECEMBER 6, 1950

| | |
|------------|---|
| Tolson | ✓ |
| Ladd | ✓ |
| Clegg | ✓ |
| Glavin | ✓ |
| Nichols | ✓ |
| Rosen | ✓ |
| Tracy | ✓ |
| Harbo | ✓ |
| Belmont | ✓ |
| Mohr | ✓ |
| Tele. Room | ✓ |
| Nease | ✓ |
| Gandy | ✓ |

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Nichols to Mr. Tolson dated December 6, 1950, relative to an air raid warning resulting from an unidentified plane sighted over the northeastern section of the U. S.

Referral/Consult

Information concerning this was furnished by

RECORDED - 2

At about 12:55 P.M. Mr. Rowley of the White House advised Mr. Roach that in view of the fact that the planes had been identified as friendly planes, the alert was off.


AHB:ma

54 DEC 12 1950

DEC 9 1950

INDEXED - 2

The above information was furnished to you upon receipt telephonically. As additional information is received, you will be advised.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'V. J. K.' or similar, with a checkmark-like flourish at the top left.

December 6, 1950

Dear Sir:

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. LADD
MR. NICHOLS

Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to the President, called and stated that he had just been discussing the recent information which they had from the Eastern Command. He stated that he and Pat Coyne, the secretary to the National Security Council, assumed that I had the same information. I told the Admiral that this information had been flashed to us from the White House. I told the Admiral that the last information that had come to us was that the radar people who had picked it up are not certain but it might be caused by some birds or geese. I stated that nevertheless the fighter planes have gone out to intercept whatever it is. The Admiral stated he was glad to know we had this information.

Very truly yours,

H J E H.


John Edgar Hoover
Director

cc-Mr. Nease

JEH:EN

RECORDED - 2

12-11-50-125



Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

125

DEC 11 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON *12m*
 FROM : L. B. NICHOLS
 SUBJECT:

DATE: December 6, 1950

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Mrs.
~~Miss~~ Betty Hill of the Bureau switchboard just received a call from the White House security switchboard to the effect that an air raid warning was out as an unidentified plane had been cited over the Northeastern section of the United States. After giving this information, the individual calling hung up. This is a direct line from the White House.

The Security Division is making a check now to verify this information.

CC: Mr. Ladd

FCH:mb

RECORDED - 83

162-51484-127

DEC 9 1950

24

WFE

27d
 54 DEC 19 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 6, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd *DL*

SUBJECT:

Captain Post of the Navy Top Secret Briefing Section has advised Agent Deloach of the Liaison Section that the radar system at Limestone, Maine, is not yet sure whether the disturbance was caused by birds or planes. He, Captain Post personally thinks that the alert is "junk". He has advised however, that planes have gone out to intercept whatever it is and word should be coming through within a matter of a few minutes.

EHW:dad

☒ Tolson
☒ Ladd
☒ Clegg
☒ Glavin
☒ Nichols
☒ Rosen
☒ Tracy
☒ Harbo
☒ Mohr
☒ Tele. Room
☒ Nease
☒ Gandy

ENCL

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

RECORDED - 2

112-51454-128
DEC 9 1950

CRIMINAL

55 DEC 18 1950

ENCLOSURE



62-81484-128

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATION - USA

DATE: January 6, 1951

Tolson _____

Ladd _____

Clegg _____

Glavin _____

Nichols _____

Rosen _____

Tracy _____

Harbo _____

Belmont _____

Mohr _____

Tele. Room _____

Nease _____

Gandy _____

b7D

In accordance with the Executives Conference Memorandum dated December 22, 1950, I talked with [redacted] on January 4. [redacted] advised that the Canadians do have a Stay-Behind Program, none of the details of which were in his possession. He stated that he would communicate with his headquarters in Ottawa and would thereafter advise the Bureau concerning the plans which the Canadians have.

ACTION:

This matter will be followed with [redacted]

pl

L

CEH:mer

RECORDED - 42

INDEXED - 42

JAN 9 1951

137

65 FEB 3 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 22, 1950

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: PROPOSED UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATION - USA

On December 21, 1950, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Ladd, McIntire for Mr. Clegg, Glavin, Parsons for Mr. Harbo, McGuire for Mr. Nichols, Hargett for Mr. Rosen, Tracy, Mohr, Sizoo and Belmont, considered a suggestion that an underground organization be set up in the Pacific Northwest and on the West Coast along the same lines as the "Stay-behind Program" in Alaska presently being developed.

The suggestion pointed out that great difficulties were experienced by having to set up underground networks in European countries during World War II and that the United States might consider such action while there is time to establish here a more thorough and safe system, looking toward a system that would function in the event the United States were invaded. It was pointed out that in the event of war with the Soviet Union, the Pacific Northwest and the West Coast generally would be a logical target for invasion. It was suggested that serious consideration be given to planning for such an organization on the West Coast and in the Pacific Northwest at the present time, and further, that we determine what steps have been taken in the way of planning on the part of the Canadians, as they would be in the invasion path from any Soviet occupation zone in Alaska.

In connection with this suggestion, it was pointed out to the Conference that if an underground or stay-behind program is to be developed effectively, the program would require extensive planning and the contacting of a great many individuals throughout the Northwest and West Coast areas for the purpose of developing stay-behind agents. To be effective, such a program would require literally thousands of Agent days. In addition, due to the number of people who would have to be contacted to develop an appropriate number of stay-behind agents, the possibility of publicity is very apparent with the resultant charge that the Bureau is promoting hysteria. It was pointed out that there is no assurance that if an invasion did occur, it would occur in the Pacific Northwest or on the West Coast and consequently if such a program is to be worthwhile, we would have to extend it to other parts of the country. It was further pointed out that it would seem premature at this time to launch such a program, particularly with the heavy load of work the Bureau now is carrying, inasmuch as any invasion of this country would be likely only after the country had been weakened by continuous warfare over a period of time. It was suggested that such a program could be more readily considered from a practical standpoint if conditions in the future reflect a greater possibility of invasion.

Tolson ☒
Ladd ☒
Clegg ☒
Glavin ☒
Nichols ☒
Rosen ☒
Tracy ☒
Harbo ☒
Belmont ☒
Mohr ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Nease ☒
Gandy ☒

cc - Mr. Clegg
65 FEB 1 1951
AEB:tlc

RECORDED - 42

TWO - 42

5-RW

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

~~The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended against the adoption of this suggestion with the exception that it was recommended that through liaison with [redacted] we determine whether the Canadians are taking any steps in this direction.~~

b7D

[redacted] In the event you approve, we will contact [redacted] in this respect, but will not consider launching any program in this country at the present time.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

✓

Clyde Tolson

Gh.
H.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENRICH

SUBJECT: UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT (USA)
SUGGESTION CONCERNING

DATE: December 19, 1950.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

PURPOSE:

To point out the desirability in the light of our current program in Alaska of setting up an underground organization in the Pacific Northwest and the West Coast area generally.

DETAILS:

There is attached a letter from New York containing a suggestion from [] a former Czech newspaper man who served with the underground in Czechoslovakia and later did work for British Intelligence. [] wished to call to the attention of the proper U. S. authorities the difficulties experienced by having to set up underground networks in European countries during World War II so that the United States might consider such action while there is time to establish a system more thorough and more safely in the United States.

b6
b7C

The Office of Policy Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency is charged with clandestine and underground operations in foreign countries.

In Alaska, the Bureau successfully prevented CIA intervention in the organization and operation of an underground system of "stay-behind" agents for intelligence purposes and escape and evasion program for the rescue of United States and allied personnel.

In the event of war with the Soviet Union, the Pacific Northwest and the West Coast generally would be a logical target for invasion.

It is pointed out that since the Alaskan operation is now underway, serious consideration should now be given to planning for the establishment of just such an organization in the Pacific Northwest and along the West Coast of the United States.

It is also desirable in connection with the establishment of a "U. S. underground" to determine what steps have been taken in the way of planning on the part of the Canadians who are in the same position as we are in the event of an invasion of the Pacific Northwest and who in any event would be in the invasion path from any Soviet occupation zone in Alaska.

ACTION:

RECORDED - 42

INDEXED - 42

JAN 9 1951

b7D

It is respectfully recommended that immediate consideration be given to planning along the above lines and toward contacting [] for their observations. We still have time for planning and should take advantage of such time as we have left.

EW/wl
Attach.

XEROX
12/27/50

111

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SAN JUAN

SUBJECT: CONTACTS WITH U. S. COAST GUARD

DATE: February 10, 1951

Re SAC Letter No. 91, December 6, 1950 (H).

On February 8 and 9, 1951, I discussed with Captain C. A. ANDERSON, Commander of the local Coast Guard District, and Commander HORATIO G. THOMPSON, Captain of the Port, the matters referred to in referenced letter.

Both Captain ANDERSON and Commander THOMPSON assured me of their cooperation in connection with the anchorage and movements of foreign flag vessels and in regard to the program of validation of Merchant Seamen's certificates.

Appropriate liaison will be maintained with these officials.

ACS:JPD

RECORDED - 133

INDEXED - 133

EX-17

141
FEB 14 1951
16

56 FEB 9 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 16, 1951

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: PRACTICE BLACKOUTS,
ALASKAN COAST
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

You will recall that press releases on December 20, 1950, indicated that military bases along the Alaskan coast had been under a "complete blackout" during the hours of darkness on that day.

Local newspapers reported on December 21, 1950, that U. S. military authorities stated that the blackout was a "practice maneuver."

Representatives of OSI at the Seat of Government have advised Mr. E. S. Saunders, Liaison Section, Security Division, that the practice blackouts had been ordered by the Commanding General of the Alaska Command and had been in the nature of a "dry run."

ACTION:

None. For your information.

EX-35

WTB:jvs

RECORDED - 24
INDEXED - 24

FEB 17 1951

X-35

66 FEB 26 1951

WBT

Censorship & Blackout Shroud Alaskan Coast

ANCHORAGE, Alaska, Dec. 20—Military bases along the Alaskan seacoast were under complete blackout during hours of darkness today. Army officers flatly refused to discuss the measure.

Simultaneously, the Army halted publication of news concerning troop strength in Alaska and the Pacific airlift carrying supplies to Korea.

The Army port of Whittier, just south of Anchorage, was under a complete night time blackout such as was imposed during World War II. The Air Force base at Shemya, in the Aleutian Islands, also was darkened. The blackouts were enforced only on military reservations.

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

12-20-50

5-103

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Cold War:

Army Posts on Alaska Coast Holding 'Practice' Black-Outs

ANCHORAGE, Dec. 20 (UP). Military bases along the Alaskan coast were ordered blacked out this week, but the Army said today it was only a "practice maneuver."

The Army post of Whittier, south of here, was under complete nighttime blackout such as was imposed during wartime. Civilians were practicing evacuation.

Practice blackouts and alerts also were ordered this week at

Shemya, Aleutian refueling base for Far Eastern airlift planes, and other seacoast Army, Air Force and Navy bases. Practice blackouts were conducted earlier at Anchorage, Fairbanks, Seward and Kodiak.

An Army spokesman said every base and large city in the territory had been through blackout maneuvers.

Anchorage, Alaska's largest city, was ablaze with lights last night.

Page

Times-Herald 1

Wash. Post _____

Wash. News _____

Wash. Star _____

N.Y. Mirror _____

Date: 12-21-70

62-81284-142

(BLACKOUT)

ANCHORAGE, ALASKA--MILITARY BASES ALONG THE ALASKAN SEACOAST WERE UNDER COMPLETE BLACKOUT DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS TODAY BUT ARMY OFFICERS FLATLY REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE MEASURE.

SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ARMY ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD HALTED PUBLICATION OF NEWS RELEASES CONCERNING TROOP STRENGTH IN THE TERRITORY.

MAJ. JAMES K. BRYAN, PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER FOR THE ALASKAN COMMAND, SAID HIS OFFICE NO LONGER WOULD RELEASE INFORMATION CONCERNING TROOP MOVEMENTS OR TROOP DISPOSAL IN ALASKA. HE SAID THE INFORMATION "BAN" ALSO APPLIED TO THE PACIFIC AIRLIFT CARRYING SUPPLIES TO KOREA.

THE ARMY PORT OF WHITTIER, JUST SOUTH OF ANCHORAGE, WAS UNDER A COMPLETE NIGHTTIME BLACKOUT SUCH AS WAS IMPOSED DURING WORLD WAR II. THE AIR FORCE BASE AT SHEMYA, IN THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS, ALSO WAS DARKENED.

UNITED PRESS STAFF CORRESPONDENT JOHN J. RYAN REPORTED THAT THE BLACKOUTS APPARENTLY HAD BEEN IN FORCE ABOUT A WEEK. RYAN RETURNED FROM A TOUR OF THE COAST YESTERDAY.

THE BLACKOUTS WERE ENFORCED ONLY ON MILITARY RESERVATIONS.

ANCHORAGE, ALASKA'S LARGEST CITY, WAS ABLAZE WITH LIGHTS LAST NIGHT WHILE NEARBY WHITTIER WAS IN ABSOLUTE DARKNESS, RYAN SAID.

1 OBSERVERS BELIEVED THE BLACKOUT WAS PART OF A STEPPED UP
2 ENFORCEMENT OF AN EMERGENCY ALERT PROCLAIMED FOR ARMED FORCES
3 PERSONNEL WHEN THE KOREAN WAR BROKE OUT.

IT WAS NOT KNOWN IMMEDIATELY WHETHER BASES IN THE INTERIOR ALSO WERE BLACKED OUT.

12/20--JL859A

62-10000-142

1.15

(BLACKOUT)

THE AIR FORCE SAID TODAY THAT "BLACKOUT" REGULATIONS IN ALASKA WERE ORDERED BY THE LOCAL THEATER COMMANDER AND DO NOT APPLY TO OTHER THEATERS. ALASKA IS AN AIR FORCE COMMAND.

A SPOKESMAN ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT MILITARY TRAINING IN ALASKA IS "PRETTY REALISTIC."

IN REPLY TO ANOTHER QUESTION, AN ARMY SPOKESMAN SAID THERE IS NO "DAM" ON INFORMATION IN REGARD TO TROOP MOVEMENTS, BUT SINCE JULY 1 THE PRESS HAS BEEN "REQUESTED" NOT TO MENTION MAJOR TROOP MOVEMENTS. HE SAID THIS APPLIES TO CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AS WELL AS THE VARIOUS THEATER COMMANDS. THE SPOKESMAN DECLINED TO DEFINE HIS USE OF "REQUESTED."

12/30--PA 155A

5-113

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, San Francisco
SUBJECT: U. S. ARMY WAR PLANS


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 3-30-51

ATTENTION: ASSISTANT TO DIRECTOR D. M. GLADDEN

Referral/Consult

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Clegg ✓
Mr. Glavin ✓
Mr. Ladd ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tracy ✓
Mr. Harbo ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Laughlin ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Nease ✓
Miss Gandy ✓



The above is being set out for your information in order that the Bureau might be aware that the Army is apparently making war plans similar to the Bureau's war plans.

HFC:mht
100-27336

100-27336-143
RECORDED-66
INDEXED-66

100-27336-143

65 APR 16 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. M. Belmont *AB*
 FROM : V. F. Keay *VFK*
 SUBJECT: WAR PLANS IN HANDLING OF AMERICAN CITIZENS RETURNING FROM ABROAD

DATE: April 27, 1951

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be referred to supervisor Whitson in the Espionage Section for information and consideration. The Liaison Section should be informed of what reply should be given to the State Department.

REE:mhm
 mhm

*Nicholas was
 at the meeting
 of 4-27-51 when
 this was discussed
 with Ramsey and Jones*

RECORDED - 34
 INDEXED - 34

62-81484-144
 MAY 1 5 1951

274

200000 - 10011

ELJ

The Director

May 4, 1951

D. M. Ladd

PROSAB
(PROTECTION OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
BASES OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE)
Bureau file 62-31484)

PURPOSE:

To recommend that a revised chart showing the location of our field offices and resident agencies in relation to the Strategic Air Command bases be furnished to Honorable Thomas A. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force, and General Joseph F. Carroll.

BACKGROUND:

You will recall that by letter dated July 14, 1950, to Honorable Thomas A. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force, with a copy to General Joseph F. Carroll, we furnished to each a copy of a chart showing the information reflected above.

DETAILS:

As I advised you by memorandum dated April 19, 1951, bearing the above caption, the Air Force has furnished a revised list of 32 Strategic Air Command bases. This number includes the 15 bases originally designated, as well as 17 others which will be used or are presently being used by the Strategic Air Command. The cartographic Section has revised the chart previously prepared which shows the location of our field offices and resident agencies in relation to the Strategic Air Command bases identified by the Air Force. Copies of this chart are attached for your information.

The Boston and Kansas City offices have been instructed to advise whether consideration has been given to requesting authority for opening resident agencies near the Sedalia Auxiliary Field, Knob Noster, Missouri, and the Limestone Air Force Base, Limestone, Maine.

Attachment

CD:dew

NOT RECORDED
711 JUN 1 1951

ORIGINAL FILE IN

RECOMMENDATION:

That a copy of the revised chart reflecting the location of our field offices and resident agencies in relation to the Strategic Air Command bases, be furnished to Mr. Finletter and General Carroll.

ACTION:

A suggested letter to Mr. Finletter and General Carroll is attached for your approval.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT


TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 15, 1951

FROM : V. P. KEAY *pln*SUBJECT: *LOSS OF TWO U. S. JET PLANES
OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Referral/Consult

| | |
|------------|-------------------------------------|
| Tolson | _____ |
| Ladd | _____ |
| Clegg | _____ |
| Glavin | _____ |
| Nichols | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Rosen | _____ |
| Tracy | _____ |
| Harbo | _____ |
| Belmont | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Nease | _____ |
| Gandy | _____ |


SWP. nke

RECORDED - 54

INDEXED - 54

JUN 27 1951

62-81484-146

66 JUL 16 1951
Cas 261
o American War Plans

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
AIR MAIL

Date: August 30, 1951

To:



From: Director, FBI

Subject: ARMY WAR PLANS

147

EX - 110 RECORDED - 38 On August 10, 1951, a conference was held in Detroit, which conference was attended by representatives of various U.S. agencies, as well as representatives from the Canadian Army, the Canadian Immigration and Naturalization Service, and [redacted]

[redacted] At the meeting various aspects of sabotage in international institutions, such as railroad bridges, vehicular bridges and tunnels, in and around the Detroit Area, were discussed. The discussions centered primarily around protective measures to be taken in the event of an emergency.


Referral/Consult




[redacted] The Bureau has voiced no objection to [redacted] establishing this relationship since it pertains to a purely local situation. This, however, is being submitted to you for your information in the event the matter is brought to your attention by the officials of [redacted] in Ottawa.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alven _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

cc - Foreign Service Desk



44 SEP 19 1951



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. L. LAUGHLIN

DATE: August 29, 1951

FROM : V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: ARMY WAR PLANS

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Egan _____
 Gurnea _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

b7D

A letter has been received from the SAC at Detroit dated August 14, 1951, which discusses a meeting held on August 10, 1951, with representatives of the Headquarters, Fifth Army; Detroit Police Department; U.S. Coast Guard; Michigan State Police; Immigration and Naturalization Service (U.S. and Canada); Office of Naval Intelligence; Michigan State Guard; Canadian Army and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] An Agent from the Detroit Field Office attended as an observer. At the meeting various aspects of sabotage in international institutions, such as railroad bridges, vehicular bridges and tunnels, were discussed. The discussions centered primarily around protective measures to be taken in the event of an emergency.

The plans discussed and the action to be taken in connection with these plans would appear to fall within the nature of plant protection and consequently not within the jurisdiction of the Bureau. It is believed, however, that the Detroit Field Office should follow this matter closely to make certain that no plans are promulgated which might involve the basic jurisdiction of the Bureau.

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED] The Bureau handles liaison with [REDACTED] in Canada; however, since the contact to be made by Colonel Randolph involves a local situation, it is not believed that the Bureau should voice any objection; however, it is believed that [REDACTED] should be informed of this situation.

b7D

Attachments

SVP:hke

RECORDED - 38

162-81484-147
SEP 5 1951

INDEXED - 38

EX-119

ACTION:

There is attached a letter to the Detroit Field Division to follow this matter and a letter to Mr. Bethel advising him generally of the situation.

✓ 8

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

TO: Mr. Tolson

August 28, 1951

FROM: Mr. Clegg

SUBJECT: [illegible]

Reference is made to your letter of August 1, 1951, in the above-captioned matter.

The above mentioned letter received on August 10, 1951, in New York in the captioned letter, as it is not effective in nature and consequently not within the jurisdiction of the FBI; however, you should call this letter carefully and as a representative to attend the various matters, and as a matter to the extent that you are concerned with it, it is not a matter to be taken to jurisdiction.

RECORDED - 33

148

SFB:hke

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alben _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

MAILED
AUG 30 1951
FBI
NEW YORK

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Detroit

SUBJECT: ARMY WAR PLANS

DATE: August 14, 1951

On August 10, 1951, at the request of Major ALFRED STANSBURY, Fifth Army Regional Office, a meeting was held with representatives from the Headquarters, Fifth Army, Detroit Police Department, U.S. Coast Guard, [redacted] Michigan State Police, Immigration and Naturalization Service (U.S. and Canada), Canadian Army, Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Michigan State Guard. An agent from this office attended as an observer at the request of Major STANSBURY. Referral/Consult

b7D

Colonel RANDOLPH obtained information from those present as to the jurisdiction of the organizations they represented and was advised by [redacted]

b7D

Inspectors of the Detroit Police Department informed that the Detroit police considered the Detroit vehicular bridge and tunnel to be of vital interest and were on the Detroit Police Department list for emergency attention in the event of an emergency.

Lieutenant [redacted] representing the Coast Guard, advised that he had been authorized to set up an Advisory Council of shipping interests to work out proper safeguards for waterfront facilities.

b6
b7C

JP:JC
100-11880

INDEXED - 38

AUG 16 1951

Referral/Consult

EX - 119

COPIES DESTROYED
211 NOV 17 1964

Letter to the Director
August 14, 1951

ARMY WAR PLANS

It was suggested that a meeting be held in the near future and, in the event a representative of this office attends, the Bureau will be promptly advised.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*
 FROM : V. P. KEAY *✓*
 SUBJECT: ~~PROPOSED EXECUTIVE ORDER FOR~~
~~CONTROL OF RADIO STATIONS IN THE~~
 EVENT OF BOMBING OF U.S.

DATE: November 16, 1951

OK
 Tolson ☒
 Ladd ☒
 Clegg ☒
 Glavin ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tracy ☒
 Harbo ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Nease ☒
 Gandy ☒

Mr. Reynolds discussed the proposed Executive Order captioned above with Rear Admiral John R. Redman, Director of Communications on Electronics under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Redman advised that the Executive Order has not as yet been issued, but that it is anticipated that the President will delegate either the Secretary of Defense or the National Security Resources Board to promulgate plans for the implementation of this directive.

You will recall that it has been proposed that in the event of a bombing on the United States, all radio stations would be immediately shut off so that the enemy could not use the beams as homing devices for their bombers or guided missiles. Admiral Redman stated it is planned that each Government agency that utilizes radio communications will submit to the Secretary of Defense or the National Security Resources Board a plan for use of their facilities in accordance with defense plans to be placed in effect in the event of a bombing of this country. Admiral Redman stated that a Colonel Lewis of the Air Force is coordinating this matter.

ACTION:

A contact will be made with Colonel Lewis in order that action may be taken to protect the best interests of the Bureau.

SWR:hke

RECORDED - 26
 INDEXED - 26

62-81484-149

DEC 17 1951

DEC 28 1951

0 American War Plans

*Noted at 11c
 Working committee
 12-26-51
 W.S.S.*

254

g JV

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✓

7 RH

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 28, 1952

FROM : V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult ✓

INFORMATION CONCERNING

There is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum dated January 15, 1952, entitled, "Vulnerability to Guerrilla Action." It was confidentially made available to Mr. Reynolds by [REDACTED]

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

ACTION:

This memorandum is submitted primarily as a matter of general interest. However, liaison will be maintained with [REDACTED] in order that the Bureau may procure a copy of the study for whatever value the same might have.

Attachment

EX. - 28

RECORDED - 24

INDEXED - 24

FEB 1 1952

150

STR:hke

1 ENCL.

JAN 30 1952

May 23, 1952

76-151

Professor Charles Kraus
School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University
Thirty-seventh and O Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Professor Kraus:

This will confirm the telephonic conversation between you and Mr. Nichols, of my office, on Wednesday.

As Mr. Nichols told you, while we deeply appreciate your kind invitation to have a Bureau official designated to your reserve unit of the American Military Government, I regret that our responsibilities will not permit this.

In line with your conversation with Mr. Nichols, you may wish to consider Colonel Charles W. Woodson, Superintendent of the Virginia State Police, Richmond, Virginia. Colonel Woodson was born December 20, 1907, at Austburg, Virginia. He attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute for two years. He entered the field of law enforcement in 1932, when he became a Trooper in the Virginia State Police. He is a graduate of the 15th session of the FBI National Academy, 1940. At the time, he was a Lieutenant in the Virginia State Police and he was elected class president. Woodson was promoted to the rank of Captain in July, 1940, and to Superintendent in November, 1941. He entered the Navy in March of 1944, with a commission and after his release from Naval service returned to the Virginia State Police as Superintendent, with the rank of Colonel. For the last several years he has been a panel member of the National Academy. He is a man of the highest character.

LBH:hmc

cc - Mr. Clegg
Mr. Mohr
Richmond
Pittsburgh
Norfolk

25 MAY 11 1952

RECEIVED

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Belmont
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

JUN 10 1952

RECEIVED
MAY 23 7 11 PM '52

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 76-151

Professor Charles Kraus

May 25, 1952

In the event Colonel Hodson is not interested, the following two names are being suggested:

Deputy Chief Claude J. Staylor of the Norfolk, Virginia Police Department, who was born March 6, 1912, at Norfolk, Virginia, is a high school graduate and attended a police training course at the University of Richmond in 1939. He was a professional baseball player in 1933-1936 and in 1936 was appointed to the Norfolk Police Department. He became Captain in 1943 and Deputy Chief in 1949. He attended the 30th session of the FBI National Academy, 1949, and upon graduation was appointed in charge of the Detective Bureau, Norfolk Police Department. Staylor is thoroughly honest and very capable.

Chief Paul M. Houser of the Altoona, Pennsylvania Police Department was born August 24, 1912, at Altoona, Pennsylvania. He attended high school and two years of college at the University of Maryland. He was appointed to the Police Department in 1936. He became Sergeant in 1940, and was promoted to Chief in 1948. He attended the 47th session of the FBI National Academy in 1951, and was elected Vice-President of the class. Houser makes a fine appearance.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT:

DATE: May 7, 1952

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Nichols ✓
Glavin ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Nease ✓
Gandy ✓

Bill Hillman, the author of the recent book "Mr. President," brought Professor Charles Kraus, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, to the Bureau on May 6. Professor Kraus, home telephone - Oliver 6951, advised that he has the responsibility for training a reserve unit for the American Military Government, which unit is fully integrated and is the only such unit in existence. It is planned to fully train this unit and to keep the unit in a state of readiness. Should war break out the unit could go into occupied areas and take over. The training would consist of training once a week and two weeks of summer camp.

Professor Kraus needs a man to head the public safety section. Bill Hillman, who has been helping him, told him that he should try to interest the Director and have one of the top officials so designated. The individual they are seeking must have a law enforcement background, be able to serve not only as chief of police of a large occupied area but more important be able to train up the democratic techniques and procedures.

The man would be given a reserve status and obviously if the unit were activated the man they are seeking for this position would be activated with the unit. I told Professor Kraus that while the Director would be very happy to help out in every way due to his long friendship with Bill Hillman it would be absolutely impossible to designate any of the top officials from the Bureau since their services would be thoroughly needed in the event such an emergency would break out and we might as well be realistic at the moment. Kraus, of course, was very persuasive in advocating the importance of his cause. I was just as persuasive in advocating the importance of ours. Kraus then wondered if we knew of any topflight men in the vicinity who might be interested. I told him that we would give this some thought and would let him know.

cc - Mr. Clegg
cc - Mr. Mohr

LBN:md

RECORDED - 73

INDEXED - 73

62-81484-151
10 MAY 29 1952

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 1-2331-

CRIMINAL

O American War Plans

Let. to Kraus
5/23/52
h 62

ADDENDUM: 5/14/52 AVH

Mr. Clegg suggests that we might consider the following:

COLONEL CHARLES W. WOODSON, SUPERINTENDENT, VIRGINIA STATE POLICE, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA: Born 12/22/07, Rustburg, Virginia. Attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute two years. Entered law enforcement as Trooper, Virginia State Police, 1932. Graduate 13th session, NA, 1940. Was then Lieutenant, Virginia State Police. Elected NA class president. Promoted to Captain, July, 1940, and to Superintendent, November, 1941. Entered Navy, March 1944, with commission. After release from Naval Service, returned as Superintendent with rank of Colonel. For the last several years has been panel member at NA. Man of highest character, (thoroughly Bureau minded and our good friend) (1-2331).

DEPUTY CHIEF CLAUDE J. STAYLOR, NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT: Born 3/6/12, Norfolk, Virginia. High school graduate and attended police training course from the University of Richmond, 1939. Professional baseball player 1933-36. Appointed Norfolk PD in 1936. Became Captain Norfolk PD in 1948 and Deputy Chief in 1949. Attended 38th session of NA, 1948 and upon graduation appointed in charge of Detective Bureau, Norfolk PD. Thoroughly honest and very capable, loyalty to Bureau unquestioned. (1-5329).

CHIEF VAUL E. ROUZER, ALTOONA, PENNSYLVANIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT: Born 8/24/12, Altoona, Pennsylvania. Attended high school and two years at University of Maryland. He was appointed to the Police Department in 1936. Became Sergeant, 1940, Chief, 1945. Attended 47th session of NA, spring, 1951. Elected Vice-President of class. Makes fine appearance and has a good attitude.

RECOMMENDATION:

I would recommend that we suggest the name of Colonel Woodson to Hillman.

5-15

OK.
H

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 28, 1952

FROM : SAC, El Paso

AIRMAIL SPECIAL DELIVERYSUBJECT: ~~INTERNATIONAL SITUATION~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

As of possible interest to the Bureau, in my most recent conversations with Colonel JAMES PARKER and Major GEORGE PRUSSING, of the Strategic Air Command, Biggs Air Force Base, El Paso, Texas, they have advised of a growing concern over the present international situation. Both individuals stated they believe that it is highly possible that the United States will be attacked sometime in the very near future. They could offer nothing concrete as indicative of the reasons for their thinking other than a most recent order to them that all key personnel on their base must be armed at all times.

If any concrete information concerning the international situation comes to my attention, through these or other sources, the Bureau will be advised.

HGF:bjs

REGISTERED

INDEXED-126
RECORDED-126

EX-25

62-81464-153

65 JUL 11 1952 OFFICE OF ORIGIN: EL PASO, TEXAS
CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. HOOVER

DATE: July 17, 1952

FROM : SAC AUERBACH

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ~~AIR~~ FORCE DEFENSE

Referral/Consult

I was today confidentially advised by SAC Contact

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Ladd ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Clegg ✓
Mr. Glavin ✓
Mr. Harbo ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tracy ✓
Mr. Laughlin ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Winterrowd ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Holloman ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

Heck

o America War Plans.

22 1952

RECORDED - 75

62-81484-154

INDEXED - 75

RDA:LM

60 AUG 5 1952

619

RM

Director, FBI

7/24/53


cc
SAC, Butte

Referral/Consult

MOUNTAIN HOME AIR FORCE BASE

0 MOUNTAIN HOME, IDAHO

American War Plans



The above information is being furnished the Bureau for completion of its files.

PW:iap

62-81484- ✓

NOT RECORDED

146 JUL 30 1953

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56 AUG 6 1953

INITIALS #4 ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-85557-653

MR. A. H. BELMONT

February 5, 1953

W. A. FRANIGAN

CONFIDENTIAL FILES
MAINTAINED IN ROOM 7231

The file on "American War Plans," Bureau file 62-81484, contains much classified information affecting the national defense, including programs under way or projected by the military agencies of the United States, as well as data concerning emergency procedures to be followed in United States establishments abroad.

ACTION:

It is recommended that this file be continued to be maintained in Room 7231, and that its contents be made available only on a "need-to-know" basis.

LK:hgm
66-17404

cc: 62-81484

62-81484 ✓
NOT RECORDED
146 FEB 10 1953

ORIGINAL FILED 62-81484

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Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

100-100000

Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

August 14, 1953

Director, FBI

S. 2505,
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS,
FIRST SESSION

Reference is made to your memorandum dated August 10, 1953, which requested my views concerning S. 2505, Eighty-third Congress, First Session, which is a bill to amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, and for other purposes.

The bill would provide the following:

That during a state of war or when hostile action appears imminent, the head of any federal agency may authorize the destruction of any records in his custody that cannot otherwise be effectively disposed of under statutes, in U. S. establishments retention of such records, in U. S. establishments outside of the United States or, in the case of records within the United States, when the retention of such records would imperil the security of the United States.

That during the existence of a state of war or when hostile action appears imminent, the head of any federal agency may authorize the destruction of any records, books, maps, photographs, documents, papers or written or printed material pertaining to Government contracts and required to be retained in the custody of any person when their retention would imperil the security of the United States.

That the head of each federal agency by regulation shall, in the interest of economy and efficiency, authorize the destruction of such war contracts notwithstanding provisions in individual contracts to the contrary, at any time from three years after disposition of termination inventory or three years after final settlement of such war contract. Such regulation may include provision for making and retaining of photographs or microphotographs which would have the same force and effect as the originals

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Gandy

ESS:hke

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156

Aug 12 1953

RECORDED-62

INDEXED-62

thereof and would be treated as originals for the purpose of admissibility in evidence.

In so far as the FBI is concerned, there appears to be no objections to the provisions of the bill concerning destruction of records, etc., during wartime or when hostile action appears imminent and such destruction cannot be made in accordance with existing statutory provisions.

The provisions of the bill pertaining to the destruction of war contract records do not contemplate the period of hostility and provide that the head of the federal agency destroying such records may provide for microphotographs of the records. You may wish to consider the fact that such war contract records might be needed for evidentiary purposes subsequent to the three-year period and whether microphotographs thereof would suffice.

2



ENCLOSURE

62-81484-157

RECORDED - 30
INDEXED - 30

Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

August 18, 1953

John Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

158

W/H

S. 2505,
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS,
FIRST SESSION

Reference is made to your memorandum dated August 10, 1953, which requested the views of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference concerning S. 2505, Eighty-third Congress, First Session, which is a bill to amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, and for other purposes.

The bill would provide the following:

That during a ^{America} state of ^{Plans} war or when hostile action appears imminent, the head of any Federal agency may authorize the destruction of any records in his custody that cannot otherwise be effectively disposed of under statutory provisions when the retention of such records, in U. S. establishments outside of the United States, would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States or, in the case of records within the United States, when the retention of such records would imperil the security of the United States.

That during the existence of a state of war or when hostile action appears imminent, the head of any Federal agency may authorize the destruction of any records, books, maps, photographs, documents, papers or written or printed material pertaining to Government contracts and required to be retained in the custody of any person when their retention would imperil the security of the United States.

That the head of each Federal agency by regulation shall, in the interest of economy and efficiency, authorize the destruction of such war contract records, notwithstanding provisions in individual contracts to the contrary, at any time from three years after disposition of termination inventory or three years after final settlement of such war contract. Such

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AUG 18 1953

56 SEP 1 1953

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- Tolson
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- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Laughlin
- Mohr
- Tele. Rm.
- Holloman
- Gandy

regulation may include provision for making and retaining of photographs or microphotographs which would have the same force and effect as the originals thereof and would be treated as originals for the purpose of admissibility in evidence.

This matter has been considered by the members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and in so far as the IIC is concerned, there appear to be no objections to the provisions of the bill concerning destruction of records, etc., during wartime or when hostile action appears imminent and such destruction cannot be made in accordance with existing statutory provisions.

The provisions of the bill pertaining to the destruction of war contract records do not contemplate the period of hostility and provide that the head of the Federal agency destroying such records may provide for microphotographs of the records. You may wish to consider the fact that such war contract records might be needed for evidentiary purposes subsequent to the three-year period and whether microphotographs thereof would suffice.

(The observations of the military members of the IIC were obtained through liaison and are reflected in this memorandum.)

1954
JAN 15 1954

62-81484-158

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: September 11, 1953

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: U. S. WAR PLANS

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
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 Belmont _____
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 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
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0 AMERICAN WAR PLANS

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

CC - R. T. Harbo

LW:fk
ke

RECORDED - 41

162-81484-159
23 SEP 18 1953

50 SEP 21 1953

124

Handwritten initials and signatures, including "Harbo" and "LW:fk".

Referral/Consult

January 21, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

0
American War Plans

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-370055-

Tolson
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Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

NOT RECORDED
176 JAN 26 1955

7-189

4.

Upon my return to the office, in the absence of Mr. Belmont, I discussed this matter generally with Mr. Keay and asked that there be prepared for me at once a memorandum from Mr. Belmont's Division setting forth any pending matters with the Department that affected directly or indirectly a smooth-running operation in case of a national emergency and I asked Mr. Keay to convey to Mr. Harbo the request to prepare a memorandum concerning any pending matters in our relocation site which have not yet been consummated in order that we can give prompt and appropriate attention to completing that project.

Very truly yours,

J E H
John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:mpd

JEH:mpd

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| | |
|-----------------|--------------------|
| SENT FROM D. O. | |
| TIME | 12:38 |
| DATE | 1/22/58 |
| BY | <i>[Signature]</i> |

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

AUGUST 19, 1954

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Referral/Consult

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that [Redacted] be advised
that there is no Bureau objection to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

ESS:hke

COPY/ki

100-514-1
NOT RECORDED
145 AUG 27 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SAC, DENVER

June 9, 1954

DIRECTOR, FBI

AIR FORCE LIAISON,
CIVIL AIR PATROL

Answer in 1st. Plane

By letter dated June 5, 1954, the Civil Air Patrol, Washington, D. C., advised that, "One of the missions of the Civil Air Patrol in its role as the Civilian Auxiliary of the United States Air Force will be, in time of mobilization, aerial search for aircraft bearing foreign agents or military personnel engaged in sabotage, espionage or actual military operations which penetrate our borders." They advised that in time of war this mission will be performed at the request of the Air Intelligence Service Squadron. There is attached for your information a copy of a letter addressed to the Civil Air Patrol clarifying this misunderstanding.

You are instructed to contact AISC Headquarters at Colorado Springs and advise them of this apparent misunderstanding on the part of the Civil Air Patrol and request that they take steps to insure that other misunderstandings of this nature will not recur.

[Signature]
Attachment

NWP:hke

62-81414-

JUN 10 1954

[Signature]

62-81414-1

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-81414-1

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

124

COMM - FBI
JUN 10 1954
MAILED 28

MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

Date: April 6, 1954

A. H. BELMONT

AIR FORCE LIAISON
4602ND AIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SQUADRON
American War Plans

There is attached a draft of a proposed brochure prepared by the 4602nd Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS) and received by letter dated April 1, 1954, from Brigadiere General W. M. Burgess, Deputy for Intelligence, Air Defense Command.

This draft has been reviewed and there appears to be nothing objectionable to the Bureau contained therein. This draft merely sets forth the wartime mission of the AISS to collect positive intelligence from downed enemy aircraft and foreign airmen. It clearly points out on page two that the AISS has no subversive or domestic intelligence mission and in no way conflicts with the internal security jurisdiction of the FBI. The draft clearly states the procedures for notification by civilians and by law enforcement agencies and contains instructions as to the type of information desired. When published, it is believed that the AISS will distribute the proposed brochure not only to our field offices but to Civil Defense Officials, law enforcement agencies and other individuals who may be in a position to assist the AISS in the event of an emergency.

You will recall that the Bureau took over the handling of police liaison for the AISS. Initial contacts have been made with all law enforcement agencies by our field offices, and this project is being handled on a continuing basis.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to General Burgess advising him that the attached draft has been reviewed and that there appears to be nothing objectionable to the Bureau contained therein. The letter also requests that the AISS make available to the Bureau a copy of the brochure in its final form so that our field offices may be advised of the publication and content. General Burgess has also been requested to furnish copies of the brochure to our field offices and resident agencies through their regular liaison contacts.

Attachment

NWP:hke

162-81484-
NOT RECORDED
11 1954

124
51 APR 19 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-81484-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. Rosen *Rosen*DATE: January 6, 1954 *Viper*FROM : L. N. Conroy *Conroy*SUBJECT: SENATOR JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY
NAME CHECK REQUESTSYNOPSIS: AMERICAN WAR PLANS

Reference is made to my memorandum, 12-16-53, concerning name checks received from G-2 on 129 Senators and Congressmen who are to be invited to the Pentagon early in January, 1954, where they are to be briefed on the future war plans of the US. As stated in referenced memorandum this check is being confined to main files and G-2 is being furnished information only in instances where we conducted investigations. The FBI has not conducted an investigation of Senator Joseph McCarthy. However, you will recall that the Senator has been connected with four matters in which the Bureau has been interested: (1) Alleged irregularities in the General Election, State of Maryland, November 7, 1950. (2) Allegation in December, 1951, that Senator McCarthy committed sodomy on Lieutenant [redacted] US Army. Pertinent information concerning [redacted] was furnished to General A. R. Bolling, G-2 on 1-22-52. (3) Investigation in 1950 to determine the source of Senator McCarthy's information concerning Edward G. Posniak, the subject of a loyalty investigation. (4) In 1952 the Bureau assisted the Loyalty Review Board and the Civil Service Commission by conducting latent fingerprint examinations in an attempt to identify the Senator's source regarding the Board's meeting on February 13, 14, 1951. Senator McCarthy, although involved in each of the above matters, has not been the subject of an investigation conducted by the Bureau. It is therefore recommended that G-2 be advised the FBI has conducted no investigation pertinent to their inquiry.

RECOMMENDATION:

If [redacted] approve, the name check request will be stamped "No investigation conducted by the FBI pertinent to your inquiry," and will be returned to G-2 by the Liaison Section.

RVH:res

1 - V. P. Kease

56-9756

62-96332

121-23278

121-35707

JAN 28 1954

NOT RECORDED
176 JAN 18 1954

ORIGINAL - N

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-60527-367

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DETAILS:

Reference is made to my memorandum dated December 10, 1953, concerning name checks submitted by G-2 on 129 Senators and Congressmen who are to attend a conference at the Pentagon early in January, 1954. According to G-2 this conference is for the purpose of briefing the members of Congress on future US war plans.

As set forth in the referenced memorandum the search in general indices was confined to main files and data is being furnished to G-2 only in instances where we have conducted investigations.

The FBI has not conducted an investigation of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. However, you will recall that the Senator has been connected with four matters in which the Bureau has been interested. These are as follows:

(1) In an investigation entitled "Unknown Subjects; Alleged Irregularities, General Election, State of Maryland, November 7, 1950; Perjury" it was ascertained that Senator McCarthy was involved with others in the issuance of certain campaign literature which made it appear that Senator Tydings presided over a Senate investigation in such a manner as to "white-wash" charges concerning disloyalty of State Department employees. Senator McCarthy was not mentioned as a subject in this investigation. The Department closed this case by memorandum dated October 16, 1953.

(2) In a letter dated December 29, 1951, addressed to Senator Benton of Connecticut bearing the purported signature of Lieutenant [redacted] it was alleged that Senator McCarthy committed sodomy on [redacted] and on others known to [redacted] and all other persons interviewed denied knowing McCarthy and also denied having engaged in any activities whatsoever with him. Results of this investigation were furnished to the Department on January 22, 1952. Information concerning Lieutenant [redacted] was furnished to General A. R. Bolling, G-2, on January 22, 1952.

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(3) In July, 1950, at the request of the Department the Bureau conducted an investigation to determine the source from which Senator McCarthy obtained information concerning one Edward G. Posniak, the subject of a loyalty investigation. This case is entitled "Unknown Subjects; (Source of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's Information Regarding Government Employees) Removal of Government Property; Loyalty of Government Employees." It concerned a statement made by Senator McCarthy during a speech on the floor of the Senate, July 25, 1950, in which he mentioned Posniak and at the same time distributed copies of a document which purported to be a Civil Service Commission summary of the investigation of Posniak.

On July 25, 1950, the Attorney General requested the Bureau to conduct an investigation to determine the source from which Senator McCarthy obtained the above summary indicating in his request that there may have been a violation of Title 18, Sections 641 and 2071, United States Code.

The investigation failed to establish conclusively the identity of Senator McCarthy's source. It did indicate that may

possibly have been the source of Senator McCarthy's information. The summary distributed by the Senator was apparently not an authentic copy of any document prepared by the Civil Service Commission, the State Department or the Loyalty Review Board.

The results of this investigation were sent to the Deputy Attorney General on November 7, 1950, and December 7, 1950. On the latter date the Department was advised that no additional investigation was to be conducted and no further request for investigation has been received from the Department since that time.


(4) "Unknown Subject (Source of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's Information Regarding Minutes of Loyalty Review Board's Meeting of February 13, 14, 1951) Miscellaneous Information Concerning Loyalty of Government Employees." The Department by memorandum dated January 22, 1952, requested the Bureau to conduct an investigation in an attempt to identify Senator McCarthy's source for his press release January 5, 1952. This release was allegedly based on the confidential minutes of the Loyalty Review Board's meeting February 13-14, 1951.

The Civil Service Commission had conducted a previous investigation in this matter. On February 13, 1952, Deputy Attorney General Vanech advised he thought it would be better for the Civil Service Commission to conduct this investigation. Therefore, the Bureau did not conduct an investigation in this matter

but did cooperate with the Loyalty Review Board and the Civil Service Commission in that it conducted such latent fingerprint examinations as were requested.

OBSERVATION:

It is noted that although Senator McCarthy was involved in each of the above matters, he was not the subject of these inquiries and therefore G-2 is being advised that no investigation concerning Senator McCarthy has been conducted by the FBI pertinent to their inquiry.



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. Rosen

DATE: January 8,
1954

FROM : L. N. Conroy

SUBJECT: REPRESENTATIVE ALFRED D. SIEMINSKI
NAME CHECK REQUESTSYNOPSIS: AMERICAN WAR PLANS

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Gearty _____
 Mohr _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
 Miss Gandy _____

Reference is made to my memorandum, 12-16-53, on name checks from G-2 on Congressmen to attend conference at Pentagon in January, 1954, on war plans. Indices search confined to main files and G-2 being furnished only results of FBI investigations. Name check received from G-2 regarding Congressman Alfred D. Sieminski. Investigation conducted 1942 regarding telegram Sieminski sent President alleging sale of oil to Germany by British and American companies. Sieminski apologized for telegram stating allegations had little basis in fact and telegram sent on impulse. Persons contacted incidental to handling this matter described Sieminski as loyal; however, it was determined in 1942 that Sieminski was active in American Slav Congress which was cited by Attorney General in 1948. Results of investigation transmitted to G-2 in 1943.

Sieminski has expressed a strong anti-Communist feeling, and has, on numerous occasions, displayed a friendly attitude toward Bureau. Bureau contacted in 1952 and 1953 by Sieminski and wife in regards to children of Mrs. Sieminski still living in Poland whom she desired to have come to U. S. They were referred to State Department. In March, 1953, Sieminski, while at White House, made remarks that Senator McCarthy may be getting information in FBI files from FBI Agents or former Agents. He apologized when informed of sanctity of FBI files. Attached memorandum refers G-2 to information previously furnished them, and advised that FBI has not conducted investigation concerning Sieminski.

Recommendation:

If you approve, the attached memorandum will be transmitted to G-2 by the Liaison Section.

Attachment

C. E. St. Vincent:mdc

1 - V. P. Key

62-81484- ✓
 NOT RECORDED
 113 JAN 22 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-60521-

DETAILS:

Reference is made to my memorandum dated December 16, 1953, concerning name check requests submitted by G-2 on 129 United States Senators and Representative. These members of Congress are to attend a conference at the Pentagon in January, 1954, where they will be briefed on future United States war plans. As previously indicated, the indices search was confined to main files only, and G-2 is being furnished information only in instances where the FBI has conducted an investigation.

FBI files reflect that in June, 1942, the State Department requested an investigation as a result of a telegram Alfred D. Sieminski had sent to President Roosevelt. This telegram charged that the British Persian Oil Company was selling oil to Germany and that the Adam Opel Foreign Branch of General Motors in Germany had declared 13 million dollars profit to American investors for the quarter ending in January, 1942. Sieminski, when interviewed, explained that an unknown individual, whom he had met in a restaurant in New York, had furnished him the information on which he based his telegram to the President; that when he sent the telegram he was emotionally upset as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor and also because he had a brother in the Pacific area. He subsequently wrote a letter to the Director explaining his action in sending the telegram, and apologizing for his impulsive behavior which caused the investigation.

No one interviewed during the course of the investigation indicated that Sieminski was anything but a patriotic citizen; however, it was revealed that in 1942 he was connected with the American Slav Congress as Executive Secretary to the President.

It is to be noted that an investigation by the FBI in 1943 failed to reveal that leadership of the American Slav Congress was actually under control of the Communist Party at that time. The American Slav Congress was cited by the Attorney General as subversive on June 1, 1948.

Results of the afore-mentioned investigation were furnished to G-2 in September, 1943, inasmuch as Sieminski was attending Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

Referral/Consult

In March, 1952, and in July, 1953, the FBI was contacted by Representative Sieminski and his wife, for advice and information regarding a son and daughter of Mrs. Sieminski, by a former marriage, who were living in Poland. Efforts had been made to effect their escape from Poland to the United States without success, and it was the opinion of Mrs. Sieminski that possibly the Polish Ambassador to the United States could be of some help. Congressman Sieminski stated in July, 1953, that he was considering resigning his position as a United States Congressman, and as a private citizen go to Sweden and use Sweden as a base in an attempt to personally enter Poland and effect the release of the two children. The Congressman and his wife were informed that the facts as furnished by him and his wife would be made a matter of record, but that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Department of State.

In March, 1953, Congressman Sieminski attended a luncheon at the White House at which time a discussion arose concerning FBI "raw" files. Sieminski advanced the opinion to General Persons, Deputy Assistant to the President, and other Congressmen that Senator McCarthy may be getting information contained in FBI files from FBI Agents or former FBI Agents. Sieminski was immediately contacted by a representative of the Bureau and advised of the sanctity of FBI files and how highly this responsibility is held

by Bureau employees. He was also shown an extract of the agreement each Agent makes when he enters on duty with the Bureau. The Congressman thereupon apologized for his remarks, and admitted that his heart had ruled his head in the matter. He said that he regarded the FBI as the greatest bastion of integrity and honor, and that he held the Director in the highest esteem.

Congressman Sieminski, in his correspondence with the Bureau, has frequently expressed a desire to assist the Bureau whenever possible, and in January, 1951, he advised that as a member of the Appropriations Committee, the Bureau could have anything it desired so far as he was concerned. He has often expressed a very strong anti-Communist feeling, and has utilized the Director's speeches on the subject of Communism in his political campaigns.

Attached hereto is a memorandum which refers G-2 to information transmitted to them on September 17, 1943. G-2 will be further advised that no investigation has been conducted by the FBI pertinent to their inquiry with regard to Sieminski. (94-43227) (100-113124)

R. A. Rosen

January 5, 1954

R. L. R. Conroy

MEMORANDUM
 TO : SAC, NEW YORK
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK
 SUBJECT: CHAVEZ

SYNOPSIS:

You will recall my memorandum of 12/10/53, advising that C-2 had requested name checks on 120 Congressmen and Senators, including Chavez, in connection with War Relocation Conference to be held at the Pentagon early January. Search and review restricted to main files since it was a good C-2 would only be furnished results of our investigations. C-2 interviewed numerous complainants re Hatch Act violations growing out of 1940 New Mexico primary contest between Chavez and Congressman John J. Farsey. Charges were made against both Chavez and Farsey supporters. Results furnished Department who advised no investigations desired. On 1/10/54, Albuquerque Office received second-hand verbal allegation that Chavez made a fortune in connection with the Flood and Youth Center money donated to Mexico. Criminal source interviewed and advised he used in such information and apparently was misinterpreted. Results furnished Department on 2/20/54, advising no investigation warranted. I am presently conducting investigation re bribery, fraud against the Government (Conflict of Interest) conspiracy, concerning Chavez. It was alleged by one Frank Taylor, used car dealer and bad check artist, Albuquerque, that Chavez had agreed to aid the J.C. Construction Company, Phoenix in obtaining a Government loan in return for which Chavez was to receive \$50,000 through an intermediary. Investigation developed no evidence Chavez assisted or agreed to assist the construction company. No Government loan obtained by company. No evidence intermediary between company and Senator did in fact act in such capacity. Victor Chavez Nixon, the Senator's daughter, and wife of the nationally syndicated columnist George Nixon, is the alleged intermediary. The Criminal Division is presently considering prosecution of the owners of the J.C. Construction Company and Mrs. Nixon for violation of the Conflict of Interest statute as evidence exists that she received \$500 from the J.C. Company as its bookkeeper.

1 ENCL.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-11111

142-21417 -

JAN 10 1954

JAN 10 1954

representative while still employed on his father's Congressional payroll. An inquiry developed evidence that Chavez was unaware of the above activities of his daughter. FBI received numerous allegations of election irregularities as result of the November, 1952, General Election in the State of New Mexico. Three investigations pending involving improper marking and handling of ballots, stuffing of ballot boxes and a contribution of \$5,000 to Chavez's campaign by three labor unions. These cases on Department decision are being held in abeyance pending result of investigation by Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections. 12/10/52, news release by above Committee indicated Committee recommended that 30,000 votes cast during the above election be thrown out for violation of the Secrecy Laws. There has been no dissemination of any of the above information outside the Department. G-2 is being furnished information re bribery investigation as it concerns Chavez. His daughter is not being identified as the intermediary. G-2 is being advised FBI presently conducting election law investigations re General Election New Mexico 11/52. They are being referred to the Department for any additional information desired.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached memorandum be furnished to G-2 through Liaison Channels.

DETAILS:

You will recall my memorandum of December 16, 1953, wherein you were advised that G-2 had submitted name checks on 100 Congressmen and Senators in connection with a conference to be held at the Pentagon concerning future war plans in the United States. The conference is scheduled for early January. It was agreed at that time that we would disseminate to G-2 only the results of our investigations and therefore this search and review was restricted to main files only.

Our files reflect that as a result of the New Mexico primary election of September 14, 1949, between Congressman John J. Dempsey and Chavez numerous complaints were received concerning violations of the Hatch Act. These charges were made against the supporters of both Chavez and Dempsey. The Bureau interviewed the complainants to obtain the facts, submitted the results to the Department and was advised in each case that no investigation need be made. (62-55700-125)

On January 16, 1953, the Albuquerque Office received a letter written by E. J. Crawford, prominent businessman, Carlisle, New Mexico, which contained general allegations that Senator Chavez made a fortune in connection with the "Hoof and Mouth Disease" money that was donated to Mexico. Crawford attributed this information to one Howell Bruner of El Paso, Texas. The latter when interviewed by Bureau Agents advised that he knew nothing concerning the activities of Senator Chavez and stated that apparently there has been a misinterpretation of some of his statements. The Bureau furnished this information to the Department on 2/26/53, advising that no further investigation was contemplated. The above information is not being disseminated to G-2. (46-19270)

The Bureau is presently conducting investigation captioned "Senator Dennis Chavez, et al, Bribery Fraud Against the Government (Conflict of Interest) Conspiracy." This case

involved allegations received from one [redacted] used car dealer and had check artist, Albuquerque, New Mexico, to the effect that Sam and [redacted] of the [redacted]

[redacted] Phoenix, Arizona, had in September, 1951, agreed with Senator Chavez to pay the Senator, through an intermediary, the sum of \$50,000 in return for which Senator Chavez was to aid the Construction Company in obtaining a Government loan. No evidence has been developed to indicate that Senator Chavez had assisted or agreed to assist the building contractors or their Company. It was further determined that the building contractors did not obtain a Government loan. No evidence was uncovered to establish that the person named by the complainant as the intermediary between the contractors and the Senator did in fact act in such capacity. [redacted]

and [redacted] of the nationally syndicated columnist [redacted] is the all red intermediary. Our investigation did not establish that [redacted] ever contacted or discussed with [redacted] any phase of her relationship with the building contractors. Our inquiry developed evidence indicating that Chavez was unaware of [redacted] dealings with the Hoffmanns of the Construction Company. The Criminal Division is presently considering the advisability of effecting prosecution against the Hoffmanns and [redacted] for violation of the Conflict of Interest Statute as evidence exists that the [redacted] in September, 1951, accepted \$2500 as the Washington representative of the CCC Company while still employed on [redacted] Congressional payroll.

C-2 is being advised of the above investigation as it relates to Senator Chavez. C-2 is being referred to the Criminal Division of the Government for any further details of the investigation they may desire. (55-2462)

As a result of the November 4, 1952, General election in the State of New Mexico out of which Chavez was elected to a Senate seat, 36 allegations of election

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b7C

irregularities were received by the Bureau. Of this total there are presently three cases still in pending status, the balance having been closed by the Department. The pending cases are as follows:

SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE; INVESTIGATION AND HANDLING OF
BALLOTS IN THE SENATORIAL ELECTION, GENERAL ELECTION,
OCTOBER 4, 1952, SECTION 1273. (56-1250)

Complaint received to effect that during a recount of the ballots in the senatorial election, a number of ballots were observed that had been irregularly and improperly marked. All investigation requested by the Department has been completed with the exception of the examination of certain ballots currently in the possession of the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections. The Subcommittee will not release disputed ballots until completion of its examination. Liaison maintained by Washington field Office with committee regarding release. Department memorandum of 12/2/53, states Government should, upon release of material, petition to U.S. District Court to impound the ballots needed by the Bureau. Department requested by memorandum dated 12/6/53, to advise just what ballots should be examined and the nature of the examination desired.

" [REDACTED], ET AL, PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 1952
SECTION 1273. (56-1277) b6 b7C

This case involves the alleged stuffing of ballot boxes by [REDACTED] and others, in Albuquerque on the nights of November 3 and 4, 1953. Investigation conducted indicates a possible perjury violation at hearing before Senate Subcommittee. Investigation completed September 30, 1953, and Department by memoranda dated October 27 and November 23, 1953, advises that further investigation is required, but that it should be deferred until after the Senate Subcommittee submits its report.

SENATOR MARK A. FERRETT (D-NO),
WASHINGTON, D.C. (56-12442)

This case involves allegations that [redacted] of the International Industrial Garment Workers Union, William Green (deceased) of the American Federation of Labor and [redacted] of the United Mine Workers had contributed in excess of \$5,000 to the campaign fund of Senator Chavez. An investigation all denied such contributions although [redacted] stated the "IUCW 1952 Campaign Committee" did contribute 1,000 to Chavez's campaign fund. [redacted] committee is an organization separate and distinct from the union itself. Investigation also determined that three New Mexico corporations had donated to the fund. All investigation completed and the Department on 1/21/53, requested to advise as to whether further action contemplated. Department's reply dated 5/1/53, advised that to render an opinion at this time would be premature and that it is of the opinion that this matter should be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the other cases in New Mexico. The Department followed and in reply dated 12/8/53, advised it was still of the same opinion as expressed in its memorandum of May 1, 1953.

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Press release by Senator Mark A. Ferrett (D-No) December 12, 1953, indicates Subcommittee, by a vote of two to one, is recommending that 30,000 votes case Durin captioned election be thrown out for violation of secret laws. Senator Ferrett states a final report of the Subcommittee will be made in about six weeks and that its findings will be subject to approval of the parent Rules Committee and the Senate. Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., (D-Mo), the dissenting member of the Committee contends "no proof of fraud" found.

Concerning the above C-2 is being advised that the FBI is conducting election law investigations growing out of the November 4, 1952, General Election in the State of New Mexico. They have been referred to the Criminal Division of the Department for the results of these investigations. Memorandum to C-2 does include the press release of 12/12/53, by Senator Mark A. Ferrett.

Mr. A. Rosen

January 8, 1954

Mr. L. N. Conroy

LOUIS C. RABAUT
CONGRESSMAN - MICHIGAN
NAME CHECK REQUEST

SYNOPSIS: AMERICAN WAR PLANS

Reference is made to my memorandum dated 12-16-53, concerning name check requests submitted by G-2 on 129 Senators and Representatives who will attend conference at Pentagon in January, 1952, where they will be briefed on future war plans. As previously indicated, indices search confined to main files and G-2 being furnished information only in instances where FBI conducted investigations. Congressman Rabaut was the subject of an investigation conducted by FBI in latter part of 1952 and 1953, in case entitled "Louis C. Rabaut, Bribery," 58-2827. Matter first referred to Bureau in November, 1952, by USA Philip Hart, Detroit, Michigan, upon receipt of affidavit of [redacted] attorney, alleging Congressman Rabaut received fees for assisting aliens in immigration and naturalization matters. [redacted] interviewed and denied personal knowledge of acceptance of fees from aliens by Rabaut. He volunteered information that affidavit was given by him at request of Richard Durant, political opponent of Congressman Rabaut. [redacted] stated he was told by Durant there were other instances of similar nature. Results of interview furnished USA Hart who advised he would not entertain prosecution. On 12-15-52, Assistant Attorney General requested that Richard Durant be interviewed. [redacted] Durant and all others interviewed unable to furnish evidence substantiating original allegation. Results of investigation furnished USA at Detroit and to the Criminal Division of the Department. Department advised by memorandum 11-5-53, that evidence not sufficient to base prosecution thereon. Rabaut described in files as very friendly toward FBI. Name check request requested subversive information only. Therefore, G-2 is being advised the FBI conducted no investigation pertinent to their inquiry concerning Rabaut.

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b7C

ORIGINAL FILED IN 58-2827

RECOMMENDATION:

Tolson _____ If you approve, G-2 will be advised by the Liaison Section
Ladd _____ that the FBI conducted no investigation pertinent to their inquiry
Nichols _____ concerning Rabaut.
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

53 JAN 19 1954

1 - V. P. Keay

JCG:hr:bjd

162-21487-
NOT RECORDED
176 JAN 15 1954

DETAILS:

Reference is made to my memorandum dated December 16, 1953, concerning name check requests submitted by G-2 on 129 U.S. Senators and Representatives who are to attend a conference at the Pentagon in January, 1954, where they will be briefed on future U.S. war plans. As previously indicated, the indices search was confined to main files only and G-2 is being furnished information only in instances where FBI conducted investigations.

Bureau files reflect that Congressman Rabaut was the subject of an investigation conducted by the FBI in the latter part of 1952 and 1953, in the case entitled "Louis C. Rabaut, Bribery," 58-2827.

This matter was first referred to the Bureau in November, 1952, by U. S. Attorney Philip A. Hart, Detroit, Michigan, upon the receipt by USA Hart of an affidavit executed by [redacted] attorney-at-law, Detroit, dated October 1, 1952, alleging that Congressman Rabaut received fees for assisting aliens in immigration and naturalization matters.

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b7c

Detroit Office memorandum of November 5, 1952, advised that United States Attorney Hart in referring this matter to the FBI requested that [redacted] be interviewed. [redacted] denied any personal knowledge of acceptance of fees from aliens by Rabaut. [redacted] advised that the affidavit mentioned above was given by him at the request of Richard Durant, a political opponent of Congressman Rabaut. [redacted] also stated he was told by Durant there were numerous other instances of a similar nature; however, [redacted] did not furnish any definite information concerning such alleged instances. The results of the interview with [redacted] were furnished to USA Hart who advised he would not entertain prosecution.

Under date of November 25, 1952, the FBI directed a memorandum to the Attorney General informing him of the allegation made against Congressman Rabaut, together with the results of the interview with [redacted] and the opinion of USA Hart.

By memorandum dated December 15, 1952, Assistant Attorney General Charles P. Murray requested that Richard Durant be interviewed. Further, that any leads developed as a result thereof be followed up. Durant advised he did not know of his own personal knowledge that Rabaut accepted fees from aliens in connection with immigration and naturalization matters. However, he furnished

the names of several other individuals who would possibly have first hand knowledge as to this matter. All of these individuals were interviewed and none of them furnished information to substantiate the original allegation.

Interviews with other individuals and additional investigation failed to substantiate the above allegation. The results of the investigation were furnished the United States Attorney at Detroit, Michigan, and to the Criminal Division of the Department.

The Department advised by memorandum dated November 5, 1953, that United States Attorney Fred M. Baess, Detroit, informed the Department that in his opinion prosecutive action was not warranted in the above case. The Criminal Division of the Department concurred in his opinion that the evidence submitted was not sufficient to base prosecutive action thereon.

Bureau files reflect that letters of congratulation on being elected were sent Rabaut in 1944, 1948 and 1950, and that he has been a very close friend of the Bureau. He was formerly a member of the House Appropriations Committee.

G-2 in submitting the name check on Rabaut indicated they were interested in subversive information only. In view of this fact, G-2 is being advised by the Liaison Section that the FBI conducted no investigation pertinent to their inquiry concerning Rabaut.

Mr. A. Rosen

January 7, 1954

L. N. Conroy

CONGRESSMAN HARRY R. SHEPPARD
 DEMOCRAT * CALIFORNIA
 NAME CHECK REQUEST

Referral/Consult

SYNOPSIS:AMERICAN WAR PLANS

Reference is made to my memorandum, 12-16-53, concerning name checks from G-2 on 129 Congressmen to be invited to the Pentagon in January, 1954, where they are to be briefed on war plans. Indices serach confined to main files and G-2 is being furnished information only where we have conducted investigations. Bufiles reflect "Fraud Against the Government" investigation instituted in September, 1942, concerning the sale of a California hotel for which the Government was allegedly charged an excessive amount. In the course of investigation two persons made statements indicating dishonesty on part of Sheppard. Both persons found to be unreliable and that no basis in fact existed for the allegations. No investigation conducted concerning Sheppard. The Department was furnished results of the investigation and on 9-23-53 advised charges not substantiated and stated matter should be closed.

Information furnished Department which requested on 10-2-53 that further inquiries be made. Persons interviewed advised no contributions discussed with Congressman but that contract was discussed and Sheppard stated he would help obtain the contract. Anderson advised that Willard G. Herron, a friend and associate of Sheppard's, did suggest donation to aid in campaign. He stated Herron later raised price for any help the Congressman might furnish which was to be paid through an attorney ostensibly as a retainer fee. Another person advised Herron helped Sheppard and solicited contributions through friendship, and stated Herron always within legal bounds. Results furnished Department, 11-6-53. On 12-21-53, Department advised matter under consideration and decision will be furnished Bureau when reached. G-2, in the attached memorandum is being furnished information re the basis of the election

Attachment

ADS:res

1 - V. P. Keay

46-2471
 66-1291

162-81484 -
 NOT RECORDED
 176 JAN 14 1954

JAN 19 1954

law investigation and is being referred to the Department in the event further information is desired by them.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the attached memorandum will be furnished to G-2 by the Liaison Section.

DETAILS:

Reference is made to my memorandum dated December 16, 1953, concerning name checks submitted by G-2 on 129 Senators and Congressmen who are to attend a conference at the Penatgon in January, 1954. This conference is for the purpose of briefing the members of Congress on future U. S. war plans.

As set forth in the referenced memorandum the search in General Indices was confined to main files and data will be furnished to G-2 only in instances where we have conducted investigation.

In September, 1942, a "Fraud Against the Government" investigation was instituted by the FBI in connection with the sale by A Rex B. Clark of the Norconian Hotel, Norco, California, to the Federal Government. There were indications that Clark, who had not been reimbursed at the time of the inquiry, had charged the Government an excessive amount. Clark, a chronic complainer, blamed Congressman Harry Sheppard and others for holding up the transaction. Clark was critical of Sheppard as well as many other Government officials. In addition to the above, there was an attempt made by a Lloyd E. Noble to swindle \$200,000 from Clark under the guise of obtaining from the Government quick payment of the amount due for the hotel. Incidental to perpetrating this swindle, Noble indicated that Congressman Sheppard and another Congressman would have to be paid off so they would not block the payment by the Government of the money due Clark. These allegations concerning Sheppard were patently baseless and no investigation was made with regard to them. In fact, in December, 1942, Sheppard was advised by the Bureau that while we were investigating the sale of this hotel we were not conducting any investigation with regard to him.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The foregoing information was furnished to the Department who requested on October 2, 1953, that interviews of two persons be made for more information in this matter and to determine, if possible, if Congressman Sheppard agreed to furnish aid in obtaining the reinstatement of the contract in exchange for a campaign contribution. The persons interviewed advised that no contributions were discussed directly with the Congressman, but the contract was discussed and Sheppard said he would be glad, to help obtain the contract. Mr. Anderson stated that Willard G. Herron, a personal friend and associate of Sheppard's had stated Sheppard could cause review of matter and suggested that the corporation donate money to help the Congressman in his campaign. Anderson advised that Herron subsequently informed him the price for help had gone up and payment of the contribution was to be made through an attorney ostensibly as a retainer fee. Another person contacted stated that Herron helped the Congressman and solicited contributions through friendship and always within legal bounds. The results of the foregoing inquiries were furnished to the Department on November 6, 1953. The Department, by memorandum, December 21, 1953, advised that matter presently under consideration and that the Bureau will be informed of the decision when reached.

The attached memorandum for G-2 sets forth the allegation concerning the above-mentioned [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

January 7, 1954

HARRY R. SHEPPARD
NAME CHECK REQUEST

In response to your name check request on the above person, this is to inform that the FBI in October, 1953, upon instructions of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice made certain specific inquiries concerning an allegation that Congressman Harry R. Shepard and two of his associates had solicited campaign contributions from a corporation in California in exchange for any aid the Congressman might give in having a facilities contract "reinstated" for the corporation.

The results of these inquiries were furnished to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice for its consideration, to which you are referred for further information concerning this matter.

The foregoing information is furnished to you as a result of your request for an FBI file check only and is not to be construed as a clearance or a nonclearance of the individual involved. This information is furnished for your use only and is not to be disseminated outside of your agency.

Original to G-2
Request received
A. D. Short: res
46-2471
56-1291

62-81484-
ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: December 1, 1953

FROM : V. P. KEAY

Referral/Consult

SUBJECT: AIR DEFENSE WARNING SYSTEM

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____

AMERICAN WAR PLANS

ORIGINAL FILED 62-172179-

Attachments (2)
cc - Mr. L. H. Martin

NWP:hke

62-81484-
NOT RECORDED
176 JAN 13 1954
RECEIVED (2) GENERAL

52 JAN 23 1954

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont, 12/1/53

ACTION:

It is recommended that this authenticator pamphlet be maintained in Mr. Belmont's Office. Instructions are being issued for Agents on night and week-end duty so they will be familiar with this system.

ADDENDUM: 12/8/53

Copies of this memorandum have been placed in the night and week-end duty instruction folders and the authenticator has been placed in a manila envelope in the instruction folder maintained in the center drawer in Mr. Belmont's desk.

LHM:hke

2
SAC, DENVER

December 21, 1953

100-31424 ✓
DIRECTOR, FBI

Referral/Consult

AIR FORCE LIAISON

42-35557-

NWP:hke

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gandy _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

124
JAN 21 1954

maine in 35 38

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: DECEMBER 18
1953

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: AIR FORCE LIAISON

Referral/Consult

SYNOPSIS: AMERICAN WAR PLANS

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
 Sizoo
Miss Gandy

RECOMMENDATIONS:

NOT RECORDED

176 JAN 18 1954

(1) That the attached SAC letter be sent to the field advising that the Bureau will continue to handle contacts with law enforcement

AHL:ike/mls

Attachment FOR APPROVAL

62-85557-

Memorandum for Mr. Ladd
Re: Air Force Liaison

December 18, 1953

Referral/Consult

agencies, [redacted] This
SAC letter also advises the field that the Bureau has no objection
to this matter being discussed at law enforcement conferences and
that the AISS will make a representative available for these con-
ferences if it is so desired.

✓ 1 per y
12-21

✓

OK.
H.

(2) That the attached letter be forwarded to the SAC at
Denver advising him of the discussion held here and reiterating
that he is expected to maintain close liaison with the AISS Headquarters
at Colorado Springs.

✓ 1 per y
12-21

✓


OK.
H.

12/21/53 SAC to [unclear] for [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear]

Memorandum for Mr. Ladd, 12/18/53


Referral/Consult

DETAILS:



Referral/Consult

Memorandum for Mr. Ivid, 12/18/53



Memorandum for Mr. Ladd, 12/18/53

Referral/Consult

Inspector Keay made the Bureau's position clear by stating specifically that the Bureau did not wish to interfere with the wartime mission of the AISS. It was pointed out that we did, however, wish to avoid confusion in the law enforcement field and to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of police officials in so far as the Bureau's long standing liaison with the police in internal security matters is concerned. It was pointed out that close coordination between the AISS and the Bureau on the field level is necessary, as well as at Headquarters level.

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INDEX

On June 10, 1968, he was interviewed by SA [redacted] at his home, 11, 12, 1968, according to above check. He stated he received information on 12-17-67 from [redacted] that he was invited to attend a conference at the [redacted] early in January, 1968.

There is attached a list of 1 exonerated prisoners concerning whom, as far as being listed in the mail, information is being furnished to your agency. A list of 100 exonerated prisoners, returned to the U.S. via prison, out of the total list of 100 exonerated, submitted by you, has now been submitted.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

10-31454-

1997

173 DEC 30 1953

1-1-2

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

55 JAN 5 1955

THE TADPOLE

SECRET

Here is the list of the
names of the people who
were in the room.

1940 in, 1941 in, 1942 in
 1943 in, 1944 in, 1945 in
 1946 in, 1947 in, 1948 in

type of "relatives"

Purpus, Louis E. ., Illinois
 Row, Paul E., Ohio
 Riley, Peter ., Illinois
 Ruby, Fred ., Illinois
 Saxon, Clarence, Missouri
 Seaburg, Lloyd ., Michigan
 Shoenfeld, Albert ., Illinois
 Shaw, Sam, Oregon
 Smith, Sam, Ill. Iowa
 Smith, Glenn ., Wisconsin
 Spradick, Atlanta ., New Mexico
 St. John, John ., New England
 Sted, E. Elliot, New Jersey
 Tamm, Clara ., Michigan
 Thacker, Paul L., Nebraska
 Jones, Benjamin ., Pennsylvania
 Wren, Michael ., Ohio
 Zinner, Otto, South Dakota
 Lord, Melvin ., Wisconsin

[illegible]

Mr. Tolson

October 16,
1953

Mr. C. C. Conroy

149 1/2 ...
...

Reference is made to the memorandum submitted to Mr. Tolson on October 11, 1953, concerning name check requests received from C-2 on 129 Senators and Congressmen who are to be invited to attend a conference at the ... on early in January, 1954.

A review of the main file references on the following 50 Senators and Congressmen has failed to reflect any investigation conducted by the FBI pertinent to the C-2 request. These name check forms are, accordingly, being returned to C-2 by liaison stamped "No investigation conducted by the FBI pertinent to your inquiry." You will be kept informed as to the disposition of the remaining name checks yet to be handled.

RE: FBI:

None. This is submitted for your information.

100-81484-

OCT 20 1953

12 ENCL

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN

U. S. Senators

Bridges, Styles, New Hampshire
 Byrd, Harry Flood, Virginia
 Gase, Francis, S. Dakota
 Cordon, Guy, Oregon
 Dirksen, Everett McKinley, Ill.
 Duff, James H., Pennsylvania
 Dworshak, Henry C., Idaho
 Hayden, Carl, Arizona
 Hendrickson, Robert C., N.J.
 Hill, Lister, Alabama
 Hunt, Lester C., Wyoming
 Kilgore, Harley E., W. Virginia
 Knowland, William F., Calif.

McCarran, Pat, Nevada
 McClellan, John L., Ark.
 McPherson, Burnet B., S.C.
 Mundt, Carl L., S. Dakota
 Robertson, L. Willis, Va.
 Russell, Richard B., Ga.
 Saltonstall, Leverett, Mass.
 Smith, Margaret Chase, Maine
 Stennis, John G., Miss.
 Symington, Stuart, Missouri
 Thyne, Edward J., Minnesota
 Young, Milton E., N. Dakota

House of Representatives

Andersen, H. Carl, Minnesota
 Arends, Leslie G., Illinois
 Bennett, Charles E., Fla.
 Bishop, C. W. (Puth), Ill.
 Bray, William C., Indiana
 Brooks, Overton, La.
 Canfield, Gordon, N.J.
 Gavin, Leon H., Pa.
 Cole, W. Sterling, New York
 Cooper, John Sherman, Ky.
 Levereux, James P. S., Md.
 Doyle, Clyde, California
 Durham, Carl T., N. Carolina
 Farrington, Joseph E., Hawaii
 Fenton, Ivor D., Pennsylvania
 Ferns - Isern, A., Puerto Rico

Fisher, O. C., Texas
 Hardy, Porter, Jr., Va.
 Hebert, F. Edward, La.
 Hess, William E., Ohio
 Horan, Walt, Washington
 Jensen, Ben F., Iowa
 Kilday, Paul J., Texas
 Norblad, Walter, Oregon
 Philbin, Philip J., Mass.
 Rivers, L. Mendel, S.C.
 Shafer, Paul W., Michigan
 Short, Dewey, Missouri
 Smith, Wint, Kansas
 Van Sandt, James P., Pa.
 Vinson, Carl, Georgia
 Wickersham, Victor, Okla.
 Wigglesworth, Richard E., Mass.

62-11454-
 ENCLOSURE

R. A. Rosen

December 11,
1953

C. C. Conroy

12-11-53
12-11-53

Reference is made to the memorandum submitted December 11, 1953, informing that C-2 requested name checks on 52 Senators and Congressmen who are to attend a conference at the Pentagon early in January, 1954. According to C-2 this conference is for the purpose of briefing the members of Congress on future U. S. war plans and no one will attend if there is any doubt concerning his security.

Since the submission of the reference memorandum there has been sent to the Bureau name check requests from C-2 on an additional 77 Congressmen who are also to attend the above-mentioned conference, making a total of 129 Senators and Representatives.

As set forth in the previous memorandum the name check section is confining the search to main files and will furnish data to C-2 only in instances where we have conducted investigations. Concerning data in our files other than that developed during investigations, C-2 will be advised that we have conducted no investigation.

C-2 has requested that these checks be handled on or before 12-30-53 as the conferences are to be in the first week in January, 1954.

REMARKS:

If you approve C-2 will be advised by Liaison that the handling of these name checks will be expedited. They will also be advised that in view of the number submitted at this late date, and because of the heavy volume of other name check work no assurance can be given that all of the names submitted will be completed on or before 12-30-53.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

cc: V. A. Nease

FVH:jia

12-11-53
NOT RECORDED

176 DEC 30 1953

Right. We simply
can't meet such
unreasonable dead
lines. #

W. ROSEN

October 11,
1953

L. N. CONROY

CONFIDENTIAL

On 10-1-53, 1-2 re. subpoenaed checks of 54 Senators and Congressmen who are to attend a conference at the White House early in January for briefing on future war plans of the United States and that no one would be permitted to attend if there is doubt as to his security.

List of the names submitted is set forth. Many of the individuals in addition to being a legally prominent are controversial figures. It will have hundreds of file references concerning some of the names. Not likely that 1-2 will exclude any of above from conference in absence of very substantial derogatory information. Check 1 being confined to main files and 1-2 will only go down and data in instances where it concerns investigation. In those instances where there is no main file 1-2 will be advised only that no investigation has been conducted by 1-2 concerning such individual.

FILE:

The files are being checked by the 1-2 Check Section and you will be advised of the results thereof as pertinent data is prepared for dissemination to 1-2.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

102-51454-
NOT RECORDED
OCT 20 1953

cc - 1-2
55 ADVANCE
10/11/53

AMERICAN WAR PLANS

REF ID:

On December 8, 1953, Colonel W. L. Perry, G-2, furnished FBI Liaison Agent John F. Sullivan with name check forms on 52 Senators and Congressmen. Perry advised he desired a check of the Bureau files for subversive information inasmuch as these individuals were to be briefed at the Pentagon early in January on the future war plans of the United States and that it is imperative that no Senators or Congressmen be permitted to attend the conference if there is any doubt as to their security.

List of the names submitted is set forth below:

UNITED STATES SENATORS

James H. Duff, Pennsylvania
John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky
Francis Case, South Dakota
Harry Blood Byrd, Virginia
Styles Bridges, New Hampshire
John C. Stennis, Mississippi
Steward Symington, Missouri
Edward J. Thye, Minnesota
Milton E. Young, North Dakota
William L. Knowland, California
Lester C. Hunt, Wyoming
Romer Ferguson, Michigan
Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota
Joseph R. McCarthy, Wisconsin
Guy Gordon, Oregon
Harley M. Kilgore, West Virginia
Burnet R. Maybank, South Carolina

Henry C. Ewolski, Idaho
Lister Hill, Alabama
Carl Hayden, Arizona
Allen J. Ellender, Sr. Louisiana
Lennis Chavez, New Mexico
Everett McKinley Dirksen, Ill.
John L. McClellan, Arkansas
Pat McCarran, Nevada
L. Willis Robertson, Virginia
Margaret Chase Smith, Maine
Levett Saltonstall, Mass.
Richard B. Russell, Georgia
Festes Kefauver, Tennessee
Lyndon B. Johnson, Texas
Robert C. Hendrickson, N. J.
Ralph E. Flanders, Vermont

UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES

Carl Vinson, Georgia
Wint Smith, Kansas
James P. S. Devereux, Maryland
Paul Cunningham, Iowa

C. W. (Bunt) Bishop, Illinois
William L. Hess, Ohio
Elvin L. O'Konski, Wisconsin
William C. Bray, Indiana

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

| | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Charles E. Wilson, Ohio | Walter Harbald, Oregon |
| William J. Smith, Massachusetts | Warren J. Harrison, Washington |
| James J. Van Ant, Pennsylvania | W. Lindner Cole, Colorado |
| Harry Hart, is current official | Lerville C. Bonds, Illinois |
| Paul J. Schier, Michigan | John J. Gavin, Pennsylvania |
| James W. Withers, Connecticut | |

As you know, many of these individuals, in addition to being nationally prominent, are controversial figures. There will be literally hundreds of references in our files concerning some of these persons. It is not likely that A-2 will exclude from this conference any of the above persons in the absence of very substantial derogatory information. The checks are being confined to main files and A-2 will only be furnished data in last files where the person has been connected investigation. Where we have no main file, A-2 will be advised only that an investigation has been conducted by the FBI concerning such individual.

The memoranda will be submitted on an individual basis upon completion and you will be advised as to the material being submitted to A-2 in response to these checks.

MR. V. P. HEALY

December 9, 1953

JOHN F. SULLIVAN

NAME CHECK OF SENATORS AND
CONGRESSMEN FOR G-2

On December 7, 1953, Colonel W. A. Perry, W-2, furnished Liaison Agent John F. Sullivan with the attached list of Senators and Congressmen on whom G-2 desired a check of the Bureau's files to determine whether there was any subversive information concerning them.

He stated that this check is very necessary because these Senators and Congressmen are to be brought to the Pentagon sometime in the early part of January to be briefed by the military on the future plans of the United States, and it was most imperative that no Senator or Congressman be permitted to attend this conference if there is any doubt concerning his security.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Name Check Unit check the attached list for subversive information. It is further recommended that this check be on a plain file basis.

Attachment

JFW:shk

162-81484-
NOT RECORDED
176 DEC 30 1953

INITIALS ON DOCUMENT

5 5 JAN 5 - 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-60001-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: Feb. 2, 1955

FROM : L. B. NICHOLS

SUBJECT: American War Plans

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Fred Mullen brought around the attached statement which is to be used in the event of a shooting war in the Pacific. He told me the Attorney General had instructed yesterday that he get it up and put it in a portfolio.

It appears to be a good statement to me and I will return it to Mullen. If you approve, I will advise him we have no objection to the statement.

LBN:FML
 Attachment

original statement
 to Mullen
 2/2 170

RECORDED - 24

INDEXED - 24

62-81484-161

EX-103

7-182

FEB 3

1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 14, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Referral/Consult

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN THE EVENT OF FORMOSAN
OPEN HOSTILITIES

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Egan
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
 Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

This memorandum is to record the results of the conference held at the Attorney General's office starting at 3:00 p.m., March 14, 1955, relative to the Justice Department's plans in the event of Formosan open hostilities. In addition to the Attorney General and the Director, the following were present:

From the Department - Legal Counsel Rankin, Walter Yeagley, William Foley, Frederick Ford, Office of Legal Counsel, Barrett McDonnell and John Lindsay;

From Immigration & Naturalization Service - General Howard and General Partridge;

From FBI - Belmont.

The Attorney General followed the agenda set forth in his memorandum to Rogers, et al, dated February 25, 1955:

AWB:hmm

(7)

cc - Mr. Boardman

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Keay

Mr. Branigan

Mr. Baumgardner


Mr. Hennrich

NOT RECORDED

145 APR 4 1955

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Referral/Consult



ACTION:

1. We will send the fifth copy of the Portfolio to Little Rock as soon as the Department furnishes it to us.

COVERED
MEMO BAAWICAW
TO BELMONT 3/22/55
HEW

2. We will review the cases of the thirty-six Chinese aliens on the basis of the revised standards so that they who do not meet the standards will be removed if the Attorney General approves the revised standards.

covered
Memo - Belmont
3/23/55
AG

3. Liaison will follow with CIA to get the results of the meeting between INS and CIA next week.

covered
Memo Belmont
to Boardman
3-17-55
WHEW

4. We will resolve with the State Department their procedure of evaluation of the Chinese at the United Nations and thereafter send a letter to the Attorney General.

covered - Memo
Belmont to Boardman
3-17-55
WHEW
and Memo Roach
to Belmont 3-17-55
D.J.S.

5. As soon as the microfilm is received from INS, we will start an immediate check of our files and take appropriate action based on the results of that check as it pertains to the Chinese scientists and students.

OK.
H.

7

Jim

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TO :

FROM : J. E. BELMONT

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN THE EVENT OF FORMOSAN OPEN HOSTILITIES

This memorandum is for record purposes in connection with the conference held in the Attorney General's office starting at 3:00 pm, February 7, 1955, relative to the Justice Department's plans in the event of Formosan open hostilities. In addition to the Attorney General and the Director, the following were present:

From the Department - Deputy Attorney General Rogers, Legal Counsel Rankin, Walter Yeagley, William Foley and Frederick Ford, office of Legal Counsel;

From Immigration & Naturalization Service - General Swing and General Howard;

From FBI - Belmont.

The Attorney General followed the agenda set forth in his memorandum to Rogers dated February 3, 1955: Referral/Consult



CC - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Keay
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Tamm

62-21151-1
NOT RECORDED
117 MAR 15 1955

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

186

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Referral/Consult

ACTION:

(1) The Department's Relocation Plan will be reviewed and a memorandum sent to the Attorney General.

(2) A memorandum will be prepared showing potential of espionage and sabotage at our borders.

(3) The Department will be followed by the helicopter unless advice is received to the contrary.

(4) We are checking with INS as to the difference in the number of alien Chinese in this country, as reported by General Swing and Ray Farrell, of INS.

(5) We are checking with the Department as to the name of the carriage to be used in the event alien Chinese are picked up and the warrants will be prepared.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: Feb. 23, 1955

FROM : I. W. Conrad

SUBJECT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLANNING COMMITTEE
(Bufile 80-637)

| | |
|------------|--|
| Tolson | |
| Boardman | |
| Belmont | |
| Mohr | |
| Parsons | |
| Rosen | |
| Tamm | |
| Sizoo | |
| Winterrowd | |
| Tele. Room | |
| Holloman | |
| Gandy | |

b6
b7C

On 2-17-55 [redacted] of the Records and Communications Division, [redacted] of the Radio-Electrical Section and the writer attended a special meeting of the Telecommunications Planning Committee (TPC). The entire meeting was devoted to a presentation by representatives of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company of the emergency planning being done by the Bell System.

[redacted] of the Long Lines Division, assisted by [redacted] both of AT&T, gave a very informative presentation of the construction work being done and being planned in providing for continuity of telephone service in a large-scale emergency. Their present plans are being developed under the concept of "express routes" for many of the cross-country toll circuits. In other words, major toll circuits including open wire, cable and microwave relay facilities are being built to by-pass the large industrial centers. This is being done to prevent the bombing or other destruction of industrial centers from isolating large sections of the country with respect to telephone communications. It was indicated that they expect to complete this phase of the program by sometime in 1958.

[redacted] of AT&T was in attendance and spoke to us briefly after the meeting. [redacted] said he wanted the Bureau to know what the telephone company was doing in respect to emergency planning and again emphasized his high regard for the Director and for the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information only.

162-2144-
NOT RECORDED
176 MAR 7 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN

AJB:KMB

(4)

pm

184

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 4/1/55

FROM : SAC, Anchorage (66-82)

Attention: Liaison SectionSUBJECT: ~~DEW LINE -~~
~~EARLY WARNING RADAR NET~~

Captioned project, which embraces installation of 23 radar stations across the northernmost part of Alaska and Canada as part of the early warning radar net, is the subject of some concern to the various armed forces intelligence agencies in the Territory.

The plan was worked out between the United States and the Canadian Defense Departments, with the United States to provide the bases. The project is hybrid in that Navy has the responsibility for transporting from the West Coast all the necessary material to construct and complete the various installations along the Arctic Ocean coastline, Army has the responsibility of unloading the material from the ships and taking it to the radar sites, and Air Force has the responsibility for letting the contract and manning the stations after construction. It does not appear that the contract has yet been let, but a letter of intention has been issued to Western Electric as the prime contractor for constructing the various stations.

There is only a very short construction season in that area, some six or seven weeks. All personnel must, of course, be flown in from Fairbanks. Many of the construction people will be hired in Fairbanks, and of course many others will be hired in the States or will have come up from the States to Fairbanks to sign on and work on the project. At the present time knowledge of the location of one of the sites is classified as Confidential; knowledge as to the location of more than one of them is classified as Secret. The technical equipment used, of course, is Top Secret.

No provisions have been made, or at least are known to any of the intelligence agencies in Alaska, as to what security clearance is to be required for employees on the project, of which they anticipate about five hundred.

Local agency checks in Alaska will be of only limited value because of the influx of workers from the States..

JAH/mer

RECORDED-9

INDEXED-99

- 1 -

EX-128

62-81484-162

4-12
17 APR 4 1955

APR 5 1955

EX-128
RECORDED COPY FILED IN
EX-128

APR 15 1955

(L)

American War Plans

AN 66-82

A national agency check is a possibility and Colonel DOYLE REES, head of OSI, has requested that the other members of the intelligence group advise their headquarters of the possibility of requesting an expedite national agency check of approximately 500 names. The date when those requests might be made is unknown, although it will probably be in the next sixty days if at all.

Of further interest to the Bureau is the idea that Navy will have a convoy of thirty to forty cargo type vessels bringing the material in, and to do so they must pass within a few miles of the Siberian coast. They have only three weeks during August when the passageway is clear to get the material in, unload it along several thousand miles of Arctic Ocean coastline, and get their ships out again.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: April 13, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: CABINET ACTION: (1) REGIONAL WAR RESOURCES COORDINATORS(2) WARTIME ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Non enclosed in Plans

Cabinet Paper No. 22, entitled "Regional War Resources Coordinators," contains a provision for the establishment of regional coordinators of war resources who at this time would, among other things, participate in wargames to test field programs and administrative readiness under attack conditions and report the results of their observations to the Office of Defense Mobilization.

Under attack conditions the regional war resources coordinator would exercise line command over the field organizations of the resources agencies such as War Food, War Housing, War Production and Manpower. He will also be responsible for directing the allocation and use of all resources available within the region and would have authority to coordinate all Federal establishments in the region in bringing total Federal programs and resources to bear.

This phraseology appears broad enough to cover the activities of the FBI, particularly the Field Offices thereof, and could conceivably interfere with the Bureau's ability to carry out its statutory responsibilities.

There is enclosed a memorandum to Mr. John V. Lindsay, Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, suggesting that it might be desirable to point out to these regional coordinators and their superior officers the statutory responsibilities of the FBI during periods of emergency.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the enclosed memorandum go forth to Mr. Lindsay.

Enclosure

JEM:mlp

(6)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Nichols
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - J. E. McArdle
- 1 - sect. tick.

34 APR 25 1955

RECORDED - 80
 INDEXED - 80

62-141-163
 APR 19 1955
 JEM
 McArdle
 LINDSON

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1511351-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 66

Page 4 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 6 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 7 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 8 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 9 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 10 ~ Referral/Consult;
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Page 12 ~ Referral/Consult;
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X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 & dupl. 1 - Yellow
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
1 - Mr. McArdle
1 - Section Tickler

Mr. John V. Lindsay
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General
Director, FBI

April 14, 1955

RECEIVED - 80
EX-103

CABINET ACTION: (1) REGIONAL WAR RESOURCES COORDINATORS
(2) WARTIME ORGANIZATIONS FOR ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

Reference is made to your memorandum March 31, 1955, attaching Cabinet Papers 22 and 23 representing action taken at the Cabinet Meeting March 25, 1955.

Cabinet Paper No. 22, dealing with Regional War Resources Coordinators, points out that under attack conditions these coordinators will have authority to coordinate all Federal establishments in the region to bring total Federal programs and resources to bear and that under conditions other than a period of attack they will provide mobilization leadership and guidance to all field establishments but that these establishments will receive specific instructions as to their programs through their normal Chain of Command.

Even though not named, it appears that the FDI is included among those Federal establishments which would come under the control of the Regional War Resources Coordinators in view of the fact that the proposal states that these coordinators will "have authority to coordinate all Federal establishments in the region in bringing total Federal programs and resources to bear." If this procedure is put into effect as it is written, the FDI would be under obligation to perform duties as directed by the Regional Coordinators even to the extent of not being able to handle our own responsibilities in connection with the Emergency Internal Security Program.

The Attorney General may desire to forcefully clarify this point as to the FBI and Justice Department responsibilities during such a period of emergency.

Cabinet Paper No. 23, entitled "Wartime Organization for Economic Stabilization," does not appear to pertain to the activities of the FDI.

Attached are the documents initially submitted by your memorandum March 31, 1955.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
 Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Goman

Enclosure (3)
JEM:mlp:mnmlp

COMM - FBI

APR 18 1955

MAILED 24

APR 26 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Encl to Belmont to Boardman
memo dated 4/13/55, captioned
as above, JEM:mlp)

RECEIVED READING ROOM
APR 15 10 05 AM '55

RECEIVED READING ROOM
APR 15 10 05 AM '55

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE:

April 4, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN EVENT
OF FORMOSAN OPEN HOSTILITIES

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

A conference was held in the Attorney General's Office on 4/4/55, relative to further developments in the planning of the Justice Department to meet possible Formosan open hostilities. Present, in addition to the Attorney General and the Director, were Deputy Attorney General Rogers; Assistant Attorney General Ranking; Walter Yeagley, William Foley, Barrett McDonnell and Ed Ford, of the Department; Generals Swing, Partridge and Howard, of Immigration and Naturalization Service; and Mr. Belmont of the Bureau. Referral/Consult

American War Plans

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-40-1510

AHB:CSH (8)
cc Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan

Mr. Donahoe
Mr. Coz
Mr. McArdle

NOT RECORDED

145 APR 18 1955

24 APR 15 1955

59 APR 15 1955

APR 25 1955

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL
MILSON

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TO : MR. BOARDMAN
FROM : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: April 11, 1955

CC - Mr. Norstrom

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN THE EVENT OF FORMOSAN OPEN HOSTILITIES

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The fourth conference dealing with the above subject matter was held in the Attorney General's office at 10:00 a.m., April 11, 1955. In addition to the Attorney General and the Director the following were present:

From Immigration and Naturalization Service:

General Edwin Howard
Mario Notò
Harlon B. Carter, (Border Patrol)

From Department:

Deputy Attorney General Rogers
Assistant Attorney General Tompkins
J. Walter Yeagley
William Foley
John Airhart
Barrett McDonnell
Fred Ford


Referral/Consult

From FBI:

A. H. Belmont

0 American War Plans

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-40-413



AHB:tlc 59 MAY 2 1955

CC - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Donahue
Mr. Cox

62-81484-1
24 APR 27 1955
NOT RECORDED
145 APR 28 1955
FBI - NEW YORK

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BOARDMAN

of the proposed plan of I&NS to cover the borders. Tompkins said his memorandum may raise a question regarding advanced security screening of the recruits whom I&NS will use on border coverage. Yeagley said that he has referred the I&NS proposed program to the ICIS as this Committee studied this problem in 1951 and made a number of recommendations which, however, were not carried out because of budgetary problems. Yeagley further said that the proposed I&NS plan does not appear to cover "D-Day" or shortly before which would be a most important period. He said that ICIS would review the I&NS program and suggest any weaknesses in connection therewith.

General Howard said that if an emergency arose on short notice, 1112 I&NS officers now engaged on other I&NS work would be flown to the borders. The Attorney General stated he wanted I&NS to certify to him that I&NS would be able to do this and that I&NS should contact the Department of Defense to be sure that the necessary priorities would be granted.

The Attorney General asked if CIA has given information to I&NS which would be helpful to the border coverage. General Howard said CIA has given everything it has; that I&NS needs further intelligence information from CIA and that CIA has a list of the items that I&NS needs in the way of information.

The Attorney General furnished to General Howard our memorandum dated April 8, 1955, in which we pointed out additional specific facts reflecting potential security weaknesses on the Mexican border. The Attorney General stated that this memorandum should be very helpful to General Swing.

4. Implementation of the Department of
Justice Relocation Plan

Mr. John Airhart, newly-appointed Relocation Coordinator of the Department, stated that there is a need to "organize the organizers" within the Department on relocation planning. He asked that relocation officers be set up in each of the Divisions of the Department and requested that Bernard Schmid be made available as a budget officer. He said the Department would also need a paymaster. He pointed out that during relocation tests the Bureau of the Budget would probably have observers sent out to the various relocation sites.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 17, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN EVENT OF
FORMOSAN OPEN HOSTILITIES

Referral/Consult

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference is made to the attached memorandum on the captioned matter from the Attorney General addressed to the Director and Messrs. Rogers, Tompkins, Swing, Rankin and Yeagley, setting forth the Attorney General's understanding of the status of this Department program and requesting our advice concerning inaccuracies or omissions. The Director has placed a notation on the Attorney General's memorandum to the effect that this matter should be handled promptly and has issued instructions that we see that the Watch List Subcommittee of the Inter-agency Committee on National Censorship Planning be activated and that we act promptly with regard to the Chinese students program. There is attached a proposed letter to the Attorney General containing the Bureau's comments and observations with regard to his communication

American War Plans

Attachment

WRW:kfc 39 MAY 2 1955
(7)
cc-s Mr. Boardman
Mr. W. F. Woods

NOT RECORDED

145 APR 28 1955

Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan

Mr. P. L. Cox
Mr. Norstrom

100-40

Wash

file
Date: June 23, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Madrid

Subject: SAFE HAVEN AND EVACUATION OF
AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM EUROPE
ADMINISTRATIVE *O*

Referral/Consult

American War Plans

JEP:CM

pb
61 AUG 19 1955


162-81484 ✓
NOT RECORDED
133 AUG 18 1955
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

FILED IN 65-36220-2311

Director

Referral/Consult

6/23/55



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 5/18/55

FROM: JAH SAC, Anchorage (66-82)

SUBJECT: DEW LINERemylet 4/1/55 captioned DEW LINE, EARLY WARNING
RADAR NET. Referral/Consult

Since the employees of the contractors who are installing the technical equipment requiring security clearances have been previously handled by the Air Force, and since the

JAH/mer

RECORDED - 15
INDEXED - 15

EX-125

62-81484-165

10 MAY 23 1955

meaple

JAH

62

FBI MAY 1 1955

American War Plans

labor force will be concerned only with a single location in most instances by geographic location only, the problems outlined in the previous letter appear to have evaporated and it is not contemplated that the Air Force will request any sizable name checks from the Bureau.

Mr. Tolson ☒
Mr. Boardman ☒
Mr. Nichols ☒
Mr. Belmont ☒
Mr. Harbo ☒
Mr. Mohr ☒
Mr. Parsons ☒
Mr. Rosen ☒
Mr. Tamm ☒
Mr. Sizoo ☒
Mr. Winterrowd ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Mr. Holloman ☒
Miss Gandy ☒

American War 11

(SECURITY)

THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL HAS SET OUT TO MAKE THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES SECURITY CONSCIOUS.

THE TOP-LEVEL INDUSTRY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE AVAILABLE A THICK BOOKLET TITLED "SECURITY PRINCIPLES FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES." THIS SUPPLEMENTS A HERETOFORE SECRET, 100-PAGE MANUAL CALLED "DISASTER PLANNING" WHICH DEFENSE LEADERS AGREED TO DECLASSIFY TO HELP DEVISE INDUSTRY SECURITY SAFEGUARDS.

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR YEARS HAVE BEEN SELLING FOR ONLY A FEW CENTS MAPS OF VITAL OIL AND GAS INSTALLATIONS. THE PRESUMPTION IS THAT SPIES AND POTENTIAL SABOTEURS ALREADY KNOW THE WHEREABOUTS OF THESE PROJECTS. THEREFORE THE MAIN PROBLEM IS THROWING UP PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE TIME WHEN THE COLD WAR MAY TURN HOT.

THE NPC MANUALS -- PREPARED AT GOVERNMENT REQUEST -- DO THIS IN EXPERT FASHION. THEY ALSO WARN THE INDUSTRIES WHAT THEY CAN EXPECT IN EVENT OF AN ATOMIC ATTACK.

THE SECURITY MANUAL TELLS HOW TO FIX RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOOLPROOF SECURITY MEASURES. DISASTER PLANNING IS A LIST OF IDEAS, BASED ON TESTED PLANS, TO HELP INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES FORM PROGRAMS PATTERNED TO THEIR COMMUNITIES.

THEME OF BOTH MANUALS IS THAT, WITHOUT OIL AND GAS TO RUN ITS TRAINS, PLANES, SHIPS, MACHINES, FACTORIES AND HOMES, THE NATION WOULD LOSE A WAR OVERNIGHT. HENCE, NPC WARNED, "IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT PLANNING MUST TAKE PLACE BEFORE ATTACK, AND SPEED IS VITAL."

5/14--PA114P

RECORDED - 98

INDEXED - 98

65-51411-166

27 JUN 9 1955

*File in Boardman
55 JUN 15 1955*

*We should try to get
copies of these manuals
& see what they are all
about.*

WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

SEC 22B

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *LB*

DATE: May 19, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*SUBJECT: *DISASTER PLANNING AND
SECURITY PRINCIPLES FOR THE
PETROLEUM AND GAS INDUSTRIES

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holtzman _____
Gandy _____

The Washington News Service reported on 5/14/55 that the National Petroleum Council had published for dissemination to the oil and gas industries two booklets entitled "Security Principles for the Oil and Gas Industries" and "Disaster Planning for the Oil and Gas Industries." The National Petroleum Council is composed of representatives of the oil and gas industries serving in an advisory capacity to the Secretary of Interior, by whom they are appointed. The Director commented, "We should try to get copies of these manuals and see what they are about. H."

Referral/Consult

The manual "Security Principles for the Petroleum and Gas Industries" is essentially a plant-protection study. It sets forth the responsibilities of the FBI over sabotage and espionage and in addition recommends certain protective measures such as personnel security and plant security, both from espionage and sabotage, and direct enemy attack. The disaster-planning manual presents the many problems to be considered in disaster planning and suggests some solutions to be used as guides in industry war planning.

ACTION:

For your information these manuals have been made available to the Internal Security Section for appropriate review and analysis.

JJD:dje
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner (with 2 enclosures)
- 1 - Section tickler
- 1 - J. J. Daunt

RECORDED - 98

INDEXED - 98

27 JUN 9 1955

EX-125

JUN 13 1955

*memo Belmont
to Boardman
5-24-55
quah*

517MM

American War Plans

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: May 24, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: DISASTER PLANNING AND SECURITY PRINCIPLES
FOR THE PETROLEUM AND GAS INDUSTRIES.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Ladd _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

SYNOPSIS

American War Plans

My memorandum of 5-19-55 advised that the booklets entitled "Security Principles for the Oil and Gas Industries" and "Disaster Planning for the Oil and Gas Industries," had been secured and would be reviewed. A review of these booklets reflects the following:

"Disaster Planning for the Gas and Oil Industries"

This booklet was prepared by the National Petroleum Council, 1625 K Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., in response to a request of the Office of Oil and Gas of the Department of the Interior. The booklet might be described as suggested war plans for the petroleum and gas industries.

The booklet discusses the plans that management must make including the continuity of management and the continuity of operations. It attempts to predict as far as possible, from information available, what may be expected in the event of war and what can be done to minimize the damage and continue operations.

Chapter 3 of the booklet, dealing with security, is the only portion relating directly to the work of the Bureau. This chapter points out the responsibility of the FBI for apprehending espionage agents and the responsibility of industry to cooperate fully with the FBI in apprehending suspects. The statement is made that the prime responsibility for preventing sabotage lies with industrial management. The sabotage potential of the Communist Party is pointed out. The statement appears that keeping security risks from becoming employees is one of the most effective personnel security measures.

Chapters appear on communications, medical aid, training of personnel, plant damage control and rehabilitation.

Attachments - 2 ENCL.

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Baumgardner
Hall

GWH:111
(5)

RECORDED - 98

62-81484-168

INDEXED - 98

EX-125

JUN 9 1955

57 JUN 13 1955

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

Memorandum to Boardman from Belmont
May 24, 1955

The appendix contains bomb-blast tables and charts, a blank emergency succession table for key management positions, a check list for defense planning, a section on the classification and protection of records, a section on countermeasures of the German oil industry to allied bombings, a section on the tax incentive for protective construction, a security survey form, a list of criteria for determining security risks, suggested personnel and supplies for casualty stations, and similar items.

The criteria for determining security risks mentioned above is based on the criteria used by the Industrial Employment Review Board.

"Security Principles for the Petroleum and Gas Industries"

This booklet was prepared by the Petroleum Administration for Defense and published by the National Petroleum Council under date May 5, 1955. The purpose of the booklet is to provide uniformity, eliminate inconsistencies, and furnish policy guidance for security programs throughout the petroleum and gas industries.

The booklet discusses the risks that will be encountered by the industries in a cold war and a full-scale war. The Director is quoted on page 12 as stating that subversive activities today far exceed in seriousness any that we have previously had in this country.

The booklet states that the Federal Government is responsible for ^{determining} the state of international conditions and relationships affecting the welfare and security of the nation and lists the Bureau as one of the agencies concerned with the field of internal security.

The booklet states that the function of industrial management is to provide the facilities and operating organizations for a dependable supply of petroleum and gas.

The booklet discusses the selection of those facilities in industrial organization which are vital to the continuation of production.

The hazards inherent in the production, operation and the hazards of espionage, sabotage and direct enemy attack are discussed.

Memorandum to Boardman from Belmont
May 24, 1955

The booklet points out that the very nature of the petroleum and gas industries makes it difficult to conceal many phases of its operation. It also states that industrial sabotage is the most effective method that can be applied against a national defense emergency effort and is a basic doctrine of the Communist Party and other revolutionary bodies. The pamphlet discusses some of the methods and possible objectives of the saboteur.

Protective measures are discussed, including the screening of personnel. The statement is made that some help may be secured in personnel investigations and clearances from Government agencies when a classified contract is involved. On page 68 it is stated that the investigation of actual or suspected espionage or sabotage is a function of the FBI and any basis for suspicion of espionage or sabotage should be reported to the nearest field office of the FBI. The booklet states, on page 69, that it must not be assumed that the FBI will either directly or indirectly inform management of subversives or suspected subversives employed in the system or facility. The statement is made that the Federal Government is not accepting fingerprint records from private industry but it is recommended that duplicate sets of fingerprints be obtained. The booklet points out that fingerprint cards may be obtained from the Government Printing Office and the pamphlet "How to Take Fingerprints" from the FBI. This pamphlet is available to the public upon request.

Again on page 96 the statement is made that suspicious action or subversive information should be reported promptly to the FBI. Attention is called to the Bureau's jurisdiction in espionage, sabotage and related matters through presidential directive and it is pointed out that the nearest FBI office is listed on page one of most telephone directories.

In the appendix, a sample personnel security questionnaire appears along with a list of organizations cited by the Attorney General. The appendix also contains a security inspection report form for the use of industry in inspecting the security of its installations.

ACTION:

None. For your information. The booklets are attached.

[Handwritten signatures and initials follow]

Orig

Storage
low

1-Mr. McArdle
1-Mr. D. J. Sullivan
1-Section Tickler
July 18, 1955

SAC, ANCHORAGE (66-82)

DIRECTOR, FBI

RECORDED-52 DEW LINE


INDEXED-52

62-81484-169
Reurlet 7/6/55.

15327

Referral/Consult

EX-107



Dis: hke
(6)

NOTE ON YELLOW: Instant information obtained
from Major Mann by SA D. J.
Sullivan on July 14, 1955.

R
AB
JB

52
41
14

COMM - FBI
JUL 18 1955
MAILED 30

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Ly _____

EDI-7021ICE
REC'D DEPT. 11

59
63 JUL 26 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 7/6/55

FROM ~~WFO~~ SAC, Anchorage (66-82)

SUBJECT: ~~X~~ DEW LINE

Referral/Consult

Remylet 5/18/55 captioned as above.

It is suggested that an inquiry may be in order in so far as the Bureau is concerned, in light of the jurisdictional problems as far as both criminal and security matters are concerned in connection with these installations.

I would appreciate any information the Bureau is able to obtain along this line so that proper plans can be made to adequately fulfill the Bureau's responsibility.

JAH/mer

memo to SAC,
Anchorage
1-15-58

7/18/53
DJS

RECORDED-52
INDEXED-52

RECORDED
INDEXED-52 62-81484-169
RD

20

1 - c memo
Det. Levine
7-19-55/f

M. J. J.

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | _____ |
| Mr. Boardman | _____ |
| Mr. Nichols | _____ |
| Mr. Belmont | _____ |
| Mr. Harbo | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr | _____ |
| Mr. Parsons | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen | _____ |
| Mr. Tamm | _____ |
| Mr. Sizoo | _____ |
| Mr. Winterrowd | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Mr. Holloman | _____ |
| Miss Gandy | _____ |

August 13, 1955

15328

MEMORANDUM TO: MR. J. EDGAR HOOVER

American War Plans

There was an article in the NEW YORK TIMES of August 11th giving an interview with Senator Herbert H. Lehman before he departed on a vacation abroad.

Even he stated in this interview that we must not let our guard down and keep our defense appropriations up, he considering that appropriations for the Air Force and the ground forces were inadequate.

Victor Emanuel

RECORDED - 88

INDEXED-88

62-81484-170

AUG 22 1955

SEP 10 8 15 AM '55

LET - 102100
REC'D PERSONAL

AUG 26 1955

CHIEF OF BUREAU

November 1, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

Referral/Consult

0 American War Plans

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____



NOV 26 1955 RECORDED - 77
INDEXED - 77

RTT-VE

16 NOV 3 1955

✓
✓
62-83626
62-85557

UNRECORDED

Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Belmont, Nichols

November 1, 1955

Referral/Consult



Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:tlc
(7) *sh*

| | |
|-----------------|----------------|
| SENT FROM D. O. | |
| TIME | <i>6:44 PM</i> |
| DATE | <i>11-1-55</i> |
| BY | <i>ds</i> |

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH ¹²

DATE: April 10, 1957

FROM : MR. B. A. WELLS ^{BAW}

Referral/Consult


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| Tolson | _____ |
| Nichols | _____ |
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| Belmont | _____ |
| Mason | _____ |
| Mohr | _____ |
| Parsons | _____ |
| Rosen | _____ |
| Tamm | _____ |
| Nease | _____ |
| Winterrowd | _____ |
| Room | _____ |
| man | _____ |

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS
EMERGENCY RELOCATION (BOAT)0 American WAR P/275 ✓ *Belmont*
*Looney*ACTION:

For information.

BAW: jlk ^{jk}
(4)

- 1 - Mr. McArdle
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Wells

INITIALS
LIAISON ORIGINAL

64 APR 19 1957

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-17381-1699

& 1
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. L.H. Martin
1 - Mr. McArdle
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Daunt

VIA LIAISON

Date: April 3, 1957

To: Major General Kenneth P. Bergquist
Director of Operations, DCE/O
United States Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

*Delivered Command Post
4-4-57
JJD*

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: HEADQUARTERS USAF COMMAND POST
ATTACK WARNING NOTIFICATION

Reference is made to your communication of March 27, 1957, entitled "Headquarters USAF Command Post Attack Warning Notification," wherein you set forth a new notification procedure utilizing a recording system.

This revised procedure has been reviewed in connection with our emergency planning and has been found adequate in meeting our needs, particularly in view of the independent existing arrangements that we have established with the USAF Command Post.

JJD:uep
(8)

Cover memo Roach to Belmont, 4/2/57
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - PENTAGON COMMAND
POST NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

JJD:uep

RECORDED - 28

INDEXED - 28

20 APR 16 1957

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

64 APR 19 1957

CAUTION: Not Plans

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

Referral/Consult

DATE: 6-12-57

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT:

U.S. WAR PLANS

Tolson
 Nichols
 Boardman
 Belmont
 Mason
 Mohr
 Parsons

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

cc - Mr. Boardman
 cc - Mr. Rosen

ADDENDUM, LBN:hpf,

RECORDED-57

6/13/57

62-81484-173

LBN:nl
 (4)

We are presently making an Atomic Energy 9 1957
 investigation on [Redacted] So far as I can see there is nothing
 too exciting that has shown up in a very quick review of reports.

INDEXED-57

EX-117

b6
 b7C

55 JUN 25 1957

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*

DATE: August 12, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *RR*SUBJECT: ~~CESSATION OF U. S. NUCLEAR TESTS~~

Referral/Consult

| | |
|----------|-------|
| Tolson | _____ |
| Boardman | _____ |
| Belmont | _____ |
| Mohr | _____ |
| Nease | _____ |
| Parsons | _____ |
| Rosen | _____ |
| Tamm | _____ |
| Trotter | _____ |
| Glavin | _____ |

0 AMERICAN WAR PLANS

[Large redacted area]

ACTION:

For information.

EX-135

REC-3

62-81484-175

JMF:bjt (5) *bjk*
 1 - Mr. Nease
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Liaison Section
 1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

55 AUG 22 1958

AUG 20 1958

*JMF**P.A. 8/12**Ar**5-10/10/58*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 13, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. RoachSUBJECT: POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION
CONCERNING RECENT SERIES OF
U. S. NUCLEAR TESTS

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Clayton _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

On August 12, 1958, Liaison Supervisor M. W. Kuhrtz

was advised

MWK:bjt
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Donahoe
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Kuhrtz

REC-66

EX-140

23 AUG 25 1958

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67 SEP 3 1958

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 22, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

Referral/Consult

AMERICAN WAR PLANS

SUBJECT: CESSATION OF U. S. NUCLEAR TESTS

My memorandum of August 12, 1958, copy enclosed, reflected that on August 11, 1958, we were advised in confidence by

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Clayton _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Also, on August 21, 1958, Captain John H. Morse, Jr., U. S. Navy, Special Assistant to McCone, expressed bitter disappointment at the way things were going on the question of the test ban and indicated that on behalf of AEC he had fought hard against the idea because he felt it was unrealistic and was being done only for political purposes.

ACTION:

For information.

JMF:bjt (5)

- 1 - Mr. Nease
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

Enclosure

60 SEP 3 1958

REC-10

62-81484-177

15 AUG 27 1958

EL-12

ESP SEC

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont


DATE: September 5, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION
CONCERNING RECENT SERIES OF
U. S. NUCLEAR TESTS

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Clayton _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

ACTION:

None. For information.

SJP:bjt
(7)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Donahoe
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

REC-97

62-81484-178

13 SEP 10 1958

59
55 SEP 15 1958

O AMERICAN WAR PLANS

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: October 10, 1958

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT *ABW*SUBJECT: "THE NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN, OCTOBER 10, 1958, CONCERNING U.S. AIDES SUSPECTED FROM TEST SPYING BY SOVIET UNION"

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 Holloman _____
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 Sullivan _____

Reference is made to the above article which refers to the Soviet announcement of its having detected all the nuclear tests conducted by the U.S. The article also refers to the speech by General Arthur Trudeau given before the American Society for Industrial Security on September 16, 1958, in which he stated that the advanced state of Soviet technology is due more to Soviet success in espionage and subversion than as a result of its scientific capabilities.

The above Soviet announcement mentioned in the Baldwin article refers to the Tass News Agency (Soviet) announcement on July 28, 1958, which announced the detection by the Soviets of 32 U.S. nuclear tests. This listing gave the exact times and dates for these tests. The details in the Tass article of U.S. tests which have caused some concern to U.S. officials result from a U.S. test on April 29, 1958, which was scheduled for detonation at 9:25 P.M. local time. This test was canceled out at the very last minute and no U.S. announcement was made of such action. Also on July 14, 1958, a U.S. test was scheduled; however, only the "trigger device" was detonated, which action is too mild to register on any seismic or acoustic detection system. The above-scheduled tests and times were listed in the above Soviet announcement. Since they could not have possibly registered on any Soviet seismic or acoustic detection system, it is possible that allegations could result that the Soviets could have an espionage penetration in the U. S. to obtain these facts. This logic is totally unfounded and not based on fact. Actually, the U. S., in connection with its nuclear tests, conducts a "count down" radio communication signal to various observation and alerting outposts thousands of miles from the test site for the purpose of making various recordings. This "count down" activity will begin from six to eight hours prior to the actual detonation and since it is beamed out via radio is easily intercepted by anyone, such as the Soviets, to give them an indication of a nuclear test on our part. Actually, this is the same system the U. S. uses in our intercept facilities to obtain time and details of Soviet nuclear tests and also the launching of their guided missile tests. This communications intelligence activity

MARK: jlk (6)

- 1 - Mr. Nease
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. [unclear]

63 NOV 17 1958

ENCLOSURE
REC-66

EX-102 12 OCT 16 1958

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 INFORMATION

AMERICAN WAR PLANS

62-81484-179
 7-11-58
 5-11-58

Memo Mr. Belmont to the Director
RE: "THE NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE BY
HANSON W. BALDWIN, OCTOBER 10, 1958,
CONCERNING "U.S. AIDES SUSPECT ATOM
TEST SPYING BY SOVIET UNION"

most certainly is engaged in by the Soviets; therefore, it is very simple for them to detect our scheduled nuclear tests which were called off as above noted at the last minute.

Liaison has contacted Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on this date regarding the Baldwin story and has determined that these agencies made no release relative to ~~Soviet~~ espionage penetration of our nuclear test activities.

Caution must be used in the handling of the above information relative to the U. S. Government, as well as the possible Soviet intercept activity of radio communications. This is all identified with the U. S. communications intelligence activity which is highly classified.

With regard to the Baldwin article on the Trudeau speech, Liaison interviewed General Trudeau on September 17, 1958, following his speech and he denied being aware of any current espionage cases or Soviet penetrations within the U. S. other than those of which the Bureau is aware. My memorandum of September 17, 1958, regarding the Liaison interview with General Trudeau reflects that Trudeau commented that he made his speech as sensational as possible in order to give a "shot in the arm" to the security group which he was addressing. He stated that his speech was not prepared for public consumption or through the medium of the press, but with the understanding only that he was dealing directly with officials representing industrial security.

ACTION:

✓
The above is submitted for information.

RW *gaf* *[Signature]*

OCTOBER 10, 1958.

U.S. AIDES SUSPECT ATOM-TEST SPYING BY SOVIET UNION

Accuracy in Listing Pacific Blasts Ascribed to Means Other Than Detection

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Officials in the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission have expressed concern about the accuracy of Soviet announcements dealing with United States nuclear tests.

There are two reasons for this concern.

Experts maintain that the impression given by the accuracy of the Soviet announcements—that a detection system for nuclear tests is virtually foolproof—is contrary to fact.

They assert that the Russians could not possibly have detected all the tests they correctly announced by any form of instrumental detection known to the United States. They point out that the United States monitoring system, which has detected many Soviet tests not announced by Moscow, was unable to detect all of the United States tests held during Operation Hardtack at the Pacific proving grounds from late April through July.

The second cause for concern is a corollary to the first one; officials believe that the Soviet knowledge of the number of United States tests was derived by leaks or espionage.

The concern of the United States officials dates back to a Soviet announcement on Aug. 23 that the United States had detonated a total of thirty-two nuclear devices in the Pacific tests instead of the fourteen officially announced. The Soviet was almost correct.

'Leaks' Are Suspected

Some informed officials do not believe that Soviet observation stations detected all the thirty-two tests, which were listed by time and date. These officials believe that "leaks" to the press or espionage gave Moscow its accurate knowledge. They called attention to a speech by Lieut. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, the Army's Chief of Research and Development, on Sept. 16 to the American Society for Industrial Security.

General Trudeau said then that the "advanced state of Soviet technology today is due more to Soviet success in espionage and subversion than it is to their scientific apparatus, good as it is."

He added that "I wish I could speak out even more strongly on this subject, using some recent cases we know of * * *. But I am unable to do so in a public address at this time."

The United States officials say that some of the tests conducted in the Pacific were at very high altitude, some were under water, others were of very small yield, with radioactivity reduced to the minimum. They contend that tests of

Continued on Page 2, Column 6

U.S. AIDES SUSPECT ATOM-TEST SPYING

Continued From Page 1, Col. 5

small-yield devices can be, and have been, concealed successfully.

The question of the number of tests conducted by the United States was again emphasized this week by the Russians when Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, announced in the United Nations that the Soviet Union would continue testing until it equalled the number of tests conducted by the West since last March 31.

If the Russians choose to go through with this plan, it would mean at least forty-three more detonations, which is the approximate number of tests conducted by the United States and Britain since March 31.

In the meantime the United States has started another series, Operation Deadline in Nevada, which will add seven more tests to the three already conducted there.

Since testing of nuclear devices started shortly after World War II, the United States has

detonated about 140, the Soviet Union about sixty, and Britain twenty-one. Some tests by the Soviet Union and the United States have been undetected.

The technical fallibility of a nuclear monitoring system, as already proved by tests so far conducted, is one of the reasons why some United States officials are worried about the results of last summer's Geneva conference on the feasibility of detection.

The officials fear that the public impression is that a foolproof system is possible and desirable. There is also worry in the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission about the effects of any agreed cessation of nuclear testing, a topic scheduled to be discussed with the Russians in Geneva starting Oct. 31.

In this connection, United States officials called attention to an article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, by Henry A. Kissinger, entitled "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace."

Wash. Post and Times Herald _____

Wash. News _____

Wash. Star _____

N. Y. Herald Tribune _____

N. Y. Journal-American _____

N. Y. Mirror _____

N. Y. Daily News _____

N. Y. Times _____

Daily Worker _____

The Worker _____

New Leader _____

Henry Belmont to
Director 10-11-58
10/12/58

62-81484-179

ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *APB*

DATE: January 20, 1959

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *(3)*SUBJECT: CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
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 Nease _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____

Referral/Consult

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AMERICAN WAR PLANS

JME:bjt (8) *lyt*

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Nease

1 - Mr. Mohr

1 - Mr. Rosen

1 - Mr. Whitson

1 - Liaison Section 1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

EX-124
 REG-38
 1-2-149

66 FEB 2 1959

JAN 28 1959

81484-180

3/18/59

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont
RE: CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING

OBSERVATION:

The principal Bureau interest in the above would seem to be in the probable upturn in the volume of applicant-type investigations for clearance purposes which we would be called upon to conduct for AEC if this country should resume large-scale testing of nuclear weapons.

ACTION:

For information.

gh Q ✓

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

Sordkye
P. Schuyler

Vol. XLIV, No. 1145

June 5, 1961

844, 848 next to book
870
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THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

57 JUL 31 1961

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLIV, No. 1145 • PUBLICATION 7199

June 5, 1961

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

JUL 24 1961

Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests Submitted by Western Delegations at Geneva Conference

GENEVA, SWITZ

The United States and United Kingdom delegations to the ~~the~~ Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests introduced in the conference on April 18, 1961, the following draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. The U.S. and U.K. delegations declared that they were prepared to use this draft as a basis for negotiation or to sign it immediately. The text incorporates the new proposals presented by the two Western delegations when the conference resumed its sessions on March 21, 1961, and at subsequent meetings, as well as much previously agreed material.

The treaty completely prohibits weapon test explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water, and—except for explosions producing smaller seismic signals—underground. Tests producing such explosions would be temporarily prohibited through a moratorium voluntarily undertaken by each nuclear power, while an effort was made through a seismic research program to improve methods of monitoring them with a view to lowering the treaty threshold.

A worldwide control post net of 180 stations is to be set up, under the treaty, within 6 years; in the same period, earth and solar satellite systems are to be launched to detect outer-space explosions. Unidentified seismic events are to be inspected by teams of specialists. Control operations are to be undertaken by an international staff so constituted as to avoid self-inspection. Nuclear explosions for research and other peaceful purposes are permitted under strict safeguards.

For a history of the political and technical developments of the negotiations from October 31, 1958, to August 22, 1960, see the Department of State Bulletin of September 26, 1960, page 482.

PREAMBLE

The Parties to this Treaty

Pursuing the aim of reducing international competition in armaments and in the development of new weapons of war;

Endeavoring to take a practical step toward the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, including the eventual elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons under effective international control and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

Desirous of bringing about the permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions;

Recognizing that the establishment and continuous operation of effective international control is essential to the achievement of this objective;

Hoping that all other countries will also join in undertakings not to carry out nuclear weapon tests and to ensure the satisfactory operation of that control throughout the world;

Confident that a discontinuance of such tests under effective control will make possible progress toward agreement on measures of disarmament
Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Obligations to Discontinue

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty under-

conomic Community. In this connection, the President and Dr. Hallstein discussed in particular the effect of the coming into existence of the EEC upon trade with the Latin-American countries.

With regard to the Association of African States with the EEC, the President and Dr. Hallstein also discussed the need for a sustained, increased and coordinated flow of development and technical assistance to the less-developed countries.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Scheduled June 1 Through August 31, 1961

| | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|----------|
| U.N. Trusteeship Council: 27th Session | New York | June 1- |
| International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 11th Annual Meeting. | Washington | June 5- |
| IMCO Preparatory Expert Working Group on Oil Pollution of the Sea. | London | June 5- |
| International Labor Conference: 45th Session | Geneva | June 7- |
| 8th International Electronic, Nuclear, and Motion Picture Exposition. | Rome | June 12- |
| FAO Expert Meeting on Economic Effects of Fishery Regulation. | Ottawa | June 12- |
| U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 21st Session | Geneva | June 12- |
| FAO Advisory Committee on the Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign: 3d Session. | Rome | June 14- |
| IAEA Board of Governors | Vienna | June 19- |
| ICAO Assembly: Extraordinary Session | Montreal | June 19- |
| FAO Council: 35th Session | Rome | June 19- |
| FAO/OIE Meeting on Emerging Diseases of Animals | Ankara | June 19- |
| International Whaling Commission: 13th Meeting | London | June 19- |
| 11th International Berlin Film Festival | Berlin | June 25- |
| 7th International Conference on Large Dams | Rome | June 26- |
| U.N. ECA Conference of African Statisticians: 2d Session | Tunis | June 26- |
| International Wheat Council: 32d Session | London | June 27- |
| European Civil Aviation Conference: 4th Session | Strasbourg | July 3-* |
| U.N. Economic and Social Council: 32d Session | Geneva | July 4- |
| 8th Inter-American Travel Congress | Rio de Janeiro | July 5- |
| FAO Meeting on Plant Exploration and Introduction | Rome | July 10- |
| Development Assistance Group: 5th Meeting | Tokyo | July 11- |
| WMO Regional Association III (South America): 3d Session. | Rio de Janeiro | July 11- |
| International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Working Party on Oceanography of the Committee on Biology and Research. | Nanaimo, British Columbia | July 15- |
| IBE Council: 27th Session | Geneva | July |
| South Pacific Commission: Meeting of Urbanization Committee | Nouméa | July |
| 2d FAO Latin American Meeting on Higher Agricultural Education. | Quito | Aug. 14- |
| 2d FAO World Conference on Eucalyptus | São Paulo | Aug. 14- |
| 15th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival | Edinburgh | Aug. 20- |
| U.N. ECOSOC Conference on New Sources of Energy | Europe | Aug. 21- |
| ICAO Diplomatic Conference on the Hire, Charter, and Interchange of Aircraft. | Montreal | Aug. 29- |
| ICAO International Conference on Private Air Law | México, D.F., or Acapulco | Aug. 29- |
| Caribbean Commission: 31st Meeting | San Juan | August |
| South Pacific Commission: Women's Interest Seminar | Apia, Western Samoa | August |

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, May 16, 1961. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; OIE, International Office of Epizootics; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; U.N., United Nations; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

takes, subject to the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes:

A. to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and

B. to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions anywhere.

2. The obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply to all nuclear weapon test explosions except those underground explosions which are recorded as seismic events of less than magnitude 4.75.

ARTICLE 2

Establishment of Control Organization

1. For the purpose of assuring that the obligations assumed in this Treaty are carried out by the Parties, there is hereby established a Control Organization, hereinafter referred to as "the Organization", upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Treaty and the Annexes thereto.

2. Each of the Parties agrees to cooperate promptly and fully with the Organization established under paragraph 1 of this Article and to assist the Organization in the discharge of its responsibilities pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty and the provisions of any agreements which the Parties shall have concluded with the Organization.

ARTICLE 3

Elements of Control Organization

1. The Organization established under Article 2 of this Treaty shall consist of: a Control Commission, hereinafter referred to as "the Commission"; a Detection and Identification System, hereinafter referred to as "the System"; a Chief Executive Officer, hereinafter referred to as "the Administrator"; and a Conference of Parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as "the Conference".

2. The Headquarters of the Organization shall be located at Vienna.

ARTICLE 4

Composition of Control Commission¹

1. The Commission shall consist of the following Parties:

A. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, as original Parties to this Treaty; and

B. Eight other Parties to the Treaty elected by the Conference as follows: Three Parties associated with the USSR; two Parties associated with either the United Kingdom or the United States; three Parties not associated with any of the original Parties.

2. The Parties referred to in paragraph 1 B of this Article shall be elected and shall serve for a period of two years; they shall be eligible for re-election.

3. The Parties elected to the first elected Commission shall serve from the time of their election until the end of the third regular session of the Conference. The Parties elected at the third regular session of the Conference, and those elected biennially thereafter, shall serve from the end of the Conference at which they were elected until the end of the Conference which elects their successors.

4. Each member of the Commission shall have one representative.

ARTICLE 5

Parties or Other Countries Associated with the Original Parties

The determination whether a Party or other country is at any time to be regarded for the purposes of this Treaty as associated with any of the original Parties shall be made by the Preparatory Commission or by the Commission. However, in any case in which advice is jointly tendered by the three original Parties, the determination shall be made in accordance with that advice.

¹ The above revised text is submitted in the context of the statements made by the United States and United Kingdom Representatives at the 274th, 286th, and 289th meetings, to the effect that the United States and United Kingdom Governments are prepared to accept the above text provided expressly, and not otherwise, that agreement is reached by this Conference upon a control system which is reliable, rapid and effective—such as is set forth in other articles and annexes of the present draft treaty proposal—and provided that agreement is reached upon all other treaty articles and annexes. [Footnote in original.]

Functions of the Control Commission

1. The Commission shall establish procedures and standards for the installation and operation of all elements of the System, and shall maintain supervision over the System to ensure its timely installation and effective operation in accordance with the terms of this Treaty and its annexes. The Commission shall determine, after consultation with the Parties concerned, the extent to which existing launching, tracking, and data receiving and transmission facilities should be used in the installation and operation of the satellite systems.

2. A. The Commission shall appoint the Administrator; this appointment shall require the concurring votes of the original Parties.

B. (i) Subject to the approval of the Commission in each case, the Administrator shall appoint five Deputy Administrators, including one First Deputy Administrator who shall act in place of the Administrator in case of absence or vacancy.

(ii) Approval by the Commission of the appointment of the First Deputy Administrator shall require the concurring votes of the original Parties.

(iii) Appointment by the Administrator of two Deputy Administrators shall be made upon the recommendation, or with the approval of the Government of the USSR; appointment of the two other Deputy Administrators shall be made upon the recommendation, or with the approval, of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States.

C. The term of office of the Administrator shall be a period of three years. The initial term of office of the First Deputy Administrator shall be a period of two years; subsequently, the term of office of the First Deputy Administrator shall be a period of three years. The term of office of the other Deputy Administrators shall be a period of three years.

D. The Administrator and the Deputy Administrators shall be eligible for reappointment. An Administrator or Deputy Administrator appointed to fill a vacancy which has occurred before the expiration of the term provided for by this Article shall hold office only for the remainder of his predecessor's term but shall be eligible for reappointment.

3. The Commission shall establish procedures for disseminating to all Parties and interested scientific organizations data produced by the System.

4. The Commission shall submit to the Conference an annual report and such special reports as the Commission deems necessary on the operation of the System and on the activities of the Commission and the Administrator in carrying on their respective responsibilities. The Commission shall also prepare for the Conference such reports as the Organization may make to the United Nations.

5. Except for the location of the Headquarters of the Organization, the Commission shall decide upon the location of components' of the System. Such decisions shall be taken in agreement with the Party exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory on which the component is to be located. If any location recommended by the Commission should be unacceptable to the Party concerned, the Party shall provide, without undue delay, an alternative location which in the judgment of the Commission meets the requirements of the System, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes.

6. The Commission shall lay down permanent flight routes, for use by special aircraft sampling missions, over the territory under the jurisdiction or control of each Party. Such flight routes shall be laid down in agreement with the Party concerned and in accordance with the standards set forth in Article 7 of Annex I. If a permanent flight route which the Commission desires to lay down should be unacceptable to the Party concerned, the Party shall provide, without undue delay, an alternative route which in the judgment of the Commission meets the requirements of the System.

7. The Commission may conclude agreements with any State or authority to aid in the carrying out of the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes.

8. The Commission shall ensure that the most effective and up-to-date equipment and techniques are incorporated in the System and, to this end, shall ensure that an adequate research and development program is carried out.

9. The Commission shall establish procedures for the implementation of Article 13 on detonations for peaceful purposes.

10: In addition to the functions referred to in the preceding paragraphs of this Article, the Commission shall perform such other functions as are provided for in this Treaty and its Annexes.

ARTICLE 7

Procedures of the Control Commission

1. The Commission shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously.

2. The Commission shall meet at such times as it may determine, or within twenty-four hours at the request of any member. All members shall be notified in advance of meetings of the Commission. The meetings shall take place at the Headquarters of the Organization unless otherwise determined by the Commission.

3. The Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure including the method of selecting its chairman.

4. Any Party to the Treaty which does not have a representative on the Commission may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Commission whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Party are specially affected.

5. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Treaty, decisions of the Commission shall be made by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Each member of the Commission shall have one vote.

ARTICLE 8

The Conference

1. The Conference consisting of representatives of Parties to this Treaty shall meet in regular annual session and in such special sessions as shall be convened by the Administrator at the request of the Commission or of a majority of Parties to the Treaty. The sessions shall take place at the Headquarters of the Organization unless otherwise determined by the Conference.

2. At such sessions, each Party to the Treaty shall be represented by not more than three delegates who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. The cost of attendance of any delegation shall be borne by the State concerned.

3. The Conference shall elect a President and such other officers as may be required at the beginning of each session. They shall hold office for the duration of the session. The Conference, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, shall adopt

its own rules of procedure. Each Party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on budgetary matters shall be made pursuant to Article 15 and decisions on amendments pursuant to Article 23. Decision on other questions, including the determination of additional questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a simple majority of the Parties to the Treaty present and voting.

4. The Conference may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of this Treaty or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in this Treaty and may make recommendations to the Parties or to the Commission or to both on any such questions or matters.

5. The Conference shall:

A. Elect States to serve on the Commission in accordance with Article 4;

B. Consider the annual and any special report of the Commission;

C. Approve the budget recommended by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 15;

D. Approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as required by any relationship agreement between the Organization and the United Nations or return them to the Commission with the recommendations of the Conference;

E. Approve any agreement or agreements between the Organization and the United Nations or other organizations as provided in Article 17; or return such agreements with its recommendations to the Commission for resubmission to the Conference;

F. Approve amendments to this Treaty in accordance with Article 23.

6. The Conference shall have the authority:

A. To take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Commission;

B. To propose matters for consideration by the Commission and request from the Commission reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Commission.

ARTICLE 9

Administrator and International Staff

1. The Administrator shall be the chief executive officer of the System and the head of the staff of the Organization. He shall be responsible to

the Commission and, under its supervision, shall carry out its policy directives. He shall have executive responsibility for the installation and operation of the System under procedures and standards established by the Commission. He shall provide to the Commission such advice, reports and assistance as the Commission may request.

2. The Administrator and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions concerning the performance of their duties from any authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their status as international officials and employees responsible only to the Organization. Each Party undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Administrator and staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

3. Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Administrator shall appoint, organize and direct the staff of the Organization in accordance with the following provisions:

A. The staff shall include such qualified scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required to carry out the functions of the Organization with the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence and integrity.

B. The staffing of individual components of the System shall be designed so as to ensure maximum operating efficiency.

C. In keeping with the foregoing stipulations, the staff of the Organization shall be recruited on as wide a geographical basis as possible from personnel recommended by, or acceptable to, the governments of the countries of which they are nationals and acceptable to the Administrator, subject to the following provisions:

(i) The permanent administrative, scientific and technical staff of the Headquarters of the Organization shall, as a whole and at all levels, be composed in equal proportions of nationals of the USSR, nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States, and nationals of other countries. In cases where deputies, other than the Deputy Administrators, to senior officials of the Organization Headquarters are appointed, a national of the USSR shall have a deputy who is a national of the United Kingdom or of the United States, and a national of the United

Kingdom or the United States shall have a deputy who is a national of the USSR.

(ii) In land control posts situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of any of the original Parties, the scientific and technical staff of each post shall be composed in equal proportions of nationals of the USSR, nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States, and nationals of other countries. In the appointment of nationals of other countries, preference shall be given, subject to other provisions of subparagraph C of this Article, to nationals of countries exercising jurisdiction or control over territory upon which control posts are to be established.

(iii) In land control posts situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of Parties other than the original Parties, no more than one-third of the scientific and technical staff of each post shall be composed of nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory on which the control post is situated.

(iv) The supporting and auxiliary staffs of each land control post shall, wherever possible, be composed of nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory on which the control post is located.

(v) The scientific and technical staffs of control posts on ships or in areas not under the jurisdiction or control of sovereign states and the members of the staff of the Organization selected by the Administrator for the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 11 of Annex I shall be composed in equal proportions of nationals of the USSR, nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States, and nationals of other countries.

(vi) The chief or acting chief of each control post shall be a national of a country other than that exercising jurisdiction or control over a territory on which the control post is situated. If the country exercising jurisdiction or control over such territory is associated with an original Party, the chief or acting chief of the control post shall be a national of other than such original Party or a country associated with it.

(vii) The chief or acting chief of each control post situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United States or the United Kingdom shall be a national of the USSR; the chief or acting chief of each control post situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of

the USSR shall be a national of the United States or the United Kingdom.

(viii) The scientific and technical staffs of on-site inspection groups shall be composed of technically qualified personnel who are not nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory in which the event under investigation may have occurred. The Party exercising jurisdiction or control over such territory may designate one or more observers to accompany the inspection group.

(ix) The scientific and technical staff of any on-site inspection group despatched to conduct an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR shall be composed of nationals of the United States or the United Kingdom; the scientific and technical staff of any on-site inspection group despatched to conduct an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United States or the United Kingdom shall be composed of nationals of the USSR.

(x) The USSR or the United Kingdom and the United States may authorize the Administrator to depart from the requirements of sub-paragraphs (i) through (ix) above, insofar as they concern the appointment of their respective nationals to scientific and technical staff positions, either in favor of the nationals of another Party or other Parties or without restriction. In each case, the original Party or Parties concerned shall furnish the Administrator in writing with the authorization, including the period of its duration. Notwithstanding the authorization made under this paragraph, the nationals so appointed shall be considered, for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (v) to be nationals of the original Party authorizing the departure.

(xi) In making appointments under sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii) and (v), the Administrator shall ensure that the administrative, scientific and technical staff of the Headquarters of the Organization, and the scientific and technical staff of each control post, shall be so composed that the total number of nationals of the USSR and of countries associated with it shall be equal to the total number of nationals of the United States and the United Kingdom and of countries associated with either of them.

(xii) Any adjustment to the proportions in subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (v) above, which

may be unavoidable for practical reasons, shall be kept to the minimum, and a compensating adjustment shall, whenever possible, be made elsewhere in the System.

D. Regulations governing the appointment, remuneration and dismissal of staff shall be approved by the Commission.

4. The Administrator shall prepare for the Commission the budget estimates of the Organization.

5. The Administrator shall develop and arrange for the execution of a program of research and development for the continuing improvement of the equipment and techniques used in all components of the System, and shall from time to time make recommendations to the Commission regarding improvements to be incorporated in the System. The program may, with the approval of the Commission, include detonations performed to test the effectiveness of the System. Any nuclear detonations for this purpose shall be conducted under the procedures set forth in Article 13.

6. The Administrator shall prepare recommendations for approval by the Commission regarding:

A. specific sites for all components of the System;

B. specific flight patterns for routine air sampling flights;

C. the number and base location of inspection groups;

D. the equipping of all components of the System and the standards and specifications which equipment to be used therein must meet.

7. A. When special aircraft sampling missions are undertaken, the Administrator shall appoint two qualified members of the Organization staff to accompany each aircraft as technical operators. The technical operators shall, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of Annex I, verify the execution of the agreed flight plan; operate the sampling equipment; direct sampling operation; make appropriate arrangements for the safe delivery to the Organization of the samples collected; and report on the mission to the Administrator.

B. (i) The technical operators shall not be nationals of

(a) any Party exercising jurisdiction or control

over territory in which the event under investigation may have occurred, or of

(b) any original Party which may be associated with the Party in paragraph 7 B(i) (a) of this Article, or of

(c) any Party which may be associated with any original Party to which paragraphs 7 B(i) (a) or 7 B(i) (b) of this Article may refer;

nor, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph B(ii), shall they be nationals of any Party exercising jurisdiction or control over territory in the air space over which samples may be taken.

(ii) On flights investigating events which may have occurred in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR, the technical operators shall be nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States. On flights investigating events which may have occurred in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United Kingdom or the United States, the technical operators shall be nationals of the USSR.

C. Any Party exercising jurisdiction or control over territory in which the event under investigation may have occurred or in the air space over which samples are to be taken may designate an observer to accompany the technical operators on the flight.

8. The Administrator shall determine when special aircraft sampling missions are required in accordance with the terms of Article 7 of Annex I and shall have authority to order the despatch of such missions. For missions whose purpose is the collection of samples over the territory of a Party or Parties, the Administrator shall select routes from among the permanent flight routes laid down by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 6; before despatch of the mission, the Administrator shall notify all Parties over whose territories it will fly and shall inform them of the routes selected.

9. The Administrator shall forward to the Commission within twenty-four hours after receipt all reports submitted to him by inspection teams and special aircraft missions, together with any relevant data and analyses.

10. The Administrator shall encourage and facilitate the participation by personnel of components of the System in programs of basic scientific research, to the extent that such participation would not interfere with their primary duties.

11. In addition to the functions referred to in the preceding paragraphs of this Article, the Administrator shall perform such other functions as are provided for in this Treaty and its Annexes.

ARTICLE 10

On-Site Inspection of Seismic Events

1. A. The Administrator shall certify immediately by public notice at the Headquarters of the Organization whenever he determines that an event eligible for on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of Annex I has occurred. This certification shall include a specification of the time of origin and location of the seismic event, the area eligible for inspection (hereinafter referred to as the "certified area"), and the data and analysis upon which the determination of eligibility was made. The Administrator shall make every effort to make this certification within seventy-two hours after the occurrence of the event.

B. Whenever the Administrator is informed through the Organization that a seismic event of seismic magnitude of 4.75 or above which is located by the System has occurred, and if the event is not immediately rendered ineligible for on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of Annex I, he shall immediately make public at the Headquarters of the Organization all data relating to such a seismic event which could be of assistance

(i) to any Party exercising its right to request an on-site inspection under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, or

(ii) to the Commission in its decision whether to issue a directive under paragraph 4 of this Article.

The Administrator shall make every effort to make this data public within seventy-two hours after the occurrence of all events referred to in this subparagraph, except for those events which have subsequently been found ineligible for on-site inspection in accordance with sub-paragraphs 3 C and 3 D of Article 8 of Annex I.

2. A. If any portion of the certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of any of the original Parties, the Administrator shall immediately despatch an inspection group to carry out an on-site inspection of such portion of the certified area in accordance with Annex I, provided that:

(i) The USSR requests the inspection of such portion of the certified area which lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United Kingdom or the United States, and the current annual number of inspections for the Party liable to inspection is not exhausted, or

(ii) The United Kingdom or the United States requests the inspection of such portion of the certified area which lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR and the current annual number of inspections for the USSR is not exhausted, and

(iii) The request for inspection is made to the Administrator not later than fifteen days after the Administrator has made public all data relating to the seismic event in question, as specified in paragraph 1 B of this Article.

B. An original Party requesting an on-site inspection pursuant to this paragraph shall simultaneously inform the other original Parties.

3. A. If any portion of a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party other than an original Party, any Party may, not later than fifteen days after the Administrator has made public at the Headquarters of the Organization all data relating to the seismic event in question as specified in paragraph 1 B of this Article, request the Commission to direct an on-site inspection of such portion of the certified area.

B. The Commission shall consider and decide upon any such request within forty-eight hours after its receipt. If a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of more than one Party, other than an original Party, the Commission shall make a separate decision as to the inspection of that portion of the certified area on the territory of each Party concerned. If the current annual number of inspections of the Party liable to inspection is not exhausted, and if the Commission decides that the request to direct an on-site inspection should be complied with, the Commission shall direct the Administrator to carry out an on-site inspection of the certified area lying in that Party's territory in accordance with Annex I.

C. If any portion of a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party represented on the Commission, that Party shall not participate in the decision as to the inspection of such portion of the certified area.

D. If any portion of a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party associated with an original Party, that original Party and Parties associated with it which are represented on the Commission shall not participate in the decision as to the inspection of such portion of the certified area.

4. A. If any portion of a certified area lies in an area not under the jurisdiction or control of any sovereign state, the Administrator shall decide whether to undertake an on-site inspection. The Administrator shall notify the Commission of his decision whether to undertake an on-site inspection and shall make every effort to do so within seventy-two hours after the occurrence of the event. After the Administrator notifies the Commission that he has decided to undertake an on-site inspection, he shall proceed to have the inspection carried out unless he is otherwise directed by the Commission within forty-eight hours of such notification.

B. The Commission may direct the Administrator to inspect a certified area not under the jurisdiction or control of any sovereign state, if the Administrator has not already proceeded to do so; not later than fifteen days after the Administrator has made public at the Headquarters of the Organization all data relating to the seismic event in question as specified in paragraph 1 B of this Article.

C. All on-site inspections under this paragraph shall be carried out in accordance with Annex I.

5. The number of on-site inspections which may be carried out in territory under the jurisdiction or control of each of the original Parties, pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be twenty inspections in each annual period.

6. A. The number of on-site inspections which may be carried out in each annual period in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party other than an original Party, pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, shall be, with respect to each such Party, two, or such higher number as the Commission may, after consultation with the Party, determine by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

B. Pending the determination of a Party's number by the Commission, the provisional number for that Party shall be one inspection in each

annual period for each 500,000 square kilometers or remaining fraction thereof of territory under its jurisdiction or control, except that for each Party the provisional number shall be at least two inspections in each annual period. Inspections carried out under a Party's provisional number shall be deducted from the number subsequently determined for that Party for the annual period in which such inspections were initiated. In the case of acceding Parties, the Preparatory Commission shall, after consultation with such Parties, promptly recommend, for subsequent approval by the enlarged Preparatory Commission, an appropriate number of inspections to be carried out in each annual period within territory under the jurisdiction or control of such Parties.

7. The number of on-site inspections for each Party shall be reviewed by the Commission within three years after this Treaty enters into force and annually thereafter. In light of each such review, which shall take full account of practical experience in the operation of the System and of measures taken to maintain or improve its effectiveness, the Commission may fix revised numbers, provided that no number (A) shall be less than two, (B) nor less than twenty per cent of the average annual number of events of seismic magnitude 4.75 or above which are located by the System in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 8 of Annex I, provided that when criteria for the identification of seismic events eligible for on-site inspections are agreed, no number shall be less than thirty per cent of the events remaining unidentified after the application of such criteria, occurring in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the Party to which the number relates. Such average annual number shall be based on data from control posts and research programs undertaken by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 for a period prescribed by the Commission.

8. The liability of a Party to on-site inspections pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3 of this Article shall commence from the date on which the Treaty enters into force for that Party. The annual period in which the number of on-site inspections for each Party may be carried out shall commence on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter on the anniversary of that date in each succeeding year. In the case of a Party which deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance

after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the number of on-site inspections which may be carried out in territory under its jurisdiction or control in the period remaining before the next anniversary of the date of entry into force of the Treaty shall bear the same proportion to its number determined in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Article, as that period bears to one year, but shall not be less than two. If the number of on-site inspections calculated in accordance with the preceding sentence includes a fraction, that fraction shall, if it is smaller than one-half, be disregarded, or, if it is one-half or greater, be regarded as equivalent to one.

9. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article, the Commission may direct the Administrator to carry out on-site inspection in territory under the jurisdiction or control of any Party either at the request of such Party or pursuant to an agreement made by such Party prior to or subsequent to signature of the Treaty. Inspections carried out under this paragraph shall not be deducted from a Party's number. Inspections carried out pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall take priority over inspections carried out under this paragraph.

10. The Administrator shall make available to all Parties to the Treaty within twenty-four hours after receipt all reports submitted to him by on-site inspection groups, together with any relevant data and analyses.

ARTICLE 11

Installation and Operation of the System in Parties' Territories

Each of the original Parties and all other Parties to this Treaty agree to accept on territory under their jurisdiction or control components of the System which is established on the basis of the "Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests" of August 20, 1958, the "Report of the Technical Working Group on the Detection and Identification of High-Altitude Nuclear Explosions" of July 15, 1959, and the "Conclusion of Technical Working Group II Regarding Possible Improvements of Techniques and Instrumentation" of December 18, 1959, and shall be installed and shall operate in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes.

ARTICLE 12

Undertakings Concerning Co-operation with the System

1. Each of the Parties undertakes to assure that adequate and expeditious transportation is available from the point of entry, or within its territory, to the site of any element of the System or any area where an on-site inspection is to be conducted.

2. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization of existing meteorological and commercial aircraft flights over ocean areas for routine air-sampling purposes.

3. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission to have aircraft immediately available for special flights, carried out pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 and Article 7 of Annex I, over territory under its jurisdiction or control or to permit such special flights by aircraft forming part of the System.

4. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization of existing weather or geophysical exploration vessels for use as components of the System.

5. Each of the Parties undertakes to give inspection groups, despatched pursuant to the provisions of Article 10, immediate and undisputed access to the area in which an on-site inspection is to be conducted, to refrain from interference with any operation of an inspection group and to give such groups the assistance they may require in the performance of their mission.

6. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission: for the design, construction, and provision of necessary satellite vehicles; for the provision and use of launching sites and launching vehicles; for the establishment and operation of stations to track satellites and to receive and analyze data from such satellites; and for the establishment and carrying out of a research program to measure background levels in space and to develop the necessary equipment and techniques to put effective space monitoring control systems into operation.

ARTICLE 13

Detonations for Peaceful Purposes

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes

to detonate, or assist others in the detonation of, nuclear devices for peaceful purposes only in accordance with the provisions of this Article. The detonations carried out pursuant to the provisions of this Article shall not be regarded as a violation of Article 1.

2. A Party intending to carry out or assist in such a detonation shall provide the Commission, at least four months in advance of the proposed detonation date, with a plan containing the following information:

A. The date, site and purpose of the proposed detonation;

B. The procedure it will follow to comply with paragraph 4 of this Article;

C. The expected yield of the device;

D. The measures to be taken to ensure that there will be no substantial fallout outside the immediate vicinity; and

E. the measurements to be taken and any experimentation to be conducted therewith.

3. Within two months after the receipt of the plan, the Commission shall authorize the Party to proceed with, or assist in, the proposed detonation, unless the Commission shall find that such detonation would not be carried out in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article. If, as a result of observations at the proposed site, the Commission determines that there is a lack of compliance with paragraph 4, it shall immediately so notify the Party planning to conduct or assist in the detonation. The Party shall thereupon refrain from carrying out or assisting in the detonation until notified by the Commission that it has determined that the detonation will be carried out in accordance with paragraph 4.

4. Each of the original Parties shall be given an adequate opportunity at a designated inspection site to inspect externally and internally any nuclear device to be detonated pursuant to this Article and to examine detailed drawings of the device, provided that such detailed drawings may not be reproduced or taken away from the inspection site. The device to be detonated shall, after inspection and reassembly, be under the continual surveillance of members of the Organization staff until detonation.

5. Members of the Organization staff shall, in addition to maintaining surveillance of the device to be detonated, observe all preparation for, and the actual firing of, the device and shall at all times

have unrestricted access to the vicinity of the detonation to ensure that the device employed is the one provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article.

6. Representatives of the original Parties shall be given adequate opportunity to accompany and to participate with members of the Organization staff in the exercise of their functions under paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article.

7. The Commission may, with the concurring votes of the original Parties, provide for any other system of safeguards to ensure that nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes are carried out in accordance with the objectives of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 14

Periodic Review of the System

1. Three years after the coming into force of this Treaty, the Commission shall review the System established under this Treaty in order to:

A. evaluate its effectiveness for verifying compliance with the obligations set forth in Articles 1 and 13 of this Treaty;

B. determine in the light of experience and scientific progress whether any specific improvements should be made or new elements added to the System;

C. consider such measures to improve or maintain the effectiveness of the System as may be proposed by any Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the operation of the Treaty.

2. The System may be reviewed by the Commission annually thereafter for the same purpose upon request of the Conference or any of the original Parties.

ARTICLE 15

Finance

1. Annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization shall be submitted to the Commission by the Administrator. After receipt of these estimates, the Commission shall submit a proposed budget to the Conference. The Conference may approve the budget as submitted or return it to the Commission with recommendations. If the budget is returned, the Commission shall then submit a further budget to the Conference for its approval.

2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Parties in accordance with a scale fixed by the Conference on the basis of recommen-

dations submitted to the Commission as part of each annual budget. The annual contributions of the USSR and the United States shall be equal.

3. Any Party desiring to pay its assessments, in whole or in part, by supplying materials, services, equipment or facilities shall make its offer in writing to the Commission. Within ninety days after receipt of the offer, the Commission shall determine whether to accept the offer, in whole or in part, and shall notify the Party of its decision. The Commission shall not accept such an offer unless the materials, services, equipment or facilities offered by the Party meet the standards prescribed by the Commission and are readily usable.

4. Subject to the rules and limitations approved by the Conference, the Commission shall have the authority to exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the Organization without, however, imposing on the Parties to this Treaty any individual liability in respect of a loan or loans entered into pursuant to this authority.

5. Decisions of the Commission and of the Conference on all financial questions shall be made by a majority of those present and voting. However, decisions by the Commission on the scale of contributions to be recommended and on the total amount of each annual budget shall require the concurring votes of the original Parties.

ARTICLE 16

Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Organization, its staff and the representatives of Parties shall be granted by the Parties, and the legal capacity which the Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Parties, shall be as set forth in Annex II of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 17

Relationships with Other International Organizations

1. The Commission, with the approval of the Conference, is authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements establishing an appropriate relationship between the Organization and the United Nations.

2. The Commission, with the approval of the Conference, shall arrange for the Organization to be brought into an appropriate relationship with any international organization which may in the

future be established among of the Parties to this Treaty to supervise disarmament and arms control measures.

ARTICLE 18

Annexes

The Annexes to this Treaty form an integral part of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 19

Parties to the Treaty

1. The essential Parties to this Treaty shall be:

A. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, referred to herein as the "original Parties";

B. Any other State whose adherence is decided by the Commission to be necessary for the achievement of the fundamental Treaty purpose of securing an effectively controlled permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions on a world-wide basis or to permit the installation of elements of control as required by the provisions of Annex I. If any State which is proposed to be the subject of a decision in accordance with the preceding sentence is associated with an original Party for the purposes of this Treaty, that original Party and any State associated with it for the purposes of this Treaty shall abstain from voting in the decision.

2. The signature and ratification or the acceptance of this Treaty by all the States designated in paragraph 1 A and any State whose adherence is decided to be necessary in accordance with paragraph 1 B shall be required for the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article.

3. Any other State desiring to adhere, whose adherence the Preparatory Commission or the Commission decides would contribute to the achievement of the purposes of this Treaty, may become a Party.

ARTICLE 20

*Signature, Ratification, Acceptance
and Entry into Force*

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by the states referred to in paragraph 1 A of Article 19. The signatory states shall become Parties to this Treaty by deposit of instruments of ratification.

2. Instruments of ratification and instruments of acceptance by states adhering pursuant to paragraphs 1 B and 3 of Article 19 shall be deposited with the Government of _____

_____, hereby designated
as Depositary Government.

3. Ratification or acceptance of this Treaty shall be effected by states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

4. This Treaty, apart from Annex III, shall enter into force when all the original Parties have deposited instruments of ratification thereof.

5. The Depositary Government shall promptly inform all signatory states of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each instrument of acceptance and the date of entry into force of this Treaty. The Depositary Government shall promptly inform all Parties of the dates on which states become Parties to this Treaty.

6. Annex III of this Treaty shall come into force on the day after this Treaty shall have been signed by the original Parties.

ARTICLE 21

Registration

1. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Agreements between the Organization and any Party to this Treaty or any other State or public international organization shall be submitted for registration by the Commission with the United Nations.

ARTICLE 22

Duration.

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of a Party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the Treaty and its Annexes, including those providing for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system, are not being fulfilled and observed.

ARTICLE 23

Amendments

Amendments to this Treaty and its Annexes shall enter into force for all Parties to the Treaty when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Conference and ratified in accordance with their respective constitu-

tional processes by two-thirds of the Parties to this Treaty, including all the original Parties.

ARTICLE 24

Authentic Texts

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Government. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Government to the Governments of the other signatory States and to the Governments of States which become Parties to this Treaty pursuant to paragraphs 1 B and 3 of Article 19.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at _____, this _____ day of _____, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-one.

ANNEX I

Detection and Identification System

PART I—DESCRIPTION

ARTICLE 1

The System established in this Treaty shall include the features set forth herein which are derived from the "Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests" of August 20, 1958, the "Report of the Technical Working Group on the Detection and Identification of High Altitude Nuclear Explosions" of July 15, 1959, and the "Conclusion of Technical Working Group II Regarding Possible Improvements of Techniques and Instrumentation" of December 18, 1959.

ARTICLE 2

1. The System shall, when completely established and unless otherwise decided in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, consist of the following components: A headquarters, regional offices, land control posts and ship-based control posts, systems of satellites, radiochemistry laboratories, air and water sampling facilities, on-site inspection facilities, and communications facilities. Upon recommendation of the Administrator, the

Commission may decide, with the affirmative votes of the original Parties, to add components as may be appropriate for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions.

2. The general characteristics of the System shall be as follows:

A. The land control posts shall be uniformly equipped with apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of acoustic waves, seismic waves, electromagnetic signals, fluorescence of the upper atmosphere, visible light, and cosmic noise absorption.

B. A number of control posts situated on islands or near the shore lines of oceans shall be equipped, in addition to the methods mentioned in paragraph 2 A of this Article, with apparatus for the recording of hydroacoustic waves. Certain control posts in areas not covered by existing weather stations (e.g. Southern Hemisphere) shall include meteorological equipment and personnel necessary to obtain data on air mass movements in order to predict the course of any air mass suspected to contain debris from nuclear explosions.

C. Control posts located on ships, which shall be stationed within specified ocean areas, shall be uniformly equipped with apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of hydroacoustic waves, fluorescence of the upper atmosphere and visible light. The methods of recording electromagnetic signals and cosmic noise absorption may also be used on ships at the discretion of the Administrator.

D. Aircraft and vessels for air and water sampling operations shall be suitably equipped with apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris from the air and from the water.

E. On-site inspection groups shall be appropriately manned and equipped to carry out on-site inspections to determine the nature of unidentified events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions.

F. Satellites in terrestrial and solar orbits shall be suitably equipped with apparatus for recording delayed and prompt gamma rays, X-rays, neutrons, and electrons trapped in the earth's magnetic field.

G. Suitably located ground stations shall be equipped to launch, track and to transmit to and receive data from satellites.

ARTICLE 3

Headquarters

1. *The Headquarters of the System* shall include directorates for Administration, for Supply, for Technical Operations and for Field Operations. Technical Operations shall be comprised of a Research and Development Center and a Data Analysis Center which shall include a Central Radiochemical Laboratory. Field Operations shall be comprised of a Central Inspection Office, a Communications Center and an Operations Center which shall include a Weather Center. Administration shall include offices for Finance and Personnel; and Supply shall include offices for System Construction and for Supply and Maintenance.

2. *The Research and Development Center* shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to conduct, either directly or by contract, research and development programs for developing and improving equipment and techniques for detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

3. *The Data Analysis Center* shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities for evaluating all data received from components of the System. All data from the components of the System shall be reported directly to the Data Analysis Center, whose functions shall include:

A. To analyze all data received from all components of the System.

B. To determine and report strictly on the basis of this analysis the time and place of occurrence and the magnitude or equivalent yield of:

(i) an event for which the data is sufficient to establish its nature as a nuclear explosion.

(ii) an event which is identifiable on the basis of the data as a natural geophysical disturbance.

(iii) an event which is not identifiable on the basis of the data as natural and which therefore could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion.

C. To examine continuously the work of the components of the System to ensure the maintenance of a high degree of technical proficiency.

4. *The Central Radiochemical Laboratory* shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to perform radiochemical and physical analyses of samples received from control posts, ships,

aerial sampling centers or other components of the System. The Central Radiochemical Laboratory shall analyze the samples for fission products and other nuclides to confirm the origin of the debris as being from a nuclear detonation as opposed to some other type of nuclear reaction. In addition, the Central Radiochemical Laboratory shall review for accuracy the findings of these components of the System concerning the characteristics and age of any nuclear debris involved. The Central Radiochemical Laboratory shall also be responsible for developing test procedures for use at field laboratories as required to ensure uniformity in analysis and measurement techniques throughout the System.

5. *The Central Inspection Office* shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to direct on-site inspection of events which cannot be identified as natural events and which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions. The Central Inspection Office shall organize and maintain inspection groups on an alert basis and shall be responsible, when so directed, for the dispatch of these groups to areas designated for inspection as soon as possible following notification by the Administrator. For these purposes the Central Inspection Office shall be responsible for:

A. Rapid development of a plan for movement of the inspection group to the area of the event in consultation with the Party or Parties exercising jurisdiction or control over territory in which the inspection is to take place;

B. Rapid movement of inspection personnel and equipment to the area;

C. Direction of the inspection groups and for the conduct of the inspection in the suspect area, including provisions for additional staff, equipment and supplies deemed necessary by the inspection group.

6. *The Communications Center* shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to ensure rapid and reliable communications with control posts, ships, aerial sampling centers, regional offices, and satellite tracking stations. "Rapid and reliable communications" is defined as such a communications network as will ensure an exchange of accurate and complete messages with any of the components of the System within eight hours.

7. *The Operations Center* shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to control all

field operations, excluding on-site inspection. The Operations Center shall control the launching and positioning of satellites, as well as the movement of aircraft, vessels, equipment and personnel which are deployed for the purpose of conducting air and water sampling operations. It shall maintain complete and current information on the operational status of each component of the System, including aerial sampling flights over the oceans and over territories under the jurisdiction or control of Parties to this Treaty. The Operations Center will ensure that steps are taken to maintain all components of the System at all times in a high state of operational readiness to perform their assigned functions.

8. *The Weather Center* shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to prepare forecasts of air mass trajectories from any point at which a nuclear explosion is suspected to have occurred for use in vectoring aerial sampling flights to intercept these air masses. The Weather Center shall be provided by wire or radio with weather data from existing national weather networks under the control of the Parties. Appropriate arrangements shall be made for other national or international networks to supply weather data to the Weather Center by wire or radio. In addition, the Weather Center shall be provided with weather data from special weather detachments established in accordance with paragraph 2 B of Article 2 of this Annex.

ARTICLE 4

Regional Offices

1. Regional Offices shall be established as the Commission determines to be necessary for the effective administration and operation of the System.

2. Each Regional Office shall perform the following functions:

A. Provide logistic support to and administrative supervision over components of the System operating in its region;

B. Provide necessary support and administrative assistance to inspection groups operating in its region;

C. Maintain liaison with national and local authorities in its region in connection with its performance of the above functions and in particular to ensure the expeditious transportation and local support of inspection groups.

ARTICLE 5

Land Control Posts

1. The network of control posts shall, when completely established, include at least 170 land control posts. Unless otherwise determined under paragraph 2 below, the spacing between control posts shall be about 1700 kilometers in continental aseismic areas, about 1000 kilometers in continental seismic areas, and between 1000 and about 3500 kilometers in ocean areas.

2. The number of control posts to be installed in the USSR, United Kingdom and United States shall be as specified in Article 17 of this Annex. Except for the number of control posts to be installed in the USSR, United Kingdom and United States, the Commission shall determine, on the basis of the foregoing standards of spacing, the number of control posts to be installed in other territories under the jurisdiction or control of the original Parties and all territories under the jurisdiction or control of Parties other than the original Parties to the Treaty. With the approval of the Commission and of the Party concerned, the control posts may be arranged in an alternative distribution within territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party if, in the view of the Commission, such a redistribution will result in an improvement in the capabilities of the System.

3. Specific sites for control posts shall be selected in a manner to give the maximum over-all capability to the System. The siting of individual control posts shall be determined primarily on the basis of the seismic requirement. However, in the event that two or more suitable seismic sites are found in the desired areas, a final selection of the location of the control posts shall be made with due consideration of siting requirements of the other methods of detection set forth in Article 2 of this Annex. In the event that no control post location fulfilling seismic requirements is found that permits satisfactory operation of other detection equipment as set forth in this Annex, the Administrator may direct the installation of such equipment at a more favorable location. In the event that, after a control post is established, the background seismic noise increases above acceptable limits due to human or other activity, the Administrator, after consultation with the Party, may direct that the control post may be moved to another location.

4. All land control posts shall maintain contin-

uous operation of apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of fluorescence of the upper atmosphere, visible light, cosmic noise absorption, acoustic waves, seismic waves and electromagnetic signals. Control posts situated on islands or near the shore lines of oceans shall, in addition, maintain continuous operation of apparatus for the recording of hydroacoustic waves. In addition, equipment may be operated at certain land control posts to track and to transmit to and receive data from satellites.

ARTICLE 6

Ship-Based Control Posts

1. The network of control posts shall, when completely established, include a system of ship-based control posts, which shall be employed in ocean areas which do not contain suitable islands. There shall be a sufficient number of ships to maintain a capability for continuous operation of four stations each in the North Pacific and South Pacific Oceans and one station each in the North Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

2. Ship-based control posts shall maintain continuous operation of apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of hydroacoustic waves, fluorescence of the upper atmosphere and visible light. Equipment for recording electromagnetic signals and cosmic noise absorption may also be used on ships at the discretion of the Administrator.

ARTICLE 7

Air and Water Sampling Operations

1. Daily routine air sampling flights shall be conducted at several different altitudes over ocean areas in approximately a north-south direction near the sides of continents, as well as in the center of remote ocean areas such as the Central Pacific the Indian Ocean west of Australia and the North Atlantic Ocean, for the purpose of detecting nuclear explosions by the method of collecting radioactive debris.

2. Special aircraft sampling flights shall be conducted to search for a possible radioactive cloud for the purpose of collecting samples of radioactive debris within two to five days after the date of origin of the debris. Special sampling flights shall be initiated whenever fresh radioactive debris has been detected by a routine air sampling flight or by a control post or when acoustic signals recorded at control posts establish

the time and position of a possible explosion in the atmosphere. In an instance, the flight routes of the aircraft shall be selected on the basis of meteorological trajectory forecasts from the location of the suspected event, and the aircraft shall search at several different altitudes.

3. Special aircraft flights undertaken over territory under the jurisdiction or control of Parties shall be conducted, on instruction of the Administrator in accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty, over permanent flight routes as set out by the Commission in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty. Such permanent flight routes shall be laid down in advance in such number and geographical location that, according to meteorological data, interception of any cloud containing radioactive debris will be assured within two to five days of the suspected event. Sampling aircraft to be used over territory under the jurisdiction or control of Parties shall be located in or near permanent flight routes and shall be maintained in a high state of operational readiness to conduct the sampling flights directed by the Administrator.

4. Special aircraft flights over ocean areas shall be conducted from aircraft sampling centers distributed uniformly throughout the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. When the area to be covered by such flights is remote from any one of the centers, operations will be staged out of the nearest air field, and necessary supplies which cannot be procured locally will be airlifted from the nearest center.

5. Water sampling operations, by ships and/or aircraft, shall be conducted for the purpose of collecting samples of water suspected of containing radioactive debris whenever hydroacoustic signals recorded at control posts establish the time and position of a possible underwater explosion. Suitably equipped aircraft and/or vessels shall be deployed in such a manner that water sampling operations can be conducted at the site of the event within four days after such operations are directed by the Administrator.

6. A. Radiochemical laboratories shall be located at each of the aerial sampling centers established in accordance with paragraph 4 above. Laboratories at aerial sampling centers shall be equipped to carry out all the necessary radiochemical analytical techniques required to determine the presence of fresh debris and to ascertain the date of origin of the debris with a precision con-

sistent with the most modern radiochemical dating techniques. This shall be done by using as many dating techniques as sample-size and age of the debris permit.

B. Upon termination of a sampling flight, samples shall be assayed by suitable instruments, for example gamma spectrometers. Samples shall be divided in equal parts. One part shall be sent to the nearest radiochemical laboratory, and the other part shall be sent to the Central Radiochemical Laboratory for further analysis with an indication as to which are suspected of containing fresh fission products.

C. Water samples shall be assayed by suitable instruments as soon as practicable following sample collection, and those samples suspected of containing fresh fission products shall be divided in equal parts. One part shall be sent to the nearest radiochemical laboratory and the other to the Central Radiochemical Laboratory for analysis.

ARTICLE 8

Criteria for On-Site Inspection of Seismic Events

1. A seismic event which is located by the criteria in paragraph 2 of this Article and which is determined to be of seismic magnitude 4.75 or greater shall be eligible for on-site inspection unless rendered ineligible for inspection by the fulfillment of any of the criteria in paragraph 3 of this Article.

2. A seismic event shall be considered to be located when seismic signals, whose frequencies, amplitudes, durations, and velocities are consistent with those of the waves from earthquakes or explosions, are recorded at a sufficient number of control posts to establish the approximate time and position of the event. This requires at least four clearly measurable arrival times of identifiable phases which are mutually consistent to within plus or minus three seconds. These four consistent arrival times must include P-wave arrival times at three different control posts.

3. A located seismic event shall be ineligible for inspection if, and only if, it fulfills one or more of the following criteria:

A. its depth of focus is established as below sixty kilometers;

B. its epicentral location is established to be in the deep open ocean, and the event is unaccompanied by a hydroacoustic signal consistent with the seismic epicenter and origin time;

C. it is established to be a foreshock of a seismic event of at least magnitude 6 which has been clearly identified as an earthquake by the criteria in sub-paragraphs A and B above. For this purpose a "foreshock" is defined as one of a sequence of earthquakes which occurs less than forty-eight hours before the main shock and which has an epicenter within ten kilometers of the epicenter of the main shock;

D. it is established to be an aftershock of a seismic event of at least magnitude 6 which has been clearly identified as an earthquake by the criteria in sub-paragraphs A and B above. For this purpose, an "aftershock" is defined as one of a sequence of earthquakes which occurs less than one week after the main shock and which has an epicenter within ten kilometers of the epicenter of the main shock.

4. In cases where adequately precise regional travel time curves are available, and where consistent arrival times are available from control posts surrounding the epicenter, that is, from control posts at least one of which lies in every possible 90-degree sector around the epicenter, the area eligible for inspection will be 200 square kilometers. In cases where adequately precise regional travel time curves are not available, or where data from control posts lying in every possible 90-degree sector around the epicenter are not available, an area of 500 square kilometers shall be eligible for inspection. The area eligible for inspection shall be chosen so as to have the highest likelihood of containing the epicenter.

5. The basic data for all criteria shall be obtained from control posts.

6. Within three years after the entry into force of this Treaty and annually thereafter, the Commission shall review the provisions of this Article. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 23, the Commission may at any time, with the concurring votes of the original Parties, amend the provisions of this Article. Such amendments shall be binding on all Parties to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

A Seismic Event Equal to or Greater than Magnitude 4.75

1. "A seismic event equal to or greater than magnitude 4.75" is a seismic event whose apparent magnitude M as measured by the formula M equals Q plus $\text{LOG}(A/GT)$ is equal to or greater than 4.75 at one-half or more of the control posts

which measure the quantity "A" and which are located at distances greater than 16 degrees and less than 90 degrees from the epicenter. The symbols in the formula M equals Q plus $\text{LOG}(A/GT)$ are defined as follows:

A. "A" is one-half of the maximum peak positive to negative amplitude (displacement), expressed in microns in the record of the first five cycles of the P waves made by a short-period vertical-component seismograph with characteristics which will permit operation of single seismometers at quiet stations with magnification greater than ten to the sixth power at the frequency of peak response. "A" is measured if it exceeds three times the arithmetical mean of the ten greatest peak amplitudes of the noise oscillations recorded during the preceding two minutes. Noises, the periods of which differ from the signal period by not more than one and one-half times, are counted. The noise amplitude and period are determined by the same procedure as for the signal.

B. "T" is the time, measured in seconds, between the first of the peaks used in determining "A" and the next following peak of the same sign.

C. "G" is the steady state magnification of the seismograph at period T.

D. "Q" is given as a function of distance in the following table:

| Distance | Q | Distance | Q | Distance | Q |
|------------|-----|------------|-----|------------|-----|
| 16 Degrees | 5.9 | 41 Degrees | 6.5 | 66 Degrees | 7.0 |
| 17 | 5.9 | 42 | 6.5 | 67 | 7.0 |
| 18 | 5.9 | 43 | 6.5 | 68 | 7.0 |
| 19 | 6.0 | 44 | 6.5 | 69 | 7.0 |
| 20 | 6.0 | 45 | 6.7 | 70 | 6.9 |
| 21 | 6.1 | 46 | 6.8 | 71 | 6.9 |
| 22 | 6.2 | 47 | 6.9 | 72 | 6.9 |
| 23 | 6.3 | 48 | 6.9 | 73 | 6.9 |
| 24 | 6.3 | 49 | 6.8 | 74 | 6.8 |
| 25 | 6.5 | 50 | 6.7 | 75 | 6.8 |
| 26 | 6.4 | 51 | 6.7 | 76 | 6.9 |
| 27 | 6.5 | 52 | 6.7 | 77 | 6.9 |
| 28 | 6.6 | 53 | 6.7 | 78 | 6.9 |
| 29 | 6.6 | 54 | 6.8 | 79 | 6.8 |
| 30 | 6.6 | 55 | 6.8 | 80 | 6.7 |
| 31 | 6.7 | 56 | 6.8 | 81 | 6.8 |
| 32 | 6.7 | 57 | 6.8 | 82 | 6.9 |
| 33 | 6.7 | 58 | 6.8 | 83 | 7.0 |
| 34 | 6.7 | 59 | 6.8 | 84 | 7.0 |
| 35 | 6.7 | 60 | 6.8 | 85 | 7.0 |
| 36 | 6.6 | 61 | 6.9 | 86 | 6.9 |
| 37 | 6.5 | 62 | 7.0 | 87 | 7.0 |
| 38 | 6.5 | 63 | 6.9 | 88 | 7.1 |
| 39 | 6.4 | 64 | 7.0 | 89 | 7.0 |
| 40 | 6.4 | 65 | 7.0 | 90 | 7.0 |

ARTICLE 10 Inspection Groups

1. Inspection groups shall be established and maintained to conduct on-site inspections as directed by the Administrator. They shall be based at a number of locations sufficient to insure prompt arrival and logistical support at the site of any unidentified continental or maritime event. Inspection groups shall be responsible for the collection and preliminary evaluation of evidence concerning the nature of the event in question. They shall remain in the inspection area until recalled by the Administrator.

2. Each inspection group shall be staffed with scientific, technical and other personnel qualified to perform the duties required in the conduct of an on-site inspection.

3. Each inspection group shall, when dispatched, conduct any inspection directed by the Administrator in a prompt and efficient manner and shall be authorized to:

A. Establish a local base of operations.

B. Establish and maintain communications with its permanent base, the Central Inspection Office, and, as required, other components of the System.

C. Consult with local officials and individuals.

D. Conduct low-altitude aerial inspection of the area eligible for inspection, utilizing such techniques as may be necessary for this purpose, including, but not limited to, photographic, electromagnetic, magnetic, infrared and radioactivity surveys.

E. Conduct surface and subsurface inspection in the area eligible for inspection for all evidence which may in any way relate to the nature of the event, utilizing such techniques as may be necessary for this purpose, including, but not limited to, drilling for radioactive samples for scientific analysis.

F. Utilize such other means of investigation on site as would be likely to produce relevant data.

4. Each inspection group shall submit to the Administrator periodic progress reports during the course of any inspection and a final report upon the conclusion of the inspection operation. Copies of these reports shall be sent to the Party or Parties exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory in which the inspection is being or has been carried out.

5. Each inspection group shall have available

for its use the technical apparatus and facilities necessary for the performance of a prompt and efficient inspection operation. Such apparatus and facilities shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

A. Portable seismographs for recording after-shocks, geophysical equipment for seismic profiling, detection equipment for locating metallic articles, radiation detectors, equipment for collecting radioactive samples on the surface, drilling equipment for obtaining underground radioactive samples, portable laboratory equipment for field radiochemical analysis, and photographic equipment.

B. Appropriate surface and air transport for rapid movement to an inspection area along routes prescribed by the host country, and for the operation and logistics of the inspection group.

C. Appropriate aircraft for the conduct of low-altitude aerial reconnaissance of the inspection area for evidence of the nature of the event in question.

D. Appropriate vessels for the conduct of inspection of maritime events.

E. Technically suitable and reliable communications equipment to establish and maintain contact with its permanent base of operations, the Central Inspection Office, and, as required, other System components.

ARTICLE 11

High Altitude Systems

1. The high altitude systems, which are based upon the recommendations contained in the "Report of the Technical Working Group on the Detection and Identification of High Altitude Nuclear Explosions", of July 15, 1959, are established for the purpose of providing, when in effective operation, a level of capability not less than that estimated by the Technical Working Group in sections A and B of their Report. The techniques and instrumentation for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions at high altitudes shall comprise apparatus installed at control posts and ground stations as specified in Articles 2, 5 and 6 of this Annex, together with satellite systems.

Satellite systems shall be so positioned in orbits as to provide maximum capability for detecting nuclear explosions as follows:

A. One or more satellites (trapped-electron

satellites) placed in an appropriate terrestrial elliptical orbit and suitably instrumented with counters for recording electrons trapped in the earth's magnetic field. A satellite shall be replaced when it can no longer record or transmit the required data to ground stations.

B. At least six satellites (far-earth satellites) placed in terrestrial orbits at altitudes of more than 30,000 kilometers so as to be continuously outside the earth's trapped radiation belts. Three of the satellites shall be nearly equally spaced in the same orbital plane, and three satellites shall be similarly placed in a second orbital plane positioned at approximately right angles to the first. Each satellite shall be suitably equipped with instruments for recording prompt and delayed gamma rays, X-rays, and neutrons. A satellite shall be replaced when it can no longer record and transmit to ground stations the required data from any three of the four methods of detection as set forth in this sub-paragraph. In addition, satellites shall be replaced when the System

(i) no longer provides complete surveillance of the earth, or

(ii) no longer provides surveillance in all directions in space lying outside the orbits of the System's component satellites by means of the X-ray detection method from at least three satellites.

C. At least four satellites (solar satellites) placed in appropriate solar orbits and suitably equipped with instruments, including those for recording X-rays. A satellite shall be replaced when it can no longer record and transmit to ground stations the required data on X-ray signals.

2. Each satellite requiring replacement shall be replaced as rapidly as possible.

3. Each satellite shall carry apparatus for verifying the performance of its equipment. Each satellite shall be inspected immediately prior to launching to ensure its instruments meet the detection requirements and that the satellite includes nothing which might interfere with the performance of its equipment. After inspection, the launching of each satellite shall be observed. This inspection and the subsequent observation of the launching of the satellite shall be performed by members of the staff of the Organization selected by the Administrator in accordance with the principles set forth in sub-paragraph 3 C (v) of Article 9.

PART III—DATA REPORTING AND EVALUATION

ARTICLE 12

1. All components of the System shall immediately examine all records obtained. When data which meet criteria established by the Headquarters of the System are observed, they shall be reported by wire or radio to the Data Analysis Center. All components of the System shall provide additional data to the Center upon its request. In addition, all original data and records obtained by all components of the System shall be forwarded expeditiously to the Headquarters of the System. Reliable electronic transmission of data and frequent collection of records and materials by aircraft shall be incorporated in the reporting system.

2. The equipment at control posts, ships, satellite tracking and data transmitting and receiving stations, and air and water sampling centers shall be examined periodically by technical personnel from the Headquarters of the System for the purpose of ensuring the validity of the data transmitted from these components to Headquarters.

PART IV—SUPPORT FACILITIES

ARTICLE 13

Communications

The System shall have rapid and reliable communications between its components and Headquarters and shall have the right to install, maintain and operate communications facilities, including radio networks, using existing channels when they are suitable for this purpose. The network must be capable of ensuring an exchange of accurate and complete messages between the Headquarters and any component of the System within eight hours. Provisions shall be made for the receipt of standard time signals by all components of the System which record geographical data. Provisions shall also be made for transmission to the System Headquarters of all weather data required by the Weather Center as set forth in paragraph 8 of Article 3 of this Annex.

ARTICLE 14

Supplies and Services

1. The System Headquarters shall manage resources of the System for supplies and services by such means as: establishing procurement, con-

struction and transportation criteria; publishing instructions for operation and maintenance of equipment; receiving and processing supply and maintenance reports from the elements of the System and establishing specification and performance standards for equipment.

2. The System Headquarters shall ensure that technical equipment meets required performance standards before authorizing acceptance of the equipment for use in the System.

3. Maximum use shall be made of sources of supply of non-technical equipment indigenous to the area where facilities of the System are located. Support equipment and supplies shall be locally procured where possible by the Regional Offices or control posts.

ARTICLE 15

System Phasing

The controls provided for in this Treaty shall be progressively extended, and the components of the System installed in three phases, in order to achieve and ensure world-wide compliance with the obligations of this Treaty. The sub-phases of Phase I shall begin within three months after the Treaty enters into force. Sub-phase I-A shall be completed within two years after the Treaty enters into force. Sub-phase I-B shall be completed within four years after the Treaty enters into force. Phase II shall begin within one year after the Treaty enters into force, and shall be completed within five years after the Treaty enters into force. Phase III shall begin within two years after the Treaty enters into force and shall be completed within six years after the Treaty enters into force. Each control post and each other facility shall be put into operation, in whole or in part, as it is installed, and the System shall be fully operational within six years after the Treaty enters into force. The Commission may, however, decide, with the affirmative votes of the original Parties, to postpone, add to, or refrain from establishing any part of Phases I, II, and III.

ARTICLE 16

Phasing of Headquarters

The Headquarters of the System shall be established at the beginning of Phase I and shall be expanded through Phase I and subsequent phases as required to provide effective administration and operation of the System.

ARTICLE 17

Control Post Phasing

Land control posts and control posts on ships shall be established as follows:

| | Phase I | | Phase II | Phase III |
|-------------------------------------|---------|-------|----------|-----------|
| | A | B | | |
| USSR..... | 9 | 9 | ----- | ----- |
| U.S..... | 6 | 4 | ----- | ----- |
| U.K..... | 1 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Oceanic Islands..... | 20 | ----- | 16 | 24 |
| Ships..... | 10 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Australia..... | ----- | ----- | 4 | 3 |
| Asia (Non-USSR)..... | ----- | ----- | 21 | ----- |
| Europe (Non-USSR)..... | ----- | ----- | 3 | ----- |
| North America and Greenland..... | ----- | ----- | 14 | ----- |
| Africa..... | ----- | ----- | 7 | 9 |
| South America..... | ----- | ----- | 6 | 10 |
| Antarctica..... | ----- | ----- | ----- | 4 |
| | 46 | 13 | 71 | 50 |

ARTICLE 18

Aircraft Sampling Phasing

Aircraft sampling facilities shall be established and made fully operational within two years after the Treaty enters into force.

ARTICLE 19

Satellite Systems Phasing

Subject to the provisions of Article 11 of this Annex, satellite systems shall be installed as follows:

| | Phase I | | Phase II | Phase III |
|--------------------------------|---------|-------|----------|-----------|
| | A | B | | |
| Trapped-electron Satellites | 1 | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Far-earth Satellites..... | ----- | 6 | ----- | ----- |
| Solar Satellites..... | ----- | ----- | ----- | 4 |
| | 1 | 6 | ----- | 4 |

ARTICLE 20

Inspection Group Phasing

Inspection groups shall be established from the beginning of Phase I. A sufficient number of groups shall be maintained to carry out inspections at any time in the numbers which, in accordance with the terms of this Treaty and its Annexes, may currently be required.

ARTICLE 21

Communications Phasing

A survey of communications requirements shall be performed at the beginning of each phase. Ele-

ments of the communications system shall be timed to be operational so as to ensure rapid and reliable communications for each control post or other component of the System as soon as such post or other component becomes operational.

ANNEX II

Privileges and Immunities

ARTICLE 1

Definitions

In this Annex:

(1) The expression "representatives of Parties to this Treaty" includes representatives on or to any organ of the Organization established under the provisions of this Treaty, including the Conference, together with the members of their official staffs.

(2) The expression "representatives of Parties to this Treaty on the Control Commission" includes all members of the official staffs of such representatives except those whose duties are clerical. For the purpose of this Annex such clerical personnel shall be deemed to come within the class of persons referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of this Article.

(3) The expression "members of the Organization staff" includes the Administrator and all the employees of the Organization.

(4) The term "expert" shall mean an individual performing a mission on behalf of the Organization either at the headquarters of the Organization or in the territory of a Party to this Treaty.

(5) The term "host government" shall mean the government of the country in which the headquarters of the Organization is located.

ARTICLE 2

Juridical Personality

A. The Organization shall possess juridical personality. It shall have the capacity (a) to contract, (b) to acquire and dispose of property, (c) to institute and defend legal proceedings.

B. The Organization may provide for suitable identification of ships and aircraft employed on the official service of the Organization.

ARTICLE 3

Property, Funds and Assets

A. The Organization, its property and assets,

wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case the Commission, on behalf of the Organization, has expressly waived this immunity, but such express waiver of immunity shall not extend to any measure of execution or detention of property.

B. The premises of the Organization shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the Organization, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.

C. The archives of the Organization and all documents belonging to it or held by it or by its staff or experts on its behalf shall be inviolable wherever located.

D. The Organization, without being restricted by financial controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind, may, subject to the obligation to give effect as far as is practicable to representations made to it by any Party, exercise the following rights:

(1) To hold currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency;

(2) To transfer its funds freely from, to, or within any country Party to this Treaty and convert any currency held by it into any other currency.

E. The Organization, its assets, income and other property shall be:

(1) Exempt from all direct taxes except those taxes which are in reality a charge for specific services;

(2) Exempt from all customs duties, prohibitions and restrictions on imports and exports in respect of articles imported or exported by the Organization for its official use; articles imported under such exemption shall not be disposed of, by sale or by gift, in the country into which they are imported except under conditions approved by the Government of that country;

(3) Exempt from all customs duties, prohibitions and restrictions on imports and exports in respect of its publications.

F. The Organization shall be exempt from taxes imposed directly on its expenditure transactions but not exempt from those taxes which are in reality a charge for specific services.

ARTICLE 4 *Communications*

A. Each Party shall take appropriate steps necessary to ensure that its domestic and international telecommunication services accord to telecommunications of the Organization treatment at least equal to government telecommunications with respect to priority of transmission, and accord these telecommunications higher priority, i.e., special priority as accorded to the United Nations Organization in emergencies, when requested, and that rates charged shall be no higher than minimum government rates. Postal communications shall be handled in the most expeditious manner possible.

B. No censorship shall be applied to the official correspondence and other official communications of the Organization.

C. The Organization shall have the right to use codes known to all Parties and to despatch and receive by courier or in sealed bags only official correspondence, other official communications, and objects intended for official use. Such couriers and sealed bags shall have the same immunities and privileges as diplomatic couriers and bags.

D. Nothing in paragraphs B and C of this Article shall be construed to preclude the adoption of appropriate security precautions to be determined by agreement between a Party and the Organization.

ARTICLE 5

Representatives of Parties to this Treaty

A. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty on the Control Commission shall enjoy, in the territory of the host government, the same privileges and immunities as the host government accords diplomatic envoys accredited to it.

B. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty on the Control Commission shall enjoy, while present in the territory of another Party in the discharge of Commission duties, the same privileges and immunities as the Party accords diplomatic envoys accredited to it.

C. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty shall enjoy, while present in the territory of the host government and while in the territory of another Party in the discharge of their official duties and during their journey to and from the place of meeting, the following privileges and immunities:

(1) Immunity from arrest, detention or any

legal process with respect to words spoken or written and acts done by them in their official capacity;

(2) Inviolability for all their official papers and documents;

(3) The right to use codes, couriers, and sealed bags in communicating with their Governments, their staffs and with the Organization;

(4) The same exemption in respect of themselves and their spouses from immigration restrictions, aliens' registration and national service obligations as is accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(5) The same facilities with respect to currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(6) The same immunities and facilities with respect to their personal baggage as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(7) The right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first arrival to take up their posts in the territory of a Party and, on the termination of their functions there, to re-export such furniture and effects free of duty; furniture and effects so imported shall not be disposed of, by sale or by gift, in such territory except under conditions approved by the Government thereof.

D. A representative to whom this Article applies shall, during any period when he is present in the territory of another Party for the discharge of his duties, be exempt from taxation on his official salary and emoluments, and where the legal incidence of any other form of taxation depends upon residence, any such period shall, for the purposes of determining his liability to taxation, be treated as not being a period of residence in that territory.

E. The Administrator shall communicate to the Parties concerned the names of the representatives and members of their official staffs to whom paragraph B of this Article applies and the probable duration of their stay in the territories of such other Parties.

F. The privileges and immunities accorded under paragraphs A, B, and C are not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organiza-

tion. Consequently a Party not only has the right, but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its representatives and their staffs in any case where, in its opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the purposes for which the immunity is accorded.

G. The provisions of paragraphs A to E above shall not require any Party to grant any of the privileges or immunities referred to therein to any person who is its national or any person who is its representative or is a member of the staff of such representative.

ARTICLE 6

Organization Staff and Experts

A. The Administrator and the deputies of the Administrator shall be accorded the privileges and immunities normally accorded to diplomatic envoys.

B. All other members of the Organization staff shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities:

(1) Immunity from arrest or detention whenever assigned to a control post, an inspection group, or a routine or special flight; and at all times immunity from arrest, detention or any legal process with respect to words spoken or written and acts done by them in the performance of their official functions;

(2) The same facilities with respect to currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(3) The same immunities and facilities with respect to their personal baggage as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(4) The same exemption from immigration restrictions, aliens' registration and national service obligations for themselves, their spouses and members of their immediate families residing with them and dependent on them as is accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(5) The same repatriation facilities in time of international crisis for themselves, their spouses and members of their immediate families residing with them and dependent on them, as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(6) The right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first arrival to take up their posts in the territory of a Party and, on the termination of their functions there, to re-export such furniture and effects free of duty; furniture and effects so imported shall not be disposed of, by sale or by gift, in such territory except under conditions approved by the Government thereof.

C. Every expert performing a mission for the Organization either at the headquarters of the Organization or in the territory of a Party shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities:

- (1) Immunity from arrest or detention;
- (2) Immunity from legal process in respect to words spoken or written and acts done by him in the performance of his official functions;
- (3) The same exemption from immigration restrictions, aliens' registration and national service obligations as is accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;
- (4) Immunities and privileges specified in items (2) and (3) of paragraph B of this Article.

D. Every member of the Organization staff and every expert shall be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to him by the Organization.

E. The Administrator shall keep the Parties currently informed as to each individual to whom any of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article is applicable. A Party shall always be entitled to notification of the name and responsibility of any such individual before his arrival for official duties in the territory of that Party, so that it may have an opportunity to comment to the Administrator upon the proposed assignment of such expert or member of the Organization staff.

F. Privileges and immunities are granted to members of the Organization staff and to experts in the interests of the Organization and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Administrator shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any such individual in any case where the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the Organization. In the case of the Administrator his immunity may be waived by the Commission provided the Commission finds the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the Organization.

G. The provisions of paragraphs A to D inclusive above shall not require any Party to grant any of the privileges or immunities referred to therein to any person who is its national, except:

- (1) Immunity from arrest, detention or any legal process with respect to words spoken or written and acts done by him in the performance of his official functions for the Organization;
- (2) Facilities with respect to currency or exchange restrictions so far as necessary for the effective exercise of his functions.

ARTICLE 7

Abuses of Privileges

A. The Organization shall at all times cooperate with the appropriate authorities of Parties to facilitate the proper administration of justice, secure the observance of police regulations, and prevent the occurrence of an abuse of the privileges and immunities set out in this Annex.

B. If any Party considers that there has been an abuse of the privilege of residence in its territory or of any other privilege or immunity granted by this Annex, the following procedure shall be adopted:

(1) In the case of an abuse by the Administrator, consultations shall be held between the Party and the Commission to determine the action to be taken.

(2) In the case of an abuse by any individual referred to in paragraphs (1) or (2) of Article 1, the Party which considers that there has been an abuse may, after consultation with the Party whose representative is concerned and in accordance with the diplomatic procedure applicable to diplomatic envoys accredited to the former Party, require the representative to leave its territory.

(3) In the case of an abuse by any individual referred to in paragraphs B and C of Article 6, the Party which considers that there has been an abuse may, after consultation with the Administrator and, in the event of disagreement, with the Commission, require the Administrator to arrange for an immediate replacement.

ARTICLE 8

Laissez-Passer

A. Members of the staff of the Organization and experts on missions on behalf of the Organization shall be entitled to use a special *laissez-passer* procedure modelled on the United Nations *laissez-*

passer procedure, to be evolved by the Administrator pursuant to regulation approved by the Commission.

B. Parties shall recognize and accept the Organization *laissez-passer* issued to members of the staff of the Organization and to experts on missions on behalf of the Organization as valid travel documents.

C. Members of the staff of the Organization and experts travelling on the Organization *laissez-passer* on the business of the Organization, shall be granted the same facilities for travel as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions.

ARTICLE 9

Interpretation and Supplementary Agreements

A. The provisions of this Annex shall be interpreted in the light of the functions with which the Organization is entrusted by this Treaty and its Annexes.

B. The provisions of this Annex shall in no way limit or prejudice the privileges and immunities which have been, or may hereafter be, accorded to the Organization by a State by reason of the location, in the territory of that State, of the headquarters or other components and agencies of the Organization. The Organization may conclude with any Party or Parties agreements supplementing the provisions of this Annex, so far as that Party or those Parties are concerned.

ANNEX III

The Preparatory Commission

A. A Preparatory Commission, consisting of one representative from each of the original Parties to this Treaty, shall come into existence on the day after this Treaty shall have been signed by all the original Parties. The Preparatory Commission shall remain in existence until the Control Commission has been elected in accordance with Article 4 of this Treaty.

B. Except as provided in Section E of this Annex, the Preparatory Commission shall take decisions by agreement among the three original Parties, adopt its own rules of procedure, meet as often as necessary and determine its own place of meeting. It shall appoint an executive secretary and such staff as shall be necessary, who shall exer-

cise such powers and perform such duties as the Preparatory Commission may determine.

C. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission may be met by a loan provided by the United Nations or by advances from governments. The repayment of loans shall be included as an item in the budget for the Control Organization's first financial period. The Preparatory Commission shall make the necessary arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations for repayment of the loan. Advances from governments may be set off against assessments of the governments concerned levied in accordance with the provisions of Article 15.

D. Pending deposit of instruments of ratification of the Treaty by all the original Parties, the Preparatory Commission shall:

1. Conduct preliminary technical studies and consultations with regard to the location, installation, and equipping of control posts and other components of the Control Organization, including:

(a) geological and topographic map studies of the geographical areas of the world where control posts are to be located;

(b) consultations with technical representatives of the original Parties for the purpose of adopting standard construction designs for control posts and regional offices and of choosing types of equipment for each of the methods of detection;

(c) studies of the surveys which will be required for selecting sites for control posts and other components;

(d) studies of communication requirements;

(e) consultations with the original Parties for equipping and utilizing their aircraft for routine flights and vessels to be stationed in accordance with the Treaty and its Annexes;

(f) studies of requirements for standard time transmission and reception to ensure accurate relative time at all control posts and other components of the Control Organization.

2. Draw up detailed requirements and regulations for the staffing of the Organization and invite applications for posts to be filled during the initial operations of the Organization;

3. Draw up requirements and invite applications for the post of Administrator;

4. Recommend the site in Vienna of the permanent headquarters of the Organization; draw up

recommendations for the provisions of a headquarters agreement defining the status of the Organization and its rights and relationship with the host country;

5. Draw up detailed plans for the day-to-day technical and administrative operations of the Organization;

6. Draw up for submission to the Conference the budget for the Organization's first financial period and a recommended scale of assessment;

7. In conjunction with the United Nations, initiate the preparation of a draft agreement which would be in accordance with Article 17 of this Treaty;

8. Make arrangements for the convening of the first conference, to be held not later than six months from the date instruments of ratification have been deposited by all the original Parties.

E. 1. On the day after deposit of instruments of ratification of the Treaty by all the original Parties, or as soon thereafter as possible, the Preparatory Commission shall be enlarged, to consist of one representative from each of the original Parties to this Treaty and one representative from eight other states, chosen by agreement between the three original Parties from among those states which at that time have deposited instruments of ratification of the Treaty.

2. The Preparatory Commission thus enlarged shall exercise the powers conferred upon the Control Commission by the Treaty, in accordance with the Procedures therein specified for the Control Commission. After the Preparatory Commission has been enlarged and pending the appointment of the Administrator, the executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission shall exercise the powers conferred upon the Administrator by the Treaty.

3. Pending the enlargement of the Preparatory Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Section, the Preparatory Commission shall continue to exercise only those functions listed in Section D of this Annex.

Dr. Spilhaus To Be U.S. Commissioner of Century 21 Exposition

The Senate on May 11 confirmed the nomination of Dr. Athelstan Spilhaus to be U.S. Commissioner for the World Science-Pan Pacific Exposition, now known as Century 21 Exposition.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission

The Department of State announced on May 8 (press release 300) that Atomic Energy Commissioner Leland J. Haworth would serve as U.S. representative to the third meeting of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC), at the Pan American Union, Washington, May 9-13. John A. Hall, Assistant General Manager for International Activities, Atomic Energy Commission, was alternate U.S. representative. Other members of the delegation included:

Senior Advisers

Howard E. Furnas, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy and Outer Space Matters, Department of State

Walter G. Whitman, Science Adviser, Department of State

Advisers

Allan T. Dalton, Division of International Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission

Francis J. McNeill III, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State

Edward E. Sinclair, Assistant Director, Division of International Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission.

TREATY INFORMATION

Pilotage Arrangements Agreed Upon for Great Lakes and Seaway

The Department of State announced on May 12 (press release 308) that by an exchange of notes on May 5, 1961, the United States and Canada entered into an agreement to give effect as from May 1, 1961, to arrangements for a coordinated pilotage system to meet requirements for the pilotage of ocean vessels navigating the waters of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River as far east as St. Regis, N.Y. The basis for such a system is provided for in Public Law 86-555 (Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960) and Canadian legislation of August 1, 1960, to amend the Canada Shipping Act.

Under the Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960 the

Secretary of Commerce has regulatory responsibilities in regard to the operations of U.S. pilots in such a system. The Secretary is also authorized to enter into certain arrangements with the appropriate agency of Canada for coordination of, and participation by U.S. and Canadian pilots in, the pilotage of the vessels concerned in the above-mentioned waters of both countries. Section 6 of the Great Lakes Pilotage Act provides that written arrangements between the Secretary of Commerce and the Canadian agency shall be subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

Written arrangements between the Secretary of Commerce and the Minister of Transport of Canada as the head of the appropriate agency of Canada are covered in an annex of the agreement reached by the exchange of notes. These arrangements provide for the basis of participation by U.S. pilots registered by the Secretary of Commerce and by Canadian pilots registered by the Minister of Transport. Provision is also made for coordination in the number of pilots to be registered; the dispatching of pilots and use of facilities by pilotage pools; rates, charges, and conditions for the performance of pilotage services; sharing of revenues and expenses by pools, and accounting in connection therewith; and the reporting of violation of regulations.¹

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on the international recognition of rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.

Ratifications deposited: Switzerland, October 3, 1960; Italy, December 6, 1960.

Adherence deposited: Haiti, March 24, 1961.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail, with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3,

¹ For texts of the Secretary of State's note on behalf of the U.S. Government and the annex thereto, together with the Canadian Ambassador's note on behalf of the Canadian Government, see Department of State press release 308 dated May 12.

1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202. *Ratification deposited:* Saudi Arabia (with reservations), March 6, 1961.

Adherence deposited: Dahomey, April 27, 1961.

Telecommunications

North American regional broadcasting agreement and final protocol. Signed at Washington November 15, 1950. Entered into force April 19, 1960. TIAS 4460.

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, May 4, 1961.

Trade and Commerce

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.¹ *Signature:* Ghana, April 24, 1961.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960.¹ Becomes effective between Argentina and any participating government on 30th day following acceptance, by signature or otherwise, by Argentina and that government.

Signatures: Argentina (subject to ratification), France, and Uruguay, November 18, 1960; Chile, November 21, 1960; Belgium, Finland, and Peru, November 24, 1960; Austria (subject to ratification), November 25, 1960; Brazil (subject to ratification), January 3, 1961; Norway, January 27, 1961; Israel, February 9, 1961; Luxembourg, February 24, 1961; Canada, April 14, 1961; Denmark, April 21, 1961; Netherlands, April 25, 1961; United Kingdom, May 1, 1961; United States, May 4, 1961.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Rio de Janeiro May 4, 1961. Entered into force May 4, 1961.

Greece

Agreement concerning the uses of the drachmas deposited under the agricultural commodities agreement of January 7, 1960 (TIAS 4403). Effected by exchange of notes at Athens April 20 and 29, 1961. Entered into force April 29, 1961.

Israel

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of July 26, 1956 (TIAS 3612), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv March 23 and April 30, 1961. Entered into force April 30, 1961.

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv May 10, 1961. Entered into force May 10, 1961.

Senegal

Agreement relating to economic, financial, technical, and related assistance. Signed at Washington May 13, 1961. Entered into force May 13, 1961.

¹ Not in force.

| | | |
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. SULLIVAN *Wes*

FROM : W. S. TAVEL *ST*

SUBJECT: AMERICAN WAR PLANS
BUFILE 62-81484

DATE: 7-12-61

Tolson _____
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Callahan _____
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DeLoach _____
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The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Branch, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1113 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

There are three sections and one Sub A section to this file. See memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. Belmont dated 2-5-53, (62-17404-17, copy filed above serial 155 in 62-81484) for the previous authorization to maintain this file in the Special File Room.

13
LWB:wjs
(2)

ST
7/12

7-26-61

ADDENDUM - ESPIONAGE SECTION

Review of file indicates no substantive additions of serials subsequent to January 20, 1959, except serial 181 dated June 15, 1959. Serial 181 should be filed in 100-343044 re "Soviet War Plans" and file 62-81484 need no longer be maintained in the Special File Room.

LW:mhd *mhd*

62-81484-

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25 JUL 31 1961

61 AUG 3 1961 *99*

RECORDED

Tolson ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Callahan ☒
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 Gandy ☒

American War Plans

UPI-93

ADD 2 TESTS, WASHINGTON

SPEAKING WITH EMPHASIS AS U.N. AMBASSADOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON WATCHED FROM A CORNER OF KENNEDY'S CAMERA-CLUTTERED OFFICE, THE PRESIDENT SAID THIS COUNTRY ALSO NEVER WOULD UNDERTAKE AN ATOMIC TEST AS PART OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. HE SAID SUCH TESTS WOULD BE HELD ONLY WHEN ESSENTIAL TO THE DEFENSE OF THE NATION, THE PROTECTION OF THE FREE WORLD AND IN THE INTEREST OF NECESSARY SCIENTIFIC AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENT.

SHOULD ATMOSPHERIC TESTS BECOME NECESSARY, HE ADDED, THEY WILL BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY TO THE DEGREE THAT ORDERLY SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT REQUIRES.

MEANTIME, KENNEDY SAID HE WANTED THE WORLD TO KNOW HE WAS ORDERING PREPARATIONS FOR ATMOSPHERIC TESTS. WHETHER SUCH TESTS ARE FIRED, HE WENT ON, WILL DEPEND ON FURTHER SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF THE SOVIET SERIES PLUS THE SCIENTIFIC AND MILITARY NEEDS OF THIS COUNTRY.

IN THIS CONNECTION, THE PRESIDENT SAID RUSSIA SECRETLY PREPARED FOR HER CURRENT SERIES OF SHOTS AT THE SAME TIME SOVIET NEGOTIATORS WERE DISCUSSING A TEST BAN TREATY. HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT THE UNITED STATES TO BE IN SUCH A COVERT POSITION.

KENNEDY ALSO SAID THE UNITED STATES STILL WAS READY TO SIGN A TEST BAN AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA PROVIDED IT CARRIES PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE INSPECTION AND CONTROL.

STEVENSON AND FORMER PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN JOINED STATE DEPARTMENT AND DEFENSE LEADERS AT THE TOP-LEVEL NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WHICH PROCEEDED THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

11/2--TD1257PES

62-81484-A
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184 NOV 16 1961

179
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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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UPI-107

ADD 3 TESTS, WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT DID NOT SPELL OUT DETAILS OF POSSIBLE U.S. TESTS. IT IS KNOWN, HOWEVER, THAT SCIENTISTS AND MILITARY EXPERTS WANT TO CONDUCT ATMOSPHERIC TESTS TO PERFECT WARHEADS FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ROCKETS, ANTI-MISSILE MISSILES AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

IN ADDITION, SOME CONGRESSMEN HAVE URGED THAT ATMOSPHERIC TESTS ARE NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A NEUTRON BOMB--A WEAPON THAT CAN KILL TROOPS ON A BATTLEFIELD BUT LEAVE PROPERTY AND CITIES INTACT.

U.S. SCIENTISTS AND NUCLEAR EXPERTS STILL ARE ANALYZING THE RESULTS OF THE RUSSIAN SERIES.

11/2--TD118 PES

[redacted]
[redacted]
/10 February 1964

President Lyndon B. Johnson
c/o Prof. Eric Frederick Goldman
History Department
Princeton, New Jersey

b6
b7c

American War Plans

Dear Professor Goldman:

Since you get about 500 letters per day, I'll make this short and to the point; I have an idea which may save the United States from a possible nuclear attack-- viz., a security measure.

The only motive I have is to protect this country of ours from those people who would like to destroy it for purely selfish and jealousy-motivated reasons.

THE BASIC IDEA: Although there may be other ways for a nuclear missile to be brought into the United States, I believe that the conventional way is for them to "home in" on a radio transmitter, correct?

If this be so, then my idea is as follows: Immediately after initial warning of the attack, ALL radio frequencies, regardless of priority, be cut off at their own source. (The Conelrad system was good as far as it went, but this goes farther).

THEN: Put into effect my idea of an "auxiliary" group of transmitters, representing those of the United States in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and any other large body of water. Presumably, only the larger stations need be represented, such as the ones in the industrial areas.

These radio transmitters would be kept in water-tight compartments at secretly designated areas in the oceans named. They could be activated by remote control or manually by Naval personnel, whichever would be the more practical. The X-mitters would be held aloft by helium-filled balloons.*

The transmitters could be designed either to oscillate on all frequencies, or, which would be better probably, to send out a continuous signal on the same frequencies of the FCC-assigned frequencies of the stations.**

REASONING: It would be far better to blow up 100 or more radio transmitters than to blow up 100 or more American cities!!!

Please answer as soon as possible. Acknowledge before 1 March 1964.

Copies of this letter have been sent to other responsible people.

Enclosed is a rough diagram of the above-proposed idea.

EX-108 Sincerely, 12 FEB 24 1964

*See diagram.

**Or a combination of the two systems.


60 FEB 28 1964

no ack
CORRESPONDENCE
copy
ok-8

2-16-64 DIAGRAM FOR X-MITTERS PLACEMENT
AND BASIC OPERATION
by BILL HAYS JR.

Place X-mitter in same relative position (not necessarily as to distance—position only) as in the United States.

PACIFIC
OCEAN




ATLANTIC
OCEAN

X-MITTER AT REST



NOTE; SHOULD ALSO BE KEPT ON
11 HOURS

X-MITTER ACTIVATED



ENCLOSURE

62-81484-185

UNITED STATES

MENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. TROTTER

DATE: 6-19-64

FROM : A. K. Bowles

SUBJECT: BIBLIOGRAPHY CONCERNING
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
PREPARED BY
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
✓ Sullivan ✓ _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

[redacted] Information Technology Division, National Bureau of Standards, who has contacted Ident previously concerning a missing person matter, advised me by telephone that an associate in his office, [redacted] had prepared a bibliography of bibliographies concerning unconventional warfare. [redacted] said [redacted] compiled this bibliography on his own time in order to get a basis for information retrieval experiments on a subject that is out of the ordinary.

[] said [] had an extra copy of this bibliography which he would like to send to the FBI. I told him that if he sent it to me I would see that it got into the hands of people in the FBI who might be interested in seeing it.

No arrest record in Ident nor record in Bureau files identifiable with [] or []

ACTION:

Bibliography prepared by [redacted] is attached for attention of Domestic Intelligence Division.

Enc.

AKB:hš
(3) *L*

1 - Mr. Sullivan

REC- 58

18 JUN 26 1964

~~ENCLOSURE~~

ENCLO. BEHIND FILE

52 JUL 8 1964

UNITED STATES

MENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

1-Mr. DeLoach 1-Liaison
1-Mr. Sullivan

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DATE: October 4, 1967

Referral/Consult

1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. R. D. Cotter
1-Mr. R. W. Smith
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Fitzgerald

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT:



10 American War Plans

It is emphasized that the above highly sensitive information was obtained by Liaison on a strictly confidential basis and should not be discussed outside the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information.

JME:hke
(9)

62 OCT 17 1967

6 OCT 19 1967

S. Fitzgerald