



U.S. Department of Justice

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
Washington, D.C. 20535

December 4, 2020

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD JR.  
THE BLACK VAULT  
SUITE 1203  
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD  
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request No.: 1481651-000  
Subject: U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE U.S.

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed 220 pages of records were determined to be responsive to your subject and were previously processed and released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Please see the selected paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☐ In an effort to provide you with responsive records as expeditiously as possible, we are releasing documents from previous requests regarding your subject. We consider your request fulfilled. Since we relied on previous results, additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may request an additional search for records. Submit your request by mail or fax to – Work Process Unit, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, fax number (540) 868-4997. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence.
- ☒ Please be advised that additional records responsive to your subject exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you must advise us that you want the additional records processed. Please submit your response within thirty (30) days by mail or fax to—Work Processing Unit, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, fax number (540) 868-4997. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence. **If we do not receive your decision within thirty (30) days of the date of this notification, your request will be closed.**
- ☒ One or more of the enclosed records were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession.

If this release of the previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may file a FOIPA request with NARA at the following address:

National Archives and Records Administration  
Special Access and FOIA  
8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500  
College Park, MD 20740-6001

Reference file number 62-HQ-116391 serials 41 and 62 in your correspondence.

- ☐ Records potentially responsive to your request were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and they were not previously processed pursuant to the FOIA. You may file a request with NARA using the address above.

- ☐ One or more of the enclosed records were destroyed. Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) , Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.
- ☐ Records potentially responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) according to Title 44 United States Code Section 3301, Title 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Chapter 12 Sub-chapter B Part 1228, and 36 CFR 1229.10.
- ☐ Documents or information referred to other Government agencies were not included in this release.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **"Part 1"** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **"Part 2"** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **"Part 3"** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel  
Section Chief  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

## FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

### Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

### Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

### Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit [www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records](http://www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records).
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at [www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks](http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks). Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at [www.edo.cjis.gov](http://www.edo.cjis.gov). For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check.

## **EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS**

### **SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552**

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

### **SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a**

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.



This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault

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Total Deleted Page(s) = 6  
Page 98 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 99 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 100 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 104 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 105 ~ Referral/Direct;  
Page 106 ~ Referral/Direct;

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz

b6 per FBI

b7C per FBI

Dep. AD Adm. ☒  
Asst. Dir.:  
Adm. ☐  
Comp. Syst. ☐  
Ext. Affairs ☐  
Files & Com. ☐  
Gen. Inv. ☐  
Ident. ☐  
Inspection ☐  
Intell. ☒  
Laboratory ☐  
Plan. & Eval. ☐  
Spec. Inv. ☐  
Training ☐  
Legal Coun. ☐  
Telephone Rm. ☐  
Director Sec'y ☐

TO : Mr. J.B. Adams

DATE: 1/16/75

1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Schwartz

FROM : Mr. W.R. Wannall *Wannall*  
SUBJECT: *President's Commission*  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.

This memorandum reviews statement of CIA Director William Colby before the President's Commission on CIA on 1/13/75 and his similar statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 1/15/75, copies of which are attached and which were provided to the Bureau by Mr. Colby with a request that they be closely held.

In his statement to the President's Commission, Mr. Colby offers his full cooperation and assures the Commission at the outset that the CIA has not conducted a "massive illegal domestic intelligence operation" as alleged in the New York Times article of 12/22/74. Mr. Colby begins his statement by outlining the structure, authority and foreign intelligence mission of the CIA. He then describes the nature of CIA activities in the U. S. to demonstrate the relationship between them and the collection of foreign intelligence. Following this, he discusses the various allegations raised in the New York Times article of 12/22/74 and several subsequent publications. He concludes his statement with some observations aimed at assisting the Commission in making constructive recommendations to improve the procedures governing CIA activities.

The Colby statement to the President's Commission has been reviewed by the Intelligence Division and the following possible inaccuracies have been noted.

On page 25 of the statement the following appears:  
"In 1970, in the so-called Huston Plan, the Directors of the FBI, DIA, NSA, and CIA recommended to the President an integrated approach to the coverage of domestic unrest."

Enclosures

LFS:tdp (6) *tdp*

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 12  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

16 JUN 26 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

62-116391

58 JUN 27 1975

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. J.B. Adams  
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.

The report submitted to the President in 6/70 (referred to as the Huston Plan) proposed for the President's consideration the establishment of an interagency group on domestic intelligence to effect coordination between the various member agencies. Membership in the group was to consist of appropriate representatives named by the Directors of the FBI, CIA, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the counterintelligence agencies of the Army, Navy and Air Force, along with an appropriate representative of the White House. The FBI footnoted this recommendation as follows: "The FBI is opposed to the creation of a permanent committee for the purpose of providing evaluation of domestic intelligence; however, the FBI would approve of preparing periodic domestic intelligence estimates." In addition, out of six other proposals in the Huston Plan, five were opposed by the Bureau in footnotes to the report.

In addition, on page 26 of Mr. Colby's statement it is stated that the Huston Plan was not implemented but an Interagency Evaluation Committee was established chaired by a representative of the Department of Justice and including representatives from CIA, FBI, Department of Defense, State Department, Treasury Department, and National Security Agency. This is not an accurate statement since the group formed was known as the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and the State Department was not represented on it.

Page 37 of Mr. Colby's statement to the President's Commission comments on the allegation in the New York Times article that CIA engaged in the "surreptitious inspection of mail." The statement comments that "From 1953 until 2/73 CIA conducted programs at three sites in the U. S. to survey mail between the U. S. and two Communist countries. Some of this mail was opened to determine Communist censorship techniques or to report the contents of the messages. The main product of this activity was material of an internal security nature, which was disseminated to the FBI."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. J.B. Adams  
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.

If the last sentence of the above quotation refers to the volume of material provided to the FBI from this CIA mail program, it appears to be inaccurate. Beginning in 1958 and not in 1953, the date Mr. Colby states the program began, the Bureau received a substantial amount of information from this CIA operation (referred to in Bureau records as Bureau Source 200). Our records indicate that as of 1/62 CIA was screening approximately 200,000 of 500,000 pieces of airmail going to the USSR each month, of which about 1200 items received "close scrutiny" (an apparent reference to actually opening and reading the communications). Of these items receiving "close scrutiny" at that time, we were receiving approximately 250 - 300 items monthly, all of which originated in New York City, as far as we know.

Classified ~~"SECRET"~~ because it contains information so classified by CIA..

ACTION:

For information. We are continuing our review of Mr. Colby's statements to determine if there may be any other areas of possible inaccuracy and to determine in what way these statements may have a bearing on the Bureau's operations.

HS

WFL

Jm

V

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Callahan <sup>b6 per FBI</sup>  
1 - Mr. Adams <sup>b7C per FBI</sup>  
1 - Mr. Mintz

Assy. Dir. ☒  
Admin. ☐  
Comp. Syst. ☐  
Ext. Affairs ☐  
Files & Com. ☐  
Gen. Inv. ☐  
Ident. ☐  
Inspection ☐  
Intell. ☒  
Laboratory ☐  
Plan. & Eval. ☐  
Spec. Inv. ☐  
Training ☐  
Legal Coun. ☐  
Telephone Rm. ☐  
Director Sec'y ☐

TO : Mr. J.B. Adams

DATE: 1/20/75

FROM : Mr. W.R. Wannall *Wannall*

1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Schwartz *Wannall*

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.

Memorandum from Mr. Wannall to Mr. Adams 1/16/75 reviewed the 1/13/75 statement of CIA Director Colby before the President's Commission on CIA and his 1/15/75 statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee.

On 1/16/75 Mr. Colby forwarded a revised version of his 1/13/75 statement to the President's Commission. Attached is a copy of the revised version in which the changes have been indicated by inserting the original language in italicized type at the points of revision. Most of the revisions are minor in nature and do not materially change the substance of Mr. Colby's original statement. The following significant changes have been noted:

On pages 29 and 30 of the revised statement a paragraph has been inserted describing how in 1967 and ending in 12/68 CIA's Office of Security placed 10 informants in dissident organizations operating in the Washington, D. C., area in order to gather information relating to plans of these organizations for demonstrations and other activities which might endanger CIA facilities. It was previously noted that this information appeared in Mr. Colby's 1/15/75 statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee but was not in his original statement to the President's Commission.

On page 37 the comments concerning CIA's mail survey program have been considerably revised. The original version contained the sentence "the main product of this activity was material of an internal security nature, which was disseminated to the FBI." This sentence has been eliminated from the revised version. This change and other changes in the revised statement result in a more accurate accounting of our understanding of the nature of CIA's mail survey program; however, the revised version still indicates that the program extended

LFS:tdp (6) *tdp*

REC-107 62-116391-84

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CONTINUED - OVER

Enclosure

Classified by 12

Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

53 JUN 27 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE 62-116391



~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. J.B. Adams  
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S.

from 1953 until 2/73 and that the results were shared with the FBI. As noted in our memorandum of 1/16/75, the Bureau did not begin to receive information from the CIA operation until 1958, five years after the date of its beginning.

Classified ~~"SECRET"~~ because it contains information so classified by CIA.

ACTION:

For information.

HS

TWH

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-03-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm.

Dep. AD Inv.

b6 per FBI

b7C per FBI

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 1/6/75

FROM : H.A. Boynton, Jr.

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CIA  
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE U.S.  
SPECIAL INQUIRY INVESTIGATIONS

At 8:30 a.m. 1/6/75 Miss Jane Dannenhauer, Staff Assistant (Security), at the White House called Supervisor R.H. Haynes and advised that Mr. Phillip Areeda, Counsel to the President, had requested full-field investigations concerning Ronald Reagan, Lyman Lemnitzer, C. Douglas Dillon, Edgar Shannon, Jr., and John Connor. The White House desires the results of these investigations by the close of business 1/9/75. Miss Dannenhauer advised that she realized this was an extremely short deadline and that an oral report by that time concerning any substantial derogatory information would be satisfactory. This can be followed up by written reports as time permits.

As to other members of the Commission, we have just recently completed an investigation of Nelson A. Rockefeller in connection with his appointment as Vice President. Miss Dannenhauer asked that we "hold" the investigation of Joseph Lane Kirkland and Erwin N. Griswold pending further advice from the White House. She did not indicate the reason that investigations are not being requested at this time.

The Name Check Section previously furnished, on an expedite basis, background information on these individuals directly to Miss Dannenhauer on the evening of 1/3/75.

## ACTION:

The Special Investigative Division has initiated expedite Special Inquiry Investigations on the above-named individuals.

RHH:tdp (6)

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

- 1 - Mr. Cleveland (Attn: Young)
- 1 - Mr. Gebhardt (Attn: Hetherington)
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Boynton
- 1 - Mr. Haynes

XEROX

JAN 24 1975

FEB 07 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ADDENDUM:

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

RHH:tdp

1/6/75

Miss Dannenhauer called Supervisor R.H. Haynes at 10 a.m. this date and requested that Kirkland and Griswold also be investigated. This is being done.

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten initials]* WVC *[Handwritten initials]* WVC

*[Handwritten initials]* RH

*[Handwritten mark]* 17

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec. \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: 2/14/75

1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar

FROM : W. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

*Rockefeller Commission*

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group) held on the morning of 2/14/75 at CIA Headquarters.

The Group chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various congressional meetings.

At the meeting of the Group on 2/14/75 several items of interest were discussed. They were:

(1) A Secrecy Agreement (copy attached) was presented to Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), with the request that all staff employees of the Committee, which may number as high as 40, be requested to sign. Miller was rather cool to the suggestion and indicated that the SSC and Senator Church would take it under advisement. It is to be noted that this draft of the Secrecy Agreement was prepared by the Security Committee of USIB in concert with Mr. Kevin T. Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice. Although this was considered the final draft of the Secrecy Agreement, the Treasury representative on the Group was hopeful additional language could be incorporated into the Agreement to cover other than classified information such as the confidentiality of Internal Revenue returns.

(2) Memorandum Cregar to Wannall, dated 2/4/75, advised that Mr. Colby, in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence, had been instructed by the White House to identify what information the Intelligence Community felt could not under any circumstances be discussed with a congressional committee.

Enclosures  
62-116395

60 MAR 26 1975  
WOC:ebc  
(6)

NOT RECORDED

48 MAR 3 1975

5 FEB 23 1975  
CONTINUED OVER

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116395-1

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: SENSTUDY 75-  
62-116395

Attached is a copy of the paper Colby provided to the White House responsive to this request. It does encompass recommendations of member agencies of the Group including the FBI.

At a subsequent meeting Mr. Colby had with unidentified persons at the White House, the above list was discussed. Colby recommended the Intelligence Community had three options to deny a congressional committee sensitive information. They were: (A) to refuse providing sensitive information to a congressional committee and face the possibility of a contempt citation, (B) have the President refuse to authorize the release of such information, presumably through the exercise of Executive Privilege, or (C) the President could call the majority and minority leaders of the congressional committee to the White House, furnish to them the answer to the question with the added caveat that they were the only persons being informed of the answers and, therefore, would be personally accountable for any leak of information. Representatives of the White House were not very enthusiastic to the options put forth by Mr. Colby and indicated that they would be calling a meeting at the White House of senior officials of the Department of Defense, Justice Department, CIA and the FBI to review what position the Intelligence Community should take in responding to a request for extremely sensitive and highly classified information.

(3) Members of the Group were allowed to read an internal memorandum from Mr. David W. Belkin, Executive Director of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the U. S. (The Rockefeller Commission), to Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President. This memorandum reports the results of a conversation between Mr. Belkin and Mr. William Miller, Chief of Staff for the SSC. The memorandum revealed that Miller believes that within two weeks his staff will be in three-quarters gear. He plans to have a total staff of about 40, 10 to 12 of whom will be lawyers. The initial work of the staff will concentrate on a review of documents, interviews, and what Miller called "depositions." Miller does not plan to have any hearings of the SSC for several months and believes the September deadline could not be met, rather that the investigation would take at least the rest of the year.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: SENSTUDY 75  
62-116395

Bellin's memorandum also noted that the thrust of the SSC's investigation will include the whole range of intelligence gathering agencies; will delve into the basic matters of policy, including whether or not there is a need for all of the agencies; what the results are; related public policy matters, as well as rights of privacy.

Miller also advised Bellin that the SSC would operate out of a room referred to as "the auditorium," which Miller thought gave the best security. He said there would be rigid standards imposed to seal off any leaks. These standards would include having everything in a central filing area with a specific check-out system permitted to particular people so that if leaks occurred the source of such leaks could be readily ascertained. Xeroxing would be severely limited. In response to a question from Bellin to Miller as to why the Senate and House did not create a joint Senate/House committee as opposed to individual Senate and House Select Committees, Miller advised that it was too difficult to arrange because of matters of protocol.

It is noted that although a House Select Committee is being formed with basically the same charter as the SSC, no chairman of the House Select Committee has been designated and the Group estimates that it will be a month before the House Select Committee can get started.

ACTION:

For information.

WRW/TLM

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten mark]*

February 18, 1975

NOTE FOR MR. ADAMS

Set forth below are responses to questions raised by Mr. Kelley in connection with his review of the statement by Mr. Colby before the Rockefeller Commission on 1/13/75.

The last paragraph, Page 14, and the first paragraph, Page 15, which paragraphs concern the activities of CIA's Domestic Collection Division (DCD), which has representatives in 36 American cities. The last paragraph of Page 14 sets forth that DCD is also responsible for the resettlement of foreign defectors who take up residence in the United States.

With regard to this, in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4 and Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/3, the DCD has been given the responsibility to administer facilities in the United States for the reception, exploitation, rehabilitation, and resettlement of selected defectors and certain other foreign nationals. It should be noted that during the resettlement of these defectors the FBI has access to them if so desired.

The first paragraph on Page 15 refers to information received by DCD representatives which more properly falls within the jurisdiction of other U. S. Government agencies. It notes that when possible the possessors of the information are referred to the appropriate local agency. "In a few cases Domestic Collection Division offices have accepted and passed to CIA Headquarters, for forwarding to the appropriate agency, information about foreign involvement in U. S. narcotics traffic, dissident activities, and terrorism which they learned while conducting their normal collection activity." With regard to the above, Mr. Kelley asked: "When sent to Headquarters--why so? What do they do with it?"

The CIA is structured as a centrally organized organization. Its basic procedure is to receive information at Headquarters, evaluate it, and disseminate it where appropriate to other interested agencies in the form of intelligence reports, memoranda, or teletype reports if appropriate. As a matter of fact, since July of 1974 as a result of discussions held with CIA, DCD local offices have been authorized to pass information to local FBI offices in those instances where the information appears to be of immediate interest to the local FBI office.

ENCLOSURE

53 JUN 27 1975

62-116391

5/AYC



Page 15, Paragraph 2, discusses the Foreign Resources Division (FRD) of CIA, the principal mission of which is to develop relationships with foreigners in the United States who might be of assistance in the clandestine collection of intelligence abroad. "In this process, it also collects foreign intelligence from foreigners in the United States." Mr. Kelley asks: "Foreigners -- Does this mean aliens only?" Mr. Kelley also asked: "Do they inform and clear with us in such cases."

The individuals contacted are aliens either in the United States as officials of a foreign government or as visitors from a foreign government. In the course of developing relationships with such aliens, the FRD may come into contact with U. S. citizens as a means of access to the aliens. Our relationship with the FRD is governed by the February 7, 1966, Memorandum of Understanding with CIA, which provides for the close coordination with the FBI of FRD activities. In brief, this understanding requires that prior to making a recruitment approach to a foreign official in the United States or to a visitor from a communist bloc country or other country of known or presumed interest to the FBI, CIA must obtain the Bureau's prior concurrence for such a recruitment effort.

In addition to the above, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2, which is captioned "Coordination of Overt Collection Activities," has designated CIA, as a service of common concern, to be responsible for the selective exploitation within the United States of nongovernmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.

Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 2/3 levies the above charge on the Domestic Collection Division (DCD) of CIA, which Division conducts an Alien Interrogation Program. Prior to exploiting aliens for purposes of overtly collecting foreign intelligence information, the DCD initiates a name check with us. If we have an operational interest in the alien we then hold discussions with CIA and service any requirements they may have in connection with our exploitation of the alien.

Page 17, Paragraph 1, sets forth the activities of the Office of Security of CIA which has eight field offices located throughout the United States. This includes investigation of all applicants for employment with CIA, actual or potential contacts of CIA, and consultants and independent contractors to determine their reliability prior to their exposure to sensitive matters in dealing with the Agency. Mr. Kelley commented: "This seems to include many possibilities."

In accordance with the provisions of Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/14 concerning uniform personnel security standards and practices governing access to sensitive compartmented

information, the CIA, as do other agencies of the intelligence community, conducts background investigations of its own employees, contractor employees, and other individuals requiring access to classified CIA information prior to the issuance of clearances to these individuals. In the early stages of CIA's development the Bureau conducted the required background investigations of CIA staff employees. With the development of the Security Office of CIA the responsibility for such investigations was taken over by CIA.

Page 26 of Mr. Colby's statement sets forth: "We often queried our overseas stations for information on foreign connections with Americans in response to FBI requests or as a result of our own analyses." Mr. Kelley asked: "What analyses?"

It is believed that these analyses were based on information obtained by CIA through its participation in the Inter-Agency Evaluation Committee. As a result of information obtained and analyses made thereof, it may have been necessary for CIA to query its overseas stations for information concerning possible foreign connections of Americans involved in civil disorders in the United States, without specific requests from the FBI for such queries.

Page 27, Mr. Colby states: "In order to obtain access to foreign circles, the Agency also recruited or inserted about a dozen individuals into American dissident circles in order to establish their credentials for operations abroad." Mr. Kelley asked: "Did CIA inform us of this program?"

A review of our files fails to reflect that CIA advised us of this matter prior to the discussions we have had with CIA officials subsequent to the publication of the Hersh article in "The New York Times" on 12/22/74.

Page 28 concerns the termination by Mr. Colby in March, 1974, of CIA's program to collect counterintelligence information concerning possible foreign links with American dissidents and issued specific guidance that any collection of counterintelligence information on Americans would only take place abroad and would be initiated only in response to requests from the FBI or in coordination with the FBI and that any such information obtained as a byproduct of foreign intelligence activities would be reported to the FBI.

Mr. Kelley asked: "Why was it necessary to so state. This should have been clear from inception."

It would appear that it was not until an extensive review, initiated by former CIA Director Schlesinger and completed by current Director Colby, that the full extent of CIA's domestic activities was appreciated by even the CIA leadership and that when this became evident to Mr. Colby it was his decision to issue these strict guidelines.

Page 28, Mr. Colby states: "In the course of this program, files were established on about 10,000 American citizens in the counter-intelligence unit." Mr. Kelley asked: "Source of the 10,000 story?"

The first public disclosure concerning CIA's maintaining files on approximately 10,000 American citizens was made in the Hersh article which appeared in "The New York Times" on 12/22/74. It is apparent that as a result of review of its records that CIA has determined that the 10,000 figure quoted by Hersh was substantially accurate.

On Page 28, Colby's statement continues: "About two-thirds of these were originated because of specific requests from the FBI for information on the activities of Americans abroad, or by the filing of the reports received from the FBI." Mr. Kelley inquired: "What percentage came from us alone? How many by filing of FBI reports which is not a request?"

The two-thirds figure (approximately 6500) quoted by Mr. Colby appears to be reasonable; however, we are unable to state what proportion of this figure pertains to specific FBI leads or by the filing of FBI reports.

Mr. Colby's statement continues by stating: "The remaining third was opened on the basis of CIA foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information known to be of interest to the FBI." Mr. Kelley commented: "A weak excuse or explanation."

By way of a possible explanation, CIA being aware of the FBI's responsibilities and interest in any foreign connection of American dissidents would be alert to provide such information to the Bureau developed abroad as a result of its foreign intelligence or counterintelligence responsibilities. It would seem that if such information was developed, or came to CIA's attention, they would conduct some investigation to substantiate the information and then send it to us. They would most likely open a file on individuals on whom they had developed the information to act as a repository for the information and in anticipation of a possible follow-up request from us for additional investigation.

Page 28, Mr. Colby states: "In May, 1970, the Department of Justice provided us with a machine tape listing of about 10,000 Americans. The listing could not be integrated in CIA files and was destroyed in March, 1974." Mr. Kelley asks: "What's this--why couldn't they integrate--why destroy after four years."

This refers to the machine listing of names which was provided to CIA by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Unit (IDIU) of the Department of Justice. We were not aware of IDIU's furnishing such a listing to CIA prior to being so advised by Assistant Attorney General Silberman in a conference with Bureau representatives in early January, 1975. It is our understanding that the list was prepared and furnished to CIA by former Departmental attorney [redacted] who headed the IDIU. As to why CIA could not integrate this list with its own computer system, we are not aware of the reason but it is possible that the machine listing was not compatible with CIA's computer system. It would appear that the machine listing was destroyed in March, 1974, at the same time that Mr. Colby learned of and terminated some of the domestic activities of CIA.

b6 per FBI

b7C per FBI

Page 36, Paragraph 2, states: "The Agency has conducted physical surveillances on our employees when there was reason to believe that they might be passing information to hostile intelligence services. This was done on rare occasions, and in recent years only three times--in 1968, 1971 and 1972. In 1971 and 1972, physical surveillance was also employed against five Americans who were not CIA employees. We had clear indications that they were receiving classified information without authorization, and the surveillance effort was designed to identify the sources of the leaks." The Director asked: "Shouldn't such matters be given to us for investigation?"

We are not aware of the specific instances of physical surveillance conducted by CIA on their own employees in 1968, 1971 and 1972, however, believe the investigations were conducted based on leaks of CIA classified information, as were the investigations against five Americans who were not CIA employees.

Unauthorized disclosure of classified defense information may be a violation of the espionage statute, one which we have investigative jurisdiction. However, we do not initiate investigation of such matters unless specifically requested to do so by the Department. When such matters are referred to us by other agencies we require [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] This information is then referred to the Department for its advice as to whether we should initiate investigation. The Department has concurred in our handling of "leak" cases in this manner.

b7E per FBI

The above policy was initiated in 1962 as we found that prior to that time we were basically being used as a dumping grounds by the other agencies to conduct investigations, with no possibility of prosecution, and the end result of uncovering lax security practices or over-talkative personnel in these agencies.

There are provisions for each agency to handle unauthorized disclosure of its classified information set forth in National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (7), "Protection of Intelligence and of Intelligence Sources and Methods."

"The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice of the members of the United States Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Each department and agency shall remain responsible for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization. Each shall also establish appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that agency of intelligence information or activity. The Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate; to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or of intelligence sources or methods. A report of these investigations, including corrective measures taken or recommended within the departments and agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for review and such further action as may be appropriate, including reports to the National Security Council or the President."

While it would appear that CIA's activity with regard to investigations of unauthorized disclosures by its own employees were valid investigations under the Directive, the investigations of five Americans were not. A possible explanation as to why such investigations were undertaken could be that when the Director of Central Intelligence received a report on the five Americans who were receiving classified information without authorization, he realized that [redacted] required by the Department prior to authorizing investigation by the FBI could not be satisfied and, therefore, ordered CIA to proceed with the investigation mistakenly relying on his charge to protect intelligence sources and methods as his rationale for justifying the investigations.

b7E per FBI

W. R. Wannall

*WRW*

*Ky Jm*

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

*myself  
notes on CIA  
statement - Give to me  
when Callahan et al  
come in for  
revisit -*



CLARENCE M. KELLEY  
DIRECTOR

Pg. 14 - Look at

Pg. 15 - 1<sup>st</sup> H - When sent  
to Hdqtrs - Why so - what  
do they do with it -

Pg. 15 - "Foreigners" - Does  
this mean client only -  
Penultimate

H 2 - Look sentence -  
Do they inform & clear with  
us in such cases -

Pg. 17 - H 1 - This seems to  
include many possibilities

Pg. 26 - what analyses -

Pg. 27 - Did CIA inform us  
of this program.

Pg. 28 - Why was it necessary  
to do this - This should have  
been clear from inception.

(2) Source of 10,000 story?

(3) What percentage came from  
us alone? How many "by  
filing of FBI reports which is  
not a request.

ENCLOSURE

62-46391-

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. J.B. Adams

DATE: 2/19/75

FROM : Mr. W.R. Wannall *WRW*

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

*Activities in US*

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. B.J. White  
1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Branigan  
1 - Mr. Cregar  
1 - Mr. Schwartz

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

On 2/13/75 Mr. David Blee, Deputy to the Deputy Director for Operations, CIA, furnished Liaison Officer L.F. Schwartz the attached copy of a draft memorandum entitled "CIA Support of the FBI in Operations Against Foreign Intelligence Targets in the United States," which Mr. William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), proposes to furnish to the Rockefeller Commission. Mr. Blee explained that during his presentation before the Commission Mr. Colby made reference to CIA's having provided technical support to the FBI. Several of the Commission members expressed interest in this and asked Mr. Colby for more details. As a result, Mr. Colby has prepared the attached draft memorandum, but before giving it to the Commission, has requested that it be reviewed by the Bureau. According to Mr. Blee, Mr. Colby would welcome any changes the Bureau may wish to make.

The draft has been reviewed by the Intelligence Division in coordination with the Laboratory Division and the following changes are suggested which it is believed will result in a more accurate account of the background of CIA's technical support of the Bureau:

## PARAGRAPH 1

This paragraph has been revised as follows:  
The Agency has within the past few years developed a closer working relationship with the FBI in support of their intensified efforts to penetrate, technically, foreign intelligence targets in the United States. This cooperation arose from the fact the FBI did not have sufficient sophisticated technical equipment needed for the penetration of these targets, nor did it have funds available

Enclosures  
LFS:tdp (7)

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED - OVER

Classified by 12  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

5 FEB 27 1975

ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE



~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. J.B. Adams  
RE: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

to acquire such equipment. Knowing the CIA had developed, in the course of its operations abroad, such equipment, the FBI sought CIA support to meet certain technical requirements in these penetration efforts.

PARAGRAPH 2

The first complete sentence of this paragraph, appearing on page 2 of the attached draft, has been revised as follows:

The White House then refers these proposals to CIA for the DCI's consideration and, if appropriate, for the provisioning of funds for technical equipment and other support for unusual items.

In addition, it is being suggested that the last sentence of paragraph 2 be deleted.

PARAGRAPH 3

The second sentence has been revised as follows:  
CIA projects a continuation of such support to the FBI against foreign intelligence targets in the United States.

~~Classified "SECRET"~~ since it contains information so classified by CIA.

ACTION:

If approved, Mr. Blee will be advised through Liaison of the Bureau's proposed changes in the draft memorandum. For convenience, there is attached a retyped version of the CIA draft which incorporates the above suggested changes.

*yes* *Tull* *Bjw/j* *ok* *gma* *JH* *waw* *Blue classified* *SP-13* *1/25*

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Dep. Dir. ☒  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. ☐  
Comp. Syst. ☐  
Ext. Affairs ☐  
Files & Com. ☐  
Gen. Inv. ☐  
Ident. ☐  
Inspection ☒  
Intell. ☒  
Laboratory ☐  
Plan. & Eval. ☐  
Spec. Inv. ☐  
Training ☐  
Legal Coun. ☐  
Telephone Rm. ☐  
Director's Sec'y ☐

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall *Wannall*

DATE: 2/25/75

1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Branigan  
1 - Mr. Cregar  
1 - Mr. Boynton  
1 - Mr. Schwartz

FROM : H.A. Boynton, Jr. *Boynton*

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) *Activities Within The U.S.*

On 2/19/75 Liaison Officer L.F. Schwartz met with Mr. James Angleton at his request. He indicated that he desired confidentially to advise the Bureau concerning his recent appearance before the Rockefeller Commission. Angleton stated that he had appeared before the Commission for approximately 2½ hours, furnished a prepared statement and responded to questions from the Commission members and staff representatives. Angleton was accompanied by his two deputies, Raymond Rocca and N. Scott Miler, neither of whom were questioned on that day but who made later appearances before the Commission. Angleton observed that he was treated most courteously by the Commission, particularly by Vice President Rockefeller. He sensed that the Commission members are approaching their duties very seriously and are sensitive to suggestions in the press that the Commission was handpicked to "white wash" the CIA. He noted further that the Commission staffers (whom he described as typical bright young attorneys who are trying to make names for themselves) while not antagonistic, appear to have a less friendly attitude than the Commission members and tend to adopt a "cross-examiner's attitude" in their questions. *(S)*

Angleton advised that in his statement and in his responses to questions, he specifically denied that he or his staff had any knowledge of or responsibility for any domestic surveillances, wiretaps or break-ins as alleged in the Hersh article or as admitted to by Mr. Colby. He asserted that the only portion of the Hersh allegations for which he had any responsibility was the mail intercept program (known as the Hunter Project). In his statement to the Commission, he noted that this program was initiated by another CIA element in 1953 and that supervision of it was taken over by Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff in 1955. He noted that throughout its existence the mechanics of the mail *(S)*

LFS:tdp (8) *tdp*

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 3764

Exempt from GDS, Category 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAR 11 1975

5- *Self*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

10/26/89  
Classified by SP4ELW/KSA  
Declassify on: OADR  
C. A. 88-182-6

62-99724  
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall  
RE: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(U) intercept program were handled by CIA's Office of Security. Beginning in 1958, according to Angleton, pertinent portions of the product of this program were disseminated to the Bureau, such dissemination continuing for many years and totaling thousands of separate items of information. He explained how the material was forwarded to the Bureau through a special secure channel and was given particularly secure handling by the Bureau. He indicated that the program developed a number of items of information which were of significant value to CIA and the Bureau and he indicated that from time to time the Bureau would alert CIA to the names of individuals or categories of individuals of interest to the Bureau who might come to CIA's attention through this coverage. As an example, he cited to the Commission a blind memorandum from the Bureau which was transmitted to him in 1972 with a notation that attached was a list of the types of traffic the FBI would like to receive. Angleton's comments concerning the Hunter Project appear to be essentially accurate. (S)

(U) In his statement to the Commission, Mr. Angleton asserted further that his Counterintelligence Staff conducted no activity which had not been approved specifically by higher authority. He further indicated that all counterintelligence information developed by CIA affecting U. S. citizens or internal security matters was as a matter of routine disseminated to the FBI or in some instances to other U. S. agencies with copies of such dissemination also going to the FBI. (S)

(U) The remainder of Angleton's statement is a forceful defense of the role of counterintelligence in the protection of the national security. He advised the Commission that beginning in the Summer of 1973, for reasons never explained to Angleton, the leadership of CIA began a severe compression of the role of the Counterintelligence Staff, reducing its complement of personnel by one half and transferring some of its functions to other CIA components. Angleton expressed most strongly his conviction that the closest cooperation between the FBI and the CIA in counterintelligence matters (S)

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall  
RE: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CENTRAL  
\* INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(U) is essential and he expressed personal satisfaction in having participated in the encouragement of such cooperation which he stated exists and is most effective. He cited published reports of Director Kelley's remarks (reported in the press 10/74) warning of the rising problem posed by steadily increasing numbers of hostile intelligence representatives in the U. S. and indicating that the Bureau planned to seek additional Special Agents to handle the increasing counterintelligence problem. Mr. Angleton's statement includes the following comment, "We concur with Mr. Kelley and believe that there has been a severe decline in the effectiveness of U. S. counterintelligence both domestically and overseas." (S)

(U) Mr. Angleton noted further that similar statements were submitted to the Commission by Mr. Rocca and Mr. Miler. Mr. Miler's statement questions why, to date, the leadership of CIA has not seen fit to dispel the false allegation in the Hersh article that Angleton and the Counterintelligence Staff were responsible for or even knowledgeable about the domestic activities (other than mail intercepts) which CIA has recently admitted. In his statement Mr. Miler also lamented the lack of support currently existing in CIA for the value of counterintelligence operations. (S)

(U) Mr. Angleton emphasized that he was furnishing the above to the Bureau on a strictly confidential basis stating that he had not furnished copies of his statement or Mr. Rocca's or Mr. Miler's statements to the Commission to Mr. Colby nor had he been requested to. Mr. Angleton indicated that he would be most happy to cooperate if it were desirable to discuss the above comments with any appropriate Bureau official. He noted further that in response to a Commission request for suggestions of names of responsible and knowledgeable potential witnesses, Angleton furnished the names of Bronson Tweedy and Thomas Karamessines, former CIA officials, and former Special Agent Sam Papich, who handled Liaison with CIA. (S)

Classified "~~SECRET~~" because it contains information so classified by CIA.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall  
RE: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

ACTION:

For information.

*Tul*

*VPS*

*[Signature]*

*SBA*  
*080*

*wfai*

*K*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

DATE 10-24-2016

BY: [REDACTED]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams

b6 per FBI

b7C per FBI

Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_

Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_

Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_

Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Ident. \_\_\_\_\_

Inspection \_\_\_\_\_

Intell. \_\_\_\_\_

Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_

Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_

Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Training \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/10/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

FROM : W. J. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

6/1/81 CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 PMV/mac/lmdc Mr. Cregar  
REASON - FCIM II, 1-2.4.2. 2  
DATE OF REVIEW... 3/10/95... [REDACTED]

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, (hereafter referred to as the Group), held on 3/7/75.

The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees.

At the meeting of the Group on 3/7/75 the following items were discussed:

Congressman Robert McClory has been designated as the minority leader of the House Select Committee. Copies of the annexes prepared by various members of the Intelligence Community have been delivered to both the majority and minority leader of the House Select Committee. Congressman McClory is very security conscious, is concerned that sensitive relationships are not inadvertently disclosed during forthcoming hearings and according to Mr. John Clarke appears to have no questions regarding FBI authority to engage in domestic surveillances. CIA has prepared a draft letter to Senator Church releasing CIA employees from any obligations imposed upon them by CIA's Secrecy Agreement (draft copy furnished the Legal Counsel Division). Prior to releasing the letter to Senator Church, CIA is having it reviewed by the White House to determine if they have any objections to its content.

CIA anticipates that staff employees of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will have direct access to CIA buildings but will not have direct access to CIA files or CIA personnel. Arrangements for the staff of the SSC to interview CIA personnel will be made through Mr. John Clarke.

WOC:ebc  
(17)

NOT P  
170 APR 9

CONTINUED - OVER

56 APR 11 1975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

LEGAL COUNSEL

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, and Mr. John Warner, General Counsel, CIA, will have a meeting with the Counsel of the SSC on Tuesday, 3/11/75, to work out precise wording for a Secrecy Agreement that all members of the SSC staff have agreed to sign.

On 3/10/75 the staff of the SSC will convene to develop a list of requirements that they expect to levy on all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. Hopefully Mr. Clarke will have some information on these requirements prior to the time they are levied on the individual agencies.

(U) As a result of Mr. Colby's appearance before the House Government Information in Individual Rights Subcommittee, Government Operations Committee, 3/5/75, CIA is getting many, many, calls from Senators and Congressmen asking how they can find out whether CIA has a file on them and what its contents are. Mr. Clarke noted that members of the Group should anticipate receiving similar calls from Congressmen. (S)

(U) Mr. Hank Knocke, who heads up the CIA task force responsive to the Rockefeller Commission, advised that staff members of the Rockefeller Commission have been issued CIA badges, occupy CIA office space, and have authority to personally contact any CIA employee without clearing such contact with CIA officials. In addition, the Rockefeller Commission staff employees have been granted access to CIA files. After reviewing these files, if the staff decides to make certain portions of the files a matter of official Commission business, CIA has a right to excise the names of any sensitive sources. In the event information contained in these files originates with another Agency of the Government CIA has insisted and the staff concurs that the originating Agency must be consulted before such information can be released to the staff. (S)

(U) Mr. Knocke also advised that it is his understanding that both Mr. Kelley and Mr. Colby will receive in the mail shortly a request from the Commission to prepare a joint response covering the activities of foreign intelligence officials in the U. S. (S)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

(U) CIA as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community is concerned over requests received by [redacted] under the Freedom of Information Act. Treasury, National Security Council, Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA, State Department and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), have received requests from [redacted]. According to Mr. Clarke, a meeting will be convened by the OMB involving interested parties in an effort to coordinate a response. Mr. Colby, in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence, is very concerned that in responding to [redacted] requests one Agency does not deny providing information to [redacted] that another Agency expects to give [redacted]. To date the Bureau has not received a request from [redacted] under the Freedom of Information Act. ~~(C)~~ b6 per FBI b7C per FBI

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WZW/twz

*[Handwritten signature]*  
msc

*This may possibly be considered a conspiracy to deny FOI rights. We should avoid all such implications.*

*Noted by [redacted] & Legat Council  
3/14/75  
JCF*

~~(C)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

### BACKGROUND MATERIAL

#### I. Introduction

The FBI's counterintelligence program was developed in response to needs at the time to quickly neutralize organizations and individuals who were advocating and fomenting urban violence and campus disorder. The riots which swept America's urban centers, beginning in 1965, were quickly followed by violent disorders which paralyzed college campuses. Both situations led to calls for action by alarmed Government leaders and a frightened citizenry.

#### II. Tenor of the Times

An Associated Press survey noted that, during the first nine months of 1967, racial violence in 67 cities resulted in 85 deaths, injuries to 3,200 people and property damage of over \$100,000,000. The February, 1970, issue of "Security World" stated that during the period January 1 to August 31, 1969, losses specifically traced to campus disorders amounted to \$8,946,972.

In March, 1965, then Senator Robert F. Kennedy predicted more violence in the South and North after Congress passed voting rights legislation. Kennedy said, "I don't care what legislation is passed--we are going to have problems... violence."

62-116391-18  
ENCLOSURE

A United Press International release on December 5, 1967, quoted Pennsylvania's Governor Raymond P. Shafer as warning that "urban disaster" in the form of "total urban warfare" is waiting in the wings to strike if the race problem is not solved in the Nation's cities.

Attorney General Ramsey Clark reported to President Johnson on January 12, 1968, according to the "Washington Star," that extremist activity to foment "rebellion in urban ghettos" has put a severe strain on the FBI and other Justice Department resources. Clark called this "the most difficult intelligence problem" in the Justice Department.

A United Press International release on February 13, 1968, stated that President Johnson expected further turmoil in the cities and "several bad summers" before the Nation's urban problems are solved.

### III. Calls to Action

President Lyndon Johnson said in a television address to the Nation on July 24, 1967, in describing events that led to sending troops to Detroit during that city's riot, "We will not tolerate lawlessness. We will not endure violence. It matters not by whom it is done, or under what slogan or banner. It will not be tolerated." He called upon "all of our people in all of our cities" to "show by word and by deed that rioting, looting and public disorder will just not be tolerated."

In a second address to the Nation in just three days, President Johnson announced the appointment of a special Advisory Commission on

Civil Disorder to investigate origins of urban riots. The President said that this country had "endured a week such that no Nation should live through; a time of violence and tragedy." He declared that "the looting and arson and plunder and pillage which have occurred are not part of a civil rights protest." "It is no American right," said the President, to loot or burn or "fire rifles from the rooftops." Those in public responsibility have "an immediate" obligation "to end disorder," the President told the American people, by using "every means at our command. . . ."

The President warned public officials that "if your response to these tragic events is only business-as-usual, you invite not only disaster but dishonor." President Johnson declared that "violence must be stopped--quickly, finally and permanently" and he pledged "we will stop it."

House Speaker John W. McCormick said on July 24, 1967, after conferring with President Johnson that the President had told party leaders that "public order is the first business of Government." The next day, Senator Robert C. Byrd advocated "brutal force" to contain urban rioting and said adult looters should be "shot on the spot."

On April 12, 1968, Representative Clarence D. Long of Maryland urged J. Edgar Hoover in a letter and in a public statement to infiltrate extremist groups to head off future riots and said FBI Agents "could take people like Negro militants Stokely Carmichael and [redacted] out of circulation."

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

The "St. Louis Globe--Democrat" in a February 14, 1969, editorial entitled, "Throw the Book at Campus Rioters," described campus disorders then sweeping the Nation as "a threat to the entire university educational system." This newspaper called on the Attorney General to "move now to stop these anti-American anarchists and communist stooges in their tracks. He should hit them with every weapon at his command. The American people are fed up with such bearded, anarchist creeps and would applaud a strong drive against them. They have been coddled and given license to run roughshod over the rights of the majority of college students far too long. It is time to hit them hard with everything in the book."

On October 2, 1969, Senator Byrd said that "events in the news in the past few days concerning activities by militant radical groups should alert us to the new trouble that is brewing on the Nation's college campuses and elsewhere." Senator Byrd said that "all of us would do well to pay heed now, and law enforcement authorities should plan a course of action before the situation gets completely out of hand."

After the August 24, 1970, bombing at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, a group of faculty members called for disciplinary action against students involved in disruption and violence. In a statement delivered to the Chancellor, 867 faculty members said "the rising tide of intimidation and violence on the campuses in the last few years has made

normal educational and scholarly activities increasingly difficult. There has been a steady escalation of destructiveness that has culminated in an act of homicide. Academic freedom, meaning freedom of expression for all ideas and viewpoints, has been steadily eroded until now many are questioning whether it exists on the Madison campus." The faculty members said that "the acts of a few must not be allowed to endanger the rights and privileges of all members of the academic community."

"The New York Times" reported on October 11, 1970, on "The Urban Guerrillas--A New Phenomenon in the United States" and noted that the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security recently heard four days of testimony on four bills aimed at "crushing the urban guerrillas," including one "that would make it a crime to belong to or aid organizations advocating terrorism, and would prohibit the publication of periodicals that advocate violence against police and the overthrow of the Government."

The President's Commission on Campus Unrest in detailing "the law enforcement response" noted that "it is an undoubted fact that on some campuses there are men and women who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and sometimes to maim and kill. The police must attempt to determine whether or not such a plot is in progress, and, if it is, they must attempt to thwart it."

Finally, Allan C. Brownfeld, a faculty member at the University of Maryland, writing in "Christian Economics," February 11, 1970, on "The New Left and the Politics of Confrontation" noted that "in many

instances, those extremists who have fomented disorder have been in violation of state and Federal statutes." But, Mr. Brownfeld noted, "what is often missing is the will to prosecute and to bring such individuals before the bar of justice." Mr. Brownfeld's article was subcaptioned "A Society Which Will Not Defend Itself Against Anarchists Cannot Long Survive."

#### IV. Appropriations Testimony

On February 10, 1966, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover testified regarding the Ku Klux Klan, saying that "the Bureau continues its program of penetrating the Klan at all levels and, I may say, has been quite successful in doing so. The Bureau's role in penetrating the Klan has received public attention due to the solution of the brutal murders of Viola Luizzo in Alabama, Lieutenant Colonel Lemuel A. Penn in Georgia and the three civil rights workers in Mississippi. We have achieved a number of other tangible accomplishments in this field, most of which are not publicly known but are most significant." Discussion off the record followed.

#### V. Public Support of the Counterintelligence Program

Following acknowledgement that the FBI had a counterintelligence program, syndicated columnist Victor Riesel wrote on June 15, 1973, "no apologies are due from those in the highest authority for secretly

developing a domestic counterrevolutionary intelligence stratagem in early 1970." Mr. Riesel detailed the record of "dead students," "university libraries in flames," and "insensate murdering of cops," and concluded "it would have been wrong not to have attempted to counter the sheer off-the-wall terrorism of the 1969-70 bomb seasons. And it would be wrong today. No one need apologize for counterrevolutionary action."

"Our reaction is that we are exceedingly glad he ordered it," wrote the "St. Louis Globe--Democrat" in a December 11, 1973, editorial on the counterintelligence program. This newspaper noted that "the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the late J. Edgar Hoover conducted a three-year campaign of counterintelligence 'to expose, disrupt, and neutralize' the New Left movement..." and that "many of these New Left groups were doing everything they could to undermine the Government and some of them resorted to bombings, street riots, and other gangster tactics. Others waged war on police across the Nation and on our system of justice. Still others disrupted the Nation's campuses. The Nation can be thankful it had a courageous and strong leader of the FBI to deal with the serious threats posed by New Left groups during this period."

On June 18, 1974, Eugene H. Methvin, Senior Editor, "The Reader's Digest," testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding terrorism and noted, "...the FBI's counterintelligence



program against the extremist core of the New Left was a model of sophisticated, effective counter-terrorist law enforcement action first developed and applied with devastating effect against the Ku Klux Klan in the mid-1960's. In that context the strategy won great publicity and praise; yet now we have the Attorney General condemning it. In the current climate of justifiable revulsion over Watergate, we are in danger of crippling law enforcement intelligence in a hysteria of reverse-McCarthyism in which we close our eyes to evidence and some compelling necessities of domestic and international security."

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1969

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM: Tom Charles Huston  
Staff Assistant to the President

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

The President has directed that a report on foreign Communist support of revolutionary protest movements in this country be prepared for his study. He has specifically requested that the report draw upon all the resources available to the intelligence community and that it be as detailed as possible.

"Support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign Communists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protest movements in the United States.

On the basis of earlier reports submitted to the President on a more limited aspect of this problem, it appears that our present intelligence collection capabilities in this area may be inadequate. The President would like to know what resources we presently have targeted toward monitoring foreign Communist support of revolutionary youth activities in this country, how effective they are, what gaps in our intelligence exist because of either inadequate resources or a low priority of attention, and what steps could be taken, if he directed, to provide the maximum possible coverage of these activities.

I have asked CIA, NSA, and DIA to submit their contributions to me by Monday, June 30th. I would appreciate it if the Bureau would provide their response to the President's request by that date.

Since the Bureau has primary responsibility in this area, I would like to discuss the matter further with your staff after I have had an opportunity to evaluate the initial contributions. The President has assigned a high priority to this project, and I want to insure that he receives the most complete report that it is possible to assemble.

Tom Charles Huston

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

62-116391-180-446

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-03-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 8/22/67

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

FROM : [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
INTEREST IN U. S. RACIAL SITUATION

James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),  
furnished the following to the Liaison Agent on 8/21/67:

The White House recently informed Richard Helms, Director, CIA, that the Agency should exert every possible effort to collect information concerning U. S. racial agitators who might travel abroad. This request apparently stemmed from the travel and the highly publicized activity of Stokely Carmichael. Hunt advised that because of the pressure placed upon Helms, a new desk has been created at CIA for the explicit purpose of collating all information coming into the Agency and having any significant bearing on possible racial disturbances in the U. S. Instructions are being sent to all CIA foreign offices to be on the alert for information and to develop foreign sources who might receive information concerning activities in the U. S. CIA will disseminate information developed to the Bureau.

## ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:rab  
(6)

SI-125 REC-31

62-80750-4605

SEP 6 1967

ENCLOSURE

55 SEP 11 1967

62-116391-18

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Adams

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON  
CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE  
UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-03-2016 BY [ ] ADG

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan  
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/21/75

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
ASST. DIR. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

By letter dated 3/17/75 to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, [ ] Staff Attorney; Vice President's Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, requested that the following documents, which are in possession of the FBI, be made available to the Commission:

1. Sam Papich's memorandum of 8/21/67 re White House request to the CIA concerning dissident groups. (actual date 8/22/67)

This memorandum deals solely with information received by Papich from a CIA official on 8/21/67 concerning a White House instruction to the then CIA Director Helms to exert every possible effort to collect information concerning U. S. racial agitators who might travel abroad. As this information originated with CIA, SA W. O. Cregar, INTD, obtained clearance from Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director for Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, on 3/21/75, to make the information available for review by [ ] In line with our current policy, we will advise the Deputy Attorney General that a copy of the Papich memorandum is available for review in Mr. Mintz's office.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

2. Ramsey Clark's letter 9/14/67 to the Bureau asking the Bureau to engage in collection of information concerning dissident groups.

As this memorandum originated in the Department, the decision to furnish same to the Commission should be made by the Department and the Deputy Attorney General is being so advised in the attached letter to him.

3. A 1969 White House request to the Bureau for information concerning the foreign connections of various dissident groups.

[ ] is referring to a personal and ~~confidential~~ memorandum for the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 6/20/69 from Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President. As this is a White House

Enclosures  
FJC:aso (7)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116391

5-78

Memorandum to Mr. Adams  
Re: Vice President's Commission on  
CIA Activities within the  
United States

document, we felt it necessary to obtain the clearance of the White House to furnish this document to [redacted] On 3/21/75, SA Robert Haynes, INTD, obtained such clearance from Mr. Kenneth Lazarus, Assistant Counsel to the President. In view of this, we will enclose two copies of the Huston memorandum in attached letter to the Deputy Attorney General, which copies can be furnished to [redacted] b6 per FBI b7C per FBI

4. Compilation of statements by public figures showing the atmosphere during the period of the greatest activities by dissident groups.

This is a paper prepared by INTD and is a compilation of statements made by public figures concerning the tenor of the times during the period of greatest activities by dissident groups and statements by such figures supporting the Bureau's efforts to thwart such activities. As this is all public source material, we are furnishing copies to the Deputy Attorney General to give to [redacted]

Attached are two copies of the Papich memorandum with administrative data excised to be retained in the office of Assistant Director Mintz for review by [redacted] b6 per FBI b7C per FBI

The administrative data has also been excised from copies of the material being furnished to the Deputy Attorney General for delivery to [redacted]

A memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General is enclosed in line with the above.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the enclosed memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General be sent.

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]* PLM

*[Signature]*

March 26, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CALLAHAN  
MR. JENKINS  
MR. ADAMS  
MR. MINTZ  
MR. WANNALL

RE: COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

On March 24, 1975, I appeared before the above Commission in the Vice President's Conference Room at the Old Executive Office Building. I was queried on a number of matters and three requests were made of me. These are as follows:

1. That the February 1966 Memorandum of Understanding covering the working relationship between the FBI and CIA should be up-dated and, particularly, should include any additional items which might further clarify or make more workable this relationship.
2. That I look into the situation involving a subject named Thomas Riha concerning whose location was a subject of some dispute as a result of information given by a CIA agent to his superiors. It was reported by the CIA agent when questioned about this information that it had originally come from an Agent of the FBI. The Director of CIA had been unable to secure the identity of the FBI Agent from the CIA agent and this allegedly angered Mr. Hoover and resulted in his determination that liaison between the FBI and CIA should cease.

One of the members of the Commission, John T. Connor, expressed the opinion that it was entirely possible the Riha situation was not the real reason for Mr. Hoover's action.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

CMK:EDM (7)

SENT FROM D. O.	
TIME	9:15 AM
DATE	3-27-75
BY	<i>[Signature]</i>

REG-11 62-116391-19  
EX-110

18 MAR 28 1975

56 MAR 31 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Memorandum for Messrs. Callahan, Jenkins, Adams,  
Mintz, and Wannall

March 26, 1975

Mr. Connor said he had been informed the possibility existed that actually the reason was that the FBI had been pressured to conduct investigations and make certain installations which Mr. Hoover felt were inadvisable and rather than to give this as the reason, he used the Riha matter for an excuse. I informed the Commission that I had no substantiation for this possibility but that I would check and see whether or not there appeared to be any such explanation.

3. It was suggested that there be regular meetings between Mr. Colby and me in order that we might establish a high level rapport between our two agencies. This suggestion came about after I had mentioned the meetings among the directors of the various Federal criminal investigative groups. I informed the Commission I would immediately set the wheels in motion to establish such meetings.

In addition they questioned me about my feeling of the level of cooperation existing at this time between the FBI and CIA. I responded that I thought the relationship was excellent; that I had had a couple of visits with Mr. Colby and found him very receptive to establishing a good exchange; and that I had also talked with a number of his people and found them equally receptive.

They asked me about the liaison that we had with CIA, and I outlined that we had frequent liaison at several levels and the reports given me indicated that this was a most successful relationship. In the same vein, they asked whether or not we had received support in some of our technical needs, and I indicated this support had been expeditious and very satisfactory.

They asked for a delineation of the work we did wherein there might be some overlapping with CIA, and I outlined to them our structure, interpretation of the aforementioned agreement with them, and generally pointed out

Memorandum for Messrs. Callahan, Jenkins, Adams,  
Mintz, and Wannall

March 26, 1975

that we found we had not, at least under my administration, encountered any problems which were insoluble. In expanding on this, I said that if a real problem arose, we did not feel that we had to be guided by any set and rigid rules, but that we would be generally compelled toward a solution which was for the good of the Nation at large without reference to which agency would do what.

All in all, the appearance was a very pleasant one and there was nothing which was brought up that I might consider derogatory to us or to CIA.

Very truly yours,

*Clarence M. Kelley*  
Clarence M. Kelley  
Director



b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

J. B. ADAMS  
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR



3/17/75

MR. CALLAHAN:

As you will note from the attached memo, [REDACTED] staff member of the Rockefeller Commission, is hopeful of having Mr. Kelley appear before the Commission on the afternoon of 3/24/75 to describe the current relationship existing between the FBI and CIA today.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Mr. Kelley has an appointment scheduled at 2:15 p. m. on 3/24/75 to meet the senior class of Rockhurst High School, Kansas City, Missouri. We will promptly secure an outline covering the area of testimony desired and will submit the necessary briefing material.

*Handled  
3-20-75  
WBJ*

*JBA*  
J. B. ADAMS

JBA:ams

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall

*5-6006*

*K*

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD-Adm.	_____
Dep. AD-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
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Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ENCLOSURE

62-116391-22

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Dir. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/10/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This reports information received telephonically from Mr. Robert Gambino, Office of Security, CIA, on the morning of 3/1/75.

According to Mr. Gambino, a CIA officer employed by CIA's Office of Security, [REDACTED] has been called to testify before the Rockefeller Commission on 3/3/75. The purpose of this testimony is to discuss CIA's recruitment of approximately 10 dissidents. The dissidents were to be infiltrated into extremist and revolutionary groups active in the Washington, D. C., area in 1967 in order that CIA could obtain firsthand knowledge as to whether any of these extremist or revolutionary groups were planning any physical damage or attack on CIA installations throughout the Washington, D. C., area.

b3 per CIA

In preparation for this testimony CIA was reviewing all records in their Office of Security. In this connection they came across a note from CIA Security Officer [REDACTED] reflecting a conversation he had with myself. During that time I had liaison responsibilities with CIA's Office of Security. The note, signed by [REDACTED] read as follows: "Discussed with William O. Cregar, FBI, 4/4-6/67. Says go ahead after conferring with Mr. William Sullivan, Assistant Director, FBI. 'They never heard of this matter.'" Copies of this note are being furnished to the Rockefeller Commission contemporaneous with [REDACTED] testimony.

I have reviewed all possible Bureau records in an effort to locate any memoranda that might have been prepared. I have found no such memoranda and am inclined to believe that I did not make a record of my conversation with [REDACTED] in view of the quotation, "They never heard of this matter."

b3 per CIA

WOC:ebc  
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116391-22  
ENCLOSURE  
S-200b

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Although I have no specific recollection of the conversation with [ ] I do have some recollection that such a conversation did take place with him as well as with Mr. Osborn, the Director of Security, CIA. This is somewhat reinforced by the fact that I can recall CIA and specifically Mr. Osborn was concerned about the security of CIA's installations. There was considerable campus unrest during this period of time. I can recall CIA recruiters were attacked and beaten. As a matter of fact, I am almost sure that CIA's recruiters were forced off campus and did potential employees' interviews in Federal buildings. b3 per CIA

Recognizing that both Osborn, as the Director of Security, and CIA generally were very security conscious, I can understand and believe it was probably likely that the Office of Security, CIA, began to plan the security and physical protection of all their offices throughout the U. S. The fact is that approximately one and one-half years after my reported conversation with [ ] one of CIA's offices in Ann Arbor, Michigan, was bombed, resulting in the now famous Keith decision. In the interim Martin Luther King was assassinated 4/4/68 and parts of the District were burned; Resurrection City existed during May and June, 1968. All of these events remind one of the situation that existed at that time and helps me at least put into perspective why CIA's Office of Security was concerned about the security of their installations.

Although I cannot recall the specific conversation with [ ] I did periodically speak to him during my eight-year liaison assignment. Had I received such a request as reported on [ ] note, I would have discussed it with the Assistant Director at that time. It is likely that Mr. Sullivan who was then the Assistant Director would have reacted as reported in [ ] quotation. I say this because b3 per CIA

if the facts are true, no operational activity to collect intelligence was envisioned. CIA merely proposed to place assets in a position to know if any violent activity was planned against CIA establishments and the Bureau was merely interposing no objections to such activity on the part of CIA.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

I have attempted to reconstruct the events in my own mind as well as to view other activities that transpired during the approximately eight years of my liaison assignment. In all honesty I cannot recall any case wherein I was requested or instructed to make an arrangement with CIA without making a specific record of it in Bureau files.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

*[Handwritten signatures: "John" and "Jma" with "wlu" to the right]*

*[Handwritten "K" below the signatures]*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-03-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: March 17, 1975

FROM : W.O. Cregar

1 - Mr. N.P. Callahan  
1 - Mr. J.B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J.A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

Rockefeller Commission

This memorandum reports the results of an interview I had with [REDACTED] staff member of the Vice President's Commission, on the afternoon of 3/13/75.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

To facilitate the recording of this interview, sub-headings will be used to report topical areas of [REDACTED] interest.

At the outset of the interview, [REDACTED] advised me that the interview was voluntary, that I need not discuss any matters with him, and that I could discontinue the interview at any time of my choosing. I advised [REDACTED] that I fully understood and appreciated his consideration.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

## BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

In response to the question, I recited my background from the date of graduation from college describing other employments I had prior to entering the Bureau. Following that, I had to give [REDACTED] in considerable detail, my offices of assignment, the character of work I performed for the Bureau in those offices, i.e. criminal, applicant, security, up to my assignment as Section Chief of the CI-2 Section of the Intelligence Division. He asked me such questions as what level of supervision I enjoyed in various offices as well as my present responsibilities. He was interested in my involvement in the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) including those committees of USIB in which I participate, taking particular note of the Security Committee of USIB.

## LIAISON RESPONSIBILITIES

In response to a specific question, I advised [REDACTED] that I was originally assigned to the Civilian Liaison Branch of the Liaison Section on 4/27/61. Although I did not have a specific date, I estimated that I assumed liaison responsibilities with the Office of Security, CIA, some time during the latter part of 1961. I was asked to

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2-ENCLOSURE Enclosure

APR 24 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall  
RE: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

identify those persons in the Office of Security with whom I had day-to-day liaison responsibilities and how they related to former Special Agent S.J. Papich's liaison responsibilities with the Counterintelligence Staff of CIA. [ ] asked me specifically if Mr. Papich and I worked closely together, whether we shared an office and if Papich and I exchanged problems that arose regarding our liaison responsibilities with CIA. He said that he had interviewed Mr. Papich at considerable length and was aware that frequently problems would arise between the FBI and CIA's Counterintelligence Staff. I advised [ ] that I was aware of many operational problems that occurred during the period of time I had liaison with CIA but in the main, those problems involved operational matters and did not involve CIA's Office of Security. He asked me if these problems were the result of Mr. Hoover's reluctance and I advised him I did not think so but many times were the product of genuine differences of opinion. He asked me when problems occurred were they personally discussed with Mr. Hoover. I described to him the Bureau's chain of command and that when a problem arose it was presented to Mr. Hoover in the form of a memorandum and proceeded through the chain of command to whatever level was appropriate to resolve the problem. He asked me if I ever discussed problems I might have had with CIA personally with Mr. Hoover and I advised him in the negative. He asked me if I was aware of whether Mr. Papich discussed problems that arose with CIA personally with Mr. Hoover. I told him that I knew on occasion Mr. Papich would see Mr. Hoover in the company of the Director of CIA, but that I was not aware of any problems that Mr. Papich personally discussed with Mr. Hoover. In the context of coordinating activity, [ ] asked whether there was coordination between CIA and the FBI regarding investigative matters in the counterintelligence field. I told him that we disseminated a tremendous amount of material to CIA regarding the activities of foreign officials assigned in the U.S. and that I thought the coordination between the FBI and CIA in this field was excellent.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

THE OBER OPERATION:

[ ] asked me if I was aware of CIA officer Richard Ober and the special assignment he was given while assigned to the Counterintelligence Staff. I responded by saying that I knew Ober and had done business with him in the absence of Mr. Papich and was aware that there was a considerable

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall  
RE: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

amount of material disseminated to Mr. Ober's office by the FBI. [ ] asked me if I knew what Mr. Ober's mission was at CIA. I answered by saying that it was my understanding Ober's effort was to resolve whether any of the dissident b6 per FBI groups in the U.S. were receiving direction and guidance or b7C per FBI financial support from abroad. His role was one of coordination in that he would collect information on dissident groups abroad, combined with that information provided by the Bureau, and attempt to establish whether the dissident movement was a worldwide coordinated effort. He [ ] asked if I was aware of whether this requirement was levied upon the CIA from some higher authority. I said I did not know but that it had been my experience through the USIB mechanism that the White House was interested in trying to establish foreign connections with the American dissident movement.

DOMESTIC DISSIDENT MOVEMENT:

I was asked whether we ever disseminate information to CIA's Office of Security regarding the activities of domestic dissidents. I told [ ] that we would disseminate to the Office of Security if we had any information indicating that an American dissident was in any way affiliated with CIA or through our coverage information was developed indicating the dissident movement was attempting to penetrate CIA's premises or establish relationships with CIA's current or former employees. He asked me if the Bureau would normally disseminate information to CIA's Office of Security in the event we had developed information suggesting a CIA building was the target of a demonstration or physical attack. I said we certainly would have disseminated that to the Office of Security under those circumstances. I was asked if I felt we provided CIA with sufficient information regarding the dissident movement to preclude them from having any concern about the physical security of their buildings. I advised [ ] that although we provided information to them, there was no way of guaranteeing that the Bureau would be advised in advance if and when a dissident group decided to attack a CIA building. I reinforced this, reminding him that a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan, was bombed by dissidents in 1968.

[ ] then raised the question of a conversation that I had with [ ] of CIA's Office of Security in 4/67. I advised [ ] that I had been informed by CIA that their records show a discussion between [ ] and myself on 4/4/67. (See memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall, dated 3/10/75, entitled "Senstudy 75," copy attached.) [ ]

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall  
RE: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
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b3 per CIA  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

then read from a folder as follows: "Discussed with William O. Crègar, FBI, 4-6-67. Says go ahead after conferring with Mr. William Sullivan, Assistant Director, FBI. 'They never heard of this matter.'" [redacted] asked me if I could recall that conversation. I told him that I could not specifically recall the conversation but that I had some recollection that such a conversation did take place with [redacted] as well as with Mr. Osborne, the Director of Security, CIA. [redacted] did not pursue this matter any further other than to ask if it would be normal for me to have gone to Mr. Sullivan rather than to Mr. Hoover and did I feel that Mr. Sullivan would have been more likely to interpose no objection to CIA's effort than Mr. Hoover would. I told [redacted] that Mr. Sullivan was the Assistant Director in the Division where I worked and that it would be normal that I would discuss such a matter with him.

MAIL COVERS:

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

[redacted] made reference to articles in the paper indicating that CIA had engaged in an extensive mail cover on mail going to and coming from the Soviet Union. He asked if I was aware of this cover. I told him I was. He asked if I knew if Mr. Hoover was aware of this mail cover. I told him that I did not have firsthand knowledge that he was aware of it but I assumed he was. In response to a question I advised him I felt the FBI had received some value from this cover. He asked if I knew of any other mail cover CIA utilized. I advised him that although I did not have firsthand knowledge of it I had read of it in the paper where the CIA had allegedly operated a mail cover out of New Orleans, Louisiana.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Although [redacted] did not specifically ask me if I knew of any mail covers that the Bureau had conducted, we should anticipate such a question being asked on the occasion of Mr. Kelley's appearance before the Rockefeller Commission on 3/24/75.

FBI - CIA Collaboration:

[redacted] asked if I was aware of any FBI-CIA collaboration to [redacted] I asked him if he was referring to [redacted] He said not necessarily, and further suggested that [redacted]

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b7E per FBI

[redacted] I advised [redacted] that during my assignment on liaison

CONTINUED - OVER



Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
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b7E per FBI

I was not aware of any collaboration between FBI and CIA in this context. At that point [ ] asked me if I was aware of any collaboration between CIA and FBI in connection with [ ] I advised [ ] that I knew of no collaboration between the Bureau and CIA regarding [ ]

[ ] I advised [ ] that I knew of no incident while I functioned as a liaison officer. However, subsequent to my reassignment I have some recollection that CIA had requested the Bureau to [ ]

[ ] asked under what Section within the Intelligence Division [ ] I noted that Section Chief Forrest Putman was responsible for [ ] but indicated he had not reported to Bureau Headquarters until early 1973. [ ] asked me who preceded Mr. Putman in that position. I advised [ ] that I had been responsible for [ ] He asked who was my predecessor and I advised him Mr. Andrew J. Decker. He asked if Mr. Decker was still in the Bureau and I advised him in the affirmative. I advised him that he was now an Assistant Director.

b3 per FBI  
b7E per FBI

I anticipate that the Commission might pursue the question of [ ] and the Director should be prepared to respond to such questions during his forthcoming appearance before the Rockefeller Commission.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Discontinuance of Liaison with CIA February, 1970:

[ ] asked if I knew the reason for the discontinuance of our liaison relationship with CIA. I said it was my understanding it resulted from a misunderstanding in the Thomas Riha case. After a very, very brief discussion of the Riha case, [ ] asked how the relationship between CIA and FBI continued from 2/70 until 11/72 when the formal liaison relationship between CIA and FBI was re-established. I advised [ ] that we did continue to have considerable contact with CIA at various levels concerning operational matters and that frequently I was called upon to discuss operational matters with the

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
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Counterintelligence Staff of CIA over the secure line. I further noted that approximately once a week I visited the CIA building, sometimes in the company of the Assistant Director in charge of the Intelligence Division on USIB business. Frequently on those occasions I would take advantage of being in the building to conduct official FBI business. I told [ ] that Mr. Hoover was aware that representatives of the Bureau continued to attend USIB meetings at CIA and on occasion received memoranda reporting the results of such meetings. On other occasions, I made inquiry of CIA for other Divisions in the Bureau via the secure line. As an example, I noted that during the preparation of our budget we would have to inquire of CIA as to the approximate number of name checks they would be submitting in the next fiscal year. This and other budgetary material that we needed from CIA was handled with the full knowledge of FBI officials. [ ] inquired as to whether this was not a more cumbersome way to conduct FBI-CIA business. I advised him that it probably would have been more effective to have a liaison officer and undoubtedly that was the reason why liaison was re-established in 11/72.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Interaction Between FBI-CIA:

[ ] asked if there is today an interaction between the two agencies, namely an exchange in ideas and training methods. I told [ ] that certainly was the case and that on a regular basis I, as the Bureau's alternate member on USIB, speak before CIA's Midcareer Course, their Senior Seminar, their Career Development Course for Science and Technology, as well as participate in operational seminars. In addition, I pointed out to [ ] that CIA's officers lecture at all our Counterintelligence Schools and frequently representatives of both agencies meet to discuss specific operational matters.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Over-All Impression:

My over-all impression of [ ] interview was:  
(1) He was attempting to establish that many of the problems existing between CIA and FBI were the result of Mr. Hoover's tight control of FBI personnel and reluctance to engage in a free

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
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exchange with CIA personnel on a desk level, and (2) That CIA tried to use the Bureau as a cover for certain activities. CIA desired to engage in in the U. S.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Conclusion:

[ ] advised that he anticipated having me appear as a witness before the Rockefeller Commission on the early afternoon of 3/24/75. However, he had to clear this appearance with the Commission and would subsequently advise me of their desires. He anticipates having former Special Agent Sam Papich appear during the entire morning of the 24th, followed by my appearance and finishing up the day with the appearance by Mr. Kelley. He pointed out that he expected Mr. Kelley's appearance to describe the current relationship existing between FBI and CIA today. At any rate, he indicated that he would be submitting a brief outline both to Mr. Kelley and myself as to what specific areas of interest the Commission will explore.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

ACTION:

Mr. Wannall is to be interviewed by [ ] at 1:30 p.m., 3/17/75, following which recommendations will be made regarding the Director's forthcoming testimony before the Rockefeller Commission.

*gm*  
*Chase*  
*Jan 1975*  
*wf*

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

**DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE  
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES**  
**MARCH 24, 1975**

I. Introduction of Mr. Kelley by Staff Attorney [REDACTED]

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

II. FBI Organization

A. Division of Basic Responsibility

(1) Criminal Investigation

FBI investigations in criminal cases are based on specific violations of Federal laws where jurisdiction is assigned to the FBI. The results of these investigations are reported to the U. S. Attorneys or the Attorney General, who have the responsibility of deciding whether to prosecute.

Where matters of organized crime are concerned, investigations are conducted to develop information on the activities of organized crime in general, in addition to developing substantive cases against individual racket figures.

(2) Internal Security and Counterintelligence

The FBI has investigative jurisdiction of matters relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, treason, insurrection, rebellion, seditious conspiracy, advocating the violent overthrow of the Government and other matters affecting the national security.

The FBI's counterintelligence effort is devoted to identifying Soviet, Satellite, and Chinese People's Republic intelligence personnel, developing information regarding their activities, and ascertaining their intelligence targets, in addition to investigation of espionage cases for prosecution.

I should also mention other basic FBI responsibilities, such as certain applicant investigations, some civil matters where the U. S. Government is or may be a party of interest, and laboratory and training services provided state and local law enforcement agencies.

RPF: vb

SEE NOTE PAGE NINE

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

2-116391-25

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

## **B. Manpower Within Each Division of Responsibility**

The FBI had 8,350 Special Agents on the rolls at the end of February, 1975. Of these, 41 percent, or 3,430 Agents, were assigned to general criminal cases, 24 percent, or 2,000 Agents, work on organized crime and white collar crime, and 23 percent, or 1,920 Agents are assigned to Security cases.

Of the 23 percent of our Agents working Security Matters, 13 percent, or 1,085, work counterintelligence matters and 10 percent, or 835 Agents, are assigned in the area of Internal Security Matters.

A further 250 Agents are needed for assignment in the vital counterintelligence field due to an increased workload in this area.

The remainder of our responsibilities, such as training, applicant matters, laboratory and liaison functions, require the assignment of 1,000 of our Agents, 12 percent of our manpower.

## **III. Basic Jurisdictional Line Between FBI and CIA**

### **A. FBI--Operations conducted in the Continental U. S., Hawaii, Alaska and Puerto Rico**

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's jurisdiction to conduct investigations of all domestic espionage and counterespionage matters affecting the internal security of the Continental U. S., Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, derives from Congressional enactments, Presidential Directives, and orders of the Attorney General.

### **B. CIA--Operations conducted abroad**

The Central Intelligence Agency operates under provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, which charges that agency with the collection, collation, evaluation, coordination, and dissemination of intelligence information. The agency's activities are concentrated outside the U. S., although certain operations are conducted in the U. S. within established guidelines set forth in National Security Council Directives and memorandum of understanding between the FBI and the CIA.

- C. Not strictly a geographical division (one agency should notify the other if it is conducting legitimate operations in the other's territory)

While the FBI is responsible for internal security and counter-intelligence investigations in the Continental U. S. , Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, the CIA is charged with collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations abroad.

Under current procedure, the FBI does not operate assets abroad; however, on occasion certain situations arise which necessitate travel of an asset or assets abroad, within the operational jurisdiction of the CIA. For example, an asset may be requested by a hostile intelligence service representative to meet abroad for clandestine purposes, or to receive training. In such instances, prior notification of our asset's travel is given to CIA, permitting representatives of that agency to brief the asset prior to his departure from the U. S. and debrief him upon his return, if CIA so desires.

(FOR DIRECTOR'S INFORMATION ONLY: A recent Intelligence Division survey concerning travel of FBI assets abroad, disclosed travel of [ ] assets to [ ] countries during period 1958 to January, 1975. While this survey is not all-inclusive, over [ ] instances of travel are recorded of which approximately [ ] were coordinated with CIA. A review of those cases where CIA was not notified of travel shows these matters were either of no positive foreign intelligence value to CIA, or were of extreme sensitivity to the counterintelligence or domestic internal security functions of the FBI.)

b7E per FBI

- D. Domestic CIA activities recognized as legitimate by the FBI

There are a number of overt CIA activities within the United States. These include the overt collection of foreign intelligence through CIA's Domestic Collections Division (DCD), the resettlement and debriefing of overt defectors, the review of publications and broadcasts by CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service, the conducting of background investigations on agency employees (CIA's Office of Security) and activities having to do with the letting of CIA contracts.

In addition, CIA conducts clandestine activities in the United States looking toward the development of sources of positive foreign intelligence. Positive foreign intelligence is a comprehensive product resulting from the collection of all available information concerning other countries where such information is significant to our Government.

In January, 1964, the CIA advised it had reorganized its clandestine activities in the United States and created what was then called the Domestic Operations Division. Subsequently, this division was renamed the Foreign Resources Division. As we understand it, the reason for the creation of the Foreign Resources Division was for the long-range development of foreign nationals, while they are in the United States, to be used as sources of foreign intelligence upon their return to their home country or on reassignment to a third country.

The rationale for such effort is predicated on the need for the development of sources within foreign countries for the collection of positive foreign intelligence. CIA has long held that the assessment and recruitment of such sources of positive foreign intelligence can more effectively be accomplished in the safety of the United States, as opposed to the hostile environment of a foreign country.

- E. February 7, 1966, memorandum of understanding as an example of jurisdictional division.

Recognizing that such activity on the part of CIA could conflict with the counterintelligence responsibilities of the FBI within the United States, a series of conferences between representatives of CIA and the FBI was held to develop guidelines for the activities of CIA's Foreign Resources Division in the United States. This culminated in a memorandum of understanding between the FBI and CIA dated 2/7/66. These guidelines do not purport to convey to CIA any authority or mission beyond that in existing United States statutes. Nor does it in any way abrogate the Bureau's counterintelligence or internal security responsibilities. The understanding delineates the coordination between FBI and CIA in furtherance of CIA's effort to develop sources of foreign intelligence for use once they depart the United States.

**F. Specific instances of interest where FBI will or will not assert its jurisdiction:**

**(1) Investigations involving CIA employees**

**(a) Espionage cases--FBI will investigate**

The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of the espionage statutes. In instances where there is an allegation of violation of espionage statutes, the FBI conducts the appropriate investigation required by law. This procedure is applicable in all such instances including, of course, allegations involving CIA employees.

**(b) Administrative cases--FBI will not investigate**

The CIA, as well as other agencies of the intelligence community, conducts investigations concerning malfeasance or misconduct on the part of its own employees or contractors' employees. The FBI conducts no investigation concerning CIA employees in such matters unless the CIA investigation indicates a violation of some Federal statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction (espionage or otherwise).

**(c) Leak cases--FBI refers to Justice Department for prosecutive opinion before taking on an investigation**

Leaks of classified information by CIA employees are initially handled by the CIA to establish whether the source can be identified and whether administrative action by the CIA against the employee is the appropriate remedy. Where it appears that the leak is of such a nature that it involves unauthorized disclosure of classified material which would make the employee subject to investigation under the espionage statutes, then details of the allegation are furnished to the FBI. The Department of Justice is apprised of the facts and it determines whether the FBI conducts an espionage investigation. To assist the Department in making this determination, we require the referring agency (CIA or other) to [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] Upon determination by

b7E per FBI



the Department that the answers meet the criteria for assuming jurisdiction, the Department directs the FBI to conduct the appropriate investigation.

**(2) Penetration of dissident groups**

- (a) FBI's primary jurisdiction to determine foreign connections of and gather intelligence covering domestic dissident groups**

Based on Presidential Directives, reaffirmed by Charters of the National Security Council in 1949 and the Attorney General in 1964, the FBI is charged with the responsibility of investigating, correlating, and coordinating matters concerning espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related matters affecting internal security. Many domestic dissident groups adopt foreign political philosophies, correspond with, visit, and are contacted by, foreign interests, and groups. The duties imposed on the FBI by the Directives and statutes, therefore, require intelligence investigations within the U. S. of both domestic dissident groups' activities and their foreign connections.

- (b) CIA's recruitment of persons in dissident groups for use overseas.**

Although the 1966 understanding does not refer to U. S. citizens or domestic dissident groups, it would appear to be within the spirit of the understanding that CIA would advise the Bureau of any effort on its part to recruit persons in such domestic groups to be used as sources overseas. We would expect such notification, together with the identification of such individuals. The possibility of pending or future prosecution is one obvious example of why we would need notification.

- (c) Large-scale intelligence gathering by CIA concerning domestic dissident groups.**

We would not expect the CIA to be engaged in large-scale intelligence gathering within the U. S. regarding domestic dissident groups.

#### IV. Relations Between FBI and CIA

##### A. At the Headquarters Level

Current relations between the FBI and CIA at all levels within the Headquarters complex are excellent. On 11/13/72, formal liaison was re-established with CIA after a hiatus of approximately 24 years. We presently have one Special Agent of the FBI whose full-time responsibility is taken up in liaison matters with CIA. A major portion of this liaison officer's time is spent at CIA Headquarters or various other CIA installations in the Washington, D. C., area.

In addition, the Bureau is a member of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), chaired by Mr. Colby. In this context, the Bureau's USIB representative or his alternate has occasion to sit with Mr. Colby in USIB meetings. Other FBI representatives sit on various USIB committees with their CIA counterparts.

Since the latter part of 1971, the Bureau's alternate member on the USIB has appeared before various CIA schools. More recently, the same Bureau representative has appeared bi-monthly at CIA's Midcareer Course to discuss the role of the FBI in the field of counterintelligence and on the USIB. Additionally, a Bureau representative appears before CIA's Career Development Course as well as participating in CIA's Senior Seminar. Later this month, three FBI Agents will participate in an operational symposium at CIA Headquarters. Last year, Bureau representatives made presentations at the annual meetings of base chiefs of CIA's Foreign Resources Division and Domestic Contacts Division.

As a reciprocal arrangement, CIA has arranged to have highly experienced counterintelligence officers lecture at various FBI counterintelligence courses at our Quantico Academy.

From an operational standpoint, Agents of the FBI's Intelligence Division and CIA's Directorate of Operations continually discuss cases at a desk level in an effort to coordinate investigations that have both United States and overseas ramifications.

**B. At the Field Level**

Liaison between the CIA and FBI on a field level has been encouraged. Shortly after I became Director of the FBI, I met with Director Colby of CIA. Also present at this meeting were our respective staffs. On that occasion, I took the opportunity to reiterate to Mr. Colby that it was my desire during my administration of the FBI that both agencies should be guided by what is best for the United States Government rather than what is best for each agency. Mr. Colby wholeheartedly agreed. Following that, in 2/74, I sent a letter to various FBI field offices enclosing a copy of the FBI/CIA understanding. In this letter, recipient field offices were instructed to develop a closer working relationship with CIA's Foreign Resources Division field offices. Likewise, in June of 1974, I sent a similar letter to all FBI field offices instructing them to establish a close working relationship with CIA's Domestic Collection Division field offices.

I firmly believe there is an excellent exchange of information between FBI and CIA field offices and that both the Bureau and CIA are operating on the basis of doing what is best for the United States Government, rather than what is best for each individual agency.

**V. Resolution of Conflicts Between FBI and CIA**

**A. Referral of Conflicts to the Attorney General**

The FBI's liaison representative maintains close and cooperative relationships with CIA at a policy level. In addition, there is direct liaison between the two agencies at various levels concerning operational matters. These liaison relationships supplement the memorandum of understanding of February 7, 1966, referred to previously, which sets forth guidelines concerning CIA's clandestine activities within the United States.

Through the FBI's close liaison with CIA, we have succeeded in resolving potential conflicts between the two agencies on an ad hoc basis. Prior experience demonstrates that the FBI's policy level and operational level relationships with CIA are sufficiently effective to permit resolution of foreseeable future problems. However, in the event an

issue might arise which is not susceptible of resolution through normal liaison between the two agencies, the matter would be referred to the Attorney General for a determination.

**B. United States Intelligence Board (USIB) as Potential Arbiter**

While the Attorney General might make a determination with respect to potential conflicts between the FBI and CIA which cannot be resolved through normal liaison between the two agencies, it is not inconceivable that an issue might arise in the future of concern to the United States intelligence community as a whole. The USIB represents the entire intelligence community and, consequently, would be the proper forum for resolution of a conflict affecting the interests of each of the member agencies. Such a conflict might be, for example, whether a communist-bloc defector should be debriefed by us for counterintelligence information before turning the defector over to CIA for a debriefing covering positive intelligence information he may possess. In such a situation, the USIB exists as an appropriate forum in which the essential interests of each of the members of the intelligence community might be clearly defined and a determination made as to what course of action would best serve the interests of the United States.

**NOTE:**

See memorandum Mr. W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated 3/19/75, captioned "Director's Testimony of March 24, 1975, Before Commission on CIA Activities Within the U. S.," prepared by RPF:vb.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Admin. \_\_\_\_\_

Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_

Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_

Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_

Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Ident. \_\_\_\_\_

Inspection \_\_\_\_\_

Intell. \_\_\_\_\_

Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_

Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Training \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/19/75

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall *WRW*

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY OF MARCH 24, 1975,  
BEFORE COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE U. S.

Enclosed herewith is a briefing paper for the assistance of the Director in his scheduled testimony on 3/24/75 before the Commission on CIA Activities Within the U. S.

Enclosure

RPF:vb

(10) *vb*

*RPF*

- 1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh
- 1 - Mr. D. W. Moore, Jr.
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - Mr. R. P. Finzel

REC-73

62-116391-25

22 APR 2 1975

EX 104

2-ENCLOSURE

54  
58 APR 4 1975

5-F *RPF* - file  
*Fulton*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : W. R. Wannall (w)

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 3/27/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
b6 per FBI.  
b7C per FBI  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated 3/24/75, captioned as above (~~cc~~ attached), reported certain Bureau documents had been furnished to [redacted] staff attorney for captioned Commission, and that these documents would be made a part of the Commission's records.

In discussion with [redacted] it was pointed out to him that it was the practice for the FBI for several years to classify materials of a sensitive nature only when they were to be disseminated outside of the FBI and that some of the documents being furnished to him did not bear specific classification markings. [redacted] advised that the entire Commission record was going to be classified but that if we had any additional concern about specific documents the matter could be discussed further.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

A review of the documents furnished by the Intelligence Division reveals that the Papich memorandum of 8/22/67, concerning information received from CIA regarding a request of CIA by the White House to exert every possible effort to collect information concerning U. S. racial agitators who might travel abroad and the action that CIA planned to take regarding this request, should be classified "Secret."

Sam Papich's letter of retirement dated 3/2/70, which discusses our coverage of Soviet-bloc intelligence services and other actions of the FBI and CIA, should bear a classification of "~~Secret~~."

The Papich letter to Mr. Hoover dated 11/6/67, which discusses six highly sensitive programs which had been in effect but discontinued prior to November, 1967, should be classified "~~Top Secret/No Foreign Dissem~~."

Bureau letter to SAC, Atlanta, and seven other offices dated 2/4/74, which explains in detail the memorandum of understanding between CIA and the FBI and contains information classified "~~Secret~~" by CIA, should be classified "~~Secret~~."

CONTINUED OVER

Enclosure  
FJC:aso (5)

70 APR 10 1975

62-116391

5-17

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams  
Re: Commission on CIA Activities  
Within the United States

A review of the other documents furnished to the Commission reveals that they are appropriately classified.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you agree, Legal Counsel will retrieve the documents from [ ] and the appropriate classifications will be affixed to the documents which will then be returned to him. b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

JHC

PLM

wrl

JMA

JMA

I called [ ] 12<sup>10</sup>/<sub>8</sub> 4/1/75  
pursuant to above. He agreed  
to classification but it must  
be done in his office.  
12<sup>17</sup>/<sub>8</sub> I so advised SA F. J. Cassidy  
of Intell Div. and requested [ ]  
be contacted for purpose of  
classifying the documents.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

JMA

At 2:40 PM, 4/1/75

Appeared at [ ]

- 2 -

offices and applied the  
recommended classifications  
to the 4 documents mentioned  
on page 1 of this memo.  
F. J. Cassidy

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/21/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
b6 per FBI \_\_\_\_\_  
b7C per FBI \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

At 9:00 a.m. on March 21, 1975, [redacted] staff attorney for the above Commission, met with me in my office and provided me with a copy of an outline he had prepared for use in directing questions to the Director at the time of his testimony on March 24, 1975. [redacted] said that the Director would not need to have a prepared statement because the testimony will be as a result of questions presented by [redacted] or members of the Commission. He said that if the Director desires to make an opening statement, it would be agreeable for him to do so, but it was not essential.

[redacted] elaborated on the outline by indicating that his interest is in Mr. Kelley's experience since he became Director of the FBI in regard to testimony concerning relations between the FBI and CIA. He said that in regard to the understanding as to the basic jurisdictional lines between the Bureau and CIA, he would like for the Director to discuss the current jurisdiction and to go beyond the memorandum of understanding between the two agencies and discuss items that may be "in the spirit of the memorandum."

Under Item III-F regarding the instances where CIA might be investigating its own employees and the FBI might have an interest from an espionage standpoint, he would like for the Director to be able to testify as to the types of cases that the FBI would undertake to investigate.

Under item IV-A, he would like the Director to explain in specific detail the liaison contacts we have with CIA including the liaison assignment of Supervisor Leon F. Schwartz and other contacts that may be made from time to time such as those of the FBI Laboratory. Under the

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd  
(4)

REC-73

EX-101

15 APR 3 1975

70 APR 11 1975

62-116391

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL



Memorandum to Mr. Adams  
Re: COMMISSION ON CIA, etc.

same heading, he asked that the Director be prepared to testify in detail as to efforts that have been made to improve relations between the CIA and the FBI, such as personal meetings between Director Kelley and Director Colby, exchanges of training information and instructors, and any other efforts in that regard.

Under Item IV-B (3), he asked that the Director be prepared to discuss, and that [ ] have available for submission to the Commission members, copies of the two documents identified as "February, 1974, Directive Re Relations with CIA Foreign Resources Division," which was sent from FBI Headquarters to some field divisions, and "July, 1974, Directive Re Relations with CIA's Domestic Contact Division," which was sent from FBI Headquarters to all field divisions. b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

As to the last item V, he would like the Director to advise concerning his views as to the workability of various means of resolving possible conflicts between the CIA and the FBI including referral of such matters to the Attorney General and ultimately to the President.

Memorandum of Mr. Wannall to Mr. Adams dated March 19, 1975, captioned "Director's Testimony of March 24, 1975, Before Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States" enclosed a briefing paper for the Director's use in testifying. The briefing paper appears to cover the specific areas requested by [ ] however, this memorandum should be reviewed by the Intelligence Division and compared with the briefing paper they prepared for any additional information required. The outline discussed by [ ] is the same as that used by the INTD to prepare their briefing paper. b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Intelligence Division compare [ ] requests of March 21, 1975, regarding the Director's testimony with the briefing paper previously prepared and furnish any additional information necessary.

Briefing  
paper  
was  
sent to  
Director  
in K.C.  
Thursday  
3-20-75  
edw



Memorandum to Mr. Adams  
Re: COMMISSION ON CIA, etc.

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONT'D)

2. That the Intelligence Division locate and make available for review by  copies of the two documents he specifically requested identified as a February, 1975, Directive, and a July, 1974, Directive.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Large handwritten initials]*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. Wannall

FROM : W. Cregar

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

DATE: 3/25/75

1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Dep. AD Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

This memorandum reports the results of my appearance before the Vice President's Commission on 3/24/75.

My appearance before the Vice President's Commission lasted approximately three quarters of an hour, from 3:30 to 4:15 p.m. Following a brief resume of my background, [REDACTED] staff member of the Vice President's Commission, asked me a series of questions. His questions highlighted my liaison responsibilities with CIA's Office of Security. This included how my responsibilities interacted with the responsibilities of former Special Agent Sam Papich who liaised with CIA's Counterintelligence Staff. I advised the Commission that I had direct access to the various directors of the Office of Security, that I was not inhibited in any way by those directors, had free access to any personnel within CIA's Office of Security and that we enjoyed a very, very excellent relationship. I also advised the Commission that in the absence of Mr. Papich I assumed his liaison responsibilities with CIA's Counterintelligence Staff and in my absence Mr. Papich assumed my responsibilities with regard to CIA's Office of Security. [REDACTED] asked what was the status of the Bureau's relationship at a field level during the time I was assigned to our Washington Field Office. I pointed out that in the event discussions were needed with CIA, a request was submitted to the Bureau and in most instances Mr. Papich, as the Headquarters Liaison Officer, made such arrangements. I noted that this was peculiar to the Washington Field Office in view of its close proximity to Bureau Headquarters. In other field divisions there was more direct liaison between field offices of the FBI and CIA throughout the 1950's.

WOC:ebc  
(6)

INTELLIGENCE DIV.

EX-110

REC-44

62-116391-31

APR 8 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

82  
51 APR 14 1975

62-116391

5-1006

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
b7E per FBI

[redacted] did spend considerable time on how the Bureau handled leak cases and during the course of my testimony introduced into the record a Bureau letter to the Director for Inspection Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense, dated 11/5/69 (made available to the Commission by the Bureau) which identified [redacted] designed to assist the Department of Justice in making a determination as to the prosecutive merits of a case involving the unauthorized disclosure of classified defense information. In response to questions of the Commission, I advised them that in the latter part of the 1960's many of these leak cases were investigated by the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). In those instances it was the responsibility of each individual agency to conduct their own separate investigation, report the results of these investigations to the Security Committee which in turn prepared a consolidated report for USIB's consideration.

The Commissioners also asked if I was aware of the special assignment of CIA Officer Richard Ober while he was assigned to CIA's Counterintelligence Staff. I responded that I knew Mr. Ober, had done business with him in the absence of Mr. Papich and was aware that there was a considerable amount of material disseminated to Mr. Ober's office by the FBI. I was also asked whether I knew of any massive effort on the part of CIA to penetrate the dissident movement in the U. S. I responded in the negative. I was also asked whether on occasion we turned over to CIA FBI assets who traveled abroad. I responded by saying that over the years a significant number of FBI assets traveled overseas responsive to various dissident organizations they were members of. In practically all instances we would make the asset available to CIA for briefing prior to the travel and certainly for debriefing jointly with the FBI after the trip. I also was asked if CIA then assumed complete control of these assets even though he returned to the U. S. I informed the Commission that on the contrary the asset would always remain under the FBI's control as long as he functioned in this country. The only time we turned over an asset to CIA completely was in those instances when he planned to remain out of the U. S. for extended periods of time.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Considerable time was spent on how liaison between FBI and CIA functioned after the disestablishment of a formal liaison relationship in 2/70. I advised [ ] that FBI Headquarters did have considerable contact with CIA at various levels concerning operational matters and that frequently I was called upon to discuss operational matters with representatives of CIA's Counterintelligence Staff over the secure telephone line. I noted that approximately once a week I visited the CIA building, sometimes in the company of the Assistant Director in charge of the Intelligence Division on USIB business. On those occasions I would take advantage of being in the building to conduct official FBI business. The Commission was advised that Mr. Hoover was aware that representatives of the Bureau continued to attend USIB meetings at CIA and on occasion received memoranda reporting the results of such meetings. I further noted that during this period of time Mr. Hoover approved my appearance at a CIA Midcareer Course as an FBI lecturer. I also pointed out to the Commission that frequently I had to make inquiries of CIA for other divisions of the Bureau and I did so with the knowledge and approval of Bureau officials. [ ] did inquire as to whether this arrangement was less effective than having a full-time Liaison Officer visiting CIA on a daily basis. I told the Commission that in my judgment it would have been more effective to have a full-time Liaison Officer and undoubtedly that was the reason for liaison being re-established in 11/72.

The testimony was taken in an extremely friendly atmosphere and I was shown every courtesy by all the Commissioners, particularly the Vice President who thanked me profusely for my appearance.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

W Wannall

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

RM

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-03-2016 BY [ ] ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

SAC, Atlanta

2/4/74

Director, FBI

RELATIONS WITH THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA).

The Bureau has, in the past several months, received a substantial increase in written requests from CIA wherein it asks the Bureau's concurrence to either assess or recruit foreign officials or communist-bloc visitors in the U. S. for the purpose of developing sources of foreign intelligence. In the main, these requests have involved officials from the Sino-Soviet countries. The increase of CIA activity in this area is predicated on the fact that greater emphasis is being placed on the development of live sources within the Sino-Soviet bloc and the determination that the most secure area of the world for CIA's development of such sources is here in the U. S. As a result, more and more CIA effort and resources are being concentrated on the recruitment of such sources while the latter are temporarily in the U. S. This CIA activity is effected with the concurrence of the FBI.

SAC Letter dated 2/16/66 discussed an agreement between the FBI and CIA dated 2/7/66. A copy of this agreement is enclosed herewith for each office. You are authorized to reproduce sufficient copies of the 1966 agreement in order that all personnel in your office having liaison with CIA and handling foreign intelligence matters be completely conversant with the terms of this agreement.

This agreement does not purport to convey to CIA any authority or mission beyond that in existing U. S. Statutes, nor does it in any way abrogate the Bureau's counterintelligence or internal security responsibilities. The agreement simply provides guidelines for CIA's activities in pursuit of sources of foreign intelligence to assure that the best interests of the U. S. are protected by the avoidance of conflict or overlap of CIA's efforts with the Bureau's investigations or responsibilities.

Enclosure

2 - [ ] (Enclosure)  
2 - [ ] (Enclosure)  
2 - [ ] (Enclosure)

2 - [ ] (Enclosure)  
2 - [ ] (Enclosure)  
2 - [ ] (Enclosure)  
2 - WFO. (Enclosure)

b7E per FBI

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

62-116391-32

~~SECRET~~

Letter to SAC, Atlanta  
RE: RELATIONS WITH THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Representatives of the Bureau and CIA have discussed the relevancy of this agreement. It was concluded the agreement is currently valid and CIA has assured the Bureau that its intention is to abide by both the spirit and the letter of the agreement. For this reason, it is imperative that all Agents in your office handling foreign intelligence matters be completely familiar with the agreement. For your guidance, the component of CIA involved in the assessment and possible recruitment of foreign officials or communist-bloc visitors in the U. S. is the Foreign Resources Division (FRD). This is a covert component of CIA having offices located in [redacted]

(S) [redacted] If not already done, a liaison relationship should be established with representatives of the FRD b1 per CIA in your territories. The location of FRD offices and the b3 per CIA identity of CIA representatives assigned to these offices is considered classified and should not be revealed to unauthorized persons. FRD should not be confused with CIA's Domestic Collection Division (DCD), an overt component of CIA which also maintains field offices. DCD personnel handle a number of functions, including interviews for positive foreign intelligence of U. S. businessmen, scientists, etc., who travel abroad. If it should be necessary to refer a complainant to CIA, the person should be referred to CIA Headquarters or to the local DCD office. Under no circumstances should he be referred to a local FRD office.

(S)

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter to SAC, Atlanta  
RE: RELATIONS WITH THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S)



~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Letter to SAC, Atlanta  
RE: RELATIONS WITH THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S)



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter to SAC, Atlanta  
RE: RELATIONS WITH THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

The above information is being furnished recipient offices at this time inasmuch as the Bureau anticipates minor problems occurring and misunderstandings developing. Should such problems or misunderstandings occur, recipient offices should attempt to amicably work them out with the local CIA representatives. However, should this be impossible, all offices should feel free to communicate with the Bureau by appropriate communications commensurate with the problem in order that a resolution can be effected at a Headquarters level.

(S) The substantive matters outlined above have been discussed with appropriate officials of CIA at a Headquarters level and there has been complete unanimity [redacted]

CIA

Headquarters is sending similar instructions to their FRD offices throughout the U. S. It is suggested that after a suitable period of time has elapsed following the receipt of this letter you make arrangements to meet with the FRD representative in your field office and review with him the arrangements set out above.

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
b7E per FBI

SAC, [REDACTED]

7/12/74

Director, FBI

RELATIONS WITH THE DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION  
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

ReBulet to [REDACTED] 2/4/74, captioned "Relations With CIA,"  
with copies to [REDACTED]

b7E per FBI

[REDACTED] Single copies of relet and its enclosure are forwarded herewith to those offices which have not previously received them. Purpose of relet was to review the 1966 CIA-FBI agreement pertaining to activities handled by CIA's Foreign Resources Division (FRD) which is principally concerned with the covert assessment and possible recruitment of certain foreign officials and visitors while they are in the U. S., for use when they return home or are assigned elsewhere. In accordance with the 1966 agreement, FRD coordinates its activities with the Bureau at Headquarters and in the field. As noted in reBulet, the location of FRD offices and the identities of CIA representatives assigned to them are considered classified and should not be revealed to persons outside the Bureau. Instant communication is classified "~~Secret~~" because it contains information so classified by CIA. ReBulet, although not classified under current procedures for classification of internal Bureau communications, also contains information classified "~~Secret~~" by CIA.

Purpose of instant communication is to furnish guidelines for your relations with CIA's Domestic Collection Division (DCD), which was formerly known as the Domestic Contact Service. DCD is the element of CIA which is responsible for the collection, within the U. S., of foreign positive intelligence from selected individuals and organizations, governmental and private, as a service of common concern to the United States Intelligence Board agencies. DCD has a network of 16 field offices, 16 resident offices and 4 residencies for this purpose. Its field representatives are overt in that they carry CIA credentials in true name. CIA's authority for overt intelligence collection in the U. S. lies in the National Security Act of 1947 and is outlined in National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2 dated 17 February 1972. DCD does not conduct covert activity nor does it engage in operational activities in the U. S. The local DCD office is the

2 - All Offices (Enclosures)

~~SECRET~~

~~ENCLOSURE~~

Classified by 3764

Exempt from GDS, Category 2

Date of Declassification Indefinite

Certified True Copy

62-116391-32

~~SECRET~~

Letter to SAC   
RE: RELATIONS WITH THE DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION  
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

b7E per FBI

correct point of reference for complainants of possible interest to CIA who may contact your offices. The complainant may be given the telephone number listed in the local telephone directory, but not the address, of the local DCD field office only. DCD resident offices and residencies do not have listed telephone numbers.

DCD and Bureau representatives met recently, at which time the Chief, DCD, expressed interest in broadening the relationship which exists between DCD field elements and FBI offices. He noted that in many but not all areas the DCD representative is well known to the local FBI office. He is in favor of close liaison between DCD and FBI field offices and plans to instruct his field representatives to establish such liaison, if it does not already exist. He is also authorizing local DCD representatives to furnish pertinent information they may develop to local FBI offices where an FBI interest is apparent. The Bureau agrees that such local liaison and exchange of information would be desirable. All recipients should take steps to become acquainted with the local DCD representative and arrange for appropriate liaison with him.

DCD has developed many valuable contacts for the collection of foreign intelligence information, particularly in the business and academic communities. At present, the area of greatest potential conflict of interest between DCD and the Bureau are those domestic sources who are in contact with Soviet, Eastern European and People's Republic of China nationals. Both the Bureau and DCD may have an interest in many of the same sources. Since DCD is actively engaged in collecting positive intelligence information on the foreign targets, the Bureau should coordinate with the local DCD office when it suspects there may be concurrent interest. DCD representatives foresee no situation, however, in which DCD would object to FBI contact with its sources. If a problem arises between DCD and the Bureau in the field, you should furnish pertinent information to the Bureau so that, if necessary, the matter may be discussed with DCD Headquarters.

Another area of possible concern which was discussed with DCD is the investigative problem which may be created when a DCD source contacts a foreign diplomatic establishment or official in the U. S. of apparent interest to the Bureau. DCD representatives noted that DCD sources are not under operational control and often are not contacted on a regular basis; therefore,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter to SAC,

b7E per FBI

RE: RELATIONS WITH THE DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION  
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

DCD may not become aware of contacts with foreign officials or diplomatic establishments until after the fact. When DCD becomes aware of such contacts, you will be notified locally.

In general, DCD representatives expressed a desire for full cooperation between DCD field elements and FBI offices. It was agreed that such cooperation would materially assist both the FBI and DCD in fulfilling their respective responsibilities. You are, therefore, urged to ensure that a friendly and cooperative liaison relationship is established, if not already in existence, between your offices and the local DCD office.

For your information, enclosed is a copy of an annotated map setting forth the location of DCD field offices, resident offices and residencies.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/21/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall *WRW*

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON CIA  
ACTIVITIES WITHIN  
THE UNITED STATES

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan  
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. E. W. Walsh  
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore  
1 - Mr. B. J. White  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton  
1 - Mr. [redacted]

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
b6 per FBI ✓  
b7C per FBI ✓  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. *[initials]*  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Reference memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams captioned as above, dated 3/21/75, summarizing conversation of Assistant Director John A. Mintz with [redacted] Staff Attorney for the above Commission, which occurred this morning.

As noted in referenced memorandum, [redacted] elaborated on the topics concerning which the Commission would be seeking testimony from the Director during his forthcoming testimony before the Commission on 3/24/75. The Intelligence Division has reviewed briefing material prepared for the Director's use in connection with his testimony on 3/24/75 and has concluded that the issues raised this morning by [redacted] were adequately covered therein with the exception of the following matters:

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

1. With reference to Item III-F in the briefing material, [redacted] indicated that he would like the FBI Director to elaborate on the types of cases wherein the FBI would undertake to investigate CIA employees.

In the briefing material furnished to the Director, it was indicated that the FBI does not investigate malfeasance or misconduct by CIA employees, except where a violation of Federal law is involved. In this regard, it might be added that the FBI is authorized under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 535, to investigate violations of Federal law by employees of the Federal Government. Similar authority is conferred upon the Attorney General by this Section.

EX 104

REC-38

62-116391-32 APR 2 1975

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

2. With reference to Item IV-A of the briefing material, [redacted] indicated that he would like the Director to explain in detail the liaison contacts we maintain with CIA, including the assignment of Liaison Supervisor Leon F. Schwartz and other contacts that might be made such as those of the FBI Laboratory.

CONTINUED - OVER

Enclosures  
AFW:aso (11)

ENCLOSURE

1975

62-116391

DO NOT CLASS

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams  
Re: Commission on CIA  
Activities within  
The United States

In the briefing material furnished for the Director's use, the character of FBI liaison with CIA at the Headquarters level was outlined in detail. We noted that an FBI Special Agent Supervisor devotes full time to his liaison assignment with CIA and that he spends the major portion of his time at CIA Headquarters. It might be added that in addition to the activities of our Liaison Supervisor, representatives of other FBI Headquarters components such as the FBI Laboratory and Computer Systems Division have numerous contacts with their counterparts at CIA regarding operational matters of mutual concern.

3. With reference to Item IV-B (3) of the briefing material, [ ] asked that the Director be prepared to discuss two documents sent from FBI Headquarters to our field offices concerning field-level liaison with CIA. These documents were identified as a February, 1974, directive to the field concerning relations with the CIA's Foreign Resources Division and a July, 1974, communication concerning relations with CIA's Domestic Contact Division. These documents were not included in the briefing material furnished to the Director, and, accordingly, they are appended hereto for his assistance. b6 per FBI b7C per FBI

It should be noted that [ ] is fully aware of the contents of the two documents referred to in the preceding paragraph as they have been made available for his review in Assistant Director Mintz's office.

ACTION:

None. For information.

RPT  
per [ ]  
Jm  
mpt  
Gm

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,  
Chairman

David W. Belin,  
Executive Director

John T. Connor  
C. Douglas Dillon  
Erwin N. Griswold  
Lane Kirkland  
Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
Ronald Reagan  
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

March 17, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-03-2016 BY   ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Honorable Clarence M. Kelley  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kelley:

This will confirm that you will be testifying before the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States on Monday, March 24, 1975, at 3:00 PM. Your testimony will be taken in Room 275 of the Old Executive Office Building.

Attached is a brief outline of the subject matters which I propose to cover with you before the Commission. Should you have any questions concerning any area of your proposed testimony, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely yours,

Staff Attorney

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Attachment

✓ CC: W. Raymond Wannall

ENCLOSURE

62-116391-33



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: March 18, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON  
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Dep. Asst. Dir. ☒  
Asst. Dir. ☒  
Admin. ☒  
Comp. Syst. ☒  
Ext. Affairs ☒  
Files & Com. ☒  
Gen. Inv. ☒  
Ident. ☒  
Inspection ☒  
Intell. ☒  
Laboratory ☒  
Plan. & Eval. ☒  
Spec. Inv. ☒  
Training ☒  
Legal Coun. ☒  
Telephone Rm. ☒  
Director Sec'y ☒

Memorandum 3/11/75 reported on conference in the Director's Office that date attended by Messrs. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Staff Members of captioned Commission, and, in addition to the Director, Messrs. Callahan, Adams, and Wannall. On 3/17/75 [REDACTED] interviewed Wannall from 1:30 p.m. to 3 p.m. and referred to the following matters which were discussed at the 3/11/75 conference.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

[REDACTED] at the 3/11/75 conference stated that during his review of matters within the Counterintelligence Division of CIA, he had noted that beginning in or shortly after August, 1967, the FBI began increasing the amount of material disseminated to CIA, and asked if we could explain why this had occurred. Wannall referred to a request the FBI had received from the Attorney General in September, 1967, wherein the Attorney General referred to the situation involving dissident activity in the U.S. and said it would be necessary for the FBI to increase its coverage in an effort to establish whether violations of Federal laws were involved. Wannall referred also to a public statement by former President Johnson, precise date not recalled, to the effect that if Government agencies continued doing business as usual, the pressing problem brought about by dissident activities in this country would not be met.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Responding to an inquiry by [REDACTED] as to whether the FBI had disseminated outside the Bureau papers with regard to domestic dissident activities, Wannall said he recalled a monograph on this subject dated to the best of his recollection in 1969, which was put out responsive to a White House request for information which might show foreign direction, control, or financing of domestic dissidents.

REC-10 62-116391-10 APR 9 1975

Referenced memorandum of 3/11/75 advised that we would research the matter relating to the reported increase in dissemination of material to CIA beginning about August, 1967, and would furnish results to you together with our recommendations.

During the interview of 3/17/75, [REDACTED] referred to the foregoing matters and said that he would be sending a request in writing to Mr. Wilderotter of the Department for a copy of the 1969 monograph,

Enclosures 3-ENCLOSURE May 62-116391

- WRW:lm1 (6)  
1 - Mr. Callahan (with enclosures)  
1 - Mr. Adams (with enclosures)  
1 - Mr. Mintz (with enclosures)  
1 - Mr. Wannall (with enclosures)  
1 - Mr. Boyington (Attention: Mr. Schwartz)

ADDENDUM LEGAL COUNSEL-

CONTINUED - OVER P. 4

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Memorandum to Mr. Adams

Re: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON  
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

a copy of the September 14, 1967, Attorney General memorandum, a copy of any material relating to President Johnson's statement to the effect that the situation could not be met by doing business as usual, and a copy of any communication which might explain the reason for the increase in dissemination of Bureau material to CIA beginning about August, 1967.

Attached are copies of the following:

*Enclosure detached & filed in 62-116391*  
(1) Monograph classified "~~Top Secret~~" dated June 30, 1969, captioned "Foreign Support for Revolutionary Protest Movements in the United States." This was prepared in response to a letter of 6/20/69 signed by former White House Staff Assistant to President Nixon, Tom Charles Huston, who said that the President had directed that a report on this matter be prepared for his study and that contributions had also been requested from the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

(2) An unclassified letter dated 9/14/67 from former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, in which he stated that it was most important that the FBI use maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon the question as to whether there had been or was then a scheme or conspiracy by any group of whatever size, effectiveness, or evaluation, to plan, promote, or aggravate riot activity.

(3) A paper undated captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Background Material," which on page 3 refers to President Johnson's warning to public officials that "if your response to these tragic events is only business-as-usual, you invite not only disaster but dishonor." This paper was utilized as hand-out material in connection with the Director's press release of 11/18/74 relating to the Counterintelligence Program.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

(4) Memorandum 8/22/67 from [redacted], to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dictated by former Liaison Agent Sam J. Papich, on the subject "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Interest in the U. S. Racial Situation." In this memorandum, Papich advised that on the previous day James Hunt of CIA said that the White House had informed the CIA Director that the Agency should exert every possible effort to collect information concerning U.S. racial agitators who might travel abroad and that because of the pressure placed upon the CIA Director, a new desk had been created at CIA for the explicit purpose of collating all information coming into the Agency and having any significant bearing on possible racial disturbances in the U.S. It will be noted that this particular memorandum was disseminated widely throughout the Intelligence Division to those supervisors handling racial and radical matters. It undoubtedly formed the basis for the stepped-up dissemination to CIA of Bureau material relating to such matters shortly after 8/22/67.

Memorandum to Mr. Adams  
Re: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON  
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

[ ] said that the Rockefeller Commission is hopeful of having the Director appear before the Commission on the afternoon of 3/24/75 to present an overview regarding current relationship existing between the FBI and CIA. He was requested to present specific questions which the Commission would propound to the Director in the event the latter does appear, and he promised to do this immediately through Mr. Wilderotter with a copy for the FBI. Upon receiving these questions, we will provide material to assist the Director in responding to them.

ACTION:

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Since [ ] said he would be submitting a written request for copies of the above-listed documents, it is recommended that they be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division to determine what excision, if any, is necessary and then discussed with an appropriate Departmental official to determine if they should be made available to the Vice President's Commission on CIA.

ADDENDUM: WRW:lm1 *luc* 3/18/75

The foregoing was dictated prior to the Director's Briefing Conference this morning. Upon returning from the conference, Wannall learned that during his absence [ ] had delivered to his office the two communications dated 3/17/75, attached immediately below this memorandum. The first is a communication to the Director confirming that the Director is to testify before the Vice President's Commission at 3 p.m., March 24, 1975, and attaching an outline of the subject matters which [ ] proposes to cover during the Director's testimony. The Intelligence Division is getting together material to cover these subject matters for the Director's possible use.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

The second letter from [ ] is a copy of a communication addressed to Mr. Wilderotter at the Department wherein a request is set forth for the documents described above, with one exception. Instead of asking for the 1969 monograph, [ ] has asked for the 1969 White House request to the Bureau for information concerning foreign connections with various dissident groups. A Xerox copy of the 1969 White House request has been attached to the top of the copy of the monograph which is an enclosure hereto in order that the Legal Counsel Division can consider this in line with the action recommended above.

Memorandum to Mr. Adams  
Re: Vice President's Commission on the  
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

ADDENDUM BY LEGAL COUNSEL, 3/18/75, JAM:mfd

At 1:00 p.m. on March 18, 1975, I discussed with Assistant Director Wannall the question of what excision should be made in the documents attached that may be released to the Commission on CIA. I advised Mr. Wannall that I was in a position to negotiate with the Department to attempt to limit dissemination of any material that might interfere with the current operations of the Intelligence Division. Mr. Wannall advised me that his review of the materials indicates that the text of all of the items could be released to the Commission, but he recommended that administrative markings including file numbers, routing blocks, names of Bureau officials and supervisors, and any other administrative data appearing on the documents should be deleted. I concur in that view.

*See memo  
Wannall to Adams  
dated 3/18/75  
re: Vice President's  
Commission on CIA  
documents attached  
to this letter  
which  
transmit letter to  
the President re  
CIA documents  
referred to  
in the memo  
dated 3/18/75*

*[Signature]*

*JAM PLM*

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

March 11, 1975

At 10:00AM today, the Director is  
scheduled to meet with [redacted]

[redacted] Staff Member of the Vice  
President's Commission on the  
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

[redacted] will probably be accom-  
panied by two other Staff Members,  
Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted]

Messrs. Callahan, Adams, and  
Wannall will be standing by.

Copy of memorandum attached.

1 - [redacted]  
lew

MR. CALLAHAN \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. JENKINS \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. ADAMS \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. ASH \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. BASSETT \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. CLEVELAND \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. DECKER \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. GALLAGHER \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. GEBHARDT \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. JAMIESON \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. MC DERMOTT \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. MINTZ \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. MOORE \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. WALSH \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. WANNALL \_\_\_\_\_  
WHITE \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. COLEMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
MR. REED \_\_\_\_\_  
TELE. ROOM \_\_\_\_\_  
[redacted] \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

*Memo Wannall to Adams  
3-11-75  
WRW-aml*  
*Prepare memo  
and mtg. pls.*  
*K*

62-116391

5-WRW

62-116391-34

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-03-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

Assoc. Dir. ☒  
Dep. AD Adm. ☒  
Dep. AD Inv. ☒  
b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
Ext. Affairs ☐  
Files & Com. ☐  
Gen. Inv. ☐  
Ident. ☐  
Inspection ☒  
Intell. ☒  
Laboratory ☐  
Plan. & Eval. ☐  
Spec. Inv. ☐  
Training ☒  
Legal Coun. ☒  
Telephone Rm. ☐  
Director Sec'y ☐

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: March 11, 1975

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON  
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Pursuant to the Director's memorandum in captioned matter dated March 10, 1975, Messrs. Callahan, Adams, and Wannall joined the Director in his office this morning at approximately 10:25 a.m. and were introduced to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Staff Members of the Vice President's Commission.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

[REDACTED] inquired as to when the FBI investigates CIA employees. He referred specifically to leaks of information by such employees. It was explained to him that leaks of classified information to the press are handled within the involved agency or agencies to establish if the source of the leak can be identified and then whether administrative action is appropriate or whether the leak involved unauthorized disclosure of classified material which would make the suspect employee subject to investigation under the Espionage statutes. It was pointed out that if a case developed where prosecution might be entertained the investigation of the case would be within the purview of the FBI provided the Criminal Division of the Department ordered investigation and would entertain prosecution. It was noted that the FBI has been designated by statute (28, U.S. Code, Section 535) to investigate violations under Title 18, U.S. Code, involving employees of the Federal Government. (A check of this Code Section shows similar authority is conferred upon the Attorney General.)

Referring to the memorandum of understanding between the FBI and CIA dated 2/7/66, [REDACTED] asked whether this was drawn up as a result of "flaps" which had developed between the two organizations. He was advised that there had been certain areas in which questions had arisen with regard to the activities of CIA in the U.S. and how they might impact upon FBI responsibilities, and the memorandum was worked out to eliminate these, but that also one of the bases for it was to assure that the two agencies were not duplicating work but utilizing their respective assets to the best interests of the Government.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

[REDACTED] then inquired of Mr. Kelley as to whether he felt the FBI had sufficient manpower to devote to its counterintelligence responsibilities. Mr. Kelley explained that he did not feel

WRW:lm1 (6) ENCLOSURE  
1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Boynton (Attention: Mr. Schwartz)

APR 9 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams

Re: VICE PRESIDENT's COMMISSION ON  
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

that we do have sufficient manpower at this time and for that reason he had asked for an additional 250 Agents all of whom would be dedicated to our counterintelligence work. He explained that when he first arrived as Director, he noted that of the 25% of our assets devoted to our security responsibilities about 12% were in the foreign area of our operations and 13% in our domestic area.

Mr. Adams explained that by cutting back on low priority matters in all areas of our operations, that is, security, White Collar Crime, organized crime, general criminal, etc., we have been able to target on high priority work. [ ] then inquired as to whether Mr. Kelley felt that additional Agents were needed for assignment in the Bureau's criminal areas of operation. Mr. Kelley responded that he thought that our criminal investigation demands are pretty well met at the present time with available manpower. He explained that about 25% of our assets are devoted to organized crime and White Collar Crime, 35 to 40% to our general criminal cases, about 25% to our security cases, and the remainder to service needs such as training, laboratory matters, and liaison functions. He said he felt that the 25% currently utilized in the security area required an additional 250 men for counterintelligence work. b6 per FBI b7C per FBI

Indicating that he had talked with former Special Agent Sam Papich, [ ] said that he had learned that Papich had written a letter to former Director Hoover in 1968 and also a retirement letter. Papich had told him that he was reluctant to furnish copies of these letters to the Vice President's Commission on CIA without the prior approval of the FBI. Mr. Adams stated that we would check into this matter and would have to take up the question of the release of the Papich letters with the Department. [ ] said that the Commission would be furnishing a list of documents of the FBI which they would desire released for the Commission's use, and he was advised that this also would be a matter which would have to be taken up with the Attorney General. b6 per FBI b7C per FBI

[ ] then inquired as to the identity of our Agent responsible for liaison with CIA and he was given the name of Supervisor L. F. Schwartz. He said that he understood William O. Cregar had previously handled liaison matters with CIA and asked if we objected to interviews being conducted by Commission staff members with Schwartz and Cregar. Mr. Kelley said he had no objection to this. b6 per FBI b7C per FBI

[ ] then referred to the fact that he had been working in the Counterintelligence Division of CIA and referred specifically to an operation within that Division which had been under the control

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Memorandum to Mr. Adams  
Re: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON  
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

of Mr. Richard Ober. Ober was the CIA official involved in CIA's operations with respect to dissident domestic groups. He asked if we were aware of this and was advised by Wannall that the Intelligence Division was aware of this fact and that some of the Section Chiefs in the Division had on occasion met with Mr. Ober in the past.

[ ] then inquired whether the FBI had disseminated outside the Bureau papers with regard to domestic dissident activities. Wannall said that he recalled a monograph on this subject matter dated to the best of his recollection in 1969, which was put out responsive to a White House request for information which might show a foreign direction, control, or financing of domestic dissidents. [ ] inquired if there had been any prior ones. Mr. Kelley said that there had possibly been similar papers prepared with respect to other groups such as the Nation of Islam or the Black Panthers.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

According to [ ] he was endeavoring to establish why CIA had become involved in domestic matters to the extent which it had done so. There was considerable discussion as to whether CIA would advise the FBI if it was engaged in developing sources among domestic dissident groups in order that these sources could be utilized abroad. Mr. Adams explained to him that he could understand where there might be individual situations where CIA might be desirous of developing a U.S. citizen in a domestic dissident group for such use, but he felt that it was incumbent upon CIA to notify the FBI of any such situations since we might very well have an interest in the person CIA was seeking to develop. Mr. Kelley also commented that he felt it was certainly within the spirit of the memorandum of understanding of 2/7/66 that CIA should so advise us since we could be working up a case for prosecution on the particular individual CIA desired to develop for overseas use.

[ ] then asked whether the FBI had informants operating overseas, and if so, if we would inform CIA of this fact. Wannall advised him that we do not have informants operating overseas as such but on occasion a source does make a trip abroad for our counterintelligence purposes and in such instances we give prior notification to CIA, permitting representatives of that agency to brief the source prior to his departure from the U.S. and debrief the source upon his return from overseas, if CIA so desires.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

[ ] then asked to whom we would go in the event we had a dispute with CIA which could not be resolved between the



Memorandum to Mr. Adams

Re: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON  
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

two organizations. Mr. Adams explained that the FBI is a member of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and such matters, of course, could be taken up before the Board, but basically if any such dispute arose, the FBI would take up the matter with the Attorney General. However, it was pointed out to [ ] that we could recall no instances where we had to pursue such a course, that we have been able to work out any differences between the FBI and CIA by discussing the matter with appropriate officials of the latter agency.

b6 per FBI

b7C per FBI

[ ] said that in reviewing the operations which had been carried out under Richard Ober of CIA, he had noted that the FBI began increasing the amount of material disseminated to CIA during or shortly after August, 1967. He asked if we could explain why this occurred. Wannall referred to a request the FBI received from the Attorney General in September, 1967, wherein the Attorney General referred to the situation involving dissident activity in the United States and said that it would be necessary for the FBI to increase its coverage in an effort to establish whether violations of Federal laws were involved. Wannall also referred to a public statement by President Johnson, precise date not recalled, to the effect that if Government agencies continued doing business as usual the pressing problem brought about by dissident activities in this country would not be met. [ ] was told we would endeavor to determine why there may have been an increase in our dissemination to CIA beginning in or shortly after August, 1967.

b6 per FBI

b7C per FBI

[ ] and [ ] both made it quite clear that they were merely seeking information and had no intention of interfering with FBI-CIA relations.

ACTION:

(1) We will secure copies of the two letters of former Special Agent Papich referred to by [ ] and take up with the Department the question of releasing copies of them to captioned Commission.

*I ASKED [ ] TO SEND ANY  
REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS THRU  
DAG (WILDEROTTER) JMA*

b6 per FBI

b7C per FBI

(2) We will research the matter relating to the reported increase in dissemination of material to CIA beginning about August, 1967, and will furnish the results together with our recommendations.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1481651-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 141

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Page 6 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 7 ~ Referral/Consult;  
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Page 10 ~ Referral/Consult;  
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Page 15 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 16 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 18 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 19 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 20 ~ OTHER - 62-HQ-116391 Serial 2 : NARA;  
Page 21 ~ OTHER - 62-HQ-116391 Serial 2 : NARA;  
Page 22 ~ OTHER - 62-HQ-116391 Serial 3 : NARA;  
Page 23 ~ OTHER - 62-HQ-116391 Serial 3 : NARA;  
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Page 28 ~ Referral/Consult;  
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Page 142 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 152 ~ Referral/Consult;  
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Page 158 ~ OTHER - 62-HQ-116391 Serial 27 : NARA;  
Page 159 ~ OTHER - 62-HQ-116391 Serial 27 : NARA;  
Page 160 ~ OTHER - 62-HQ-116391 Serial 27 : NARA;  
Page 165 ~ Referral/Consult;  
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March 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CALLAHAN  
MR. ADAMS  
MR. WANNALL

RE: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

*President's Commission on CIA Activities within the U.S.*

On March 10, 1975, [ ] Staff Member of the Vice President's Commission on the CIA phoned me. He said that he would like to get together with me to discuss the CIA with particular emphasis on our cooperation or lack of cooperation with them. He said there probably would be other incidentals which need to be reviewed. He indicated he probably will be accompanied by two other Staff Members, [ ] and [ ]

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I informed him I would be available at 10:00 AM, March 11, 1975, and would set aside until approximately 12:00 Noon for this meeting. I indicated that in conformance with his request, I would meet with him and his associates alone for a brief period and then would call in three of our people to assist in responding to any questions they might have. I identified them as Messrs. Callahan, Adams, and Wannall. He said this would be a good arrangement and that he would look forward to seeing us.

I would imagine the discussion will be general in nature and know of no preparations that we need to make. I would say further that rather than make any extensive preparations, if there is any specific request, we supply it to Mr. [ ] at some later date.

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In contemplation of this conference, the three aforementioned people should stand by and be ready to come immediately upon my call to you. I would say that it would be shortly after 10:15 AM that you would be called.

If there be any need to contact Mr. [ ] he can be reached at

EX-101

REC 68

Very truly yours,

*Clarence M. Kelley*

18 MAR 13 1975

Clarence M. Kelley  
Director

SENT FROM D. O.

TIME 2:30 PM

DATE 3-10-75

BY JEW

MAR 17 1975

CMK:EDM.(7)

TELETYPE UNIT

GPO 954-546



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. J.B. Adams

DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : W.R. Wannall *Wannall*

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

This memorandum advises that Mr. [redacted] staff member of the Vice President's Commission, will interview Section Chief W.O. Cregar in Mr. Cregar's office at 1:30 p.m. on 3/13/75. *Q. Cregar*

Memorandum W.R. Wannall to Mr. J.B. Adams, dated 3/11/75, reported the results of a meeting in the Director's office with Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted] staff members of the Vice President's Commission. At that meeting, Mr. [redacted] inquired whether there would be any objection to the Commission staff interviewing Mr. Cregar, who formerly handled liaison matters with CIA. Mr. Kelley advised Mr. [redacted] that he had no objection to this. *I*

Mr. [redacted] telephonically contacted me on the morning of 3/12/75 to determine if he could interview Mr. Cregar in Mr. Cregar's office at 1:30 p.m. on 3/13/75. After determining from Mr. Cregar that he would be available, Mr. [redacted] was telephonically advised of the above.

Following the interview, Mr. Cregar will prepare a memorandum setting forth what transpired during the interview.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

WOC:bcw (6) *bcw*

- 1 - Mr. N.P. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. J.B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar

56 MAR 25 1975

REC-4

62-116391-15

15 MAR 19 1975

*S-wop*  
*WAW*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/20/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION-ON  
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec. \_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum advises that on the afternoon of 3/20/75 Mr. [ ] Staff Member of the Vice President's Commission, telephonically contacted me to advise that the Commission desired me to appear before the Commission on 3/24/75.

Memorandum Cregar to Wannall, dated 3/17/75, reported in considerable detail my interview with Mr. [ ] In that memorandum I reported that Mr. [ ] anticipated having me appear as a witness before the Rockefeller Commission on the early afternoon of 3/24/75.

Pursuant to a telephonic request from Mr. [ ] on 3/20/75, I telephonically contacted his office and spoke with him. He advised that the Commission desires that I appear as a witness on 3/24/75. Mr. [ ] will visit me at my office on the morning of 3/21/75 to provide me with a brief outline as to what areas the Commission desires to have me testify on.

## ACTION:

If approved, I will be available for testimony before the Rockefeller Commission on 3/24/75. A memorandum for the record will be prepared following my testimony.

WOC:ebc

(6)

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Cregar

50 APR 02 1975

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called  
Mr. Wannall +  
advised him  
3-24-75

EX-110

REC-4  
62-116391-16

Co MAR 25 1975

5-2008

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,  
Chairman

David W. Belin,  
Executive Director

John T. Connor  
C. Douglas Dillon  
Erwin N. Griswold  
Lane Kirkland  
Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
Ronald Reagan  
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

March 17, 1975

Mr. James A. Wilderotter  
Associate Deputy Attorney General  
Department of Justice  
10th & Constitution Avenue  
Washington, D. C. 20530

Rockefeller Commission

Dear Mr. Wilderotter:

During the course of an interview which I had today with Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, I learned of the following documents which I would also like the Bureau to furnish for presentation to the Commission:

1. Sam Papich's memorandum of August 21, 1967, re White House request to the CIA concerning dissident groups;
2. Ramsey Clark's letter of September 14, 1967, to the Bureau asking the Bureau to engage in collection of information concerning dissident groups;
3. 1969 White House request to the Bureau for information concerning the foreign connections of various dissident groups (this apparently led to a paper, prepared by the Bureau and forwarded to the White House, providing the requested information);
4. Compilation of statements of public figures, showing the atmosphere during the period of the greatest activity by dissident groups (this compilation apparently was compiled by Wannall's section).

REC-71 62-116394-20

I have already discussed these requests with Mr. Wannall, and he is in the process of attempting to locate these documents. I would like to

5 MAR 31 1975

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memo Wannall-Adams 3/21/75, FSC, also  
let Rep AC, 3/21/75, VSC, also

- 2 -

use these documents during next Monday's hearing before the Commission (March 24, 1975) and would therefore appreciate your making every effort to furnish them to me by Friday of this week, if not before.

~~Very truly yours~~



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b7C

✓ CC: ~~Ray~~ Raymond Wannall

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. ☒  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/20/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

At 12:00 noon on March 20, 1975, I spoke with [redacted] staff attorney for the Commission on CIA Activities, concerning the Director's testimony which is scheduled for Monday, March 24, 1975, in Room 275 of the Old Executive Office Building. Mr. [redacted] told me that the Director's testimony has been rescheduled for 3:30 p.m. on the same date at the same place. He said that he will question the Director for approximately 1/2 hour concerning matters that were involved in his recent interview of the Director and matters described in the outline provided the Director by his letter of March 17, 1975.

Following that testimony, the Commission members will inquire by asking direct questions of the Director. Mr. [redacted] said that he has no way of knowing the precise scope of the questions that may be asked by the members of the Commission nor how much time the testimony may require. He said that it was desired that the Director would testify alone although if the Director wishes he may have someone available to answer questions of a technical nature that may arise. He said that such persons would not be present during the Director's testimony, but could be readily available to be called if needed. In the event the Director does request that others be available to be called, Mr. [redacted] should be advised of the names as soon as possible.

The entire day will be devoted to receiving testimony concerning the FBI. Former SA Sam Papich will testify first beginning at 10:30 a.m. and continuing after lunch. Section Chief William Cregar will be called to testify at 3 p.m. Mr. Cregar should be available at 2:30 p.m. in the event it is possible to call him to testify earlier than his scheduled time.

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
JAM:mfd

REC-35

ST-112

14 MAR 26 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

70 APR 21 1975  
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Memorandum to Mr. Adams  
Re: Commission on CIA Activities, etc.

In addition to himself, others who will be present when the Director testifies will be the members of the Commission, David Belin, Staff Director, [redacted] of Mr. Belin's staff, [redacted] a staff member, and two legal representatives of the Vice President, [redacted] and [redacted] and a reporter who will transcribe the proceedings.

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Mr. [redacted] said that he was convinced the Director will be able to answer from his own knowledge all of the questions that will be presented to him because they will deal with the Director's views concerning FBI - CIA relationships and jurisdiction. He said that he had prepared a summary of his recent interview with the Director and he offered to make a copy of the summary if it would be of some use to the Director in preparing for the testimony. I asked that he furnish us a copy and he said that he would be communicating with Mr. Cregar today or tomorrow and that he would furnish a copy to Mr. Cregar for our use.

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RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

*John*

*John*

*4*

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Office of Associate Director

, 1975

☒ Director \_\_\_\_\_ Mrs. Metcalf, 5633  
☒ Mr. Callahan, 5744 \_\_\_\_\_ Telephone Room  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Jenkins, 5744  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Adams, 5744  
  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Ash, 4130 IB \_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Bowers, 4509  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Bassett, 6212 JEH \_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Heim, 4264  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Cleveland, 1742 \_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Herington, 5634  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Decker, 3114 IB \_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Malmfeldt, 4718  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Gallagher, 5734  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Gebhardt, 5012 JEH  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Jamieson  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. McDermott, 5829 JEH \_\_\_\_\_ Corres. Review, 5533  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Mintz, 5640 \_\_\_\_\_ Mail Room, 5531  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Moore, 5634 \_\_\_\_\_ Teletype  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Walsh, 6012 JEH \_\_\_\_\_ Personnel Records  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Wannall, 4026 JEH \_\_\_\_\_ Mechanical Section  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. White, 7621  
  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. O'Connell, 5744 \_\_\_\_\_ For Appropriate  
Action  
\_\_\_\_\_ For Your Approval  
\_\_\_\_\_ Initial and Return  
\_\_\_\_\_ Please Call Me  
\_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
\_\_\_\_\_ Per Conversation  
  
\_\_\_\_\_ Miss Tietgen  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mrs. Mutter  
\_\_\_\_\_ Miss Downing  
\_\_\_\_\_ Miss Southers

Room \_\_\_\_\_

If Director unable  
to all him suggest  
to talk to him.

*J. B. Adams*  
J. B. Adams  
Room 5744, Ext. 2666

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/24/75

FROM : W. *Wob* Cregar

1 - Mrs. Metcalf  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: *Wob* VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum transmits a request from former Special Agent Sam Papich wherein he asks to have the opportunity to speak with the Director for approximately 10 to 15 minutes on Tuesday, 3/25/75, anytime after 11 a.m.

On the evening of 3/23/75 I had a telephonic conversation with Mr. Papich who is in Washington, D. C., preparatory to his appearance before the Rockefeller Commission on the morning of 3/24/75. Papich advised that he is concerned about being called before Select Committees of the Congress and for that reason desired to have a very, very brief conversation with Mr. Kelley. Although Papich did not specifically discuss with me why he wanted to see Mr. Kelley, I got the distinct impression he desired some guidance as to how he should react if subsequently interviewed by staffs of the House and Senate Select Committees. He indicated he is fully prepared to protect the Bureau's interests in every way he can and stated that during his interviews by the Rockefeller Commission staff he has not discussed any specific Bureau cases that he had knowledge of. *mg*

Inasmuch as Papich is seeking guidance from the Bureau as to how he can be responsive to future inquiries from the Select Committees but stay within the limits of commitments he made to the Bureau at the time of his retirement, i.e., not discuss any information he obtained by virtue of his FBI employment, the Intelligence Division believes it would be desirable for Mr. Kelley to see Papich for the guidance he seeks.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. Kelley designate a time he would be available to see Mr. Papich sometime after 11 a.m., 3/25/75.

WOC:ebc  
(7) *Wob*

*Wob* *Wob*

*Mr. Kelley will see in N.Y. JMA*

57 APR 7 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

*Wob*



Proposed Areas of Testimony For  
CLARENCE M. KELLEY

I. Background Information

Mr. [ ] will give a sketch of Mr. Kelley's background before beginning the questioning.

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II. FBI Organization

A. Divisions of Basic Responsibility

- (1) Criminal Investigation
- (2) Internal Security and Counterintelligence

B. Manpower Within Each Division

[Mr. Kelley will give figures showing the number of men (and the percentages) working in the primary areas of the Bureau's responsibility. He will indicate the need for more men in the counterintelligence field.]

III. Basic Jurisdictional Line Between FBI and CIA

- A. FBI -- Operations conducted in the Continental U.S., Hawaii, Alaska and Puerto Rico;
- B. CIA -- Operations conducted abroad;
- C. Not strictly a geographical division (one agency should notify the other if it is conducting legitimate operations in the other's territory);
- D. Domestic CIA activities recognized as legitimate by the FBI;
- E. February 7, 1966, Memorandum of Understanding as an example of jurisdictional division;

62-116391-24  
ENCLOSURE

III. (continued)

F. Specific instances of interest where FBI will or will not assert its jurisdiction:

- (1) Investigations involving CIA employees;
  - (a) Espionage cases -- FBI will investigate,
  - (b) Administrative cases -- FBI will not investigate,
  - (c) Leak cases -- FBI refers to Justice Department for prosecutive opinion before taking on an investigation.
- (2) Penetration of dissident groups;
  - (a) FBI's primary jurisdiction to determine foreign connections of and gather intelligence covering domestic dissident groups,
  - (b) CIA's recruitment of persons in dissident groups for use overseas (Mr. Kelley would expect to be kept notified.),
  - (c) Large scale intelligence gathering by CIA concerning domestic dissident groups (Mr. Kelley would not expect CIA to engage in such activity.)

IV. Relations Between FBI and CIA

A. At the Headquarters Level;

- (1) Liaison maintained there;
- (2) The present relationship enjoyed between FBI and CIA;
- (3) Efforts made to improve relations;
  - (a) Meetings with Director Colby,
  - (b) Exchange of training instructors, etc.
  - (c) Others.

IV. (continued)

B. At the Field level;

- (1) Liaison maintained there;
- (2) The present relationship enjoyed between FBI and CIA;
- (3) Efforts made to improve relations;
  - (a) February 1974 Directive re relations with CIA's Foreign Resources Division,
  - (b) July 1974 Directive re relations with CIA's Domestic Contact Division,
  - (c) Others.

V. Resolution of Conflicts Between FBI and CIA

- A. Referral of Conflicts to the Attorney General;
- B. USIB as Potential Arbiter.

## OFFICE OF DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

March 17, 1975

5:15 PM

Mr. [ ] with the Vice President's Commission on CIA, called. He said he had tentatively scheduled the Director to testify at 3:00 PM next Monday, March 24, and he was going to send confirmation of that today along with a topic outline of the areas in which he proposes to question the Director. He said the only thing is, he might want to shift the Director's appearance to 3:30 PM rather than 3:00 PM and asked if there would be any problem in scheduling.

MR. CALLAHAN \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. JENKINS \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. ADAMS \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. ASH \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. BASSETT \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. CLEVELAND \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. DECKER \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. GALLAGHER \_\_\_\_\_ b6  
 MR. GEBHARDT \_\_\_\_\_ b7C  
 MR. JAMIESON \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. MC DERMOTT \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. MINTZ \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. MOORE \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. WALSH \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. WANNALL \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. WHITE \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. COLEMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
 MR. REED \_\_\_\_\_  
 TELE. ROOM \_\_\_\_\_  
 MRS. METCALF \_\_\_\_\_

I told him that I had been holding from 3:00 PM on and there would be no problem insofar as the Director's schedule. He said the problem is that there are other witnesses and he wants them in logical order. He said he would be sending confirmation tomorrow and I told him I would watch for it.

1 - Mr. Adams  
 1 - Tele Room  
 edm

*Confirmation  
 rec'd & sent up  
 with memo 3/18/75  
 W. J. Adams  
 "W. J. Adams"  
 on 3/19/75  
 CIA*

*K*

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,  
Chairman

John T. Connor  
C. Douglas Dillon  
Erwin N. Griswold  
Lane Kirkland  
Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
Ronald Reagan  
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,  
Executive Director

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. Asst. Dir.:	_____
Dep. Dir.:	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

March 17, 1975

*Commission on CIA Activities Within The United States*


Honorable Clarence M. Kelley  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kelley:

This will confirm that you will be testifying before the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States on Monday, March 24, 1975, at 3:00 PM. Your testimony will be taken in Room 275 of the Old Executive Office Building.

Attached is a brief outline of the subject matters which I propose to cover with you before the Commission. Should you have any questions concerning any area of your proposed testimony, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely yours,



Copy made for Tele. Rm.

*3/18/75 gms*

ENCLOSURE

Attachment

CC: W. Raymond Wannall

APR 2 1975

EX 104

REC-73

62-116391-24

b6  
b7C

*B. F. R. P. 24*

EXP. PROC.

MAR 18 1975

*Memo to G. B. Adams;  
3/18/75 RPF:wh*

APR 7 1975

*Xerox made & sent to Mr. Adams 3-18-75 edm*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan  
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/18/75

FROM : W. R. [redacted]

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

SUBJECT: VICE-PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams  
dated 3/17/75 captioned "Letter Dated March 12, 1975, From  
[redacted] Staff Attorney, Commission on CIA Activities  
Within the United States, Request for Bureau Documents," en-  
closed a letter from Mr. [redacted] Staff Attorney,  
Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, to  
Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General,  
requesting that the Commission be furnished the following  
FBI documents:

1. Letter requesting retirement from Sam Papich to J. Edgar Hoover dated in February or March of 1970;
2. Letter from Sam Papich to J. Edgar Hoover expressing Papich's concern over the Bureau's failure to take action in the counterintelligence field, dated in 1968; -?(1967)
3. Recent directive from Director Kelley to the Field Offices explaining the permitted liaison between FBI and CIA at the Field Office level;
4. Memorandum of Understanding between the CIA and the FBI dated February 7, 1966;
5. February 1974 directive from Director Kelley to the Field explaining in detail the understanding between CIA and the FBI;
6. Memorandum containing the eleven questions which the Justice Department uses to determine whether the FBI should undertake an investigation involving the passing of classified material.

Referenced memorandum suggested Intelligence Division (INTD) assemble the documents requested and prepare an appropriate response in the form of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) which will be furnished by cover letter to the Associate Deputy Attorney General.

Enclosures

FJC:jlbt

(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116391

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams  
Re: VICE-PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON  
CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to instructions subsequently received from the Legal Counsel Division, the attached letter to the Deputy Attorney General has been prepared advising that the documents requested by Mr. [REDACTED] have been located and are available for review at FBIHQ. b6 b7C b7D

Attached are two copies of the documents requested by Mr. [REDACTED]. It should be noted that the identity of the criminal informant, [REDACTED] has been excised from the Papich letter of 3/2/70 and that data of an administrative nature has been excised from the remaining documents. The notations made by former Director Hoover on the Papich letter of 11/6/67 have not been excised as INTD feels the notations show the actions taken on the points raised in that letter.

RECOMMENDATIONS:


1. That the attached letter to the Deputy Attorney General be sent.

*FRC*

2. That the copies of the attached documents requested by [REDACTED] be maintained by the Legal Counsel Division to be available for review by him if he so desires.

b6  
b7C

*FRC*



The Deputy Attorney General

March 20, 1975

Director, <sup>REC-4</sup> FBI

62-116391-26

LETTER DATED MARCH 12, 1975, FROM  
[REDACTED] STAFF ATTORNEY,  
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN  
THE UNITED STATES  
REQUEST FOR BUREAU DOCUMENTS

1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar  
1 - Mr. Cassidy

b6  
b7C

Reference is made to letter dated March 12, 1975, sent to Associate Deputy Attorney General James A. Wilderotter from [REDACTED] Staff Attorney, Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, in which Mr. [REDACTED] requests that this Bureau furnish certain documents to the Commission.

The documents Mr. [REDACTED] requested have been located. We would prefer that the documents remain under our control, however, interpose no objection to the review of these documents by Mr. [REDACTED] in FBI Headquarters space.

It would be appreciated if you would advise Mr. [REDACTED] that the documents mentioned in his letter of March 12, 1975, are available for review in the office of Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division, Room 5640, Justice Building.

FJC:aso (9)

NOTE:

See memorandum W. R. Wannall, to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated 3/18/75, captioned "Vice-President's Commission on CIA Activities within the United States," prepared by FJC:jlb.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

58 APR 8 1975  
MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams *[Signature]*

FROM : Legal Counsel *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

DATE: 3/21/75

Assoc. Dir. *[Signature]*  
Dep. AD Adm. *[Signature]*  
Dep. AD Inv. *[Signature]*  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection *[Signature]*  
Intell. *[Signature]*  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

At 9:00 a.m. on March 21, 1975, Mr. [REDACTED] staff attorney for captioned Commission, appeared in my office and requested documents previously requested by letter addressed to Mr. Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, dated March 12, 1975. I told Mr. [REDACTED] that the material had been collected and it was our view that in the interest of security and cooperation with the Commission, we would recommend that he approve a procedure whereby he or another member of his staff would review documents requested prior to such documents, or copies of such documents, being made available to him for Commission purposes. Mr. [REDACTED] said that the information he received prior to making his request for documents led him to believe that any documents he did request would have to be produced for Commission purposes.

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However, he said he did not need original documents, but could use copies. Further, he said that it would be agreeable to him to conduct a preliminary review of the documents that he might request before the final decision is made to submit document copies to him for Commission purposes. He indicated that he appreciated our concern for security of the documents and that it was reasonable for us to limit the release of documents to those which he determined are absolutely essential for Commission purposes.

As to the materials described in his March 12, 1975, letter to Mr. Wilderotter, he asked that a determination be made by COB on March 21, 1975, as to whether he could review those documents to make the final determination. He will recontact me later today for an answer to that question.

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd  
(4) *[Signature]*

REC-56  
EX-111

62-116391-28  
5 APR 4 1975  
*[Signature]*

CONTINUED - OVER

50 APR 11 1975 *[Signature]*

62-116391

*Memorandum  
Legal Counsel  
K Adams 3/24/75 JAM:mfd*

Memorandum to Mr. Adams  
Re: Commission on CIA Activities, etc.

Mr. [ ] also inquired about a document request made by letter dated March 17, 1975, to Mr. Wilderotter which involved a Papich memorandum of August 21, 1967, concerning a White House request to CIA regarding dissident groups and other documents. I advised Mr. [ ] that while we were willing to discuss these documents with him there was a problem of the "third agency rule" which required us to secure the approval of other agencies involved in the material prior to their review in preparation for their release. Mr. [ ] said he understood that problem, but again requested a determination be made before COB 3/21/75, in order for him to make a determination as to need for copies of the requested documents to be made available for Commission purposes.

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Mr. [ ] explained that the urgency for making a determination<sup>b6</sup> as to the submission of all the documents described above was that he intended<sup>b7C</sup> to discuss the testimony of Sam Papich with Papich on March 22 or 23, 1975, to prepare for his appearance on March 24th and it would<sup>b6</sup> be useful for him to have the requested material prior to his conference with Papich.

The significance of the above discussion is that Mr. [ ] agreed in behalf of the Commission to the procedure of having documents reviewed while still in the custody of the FBI in order to make a determination as to whether copies of specific documents must be submitted for review by the Commission.

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### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Intelligence Division resolve the question regarding the third agency rule involving the documents requested in [ ] March 17, 1975, letter in order that [ ] may review the documents requested by COB March 21, 1975.

b6  
b7C

2. That the documents requested in the March 12, 1975, letter from [ ] be made available for his review by COB March 21, 1975.

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,  
Chairman

David W. Belin,  
Executive Director

John T. Connor  
C. Douglas Dillon  
Erwin N. Griswold  
Lane Kirkland  
Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
Ronald Reagan  
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

March 17, 1975

Mr. James A. Wilderotter  
Associate Deputy Attorney General  
Department of Justice  
10th & Constitution Avenue  
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Wilderotter:

During the course of an interview which I had today with Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, I learned of the following documents which I would also like the Bureau to furnish for presentation to the Commission:

1. Sam Papich's memorandum of August 21, 1967, re White House request to the CIA concerning dissident groups;
2. Ramsey Clark's letter of September 14, 1967, to the Bureau asking the Bureau to engage in collection of information concerning dissident groups;
3. 1969 White House request to the Bureau for information concerning the foreign connections of various dissident groups (this apparently led to a paper, prepared by the Bureau and forwarded to the White House, providing the requested information);
4. Compilation of statements by public figures, showing the atmosphere during the period of the greatest activity by dissident groups (this compilation apparently was compiled by Mr. Wannall's section).

I have already discussed these requests with Mr. Wannall, and he is in the process of attempting to locate these documents. I would like to

ENCLOSURE

62-116391-38

use these documents during next Monday's hearing before the Commission (March 24, 1975) and would therefore appreciate your making every effort to furnish them to me by Friday of this week, if not before.



b6  
b7c

✓ CC: ~~Wann~~ Raymond Wannall

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1481651-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 264

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Page 10 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 11 ~ Referral/Consult;  
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1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Legal Counsel Division

The Attorney General

March 25, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton  
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

**INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE  
UNITED STATES BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS**

Reference is made to letter in above caption dated March 6, 1975, to the Attorney General and Mr. William Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), from Mr. David W. Belin, Executive Director of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States.

Mr. Belin requested a response advising of the specific scope and nature of foreign intelligence activities in the United States. The response was to be submitted as rapidly as possible, hopefully within 15 days, and was to be coordinated with the CIA.

There are enclosed two copies of a paper dated March 20, 1975, which responds to Mr. Belin's request. This paper has been coordinated with the CIA and a copy is being furnished to Mr. Colby.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)

1 - Mr. William Colby (Enclosure)  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

REC 8 62-116391-

EX-110

5 APR 14 1975

EWL:jvl  
(11)

**NOTE:**

See memorandum, 3/24/75, A. B. Fulton to Mr. W. R. Wannall, captioned "Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States," prepared by EWL:jvl.

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Dep. AD Adm.  
Dep. AD Inv.  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin.  
Comp. Syst.  
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Files & Com.  
Gen. Inv.  
Ident.  
Inspection  
Intell.  
Laboratory  
Plan. & Eval.  
Spec. Inv.  
Training  
Off. Coun.  
Phone Rm.  
Director's Sec'y

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APR 15 1975

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GPO 534-540

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/24/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

My memorandum of March 21, 1975, captioned as above, recommended and it was approved that documents requested by Mr. [ ] staff attorney for captioned Commission, be made available for his review in my office on the afternoon of March 21, 1975.

Mr. [ ] accompanied by [ ] also a member of the Commission, staff, appeared in my office at 6:20 p.m. on March 21, 1975, and reviewed the documents until 6:51 p.m., at which time Mr. [ ] requested a copy of each of the documents. I furnished Mr. [ ] a copy of each document he had reviewed and asked him whether the documents would be made a matter of record in the Commission files and whether other copies of the documents would be made. Mr. [ ] said that the documents would be made a matter of record, that they would be reviewed by Commission staff and members of the Commission, but that unless he specifically advised me there would be no other copies made of the documents.

I told Mr. [ ] that it was the practice of the FBI for several years to classify materials of a sensitive nature only when they were to be disseminated outside of the FBI. I pointed out to him that some of the materials he was receiving did not bear specific classification markings but that I would discuss this matter with the Intelligence Division and advise him as to whether it would be necessary to classify individual documents. He told me that the entire Commission record was going to be classified but that if we had any additional concern about specific documents, we could discuss the matter further.

Enc.

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd  
(3)

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

CONTINUED - OVER

51 APR 17 1975

62-116391

5.2

Memo Wannall - Adams  
3/27/75 REC'd

REC-3162-116391-37  
EX-101  
9 APR 10 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Adams  
Re: Commission on CIA Activities

Attached is an exact copy of each document furnished to Mr. [ ]

b6  
b7C

At 9:00 a.m. on March 24, 1975, Mr. Adams advised me that Sam Papich had expressed some concern that he might be asked to testify concerning matters described in the documents released to the Commission. He was reluctant to testify concerning those matters unless the Bureau approved of such testimony. Mr. Adams advised me that Mr. [ ] should be told that the Bureau had no objections to Papich testifying as to items described in the materials.

At 9:05 a.m. on March 24, 1975, I called Mr. [ ] and advised him that we would not object to Mr. Papich testifying as to information contained in the materials furnished on the afternoon of March 21, 1975. Mr. [ ] told me that the Commission members had expressed a great deal of interest in the 1966 Memorandum of Understanding and he asked whether the FBI would have any objections to him making copies of that document for use by the Commission members today. He assured me that upon completion of the testimony today he would collect all the copies and he would destroy them. I told him that under those circumstances we would have no objection to him making copies.

b6  
b7C

I discussed with Assistant Director Wannall the possibility of having the documents reviewed for purposes of classification. He agreed that it would be appropriate to do so and upon completion of that review we will advise Mr. [ ] of the classification necessary for the individuals documents.

b6  
b7C

*Handled by Kennedy w/ly*

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM      w/ly      [Signature]

[Signature]

BY LIAISON

Date: November 5, 1989

To: Director for Inspection Services  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF  
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO  
PRESS AND OTHER PUBLIC MEDIA

As you are aware, unauthorized disclosure of classified defense information and certain atomic and nuclear data to the press or other public media may be a violation of the espionage statute or the Atomic Energy Act, respectively.

This Bureau, however, does not initiate investigation of such matters unless specifically requested to do so by the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice.

In order for the Assistant Attorney General to make a determination in this regard, it is requested that we be furnished the following information at the time such matters are referred to us:

- Document*
1. Date and identity of the article or release disclosing the classified information.
  2. Specific statements which are classified and whether the data was properly classified.
  3. Whether the classified data disclosed is accurate.
  4. Whether the data came from a specific document and, if so, the origin of the document and the name of the individual responsible for the security of the classified data disclosed.

Director for Inspection Services  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

5. The extent of official dissemination of the data.

6. Whether the data has been the subject of prior official releases.

7. Whether prior clearance for publication or release of the information was sought from proper authorities.

8. Whether the material or portions thereof or enough background data has been published officially or in the press to make an educated speculation on the matter possible.

9. Whether the data can be declassified for the purpose of prosecution and, if so, the name of the person competent to testify concerning the classification.

10. Whether declassification had been decided upon prior to the publication or release of the data.

11. What effect the disclosure of the classified data could have on the national defense.

1 - Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

BY LIAISON

Attention: Deputy Director for Plans

1 - Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

BY LIAISON

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army

BY LIAISON

Attention: Director of Counterintelligence

1 - Commander, Naval Intelligence Command

BY LIAISON

1 - Office of Special Investigations  
Air Force

BY LIAISON

Attention: Chief, Counterintelligence Division

Director for Inspection Services  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

1 - Office of Counterintelligence and Security BY LIAISON  
Defense Intelligence Agency

1 - Director, Division of Security BY LIAISON  
Atomic Energy Commission

1 - Director BY LIAISON  
Defense Atomic Support Agency

Attention: Chief, Intelligence and  
Security Directorate

1 - Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/11/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON CIA  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

On March 10, 1975, Associate Deputy Attorney General Wilderotter had hand delivered to my office the attached memorandum from the Attorney General addressed to Wilderotter which enclosed a copy of a letter from David W. Belin, Executive Director of captioned Commission, dated March 6, 1975, addressed to the Attorney General. Wilderotter requested that the Bureau undertake to comply with the request stated in the letter from Belin in behalf of the Department. The Belin letter requests within a 15-day deadline a response advising of the specific scope and nature of foreign intelligence activities within the United States. Consistent with our previous position in regard to responses to the Commission, it would be appropriate for a letterhead memorandum to be prepared and submitted to the Department for transmission to the Commission.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division prepare an appropriate letterhead memorandum for submission to the Attorney General and his consideration of sending it to the Commission.

Enc.

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Farrington
- 1 - Mr. Hotis
- 1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd  
(6)

ENCLOSURE

4 APR 22 1975

REC-46

ST. 104

5 APR 15 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3-24-81 BY SP4 JRM/ld  
207939

memo to W. Wannall  
"Commission on CIA  
Activities within the US"  
3/24/75 EWL:jvl  
let to AG, Capt "Intelligence Activities  
within the US by Foreign Governments"  
3/25/75 EWL:jvl

From  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

3/7/75

Deputy Attorney General-----	
Solicitor General-----	
Director of Public Information-----	
Assistant Attorney General for Administration-----	
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust-----	
Assistant Attorney General, Civil-----	
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights-----	
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal-----	
Assistant Attorney General, Land & Nat. Resources-----	
Assistant Attorney General, Legal Counsel-----	
Assistant Attorney General, OLA-----	
Assistant Attorney General, Tax-----	
Administrator, DEA-----	
Administrator, LEAA-----	
Chairman, Board of Immigration Appeals-----	
Chairman, Parole Board-----	
Commissioner, I&NS-----	
Director, Bureau of Prisons-----	
Director, Community Relations Service-----	
Director, FBI-----	
Pardon Attorney-----	
Records-----	

Attention James Wilderotter

REMARKS: I presume this is in your bailiwick.  
I will give the Attorney General a copy.

SL

216-2

*Mr. Legal Counsel  
to Mr. Adams  
3/11/75 JAM:myl*

ENCLOSURE

62-116391-38

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5-24-87 BY SPAN/MLH  
207939



COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,  
Chairman

David W. Belin,  
Executive Director

John T. Connor  
C. Douglas Dillon  
Erwin N. Griswold  
Lane Kirkland  
Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
Ronald Reagan  
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

March 6, 1975

RECEIVED  
OFFICE OF THE  
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
APR 7 1975

✓ The Honorable Edward Levi,  
Attorney General of the United States  
Department of Justice  
and  
Mr. William Colby  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C.

Re: Intelligence Activities Within the United States  
by Foreign Governments


Dear Attorney General Levi and Director Colby:

In the course of our investigation it may be very important to have factual background information concerning the intelligence activities by foreign governments inside the United States. We would very much appreciate receiving from you as rapidly as possible, and hopefully within the next 15 days, a coordinated response advising us of the specific scope and nature of foreign intelligence in the United States.

This would include all matters directly or indirectly involving the procedures, objectives and requirements of foreign intelligence operations in the United States including expressly, but not by way of limitation, such matters as intelligence directed against American citizens or resident aliens or American corporations or unincorporated businesses or against federal, state or local governments.

We would also appreciate this analysis including how the scope, procedures, objectives and requirements of such activities have changed over the past 15 years.

Sincerely yours,

  
David W. Belin  
Executive Director

216-2

2

ENCLOSURE

62-116391-38

The Deputy Attorney General

April 18, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Schwartz  
1 - Mr. Cassidy

LETTER DATED MARCH 25, 1975, FROM  
[REDACTED] STAFF ATTORNEY,  
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
REQUEST FOR BUREAU DOCUMENTS

b6  
b7C

Reference is made to the letter dated March 25, 1975, sent to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, from [REDACTED] staff attorney, Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, in which Mr. [REDACTED] requests that this Bureau furnish certain documents to the Commission.

b6  
b7C

Among the documents requested are all notes or interoffice memoranda pertaining to two letters submitted by Mr. Sam Papich, a former Special Agent of the FBI, to Mr. Hoover, the letters being dated March 2, 1970, and November 6, 1967.

The documents Mr. [REDACTED] requested have been located. It would be appreciated if you would advise him that the documents requested are available for review in the office of Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Room 5640 Justice Building.

REC 8

62-116391-40


FJC:aso (8)

EX-110

18 APR 22 1975

NOTE:

See memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated 4/4/75, captioned "Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (Rockefeller Commission)," prepared by FJC:aso.



MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. D. Ryan  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - [redacted]

DATE 11/12/75

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : T. W. Leavitt *twl/ssm*

SUBJECT: [redacted]

PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

b6  
b7C

*Senstudy 75*

At approximately 12:45 p.m., 11/12/75, SA [redacted] while covering Inspector [redacted]'s desk, received a telephone call from an individual who identified himself as [redacted] stated he was a Washington, D. C. representative of the Public Broadcasting System and advised as follows:

He will be covering for the Public Broadcasting System, the forthcoming hearings of the Senate Internal Security Committee relative to the FBI's Counterintelligence Program. He stated that in order to be prepared for these hearings, he felt he would need the following documents: "The Justice Department's report on the FBI's counterintelligence activities dated November 18, [redacted]" and "The Attorney General's letter to Mr. [redacted]"

[redacted] stated he had called the Justice Department concerning these reports and had been referred to the FBI.

SA [redacted] advised [redacted] that he did not know whether or not the FBI had such material but that since the material originated with the Department of Justice, his request should be made to them. Mr. [redacted] appeared satisfied with this reply and stated he would, in fact, call the Office of the Attorney General.

## ACTION:

That this memorandum be referred to Mr. W. O. Cregar for his information and possible referral to the Department of Justice.

SSM:mjg  
(5)

*wrw/ssm*

62-116395  
NOT RECORDED  
46 NOV 14 1975

*Records  
62-116395*

ENCLOSURE

61 NOV 25 1975

NOV 14 1975

FIVE

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Sys. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

ORIGINAL FILED IN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : W. R. Wannall *WRW/*

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
(ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION)

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/24/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

By letter dated 3/25/75 to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Mr. [REDACTED] staff attorney of captioned Commission, levied a number of requests for documents in possession of the FBI to be supplied to the Commission. b6  
b7C

One of the requests was for "all directives from the Attorney General to the FBI directing the FBI to undertake activities with regard to dissident groups during the period 1965 through 1972." As we do not have a central repository for the type of documents requested, personnel of the Intelligence Division (INTD) reviewed all abstracts in the Files and Communications Division pertaining to incoming mail from the Department from the years 1965 to 1972, and in addition canvassed all Sections of INTD in an effort to locate as many documents as possible which would be responsive to Mr. [REDACTED]'s request. We were able to locate communications from three former Attorneys General and 42 communications from Assistant Attorneys General of the former Internal Security Division, Criminal Division, and the Civil Rights Division of the Department, which documents requested investigative activity on the part of the FBI concerning dissident groups during the pertinent period. b6  
b7C

ST 104 REC-28

62-116391-46X

The attached letter to the Deputy Attorney General, which transmits a memorandum for captioned Commission along with copies of documents responsive to the Commission's request, seeks Departmental concurrence to furnish the documents to the Commission.

## RECOMMENDATION:

12 APR 30 1975

45 ENCLOSURE That the attached letter to the Deputy Attorney General, enclosing a memorandum for the Commission with the documents requested and seeking Departmental concurrence in furnishing such documents, be sent.

62-116391  
Enclosures  
FJC:aso (5)

FJC

PLM

JBA  
PLM

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

55 APR 16 1976

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,  
Chairman

John T. Connor  
C. Douglas Dillon  
Erwin N. Griswold  
Lane Kirkland  
Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
Ronald Reagan  
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,  
Executive Director

*Rec'd  
4-25-75  
W*

April 23, 1975


Honorable Harold R. Tyler, Jr.  
Deputy Attorney General  
U. S. Department of Justice  
9th & Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Judge Tyler:

As you know, we are investigating possibly questionable CIA activities within the United States. We would appreciate receiving from the Department of Justice information on any CIA efforts to intervene in the ordinary course of civil or criminal investigations or litigation undertaken by the Department.

I would appreciate it if you would furnish the Commission within two weeks with a summary of any such interventions, calling particular attention to anything which suggests the CIA may have been attempting to cover up some form of improper activity.

Sincerely yours,



David W. Belin  
Executive Director

ENCLOSURE

The Deputy Attorney General

April 29, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cassidy

LETTER DATED MARCH 25, 1975, FROM  
[REDACTED] STAFF ATTORNEY,  
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
REQUEST FOR BUREAU DOCUMENTS

b6  
b7C

Reference is made to the letter dated March 25, 1975, to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, from [REDACTED] staff attorney, Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, in which Mr. [REDACTED] requests that this Bureau furnish certain documents to the Commission.

Among the documents requested are "all directives from the Attorney General to the FBI directing the FBI to undertake activities with regard to dissident groups during the period 1965 through 1972." We have located three memoranda from the former Attorneys General and 42 memoranda which were directed to the FBI by various Assistant Attorneys General of the then Internal Security Division, the Criminal Division, and the Civil Rights Division of the Department, all of which appear to be responsive to Mr. [REDACTED]'s request.

MAILED 7  
APR 29 1975

b6  
b7C

As the documents requested by Mr. [REDACTED] originated with the Department, your concurrence in furnishing them to him is requested. For your convenience a copy of each document we propose be furnished to Mr. [REDACTED] is attached to the enclosed memorandum captioned "Commission on CIA Activities within the United States". A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. **SI 104 REC-28 62-116290**

In connection with your review of these documents you may desire to declassify or downgrade the classification of those documents attached which now bear a security classification as from our review of the documents it does not appear that they are classifiable under present classification guidelines.

12 APR 30 1975

ENCLOSURE

After reviewing these documents if you concur in furnishing them to Mr. [REDACTED] it would be appreciated if you would transmit them to [REDACTED]

Enclosures - 47

FJC:aso (7)

55 APR 16 1976

TELETYPE ~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

SEE NOTE  
PAGE TWO

The Deputy Attorney General .

NOTE:

See memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated 4/24/75, captioned "Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (Rockefeller Commission)," prepared by FJC:aso.

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz

April 29, 1975

**COMMISSION ON CIA  
ACTIVITIES WITHIN  
THE UNITED STATES**

1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cassidy

Reference is made to the letter dated March 25, 1975, to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, from [redacted] staff attorney, Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, in which Mr. [redacted] requested "all directives from the Attorney General to the FBI directing the FBI to undertake activities with regard to dissident groups during the period 1965 through 1972."

Through a review of FBI files the attached documents have been located which appear to be responsive to Mr. [redacted]'s request. Three of the attached documents were directed to the FBI by former Attorneys General and the other 42 by the Assistant Attorneys General in charge of divisions within the Department which normally handle prosecutive actions which might arise out of our investigation of dissident activity. As it was felt these 42 documents would be responsive to Mr. [redacted]'s request, they are also being furnished as attachments to this memorandum.

Enclosures - 45

1-The Deputy Attorney General

FJC:aso (6)

NOTE:

See memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated 4/24/75, captioned "Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (Rockefeller Commission)," prepared by FJC:aso.

Assoc. Dir.  
Dep. AD Adm.  
Dep. AD Inv.  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin.  
Comp. Syst.  
Ext. Affairs  
Files & Com.  
Gen. Inv.  
Ident.  
Inspection  
Intell.  
Laboratory  
Plan. & Eval.  
Spec. Inv.  
Training  
Legal Coun.  
Phone Rm.  
for Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☒

**ENCLOSURE**

GPO 93



1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

May 7, 1975

The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

Director, FBI

LETTER DATED MARCH 25, 1975, FROM  
[REDACTED] STAFF ATTORNEY,  
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
REQUEST FOR BUREAU DOCUMENTS

b6  
b7C

Reference is made to the letter dated March 25, 1975, to  
Mr. James A. Wilderotter, then Associate Deputy Attorney General, from  
[REDACTED] staff attorney, Commission on CIA Activities Within the  
United States, in which Mr. [REDACTED] requested that this Bureau furnish  
certain documents to the Commission.

Among the documents requested were "all directives from the  
President or White House staff to the FBI directing the FBI to undertake activity  
with regard to dissident groups during the period 1965 through 1972."

We have located six communications from The White House to the  
Bureau, as well as seven intra-Bureau communications, all of which concern  
requests from White House staff members for information concerning dissident  
activity during the period 1965-1972. Authorization has been obtained from  
Mr. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, The White House, to  
furnish these 13 communications to the Commission.

ENCL BEHIND FILE

Our files reveal that, with the formation of the Intelligence Evaluation  
Committee (IEC) in 1970, which Committee was chaired by a member of another  
component of the Department, the majority of requests for information concerning  
dissident activity emanating from The White House came to the FBI through its  
membership on the IEC. Attached are seven memoranda from the Executive  
Director of the IEC addressed either to the FBI representative or IEC members  
and 16 intra-Bureau memoranda prepared by the FBI-IEC member which contain  
levies for input concerning dissident activity, which communications we feel  
are responsive to Mr. [REDACTED]'s request.

It is our feeling that these 23 documents pertaining to IEC activity  
would be responsive to the request of Mr. [REDACTED] however, as the IEC was  
chaired by another component of the Department and instructions were issued

18 SEP 12 1975

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAIL ROOM [ ] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

ENCLOSURE

GPO 934-546

**The Deputy Attorney General**

to the FBI through that mechanism, the decision concerning furnishing them to the Commission should rest with your office. Attached are Xerox copies of the 23 documents mentioned above. In the event the decision is made to furnish these documents to the Commission, it is suggested that clearance for such action be obtained from Mr. Wilderotter.

Also attached is a memorandum captioned "Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States," enclosing copies of the 13 communications mentioned in Paragraph 3 above, for transmittal to Mr.  A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

b6  
b7C

**Enclosures - 38**

**NOTE:**

See memorandum Mr. W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated 5/6/75, captioned "Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission)," prepared by FJC:vb.



THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1975

Dear Mr. Director:

Thank you very much for your letter of April 18th. I appreciate greatly your clear and concise answers to the questions asked by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States.

I am delighted that the meetings between you and Mr. Colby, and your staffs, have been scheduled.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

D

ST 112

Mr. Clarence M. Kelly  
Director  
United States Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C. 20535

REC-63

62-116391-48

18 MAY 14 1975

P.S. Hope all is well 5-wk  
at home! Very best  
Belson

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

May 5, 1975

On 5/6/75 at 12:30 PM the Director is scheduled to have lunch with William E. Colby, Director, CIA; William Nelson, Deputy Director of Operations; Jack Blake, Deputy Director for Administration and Messrs. Callahan, Jenkins, Adams and Wannall.

gms

MR. CALLAHAN ☒  
MR. JENKINS ☒  
MR. ADAMS ☒  
MR. ASH ☒  
MR. BASSETT ☒  
MR. CLEVELAND ☒  
MR. DECKER ☒  
MR. GALLAGHER ☒  
MR. GEBHARDT ☒  
MR. MCDERMOTT ☒  
MR. MINTZ ☒  
MR. MOONEY ☒  
MR. MOORE ☒  
MR. WALSH ☒  
MR. WANNALL ☒  
MR. WHITE ☒  
MR. COLEMAN ☒  
MR. REED ☒  
TELE. ROOM ☒  
MRS. [unclear] ☒

EXP. PROC.

MAY 5 1975

5-urw

Form DJ-96a  
(Rev. 6-22-64)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ROUTING SLIP

TO:	NAME	DIVISION	BUILDING	ROOM
1.	Mr. Adams	FBI	Main	5744
2.				
3.				
4.				

- ☐ SIGNATURE ☐ COMMENT ☐ PER CONVERSATION  
☐ APPROVAL ☐ NECESSARY ACTION ☐ AS REQUESTED  
☐ SEE ME ☐ NOTE AND RETURN ☐ NOTE AND FILE  
☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ CALL ME ☐ YOUR INFORMATION  
☐ ANSWER OR ACKNOWLEDGE  
ON OR BEFORE \_\_\_\_\_  
☐ PREPARE REPLY FOR  
THE SIGNATURE OF \_\_\_\_\_

REMARKS

FROM:	NAME	BUILDING & ROOM	EXT.	DATE
	James A. Wilderotter	4208	3995	3-27

ENCLOSURE

MAY 23 1975

314

NOT RECORDED

3 MAY 15 1975

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
Washington, DC 20500

David W. Belin,  
Executive Director

March 25, 1975

Mr. A. Rockefeller,  
Chairman

Mr. T. Connor  
Mr. Douglas Dillon  
Mr. N. Griswold  
Mr. Kirkland  
Mr. L. L. Rostenkowski  
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Jr.

Mr. James A. Wilderotter  
Associate Deputy Attorney General  
Department of Justice  
10th & Constitution Avenue  
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Wilderotter:

The Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States would appreciate your making an effort to locate and provide the Commission with the following additional documents:

1. All Directives from the Attorney General to the FBI directing the FBI to undertake activities with regard to dissident groups during the period 1965 through 1972;
2. All Directives from the President or White House staff to the FBI directing the FBI to undertake activities with regard to dissident groups during the period 1965 through 1972;
3. Any notes or interoffice memoranda pertaining to the two letters of Mr. Papich to Mr. Hoover dated March 2, 1970, and November 6, 1967;
4. Any documents in the possession of the Bureau, including inter-office memoranda, showing a connection between CIA and known or suspected mafia personalities specifically for, but not limited to, the period 1958 through 1965.

Your assistance in expediting this matter would be appreciated.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
BLX 1/26/97


Memo 1, 2, 3 & 4 all  
captioned "Commission  
on CIA Activities within  
the United States"  
filed in 62-116391

① See memo W.R. Wannall  
to J.B. Adams dated  
4-24-75

② See memo W.R. Wannall  
to J.B. Adams dated  
5-6-75

③ See memo W.R. Wannall  
to J.B. Adams dated  
4-16-75

④ See memo W.R. Wannall  
to J.B. Adams dated  
4-21-75



62-116391

ENCLOSURE

62-116391-1

b6  
b7c

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 5/6/75

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall *WRW*

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
(ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Lab. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

By letter dated 3/25/75 to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, then Associate Deputy Attorney General, Mr. [ ] staff attorney of captioned Commission, levied a number of requests for documents in possession of the FBI to be supplied to the Commission.

b6  
b7C

One of the requests was for "all directives from the President or White House staff to the FBI directing the FBI to undertake activity with regard to dissident groups during the period 1965 through 1972." As we do not have a central repository for the type of documents requested, personnel of the Intelligence Division (INTD) reviewed all abstracts in the Files and Communications Division pertaining to incoming mail from The White House from the years 1965 to 1972 and, in addition, canvassed all Sections of INTD in an effort to locate as many documents as possible that would be responsive to Mr. [ ]'s request.

b6  
b7C

Six communications from The White House to the Bureau, which appear to be responsive to Mr. [ ]'s request, as well as seven intra-Bureau communications, which concern oral requests from White House staff members for information concerning dissident activity during the pertinent period, have been located. On 4/28/74 and 5/2/75, Mr. Wilderotter, who is now Assistant Counsel to the President, The White House, authorized furnishing the above-mentioned 13 communications to the Commission.

ST. 114 REC-37 62-116391-51

Bureau files reveal that, in 1970, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) was formed. Mr. Robert C. Mardian, the then Assistant Attorney General of the Internal Security Division of the Department, advised Mr. Hoover that he had been commissioned by the President to put together an interdepartmental intelligence unit (subsequently named IEC) for the purpose of pooling information received from various intelligence agencies. Based on the evaluation of such information, it was hoped that this unit might eventually be able to predict, with some degree of accuracy, demonstrations, criminal acts which might be committed by dissidents and others whose goals were inimical

22 MAY 20 1975

Enclosures - Sent 5-14-75  
FJC:vb (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

1 MAY 29 1975

62-116391  
SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams

Re: Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission)

to the U. S. Government. The FBI was designated as a member of the IEC and, under the instructions of the then Attorney General John N. Mitchell, designated personnel full time to work with the IEC.

From that time until 6/11/73 when the IEC was phased out, it was chaired by another component of the Department and levies from The White House for information concerning dissident activity came to the Bureau through the IEC. A review of files reveals seven memoranda from the Executive Director of the IEC addressed either to the FBI representative or IEC members and 16 intra-Bureau memoranda written by the FBI members, IEC, which memoranda pertain to input for estimates to be prepared by IEC for The White House concerning dissident activity.

With regard to the communications resulting from FBI membership in the IEC, it is the opinion of INTD, as the information in these communications emanated from another component of the Department, or from The White House through that component to the FBI, that we should furnish the communications to the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) for his consideration in furnishing them to the Commission. If the DAG decides on that course of action, it will be up to his office to obtain White House concurrence to furnish that information to the Commission.

It is further proposed that, at the time we furnish the communications emanating from the IEC to the DAG, we also furnish the 13 communications cleared by The White House to the DAG for transmittal to the Commission.

ACTION:

If you approve, attached is a letter to the Deputy Attorney General, along with a memorandum for the Commission along the lines set forth above.

FJC

BRW  
H&B

OK

Jim

CHM

PLM

JAN  
H&B



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT.  
112494-384

DATE: 5-28-75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO  
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth in summary form the requests we have received from various Committees in Congress and the status of our replies.

## Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities - Church Committee

We have substantially complied with requests from the Committee contained in their letter of 3-19-75. The remaining aspects of these requests involve decisions by the Department of Justice concerning COINTELPRO and our recommendation that one particular document not be furnished the Committee.

Responses to the Senate Select Committee request of 4-30-75, which generally pertains to sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, the Manual of Instructions, Bureau forms, indexing information and classification materials has been substantially complied with. We have made available to the Committee after receiving Departmental approval, the requested sections of the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Manual of Instructions. We are awaiting the Department's approval on the response concerning indexing information, Bureau forms, and classification material. The final area contained in the 4-30-75 requests pertains to superseding Manual of Instructions sections back to 1960. We have just gathered the necessary material which must now be reviewed and a response prepared.

The request of the Committee dated 5-12-75 concerning allegations of CIA's involvement in a plot to kill Castro has been responded to.

- 1 - Mrs. Metcalf
- 1 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: Mr. Cregar)
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Hotis
- 1 - Mr. Daly

NOT RECORDED

46 JUN 13 1975

PVD:EEK

84 JUN 13 1975

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Memorandum to Mr. Adams

Re: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

By letter dated 5-14-75, we received a lengthy request from the Committee which pertains to among other things information concerning all wiretaps including their location and other requests which would amount to a complete reconstruction of Bureau files, as well as Inspection surveys for ten offices.

[redacted] and [redacted] of the Committee staff, both indicated that this particular request should be considered entirely negotiable, however K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Department, who indicated that he was going to negotiate with the Committee on this matter, has not contacted the Committee to engage in such negotiations. We are, however, going over this request and where necessary preparing the responses.

House Judiciary Committee (Edwards Committee)

We have complied with all aspects of this Committee's request contained in their letter of 4-10-75. All responses have been approved by the Department and disseminated to the Committee. This particular request pertained to our authority to collect, retain, and disseminate information, our procedures and policy for photographic surveillance, and our indexing procedures.

The Department is in receipt of a letter dated 5-13-75 from Chairman Peter Rodino of captioned Committee requesting the Department to set forth the legal basis for denying GAO access to Bureau files. This request has not been referred to the Bureau by the Department for us to respond to. It would appear at this point that the Department will respond to the particular request.

Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security  
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Kennedy Committee)

We have received a request from the Department dated May 20, 1975, requesting information concerning consensual electronic surveillances in the national security area which request was prompted by an inquiry from this Committee. We are gathering the necessary material for response to this particular request.

Memorandum to Mr. Adams

Re: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

Commission on CIA Activities  
Within the United States

We responded to the Commission's request dated 5-2-75 which requested certain information concerning facts surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. We have also completed all photographic work requested and the results have been furnished the Commission.

Miscellaneous

We received orally a request from the Deputy Attorney General on Friday, May 16, 1975, requesting information pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy; on 5-19-75, we received a request for information we may have relative to governmental involvement in the assassination of Trujillo, and on 5-19-75, we received another request concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's involvement with Castro agents in Mexico. We have orally responded to the request of 5-16-75 and furnished a copy of a 6-19-67 Letterhead memorandum containing information concerning this request. This Letterhead memorandum had previously been disseminated to the Department. The latter two requests are being expeditiously handled. → Sent at 5/28 + 5/29

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

pvj TBH/pvj

John  
[Signature]

pvj

[Signature]



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New Orleans, Louisiana  
June 19, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT  
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY  
DALLAS, TEXAS, NOVEMBER 22, 1963

On June 18, 1967, [redacted] Cuban exile,  
[redacted] New Orleans, Louisiana appeared at the  
New Orleans Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation  
(FBI) and volunteered the following information:

During the past week, [redacted] New  
Orleans Cuban exile leader and key figure in the assassina-  
tion probe of Orleans Parish District Attorney James Garrison  
was in Miami, Florida. While there, he met with [redacted]  
[redacted] who was leader of the Delegation of the Cuban Student  
Directorate in 1963. [redacted] advised [redacted] that he had  
received a telephone call from [redacted] Cuban exile  
and investigator for Garrison, during which [redacted] stated  
that Garrison will prove that President Kennedy was assassinated  
by Cuban exiles and that [redacted] was aware of Oswald's  
purported affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency.  
Fowler also stated that [redacted] and Lee Harvey Oswald had  
staged their confrontation on Canal Street, New Orleans in  
August, 1963.

[redacted] also advised that he had been previously  
contacted (date not indicated) by Mr. [redacted] an investigator  
of Garrison. [redacted] accused [redacted] of having known about  
Oswald's activities prior to the assassination of President  
Kennedy. [redacted] stated that this information had been  
furnished by Claire Booth Luce. [redacted] denied this and stated  
that all he knew about Oswald prior to the assassination had  
been furnished to him by [redacted]

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b7C

b6  
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b6  
b7C

DECLASSIFIED  
19-718-211

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT  
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY  
DALLAS, TEXAS, 11/22/63

On Thursday, June 15, 1967, [redacted] happened to meet [redacted] on Canal Street, New Orleans. At this time [redacted] stated that the investigation was becoming complicated because Garrison had information that an identical double of Lee Harvey Oswald existed and this individual was a "double agent" of the FBI.

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b7C

[redacted] also stated that Garrison will attempt to make the trial last over a year's period so that further investigation can be conducted and additional evidence entered.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *Wannall*

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOC*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan  
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 7/2/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum records the results of a meeting in the Deputy Attorney General's office on the morning of 7/2/75.

Mr. [redacted], Legal Counsel Division, and Section Chief William O. Cregar of the Intelligence Division met in the office of the Deputy Attorney General on the morning of 7/2/75. Also present at the meeting were the Deputy Attorney General and Messrs. K. William O'Connor, [redacted] all of the Department of Justice. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss three specific matters the first being the draft letter dated 6/25/75 to the Attorney General from Senators Church and Tower (see memorandum Wannall to Adams captioned as above dated 6/30/75). The second matter discussed was the Task Force concept. The third item was a review by FBI regarding the Rockefeller Commission files (these files constitute 12 legal file draws of documents as well as approximately 40,000 pages of testimony).

## LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DATED 6/25/75

A review of this letter was set out in the memorandum Wannall to Adams dated 6/30/75. The Deputy Attorney General found considerable difficulty in understanding paragraph 2 of the 6/25/75 letter pointing out that neither the Department of Justice nor the FBI had entered into any agreement. In view of the ambiguities the Deputy Attorney General found in the letter as well as the lack of any specific agreement entered into with the Senate Select Committee (SSC) by the Department and/or the FBI,

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WOC:lhb/lhb

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84 JUL 17 1975

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116395-33

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

the Deputy Attorney General instructed that the Department prepare a letter over the Attorney General's signature asking for clarification of the 6/25/75 letter as well as raising the question of any agreement entered into by the Department or the FBI.

#### TASK FORCE CONCEPT

The Task Force concept is designed to identify various abuses which the SSC desires to investigate in-depth. A member of the intelligence community would be identified to the Executive Branch as a Task Force leader. The purpose would be to permit that Task Force leader to be completely knowledgeable on all available information throughout the intelligence community for a particular abuse. In other words, the White House could look to the Task Force leader as the one person in the intelligence community who would be privy to all information regarding a particular abuse. The Deputy Attorney General had no problem with this concept but did insist that the Task Force leaders should not negotiate directly with their counterparts on the SSC on behalf of the intelligence community for any particular abuse (the White House has insisted on this). The Deputy Attorney General instructed Mr. O'Connor to make this quite clear to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, and if Wilderotter insisted on unilateral negotiations between Task Force leaders and the SSC, Wilderotter should be referred to the Deputy Attorney General in order to resolve this issue.

#### THE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION FILES

As you know, the President has ordered that copies of the Rockefeller Commission files including testimony be turned over to the SSC. There has been no third agency coordination on the part of CIA regarding what information was turned over to the Rockefeller Commission. As a result

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

of the above, we are not aware what sensitive information involving the FBI has been furnished to the Rockefeller Commission by CIA.

The Criminal Division of the Department has received copies of the entire Rockefeller Commission file plus testimony. The Deputy Attorney General has ruled that these files and testimony cannot be turned over to the FBI in toto until such time as the Criminal Division has ruled on any possible criminal culpability on the part of the FBI. To facilitate the review of the Rockefeller Commission files, the Criminal Division will separate out any information it feels involves any FBI criminal culpability. That portion separated out will be the subject of discussion between the Deputy Attorney General and the Director. The remaining portion of the Rockefeller files will then be turned over to the FBI for review to determine if any of the information contained therein could possibly jeopardize sensitive ongoing investigations or adversely affect the security and welfare of FBI sources mentioned therein.

The Legal Counsel Division is preparing a letter alerting the SSC to the possibility that sensitive information may be contained in the Rockefeller files and requesting that Senators Church and Tower consider a briefing by FBI officials regarding those sensitive areas of concern to the FBI which may be embodied in the Rockefeller Commission files.

ACTION:

For information.

Ewf  
MPC  
H  
JBS  
Per  
WFW  
Jm



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
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DATE 11-03-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

ENCLOSURE

37

March 2, 1970

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 11-03-2016 BY:  

Dear Mr. Hoover:

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

I ask that you approve my request to retire from Bureau service and, if it is convenient, to have this retirement become effective April 1, 1970.

For several weeks I have been giving this matter serious thought since I began questioning my capability to bring about a better coordinated effort directed against foreign intelligence targets, particularly those of the Communist-Bloc. I have always aimed for perfection, but I do not find that the desired results are being achieved. For almost 18 years I have handled an assignment during a period of turbulent, hectic, and controversial developments in the area of Internal Security - U. S. Intelligence. It was most challenging, very rewarding, but also punishing. Because of this deep involvement I now realize that I have badly neglected my responsibilities as a father and husband. With the time I may have left I would like to give my family the attention it rightfully deserves.

It would be most dishonest of me if I didn't comment on the recent events which have led to the severance of direct liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. Since I have been the principal Bureau element in the day to day relations between the organizations, it has been my responsibility to anticipate problems, move in on the situation, and protect Bureau interests in an efficient and effective manner. I have reviewed my position in this latest development, and I certainly must share responsibility for the tragic turn of events. I believe that I might have employed better perception by following developments in Denver more closely. I deeply regret this. I do not like to fail. I do not like to lose.

I have been involved in intelligence operations dating back to our S.I.S. history, and I think I can speak with some authority in stating that never in our history has this nation been faced with greater security threats from communist intelligence services who, through police state organizations, have developed unusually sophisticated capabilities to strike at our vulnerabilities of a democratic and free society. A continuing and priority target of the Bloc is to penetrate and split or disrupt our internal security and intelligence organizations. Contrary to the tempo of the times many years ago, there is hardly an intelligence operation or an internal security case which does not have direct or indirect international ramifications. The course of events and the highly capable effectiveness of Communist-Bloc intelligence services have placed increasing burdens on us and have necessitated close working relations with CIA, military intelligence services and other agencies. The complex nature of many cases, the rapid means of travel and communication, the daily occurrence of emergency type political developments in various parts of the world have warranted direct liaison with approximately twenty CIA officials on a daily basis. In addition, there are about thirty officials contacted with lesser frequency. The Bureau is a member of the U. S.

Classified by 12  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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4/1/75

Intelligence Board and its sub-committees which cover matters such as handling of defectors, development of computer programs, leaks of classified information and production of intelligence studies. Our Legal Attaches have reason to contact CIA on a regular basis, and although it has been a small volume of business, the line of communication between our domestic offices and local CIA representatives has been definitely useful. The daily business with CIA relates to hundreds of cases pertaining to activities of all Communist-Bloc services, the New Left, Black Nationalists, the Communist Party and related organizations, and political crises in areas such as Vietnam, the Middle East, and Latin America. Theoretically, all business could be handled by mail, but from a practical standpoint such a procedure will lead to unbelievable chaos. There will be almost insurmountable obstacles if we are to discharge our duties in a responsible manner and if we are to counter a relentless enemy in the interest of national security. Because interests of other agencies are frequently intertwined with cases involving the Bureau and CIA, the break in FBI-CIA liaison will adversely affect our liaison with such agencies.

I think you will share my alarm over the consequences once the word is received by the "troops" in all U. S. agencies that FBI and CIA no longer have any liaison. Unfortunately, there will be individuals who will maliciously distort and misinterpret the true facts. Within a short period, there will be stories in the press, and worst of all the Communist-Bloc services will pick up a choice entree for the promotion of subtle, skillful and extremely harmful disruption. I am absolutely convinced that the intelligence services of Great Britain, France, West Germany and others are well penetrated by the Soviets. I can't believe that the Philbys, the Blakes, the Alger Hisses were the last of the penetrations. I mention this because if such penetrations exist, the break in relations between the FBI and CIA will provide a basis for promoting further rifts. This is the first time in our history that such an event has occurred, and it is difficult to believe that the enemy will not make every effort to reap the greatest profit possible. Briefly, Mr. Hoover, I have too much respect for you and our FBI to expose us to a potentially disastrous situation.

Although the Denver incident is a blight on the relations between the FBI and CIA, it would be most unfair of me not to comment on the dedicated and selfless efforts of numerous individuals in CIA who strived for honest and harmonious relations. As a result of their endeavors there have been many services performed in behalf of the Bureau including notable and outstanding accomplishments. We have been furnished sources, informants, solid productive cases, technical advice and equipment, and there have been instances of cooperation which led to substantial saving of Bureau funds. There also have been examples of alertness on the part of CIA employees which prevented Bureau commission of errors and averted embarrassment. Among some of the more significant examples of cooperation I cite the excellent and badly needed assistance of CIA in the Rudolph Abel case. I also refer to the Agency's providing us with one of the better criminal informants we have had in recent years in the person of . I only refer to the foregoing to emphasize that, if at all possible, we should preserve the good friends and the supporters of the Bureau.

It is recognized that one can also present a bill of particulars relating to examples of poor cooperation and deliberate skuldugery. I hold no brief for those in CIA who disrupted relations between

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
the two agencies because of uncalled-for actions. Some of these were the parasites who commanded their bureaucratic empires, never produced a creative idea, and lived off the errors of the dedicated people. I believe that an honest and thorough examination will reveal that the presence of such types at the present time is negligible or their influence is almost completely neutralized. Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances. You may not realize that a few years ago we enjoyed a poor reputation among CIA employees. We were characterized as being devious and there was a decided atmosphere of mistrust. Happily, that is not the situation today. I am confident that you can go into any segment of CIA, here and abroad, and you will find that Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity are sincerely related to the FBI. The problems in past years primarily arose from unbelievably poor communication among interested parties. This communication has been greatly improved because of the efforts of many dedicated people. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. In our own Bureau there are numerous officials and employees who have little or no knowledge of the background and the principles of the National Security Act of 1947 and of the National Security Council Directives. In addition, these same people have a vague conception of the objectives and functions of an intelligence organization. Similarly, within CIA there are very many whose conception of the FBI, its jurisdiction, its objectives, its law enforcement character, is shocking at times. Tremendous progress has been made, but it is not easy to harmoniously coordinate the operations of an organization designed to operate in a clandestine manner with an agency which is basically a law enforcement body. This difficulty is further aggravated because our relationship is still composed of a fragile fabric. One incident potentially can destroy years of constructive effort.

Mr. Hoover, I respectfully request that you reconsider the decision to sever liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. I appeal to you to leave the door open for further deliberation because I am confident this conflict can be satisfactorily resolved. I believe that my removal from the scene provides the opportunity to appoint another agent who will measure up to your desired capabilities and who will be able to rapidly resolve the problem with a new and fresh approach. It is a good time to reexamine our relations with CIA and to make adjustments satisfactory to you.

I sincerely regret that this situation arose, since I readily appreciate you are burdened with so many heavy responsibilities. Yet I feel that I had a firm obligation and duty to communicate with you because of the very nature of my assignment these many years and because of my involvement in this controversial case.

My years with the Bureau gave me more satisfaction than anyone can imagine. You would have to know me better to appreciate this. I want to assure you that wherever I go or whatever I do I will be prepared to be of service in any cause which involves the preservation of a strong and respected FBI.

Sincerely yours,

  
Sam Papich

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~~SECRET~~

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DATE 11-03-2016 BY   ADG

November 6, 1967

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Mr. John Edgar Hoover  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

~~Downgrade to Secret~~  
~~per 68324 405 PM/Sue~~  
~~11/28/12~~

Dear Mr. Hoover:

This has not been an easy letter to write as you will readily recognize. However, I feel that if I didn't report to you I would not be discharging my responsibility as an FBI Agent and, most important of all, I would not be fulfilling my obligation to a man who has been such a significant influence for most of my adult life.

I have become deeply concerned over the current state of the Bureau's position in the fields of internal security and collection of intelligence information. I am confident that my concern must be shared by other Agents, although I have not consulted with anybody relative to this communication. I realize that I possibly have made an erroneous evaluation of developments or I may not have the capability of realistically interpreting events in a confusing political society. At the same time I am not looking at our problems as a neophyte. I have seen much and I have been well trained. I have always been deeply involved in my work and with one of the greatest organizations that ever existed.

The Bureau appears to be following a line of "don't rock the boat." I detect an attitude of "don't take any risks." This is not the spirit which made the Bureau and it is not the spirit which is necessary to counter the forces of the largest and most sophisticated intelligence and security services in the world. I fear that we have stagnated to the point where imaginative, resourceful, and creative approaches to targets are stifled. Where we should be employing aggressiveness like never before, we seem to have adopted a totally defensive position. The foregoing are largely predicated on my reaction to the following:

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

Classified by 12  
Exempt from GDS, Category 273  
Date of Declassification Indefinite  
11-1-76

(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~TOP SECRET - No Foreign Dissem~~

~~SECRET~~

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S)



2/ These are some of the situations which have prompted me to communicate directly with you. I hesitated to burden you with the above, fully realizing the enormous tasks which confront you on a day-to-day basis. Yet I know that you would consider me derelict in my duty if I did not apprise you of developments which possibly affect the welfare of our Bureau. If I, personally, am concerned, it is largely because of your guidance and influence which I have had the honor and privilege of experiencing for almost twenty-seven years.

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~



~~SECRET~~

I would like to digress from the foregoing for a moment. Not long ago you spoke before the national convention of Ex-Agents. I do not know if you fully appreciate the impact you had on those men. It was a magnificent message which had an electrifying effect on the hundreds who were present and the men throughout the country who subsequently heard the recording, or read the transcript. I mention this because you may wish to give consideration to personally appearing before the Agents in the field. This possibly could be done at two or three of the larger offices. Your appearance and remarks would be tremendous for morale. These are very difficult days, Mr. Hoover, and we do need a "shot in the arm."

*There are only 24 hours in a day. H*

I respectfully apologize for any irritations this letter may create. Regardless of the action which you may take, I want to assure you that I have every desire to serve the Bureau to the best of my ability and conforming to your direction.

Sincerely yours,

*Sam Papich*

Sam Papich

*Also our budgetary problems are almost overwhelming & require more & more circumventing of our activities & prohibiting every desirable expansion.*

*H*

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 7, 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions.

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI.

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development.

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved.

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an

~~SECRET~~

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Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification~~

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Central Intelligence Agency  
Operations in the United States

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad.

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *Wannall*

FROM : A. B. Fulton *ABF*

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Legal Counsel Division

DATE: 3/24/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton  
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Reference memorandum 3/11/75 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams.

Memorandum advised of receipt on 3/10/75 from Associate Deputy Attorney General Wilderotter of a copy of a letter dated 3/6/75 from David W. Belin, Executive Director of captioned Commission, addressed to the Attorney General and the Director of CIA. Wilderotter requested that the Bureau undertake to comply with the request from Belin in behalf of the Department. The Belin letter requested, within a 15 day deadline, a response advising of the specific scope and nature of foreign intelligence activities in the United States. The response was to be coordinated with CIA.

Attached is a memorandum from Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, with a copy designated for the Deputy Attorney General and Mr. William Colby, Director, CIA. As enclosures to memorandum are copies of a paper responsive to Mr. Belin's request which was prepared by the Intelligence Division. This paper has been coordinated with Mr. Larry Sternfield, Research Staff, Counterintelligence Operations, CIA, and approved by Mr. Colby. *Mag*

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached memorandum and paper be approved.

Enclosures - Sent 3-26-75

EWL:jvl  
(7)

to Rev. War.

PLM

APR 9 1975

6 APR 15 1975

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-03-2016 BY [redacted] ADG

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO

FROM : L. F. Schwartz

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
(ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - [redacted]

DATE: 4/14/75

1 - Mr. Schwartz

1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
b6 per FBI \_\_\_\_\_  
b7C per FBI \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

b7E per FBI

Pursuant to the request of SA Fred J. Cassidy, [redacted] Section, Intelligence Division, on 4/14/75, I furnished to CIA Xerox copies of a letter from Mr. Helms to Mr. Hoover dated 3/13/70 and a letter from Mr. Helms to Mr. Hoover dated 3/20/70 to Mr. Enno (Hank) Knoche, CIA liaison representative to the Rockefeller Commission, for the purpose of obtaining CIA concurrence to furnish these documents to the Rockefeller Commission in connection with a request of the Bureau by that Commission for any documents pertaining to the two letters of SA Papich to Mr. Hoover dated 3/2/70 and 11/6/67. ✓

Mr. Knoche advised that the Inspector General's Office of CIA was already reviewing the two letters in question and he indicated he would be able to give the Bureau a very prompt reply in this matter. On 4/14/75 Mr. Knoche's representative called to advise that CIA agreed that the letter of 3/13/70 could be released without any change but CIA requests that the letter of 3/20/70 be sanitized as follows before releasing it to the Commission.

(S) On Page 2, Paragraph 4, the names [redacted] and [redacted] have been deleted. (S)

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S) On Page 3, the second paragraph, the second and third sentences beginning [redacted] and ending with [redacted] have been deleted and the following sentence should be footnoted at the bottom of the page to explain the deletion: [redacted] (S)

CIA advised that if the letter of 3/20/70 is sanitized as above it can be released to the Rockefeller Commission.

5 APR 22 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116391  
Enclosures  
LFS:aso (5)

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

~~SECRET~~

70 ENCLOSURE  
APR 29 1975

62-116391

S-FL

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to [redacted]  
Re: Commission on CIA Activities  
Within the United States  
(Rockefeller Commission)

62-116391

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

b1 per CIA  
b3 per CIA

(S) In addition to the above, we are also deleting the word [redacted]  
from the second paragraph on Page 3 of the 3/20/70 letter as this is a  
highly classified code word for an ongoing investigation and we have so  
advised CIA.

ACTION:

For information: U

KS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY:  

1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

March 11, 1970

BY COURIER SERVICE

1 - [REDACTED]

ST-105

REC-47

67-10750-4781

Honorable Richard Helms  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

As I am sure you will agree, the need for close coordination of the intelligence-gathering and counter-intelligence efforts of the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is self-evident. This matter is one which requires a continuing analysis to assure that both agencies have established working agreements whereby we can most effectively realize positive results with a minimum of duplication, misplaced effort, and jurisdictional problems.

During January, 1966, representatives of this Bureau met with officials of the CIA to consider coordination of our mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. As a result of these conferences, a set of ground rules was drawn up and agreed to by both agencies. A copy of this agreement was transmitted in my letter of February 7, 1966, to then CIA Director Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. A copy of the agreement is enclosed for your information. This agreement has proven generally effective and no major problems have been encountered since its adoption in the areas it covers. ✓

The FBI has primary responsibility with regard to matters involving the internal security of the United States as well as for conducting counterintelligence operations in

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Group 1

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downgrading and  
declassification

see note, page 2

WCS:mea

(7) *283*

MAR 24 1970

TYPE UNIT

62-116391-41

*WBS*

MAILED 6  
MAR 11 1970  
COMM-FBI

*Let*

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Honorable Richard Helms

this country. While this Bureau does not have any statutory responsibilities with regard to the collection of foreign intelligence, I have always recognized that the potential for the development of such intelligence in this country is considerable. The FBI has, in fact, made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U. S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, and policy-making officials of the Government. While these efforts have, of course, been incidental to our main internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, we have on a selective basis developed sources [redacted]

[redacted] in the b7E per FBI United States. The product of this coverage has been furnished on a regular basis to the CIA and other interested agencies and officials of the Government.

I know that you will share my belief that this matter requires a periodic reexamination to assure that the national security interests continue to be served in the most effective and complete manner possible. After reviewing this matter, including the attached 1966 agreement, I would welcome any observations you may desire to make.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

NOTE:

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
Classified "~~Secret~~" since disclosure would seriously damage the internal security interests.

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

b6 per FBI

b7C per FBI

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. \_\_\_\_\_

Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_

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Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_

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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_

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Training \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *Wannall*

DATE: 3/25/75

FROM : W. Cregar

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar

This memorandum responds to three questions raised by the Director following his appearance before the Rockefeller Commission on the afternoon of 3/24/75. The questions are:  
(1) Was the Riha case the only reason for the disestablishment of a formal liaison relationship with CIA in March, 1970, or was it simply the excuse used for breaking off relations?  
(2) Should the FBI-CIA Understanding be expanded and redefined?  
and (3) Should the FBI recommend bimonthly meetings between the Directors of FBI and CIA, each accompanied by a small staff?

(1) It is the consensus of those Bureau Supervisors who were at Headquarters in March, 1970, that the Riha case was the only reason for disestablishment of a formal liaison relationship with CIA. Mr. Helms, then Director of CIA, was unable to force his employee to provide the name of the alleged FBI Agent who furnished incorrect information to CIA. There has been a question raised as to whether the FBI ever possessed the information allegedly attributed to an agent of the FBI by CIA's officer. We are reviewing the entire Riha file and will prepare a comprehensive memorandum in an attempt to resolve this issue. We recognize there were some problems associated with CIA prior to March, 1970, but no more so than at any other period of time. One could argue that former Special Agent Sam Papich's letter to the Director in 1967 was a factor leading to a breakoff of relations. It appears [redacted] staff attorney for the Vice President's Commission, feels Papich's letter was a contributing factor. We in the Intelligence Division do not believe that was so and we reaffirm that the Riha case in and of itself caused the discontinuance of formal liaison relationship with CIA.

REC-101

02-116391-114  
MAY 7 1975

(2) The Intelligence Division does not believe there is any need to expand or redefine the FBI-CIA Understanding of 2/7/66. It is currently working very well and there have been no serious breaches on the part of CIA. If any violations of the Understanding have occurred on the part of CIA, they have been ones of omission rather than commission. Since the date of our letter to the field 2/4/74 wherein we re-emphasized the 1966 Understanding and encouraged closer field liaison, we have

WOC:ebc (6) *ebc*

5- *Wannall* CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

noted a marked improvement in our efforts to penetrate the Sino-Soviet-Bloc. The field is getting some valuable information from CIA. We have permitted CIA to make recruitment approaches and they have had several successes, the results of which have been furnished to the FBI. Both FBI and CIA field offices have a good appreciation of the 1966 Understanding and it is working well. We see no need to either expand or redefine the 1966 Understanding at this time. However, should such a need arise in the future we will certainly recommend such a course of action. As a point of interest, we are currently negotiating with CIA at their request the development of a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive which will clearly define what activities in the U. S. CIA can and cannot engage in.

(3) The Intelligence Division enthusiastically endorses bimonthly meetings between the Directors of FBI and CIA, each accompanied by a small staff, to review any problems that exist, to plan for future efforts, and to establish a rapport which would facilitate resolving issues rather than creating issues.

ACTION:

(1) The Intelligence Division will prepare a separate memorandum on the Riha case for the Director's information.

(2) If the Director agrees, our liaison representative will explore with CIA officials their views as to regular meetings between the Director, Mr. Colby and their respective staffs on a bimonthly basis.

*OK*

*gm*

*per*

*wkw*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. B. Wannall

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Mintz

DATE: 4/10/75

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

This recommends that the Director select an appropriate date and time to meet with CIA Director William E. Colby and members of his staff.

By memorandum from Mr. Cregar to Mr. Wannall 3/25/75 it was recommended that Liaison would inquire of appropriate CIA officials concerning their views as to the suggestion that regular meetings be held between the Director and Mr. Colby and their staffs on a bimonthly basis. The suggestion for such meetings was made by the Vice President's Commission during Mr. Kelley's appearance before it on 3/24/75.

On 4/9/75 Liaison Officer L.F. Schwartz discussed this suggestion with Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, and Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy. Both General Wilson and Mr. Clarke were enthusiastic about such meetings and they felt that Mr. Colby would also be in favor of them. On 4/10/75 Mr. Clarke called to advise that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Colby and Mr. Colby had agreed that such meetings would be a very good idea. Mr. Colby indicated that he would await further advice from Mr. Kelley as to when the first meeting should take place and who should participate.

## RECOMMENDATION:

REC-101

(1) It is recommended that the Director indicate a suitable date and time for the first meeting with Mr. Colby and his staff. Liaison will then contact CIA to confirm that this date and time are acceptable, after which a letter will be drafted inviting Mr. Colby to the meeting.

LFS:tdp (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

MAY 7 1975

7 MAY 8 1975

5- [signature]

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall  
RE: VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(2) It is further recommended that the Director indicate the Bureau personnel who should be present for the meeting.

HS

WRC  
JH

JH

PCW

WRC

Function arranged  
by Mr Adams for 12:30 PM  
5/6/75. To be attended by  
Director, Messrs Callahan, Jenkins,  
Adams & Wannall. Attending  
for CIA will be Mr Colby, Mr  
William Nelson and Mr Jack Blake  
WRC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 18 1975

TELETYPE

NR002 AQ CODE

7:38 PM NITEL 9-18-75 FXH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-03-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM ALBUQUERQUE

ATTENTION: SECTION CHIEF W.O. CREGAR, INTD.

SENSTUDY

FORMER SPECIAL AGENT SAM J. PAPICH, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO, TODAY ADVISED THAT HE WAS INTERVIEWED SEPTEMBER 18, 1975, BY DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEYS REGARDING HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION:

PAPICH STATED THAT INTERVIEW COVERED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND DEALT LIGHTLY REGARDING CONTACTS WITH ANONYMOUS SOURCES. DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEYS PLACED EMPHASIS ON PAPICH'S KNOWLEDGE ABOUT AUTHORITY FOR ABOVE ACTIVITY. PAPICH STATED HE REPLIED TO BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE HE AND ANYONE INVOLVED IN SUCH ACTIVITY ASSUMED AUTHORITY CAME FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL MEANING ATTORNEY GENERAL AND/OR PRESIDENT. PAPICH EXPLAINED TO ATTORNEYS THAT [REDACTED]

AND THIS PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED

TO [REDACTED]

Dep. A.D. Adm.  
Dep. A.D. Inv.  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin.  
Crim. Inv.  
Ext. Affairs  
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Training  
Off. of Cong. & Public Affairs  
Director's Sec'y

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b7C per FBI

b7E per FBI

ORIGINAL FILED IN

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INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

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Record  
cc 67-

Papich

62-116391-5-678

PAGE TWO

PAPICH DENIED DIRECT KNOWLEDGE THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ALSO DISCUSSED WAS  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PAPICH STATED HE RESPONDED THAT

b7E per FBI

HE HAD KNOWLEDGE OF A COOPERATIVE EFFORT REGARDING ABOVE  
[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEYS INDICATED TO PAPICH THAT  
THEY PLAN TO INTERVIEW FORMER BUREAU OFFICIALS WILLIAM  
C. SULLIVAN, CARTHA DE LOACH, AND DONALD E. MOORE.

PAPICH ADVISED HE DETECTED NO HOSTILITY ON PART OF  
INTERVIEWING ATTORNEYS.

END.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [redacted] ADG

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mrs. [redacted]

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

April 18, 1975

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller  
The Vice President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

b3 per FBI  
b7E per FBI

Dear Mr. Vice President:

During my appearance before the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States March 24, 1975, I was asked the following three questions: (1) Was the Thomas Riha case the only reason for the discontinuance of a formal liaison relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in March, 1970, or was it simply the excuse used for breaking off a liaison relationship? (2) Should the FBI-CIA Understanding of February 7, 1966, be expanded and redefined? (3) Should there be bimonthly meetings between the Directors of the FBI and CIA accompanied by their respective staffs?

I have thoroughly reviewed the Riha case and have obtained the opinion of those Bureau officials who were assigned at Headquarters in March, 1970, at the time a formal liaison relationship with CIA was discontinued. It is the consensus of those Bureau officials and reaffirmed by my own review of the Riha case that it was the sole cause for the discontinuance of the formal liaison relationship with CIA. 62-116391-46

The Understanding dated February 7, 1966, between the FBI and CIA, which covers an important area of mutual interest, is currently working very well. Both FBI and CIA field personnel have a good appreciation of the Understanding. As a result, I see no need to either expand or redefine the Understanding at this time.

WOC:ekw  
(8)

(Thomas Riha)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO


b3 per FBI  
b7E per FBI

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GPO 53134

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Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller

I enthusiastically endorse bimonthly meetings between myself and CIA Director William E. Colby accompanied by our respective staffs. I believe it would provide a forum to review any problems that arise and to further establish a rapport which would facilitate resolving issues as they develop. We have already scheduled the first such meeting and fully anticipate regular meetings thereafter.

In closing, may I thank you for having had the opportunity to appear before the Commission and express my appreciation for the courtesies you extended me.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley  
Director

NOTE: See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 4/8/75, captioned "Thomas Riha, Miscellaneous - Information Concerning."



1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
    (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall      b6 per FBI  
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan      b7C per FBI  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - [redacted]  
1 - [redacted]  
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz  
    BY LIAISON

August 27, 1975

BC  
Honorable William E. Colby  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Bill:

I am writing in reference to the August 16, 1975, memorandum from the President pertaining to recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission, a copy of which you provided on August 21, with a request for my comments on certain portions thereof.

Recommendation 6 of the Rockefeller Commission report pertains to the establishment of written guidelines between the Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the handling of reports of criminal violations by employees of the Agency or relating to its affairs. I feel that this is a matter for direct negotiation between CIA and the Department of Justice.

Recommendation 14a pertains to the development within the FBI or elsewhere in the Department of Justice of a capability to evaluate, analyze and coordinate intel-

Assoc. Dir.  
Dep. AD Adm.  
Dep. AD Inv.  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin.

ligence and counterintelligence collected by the Bureau. It is my belief that a capability already exists within the Department of Justice for the analysis and evaluation

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Training  
Legal Coun.  
Telephone Rm.  
Director Sec'y

LFS:lhb  
(11)

ENCLOSURE

XEROX

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

12 AUG 28 1975

SEP 22 1975  
MAIL ROOM

SEP 12 1975  
TELETYPE UNIT

Honorable William E. Colby

of intelligence relating to internal security and a capability exists within the FBI for the analysis and evaluation of counterintelligence information. If necessary, these capabilities could be expanded.

With regard to Recommendation 14c, the Bureau has in the past appreciated receiving significant foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information from CIA and I will continue to look to you for such information and other support in the future.

Recommendation 18c refers to investigations by CIA of individuals presently or formerly affiliated with it. The recommendation is that such investigations must be coordinated with the FBI whenever substantial evidence suggesting espionage or violation of a Federal criminal statute is discovered. I feel that such coordination is important and should be accomplished as soon as reasonably possible in each instance. I suggest that the mechanics of such coordination be worked out between representatives of your Office of Security and this Bureau's liaison representative with the CIA.

With regard to Recommendation 30, it is my belief that the draft National Security Council Intelligence Directive #9 (NSCID 9) which has been approved by me and by you and which you have forwarded to the National Security Council, together with the memorandum of understanding between CIA and the FBI dated February 7, 1966, satisfactorily provide for the provisions of this recommendation. I have already expressed this view to

Honorable William E. Colby

the Department of Justice which I understand is currently reviewing the draft NSCID 9 at the request of the National Security Council.

I hope that these observations will be of some help to you.

Sincerely,

NOTE:

At a luncheon meeting on 8/21/75 at which Mr. Colby was a guest of the Director, he furnished the Director a copy of a memorandum dated 8/16/75 from the President addressed to the Attorney General; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Director of Central Intelligence. This memorandum pertained to the recommendations contained in the report of the Rockefeller Commission and requested comments from Mr. Colby and the other addressees by 8/31/75. Mr. Colby indicated that he would appreciate any comment that the Director would be able to make on Recommendations 6, 14, 18 and 30. We have been requested separately by the Department of Justice to furnish our views concerning the Department's comments on NSCID 9 and on certain of the recommendations contained in the Rockefeller Commission Report. Our reply to the Department is contained in a letter to the Attorney General dated 8/26/75 and instant response to Mr. Colby has been prepared in conformance to our reply to the Department.

75-3852

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT  
AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

I have completed my initial review of the Report of the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States and Agency comments on its recommendations and believe that it is appropriate to proceed promptly with the implementation of the majority of the Commission recommendations. Toward this objective, I direct the following:

The Director of Central Intelligence should prepare internal CIA regulations and guidelines to carry out the purposes of Commission Recommendations numbered 6, 9-13, 14b, 15b-c, 16-18, 20, 22-25, and 27-28. To the extent practicable, and within the bounds of prudent security, these regulations should be unclassified. The DCI should also review all current CIA regulations and directives for conformity with these recommendations, make such modifications as may be necessary, and, as noted above, provide for their declassification as appropriate.

The Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence should prepare and coordinate as necessary the internal procedures and guidelines suggested in Commission Recommendations 6, 14, 18 and 30. These agreed guidelines should, to the extent practicable, be unclassified.

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director, Office of Management and Budget,

62-116391-63  
ENCLOSURE

and the Director of Central Intelligence should prepare a draft directive establishing an interagency committee to oversee the domestic uses of aerial intelligence photography.

The above actions should be completed by August 31. Copies of the resultant directives should be forwarded to the White House for my information.

*Harold R. Ford*

cc: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
Chairman, President's Foreign  
Intelligence Advisory Board  
The Counsel to the President

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy  
May 7, 1975

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the letter dated March 25, 1975, to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, then Associate Deputy Attorney General, from [redacted] staff attorney, Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, in which [redacted] requested "all directives from the President or White House staff to the FBI directing the FBI to undertake activity with regard to dissident groups during the period 1965 through 1972."

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Through a review of FBI files, the attached documents have been located which appear to be responsive to [redacted] request. Six of the documents were directed to the FBI by members of The White House staff. The other seven documents are intra-Bureau communications which reveal oral requests from The White House staff.

FBI files reveal that, with the formation of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) in 1970, which Committee was chaired by another component of the Department of Justice, the majority of directives from The White House for information concerning dissident activity came to the FBI through its membership in the IEC.


Enclosures - 13

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

FJC:vb

(7)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_



MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 21, 1969

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI


Dear Mr. Hoover:

I wish to call to your attention the fine job which your people in the Domestic Intelligence Division did during the weeks preceding the November Mobilization. Their efforts were of great assistance to us, and we appreciated the thoroughness and timeliness of the material which they made available to the White House.

The arrangements now in effect for FBI liaison with the White House are working quite satisfactorily, and I appreciate the personal effort which you have made to insure that the Bureau is responsive to the requirements of the President.

Best personal regards,

Sincerely,

  
John D. Ehrlichman  
Assistant to the President  
for Domestic Affairs

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

62-111181-3554, 8/1

EXP. PROC.

NOV 25 1969

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

February 25, 1969

Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Deke:

*New Left Movement - L.A.*

We are in the midst of putting together a complete analysis of the current student disorder problem in the country. As you know, President Nixon has taken a very strong stand opposing such disorders, and we would like as much information as we can get on this subject for his further study.

It would be most appreciated if you could provide some statistics which you may have available on the following specific subjects:

1. How many violent disorders have there been.  
An annual breakdown for past ten years.
2. Percent of student involvement.
3. Numbers of non-students involved. *REC-110*
4. Effect of professional organization. *[REDACTED]*
5. Affiliation of professionals involved.  
Communist Party. Socialist organizations. *15 MAR 4 1969*
6. Number of students involved who are on federal scholarship
7. Who is responsible for violence. *[REDACTED]*

100-446997-432

February 25, 1969

8. Categories for student grievances.
9. Value of property damages.
10. Number of lost teaching hours.
11. Number of faculty involved.
12. Methods of property destruction.

I know a lot of these statistics might not be available, and the question of who is responsible for these disorders is difficult to answer conclusively. Whatever you can provide in this area will be very helpful to us.

Sincerely,



Egil Krogh  
Staff Assistant to the Counsel



THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1969

BLACK PANTHER PARTY  
GENERAL

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of  
Investigation  
Washington, D. C. 20535

Dear Mr. Hoover:

First I would like to express my appreciation for your keeping me advised of the activities of the Students for a Democratic Society. I have great interest in doing whatever I can to bring to the public's attention the danger of this organization to our society.

Although I would suppose you have seen it by this time, I am enclosing a copy of a coloring book which the IACP have informed me is being distributed by the Black Panther Society to ghetto youths. The format is to have a breakfast, allegedly for the purpose of filling hungry young stomachs, and then pervert hungry young minds with this garbage.

I have written to several Senators and other centers of influence in the business community in an effort to bring some action against this type of subversion. Principally I am interested in knowing whether existing laws prohibit the distribution of such material. And, if not, what laws are required.

Thank you again for your staunch support of the Administration's effort to overcome the headlong rush to the Left in this country.

Sincerely,

*Spiro T. Agnew*  
Spiro T. Agnew

JUL 7 1969

EX-101

REC 13

JUL 3 1969

b3 per FBI  
b7E per FBI

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

MR. DeLOACH

December 12, 1966

STERLING B. DONAHUE

VISITS OF MRS. L. B. JOHNSON  
TO COLLEGE CAMPUSES

Mrs. Mildred Stegall called from the White House on the afternoon of 12/9/66. She advised that Mrs. Johnson is planning visits to three colleges: Middleburg College, Middleburg, Vermont; Brown University, Providence, R.I.; and the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Mrs. Stegall asked if we would prepare a concise rundown on these colleges as to whether there have been demonstrations or other problems on the campuses. She indicated the visits were contemplated for March 3 at the University of Michigan; June 5 at Brown University; and June 12 at Middleburg College.

On Saturday afternoon, 12/10/66, Mrs. Stegall called and advised Mrs. Johnson would like the material that afternoon as she was considering whether to accept the invitations. This material was prepared and delivered to the White House Saturday afternoon. Attached are the record copies of the material.

ACTION:

For information.

~~SECRET~~  
(5)

DEC 13 11 28 AM '66

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

62-109119-2053

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

MR. DeLOACH

✓ / June 4, 1968

S. B. DONAHUE

MAYORS CONFERENCE  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS  
JUNE 12 - 15, 1968


Mrs. Mildred Stegall called from the White House at 11:55 a.m. today. She requested that the White House be furnished an analysis of the potential for violence, anti-Vietnam demonstrations, racial demonstrations, etc., at the above Conference, should the President decide to make an appearance there.

Inspector Joseph Sizoo of the Domestic Intelligence Division was advised of this request and the necessary information will be secured from the Chicago Office.

ACTION:

For information.

SBD:hmm  
(3)



157-6-9-6804,



Mr. W. C. Sullivan

5/1/68

C. D. Brennan

**ANTIWAR AND RACIAL DEMONSTRATIONS  
AT VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY, VILLANOVA  
PENNSYLVANIA**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY   ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Pursuant to Mr. DeLoach's request, we have prepared a memorandum for transmittal to Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House regarding demonstration activity at Villanova University. Mrs. Stegall requested this.

This memorandum indicates that Villanova University students have participated in antiwar demonstrations in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, area in the past, but no antiwar or racial demonstrations have taken place on the Villanova University campus. Students at several colleges located in close proximity to Villanova University have in the past staged antiwar and racial demonstrations and have been engaged in disputes with school officials.

On 4/29/68, the Assistant Dean of the Villanova University Law School advised that the Attorney General is scheduled to speak at Villanova University commencement exercises on 5/13/68 and it is rumored that "an even more important person may speak." Commencement exercises are to be held in Convention Hall in Philadelphia which is adjacent to the University of Pennsylvania campus where an active chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society exists.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That the attached letters to Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House and the Attorney General be approved.

Enclosures

94-1-8283-60

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

5/23/68

C. D. Brennan

**ANTIWAR AND RACIAL DEMONSTRATIONS  
AT TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY,  
FORT WORTH, TEXAS**

Pursuant to Mr. DeLoach's request, we have prepared a memorandum for transmittal to Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House regarding various antiwar and racial groups located at Texas Christian University and in the vicinity of Fort Worth, Texas. Mrs. Stegall requested this information.

This memorandum indicates that an organization known as Students for Peace is active on the campus of Texas Christian University and has engaged speakers on various occasions since its formation in December, 1967, who spoke against U. S. policy in Vietnam and were critical of the present administration. Chapters of the Students for a Democratic Society, a militant youth group which has been extremely critical of U. S. policy in Vietnam, are located at Southern Methodist University at Dallas, Texas, and North Texas State University at Denton, Texas, both of which are in close proximity of Fort Worth, Texas.

The Afro-American Student Society, a Negro student organization at East Texas State University, is presently engaged in a controversy with University officials and has presented a list of demands to the administration relating to the rights of Negroes at East Texas State University. An official of this organization has indicated that if these demands are not met a demonstration will take place.

In the city of Fort Worth, spontaneous demonstrations occurred in April, 1968, following the assassination of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. City officials have advised

Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan  
RE: ANTIWAR AND RACIAL DEMONSTRATIONS  
AT TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY

that subsequent to these demonstrations a Community Relations Commission has been established to promote a better understanding of the races. While the programs initiated by this group are considered successful, officials advised that there are dissident groups in the Fort Worth area having propensity for violence of a spontaneous nature.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House be approved.

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]

4/26/72

T. J. Smith

1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]

STUDENT AGITATION AND  
ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATIONS

My previous memorandum captioned "Student Agitation" dated 4/24/72 stated that Mr. David Wilson who is on the staff of Mr. John W. Dean III, Counsel to the President, had requested information concerning antiwar demonstrations occurring on campuses be furnished to him telephonically.

In accordance with Mr. Wilson's request, we have been relaying information to his office by telephone received from our field offices on antiwar incidents then occurring on college campuses.

On 4/26/72 Mr. Wilson advised Supervisor R. H. Haynes that he would also like to be advised telephonically of any major demonstration bearing on the escalation of the Vietnam war then in progress, as well as any planned demonstrations of this nature that are to take place in Washington, D. C.

Pursuant to Mr. Wilson's request, we are broadening our instructions to field offices who are now telephonically furnishing us information on student agitation to include incidents relating to antiwar demonstrations both on and off campus.

As in the initial instructions which related only to campus demonstrations, we are instructing that all phone calls be confirmed by immediate teletypes. This information will then be included in our daily summary teletype which is sent to the White House and will be used as confirmation of our phone call.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information.

(7)

62-112228-1402

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

6/27/68

C. D. Brennan

**ANTIWAR AND RACIAL DEMONSTRATIONS AND STUDENT  
AGITATIONAL ACTIVITY, NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE**

Pursuant to the request of Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House, we have prepared a memorandum regarding recent demonstration activity instigated by antiwar, racial and student groups in the Nashville, Tennessee, area.

This memorandum indicates that a major racial disturbance occurred in Nashville in April, 1967, after Stokely Carmichael made inflammatory speeches at two local colleges. In January, 1968, racial tension in Nashville was increased by the shooting of two Nashville police officers, one of whom was killed. Following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., in April, 1968, racial violence again erupted in Nashville and 2,800 National Guardsmen were used to restore order. Nashville police advised there is a great potential for violence during the coming months.

The national headquarters of the Southern Student Organizing Committee, a militant New Left group which is the southern counterpart of the Students for a Democratic Society, is located in Nashville. This organization and other antiwar groups have staged demonstrations in the past in Nashville protesting U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

On 6/29/68 dedication ceremonies of Percy Priest Dam located in a rural area ten miles east of Nashville are scheduled to take place. The Nashville Police Department and other sources have advised that there is no indication that any demonstration activity will occur during this ceremony.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the attached letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall be approved.

157-6-28-1500

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

September 24, 1968

C. D. Brennan

DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITY, THOMAS MORE  
COLLEGE, COVINGTON, KENTUCKY

Pursuant to the request of Mrs. Mildred Stogall, at the White House, we have prepared a memorandum concerning Thomas More College, Covington, Kentucky, in which the President has expressed an interest.

This memorandum indicates the college was formerly known as Villa Madonna College and a dedication commemorating its opening as Thomas More College will be held September 28, 1968, at Covington, Kentucky. There has been no New Left, subversive or black militant activity at the school or in Covington which is located across the Ohio River from Cincinnati, Ohio. There are no planned demonstrations at this college, including the date for the above-mentioned dedication ceremony.

During the last year, the Ohio State Committee to End the War in Vietnam conducted numerous demonstrations against United States policy in Vietnam in the Columbus, Ohio, area. This group is a student organization at Ohio State University which participated in a demonstration disrupting campus activity in February, 1968, ending with the arrest of 11 individuals.

In December, 1967, anti-draft demonstrations at Cincinnati resulted in the arrest of 85 individuals.

In July, 1968, a chapter of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam at Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio, was a sponsor of a demonstration in Cincinnati opposing the war in Vietnam on the occasion of the Governor's Conference being held in that city. The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam is a group organized on

Enclosure

AM:ted (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

94-58529-3

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITY, THOMAS  
MORE COLLEGE, COVINGTON, KENTUCKY

campuses throughout the United States which participates in the organization of antiwar demonstrations.

Racial violence lasting several hours occurred in a predominantly Negro section of Cincinnati August 16, 1968, following the death by gunfire of a restaurant owner in that area. On the following day, roving Negro gangs engaged in sporadic fighting in Covington, Kentucky, which required police action to restore order.

In April, 1968, an unsubstantiated report was received that members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, a civil rights organization in Cincinnati, were in possession of dynamite. It was also reported that in June, 1968, guns were found by local police in the Lincoln Heights section of Cincinnati in the car belonging to a member of that organization.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall be approved.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY   ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

February 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HAYNES


SUBJECT:

DETAILED INFORMATION REGARDING  
X INCOME SOURCES FOR REVOLUTIONARY  
GROUPS

The President has asked for a detailed breakdown of the income sources for the various revolutionary groups. He would like to have a listing of sources for such groups as the Black Panther Party, the New Mobilization, SDS, YSA, and other militant groups around the country.

What would be most helpful would be a designation of the group and then after that, a listing of its income sources in as detailed and specific a way as possible. It would be much appreciated if we could have this information by Thursday, February 26, 1970.

Thank you very much, Bob.

  
Egil Krogh, Jr.  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for Domestic Affairs

100-446997-70-13



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 27, 1969

Dear Director Hoover:

Your June 26, 1969, report concerning [REDACTED] b3 per FBI  
[REDACTED] a "Black Panther" member displeased b6 per FBI  
with racial discrimination encountered in Cuba, b7C per FBI  
has been forwarded to the President. b7E per FBI

GENERAL

When you receive further information concern-  
ing "Black Panther" discontent in Cuba, we would  
be very much interested in seeing it.

Thank you very much.


Sincerely,

*Egil Krogh Jr.*

Egil Krogh, Jr.  
Deputy Counsel to the  
President

REC-111

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.



b3 per FBI  
b7E per FBI

JUL 9 1969

~~EXP. PROC.~~

JUN 30 1969

XEROX

JUL 11 1969

b3 per FBI  
b7E per FBI

SECRET

~~No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad~~  
~~Controlled Dissem/For Background Use Only~~

20 APR 1971

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY:  

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Members of the IEC

FROM: *JFD* Mr. John F. Doherty  
Executive Director IEC

SUBJECT: The Potential for Violence in the Major  
Cities During Summer 1971

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

Mr. Dean proposed an estimate on the above subject be prepared by the IEC. This proposal was referred to the Staff by Assistant Attorney General Mardian.

A review of the proposal by the Staff resulted in the preparation of estimate objectives (see attachment 1).

A copy of the objectives was made available to the White House with a request for comments, which were received in a memo from Mr. Caulfield dated April 16, 1971, (see attachment 2). Paragraph A of this memo relates to the acquisition of information concerning employment, housing and welfare and suggests discreet inquiries be made to appropriate Public Information Offices. How this is to be accomplished without identifying the existence of the IEC concerns the Staff members.

In an attempt to clarify this matter, I called Mr. Caulfield and suggested that information concerning employment, housing and welfare, in the opinion of the Staff, could best be obtained by the White House from Departments and Agencies not affiliated with the IEC. Mr. Caulfield indicated that both he and Mr. Dean believe the White House should not be involved in acquiring this information; therefore, the Staff desires advice and guidance from the IEC as to the proper method of obtaining the pertinent information for the estimate without disclosing the existence of the IEC.

Attachments: 1. Objectives of Estimate E-7  
2. Memorandum from Mr. Caulfield

APR 30 1971

ENCLOSURE

(Intelligence Evaluation Committee)

NOT RECORDED

176 MAY 4 1971

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
classification

~~No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad~~  
~~Controlled Dissem/For Background Use Only~~

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

157-6-2979

Intelligence Evaluation Committee

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

~~FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

April 15, 1971

Proposal: Estimate E-7

THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN THE MAJOR CITIES DURING  
SUMMER 1971

Objectives

I. FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE VIOLENCE

A. Employment

1. Labor statistics
2. Union policies
3. Public Works
4. Specific local economic problems

B. Housing

1. General evaluation of public housing
2. Projected changes in availability and/or cost of public housing

C. Welfare

1. General evaluation of the welfare program
2. Projected changes in:
  - a. Medical care
  - b. Vocational training
  - c. Child care
  - d. Recreational facilities
  - e. Food stamp plan

D. Community Relationships

1. Police-Community relationships
2. Intercommunal relationships
  - a. Militant ethnic groups
  - b. Racial or ethnic disturbances on military bases
  - c. Racial or ethnic disturbances in ghetto areas
3. Churches

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY:  

~~ENCLOSURE~~  
ENCLOSURE

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~~SENSITIVE~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

-2-

## II. AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES

### A. Military

1. Thefts of weapons and/or explosives from military bases
2. Any information concerning unexplained loss of weapons or explosives from military bases
3. Vulnerability of military weapons and explosives to theft or unauthorized access

### B. Civilian

1. Thefts of weapons and/or explosives from construction sites, law enforcement agencies, or commercial suppliers.
2. Any information concerning the stockpiling of weapons by individuals or groups
3. Vulnerability of law enforcement agencies, construction sites, and commercial weapons or explosives suppliers to theft or unauthorized access.

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1971

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY   ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN F. DOHERTY  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IEC  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

With respect to the memorandum and questions posed by Mr. Vaught regarding the proposed study, be advised that John Dean and I make the following suggestions:

A) With respect to subheadings A, B and C of Section I of the memorandum, inquiry should be discreetly made of the Public Information offices of the agencies concerned with a view towards obtaining as much information as possible with regard to the subjects or factors considered important to the conclusions to be reached.

B) It is our view that the remainder of the factor material required for purposes of the study can be obtained through the participating efforts of the agency members of your committee.

We hope these comments will be of assistance. Please call if there are any questions.

  
John J. Caulfield  
Staff Assistant to the  
President

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED]

ADG

b6 per FBI

b7C per FBI

*Has not been located yet*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1969

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM: Tom Charles Huston  
Staff Assistant to the President

The President has directed that a report on foreign Communist support of revolutionary protest movements in this country be prepared for his study. He has specifically requested that the report draw upon all the resources available to the intelligence community and that it be as detailed as possible.

"Support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign Communists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protest movements in the United States.

On the basis of earlier reports submitted to the President on a more limited aspect of this problem, it appears that our present intelligence collection capabilities in this area may be inadequate. The President would like to know what resources we presently have targeted toward monitoring foreign Communist support of revolutionary youth activities in this country, how effective they are, what gaps in our intelligence exist because of either inadequate resources or a low priority of attention, and what steps could be taken, if he directed, to provide the maximum possible coverage of these activities.

I have asked CIA, NSA, and DIA to submit their contributions to me by Monday, June 30th. I would appreciate it if the Bureau would provide their response to the President's request by that date.

Since the Bureau has primary responsibility in this area, I would like to discuss the matter further with your staff after I have had an opportunity to evaluate the initial contributions. The President has assigned a high priority to this project, and I want to insure that he receives the most complete report that it is possible to assemble.

Tom Charles Huston

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

42

57

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

March 30, 1971

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TO: Inspector [ ] Member, IEC

FROM: J.F. J. F. Doherty, Executive Director, IEC

SUBJECT: APRIL - MAY DEMONSTRATIONS

*Intelligence Evaluation Committee*

The demonstrations scheduled for April 24 through May 5, 1971, are fast approaching. In view thereof, we would be grateful if the Bureau could forward to the IEC permanent staff any pertinent information it may receive concerning the above subject.

The Bureau's contributions to the April-May Demonstrations Estimate are of great assistance but, in addition, it is believed receipt of FBI letterhead memoranda, Current Intelligence Analyses, Studies and Monographs, and other field office submissions (not including investigative reports) would be very helpful in the preparation of revisions of Estimate E-1 which deals with the April-May demonstrations.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY: [ ]

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

62-113887-60

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

6/8 APR 71



~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~

FROM: John F. Doherty, Executive Director Justice Dept.

5037

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *ESM*

DATE: 11/20/72

FROM : G. T. Tunstall *GTT*

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

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This is to advise of a request by IEC for data needed for compilation of a calendar of events, activities and personalities which might be targets of terrorist activities. This is also to request approval for attached letter to be sent to IEC pointing out the type of data the Bureau will furnish.

The President's Cabinet Committee on Terrorism has requested IEC prepare, on a weekly basis, such a calendar focusing primarily on domestic activities. In line with this request the Bureau is being asked to furnish any information received regarding events, activities or individuals who could reasonably be expected to attract terrorist attacks.

In connection with this IEC request, the State Department will be furnishing all available data regarding travel of foreign nationals and cultural exchange groups to this country, travel of Soviet and certain communist-bloc diplomatic officials within the U.S. and schedules of international conferences and meetings which may logically be the targets of terrorists. The Secret Service and the Defense Department will be furnishing data regarding travel of U.S. officials who may be subject to such acts. The Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency will also be furnishing, on a weekly basis, any data developed regarding this request.

*EX-117 REQ 43*  
Additional instructions to the field in connection with this request will not be necessary as recent instructions regarding submission of a weekly summary of terrorist activities included a request for targets of terrorism to be included in this communication.

Enclosure

15 NOV 28 1972

*MLL* - XEROX CONTINUED - OVER

NOV 30 1972

62-113887-178X

*WMC*

Memorandum to Mr. E.S. Miller  
Re: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)

ACTION:

If approved, attached letter will be sent to IEC and pertinent data received by the Bureau will be furnished IEC through the Bureau's representative to the IEC staff.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED]

ADG

b6 per FBI

b7C per FBI

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 11/9/72

FROM : G. T. Tunstall

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

The White House has requested captioned Committee submit periodic reports on the potential for violence during demonstrations which may be held during the upcoming Presidential inauguration ceremonies. Bernard Wells, Executive Director of IEC, has indicated that the Committee will shortly begin submissions of weekly communications regarding the plans of dissident and militant groups during the inauguration as well as an evaluation of the disruptive potential of such demonstrations.

Much of the information necessary for this evaluation can be furnished by the Domestic Intelligence Division. If approved, the Extremist Intelligence, Internal Security, Nationalities Intelligence, Research and Revolutionary Activities Sections will be canvassed for information in line with the above request.

ACTION:

If you approve, the Bureau's representative to the IEC staff will compile all pertinent data developed by these Sections and furnish to IEC.

62-113887-174

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 10/20/72

FROM : G. T. Tunstall

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

On 10/18/72 The White House requested that captioned Committee submit by 11/10/72 an evaluation of the potential of foreign students (Arab, Israeli and Irish) in the U.S., for conducting or aiding terrorist activities in this country.

In order to fulfill the above levy, each member agency of IEC is being asked to furnish any available information regarding the following points:

- 1) Number of foreign students of each designated nationality in the U.S. and their location.
- 2) Membership by these students in either terrorist groups or groups capable of committing acts of terrorism.
- 3) Student groups formed by these students, including size of membership, key officials and any connections with foreign groups such as AL FATAH.
- 4) Actual membership of such students in such terrorist organizations as AL FATAH.
- 5) Relationship of students and/or student groups with other militant groups within the U.S.
- 6) Past terrorist activities in which such students and/or groups have been involved.
- 7) Extent of propaganda efforts conducted by or directed at such students and/or student groups.

62-113887-173

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
RE: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)

8) Current U.S. restrictions placed upon foreign students.

The evaluation requested will undoubtedly be furnished to the President's committee studying ways and means of preventing terrorist activities in the U.S. The information being requested by IEC can be partially fulfilled by the Extremist Intelligence, Nationalities Intelligence and Revolutionary Activities Sections of the Domestic Intelligence Division. These Sections are being canvassed for information in line with the above request and the Bureau's representative to the IEC staff will compile all available data for approval and submission to the IEC. The Bureau's representative thereafter will participate in the preparation of the evaluation which has been requested by The White House.

ACTION:

For information. Upon completion, Bureau's contribution will be submitted for approval prior to being furnished to IEC.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-04-2016 BY   ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

S-8-72

FROM : R. D. Cotter

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Mr. Bernard A. Wells, Executive Director, IEC, has advised that the White House has expressed an interest in being advised of the plans and the disturbance potential of demonstrations scheduled for May 27 for Washington, D. C.

These demonstrations are in protest to the U. S. support of European colonialist rule in Southern Africa, including present situation in Rhodesia. They are sponsored by the African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee, a group composed of pan-African organizations and the Congress of African Peoples. Individuals involved in these demonstrations are expected to range from the most militant to high-level civil rights leaders. They are expected to draw support from all levels of the black community and could easily involve violence.

In view of the violence potential of the above demonstrations, the IEC, in accordance with the White House request, is obtaining all available information concerning the plans for these demonstrations from the member agencies of IEC. Information developed by the Bureau will be furnished to IEC by the Bureau's representatives and will be included in the overall reports submitted to the White House.

ACTION:

If approved, Bureau representatives will furnish desired information to IEC as developed.

62-113887-149

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY   ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 2/3/72

FROM : R. D. Cotter

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Mr. Bernard A. Wells, Jr., Executive Director of captioned Committee, has advised that the IEC, with White House approval, will undertake an intelligence estimate of the Jewish Defense League (JDL), militant anti-Soviet group which is suspected of employing violent tactics on a number of occasions. The estimate is aimed at coordinating all pertinent data held by member IEC agencies concerning the JDL, including its strength, international connections, and likely future strategy. All member agencies have been requested to furnish relevant data in their possession.

The Bureau has conducted a thorough investigation of JDL activities in the U.S. and has already prepared and disseminated to interested outside agencies a considerable number of reports and letterhead memoranda.

## ACTION:

If you approve, copies of all reports and letterhead memoranda previously disseminated on the JDL will be provided to Bureau representatives on the IEC. This material will be summarized in the form of an overall report which, after approval, can be furnished to IEC in response to its needs.

62-113887-137



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller  
FROM : R. D. Cotter *rec*  
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

DATE: 11/18/71

Mr. John W. Dean III, Counsel to the President, has requested that IEC conduct an in-depth study of the plans and strategies of the "militant left vis a vis the labor movement." This request was prompted by a newsletter emphasizing the need for worker-student alliances which was prepared by the Revolutionary Marxist Caucus, an adjunct of the Spartacist League. To a great extent, of course, this study will depend upon information furnished by the Bureau.

In line with the above, Bureau will furnish background data regarding attempts of the militant left, both black and white, to exert influence and draw strength from the American Labor Movement. This data, available in Bureau files, will include a brief history of the communist movement, both Chinese and Soviet oriented, as related to the role of labor in the movement with special emphasis placed upon plans and strategies of New Left and black extremist groups.

A brief summary will be included regarding the various splinter groups and their plans to infiltrate and use the labor movement in furthering their various causes. The study will be mainly concerned with current activities.

When compiled, the above information will be prepared by the Bureau's representatives on IEC and submitted for your approval. The data will then be incorporated along with contributions from other member agencies in a report on the in-depth study requested by the White House.

6 DEC 2 1971

CONTINUED—OVER—

51 DEC 7 1971

62-113887-107

Memorandum R. D. Cotter to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC)  
62-113887

ACTION:

If approved, individual sections of the Domestic Intelligence Division will be requested to assemble pertinent information regarding the policies and activities of the various groups as follows:

Extremist Intelligence

- League of Revolutionary Workers; International Black Workers Congress

Internal Security

- Details regarding Communist Party, USA, and Socialist Workers Party

Nationalities Intelligence - Progressive Labor Party; Revolutionary Union

New Left

- Students for a Democratic Society; Worker-Student Alliance; Revolutionary Youth Movement; Young Socialist Alliance; Student Mobilization Committee; National Peace Action Coalition

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY   ADG

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *ESM*

DATE: 10/21/71

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

FROM : R. D. Cotter *RD*

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
(REVISION OF THE OCTOBER-NOVEMBER ANTIWAR OFFENSIVE)

At the specific request of the White House, the IEC prepared and submitted a comprehensive report dated 9/24/71 outlining scheduled antiwar activities and an evaluation of the potential for civil disorders. This report, although incorporating data from various other agencies, was prepared to a considerable extent on FBI data.

The Honorable John W. Dean III, Counsel to the President, on 9/13/71 requested the IEC to update this report. Attached is the Bureau's copy of the revised estimate dated 10/21/71 which for the most part was prepared and based on data furnished by the FBI. No action is required.

ACTION:

For information. *V*

62-113887-102

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 9/29/71

FROM : R. D. Cotter

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Mr. Bernard A. Wells, Executive Director of the Staff of captioned Committee, has advised that the White House has requested IEC to prepare an estimate on the future implications to domestic order posed by events at Attica State Prison. The White House is interested in the scope of the problem posed by prison riots as well as the influences which create these conditions in the penal system. Of particular interest is the influence of black and New Left extremists in prison disorders.

According to Mr. Wells, 10/15/71 has been set as the deadline for this estimate and all member agencies of IEC are being requested to furnish any pertinent data they may possess.

The Bureau has previously levied a requirement on the field to furnish data developed regarding the extremist activity directed against prisons and the field has been instructed to submit such data in form suitable for dissemination by 10/1/71. Upon receipt of this material, Bureau representatives on IEC Staff will prepare a summary which can be submitted to IEC. This will be submitted for prior approval by the Bureau.

## ACTION:

When completed, summary will be submitted for your approval.

62-113887-98

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
*Memorandum*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 9/22/71

FROM : R. D. Cotter *REC*

SUBJECT: 0 INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Mr. Bernard A. Wells, Executive Director of the Staff of captioned Committee, has advised that the White House has requested that the IEC prepare an up-to-date estimate with regard to the Fall Offensive planned in forthcoming weeks by major antiwar groups in the U.S. The White House is interested in information as to what activities are scheduled including sponsoring organizations and the likely size of any demonstrations, the major issues which will be stressed and especially information as to the likelihood of militant and violent activity. *10*

According to Mr. Wells, no specific deadline has been set for this estimate but the White House is interested in receiving the data as quickly as possible. All member agencies of IEC are being requested to furnish any pertinent information they may have.

The Bureau has already developed a considerable amount of information along these lines and we can prepare a report by 9/24/71 pursuant to the request of the White House. *115802-45*

ACTION:

REC 25 EX-104

SEP 24 1971

An estimate on the above-described subject matter is being prepared and will be submitted to the IEC after your approval.

62-113887-95

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 8/13/71

FROM : R. D. Cotter

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
REVISION OF POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN  
MAJOR CITIES IN SUMMER OF 1971

8/13/71

At the specific request of the White House, the IEC prepared and submitted a comprehensive report dated 6/16/71 on the potential for racial violence in major U.S. cities this summer. This report, although incorporating data from various other agencies, was based to a considerable extent on FBI data.

Mr. John F. Doherty, Executive Director of the IEC, has been advised that the June 16 report was most helpful to the White House and was used as a basis for Presidential action to lessen the possibilities of violence in concerned areas. On 8/3/71 the White House requested that this report be updated.

Attached is the Bureau's copy of IEC revised estimate dated 8/13/71 which for the most part was prepared and based on FBI data. No action is required.

ACTION:

REC-39

EX-100

For information.

62-113887-89

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-04-2016 BY

ADG

b6 per FBI

b7C per FBI

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 6/24/71

FROM : R. D. Cotter

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Mr. John F. Doherty, Executive Director of the Staff of captioned Committee, has advised that the IEC with the concurrence of the White House is scheduling three additional intelligence estimates as follows:

- 1) The Interrelationships of Black Power Organizations Within the Western Hemisphere
- 2) The Interrelationships of Arab Terrorists Groups and U.S. Black Militants
- 3) X Jewish Defense League (JDL); An Assessment

No specific deadline has been set for any of these estimates; however, all member agencies have been requested to furnish any pertinent information they may have.

## ACTION:

Separate estimates will be prepared on the above-three subject matters summarizing pertinent data available to the Bureau and will be submitted to the Committee pursuant to Mr. Doherty's request.

62-113887-72

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan *CD*

DATE: 6/7/71

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

FROM : R. D. Cotter *RC*

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Reference my memorandum 6/2/71 concerning two estimates being prepared by IEC for the White House. There has been a change in the second estimate undertaken by the Committee; namely, one involving antiwar convention to be held in New York City, 7/2-4/71. IEC would now like to receive information concerning this convention and its effect on the future activities of the antiwar movement. Previously the Committee had asked for information concerning the convention prior to its being held. Deadline has been changed to 7/14/71.

In addition IEC will undertake preparation of an assessment of an antiwar conference being held at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 6/25-27/71 and its effect on the future activities of the antiwar movement. Deadline for submissions concerning this estimate is also 7/14/71.

## ACTION:

Separate estimates will be prepared on the above two matters and submitted to the Committee as requested.

62-113887-76,



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan *CD*

6/4/71

FROM : R. D. Cotter *RD*

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION  
COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Mr. John F. Doherty, Executive Director of the staff of captioned Committee, has requested that Bureau contribute material for two estimates being undertaken by the Committee which will be furnished to the White House, as follows:

1) Disruptive activity by antiwar elements at wedding of Tricia Nixon, 6/12/71. Deadline for submission of material for this estimate is close of business 6/8/71.

2) Information concerning antiwar convention scheduled for New York City, 7/2-4/71. Deadline for submission of information for this estimate is close of business 6/28/71.

Mr. Doherty is requesting pertinent information from other members of the IEC.

ACTION:

Separate estimates will be prepared on the above two matters and submitted to the Committee as requested after approval by the Director.

58 JUN 15 1971

JUN 9 1971

62-113887-74

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO Mr. C. D. Brennan *CD*

DATE: 4/22/71

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

FROM [REDACTED] *na*

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
(REQUEST FOR ESTIMATE ON HAITIAN SITUATION)

At 11:30 a.m. this morning Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian of the Internal Security Division of the Department called me as the Director's representative on the captioned Committee.

Mr. Mardian stated that he had just received a call from the Attorney General with respect to the death of President Duvalier of Haiti and the Attorney General wanted as soon as possible an estimate prepared by the IEC as to what can be expected here in the United States, particularly as regards Haitian exiles, as well as in Haiti in view of the death of Duvalier. Mr. Mardian stated that he had made a similar request of the Central Intelligence Agency in this regard.

## ACTION:

The Nationalities Intelligence Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division is preparing a concise estimate in this regard on an expeditious basis and it will be furnished for the Director's approval before submission to the IEC.

62-113887-51,

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY [REDACTED] ADG

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 3/29/71

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

FROM : [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

73 This memorandum is to advise of the results of the meeting of captioned Committee which took place later afternoon, March 26, 1971, in the Staff Conference Room of the Committee located on the Fourth Floor of the 9th & D Street Building. This meeting was attended by representatives of the Internal Security Division of the Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Treasury Department, Secret Service, and the FBI. The meeting was chaired by Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian of the Internal Security Division of the Department.

DC The meeting appeared to have been called primarily for the purpose of introducing Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, Enforcement and Operations Division. Mr. Mardian explained that Mr. Rossides has responsibility over intelligence-gathering aspects which include Internal Revenue Service, Bureau of Customs and the Alcohol, Tax and Firearms Division of the Department and, accordingly, he will participate in future meetings of the Committee and the intelligence units under him will be called upon to make contributions pertinent to the Committee's work.

The remainder of the meeting consisted of a brief presentation of Mr. Mardian with respect to the forthcoming massive demonstrations in Washington, D. C., which are scheduled

R 31 1971

CONTINUED - OVER

62-113887-38

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. Brennan  
Re: Intelligence Evaluation Committee  
62-113887

to commence on April 24, 1971. Mr. Mardian pointed out that intelligence developed to date indicates possibility that these demonstrations would be massive and that elements could be involved which could undertake substantial disruptive measures

He also advised that the White House is quite concerned with respect to these forthcoming demonstrations and is depending upon the captioned Committee and the agencies comprising the Committee to produce the intelligence which will result in the best possible intelligence estimate as to what will take place.

ACTION:

This is submitted for your information.

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SENSITIVE~~

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

# Memorandum

TO : Inspector [REDACTED]  
Member, IEC

DATE: May 6, 1971

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

FROM : John F. Doherty  
Executive Director, IEC

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ESTIMATE

The White House has requested that an Estimate be prepared on the following subject:

"The Likelihood of Demonstrations by the  
PEOPLES COALITION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE (PCPJ)  
or any other organization at the NATO Conference  
on Cities, to be held at Indianapolis, Indiana,  
on May 26 - 31, 1971."

It may be of interest to note that the indications we have received are that the Vice President has been committed to open this Conference, and there is a good possibility that the President will appear at some time during the scheduled Conference.

You are requested to forward to me a contribution on this subject on or before May 20, 1971.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY: [REDACTED]

b6 per FBI  
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MAY 27 1971

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

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62-113887-65

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

May 5, 1971

TO: Inspector [REDACTED]  
Member, IEC

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI  
11

FROM: *JF* John F. Doherty  
Executive Director, IEC

RE: REQUEST FOR ESTIMATE RECEIVED  
FROM THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. John Dean, Counsel to the President,  
requested that the IEC prepare an estimate on the  
following:

*28* The plans of the Peoples Coalition for Peace  
and Justice (PCPJ), and plans of the National  
Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and any other  
organizations to demonstrate at military bases  
on May 16, 1971. *U*

It would be helpful to the staff if your  
contribution for this estimate could be received by  
me on May 12 as we anticipate having the estimate  
completed by May 14.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY: [REDACTED]

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

62 MAY 14 1971

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~~SENSITIVE~~

62-113887-62

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

April 30, 1971

TO:

Inspector   
Member - IEC

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

FROM:

John F. Doherty  
Executive Director - IEC

*Intelligence Evaluation Committee*

*S-1*

At the request of the White House, the IEC has been preparing a calendar for a period of two months. The last was prepared for the period April-May and has been made available to you.

Consistent with the requirements of the White House, a calendar is being prepared for the period May-June and additional calendars for a two month period will be prepared as required.

It would be appreciated if you as a member of the IEC could forward a calendar contribution for the months of May-June and continue to do so for a future two months until the White House requirement for a two months calendar is discontinued.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 11-04-2016 BY:

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

*62-113887-60,*

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

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DATE 11-04-2016 BY:

April 6, 1971

b6 per FBI  
b7C per FBI

TO: Inspector   
Member, IEC

FROM: *JF* John F. Doherty  
Executive Director, IEC

RE: APRIL-MAY DEMONSTRATIONS

The staff of the IEC indicated at its last meeting an interest in obtaining from the FBI, information as to the number of buses and train reservations made by any group for the purpose of attending the April 24 demonstration and also any comparative figures that may be made available concerning past demonstrations.

In addition, the staff would appreciate an estimate from the Bureau of the support the demonstration may receive from the campuses and labor unions throughout the United States.

Reports received by the Committee staff indicate some individuals who may be remotely connected with the Capitol bombing are also active in the preparations for the April-May Demonstrations. It would be appreciated if the Bureau could make available to the IEC photographs of any and all currently considered suspects in the Capitol bombing.

ENCLOSURE

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62-113887-45



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 11-04-2016 BY   ADG

b6 per FBI  
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TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *ESM*

DATE:

*1/24/72*

FROM : R. D. Cotter *RD*

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)  
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Mr. Bernard A. Wells, Executive Director of captioned Committee, advised that the following request was levied on the IEC on 1/19/72 by the Honorable John Dean, Counsel to the President.

Mr. Dean said that the White House desires that the IEC prepare regular reports regarding potential disruptions at both forthcoming national political conventions based on information supplied by member agencies.

Mr. Dean told Wells that beginning immediately they would like to get monthly reports on the Republican Convention in San Diego, 8/21-24/72, and the Democratic Convention in Miami Beach, 7/10-13/72. Beginning about May, the White House desires biweekly reports and reports on a weekly basis beginning about 7/1/72. Mr. Dean told Wells that the White House would expect the IEC to serve as a focal point for pertinent information as to possible disturbances at the two political conventions.

The IEC has for some time been collecting information concerning the two major conventions, both of a public source nature and data made available by the Bureau and other member agencies in letterhead memorandum form.

Attached is a draft of the first estimate prepared by the IEC staff concerning the forthcoming Republican Convention. In summary, it shows that leaders of national protest groups are calling for a million demonstrators at the Republican Convention to protest against President Nixon's policies. To date, demonstration leaders are stressing nonviolent tactics, but past

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Enclosure

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EX-104

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Memorandum R. D. Cotter to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC)  
62-113887

experience indicates large-scale demonstrations can rapidly develop into violence despite announced peaceful intentions. San Diego has been relatively free of demonstrations in the past, but the Republican Convention will serve as a magnet, drawing large numbers of youth to the city for the Convention including "street people" and others experienced in militant disruptions.

All Bureau information incorporated in the attached report has been previously disseminated in letterhead memorandum form to interested agencies, including the IEC.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1) That attached draft be approved.
  - 2) That appropriate sections of Domestic Intelligence Division be alert to supply Bureau representatives on the IEC with pertinent information regarding possible disruptions at both the Democratic and Republican National Conventions in a form suitable for dissemination (reports, letterhead memoranda or teletypes from which administrative data is excised).
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