



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

October 6, 2021

JOHN R. GREENEWALD JR.  
SUITE 1203  
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD  
CASTAIC, CA 91384-4520

FOIPA Request No.: 1364028-000  
Subject: Strategic Defense Initiative  
(1983- Present)

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552

☐ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(2)

☒ (b)(3)

50 U.S.C., § 3024 (i)(1)

☐ (b)(4)

☐ (b)(5)

☒ (b)(6)

☐ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☒ (b)(7)(C)

☐ (b)(7)(D)

☒ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (b)(8)

☐ (b)(9)

Section 552a

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (k)(1)

☐ (k)(2)

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667 pages were reviewed and 14 pages are being released.

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☒ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency (ies) [OGA].
- ☒ This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. "Part 1" of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. "Part 2" includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. "Part 3" includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel  
Section Chief  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

This is the final release of information responsive to your FOIPA request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.

Inquiries regarding your Other Government Agency (OGA) referral(s), designated within the release as "Referral/Direct," may be directed to:

Department of Defense  
Office of Freedom of Information  
1155 Defense Pentagon (OSD Mailroom – Room 3C843)  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

Duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.

## FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

### Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

### Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

### Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit [www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records](http://www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records).
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at [www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks](http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks). Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at [www.edo.cjis.gov](http://www.edo.cjis.gov). For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check.

## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.


### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault

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The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are  
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages  
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1364028-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 5  
Page 9 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 16 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 17 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 18 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 22 ~ Duplicate;

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TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
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Date 4/29/88

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: [redacted] CI-1B)  
ROOM 4425)

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FROM: SAC, MOBILE [redacted]

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)  
AUBURN UNIVERSITY

[redacted]  
(OO: MOBILE) 4663-

[redacted]

*mlb*

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

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Re telcon of 4/27/88 between SA [redacted]  
Mobile Division and SA [redacted] FBIHQ. *ML*

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and four copies of an LHM pertaining to above captioned matter as requested during above referenced telcon.

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 5)  
2 - Mobile  
WLO/dw  
(4)

*1-4425  
1 encl - SDI, PACE wither  
1 encl - [redacted]  
1 encl - 4505  
1 encl - [redacted]*

*563  
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[redacted]

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*4410*  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60267/MS/EP/mt  
REASON: 1.6 (2+1)  
DECLASSIFY ON: X 1+1

12 MAY 19 1988

*5-6*  
ENCLOSURE

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Approved: *W. H. AT* Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_ (Number) \_\_\_\_\_ (Time) Per \_\_\_\_\_

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
AS SHOWN OTHERWISE~~



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~

Mobile, Alabama  
May 2, 1988

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)  
AUBURN UNIVERSITY

This communication is classified ~~"Secret"~~ in its entirety, unless otherwise noted.

In December, 1986, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, the Space Power Institute Building on campus connected to the Leach Nuclear Science Center. Established in 1985 through a multi-million dollar contract from the Office of Innovative Science and Technology, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), the Space Power Institute at Auburn University is charged with researching increased power capacity in space equipment and vehicles. Named to direct the center was [REDACTED] former [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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Auburn was designated the lead institution of five universities to conduct power-based research for the nation's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Auburn's part of the four-year \$19 million contract was \$5.7 million.

Other member universities in the Non-Nuclear Space Power Consortium with Auburn are the University of Texas at Arlington, Polytechnic Institute of New York, Texas Tech University, and the State University at Buffalo, New York.

The power technology required for SDI space-based defense weapons, advanced manufacturing technology and long-term manned space programs is well beyond the current technology. Researchers at these five universities are working to increase power while decreasing the size and weight of the power source.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] ON 4/3/06

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)  
AUBURN UNIVERSITY

"Capacitor technology will play a major role in the power of all proposed SDI weapons concepts as well as the housekeeping, auxiliary electronics and communications equipment in spacecrafts", said [redacted]

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"The desirability of high energy density storage for use in the SDI has prompted a general search across many technologies for ways to store more energy in smaller packages."

"If we plan to use these (capacitors) in space, it will be necessary to get away from the crude and relatively bulky techniques that are the norm now," said [redacted], one of the AU Electrical Engineering faculty members working on the project. "When you're talking about orbiting banks on these devices the size of filing cabinets, you can appreciate the difference that's involved if the size can be reduced to that of a typewriter."

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Researchers hope to make the effect of power technology on spacecraft dynamics more predictable. The researchers are planning to establish achievable energy storage densities and develop an efficient switching technology for onboard electronics. Problems related to the need for housekeeping power will also be studied.

A second major SDIO contract from the Office of Innovative Science and Technology was awarded to Auburn in 1986 through the Naval Surface Weapons Laboratory. The \$9.9 million four-year contract, one of the largest single contracts in the University's history, allows for research in three key areas - materials, microelectronics and space simulation. It also created at Auburn the Center for Advanced Technology, directed by [redacted]

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During 1986-87, numerous newspaper articles concerning SDI research at Auburn University (AU), Auburn, Alabama, appeared in newspapers published in major cities throughout the United

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STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)  
AUBURN UNIVERSITY

States. Many of the articles were syndicated and contained detailed accounts of the amount and type of SDI research being conducted at AU. One article made reference to AU contracts and claimed that the NASA contracts would place the school "at the cutting edge of space technology". Alabama State Senator HOWELL HEFLIN announced that the Space Power Center at AU would help "begin the development of a cadre of engineers and physicists which will provide the crucial talent pool for the space program for years to come." AU was listed as one of seven universities in the nation to receive funding for new centers and one of two which would conduct research in the area of space power.

Prior to media attention given to SDI Researcher Contracts at Auburn University, the Soviets revealed no interest in AU and there were no Soviet visitors to the area.

On March 8, 1988, [redacted] appeared at AU for the purpose of lecturing to students about the Numerical Analysis Library at Moscow State University. [redacted] departed Auburn, Alabama on March 10, 1987 en route to San Diego, California.

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During March, 1987, the Mobile Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation learned that [redacted] [redacted] Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., planned to accept a bronze plaque. The Soviets expressed no interest in the plaque and did not attend the 1985 conference at AU. Suddenly, in 1986, [redacted] contacted representatives of AU and expressed an interest in visiting Auburn to obtain the bronze plaque. The contact was initiated by the Soviets without any contact from officials of AU. The Soviet request to visit Auburn did not occur until two years after their original invitation and after extensive media coverage of SDI projects at the University.

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During 1986, AU began receiving extensive publicity regarding their participation in the SDI research projects. Without any prior communication, [redacted] personally contacted an official of AU during December, 1986, and expressed an interest in the bronze plaque. [redacted] traveled to AU and met with the University President on March 19, 1987, at which time the

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STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)  
AUBURN UNIVERSITY

plaque was presented to the Soviets. [ ] expressed an interest in establishing a Soviet Exchange Student Program at AU.

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The topic concerning the Exchange Student Program had not been discussed with the Auburn University Administrators prior to [ ] visit. In addition, [ ] expressed an interest in establishing a Soviet Exchange Student Program at the University.

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# Memorandum



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ADD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
ADD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_ b6  
Training \_\_\_\_\_ b7C  
Cong. Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_  
Off. of BEO \_\_\_\_\_  
Off. Liaison & \_\_\_\_\_  
Int. Affs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Off. of Public Affs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

To : [Redacted] Date 11/19/90  
(Attn: [Redacted])  
From : SSA [Redacted]  
FBI Liaison Officer to the Defense Department  
Subject : Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)

On November 15, 1990, liaison was established with Colonel David W. Linn, Counter-Intelligence Coordinator, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), The Pentagon, Room 1E1062, Washington, D.C. SDIO is a major defense entity charged with implementation of the so-called "Star Wars" defense system. Attached is basic information concerning the SDI Program.

It is recommended that 62-122875 be opened as a repository for information concerning this agency.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3/28/00 BY 60267/NLS/CP/mfj

1- ENCLOSURE  
Enclosure

① - [Redacted] Room 5636)  
(Attn: [Redacted])  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
JTY:sem (5)

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*[Handwritten signature]*

# Chapter 1

## SDI Program in Perspective

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This chapter describes the policy associated with the SDI Program, including the rationale for defenses, the implications of the evolving international environment for this policy rationale, recent Presidential decisions on SDI, and recent developments in the definition of defense architectures. Section 1.2.1 describes U.S. efforts in the Defense and Space Talks to pave the way for a cooperative transition to a more stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union based on a balanced mix of offensive and defensive weapons.

### 1.1 SDI in Perspective

The nature of the threat we face has changed and will continue to change over the next decade. In the 1950s and into the 1960s, the United States relied on its virtual monopoly and later its large advantage in nuclear weapons and delivery means and used the threat of massive retaliation to deter a Soviet attack against the United States and its allies. In response to growth in the Soviet nuclear arsenal in the 1960s, the United States gradually moved from a policy of massive retaliation to deter Soviet attack to one of flexible response.

At the same time the Soviet Union was expanding its offensive arsenal, it was deploying air defenses to protect itself against U.S. strategic bombers. The United States also deployed significant air defenses, and both we and the Soviets began development and deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed in 1972 (in the SALT I Interim Agreement and Antiballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty) to limit growth of offensive arsenals, to seek future reductions in offensive forces, and to place significant limits on ABM systems. After the ABM Treaty was signed, the United States made little effort to defend against Soviet strategic nuclear attack, either from ballistic missiles or bombers. Our defensive efforts were basically confined to passive measures, such as hardening of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and critical command and control facilities. We in the United States accepted the premise on which the ABM Treaty was based—that deployment of defenses available in 1972 would spur growth of offensive forces. This led to U.S. acceptance of mutual vulnerability.

We believe, however, that the Soviets have not accepted the condition of mutual vulnerability that was a desired result of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union has continued to expand its air defenses, deployed the world's only operational ballistic missile defense system around Moscow, and developed extensive passive defenses, including reinforced silos to protect its missiles and a civil defense program to protect its leadership. Moreover, the Soviets have long maintained an intensive program to develop advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. The Soviets' refusal to accept mutual vulnerability is further evidenced by the continued growth in the Soviet offensive arsenal and their pursuit of the capability to exercise a nuclear first strike against U.S. military forces. The Soviets continue to invest as much on strategic defenses, including air defense, as they do on strategic offensive forces.

The military challenge presented to us by the Soviets, and our potential to exploit emerging technologies that held the promise of providing effective defenses, caused the United States, in the early 1980s, to begin to rethink its decision to forego defenses

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DATE 4/3/00 BY 60322/NUS/EL/m

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## *SDI Program in Perspective*

against ballistic missiles. Soviet actions pursuant to the ABM Treaty have shown that the hope that the abandonment of significant ballistic missile defenses would eliminate incentives for the Soviets to proliferate offensive forces and encourage offensive force reductions was ill-founded. Second, although technology available in 1972 did not permit truly effective defenses—only ground-based, limited-area defenses using nuclear-armed interceptors which might be easily countered—1980s technology offered the promise of effective defenses that could render ballistic missiles obsolete.

Consequently, in the 1980s the United States responded to Soviet deployments of offensive counterforce weapons and improvements in defensive capabilities by increasing the accuracy, penetration capability, and survivability of our deployed strategic offensive forces and the survivability of critical command, control, and communications assets. We also began to reexamine the potential role of active defenses. Building on several ongoing research and development programs, we established the SDI Program to conduct a broadly based research and development effort to determine the feasibility of effective ballistic missile defenses.

In part, our desire to pursue SDI was based on a survey of the technological capability of the United States. This led to the conclusion that the state of the art in defensive technologies had progressed to the point where it was reasonable to investigate whether these new technologies could permit us to turn to defense to enhance deterrence and provide a more secure and stable long-term basis for deterrence.

The goal of Phase I strategic defenses remains the same—that is, to enhance deterrence of Soviet attack by increasing uncertainty as to the potential to achieve the attack's objectives. If deterrence fails, Phase I defenses could provide some protection of military and civilian targets and, hence, deny certain Soviet military objectives. In addition, the defenses could be very effective in protecting the United States from limited or accidental ballistic missile launches. In this case, Phase I defenses could provide meaningful population protection.

The United States is considering, in its evaluation of options generated by SDI research, the degree to which certain types of defensive systems discourage an adversary from attempting to overwhelm them with additional offensive capability. We seek defensive options—as with other military systems—that can maintain capability more easily than countermeasures could be taken to try to defeat them.

## **1.2 SDI and the Evolving International Security Environment**

The international security environment that the United States faces is changing. As relations between the United States and the Soviet Union improve, some have raised questions as to the need for expenditures on additional U.S. strategic forces, including the SDI Program. We believe that the SDI Program, as well as our strategic offensive force modernization programs, remains critical for ensuring our future security. Furthermore, if the Soviets are sincere about pursuing a defensive military doctrine (and they have taken steps in that direction in the conventional area), they should welcome greater mutual reliance on strategic defenses that threaten no one. Last, the rise of regional powers, some possessing ballistic missile technology and nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads, poses a substantial threat to the United States and its friends and interests worldwide.

Notwithstanding the improvements in United States-Soviet Union relations and announced Soviet intentions to reduce emphasis on military spending, particularly that focused on conventional capability, Soviet strategic modernization continues today at an

impressive pace. Moscow is in the process of modernizing a strategic force which has already been upgraded significantly over the past 10 years. These new Soviet forces—including the SS-18 Mod 5, mobile SS-24, and SS-25 ICBMs, and Typhoon- and Delta IV-class ballistic missile submarines—will allow the Soviets to pose an increasingly diverse and flexible threat to the United States and our allies. And, as previously mentioned, Soviet strategic defense modernization continues at a robust pace.

### *1.2.1 Defense and Space Talks*

The United States wishes to pave the way for a cooperative transition to a world in which effective defenses against ballistic missile attack play an increasing role in ensuring deterrence. The United States is pursuing this objective with the Soviet Union in the Defense and Space Talks.

The U.S. position in the Defense and Space Talks is consistent with and supportive of the objectives of the SDI Program. We seek an agreement that would help provide a stable, predictable basis for developing and testing advanced defenses against ballistic missiles and for deploying such defenses when they are ready. We have rejected Soviet proposals to constrain the SDI Program and Soviet demands that the United States waive or forfeit its existing rights under the ABM Treaty. We must not close off promising avenues of technological research before they yield answers to the fundamental question of whether effective strategic ballistic missile defenses are feasible.

### *1.2.2 SDI and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks*

If negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union continue on their current course, we expect a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement to enter into force in the near future. U.S. strategic defenses would be a natural complement to the offensive reductions of a START Treaty. First, defenses would offer insurance against possible Soviet cheating under a START Treaty regime. This insurance would be particularly important because the reductions resulting from a START Treaty would increase the marginal importance of each offensive weapon and thus the military significance of cheating. Protection against possible cheating would be important given the uncertainties associated with verification of mobile ICBM limits. Strategic defenses are an effective means of addressing the threat posed by Soviet mobile missiles. In addition, because space-based strategic defenses can destroy ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in the boost and post-boost phases, they would provide an incentive to "de-MIRV" consistent with U.S. arms control strategy.

### *1.2.3 Ballistic Missile Proliferation*

Over the next 10 to 15 years, many additional nations will obtain ballistic missile capabilities sufficient to threaten U.S. interests worldwide, our friends and allies, and ultimately the United States itself. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has reported that at least 15 developing countries will be producing their own ballistic missiles by the year 2000. These missiles may be armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

Because of the nature of some of these third world threats, deterrence based on the prospect of offensive retaliation may not be credible or effective, and defenses may be necessary to address them. Furthermore, should a variety of additional nations obtain ballistic missile technology, and the U.S. forces remain unprotected against

### *SDI Program in Perspective*

ballistic missile attack, it would seriously undermine our ability to carry out certain regional policies.

In addition, given the nature of the proliferation threat, there is likely to be an increased risk of accidental or unauthorized launches. Loss of positive control over ballistic missile forces is more likely to occur in the third world because of lack of experience, the absence of adequate physical and organizational safeguards, and the danger of political instability. Our ability to defeat these threats could deter these nations from obtaining such capability in the first place and would provide more flexibility in responding to their use, should deterrence fail.

By undermining the political and military utility of ballistic missiles, defenses would help to dampen the incentives for their proliferation and complement our nonproliferation policies. In the absence of such defenses, the United States could confront the future possibility that the combination of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction could be used against its cities, forces, or allies with relative impunity by emerging powers.

#### *1.2.4 Soviet Uncertainties*

The Soviet Union is undergoing a dramatic process of political change. As we respond to these positive developments, however, we have a responsibility to recognize and address areas that remain unchanged. The current situation is marked by considerable uncertainty, and the Soviet Union remains a nuclear superpower. And while we have indications of reduced Soviet investment in conventional forces, their strategic modernization efforts continue. In short, the opportunities are great, but so are the uncertainties and risks.

These uncertainties and potential dangers for the United States and its allies underscore the need to maintain a robust SDI Program as a precaution against the possibility of instability in the Soviet Union.

### **1.3 Presidential Decisions**

Upon entering office, President Bush called for a comprehensive review of our national security strategy and objectives. In doing so, he pressed the Executive branch to "challenge assumptions" concerning previous national security policies and programs, including SDI.

Based on that review, the President has determined the following:

- The goals of the SDI remain sound.
- Pursuit of the SDI Program provides a hedge against any Soviet decision to expand rapidly its ABM capability beyond that allowed by the ABM Treaty.
- The SDI Program will be conducted in a way that permits the President to make, within the next 3 years, an informed decision on deployment of strategic defenses.
- We will continue to pursue options for layered defenses, composed of both space- and ground-based elements, which offer the promise of meeting the stated JCS requirements for Phase I defenses.

- Particular emphasis should be given to determining the feasibility of promising concepts for effective boost-phase defenses, for example, "Brilliant Pebbles," on an expedited basis. Investigation of particularly promising approaches should be limited by the pace of technical progress rather than by funding. The SDI Program should be configured to permit deployment of layered defenses on a schedule as close as possible to that envisioned in the Five-Year Defense Program submitted to the Congress in January 1989.
- The SDI Program will continue to be conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty.

With his decision to continue pursuing options for layered defenses, the President recognized the leverage space-based defenses would provide by threatening enemy boosters and post-boost vehicles. He also realized that deterrence could be significantly enhanced by a space-based defensive system's ability to create large uncertainty in the results of a structured attack, thereby reducing the likelihood of a first-strike attack.

The President's decisions affirm SDI's goal—to conduct a vigorous research and technology program that could provide the basis for an informed decision regarding the feasibility of eliminating the threat posed by ballistic missiles of all ranges and to increase the contribution of antiballistic missile defense systems to United States and allied security. Deployment of these effective ballistic missile defenses would permit a major shift in our strategy from emphasizing the threat of retaliation to emphasizing direct denial of Soviet war aims, and would provide a true damage-limiting capability for the United States should deterrence fail.

#### **1.4 Recent Developments**

The Defense Science Board (DSB) and the JASONs have recently reviewed the Brilliant Pebbles concept. The groups found the concept innovative and capable, with no fundamental flaws, and deserving of continued support. Both made useful suggestions of technical improvements, which have been incorporated into the program. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) has performed initial cost estimates of the Brilliant Pebbles concept and believes that it could reduce the cost of a Phase I system by at least 20 percent. SDIO believes that these estimates are conservative, especially in light of the opportunities for innovation in manufacturing technology for producing large numbers of identical Pebbles.

The President directed an independent review of the SDI Program. This review is nearing completion. The preliminary results of the study are consistent with those of the DSB and the JASONs—Brilliant Pebbles provides the promise of an innovative approach to space-based defenses. Furthermore, the study recommended ways to export the innovative architectural and technical approach from Brilliant Pebbles to other parts of the Program. The detailed results of the review will be available in the near future.



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Denver, Colorado  
January 30, 1986

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~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
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JAMES FLOYD SCOTT

This communication is classified "~~secret~~" in its entirety.

This investigation was initiated upon learning that Dr. JAMES FLOYD SCOTT, a professor of physics with a specialty in lasers and astrophysics at the UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO (CU), Boulder, Colorado, and [redacted] had forwarded preliminary proposals to obtain funding from the STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE OFFICE (SDI) for research on SDI. (S)

The following information was provided by SCOTT to the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), on June 16, 1982: (S)

SCOTT was invited by the SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCE to lecture and work in the USSR and had done so on several occasions, prior to 1982. In October 1981, on such a visit, he met Soviet citizen [redacted] who acted as his translator. At the time, she was working as a translator at the INSTITUTE OF PHYSICAL PROBLEMS, an affiliate of the SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCE. At that time, her married name was [redacted]. She was divorced on May 15, 1982. SCOTT also divorced his American wife during this same time period. b6 b7C

SCOTT and [redacted] decided to get married in February 1982, and, in fact, were married on September 22, 1982, in Moscow. (S) (u)

Prior to the marriage, SCOTT was aware of the likely difficulties his future wife would have in immigrating to the United States. He believed that she had a security clearance, although, according to her supervisors, she did no sensitive work. It was also noted at the time that [redacted] had studied English at the MOSCOW ENGLISH INSTITUTE for three years, which is also used to teach English to Soviet Intelligence officers. [redacted] was allegedly offered a job by Soviet Intelligence and also invited to join the COMMUNIST PARTY but declined both invitations. (S) b6 b7C

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JAMES FLOYD SCOTT

On August 19, 1982, SCOTT stated he had just completed seven weeks of work in the City of Dushanbe, USSR, commenting this was his third trip to the USSR in that year, all at the invitation of the USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCE.

During his stay in Dushanbe, he was summoned by the Foreign Relations Department (Soviet Intelligence) and confronted by two men identified as [ ] and (first name unknown) [ ]. They advised him they were aware of his intentions to marry a Soviet National and his status in the USSR. They stated that all of his problems would be solved if he submitted full reports in writing. Over a two-week period, SCOTT met with them for a total of 14 hours. The four reports they wanted were as follows: (S)

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- 1) The general feel of physics;
- 2) SCOTT's definition of industrial espionage and a list of U. S. firms working in the field of laser technology;
- 3) SCOTT's earlier visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC);
- 4) SCOTT's previous work at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

SCOTT implied that he had complied with the two requests but had refused to give the other two. It is noted that, while he worked in Los Alamos, New Mexico, SCOTT had a "Q" clearance. (S)

SCOTT and [ ] were married in Moscow on September 22, 1982, and the marriage and a picture of the couple were published in the "DAILY CAMERA," a Boulder newspaper. SCOTT and his wife returned to Boulder and are currently residing in Boulder.

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Since his marriage and return to Boulder, SCOTT has not been receptive to being interviewed by FBI personnel. It is noted that, before his marriage, SCOTT had been interviewed by the FBI regarding his trips to the Soviet Union, and he had been cooperative. (S)

On his return to Boulder, SCOTT joined the Boulder Sister City Project (BSCP). This project was initiated in Boulder with the consent of the Boulder City Council. In January 1984, BSCP adopted the City of Jalapa, Nicaragua, as its sister city. As part of the program, it has cultural exchanges with the City of Jalapa. BSCP members are generally opposed to the current U. S. foreign policy on armaments. In June 1984, SCOTT and his wife traveled to Dushanbe, USSR, carrying an official invitation to Dushanbe city officials to join Boulder as a sister city.

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JAMES FLOYD SCOTT

BSCP prompted the actions since it has been putting on informational and cultural programs about the Soviet Union since its inception in 1983. Upon his return from Dushanbe, SCOTT gave a lecture and slide show on his visit to the USSR. b6 b7C

In 1984, SCOTT also sponsored [redacted] LATVIA STATE UNIVERSITY, USSR, to come to Boulder to do research on laser spectroscopy of crystals. [redacted] did not come to Boulder. [redacted] was also accepted on June 28, 1984, to do research under the IREX Program, sponsored by [redacted] and [redacted] from the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA.

It is noted that SCOTT, unlike other U. S. citizens who have married Soviet Nationals, had no problem getting his Soviet wife out of the USSR and, since then, has returned to the USSR for a visit with his wife and returned to the U. S.

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