



September 29, 2015

[Redacted]

FOIPA Request No.: [Redacted]  
Subject: FILE NUMBER 66-HQ-2554

Dear [Redacted]

You were previously advised we were consulting with another agency concerning information related to your Freedom of Information (FOIA) request.

A portion of that information has been returned to the FBI and is enclosed. Deletions have been made pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 as noted below. See the enclosed form for an explanation of these exemptions.

**Section 552**

**Section 552a**

- |   |   |                                 |
|---|---|---------------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(1)        | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)                   | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(3)        | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1) |
| <u>50 U.S.C., 3024(i)(1)</u>                      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2) |
| <u>18 U.S.C., 798; 50 U.S.C., 402(P.L. 86-36)</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3) |
| <u>50 U.S.C., 3605;</u>                           | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)                   | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)                   | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6)        |   | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7) |

73 pages were reviewed and 73 pages are being released.

Deletions were made by:

Army  
Bruno C. Leuyer  
Chief, US Army FOI/PA Office  
Attn: AAHS-RDF  
7701 Telegraph Road, Suite 150  
Alexandria, VA 22315-3905

If you wish to appeal those denials, please write directly to the agency.

Due to the fact that our office has processed all other information currently in our possession, your request is being administratively closed at this time, pending the completion of the outstanding consultations by our office. The FBI will correspond with you regarding those documents when the consultation is completed.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S. C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.


For questions regarding our determinations, visit the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request. Your patience is appreciated.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's eFOIA portal at <http://www.justice.gov/oip/efoia-portal.html>. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in any correspondence to us for proper identification of your request.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



David M. Hardy  
Section Chief,  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division

Enclosures (2)

## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.



per OGA letter dated  
3/15/2012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 9, 1949

THE DIRECTOR

THE EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)

REQUEST

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

At the Executive Conference on May 3, 1949, attended by  
Messrs. Tolson, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Rosen, Tracy, Mohr, Carlson,  
Ladd and Fletcher, the Conference was advised

[Redacted]

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)

As a matter of fact,

[Redacted]

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)

If you agree,

[Redacted]

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)

Respectfully,  
For the Conference.

Clyde Tolson

RECORDED - 116

INDEXED - 116

66-2554-7245  
MAY 23 1949

cc - Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

323-013  
CLASSIFIED BY: [Signature]  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR  
5-8-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 10-04-2012

per OGA letter dated  
3/15/2012

May 9, 1949

THE DIRECTOR

THE EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

~~TRAFFIC COVERAGE ON~~ (b1) IN CABLES

b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i)(1)

At the Executive Conference on May 3, 1949, attended by  
Messrs. Tolson, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Rosen, Tracy, Mohr, Carlson,  
Ladd and Fletcher, the Conference was advised that it has been ascer-  
tained that coded foreign traffic was being obtained by the Army from  
various telegraph and cable companies in the United States.

It has been ascertained that this material is checked over  
each day and that it is  
transmitted to Washington by special courier traveling by air. It is  
delivered to the Army for processing and copies of this traffic are  
presently being made available to the Bureau through the Army. It was  
ascertained that the Army was authorized over two years ago to make the  
contacts desired with the cable companies for the purpose indicated:

b1

b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i)(1)

It was recommended to the Conference that even though the contacts  
would normally be made by the Bureau

it appears that no purpose  
would be served in taking over this coverage since it would amount to  
messenger service handled by the Bureau.

The Conference was of the unanimous opinion that with reference  
to this type of traffic the status quo be maintained

particularly since the results of this material are made available  
to the Bureau on a daily basis.

If you approve, no further action with reference to this matter  
will be taken.

b1

b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i)(1)

respectfully,  
For the Conference

RECORDED - 3  
INDEXED - 3

66-2554-2247  
MAY 32 1949

cc - Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

Clyde Tolson

OK

JFM

Jh

H37

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

156  
62 MAY 16 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5-8-91 BY SP5 C/dep

Per OGA letter dated  
3/15/2012

**CONFIDENTIAL**

THE DIRECTOR  
~~THE EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE~~

May 26, 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

At the Executive Conference on May 26, 1949, Messrs. Tolson,  
Ladd, N. H. McCabe, Glavin, Harbo, Rosen, Q. Tamm, Mohr, Carlson and  
Fletcher being in attendance, advice was furnished that [redacted]

[redacted] now has been ordered  
by his government to proceed to [redacted] to undertake an assignment  
which has not been defined. [redacted] feels that the assignment is  
important and is a promotion. He believes that he will serve as a  
[redacted] He has volunteered to  
take up the assignment in [redacted] as ordered by his government so that  
he might continue to furnish information of interest to [redacted] and also  
to the United States. He has been working [redacted]  
arrangement whereby, in return for his services, he, his wife, infant  
son and mother-in-law [redacted] at the proper  
time. [redacted] consider him intelligent, cautious and anxious to  
cooperate. (C)

b7D

[redacted] are anxious to arrange for a contact in [redacted]  
through whom [redacted] can, if necessary, get in touch with either the  
[redacted] or the Bureau. The Legal Attache at Mexico City is John N. Speakes,  
and it was recommended that his name, telephone number and post office  
box number be furnished to [redacted] so that he [redacted]  
of contact [redacted]

b7D

The Conference was of the unanimous opinion that this further  
cooperation with [redacted] should be undertaken, even though the juris-  
diction of the Bureau in Mexico is on a police liaison basis. [redacted]

The actual role [redacted]  
[redacted] in behalf of [redacted] and not the Bureau.

There is attached, for your approval, a radiogram to the  
Legal Attache at [redacted] which is in accord with the recommendation  
of the Conference.

Attachment

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

RECORDED - 117  
Respectfully,  
For the Conference

106-2554-9261  
JUN 1 1949

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)  
b7D Clyde Tolson

323,013  
CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR  
5/8/91

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

JUN 2 1949 m w

THE DIRECTOR

July 15, 1949

The Executives' Conference

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5-7-91 BY SP-5 CJP/deg  
323,013

At a meeting of the Executives' Conference on July 13, 1949, attended by Hegora, Tolson, Clegg, Tracy, Harbo, Nichols, Carlson, Callahan, Fletcher, Rosen and Ladd, the activities of the Bureau in conducting applicant type investigations was discussed in detail in an effort to determine whether there were any categories presently being handled which could be cut off or curtailed. The various type of applicant cases discussed and the views of the conference were as follows:

(1) DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS

It was pointed out that the Bureau presently conducts all investigations of employees of the Department of Justice, in accordance with the order of the Attorney General dated July 31, 1947. This includes the maintenance employees of the Justice-Archives group and of the Identification Building.

The Conference was unanimously of the opinion that these inquiries should be continued.

(2) SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR THE WHITE HOUSE

The Conference was advised that since President Truman had assumed office, we had had a total of 115 such cases, mostly involving Presidential appointments.

The Conference was of the unanimous opinion that they would have to continue.

(3) SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Conference was advised that these special inquiries originated in a personal request to the Director by the then Secretary of Defense James Forgy on April 22, 1948. The request was reiterated by Louis Johnson, the incumbent, on April 20, 1949. As of June 23, we have 7 inquiries pending in this category. A 10 day dead line is set. No reimbursement is received.

The Conference was unanimously of the opinion that these inquiries should be continued.

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

JUL 25 1949

RECORDED - 3  
INDEXED - 3

166-2534-7307  
F B I  
23 JUL 21 1949

MLL:ad

(4) SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

It was pointed out that these inquiries are made as the result of an agreement with the Bureau of the Budget which was approved by you. The investigations commenced in February, 1949. As of June 24, there were 77 such inquiries pending. A 20 day dead line is set and the Bureau is remunerated in the amount of \$200 per case. This arrangement will continue through the fiscal year of 1950.

*A. thru fiscal year 1950.*

The conference was unanimously of the opinion that these inquiries should be continued.

(5) SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The conference was advised that these inquiries are conducted at the request of Admiral Sowers, the Director of the National Security Council. The Director approved the handling of such inquiries which are very infrequent. Since January 1, 1949, we have received only 5 such inquiries and at the present time have none pending. A 15 day dead line is set. No reimbursement is received.

*A. H.*

The conference was unanimously of the opinion that these inquiries should be continued.

(6) SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

The conference was informed that from time to time requests are received to conduct investigations of personnel for Congressional Committees. These are handled if the Attorney General approves. The latest conducted consists of 5 for the Senate Committee on Armed Forces which is headed by Senator Willard Tamm, Democrat of Maryland. At this writing, none are pending. The dead line depends on the urgency of the request which is usually 15 days. No reimbursement is received.

*A. only when specifically approved.*

The conference was unanimously of the opinion that these inquiries should be continued.

(7) SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD

It was pointed out that at the request of the Acting Chairman Judge Socolman of the National Security Resources Board and with your approval, the FBI entered an agreement with the National Security Resources Board to investigate 100 personnel as to loyalty and security on April 22, 1949. At the present time, there are 232 cases pending. Eight have been closed. The reason for such a large number is that the National Security Resources Board wish to forward all cases possible to the Bureau during the fiscal year of 1949 for budget purposes. It is estimated that a total of 350 individuals are involved after which the only investigations will be replacements. A 21 day dead line for applicants

to pay and 30 days for incumbents. We are reimbursed in the amount of \$200 and this arrangement will continue through the fiscal year 1950.

*Ok through  
1950  
fiscal year*

The Conference was unanimously of the opinion that these inquiries should be continued.

**(B) APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS FOR THE GENERAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

It was pointed out that the Bureau by agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency which was approved by you, first investigated applicants for the Central Intelligence Agency September 30, 1946. These investigations were continued until December 31, 1947. During that time the Bureau disposed of 3,340 requests. At the suggestion of the Bureau of the Budget, the Central Intelligence Agency requested the Bureau in December, 1948, to resume investigations of its applicants. This agreement was approved by you and was confirmed by the Bureau's letter to CIA of December 17, 1948. Since that time, we have received 1500 requests of which 918 have been completed and 590 are pending. These investigations are handled at \$200 per case. Dead lines are 30 days on applicants and 60 days on incumbents. The reimbursement arrangements will continue through the fiscal year of 1950.

The Conference was further advised that at the time the Bureau discontinued investigating CIA applicants, CIA opened a number of field offices around the country and hired a number of investigators for the purpose of conducting their own investigations. Then at the time the Budget Bureau requested the Bureau to take this work back, Admiral Hilsenrath expressed the hope that this would not be a temporary move in view of the fact that it would mean abolishing his field offices and that in the event the Bureau later discontinued, he would have to again set up appropriate offices for the purpose of handling this work. Thereafter, it is known that a number of the CIA field offices were closed and that investigators were absorbed into other positions or dropped.

*Ok thru  
1950  
fiscal year*

In the light of the above, the Executives' Conference was of the opinion that the Bureau should continue to conduct applicant investigations for CIA.

The attention of the Conference was called to the fact that in the following listed type of applicant investigations, the Act of Congress specifically requires an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that the Bureau's appropriation contains funds for the purpose of completing these investigations.

The Conference was, therefore, of the opinion that in the following type of cases, all of which are Acts of Congress, that the Bureau must continue to conduct the investigations:

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*OK but try  
to resist any extension  
H*

- (1) ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
- (2) VOICE OF AMERICA INVESTIGATIONS
- (3) EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM INVESTIGATIONS
- (4) WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION INVESTIGATIONS
- (5) INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
- (6) GREEK-TURKEY AID BILL
- (7) INSTITUTE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

*C*  
Clyde A. Tolson

cc - Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy



THE DIRECTOR

October 3, 1949

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

45935

On September 27, 1949, suggestions relating to the dissemination of information in the Bureau files were presented to the Conference with Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Nichols, Rosen, Tracy, Mohr, Nease, Carlson and Fletcher in attendance.

Bureau policy provides that no information be furnished to another agency unless the individual or organization concerning whom the inquiry is made has been the subject of an investigation, or unless there is reliable proof in our files of the membership of an individual in one of the groups declared subversive by the Attorney General. In any event, only confirmed established information is disseminated. It was suggested that with respect to the intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, and the State Department, pertinent information, confirmed or not, be furnished for the following reasons:

- (1) Bureau files contain considerable derogatory information of such a nature that there has been no attempt to verify or confirm it. It remains in our files completely unconfirmed, and it is not the subject of investigation. For example, an allegation that a person is a member of the Communist Party is not investigated unless there is additional information reflecting that he is potentially dangerous to the security of the United States.
- (2) The Bureau files contain considerable information which is not the subject of verification. For example, regarding information obtained from one of the intelligence agencies from a foreign source, confirmation or verification by investigation is not practicable because the Bureau does not have investigative jurisdiction abroad.
- (3) The dissemination of information which has not been confirmed or verified may prove to be of value to the Bureau, as it will permit more intelligent questioning of individuals by the intelligence agencies, if that is contemplated by one of the agencies. It also would possibly be advantageous to the Bureau to furnish unverified or unconfirmed information pertaining to an American abroad to such agencies as CIA so that CIA would be alerted and perhaps cover the individual's activities while he is abroad to the ultimate benefit of the Bureau if he later should become the subject of Bureau investigation upon his return to the United States.

323013  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Mohr  
Nease  
Carlson  
Fletcher

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

CC - Mr. H. A. Clegg  
 Mr. J. E. Mohr  
 OCT 11 1949

RECORDED - 41  
 INDEXED - 41

166-2554-7385  
 3 OCT 1949

EBF:118



THE DIRECTOR

- (4) The intelligence agencies indicated are investigative agencies and they can more accurately and completely handle their work, if provided with available information and allegations, in the same manner as the Bureau, under similar circumstances. This, again, would be to the ultimate advantage of the Bureau.

45936

With reference to the dissemination of information concerning aliens, it was suggested that not only the intelligence agencies named above be furnished substantial information appearing in our files, even though unconfirmed, but also the Immigration Service should be furnished a similar type of information, since it would be helpful to the Immigration Service in its interrogation of incoming aliens and in investigations relating to applications for citizenship. In the case of aliens, particularly, a great deal of the information in the Bureau's files has been obtained from other sources abroad.

In connection with aliens entering the United States under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the President instructed that the name of every individual selected should be submitted to the FBI before admission. The Bureau's files seldom contain verified information concerning these persons and we have not investigated them, as in most instances they have never been in the United States.

In the processing of the forms furnished by the Displaced Persons Commission, the names of the sponsors residing in the United States are also checked through the files, as well as the names of the aliens. Often information of a derogatory subversive nature is found in the files concerning these sponsors, which information has never been confirmed. To properly discharge the responsibilities of the Bureau under the Displaced Persons Act, it was suggested that pertinent derogatory information, unconfirmed or unverified, be furnished to the Displaced Persons Commission, not only as to the alien but also as to the sponsors of the alien.

It was suggested, in making these exceptions to the general rule that unconfirmed information should not be disseminated, that utmost care be exercised to see that disproven information, classified information received from other intelligence agencies such as top secret information, and other information which on its face appears to be unreliable and untrue, not be disseminated. In the event of dissemination of unconfirmed information, it would be clearly indicated that the information has not been confirmed and has not been the subject of investigative inquiry. The source, so far as possible, would be fully and accurately identified to permit evaluation of the information.



copy ans

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

February 13, 1950

TO : MR. H. B. FLEMING  
FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: DR. SLOVKO ZORE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - YU

~~SECRET~~

By letter dated November 29, 1949 the New York Field Office suggested that the Bureau may desire to contact the State Department to determine if information used on the Voice of America program could not be obtained in advance and transmitted to the Bureau's informant to Dr. Slavko Zore. Dr. Zore, according to the New York Office, has expressed considerable interest in information used on the Voice of America program. The New York Office thought that if the State Department would permit the use of information in advance of its being placed on the Voice program, it would enhance the value in Zore's estimation of the Bureau's informant.

This matter was taken up with the State Department by Mr. Roach with Mr. Jack Neal of the Security Division who, in turn, after considerable delay and discussion, has obtained a reply from the State Department and particularly those handling Yugoslav matters at the Department. State Department officials state that they would hesitate to make such information available for use by our informant, particularly so if it were to be given to Dr. Zore. They stated that "Dr. Zore is our friend and has in the past supplied information to us." Mr. Neal stated that this sort of shocked him in view of the fact that from his knowledge of the case Dr. Zore is our subject and is considered an espionage agent in this country who is attempting to obtain official information from this Government for transmittal to his home office. Mr. Neal further advised that he did not believe it proper for him to discuss the matters of the case with the State Department official and in view of the fact that Zore is considered friendly toward the State Department, he suggested that it may be well to have the supervisor in the Bureau who is handling the case discuss the matter in some detail with the State Department official on the Yugoslav desk.

It should be noted that all messages previously cleared with the State Department for transmittal to Dr. Zore by our informant have been cleared with Mr. Neal and that there has been no occasion for him to discuss the case with any State Department official, particularly those handling Yugoslav matters, as he states that the information submitted to him for clearance to date has been rather nebulous and of no particular interest to the State Department.

OBSERVATION:

~~CLASS BY SP5~~  
DATE OF REVIEW ~~QADR~~  
323 013

It would appear from the above-mentioned facts that Dr. Zore may not be as hostile to this Government as we had supposed or it may be that the State Department has been "taken in" by this individual. Further, it is conceivable that Dr. Zore is using the Bureau's informant with the knowledge that he has been in touch with us. Now that information has come to light concerning the political leanings of Dr. Zore, it is believed advisable that the supervisor handling this case meet with Mr. Neal and the State Department official handling Yugoslav affairs.

RRA:mk 7

~~SECRET~~

NOT RECORDED  
45 APR 24 1950

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DATE 2/19/99 BY SP-5 ubp

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OTHERWISE

original copy filed in

copy:ahs

MEMO TO MR. FLETCHER

so that some understanding and evaluation can be placed upon the true activities of Dr. Zore. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Bureau supervisor handling this case meet with Mr. Neal and the State Department official handling Yugoslav matters so that the case may be discussed and particularly the political leanings of Dr. Zore be determined. If you approve, the Liaison Section will perfect arrangements for such a meeting. ~~(S)~~

(Approved by Executives Conference, 2/16/50;  
Messrs. Tolson, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, McGuire,  
Tracy, Mohr, Carlson and Fletcher; in  
attendance. HBF)

DIRECTORS NOTATION: "OK H."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR

April 20, 1950

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

REPORTING OF SECURITY FACILITIES TO THE BUREAU BY THE  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/3/81 BY SP-5c/007

The Executives' Conference, Messrs. Ladd, Tracy, Harbo, Clegg, Carlson, Mohr, Nease, Glavin and Belmont in attendance on April 19, 1950, was advised that a problem was brought up by the New York Office in that the Atomic Energy Commission field offices could not advise the local field division of the FBI of all Atomic Energy Commission facilities in the area due to the fact that Atomic Energy Commission facilities, for example, under the Oak Ridge installation might be located in New York City and the local Atomic Energy Commission field office would have no knowledge of it because it came under Oak Ridge.

This matter was discussed with the Atomic Energy Commission Security Division as a result of which, by memorandum dated April 13, 1950 to all Managers of Operations, the Atomic Energy Commission Security Division advised that each security facility will hereafter be reported by the Atomic Energy Commission Operations Office directly to the FBI Headquarters in Washington, D. C. The Bureau, in turn, will notify the FBI field offices of the security facilities within their respective districts. Each Operations Office is to prepare not later than April 30, 1950, a complete list of security facilities and this list is to be transmitted to the Bureau Headquarters in Washington. At intervals of ninety days after May 1, 1950, a list of deletions and additions is to be transmitted to the Bureau in Washington.

The attached SAC Letter was approved by the Executives' Conference advising the field of the arrangements made with the Atomic Energy Commission in this respect. If it meets with your approval, it will be disseminated to the field.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

*ym*  
Clyde Tolson

Tolson CC - Mr. H. H. Clegg  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_ Mr. J. P. Mohr  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols AHB:tlc  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RECORDED - 64

INDEXED - 64

66-2554-7681

54 APR 29 1950

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)  
DATE 02-12-2014 J9674T52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024(i) (1)

Classified per OGA letter dated 6/11/2012

June 5, 1950

THE DIRECTOR

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

~~SECRET~~

(C)  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

SP-5 C/1012  
3/15/91

Classified on: OADR

At the Executives' Conference, June 5, 1950, Messrs. Ladd, Glavin,  
Harbo, Mohr, Rosen, McIntire, Nichols, and Belmont in attendance. The  
Conference was advised that

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Attachment  
52 JUN 14 1950  
INDEXED - 104  
RECORDED - 104  
66-2534-7816  
GC - Mr. H. H. Clegg  
B:tlc - Mr. J. P. Mohr


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1

b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024(i) (1)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~



(C)

A proposed memorandum to the Attorney General on this matter is attached for your consideration.

*Ironcur*  
*JK*

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

*y*

Glyde Tolson

~~SECRET~~

Classified per OGA letter dated 6/11/2012

THE DIRECTOR

The Executives' Conference

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024(i) (1)

EX-100-323,013 JUL 10, 1950  
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
CIVIL RIGHTS  
E.O. # 12356  
DATE 6/3/91 LATTIPLA C/PH

~~SECRET~~

At a meeting of the Executives' Conference on July 10, 1950, attended by Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Tracy, Parsons, Mohr, Belmont, Rosen, McGuire and Ladd, the conference was advised that [redacted]



The Executives' Conference considered the above and felt that it would be necessary for the Bureau to install an appropriate teletype machine for this purpose otherwise the Bureau would be in the position of [redacted]

It was, therefore, the unanimous recommendation of the conference that such equipment be obtained and installed.

*A. Did we know, equipment & have we given respectfully, thought to let or the Conference application in*

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

Classified by SP-5 JPH/3/91  
Declassify on: OADR

54 JUL 14 1950 Mr. Glegg  
Mr. Mohr

(S-1)  
Clude



THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

August 8, 1950

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE *Memo*

101/PAR 323,013
INTERNAL
EXT. LIST
NO. 12358
DATE 8/4/91 INITIALS CIP/HR

APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS

[Redacted] (S-1)(S)

The Executives' Conference considered our program relating to [Redacted] to recommend future (S-1)(S) action at the termination of our present agreement.

PRESENT PROGRAM

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OTHERWISE

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Declassify on: OADR 6/4/91

In accordance with an agreement reached between representatives of this Bureau [Redacted] and approved by the (S-1)(S) Director, this Bureau reinstated the program of investigating applicants [Redacted]

[Redacted] conferences were held in November (S-1)(S) and December, 1949 and the agreement was extended through June 30, 1951. This extension was approved by a letter from the Director to [Redacted]

[Redacted] (S-1)(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S-1)(S)

The Director in approving the recommendation to continue investigating [Redacted] (S-1)(S) indicated that he agreed to extend our agreement through to June 30, 1951, but that he wanted the problem reconsidered in six months.

REASONS FOR CONTINUING THE PROGRAM

1. [Redacted] (S-1)(S)

2. [Redacted]

- Mr. Tolson (C)
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. [Redacted]
- Tele. Rm.
- Misc.

It might be noted that the Director in his testimony of February 3 and February 7, 1950 before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations was able to use excerpts from various letters of the [Redacted] (C)

(Page 100 of the Director's testimony as above noted.)

CC Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr. *SPC*  
AR:TB 4 AUG 19 1950

RECORDED - 14 166-2557-7964  
INDEXED - 14  
AUG 18 1950

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR

- 3. The deadlines in the cases are such that no serious inconvenience has been caused the Bureau in handling the investigations.
- (C) 4. Cases are being referred to the Bureau [redacted] in an even flow so that no emergency situations have been created. (S-1)(S)
- (C) 5. The handling of these investigations by the Bureau precludes [redacted] from having any excuse for the maintenance of a large investigative staff in the domestic field. (S-1)(S)
- 6. The arrangement would result in a reimbursement to the Bureau during the fiscal year of 1951 in an amount in excess of \$500,000.00.

REASON FOR DISCONTINUING THE PROGRAM

- 1. The Bureau at this time has an excessive work load.

RECOMMENDATION

Messrs. Glavin, Tracy, Carlson, Long for Glegg, Harbo, Belmont, Ladd and Rosen were in favor of continuing the program and Mohr was for discontinuing. Mohr is of the opinion we should tell [redacted] now that with the present emergency and its continuing possibilities with greater responsibilities being imposed upon the Bureau in connection with our primary work that we just cannot continue to conduct applicant investigations and we are faced with the imperative necessity of curtailing this work as promptly as possible. Those in favor of the program being continued felt that the advantages far outweighed the disadvantages. (S-1)(S)

*Agree with Mohr*

Respectfully,  
FOR THE CONFERENCE

Clyde Tolson

*I disagree in many ways  
but with reluctance*

Oct. 26, 1950

THE DIRECTOR

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

~~SECRET~~

MAINTENANCE CERTAIN CLASSIFICATIONS BUREAU FILES  
OUTSIDE CONFINES RECORDS SECTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The Executives Conference consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Tracy, Harbo, Ladd, Mohr, Fred McIntire for Mr. Clegg, Mr. McGuire for Mr. Nichols, Mr. Laughlin for Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Rosen, considered the maintenance of certain classifications of Bureau files outside of the confines of the Records Section.

The Conference was advised by Mr. McGuire that as a result of a 6-day deadline in Departmental applicant cases in the Summer of 1945, the Records Section was instructed, as a result of the inspection conducted of the Records Section at that time, to permit mail in Departmental applicant cases to be retained in the supervisor's office until the investigation was completed and the case concluded.

This meant that the initial piece of mail received in a Departmental applicant case was recorded and indexed in the Bureau's records to show that we had a pending case on the subject matter. As soon as the index card was made and the file number placed on the first serial, the first serial was physically sent directly to the supervisor handling the case and no jacket was maintained in the Records Section. Thereafter, all letters, teletypes, and reports on that particular case, on receipt in the Records Section, would be sent directly to the supervisor who, upon completion of the investigation and closing of the case, would transmit all the pertinent material pertaining to that investigation back to the Records Section for complete processing.

at  
It was pointed out to the Conference that all times the Bureau's indices clearly reflected the existence of a pending file and because of the limited handling and close supervision, the physical location of the file could readily be determined.

This system proved effective due to the fact that this was a deadline type of case wherein close supervision could be afforded the investigation and it also materially reduced service requests in the Records Section as well as reduced locate work for files and serials. Other advantages included streamlining the processing and filing operations in that all mail on particular applicant cases would be handled in one group through the various steps of blocking, classifying, numbering, and recording.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

JJM:FML

DECLASSIFIED BY 60290 AUC BCE/TCG/ELH  
0104/6/05

RECORDED - 90

66-2554-82 36  
NOV 15 1950

Mr. Clegg into unclassifiable per OGA (of date) 2/16/05  
4/6/05 ELH

10/15/91  
Classified by SP-5 C/OAF  
Declassify on: OADR

EX-75  
1/17/02

The Executives Conference for the Director, Oct. 26, 1950

~~SECRET~~

This system was so successful that when the Atomic Energy program started, the same procedure was applied to Atomic Energy Cases in December, 1946. The same reasons, namely, deadline cases, volume of work, and close supervision, prevailed and as other types of applicant categories arose, except Bureau applicants, the same procedure was adopted in rapid succession in cases involving special inquiries for the White House, Congressional Committees, and other Government agencies, applicants for Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Greek Turkey Aid Bill cases, applicants for International Labor Organization, applicants for World Health Organization, applicants for National Security Resources Board, European Recovery Program cases, Voice of America cases, sensitive positions in the United States Government, Central Intelligence Agency investigations, Armed Forces Security Agency, Loyalty of Government Employees, and the International Development Program of the State Department.

Service requests on these files are handled just as expeditiously as are requests from supervisors and Bureau officials in any other category of cases physically maintained in the Records Section proper.

This whole program was considered by the Executives Conference and approved as a result of a memorandum from Mr. Clegg to Mr. Tolson on June 2, 1949, wherein specific reference was made to the processing of mail in the so-called applicant type files and a recommendation made that the mail be sent directly to the interested division.

The Conference unanimously recommended in view of the saving to the Bureau resulting from the streamlined handling of the applicant type of case other than Bureau applicants in this manner, the Records Section be authorized to continue handling these classifications in the manner in which they have, since there is a record in the general indices at all times reflecting that there is a case pending in the Bureau and the physical location of the material in that case can readily be located in the interested supervisor's office.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference,

Clyde Tolson

~~SECRET~~

*I think this is sound procedure - certainly expeditious the handling of the work -*

10/27

*THROTTLE*  
*Be careful of this - If we were running on a 45-day deadline it might be desirable but the records show an average 70 odd days in some cases over 100 days in some files*

*Push delays in office of Peter Tracy file. Do with...*

THE DIRECTOR

January 19, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF ENEMY NATIONS IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The Executives Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Rosen, McIntire for Clegg, Nichols, Tracy, Ladd, Mohr, Sizoo, and Belmont, on January 19, 1951, considered the advisability of a survey by a Laboratory representative of the Bedford Springs Hotel and the Homestead Hotel for possible microphone installations to cover Soviet and satellite nation officials who will be housed in these hotels in the event of an emergency. (S) (U)

It was pointed out to the Conference that we have been discussing for some time with the State Department the procedure for handling diplomatic and official representatives of enemy nations in the event of hostilities. The State Department has indicated that certain microphone coverage at these hotels would be desirable in the event diplomats were housed there but the State Department has not definitely decided what coverage it will desire. Inasmuch as the need for such coverage may arise at a moment's notice, the Security Division recommends that we go ahead and conduct a survey of the two hotels, which have been designated by the State Department to house Soviet and satellite diplomatic officials in the event of emergency. These two hotels are the Bedford Springs Hotel, Bedford, Pennsylvania, for Soviet officials, and the Homestead Hotel, Hot Springs, Virginia, for satellite nation officials. (S) (U)

If we wait until the State Department makes up its mind, we may have insufficient time to make an appropriate survey. The Executives Conference unanimously recommended that a Laboratory representative make a discreet survey of these two hotels with a view to ascertaining what microphone coverage would be feasible, what rooms would be most readily accessible for such a purpose, and where a plant could best be set up for monitoring purposes. Such a survey would enable the placing of important diplomatic officials in the appropriate rooms where coverage could be assured. (S) (U)

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RECORDED - 101

INDEXED - 101

66-2554-8492

JAN 24 1951

CC: Mr. H. H. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

AIB:ner 64

EX-37

Classified by *[Signature]*  
Declassify on: OADR  
Multiple copies  
4/21/51

In the event you approve, the Laboratory will undertake this survey on a discreet basis. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Respectfully,  
for the Conference

KA

4  
Clyde Tolson

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE DIRECTOR

December 8, 1950

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

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APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS FOR  
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

The Executives Conference, with Messrs. Tolson, Nease, McGuire for Nichols, Sizoo, Glavin, Parsons for Harbo, Mohr, Tracy, Belmont, Ladd, Clegg and Rosen in attendance, today reconsidered the problem of investigations for other agencies such as GIA, Armed Forces Security Agency and others wherein by agreement we conduct these investigations for them. In addition, the Conference also considered those applicant investigations for other Governmental agencies which are conducted pursuant to statutory requirement. It was pointed out that in view of our difficulty in meeting our required responsibility, consideration should be given as to whether we should agree to carry out additional and further responsibilities not actually required of us. The problem of funds was not in issue.

(4) 171

The following applicant investigations are conducted on an agreement basis:

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY

An agreement was entered into with Admiral E. E. Stone on June 20, 1950 to accept 720 cases during the fiscal year 1951 on a reimbursable basis. This agency has intended to hire for the current year 2,000 employees. This estimate was of August, 1950, and it is entirely possible that this number has increased since then. It is, however, our agreement that we will handle 720 cases for the fiscal year.

Recommendation:

RECORDED - 9 166-2554-9500 INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

Messrs. Tolson, Nease, McGuire, Sizoo, Glavin, Parsons, Mohr, and Rosen recommend that we advise Admiral Stone that we will finish those investigations which we presently have received (they number 156) and that we will be unable to accept any more in view of the other commitments and responsibilities which have been placed upon the Bureau. (In this respect, Stone can get the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps or the Coast Guard to conduct the investigations for them.)

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-2554-9500

Belmont, Tracy, Clegg and Ladd recommend that we go to Admiral Stone and advise him that we can handle only those investigations which are absolutely essential; that we try to whittle the list down to 50 or 75. This group points out that we have been

Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Clegg

4/24/97

Classified by SP-5 CIB/DF  
Declassify on: OADR

R [Signature]

FEB 12 1951 323,013



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 08-02-2012

THE DIRECTOR

April 19, 1951

classified per OGA letter dated 7/13/2011

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

~~SECRET~~

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OTHERWISE

The Executives Conference, attended by Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Rosen, Tracy, Mohr, Sizoo, and Belmont, considered the report made by Mr. V. P. Keay on his check of the Legal Attache's Office in Mexico City, Mexico, which report posed certain problems as follows:

Coverage Along the American Border -- Stationing of an Agent in American Consulate, Monterrey, Mexico

10/23/91  
Classified by SP-5C/DJE  
Declassify on: OADR

There has been a number of suggestions by the SAC's of our border field offices and by Inspector Naughten that Agents be permitted to go from the border farther into Mexico than the present 25-mile limit. The 25-mile limit is to prevent a diplomatic incident such as that which occurred several years ago. There is a need in Northern Mexico to develop additional confidential informants relating to subversive matters and there are a great many leads on fugitives, selective service cases, and other criminal matters in that area. Legal Attache Speakes recommends, and Mr. Keay agrees, that a representative stationed in the American Consulate at Monterrey, Mexico, is the solution to this problem. The Consul has informally indicated to Speakes that he was entirely agreeable to having a representative in the Legal Attache's Office in his Consulate. Monterrey is a principal industrial city located in Northcentral Mexico about 100 miles from the United States Border.

If additional coverage is needed, Speakes suggested, and Mr. Keay agrees, that an Agent can be stationed in the Consulate at Guaymas, Mexico, on the Northwestern Coast on the same basis. Such coverage would have been invaluable in connection with the William Edward Cook Kidnaping and Unlawful Flight Case.

Additional Coverage in Mexico City

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024(i)(1)

The principal problem in Mexico is the threat to internal security due to the subversive activities as between Mexico and the United States. There is, of course, a great deal of similar criminal activity and in fact the criminal statistics of the Legal Attache's Office compare favorably with those in smaller domestic field offices. At present, the Legal Attache's Office maintain complete coverage on, for instance, American Communists who go to the vicinity of Mexico City from the United States.

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

RECORDED - 126

APR 26 1951

INDEXED - 126

15

118

~~SECRET~~

cc Mr. H. H. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

APR 30 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



[Redacted]

The Sobell case, of course, illustrates the same type of activity in the espionage field. [Redacted] handles the important investigations which he starts both through information received from his confidential informants and upon requests from the Bureau. His present force in the Embassy is being utilized to the utmost. He estimates there are 75 known members of the American Communist Party presently in the vicinity of Mexico City. He has active investigations on 24 of them. [Redacted] not only utilizes his regular informants in the investigations but the Special Agents actively participate in surveillances, interviews, etc., due to the fact that the police departments in Mexico are of a low ebb in so far as efficiency and honesty are concerned.

Mr. Key recommended that we extend our coverage and investigations in Mexico in order that we can detect the dangerous American Communists who travel there and in general handle the field relating directly to internal security cases. He suggested the necessity of having an understanding with [Redacted] in this respect inasmuch as [Redacted] and inasmuch as we would probably not be able to conceal our additional activities. Other solutions are:

(1) That we extend our investigations adding necessary personnel in the Embassy (in addition to stationing an Agent at Monterrey, Mexico) but that we not discuss the matter with [Redacted] to would, however,

(2) That we continue to operate more or less as at present, that is, handling the more important investigations and making requests [Redacted] in all other matters.

(3) That we reduce our activities to a very minimum, confining them strictly to liaison and perhaps maintaining only one Agent in Mexico. By this, we would avoid responsibility for any situation.

Opinion of the Executives Conference

The Executives Conference was of the unanimous opinion that we should increase our personnel in Mexico as was needed, that we should extend our coverage and our investigative activities, but that we should not reach any understanding with [Redacted] concerning these increased activities. It was felt that we should continue to put

*In Writing*

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the following action will be taken:

(1) We will endeavor to effect arrangements to station an Agent in the American Consulate at Monterrey, Mexico. Consideration for stationing an Agent in the Consulate at Guaymas, Mexico, will be deferred until we see how the extent of the work develops.

(2) The Legal Attache will be instructed to extend his coverage and investigative activities, particularly with reference to the American Communist Party colony. He will also endeavor to effect arrangements to station an additional Agent in the Legal Attache's Office in the Embassy in Mexico City for this purpose. (C)

(3) Through liaison, <sup>and in writing</sup> we will continue to impress upon the seriousness of the problem of subversive activities as between the United States and Mexico and will continue to request information [redacted]

[redacted]

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Glyde Tolson

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024(i) (1)

4/22

OK  
AS

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR

March 28, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~MEASURES FOR INCREASED SECURITY OF  
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

On March 26, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Ladd, Clegg, Harbo, Tracy, Mohr, Sizoo and Belmont considered certain recommendations of the United States Communications Intelligence Board Security Committee to that Board on measures for increased security of communications intelligence.

Background:

The U. S. Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) has as its members ONI, G-2, Air Force Intelligence, State Department, CIA, and the FBI. The principal matter of concern is a security of information produced by the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA).

Information produced by AFSA is disseminated to the various interested members of USCIB. This distribution is becoming increasingly voluminous and reached well over 750,000 items of distribution in September, 1950. The various agencies receiving this information may, within the scope of their own requirements, distribute it as received to certain of its subordinate agencies, such as, the G-2 submitting it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to General MacArthur, and to other foreign U. S. military points. [CIA may be expected to do similarly.] Within the State Department there is a rather wide distribution. There are at present certain standards of security set forth in the USCIB Directives but it is felt that, with the increased dissemination of this information, it is vitally important for its source to be kept confidential and it is necessary to provide additional security. This is further emphasized by the fact that it is believed important at times to bring the material to the attention of Government agencies which are not members of USCIB and this activity will likely be increased in the future.

The Suggestions:

The suggestions of USCIB are as follows:

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Declassify on: OADR

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

(1) Appoint a full-time Security Officer who would report directly to the Chairman, USCIB, and who should be assisted by a small competent staff.

It is proposed that the USCIB Security Officer will be responsible for keeping USCIB informed regarding major COMINT (Communications Intelligence) security problems; coordinating USCIB security

APR 5 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ INDEXED - 131

RECORDED - 131

CC - Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr  
AMB:tlc

3626  
OK

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

procedures; assisting the Security Committee in the formulation of security policies; and performing such duties as the Chairman of USCIB may direct. It is further proposed that the Security Officer will be selected from nominations submitted by USCIB members with the following suggested functions: maintain a list of indoctrinated personnel in USCIB member and department agencies; draft the security regulations; with the consent of the Board member representing the department or agency concerned, conduct security surveys; based on the findings of such surveys, recommend to the COMINT Activity surveyed, appropriate action for the improvement of such security procedures; maintain continuous review of all aspects of COMINT security; assist operating Security Officers and serve as a point of reference for difficult security problems; handle all COMINT security problems which arise outside participating departments and agencies.

(2) Issue a basic security manual establishing standards and procedures for all phases of COMINT security.

Inasmuch as the regulations currently enforced by the various USCIB members, while basically similar, differ greatly in the thoroughness with which they set forth procedures for all phases of the COMINT activity, the Security Committee suggests that one of the duties of the proposed Security Officer would be to compile USCIB regulations using as a basis the British-U.S. COMINT agreement, and various USCIB directives which set forth security procedures. In other words, a compilation into a manual of all security regulations which now evolve from the various agreements and which establish such regulations as the USCIB code words, etc.

(3) Direct the USCIB members to study the command control over COMINT to insure that their organizational structure gives those having the responsibility for the protection of COMINT the adequate and overriding authority necessary for COMINT protection.

In connection with this recommendation, the Committee discussed several matters which it felt required further exploratory study by the member agencies, such as the need to obscure COMINT activities by concealing COMINT budgets of the various departments; compartmentation of COMINT in the member agencies; simplifying and centralizing the control of COMINT within the member agencies.

(4) Authorize the USCIB Coordinator to control dissemination of certain sensitive categories of COMINT after approval of each category by USCIB at executive session. This might be accomplished by confining the material to AFSA and nominating a USCIB member representative to inspect them there.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified per OGA letter dated 7/25/11

The Director

May 8, 1951

The Executives Conference

~~MICROPHONE-TELEPHONE UNITS~~

~~SECRET~~

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

On May 7 the Conference composed of Messrs. Ladd, Mohr, Glavin, Nichols, Clegg, Nease, Sizoo, Belmont, Rosen, Tracy and Harbo considered suggestions by Mr. Conrad of the Laboratory concerning security measures pertaining to microphone-telephone units.

Information has been received indicating that Kenneth Schmidt, a private businessman, intends to file a patent application for a countermeasure device for the purpose of rendering telephones immune against modification for microphone purposes. The device employs a mercury switch in the telephone handset which would render the microphone inactive when the handset was in a horizontal position. Although the method employed is different, the end result is the same as that obtained through the countermeasure device employed by the Bureau and which has been installed on the telephones of Cabinet members and at the White House. Mr. Conrad points out that under a provision of the U. S. Code the Patent Office at the request of either the military or the Atomic Energy Commission is required to place a patent application in a secrecy status which will prevent all public knowledge so long as the agency requesting secrecy handling maintains its request. This law also permits the patent applicant to sue the United States Government for damages thereby sustained. Mr. Conrad suggests that the Bureau take steps through liaison with the military to insure that if Schmidt applies for a patent as described above it be placed in a secrecy category. The Conference was opposed to this proposal but feels that the information should be brought to the attention of former Special Agent Pat Coyne of the National Security Council for appropriate attention.

Mr. Conrad points out that Schmidt, who has developed a radio frequency microphone-telephone unit, has informally indicated to Mr. Conrad that <sup>he</sup> understands the existence of such a unit is a highly confidential matter in the United States Government, he has never been formally advised that it is considered classified material. Mr. Conrad suggests it would be desirable for either the Bureau ~~or CIA~~ formally advise Schmidt that this device is highly classified. The Conference was opposed to any action by the Bureau other than to bring this fact to the attention of Pat Coyne of the National Security Council. It is pointed out that Coyne has conferred with Schmidt at the ~~time~~ he demonstrated his unit to representatives of the Defense Department and at the time the Executive Order was issued restricting

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

cc - Mr. H. H. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

RECORDED - 134

146-3554-8737  
MAY 14 1951

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Classified by *sp-5 c/bj*  
Declassify on: OADR

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Memorandum for the Director

~~SECRET~~

b1


b3 50 U.S.C. Section 3024 (i) (1)

the use of this type of equipment.

(S) Mr. Conrad further pointed out that Schmidt in manufacturing kits of technical equipment, which he has sold in quantity to the State Department, furnishes a mimeographed list of instructions which includes detailed information concerning procedures whereby telephone instruments and connecting wires can be used for microphone purposes. Mr. Conrad feels that information of this type should be designated as classified information by the Government and that the Bureau should bring this to the attention of the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies. The Conference was opposed feeling that this information should be brought to the attention of Pat Coyne but no other action taken.

To summarize, the Conference recommends that the Bureau through liaison bring to the attention of Pat Coyne of the National Security Council the factual information in this memorandum for such action as the National Security Council deems appropriate.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

  
Clyde Tolson

~~SECRET~~



The Director  
 The Executives Conference

June 4, 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by SP-5C/DH  
 Declassify on: OADR 11/2/91

~~STREAMLINING APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS~~

The Executives Conference with Messrs. Callahan, Tracy, Harbo, Mohr, Belmont, Ladd, Rosen, Sizoo and Clegg being present considered the recommendations made by Mr. Mason as a result of a survey of applicant investigation procedures at the Bureau.

The following tabulation of the amount of time required to handle various types of applicant cases after the receipt of the request by the Bureau.

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 OTHERWISE~~

	AVERAGE SOG DAYS TO OPEN	SOG DAYS TO CLOSE	AV. FIELD DAYS TO INVESTIGATE	TOTAL DAYS TO HANDLE
European Recovery	8	4.7	52.9	68.3
International Development Program	8.3	4.3	47	61.5
Voice of America	8.4	3	42.6	54
[Central Intelligence Agency]	8.4	3	38.6	50
Inter-American Affairs	8.1	2	35.5	45.6
Greece Turkey Aid Bill	7	2	36	45
International Labor Organization	2	1	16.8	19.8
World Health Organization	4	1	15.5	20.5
NSRB			Program Closed	
Office of Defense Mobilization	8	2	42.6	52.6
TVA	-	-	-	No receipts yet
Misc. Congressional Committees	2.8	1.	19.5	23.3
Departmental Applicants Clerical	9	5		
Departmental Applicants Professional	2	2	30.8	34.8

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RECORDED - 34

In Atomic Energy applicant cases, the average amount of time required to handle is as follows: JUN. 8 1951

INDEXED - 34 13

- Average number of days to open the case at the SOG, 9
- Average number of days to close the case, 2.7
- Average field days to investigate, 43.41 (deadline is 30 days)
- Total days to handle, 55.11

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

1950 fiscal year, Atomic Energy cases handled - 41,000.  
 1951 fiscal year to date - 70,319. Estimated 1952 fiscal year as  
 made by the Atomic Energy Commission Officials - minimum 90,000,  
 possibility - 240,000.

Mr. Clegg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 HANDLED BY  
 STAFF DESK

RECOMMENDATIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. For a time prior to two years ago a synopsis report was used in Atomic Energy cases. It is recommended that the Bureau return to synopsis reports for all construction workers where no derogatory information has been developed during the investigation. It is recommended that a full report be made on Atomic Energy Commission employees, top scientists, and key personnel. This does not diminish the quantity or quality of investigation. The reduction is in administrative handling and report preparation. Synopsis reports were used for many months with no embarrassment to the Bureau.

ADVANTAGES:

- a. Saving in dictation time, stenographers' time, typing time, reviewing time in the field and at SOG.
- b. Will permit more expeditious receipt of reports from the field and more expeditious handling after arrival at the Bureau.
- c. Saving in paper, less material to handle, less filing space in field and at SOG.
- d. Any time there is any derogatory information or any data questionable as to whether it is derogatory, a full report will be made.
- e. The investigative notes will be required to remain in the file of the case in the field office.
- f. Agents' time saved could be spent on other investigative work with a possible reduction of supervisors at SOG.

DISADVANTAGES:

- a. Synopsis reports might cause the investigations to be "synopsized" with less thoroughness.
- b. Diminishes opportunity for supervision at SOG thus less deterrent in preventing agents in taking short cuts in the field.
- c. Places more supervision in the field.
- d. The Atomic Energy Commission has a staff who read the reports and check off the various phases of the investigation conducted. Some of the members of the Conference stated that they would be ashamed to send a synopsis report to the AEC as representative of the Bureau's work.

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RECOMMENDATION OF JOINT COMMITTEE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Messrs. McKee, Scheidt, Harbo, Kimball, Mason, and Glegg recommend favorably. McKee's recommendation was with some reluctance and due to the increase in volume.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

Recommending favorably that synopsis reports be used as suggested in construction worker cases which represent 30% of the volume, Messrs. Harbo, Nease and Glegg.

*OK* Recommending that the system of full reports be continued, Messrs. Ladd, Callahan, Tracy, Mohr, Belmont and Sizoo.

2. The Security Officers of the Atomic Energy Commission are agreeable to limiting the investigation of temporary construction workers. Principal purpose of such investigation being to determine whether a carpenter or tradesman is of the type claimed. Atomic Energy Commission's Security Officers suggest that for such temporary construction workers the investigation be limited to a check of one place of residence, one place of employment, field office indices and police records for the past five years. Construction worker cases now constitute 30% of current volume and 75% of this work would be saved by reducing the investigation as suggested.

RECOMMENDATION OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Messrs. McKee, Scheidt, Kimball, Mason are favorable. Mr. Harbo, unfavorable.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

*OK* The majority of the Conference felt that the Bureau had a responsibility; that the Security Officers' suggestion did not relieve the Bureau of such responsibility; a piecemeal investigation would be undesirable. All members of the Conference except Mr. Glegg were opposed to this suggestion because we would not be meeting our responsibility.

Glegg favored the suggestion since the part-time construction workers had very little, if any, access, in most instances, to any confidential or classified material; a waste of Bureau time, in view of the more important investigations to be made, does not seem called for or justifiable. It was Glegg's recommendation that the Security Officers' suggestion be approved.

3. That the present folder (a regular file folder as attached and marked A) be cut by the Mechanical Section so as to remove

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approximately 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  inches near the left side as per B, attached, in order to eliminate the necessity of writing the name on the folder. The name of the subject appears on the Bureau letter which would be clearly legible by removing this section of the folder and this would save \$200 per month in cost of folders as well as the time of one GS-3 clerk.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Unanimously approved. 7. MKA

4. It is recommended that the cover letter now transmitting the investigative reports to the Atomic Energy Commission be eliminated and that a rubber stamp with the phraseology "Investigation completed by FBI" and the date be used to stamp the top report which would be a notification of the closing of the case.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

Unanimously favorable. 7. MKA

5. It now requires one-half of the time of one GS-2 clerk to stamp in the incoming PSQs received from AEC on which our investigation is based. A stamping machine now used in the Identification Division will stamp 9,000 cards monthly or the same number of PSQs monthly. The rental charge for this machine is less than \$500 per annum. Mr. Callahan advises the money is available for this purpose.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

Unanimously favorable that such a machine be rented to avoid hand stamping these PSQs. 7. MKA

6. The Atomic Energy unit supervisors request checks at G-2 in Washington and a daily list (25 mimeographed copies made) of names for G-2 to check through their Washington and regional files is prepared. One typist is required one-half time and there is additional mimeographing time required to do this work. The result of the check at G-2 is unproductive. The field offices check Army and Navy service records anyhow. Recommendation made to discontinue this type of check at G-2.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

The Conference was unanimously unfavorable since the law requires a check at G-2 in investigating individuals under the Loyalty Program and by analogy such checks should be made of Atomic Energy applicants. 7. MKA

7. If the check at G-2 as in 6 above is to continue, it is recommended that the mimeographed lists be discontinued and that a four-fold type of routing slip for checking at G-2 by mail be adopted.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4 -

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION

Unanimously unfavorable since routing slips would have to be typed and there did not seem to be any saving of time by typing one list and mimeographing it than by typing these routing slips. *OK*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8. The Executives Conference unanimously recommended unfavorably a suggestion that on page one of the report forms there be printed this phraseology "In the event this is an applicant-type investigation, this report presents the results of an FBI investigation conducted in accordance with limitations placed by the requesting agency and this report is not to be considered as clearance by the FBI." *OK*

At present reports are hand stamped "This is the result of an FBI investigation and is not to be considered as clearance." Although in making the suggestion it was felt that some time would be saved, but for such phraseology to appear on general Internal Security and criminal-type cases where the phraseology has no application to such cases would place the Bureau in a ridiculous light and therefore the recommendation was unanimously disapproved by the Conference.

9. The Atomic Energy Commission instructs the Bureau to discontinue the investigation in 8.9% of the cases after the investigation has started. One example, at Paducah, Kentucky, 800 investigations have been ordered whereas the hiring agency intends to employ only 50 to 100 of these persons on classified work. It was recommended that the strongest possible representations be made to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to avoid unnecessary requests.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

It was pointed out that this was now being done both directly by the Bureau and through the Department. *OK*

10. A form (#79) is required to be sent to the Civil Service Commission advising of any person on the government payroll who is being investigated for employment. It is recommended that an effort be made to get the Atomic Energy Commission to fill out these forms and forward them to the Bureau attached to the PSQ (which requests the investigation).

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

Such a card must be sent under regulations. It was unanimously recommended that we try to get the Atomic Energy Commission to do as recommended so as to avoid this typing in the Bureau. If approved, Liaison will endeavor to bring about this procedure.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*OK*

11. It was recommended that typists be instructed to discontinue erasing errors on letters to field offices. Instead, when they make a typing error they would X out the mistake and type the word correctly immediately thereafter thus saving a great deal of time required to erase errors on numerous carbon copies of such letters which go only from the Bureau to the field offices.

JOINT COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Messrs. McKee, Scheidt, Kimball, Harbo, Mason and Glegg recommended favorably.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

Due to the fact that this would save time and reduce the time now required to send the cases to the field Messrs. Nease, Harbo, and Glegg recommended favorably.

All other members of the conference recommended unfavorably since we have many new typists and many such errors are made and the field would be critical of the Bureau which in turn would be setting a bad example for the field. *1 OF 2*

12. Mr. Glegg suggests that in view of the heavy load of work on the Bureau; in view of the promiscuous and at times unnecessary investigations which the Atomic Energy Commission requests the Bureau to make; in view of the fact that out of 7,000 Atomic Energy cases investigated for the Oak Ridge installation only a very few hundred had any type of derogatory information developed and of the whole total only 2 had any subversive, derogatory data and this was already contained in the Bureau files prior to the investigation; in view of the amount of money being spent or which would be required even by synopsis reports; and since from checks made it appears that in the overwhelming majority of instances there is no derogatory information of any type developed (at present the number of Atomic Energy investigations in which derogatory data is developed averages 4 to 5 per cent); and since the cost of typing reports in these cases is very great it was recommended that the following plan be adopted:

1. The Agent would be required to make legible notes during the investigation. These notes would be saved and placed in the field office file.
2. The field supervisor would be required to check these notes for completeness, thoroughness and to see if there is any possibility of there being derogatory information.
3. When there is beyond question no derogatory information, the field would then transmit to the Bureau a form letter on which would be shown the various types of investigations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



made such as neighborhood, police record, employment record, credit record, birth date and place, references, etc., and there would follow the statement that no derogatory information was developed during the investigation.

4. A copy of the form letter would be sent to the Atomic Energy Commission.

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#### ADVANTAGES

1. Saving large amounts of money now spent on dictation, typing and reviewing at SOG.
2. In cases of any doubt of any of the information being derogatory a full investigative report would be prepared. This would be in a small fraction of the cases.
3. The time saved would be spent on developing subjects for the Security Index, Internal Security Investigations and criminal investigations.
4. In the event a person investigated were later found to be subversive or undesirable there would be as much reflection on the Bureau for not having discovered this whether the report were lengthy or one short sentence on a form letter.
5. The likelihood of a mistake in the field under the suggested procedure is no greater than error in a lengthy report.
6. The evaluation which the Bureau would be making in this case is no greater than the evaluation made when we stamped over two million Loyalty forms "No derogatory data in FBI files." The evaluation in which the Bureau engages in daily as to how many neighbors to interview, what information a person interviewed gave should be reported, and similar evaluations regularly made does not make this such a startling one and the expense of maintaining a historical precedent of more lengthy reports does not appear justifiable.

#### DISADVANTAGES

1. The Bureau could be accused, for the first time, of drawing conclusions based upon its completed investigations.
2. Under the present reporting system the information is furnished to the Atomic Energy Commission and they only draw the conclusions and do the evaluating and the Bureau does not participate.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. It would be establishing a dangerous precedent and might cause laxity on the part of the investigating agent and the field supervisor.
4. It is believed that the general public would prefer that the Bureau spend this money for adequate typing in order that the record would be as complete as it is in the government files.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Messrs. Glegg and Tracy recommend that a form be prepared on which the agents would prepare their notes and that this form with the notes attached would be placed in the file and a form letter report come to the Bureau as suggested when no derogatory information is developed. Mr. Nichols advised that he favors this suggestion.

All other members of the Conference present were opposed for the reasons cited under "Disadvantages." Tolson - C/T

Before this is done, concurrence of the Atomic Energy Commission must be obtained.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE DIRECTOR

6/16/51

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUGGESTION #615  
EMPLOYEE: SAC E. A. SOUCY  
PITTSBURGH OFFICE

~~SECRET~~

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

CONSOLIDATION OF FILES IN THE FIELD

On 6/11/51, the Executives Conference, with Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Tracy, Harbo, Mohr, Belmont, Ladd, Rosen, Sizoo, Nichols and Clegg present, considered the question of consolidation of Bureau files. In December 1950, the question of consolidating closed files in Field Offices was considered, at which time instructions were issued that this matter be reconsidered in June 1951.

SUGGESTION:

That the practice of consolidating closed files in the field be extended. At present, once each six months, closed files of Atomic Energy Applicants, [CIA Applicants,] Voice of America Applicants, ERP Applicants, and Selective Service Violators are consolidated in the field offices. Duplicate serials are destroyed during the consolidation and several individual files are thus enclosed within a single binder which shows the classification number and inclusive file numbers.

The Executives Conference recommended, and the Director approved, in May 1950, that the Pittsburgh Office proceed to consolidate all criminal and applicant-type classifications on the same basis. The criminal cases were to be consolidated when they were 3 years old and the applicant cases were to be consolidated after a 6-month lapse of time.

Classified by SP-5 C/P/H  
Declassify on: OADR 7/19/71

RESULTS OF THE EXPERIENCE AT THE PITTSBURGH OFFICE:

During approximately 6 months at the Pittsburgh Office, 23,822 files were consolidated. This required 266½ hours of clerical time, costing \$326.51. The files consolidated were in 215 file drawers.

As a result of this procedure, 47 file cabinet drawers of space was provided. This is nearly 9½ five-drawer file cabinets. 21.8% of the file-drawer space was saved. The cost of cabinets saved at \$62.36 each would represent a savings of \$586.18. The floor space on the basis of \$2.00 per square foot would amount to \$141.00 annual rent. The indicated savings in floor space and file cabinets was thus \$400.67.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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cc-Messrs. Mohr & Clegg  
HRC:DMG

INDEXED 127  
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~~SECRET~~



The Director

July 10, 1951

The Executives Conference

SECURITY OF TELETYPE TRAFFIC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 11/27/91 BY SP-5 EJA/arc

On July 6 the Conference composed of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Callahan, Tamm, Trotter, Belmont, Rosen, Mason, Sizoo, Nichols and Harbo considered the suggestion by Mr. Conrad that the Bureau either issue a new code book for use in connection with teletype traffic of such a nature that coding is required or issue a cipher pad in order that coded teletype traffic may be given the same security now provided to radio traffic involving security matters.

An examination of incoming and outgoing teletype traffic for a three day period disclosed a total of 2,901 messages of which 28 were coded. Present regulations provide that high security teletypes shall be encoded in code C. Mr. Conrad points out that since our code C has been used for several years to handle non-confidential radio traffic, it must be assumed that the Russians have monitored that radio traffic and have successfully reconstructed the C code.

Mr. Conrad further points out that there are several means by which the Russians could conceivably get copies of our teletype traffic as follows:

1. At the "switching center" in any large city teletype calls are handled by a telephone company operator in a manner analogous to the usual switchboard handling of telephone calls. This teletype operator could conceivably monitor the circuits which she establishes and make copies of the messages transmitted or at the time she establishes the Bureau's connections she could cut into the Bureau's circuit any other line which she desired. For example if the Russians subscribed to teletype service it would be entirely possible for the teletype operator to connect the Russian teletypewriter to the FBI circuit with the result that the FBI traffic would be reproduced on the Russian teletypewriter. The difficulties confronted by the enemy in such a situation would be that of recruiting teletype operators who would so cooperate with them; further it would be necessary for the operator to avoid direct observation of her improper activity by the telephone company supervisor.

2. The telephone company operates in large cities service identified as the "teletype" for the purpose of conducting test monitoring of subscribers' teletype lines to ascertain that the service is satisfactory and the subscribers' equipment is working properly. Disloyal employees could monitor and reproduce traffic going over the Bureau's teletype

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

cc - Mr. H. H. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

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STOP DESK

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INDEXED 126  
16 1951

Memorandum for the Director

lines under the pretext of conducting a routine test.

3. By applying a tap on the Bureau's teletype lines. This is basically similar to the method of tapping a telephone line but is technically somewhat more difficult and requires personnel with more technical training. It is necessary to locate points where the teletype circuits can be tapped which would of course be facilitated if they had contacts within the telephone company.

Mr. Conrad points out that the Russians have the technical "know how" to carry out such matters and accordingly he feels that our top security teletype traffic should depend on something beside the teletype system itself, i.e., a satisfactory system of cryptographic security.

The Conference noted that under existing instructions the field is required to check both telephone and teletype lines once a month to guard against any possible taps or tampering with our lines; that in many of the offices the telephone company lines run from the telephone exchange to the office building in a lead cable; that the telephone company conducts its own checks to see that their facilities and personnel function properly. Mr. Nichols pointed out that he has had numerous conferences with telephone company representatives as a result of which it is his opinion that it is highly improbable that any improper recording or monitoring of the teletype messages would take place at the telephone exchange. The Conference further noted that the Bureau has recently ordered 120 automatic encoding machines which will provide the means for prompt encoding of selected traffic. Although this equipment will not be delivered for many months we have been advised that 30 encoding machines will be loaned to the Bureau by AFSA and delivery is expected the middle of July. It is planned to distribute these machines among the offices handling the bulk of the security work in the field.

Mr. Ladd pointed out that during the past years there has been no indication whatever that any of our traffic has been sent anywhere except to its destination within the FBI.

It was Mr. Harbo's view that there is a need for greater cryptographic security in handling top security teletype traffic than is provided by our code G. However in view of the imminent acquisition of 30 automatic encoding machines plus plans for delivery of additional units later this year that will provide the additional security necessary.

TO : Mr. Harbo

DATE: July 10, 1951

FROM : D. J. Parsons

SUBJECT: AUTOMATIC ENCIPHERING EQUIPMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 11/22/91 BY SP-501 BTK

*Amid*

As you know, we have arranged to purchase 120 automatic encoding machines which are officially known as the AFSAM-7. Mr. Callahan has been in touch with Colonel Revane, the AFSA finance officer, concerning the payment for equipment obtained on the military contact.

AFSA has requested that we advise the accessories needed for operation of these machines in the Bureau's system, and in this connection Messrs. Newpher, Conrad and myself have discussed the matter with Colonel Sears and Mr. Austin and have selected the following items:

1. 120 office cases with power converters. These are shown in the attached photographs and are desirable wherever the machines are being used in a fixed location. They cannot be used satisfactorily in the carrying cases for continuous use. These cases cost \$100.00 each.
2. 120 AFSAM-207 cipher units. These units are the containers for the rotors and will be of material assistance in that the extra set of rotors can be properly arranged within the cipher unit permitting the machine to be shifted to the next cipher arrangement without loss of time. These units cost \$50.00 each.
3. 250 sets of rotors. This number is necessary in order to provide two sets for each machine with an additional ten sets which we will have for replacement and emergency.
4. 5 AFSAM-107 stepping units. This is the unit which is an important part of the machine and actually changes the rotor positions while the message is being sent. It is felt that five of these should be obtained for emergency replacement in the event a machine break down.
5. 5 Power converters. These additional power converters are for replacement in the event of any failure of the power supply in the office cases. They cost \$25.00 each.
6. 2,000 rolls of paper tape. Each machine comes equipped with two rolls of paper tape and this amount is considered to be a minimal supply until we can determine through actual use the amount that will be needed over a longer period. We will be able to obtain additional rolls of paper at a later date.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 80-749-27

35 JUL 31 1951

Attachment f-225

RECORDED - 88

166-2554-8902

JUL 28 1951

EX-81 INITIAL 65 ON ORIGINAL

Memorandum for Mr. Harbo

7. 200 ribbons. Each machine is equipped with a ribbon and one spare. The 200 desired are considered as a nominal supply until it can be determined the rate at which they will be used.

There is attached hereto a letter addressed to the Director of AFSA officially confirming our oral request for the 120 machines and listing the above items.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to Admiral Stone.

ADDENDUM:

Approved by the Executives Conference on July 13, 1951, with Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Callahan, Tamm, Mohr, Rosen, Clegg, Sizoo, McGuire, Laughlin and Parsons in attendance. DJP:VH

Classified per OGA letter dated 7/25/2011

~~SECRET~~ (U)

August 15, 1951

THE DIRECTOR

THE EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

The Executive Conference of August 14, 1951, consisting of Hoover, Ladd, Laughlin, Mason, Belmont, Mohr, Parsons, Tracy, Nease, Rosen and Glavin considered two memoranda submitted by Mr. T. P. Keady concerning alert planning for the protection of key Government personnel. It was pointed out to the Conference that Colonel Bronson, who is on loan from the Air Force to the National Security Resources Board to carry out the alert planning program for the protection of different Government personnel and has advised Mr. Barklett of the Bureau's Liaison Section that the agencies considered as key agencies by the President in this planning include the White House, the FBI, State Department, NSA civil defense and National Defense. Mr. Bronson stated that he is preparing a book for the President showing the planning for the key Government agencies as to the proposed operations in the event of an emergency and requested that the Bureau fill out the attached forms concerning this matter.

For the Director's information, the forms would reflect all information including the designated emergency sites, when we would be ready for operation in the emergency, site, personnel, trained for emergency functions, where our vital records would be, our communication facilities, which would reflect call signs, frequencies, code words, cryptographic facilities, principal personnel agencies, boards, committees, etc. directly essential to permit performance of our emergency functions for the first 90 days of operations. Further information is requested concerning our emergency relocation sites, what agencies would be utilizing them and for what purpose, the present use or status, number of seats ownership, major facilities available now and after relocation. It also requests information concerning the directory of key personnel for emergency relocation. In addition, Colonel Bronson has requested additional information in an organization chart form, showing the Bureau's relationship to other important agencies, relationship to a superior agency, major sub-divisions into which the FBI is divided and relationship to the field organization of the agency.

It was pointed out to the Conference that this material is being gathered by Colonel Bronson at the suggestion of the President through a query raised to him by Mr. David Stone of the White House staff. According to Colonel Bronson, the other agencies have already made known their emergency relocation sites as follows: State Department at Mary Washington College, Fredericksburg, Virginia,

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Alben \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
cc - Mr. [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]

RECORDED - 67  
INDEXED - 67  
STOP PRESS  
8/21/51

66-2554-8967  
AUG 28 1951

Classified by SP-5 CJE/HE  
Declassify on: OADR 11/29/91

~~SECRET~~

Memo for the Director - Continued

b1

50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)

b3 National Security Act of 1947 & CIA Act of 1949

(S)

Civil Defense at  
the National Defense  
at Fort Meade, Maryland; and White House as the Bomb shelter, Congress-Id,  
Railroad car, Yacht Williamsburg, or President's plane the  
Independence.

It was pointed out to the Conference that to have not  
advised persons outside the Bureau in writing concerning our suggested  
emergency relocation quarters at Shepherdsburn, West Virginia.  
Further, we have not furnished much of the information requested  
by Colonel Bronson at this time at any time in the past concerning  
communications facilities, et cetera.

The Conference feels, however, that since it is the desire  
of the President to have this information, that it will be necessary  
for the Bureau to furnish the information requested by Colonel Bronson  
at this time.

Should the Director agree, immediate steps will be taken  
by the Bureau to secure the information desired by Colonel Bronson.

This matter will again be brought to the attention of  
the Director before submission to Bronson.

Respectfully,  
for the Conference

Clyde Tolson

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Algen \_\_\_\_\_
- Selmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



The Director

July 13, 1951

The Executives Conference

WAR PLANS  
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

~~SECRET~~ ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12/17/97 BY sp-5/abj

On July 13 the Conference consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Callahan, Tamm, Mohr, Rosen, Glegg, Sizoo, Laughlin, McGuire and Parsons considered the request of the National Security Resources Board for information concerning the Bureau's emergency headquarters in order that they may make plans for an emergency radio link with the other critical agencies.

The NSRB previously requested information from the Bureau on war plans concerning the names of successor heads, plans on security of records and on communications. We advised their representative concerning the chain of command but have not advised them as to the location of the Bureau's emergency headquarters. Pursuant to further inquiries concerning emergency communications, Mr. Leslie Kullenburg called at Mr. McGuire's office on July 5 and talked to Messrs. McGuire and Conrad.

Mr. Kullenburg, who is actually with Civil Defense but who is representing the NSRB Committee, advised that he had been given the assignment of establishing a radio communications link between the relocation centers of the White House, State Department, CIA, Defense, Civil Defense and FBI. He produced a map showing the relocation centers of all of the agencies with the exception of the Bureau and advised that a short-wave radio system has already been engineered by his Committee to connect these critical agencies. Approximately \$150,000 has already been spent toward the purchase of the necessary equipment and these costs are to be prorated among the agencies concerned. He estimated that the necessary terminal equipment to permit the FBI to tie in to this system would cost somewhere between \$20,000 and \$35,000. The Civil Defense Center will be located deep in the interior of a granite mountain with the antenna towers on top of the mountain and present plans call for manning these points on a 24 hour basis prior to the onset of an emergency.

The Conference believes that it would be highly undesirable to advise these representatives of our emergency headquarters plans particularly in view of the fact that the erection of special equipment, which would be necessary for the short-wave system at Shepherdstown, would be undesirable and we presently have no intention of maintaining a staff at

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

cc - Mr. H. H. Clegg

SEP 12 1951

DJP:VH

RECORDED  
Classified by sp-5/abj  
Declassify on: OADR

66-2534-8998  
SEP 6 1951

ORIGINAL FILE IN



Memorandum for the Director

~~SECRET~~

Shepherdstown prior to its actual use by the Bureau. The Bureau considered the alternative proposal of advising the NSRB that the Bureau is presently considering the relocation of its main radio station and included in such considerations are the inclusion of certain emergency facilities; that upon completion of these plans we will advise the NSRB of the location of these facilities from which we will maintain emergency communications. It was pointed out to the Conference that in planning the relocation of our main radio station we are including plans to permit communication with Shepherdstown and therefore consider it desirable that we advise the NSRB of the location of our new radio station if approved.

The Conference was unanimously in favor of this latter proposal and further agreed that we will not commit ourselves to the purchase of equipment for the emergency link at this time but would await their recommendation for further consideration after we advise them of our radio station location.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

Classified per letter dated 7/25/2011

THE DIRECTOR

August 28, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

~~ASSIGNMENT OF A BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE TO VIENNA~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

The Executives Conference, consisting of Messrs. Ladd, Glavin, Rosen, Mohr, Belmont, G. C. Gearty, Parsons for Harbo, Quinn Tamm for Tracy, and Laughlin, on August 28, 1951, considered the request of Lieutenant General S. Leroy Irwin, Commanding General, Headquarters, U. S. Forces in Austria, to have a Bureau Agent detailed for duty in Austria. The letter of General Irwin's dated July 27, 1951, addressed to Major General A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was forwarded to the Bureau by the latter on August 24, 1951. These letters are attached.

It was pointed out that Lieutenant General Irwin formerly was with G-2 in Washington and is well and favorably known to the Bureau. It was explained that undoubtedly General Irwin can be counted on to make available such information in which the Bureau would have an interest and also to insure that complete cooperation is extended to the Bureau's representative.

It was noted that Austria is presently under the control of the Americans, British, and Russians. This is also true of the city of Vienna. Vienna is very close to the Russian-dominated satellite countries of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Undoubtedly Soviet Intelligence would be very active in Austria and, hence, the possibility exists of the Bureau gaining information concerning the Soviets' techniques. It was also observed that the Bureau representative at this post would gain access to defectors and possibly be in a position to develop double agents. (S)

The comment contained in General Irwin's letter that at least 50 of the non-occupational Americans have been identified as Communists was discussed and the possibility of obtaining on-the-spot information concerning the activities of these persons was mentioned.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
CC: Mr. H. H. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr  
LLL:mer

RECORDED - 66

INDEXED - 66

SEP 11 1951

~~SECRET~~

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Declassification: OADR

52 SEP 18 1951

EX-791



The Director  
The Executives Conference

October 6, 1951

~~SECRET~~

~~WAR PLANS~~  
~~SECURITY AGENCIES~~  
~~MICROWAVE SYSTEM~~

2/3/72  
Classification ~~SP-SECRET~~  
Excluded from GDSR

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
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OTHERWISE

On October 4, the Executives Conference consisting of Messrs. Ladd, Glavin, Tracy, Belmont, Mason, Gearty, Sizoo, Laughlin, Mohr, Rosen and Parsons considered the Bureau's link in the security agencies microwave system.

In July 1951, a representative of the Federal Civil Defense Agency serving on a committee of the National Security Resources Board called at the Bureau and advised that his committee was planning a microwave radio system to link the emergency headquarters of the critical agencies and the White House. We were advised that when the system was engineered each agency would be expected to bear an apportioned cost of the installations. It was requested that the Bureau supply the location of its emergency headquarters in order to be included in the plan.

At that time the committee was not informed of the location of our emergency headquarters because other arrangements had been made to advise the White House and also because we did not intend to have any personnel assigned at our emergency headquarters in Shepherdstown. We, therefore, advised the NSRB representative that our link in the communication system would be at our main radio station which we were planning to relocate in nearby Virginia.

A memorandum has now been received from the National Security Resources Board outlining the proposed system and assigning frequencies for the critical agencies including the White House, National Defense agencies, [CIA and] State Department. The memorandum states that no arrangements have been made for the FBI since no location has been designated at this time.

It was proposed to the Conference that since we were now advising NSRB in a war plans memorandum that our emergency relocation headquarters will be at Shepherdstown, Virginia, we so advise the committee arranging these communications. The Conference considered that if the Bureau decides to erect the necessary tower and install the equipment to tie into the microwave system this could be done at

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

op - Mr. H. H. Clegg RECORDED - 62  
Mr. Mohr

66-3537-9115  
OCT 10 1951

DJP:VH

INDEXED - 62

~~SECRET~~

STON DESK OCT 14 1951

Memorandum for the Director

~~SECRET~~

Shepherdstown without disclosing the nature or purpose of the equipment. The tower would be similar to that used in television and other ultra-high-frequency radio relays. If the Director approves we will advise the committee and await their recommendation on equipment, after which an additional proposal will be submitted for the Director's approval.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

KH

Glyde Tolson

I have instructed  
Mr. Parsons to confer  
with Colonel Bronson  
of the National  
Security Resources  
Board concerning  
the Bureau installation  
at Shepherdstown.

10/9

But why has it taken  
so long to arrive at this  
decision. By the time I  
got this news I had  
already been contacted  
by Mr. Starnes & Ad. Sawyer  
& asked to do what is now  
recommended.

KH

~~SECRET~~

classification per OGA letter dated 8/2/2011

THE DIRECTOR

October 15, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

~~SECRET~~

RAR PLANS  
SECURITY AGENCIES' MICROWAVE SYSTEM

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

On October 15, 1951, the Executives Conference consisting of Messrs. Glavin, Tracy, Mohr, Belmont, Rosen, Clegg, Gearty, McGuire and Parsons considered the proposed microwave system to connect the relocation points of the critical agencies with the White House.

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)

The Conference was advised that information had been obtained from Colonel Bronson of WEPB reflecting that the present status of the microwave system shows the system has already been started but is far from completion. The present plan calls for a system which will connect the emergency headquarters for the State Department at Fredericksburg, Virginia; Warrenton, Virginia; Federal Civilian Defense Agency, Mount Weather, Virginia; FBI, Shepherdstown, West Virginia; Department of Defense agencies, Camp Ritchie, Maryland; and the White House at Thurmont, Maryland (see attached map). A link from Warrenton to FCDA at Mount Weather is presently completed and in operation. This is the only part of the network now installed. The military agencies are not ready to occupy the facilities at Camp Ritchie which are to be rather elaborate. Holes have been drilled into a mountain and buildings and office space are being constructed within the mountain, and this whole installation has become known as "The Rock." Until "The Rock" is completed, the temporary relocation plans for the defense agencies provide for facilities at Camp Meade, Maryland, and they now have a temporary microwave link between Camp Meade and Camp Ritchie. A link will soon be completed from the FCDA headquarters, Mount Weather, to Camp Meade.

The Military will also install a link from Camp Ritchie to the White House site at Thurmont. Because of the distance from Camp Ritchie to the FCDA headquarters at Mount Weather, a relay point at Sharpsburg, Maryland, is planned. This would be the ideal tie-in point for the Bureau since Shepherdstown, W. Va., is only four miles from Sharpsburg. Because there are no facilities now at Sharpsburg, it is proposed that the Bureau tie into the system at Mount Weather.

The State Department is in the same situation as the Bureau, i.e., they do not have a relocation site which they occupy. They plan to go to Mary Washington College in Fredericksburg, Virginia,

Vertical text on the left margin: "See memo re WEPB Plans" and other illegible markings.

Vertical text on the bottom left margin: "Lion", "ad", "egg", "aw/n", "chole", "son", "AGE", "RE-11", "E-11".

OCT 26 1951  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr  
EJP/mek

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EX - 3

66-2554-9140  
OCT 20 1951  
Classified by SP-5 MDP  
Declassify on: OADR

Memorandum to the Director  
10/15/51

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)

but since they have no personnel there, they have erected no microwave system. As a stop-gap plan, in the event of an emergency State Department officials would go to [redacted] at Warrenton until their Fredericksburg facilities could be occupied and equipped.

Because of the arrangements which have already been made with the people in Shepherdstown, we feel that we can arrange to install microwave equipment at Shepherdstown under a pretext without revealing the exact nature of the installation. The equipment will appear similar to that installed and used by the AT & T in their nation-wide microwave network which is used for television and communications.

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)

The Conference was advised that it will be necessary to reach a decision as to the number of channels which we will need in the Security Agencies' Microwave System. A channel would function substantially in the same way as a telephone line, i.e., it would permit one incoming or outgoing telephone call carried by microwave. The Committee must plan for a channelling procedure at Camp Leather in order to handle the microwave communications and therefore desire to know the number of channels that the Bureau feels necessary for the handling of urgent voice conversations with the other agencies. [redacted] presently has 10 channels from Warrenton to Mount Weather but they plan to increase this number to 24 since the State Department calls will also go through their station. The military plan from Camp Ritchie has more than 24 channels down to Sharpburg, Maryland. We do not know the number of channels presently planned for Camp Ritchie to Thurmont.

The Conference unanimously recommends that even though 6 channels (considering one for each of the critical agencies and the White House) would probably be sufficient, we should request 10 channels in order to have some flexibility. We estimate that equipment to permit 10 channels of microwave communication including a tower to be installed at Shepherdstown would cost in the neighborhood of \$50,000.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

OK  
Pr

~~SECRET~~

Tolson  
Ladd  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Harbo  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Gandy



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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

7692  
Classified by ~~SP5ci~~  
Declassify on: OADR ~~44~~

THE DIRECTOR

March 21, 1952

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

~~SECRET~~

COLONEL [redacted]  
ESPIONAGE - R.

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

### Executive Conference

On March 21, 1952, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Glavin, Harbo, Winterrowd for Rosen, Tracy, Holloman, and Henrich for Belmont, considered a recommendation that an approach be made to the subject with a view toward obtaining intelligence information from the subject and possibly his defection. The subject has been recalled by the Soviet Government and will depart on April 3, 1952.

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

Colonel [redacted] is Assistant Air Attache at the Soviet Embassy, having entered the United States on December 7, 1949. In December, 1950, he made contact with Colonel [redacted] a United States Air Force officer who had previously been cooperating with the Bureau in an effort to assist in the defection of Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] a Russian official assigned to the Soviet Military Mission at the UN. This operation was unsuccessful.

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

[redacted] has had numerous meetings with [redacted] since December, 1950 in a clandestine manner and has requested from [redacted] information of a classified nature including Air Force manuals, specifications on pressurized altitude suits, details on fighter planes, and information regarding a highly secret bombsight. We have passed certain classified information of a low level after clearance. Subject has actually paid cash sums to [redacted] for information received.

The Air Force during recent months has indicated some reluctance to have [redacted] continue the operation and has suggested that [redacted] has been a little too talkative regarding the operation around Air Force Headquarters.

The Washington Field Office has advised that [redacted] has been recalled and will depart the United States on April 3, 1952. The Domestic Intelligence Division

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

CC - Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

RECORDED-137

INDEXED-137

66-2554-9520

57 MAR 25 1952

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

recommends that an approach be made to [redacted] prior to his departure by an Agent at a point away from his office or home. The Agent would not be identified with the Bureau. [redacted] would be informed that his espionage activities have been detected; that he has thus failed in his mission; that he will be given an opportunity to cooperate in furnishing information regarding his activities and Soviet intelligence activities, and if cooperative, a suggestion of defection can be made. In attempting to secure his cooperation he will be informed that if he does not cooperate, the fact that his activities have been compromised will be reported to his superiors. (U)

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

[redacted] are in Russia. The possibility of defection is remote. Fear of drastic action by [redacted] should it be revealed that his activities have been compromised is our only hope of gaining cooperation. This too is somewhat remote. Our information is that the Russian Intelligence Service does expect perfection in its agents and they are held strictly accountable for their actions and the actions of their informants. While we cannot specifically state how drastic such action would be, it would undoubtedly be severe. Subject is thus faced with the alternative of cooperating on the promise of not revealing the fact that his operation has been compromised, or failing to cooperate and facing notification to his superiors that his operations are compromised. This would be accomplished either through the State Department declaring him persona non grata and stating the reasons therefor, or possibly through an anonymous letter to Russian officials setting forth factual data. (U)

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

It is proposed that the approach to [redacted] be made without the knowledge of the State or Justice Departments. It is proposed that the Air Force be notified on a high level of our contemplated action, first, because the informant in this case is an Air Force Colonel, and, secondly, in the event our plan is unsuccessful, due to the possibility that the Russians might take retaliatory action by declaring the U. S. Air Attache in Moscow persona non grata. (U)

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~~SECRET~~ (U)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

It is felt that the Air Force should have an opportunity to demur to our proposed action. In the event they do oppose this, we would not proceed but would advise the State and Justice Departments of information in our possession for whatever action they deem desirable. (U)

The Domestic Intelligence Division recommends that although the chances of success in this proposal may be remote, we should proceed, as suggested, since we have nothing to lose. The Bureau could not be compromised and we would only move with Air Force concurrence.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The majority of the Conference consisting of Messrs. Glavin, Harbo, Tracy, Gearty, Holloman, Winterrowd for Rosen, and Hennrich for Belmont voted in favor of the recommendation.

The minority, consisting of Messrs. Tolson and Ladd, voted against the recommendation. They felt the action was premature and that summaries should be furnished to the State Department and the Attorney General, as well as other interested agencies, with the suggestion that they might desire to declare the subject persons non grata.

Mr. Belmont, who was not present at the conference, concurs with the majority. He feels there is a matter of principle involved in this question, pointing out that the Domestic Intelligence Division has consistently tried to take an aggressive, direct approach to problems in the belief that only through throwing off reluctance to face issues and evolving new means and techniques, such as the use of direct approach, wherever possible, will we be able to solve our problems. In keeping with this feeling, we have developed our Toplev Program. We have initiated the program for the surveillance of Soviet nationals in New York and Washington, both of which have produced excellent results. Mr. Belmont feels we need to use every technique we can to (U)

~~SECRET~~ (U)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

~~SECRET~~ (U)

gain knowledge regarding Soviet Intelligence. On one previous occasion in December, 1951, we made an approach to [redacted] an Assistant Soviet Air Attache. While this was unsuccessful, the Bureau was not embarrassed, [redacted] was immediately put under guard by the Soviets and was quickly removed from the United States. We need to know what Soviet Intelligence will do under such circumstances. In putting into effect our direct action policy, we keep three things in mind: (1) getting the information we need; (2) protecting the Bureau; and, (3) assuring that we maintain control of the operation. In this case all three of these factors are present. We need to know what the Soviets will do in instances of this kind. The operation will not be compromised because it will end anyway with the return of [redacted]. The Bureau Agent will not be identified. We have control and the Bureau will not be compromised. By proceeding with this action, we will increase our store of knowledge as to what the Soviet action will be. \* (U)

In the event you approve the majority recommendation, this matter will be immediately taken up with the Air Force and if they agree, the Washington Field Office will be instructed to proceed, as outlined.

KA  
Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Glyde Tolson

~~SECRET~~ (U)

61 APR 21 1957

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY 3~~

REC'D  
APR 21 1957

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RECORDED 100  
APR 12 1957

66-8554-9617

The communication dated out at this point  
operation investigation will include a full  
it will not be classified higher than "confidential"  
The proposed inclusion of data concerning  
the centrally located could be listed as a matter of  
and such data locations of their respective countries  
headquarters, if any information is available in the  
operation in higher than "confidential" information  
in, you, in his communication, states he is not  
andly stated that the reason for the security investigation  
currently applied to our agency, on a "need-to-know" basis,  
to the government's location of our headquarters

It will be noted that the communication, which is  
addressed to each member of the committee on state  
affairs, dated the office of the chief financial officer  
of the department of the treasury, is a confidential  
document. It is suggested that the communication be  
classified "confidential" in order to protect the  
information contained therein from unauthorized disclosure  
in the event of a breach of security. It is suggested  
that the communication be classified "confidential" in  
order to protect the information contained therein from  
unauthorized disclosure in the event of a breach of  
security. It is suggested that the communication be  
classified "confidential" in order to protect the  
information contained therein from unauthorized disclosure  
in the event of a breach of security.

The communication contained in Exhibit A, dated  
April 14, 1957, is a confidential document. It is  
suggested that the communication be classified  
"confidential" in order to protect the information  
contained therein from unauthorized disclosure in the  
event of a breach of security. It is suggested that  
the communication be classified "confidential" in order  
to protect the information contained therein from  
unauthorized disclosure in the event of a breach of  
security.

~~Declassify on: OADR  
Classified by: OADR  
Date: 11-17-01~~

APR 15 1957

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY 3~~

APR 21 1957



~~SECRET~~

47

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Other copies

Handwritten initials

Handwritten notes for the conference

Should the Director agree, Mr. Banters will be instructed to be advised by you.

In addition to the information in the report, a "lead-to-lead" list, the Bureau could have no objection to information in the report being furnished to the "Control Information" and since it is desired that the Bureau's cooperation be considered in the conference held last year, you should be advised that the information be furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation is being furnished to the Bureau during the past few days.

F. B. I.

Respectfully (continued)

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

A. H. BELMONT

F. A. BRANTGAN

July 23, 1952

SOVIET OFFICIALS ALBUM  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R  
(100-953119)

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ALBUM  
ESPIONAGE - R  
(100-942524)

1-28 92  
SEARCHED BY [initials]  
INDEXED BY [initials]

Executive Conference

PURPOSE:

To submit for your approval the recommendation of the Espionage Section as to the modification in the maintenance of the Soviet Intelligence Album and the Soviet Officials Album, based upon the recommendations made by field representatives present at the Special Espionage and Security Conference held June 27 and 28, 1952.

BACKGROUND:

The Soviet Intelligence Album has been maintained since July 31, 1945. It contains a photograph, physical description and brief statement as to the activities and modus operandi of known and suspected espionage and propaganda agents and couriers. Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, New York and Washington Field maintain copies of this album. All offices contribute inserts to the album, as intelligence agents are identified by those offices. Inserts to the album are exchanged with the British Intelligence Service.

The Soviet Officials Album has been maintained since October 17, 1947. It contains a photograph, physical description, description of position held, residence and brief statement concerning the activities and contacts of each Soviet official. This album is maintained by the New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Washington Field Offices. Only New York and the Washington Field Office contribute to the album since no Soviets are stationed elsewhere. Inserts are exchanged with the British Intelligence Service and CIA.

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- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

DEWich  
Attachments (2)

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Both albums are maintained in bound volumes, the inserts being filed alphabetically therein. A photograph is stapled to each insert and the descriptive data mimeographed thereon.

The representatives attending the Special Espionage and Security Conference on June 27 and 28, 1952, were briefed regarding the album, and the field's suggestions were solicited as to modification or changes needed so the album might be of more value to the field. The field made three recommendations as follows:

(1) The photographs should be separated from the descriptive data inasmuch as at the present time the photographs cannot be exhibited readily to informants without detaching the photographs from the inserts, and it was felt that it would be of considerable aid if the photographs were maintained separately.

(2) An informative index to be maintained in conjunction with the album was recommended, it being pointed out that this would be particularly desirable if it could be handled in a general appearance breakdown.

(3) It was recommended that the Soviet Officials Album be broken down into active and inactive sections, since the great majority of Soviet officials have returned to the Soviet Union, and the main purpose of the album is to identify officials presently in the United States.

The recommendations of the field have been considered in the Espionage Section and it is believed they are well founded and should be adopted. With regard to the adoption, the following details have been considered and are believed workable by the Espionage Section:

(1) The inserts containing the descriptive information should be maintained as at present, with the exception of the photograph. The photograph should be submitted separately to the Bureau and interested offices where

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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It should be stapled to a 5 x 8 index card and filed in a card index. The photographs presently on file in the albums should be removed from the inserts and likewise stapled to 5 x 8 index cards and included in the card index. This applies to both the Soviet Intelligence and the Soviet Officials Albums. The card index for the Soviet Intelligence Album should be set up by each office maintaining it, on a general appearance (age-height-weight) basis, and the Soviet Officials Album should be set up by each office, on an active (presently in the United States) and an inactive (outside the United States) basis, as discussed under (2) and (3) below. X

(2) A general appearance index could be readily maintained by classifying each subject of the Soviet Intelligence Album into the following four categories: X

- (a) Sex. This could give two major sections to the index.
- (b) Date of birth (within a ten-year period, i.e., 1871-1880; 1881-1890, etc.) This would give a primary breakdown of seven ten-year periods (1871-1940).
- (c) Height, i.e., whether tall (over 5'10"); medium (5'6" to 5'10"); short (under 5'6"). These would be subdivisions of each "Date of Birth" category.
- (d) Weight, i.e., whether heavy (over 180); medium (130 to 180); or light (under 130). These would be subdivisions of each "Height" category. X

It is recommended that this breakdown apply only to the Soviet Intelligence Album since it has been noted that the physical descriptions of the Soviet officials, which are received from State Department visa forms, are not sufficiently detailed to make a general appearance breakdown. Also, as soon as Soviet officials are identified as being engaged in intelligence activities, their photographs are also included in the Soviet Intelligence Album. X

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Such broad general breakdowns could facilitate a search for logical suspects based on the physical description given by an informant in those cases where an unknown subject was to be identified. ✓

The Soviet Intelligence Album at present contains approximately 500 photographs of men and 100 photographs of women. The above-listed categories will give 63 subdivisions for each (male and female) section, which should be sufficient to effectively catalogue the existing album. ✓

In order to locate the photograph by the individual's name, it would be necessary only to check the alphabetical blind memorandum for that person, and determine the corresponding physical description under which the photograph is filed. ✓

It is noted that several photographs received from Stett do not have a physical description. These should be filed in an "Unclassified" category. Photographs of the Intelligence agents identified by the Bureau have the necessary description. ✓

It is recommended that this general appearance card index of photographs be maintained by each of the seven offices that presently maintain the Soviet Intelligence Album, and that a similar index be maintained in the Espionage Section in conjunction with the copy of the album maintained there. Maintaining the card index in the field will insure ready access to it for exhibition to informants and as an investigative aid to agents handling espionage matters. ✓

The above matter was discussed informally with Mr. Deles of the Single Fingerprint Section of the Identification Division, who maintains the "confidence-man" general appearance file. It is suggested that this memorandum be referred to the Identification Division for any observations as to the workability of the system proposed. ✓

~~SECRET~~

(3) An active and inactive section of the Soviet Officials Album can be easily maintained by all Offices which currently have the album. The Bureau, at the present time, has an index showing the identity of all Soviet officials currently in the United States. The Bureau receives, under the captioned "Movement of Soviet Nationals," notification of the departure of all Soviets. Upon receipt of this notification by the Bureau, the Bureau will notify the interested offices to remove the photograph maintained on the 5 x 8 card from the active section of the card index of photographs and place it in the inactive section. It is not believed necessary that the insert itself should be removed from the bound volume and placed in an inactive section, inasmuch as the active and inactive card index would serve the field's purpose adequately. X

It is to be pointed out that this album is used primarily by Agents on surveillance in attempting to identify contacts of Soviet officials and familiarize those Agents with identities of Soviet officials presently in the United States. X

#### ACTION:

As mentioned under section (2) above, this memorandum should be referred to the Identification Division for comments as to the workability of the general appearance index.

In the event the above recommendations are approved, there is attached hereto a memorandum which should be included in an SAC letter instructing the field as to the changes that have been adopted regarding the Soviet Intelligence Album. X

There is also attached a letter to New York with copies to other offices which maintain the Soviet Officials Album containing detailed instructions as to the maintenance of the Soviet Officials Album. It is believed unnecessary that this be transmitted to all SACs inasmuch as only four offices are concerned with Soviet officials. X

#### ADDENDUM:

August 5, 1952

On August 5, 1952, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Nichols, Glavin, Tracy, Harbo, Mohr, Rosen and Ladd,

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Winterrowd for Rosen, Clegg, Gearty, Holloman, and Belmont unanimously recommended approval of the proposed SAC Letter and letter to New York with copies for Washington Field, Los Angeles and San Francisco.

ARB:tlc

*OK W  
disputed matter*

~~SECRET~~

MR. TOLSON

December 4, 1952

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

The Executives Conference of December 1, 1952, consisting of Messrs. Ladd, Winterrowd, Rosen, Belmont, Tracy, Gearty, Clegg, Mohr, Harbo, and Glavin, considered the communication received from Administrative Assistant Attorney General J. A. Andretto concerning the Bureau's participation in the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee. It was pointed out to the Conference that the Department of Justice has been requested to make available to the Committee the sum of \$4,271 as its contribution to the support of this organization; that since the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the FBI are the two agencies which are affected, he inquired as to whether we have funds with which to meet our share of this assessment.

By way of background, the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee was created in 1922. The purpose of the Radio Advisory Committee results from the Communications Act which empowered the Federal Communications Commission to assign frequencies to all non-Federal Government users and the President to make such assignments to all Federal Government users. The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee recommends to the President lists of broad assignments of frequencies to Federal users which are then promulgated in Executive Orders. In effect, the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee performs the same function for Federal users as the Federal Communications Commission does for non-Federal Government users. The membership of the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee is made up of the following agencies: Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture, Department of Interior, Department of Justice, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency. In connection with the Department of Justice in addition to the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Bureau of Prisons are members. However, in connection with the Bureau of Prisons, they are a very minor participant as compared to the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service which have approximately equal radio interests and operations.

The Department of Justice has been represented by the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee since inception. The Bureau took active participation in this group shortly before World War II when we were endeavoring to establish our present radio communications

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Laughlin
- Mohr
- Tele. Rm.
- Holloman
- Gandy

CC: Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Clegg

RECORDED  
INDEXED - 28

DEC 11 1952

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
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Memo to Mr. Tolson (continued)

network. In this respect, it is pointed out that the military agencies which are the greater users of radio frequencies initially opposed the establishing of our network and it was only through our active participation in the early stages in the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee that we were able to overcome the objections of the military and obtain the frequencies necessary for our operations. Through our participation in the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee we have obtained all the frequencies now used by us in our various radio operations.

Our continued participation in the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee would assure that the Bureau's interests in the radio field are protected so that frequencies which would jeopardize the operations of our own network are not assigned to other agencies and any attempt to obtain such frequencies would impede the Bureau's operations in the field. Further, it would permit us to be in a better position to obtain additional frequencies should such be necessary.

The Conference was further advised that contact at the Bureau of the Budget in connection with this matter resulted in information being furnished that it had been necessary that participating members of this Committee be assessed a nominal amount and it was hopeful that the Bureau could bear its share of the \$4,271 or one-half thereof, \$2,135.50. The Conference was further advised that Mr. Harbo stated that it is essential that the Bureau continue to be represented on this Committee; that he is fully convinced that as long as the FBI engages in radio communications on a rather extensive basis it is absolutely essential to retain our representation on this Committee and actively participate in its meetings. Mr. Harbo stated that unless we do so, we would be in grave danger of finding it impossible to adequately protect our rights with reference to frequency allocations and especially with reference to the fulfillment of our possible needs for additional radio frequencies in the future. Mr. Harbo feels it would appear reasonable for us to undertake to pay for half of the \$4,271 assessment against the Department of Justice with Immigration and Naturalization Service paying the other half. The Executives Conference unambiguously concurred with Mr. Harbo's comments and should you agree, there is attached a suggested communication to go forward to Mr. S. A. Andretta.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
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- Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*I agree*  
*12-4*

*OK*



THE DIRECTOR

12/9/52

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

Present at the Conference on 12/8/52 were Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Tracy, Harbo, Belmont, Ladd, Rosen, Gearty, Winterrowd and Mason.

DIRECTORY OF  
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY  
GRADUATES

The Conference considered who should be included in the 1953 edition of the Directory of FBI National Academy Graduates. The Directory will be shortly presented for approval, prior to printing.

Until January 1952, the Directory of FBI National Academy Graduates contained the names of all graduates, except those who were removed from the rolls for misconduct. In other words, those still in law enforcement were shown, those retired were shown, those out of law enforcement, but in good standing were so indicated by an asterisk.

In the 1952 Directory, however, all graduates who had left law enforcement work were left out of the Directory. In other words, the 17 men who went to the Office of Price Stabilization, the one who went with Central Intelligence Agency and the one who took a position with the U. S. Secret Service were excluded in the 1952 edition. Men who were deceased graduates in good standing and men who retired from law enforcement work were included in the 1952 edition.

It was pointed out to the Conference that, of the 17 men who went with the Office of Price Stabilization, at least 10 have already left. No investigation has been made to determine whether the other 7 still remain with the Office of Price Stabilization. It is noted that one graduate is still with Central Intelligence Agency and another is still with the U. S. Secret Service.

Majority View:

The majority felt that the 1953 Directory should contain:

- All graduates actively engaged in law enforcement who are in good standing.
- All retired graduates who are in good standing.
- All deceased graduates in good standing.

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 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

This was the procedure followed in the 1952 Directory. The following members of the Conference favor the same instructions for the 1952 Directory: Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Tracy, Harbo, Belmont, Ladd, Rosen, Gearty, and Winterrowd.

cc-Mr. Mohr

DEC 10 1952  
EDM:DMC

INDEXED 166-2554-10105  
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-10-92 BY SP5/...

Memorandum to the Director

If the Director agrees with the majority view, Mr. J. S. Rogers who is preparing the 1952 Directory will be so guided.

Minority View:

Mr. Mason felt it desirable to include everything that the majority wishes to include, and in addition to list the names of those graduates in good standing who may now be employed in industry, Government, or in some organization not eligible to designate candidates for the FBI National Academy. In other words, the graduate at U. S. Secret Service and the graduate at Central Intelligence Agency would be listed by name (but neither Secret Service nor Central Intelligence Agency would be shown), and show them as having left the last local law enforcement agency with which affiliated to take another position. The other position would not be shown. This is the procedure followed for all years up to 1952, but not including 1952.

The reasons for this view are:

1. People drop in at field offices and state they are graduates of the FBI National Academy, but are not now in law enforcement. The SAC looks at the Directory and finds that the person's name is not listed. He has no way of telling whether the individual is an FBI National Academy graduate or is prevaricating, or may be a graduate whose name was removed from the Directory for misconduct.
2. Many graduates who left law enforcement took better-paying positions in other fields of work and are still good friends and strong supporters of the Bureau. Some of them have inquired as to why their names cannot be listed. They are proud of having their names in the Directory. Some of these people are in a position to be of great help to the Bureau.
3. The policy governing the 1952 edition was enunciated principally because of graduates who went to work with the Office of Price Stabilization. This problem has been greatly diminished and will, in all probability in the near future, be completely eliminated.
4. The system of record keeping at the Bureau is greatly simplified.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Glyde Tolson

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson ✓  
FROM : Executives Conference  
SUBJECT: AUTOMATIC CODING EQUIPMENT DEVICES

DATE: Nov. 19, 1953

~~SECRET~~

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Sizoo  
Miss Gandy

RECEIVED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

On November 18, the Conference, composed of Messrs. Ladd, Glavin, Mohr, Clegg, Tracy, Rosen, Holloman, Belmont and Harbo, was advised that the Army Security Agency is now ready to deliver us 120 automatic coding machines by the end of this calendar year. It will be recalled that the Bureau placed an order for 120 cipher machines of the AFSAM-7 type in 1951 and that \$258,900 of our 1952 appropriation was earmarked to pay for the equipment. However, as a result of rising production costs, we are now advised that the total cost of the 120 units will be \$299,232.10, which is \$40,332.10 in excess of the amount previously earmarked. (S)

Mr. Glavin has advised that there is a balance of uncommitted funds in our 1952 monies which could be allotted to take care of the \$40,332.10 so that our 1952 appropriation will take care of the full payment of \$299,232.10 now required to pay for the 120 cipher machines. (S)

The Conference unanimously recommends, in view of the foregoing, that we advise the Army Security Agency we are ready to accept delivery of the 120 cipher machines and related accessories between now and December 31, as they have proposed. (S)

1 - Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Glavin

*FY 1952 funds  
mail to pay for  
aria will light up  
mail 11/23*

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 80-749-112

# Office Memorandum

TO : MR. R. T. HARBO *RE*

DATE: December 7, 1953

FROM : C. F. DOWNING

SUBJECT: AUTOMATIC CODING EQUIPMENT

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Nease
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

As you know, the Bureau has been using cipher machines in twenty of its offices for the past two years. This equipment was loaned to us by the National Security Agency, and we have been following the basic security requirements in maintenance and operation of this equipment. It has been necessary to see that the equipment was so maintained within the offices that it would be protected from compromise by inspection, copying, theft, capture or salvage. The fact that we were using equipment that would do this work was not to be known to any unauthorized person.

A new machine known as the AFSAM-7 has been developed by NSA, and the Bureau is purchasing 120 of these machines. The AFSAM-7 will be used by the Bureau, the State Department, CIA, and the Armed Forces. Security requirements permit use of this machine in areas where it was not possible to take other automatic coding equipment, but NSA requirements of the services are that the equipment must be given maximum security possible under the circumstances to prevent unauthorized viewing and physical access.

In order to achieve maximum security in each office, the attached letter to all SAC's has been prepared, outlining the proposed and stating specific security requirements that must be met in the maintenance of this equipment. As replies from the field are received, they will be evaluated and any changes necessary in their plans will be furnished them at the time the machines are sent to them.

### RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached SAC letter be forwarded.

ADDENDUM: *12-14-53, R. T. Harbo: [unclear], Favorably recommended by Executives Conference, 12-14-53, Messrs. Ladd, Tracy, Trotter, Belmont, Tamm, Nichols, Rosen, and Harbo.*

Attachment

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# Special Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. T. HARBO *RT*

DATE: December 9, 1953

FROM : C. F. DOWNING

SUBJECT: AUTOMATIC CODING EQUIPMENT

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Sizoo
- Miss Gandy

As you were advised previously, on 12-8-53 we received twenty AFSAM-7 cipher machines from the Army Security Agency and it is anticipated that one hundred more machines of this type will be received prior to 1-1-54.

In connection with the distribution of this equipment to the field it is proposed that we ship two machines to each office, in alphabetical order, as the machines are received from NSA.

The order in which machines are shipped to the various offices would appear to be immaterial since it will be at least several weeks before machine rotors are provided us and a month or more before this equipment can be put into operation. In addition, twenty of our offices handling the largest volume of traffic presently are equipped with and are using cipher machines loaned to us by NSA.

RECOMMENDATION:

That approval be granted for the Cryptanalysis-Translation Section to ship two AFSAM-7 cipher machines to each field division, in alphabetical order, as these machines are received from NSA.

ADDENDUM: (12-14-53 R. T. Harbo/kmb) Favorably recommended by Executives Conference, 12-14-53, Messrs. Ladd, Tracy, Trotter, Belmont, Clegg, Nichols, Rosen, and Harbo.

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DEC 15 1953

*[Handwritten signature]*

THE DIRECTOR

October 14,  
1953

Classified per OGA letter dated 3/15/2012

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION BY THE BUREAU OUTSIDE THE  
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

Safeguarding Official Papers And Records

The Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Ladd, Nichols, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Tracy, Holloman, Gearty and Belmont, on October 14, 1953, considered current policy relative to furnishing information from Bureau files outside of the Executive Departments and made recommendations as to future procedures. As the problem covers a wide area, it is broken down, as set forth below, under separate captions with the Executives' Conference recommendation as to each:

(1) Dissemination Under Program "Responsibilities of the FBI in the Internal Security Field"

Under this program the Bureau volunteers information regarding subjects who are on the Security Index to the Governor of a state, or to a responsible local official, whoever is most appropriate under the circumstances, when the subject is employed in a public utility outside the vital facilities list (dissemination re vital facilities list is made to Armed Forces), or in a public or semi-public organization. In each instance the Bureau specifically passes upon the information to be disseminated; the dissemination is oral; and the field is required to furnish a statement regarding the reliability and discretion of the individual to whom the information is to be given before authority is granted.

The "Responsibilities Program" was initiated as a result of the conference on February 12, 1951, between the Director and a Committee of Governors appointed by the Executive Committee of the Governors' Conference. The Committee was designated to come to Washington for the purpose of developing greater coordination in the field of internal security between the state and Federal governments.

The basis for the Bureau's present policy under this Program is a memorandum dated February 13, 1951, which points out that if we consider the fact that the Bureau is responsible for the internal security of the country as a whole and that public utilities, public organizations and semi-public organizations are serving large portions of the people, it is plain

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
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- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
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- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

BEYOND FOR EXEMPTION  
EXEMPTED BY  
Clegg  
Tracy

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~~DECLASSIFICATION~~

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2333/ML  
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 3/13/89

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF DATE 9/19/79 GAS/RLP~~

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CLASS BY SP4 dw/ahr

DATE OF REVIEW 11/6/82

# 211,796

11/6/82

AP/CA/CAF  
# 325,013

8/19/92

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that we have a responsibility for the protection of the facilities when we have information of a subversive nature affecting them. The memorandum points out that our responsibility is to the people and, therefore, the recipient of any information we may furnish should be the state or local governor, or police department, representing the people. This was discussed at Executives' Conference on February 16, 1951, and instructions were sent to the field by SAC Letter #19 dated February 17, 1951. The field was instructed that local conditions would govern the selection of the agency to which the information was to be volunteered; in some instances it would be advisable to furnish information to the governor, and in others, more advisable to deal directly with some local official with whom the field office had excellent relations and whose discretion had been established, such as the Chief of Police or Mayor.

Under this Program the Bureau has disseminated information regarding subjects of Security Index cards to a large number of state and local officials. Our requests that the relationship be kept confidential have been honored in nearly all cases. However, the City Manager of Cincinnati, Wilbur R. Kellogg, to whom we recently volunteered information in confidence regarding an employee of the City of Cincinnati, revealed to the press under political pressure that the Bureau was his source of information. There have been one or two other instances wherein it was indicated that a confidential arrangement in furnishing this information was abused, but not as flagrant as in the case of Mr. Kellogg. In each instance where our confidence is abused, a question is, of course, raised regarding our standard claim that the files of the FBI are confidential.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously felt that the advantages of disseminating information under this program outweigh the disadvantages and that the Bureau under this program is meeting a responsibility to the people of this country. The Conference felt further that this program is the Bureau's answer to any claims by state or local officials that the Bureau is not cooperating in the security field. The Conference unanimously felt that dissemination should continue to be restricted to Security Index subjects and that we should not volunteer information regarding individuals not

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

on the Security Index. Any exceptions to this rule should be most carefully considered. The Conference vote was split as to the method of dissemination:

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Messrs. Ladd, Gearty, Holloman and Belmont recommended that hereafter dissemination under this program should be made confidentially to the state governor, or in his absence or if reason exists why it should not be furnished to the governor, to another responsible state official recommended by the field office. If a good reason exists why the information cannot be given to the governor or state official, we can then consider as an exception furnishing the information to a reliable local official. This procedure would have the effect of keeping our dissemination on a high state level and restricting dissemination to 48 states, rather than to numerous local officials.

Messrs. Harbo, Glavin, Nichols, Clegg and Tracy recommended that we continue as under our current policy, i.e., that the information be disseminated to the governor of the state or other state official, or to a responsible local official or chief of police, whoever is the most appropriate under the circumstances, with the understanding in each case that the information is furnished confidentially. They pointed out that if we restrict dissemination to the state level, the governor will have to pass the information along to local officials who can take action and, consequently, more persons than absolutely necessary will be cognizant of the dissemination by the Bureau. They felt that local officials will honor the confidential nature of the information to a greater degree if the Bureau deals directly with them.

(2) Name Checks for State Governors

As a result of the conference on February 12, 1951, with representatives of the Governors' Conference, they were advised that if the governors desired information concerning an individual to be appointed to a state government office, the Bureau would furnish information to that governor in response to his request. We have provided information to several state governors including Governor Warren, Governor Fine and others. Recently, we discontinued information to Governor Fine.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that we continue to accept such requests from governors and confine our name checks to requests re persons being considered for appointment to a state government position and that the material furnished should be public source material. Each request will be considered on its merits and if a reason exists why the information should not be furnished, the request will, of course, not be honored.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

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(3) Red Cross

On January 14, 1943, Ugo Carusi, then Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, recommended to the Director that the FBI furnish to the American National Red Cross memoranda in response to their requests for name checks. We have made name checks for the Red Cross since that time, but do not furnish them the results of loyalty investigations. Because of their close association with the defense effort and the fact that the President of the United States is the honorary head of the American Red Cross, it has generally been regarded as a quasi governmental agency.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Conference unanimously recommended that we continue to make name checks for the Red Cross.

(4) Police Departments

Section 5D2a of the Manual of Rules and Regulations provides that upon receipt of a specific request for information, a field office may furnish information of a public source nature relating to subversive matters by blind memorandum to proper representatives of local and state law enforcement agencies. The Bureau's identity as source must be kept confidential.

Since July 27, 1950, the Bureau has processed names of applicants of the Metropolitan Police Department in view of the Director's opinion that the Metropolitan Police Department is semi-Federal, inasmuch as it polices the Nation's Capital.

The New York Office makes name checks of probationary patrolmen of the New York City Police Department with Bureau authority.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference recommended that we continue our policy, as set forth above, regarding Police Departments.

(5) General Accounting Office; Government Printing Office;  
Library of Congress

Employees of these agencies are processed under Executive Order 10450 (Employees' Security Program) by Departmental authorization. Our investigative reports are furnished to these agencies through Civil Service Commission. These agencies occasionally submit names of persons who may have access to restricted areas or information to the Bureau for name checks.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended we continue these investigations and name checks.

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
(6) Foreign Intelligence Agencies and Foreign Police Agencies:

We have disseminated security information for a number of years to [redacted] the [redacted] and on a lesser basis to the Director General of Security in [redacted] on a reciprocal basis. This practice resulted through our close liaison maintained with [redacted] particularly and because of the large number of security matters of interest to the Bureau which have ramifications in the [redacted].

In addition to the information which the Bureau disseminates directly to these foreign intelligence agencies, other security information is made available to the intelligence and security services of the countries which are members [redacted].

The Bureau, as the [redacted] furnishes security data of a general nature as a part of our work as participants on this committee. We also have been making name checks for the Security Officer [redacted] in Washington, D. C., on replacement personnel who have resided in the United States an y length of time. (S) (S)

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b1  
 b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)

For a number of years the Bureau has disseminated information generally on criminal matters, particularly data from Identification Division records, to foreign police agencies on the same basis as such information is furnished to agencies in [redacted]

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

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the United States. This practice resulted from the relationships which we developed with foreign police agencies while the Bureau was a member of the International Criminal Police Commission and because it furthers the cooperation afforded the Bureau's representatives stationed abroad when contacting these agencies with regard to Bureau investigative matters having foreign ramifications. (S)

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that we continue the above policies as set forth.

(7) U. S. Courts.

We have received requests from time to time from Judges, including former Chief Justice Fred Vinson and Justice Tom Clark, for information from our files generally in connection with individuals they plan to employ in their offices. In such instances appropriate information has been furnished to these officials without obtaining Departmental approval.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that we continue handling these requests as in the past.

(8) Sex Deviates.

Memorandum for Bureau Officials and Supervisors of June 20, 1951, set forth a uniform policy for furnishing information concerning allegations concerning present and past employees of any branch of the United States Government. In addition to specific instructions for furnishing information to the Executive Branch, specific individuals were designated to receive this type of information in the Legislative Branch, i.e., the United States Senate, the Botanical Gardens, the Library of Congress, the House of Representatives, General Accounting Office, and Government Printing Office. A specified individual was designated to receive information concerning sex deviates among employees of the Judicial Branch of the Government. In the past since the designation of this policy, dissemination has been made in accordance with the policy set forth.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

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Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that we continue our policy in connection with the dissemination of information on sex deviates.

(9) Other Individuals.

The general rule followed when requests are received for information from Bureau files from other individuals outside the Executive Branch of the Federal Government is to advise them that we are unable to assist in view of the confidential nature of FBI files and that we are not permitted to release such information except upon the expressed direction of the Attorney General. All requests of this type are individually considered and information is furnished where the best interests of the Bureau would be served after approval is given by responsible Bureau officials. Among the individuals who have been furnished information are members of the new Administration who were furnished information from our files prior to the change in Administration, ex-President Herbert Hoover, a Commissioner of Municipal Civil Service Commission in New York City, and the Department of Welfare in New York City.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that we continue our rule that the files of the Bureau are confidential and that any exceptions to this rule must be most carefully considered.

(10) Bar Associations.

From time to time the Bureau has extended assistance to Bar Associations in selected situations when to do so appeared to be in the public interest. In several districts inquiries have been received from time to time regarding applicants to the Bar and information has been furnished on a confidential basis. In addition, requests have been received regarding disbarment proceedings, such as the current case involving attorney Emanuel Bloch in NY.

Executives' Conference Recommendation: The Conference unanimously recommended that we stop furnishing information to the Bar Associations in view of the fact that it appears from Mr. Nichols' memo of October 13, 1953, that the National Conference of Bar Examiners in Denver may have been abusing our confidence by advising that we have been furnishing information. Relative to disbarment proceedings, the Conference felt that each instance should be considered on the merits of the case. For example, in the case of Emanuel Bloch, it is to the public interest that the Bureau furnish such information as is possible.

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Ladd  
Belmont  
Clegg  
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Nichols  
Gandy  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Tolson  
Miss Gandy

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DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

Mr. Nichols presented to the Conference the matter of furnishing information to Congressional Committees. It was pointed out that we had furnished information to the following Congressional Committees:

- Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
- Senate Appropriations Committee
- Senate Armed Services Committee
- Preparedness Subcommittee to the Senate Armed Services Committee
- House Committee on Un-American Activities
- Senate Judiciary Committee
- House Judiciary Committee
- Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
- Subcommittee on Labor Management Relations of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee--relations with Senator Wiley

We have furnished information to the Senate Investigating Committee up until the late Summer when the Committee appointed former Special Agent Carr as Staff Director. Since then no information has been furnished to this Committee.

It was further pointed out that there may have been some isolated requests from other Committees and there have been requests from Committees which are no longer functioning such as the Select Committee to Investigate Foundations (the old Cox Committee in the House). It was pointed out that as a matter of present relations, the Senate Internal Security Committee is the only Committee on which there is a continuing program of cooperation which was established by the Attorney General personally on March 15, 1951. Following the advent of the new Administration, this relationship has been continued.

It was the unanimous recommendation of Messrs. Ladd, Holloman, Belmont, Gearty, Clegg, Harbo and Nichols there be no change in relationship with the Internal Security Committee. Mr. Clegg pointed out that considerable good has come from the Bureau from a reliable relationship with the Senate.

Those members of the Conference present also unanimously recommended that there be no change in the relations with the Senate and House Appropriations Committees and the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. Of course the cooperation extended the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is pursuant to the law.

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The Conference was unanimous, however, in recommending that requests from all other Committees be referred to the Department, which has been the traditional manner of responding to Congressional requests.

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The Conference felt that the relationship with the Appropriations Committee was a little different inasmuch as the broad overall authority of the Appropriations Committees was different than that of any other Committee of Congress. The same reasoning was advanced with reference to the Judiciary Committee which has the overall supervision of the Department incomes.

#### INVESTIGATION OF APPLICANTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES:

On March 9, 1953, Mr. Rogers established as a matter of Departmental policy that the Bureau would continue to make applicant investigations for the following Committees of the House and the Senate:

1. Judiciary Committees
2. Appropriations Committees
3. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
4. Armed Services Committee
5. Foreign Relations Committee

The Conference was unanimous in recommending no change in this proceeding.

#### REQUEST FOR NAME CHECKS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEES:

The Conference was unanimous in recommending a continuation of our present procedure which is pretty much that of handling each request on an individual basis. Requests fall in the following categories:

- a. Where a Member of Congress requests background on a former employee, the service record is now furnished.
- b. Requests for name checks on individuals previously investigated by the Bureau for other Government agencies. At the present time there is no question about replying to such requests for the 5 Committees for whom we make applicant investigations. Others are handled on an individual basis.

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The Conference recommended no change on handling the name check requests.

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Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

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MR. TOLSON

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

March 30, 1954

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE~~

~~8-78-C2-5254-  
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The Executives' Conference consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Glavin, Harbo, Rosen, Parsons for Tamm, Tracy, Mohr, Holloman and Belmont, on March 30, 1954, considered whether the Bureau should represent the United States Government in a forthcoming Nato Special Committee Conference in Paris, France, April 27 to 29, 1954.

The NATO Special Committee Conference is a part of NATO. The Bureau has served as U.S. delegate, with CIA as observer and Department of State as adviser, during the two conferences held to date, namely, March, 1953 and September, 1953. The Bureau submitted to the conferences reports on subversive and espionage activities in the United States. The delegates of the other thirteen nations likewise submitted oral and/or written reports on subversive activities in their respective countries. The information submitted by the other countries was helpful but did not add substantially to our sources of information, with the possible exception of Iceland and the Netherlands. At the second conference some intelligence data were exchanged, particularly espionage data regarding Norwegian seamen from the Norwegian delegate.

The third NATO conference is to be held April 27-29, 1954. The State Department has informally requested the FBI to continue to represent the United States. The subject matter to be covered pertains to subversive and espionage activities in the various countries. The State Department will formally by letter request us to attend and name us as U.S. delegate if we informally advise State we will attend.

Arguments Against Bureau Participation

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- (1) The security of the conference is still questionable. Therefore, we can submit to it only public source information.
- (2) We are not in a position to completely block decisions made by the Committee which may be objectionable, nor to control the ultimate distribution of our information.
- (3) The Bureau's name and reputation are being loaned to an international organization which might possibly take advantage of this fact.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SENT DIRECTOR

cc - Mr. Mohr  
MAY 1 1954  
Mr. [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

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(4) The value of data received by us so far is that it is considered to be good summaries but contains little new intelligence data. (S) (U)

(5) There is considerable cost and the time of one Bureau representative is involved. (S) (U)

(6) CIA will undoubtedly continue as an observer and other United States Government agencies may attempt "to get into the act." (S) (U)

(7) The over-all security of NATO countries is not a Bureau responsibility; it is in the main a political and military alliance. (S) (U)

Arguments for Bureau Participation:

(1) We are put in liaison contact with eleven Western European countries. (S) (U)

(2) The Committee is considered permanent and the FBI would have to supply information to the U.S. delegate if the delegate were a representative of another United States agency. The delegate would probably be CIA. We would thus have to do the work but would not be represented. (S) (U)

(3) We have a definite interest in world-wide Communism and are interested in internal security problems in these other countries. (S) (U)

(4) Participation by the Bureau enhances the prestige of the Bureau. (S) (U)

(5) Bureau participation will unquestionably promote the common welfare of the U.S. Government through the strengthening of the NATO organization. (S) (U)

(6) We did get some positive intelligence during the last conference, that is, information regarding Norwegian seamen acting as espionage agents. (S) (U)

(7) Contacts with our counterpart agencies in the NATO countries through this conference will probably increase in value as our liaison with them builds up through further attendance. (S) (U)

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FOLSON

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Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that we indicate to the State Department that we will accept the formal invitation to attend the conference in Paris at the end of April. The Conference felt that as the matters to be discussed at the NATO Conference deal with internal security and subversive problems in the various countries, it is important that we participate in order that we will continue to gather information of interest to us; in order that we can control in so far as possible the action taken by the conference within our field of jurisdiction; and because we would have to provide the information for the conference whether or not we attend. (S) (U)

If you approve, Mr. Roach of the Liaison Section will indicate to the State Department that we will accept the formal invitation and Roach will be designated as the Bureau representative.

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE DIRECTOR

JUN 10, 1954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE~~

~~PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES  
IN NORWAY, ITALY, JAPAN, AND  
AUSTRALIA~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

*John*  
The Executives' Conference on May 18, 1952, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Holloman, Harbo, Underhill for Egan, Boardman, Mohr, Tamm, Sizoo, Callahan for Glavin, Nichols, and Belmont, considered the desirability of establishing legal attaché offices in Norway, Italy, Japan, and Australia.

During the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Conference in Paris, representatives of the [redacted] and [redacted] indicated to Special Agent Ralph E. Beach the desirability of the Bureau establishing representatives in [redacted] and [redacted]. Because of the current trend of Chinese aggression and espionage operations in this country, it was considered desirable to determine whether the Bureau would be warranted in locating a Bureau representative in the Far East. See forth below under individual captions are comments on each of the countries involved.

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Norway

During the April, 1952, NATO Conference in Paris,

[redacted]

In 1950 a Soviet spy ring was exposed in Sweden and in 1954 a Soviet espionage group was arrested in Norway. The Bureau had to depend on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for information concerning both espionage operations and in the case of Sweden the Bureau's reactions were not satisfactorily answered. In the Norway case CIA failed to notify the Bureau until after the case was publicized. Norway is a member of NATO and is strategically located with respect to U.S.S.R. Sweden is a point of departure for Soviet diplomatic

AHB:egm

cc - Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr

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personnel and espionage agents to the western hemisphere. The Bureau enjoys friendly relations with police authorities in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. During the period January 1, 1953, through March 31, 1954, Bureau directed 100 leads in Scandinavian countries to the Department of State and CIA. Coverage afforded leads was, for the most part, incomplete and delayed. It is reasonable to assume that by not having on-the-scene coverage the Bureau is undoubtedly not being fully advised of matters of interest developed in the Scandinavian countries. It appears there is sufficient work in the Scandinavian countries to keep a Bureau Agent busy and considering that the area occupied by the four countries is not large and travel facilities are excellent, it is believed that the establishment of an office in Norway with coverage of leads in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland on a road-trip basis would be of benefit to the Bureau. (X)

Executive Conference Recommendation

Messers, Tolson, Holloman, Harbo, Mohr, Tamm, Callahan, and Nichols recommended against the establishment of a Legal Attache's office at Oslo, Norway, on the basis that additional Legal Attache's offices merely extend the area of our conflict of jurisdiction with CIA; that CIA has millions of dollars allotted to it for the purpose of covering intelligence activities in foreign countries and the Bureau could not hope to handle such responsibilities within the scope of its operations budget. They felt that the fact that CIA does not produce good results is not a reason for the Bureau to step into the picture. They felt that the establishment of a Legal Attache's office is a costly procedure for which we cannot be reimbursed. They felt that inasmuch as the Bureau had been thrown out of foreign intelligence activities and Congress had seen fit to give jurisdiction to CIA that CIA, therefore, should carry the responsibility for the program. (X) (U)

Messers, Tinsford, Boardman, Sizoo, and Belmont recommended the establishment of a Legal Attache's office in Oslo, Norway. They felt that our present system of Legal Attache's offices has produced valuable information and protection to the Bureau and to the internal security of this country through providing intelligence information affecting our internal security which we do not otherwise secure and through giving us a channel (X)

I share this view. Let us see how we do in Italy + Japan + then re-evaluate Norway. H.

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
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whereby we can get speedy and accurate answers to our problems. It was their feeling that unless we have channels through our legal Attaches which will provide us with prompt and accurate intelligence information we cannot properly carry out our internal security responsibilities. They felt that due to the strategic location of the Scandinavian countries we should establish a Legal Attache's office there. (U)

Italy

During the April, 1954, NATO Conference in Paris,



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The Communist Party in Italy has 2,000,000 registered members with the result that there is wide-spread infiltration in labor and industry and United States Government off-shore procurement contracts for defense material in Italy are subject to scrutiny of Soviet sympathizers who are in a position to acquire information directly relating to US national defense. Moreover, in view of the large Communist Party membership in Italy it can be assumed that Russia is taking advantage of same to recruit members for espionage and subversive activities in Italy, elsewhere in Europe, and in the United States. Communists have established Italian cover firms principally of export-import-type, which, in addition to supplying income for the Party, provide channels for intelligence purposes and permit access to material in world markets of value to Soviets. During the period January 1, 1953, through March 31, 1954, the Bureau directed to the Department of State and CIA leads in 110 cases for coverage in Italy. CIA results were (U)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

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"very poor" and the responses of the Department of State were, for the most part, incomplete and delayed. In addition to the numerous security matters, we also have a considerable number of criminal cases necessitating investigation in that country. By not being represented in Italy the Bureau must necessarily rely on other agency coverage; the results of which have been unsatisfactory. In addition, by not being on the scene the Bureau is undoubtedly missing a lot of otherwise available information which other agencies, not having the best interest of the Bureau in mind, do not recognize and make available to us. A Bureau representative stationed in Rome would have the benefit of Vatican contacts who have assured the Bureau of their desire to cooperate; would have access to numerous sources and contacts of the existing Legal Attache's office in Paris, Madrid, and other European countries and would be in liaison with official US and Italian Government agencies. (U)

Executive Conference Recommendation

Wheeler, Tolson, Holloman, Harbo, Mohr, and Callahan recommended against the establishment of a Legal Attache's office in Italy on the same grounds set forth under Norway.

Wheeler, Winterrowd, Boardman, Tamm, Sizoo, Nichols, and Belmont recommended favorably toward the establishment of a Legal Attache's office in Rome, pointing out that Italy is a strategic country both from the viewpoint of Soviet activities and location, and would afford excellent possibilities for the securing of valuable intelligence information. (U)

*I share the view.*

Far East

The intelligence potential of Communist China is of immediate and significant concern to the Bureau. At the present time there are in the United States thousands of easily intimidated and coerced "Overseas" Chinese having relatives in China; there are approximately 5,000 Chinese students in the United States who are receiving technical and scientific training; approximately (U)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

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6,000 Chinese claiming US citizenship entered the United States during 1945-1953 and the State Department suspects that many of them presented fraudulent documents readily procurable in Hong Kong attesting to their right to claim US citizenship; Chinese Communist propaganda directed against the United States is being managed by Chinese formerly prominent in the United States who have US contacts; many welfare and relief organizations as well as financial and other commercial institutions in the United States are affiliated with Chinese companies. Available information indicates that Communist Chinese attach considerable importance to "Overseas" Chinese and it is reasonable to presume that a fifth column is in process of formation. ~~(S)~~ (U)

The Bureau has experienced great difficulties in effecting coverage of leads in Chinese security cases in view of the problem involved in dealing with the Oriental mind and in having to depend on the Department of State and CIA for coverage of foreign leads. Approximately fifty per cent of the Chinese security cases presently being handled in the Espionage Section have ramifications in Hong Kong and the efforts of other US agencies to supply the Bureau with the necessary information in these cases have contributed very little. In an effort to increase coverage, arrangements were made with  to handle Bureau leads in the Far East but again the results were unsatisfactory. The net result is that the Bureau's program in so far as Chinese Communist cases are concerned is suffering for lack of suitable coverage and in consideration thereof it was felt that consideration should be given to the best matter of effecting suitable coverage. It was considered that the best possibility would be the establishment of a Legal Attache office in logical countries in the Far East, and Formosa, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Japan, and Australia were considered. It was felt that the two countries which would best lend themselves to an effective Bureau program were Japan and Australia. ~~(S)~~ (U) b7D

Japan

Japan is a key factor in US military operations in the Pacific and it is strategically located with respect to Communism. ~~(S)~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

China. Historically the Japanese have had an interest in China and it is reasonable to assume that the Japanese, who are experienced intelligence operators have taken steps to penetrate Communist China with the motive of protecting their own national interests. Present indications are that the Japanese are reinvigorating their intelligence operations and it would appear these operations would be a valuable source for the Bureau to tap. The Bureau enjoys amiable relations with various Japanese police and intelligence organizations and if proper liaison were established with the pertinent Japanese agencies of this type that source of coverage, together with the assistance of other US agencies operating in the Far East, would be of material benefit to the Bureau. (U)

Executive Conference Recommendation


McCord, Tolson, Holloman, Mohr, and Callahan recommended unfavorably to the establishment of a Legal Attache's office in Tokyo, Japan, for the same reasons as set forth under Norway.

11 McCord, Harbo, Winterrowd, Boardman, Tamm, Sizoo, Nichols, and Belmont recommended favorably toward the establishment of a Legal Attache's office in Tokyo, in view of the fact that the Bureau has no Legal Attache's office anywhere in the Far East at the present time and it is imperative that we secure intelligence data from that area. (U)

*Hayes H.*

Australia

Australia and New Zealand are strategically located with respect to Communist China and it is reasonable to presume that the Communists consider Australia, particularly, a prime intelligence target. In this respect mention should be made of the recent detection of Vladimir Mikhailovitch Petrov and his wife, Third Secretary and Code Clerk, respectively, in the Soviet Embassy in Canberra. According to press stories, Petrov had furnished considerable information relative to Soviet intelligence



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At the time the Petrus case arose, CIA had no personnel located in Australia who were in direct [REDACTED] and little or no information concerning Soviet activities in that country had been made available by [REDACTED]. The Bureau has communicated closely [REDACTED]

Bureau representatives. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Executive's Conference Recommendations

The Executive's Conference was unanimous in recommending against the establishment of a Legal Attache's office in Australia at this time. Part of the Conference based their objection on the reasons set forth under Norway. The remainder based their recommendation on the basis that Bureau on-the-scene coverage does not appear to be sufficiently compelling at this time. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Mr. Tolson also felt that whenever CIA fails to furnish information that the Bureau is entitled to have reflecting foreign intelligence pertinent to our internal security whether it is the result of their inability to produce or their failure to disseminate to us, we should go on record with CIA regarding their failure to keep us advised. We are doing this as a matter of policy at the present time, however, instructions will be reiterated to insure that it is done in all instances. ~~(S)~~ (U)

I agree H.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

Inasmuch as the majority of the members of the Executives' Conference recommended the establishment of Legal Attaches' offices in Tokyo, Japan, and Rome, Italy, and in the event you agree, the matter of establishing Bureau representatives in those two locations will be discussed with the Department of State.


OK  
H.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)



~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 29, 1954

Mr. Tolson

The Executives Conference

8/12/92 # 323075  
Classified by [signature]  
Declassify on: OADR

per OGA letter dated  
3/2012

On June 28 the Conference consisting of Messrs. Nichols, Mason, Rosen, Boardman, Belmont, Sizoo, Q. Tamm, Mohr and Parsons considered the problem of training selected field Agents in confidential techniques which would assist in obtaining valuable intelligence information from [confidential anonymous sources.] (U)

At the most recent Security-Espionage Conference, which was held in March of this year, several offices expressed a desire for specialized technical training which would assist in the difficult problem of obtaining information from anonymous confidential sources. Subsequent thereto other field offices have made similar requests and the Domestic Intelligence Division requested that the Laboratory study the problem and explore the possibility of holding a school for this specific purpose. (U)

The Conference was advised that the Laboratory has studied the problem and is in a position to give a two-week training course to carefully selected Agents, the training course to consist exclusively of lock studies, chamfering and opening sealed letters, [redacted] packages, evaluating [redacted] radio and sound problems including burglar alarms and special photographic techniques. To be most productive the classes should be restricted to eight men in each class. It was pointed out that within the last year because of pressing problems a portion of such training has been given to selected Agents in the New York and Washington Field Divisions. (U) RECORDED - 56 INDEXED - 56 66-2554-11531

Mr. Belmont pointed out that the anonymous sources are furnishing some of the most valuable intelligence information and the Bureau has encouraged the careful exploration of this possibility particularly with reference to Communist matters, Communist fugitives and the [redacted] which is of value not only to the Bureau but to other agencies. Belmont pointed out the value of this type of effort on the West coast leading to the apprehension of Steinberg and Thompson. (U)

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

1 - Mr. Sizoo  
1 - Mr. Harbo  
I agree, but the agents will have to be carefully selected. This is most important. H

53 JUL 1 1954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

Memorandum for Mr. Tolson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

It is proposed to hold four classes of eight men each for a total of thirty-two Agents who are to be carefully selected from experienced, loyal career Agents. No SAC Letter will be prepared but the matter will be orally discussed with the Agents in Charge of the most important offices from a security standpoint in selecting the best men for this training and no notes will be taken or any of the training material put into writing. ~~(S)~~ (U)

The Conference unanimously recommends approval to hold four classes of two weeks each to train a total of thirty-two men in the confidential techniques for developing [anonymous sources] of information. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1  
b3 CIA Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C., Section 403  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT Per OGA letter dated 7/7/2011  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The Director

8/11/92


11/19/54

The Executives Conference

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SP5CE/JS FOIA # 323,013  
Info classified by OADR  
per OGA let dated 2/18/05, 4/7/05

~~FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY RETRAINING SESSIONS~~

For the past several years the last two weeks of each National Academy session is devoted to specialized training in selected subjects, and former graduates in good standing who are active in law enforcement are invited to return, and during the 54th Session (concluded 11/19/54) 9 former graduates returned. In each instance they communicated directly with the Bureau indicating their intent to return and their communication was acknowledged in a cordial manner.



On 11/18/54 the Conference, composed of Messrs. Tolson, Holloman, Rosen, Parsons, Tamm, Mohr, Henrich and Harbo, considered ways and means to prevent a recurrence of such an incident.

The Conference was in agreement that the only way in which it would be possible to absolutely guarantee against the possibility of any recurrence would be to discontinue having graduates come back to participate in specialized training sessions. The Conference was advised that at present notices are sent through the National Academy News Letter to all graduates in good standing indicating the dates of the retraining session and incorporating a form which they can fill out and send to the Bureau indicating their desire to attend. The procedure proposed for consideration by the Training Division involves the following steps:

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
  - Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
  - Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
  - Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
  - Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
  - Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
  - Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
  - Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
  - Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
  - Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
  - Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
  - Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
  - Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
  - Gandy \_\_\_\_\_
1. The notice sent to former graduates would be on a separate sheet of paper and although mailed with the News Letter, would be limited to those graduates who, according to our records, are active in law enforcement and thus prima facie eligible to return to the National Academy retraining session. The distribution of these notices would be limited to those \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment cc - Mr. Sizoo Mr. Harbo

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b1

b3 CIA Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C., Section 403

b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i) (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

graduates in the continental United States, its territories and possessions and those graduates in Canada law enforcement. Specifically we would not send such notices to graduates who are stationed with the Armed Services outside of the United States

(C)

2. Graduates desiring to attend the retraining session would be instructed via the routine notice to notify the SAC covering their territory rather than the Seat of Government of the FBI. Instructions would be issued to all SACs that they are to ascertain and certify to the Bureau that the applicant is still eligible to attend retraining sessions of the National Academy, that there is no derogatory information which has come to their attention since he was initially investigated prior to attendance in the National Academy. The SAC would be required to recommend either that he be allowed to attend or that he not be accepted, in the latter event stating fully his reasons.

For use in notifying the SAC of his desire to return to a retraining session in Washington, the National Academy graduate would be furnished with a form, a tentative copy of which is attached hereto, which would provide for the graduate to in effect apply for permission to attend a designated retraining session. The graduate would be requested to indicate his full name, his present position and title, the name of the law enforcement agency affiliated with and length of service, to indicate any other part-time or full-time employment in or out of law enforcement in which he is engaged at the time he prepares the application. Thereafter the graduate would indicate the specific courses that he desired to take during the retraining period. Immediately preceding his signature would appear a printed statement on the application form to the effect that he understands he will be notified by the Bureau if he is accepted for this retraining session.

3. Although under the Training Division proposal no notification concerning retraining session would be sent to the graduate outside the continental United States, its territories or possessions or Canada, such a graduate could write to the Bureau inquiring concerning retraining and the possibility of attending. It is proposed that in each such instance, we would make inquiry through Liaison and any other channel available to establish the true status, affiliation and assignments of the graduate applying for permission to attend and each such

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 06-08-2011

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

Per OGA letter dated 5/16/2011

Mr. C. A. Tolson

June 22, 1955

The Executives' Conference

306, 446 & 323, 013  
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DATE 2/19/92 BY SP-5 CUD/ef


PLANT INFORMANT PROGRAM

On June 21, 1955, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Belmont, Harbo, Rosen, Parsons, Tamm, Sizoo and Callahan for Mohr, considered the Bureau's policy in connection with the Plant Informant Program.

BACKGROUND:

At the outbreak of the Korean conflict the Executives' Conference on July 13, 1950, recommended the reinstitution of the Plant Informant Program and as of March 20, 1954, we had developed 105,708 informants in 9391 plants. These plants are divided into five categories as follows:

- (1) Facilities on the Key Facilities List. This is the group of plants designated by the Department of Defense as vital to the national defense of this country.
- (2) Atomic Energy facilities. This list is compiled by the Atomic Energy Commission of plants engaged in some type of Atomic Energy work.



(S)

b1  
b3 50 U.S.C. Section 3024 (i) (1)

- (4) Facilities considered vital by local Army area and Naval district commanders.
- (5) Facilities considered vital by the individual Special Agents in Charge of FBI offices.

ew

On August 12, 1954, the Executives' Conference considered the scope of our Plant Informant Program as it then existed. Inasmuch as it was thought that agents' time could

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

cc - Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Rushing

INDEXED - 67

66-2554-12321

RECORDED - 67

12 JUN 23 1955

EX-112

TDR:LFJ

53 JUN 27 1955

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Mr. Tolson

be more productively applied to more pressing matters, the program was curtailed at that time. The field offices were instructed that the development of plant informants in the above categories was to be restricted to the security officer and/or other officials having responsibility for plant protection except in those cases where the SAC felt that this was insufficient to insure the Bureau's responsibility in connection with sabotage, espionage and subversive activities could be fulfilled. The field offices are under instructions to recontact all security officers and/or other officials having responsibility for plant protection at least once each year and to submit a letter to the Bureau on September 15 of each year reporting that this had been done. The first letter from the field will be due September 15, 1955.

The curtailment of the Plant Informant Program in no way affected our program of developing informants in the vicinity of Strategic Air Command Bases of the United States Air Force. As the results of an agreement between the Director and the Secretary of the Air Force, the Bureau since 1950 has engaged in a program of developing informants in the vicinity of those Air Force Bases occupied by the Strategic Air Command. We are still developing informants in connection with this and will continue to do so.

RE-EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM:

The Executives' Conference re-evaluated this problem on June 21, 1955. It does not appear that conditions relative to this program since its curtailment in August 1954 warrant reinstatement of the whole program. However, there are two classes of plants, the loss or severe damage of which would seriously impair our ability to wage war in the event of a national emergency. These are:

I. Class "A" Atomic Energy Commission Facilities.

Defined by Atomic Energy Commission as installation at which:

(a) Stock-pile quantities of separated fissionable materials, essential bomb components, or critical materials are located; or,

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Mr. Tolson

(b) Top Secret documents or material revealing details of a broad phase of the project are located; or,

(c) Uninterrupted operation is vital to the principal mission of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Examples:

(a) Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, an Atomic Energy Commission area operated by the Sandia Corporation engaged in the production of Atomic Energy.

(b) General Electric Company, Schenectady Works, Schenectady, New York, engaged in research and development for the Atomic Energy Commission.

(c) Hanford Works, Richland, Washington, operated by General Electric Company and engaged in production for the Atomic Energy Commission.

II. Designated by the Department of Defense, Category "A" Facilities.

A Category "A" Defense Facility is defined by the Department of Defense as "Indispensable - a facility for which there is no replacement, substitute or alternative, the products or services of which are presently or potentially of highest importance to the nation's capacity for conduct of war; the loss or severe damage of which would cause an unacceptable delay and/or reduction in our ability to wage war, require a national revision in the strategic mobilization and/or military operations plan for war; and/or likely prove adversely decisive with respect to the final outcome of such war." These facilities are concentrated primarily in the Northeast, North Central and Southwest areas of the United States.

Examples:

(a) Aluminum Company of America, Cleveland, Ohio, engaged in production for the Air Force.

(b) Boeing Airplane Company, Seattle, Washington, engaged in guided missile research and aircraft production.

Memorandum for Mr. Tolson

(c) Dow Chemical Company, Midland, Michigan, engaged in production of various type chemicals for use by the military.

We previously had developed informants in the facilities referred to above except for about 26 Class "A" Atomic Energy Commission facilities in which, as a matter of policy, we have never developed informants. These include Atomic Energy Commission Headquarters, Atomic Energy Commission area offices and the National Security Council. Eliminating these, there remain approximately 155 facilities classified as Class "A" by the Atomic Energy Commission or as Category "A" by the Department of Defense.

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that we reinstitute the Plant Informant Program in Class "A" and Category "A" facilities due to the importance of these plants to the security of this country. We would not develop informants in the 26 Class "A" facilities referred to above.

When the Plant Informant Program was curtailed, we never informed interested agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission and branches of the military service that we were curtailing the program; therefore, we can reinstitute it without notifying the interested agencies.

American Legion Contact Program

The American Legion Contact Program was reinstated in August 1950 and curtailed in August 1954 because the Bureau felt that the program had served its purpose. As of March 20, 1954, 16529 active Posts had been contacted by Bureau field offices and in these Posts 111,491 Legionnaires had been developed as contacts. We now require the field to contact annually all National officers, Departmental (state) Officers and members of the American Legion Americanism Commission and advise the Bureau by March 15 of each year that this has been done.

The Executives' Conference considered this program and unanimously recommended against any change in current procedure. The Executives' Conference felt that it was not necessary to reinstitute this program at this time as no apparent problem exists. If in the future problems arise or the need exists to re-emphasize necessity of support from the Legion we can reconsider this matter.

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson  
June 22, 1955

ACTION:

If you approve, the Plant Informant Program will be reinstated on a restricted basis as outlined above and we will, of course, continue the present procedure of maintaining contacts with security officers and/or individuals charged with plant security in all categories.

If you approve, no change will be made with respect to the American Legion Contact Program.

OK  
JK

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *LVB*

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AHB*

SUBJECT: PLANT INFORMANT PROGRAM

*0 EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE*

DATE: September 26  
306,696 & 323,013  
2/14/92 SP. Seider  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/27/85 BY 1145/CAJ/ML

- Tolson ✓
- Boardman ✓
- Nichols ✓
- Belmont ✓
- Mohr ✓
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Sizoo
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

SAC Letter 54-48 dated September 7, 1954, advised the field that the development of plant informants was being restricted to a contact with the security officer and/or other official having the responsibility for plant protection. The field was permitted upon securing Bureau authority in each case to develop plant informants in addition to the security officer when it was felt that this limited coverage would be insufficient. Instructions were issued that on September 15 of each year a letter should be directed to the Bureau advising that all plant informants developed have been recontacted during the past year.

The Manual of Instructions (corrected August 1, 1954) now provides for the development of plant informants in addition to the security officer in those plants designated as Category I in the Department of Defense Key Facilities List and those plants designated as Class A by the Atomic Energy Commission.

Inasmuch as complete plant informant coverage must now be developed in the above plants it is believed desirable for the field to submit more complete reports on the status of the Plant Informant Program in the above plants in order for the Bureau to properly supervise and follow this program.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the field be instructed to submit a semiannual report on March 15 and September 15 of each year on the status of the Plant Informant Program listing by name the plants in which plant informants were developed, the number of employees in the plant, the total number of plant informants developed, and whether the file on this plant is pending or closed.

Attached is a suggested SAC Letter. Also attached is a suggested change for the Manual of Instructions. ~~changes are necessary for the FBI Handbook.~~

RECORDED - INDEXED

- cc - Mr. Boardman
- cc - Mr. Belmont
- cc - Mr. Simpson

70 OCT 4 1955

52 OCT 4 1955

See Appendix on next page.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

FBI - REC'D



Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

ADDENDUM:

September 29, 1955

The Executives Conference consisting of Messrs. Tolson, McGuire for Nichols, Mason, Rosen, Belmont for Boardman, Hennrich for Belmont, Parsons and Tamm on September 29, 1955, unanimously concurred.

RDS:hif

*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

Mr. Tolson

May 3, 1956

The Executives Conference

SECURITY INDEX -  
VERIFICATION OF ADDRESSES  
Bufile 100-358086

PLANT INFORMANT PROGRAM  
Bufile 66-2542-2

AMERICAN LEGION CONTACT PROGRAM  
Bufile 66-9330

323,013  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 2/13/92 BY SP5 ur/dj

On May 2, 1956, the Executives Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Nichols, Boardman, Belmont, Mason, Mohr, Parsons, Trotter, Tamm, Holloman and Nease, considered the question of whether Security Index cases should be opened and assigned for the purpose of verifying addresses of subjects and closed upon such verification.

Present instructions call for verifications of addresses to be handled through administrative ticklers with cases opened only when the subject has moved to an address in another division or his present whereabouts is unknown. This means of handling verifications was inaugurated in 1951, it being felt at that time that a considerable administrative burden would be placed on the field by opening and closing twice a year the then 15,000-plus Security Index cases. Since that time, the Security Index has been reduced to approximately 12,900 names, of which more than 1,000 are key figures and approximately 600 are employed in key facilities. Key-figure and key-facility cases are maintained in a pending inactive status and reports are submitted quarterly and semiannually, respectively. An annual report is now required in all other Security Index cases (approximately 11,300) so that these cases are now opened once a year and verifications of addresses are made at that time. Consequently, the proposal to open cases for verification purposes would mean that approximately 11,300 additional cases will be opened per year as compared to approximately 30,000 which would have been necessary in 1951.

Enclosures

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman cc - Mr. Mason
- Belmont cc - Mr. Nease
- Mason \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr cc - Mr. Boardman
- Parsons cc - Mr. Belmont
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease AHE:pjm
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RECORDED - 13

INDEXED - 13

66-2354-124/50  
MAY 7 1956

MAY 8 1956

EX - 134

Memorandum for Mr. Tolson

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION:

The Executives Conference was unanimous in feeling that, under present conditions, the Security Index cases should be opened for the purpose of verifying addresses of the subjects and closed upon such verifications being accomplished. The administrative burden of opening these cases under today's conditions would be relatively light. It is noted that, in many instances, accomplishment of verifications requires intensive investigation, sometimes even physical surveillances. Therefore, the opening of the cases would more truly reflect the work necessarily being handled by Agents and would present a truer picture of the work load pending in an office.

An SAC Letter and appropriate Manual changes are attached.

The Executives Conference also considered the question of whether files on plants in which plant informants are developed should be opened when recontacts are necessary. These recontacts must be made each six months.

The present procedure requires the development of complete plant informant coverage in plants designated as "Class A" by the Atomic Energy Commission and plants designated as "Category A" in the Key Facilities List. The number of such plants totals approximately 150 and plant informants therein must be recontacted each six months. In all other plants (approximately 8,000), only the security officer of the plant is recontacted and such contacts must be made once each year. Plant informant files are not presently reopened for the purpose of making these recontacts. Such recontacts are made where possible by telephone.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION:

The Executives Conference was unanimous in feeling that the present practice is preferable with respect to the cases in which only the security officer of the plant is recontacted.

Memorandum for Mr. Tolson.

However, in the plants where complete informant coverage is developed (the approximately 150 plants referred to above), it was felt that these cases should be opened at the time recontacts are necessary and closed by a memorandum reflecting that all necessary recontacts have been completed. In such plants, numerous recontacts are required, many of which cannot be made by telephone, and in numerous instances plant informants have moved or resigned and it is necessary to develop additional informant coverage. Opening the cases will more correctly reflect the work necessary to accomplish these recontacts.

An SAC Letter is attached.

The Executives Conference further considered whether cases should be opened under the American Legion Contact Program. Present instructions require that the SAC or ASAC annually contact national officers, state officers and members of the American Legion Americanism Commission, advising the Bureau annually that these contacts have been made.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION:

The Executives Conference unanimously felt that, in the interest of economy and good administration, these files should not be opened on these American Legion contacts, approximately 100 in number. Contacts must be made personally by the SAC or ASAC when the individual officials are available and to open a file would require that the file be maintained in a pending status until all contacts are complete. In some instances, the SAC might have to make a special trip to contact the Legion official to prevent the file from becoming delinquent.

# Memorandum

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DATE 07-20-2012 BY uc/baw 60324



Exec AD Adm. *[initials]*  
 Exec AD Inv. *[initials]*  
 Exec AD LES *[initials]*  
 Asst. Dir.:

- Adm. Servs. *[initials]*
- Crim. *[initials]*
- Ident. *[initials]*
- Insp. *[initials]*
- Intell. *[initials]*
- Lab. *[initials]*
- Legal Coun. *[initials]*
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. *[initials]*
- Rec. Mgnt. *[initials]*
- Tech. Serv. *[initials]*
- Training *[initials]*
- Telephone Rm. *[initials]*
- Director's Sec'y *[initials]*

~~SECRET~~

To : THE DIRECTOR

Date 12/28/81

From : *[Signature]* TEE COLWELL

Subject : ~~EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE RETREAT~~  
12/1-2/81

PURPOSE: To provide the results of deliberations by the two discussion groups at the Executives' Conference Retreat, and to submit recommendations arising from these discussions. (U)

DETAILS: The theme of this year's Executives' Conference Retreat was national security and new investigative initiatives. To focus attention on this theme, a number of related topics were discussed, some of which resulted in specific recommendations. (U)

I. Topical Areas Considered by the Conference

A. Positive Intelligence Collection

It was collectively acknowledged that the FBI has traditionally and with complete justification emphasized counterintelligence in its FCI effort. However, the importance of positive intelligence is recognized and every effort is made to develop such information without sacrificing the FBI's major concern, counterintelligence. Positive intelligence is obtained in three ways:

- (1) As a byproduct of traditional FCI investigations;
- (2) Through tasking by DCI (primarily elsurs);
- (3) Through our support of NSA.

Previously, the FBI was unable to fully develop its potential for positive intelligence because of counterintelligence responsibilities and resource constraints. We were not fully aware of the intelligence community's needs, nor did we receive an adequate assessment of the information we were providing. Our expanded analytical capabilities and increased liaison has improved our position but has also underscored the need for additional effort in developing and disseminating positive intelligence. Obstacles that must

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Classified and Extended by 2  
Reason for Extension FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 (2&3)  
Date of Review for Declassification 12/18/1002

- LC:mfs (4)  
 1 - Mr. Colwell  
 1 - Mr. Mullen  
 1 - Mr. Otto  
 1 - Each Attendee

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Memorandum Colwell to The Director  
Re: Executives' Conference Retreat  
12/1-2/81

be overcome are the lack of qualified translators and the need to upgrade technical capabilities. These problems can be alleviated by increased training, recruitment of qualified linguists, and continued close liaison with the consumers of our intelligence product. Once we have carefully analyzed our resource needs, we should then make a decision toward enhancements. ~~(S)~~


(U)

Currently, we are able to respond to DCI requests which normally occur in short-term crisis situations.

(S)

b1

b3 Public Law 86-36, Section 6



RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the FBI continue to stress counterintelligence as our primary responsibility in FCI investigations. ~~(S)~~

(U)

APPROVED: <i>W</i>	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. <i>FC</i>	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. <i>DM</i>	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES <i>DP</i>	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

(2) That positive intelligence collection as a byproduct of traditional FCI investigations be expanded by enhancing our translation capabilities through the recruitment of qualified linguists and the training of current personnel. ~~(S)~~

(U)

APPROVED: <i>W</i>	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. <i>FC</i>	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. <i>DM</i>	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES <i>DP</i>	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

(3) That FCI policies and operations as a topic for presentation at the Executive Development Institute and SAC Conference be enhanced to provide managers with a better understanding of our FCI effort. ~~(S)~~

(U)

APPROVED: <i>W</i>	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. <i>FC</i>	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. <i>DM</i>	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES <i>DP</i>	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____



~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Colwell to The Director  
Re: Executives' Conference Retreat  
12/1-2/81

B. Technology Transfer

(U) The transfer of technology from the United States to Warsaw Pact countries presents a serious threat to national security. The methods used by Soviet Bloc countries to illicitly acquire our technology involve scientific exchanges, illegal diversions abroad, violation of embargo agreements by allies, and other techniques which transcends the responsibilities of the intelligence community including the FBI. Although the Soviet intelligence system plays a role in technology transfer, the responsibility for tasking and coordination comes from a politburo level agency, the VPK. Other USSR nonintelligence agencies, including those connected with the Scientific Exchange Program, also play a role. Current U.S. counter measures are fragmented and involve 27 different agencies. There is a need, not only to coordinate these efforts, but also to establish a centralized policy-making group with sufficient authority to make decisions involving foreign trade and foreign policy as it relates to technology transfer. ~~(S)~~

(U) Indications are that the American business community is not sufficiently cooperative but becomes so only when their profits are threatened through the transfer of technology relating to research and development. The benefits of legislation calling for tougher sanctions should be explored. ~~(S)~~

(U) The difficulties in keeping advanced technology out of the hands of Warsaw Pact nations once it has been incorporated into commercial products are enormous. Pure scientific research and development information can be more readily protected as it is not available as "shelf items." To have a significant impact in stemming the flow of technology transfer requires a commitment from the Administration's top policy makers. The FBI's major impact, and where we should place our emphasis, is in the area of criminal prosecutions of individuals committing violations falling within our jurisdiction. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

(3)

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Colwell to The Director  
Re: Executives' Conference Retreat  
12/1-2/81

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Director and/or Attorney General be briefed by the Intelligence Division regarding the issues involved in technology transfer, and that he in turn brief the DCI and then the National Security Council in an attempt to surface the issues and focus interest on improving our position. (S)

(U)

APPROVED: *WJW*

Director \_\_\_\_\_

Exec. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_

Exec. AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_

Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Ident. \_\_\_\_\_

Inspection \_\_\_\_\_

Intell. \_\_\_\_\_

Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_

Rec. Mgmt. \_\_\_\_\_

Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_

Training \_\_\_\_\_

C. International Law Enforcement Organizations

The growing interdependence of Nations has also created internationalism in law enforcement matters. The FBI must accept this trend, however, there are alternatives as to which vehicle would best serve our interest in carrying out our international responsibilities. (U)

Our present system of Legal Attaches has been proven to be effective. This liaison is augmented by various bilateral programs developed to address specific needs. The most obvious alternative to this system is membership in an international police organization such as Interpol. The United States is already a member with a number of agencies, including the Department of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service and Drug Enforcement Administration as participants. It is possible that by not joining with these other agencies our prestige could suffer some erosion. (U)

Criticisms of Interpol generally concern the organization's lack of effectiveness. Responses are considered to be very slow and often incomplete. Further, the membership includes countries within the Soviet Bloc and others which are considered to be proponents of terrorism. Finally, current cost estimates indicate that there would be a need for substantial commitment of our resources if we enter into full membership. (U)

Questions relating to membership include:

- (1) Is there a need for increased international involvement on the part of the FBI?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Colwell to The Director  
Re: Executives' Conference Retreat  
12/1-2/81

- (2) If it is decided that we should expand our participation, is Interpol the proper vehicle?
- (3) Should we maintain our current level of involvement with Interpol or should it be reduced or increased?
- (4) What benefits may be derived?
- (5) What would be the impact on our resources?
- (6) What would be the conditions of our involvement? (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That CID and INTD jointly determine the Department of Justice policy and operational relationship with Interpol and, if appropriate, conduct a review of issues connected with the FBI's participation in Interpol. (U)

APPROVED: *WMM*

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

D. Terrorism

One of the central issues raised in discussing terrorism was whether the FBI has taken an overly conservative position in interpreting what authority we have to collect intelligence under the Attorney General's Guidelines for domestic security investigations. The practice of opening criminal cases in instances of where jurisdiction exists for initiating an intelligence investigation may unnecessarily restrict our scope of authority. The need to maintain criminal standards is recognized, however, the FBI's increased analytical capabilities permit us to identify groups that can be targeted for intelligence investigations. (U)

Past interpretations of the domestic security guidelines may have created confusion and in some instances created a reluctance on the part of the Field to conduct investigations. A more definitive interpretation of the guidelines is needed and any problems or issues of clarity should be brought to the attention of the Department of Justice. A more realistic interpretation and additional education and training to insure that the guidelines are fully understood may allow us to more completely accomplish our mission in intelligence collection in domestic terrorism. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Colwell to The Director  
Re: Executives' Conference Retreat  
12/1-2/81

The FBI should be very cautious in giving way to pressures that are building as the results of recent criminal acts by radicals. There is a need for a balanced position that will serve our intelligence requirements without over-reacting to public and political pressure. (U)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Attorney General Guidelines for domestic security investigations be examined by Mr. Hotis and representatives of INTD and CID to determine if they require modification or if they should be more clearly stated. (U)

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Intell. _____	Training _____

(2) Any issues identified through implementation of Recommendation #1 should be brought to the attention of the Department of Justice. (U)

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
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	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Intell. _____	Training _____

E. Tactical Responsibilities of the FBI in Terrorism

The FBI's role in terrorist situations requiring tactical operations was discussed and it was the consensus that we do have a responsibility, however, there are certain limitations that must be recognized. For the FBI to develop even a marginal capability in addressing large-scale terrorist situations would require fiscal resources beyond our means. The U. S. Army's Delta group, which has a substantially different philosophy from ours, may have to assist us in large-scale operations. The factors which dictate that association must be clearly defined. (U)

In order for the FBI to adequately respond to tactical situations, an expanded SWAT capability is required. It was not considered feasible to upgrade SWAT throughout the FBI due to costs and the realization that some SWAT members are not capable of attaining the level

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Memorandum Colwell to The Director  
Re: Executives' Conference Retreat  
12/1-2/81

of competence required. Further, other administrative and investigative commitments would make it virtually impossible to sustain the necessary level of readiness. The best alternative is considered to be a fully developed centralized designated SWAT group as outlined in the 11/17/81 draft report from Mr. Hotis to the Director which was approved subsequent to the Executives' Conference Retreat. Budgeting, training commitments, resource allocation, as well as the effect of the kind of SWAT force envisioned in the study on daily FBI operations in the Washington Field Office were considered. It was recognized that if such a group is established, that SACs requesting its assistance be given on the scene supervisory authority. Further, SACs and their SWAT teams should be given the opportunity to participate with this upgraded team through regular regional SWAT exercises. It should be noted that in most instances existing SWAT teams would be utilized to augment the new group when necessary. (U)

The cost for equipping such a team has not been finalized because a portion of the required items may be available through excess property programs in the Government supply system. There is also a need to resolve issues of communication requirements, and the effect the formulation of such a team will have on the assignment and configuration of WFO personnel as well as transfer and career development policies. (U)

Extensive care must be taken to insure that the group is designed with its primary goal to be the safe release of hostages. Participation must be viewed as simply an additional duty and not as membership in an elitest group. (U)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Consideration be given to establishment of a team on the West Coast, similar to that approved for WFO, once experience has been gained and as finances permit. (U)

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director <i>WAW</i>	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____	
Exec. AD-Adm. <i>PA</i>	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. <i>AM</i>	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES <i>AM</i>	Intell. _____	Training _____

~~SECRET~~  
(7)

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Memorandum Colwell to The Director  
Re: Executives' Conference Retreat  
12/1-2/81

(2) That CID continue to explore what parameters have been established concerning the level of terrorist activity that will trigger the use of military forces; insure these guidelines have been clearly defined; and are understood by all interested agencies and departments. (U)

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____		Training _____

F. Long Range Planning

The effectiveness of the FBI's Long Range Planning process will be determined by whether or not we will be able to achieve our goal of having the planning issues drive the budget process, when appropriate. The importance of this concept can be encouraged by furnishing approved planning materials to program managers for use in formulating their budgets. (U)

A problem frequently encountered in the Government's budgeting process is the difficulty in sustaining funding for some vital programs such as technological research and development which are often cut to fund other programs. The FBI can protect funds designated for these vital areas by identifying those programs vital to future operations and to use our internal budget process in a manner designed to insure the money is not diverted. (U)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) In order to enhance our goal of having the planning function drive the budget process, a formalized close association must be established between the planners and those responsible for the budget. (U)

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____		Training _____

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Memorandum Colwell to The Director  
Re: Executives' Conference Retreat  
12/1-2/81

(2) That methods be explored to overcome problems in funding certain programs such as technological research and development. Consideration should be given to the Director establishing priorities within our internal budgeting process to protect vital programs. (U)

APPROVED: *WAW*  
Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Intell. _____	Training _____

(3) To avoid confusion in planning issues that involve more than one division, the Strategic Planning Group\* should designate one division with the coordinating responsibility. (U)

*with approval of Director  
WAW*

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Intell. _____	Training _____

(4) That the original position of the Strategic Planning Group stressing that the Assistant Directors participate directly in the development of long range planning be reaffirmed. (U)

APPROVED: *WAW*  
Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exec. AD-LES \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Intell. _____	Training _____

G. Task Force on Violent Crime

An analysis of the 64 recommendations made by the Attorney General's task force on violent crime determined that 14 would have a direct impact on the FBI if implemented. In addition, 8 others would have an affect if a closer relationship with DEA occurs or if proposed legislation is adopted. The task force's general findings were recognized as being valid concerns. It was also recognized the FBI is by far the most capable organization to address many of the problems. However, there is a limit as to how far we can expand our responsibilities with our present resources which are strained to the limit. The Administration and Congress

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Colwell to The Director  
Re: Executives' Conference Retreat  
12/1-2/81

must be made to realize that the FBI is simply not a panacea for all the Nation's ills and we cannot police America's streets. There are areas where the presence of the FBI could expect to provide positive results; however, additional resources are necessary before this expanded role can be assumed.(U)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs devise a strategy for developing an awareness among Congress and the general public that the historical tendency to task the FBI with responsibility for violations more appropriately left to state and local authorities is counterproductive to our primary mission and overall effectiveness.(U)

*consistent with AB Policy*

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
<i>WAW</i>	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____	
Exec. AD-Adm. <i>SE</i>	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. <i>AM</i>	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES <i>AM</i>	Intell. _____	Training _____

(2) That the FBI accept an expanded role in combatting violent crime but continue to press for substantial increases in resources consistent with recommendation # 37 of the Attorney General's report on violent crimes calling for substantial increases in personnel for Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies.(U)

*within the budgetary process*

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
<i>WAW</i>	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____	
Exec. AD-Adm. <i>SE</i>	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. <i>AM</i>	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES <i>AM</i>	Intell. _____	Training _____

(3) The Criminal Investigative Division should establish guidelines for narcotics investigations to insure the most efficient and effective utilization of manpower and to avoid an erosion of our commitment from current high priority programs.(U)

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
<i>WAW</i>	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____	
Exec. AD-Adm. <i>SE</i>	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. <i>AM</i>	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES <i>AM</i>	Intell. _____	Training _____

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Memorandum Colwell to The Director  
Re: Executives' Conference Retreat  
12/1-2/81

(4) The Criminal Investigative Division should assess current programs to determine if there are areas where resources can be diverted to narcotics investigations without adversely affecting priority matters. This assessment should include an analysis of narcotics investigations currently being conducted in various Field Divisions to determine how those offices were able to divert manpower to narcotics enforcement activity. (U)

APPROVED: *WAW*

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

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(11)

**EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE RETREAT**  
3/22-25/92

Information Topic: **Status of Digital Telephony Program**


- The President approved a legislative initiative to compel the telecommunications industry (common carriers, switch manufacturers, cellular phone companies, etc.) to make voice/data/image transmissions available to law enforcement upon presentation of a court order.
- Details concerning the funding are being worked out.
- The Attorney General and Director have embarked upon personal contacts with key members of Congress to expedite the legislative thrust.
- Complementary action to reduce/negate the threat of encryption has been postponed until next year.
- The fallback position--increased surreptitious entries--is being rigorously pursued. Personnel and monetary resources have been enhanced. b3 Per NSA, Public Law 86-36 Section 6
- A NSA/NIST/FBI group is pressing a Government led solution which is expected to reduce the threat of encryption.
- A systems approach is being pursued:
  - Creation and staffing of an Advanced Telephony Unit to address the entire range of issues.
  - Creation of a Technical Programs Unit to re-educate Technically Trained Agents and Electronics Technicians to practice in the digital world (the latter group to be able to assist the Agents in certain matters) and professionalize technical training.
  - 
  - Fast-track projects--many being pursued at the National laboratories--to increase capabilities for surreptitious entries.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

b1  
b3 Public Law 86-36 Section 6  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024 (i)  
b3 18 U.S.C., Section 798


THE DIRECTOR JUNE  
Per OGA letter dated 9/30/2013 April 20, 1950.

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE



Classified by *spc/16*  
Declassify on: OADR

The Executives' Conference, Messrs. Ladd, Tracy, Harbo, Clegg,  
Carlson, Mohr, Nease, Glavin and Belmont in attendance on April 19, 1950, was  
advised that Rear Admiral E. E. Stone, Director of [redacted] Agency.



The Executives' Conference unanimously approved that the first method  
described above be utilized. This would be handled in the same manner as the  
installation of a technical surveillance. The attached letter to the Attorney  
General requests authority to place the coverage. In the event this request is  
approved,

Tolson  
Ladd  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Harbo  
Mohr  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Gandy

CC - Mr. H. H. Clegg  
Mr. J. P. Mohr

Attachment

AHB:tlc

INDEXED

66-2554-7683


~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~ (U)

In the event you approve, appropriate steps will be taken to set up this coverage and Admiral Stone, who has been advised that the Bureau is considering this matter, will be advised appropriately by Liaison of action taken. (S)

Respectfully,  
For the Conference



Clyde Tolson

4/21/50  
S.A. R.W. Lawrence  
cleared with [redacted]  
re [redacted] Office with  
[redacted] coverage plus [redacted] (S)

O.K.  
H.

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~ (U)

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Per OGA letter dated 9/30/2013

2/18/93  
#323,013 + 306,696

Classified by SP5/bee 10/2/58  
Declassify on: OADR


MR. TOLSON

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE


b1  
b3 Public Law 86-36 Section 6  
b3 U.S.C., Section 798  
b3 50 U.S.C., Code 3024(i)

JUNE

The Executives Conference of September 24, 1958, consisting of  
Messrs. Tolson, Tamm, Belmont, Parsons, Trotter, Rosen, Holloman, Nease  
and Mohr, considered a proposal of Inspector H. L. Edwards, who is inspecting  
the Domestic Intelligence Division, that the Cryptanalysis Section of the Laboratory



The Conference unanimously recommended the approval of the following  
recommendations made by the Inspector. - 132 REC-12 ... 4-12669



2. That the Bureau discontinue decrypting any of this teletype traffic  
and that the manpower utilized on this work be diverted to other cryptanalysis-  
translation problems confronting the Cryptanalysis Section of the Laboratory.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

JPM:DW

(5) ~~51 OCT 7 1958~~

1 - Mr. Tamm  TELETYPE UNIT   
1 - Mr. Clayton 6 OCT 9 1958


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~



b1  
b3 18 U.S.C., Section 798  
b3 Public Law 86-36 Section 6  
b3 50 U.S.C., Section 3024(i)

~~SECRET~~



(S)

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR

June 2, 1950

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

~~REQUEST FOR FBI TO CONDUCT  
PERSONNEL INVESTIGATIONS  
ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/15/91 BY SP-5 ci/JHF

The Conference considered the request of Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, asking the Bureau to perform investigations of personnel to be employed by the Armed Forces Security Agency.

The responsibility to investigate personnel of this agency rests with the Department of Defense. We have been asked to investigate this Agency's personnel (applicants) on a reimbursable basis and we have been asked various questions as to what the cost would be; the number of investigations which we would handle; the time in which to complete the investigations; whether we could bring the investigations up to date every two years; whether we could start working these investigations in July, 1950 and other questions including the procedure they desire to have followed in these inquiries.

The Armed Forces Security Agency hires, for the most part, young people just out of schools and colleges and the Admiral states that the background investigation probably would be limited to a small area except for possible military service. The investigative requirements, however, are such that the Bureau would still be held responsible for a full and complete investigation and we would have to check, during the course of our investigation, the same sources as we would on any other individual under investigation.

As Director of AFSA, Admiral Stone has been most cooperative with the FBI according to our Liaison Section. AFSA controls communications intelligence entirely and our Liaison Section says that many of our important Espionage cases receive their initial beginning as a result of liaison either with General Carter Clark of Arlington Hall or Admiral Stone of the Naval Communications Annex. Admiral Stone is now in charge of both Arlington Hall and the Naval Communications Annex. Specific examples of cases which received their beginning as a result of communications intelligence would be the Coplon and Fuchs cases.

Admiral Stone indicates that 40 to 60 investigations would be required each month and that this would amount to a maximum work load of 720 cases per year. The cost of handling these investigations would be assumed by the AFSA and they would reimburse us for each investigation, which, according to our most recent estimates, would be about \$206.40 per investigation if we charged the amount presently received from [redacted] for similar investigations.

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RECOMMENDATION

INDEXED - 101 RECORDED - 101

66-2534-7809  
JUN 9 1950

The request of the Admiral, of course, is a shifting of responsibility upon the FBI of a function which should be handled by the Armed Forces. It is noted that the Admiral indicates that the benefits to his agency of "such an arrangement would be considerable." It cannot be denied that the benefits would be considerable


AR:LS 1 JUN 13 1950

Memorandum for the Director

in that the Armed Forces would be able to shift the responsibility, if any difficulty arose at a later date, directly to the FBI because we would be assuming the responsibility of investigating persons over which we had a burden to investigate. This is an added burden which we should not assume and the Conference unanimously recommended against taking this work. If it is approved, an appropriate letter will be directed to Admiral Stone advising him of our inability to handle these investigations for the reasons indicated above.

Those in attendance were Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Glavin, Harbo, McGuire, McIntire for Clegg, Mohr, Tracy and Rosen.

Respectfully  
For the Conference

  
Clyde Tolson

THE DIRECTOR

July 6, 1950

(S)

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

REQUEST FOR FBI TO CONDUCT PERSONNEL INVESTIGATIONS -

s/31/91

Classified by SP-5 CIB/HF

~~Declassify on: OADR~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-11-83 BY SP-5 CIB/HF

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(S) [Redacted]

The Executives' Conference recommended (S-1) (S) handling these cases which would entail a maximum work-load of 720 cases per year on a reimbursable basis. The Executives' Conference felt that the request

[Redacted]

The Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Glavin, Quinn Tamm, Fred McIntire, Carlson, Parsons and Belmont, on July 5, 1950, again considered this matter. The Conference was advised that

[Redacted]

It was further pointed out to the Conference that during the last war the Bureau had considerable difficulty in receiving prompt advice from the Armed Services concerning the breaking of codes and other matters which were of direct concern to the Bureau.

[Redacted]

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

CC - Mr. H.H. Clegg  
Mr. J.P. Mohr

AHB:tlc

JUL 13 1950

RECORDED - 41

JUL 12 1950

*File*

EX-43

Source: [unclear] Dept. Agency

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

*6-11-48*

(S) [redacted] However, in the future, [redacted] and others who are very friendly with the Bureau may be transferred and it may be desirable to have this agency under obligation to the Bureau.

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Mr. Tolson and Mr. Glavin were of the opinion that we should not re-consider our refusal to handle these investigations on the basis that we would be going far afield of our responsibilities and duties in conducting such investigations.

Messrs. Ladd, Quinn Tamm, Fred McIntire, Carlson, Parsons and Belmont were of the opinion that the matter should be reconsidered on the basis of the above information and that the Bureau should conduct these investigations.

In the event you approve the action of the majority of the Executives' Conference, arrangements will be made through our liaison [redacted]

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

*Y*

Clyde Tolson

*Lagrell  
H*

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR

July 19, 1950

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~AUTOMATIC ENCODING EQUIPMENT~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

On July 18, the Executives Conference considered the proposal that automatic encoding equipment be obtained for use in the Bureau's communications.

Since before the last war, the Laboratory has been considering the adoption of automatic encoding equipment in the Bureau's communications system and has continuously looked into new equipment which has become available commercially. Because of the great need of industry for high-security encoding, very little equipment is commercially available and none which is adaptable as automatic equipment to the Bureau's teletype and radio communications. The military forces, on the other hand, have spent many millions of dollars developing and constructing a large number of different types of automatic encoding equipment for different purposes. There has never been developed in this country any equipment specifically for a communications system such as that used by the Bureau. Immediately after the last war, when our relations with military agencies improved and we became members of NSAC, arrangements were made to consider various types of equipment designed and produced by the Army and Navy.

Basically, there are two types of equipment. (C) (U)

First, the type of equipment known as "off-line" does not connect on to the teletype line and therefore does not automatically send the encoded message. It is an encoding machine which produces the encoded message on a tape which can then be sent by either teletype or radio. Equipment of this type, and in particular a unit known as SIGABA, was in use by the military in 1947 and in December, 1947, the Laboratory recommended that such equipment be obtained for use in the Bureau's communications. Because of the high cost (approximately \$2,500 per unit), the Executives Conference in April, 1948, recommended that this equipment not be purchased but the Laboratory was authorized to check further into the matter to see if the equipment was available as surplus military equipment. It was not. Again in March, 1949, a similar recommendation was considered and the Executives Conference felt the Laboratory should look further. This problem has been followed constantly in order to consider any new equipment developed. (C) (U)

The second type of equipment is known as "on-line" and it connects on to a telephone line in the same way as a teletype machine. When the message in plain text is typed on the keyboard, the message is automatically enciphered and sent out on the line.

This particular unit was considered by the Bureau in 1947 but was considered not suitable for the Bureau's communications since it can be used only on the teletype line and there is no way that the enciphered message can be practically obtained for use by radio operators.

Tolson  
Ladd  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Harbo  
Mohr  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Gandy

DJP:AI 54 JUL 26 1950  
cc-Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

RECORDED - 29  
INDEXED - 29

63-7931  
JUL 25 1950  
6/3/51  
SP-SCIBAF

Declassify on: OADR

b1  
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Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

During the past few months the Laboratory has studied a new unit of the "on-line" equipment which, at the same time it puts the encoded message on the teletype line, also produces a paper tape with the encoded message typed thereon. This tape can be used by the radio operator and therefore this newer equipment is adaptable to the Bureau's communications system.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Glavin, Tracy, Mohr, Belmont, Rosen, and Parsons, ascertained that in view of the fact that

[Redacted]

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

*[Signature]*  
Clyde Tolson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*[Handwritten initials]*

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1, 6)  
DATE 08-25-2015 BY: C

May 17, 1950

THE DIRECTOR  
THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

On May 17, the Executives Conference was advised that prior to the consolidation of the Army and Navy cryptographic facilities into the Armed Forces Security Agency, the Bureau had obtained from the Army at Arlington Hall the unprocessed traffic

This material was worked on by our own Cryptanalytic Section at the request of the Security-Investigative Division.

Since the formation of the Armed Forces Security Agency and subsequent to our rejoining USCIB (United States Communications Intelligence Board), the matter of making available this raw traffic has been taken up with Admiral Stoen who desires, if possible, to make arrangements whereby the actual traffic will not leave Arlington Hall where it is received. Admiral Stoen has suggested the desirability of having Bureau personnel work on the traffic at Arlington Hall and pointed out the advantages to the Bureau in having the tremendous amount of reference material and machine equipment available for our use.

The Conference unanimously recommends that we accept this offer and effect arrangements whereby four Laboratory employees—2 Agents and 2 radio technicians—be properly indoctrinated and receive the necessary passes to have access to the Arlington Hall facilities and work on the desired traffic over there. It is intended that not more than two employees—1 Agent and 1 technician—will work at Arlington Hall at any one time, but by having four employees properly trained we will have the opportunity to interchange personnel in the Bureau's best interests.

The Conference consisted of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, F. H. McIntire, Rosen, Belmont, Mohr, Tracy, Glavin, and Parsons.

FOI/PA # 323,013  
DIVISION OF CIVIL RIGHTS  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
MAY 6 3 1950

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson  
c/3/91

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

DTR:AF  
cc - Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

INDEXED - 13  
RECORDED - 13

AUG 3 1950

51 AUG 7 1950

Sent to Apt Agency

A. H. Belmont

August 2, 1950

C. E. Hennrich

~~SECRET~~

PROTECTION OF STRATEGIC AIR  
COMMAND BASES OF THE UNITED STATES  
AIR FORCE

~~AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

Classified by SP-5 CJB/DMF  
Declassify on: OADR 6/4/91

PURPOSE:

- (1.) To advise of the results of a conference with General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, OSI, with respect to this matter in order that a complete understanding would be reached as to exactly what OSI expects of the FBI.
- (2.) To furnish further instructions to the Field with respect to developing informant coverage in this matter.
- (3.) To recommend that a letter be directed to all Special Agents in Charge pointing out the vital importance of this program and instructing that all Special Agents be placed on the alert for any information received from technical surveillances or confidential informants which might indicate a concentration of individuals of a doubtful loyalty in the vicinity of Strategic Air Command bases.

BACKGROUND:

With respect to captioned program, with which you are familiar, on Thursday July 27, 1950, I instructed Special Agent James E. McMahon of the Espionage Section to arrange an immediate conference through the Liaison Section with General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, OSI, in order that a complete understanding would be reached as to exactly what OSI expected of the Bureau. Special Agent McMahon was specifically instructed not to commit the Bureau on any matter whatsoever.

JEM:caw:mod

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

66-2554-  
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132 AUG 9 1950

~~SECRET~~

*Handwritten initials*

54 SEP 14 1950

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

*Handwritten initials*

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Accordingly, a conference was held between General Carroll and SA's Sanders of the Liaison Section and McMahon on the afternoon of Friday, July 28, 1950. The following matters were discussed:

General Carroll was asked concerning the instructions issued by his office to Strategic Air Command bases with respect to reporting suspected sabotage to the Bureau. He replied that close liaison is maintained between Bureau Field Offices and Strategic Air Command bases. If an accident or any incident occurs on an SAC base or to a plane that is stationed at an SAC base, the local Bureau Field Office or resident agency is immediately notified, if sabotage is suspected. General Carroll stated that instructions have been issued to the effect that if there is any doubt as to possible sabotage such doubt is resolved by notifying the appropriate Bureau Field Office of the accident immediately and at the same time advising that further inquiry was being conducted by OSI and that the Bureau Field Office would be kept informed of all pertinent developments. General Carroll commented that the Bureau Field Offices have been most cooperative in these matters and to his knowledge no controversies or difficulties have ever occurred. It was pointed out to General Carroll that if any evidence of sabotage became apparent, it was absolutely necessary that the Bureau or appropriate Field Office be immediately notified without any undue delay, to which General Carroll agreed.

With respect to the development of confidential informants, General Carroll was asked concerning his desires in this matter. He replied that he preferred that the Bureau NOT develop confidential informants among military personnel stationed at SAC bases. He stated that all servicemen are pledged to report matters pertaining to sabotage, espionage, etc., to their commanding officer and in addition, OSI already had a limited number of informants among military personnel. With respect to the development of informants among civilian employees of the United States Air Force at SAC bases, General Carroll urged that informants be developed provided the Base Commander does not object. In this regard General Carroll pointed out that it would be desirable for the Bureau to tactfully inform the Commanding Officers of the SAC bases that the purpose for developing confidential informants among civilian personnel employed by the United States Air Force on SAC bases is solely for acquiring information concerning sabotage and related

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matters and is not for the purpose of securing information regarding the personal habits and activities of the Base Commander and members of his staff. General Carroll further advised that his office had no objection toward the Bureau developing confidential informants among personnel working on the various SAC bases who are employed by private contractors rather than by the United States Air Force.

With respect to the physical security of the SAC bases, General Carroll advised that additional fences, alarms, guards, etc., are being acquired and in the future trained military police will serve as guards rather than civilians. Concerning the Air Force Screening Program for employees, General Carroll stated that all Air Force military and civilian personnel, as well as employees of contractors, and others who have access to critical areas on the bases will have their names checked through the files of the FBI, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. If any derogatory information is developed, an investigation is immediately instituted by OSI. General Carroll explained that a pass system has been inaugurated in order for all personnel to gain access to critical areas on the bases. He further stated that it would not be practicable or possible to check the names of all individuals who had access to non-critical areas, due to the vastness of such a project and because it would cause undue delay to much needed building and production programs. General Carroll further explained that private contractors on the SAC bases sometimes employ civilian guards to care for their own equipment but these guards are in no manner connected with the United States Air Force and they do not protect or have access to critical areas on the bases. It was pointed out to General Carroll and he agreed that the Bureau would not be concerned with the physical security of the SAC bases.

General Carroll next stated that his greatest concern is over the fact that a small group of individuals whose sympathies are opposed to the United States could possibly be sent from various parts of the United States to the vicinity of an SAC base and by using "Commando techniques," over power the guards, gain access to a critical area and "blow it up." General Carroll was of the opinion that knowledge of such activities could possibly be ascertained through proper interpretation of various orders.

[REDACTED]

b7E

~~SECRET~~

Throughout the entire conference which lasted from approximately 12:45 P.M. until 2:15 P.M., General Carroll was exceedingly agreeable, cooperative, and highly complimentary in his remarks toward the Bureau. By memorandum dated July 28, 1950, the Director was informed of the results of the conference with General Carroll and he was advised that this program was being closely and continuously followed.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

If you agree, there is attached a letter addressed to all Special Agents in Charge instructing that all Special Agents be immediately placed on the alert for any information received

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Communist Party offices, members, and sympathizers and other individuals considered to have subversive tendencies as well as information from established confidential informants that might indicate any concentration or travel of individuals of doubtful loyalty at or near any vital SAC base. The attached letter instructs that if such information is received, the Bureau and the appropriate field office should be immediately advised.

If you agree, there is also attached for your approval, a letter directed to the fifteen field offices covering the SAC bases which are considered of vital importance by the United States Air Force. The letter furnishes further information and instructions concerning this program which was developed as the result of the discussion with General Carroll. The letter suggests that a conference be arranged with the commanding officer of the appropriate SAC base together with the ranking OSI representative and that the commanding officer of the base be briefly informed of the provisions of the delimitation agreement which provides that the FBI will be responsible for the investigation of all cases involving espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage involving all civilians, which includes civilian employees of military establishments. (See SAC letter No. 25, dated March 8, 1949.) The letter further

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suggests that the commanding officer of the base be informed that the OSI has urged the Bureau to develop informants among civilian employees of the United States Air Force on the base, provided the commanding office does not object. The letter suggests that such objections are not anticipated if the commanding officer is tactfully informed that the Bureau is not interested in personnel or administrative matters among civilian employees of the United States Air Force.

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 05-06-2011

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

THE DIRECTOR

August 30, 1950

~~THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 6/6/96 BY SP-5 CJB/BJP

[REDACTED]  
PLACEMENT OF FBI OR FBI TRAINED INSTRUCTOR  
WITH [REDACTED]

On August 29, 1950, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Ladd, Glavin, Harbo, Mohr, Rosen, F. H. McIntire, Sizoo, Nease, Tracy, Nichols, and Belmont, considered information furnished by Special Agent [REDACTED], newly-established Liaison Agent in [REDACTED], to the effect that

b7D

[REDACTED] indicated that one of the situations of interest to the Embassy was the placement of an FBI or FBI trained instructor with the [REDACTED] said it would be of great advantage to the Embassy to have a person in that capacity. The Ambassador instructed Mr. [REDACTED]

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(S)

[REDACTED]

The attention of the Executives' Conference was called to a request through Liaison in January, 1950, from the State Department as to whether the Bureau would object to the State Department contacting Jarnier Agent [REDACTED] with regard to police instruction in [REDACTED]

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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b7C

RECORDED - 46

96-2534-8011  
SEP 5 1950  
[Signatures]

b7D

34 SEP 8

~~SECRET~~

classified per OGA letter 4/11





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b7D

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The State Department was advised at that time that the Bureau had no objection to their approaching [redacted] for the assignment desired by [redacted].

In February, 1950, Mr. Stanton Brown, Chief, Civil Intelligence Section, Panama Canal, wrote to the Bureau, advising that President Arias was anxious to secure the services of an FBI trained man [redacted]. Mr. Brown pointed out that a delicate situation might possibly exist in that President Arias might be attempting to build up [redacted].

(C)


b1

[redacted] Mr. Brown was advised by letter dated February 27, 1950, that the Bureau did not have an Agent available for this assignment and did not know of any qualified former Special Agent who was available. X

By letter dated March 9, 1950, Mr. Brown advised that President Arias reportedly advised Ambassador Davis that his Government had every intention of fighting the Communist menace [redacted] were desperately in need of a trained investigator who could prepare them in an effective investigative procedure and, therefore, in all probability another request would be made of the Bureau, probably with the blessing of the State Department. Mr. Tolson noted that we should not accede to such a request and the Director concurred.

It was the unanimous opinion of the Executives' Conference that we should neither furnish an FBI Agent to carry on such instruction, nor should we recommend any ex-Agent in the event an additional official request is received. It was further recommended that a letter be sent to [redacted], advising him of the Bureau's position in this respect. Such a letter is attached for your approval.


b7D



(8)

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

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Clyde Tolson

THE DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 21, 1950  
7/21/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
The EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

Classified by SP-5 CJP/MT

Info classifiable per OGA let dated 1/16/05 EJM  
11/1/05

At a meeting of the Executives' Conference on October 31, 1950, attended by Messrs. Tolson, Clegg, Harbo, Mohr, Laughlin, Sizoo, McGuire, Tracy, Rosen, Glavin and Ladd, the question of the Bureau's participation with OSI of the Air Force in developing stay-behind agents and agents for use in an escape and evasion route in the event of an invasion of Alaska, was discussed.

The Conference was advised that this matter had been originally instigated by A-2 of the Air Force

[Redacted]

The Conference was advised that this was called to the attention of the IIC and that at the meeting on June 8, 1950, you advised the IIC that the plan contemplated the selection, training and equipping of selected U. S. citizens who were long-established residents of that section of Alaska for which they would be expected to provide coverage and that you had pointed out to the IIC that the OSI and FBI informant coverage existing today in Alaska could be trained in detail along the lines needed in the instant proposal and that such informant networks could be turned over to the Commanding General for operation if and when such emergency in Alaska is encountered. It was further pointed out to the IIC that CIA had no authority to operate in Alaska and should not be permitted to so operate.

This matter was further considered at the July 6, 1950, meeting of the IIC, at which time the Air Force was instructed to advise the Bureau when they sent their instructions to the Joint Commander in Alaska in order that the FBI might issue appropriate instructions to its Alaska office, and was again discussed at the meeting on September 7, 1950.

[Redacted] in view of the fact that OSI and the FBI had agreed to jointly work this program out.

RECORDED - 46

INDEXED 46

166-2554-822-11

The Conference was advised that their views were desired as to whether the Bureau should continue its participation in this program. It was pointed out that this placed dual responsibility that when the program is placed in effect, namely, following an invasion, the control of the program would pass to the Military; that if the program goes badly, the FBI could be accused of failure; and if it works, the Military would get credit.

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

ML:dad cc - Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOV 13 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

I went over the objections raised in Mr. Clegg's memorandum to Mr. Tolson with reference to this program and pointed out that the Bureau had originally forced [redacted] but of this picture and had at the intelligence conference agreed to take it over. It was also pointed out to the conference that this would appear to be an intelligence operation and as such, should be handled by the Bureau. Further, that the Delimitations Agreement forbids the Military Agencies from developing informants in the civilian population;

It was pointed out that Alaska is no different from the rest of the United States; that in the event of an invasion of California or New York or any other portion of the United States, that this problem would also arise and that the development of informants within the civilian population was a function for the FBI even though their job would not require them to function until after an invasion.

Messrs. [redacted], Clegg, Harbo and Mohr were opposed to the Bureau's participation with OSI in the stay-behind Agents and escape and evasion Agent program. They felt that the Bureau should merely advise the Air Force by furnishing the names of individuals whom they might contact for the purpose of developing informants for use in this program and possibly furnishing an instructor to help train any such informants developed by OSI in subjects which the Bureau would normally handle in a training school.

Messrs. Glavin, Tracy, Rosen, McGuire, Sizoo, Laughlin, and Ladd recommended that we continue to participate with OSI in the development of this program and in this connection they indicated that in the event the Bureau stays in this program it should be carefully reviewed and a program drafted for the development of the existing OSI and FBI informant coverage in order that they might be properly trained in detail with the ultimate idea that they would be turned over to the Air Force in the event of any invasion of Alaska.

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

While this seems to be 95% military operations our prior commitments are such that I believe we will have to go along with it.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

I concur most reluctantly - we must really see that our of it is prompt + adequately developed + organized - H.

11-1

Oct. 26, 1950

THE DIRECTOR  
THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

~~SECRET~~

MAINTENANCE CERTAIN CLASSIFICATIONS BUREAU FILES  
OUTSIDE CONFINES RECORDS SECTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The Executives Conference consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Tracy, Harbo, Ladd, Mohr, Fred McIntire for Mr. Clegg, Mr. McGuire for Mr. Nichols, Mr. Laughlin for Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Rosen, considered the maintenance of certain classifications of Bureau files outside of the confines of the Records Section.

The Conference was advised by Mr. McGuire that as a result of a 6-day deadline in Departmental applicant cases in the Summer of 1945, the Records Section was instructed, as a result of the inspection conducted of the Records Section at that time, to permit mail in Departmental applicant cases to be retained in the supervisor's office until the investigation was completed and the case concluded.

This meant that the initial piece of mail received in a Departmental applicant case was recorded and indexed in the Bureau's records to show that we had a pending case on the subject matter. As soon as the index card was made and the file number placed on the first serial, the first serial was physically sent directly to the supervisor handling the case and no jacket was maintained in the Records Section. Thereafter, all letters, teletypes, and reports on that particular case, on receipt in the Records Section, would be sent directly to the supervisor who, upon completion of the investigation and closing of the case, would transmit all the pertinent material pertaining to that investigation back to the Records Section for complete processing.

at  
It was pointed out to the Conference that all times the Bureau's indices clearly reflected the existence of a pending file and because of the limited handling and close supervision, the physical location of the file could readily be determined.

This system proved effective due to the fact that this was a deadline type of case wherein close supervision could be afforded the investigation and it also materially reduced service requests in the Records Section as well as reduced locate work for files and serials. Other advantages included streamlining the processing and filing operations in that all mail on particular applicant cases would be handled in one group through the various steps of blocking, classifying, numbering, and recording.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
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- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
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- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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4/6/05  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr  
unclassifiable per OIA  
4/6/05 ELH

The Executives Conference for the Director, Oct. 26, 1950

~~SECRET~~

This system was so successful that when the Atomic Energy program started, the same procedure was applied to Atomic Energy cases in December, 1946. The same reasons, namely, deadline cases, volume of work, and close supervision, prevailed and as other types of applicant categories arose, except Bureau applicants, the same procedure was adopted in rapid succession in cases involving special inquiries for the White House, Congressional Committees, and other Government agencies, applicants for Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Greek Turkey Aid Bill cases, applicants for International Labor Organization, applicants for World Health Organization, applicants for National Security Resources Board, European Recovery Program cases, Voice of America cases, sensitive positions in the United States Government, Armed Forces Security Agency, Loyalty of Government Employees, and the International Development Program of the State Department.

Service requests on these files are handled just as expeditiously as are requests from supervisors and Bureau officials in any other category of cases physically maintained in the Records Section proper.

This whole program was considered by the Executives Conference and approved as a result of a memorandum from Mr. Clegg to Mr. Tolson on June 2, 1949, wherein specific reference was made to the processing of mail in the so-called applicant type files and a recommendation made that the mail be sent directly to the interested division.

The Conference unanimously recommended in view of the saving to the Bureau resulting from the streamlined handling of the applicant type of case other than Bureau applicants in this manner, the Records Section be authorized to continue handling these classifications in the manner in which they have, since there is a record in the general indices at all times reflecting that there is a case pending in the Bureau and the physical location of the material in that case can readily be located in the interested supervisor's office.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference,

Clyde Tolson

~~SECRET~~

*g this this is sound procedure - it certainly expedites the handling of the work -*

10/27

*THOSE fearful of this - if we were running on a 45-day deadline it might be desirable but the records show an average 70 odd days in some cases over 100 days - In some files*

*shelley  
b7E  
they file down with  
in office of Peter  
of the Bureau of*





with the understanding that it will be returned personally to Supervisor R. J. Lamphere at the close of business of each day. (S)(U)

It was pointed out to the Executives Conference that while the information contained in the summary analysis was not a verbatim transcript of the [Source] messages, it necessarily consists of paraphrased briefs of such messages. To set the information forth in any other form would cause it to lose its value as a possible means of identifying the unknown subjects. Furthermore, while the summary analysis does not state that the information was furnished by [redacted] it is inescapable upon study that the information arose as a result of analysis of USSR communications traffic. Therefore, persons studying the summary analysis will be aware that this information has been made available through at least partial knowledge of the contents of Russian coded communications. (S)(U)

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The Executives Conference was unanimously of the opinion that the [importance of identifying the unknown subjects] makes it necessary to make this summary analysis available to Supervisors in the Espionage Section who are experienced in Soviet espionage cases. This means that as all Supervisors in the Espionage Section come into contact with Soviet espionage and may have suggestions as to possible identifications based on cases they have handled or with which they have come in contact, permission would be given to all Supervisors of the Espionage Section to examine this summary analysis. (S)(U)

In the event you agree, the Supervisors of the Espionage Section will be allowed to examine this material in order that they may submit suggestions as to possible identifications.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

RJL

~~SECRET~~

66-2554-8266



THE DIRECTOR  
THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

November 28, 1950

~~SECRET~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

The Executives Conference, with Messrs. Tolson, Laughlin for Belmont, Nease, Sizoo, Glavin, Parsons for Harbo, McGuire for Nichols, Clegg, Tracy, Ladd and Rosen in attendance, today considered the request of General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of CIA, as reflected in his letter to the Director of November 21, 1950, requesting the Bureau consider taking on an additional 100 cases per month for a period of the next four months. ]

The Conference took cognizance of the fact that we are handling a little over 200 cases per month at the present time; that the international situation, according to Smith, has put great pressure on CIA operating offices; that at the end of the four month period Smith will be able to furnish a revised estimate in which he indicated the figure will be substantially reduced; that he is fully aware of the enormous work load of the FBI; that he would be willing to accept a longer time period for each investigation and that he would appreciate our views or, if the Director wished, he would be glad to discuss it further at the Director's convenience. ]

RECOMMENDATION

DECLASSIFIED BY 60290 PUC BCE /TCG/ELH  
on 4/6/05  
Info unclassified per OGA let dated 2/18/05  
4/6/05 ELH

Under the circumstances, it was recommended that we take the additional 100 cases per month for a specific period of four months. This will increase our present agreement to approximately a little over 300 cases per month which we will have to handle for CIA. It was also recommended that a memorandum be addressed to General Smith advising him that we will accept these additional cases for the specific period and that we also stress the point that of course it will take a longer time period than is presently taken, in order to complete the additional cases, as a result of the additional work load which this puts on the Bureau. A proposed letter to General Smith is attached. ]

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Classified by SP-5 C/T/K  
Declassify on: OADR 10/10/11

Clyde Tolson

OK 21

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

cc-Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr.

RECORDED - 70

66-2554-8322

DEC 5 1950

Attachment

54 DEC 7 1950

~~EX-64 SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR

February 2, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY - PROPOSED  
ASSIGNMENT OF BUREAU AGENT IN EXTENDED LIAISON  
CAPACITY

On January 31, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Glavin, Clegg, Tracy, Harbo, Mohr, Rosen, Nichols, Sizoo and Belmont, considered a suggestion that an experienced Agent with knowledge of our needs in the communications intelligence field be assigned on a working basis at the Armed Forces Security Agency, at least three full days a week, to gather information of value to the Bureau and to insure that we are making the fullest possible use of this extremely valuable source of information.

The Conference was advised that the Security Division conducted a survey of the facilities of the Armed Forces Security Agency and of the material available to us through AFSA. As a result of this survey, it is apparent that AFSA is engaged in communications intelligence on a scale beyond that readily ascertainable by reading their published traffic. AFSA has in its records section communications intelligence material, collateral material from other agencies, and public source material. The Records Section is very complete and offers us a good source of material not otherwise available. In addition, the activities of AFSA are so widespread and the amount of material handled by them is so voluminous that it is only by having a Bureau representative assigned on direct liaison who will spend a considerable amount of his time at AFSA that we can hope to gain the benefit of information available to us from that source.

The officials of AFSA have expressed their desire to cooperate to the fullest extent with the FBI and have stated that the entire facilities of AFSA are available to us. Bearing in mind that the information we secure from AFSA is in all probability the most valuable and accurate information we secure from any source on espionage matters, it is apparent that we must not overlook the possibility of increasing the flow of information to us from AFSA. We made a test check of certain espionage suspects through the files of AFSA and secured information which we did not previously have. The Security Division strongly recommended that we assign an experienced Agent on a trial basis for at least three full days a week to go over the material being received by AFSA to make sure we are getting everything of interest to us; to check their files on matters of interest to us; and generally to insure that we are getting the most benefit from this source.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

cc - Mr. Clegg  
 Mr. Mohr

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DATE 1/91 BY SP-5 c/bm

166-25371-8524


AHB:t1c

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that an experienced Agent be assigned to spend at least three full days a week on a trial basis at AFSA to secure all information which will be of value to us. The present liaison checks we make with AFSA will be handled by this Agent as part of his duties.

In the event you approve, an experienced Supervisor from the Security Division will be designated to handle this.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

  
Clyde Tolson



MR. NICHOLS

1-15-51

F. W. WAIKART

APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS OTHER THAN  
ATOMIC ENERGY APPLICANTS

Executive Conference ~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Reference is made to the attached memorandum dated  
January 10, 1951, which reflects the savings in man days that  
would accrue to the Records Section if the criminal search  
were eliminated. In order that you may be assured that each  
of the above agencies include a set of fingerprints for each  
application, the following is submitted.

[Redacted] (S) (U)

10/22/91  
Classified by SP5CIB/HF  
Declassify on: OADR

Memorandum by Mr. Rosen to Mr. Tamm dated September 25, 1946  
reflects the arrangements made with Colonel William H. Harris of  
C.I.G. for a conference to be held with representatives of the  
C.I.G. designated to determine the procedures which will be  
followed in connection with the C.I.G. Applicant Program. As a  
result the following arrangements, among others, was agreed upon,  
"CIG states it intends to fingerprint each applicant who is  
employed at the time they are placed upon the payroll" (66-6200-

118-3)

GREEK-TURKEY AID BILL(62)

A complete review of our files fails to reflect that provi-  
sions were made for the Bureau to receive fingerprints in connec-  
tion with the applications submitted for employment under the Greek-  
Turkey Aid Program. There is one reference, however, to fingerprints  
mentioned in a letter to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Director, Security  
and Investigation Division, Economic Cooperation Administration,  
which is quoted herewith:

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"The fingerprint card of [Redacted] was the only  
one received by the Identification Division of the FBI in connec-  
tion with the Greece-Turkey Aid Program."

The Identification Division was contacted in this regard,  
and it was determined that they do receive some prints, the contri-  
butor being listed as the Greek-Turkey Aid Program. Further contact  
with the supervisor handling the program at the Bureau revealed that

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

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MEMORANDUM TO MR. NICHOLS  
RE: APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS OTHER THAN  
ATOMIC ENERGY APPLICANTS

~~SECRET~~

fingerprints are not received with the application form at the Bureau. However, it has been established via Liaison channels that the contributing agency should submit fingerprints for all applicants.

In summarizing the above it would appear that all applicants under the Greek-Turkey Aid Program should submit fingerprints even though this fact can not be definitely established from a review of the Bureau files.

VOICE OF AMERICA (123)

Memorandum dated November 17, 1948 quoted herewith initialed by the Director, instructs that fingerprints be submitted with each request for investigation in V.O.A. cases, "with reference to investigations of personnel being employed by the Voice of America, it is desired that Liaison contact the State Department and effect an arrangement whereby fingerprints will be submitted with the request for investigation in order that criminal records might be included in the investigative reports at the time they are submitted to the State Department"(66-6200-123-58).

EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM (124)

ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

The Bureau arrangements, for the handling of name check forms for the E.C.A., which includes a statement to the effect that fingerprints be submitted on each individual, is quoted herewith, "It is understood that a fingerprint card will be submitted on each individual to be employed by the Economic Cooperation Administration. Upon receipt of such a fingerprint card, it would form the basis of a search of the identification records of the FBI"(62-86974-20).

By memorandum dated May 5, 1948, Mr. E.A. Tamm advised that "ERP" for European Recovery Program is identical in meaning with "ECA" for Economic Cooperation Administration, which is the now current name for the European Recovery Program"(62-86974-22).

INSTITUTE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS (62)

The arrangement for receiving fingerprints in connection with applicant investigations for the I.I.A.A. are briefly set forth in a memorandum from Mr. Rosen to Mr. Ladd, dated April 23, 1948:

"By letter of April 5, 1948, Mr. [redacted] Personnel Section, Institute of Inter-American Affairs advised that

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

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MEMORANDUM TO MR. NICHOLS  
RE: APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS OTHER THAN  
ATOMIC ENERGY APPLICANTS

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he had been in communication with the Civil Service Commission and had received a ruling from them that it would no longer be incumbent upon the Institute to furnish to the FBI Standard Form 84 (request for report on loyalty data) inasmuch as all employees of the Institute were being investigated by the FBI under Public Law No. 369 of the 80th Congress.

The only action requested by the Civil Service Commission, of the Institute, was that they continue to furnish fingerprints on all employees or applicants on either Form 86 or Form 87 as the case may require and that these fingerprints be searched through the Identification Division of the FBI" (62-61140-140).

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY (130)

By memorandum dated December 18, 1950, Mr. Callan advised Mr. Rosen that "At the inception of the investigation in connection with captioned program, each letter received by the Bureau requested investigation carrying a phrase, fingerprint charts have been furnished the C.S.C. which will make appropriate checks" (66-6200-130-7).

DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS (77)

In connection with the receipt of fingerprints from the Department for the Departmental Applicants, a portion of their Circular #4002 supplement #1 is quoted herewith:

"In accordance with that agreement, the provisions of Chapter 12-10.01 of the Federal Personnel Manual (Procedural Instructions for Record Checks and Inquiries on Appointees) are suspended insofar as this Department is concerned, and in lieu thereof, effective immediately, when a recommendation is made for an appointment to any position, excepted or competitive, in either the Departmental or Field service, there shall be submitted with the recommendation Standard Form 57 (Application) in duplicate, and Standard Form 86 (Fingerprint Chart)."

Even though the above provides for fingerprints to be submitted in most cases, the Bureau supervisor advised as a practical matter, no prints are received for Judges and White House applicants. Also, no prints are submitted on Special Inquiry Coast Guard, Bureau of Budget and Maintenance Employees. However, each maintenance employee is printed before entering on duty.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~



THE DIRECTOR

March 8, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PLANT INFORMANTS IN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION FACILITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/23/99 BY SP-5 CBT/TK

On March 8, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Clegg, Callahan for Glavin, Harbo, McGuire for Nichols, Tracy, Mohr, Sizoo and Belmont, discussed suggestions which had been made relative to the adequacy of our coverage in Atomic Energy installations.

By memorandum of Mr. Ladd to the Director dated February 17, 1951, our present coverage of Atomic Energy installations was set forth and a proposed letter was sent to the twenty-two field offices having Class A facilities of the Atomic Energy Commission under their jurisdiction, reiterating previous instructions and also instructing these offices to prepare a duplicate set of the individual plant informant index cards on each Class A Atomic Energy facility and forward same to the Bureau to enable closer supervision of the development of informants within these facilities.

Pursuant to the Director's instructions, Mr. Clegg reviewed the Bureau's informant coverage in Atomic Energy facilities and made certain suggestions, as set forth in his memorandum to Mr. Tolson dated February 27, 1951.

The Executives' Conference considered these suggestions, along with the suggestions of the Security Division, as set forth in memorandum dated March 2, 1951, from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Ladd.

I. Class A Facilities (Total 61)

A Class A facility is: (a) a facility, the continued operation of which, is essential to the principal mission of the Atomic Energy Commission which is the production and stockpiling of fissionable material and atomic weapons and the research and development relating thereto; (b) a facility in which stockpile quantities of fissionable material are located; and, (c) a facility at which quantities of top secret documents are located.

Relative to Class A facilities, Mr. Clegg suggested, in addition to the current instructions to the field, that:

(1) The present quarterly field report on plant informants shows insufficient information to enable either the SAC or the Bureau to determine the adequacy of coverage. He suggested that the

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

cc - Mr. Tolson  
MAR 27 1951

RECORDED - 92  
INDEXED - 92  
66-254-8604  
MAR 18 1951  
34



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

quarterly reports should show in simple form some information concerning the organizational arrangements, the number of buildings and areas and the different working units. He suggested that the number of employees in each building or unit or area, together with the number of informants on each, as well as the number of employees and informants on each shift, would appear to be a bare minimum of information to determine if there is adequacy of coverage.

It was pointed out that the 61 Atomic Energy Class A facilities vary widely in physical make-up; that in some instances, such as the Atomic Energy Commission Headquarters, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, the National Security Council, and the field offices of the Atomic Energy Commission, all of which are listed as Class A facilities, no informants will be developed. In other listed facilities, such as Eniwetok Proving Ground in the Marshall Islands and one facility existing in Canada, no informants can be developed. Also, there is a wide variance in the make-up of university and other research laboratories and such other facilities as the Picatinny, Watertown, and Rock Island arsenals and the Aberdeen Proving Ground. Consequently, we cannot instruct the field to report quarterly the organizational set-up of all facilities in one particular pattern.

Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that the field be required to furnish, in each instance where informants will be developed in a facility, sufficient information reflecting the organizational set-up, the various work shifts, etc., to enable both the SAC and the Bureau to determine that the informants developed provide sufficient coverage for the facility in question. This description is to accompany the quarterly reports from the field.

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(2) Mr. Glegg suggested that plant management be recontacted each six months to reindoctrinate them as to the need for full cooperation and the Bureau's responsibilities.

(3) Mr. Glegg suggested that the security officers of each Class A facility be recontacted each six months for the purpose of alerting them and their guards about reporting any information of possible significance and value to the local FBI office.

It was pointed out in connection with suggestions (2) and (3) that plant management and security officers are included in the present plant informant program and the field is under instructions to recontact all plant informants each six months.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference recommended that additional instructions to the field should again stress the recontact by the field with plant management and security officers each six months, at which time the items suggested by Mr. Clegg should be reiterated.

(4) Mr. Clegg suggested that the local authorities, police and sheriffs in the areas of Class A facilities be recontacted each six months to again impress upon them the need for reporting to the Bureau any indications of riots, disturbances or subversive activities in the areas, including towns in the vicinity of the Class A facilities. At this time the local authorities should be requested to instruct their subordinates similarly.

It was pointed out to the Conference that the 61 Class A facilities are of different types and are located in widely different areas. In some instances it may not be desirable to pin-point to local law enforcement agencies the locations of a particular facility, such as a research laboratory, etc. It was further pointed out that in view of the size of some of these facilities, for example, a proving ground, a recontact program every six months with law enforcement agencies on a perimeter or in the area of the facility will take on aspects of a major project. It was pointed out that there is danger that if we commit the field to making such recontacts each six months and reporting them, the value to be obtained is not commensurate with the effort, particularly as all law enforcement agencies have been notified publicly and through the day to day contact with Agents of the Bureau that matters concerning espionage, sabotage and subversive activities should be reported direct to the FBI. It was noted that our problem is to see that more of these agencies are alerted to report such items to the FBI and that it is doubtful that we should make a project of these particular facilities in this respect.

Conference Recommendation:

All members of the Executives' Conference, with the exception of Mr. Clegg, recommended that we reiterate and stress instructions to the field that law enforcement agencies, particularly in the areas of these Class A facilities, should be alerted to advise the Bureau of any possible disturbances or subversive activities in the areas, but that no six months report be required reflecting recontact each six months.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Mr. Clegg recommended that we follow his suggestion and recontact these police departments each six months and so report.

\*\*\*\*\*

(5) Mr. Clegg suggested that the field offices be advised that whenever it is possible and practicable, they give consideration to developing the heads of small units in the plants as informants; however, that this should be done, of course, with discretion.

Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that in the additional instructions to the field this suggestion be made without any requirement that the heads of such units must be developed, but rather as a suggestion that they constitute a fertile field.

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(6) Mr. Clegg suggested that arrangements be made to check with plant management each six months to ascertain if there are any changes in the basic organizational structure so that if there have been any new divisions or shifts added, informants can be developed in the new areas.

Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that during the aforementioned recontacts with plant management information of this type should be obtained.

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(7) Mr. Clegg suggested that Agents in the field confer with the security officer concerning the security coverage of the plant. He pointed out this suggestion is controversial; that the Class A facility is of such vital importance that the field should have knowledge concerning the security measures taken within the plant. This should be done, of course, in such a way as not to assume any responsibility or give any approval of the security measures taken. He felt that this information could be obtained informally without indicating approval or disapproval of the security measures and that such information would be valuable to show where informants should be

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

developed. He pointed out that in opposition to this suggestion there was danger that if an Agent makes a formal request for a discussion of security arrangements, the Bureau will be, by inference, assessed with some responsibility; that in the event of an explosion or fire the security officer might state that he had discussed security with the FBI.

Conference Recommendation:

After discussion of this matter, the Executives' Conference unanimously recommended against conferring with the security officer concerning the security coverage of the plant, it being felt that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages.

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(8) Mr. Clegg suggested that the advantage of the Bureau's having a card showing the name, type of work, and address of an informant in these Class A facilities appears to be very limited; that we are more interested in having an adequate number of informants in all vital locations of such plants and his specific name is not very important. The quarterly report as contemplated should be sufficient.

It was pointed out to the conference that inasmuch as the Class A vital facilities vary so highly in organization, composition and activities, the Security Division felt that the maintenance of the individual informant cards would assist in ascertaining whether the informant coverage in the individual facility was adequate. It was pointed out that unless we know the position of the informant, we will have difficulty in ascertaining whether the quality of the informant is such that adequate coverage is maintained. The Security Division recommended that existing instructions which were issued to the field in February, 1951, requiring the submission of these individual cards be allowed to stand.

Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that we set up these cards on a trial basis to ascertain whether they are of definite assistance in supervising this program. If it later appears possible to closely supervise the program only through the quarterly reports, the card system can be dispensed with.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

II. In addition to Class A facilities, the Atomic Energy Commission lists other plants of the AEC or of contractors and subcontractors engaged in handling other atomic energy work. (There are approximately 2,000 of these facilities.) These facilities have been handled under the general plant informant program. There has been some difficulty in the past in getting a complete list of these facilities. However, the Atomic Energy Commission has promised us an up-to-date list within thirty days.

Mr. Clegg recommended that because these facilities are not given the same status as the Class A facilities, their organizational structure should not be reported, as in the case of Class A facilities. He recommended that as many of the contracts in these plants are of short duration, the present program is sufficient to bring these plants within the plant informant program.

Conference Recommendation:

No change was recommended by the Executives' Conference in the handling of these facilities. The Atomic Energy Commission will be followed closely to secure the up-to-date list which will be submitted to the field.

III. Individuals Classed as "Facilities"  
(Estimated 500)

The Atomic Energy Commission lists approximately 500 individuals as "facilities" because of their present or past association with the Atomic Energy Program which gives them knowledge of restricted data.

Mr. Clegg pointed out that other than furnishing the names of such individuals to the field offices, no action has been taken; that an SAC Letter should be prepared to assure that the field offices have indexed these names. Mr. Clegg pointed out that the Atomic Energy Commission has considered these individuals, who are in possession of highly restricted information, to be of sufficient importance that they are listed as a "facility"; that in fact, the knowledge of these individuals would make them more vulnerable from an espionage standpoint than a building in which some secret work was going on. He noted that if one of these individuals were kidnapped and tortured, there is a probability that spies would be able to learn methods of increasing the efficiency and explosive power of the atomic bomb. Mr. Clegg suggested that the following action be taken concerning these individuals:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

(a) The field office review the Personnel Security Questionnaire at the establishment to determine the background of each of these individuals.

(b) The field office submit the names of these individuals, in the absence of reason to the contrary, to the Bureau with a recommendation that they be personally contacted to arrange with them for immediate notification to the Bureau in the event there are any suspicious approaches to them or any unusual circumstances which would arouse their suspicions, as far as the likelihood of bribery or kidnapping threats is concerned. It should be made clear that the Bureau has no jurisdiction as far as guarding them is concerned, but it should be suggested that they arrange through their secretaries or other appropriate contacts for notification of the FBI in the event of unexplained absence. It is believed unwise for arrangements to be made with the wives and children of such personal "facilities" due to the likelihood that this would create unnecessary fears or hysteria.

(c) Such individuals should be recontacted personally once each six months so long as they remain on this list of "facilities"; that such contacts be merely advisory and consultative, as though the individuals were being developed as sources of information or informants.

(d) The Bureau should give prior approval to any contacts with these individuals, as there are some who should not be contacted. Mr. Clegg felt that although there are some inherent disadvantages and difficulties in this program, since their names have been furnished to the Bureau as "facilities" of the Atomic Energy Commission, something should be done about it and he believes that this represents the minimum which should be done.

It was pointed out to the Conference that many of these individuals have been investigated by the Bureau under the Atomic Energy Act Applicant program. It was noted that the majority of these individuals are scientists including many who are not friendly with the Bureau. It was pointed out that by approaching such individuals, based on the thought that we have a responsibility for them because they are a "facility," our approach can readily be misunderstood, and regardless of how clearly we state our position, we will likely be charged with infringing on the liberties of these scientists or our motives otherwise misinterpreted.



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

It was pointed out that we have had in existence for some time a program dealing with these individuals, namely, the field has been instructed wherever possible and feasible, based on the background of the individual scientists and their reliability, to develop informants within this group for the purpose of advising the Bureau of any approaches to the scientific group for the unauthorized disclosure of information. Where it has been possible to develop informants within this group, they have been listed by the field as atomic energy informants.

Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference, with the exception of Mr. Clegg, recommended that we continue to attempt to develop informants within this group, as we have in the past, and that in our additional instructions to the field, we again stress the importance of developing informants among this group. It was felt that we should not approach these individuals on any other basis and that we should not assume any protective measures concerning them. It was recommended that while the Atomic Energy Commission in the past has immediately called to our attention any incidents involving these individuals for appropriate investigation, it would be desirable to have Liaison contact the Atomic Energy Commission to insure that this group of individuals has been notified specifically to report any attempts to approach them for purposes of bribery or to secure information. The purpose of this contact with the Atomic Energy Commission would be to insure that these people have been placed on notice by AEC.

Mr. Clegg recommended that these individuals be contacted and recontacted each six months in accordance with his suggestion. Mr. Clegg was also in favor of the suggestion that we contact the Atomic Energy Commission, as set out above.

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ACTION:

In the event you approve the above recommendations of the Executives' Conference, the recommendations will be incorporated immediately into an SAC Letter instructing the field.

Liaison is contacting the Atomic Energy Commission to ascertain whether instructions have been given to the individuals listed as "facilities" to report any approaches, etc., to the FBI. If such instructions have not been sent out by AEC, arrangements will be made to have this done.

*Approved I cannot  
too strongly stress the  
necessity for implementing  
this program. H.*

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson



THE DIRECTOR

March 28, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~MEASURES FOR INCREASED SECURITY OF  
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

On March 26, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Ladd, Clegg, Harbo, Tracy, Mohr, Sizoo and Belmont considered certain recommendations of the United States Communications Intelligence Board Security Committee to that Board on measures for increased security of communications intelligence.

Background:

The U. S. Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) has as its members ONI, G-2, Air Force Intelligence, State Department, [redacted] and the FBI. The principal matter of concern is a security of information produced by the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA).

b7E

Information produced by AFSA is disseminated to the various interested members of USCIB. This distribution is becoming increasingly voluminous and reached well over 750,000 items of distribution in September, 1950. The various agencies receiving this information may, within the scope of their own requirements, distribute it as received to certain of its subordinate agencies, such as, the G-2 submitting it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to General MacArthur, and to other foreign U. S. military points. [redacted] Within

b7E

the State Department there is a rather wide distribution. There are at present certain standards of security set forth in the USCIB Directives but it is felt that, with the increased dissemination of this information, it is vitally important for its source to be kept confidential and it is necessary to provide additional security. This is further emphasized by the fact that it is believed important at times to bring the material to the attention of Government agencies which are not members of USCIB and this activity will likely be increased in the future.

The Suggestions:

The suggestions of USCIB are as follows:

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- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

(1) Appoint a full-time Security Officer who would report directly to the Chairman, USCIB, and who should be assisted by a small competent staff.

It is proposed that the USCIB Security Officer will be responsible for keeping USCIB informed regarding major COMINT (Communications Intelligence) security problems; coordinating USCIB security

APR 5 1951

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CC - Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr  
AAB:tlc

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

procedures; assisting the Security Committee in the formulation of security policies; and performing such duties as the Chairman of USCIB may direct. It is further proposed that the Security Officer will be selected from nominations submitted by USCIB members with the following suggested functions: maintain a list of indoctrinated personnel in USCIB member and department agencies; draft the security regulations; with the consent of the Board member representing the department or agency concerned, conduct security surveys; based on the findings of such surveys, recommend to the COMINT Activity surveyed, appropriate action for the improvement of such security procedures; maintain continuous review of all aspects of COMINT security; assist operating Security Officers and serve as a point of reference for difficult security problems; handle all COMINT security problems which arise outside participating departments and agencies.

(2) Issue a basic security manual establishing standards and procedures for all phases of COMINT security.

Inasmuch as the regulations currently enforced by the various USCIB members, while basically similar, differ greatly in the thoroughness with which they set forth procedures for all phases of the COMINT activity, the Security Committee suggests that one of the duties of the proposed Security Officer would be to compile USCIB regulations using as a basis the British-U.S. COMINT agreement, and various USCIB directives which set forth security procedures. In other words, a compilation into a manual of all security regulations which now evolve from the various agreements and which establish such regulations as the USCIB code words, etc.

(3) Direct the USCIB members to study the command control over COMINT to insure that their organizational structure gives those having the responsibility for the protection of COMINT the adequate and overriding authority necessary for COMINT protection.

In connection with this recommendation, the Committee discussed several matters which it felt required further exploratory study by the member agencies, such as the need to obscure COMINT activities by concealing COMINT budgets of the various departments; compartmentation of COMINT in the member agencies; simplifying and centralizing the control of COMINT within the member agencies.

(4) Authorize the USCIB Coordinator to control dissemination of certain sensitive categories of COMINT after approval of each category by USCIB at executive session. This might be accomplished by confining the material to AFSA and nominating a USCIB member representative to inspect them there.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(5) Request the Chairman of USCIB to investigate the possibility of bringing Public Law 513 to the attention of publishers and press representatives through the medium of a special Department of Defense press conference.

(6) Direct the USCIB members to examine and perfect their plans for maintaining security during the possibility of emergency expansion or a large scale moving of their COMINT facilities.

Recommendations:

These suggestions were reported on favorably by the Security Division. Thereafter, Mr. Clegg reviewed the suggestions and agreed with all but the first, namely, the appointment of a security officer.

In connection with the appointment of a security officer, it was pointed out that he would have no power of inspection, but would serve in an advisory capacity to those requesting such service. He would also coordinate and prepare any additional directives or regulations affecting security. It was pointed out that control over the security measures of non-member consumers of USCIB material is desired; that someone needs to be designated for the purpose of coordinating existing security regulations in the form of a basic security manual and no one of the USCIB representatives would have time for such a project. It was further pointed out that there would be no real danger of the security officer of USCIB conducting inspections of the security practices of member agencies, since this would require changes in the basic USC (National Security Council) Directive creating USCIB, and further, the military has indicated they would never agree to such authority on the part of a USCIB security officer.

Mr. Clegg pointed out the following advantages and disadvantages with regard to the appointment of a security officer:

Advantages:

(1) It would place a responsibility on a specific officer for answering inquiries of agencies receiving this confidential material as to how to improve their security and also there would be placed on this officer the responsibility of issuing directives approved by USCIB affecting security.

(2) This would make certain that agencies not members of USCIB are alerted as to the confidential character of the information and as to security measures they should employ. This officer and staff would correlate all the existing instructions into one manual-type communication.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

DISADVANTAGES:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(1) If a Security Officer is established even though his services are presently available only to those soliciting them, the next move might well be to have him inspect the various USGIB members as to security. This the Bureau would not want. It is understood that before this could be done, there would have to be a unanimous agreement in the change of regulations. So the Bureau would not be placed in an embarrassing position, it is believed better not to set up this position which might become potentially dangerous or embarrassing.

(2) It is certainly within the competency of the various departments to establish their own security measures. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff decide on a plan of military strategy, this practice is undoubtedly made known to the three military services, to the White House, State Department, and probably  and thus already there are other matters equally as important which are already being maintained. If one needs advice, they should seek it within the scope of their own organization. b7E

Mr. Glegg recommended that the representatives of the USGIB member groups at a conference each discuss the security measures employed in their respective agencies so that a record can be made of these general measures and it can be circulated if USGIB desires in order to alert the various agencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF  
EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that the Bureau representative to USGIB take the position of approving all the suggestions listed above with the exception of number one, i.e., the appointment of a security officer. The Conference unanimously recommended that a security officer not be appointed, inasmuch as the Bureau's assent to the appointment of a security officer could be interpreted as approving the activities and recommendations of such a security officer which might be difficult to control at some future date.

In the event you approve, the recommendations of the Executives' Conference in this matter will be followed.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Clyde Tolson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE DIRECTOR

April 24, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

~~AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

On April 23, 1951, the Executives Conference, consisting of Messrs. Ladd, Glavin, Mohr, Belmont, Rosen, Casper, Sizoo, Nichols and Parsons, considered the proposal of the Laboratory to purchase 120 automatic encoding machines at a cost of approximately \$2,000 a piece or a total cost of approximately \$240,000. (S) (U)

Over a period of years, the Laboratory has been studying this problem and maintaining constant liaison with commercial and military sources in an effort to find equipment which would suit the Bureau's needs and which was available at a reasonable cost. The Bureau has for many years been using a code book for all radio traffic and a small portion of teletype traffic. Where additional security was needed, cipher pads were used to encipher the code book message groups. The manual system, which the Bureau has employed, is time consuming and, therefore, costly in man hours of the employees involved. Sixteen employees are presently utilized at the Dept of Government alone and the Bureau is now spending approximately \$100,000 per year to code and decode solely the traffic between the field and Dept of Government and this figure does not include the coding of traffic between field offices. (S) (U)

A second disadvantage of the manual system is the delay in handling the traffic since at times of heavy traffic from four to eight hours may be lost in the coding and decoding of messages. (S) (U)

There are two principal types of coding machines. One is known as the "on line" in which the machine is connected directly to a teletype line or transmitter, with such an installation the operator punches a key just as on a teletype machine, but instead of that character going out on the wire, the machine automatically through an arrangement of rotors sends a different letter. The machine on the receiving end, having the same setting, converts it back to and prints the letter that the sending operator punched. This type of machine is not adaptable to the Bureau's use because our radio communication is by Morse code rather than radio teletype, and we are prohibited from using this equipment on teletype circuits without having leased lines and purchasing the teletype equipment at both ends. We are not comfortable with this type of equipment and are satisfied that it is not suitable for the Bureau's communications. (S) (U)

The second principal type is known as "off line" in which the machine is not connected to the radio transmitter or teletype line. (S) (U)

cc: Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

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MAY 18 1951

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MAY 21 1951



Memorandum for the Director 4/24/51

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The operator punches the keys of the encoding machine just as he would a typewriter, but the machine, instead of printing the letters punched, enciphers the letters and prints the enciphered message on a tape. This tape is then used by the teletype or radio operator to send the encoded material. On a similar machine at the other end the operator types the encoded message which comes out in plain text printed on a tape. This type of machine is therefore equally adaptable to our radio, teletype or cable traffic and also to the program which is the encoded air mail communication sent to our legal attaches abroad. These machines are well engineered and have undergone such severe tests as to indicate very little in the way of service needs and no difficult service problems. (S) (U)

The machine proposed for Bureau use, which is known as the AFSM-7, will in the near future go into production by the Burroughs Adding Machine Company on a military contract. A large number is being obtained for the Armed Forces, but the contract is being extended to include machines desired by the FBI, [redacted] and State Department. These machines are far superior to any we have seen in the past. They offer greater security than the SIGABA which is the top military machine at this time. (S) (U) b7E

The use of these machines will not eliminate the code room since it will be desirable for the sake of security and administrative handling of traffic to have coded traffic flow through the code room. There will, however, be a material saving in personnel time. Based on an actual test with the SIGSIN coding machines, we have found that the average message requires approximately 6 minutes to code or decode whereas the manual method we are now using requires 30 minutes per message. We are presently handling 70 messages per day through the code room at the Seat of Government which would mean a saving of 38 man hours per day. The majority of this work is handled by Grade GS-4 employees and the average salary is approximately \$3,000 per year. Consequently, there is a saving at the Seat of Government of \$18,000 per year. Since this includes the coding and decoding of messages from the field, there would be an annual saving in the field for the coding and decoding of this same traffic. Hence, there is a saving of \$24,000 per year on the basis of traffic to and from the Seat of Government alone. The figures for the last full month show that inter-office traffic in the field amounted to 4,140 messages or 144 messages per day. A saving of 30 minutes per message would amount to 72 man hours per day, and although the salaries of the employees in the field are usually somewhat higher, based on the same figure of \$3,000 per year, there would be an additional saving of \$27,000. (S) (U)

Therefore, based on our present traffic, there would be an annual saving in excess of \$51,000 per year. Even though this would pay for the machines in 5 years, I think there is an even more important (S) (U)

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
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- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Memorandum for the Director 4/24/51

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consideration. With our present facilities, we would most certainly bog down with a material increase of coded traffic. Even now there are delays of 4 to 8 hours in the handling of coded traffic, and we are not equipped to handle the burden should a lack of telephone and teletype facilities force us to use our emergency radio network. Mr. Clegg had the personal experience in London of spending many hours through the night together with all the other Bureau employees in London decoding cables from the Bureau and encoding messages to the Bureau in the Cuban Base. Mr. Clegg subsequently observed the greatly facilitated operation in San Juan where we are able to provide the office with one of the SIGRIV units which we borrowed. The increased volume of traffic due to the special investigation of the Nationalist Party flowed smoothly and without delay. An additional factor enters into the picture in that we may in the near future be forced to encode at least a portion of our teletype traffic. Any additional coding that we do will result in an increase of our annual savings over that stated above. (S) (U)

Actually a very small percentage of our present teletype traffic is encoded though all radio traffic is. Obviously, should any emergency cause disruption of the teletype system and cause us to depend on our emergency radio network exclusively for communication, there is not adequate personnel trained to handle the burden. Mr. Nichols also pointed out the probability that a greater portion of our teletype traffic would have to be in code if we are to follow the Presidential directive which is now being worked on setting up minimum standards for security. (S) (U)

The proposal of 120 units includes two machines for each field office with additional units as needed in the Seat of Government and the larger field offices and a few additional units for emergency use on special assignment, possibly for legal attaches, major cases or exchanging with field offices should a breakdown of one machine occur. The Conference considered the possibility of reducing this number by assigning only one machine to some of the smaller field offices. However, this was considered undesirable because (1) there will be definite advantage to the field office to have two machines working simultaneously, using one for traffic transmitted and another for traffic received; (2) in the event of difficulty with one machine they would be able to stay in communication with the Bureau with the remaining instruments; and (3) we may never have another opportunity to obtain machines of this type at least at a reasonable cost. (S) (U)

The purchase will be handled by a transfer of funds to AFSA (Armed Forces Security Agency). The Armed Forces contract with the Hurdroughs Adding Machine Company will specifically state that no machines will be made for the non-military agencies until the military needs have been satisfied. This would mean that the Bureau as well as

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
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- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE DIRECTOR

June 7, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

~~SECRET~~

JOSEPH FELS BARNES Summary  
ESPIONAGE - R.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

The Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Ladd, Harbo, Nichols, Rosen, Tracy, Mohr, Sizoo and Belmont, on June 5, 1951, considered the advisability of placing this subject in the prominent persons category of the Special Section of the Security Index.

Barnes was originally the subject of a Bureau security type investigation initiated in late 1941. In view of the following information, an espionage type investigation was initiated in April of 1950.

Barnes has been engaged in the occupation of writing since 1931, when he became associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations. He has been identified by Jay David Whittaker Chambers (in 1937) and Louis Budenz (July, 1948) as a member of an underground Communist cell and as a hidden Communist, respectively. Alexander Barmine, a former Russian Diplomatic Officer, labeled Barnes and Owen Lattimore as agents of Soviet Military Intelligence in approximately 1935. According to [redacted] on October 10, 1944, the MGB agent "Sergei," was considering the recruiting of Barnes; however, Pavel Fedosimov, head MGB man at the USSE Consulate, New York City, stated that it was inadvisable to recruit Barnes, as it was believed he could be used without recruiting. Past investigation has determined that Barnes had relationships (1942-1947) with suspected Soviet agents, as well as numerous persons sympathetic to the Communist Party and the Soviet Union.

Barnes has recently been appointed to an executive editorial position with the Simon and Schuster Publishing Company, New York City. Barnes is also a part-time member of the faculty at Sarah Lawrence College and lectures publicly. Barnes is not currently associating with the Communist Party or Communist front groups; however, his association with certain persons identified as sympathetic to the Communist Party and Soviet Union continues. These persons include Frederick V. Field, Owen Lattimore, Corliss Lamont and Bartley Crum. Barnes is presently publicly advocating harmony with the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, but approves of the "Marshall Plan" and the Voice of America program concerning which the Communist press has been critical. The strongest material supporting the desirability

of apprehending Barnes in connection with the Security Index program is the [redacted] material which cannot be made available as a basis for justifying the apprehension.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

CC - Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Mohr

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

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Barnes was interviewed by Agents of the Washington Field on April 2, 1950 regarding his association with Owen Lattimore. According to these Agents, Barnes tried to give the impression of being cooperative, but he was evasive and non-specific when asked specific questions.

On May 10, 1950, Barnes testified under oath before an executive session of the HCUA and denied that he was a Communist Party member. However, he admitted that he has been associated with the American-Russian Institute due to the excellent Slavonic Library which that organization maintains.

The Security Division recommended that Barnes be placed in the prominent persons category of the Special Section of the Security Index. Further, that the Department be requested to review this case for an opinion as to whether he should be retained on the Security Index. Copies of reports in this case have been sent to the Department.

Executives' Conference  
Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that Barnes be placed in the prominent persons category of the Special Section of the Security Index and that the Department be asked to review the case.

Attached for your approval is a memorandum to the Department and also a letter to New York instructing that the subject be placed in the prominent persons category of the Special Section of the Security Index at New York and that a summary report by that office be submitted.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

*OK*  
*AD*  
Clyde Tolson

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Tolson

Jan. 5, 1954

Executives Conference

~~SECRET~~

~~THIS INFORMATION IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

AUTOMATIC ENCODING DEVICES - ARSEN-7

On December 29 the Conference, composed of Messrs. Ladd, Glavin, Tracy, Winterrowd, Clegg, Nichols, Belmont, Mohr and Harbo, was advised of the need to train personnel in the maintenance and repair of the new automatic coding equipment now delivered to the Bureau and the need to purchase tools and supplies for maintenance work. The cost for tools and maintenance supplies is estimated at \$2,265; the cost for conducting a two-week training school for 16 radio technicians would be approximately \$5,000 for travel and per diem expenses. The radio technicians would be selected from the three territorial offices and other offices distributed throughout the country. Each of the 16 radio technicians would be responsible not only for maintenance and repair of the coding machines assigned to his office but also for selected nearby offices.

We have now received delivery of 120 coding machines. They were ordered during the 1952 fiscal year and the purchase price of approximately \$300,000 is being defrayed from 1952 funds. The units are well constructed but are quite intricate and can be serviced only by a person who has received special training. The Conference agrees with Mr. Clegg's suggestion that the school be conducted at Quantico since the cost to the Bureau for per diem payments to employees will thereby be reduced by \$861 compared with payments necessary if the class were held in Washington.

Each Bureau field office will be furnished with two of the new coding machines. Use of them at present will be somewhat limited, consisting only of the coding which is currently done manually in connection with our radio traffic and teletype messages. It is not proposed that we make any increase in the amount of coding work handled by the Bureau at this time, since that would require the assignment of additional clerical personnel even with the coding machines. The main reason for the purchase of the coding equipment is to have it available to handle expeditiously a large volume of coded traffic whenever it may become necessary to utilize our CW radio network to handle all urgent communications between the field and the Seat of Government due to temporary unavailability of the regular teletype facilities in an emergency.

Attachment

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

cc - Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Mohr

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In using the equipment, the operator strikes the keys of the encoding machine just as he would a typewriter but the machine, instead of printing the letters struck, enciphers the letters and prints the enciphered message on a paper tape. This tape is then used by the radio operator to send the encoded material. On a similar machine at the other end of the circuit the operator types the encoded message which comes out in plain text printed on a paper tape. This substantially reduces the amount of personnel time required.

For the past two years the Bureau has had 20 coding machines on loan from the National Security Agency and employees of the Armed Services render necessary maintenance and repair of the equipment. However, they are unable to provide such service for the new coding machines at this time. The Conference felt that the Bureau should have its own technicians qualified to service coding machines in order to guarantee that this service would be available in time of emergency when the need to utilize this equipment would be greatest.

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RECOMMENDATION

The Conference unanimously recommends the purchase of \$2265 worth of tools and supplies for repair and maintenance of the 120 automatic coding machines recently acquired by the Bureau; also that a training school be conducted for two weeks at Quantico for 16 selected radio technicians to fully qualify them in the maintenance and repair of the coding machines. Travel and per diem costs connected with this school will amount to approximately \$5000. Attached hereto is a list of the radio technicians proposed as members of this training class. The list also shows the offices to which they are assigned. Upon completion of the course these men will be responsible for maintenance and repair of coding equipment not only in their offices but to adjacent offices so that trained service will be available to all Bureau field offices, each of which will be furnished two automatic coding machines. If approved, it is proposed to start the school on Monday, January 25, 1954.

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KAT

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The Director

~~SECRET~~

July 19, 1954

The Executives Conference

1/3/92

Classified by SP5 CE/JS

Bureau Investigation in Guatemala

Declassify on: OADR  
This classification is dated 4/18/05  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. 4/1/05

The Executives Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Nichols, Trotter for Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Hennrich for Belmont, Rosen, and Mason for Harbo, considered the recommendation submitted by the Domestic Intelligence Division that we assign an agent to Guatemala on a thirty to ninety day basis to look into matters of interest to the Bureau. The Conference recalled that in December, 1951, and early 1952, consideration was given to the assignment of an agent to Guatemala but the assignment was postponed to a more propitious time. Since then, the Bureau has continued to have interests in Guatemala. Indications were received that Canadian and American Communists considered Guatemala to be a potential refuge and allegations were received that Communist fugitives might have gone there. Several American Communists were known to have visited Guatemala and during the last half of Fiscal 1953, of the fifty-two leads sent to State [redacted] Central America, twenty-three of them were in Guatemala. The Conference considered the fact that an agent sent down to Guatemala on a thirty to ninety day basis could (1) obtain pertinent information from available documents and information now in the possession of the Guatemalan Government concerning American Communists; (2) survey the possibility of continued travel of Communists through Guatemala to South America to see if a permanent office is needed; (3) obtain needed information of an intelligence nature concerning the previous allegation that Guatemala was the "espionage center" of North America, and (4) explore the possibility of handling all Bureau leads in Central America out of Guatemala. It was pointed out to the Conference that no difficulty was anticipated with American Ambassador John Peurifoy, who is a good friend of the Bureau's and that SA John J. Mannion who formerly served as Legal Attache in Guatemala and who is acquainted with Colonel Elfege Monzon, a member of the governing junta, is available for this assignment. (S) 4

Messrs. Tolson, Nichols, Rosen and Sizoo were opposed to our sending a representative to Guatemala at the present time because [redacted] and the possibility exists that the Bureau might be blamed for [redacted] They felt that this project should not be undertaken until the situation in Guatemala should become more stable. (S) 4/10A

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Gearty
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

CEH:mpm  
- Mr. Harbo  
- Mr. Sizoo

I share this  
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JUL 22 1954



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Messrs. Boardman, Parsons, Mason, Trotter, and Hennrich were of the opinion we should send a representative to Guatemala now on a thirty to ninety day basis and that SA Mannion would be the logical agent for this assignment. They were of the opinion that it is advisable to have an agent on the ground in Guatemala as soon as possible in order to obtain whatever information may be available concerning the previous allegations that some of the Communist fugitives might have been in that country, bearing in mind the possibility that if these subjects were using Guatemala as a refuge when the revolution occurred they might have been arrested by the anti-Communist Government under fictitious names, or they might have taken asylum in the Mexican Embassy along with other important Guatemalan Communists. They also were of the opinion that the time element is important and that it is desirable to gain access to the documents captured by the new Guatemalan Government before that material is dissipated or becomes obsolete. (S)

If you approve, we will be guided by the recommendations of the majority.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

V  
Clyde Tolson

~~SECRET~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE DIRECTOR

October 18,  
1954

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

8/11/92  
Classified by SP5CE/JS

Info classified per OGA let dated 1/17/05 with 1/17/05

~~MAINTENANCE OF LEGAL ATTACHE AND LIAISON POSTS ABROAD~~

On the morning of October 18, 1954, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Nichols, Boardman, Harbo, Rosen, Parsons, Tamm, Mohr, Sizoo, Holloman and Keay, for Belmont, considered the question of closing our Legal Attache and Liaison Offices abroad, with the exception of the Liaison posts in Ottawa, Canada and London, England.

Mr. Tolson pointed out to the Conference that we are encroaching on the responsibility of the [redacted] by having representatives abroad and that it is possible that at some future time, in the event of overthrow of a government or some similar occurrence, we could be blamed along with CIA for not having had advance information. Mr. Tolson noted that the potentiality for disastrous trouble exists in these posts, [mentioning the Dides affair in France; also,] that some such international incident could very seriously embarrass the Bureau and harm its reputation.

The Domestic Intelligence Division pointed out the extreme value of these posts in connection with our internal security responsibilities and domestic intelligence activities. It was pointed out that this coverage is solely in connection with our internal security responsibilities and that during the last war there were many instances of subversives entering the United States without any advance notice to the Bureau. Even though the discovery of subversives abroad is the responsibility [redacted] in the event such persons enter the United States and damage results, it would be inevitable that the Bureau would be blamed. It was further noted that our foreign offices have been invaluable from the standpoint of developing the Bureau's contacts and friendships among important persons. Also, extremely productive results are evidenced by the fact that for the first six months of the current fiscal year, 131 fugitives have been located and recoveries totaling \$153,312.00 have been made, chiefly in Mexico. Note was also made of the locating and handling of extremely important fugitives such as Gus Hall, one of the original Smith Act subjects.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

CG - Mr. Sizoo  
Mr. Harbo

VPK:tlc  
58 OCT 22 1954

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EX-12

INDEXED-20

OCT 22 1954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12033



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The Domestic Intelligence Division noted that although problems do arise in these foreign offices and the potential for embarrassing situations does exist, it is a fact that we have operated Special Agents abroad since 1940 and have been able to handle any incidents that have arisen without serious embarrassment to the Bureau.

The Executives' Conference all felt that the offices of the Legal Attaches and Liaison representatives abroad should be continued, except Mr. Tolson, who was in favor of discontinuing all offices with the exception of Ottawa, Canada and London, England. Mr. Nichols felt that we should continue as at present but not expand our foreign offices further.

If you approve the views of the majority of the Conference, we will continue the offices of the Legal Attache and Liaison representatives abroad on the same basis as at present.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

✓  
Glyde Tolson

I want this re-evaluated March 1.  
As I have doubts as to desirability of  
continuing Legal Attaches except at  
London, Ottawa + maybe Mexico  
City.

H. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Nichols

August 8, 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Redacted]

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6  
b7c

SUGGESTION 347-54  
MADE BY [Redacted]  
SAN ANTONIO OFFICE  
and  
SUGGESTION 348-54  
MADE BY WILLIAM R. SNOPE  
SAN ANTONIO OFFICE

306,696 + 323,013  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2-20-92 BY SP5/BJA/Def

FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
SEE FILE 100-129-(218-52)

BACKGROUND:

In Executives' Conference memo of 8-5-54, captioned as above, it was recommended and approved that the Communications Section follow Bureau experience with AFSAM-7 breakdowns for six months and then reconsider these suggestions. Machines have now been in operation for six months. (S) (U)

Suggestion 347-54 was to use code words to refer to AFSAM-7 code machines being in or out of service rather than making use of an encoded message for this purpose. (S) (U)

Suggestion 348-54 was to use radio Q-signals for the same purpose.

In reference memo it was pointed out that the Laboratory Division recommended no action be taken relative to these suggestions until experience demonstrated the extent or existence of a problem; that the Cryptanalysis-Translation Section favored for this use two additional groups in C Code Books representing phrases indicating AFSAM 7 machines operative and inoperative. (S) (U)

RECONSIDERATION OF SUGGESTIONS BY RECORDS AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

Plain text code words are not considered to offer any security. Further, a minimum rate teletype involved payment for a three-minute period regardless of whether one word or a half page message is sent. Therefore, the use of plain text code words to advise of operating condition of code machines is not suitably secure and offers no definite advantages.

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(3)  
#306696 2/20/92  
#323013  
Classified by SP5/BJA/Def  
Declassify on: OADR

66-2534-1

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50 SEP 16 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INITIALS ON ORIGINALS

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-129-3371

August 8, 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Communications Section, on basis of experience favors use of two additional code groups in Code C representing phases indicating operating condition of AFSAM 7 code machines. These two code groups would greatly shorten coding and decoding time of messages used to notify of condition of machines. Since AFSAM 7 code machines were put into general use there have been only two occasions when both code machines of an office have been inoperative simultaneously. There is no real problem which forces us to take the calculated risk of using insecure procedures. (S)

Suggestion to use radio Q-signals to advise offices of operating condition of code machines not secure. In addition, would be useful only to office reporting its machines out of order because all offices cannot be contacted by radio in very short time under any but real war emergency conditions requiring 24-hour CW radio coverage in all offices. Suggestion, therefore, is impractical.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That suggestion 347-54 and 348-54 be considered unfavorably.

(2) That the Communications Section be authorized to select, add to Code C and put into use two code groups to indicate satisfactory or unsatisfactory operating condition of AFSAM 7 machines as follows:

28699	-	WIRFQ	-	AFSAM 7-s	-	Inoperative.
28640	-	WILSH	-	AFSAM 7-s	-	In Service

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Addendum by Training and Inspection Division 8/15/55 - hcc. - 2 -

Training and Inspection Division agrees. Background memorandum enclosed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. TOLSON

August 26, 1955

THE EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

2/12/93  
Classified by SP5 cu  
Declassify on: OADR  
323,013 Feb 6 1976

323,013 & 306,096  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2-19-92 BY SP-5 cu/dfg

WAR PLANS -  
FIELD RELOCATION

On 8/24/55 the Executive's Conference, consisting of Messrs. Boardman, Belmont, Harbo, Mohr, Parsons, Rosen, McGuire, Trotter, and Sizoo, considered problems involving field relocation.

It was pointed out to the Conference that most Bureau field offices will be facing the same problem of relocation as is the Bureau, in that Civil Defense in most headquarters cities is planning a general exodus of the city in an emergency, in which event there will be no cross-town traffic and all traffic will flow out of town. The basic problem for the field is having sufficient communications facilities and records with which to operate at the relocation site. The Conference was advised that from a practical standpoint field offices being comprised of trained personnel in an emergency are capable of temporarily operating without Bureau records except for the programs calling for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations (Prodip) and the program calling for the detention of individuals dangerous to the security of the United States (Detcom). These programs require specific records to insure their efficient operation.

The Conference was advised that 72% of the Security Index subjects are in the New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington Field, and Newark Offices, which offices are also believed to be the focal points for prospective espionage and sabotage activities, and, therefore, would have need for at least basic communications facilities.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

- JEN:dje (11)
- 1 - Mr. Nichols
  - 1 - Mr. Boardman
  - 1 - Mr. Harbo
  - 1 - Mr. Mohr
  - 1 - Mr. Belmont
  - 1 - Mr. Parsons
  - 1 - Mr. Cox
  - 1 - Section Ticker
- 519-SEP-11 1955  
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SEP 31 11 59 AM '55

SENT DIRECTOR 8/31/55

MAILED

Executives Conference Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A laboratory survey of the relocation sites of the above eight offices has disclosed that CW (code) radio facilities could be installed at the relocation sites of these offices for an estimated cost of \$22,350.00 plus an estimated 64 man days of engineering time and the necessary per diem. It was brought out to the Conference that to insure maximum security of radio communications, and to speed up encoding and decoding time AFSAN 7 coding machines, costing an estimated \$2,500.00 each, would be needed for relocation use at each of the above eight offices.

Executives Conference Recommendation

The Executives Conference was unanimous in its recommendation on each of the following points:

(1) That there be prepared by the Bureau and made available to each field office an additional set of the Security Index cards pertaining to the subjects residing in each field office. This set of Security Index cards is to be placed in the personal custody of the Senior Resident Agent in the Resident Agency wherein the best security is available near the field office relocation site. This index is to be kept current by the field office, forwarding to the Resident Agent in question, through the mail, revised or changed cards as they are received by the field office from the Bureau. In the event of field relocation, the Senior Resident Agent, with appropriate guard, is to transport this index to the field relocation site, it being contemplated that the office will have insufficient time and inadequate guard force to transport the Security Index now at headquarters city to their relocation site in an emergency.

(2) Inasmuch as only the New York and Washington Field Offices are primarily concerned with the program calling for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations (Prodi), the New York Office be instructed to make available to the Senior Resident Agent having custody of the above Security Index one set of instructions for carrying out this program together with a list of individuals to be taken into custody under the program. This material would be kept current on a monthly basis. The Washington Field Office will place similar information as well as their additional copy of the Security Index pertaining to their office in the confidential records repository at the Bureau relocation site.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Executives Conference Memorandum for Mr. Tolson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(3) That during the next fiscal year, funds being available, there be installed at the New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington Field Office, and Newark Office relocation sites a CW (code) radio station and that there be placed in the custody of the Senior Resident Agent having the emergency copy of the Security Index for each of these offices, ~~AFSAH 7~~ cryptographic materials. It is estimated that these radio and cryptographic systems for these eight offices will cost \$42,350.00. (S)

Only if there are available funds. LBN

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the attached SAC letter go forth advising the field that a set of Security Index cards will be made available to each office in the near future. This index to be placed in the personal custody of the Senior Resident Agent in a Resident Agency affording utmost security and instructing the field that no confidential records should be transported from the field office to the relocation site even in an emergency without maximum security in the form of an appropriate guard force.

(2) That the attached letter to the New York office, copy to Washington Field, go forth instructing the New York Office to place in the personal custody of a Senior Resident Agent at a secure Resident Agency one copy of the instructions pertaining to, and lists of individuals to be apprehended in connection with, the program calling for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations. Washington Field is to send similar records to the Bureau relocation site. Both offices are to keep these records current monthly as is done with similar records now at the Bureau relocation site.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : *[Signature]* Tolson

DATE: 9/8/55

FROM : R. T. Harbo

~~#306,696 2/19/93~~  
~~# 323,013~~

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 347-54

Made By   
San Antonio Office  
AND

SUGGESTION NUMBER 346-54  
Made By William R. Swope  
San Antonio Office

FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS  
TO DISSEMINATION  
SEE FILE 66-679 (7-18-52)

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_ b6
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_ b7C

The following two suggestions are up for reconsideration per Executives Conference August 5, 1954:

### SUGGESTION NUMBER 347-54:

"It is suggested that when the machine coding device of a field office is out of operation plaintext code words be used in teletypes to advise other field offices to discontinue or to commence the use of machine coded communications with the office having the defective machine.

It is proposed that one code word, such "Xray" would mean "Bureau Codes," one word, such as "Less" would mean "out of order" and another word, such as "Plus" would mean "in service again."

For example: Washington is advising all offices by teletype to discontinue use of machine coded communications with San Antonio: "XRAY. LESS SAN ANTONIO." When San Antonio's machine coding device is back in service, the Bureau is advising "XRAY. PLUS SAN ANTONIO," and this is then relayed by Washington to the other offices."

The advantage claimed was that personnel in offices receiving these messages sent by the suggested method would be able to save some time in coding and decoding routine messages of this nature. Disadvantages are that adoption of the suggestion would involve another Bureau code which would be insecure and undesirable.

Executives Conference recommended that no action be taken but that the matter be reconsidered after experience with the new coding equipment.

*306,696 & 323,013*  
*8-19-55*  
*spsc/ks*

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(2) **63 SEP 16 1955**

**SEP 13 1955**  
**SEP 13 1955**



9/8/55

SUGGESTION NUMBER 348-54:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"1. San Antonio Office has machine coded radio traffic for Miami. When San Antonio advises San Diego (relay station) that there is traffic for Miami and the coding machine of Miami is inoperative, it is suggested San Diego advise: "QXX MM," - QXX signifying the coding device at Miami is out of service and another coding system or another means of communication should be employed. The signal "QXY" could signify Miami is back in service.

2. It is also suggested that if this idea is adopted, "Q" signals for this purpose be added to the "Q" signal list in effect."

Assistant Director Parsons suggested that there would be very little need for adoption of this suggestion when the new AFSAM 7 machines went into use because there would be few instances in which both machines would be inoperative. The Executives Conference also recommended that this suggestion be reconsidered at a later date. (C)


OBSERVATIONS:

Mr. [ ] of the Records and Communications Division has reconsidered both the above suggestions and recommends that neither of them be adopted. The plain text code words, suggested in suggestion #347-54, are not secure and the same is true of the radio Q-signals suggested in suggestion #348-54. Mr. Downing of the Cryptanalysis-Translation Section and Assistant Director Parsons agree with Mr. [ ] Mr. Nichols also agrees with Mr. [ ] views. b6 b7C

Mr. [ ] originally suggested, in reconsidering the above suggestions, that the Communications Section be authorized to add to Bureau Code C two code groups to indicate satisfactory or unsatisfactory operation condition of AFSAM 7 machines. Mr. [ ] has since withdrawn this suggestion, pointing out that while these code groups would save 3-4 minutes on both sending and receiving ends of the message, our security might be broken if someone mistakenly sent one of these code groups unenciphered. Mr. Downing and Assistant Director Parsons agree with this position. (C)

R. T. Harbo memo for Mr. Tolson

9/8/55




RECOMMENDATION:

That no change be made in our Bureau procedure of fully encoding teletype messages to all field offices when notifying them that both AFSAM 7 machines in a particular office are inoperative. Experience has shown these occasions to be so rare that no problem is involved.

(C)

RTHB

*V. J. ...*



(U)

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: August 26, 1955

FROM : THE EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

~~SECRET~~

8/12/93

SP5 Ci

SUBJECT: ~~WAR PLANS -~~  
~~FIELD RELOCATION~~

~~FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO DE RELOCATION~~

46-17380-(7-18-52)

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On 8/24/55 the Executive's Conference, consisting of Messrs. Boardman, Belmont, Harbo, Mohr, Parsons, Rosen, McGuire, Trotter, and Sizoo, considered problems involving field relocation.

It was pointed out to the Conference that most Bureau field offices will be facing the same problem of relocation as to the Bureau, in that Civil Defense in most headquarters cities is planning a general exodus of the city in an emergency, in which event there will be no cross-town traffic and all traffic will flow out of town. The basic problem for the field is having sufficient communications facilities and records with which to operate at the relocation site. The Conference was advised that from a practical standpoint field offices, being comprised of trained personnel, in an emergency are capable of temporarily operating without Bureau records except for the programs calling for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations (Prodis) and the program calling for the detention of individuals dangerous to the security of the United States (Detcom). These programs require specific records to insure their efficient operation.

The Conference was advised that 72% of the Security Index subjects are in the New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington Field, and Newark Offices, which offices were identified to be the main points for prospective espionage and sabotage activities, and, therefore would have need for at least basic communications facilities.

ATTACHMENTS  
JEM:aje (11)

- 1 - Mr. Nichols
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Harbo
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Trotter
- 1 - Mr. McGuire
- 1 - Mr. Sizoo
- 1 - Mr. Winterrowd
- 1 - Mr. Tele. Room
- 1 - Mr. Holloman
- 1 - Mr. Gandy

FOR APPROVAL  
SENT DIRECTOR  
8-30-55

RECORDED  
INDEXED

66-2554-12375

RECORDED  
176 OCT 12 1955 ~~SECRET~~

Classified by 4472  
Exempt from GDS, Category 3  
Date of declassification indefinite  
8/21/76

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Executives Conference Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

~~SECRET~~

A laboratory survey of the relocation sites of the above eight offices has disclosed that CW (code) radio facilities could be installed at the relocation sites of these offices for an estimated cost of \$22,350.00 plus an estimated 64 man days of engineering time and the necessary per diem. It was brought out to the Conference that to insure maximum security of radio communications, and to speed up encoding and decoding time AFSAM 7 coding machines, costing an estimated \$2,500.00 each, would be needed for relocation use at each of the above eight offices. (S)

Executives Conference Recommendation

The Executives Conference was unanimous in its recommendation on each of the following points:

(1) That there be prepared by the Bureau and made available to each field office an additional set of the Security Index cards pertaining to the subjects residing in each field office. This set of Security Index cards is to be placed in the personal custody of the Senior Resident Agent in the Resident Agency wherein the best security is available near the field office relocation site. This index is to be kept current by the field office, forwarding to the Resident Agent in question, through the mail, revised or changed cards as they are received by the field office from the Bureau. In the event of field relocation, the Senior Resident Agent, with appropriate guard, is to transport this index to the field relocation site, it being contemplated that the office will have insufficient time and inadequate guard force to transport the Security Index now at headquarters city to their relocation site in an emergency.

(2) Inasmuch as only the New York and Washington Field Offices are primarily concerned with the program calling for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations (Prodip), the New York Office be instructed to make available to the Senior Resident Agent having custody of the above Security Index one set of instructions for carrying out this program together with a list of individuals to be taken into custody under the program. This material would be kept current on a monthly basis. The Washington Field Office will place similar information as well as their additional copy of the Security Index pertaining to their office in the confidential records repository at the Bureau relocation site.

OK  
CONFIDENTIAL  
SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Executives Conference Memorandum for Mr. Tolson

~~SECRET~~

(3) That during the next fiscal year, funds being available, there be installed at the New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington Field Office, and Newark Office relocation sites a CW (code) radio station and that there be placed in the custody of the Senior Resident Agent having the emergency copy of the Security Index for each of these offices, AFSAM 7 cryptographic materials. It is estimated that these radio and cryptographic systems for these eight offices will cost \$42,350.00.

4-25-56  
Tamm - 7-1-56  
Atch  
to Tolson

DIV L T B  
RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the attached SAC letter, <sup>go forth</sup> advising the field that a set of Security Index cards will be made available to each office in the near future. This index to be placed in the personal custody of the Senior Resident Agent in a Resident Agency affording utmost security and instructing the field that no confidential records should be transported from the field office to the relocation site even in an emergency without maximum security in the form of an appropriate guard force.

2-6-56  
prob

OK.  
PS.

Letter to many SAC w/o - 2/20/55

(2) That the attached letter to the New York office, copy to Washington Field, go forth instructing the New York Office to place in the personal custody of a Senior Resident Agent at a secure Resident Agency one copy of the instructions pertaining to, and lists of individuals to be apprehended in connection with, the program calling for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations. Washington Field is to send similar records to the Bureau relocation site. Both offices are to keep these records current monthly as is done with similar records now at the Bureau relocation site.

OK  
✓  
- 3 -

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR

July 16, 1956

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

DEFENSE PLANS - FIELD RELOCATION

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

On July 12, 1956, the Executives Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Nichols, Hennrich for Belmont, Mason, Callahan for Mohr, Conrad for Parsons, Rosen, Trotter for Tamm, and J. E. Edwards, considered the problem of equipping 8 selected offices with radio transmitters and AFSAM 7 coding equipment at their relocation sites, so that in an emergency they would have basic communications facilities in order to operate. These 8 offices handle 72% of the Security Index subjects. The offices involved are: New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington Field, and Newark.

The Bureau has previously approved that in these 8 offices copies of the Security Index cards for each office be kept in the personal custody of the Senior Resident Agent closest to the relocation site, wherein the best security is available, so that in an emergency, under conditions where the field office records are not available, the office can operate from its relocation site. The Bureau has also approved that New York and Washington Field Office have available at their relocation sites instructions regarding the program for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations.

Under conditions of emergency where the normal field office records and communications are not available, it can be

- CEH:LL
- (8)
- CC: Mr. Mason
- Mr. Nease
- Mr. Boardman
- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Roach
- Mr. McArdle
- 1 yellow copy

RECORDED  
INDEXED  
66-2554-12476  
JUL 17 1956

59 JUL 20 1956

EX-109

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY: Sp-5C/def  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Memorandum to the Director  
from the Executives Conference

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

anticipated that the normal commercial communications available at the relocation sites will not be adequate to handle the communications needs of the offices; therefore, in these 8 key offices, the conference considered whether radio communications should not be made available so that they will be there for use in an emergency.

10  
A  
The majority of the conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Mason, Callahan for Mohr, Rosen, Trotter for Tamm, and Edwards, were opposed to the expenditure of \$22,350.00 for the radio installations, plus \$20,000.00 for the coding machines - a total of \$42,350 for the installation of radio and coding equipment to be available at the relocation sites. It was their opinion that the anticipated needs for this equipment did not justify the expenditure at this time. (S) (U)

The minority of the conference, consisting of Messrs. Boardman, Nichols, Hennrich for Belmont, and Conrad for Parsons, recommended the installation of radio equipment at the relocation sites and the placing of coding equipment in the custody of the Senior Resident Agent closest to the relocation site, in order that in an actual emergency field offices could operate from the relocation sites and send and receive communications under secure conditions, with their own independent equipment, without having to rely upon commercial equipment, which may well be nonexistent. (S) (U)

**RECOMMENDATION:**

If you agree with the majority, no further consideration will be given to this matter at this time.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



18

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE RETREAT  
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA  
3/22-25/92

COMMENTS BY: INSPECTOR IN-CHARGE JOHN E. GUIDO AND  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT PAUL DALY  
INTERNATIONAL POLICE TRAINING (IPT)

JOHN GUIDO

We really have not had an International Police Training (IPT) Program before. We have had basically a stovepipe approach with many Divisions doing their own thing. Things were operationally driven as needed. Starting with the breakup of the Soviet Union people started asking us for help. A working group was formed to better answer the challenge. We have been trying to address the requests that are pouring in. Questions have arisen as to, what are we doing?, what are other countries doing?, and how can we get it funded?

PAUL DALY

In addition to the FBI, there has been a lot of interest in IPT by other agencies. [REDACTED] The Department of State is interested in what other countries are doing in this regard. Whatever we do should be an "add on" and not just money taken from somewhere else. We must look at the Foreign Relations Act and protect the rights of the individual.

b7E

The question has been raised, why are these other countries seeking this help from us. The United States has an interest in protecting the rights of the people in the new emerging countries and also we want these other countries to help us with our investigations as needed.

(Director Sessions made the observation that if these other countries want law enforcement assistance from us, we need to make it clear to them that they need to quit doing what they have been doing to us from an FCI standpoint. Mr. Greenleaf asked what the "vision" is for the next 2-5 years concerning IPT. He noted that we have had no requests for funding. Director Sessions noted that this should be done for FY 1994.)

(John Collingwood noted that Congress is looking for leadership in this area and that there is support out there for IPT.)

(Director Sessions asked if there is any vision to bring people back to the National Academy. Mr. Daly responded "no." Mr. Daly summarized that what we do internationally must be much more closely coordinated than in the past. John Guido concluded that we now need to know how to organize IPT and how to fund it.)

(Recorded in the first person although not an exact transcription)

The Attorney General

March 13, 1992

Director, FBI

INTERNATIONAL POLICE TRAINING (IPT)

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The purpose of this memorandum is to update you on recent initiatives taken by the FBI as a result of recommendations given by an IPT Working Group established at FBI Headquarters during the past year. The Group's recommendations focus our efforts to consolidate and coordinate past and current IPT requests, as well as to establish a framework upon which the FBI's future IPT policy can be based. As a result of implementing those recommendations, the following results have been realized:

• A team of Agents and professional support employees from the Criminal Investigative Division, Intelligence Division, Training Division, and the Office of Liaison and International Affairs, referred to as the International Training Action Team (ITAT), under the guidance of Associate Deputy Director W. Douglas Gow, has been established. The objectives of this team are:

1. To develop a system to receive, assess, prioritize, and coordinate all requests for IPT received by the FBI.
2. To assess the effectiveness of current IPT programs.
3. To effect liaison with other Executive Branch agencies involved in IPT.
4. To make policy recommendations regarding the FBI's future role in the IPT effort.

1 - Mr. Clarke  
2 - Mr. Gow  
1 - Mr. Daly  
1 - Mr. Greenleaf  
1 - Mr. Chase  
1 - Mr. Hartingh  
1 - Mr. Hogan  
1 - Mrs. Munford  
GEG/eab (13)

1 - Mr. Guido  
1 - Mr. Giaquinto  
1 - Mr. Grotz

The Attorney General  
Re: International Police Training (IPT)

° Since the FBI's current IPT initiatives are not centralized, the ITAT has created a computerized program to gather and analyze data on all past, present, and proposed IPT programs. Data is in the process of being gathered from several control files and from surveys of each FBIHQ division.

° With the assistance of the Information Management Division, a single control file, with appropriate sub files for each foreign country that has requested FBI training, has been established.

b7E

° A communication is being prepared to selected Legal Attaches to determine the nature and extent of host country training initiatives with other countries. This principally addresses the initiatives by Western European countries toward the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The information received from the Legal Attaches will be compared with that received through Interpol channels to get the most complete picture of training initiatives by other countries.

° Unit Chief [redacted], Forensic Science Training Unit, Laboratory Division; SSA [redacted], Economic Crimes Unit, White-Collar Crime Section, Criminal Investigative Division; and Operations Research Analyst [redacted], Training Division, have been selected as the FBI representatives to the assessment team which will be traveling to Poland in late March or early April. It is anticipated that this assessment will act as the model for determining the needs of other Eastern European countries as well. We are working closely with Office of International Affairs Deputy Director John A. Harris in preparation of this trip.

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b7C

As further aspects of this initiative evolve, you will be advised.

February 25, 1992

Director Sessions:

RE: INTERNATIONAL POLICE TRAINING (IPT)

The purpose of this note is to update you on the recent initiatives taken as a result of recommendations offered by the IPT Working Group. By memorandum dated January 14, 1992 (copy attached), numerous recommendations were offered in an effort to consolidate and coordinate past and current IPT requests as well as to establish a framework upon which future IPT policy could be based. Since that memorandum was written, the following results have been realized:

° A team of Agents and professional support employees from CID, INTD, Training Division and OLIA, referred to as the International Training Action Team (ITAT), under the guidance of Special Assistant Paul V. Daly, has been established. The objectives of this team are:

1. To develop a system to receive, assess, prioritize and coordinate all requests for IPT.
2. To assess the effectiveness of current IPT programs.
3. To effect liaison with other Executive Branch agencies involved in IPT.
4. To make policy recommendations re the FBI's future role in the IPT effort.

° Since the FBI's current IPT initiatives are not centralized, the ITAT has created a computerized program to gather and analyze data on all past, present and proposed IPT programs. Data is in the process of being gathered from several control files and from surveys of each FBIHQ division.

1 - Mr. Clarke  
2 - Mr. Gow  
1 - Mr. Daly  
① - Mr. Greenleaf  
1 - Mr. Guido  
1 - Mr.   
1 - Mr. Grotz  
GEG/lavl (8)

b6  
b7c

° With the assistance of the Information Management Division, a single control file, with appropriate sub files for each foreign country that has requested FBI training, has been established.

b7E

° A communication is being prepared to selected Legats to determine the nature and extent of host country training initiatives with other countries. This principally addresses the initiatives by Western European countries toward the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth Republics. The information received from the Legats will be compared with that received through Interpol channels to get the most complete picture of training initiatives by other countries.

° Unit Chief Roger N. Amrol, Forensic Science Training Unit, Laboratory Division; SSA [redacted] Economic Crimes Unit, White-Collar Crime Section, CID; and Operations Research Analyst [redacted] Training Division, have been selected as the FBI representatives to the assessment team which will be traveling to Poland in mid-March. It is anticipated that this assessment will act as the model for determining the needs of other Eastern European countries as well. Details of this trip, sponsored by U.S. Department of State and coordinated by the Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, are still being developed.

b6  
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As further aspects of this initiative evolve, you will be advised.

W. D. Gow

*Enclosure*

**EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE RETREAT**  
3/22-25/92


Information Topic: **Status of Digital Telephony Program**

- The President approved a legislative initiative to compel the telecommunications industry (common carriers, switch manufacturers, cellular phone companies, etc.) to make voice/data/image transmissions available to law enforcement upon presentation of a court order.
- Details concerning the funding are being worked out.
- The Attorney General and Director have embarked upon personal contacts with key members of Congress to expedite the legislative thrust.
- Complementary action to reduce/negate the threat of encryption has been postponed until next year.
- The fallback position--increased surreptitious entries--is being rigorously pursued. Personnel and monetary resources have been enhanced.

■



b3

- A systems approach is being pursued:
  - Creation and staffing of an Advanced Telephony Unit to address the entire range of issues.
  - Creation of a Technical Programs Unit to re-educate Technically Trained Agents and Electronics Technicians to practice in the digital world (the latter group to be able to assist the Agents in certain matters) and professionalize technical training.
  - 
  - Fast-track projects--many being pursued at the National laboratories--to increase capabilities for surreptitious entries.



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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1,6-ISM/DIPLO)  
DATE 08-25-2015 BY: C87W44B73

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR

JUNE

April 20, 1950.

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

[Redacted]

18/93 # 323013  
# 306696  
Classified by *[signature]*  
Declassify on: OADR

b1  
b3

The Executives' Conference, Messrs. Ladd, Tracy, Harbo, Clegg,  
Carlson, Mohr, Nease, Glavin and Belmont in attendance on April 19, 1950, was  
advised that [Redacted]  
Agency. [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Conference unanimously approved that the first method  
described above be utilized. This would be handled in the same manner as the  
installation of a technical surveillance. The attached letter to the Attorney  
General requests authority to place the [Redacted]  
approved. [Redacted]

To: [Redacted]  
Ladd [Redacted]  
Clegg [Redacted]  
Glavin [Redacted]  
Nichols [Redacted]  
Rosen [Redacted]  
Tracy [Redacted]

Harbo CC - Mr. H. H. Clegg  
Mohr Mr. J. P. Mohr  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Sandy Attachment

INDEXED - *[initials]* 66-2554-7683

~~SECRET~~

AHB:tlc *[signature]*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

In the event you approve, appropriate steps will be taken to set up this coverage and Admiral Stone, who has been advised that the Bureau is considering this matter, will be advised appropriately by Liaison of action taken.

(S) (U)

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

4/21/50  
S.A. R.W. Lawrence  
cleared with [redacted]  
re [redacted] Office with  
[redacted] coverage plus  
Dr

(S) (U) O.K.  
H.

b6 Per FBI  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1,6-ISM/DIPLO)  
DATE 08-25-2015 BY: C87W44B73

2/18/93  
#323,013 + 306,696

MR. TOLSON


Classified by SP5CJ/bca 10/2/58  
Declassify on: OADR

THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE


JUNE

The Executives Conference of September 24, 1958, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Tamm, Belmont, Parsons, Trotter, Rosen, Holloman, Nease and Mohr, considered a proposal of Inspector H. L. Edwards, who is inspecting the Cryptanalysis Section of the Laboratory

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The Conference unanimously recommended the approval of the following recommendations made by the Inspector. EX - 132 REC-12 100-2554-12669



2. That the Bureau discontinue decrypting any of this teletype traffic and that the manpower utilized on this work be diverted to other cryptanalysis-translation problems confronting the Cryptanalysis Section of the Laboratory.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

JPM:DW


(5) ~~51 OCT 7 1958~~

1 - Mr. Tamm  TELETYPE UNIT  
1 - Mr. Clayton  6 OCT 9 1958

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

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~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~