



November 16, 2023

MR. JOHN R GREENEWALD
SUITE 1203
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request No.: 1578303-001
Subject: COLBY, WILLIAM EGAN

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The FBI has completed its search for records subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that are responsive to your request. The enclosed 127 pages of records were determined to be responsive to your subject and were previously processed and released. Please see the selected paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- In an effort to provide you with responsive records as expeditiously as possible, we are releasing documents from previous requests regarding your subject. We consider your request fulfilled. Since we relied on previous results, additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may request an additional search for records. Submit your request by mail to **Initial Processing Operations Unit; Record/Information Dissemination Section; Information Management Division; Federal Bureau of Investigation; 200 Constitution Drive; Winchester, VA 22602. You may also email your response to foipaquestions@fbi.gov.** Please include the FOIPA Request Number listed above in your correspondence.
- Please be advised that additional records responsive to your subject exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you must advise us that you want the additional records processed. Please submit your response within thirty (30) days to **Initial Processing Operations Unit; Record/Information Dissemination Section; Information Management Division; Federal Bureau of Investigation; 200 Constitution Drive; Winchester, VA 22602. You may also email your response to foipaquestions@fbi.gov.** Please include the FOIPA Request Number listed above in your correspondence. **If we do not receive your decision within thirty (30) days of the date of this notification, your request will be closed.**
- One or more of the enclosed records were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession.

If this release of the previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may file a FOIPA request with NARA at the following address:

National Archives and Records Administration
Special Access and FOIA
8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500
College Park, MD 20740-6001

- Records potentially responsive to your request were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and they were not previously processed pursuant to the FOIA. You may file a request with NARA using the address above.

- One or more of the enclosed records were destroyed. Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) , Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.
- Records potentially responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) according to Title 44 United States Code Section 3301, Title 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Chapter 12 Sub-chapter B Part 1228, and 36 CFR 1229.10.
- Documents or information referred to other Government agencies were not included in this release.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **“Part 1”** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **“Part 2”** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **“Part 3”** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Additional information about the FOIPA can be found at www.fbi.gov/foia. Should you have questions regarding your request, please feel free to contact foipaquestions@fbi.gov. Please reference the FOIPA Request number listed above in all correspondence concerning your request.

Please be advised that if you are seeking a new search for records, you may wish to narrow the scope of your request based on material that you have already received, e.g., timeframe or locality. Additionally, be advised that “unusual circumstances” may apply. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B)(iii). These “unusual circumstances” will delay our ability to make a determination on your request within 20 days. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B). Additionally, the payment of pertinent fees may apply to your request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(A)(viii). The application of “unusual circumstances” is not a determination of how the FBI will respond to your substantive request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP’s FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP’s website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of this response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by emailing the FBI’s FOIA Public Liaison at foipaquestions@fbi.gov. The subject heading should clearly state “Dispute Resolution Services.” Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Confidential Informant Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of confidential informant records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F) [5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F)] and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552a (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records would reveal confidential informant identities and information, expose law enforcement techniques, and endanger the life or physical safety of individuals. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches and Standard Search Policy.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems, such as the Central Records System (CRS), or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. The CRS is an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. The standard search policy is a search for main entity records in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include a search for reference entity records, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files.
 - a. *Main Entity Records* – created for individuals or non-individuals who are the subjects or the focus of an investigation
 - b. *Reference Entity Records*- created for individuals or non-individuals who are associated with a case but are not known subjects or the focus of an investigation
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Foreseeable Harm Standard.** As amended in 2016, the Freedom of Information Act provides that a federal agency may withhold responsive records only if: (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the nine exemptions that FOIA enumerates, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law (5 United States Code, Section 552(a)(8)(A)(i)). The FBI considers this foreseeable harm standard in the processing of its requests.
- (iv) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1449528-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 1
Page 1 ~ b3; b7E;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1188649-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 63

Page 8 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 9 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 12 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 23 ~ b1; b3;
Page 30 ~ b1; b3;
Page 39 ~ b2; b3; b7C;
Page 40 ~ b2; b3; b7C;
Page 41 ~ b2; b3; b7C;
Page 50 ~ b2; b3;
Page 51 ~ b2; b3;
Page 52 ~ b2; b3;
Page 53 ~ b2; b3;
Page 54 ~ b2; b3;
Page 59 ~ b1; b3;
Page 60 ~ b1; b3;
Page 64 ~ b1; b3;
Page 65 ~ b1; b3;
Page 66 ~ b1; b3;
Page 69 ~ b1; b2; b3; b7C;
Page 70 ~ b2; b3; b7C;
Page 75 ~ b1; b3;
Page 76 ~ b1; b3;
Page 77 ~ b1; b3;
Page 78 ~ b1; b3;
Page 79 ~ Duplicate;
Page 80 ~ Duplicate;
Page 118 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 119 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 120 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 121 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 122 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 123 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 125 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 129 ~ Duplicate;
Page 130 ~ Duplicate;
Page 138 ~ b3; b7C;
Page 139 ~ b3;
Page 144 ~ b1; b3; b7C;
Page 147 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 148 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 149 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 150 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 151 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 152 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 153 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 154 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 156 ~ b1; b3;
Page 162 ~ b1; b3;

Page 170 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 171 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 172 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 173 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 174 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 178 ~ b1; b3;
Page 179 ~ b1; b3;
Page 180 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 181 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 184 ~ OTHER;
Page 185 ~ OTHER;
Page 186 ~ OTHER;
Page 187 ~ OTHER;
Page 188 ~ OTHER;
Page 189 ~ Referral/Direct;

```
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
```

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. _____
 Dep. AD Adm. _____
 Dep. AD Inv. _____
 Asst. Dir.: _____
 Admin. _____
 Comp. Syst. _____
 Ext. Affairs _____
 Files & Com. _____
 Gen. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Inspection _____
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____
 Plan. & Eval. _____
 Spec. Inv. _____
 Training _____
 Coun. _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director Sec'y _____

TO : MR. BASSETT. *9/18/2006*
 DATE: November 4, 1974
 BY: *60322 ucllp*
 CLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C)
 FROM : R. D. COTTER
 SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO FBI RECORDS
 [REDACTED] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

b3
 ing _____
 Coun. _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director Sec'y _____

Remymemo 10/22/74 recommending that we allow review of certain FBI records by [REDACTED] who is conducting study of events (1940-1947) which led to establishment of CIA. Intelligence Division recommended that any material first be reviewed by Intelligence Division and Legal Counsel. Director instructed he should see any material critical of other agencies or Major General Donovan.

b3

(S) [REDACTED]

* (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. Letter to Department from State Department (apparently forwarded to FBI) 8/2/41 enclosing [REDACTED]

b7D

[REDACTED]

4. 8/15/41 letter from FBIHQ to various FBI offices [REDACTED]

Enclosures — enclosures reFd to file
 1 - Messrs. Adams, Mintz, Wannall
 1 - Bufile 65-15635 [REDACTED]

SEE ADDENDUM OF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, PAGE 3

SEE ADDENDUM OF LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PAGE 4

RDC:wmj (6) 34 JAN 9 1974 b7D

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

Memo for Mr. Bassett
Re: Request for Access to FBI Records

[redacted] CIA

[redacted]
[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

ACTION:

The Intelligence Division and the Division of Legal Counsel are requested to review the attached serials and comment as to the advisability of making them available for [redacted] review and possible use.

b3

If no objections are made, the writer will arrange to allow [redacted] access to this material.

Material reviewed with [redacted] 12/3/74 [signature]

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

~~SECRET~~

b3

ADDENDUM OF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION: *hp* HWP:pld 11/5/74

The Intelligence Division interposes no objection to the review, by [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), of those serials listed above as Items 5, 6, 7, and 9, noting that Item 9 consists of an exchange of correspondence between Director Hoover and [redacted]

b3
b7D

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

Item 3, relating to [redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] Item 4, a cover letter describing Item 3, should be considered for release based on the decision regarding Item 3.

[redacted]

b1
b3

[redacted] do not appear to be relevant to [redacted] inquiry, and therefore it is suggested they not be released for review.

AAH/PC

WRW/PC

jet

~~SECRET~~

only

ADDENDUM OF LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION: THB:law 11-11-74

b1
b3

With regard to making available certain FBI records for review by [redacted] Legal Counsel Division concurs in the addendum recommendations made by the Intelligence Division with regard to items 1, 2, 3 and 4. [redacted]

[redacted] No other objections are being made.

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] However, since access in this instance will be controlled, and will not involve reproduction of copies of the documents, no objection to making them available is being interposed. No objections to items 5 and 8.

JB *jet* *Jan/80*
[Signature]
OK

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DATE: 9/8/2006
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 ucl/OG/MS
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/8/2031
DATE: October 22, 1974

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir. _____
Adm. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Records _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

TO : MR. BASSETT

FROM : R. D. COTTER

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: 3832
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY: 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION: INDEFINITE

5-10-78

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO FBI RECORDS

[REDACTED] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b3

This memorandum recommends that on a carefully controlled basis we allow a review of certain historical FBI records by [REDACTED] a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) research specialist, who is conducting a detailed study of events during period (1940 - 1947) which led to establishment of CIA.

b1
b3

[REDACTED]

During December, 1973, we offered no objection to the release to [REDACTED] of various 1940 - 1942 documents regarding these matters which had been prepared by Director J. Edgar Hoover and other FBI officials and which [REDACTED] had located in the Archives. In the Spring of 1974, the results of [REDACTED] research to date was published by CIA as a special supplement to its series "Studies in Intelligence," which was classified "Secret" (copy attached).

b3

[REDACTED] personally contacted me, as the Bureau's Document Classification Officer, on 10/3/74 and expressed the hope that he could be granted access to additional FBI records during the 1940 - 1947 period to assist him in his continuing studies. At my suggestion, he has incorporated his request in the attached letter which was forwarded by letter of 10/10/74 from [REDACTED]

6 DEC 26 1974

In his note [REDACTED] has cited the following areas of particular interest:

b1
b3
b7D

Enclosures ENC. BEHIND FILE

1 - Messrs. Adams, Bassett, Wannall (Att: [REDACTED]) Mintz (Att: [REDACTED])

RDC:bhg (6)

4 JAN 9 1975

JAN 7 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

b7C

94-6895-05687

Classified by: 3832
Declassify on: A-2

Memorandum to Mr. Bassett
Re: Request for Access to FBI Records

b3

[redacted] CIA

~~SECRET~~

(S)

[redacted]

b1
b2
b3
b7D

[redacted] letter points out that access to Bureau records in these areas is for official and classified use and that no publication of our material would be made without the FBI's prior concurrence. In my discussion with [redacted] he also gave his assurance that, if he is allowed access to any of our records, he will not publish anything, either as a CIA document or otherwise, without our specific approval.

b3

OBSERVATIONS

This request appears to be a valid one aimed at a legitimate historical purpose. In view of the lapse of time involved, it is most unlikely that disclosure of any of the material involved would jeopardize any current Bureau sources or operations or would otherwise warrant classification under terms of the existing guidelines as set forth in Executive Order 11652. Our main concern would be to not release any material which would represent an invasion of the privacy of the various individuals involved. It is unlikely that much material of this type would be involved, however, since the files would consist almost entirely of copies of official correspondence (memoranda or letters between the Bureau and other agencies).

Under the circumstances, it is felt that we should accede to this request with the following caveats to be agreed to in advance by [redacted]

I will check logical Bureau files concerning the topics of interest to [redacted] (eliminating any material which might still be sensitive or which otherwise appears undesirable to grant access to). Thereafter, I will arrange to have [redacted] review this material in our space and under my personal supervision. I will further obtain [redacted] agreement to obtain our specific clearance to quote or copy material from any particular item as well as to submit for our prior approval any material he plans to publish based on FBI material. Following [redacted] review,

b3

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Bassett
Re: Request for Access to FBI Records
[redacted] CIA

~~SECRET~~

a separate memorandum will be submitted detailing any material which [redacted] would be interested in using.

b3

ACTION

If you approve, arrangements will be made with [redacted] to proceed under the above-outlined conditions.

HS

HS

ADDENDUM BY INTELLIGENCE DIV.: WRW:lml 10/23/74

[redacted]

[redacted] Accordingly, it is recommended that after the Bureau's Document Classification Officer has compiled material which he feels may be of such nature that it can be offered to [redacted] for his review, such material be reviewed both by the Intelligence Division and the Division of Legal Counsel prior to its being exhibited to [redacted] (~~S~~)

b1
b3

get

[Signature]

[Signature]

I want to see any matter which is critical of Donovan, G-2 or other agencies -

[Signature]

~~SECRET~~

Date of Mail 12/20/74

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/8/2006 BY 60322uc/ep/09/mz

Subject JUNE MAIL C.I.A.A.

Removed By 79 JAN 6 1975

File Number 62-80750- ✓

See

December 19, 1974

REC-93

62-80750-5008

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b3

I want to thank you for your note of Christmas Greetings. My associates and I are most appreciative of your best wishes at this special time.

I am pleased that your relationship with the Bureau has been a pleasant one and I very much appreciate your comment concerning Special Agents [Redacted]. I know they will share my gratitude for your thoughtful remarks.

With best wishes to you and your staff for a Happy Holiday Season,

Sincerely,

G. M. Kelley


DATE: 9/8/2006
CLASSIFIED BY 603224C/LP/DG/mas
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/8/2031

b7C

MAILED 20
DEC 19 1974

1 - FBI Mr. Wannall - Enclosure
Personal Attention: Bring to the attention of
Special Agents [Redacted]

- Assoc. Dir. _____
 - Dep. AD Adm. _____
 - Dep. AD Inv. _____
 - Asst. Dir.: 1 - Personnel File of SA [Redacted] - Enclosure
 - Admin. _____
 - Comp. Syst. _____
 - Ext. Affairs _____
 - Files & Com. _____
 - Gen. Inv. _____
 - Ident. _____
 - Inspection _____
 - Intell. _____
 - Laboratory _____
 - Plan. & Eval. _____
 - Spec. Inv. _____
 - Training _____
 - Legal Coun. _____
 - Telephone Rm. _____
 - Director Sec'y _____
- awt:jac (7)
- jac*
- edm*
- McD*
- GEM*
- Jaw*
- AWT*
- 4 JAN 13 1975
- MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT



Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Ninth and Pennsylvania Avenues, N. W.
Room 4647
Washington, D. C. 20535

2 DIRECTOR

2 DEC 13 74

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. _____
 Dep. AD Adm. _____
 Dep. AD Inv. _____
 Asst. Dir.:
 Admin. _____
 Comp. Syst. _____
 Ext. Affairs _____
 Files & Com. _____
 Gen. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Inspection 1/15
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____
 Plan. & Eval. _____
 Spec. Inv. _____
 Training _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director Sec'y _____

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: November 5, 1974

FROM : H. N. BASSETT

DATE: 9/8/2006
 CLASSIFIED BY G032240/LP/PG/MY
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/8/2031

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO FBI RECORDS
[REDACTED] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

b3

Re my memorandum 10/22/74 recommending that we allow review of certain FBI records by [REDACTED] who is conducting study of events (1940-1947) which led to establishment of CIA. Intelligence Division recommended that any material first be reviewed by Intelligence Division and Legal Counsel. Director instructed he should see any material critical of other agencies or Major General Donovan.

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1
b3

[REDACTED]

EX-101 ~~SECRET~~ REC 44 62-80750 5009

These sections also contain several memoranda by FBI officials and/or correspondence with the Attorney General concerning two areas of disagreement between FBI Director Hoover and General Donovan:

(S) [REDACTED]

Enclosures

- 1 - Messrs. Adams, Mintz, ~~Warrall~~
 - 1 - Bufile 62-64427
- RDC:bhg

~~SECRET~~
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
 JUN 17 1976
 CONTINUED - OVER

(5) SEE ADDENDUM LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PAGE 4
 SEE ADDENDUM INTELLIGENCE DIVISION PAGE 3

51 100 15 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-80750-5009

10/1/74

Memorandum to Mr. Callahan
Re: Request for Access to FBI Records

b3

[redacted] CIA

(S) [redacted]

b1
b3

(S) [redacted]

With reference to the matter involving Assistant Secretary of State Berle, the file does contain a memorandum 3/12/42 dictated by E. A. Tamm (serial 180) which summarizes a conversation he had with Mr. Berle. The latter discussed

b3
b7D

[redacted]

It is felt that all of the material in these three sections is of possible value to [redacted] and there is no apparent reason why we should withhold it, with the exception of several serials (serials 65, 89, 106, 165, and 210) which set out data obtained in confidence from sensitive sources of a critical nature regarding COI operations or personnel.

b3

ACTION

Intelligence Division and Legal Counsel are requested to review the attached three file sections of 62-64427 and comment as to whether they concur in making them available for [redacted] review. (Serials 65, 89, 106, 165, and 210 will be first removed.)

J.B.W.
HW ↓

~~SECRET~~

ADDENDUM OF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

HWP:pld 11/6/74

The Intelligence Division has no objection to the release for review by [redacted] of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of information contained in Sections 1 through 3, Bureau File 62-64427, with the exception of Serials 65, 89, 106, 163, 165, and 210. Serial 163 has been included among those serials previously considered for exclusion from review, as noted above, since it discloses, in an attachment, background investigation not related to the nature of [redacted] inquiry.

b3

JH

*WRW
PLM*

*JBA
S
[Signature]*

~~SECRET~~

ADDENDUM OF LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION THB:law 11-15-74

Legal Counsel Division has reviewed sections 1-3 of Bureau file 62-64427 with regard to [redacted] request for access to information contained therein.

Serial 206 discloses [redacted]

b3

[redacted] and is, therefore, objectionable due to possible privacy considerations. These 3 sections contain several serials identifying [redacted] by name only, which might raise privacy and other issues if reproduced and disseminated by us; however, due to the controlled conditions of access set forth in referenced 10-22-74 memorandum, no objection is being interposed.

Serial 5 is an October, 1941, memorandum which makes reference to Nelson Rockefeller's organization's distribution of pro-American propaganda in Central and South America. Although the activity may be public knowledge, and not objectionable from a purely legal standpoint, it is questionable that we should make this document available for perusal at this time. Rockefeller's organization is also mentioned in serial 110, but identified in this instance only as an organization serviced by the Bureau along with the State Department and military intelligence agencies.

Legal Counsel Division concurs with addendum of the Intelligence Division and interposes no additional objections.

MB

JFK

JBA

Jenkins

[Signature]

OK

[Signature]

- Mrs. Metcalf
- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Cregar

December 16, 1974

b7C

1 - [Redacted]
 1 - [Redacted]
 1 - [Redacted]
 PERSONAL

W.C.A.

[Redacted]

BY LIAISON

b1
b3

*Delivered
12/18/74
LFS*

I have learned of your plans to retire after many years of distinguished service to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the intelligence community. On behalf of your friends at the FBI I want to express my appreciation for the very significant contributions you have made to the excellent relationship which exists between the Bureau and the Central Intelligence Agency. During your long career you have been a part of a community team of professionals dedicated to the preservation of our country and the ideals for which it stands. You can take satisfaction in having earned the respect of your associates for a job well done.

It is my personal hope and that of your friends in the Bureau that you enjoy many years of good health and happiness in your retirement.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
 Director

LFS:tdp
(11)

NOTE:

See memorandum Boynton to Wannall dated 12/9/74, captioned [Redacted] Liaison Officer, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Retirement [Redacted] prepared by LFS:tdp.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DEC 24 1974

REC-63 62-80250-5010

DATE: 9/8/2006
 CLASSIFIED BY 6032246/LD/DG/mas
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(C) 9/8/2031

- loc. Dir. _____
- sp. AD Adm. _____
- sp. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Intelligence _____
- Lab. _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Rec. Mgmt. _____
- Tech. Serv. _____
- Training _____
- Off. of Cong. & Public Affairs _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

64 JAN 10 1975

b3

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Asst. Dir. _____
- Adm. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

TO : MR. BASSETT

DATE: December 17, 1974

DATE: 9/8/2007

FROM : R. D. COTTER

CLASSIFIED BY 60322UW/LP/PG/mrc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/8/2031

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO FBI RECORDS

[redacted] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Re your memorandum 11/5/74 which was approved recommending that we allow [redacted] (who is compiling detailed history of CIA and its antecedents) to review three sections of our file on [redacted]

[redacted] Seven serials containing privileged information were withheld.

(4) On 12/2/74, [redacted] reviewed this material under my supervision. Based on this review he has asked for our permission to use 15 particular documents [redacted]

The 15 items in question (attached) relate to [redacted]. They contain nothing which would jeopardize current operations or sources, which would damage national security, or which would constitute an invasion of privacy. The Freedom of Information Act Unit of the Legal Counsel Division has reviewed these 15 documents and has expressed opinion that nine of them (serials 19, 29, 96, 110, 133, 143, 161, 180 and 192) represent inter and intra-agency memoranda and could be construed to be exempt under Section (b) (5) of the Freedom of Information Act.

Even if it is conceded, however, that these nine documents could be technically regarded as intra-agency material and could be withheld, it is not believed we should pursue this course under the existing circumstances. [redacted] is not proceeding through FOIA channels and it is believed our posture should be one of cooperating with him in supplying this old historical material to the extent that it will not damage national security or FBI interests. The material in question, including the nine serials cited by Legal Counsel, will in no way adversely affect either the national security or the Bureau and it is believed we should make them available to [redacted]. Bureau administrative markings will be excised prior to their release to [redacted].

ACTION That copies of the attached items (serials X6, 19, 24, 29, 68, 76X, 76, 96, 99, 110, 133, 143, 161, 180 and 192) be furnished to [redacted] for his use. As previously indicated, [redacted]

4 JAN 10 1975 17 1976
Enc. 1 - Messrs. Adams, Mintz, Wannall
RDC:bhg (5)

JEF
JCF
JK
SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 94-68950

b3

b1
b3

b3

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Jenkins

DATE: 12-9-74

FROM : J. J. McDermott

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE
NATION'S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm.

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rm.

Director Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/8/20 BY 60322UC

29/105/pmr

O.C.I.A

The Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, Senate Committee on Government Operations, opened hearings today, 12-9-74, on legislative proposals to strengthen Congressional Oversight of the Nation's Intelligence Agencies. Subcommittee Chairman Edmund S. Muskie (D-Maine) and Senator William E. Brock (R-Tenn.) were the only members present.

Testimony was given by Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., (R-Tenn.), Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., (R-Md.), Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wisc.) and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark.

Attached are copies of statements given by the witnesses. While Senator Baker is the coauthor of S. 4019, a bill to establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight, his testimony primarily was in support of the overall program. In addition to his statement, Senator Baker repeatedly emphasized he wanted to make it emphatically clear that he is not opposed to the intelligence gathering functions by various agencies and felt that perhaps today even the intelligence function may be more important than in the recent past. He stressed that Congress should share the overall responsibility, however, and have some specified oversight. Under questioning by Senator Muskie, he pointed out that the CIA, after initially cooperating with the Senate Watergate Committee, finally told the Committee that it could not furnish any further information and that the Watergate Committee would have to go through the CIA Oversight Committee. Consequently, Senator Baker added, "there was a gap in the Watergate Committee report as the information sought was never delivered." Senator Mathias supported Senate Resolution 419 which was introduced by him and Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.). This Resolution calls for the establishment of a bipartisan Committee of eight members equally divided between the majority and minority parties. This Committee would delve into Governmental operations on intelligence activities and submit a final report to the Senate no later than two years after the Resolution is established. Senator Mathias pointed out that the whole area concerning intelligence operations is a very "murky" problem and needs a study and investigation by this special Committee before taking any legislative action -- such as the establishment of a Joint Committee for Oversight.

Original Filed In 62

DEC 24 1974

- Enclosures
- 1 - Mr. Adams
 - 1 - Mr. Cleveland
 - 1 - Mr. McDermott
 - 1 - Mr. Wannall
 - 1 - Mr. Hotis

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
 - 1 - Mr. Bowers
- CONTINUED - OVER

CBF:dkg (9)

JAN 6 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

Mem Joint Com Intell 12/10/74 pmr

McDermott to Jenkins
Re: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE
NATION'S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Senator Nelson spoke in support of S. 2738 which was introduced by him and Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.). This bill would establish a Joint Committee to study the need to reorganize the departments and agencies engaged in surveillance and intelligence activities.

Former Attorney General Clark testified that none of the bills or resolutions before the Subcommittee were adequate to accomplish what he believes to be necessary. He urged the creation of a Joint Committee to have oversight capacity for all intelligence, investigation, enforcement and surveillance activity, foreign and domestic, including personnel inspection. Such a Committee, according to Clark, should include the majority and minority leaders in both Houses. Clark's proposal did not appear to be received with any great enthusiasm by Senators Muskie and Brock. One of Clark's suggestions would establish a Federal Investigative and Enforcement Review Board made up of representatives of citizen groups with power to hear and act on complaints of abuse and to review and recommend practices and procedures of all Federal intelligence, investigative, and enforcement agencies.

In response to questioning from Senator Muskie, Clark stated he had never heard of COINTELPRO while he was Attorney General, that former Director Hoover was totally independent with practically no Justice Department oversight and that the FBI should not engage in any type of intelligence or investigative activities in the absence of clearcut criminal violation.

Scheduled to appear before the Subcommittee tomorrow are Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., (R-Conn.); Professor Harry Howe Ransom, Vanderbilt University; Dr. Ray S. Cline, former Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and presently the Executive Director of Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University; Dr. Harold P. Ford, former Deputy Director, Office of Political Research, CIA, and presently the Program Director, Institute for the Study of Ethics and International Affairs, Washington, D. C.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

It appears to me the doctrine of separation of powers is being strained. I believe should consult with A.C.

Sub *TS5*
on *BF*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~SECRET~~

DEC 17 1974

DATE: 9/8/2006

DECLASSIFIED BY 603224C/CP/DA/mar
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3b,c) 8/8/2001

Asso. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Insp.	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

12:00 N URGENT 12/17/74 GJK

TO DIRECTOR NR 232-17

[Redacted]

(C) Per CIA
(P) 2P

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF

DATE 5/17/78
Classified

[Redacted]

(S) Per CIA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b1
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

b7C

b1
b3

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

END PAGE ONE

51 JAN 10 1975

~~SECRET~~

125962 80750

CLASS. & EXT. BY Per CIA 3/18/81
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 12-17-94
514778

ORIGINAL FILED IN 109-12

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. *ML* _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

1 - Mrs. Metcalf
1 - Mr. Adams

DATE: 12/9/74

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall *W.R.W.*

1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Cregar

FROM : H.A. Boynton, Jr. *HB*

SUBJECT:

[Redacted Subject]

1 - [Redacted]
1 - [Redacted]
1 - [Redacted]

b7C

b1
b3

This recommends that an appropriate letter and ~~auto-~~ graphed photograph of the Director be delivered to [Redacted] by Liaison.

[Redacted] who is known as [Redacted] to many Bureau officials and Supervisors, is one of our most important liaison contacts at CIA. As [Redacted] he has been most helpful to the Bureau since our re-establishment of Liaison with CIA in 1972. He has been particularly effective in insuring that the various operational elements at CIA adhere to the requirements of coordination with the Bureau set forth in our 1966 agreement with CIA.

[Redacted] has completed [Redacted] years of service with CIA during which he served in a variety of positions abroad and at Headquarters. He is well-known throughout the intelligence community and highly respected as a capable and professional intelligence officer.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to [Redacted] by Liaison.

(2) It is further recommended that the Director autograph a copy of his photograph to [Redacted] to be delivered by Liaison.

Enclosure - Sent 12-17-74

LFS:tdp (10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
LFS
4 JAN 14 1975

~~SECRET~~

REC-71 62-80750-5012

DEC 30 1974

DATE: 9/8/2006
CLASSIFIED BY 60322UC/L/RS/PA
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 (C) 9/8/2001

[Redacted Box]

b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 12/20/74

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, WFO

OCIA

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY TECHNICAL MATTERS -
TRAINING

b1
b3

(S) ReBulet 12/6/74, concerning a 2 week training program designed especially for SAs assigned to the [redacted] to be held in the WDC area 1/20-31/75.

(S) WFO requests Bureau authority for SAs [redacted] to attend this training school. These men are on the [redacted] and were transferred to the BA Office until such time as needed on the project. WFO believes it essential to the project for these men to receive this training by the CIA. No per diem will be involved.

b1
b3
b7C

A communication should be directed to the SAC Baltimore to insure their attendance at this training session.

Other selections for this session will be made in early 1975 and the other SA assigned to BA who is involved in this project will be trained at a later date.

EX-103

REC-31

62-80750-5013

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classified By 6588
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

2 - Bureau
1 - WFO

JHM:jak
(3)

DATE: 9/8/2006
CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/CP/06/mjt
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/8/2006



FIBS
JAN 13 1975

ELVE

THO

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

THREE

62-80750-5014
CHANGED TO
105-274419-7

MAY 6 1975
Be/cmA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/1/96 BY 6032260/CP/DA/may

1-Office, 7133
1-Mr. White
1-Mr. Wannall
(Attn: [redacted]
Rm. 4637 JEH)

1-[redacted]

January 7, 1975

b7C

By Courier Service

Honorable William E. Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

*Del. CIA by
L. Johnson
1/19/75
LJS*

Dear Bill:

Reference is made to your letter of October 23,
1974, approving my request [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Please advise whether training of five Special
Agents instead of four is acceptable.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Handwritten signature

NOTE: Copies of pertinent background correspondence are
attached.

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Rec. Mgmt. _____
- Tech. Serv. _____
- Training _____
- Off. of Cong. & Public Affairs _____
- Sec'y _____

FPS: fdb(6)

EX-109

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/11/2006 BY 60322udc/091
REC-18

[redacted]

62-80750-5815

JAN 14 1975

54 JAN 20 1975

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Alc

b2
b3
b7E

b7C

b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Jenkins
- 1 - Mr. McDermott

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep. AD Adm.
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin.
- Comp. Syst.
- Ext. Affairs
- Files & Com.
- Gen. Inv.
- Ident.
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Plan. & Eval.
- Spec. Inv.
- Train.
- Legal Coun.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

DATE: 12/24/74

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - [Redacted]

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TO: Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM: Mr. W. R. Wannall *WRW/pen*

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

The media has reported that the CIA was involved in a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration, directed against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the U.S. Attached is an article from the Sunday Edition of the "New York Times", 12/22/74, written by Seymour M. Hersh, wherein he alleges that CIA maintained intelligence files on 10,000 American citizens, as well as engaging in break-ins, wiretaps, and the surreptitious inspection of mail in the U.S. beginning in the 1950's. (S) (u)

On the morning of 12/24/74, Mr. William Colby, Director of CIA, called to speak to the Director. In his absence he spoke to Mr. Jenkins. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

REC 68 62-80750-5016

Following Mr. Colby's conversation with Mr. Jenkins, [Redacted] advised of the following: (S) (u) 104

JAN 10 1975

[Redacted]

Enclosures - 3
LFS:jlb/jlb
(7)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 12
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

CONTINUED - OVER

5-

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

b7C

9863 R00/mg CA #58-1828

DATE: 8/21/2006 7/27/93

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/EP/06/mr

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3(C) 8/31/2013

12/9/94 CA, #58-1828

All classification per - CA review of 6/2/94

CLASSIFIED BY SP7 acghem

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

12/19/94 C.A. #58-1828

All CIA info covered per

CA review of 6/2/94

9803 R00/mc

7/17/93

C.A. #58-1828

HUGE C.I.A. OPERATION REPORTED IN U.S. AGAINST ANTIWAR FORCES, OTHER DISSIDENTS IN NIXON YEARS

_____ /yst. _____
_____ /airs _____
_____ / Com. _____
_____ /v. _____
_____ /ion _____
_____ /itory _____
_____ & Eval. _____
_____ /pec. Inv. _____
_____ / Training _____
_____ / Legal Coun. _____
_____ / Telephone Rm. _____
_____ / Director Sec'y _____




Richard Helms



James R. Schlesinger



The New York Times
William E. Colby



b7C

The Washington Post _____
Washington Star-News _____
Daily News (New York) _____
The New York Times P.1, 26
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
The Los Angeles Times _____

Date 12/22/74

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/93 BY 9803 ROD/nc

SP 7 CUC/AM
11/9/94 C.A. #88-1826
per CIA Review
of 6/1/94

62-80750-5016
ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) (u)

The Hersh article also alleged that CIA was involved in break-ins. According to Mr. Nelson, they have no information in their files to support this allegation.

(S) (u)

In the late 1960's the FBI became aware of the importance that policymakers were attaching to the question of whether foreign governments were supporting dissident groups throughout the world and, more particularly, those radical and dissident groups in the U.S.

[Redacted]

b2
b3

[Redacted]

(S) (u)

[Redacted]

(u)

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)

b2
b3

[Redacted]

(u)

OBSERVATION:

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

The widely published allegations by Hersh appear to be taken out of perspective and distorted. If there are Congressional hearings on this matter, considerable damage to the entire intelligence community could occur

b2
b3

[Redacted]

(S) (u)

ACTION:

We will continue to follow this matter and keep the Director apprised of any significant developments.

WES

K

WES

~~SECRET~~

FILES ON CITIZENS

Helms Reportedly Got Surveillance Data in Charter Violation

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21—The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States, according to well-placed Government sources.

An extensive investigation by The New York Times has established that intelligence files on at least 10,000 American citizens were maintained by a special unit of the C.I.A. that was reporting directly to Richard Helms, then the Director of Central Intelligence and now the Ambassador to Iran.

In addition, the sources said, a check of the C.I.A.'s domestic files ordered last year by Mr. Helms's successor, James R. Schlesinger, produced evidence of dozens of other illegal activities by members of the C.I.A. inside the United States, beginning in the nineteen-fifties, including break-ins, wiretapping and the surreptitious inspection of mail.

A Different Category

Mr. Schlesinger was succeeded at the C.I.A. by William E. Colby in late 1973.

Those alleged operations, while also prohibited by law, were not targeted at dissident American citizens, the sources said, but were a different category of domestic activities that were secretly carried out as part of operations aimed at suspected foreign intelligence agents operating in the United States.

Under the 1947 act setting up the C.I.A., the agency was forbidden to have "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions" inside the United States. Those responsibilities fall to the F.B.I., which maintains a special internal security unit to deal with foreign intelligence threats.

Mr. Helms, who left the C.I.A. in February, 1973, for his new post in Teheran, could not be reached despite telephone calls there yesterday and today.

Network of Informants

Charles Cline, a duty officer at the American Embassy in Teheran, said today that a note informing Mr. Helms of the request by The Times for comment had been delivered to Mr. Helms's quarters this morning. By late evening Mr. Helms had not returned the call.

"This is explosive, it could destroy the agency," one official with access to details of the alleged domestic spying on dissidents said in an interview.

He described the program as similar in intent to the Army domestic surveillance programs that were censured by Congress four years ago.

"There was no excuse for what the agency did," the source said. "What you had was an insulated secret police agency not under internal question or audit."

The disclosure of alleged illegal C.I.A. activities is the first confirmation of rumors that have been circulating in Washington for some time. A number of mysterious burglaries and incidents have come to light since the break-in at Democratic party headquarters in the Watergate complex on June 17, 1972.

Throughout the public hearings and courtroom testimony on Watergate, Mr. Helms and other high-level officials insisted that the C.I.A. had been "duped" into its Watergate involvement by the White House.

As part of its alleged effort against dissident Americans in the late nineteen-sixties and early nineteen-seventies, the sources said, the C.I.A. authorized agents to follow and photograph participants in antiwar and other demonstrations. The C.I.A. also set up a network of informants who were ordered to penetrate antiwar groups, the sources said.

At least one avowedly antiwar member of Congress was among those placed under surveillance by the C.I.A., the sources said. Other members of Congress were said to be included in the C.I.A.'s dossier on dissident Americans.

The names of the various Congressmen could not be learned, nor could any specific information about domestic C.I.A. break-ins and wiretappings be obtained.

It also could not be determined whether Mr. Helms had had specific authority from top aides to initiate the alleged domestic surveillance, or whether Mr. Helms had informed the President of the fruits, if any of the alleged operations.

Distress Reported

These alleged activities are known to have distressed both Mr. Schlesinger, now the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Colby. Mr. Colby has reportedly told associates that he is considering the possibility of asking the Attorney General to institute legal action against some of those who had been involved in the clandestine domestic activities.

One official, who was directly involved in the initial C.I.A. inquiry last year into the alleged domestic spying, said that Mr. Schlesinger and his associates were unable to learn what Mr. Nixon knew, if anything.

Mr. Colby refused to comment on the domestic spying issue. But one clue to the depth of his feelings emerged during an off-the-record talk he gave Monday night at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

The C.I.A. chief, who has been informed the previous week of the inquiry by The Times, said at the meeting that he had ordered a complete investigation of the agency's domestic activities and had found some improprieties.

But he is known to have added, "I think family skeletons are best left where they are—in the closet."

He then said that the "good thing about all of this was the red flag" was raised by a group of junior employes inside the agency.

It was because of the prodding from below, some sources have reported, that Mr. Colby decided last year to inform the chairmen of the House and Senate Intelligence Oversight Committees of the domestic activities.

Mr. Schlesinger, who became Secretary of Defense after serving less than six months at the C.I.A., similarly refused to discuss the domestic spying activities.

But he was described by an associate as extremely concerned and disturbed by what he discovered at the C.I.A. upon replacing Mr. Helms.

"He found himself in a cesspool," the associate said. "He was having a grenade blowing up in his face every time he turned around."

The Ellsberg Affair

Mr. Schlesinger was at the C.I.A. when the first word of the agency's involvement in the September, 1971, burglary of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist by the White House security force known as the "plumbers" became known. It was Mr. Schlesinger who also discovered and turned over to the Justice Department a series of letters written to Mr. Helms by James W. McCord Jr., one of the original Watergate defendants and a former C.I.A. security official. The letters, which told of White House involvement in the Watergate burglary, had been deposited in an agency office.

The associate said one result of Mr. Schlesinger's inquiries into Watergate and the domestic aspects of the C.I.A. operations was his executive edict ordering a halt to all questionable counterintelligence operations inside the United States.

During his short stay at the C.I.A., Mr. Schlesinger also initiated a 10 per cent employee cutback. Because of his actions, the associate said, security officials at the agency decided to increase the number of his personal bodyguards. It could not be learned whether that action was taken after a threat.

Many past and present C.I.A. men acknowledged that Mr. Schlesinger's reforms were harder to bear because he was an outsider.

Mr. Colby, these men said, while continuing the same basic programs initiated by his predecessor, was viewed by some internal critics as "the saving force" at the agency because as a former high-ranking official himself in the C.I.A.'s clandestine services, he had the respect and power to ensure that the alleged illegal domestic programs would cease.

Some sources also reported that there was widespread paper shredding at the agency shortly after Mr. Schlesinger began to crack down on the C.I.A.'s operations.

Asked about that, however, Government officials said that they could "guarantee" that the domestic intelligence files were still intact.

"There's certainly been no order to destroy them," one official said.

When confronted with the Times's information about the C.I.A.'s domestic operations earlier this week, high-ranking American intelligence officials confirmed its basic accuracy, but cautioned against drawing "unwarranted conclusions."

Espionage Feared

Those officials, who insisted on not being quoted by name, contended that all of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities against American citizens were initiated in the belief that foreign governments and foreign espionage may have been involved.

"Anything that we did was in the context of foreign counterintelligence and it was focused at foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence problems," one official said.

The official also said that the requirement to maintain files on American citizens emanated, in part, from the so-called Huston plan. That plan, named for its author, Tom Charles Huston, a Presidential aide, was a White House project in 1970 calling for the use of such, illegal activities as burglaries and wiretapping to combat antiwar activities and student turmoil that the White House believed was being "fomented"—as the Huston plan stated—by black extremists.

Former President Richard M. Nixon and his top aides have repeatedly said that the proposal, which had been adamantly opposed by J. Edgar Hoover, then the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was never implemented.

Government intelligence officials did not dispute that assertion, but explained that, nonetheless, the C.I.A.'s decision to maintain domestic files on American citizens "obviously got a push at that time."

"Yes, you can say that the C.I.A. contribution to the Huston plan was in the foreign counterintelligence field," one official said.

'A Spooky Way'

"The problem is that it was handled in a very spooky way."

"If you're an agent sitting in Paris and you're asked to find out whether Jane Fonda is being manipulated by foreign intelligence services, you've got to ask yourself who is the real target," the official said. "Is it the foreign intelligence services or Jane Fonda?"

However, this official and others insisted that all domestic C.I.A. operations against American citizens had now ceased and that instructions had been issued to insure that they could not occur again.

A number of well-informed official sources, in attempting to minimize the extent of alleged wrongdoing posed by the C.I.A.'s domestic actions, suggested that the laws were fuzzy in connection with the so-called "gray" area of C.I.A.-F.B.I. operations—that is, when an American citizen is approached inside the United States by a suspected foreign intelligence agent.

The legislation setting up the C.I.A. makes the director "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

One official with close access to Mr. Colby contended at length in an interview yesterday that the C.I.A.'s domestic actions were not illegal because of the agency's legal right to prevent the possible revelation of secrets.

'Gray Areas'

"Look, you do run into gray areas," the official said, "and, unquestionably, some of this fell into the gray area. But the director does have an obligation to guard his sources and methods. You get some foreigner snooping around and you have to keep track."

"Let's suppose as an academic exercise, hypothetically," the official said, "that a foreigner believed to be an intelligence agent goes to a Washington newspaper office to see a reporter. What do you [the C.I.A.] do? Because it's a Washington newspaper office and a reporter, do you scratch that from the C.I.A.'s record? "Sure, the C.I.A. was following the guy, but he wasn't an American."

A number of other intelligence experts, told of that example, described it as a violation of the 1947 statute and a clear example of an activity, even if involving a foreigner, from which the C.I.A. is barred.

Professor Harry Howe Ransom of the University of Virginia, considered a leading expert on the C.I.A. and its legal and Congressional authority, said in a telephone interview that in his opinion the 1947 statute in-

cluded "a clear prohibition against any internal security functions under any circumstances."

Professor Ransom said that his research of the Congressional debate at the time the C.I.A. was set up makes clear that Congress expressed concern over any police state tactics and intended to avoid the possibility. Professor Ransom quoted one member as having said during floor debate, "We don't want a Gestapo."

Similar reservations about the C.I.A.'s role in domestic affairs were articulated by Mr. Colby during his confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September, 1973.

Asked by Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, about the "gray" area of the 1947 legislation, Mr. Colby disavowed it, saying:

"My interpretation of that particular provision is that it gives me a charge but does not give me authority. It gives me the job of identifying any problem of protecting sources and methods, but in the event I identify one it gives me the responsibility to go to the appropriate authorities with that information and it does not give me any authority to act on my own.

'No Authority'

"So I really see less of a gray area [than Mr. Helms] in that regard. I believe that there is really no authority under that act that can be used."

Beyond his briefings for Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, and Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, the respective chairmen of the Senate and House Intelligence subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees, Mr. Colby apparently had not informed other Ford Administration officials as of yesterday of the C.I.A. problems.

"Counterintelligence!" one high-level Justice Department official exclaimed upon being given some details of the C.I.A.'s domestic operations. "They're not supposed to have any counterintelligence in this country."

"Oh, my God," he said, "oh, my God."

A former high-level F.B.I. official who operated in domestic counterintelligence areas since World War I, expressed astonishment and then anger upon being told of the C.I.A.'s activities.

"We had an agreement with them that they weren't to do anything unless they checked with us," he said. "They double-crossed me all along."

He said he had never been told by his C.I.A. counterintelligence colleagues of any of the alleged domestic operations that took place.

Mr. Huston, now an Indianapolis attorney, said in a telephone conversation yesterday that he had not learned of any clandestine domestic C.I.A. activities while he worked in the White House.

Huston Disagrees

Mr. Huston took vigorous exception to a suggestion by intelligence officials that his proposed White House domestic intelligence plan resulted in increased pressure on the C.I.A. to collect domestic intelligence.

"There was nothing in that program that directed the C.I.A. to do anything in this country," Mr. Huston said. "There was nothing that they could rely on to justify anything like this. The only thing we ever asked them for related to activities outside the United States."

Two months ago, Rolling Stone magazine published a lengthy list of more than a dozen unsolved break-ins and burglaries and suggested that they might be linked to as yet undisclosed C.I.A. or F.B.I. activities.

Senator Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee, who was vice chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, has publicly spoken of mysterious C.I.A. links to Watergate. The White House transcripts of June 23, 1972, show President Nixon saying to H. R. Halde- man, his chief of staff, "Well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things."

The remark, commented upon by many officials during recent interviews, could indicate Presidential knowledge about the C.I.A.'s domestic activities.

The possible Watergate link is but one of many questions posed by the disclosures about the C.I.A. that the Times's sources say they believe can be unraveled only by extensive Congressional hearings.

The C.I.A. domestic activities

during the Nixon Administration were directed, the source said, by James Angleton, who is still in charge of the Counterintelligence Department, the agency's most powerful and mysterious unit.

As head of counterintelligence, Mr. Angleton is in charge of maintaining the C.I.A.'s "sources and methods of intelligence," which means that he and his men must insure that foreign intelligence agents do not penetrate the C.I.A.

The Times's sources, who included men with access to first-hand knowledge of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities, took sharp exception to the official suggestion that the agency's domestic activities were the result of legitimate counterintelligence needs.

"Look, that's how it started," one man said. "They were looking for evidence of foreign involvement in the antiwar movement. But that's not how it ended up. This just grew and mushroomed internally."

"Maybe they began with a check on Fonda," the source said, speaking hypothetically. "But then they began to check on her friends. They'd see her at an antiwar rally and take photographs. I think this was going on even before the Huston plan."

'Highly Coordinated'

"This wasn't a series of isolated events. It was highly coordinated. People were targeted, information was collected on them, and it was all put on [computer] tape, just like the agency does with information about K.G.B. [Soviet] agents.

"Every one of these acts was blatantly illegal."

Another official with access to details of C.I.A. operations said that the illegal activities uncovered by Mr. Schlesinger last year included break-ins and electronic surveillances that had been undertaken during the fifties and sixties.

"During the fifties, this was routine stuff," the official said. "The agency did things that would amaze both of us, but some of this also went on in the late sixties, when the country and atmosphere had changed."

The official suggested that what he called the "Nixon antiwar hysteria" may have been a major factor in the C.I.A.'s decision to begin maintaining domestic files on American citizens.

One public clue about the White House pressure for C.I.A. involvement in the intelligence efforts against antiwar activists came during Mr. Helms' testimony before the Senate Watergate committee in August, 1973.

Mr. Helms told how the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board had once suggested that the agency could "make a contribution" in domestic intelligence operations.

'No Way'

"I pointed out to them very quickly it could not, there was no way," Mr. Helms said. "But this was a matter that kept coming up in the context of feelers: Isn't there somebody else that can take on some of these things if the F.B.I. isn't doing them as well as they should, as there are no other facilities?"

The Times's sources, reflecting the thinking of some of the junior C.I.A. officials who began waving "the red flag" inside the agency, were harshly critical of the leadership of Mr. Helms.

These junior officials are known to believe that the domestic spying on antiwar activists originated as an ostensibly legitimate counterintelligence operation to determine whether the antiwar movement had been penetrated by foreign agents.

In 1969 and 1970, the C.I.A. was asked by the White House to determine whether foreign governments were supplying undercover agents and funds to antiwar radicals and Black Panther groups in the United States. Those studies, conducted by C.I.A. officials who reportedly did not know of the alleged secret domestic intelligence activities, concluded that there was no evidence of foreign support.

"It started as a foreign intelligence operation and it bureaucratically grew," one source said. "That's really the answer."

The source added that Mr. Angleton's counterintelligence department "simply began using the same techniques for foreigners against new targets here."

Along with assembling the

domestic intelligence dossiers, the source said, Mr. Angleton's department began recruiting informants to infiltrate some of the more militant dissident groups.

"They recruited plants, informers and doublers [double agents]," the source said. "They were collecting information and when counterintelligence collects information, you use all of those techniques."

"It was like a little F.B.I. operation."

This source and others knowledgeable about the C.I.A. believe that Mr. Angleton was permitted to continue his domestic operations because of the great power he wielded inside the agency as director of counterintelligence.

It is this group that is charged with investigating allegations against C.I.A. personnel made by foreign agents who defect; in other words, it must determine whether a C.I.A. man named by a defector is, in fact, a double agent.

Victor Marchetti, a former C.I.A. official, said in a book published this year that the "counterintelligence staff operates on the assumption that the agency—as well as other elements of the United States Government—is penetrated by the K.G.B."

"The chief of the C.I.A. staff [Mr. Marchetti did not identify Mr. Angleton] is said to keep a list of the 50 or so key positions in the C.I.A. which are most likely to have been infiltrated by the opposition, and he reportedly keeps the persons in those positions under constant surveillance."

Fear and Awe

Dozens of other former C.I.A. men talked in recent interviews with similar expressions of fear and awe about Mr. Angleton, an accomplished botanist and Yale graduate who once edited a poetry magazine there.

He was repeatedly described

by former C.I.A. officials as an unrelenting cold warrior who was convinced that the Soviet Union was playing a major role in the antiwar activities.

"He honestly has the kind of spook mentality where he can see conspiracies in everything," one former high-level C.I.A. official said. "For example, he's convinced that too many members of the press had ties to the Soviet Union. Anybody who writes anything friendly to the Soviet Union he considers suspect."

Another former official characterized counterintelligence as "an independent power in the C.I.A. Even people in the agency aren't allowed to deal directly with the C.I. [counterintelligence] people."

"Once in it," he said, "you're in it for life."

Most of the domestic surveillance and the collection of domestic intelligence was conducted, the sources said, by one of the most clandestine units in the United States intelligence community, the special operations branch of counterintelligence. It is these men who perform the foreign wiretaps and break-ins authorized by higher intelligence officials.

'Deep Snow Section'

"That's really the deep snow section," one high-level intelligence expert said of the unit, whose liaison with Mr. Helms was conducted by Richard Ober, a long-time counterintelligence official, who has served in New Delhi for the C.I.A.

Despite intensive interviews, little could be learned about the procedures involved in the alleged domestic activities except for the fact that the operation was kept carefully shielded from other units inside the C.I.A.

One former high-level aide who worked closely with Mr. Helms in the executive offices of the agency recalled that Mr. Ober held frequent private meetings with Mr. Helms in the late sixties and early seventies.

"Ober had unique and very confidential access to Helms," the former C.I.A. man said. "I always assumed he was mucking about with Americans who were abroad and then would come back, people like the Black Panthers."

'Nothing I Can Say'

The official said he had learned that Mr. Ober had quickly assembled "a large staff of people who acquired enormous amounts of data, more than I thought was justified."

After the unveiling of the domestic operations by Mr. Schlesinger last year, sources said Mr. Ober was abruptly transferred from the C.I.A. to a staff position with the National Security Council.

"They didn't fire him," one well-informed source said, "but they didn't want him around. The C.I.A. had to get rid of him, he was too embarrassing, too hot."

The source added that Mr. Ober had vehemently defended his actions as justified by national security.

A Government intelligence official, subsequently asked about Mr. Ober, denied that his transfer to the National Security Council was a rebuke in any way.

Reached by telephone at his office this week, Mr. Ober refused to discuss the issue.

"There's nothing I can say about this," he said.

Mr. Angleton, also reached by telephone this week at his suburban Washington home, denied that his counterintelligence department operated domestically. "We know our jurisdiction," he said.

Mr. Angleton told of a report from a United States agent in Moscow who was relaying information to the C.I.A. on the underground and radical bombings in the United States during the height of the antiwar activity.

"The intelligence was not acquired in the United States," Mr. Angleton declared, "it came from Moscow. Our source there is still active and still productive; the opposition still doesn't know."

Mr. Angleton then described how the C.I.A. had obtained information from Communist sources about the alleged demolition training of black militants by the North Koreans. He also told of recent intelligence efforts involving the K.G.B. and Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

A number of former important F.B.I. domestic intelligence sources took issue with Mr. Angleton's apparent suggestion that the domestic antiwar activity was linked to the Soviet Union.

"There was a lot of stuff on radicals in the United States] that came in from the C.I.A. overseas," one former official recalled, but he said a lot of it was worthless.

Other officials closely involved with United States intelligence expressed amazement and dismay that the head of counterintelligence would make such random suggestions during a telephone conversation with a newsman.

"You know," said one member of Congress who is involved with the monitoring of C.I.A. activities, "that's even a better story than the domestic spying."

The Student Movement

One former C.I.A. official who participated in the 1969 and 1970 White House-directed studies of alleged foreign involvement in the antiwar movement said that Mr. Angleton "undoubtedly believes that foreign agents were behind the student movement, but he doesn't know what he's talking about."

The official also raised a question about the bureaucratic procedures of the C.I.A. under Mr. Helms.

"We dealt with Ober and we dealt with Angleton on these studies, went over them point by point, and Angleton, while not exactly enthusiastic, signed off," the official said.

The official said he could not reconcile Mr. Angleton's decision to permit the studies, which reported finding no evidence of foreign involvement, while mounting an elaborate and secret domestic security operation to root out alleged foreign activities. The results of the studies were forwarded to Henry A. Kissinger, then President Nixon's national security adviser.

A number of former F.B.I. officials said in interviews that the C.I.A.'s decision to mount domestic break-ins, wiretaps and similarly illegal counterintelligence operations undoubtedly reflected, in part, the long-standing mistrust between the two agencies.

In 1970, Mr. Hoover reportedly ordered his bureau to break off all but formal liaison contact with the C.I.A., forcing lower level C.I.A. and F.B.I. officials to make clandestine arrangements to exchange information.

By the late sixties, one former F.B.I. official said, all but token cooperation between the two agencies on counterintelligence and counterespionage had ended.

"The C.I.A. was never satisfied with the F.B.I. and I can't blame them," the former official said. "We did hit-or-miss jobs."

'Cutting Throats'

"We were constantly cutting the throats of the C.I.A. in our dealing with them. If the White House knew about it, they were too afraid of Hoover to do anything about it."

The former aide cited a case in the late sixties in which Mr. Angleton turned to F.B.I. for a domestic investigation because he "believed four or five guys were agents, including two guys still in the agency [C.I.A.] and three or four who had been high-level."

"They were suspected of having dealings with foreign intelligence agents," the former official said.

"We just went through the motions on our investigation. It was just a brushoff."

Before Mr. Hoover's decision to cut off the working relationship, the former official added, the F.B.I.—as the agency responsible for domestic counterintelligence—would, as a matter of policy, conduct a major clandestine inquiry into the past and present C.I.A. men.

Despite Mr. Hoover's provocative actions, the former F.B.I. man said, the C.I.A. still was not justified in taking domestic action.

"If they did any surreptitious bag jobs [break-ins], he said, "they'd better not have told me about it."

(2)

MR. CALLAHAN

12-24-74

T. J. JENKINS

NEW YORK TIMES REPORT ON
CIA OPERATIONS IN DOMESTIC FIELD

[Redacted]

b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

ACTION:

Submitted for information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/9/94 BY SP7 CJC/ACM
C.A. #PP-1826
per CIA Review
of 6/2/94

TJJ:pmd
(4)

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Wannall

ENCLOSURE

62-80757-5016

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. J. W. Marshall
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. B. P. Fisher

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *Wannall*

DATE: 1/3/75

FROM : Mr. H. A. Boynton, Jr. *HAB*

- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

- b7C
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Rec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

b1
b3

(S) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY 2603200/CP/DS/mms
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 8/3/2031

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

b1
b3

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

TO: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

Teletypes from CIA in similar cases will be addressed as follows:

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTENTION: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION/CI-1
(MR. BRANIGAN) OR CI-2 [Redacted]

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

LFS:tdp/jcp
(8)

Handwritten: Branigan
REC-71
EX 104

Handwritten: 62 80750 5017

JAN 13 1975
CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

b7C

JAN 24 1975

Handwritten: Post
FINE

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Wannall

Re:

[Redacted]

(S)

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1
b3

ACTION:

For information of the Communications Section,
Files and Communications Division, and Sections CI-1 and
CI-2 of the Intelligence Division.

LFS

TW

JW 7/70

Jm

wrl

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Wannall

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD _____
- Dep. AD _____
- Asst. Dir. _____
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Public. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 1/6/75

FROM : A. B. Fulton *AD/ASST C.I.A.*

- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - [Redacted]

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b3

The 1/3/75 edition of The Washington Post contained an article entitled "Former CIA-FBI Liaison Man Sees Operational 'Gray Areas'" (attached) which contains results of interview of former SA Sam J. Papich, who, prior to his retirement in 1970, handled liaison between the FBI and CIA for approximately 18 years.

Papich cited what he called "gray areas" where the CIA crossed into domestic operations for what he said were legitimate reasons. He blamed confusion about CIA's role on what he called a statute (the National Security Act of 1947 which established the CIA) that "goes from the vague to the ridiculous."

COMMENT: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b2
b3

The article then goes on to say that in a typical year, according to Papich, some 2000 Americans are approached by Soviet Agents in this country or overseas in an attempt to convert them into spies.

COMMENT: [Redacted]

b2

[Redacted]

Attachments (3)

FJC:ims

Classified by 4375
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

b7C

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED - OVER

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

58 FEB 1975

62-80750

DATE: 9/8/2006
CLASSIFIED BY 603234-10/05/09/1
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/8/2031

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from A. B. Fulton to Mr. W. R. Wannall

b3

Re: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b2

In this article, Papich points out that hundreds of defectors come to this country from Soviet countries and there is a procedure for processing them involving the CIA.

(S)

[REDACTED]

According to the article, Papich said the CIA cultivated foreigners living in this country to obtain information on their homelands.

b1

b3

(S)

[REDACTED]

(A) According to Papich, CIA handled its own security and this was another area where the Agency became involved in checking the backgrounds of American citizens. In policing its own employees, Papich said the CIA would require wiretaps if it had found a possible Soviet spy within the Agency.

(S)

[REDACTED]

CONTINUED - OVER

-2-
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from A. B. Fulton to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b1
b3

According to the article, Papich stated that often delays occurred when authority for operations was being transferred from CIA to the FBI.

COMMENT: [redacted]

[redacted]

b3

The article also stated the CIA is accused of interfering with U.S. domestic activity when it seeks help for its overseas work from universities.

(S) [redacted]

The article related that Papich stated the CIA often helped the FBI keep an eye on Soviets visiting the United States or employed here.

b1
b3

(S) [redacted]

~~3-
SECRET~~

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from A. B. Fulton to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re:

b3

(S)

b1
b3

ACTION:

None. For information.

WRW/TFL

JWR
[Signature]

K

-4-
~~SECRET~~

Former CIA-FBI Liaison Man Sees Operational 'Gray Areas'

By Ronald Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The former liaison man between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation said yesterday that the statutory restriction against CIA domestic activity is impossible to follow.

Sam Papich, who was the FBI's liaison man with the CIA for 18 years until he retired in 1970, cited what he called "gray areas" where the CIA has crossed into domestic operations for what he said were legitimate reasons.

Papich, who said he dealt with these crossovers on a daily basis, blamed confusion about the CIA's role on what he called a statute that "goes from the vague to the ridiculous."

A former CIA attorney acknowledged yesterday that the 1947 statute establishing the CIA has "gray areas," but he said many examples of CIA domestic activity cited over the years have been both legal and proper.

For example, he said, a CIA training program for local police departments was widely thought to have been aimed at antiwar activists and therefore represented an incursion into the domestic field.

In fact, said the former CIA official who said he approved the program at the time, its purpose was to share with local police several devices and methods the CIA had developed in its own work.


One device, he said, aids in the apprehension of murderers by detecting whether a suspect has held a piece of metal in the past 24 hours.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi D-Mich., who heads a congressional committee with oversight powers over the CIA, suggested when he was informed of the program that it should have been carried out by the FBI, the former CIA attorney said. But he said the program did not violate the CIA charter.

The charter says the CIA shall have "no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." But it also says the CIA director is "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." And it charges the agency with performing "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Agency may from time to time direct."

Papich said areas where the CIA became involved in do-

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. WRW/AM
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____



b7C

- The Washington Post A-6
- Washington Star-News _____
- Daily News (New York) _____
- The New York Times _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
- The National Observer _____
- The Los Angeles Times _____

Date 1-3-75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/11/2014 BY 60322ud/LM/DG/may

62-80750-5018

domestic matters included dealing with Americans approached by Soviet agents, Soviet visitors and spies in the United States, and Americans who work for the CIA or apply for jobs there.

In these and other areas, Papich said, the CIA and FBI functions appeared to overlap, and informal guidelines had been developed for handling the situations.

In a typical year, Papich said, some 2,000 Americans are approached by Soviet agents, either in this country or overseas in an attempt to convert them into spies.

"If you get a report that Mollie Brown while she was in Moscow was approached, what do you do? Nine times out of 10 she's a good girl, but maybe naive, and nothing happened." But background checks will be made on her, and a file could be opened at CIA headquarters because the CIA originally discovered that she had been contacted, Papich said.

"Hundreds of defectors come to this country from Soviet countries," said Papich, who heads a New Mexico organized crime commission. "There was a procedure for processing them. Who is going to be responsible for settling them? Many are neurotic, misfits — they have to be wet-nursed. Is he for real? The CIA had to stay on top of them. If they had problems, they had to get them straightened out."

In addition, Papich said, the CIA cultivated foreigners living in this country to obtain information on their homelands.

"The CIA would handle Cuban nationals here to get information on Soviet missiles in Cuba," he said. Such work might also be handled by the FBI with CIA assistance.

"Maybe he [the FBI agent handling a case] has never been abroad. It would only be logical to bring in a CIA expert," he said.

The CIA handled its own security, Papich said, and this is another area where the agency becomes involved in checking the backgrounds of American citizens.

"They had their own offices of security," he said. "What they did to protect them we never got involved in, except when it appeared an employee had violated the law." In policing its own employees, Papich said, the CIA would require wiretaps if it had found a possible Soviet spy within the agency.

Often, Papich said, delays occurred when authority for a particular operation was being

transferred from the CIA to the FBI.

"A Soviet spy in France out of the blue travels to the U.S.," he said. "You don't just pick up the phone and tell him over. It might take a week to three months. The FBI people have to become acclimated (to the subject). Let's say the CIA knows a double agent who is a source. You don't automatically turn him over to the FBI. He might not want to deal with the FBI. You might get them (the CIA) operating for six months in the U.S."

Papich said the CIA is accused of interfering in U.S. domestic activities when it seeks help for overseas work from universities. "A fellow goes to XYZ university and contacts a professor to write an article that will be planted overseas," he said. "It never runs smoothly. We (the United States) weren't cut out for it."

In addition, he said, the CIA often helped the FBI to keep an eye on Soviets visiting the United States or employed here.

"They always had one or two KGB (Soviet intelligence) agents in the group," he said. "The CIA would have an interest. They had the benefit of experience overseas."

While allowing that some abuses might have occurred, Papich said, "My feeling is some of the surveillances were misunderstood." He added, "We need time out to assess this thing in a cool, rational way to determine if the statute should be changed in light of what we want from an intelligence agency."

ar and you have a
 some great climax
 w atomic bombs at
 ets or something of
 to plan, and all at
 ou have no control,
 at the proper time.
 ure, and, of course,
 went to ask you is
 on, words empower-
 and time of some
 ing else?
 ay doubt about my
 ment of manpower
 "work or fight bill."

anted to know.
 question of power
 osition and that of
 ectly, it is that the
 Congress will serve
 military matters in
 necessity arises for

to have not only
 That is a military
 apacity to produce
 weapons are forged.
 n being in time of

t can have the most
 en to run it, it will
 lish to take on the
 and an ineffective
 ganization whereby
 too, your military
 length. That is my

quickly and most
 led in this bill?
 nce between victory
 mean the difference

mous Confederate
 ons who "get there
 a in the same way,
 test resources, and

agues might differ
 ght to differ on the
 ne matter of detail

The bill provides on page 20, I think, for this Central Intelligence Agency. I notice there that there is no statement of any functions which the Central Intelligence Agency will perform. Am I correct in assuming that that is in line with the general policy of the bill, that those functions will be set forth by Executive order?

Secretary PATTERSON. I believe so.

Mr. JENKINS. Now, does that mean that there will be eliminated the existing intelligence agencies of the Army and the Navy, as they are now functioning?

Secretary PATTERSON. No.

Mr. JENKINS. They will function specifically for their own forces, is that correct?

Secretary PATTERSON. Yes, sir, and feed into the Central Intelligence group.

Mr. JENKINS. I was going to raise that question.

Secretary PATTERSON. The functions are stated here by reference to the existing functions under Executive Order.

Mr. JENKINS. Could we have a copy of that Executive order, for the information of the committee?

Secretary PATTERSON. Yes, sir; I will get it to you today.

(The Executive order is as follows:)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE

COORDINATION OF FEDERAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

THE WHITE HOUSE,
 Washington, January 22, 1946.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF WAR, and THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. I hereby designate you, together with another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.

2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.

3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments.

b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 9/8/06 BY 60322 uclp/06
 ma

4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be exercised under this directive.

5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of your Departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence Authority shall be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of said intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence in connection with planning functions.

6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence.

7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.

8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential directives, other departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence information relating to the national security as is in their possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence may from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the National Intelligence Authority.

9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives.

10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Mr. JENKINS. Now, how is it proposed, Mr. Patterson, that the information and material gathered by the respective intelligence agencies of the components of the Armed Forces will get to the Central Intelligence agency?

Secretary PATTERSON. Just as they do now. The Intelligence Service of the Army and the Intelligence Service of the Navy and the State Department are represented on a board in the office of the Central Intelligence group, and they provide procedures whereby the Army and the Navy and the State Department people feed in their material to the Director of Central Intelligence. I believe that is working very well.

Mr. JENKINS. It seems to me that the condition of our armed forces in some considerable detail, and the policies of the State Department, that is, the day-to-day policies, have a very considerable effect one upon the other or should have, and I was going to raise the question as to how well the various components of the Central Intelligence agency as it now exists have functioned in that fashion. In other words, what do we get there as to the day-to-day policies of the State Department and so on?

Secretary PATTERSON. I believe that they are functioning effectively. The National Intelligence Authority has meetings about once a month with the Director of the Central Intelligence group, who serves as their executive. I believe the work is going along well.

Mr. JENKINS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary. In what defense area is Baltimore?

Secretary PATTERSON. It is in what we call the Second Army now. It used to be the Third Service Command, and now it is in the Second Army, Headquarters of the Second Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is a wire that went out to all of the installation commanders under that command:

Until further orders to cross picket lines in ment with local labor

That is back in during the war. If economy if those in livery of supplies consent of union in

Secretary PATTERSON. the intent of the matter should be and there may ha main, the negotiat

The CHAIRMAN. we are preparing before making the

Secretary PATTERSON. you had to have in You speak of nego something like tha tions, that is differ

The CHAIRMAN. 42 days while you and the Navy?

Secretary PATTERSON. them. If we need

The CHAIRMAN. greater economy c when the Army or

Secretary PATTERSON. by telephone or by time you need it, I collisions with civi

The CHAIRMAN. that you advocate

Secretary PATTERSON. have a free ride an going to contribut

The CHAIRMAN. fact that ships the convoys going out over there. Now, ity, or centralizati go along with nego else, when you act

If you have not ahead.

Secretary PATTERSON. given. If there is they have got to

The CHAIRMAN. emergency; is the Secretary PATTERSON.

cies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: *And provided further*, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

Inspection of intelligence of other departments

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: *Provided, however*, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

Termination of National Intelligence Authority; transfer of personnel, property, records, and unexpended funds

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) of this section has taken office—

(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and

(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency. July 26, 1947, c. 343, Title I, § 102, 61 Stat. 497; Oct. 15, 1949, c. 695, § 4, 63 Stat. 880.

Hist

1949 Amendment. Subsec. (a) amended by Act Oct. 15, 1949, cited to text, to increase Director's compensation from \$10,000 to \$16,000 per annum.

Effective Date of 1949 Amendment. The increased compensation provided by Act Oct. 15, 1949, cited to text, to effect on the first day of the first period which began after Oct. 15, 1949, the provisions of section 9 of said Act Oct. 15, 1949, which is set out as a note under section 2 of Title 5, Executive 1.

§ 403a. Same; definitions

When used in sections 403b-

(a) "Agency" means the Ce

(b) "Director" means the D

(c) "Government agency" means mission, council, independent partly owned by the United States, the United States, board, bureau, authority, administration, or other branch of the Government; and

(d) "Continental United States" means the District of Columbia. June 20, 1949, c. 227, § 1.

Hist

Codification. Section was not enacted as a part of the National Security Act of 1947 part of which comprises chapter.

Short Title. Congress in enacting sections 403a-403j of this title provided section 12 of Act June 20, 1949, that said sections should be popularly known as the "Central Intelligence Agency of 1949".

Separability Clause. Section 11 of Act June 20, 1949, cited to text, provides: "If any provision of this Act [section 11] is held to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall remain in effect."

§ 403b. Same; seal of office

The Director of Central Intelligence shall have a seal to be made for the Central Intelligence Agency. The design of the seal shall be approved by the President. June 20, 1949, c. 227, § 1.

H

Codification. Section was not enacted as a part of the National Security Act of 1947 part of which comprises the

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Jenkins

DATE: 1/7/75

FROM : J. J. McDermott

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] LOS ANGELES TIMES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
INTERVIEW WITH DIRECTOR 1/6/75

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Sys. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/1/06 BY 603224/KC/DG/ma

In accordance with previous arrangements between [REDACTED] and the Director [REDACTED] interviewed Mr. Kelley at 3 p.m. yesterday and the introductions were handled by Inspector Murphy of my front office. [REDACTED] who handles the Justice Department for the "Los Angeles Times," was also to accompany [REDACTED] but at the last minute, due to illness, [REDACTED] "Los Angeles Times" reporter who covers the White House, accompanied [REDACTED]

b7C

[REDACTED] stated that within the past two months he has conducted an extensive interview with Governor Wallace concerning the shooting of Wallace by Arthur Bremer. [REDACTED] stated that Wallace again brought up a number of questions concerning Bremer's background, motivation, activities, etc. Governor Wallace could not furnish any definite facts to indicate that Bremer was part of a conspiracy but apparently he still harbors this idea. [REDACTED] stated that he did not believe Wallace's contention and feels that Bremer acted alone; however, because of Wallace's continued contention to the contrary and the fact that Wallace will undoubtedly be running for President, he feels that these allegations will continue to be raised and [REDACTED] would like to be able to record the FBI's denial and/or explanation discounting Wallace's many allegations.

Accordingly [REDACTED] stated he would like to review FBI files on the attempted assassination so that he could accurately report the results of the FBI's investigation which would disclaim the many Wallace allegations. The Director informed [REDACTED] that such a request would have to be formally made under the Freedom of Information Act, particularly the new bill which is to be implemented February 19, 1975. [REDACTED] stated he would formally submit a request outlining all of Wallace's current allegations and specifically asking for material from FBI files bearing on such allegations. However, he also stated he

- 1 - Mr. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. Gebhardt

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Heim

JMM:asg

38 (5) JAN 12 1975

62-80750-

NOT RECORDED

191 JAN 15 1975

(CONTINUED-OVER)

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-80750-191

McDermott to Jenkins memorandum

Re: [redacted]


would like to present to Mr. Kelley the option of responding directly to the questions from information in FBI files without resorting to the procedures under the Freedom of Information Act if the Bureau feels a public response to such questions would be helpful. Mr. Kelley stated that he would certainly consider this request when he received formally from [redacted] his communication outlining the specific questions based upon the Wallace allegations.

b7C
In addition to a general discussion of Governor Wallace and related topics the Director was asked by [redacted] for comments concerning the current CIA controversy with respect to its alleged infringement on the FBI's jurisdiction in domestic security matters. The Director stated he could not get into a discussion on this topic in view of the President's Blue Ribbon Panel and Congressional inquiries which are about to begin, but in response to a specific question from [redacted] did state that the FBI was not currently conducting an inquiry concerning the CIA alleged involvement in domestic security matters.

The interview lasted approximately one and one-half hours and both Messrs [redacted] were very amiable during the interview and expressed appreciation for the Director taking the time with them.

RECOMMENDATION

For information.

Two handwritten signatures in black ink, one above the other, located in the lower right quadrant of the page.Handwritten initials, possibly 'JV', in black ink, located in the lower left quadrant of the page.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. F. Putman
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep. AD Adm.
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin.
- Comp. Syst.
- Ext. Affairs
- Files & Com.
- Gen. Inv.
- Ident.
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Plan. & Eval.
- Spec. Inv.
- Training
- Legal Coun.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director's Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *WRW*

DATE: 1/9/75

- 1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
- 1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
- 1 - [Redacted]

FROM : F. S. Putman *FP/SSM*

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY *60322/4c/4/OG/mas*
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) *9/1/2031*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Memorandum classified "Secret" as it concerns [Redacted]

b3

[Large Redacted Block]

b1
b3

[Redacted Block]

[Redacted Block]

[Redacted Block]

Enclosure

~~ENCLOSURE~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 2111V
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

VHN:jmr
(10)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

233

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep. AD Adm.
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin.
- Comp. Syst.
- Ext. Affairs
- Files & Com.
- Gen. Inv.
- Ident.
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Plan. & Eval.
- Spec. Inv.
- Training
- Legal Coun.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

Cuban Exiles Recall Domestic Spying and Picketing for C.I.A.

REX-73

By **GEORGE VOLK**
Special to The New York Times

MIAMI, Jan. 3—Cuban exiles, paid and directed by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency, engaged over a 10-year period in a series of activities that, while related to foreign affairs, had clearly a domestic character, according to Cuban participants in these actions.

In Miami and elsewhere in the United States, a large group of exiles paid by the C.I.A. were said to have watched over and compiled secret files on other Cubans and on Americans who associated with persons under surveillance.

Other refugees, while being paid by C.I.A. agents, picketed foreign consulates in New York and Miami, and waged a boycott of products manufactured by countries that traded with the government of Premier Fidel Castro, the Cuban informants said. These activities reportedly took place roughly from 1960 to 1970.

Such operations reportedly directed by the intelligence agency were reportedly carried out with the knowledge and consent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under an inter-agency agreement worked out in the wake of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. They were conducted in an effort to deal with a special circumstance and ~~apparently~~ were unrelated to the kind of domestic C.I.A. operations against dissidents that have recently come to light.

A spokesman for the F.B.I. said the agency would have no comment on the allegations. A spokesman for the C.I.A. said the agency would not comment at this time on any reports concerning its alleged activities.

Disillusionment at End

The informants said that by 1972 central intelligence operatives severed their last connections with the Cubans, disillusioned by their protégés, some of whom they suspected of being engaged in international drug trafficking.

In the late 1960's, at the height of vigilance operations reportedly supported by the agency in south Florida and

several key American cities—among them New York, San Juan, and Los Angeles—about 150 informants were said to be on the payroll of a special Cuban "counterintelligence" office here.

The office, originally in Miami, changed its headquarters several times and was based in Coral Gables, Fort Lauderdale and Pompano Beach.

Cuban informants, who reportedly began their work by conducting intelligence debriefing of refugees arriving in Miami and later switched to watching other refugees living here, were said to have operated surreptitiously. Exiles who picketed foreign consulates and organized boycotts of foreign products did so openly.

Newsletters of several exile organizations, whose members say were supported by the C.I.A., printed during 1964 pictures of pickets in front of consulates of Britain, Mexico and Spain in Miami and New York.

A mysterious exile, who died here a year ago at the age of 61, was in charge of the Cuban counterintelligence office. His former associates say the exile, José Joaquín Sangenis Perdomo, was following orders of his C.I.A. "case officer," whose code name they said was Felix.

Assist With Police

In 1964 alone, Cuban refugees, who said they were told by their C.I.A. contacts what to do and even what to say on their signs, picketed the British consulate in Miami, protesting the sale of 400 English buses to Cuba; started a boycott of Shell gasoline and Scotch whisky and later a boycott of all British, French and Spanish products; picketed the French consulate in Miami protesting the sale of French locomotives and trucks to Cuba; picketed the Mexican consulate in Miami, picketed for five consecutive days the British consulate in Miami and later the home of the British consul in Coral Gables, entering his private

garden, picketed the Mexican consulate in New York; and picketed a Japanese ship in the Port of Miami, attempting to prevent the unloading of her cargo.

"There was never a problem," one participant said. "We were detained once or twice, but each time someone would call the Miami police and we would be immediately released with no charges. This even happened when we got into the garden of the British consul who called the police."

The reported domestic operation of Mr. Sangenis was an outgrowth of his still mysterious "Operation 40," an adjunct to the Bay of Pigs invasion. Created in 1960, Operation 40 was described by Cubans as a C.I.A.-devised plan to set up a parent intelligence agency in Cuba after the expected overthrow of the Castro Government by Bay of Pigs invasion.

\$2-Million Budget Cited

Following the defeat of the Bay of Pigs brigade in April 1961, Mr. Sangenis, his former friends say, expanded his activities here with "full backing of the C.I.A."

July 1961

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-84664

Perdomo
105-84664
(Perdomo)

- The Washington Post
- Washington Star-News
- Daily News (New York)
- The New York Times
- The Wall Street Journal
- The National Observer
- The Los Angeles Times

Date **JAN 4 1975**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/12/06 BY 60322 udr/pd

JAN 17 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-80750-5019

"It began like a counterintelligence operation," said one Cuban with close ties to other Federal agencies and who in 1962 was asked but did not join the Sangenis group. "But it soon became domestic work."

ing plain and simple. As far as I know they haven't discovered a single Castro spy here, but they sure made many detailed reports, including gossip, about personal lives of all prominent Cubans, if anything usurping the functions of the F.B.I."

Other sources said that, with the exception of the chiefs of the Sangenis operation, salaries of informants were low, ranging from \$100 to \$350 a month.

These sources estimated that by the mid-1960's, when the operation was in full swing, it had a budget of about \$2-million a year, not counting logistics support, which included private aircraft in which top members of the group were traveling in the United States and between south Florida and several American countries.

"It was like a small secret army," one Cuban recalled, "and some of its members were making personal threats and demanding personal favors."

The winding down of the operation began in the late 1960's as a result, according to some exiles, of an accidental crash in southern California of a small plane piloted by one of Mr. Sangenis's men. In the wreck, the police reported by found several kilos of cocaine and heroin.

Soon afterward, another Cuban who was part of the group

and who was accused by the Federal authorities of being a large cocaine smuggler, was killed in a gun battle with the Miami police.

By 1970, the Sangenis operation was reportedly reduced to a few men who kept updating the existing files. Mr. Sangenis remained in good graces with the C.I.A. until his retirement in 1972 when, his friends say he was awarded a secret merit medal by the agency.

While many Cubans here believe that with the closing of the Sangenis office the files on the persons under surveillance were sent to Washington several informants assert that a copy of the files was made and is still in the area and that it is being used for blackmail purposes.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep. AD
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin.
- Comp. Syst.
- Ext. Affairs
- Files & Com.
- Gen. Inv.
- Ident.
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Plan. & Eval.
- Spec. Inv.
- Training
- Legal Coun.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

TO : MR. JENKINS

DATE: 1-7-75

FROM : J. J. MC DERMOTT *JJM*

SUBJECT: ~~X~~ PRESS INQUIRIES CONCERNING
INVESTIGATION OF CIA

At this morning's briefing in the Director's Office it was noted that Deputy Attorney General Silberman on 1-6-75 indicated he desired any press inquiries concerning an investigation by the Department of Justice of CIA to be answered with a "No Comment."

Today I discussed with Bob Havel of the Public Information Office of the Department the fact that Director Kelley had already specifically denied that the FBI was conducting any investigation of CIA. I suggested to Havel that the use of "No Comment" invites the press to draw an inference that we may well be investigating CIA. Havel agreed and stated that he took this matter up with Silberman on the evening of 1-6-75 and Silberman was apparently agreeable to our responding to inquiries as follows: *JJM*

"The FBI is not investigating CIA and we have not received any requests to do so."

I told Havel that we would be referring any inquiries concerning Departmental activities to his office for handling. He agreed to this arrangement.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

JJMcd:crt
(5) *JJM*

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Jenkins
- 1 - Mr. Adams

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/1/2006 BY 60322u/lp/dz/mz

REC 68

EX-101

62-80750-5020
5 JAN 15 1975

CORRESPONDENCE
JJM

K

231
JAN 14 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Jenkins

FROM : J. J. McDermott

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

REPORTER
NBC EVENING NEWS
NEW YORK CITY
INFORMATION CONCERNING [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 1/15/75

DATE: 9/7/2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/LP/DG/mas
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/7/2031

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. DeLoach
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Bishop
- Mr. Casper
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. Felt
- Mr. Gale
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Miss Holmes
- Miss Gandy
- Comp. Syst.
- Ext. Affairs
- Files & Com.
- Gen. Inv.
- Ident.
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Plan. & Eval.
- Spec. Inv.
- Training
- Legal Coun.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[REDACTED] a reporter for NBC Evening News, New York City, phone [REDACTED] contacted my office at 5 p.m. on 1/14/75 and advised that she would like a comment concerning the following information by 6 p.m. that evening. She stated that [REDACTED] had interviewed [REDACTED] on that date [REDACTED] had furnished the following information:

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

5 JAN 21 1975

- 1 - Mr. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Heim
- 1 - [REDACTED]

(CONTINUED-OVER)

NOT RECORDED
70 JAN 24 1975

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b7C

84 JAN 30 1975

asg (5)

b7C

b7C

b1
b3

b3
b7D

b1
b3

b7C

b7C

McDermott to Jenkins memorandum

Re: [redacted]
NBC Evening News

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3
b7C
b7D

[redacted] was advised that in regard to [redacted]
[redacted] the Bureau, at the request of the Special Prosecutor's
Office, conducted an investigation and she was further advised to contact
the Special Prosecutor's Office for any additional information. She was
also advised that the Bureau would make no comment as to [redacted]
allegations that [redacted]
[redacted]

RECOMMENDATION

For information.

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten initials]

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Jenkins

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 1/9/75

FROM : H.A. Boynton, Jr. *HB*

b7C

- 1 - Mr. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Fulton
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

SUBJECT: ~~RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)~~

b3

Classified "~~Secret~~"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SYNOPSIS:

[Large redacted area]

b1
b3

ACTION:

For information.

REC-31

JAN 17 1975

5021

5

b7C

Enclosure
LFS:tdp (9)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 3764
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DATE: 9/1/2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60322C/4P/DG/mjs
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(C) 9/1/2006

JAN 23 1975

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~
DATE 1/17/75

Assoc. Dir. _____
 Dep. AD Adm. _____
 Dep. AD Inv. _____
 Asst. Dir.:

- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *Wannall*

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOC*

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
REQUEST FOR BUREAU SPEAKER

(S) On 1/17/75 [redacted] telephonically inquired if Mr. William O. Cregar, Section Chief, CI-2 Section, Intelligence Division, and the Bureau's alternate member on the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB), could appear before CIA's [redacted] to speak to approximately 30 Central Intelligence Officers during the morning of 2/21/75 between the hours of 11:00 and 12 Noon.

b1
b3

The lecture would be confined to a presentation of the structure of the Bureau, its jurisdiction in the foreign intelligence field, as well as the Bureau's participation on USIB. This type of presentation has been given by Mr. Cregar before [redacted] of CIA on numerous occasions and it has proven useful in that it provides the opportunity to explain the Bureau's role in the field of foreign intelligence and clarifies some misconceptions CIA personnel have regarding the Bureau's jurisdiction.

b3

ACTION:

If approved, Mr. Cregar will handle the lecture and so advise [redacted] telephonically.

DATE [redacted]
 CLASSIFIED BY 9111/2006 60322uc/LP/06/PAAS
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/11/2031

WOC:ebc
(5) *ebc*

TWL
HB

- 1 - External Affairs Division
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Cregar

Jan
 b7C
 REC-38

wru
will be approved
Jan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
 EX 104

62-80750-522

JAN 21 1975

~~SECRET~~

57 FEB 2 1975
233

JAN 31 1975

POSTED
EX-104

CORRESPONDENCE
HRS. REC. UNIT

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/14/75

FROM :

[Redacted]

SUBJECT:

RELATIONS WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Per CIA 018207

(C) per CIA 018207

EXP. PROC. [unclear]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Instant letter classified Confidential

b1
b3

DATE: 8/31/2006
CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/LP/DG/mz
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(4C) 8/31/2031

D b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

4

Bureau

(1 - Foreign Liaison Unit)

(1 - [Redacted] Info) - sent by AS 1/26/75.

[Redacted]

rws:jn
(5)

(C) per CIA 018207
(C) per CIA RAB/dep 018207

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF
DATE

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY Per CIA 018207
REASON FOR EXTENSION REC-53
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 1-14-95
12-8-80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

62-80750-5023

JAN 17 1975

Classified by 1259
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

5-4-78
JSP/amb

FIVE
[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED BY [Signature]
ON 8/31/2006



233
31 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Date of Mail 1/16/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/31/2006 BY 60322 uc/bp/dg/m

Subject JUNE MAIL C.I.A.

Removed By 79 JAN 19 1976

File Number 62-80750-5023X

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 019 SF CODE

8:00PM NITEL 1/17/75 CJC

84-1973 85-0780 & 5-1479
DECLASSIFIED BY 10480cm/JS/C 5/75

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. A.D. Adm.	_____
Dep. A.D. Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director	57c

TO: DIRECTOR ON 12/23/92
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (62-4236)

TELETYPE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CURRENT INQUIRY INTO CIA DOMESTIC OPERATIONS - INFORMATION CONCERNING.

THIS INSTANT, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT HE RECENTLY

[REDACTED]

IT IS NOTED THAT [REDACTED] WAS COOPERATIVE WITH SPECIAL AGENTS OF THIS OFFICE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN PROVIDING THIS OFFICE WITH ACCESS TO [REDACTED]

62-80750-5024

JAN 23 1975

CLASS. & EXT. BY 10480cm/rpm
REASON-FRIM II, 1.2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 12/7/95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

CLASSIFIED BY 10480cm/JS/C
DATE 5/6/92

[REDACTED] FW/ES

b7C

b3
b7C
b7D

CONFIDENTIAL

62-23532

PAGE TWO

SF 62-4236

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b3
b7C
b7D

THIS IS BEING FURNISHED FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE
BUREAU.

~~ADMINISTRATIVE: CLASSIFIED BY 2340, XGDS, CATEGORY 2,~~

~~INDEFINITE.~~

END

HOLD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/21/76 BY 60322 U/LP/OG/m

62-80750-5025
CHANGED TO
105-274419-8

MAY 6 1975

BC/cnA

88

EX-101

REC-63

62-80750-5026

~~SECRET~~

January 20, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SW

Honorable William E. Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

DATE: 8/31/2006

CLASSIFIED BY: 60322UC/LP/DC/mas

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 8/31/2013

Dear Bill:

(S) I have been advised of the outstanding assistance rendered our Alexandria Office by [redacted]

[redacted] and I want you to know of my sincere appreciation for their efforts.

(S) [redacted] have always responded immediately and graciously to this Bureau's requests for [redacted]

Without their cooperation the FBI would have been unable to meet its commitments and responsibilities in these cases. My colleagues in our Alexandria Office share my gratitude for their invaluable aid.

b1
b3

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

MAILED 6
JAN 20 1975

1 - Alexandria (80-24)

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.: _____
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

Reurlet 1/22/75

NOTE: SAC, Alexandria, recommended letter of appreciation and the SID concurred. Bufiles and AX files contain no information precluding such a letter. Title and salutation per previous correspondence.

JWS:bjy (7)

NCD

~~SECRET~~

JWS

JWS

SAFETY 1975

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SWS
30

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Lab.	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTENTION: SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION)

DATE: 1/22/75

FROM : SAC, ALEXANDRIA

DATE: 9/11/2006

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/1/2021

The Alexandria Office receives [redacted]

[redacted]

in this regard, without the valuable assistance of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the FBI would have been unable to consistently meet its commitments and responsibilities in this important area.

[redacted] have over an extended period of time always responded immediately and graciously to the FBI's requests for [redacted]

[redacted]

In view of the above, it is recommended that a letter over the Director's signature be directed to Mr. WILLIAM E. COLBY, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C., 20505, commending [redacted]

[redacted] for their assistance to the Bureau.

Alexandria indices are negative regarding the above mentioned individuals.

- 2 - Bureau
 - 1 - Alexandria (80-24)
- ECR:pdh
(3)

REC-63 62-80750-5026

None are on

5 JAN 20 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

See Addendum Special Investigative Division

COPIES

b1
b3

Let to Colby
1/30/75
EWS:pdh

ADDENDUM OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Bureau indices contain no information which would preclude honoring the request of the Alexandria Division to direct a letter to the Director of the CIA commending specified personnel of that agency for their assistance to the Bureau. The Special Investigative Division therefore concurs with the aforementioned request made by the Alexandria Division.

WVC



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/1/2006 BY 60322uy LP/DG/maz

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
ST

REC-75
EX-101

62-80750-5027

February 6, 1975

[Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

Your communication of January 29th concerning the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been received and I thank you for bringing your observations to my attention. Since I know your comments will be of interest to the CIA, I am taking the liberty of forwarding copies of your letter, and of my reply, to that Agency.

b7C

Sincerely yours,
C. M. Kelley

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/31/2006 BY 60322 uc/lp/ab

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

MAILED 7
FEB 6 1975
FBI

NOTE: Bufiles disclose prior cordial correspondence with [Redacted] since 1954 when he wrote the Bureau stating he [Redacted]

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

JWS:bjy (4)

JWS


CEM

JWS
JWS

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Assoc. Dir. _____
 Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _____
 Dep.-A.D.-Inv. _____
 Asst. Dir. :
 Admin. _____
 Comp. Syst. _____
 Ext. Affairs _____
 Files & Com. _____
 Gen. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Inspection _____
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____
 Plan. & Eval. _____
 Spec. Inv. _____
 Training _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director's Sec'y _____

JWS/6



January 29, 1975

[Handwritten signature]

Dear Director - Clarence M. Kelley,

Our C.I.A. Agents are America's silent heroes. They protect, the interests of our great country and abroad. If mistakes have been made let, Congress pass laws to correct them. But we must be careful not to wreck, the Agency's efficient intelligence gathering activities.

b7C

Thank you and God Bless you, always with the best of

all.

Sincerely yours,



COPY:dss

EXP. PROC.

FEB 3 1975

#8

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 5/3/2002 BY 60222UC/LP/DG/ma

EX-107

REC-75

62-80750-5027

*ack
 2/10/75
 JWS:bjt*

JWS

January 29, 1975

Dear Director Clarence M. Kelley,
our C.I.A. agents are
America's silent heroes. They protect,
the interests of our great country and
abroad. If mistakes have been made let,
Congress pass laws to correct them.
But we must be careful not to wreck,
the agency's efficient intelligence
gathering activities.
Thank you and God Bless you,
always with the best of all.

Sincerely yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/31/2006 BY 60322 uc/LP/DF/

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Mintz

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm.
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.: _____
- Adm. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Rec. Mgmt. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall ^{WRR}

DATE: 1/17/75

FROM : R. L. Shackelford ^{RUS}

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Shackelford

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

b3

In his testimony before the Vice President's Commission to investigate domestic operations of CIA on 1/13/75, Mr. Colby stated:

"On 8/15/67, the Director established . . . a Unit to look into the possibility of foreign links to American dissident element." He indicated that CIA received a request from Mr. David Ginsburg, Executive Director of the President's Commission on Civil Disorder asking CIA to assist into its inquiry with "information, personnel or resources," and that later CIA activity became part of an interagency program in support of the National Commission, among others. According to Colby, "periodically thereafter, various reports were drawn up on the international aspects of the antiwar, youth and similar movements, and their possible links to American counterparts."

5-27-A
CLASS. & EXT. BY SP-2 TAP/EP
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 1-17-95

EX-110 REC-10 62-80750-5028

JAN 28 1975

[Redacted]

100-446997-84, serials 42 to 44)

(C) [Redacted]

b1
b3

DATE 9/1/2006
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 u/CP/DG/103
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/1/2008

57 FEB 25 1975

FEB 22 1975
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTINUED - OVER
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

100-446997-
100-206675

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

RE:

[Redacted]

b3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(c)

[Redacted]

b1
b3

There is no indication of any coordination between CIA and FBI in the preparation of these documents, although it is possible that some material in the documents could have been originally furnished to the FBI by CIA. *(CW)*

ACTION:

For information.

Curt

pm

Jan

[Signature]

wkw

Ky

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: December 17, 1974

FROM : H. N. BASSETT

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO FBI RECORDS
[REDACTED] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Re my memorandum 10/22/74 recommending we permit review of certain FBI records by [REDACTED] who is conducting study of events (1940-47) which led to establishment of CIA. Intelligence Division recommended that any such material first be reviewed by that Division and Legal Counsel. Director instructed he should see any data critical of other agencies or of Major General William Donovan.

b3

One particular matter in which [REDACTED] has expressed an interest is the results of 7/5/40 meeting between FBI, Army and Navy officials, ordered by President Roosevelt to discuss better coordination of intelligence matters among these agencies.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/31/16 BY 60322 uclp/dg/mo

Our files contain a memorandum for the Director dated 7/5/40 prepared by Mr. E. A. Tamm concerning this meeting which was attended by Tamm and two representatives each of Army and Navy intelligence (62-9798-88). [REDACTED]

b2
b3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NOT RECORDED
28 FEB 11 1975

While there appears to be no reason from a strictly FBI viewpoint not to disclose this material to [REDACTED] in view of the Army's paramount interest it is felt that we should check with that Department to ascertain their position prior to making this item available to [REDACTED]

b3

11/17/75 ARMY DOES NOT OBJECT per
BRIG GEN EUGENE REIDEN, USA (ACSI)

The Intelligence Division, through liaison channels, should check with an appropriate representative of the Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army, to determine whether Army would object to the release of this material to [REDACTED]

b7C

OK

pic

HND

Jan
LEGAL

1 - Messrs. Adams, Mintz, Wannall

RDC:bhg (5)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 911

See memo info made available to
for review 1/23/75

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell.
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *WRW/ku*

DATE: 2/10/75


FROM : Mr. H. A. Boynton, Jr. *B*

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HARRY ROSITZKE
IN "THE WASHINGTON POST"
2/2/75

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

Ocia

"The Washington Post" of Sunday, 2/2/75, contained an article entitled "The Names in CIA Files: Some Belong, Some Don't," by Harry Rositzke, copy of which is attached. Mr. Adams requested that the article be reviewed for any inaccuracies.



b3

9/4/8
UNCLASSIFIED COPY FILED IN

Rositzke's *x107* article appears to be a carefully expressed explanation of the roles of the CIA and the FBI and the manner in which the responsibilities of both agencies relate to each other. He cites valid examples of the types of cases in which the two agencies cooperate with each other. With one minor exception, there do not appear to be any significant inaccuracies in the article. The exception is in the following example of a hypothetical case in which narcotics is involved. Rositzke states, "A CIA penetration of a heroin ring in Istanbul comes up with the name of an American connection. If the connection is in the United States, the action goes to the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration."

REC-53 62-8050-5029

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

LFS:jcp
(6)


DATE 8/31/06 BY 60322 ucl/LP/DG/mj

FEB 14 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

FEB 22 1975

57 FEB 28 1975



b7C

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: ARTICLE BY HARRY ROSITZKE
IN "THE WASHINGTON POST"
2/2/75

This statement is inaccurate in that the action in such matters lies with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and not with the FBI.



b3

ACTION:

For information.

WR

WRW/tal

[Signature]

Jm

Routing Slip

FD-4 (Rev. 3-1-73)

1/16/75

Date

To: Director

Att.: FOREIGN LIAISON UNIT FILE

66-95

Title FBI INTEREST ARTICLES

- SAC _____
- ASAC _____
- Supv. _____
- Agent _____
- SE _____
- SC _____
- CC _____
- Steno _____
- Clerk _____

RE: *Articles from [illegible]*

Rotor #: _____

ACTION DESIRED

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Acknowledge | <input type="checkbox"/> Open Case |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Assign _____ Reassign _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare lead cards |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bring file | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare tickler |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Call me | <input type="checkbox"/> Return assignment card |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Correct | <input type="checkbox"/> Return file |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Deadline _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Search and return |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Deadline passed | <input type="checkbox"/> See me |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Delinquent | <input type="checkbox"/> Serial # _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue | <input type="checkbox"/> Post <input type="checkbox"/> Recharge <input type="checkbox"/> Return |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Expedite | <input type="checkbox"/> Send to _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> File | <input type="checkbox"/> Submit new charge out |
| <input type="checkbox"/> For information | <input type="checkbox"/> Submit report by _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Handle | <input type="checkbox"/> Type |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Initial & return | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Leads need attention | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Return with explanation or notation as to action taken. | |

62-80750500

NOT RECORDED

REC-104 5 JAN 29 1975

Attached hereto is a copy of an article appearing in "The Jerusalem Post," on 1/16/75.

1 - Bureau (Enc. - 1)
1 - Tel Aviv
HR:mcm (2)

ENCLOSURE *My 5 PM*

XXXX
SAC

See reverse side

Office LEGAT, TEL AVIV

☆ GPO : 1973 526-720

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/1/2006 BY 60322uc/DL/v

51 FEB 25 1975

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

CIA admits domestic spying

WASHINGTON (UPI). — William Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, yesterday acknowledged for the first time that the spy agency set up a counter-intelligence unit in 1967, which gathered files on 10,000 American citizens. But he denied that the activity was illegal.

In testimony before a Senate appropriations subcommittee, Colby also disclosed that a longstanding CIA source informed the agency in 1971 and 1972 of an alleged plot

to kill former Vice-President Spiro Agnew and kidnap former CIA Director Richard Helms.

This resulted in the CIA carrying out "physical surveillance in two American cities," after alerting both the FBI and secret service, Colby said.

Colby denied that any such activity could be classified as illegal domestic intelligence gathering, saying that all current CIA activities are within the limits of its charter.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

"The Jerusalem Post"
Jerusalem, Israel

Page 4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/1/06 BY 60224/DE/06

Date: Thursday, 1/16/75

Edition:

Author:

Title:

FBI Interest Articles

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office: Tel Aviv

 Being Investigated

62-80750-5030

ENCLOSURE

F B I

Date 2/11/75

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm.	
Crim. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Insp.	
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

Transmit the following in _____ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, WFO (62-NEW) (RUC)

Central Intelligence Agency

Miscellaneous Information

ATTENTION! LEGAL DIVISION

Personal Secretary to Senator JOHN O. PASTORE (Rhode Island), furnished the following information to SA _____ on 2/7/75.

REC-71 FOREIGN 62-80750-5031

Senator PASTORE, a member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary, received a telephone call at his residence on the evening of 2/4/75, from an individual identifying himself as _____

_____ advised he resides at _____ (telephone area code _____)

He said that during the past eight years _____

FEB 18 1975

- 3- Bureau (1- Legal Division)
- 2- Atlanta
- 1- WFO

RTT: krp
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8/31/2000 BY 60322/440/05/...

Adm. Cont. to Sen Pastore, advised case under investigation

LEGAL COUNSEL

2-14-75

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

WFO 62-NEW

[redacted] said he was motivated in calling Senator PASTORE at his residence because of recent newspaper accounts of Senator PASTORE'S interest in the recently formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, and of the Select Committee's interest in reviewing CIA overseas operations.

Senator PASTORE requests to be advised whether Bureau files contain any information relating to the identity of [redacted] and his bona fides.

Atlanta Division will review its files regarding [redacted] Bureau will recontact Senator PASTORE'S Office as deemed appropriate.

b3
b7C

b3

GOVERNMENT

- 1 - Mr. J.J. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
- 1 - [Redacted]

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

W.R. Wannall

~~SECRET~~

DATE: February 11, 1975 b7C

FROM : W.O. Cregar

- 1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT

[Redacted]

Central Intelligence Agency

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1
b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

REC-46 102-80750-2032

(S) [Redacted]

ACTION:

For information of the Communications Section,
Files and Communications Division, and for Sections CI-1
and CI-2 of the Intelligence Division.

WR:bcw

56 MAR 0 7 1975

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 2/11/2016
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 ucl/ep/06/2012
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/11/2031

[Redacted]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD-Adm. _____
- Dep. AD-Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Training _____
- Telephone Rm. _____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : H. A. Boynton, *HB*

- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[Redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY *E: 9/8/06* 1 - Mr. R. A. Birmingham

CLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) *9/8/2831*

b7C Inv. _____
Telephone Rm. _____

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

CENTRAL

Agency

[Redacted]

62-80750
NOT RECORDED

(S)

[Redacted]

RAB:mam

(9)

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED OVER

4 APR 3 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-511

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b2
b3

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

b1
b3

(S) [redacted]

ACTION:

None. For information. You will be kept advised of progress made in the above regard.

rb *AS* *Tub* *HB* *whd*
rc *Jim* *Chm*

~~SECRET~~

- Mr. J. B. Adams
- Mr. E. W. Walsh
- 1 - Mr. W. L. Reed
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

b7C

BY:

Date: March 14, 1975

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

b3

Attention:

From: Clarence M. Kelley, Director

*Del. CIA by
CIA
3/18/75*

Subject: REGIONAL CONFERENCE REGARDING TERRORIST/EXTREMIST
ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION AND THE XXI OLYMPIAD, 1976

The Federal Bureau of Investigation will hold a regional conference at the New York State Police Academy, Albany, New York, April 15-18, 1975. This regional conference will be held in order to have an exchange of views as to the responsibilities and roles of local, state, Federal and Canadian police agencies during the American Revolution Bicentennial celebration and the XXI Olympiad scheduled to be held in Montreal, Canada, in 1976.

Invitees to this regional conference include local and state law enforcement authorities from the Northeast corridor of the United States, Federal agencies having direct or indirect jurisdictional interest, as well as Canadian representatives of local and provincial law enforcement agencies and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Items to be covered during the conference will include, but are not limited to, the following:

- 1. Roles and Responsibilities - Identify the role, as well as capability, each agency has for the various facets of intelligence, protection and enforcement responsibilities.

62-80750-

NOT RECORDED

192 MAR 28 1975

757-22639

Assoc. Dir. _____
Sp. AD Adm. _____
AD Inv. _____

DJM:med
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/15/2004 BY 60322UC/LP/106/mmd

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

MAR 25 1975

MAR 18 1975

ORIGINAL FILED IN 157-33639-41
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 157-33639-41

WRW/PSP

PERS. REC. UNIT

51 APR 01 1975 TELETYPE UNIT

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Dissemination of Information - Method and limitations of disseminating information between agencies to insure timely information is made available to the proper agency in order for that agency to effect a necessary response.

Threat Assessment - Identity, capabilities and modus operandi of individuals or organizations having both the potential and propensity for violent acts.

Contingency Planning - Necessity of formulating and coordinating contingency plans to insure that there will be an effective response posture to a terrorist/extremist action.

You are cordially invited to send a representative from your Agency to this regional conference. Meals and lodging will be provided.

It is requested that you advise this Bureau no later than April 1, 1975, of the identity of the representative who will attend. You may notify this Bureau by contacting the office of [redacted] FBI Headquarters, Washington, D. C., telephone number [redacted]

NOTE:

See memorandum F. S. Putman to Mr. W. R. Wannall, captioned as above, dated 3/13/75, prepared by DJM:sjg.

b2
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

DATE: 2/25/75

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : H. A. Boynton

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - [Redacted]

1 - [Redacted]

SUBJECT: "WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS" ARTICLE
2/16/75 CONCERNING CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) BY
ARNOLD BEICHMAN

~~SECRET~~

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[Redacted]

The "Washington Star-News" 2/16/75 contained an article entitled "The CIA, It Turns Out, Is a Front for SUBMAG" by Arnold Beichman (copy attached). In the article, the author asserts that he was allegedly involved in setting up an agency within CIA called "SUBMAG" which functions secretly with the official CIA acting as a front for SUBMAG.

Review of the article indicates that it is an attempt at humorous journalism similar to the Art Buchwald type of column. Through Liaison we have confirmed this at CIA and have been advised by responsible CIA officials that the article is "pure fiction."

[Large Redacted Area]

ORIGINAL FILED IN

94-8-24-100

b1
b3

ACTION:

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

NOT RECORDED

15 MAR 25 1975

For information.

~~15 MAR 7 1975~~

Enclosure

LFS:dde dde
(6)

DATE: 9/8/2012
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322uc/lp/ds/mj
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9/8/2031

[Redacted]

b7C

57 MAR 27 1975

February 24, 1975

REC-38

62-80750-5033

Honorable Marie M. Runyon
Assemblywoman
70th District
State Office Building
163 West 125th Street
New York, New York 10027

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/31/2006 BY 60322uc/LP/DG/mj

Dear Miss Runyon:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 12th inviting a spokesman for the FBI to testify at a public hearing on Saturday, March 1st, concerning matters arising out of an article in "The New York Times" alleging domestic operations by the CIA.

Since representatives of the FBI will be appearing before several Congressional committees investigating the same matters, I feel it would be inappropriate for an FBI spokesman to appear before your commission. I trust you will understand the reason for my position and regret I cannot be of assistance to you.

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

- 1 - New York - Enclosure
- 1 - Albany - Enclosure

NOTE: Bufile 100-450911 discloses that correspondent has been active in the past in the "Women Strike for Peace" and other anti-Vietnam War activities. In 1968 she was Director of Development for the "National Conference for New Politics," a coalition of new left and civil rights groups. In 1968 she coordinated a rally supporting Dr. Benjamin Spock and others indicted for conspiracy to violate Selective Service laws. She is a former employee of the American Civil Liberties Union

[Redacted] Bufiles list correspondent as single.

JWS:bjy (5)

MAR 14 1975

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

AUG 20 1975



THE ASSEMBLY
STATE OF NEW YORK
ALBANY

MARIE M. RUNYON
ASSEMBLYWOMAN 70TH DISTRICT
STATE OFFICE BUILDING
163 WEST 125TH STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10027
(212) 678-2323

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. A.D. Ad.	_____
Dep. A.D. Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Regrets - K

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/31/2005 BY 60322 ucl/PG/mrr

Also: 525 W. 125th St.
N.Y., N.Y. 10027
(212) MO 2-8186

February 12, 1975

Mr. Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
506 Old Post Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20535

[Redacted box]

C.I.A. N.Y.

b7C

Dear Mr. Kelley:

I have formed a commission of Morningside Heights citizens to hold a public hearing regarding recent NY TIMES allegations of C.I.A. domestic operations in our community (the Columbia University area) during the late 1960's and early 1970's.

As a member of the NY State Assembly, I hope that the information and viewpoints provided at this hearing will be helpful in drafting state legislation to strengthen the civil liberties of New Yorkers. The results of the hearing will be embodied in a report that will be made available to state legislators, members of Congress, and the general public.

The members of the Morningside commission feel that testimony from the Federal Bureau of Investigation will be important to our deliberations, since the F.B.I. is the agency legally authorized to conduct the types of investigation that the C.I.A. (allegedly) engaged in illegally. (EX-10)

We wish a report on the F.B.I.'s surveillance activities on Morningside Heights during the period of the alleged C.I.A. violations. We also want to hear the F.B.I.'s current views on the types of domestic political surveillance required for national security.

The hearing will be held at Riverside Church (490 Riverside Drive) on Saturday, March 1st, beginning at 1:00 p.m. The members of the citizens' commission hope that a spokesman for the F.B.I. can offer testimony at that time. Please let us know what hour of the afternoon will be most convenient for your spokesman.

Sincerely yours,

Marie M. Runyon
Marie M. Runyon

31
FEB 18 1975

EXP. PROC.

7 FEB 18 1975

*ask
2/24/75
[unclear]*

CORRESPONDENCE

Now They Want It to Be Told

The CIA, It Turns Out, Is a Front for SUBMAG

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell.
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

By Arnold Beichman

The following document, whose authenticity is beyond dispute, is the introduction to a bulky work about a phase of American intelligence activity which I am certain few people know anything about. In making public this document, I can assure readers that I am not violating security. In fact — though this is only my opinion — it might well be that I am assisting national security by having persuaded this journal to allow the document which follows to be read by its large audience, friendly and hostile. In any case, I have persuaded the editors that not only is there no breach of security in their publication of this document but that SUBMAG executives want, for their own reasons, the material to reach the widest possible public, here and abroad.

At the outset in 1945, we were aware that the insuperable obstacle to creation of an efficient intelligence agency was that the American ethos cannot tolerate the idea of secret, behind-the-scenes activity, even though Americans ambivalently know that secret intelligence is essential to national security. While it is exciting to read and see cloak-and-dagger operations in films, television or in books, the American democratic spirit relishes even more exposes of intelligence. (Is it because the thrills about such adventures, vicariously shared, are vaguely immoral?)

Such an ethos, we know, does not exist in France, Britain and most other countries where the people do not expect to know much about secret service agencies. (Indeed, few British or American journalists even

Just

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/31/2016 BY 60322uc/cd/06/mrr

- The Washington Post _____
- Washington Star-News 21
- Daily News (New York) _____
- The New York Times _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
- The National Observer _____
- The Los Angeles Times _____
- Date 2-16-75

ENCLOSURE

62-80750 -

ENCLOSURE (1)

Arnold Beichman is assistant professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and this year a visiting professor at the University of British Columbia.

know who heads MI-5 or MI-6). It is a particular weakness characteristic of our countrymen — particularly among enlightened opinion, whether left or right — which could preclude efficient intelligence activity.

That is why the recommendations of the committee headed by Prof. D. B. and his committee were immensely valuable in the creation of our intelligence community. Their year-long analysis of the problems which would face an American intelligence system drew upon the World War II experiences of the Office of Strategic Services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. No activity in which OSS or the FBI were involved, it was noted by the B Committee, remained unknown for long either to newspapermen or to competitive agencies.

The B Committee consequently recommended that there be organized two intelligence agencies, one to front for the other. Thus it would be possible for critics of "spying" to shoot at something, yet miss the real target.

Specifically, they proposed that the Congress and the president would ap-

prove organization of what later became the Central Intelligence Agency. Meanwhile, the president also would set up within CIA — and then withdraw it from the agency (so as to remain legally within the congressional authorization) — a separated, unidentified operation whose existence would be known to but three persons — the president of the United States, the Operations Director and one other person to be chosen by the Director but to remain unknown even to the president unless the Director died, suffered a disabling illness or was otherwise incapacitated.

The submerged agency — SUBMAG — would be financed from the CIA purse, which would be drawn upon by the president personally. SUBMAG was to be organized along "cell" lines and its participants so buried that they themselves would have only the most limited knowledge of the SUBMAG structure.

I was chosen by the Director as the

third man for the following reasons:

1. As a middle-echelon New York State political leader I had a fair understanding of government.
2. I had a friendship with many politicians in both parties so I could travel regularly without exciting interest.
3. Most importantly, the Director and I had known each other from early prep school days.

The B Committee's second recommendation — and the most crucial — was that a system be created to publicize, without seeming to, the activities of the "front" CIA. Since this recommendation became our major policy directive and still is, it is important to quote it in full:

By publicizing CIA activities wherever feasible, we would be able to protect the activities of the submerged agency. It is important, however, to

See CIA, Page C-4

emphasize that "publicizing" does not mean only favorable publicity. It is even more important to focus blame — whether for moral reasons or operational reasons — on CIA for all conceivable reasons. Occasionally one might disclose some praiseworthy operation, but only occasionally. CIA must operate as an open agency while seeking secrecy. Our committee feels that the CIA director and his close aides should maintain regular contacts with media executives, foreign correspondents, even hold a press conference now and then, appear at a Kiwanis or Rotary luncheon — all, of course, in moderation.

Thus when CIA was organized and our parallel agency set up at the same time, there began a series of contretemps which, experience has proven, have made it possible for U.S. intelligence to function successfully. In short, CIA took certain approved risks (approved, that is, by our Director in consultation with the president) in furtherance of American national interests. These risks were deliberately created so as to keep competing foreign agencies busy planning counter-operations against CIA.

Our first success brought noteworthy embarrassment to the CIA. This affair, which really established SUBMAG, saw the president publicly assume responsibility for the U-2 overflights in 1959. Nothing before this event had worked so well in the interests of SUBMAG.

(I had better explain: By "exposing" the president, one would "embarrass" the CIA because CIA would be blamed for involving the presidential office and prestige in shabby intelligence operations. Of course, it is when such distractions occur, and soul-searching national debate over CIA ensues, that our SUBMAG people can go about their business even more efficiently, undisturbed by the *profanum vulgus*.)

The president realized that assuming responsibility for U-2 would mean senatorial investigations and terrible publicity for CIA as well as for himself. However, he saw the value of our strategy while at the same time accepting our evaluation of its minimal effects on the balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR. He therefore assumed full responsibility for the affair. It will be recalled that the affair was a bit of flummery because overflights anywhere and everywhere over Soviet and Chinese territory never stopped; they go on day and night.

The crises revolving around Cuba (referred to as Cuba One — 1961; and Cuba Two — 1962) demonstrated the importance of having a "front" agency teamed with a submerged agency. We knew that no revolutionary government, possessing modern military equipment, can be overturned from within unless there are substantial defections by the military as well as a supporting external military or para-military force. A "people's" uprising in a totalitarian country, we knew from our experience in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956, is doomed, given a secret police apparatus, subversion of the judicial system and an army of occupation.

From 1960 on, American public opinion leaders demanded action against Fidel Castro. It was determined, for reasons now well known, to seek Fidel Castro's overthrow. SUBMAG was fully aware that the outcry after action was taken would be deafening and unpleasant, but the outgoing administration and the incoming administration both agreed that it was necessary.

SUBMAG was quite properly apprehensive that the operation would fail so we turned it to our advantage by arranging that CIA's effort to overthrow Castro be publicized. Thus, whatever happened at Bay of Pigs — success or failure — would be in our national interest.

As usual the identity of CIA agents was quickly "blown" by the media. Broadcasters competed with each other to expose, minutes ahead of their competitors, "secrets." Congressmen knew all about the Bay of Pigs and toid favored Washington newsmen, pledging them to secrecy. It was a typical example of how American public opinion and American intelligence activities interact counterproductively, except, of course, for SUBMAG.

In any case, the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs was a presidential commission which, after studying the planning and the results, recommended changes to improve CIA. However, the president was by now fully cognizant of SUBMAG and he ignored the recommendations except for the retirement of the CIA director.

Cuba Two was an entirely different matter. Here we had a confrontation with cosmic disaster as a potential outcome, a confrontation which involved the relationship of statecraft to possible mental aberration, irrationality. No intelligence agency can look into some person's head — despite the nonsense of "psychohistory" and psychological "profiles" — and predict specific behavior in a specific case.

The intelligence operation in this crisis was directed exclusively by SUBMAG, although quite properly a specific role was assigned to CIA just as the Pentagon had its tasks.

During these critical days, the president met with our Director at the Carlyle Hotel suite which we maintained for SUBMAG. (As usual, the president used the fire-exit backstairs to descent.) The memorandum of the discussion between the two makes clear that CIA would work in the open as usual while SUBMAG

would see to it that the missiles would never function.

SUBMAG had had a taste of this kind of negotiation following the confrontation in Vienna between the president and Chairman N.S. Khrushchev in June 1961. He shouted at the president that unless the USSR obtained a Berlin settlement on Soviet terms, there would be war. The president accepted the challenge, telling Khrushchev that the U.S. would not leave West Berlin under any circumstances.

Three days after his return to the U.S., the president and the Director met at the Carlyle. It now became apparent to the President why absolute secrecy about SUBMAG had to be maintained. For the Director had brought with him a film for the president's eyes only of a Politburo meeting in the heart of the Kremlin — with sound track. It was Khrushchev's report to his colleagues of his meeting with the president in Vienna. The report and the discussion which followed (the President had a translation from the Russian) made it quite clear that Politburo sentiment, which Khrushchev did not oppose, was to avoid the risk of military confrontation over Berlin.

In order to avert any possible suspicion that the American policy on Berlin was based on intimate inside knowledge, it was agreed that the U.S. should surrender P—— to the USSR. P had been a CIA catch of value but the moment had come to "release" him, i.e., to uncover him. As usual, CIA came out of it, *comme-ci, comme-ca*. It got credit for having made such a catch of a high Soviet civil servant in the heart of the military-industrial complex, but dis-credit for having lost their man and for having been unable to protect him. Our movie-making continued unimpaird.

After 20 years, we have learned — and it is an axiom we ignore at our peril — that without frequent and carefully selected leaks about CIA, serious intelligence work could not be conducted by our government. Naturally, CIA people are unaware of what they might regard as their deliberate victimization by a competing government agency but it is as much in their interest as it is in the national interest. So long as there is a CIA under editorial attack, under congressional investigation, under threat of exposure, so long will it be possible for serious intelligence work to be conducted.

In time perhaps, but it is doubtful, the American people will learn, as have the peoples of other democracies, that one cannot run intelligence along the lines of a community meeting. However, after years of observation I am persuaded, as is the Director and were all presidents since 1942, that our contrapuntal intelligence system must continue, with CIA as the seemingly dominant solo.

So ends the introduction by the "third man", the New York politician. This introduction is followed by appendices and by the report of Prof. D's committee. I had hoped the remainder could be published along with this introduction, but that was vetoed for the time being. It may be that SUBMAG is preparing to "go public" as a "front" for a new agency; I don't know.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall

- Ass. _____
- Dep. AD _____
- Asst. Dir.: _____
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory _____
- Eval.
- nv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall *WRW*

DATE: 3/4/75

FROM : H.A. Boynton, Jr. *HB*

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT:

Concerning a news article appearing in the 2/28/75 edition of the Washington Post newspaper (copy attached) entitled "Colby Will Lift CIA Secrecy Pledge to Cooperate With Senate Probe," the Director noted "Can we determine what the agreement includes?"

b1
b3

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116395

Enclosures - 4

21 MAR 13 1975

BPM: tap

DATE: 8/31/2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 u/l/l/dg/m

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C)

CONTINUED - OVER

56 MAR 24 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

b7C

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall

(S) RE: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

(S) [REDACTED]

b1
b3

(S) The FBI, of course, utilizes Form FD-291 "Employment Agreement," which has been executed by all current employees and must be signed by all new personnel entering on duty, to cover the foregoing situation. The "Employment Agreement" (copy attached) covers essentially the same points noted in the attached [REDACTED]. While we do not have an exit secrecy agreement signed by the terminating employee, Form FD-193 "Report of Exit and Separation" requires (under Paragraph D, Page 2) that the exiting employee be cautioned regarding divulging confidential information and reminded that such improper action may violate Department of Justice regulations as well as Federal statutes providing for substantial fines and lengthy imprisonment or both.

ACTION:

Above for information.

BPM

~~SECRET~~

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.: _____
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

Info

Handled

Colby Will Lift CIA Secrecy Pledge To Cooperate With Senate Probe

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The head of the Central Intelligence Agency agreed to cooperate with Senate investigators yesterday by lifting the pledge of secrecy that the CIA requires of all its employees.

CIA Director William E. Colby promised the waiver at a closed meeting on Capitol Hill yesterday morning with Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the newly formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, and Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.), the committee's ranking Republican.

Church told reporters afterwards he was satisfied that Colby plans to provide all the information the committee needs for its investigation of CIA activities, including charges that the agency engaged in illegal domestic spying on American citizens.

The CIA requires everyone it hires to sign an agreement promising not to disclose any information they might obtain concerning "intelligence sources and methods" without the agency's authorization.

Church emphasized that Colby agreed to drop the requirement only for the "purposes of this Senate inquiry." However, a similar waiver probably will be provided to a new House committee that has also been assigned to investigate the government's intelligence agencies.

Later in the day, in a luncheon speech at the National Press Club, Church voiced doubts that the White House inquiry into the CIA's activities, under a commission headed by Vice President

allegations that have been made against the agency.

"The executive branch cannot, with sufficient credibility, investigate itself," Church declared. He said he hoped it would wind up its work soon "and make its records available, as a starting point, for the more comprehensive congressional investigations to come."

Promising a "muted and restrained" inquiry and not "a television extravaganza," Church said he intends at the same time to make public as much information as possible during the course of the investigation.

"Our rule of thumb," the senator said, "will be to hold public hearings whenever we can and closed hearings whenever we must." He indicated that the committee would pursue allegations of illegal or improper activities by the CIA and other agencies in public, while conducting its examination of "legitimate national security" operations largely in executive session.

The committee chairman, called the investigation long overdue, pointing out that neither the CIA nor the FBI, which also will be scrutinized, have ever undergone a thorough congressional inquiry.

Promising strict precautions against news leaks, Church said any committee staffer who discloses unauthorized information "will be fired on the spot."

In response to a question, he acknowledged that there was no way to control what senators on the committee might say, but said they were all required of the need for

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/31/06 BY 65320UL/APJ/

- The Washington Post A-2
- Washington Star-News _____
- Daily News (New York) _____
- The New York Times _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
- The National Observer _____
- The Los Angeles Times _____

FEB 28 1975

Date _____

Can we determine what the agreement involved?

K

62-80750 5034

5034

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- SEN. FRANK CHURCH TODAY WARNED THAT UNRESTRAINED INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES COULD LEAD TO TYRANNY AND SECRET POLICE, BUT HE PLEDGED A JUDICIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE SENATE INVESTIGATION OF THE CIA AND FBI.

CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, ALSO PROMISED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE CIA OR OTHER AGENCIES MAY HAVE BEEN ORDERED BY FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON OR HIS AIDES TO UNDERTAKE ILLEGAL ACTIONS.

"IF, IN FACT, WE FIND THE CIA CONDUCTED A GIVEN OPERATION ON ORDERS OF THE PRESIDENT, IT IS THE PRESIDENT WHO MUST BE HELD ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE, SHOULD THAT OPERATION BE ONE THAT IS NOT COUNTERMANAGED BY THE LAW," HE TOLD A NATIONAL PRESS CLUB LUNCHEON.

CHURCH SAID THE CIA AND FBI "OPERATE ON THE FRINGE OF THAT UNEASY BALANCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND COLLECTIVE ORDER."

"IF THAT EQUALLY TIRES TOO FAR TOWARD THE FORMER, THE RESULT IS ANARCHY; IF IT TIRES TOO FAR TOWARD THE LATTER, THE RESULT IS TYRANNY."

THE INVESTIGATION WAS PROMPTED BY CHARGES THAT THE CIA MAY HAVE SPIED ON THOUSANDS OF DISSIDENT AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1950S AND '60S.

CHURCH ADDED THAT THE CHARGES AGAINST THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INVOLVE THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD SOMETHING AMERICANS OF ALL PHILOSOPHICAL AIIMS HAVE RESOLVED SHOULD NEVER EMERGE IN THIS LAND -- THE BEGINNINGS OF A SECRET POLICE.

CHURCH PLEDGED THAT THE FORTHCOMING SENATE INVESTIGATION DID NOT INTEND TO TEAR APART THE NATION'S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, BUT RATHER TO REFORM THEM.

"IT IS NOT THE COMMITTEE'S PURPOSE TO UNDERMINE OR DISMANTLE THE CIA... NOR JEOPARDIZE THEIR SOURCES, NOR ENDANGER THEIR AGENTS, NOR EMBARRASS THE UNITED STATES WITH REVELATIONS WHICH COULD INJURE OUR RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS," HE SAID.

UPI 02-27 05:52 PED

UP-145

(CIA)

5/21/2007 60222UC/LP/04/mrs

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.: _____
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure or production of national security information, other classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is in a better position than I to make that determination;

(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

(Signature)

(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

_____, 19____, by _____

(Signature)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

4) Memorandum

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall *wrw* DATE: March 10, 1975

~~SECRET~~

FROM : W.O. Cregar *woc*
1 - External Affairs Div.
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
REQUEST FOR BUREAU SPEAKER

On 3/7/75 [redacted] telephonically inquired if Mr. W.O. Cregar, Section Chief, CI-2 Section, Intelligence Division, and the Bureau's alternate member on the U.S. Intelligence Board, could appear before CIA's [redacted] to speak to approximately 25 career officers of CIA on the afternoon of 4/11/75 between the hours of 1:30 and 3:00 p.m.

clg

b1
b3

The presentation would be confined to a discussion of the structure of the Bureau, its jurisdiction in the foreign intelligence field and the Bureau's role on the U.S. Intelligence Board. Mr. Cregar has given this presentation many times before [redacted] of CIA and it has proven useful in that it provides the opportunity to explain the Bureau's role in the field of foreign intelligence and clarifies some misconceptions CIA personnel have regarding the Bureau's jurisdiction. A question-and-answer period will follow the presentation.

b3

ACTION:

If approved, Mr. Cregar will handle the lecture and so advise [redacted] telephonically.

WOC

*Done
3/11/75
woc*

WOC:bcw (4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REC 44

62-80750-5036

DATE: 8/31/2006

14 MAR 11 1975

CLASSIFIED BY 60224C/LP/DG/mr

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 8/31/2031

54

WOC

50 MAR 17 1975


~~SECRET~~

AUG 20 1975

Memorandum H. A. Boynton, Jr., to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

~~SECRET~~

(S)



b1
b3

Between February, 1970, and November, 1972, although we did not have a personal Bureau liaison representative dealing daily with CIA, we did continue to have considerable contact with CIA at various levels concerning operational matters and were able to carry out our responsibilities. However, it was recognized that, during this period, certain problems had arisen which might have been more promptly resolved had there been existing a personal direct liaison mechanism. With the re-establishment of the Liaison Section of the Intelligence Division in November, 1972, we again designated a Bureau liaison representative to CIA who has been carrying out that responsibility since that time. During this period, a very close and cordial relationship has developed to the mutual benefit of both agencies.

In addition to the direct liaison relationship, there has been frequent contact at all levels between the two agencies.

ACTION: For information.

WAS *H* *Jma*

~~SECRET~~

Documents downgraded/
declassified during A review
Review 603 22/9/04/CP/CRB/ew/SW
11-30-2005

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
Memorandum

- Tolson _____
- DeLoach _____
- Mohr _____
- Wick ✓
- Casper _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- Felt _____
- Gale ✓
- Rosen ✓
- Sullivan ✓
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 6, 1967

FROM : W. R. Wannall

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Papich
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Inspector

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

W. R. Wannall
W. C. Sullivan

In accordance with instructions, attached letter has been prepared for Attorney General setting forth all data in our files concerning captioned matter. Briefly, information being furnished is as follows:

Matter first came to our attention in Spring of 1961 in connection with our investigation of violation of Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications Statute on the part of [Redacted] arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, by local authorities on wire tapping charge. Wire tap involved was on telephone of Dan Rowan, member of Rowan and Martin comedy team. Rowan at the time reportedly was [Redacted]

b2
b7D

Through our investigation we determined involvement of [Redacted]

[Redacted] By letter 5/22/61 we furnished former Attorney General Kennedy a memorandum containing a rundown on [Redacted] The originals of the letter and memorandum were returned to us for filing purposes. A copy of that memorandum is being attached to instant letter being sent to Attorney General. (u)

On 5/9/62 Kennedy discussed with the Director a number of matters, [Redacted]

Enclosure sent 3-6-67

GCM:ams

CONTINUED - OVER

MAR 13 1967

MAR 19 1967

62-80750-5038

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Classified by 6049
Declassify on: OADR
E.O. 12958

CIA IN PD DeLoach
Per [Redacted] 012780

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4-Spr/157
ON 3/10/97
#122330

b3
b7C

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan

Re: [Redacted]

b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

@

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] In furnishing this information we were asked that it be held within this Bureau on a strictly need-to-know basis. We have, however, included it in the attached proposed letter to the Attorney General noting [Redacted] JS(u)

b3
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted] an article in the 8/16/63 issue of the "Chicago Sun Times" reporting that CIA agents had contacted Giancana to obtain Cuban intelligence.

ACTION:

If approved, attached letter will be sent to the Attorney General, with a copy for the Deputy Attorney General.

gen

over

WCS

The Attorney General asked for this information on Friday, 3/3/67 -

AS

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Gale
- 1 - Mr. Wick
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

The Attorney General
 Director, FBI

March 6, 1967

- 1 - Mr. Papich
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Inspector

[Redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4-jum/kaa
 ON 3/10/81 FOIPA # 22,330
 CIA info declassified per 8/27/80

Our files contain the following information concerning the captioned matter, much of which has been furnished by the [Redacted] on a strictly highly confidential "need-to-know" basis. In view of this, it is requested that it be handled on a most restrictive basis. *(u)*

This matter first came to our attention in the Spring of 1961 in connection with our investigation of a violation of the Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications Statute on the part of [Redacted] who had been arrested by local authorities in Las Vegas, Nevada, on a local wire tapping charge. [Redacted] in October, 1960, had reportedly placed a wire tap on the telephone of Dan Rowan, a member of the comedy team of Rowan and Martin. Rowan at the time reportedly was [Redacted]

During the course of [Redacted] investigation it was ascertained that [Redacted] was involved. [Redacted] during interview claimed [Redacted]

The essence of the above was furnished to former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy by letter dated May 22, 1961, which enclosed a memorandum of the same date containing data made available on May 3, 1961, by [Redacted]

Since our files show that Mr. Kennedy returned the original of our letter and its enclosed memorandum dated May 22, 1961,

b3
b7C
MAILED 2
MAR 6 1967
COMM-FBI

b2
b7D

- Olson
- DeLoach
- Mohr
- Wick
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Rm.
- Holmes
- Gandy

GCM:ams(1)
 9 MAR 13 1967

SEE NOTE, PAGE 4

~~TOP SECRET~~
 GROUP 1
 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
 ENCLOSURE

62-80750-4523
 MAR 7 1967

Handwritten notes and signatures

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

The Attorney General

to us for filing purposes, a copy of the May 22, 1961, memorandum is attached hereto for your information. (u)

[Redacted]

(u)

Further with respect to this matter, I was informed of the following on a highly confidential basis by former Attorney General Kennedy during a conference in my office on May 9, 1962:

[Redacted]

b3
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The Attorney General

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

KS(u)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Also of possible interest is a news article carried in the August 16, 1963, issue of the "Chicago Sun Times." This article carried the headline, "CIA Sought Giancana's Help For Cuba Spying," and it was reported therein that CIA agents had contacted Giancana in an effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after Castro came into power. ~

Enclosure

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)

b3
b7C

b3
b7D

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

NOTE:

See cover memorandum Wannall to Sullivan, same caption,
March 6, 1967, GCM:ams. ~

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" inasmuch as information contained
herein is so classified by CIA. ~

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell.
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - [Redacted]
- DATE: 3/10/75
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Liaison Unit
- 1 - Legal Counsel
- 1 - External Affairs
- 1 - [Redacted]

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : F. S. Putman

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

b3

b7C

Classified ~~TOP SECRET~~ "Secret" since it contains data so classified by CIA. u

Memorandum concerns Time magazine report that CIA was involved in assassination plots against several Caribbean leaders including Fidel Castro of Cuba concerning which FBI had information. u

The "Washington Capital News Service" on 3/9/75, stated Time Magazine had been told by "credible sources" that CIA was involved in assassination plots against Caribbean leaders Fidel Castro, (Cuba); Rafael Trujillo, (Dominican Republic) and Francois Duvalier (Haiti). According to Time, CIA reportedly enlisted the help of U. S. Mafia figures in several unsuccessful attempts to kill Castro both before and shortly after the CIA planned invasion of Cuba in 1961. The sources claimed CIA had enlisted the help of underworld figures Sam Giancana and John Roselli in efforts to kill Castro. The magazine said the FBI later learned of these attempts while investigating a burglary of comedian Dan Rowan's hotel room in Las Vegas and that the arrested prowlers had been assigned by CIA as a favor to Giancana, who sought information to break up a budding romance between Rowan and Giancana's girl friend, Phyllis Mc Guire. u

Enclosures - 3

EX-110

REC-16

109-137 (encl.)

~~SECRET~~

62 80750-5038
MAR 18 1975

Classified by 2111
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 jmr/Koe
ON 3/10/81 FBI part 22, 330

VHN:jmr (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

FOIA info Declassed per
[Redacted] 8/27/80

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

57 MAR 20 1975

MAR 19 1975

b2
b7D

UNRECORDED COPY

b3

Classified by 9049
 Exempt from GDS, Category 2
 Date of Declassification Indefinite
 10/5/77 [Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum F. S. Putman to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: [redacted]

b3

[redacted]

*originals
returned
to file
3/12/75
vmd*

In summary the memorandum [redacted]

[redacted] first came to our attention in 1961. At that time we conducted an investigation of the Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications Statute by [redacted] who was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, by local authorities on wire tapping charges. The wire tap involved was on the telephone of Dan Rowan, member of Rowan and Martin Comedy team. Rowan at the time reportedly was [redacted]

b3
b7C

Through our investigation we determined the involvement of [redacted]

[redacted]

XS(u)

[redacted]

[redacted] By letter 5/22/61, we furnished former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, a memorandum containing [redacted] This original of the letter and memorandum were returned to us for filing purposes. *(u)*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum F. S. Putman to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re:

b3

On 5/9/62, Kennedy discussed a number of matters with the Director, including

b3
b7C

With reference to Trujillo, Time magazine reportedly stated its sources claimed CIA backed the successful drive to overthrow Trujillo, whose 31 years as dictator of the Dominican Republic ended with his shooting death in May, 1961. The sources said CIA thought Trujillo was getting too friendly with the Communists and that several sources insist that some of the guns used in the killing were smuggled into the Caribbean islands by CIA operatives. u

With reference to Duvalier, Time magazine stated that CIA collaborated with the Haitian leaders of a group of at least 200 rebels who tried unsuccessfully to overthrow Duvalier in 1963. The group of rebels reportedly was stopped at the Dominican border when they tried to invade Haiti. u

ACTION:

For information. u

Wm
Jm *am* *H*

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 1/21/75

FROM : A. B. Fulton

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

- 1 - Mr. H. A. Boynton
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman
- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

SUBJECT: "INSIDE THE COMPANY--CIA DIARY"
(BOOK REVIEW)
RESEARCH MATTER

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

The purpose of this memorandum is to review the book "Inside the Company--CIA Diary" by author Philip Burnett Franklin Agee.

SYNOPSIS:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Captioned book is a devastating attack on
CIA [Redacted]
[Redacted] (C) CIA 018207

The book was recently published in England for distribution in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. [Redacted]

[Redacted] (S) CIA 018207

In view of the numerous accurate but slanted revelations made by Agee concerning CIA, it is bound to have numerous repercussions around the world.

Agee makes brief mention of the FBI activities of SIS in Latin America during and immediately after World War II. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

ACTION: None. For information.

DETAILS - OVER

1 - 62-46855 (Book Review File)

1 - [Redacted]

LM:aso (11)

ENCLOSURE

CLASS. & EXT. BY Multiple Sources
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 1-21-92

~~SECRET~~

MAR 11 1975

FIVE

b7C

DATE: 8/31/2006
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LA/DG/mag
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 (C) 8/31/2023

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-46855-55

110-949-11

[Redacted]

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: "Inside the Company--CIA Diary"
(Book Review)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (S) FBI 9788

b1

[redacted]
[redacted] (S) FBI 9788

The FBI

Agee on several occasions briefly mentions SIS operations in Latin America during World War II and shortly thereafter. [redacted]

b1
b3

[redacted]

[redacted] (C) CIA 018207

Agee also briefly mentions Legal Attache offices in Latin America but with the exception of our office in Mexico City makes no statement concerning them outside from informing that these offices look out for FBI interests in Latin America.

b2
b3

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: "Inside the Company--CIA Diary"
(Book Review)

~~SECRET~~


Conclusions of Book

Agee continuously asserts that he is now convinced that the primary purpose behind CIA operations in countries such as those in which he served is to back and support the monopolistic capitalists who rule, regardless of the effect it has on the populace. He, therefore, urges the abolition of CIA. He further urges socialist forms of government in mid- and undeveloped countries of the world which will concern themselves primarily with the welfare of the masses rather than the welfare of the select few who reign.

PLM

wfsl

Jm



b2
b3

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 2/5/75

FROM : H. A. Boynton, Jr.

- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. H. A. Boynton, Jr.
- 1 - Mr. R. A. Birmingham

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

(C) FBI 9788

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell.
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval.
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

This is in response to the Director's question noted on Fulton to Wannall memorandum, dated 1/21/75, entitled, "Inside the Company--CIA Diary," (Book Review), Research Matter."

[REDACTED]

(C) FBI 9788

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(C) FBI 9788 EX-170

[REDACTED]

RAB:mam
(8) main

CLASS. & EXT. BY 9788 RLS/HA
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 2-5-93

CONTINUED - OVER

DATE: 8/31/06

CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 (C)

51 MAR 26 1975

MAR 24 1975

5/31/2001

Vertical handwritten notes on the right margin, including "b1 b3" and "SECRET".

b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
(Mr. A. E. Smith)

DATE: 3/11/75

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *Wannall*

FROM : Mr. A. B. Fulton *Fulton*

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

[Redacted]

b3

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

b7C

Recommends representatives of Intelligence Division appear before captioned course 3/27/75.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was advised that his office is sponsoring a [Redacted] Course for career CIA personnel from 3/20/75 to 4/4/75. There will be 30 members in the class.

[Redacted] requested a three-hour presentation by the Bureau in a panel sitting to present an overall picture of the Bureau's CI operations and responsibilities. He specifically requested that this presentation include FBI/CIA operational cooperation and liaison.

[Redacted] and FBI CI training program.

b1
b3

[Redacted] has been the liaison contact for our CI training staff for the past two years and has been most cooperative in scheduling CIA speakers for our various CI training schools. He has twice been commended for his performance in this area by letters from the Director, FBI, to Director, CIA.

[Redacted] is directly responsible for captioned school.

In view of CIA's outstanding cooperation with us in the past with respect to our CI training, it is felt that his request should be honored. The three-hour presentation is scheduled for 9:00 am to 12:00 noon, 3/27/75, at the [Redacted]

[Redacted] Section Chief William O. Cregar, CI-2, has had extensive experience in CIA liaison and has a current [Redacted]

EWL:jvl
(6)

MAR 19 1975

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED - OVER

51 MAR 26 1975

DATE: 8/21/2006

CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 uc/EP/DG/mat

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 8/31/2031

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b2
b3

b7C

~~SECRET~~

b3

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

[redacted]

b2

b3

b7C

knowledge of [redacted] Unit Chief [redacted]
[redacted] New York Unit, CI-1, has had extensive field and
Headquarters experience and has current operational knowledge
in the Soviet field. Unit Chief [redacted] Training
Unit, IS-3, has also had extensive CI experience in the field
and at Headquarters, and is also in a position to discuss
our CI training.

RECOMMENDATION:

b7C

That Special Agents Cregar, [redacted] be
designated to appear before captioned school 3/27/75.

Ewj

PLM

WRW/FSP

OK
JBS

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 8/30/2016
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 ucl/6/17/16
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 (S) 8/20/2014

March 12, 1975

BY LIAISON

*Not CIA by
Liaison
3/14/75
KFS*

Honorable William E. Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

1 - Mr. Wannall (Attn: [redacted])
1 - Mr. White
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

b7C

Dear Bill:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
(S) For the past five years [redacted]

[redacted] in your Agency has served in a technical liaison capacity primarily with the FBI Laboratory. My Laboratory associates have advised me that [redacted] has been reassigned to another position within your Agency.

b1
b3

I want to take this opportunity to thank you for [redacted] services. He was an efficient and effective representative of the CIA and participated in many delicate and sensitive conferences and in approved projects of mutual interest. He has contributed greatly toward the excellent working relationship between our agencies in the technical area. His enthusiasm, competence, interest and dedication to the United States intelligence effort are appreciated, and we in the FBI wish him continued success in his career.

Your cooperation in matters of mutual interest in the foreign intelligence field is most gratifying, and I sincerely hope our continued cooperative spirit will be of material benefit to the United States intelligence effort.

Sincerely, *RE-15*

EX-110
Clarence M. Kelley
Director

62-80750-5047
MAR 18 1975

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

(S) NOTE: [redacted] had been assigned to a technical liaison position dealing with the Laboratory Division and other Bureau personnel for the past five years. He has recently been reassigned to [redacted] [redacted] has been honest, sincere, dependable and responsive [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Over the past five years, [redacted] spent a large amount of his personal time on behalf of the Bureau

b1
b3

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Mon. William E. Colby

~~SECRET~~

Note: (cont'd)

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3

(S) for which he received no compensation. The Laboratory Division is very appreciative of [redacted] efforts and feels a letter to the CIA would show our appreciation and help in our future relationship on the working level with the CIA Audio Operations Branch.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD-Adm. _____
- Dep. AD-Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *wrwan*

DATE: 3/20/75

FROM : H. A. Boynton, Jr. *HAB*

- 1 - Mr. Boynton
- 1 - [Redacted]

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Classified "~~Secret~~" [Redacted]

Memorandum 3/17/75 from Mr. Boynton to Mr. Wannall furnished a summary of Bureau's relations with CIA, highlighting some of the problems which the Bureau considered potential threats to its jurisdiction. It was noted that the memorandum did not attempt to identify any situations wherein

Mr. Callahan requested that some examples of such activities be supplied.

Memorandum from former SA Sam J. Papich to the Director dated 3/5/70 (copy attached) noted that Papich could not recall CIA's having ever written a protest letter to the Bureau; however, it was Papich's belief that there were situations wherein CIA might have had reason to complain about the Bureau's activities. Papich attached a 25-page list summarizing 38 such situations. Attached is a brief summary of the 38 items referred to by Papich. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum dated 3/9/70 from Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach which advised that an analysis had been made of the 38 items cited by Papich and it had been concluded that the analysis did not show any real reason why CIA would raise any issue in connection with 37 of the 38 items.

DATE: 8/31/2006
 CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 uac/HF/PG/mms
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3(C) 8/31/2031

(S) [Redacted]

Enclosures

EX 104

~~SECRET~~

REC 8

62-80750-2043
CONTINUED - OVER

LFS:tdp/jlbjfb
(6)

Classified by 3764
 Exempt from GDS, Category 2
 Date of Declassification Indefinite

21 MAR 26 1975

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
56 APR 03 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[Redacted Box]

b1
b3

b1
b3

b7C

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Relations with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

6 [Redacted]

b1
b3

ACTION:

For information.

W.R.

Per

W.R.

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED on envelope
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/28/2016 BY 60322UC/LP/DG/mms

62 807 5043

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. DeLoach
① - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. J.A. Sizoo
1 - Mr. D.E. Moore

March 11, 1970

BY COURIER SERVICE

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/29/DO/mjg
ON 8/31/01

Dear Mr. Helms:

As I am sure you will agree, the need for close coordination of the intelligence-gathering and counter-intelligence efforts of the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is self-evident. This matter is one which requires a continuing analysis to assure that both agencies have established working agreements whereby we can most effectively realize positive results with a minimum of duplication, misplaced effort, and jurisdictional problems.

During January, 1966, representatives of this Bureau met with officials of the CIA to consider coordination of our mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. As a result of these conferences, a set of ground rules was drawn up and agreed to by both agencies. A copy of this agreement was transmitted in my letter of February 7, 1966, to then CIA Director Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. A copy of the agreement is enclosed for your information. This agreement has proven generally effective and no major problems have been encountered since its adoption in the areas it covers.

The FBI has primary responsibility with regard to matters involving the internal security of the United States as well as for conducting counterintelligence operations in

~~SECRET~~

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

see note, page 2

WCS:mea

(7)

~~SECRET~~

Honorable Richard Helms

this country. While this Bureau does not have any statutory responsibilities with regard to the collection of foreign intelligence, I have always recognized that the potential for the development of such intelligence in this country is considerable. The FBI has, in fact, made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U. S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, and policy-making officials of the Government.

b2
b3

I know that you will share my belief that this matter requires a periodic reexamination to assure that the national security interests continue to be served in the most effective and complete manner possible. After reviewing this matter, including the attached 1966 agreement, I would welcome any observations you may desire to make.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

NOTE:

See memo W. C. Sullivan to DeLoach 3/11/70 re "Relationships with CIA," prepared by WCS:mea.

Classified "~~Secret~~" since disclosure would seriously damage the internal security interests.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Sizoo

March 31, 1970

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 6032246/LP/09/mg
ON 9/6/06

Dear Mr. Helms:

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 20 setting out your observations with respect to various matters of mutual interest. I certainly appreciate your kind comments concerning me and I share your convictions as to the need for close coordination of our intelligence collection activities in behalf of the national security.

Your letter suggested nine particular areas which might be the subject of further discussions aimed at improving the coordination of our operations. A number of these topics are highly sensitive and complex and I will therefore make no effort here to set forth my views in detail. However, in response to your letter and as a prelude to any direct discussions on these matters, certain observations on my part may be appropriate.

With regard to electronic surveillance and mail coverage, there is no question as to the frequent value of such operations in developing needed intelligence. On the other hand, the use of these measures in domestic investigations poses a number of problems which may not be encountered in similar operations abroad. There is widespread concern by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type coverage. Moreover, various legal considerations must be borne in mind, including the impact such coverage may have on our numerous prosecutive responsibilities. The FBI's effectiveness has always depended in large measure on our capacity to retain the full confidence of the American people. The use of any investigative measures which infringe on traditional rights of privacy must therefore be scrutinized most carefully. Within this framework, however, I would be willing to consider any proposals your Agency may make.

~~SECRET~~

WCS:mea (5)

Group 1

see note, page 3

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~


Honorable Richard Helms



b3

With respect to the inclusion of positive intelligence courses in our training curricula, I am sure you will recognize that our training programs must be designed primarily to fulfill our own widespread and demanding responsibilities. While I appreciate your offer, I do not feel it would be feasible at this time to include the proposed courses in our training schedules. I would certainly have no objection to the holding of seminars between specialists of our two agencies in selective areas of interest when justified by specific circumstances.

Concerning the coordination of FBI-CIA activities in the exploitation of live sources, both in the communist bloc field and with regard to key nonbloc establishments, I am not aware of any significant problems. The 1966 agreement between our agencies was concerned directly with this question and I have no changes to suggest in the ground rules at this time. However, in the event your Agency has some specific proposals to make, I would welcome hearing further from you in this connection.



b3

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Honorable Richard Helms

Similarly, I am not aware of any major problems which exist at this time in connection with the coordination of our field liaison operations. It has been my long-standing policy that serious questions affecting the coordination of our activities with other Government agencies should be handled and controlled at a headquarters level in order to avoid administrative confusion and misunderstanding.

In line with my letter of March 11 and the observations contained in your letter of March 20, I will in the immediate future designate appropriate officials of the Bureau to meet with your representatives for detailed discussions of these matters. It is my earnest hope that such conferences will lead to a sharpened understanding of the responsibilities and objectives of our respective agencies and will serve to promote more effective cooperation in our joint commitment to the national intelligence needs.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

See memo Sullivan to DeLoach 3/30/70 captioned "Relations With CIA" prepared by WCS:mea.

~~SECRET~~

The Director

March 5, 1970

Sam J. Papich

RELATIONS WITH CIA

Reference is made to my letter of 3/3/70. I made the statement, "Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances." It is my understanding that you want such grievances identified. There is enclosed herewith a list of cases or situations which arose over the years.

Based upon a review of files and my personal recollection, this list would be representative of matters which CIA could use for making charges such as: not being forthright, not playing fairly and squarely, not cooperating, not being of assistance, not recognizing the need for concrete FBI contributions to the foreign intelligence effort; what CIA may have compiled over the years is unknown. What situations are known to CIA and have not come to our attention cannot be ascertained at this time. I am thinking of leaks including distorted information which may have been passed to CIA from ex-Bureau employees and CIA informants and sources.

It should be clearly emphasized that there is no indication whatsoever within CIA that the Agency has been seeking any kind of a showdown or confrontation with the FBI. Contrary to what some people may believe, the relationship between the two agencies up to the recent crisis was never better despite the problems which have arisen from time to time. I am confident that a thorough and impartial examination will conclusively support the foregoing.

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding, it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances. We can also produce an excellent record of support which we have given CIA; presumably CIA could do the same. There are ingredients for continuing conflict and there is also adequate machinery for maintaining sound working relations and producing badly needed intelligence information.

Enclosure

SJP:chs/wmk

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- ① - Mr. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/31/06 BY 60322UC/LP/OG/mjz

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to the Director
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

I believe that it would be most helpful to you and interested Bureau officials when evaluating and passing judgment on the attached material if we analyzed very briefly the role of the Bureau liaison Agent. A liaison Agent can be a simple mail courier or he can be the true Bureau Agent ready to confront any problem or issue with another agency, very often working with very limited information. It is expected that the Bureau Agent carry out his instructions forcefully and efficiently. He must be prepared to handle all types of personalities under various conditions. He must be alert for pitfalls and express himself in a most judicious and prudent manner but always making certain that the Bureau position is well fortified.

In evaluating the attached and my encounters with CIA, it should be noted that protests from the Bureau always were easy to handle because the Agent had J. Edgar Hoover behind him. However, when an Agent struck at an official on one day and solicited his cooperation the next day, it did require some resourceful action. It is believed that other liaison Agents regularly encounter similar situations. On numerous occasions I have bitterly fought with CIA officials and this has included rough language. I have walked out on CIA officials when I felt they were unreasonable. They took the initiative by asking the Agent to return. I did try to play fairly and squarely with all of them and never hesitated to accept a confrontation; this included the Director of the Agency. When I lectured to CIA personnel over the years I always made a point to challenge them to present any grievances or raise any subject matter relating to the Bureau. I never left a discussion with any CIA official without being positive that our position was absolutely understood. The approaches utilized by me might be open to criticism. I can only refer to the records of the Bureau and CIA and I believe the Bureau's position is most favorable. I don't think CIA has ever transmitted a letter of protest to the Bureau during the eighteen years during which the Agent handled the assignment.

ACTION:

For information.

Mr. DeLoach

March 9, 1970

W. C. Sullivan

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Reference is made to the memorandum W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach dated 3/5/70, captioned as above. At that time the Director was advised this Division would make an analysis of each situation cited in the memorandum of Special Agent Sam J. Papich relative to grievances which CIA might hold in connection with relations with the FBI.

Enclosed will be found an analysis of 38 items (2 are contained in one memorandum, making a total of 37 memoranda). In substance our analysis does not show any real reason why CIA would raise any issue in connection with 37 out of the 38 items. The recommended action in each of these cases would logically close the matter. In one memorandum the 37th item listed, it is recommended that a carefully worded letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States be sent to that Agency. The purpose of this is to protect the Bureau by giving CIA a chance to make any comments, if it has any, in regard to the current utilization of sources and facilities affecting both CIA and the Bureau. If CIA replies that it is satisfied with the current intelligence conditions in this area, we will put this particular matter to rest and we will have their letter in the file.

This Division will take any and all steps to comply with the Director's wishes in this matter and in any other concerning which this Division is involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

Enclosure

WCS:chs (6)

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. J.A. Sizoo
- 1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/21/06 BY 60322uc/LP/OG/mar

Date 10/14/05

Classification of Mail:

- Unclassified
- Confidential
- Secret
- Top Secret*
- SCI*
- Other

Mail Category:

- Letter _____ Airtel _____
- LHM _____ Memo _____
- Report _____ Other _____
- Teletype _____

FD-501 Number

FD-502 Number

Subject

Date of M

b3

Description of Material

62-80750.5045

(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

- Special File Room, Room ⁷³⁶¹~~5991~~, FBIHQ / FCIPA # 368692
- _____
(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

- TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065
- Field Office Manager - _____
File and Serial number

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/06 BY 60322 JUC/LLJ DSJ MR-1**

(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

Date

*requires special handling

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Off. Coun.
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *WRW*

DATE: 4/14/75 b7C

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOC*

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 -
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75


ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/30/06 BY 60322UC/LA/DA/may

Hotis

J. A. Mintz

OC, J. A.

This memorandum reports the results of an Executive Committee Meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community on 4/11/75.



OTHER Executive Session (US Congress)

Enclosures

WOC:lmh lmh
(7)

62-80750-62

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
170 MAY 16 1975

MAY 13 1975

CONTINUED OVER

ENCLOSURE

84 MAY 20 1975

PH...
S...
ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116395-17

Date of Mail 3/17/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/31/06 BY 60322UC/CP/RS/MAJ

t JUNE MAIL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Removed By 79 APR 14 1975

File Number 62-80750-5047

Permanent Serial Charge Out