U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535

November 16, 2023

MR. JOHN R GREENEWALD SUITE 1203 27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD CASTAIC, CA 91384

> FOIPA Request No.: 1578303-001 Subject: COLBY, WILLIAM EGAN

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The FBI has completed its search for records subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that are responsive to your request. The enclosed 127 pages of records were determined to be responsive to your subject and were previously processed and released. Please see the selected paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- In an effort to provide you with responsive records as expeditiously as possible, we are releasing documents from previous requests regarding your subject. We consider your request fulfilled. Since we relied on previous results, additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may request an additional search for records. Submit your request by mail to **Initial Processing Operations Unit; Record/Information Dissemination Section; Information Management Division; Federal Bureau of Investigation; 200 Constitution Drive; Winchester, VA 22602. You may also email your response to foipaquestions@fbi.gov. Please include the FOIPA Request Number listed above in your correspondence.**
- Please be advised that additional records responsive to your subject exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you must advise us that you want the additional records processed. Please submit your response within thirty (30) days to Initial Processing Operations Unit; Record/Information Dissemination Section; Information Management Division; Federal Bureau of Investigation; 200 Constitution Drive; Winchester, VA 22602. You may also email your response to foipaquestions@fbi.gov. Please include the FOIPA Request Number listed above in your correspondence. If we do not receive your decision within thirty (30) days of the date of this notification, your request will be closed.

One or more of the enclosed records were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession.

If this release of the previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may file a FOIPA request with NARA at the following address:

National Archives and Records Administration Special Access and FOIA 8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500 College Park, MD 20740-6001

Records potentially responsive to your request were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and they were not previously processed pursuant to the FOIA. You may file a request with NARA using the address above.



One or more of the enclosed records were destroyed. Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.

- Records potentially responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) according to Title 44 United States Code Section 3301, Title 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Chapter 12 Sub-chapter B Part 1228, and 36 CFR 1229.10.
- Documents or information referred to other Government agencies were not included in this release.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **"Part 1"** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **"Part 2"** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **"Part 3"** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Additional information about the FOIPA can be found at <u>www.fbi.gov/foia</u>. Should you have questions regarding your request, please feel free to contact <u>foipaquestions@fbi.gov</u>. Please reference the FOIPA Request number listed above in all correspondence concerning your request.

Please be advised that if you are seeking a new search for records, you may wish to narrow the scope of your request based on material that you have already received, e.g., timeframe or locality. Additionally, be advised that "unusual circumstances" may apply. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B)(iii). These "unusual circumstances" will delay our ability to make a determination on your request within 20 days. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B). Additionally, the payment of pertinent fees may apply to your request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(A)(viii). The application of "unusual circumstances" is not a determination of how the FBI will respond to your substantive request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of this response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by emailing the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison at <u>foipaquestions@fbi.gov</u>. The subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at <u>ogis@nara.gov</u>; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,

m. A. D.D

Michael G. Seidel Section Chief Record/Information Dissemination Section Information Management Division

Enclosures

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia_website.
- (ii) Intelligence Records. To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) Requests for Confidential Informant Records. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of confidential informant records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F) [5 U.S.C.§ § 552 (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F)] and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C.§ 552a (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records would reveal confidential informant identities and information, expose law enforcement techniques, and endanger the life or physical safety of individuals. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) Record Searches and Standard Search Policy. The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems, such as the Central Records System (CRS), or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. The CRS is an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. The standard search policy is a search for main entity records in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does <u>not</u> include a search for reference entity records, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files.
 - a. Main Entity Records created for individuals or non-individuals who are the subjects or the focus of an investigation
 - b. *Reference Entity Records-* created for individuals or non-individuals who are associated with a case but are not known subjects or the focus of an investigation
- (ii) FBI Records. Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) Foreseeable Harm Standard. As amended in 2016, the Freedom of Information Act provides that a federal agency may withhold responsive records only if: (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the nine exemptions that FOIA enumerates, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law (5 United States Code, Section 552(a)(8)(A)(i)). The FBI considers this foreseeable harm standard in the processing of its requests.
- (iv) Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets. The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative "FBI file." An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigations, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOI/PA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET FOI/PA# 1449528-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 1Page 1 ~ b3; b7E;

- X Deleted Page(s) X
- X No Duplication Fee X

```
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1188649-0
Total Deleted Page(s) = 63
Page 8 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 9 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 12 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 23 ~ b1; b3;
Page 30 ~ b1; b3;
Page 39 \sim b2; b3; b7C;
Page 40 ~ b2; b3; b7C;
Page 41 ~ b2; b3; b7C;
Page 50 ~ b2; b3;
Page 51 ~ b2; b3;
Page 52 ~ b2; b3;
Page 53 ~ b2; b3;
Page 54 ~ b2; b3;
Page 59 ~ b1; b3;
Page 60 ~ b1; b3;
Page 64 ~ b1; b3;
Page 65 ~ b1; b3;
Page 66 ~ b1; b3;
Page 69 ~ b1; b2; b3; b7C;
Page 70 ~ b2; b3; b7C;
Page 75 ~ b1; b3;
Page 76 \sim b1; b3;
Page 77 ~ b1; b3;
Page 78 ~ b1; b3;
Page 79 ~ Duplicate;
Page 80 ~ Duplicate;
Page 118 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 119 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 120 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 121 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 122 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 123 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 125 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 129 ~ Duplicate;
Page 130 ~ Duplicate;
Page 138 ~ b3; b7C;
Page 139 ~ b3;
Page 144 ~ b1; b3; b7C;
Page 147 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 148 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 149 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 150 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 151 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 152 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 153 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 154 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 156 ~ b1; b3;
Page 162 ~ b1; b3;
```

Page	170	~	Referral/Direct;
Page	171	~	Referral/Direct;
Page	172	~	Referral/Direct;
Page	173	~	Referral/Direct;
Page	174	~	Referral/Direct;
Page	178	~	b1; b3;
Page	179	~	b1; b3;
Page	180	~	Referral/Direct;
Page	181	~	Referral/Direct;
Page	184	~	OTHER;
Page	185	~	OTHER;
Page	186	~	OTHER;
Page	187	~	OTHER;
Page	188	~	OTHER;
Page	189	~	Referral/Direct;

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 5010-10 UNITED-STATES Assoc. Dir. _ . Dept AD Adm. __ Dep. AD Inv. emorandum 4364.752.27 \$ Asst. Dir.: Admin. . 918/2006 Comp. Syst. SWIED BY 60322 Ext. Affairs MR. BASSETT. 19 - November 4 TO Files & Com. SIFY ON: 2873.3(<)-Gen. Inv. ldent. REE INFORMATION CONTAINED Inspection R. D. COTTER FROM Intell. HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Laboratory EXCENT WHERE SHOWN Plan. & Eval. _ Spec. Inv. OTHERWISE . REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO FBI RECORDS SUBJECT: ing b3 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) Coun. Telephone Rm. ___ Director Sec'y Remymemo 10/22/74 recommending that we allow review of certain b3 who is conducting study of events (1940-1947) which led to FBI records by establishment of CIA. Intelligence Division recommended that any material first be reviewed by Intelligence Division and Legal Counsel. Director instructed he should see any material critical of other agencies or Major General Donovan. 5 漱(5) 3. Letter to Department from State Department (apparently forwarded) to FBI) 8/2/41 enclosing b7D Classified by Declassify ORDRO 4. 8/15/41 letter from FBIHQ to various FBI offices Enclosures - enclosures refer to SEE ADDENDUM OF INTEL-1 - Messrs. Adams, Mintz, Wannall LIGENCE DIVISION, PAGE 3 1 - Bufile 65-15635 SEP ADDENDUM OF LEGAL RDC:wmj (6) CONTINUED - OVER COUNSEL DIVISION PAGE 4 JAN9 107Ъ7Ď

b3 **
Memo for Mr. Bassett Re: Request for Access FBI Records
CIÁ
(ŝ)
(5)
ACTION:
The Intelligence Division and the Division of Logal Councel and
requested to review the attached serials and comment as to the advisability of making them available for review and possible use. b^3
If no objections are made, the writer will arrange to allow access to this material.
to this material.
Martine Parts
with b3 -2-
and the second sec

ADDENDUM OF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION: HWP:pld 11/5/74 b3 The Intelligence Division interposes no objection to b7D the review, by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), of those serials listed above as Items 5, 6, 7, and 9, noting that Item 9 consists of an exchange of correspondence between Director Hoover and b3 Item 3. relating to b7D Item 4, a cover letter describing Item 3, should be considered for release based on the decision regarding Item 3. b1 b3 do not appear to be relevant to inquiry, and therefore it is suggested they not be released for review. wer for Jan 2

ADDENDUM OF LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION: THB: law 11-11-74

b3 With regard to making available certain FBI records Legal Counsel Division concurs for review by in the addendum recommendations made by the Intelligence Division with regard to items 1, 2, 3 and 4. No other objections are being made. Flowever, since access in this instance will be controlled, and will not involve reproduction of copies of the documents, no objection to making them available is being interposed. No objections to items 5 and 8.



b1

- 4 -

OPTIONAL FORMTINO, 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DATE: 918/2006 lemorandum CLASSIFIED DV 60 322 UJCP 061 m 919 DECLASSIFY ON: 25%3.3(October 22, 1974 MR. BASSETT ТО 3835 CLASSIFIED BY EXEMPT FROM GDS CATE R. D. COTTER 🖗 FROM DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION I DEFINITE 10_78 SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO FBI RECORDS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1985 She Afal 80 This memorandum recommends that on a carefully controlled basis b3 0 6895 we allow a review of certain historical FBI records by а Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) research specialist, who is conducting a detailed study of events during period (1940 - 1947) which led to establishment of CIA. Specie b1 b3 During December, 1973, we offered no objection to the release to of various 1940 - 1942 documents regarding these matters which had been prepared by Director J. Edgar Hoover and other FBI officials and which had located in the Archives. In the Spring of 1974, the results of research to date was published by CIA as a special supplement to its series / Studios in Intelligence, "which was classified "Secret" (copy attached) personally contacted me, as the Bureau's Document Classifib3 cation Officer, on 10/3/74 and expressed the hope that he could be granted access to additional FBI records during the 1940 - 1947 period to assist him in his continuing studies. At my suggestion, he has incorporated his request in the attached letter which was forwarded by letter of 10/10/74 from DEC 26 1974 has cited the following areas of particular interest In his ngtě FNCLOS Enclosures ENC. BEHIND FILE b3 b7D 1 - Messrs.' Adams, Bassett, Wannall (Att -Mintz (Att: ME INFORMATION CONTAINER HEREIN'IS UNCLASSIFIEDCONTINUED - OVER RDC:bhg (6) $\sqrt{37}$ b7C NA JANO VX1977 WHERE SHOWN 1975 <u>OTHERWISE</u>

Memorandum to Mr. Bassett b3 Re: <u>Request for Access to FBI Records</u> CIA b1 b2 b3 b7D

letter points out that access to Bureau records in these areas is for official and classified use and that no publication of our material would be made without the FBI's prior concurrence. In my discussion with he also gave his assurance that, if he is allowed access to any of our records, he will not publish anything, either as a CIA document or otherwise, without our specific approval.

OBSERVATIONS

This request appears to be a valid one aimed at a legitimate historical purpose. In view of the lapse of time involved, it is most unlikely that disclosure of any of the material involved would jeopardize any current Bureau sources or operations or would otherwise warrant classification under terms of the existing guidelines as set forth in Executive Order 11652. Our main concern would be to not release any material which would represent an invasion of the privacy of the various individuals involved. It is unlikely that much material of this type would be involved, however, since the files would consist almost entirely of copies of official correspondence (memoranda or letters between the Bureau and other agencies).

Under the circumstances, it is felt that we should accede to this request with the following caveats to be agreed to in advance by

I will check logical Bureau files concerning the topics of interest to (eliminating any material which might still be sensitive or which otherwise appears undesirable to grant access to). Thereafter, I will arrange to have review this material in our space and under my personal supervision. I will further obtain agreement to obtain our specific clearance to quote or copy material from any particular item as well as to submit for our prior approval any material he plans to publish based on FBI material. Following review,

2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

b3

 \mathbf{i}

1 Memorandum to Mr. Bassett Re: Request for Access to FBI Records CIA a separate memorandum will be submitted detailing any material which would be interested in using. b3 ACTION If you approve, arrangements will be made with to proceed under the above-outlined conditions. ADDENDUM BY INTELLIGENCE DIV .: WRW:1ml 10/23/74 Saccordingly, it is recommended that after the Bureau's Document Classification Officer has compiled material which he feels may be of such nature that it can be offered b1 for his review, such material be reviewed both by the to Interrigence Division and the Division of Legal Counsel prior to its b3 being exhibited to in warch to see any in critical of sonou other agencie , B- v on - 3

94-312 Rev. 12-11-73)

Ĵ,

j,

Date of Mail _____12/20/74

.

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

0

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

LE INFORMATION CONTAINTED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE GLP 2006 FY (072244)
ETER SIPLAN

Subject	JUNE MAIL	C.IAA.		
		Removed By	79 JAN 61975	
	1	File Number	62-80750-	

Permanent Serial Charge Out

Sie		
pt: 19 62 - 80750 - 5008	A IRIT	
	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCERC WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.	
	b1 b3	
I want to thank you for your Christmas Greetings. My associates and appreciative of your best wishes at thi time.	d I are most	
I am pleased that your relation the Sureau has been a pleasant one and appreciate your comment concerning Spool I know they will gratitude for your thoughtful remarks.	I very much cial Agents share my	•
With best wishes to you and y for a Happy Holiday Season, DATE:	Le local b7	С
MAILED 20 DEC 1 9 1974 CLASSIFI DEC LASS DEC LASS	IED BY 6322uc/LP 0G/m3 SIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9 18/2031	1400579 1821
<u>FBir</u> Tannall - Enclosure Personal Attention: Bring to the a Special Agents	attention of	
Dep. AD Adm 1 - Personnel File of SA Dep. AD Inv 1 - Personnel File of SA Asst. Dir.: 1 - Personnel File of SA Admin	- Enclosure Enclosure	
Comp. Jyst awt:jac (7) Ext. Affoirs 0 Files & Com 0 Gen. Inv 0 Inspection 0	CEL LW	
Intell Laboratory Plan. & Evol Spec. Inv Training 2.4. Legal Coun 2.4.	Contra Busi	
Telephone Rm AN 4.3 1975. Director Sec'y MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT	GPO 954-540	6

-

.

Clarence M. Kelley, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover Building Ninth and Pennsylvania Avenues, N. W. Room 4647 Washington, D. C. 20535 2 DIRECTOR À 2 DEC 13 74

5010-106 OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA_GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GO ERNMENT Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Adm. Memorandum Dep. AD inv. Asst. Dir.: Admin. Comp. Syst. DATE: 9/8/2005 November 5, 1974 Ext. Affairs MR. CALLAHAN то Files & Com. Gen. Inv Ident. (-0322)CLASSIFIED BY. Inspect H. N. BASSETT FROM DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C Intell. Laboratory Plan. & Eval. Spec. Inv. UBJECT : REQUEST ACCESS TO FBI RECORDS FOR Training CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. _ Director Sec'y b3 Re my memorandum 10/22/74 recommending that we allow review of who is conducting study of events (1940-1947) which certain FBI records by led to establishment of CIA. Intelligence Division recommended that any material first be reviewed by Intelligence Division and Legal Counsel. Director instructed he should see any material critical of other agencies or Major General Donovan. (5) b1 11 b3 COPY FILED KEC 44 These sections also contain several memoranda by FBI officials and/or SECORDED correspondence with the Attorney General concerning two areas of disagreement between FBI Director Hoover and General Donovan: (5) 1018 co-Enclosures 1 - Messrs. Adams, Mintz, Wannel 1 - Bufile 62-64427 NTINUED - OVER RDC:bhg .IUN (5) SEE ADDENDUM INTELLIGENCE SEE ADDENDUM LEGAL COUNSEL **DIVISION PAGE 3** DIVISION PAGE 4 A 0.9 5

Memorandum to Mr. Callahan Re: Request for Access to FBI Records b3 CIA b1 b3 5)

With reference to the matter involving Assistant Secretary of State Berle, the file does contain a memorandum 3/12/42 dictated by E. A. Tamm (serial 180) which summarizes a conversation he had with Mr. Berle. The latter discussed

b3 b7D

b3

It is felt that all of the material in these three sections is of possible value to ________and there is no apparent reason why we should withhold it, with the exception of several serials (serials 65, 89, 106, 165, and 210) which set out data obtained in confidence from sensitive sources of a critical nature regarding COI operations or personnel.

ACTION

Intelligence Division and Legal Counsel are requested to review the attached three file sections of 62-64427 and comment as to whether they concur in making them available for review. (Serials 65, 89, 106, 165, and 210 will be first removed.)

SERVET JEN

CONTINUED - OVER

ADDENDUM OF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

A

The Intelligence Division has no objection to the release for review by ______ of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of information contained in Sections 1 through 3, Bureau File 62-64427, with the exception of Serials 65, 89, 106, 163, 165, and 210. Serial 163 has been included among those serials previously considered for exclusion from review, as noted above, since it discloses, in an attachment, background investigation not related to the nature of _______inquiry.

PLM

11/6/74

b3

HWP:pld

ADDENDUM OF LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION THB: law 11-15-74

Legal Counsel Division has reviewed sections 1-3 of Bureau file 62-64427 with regard to request for access to information contained therein.


Serial 206 discloses

and is, therefore, objectionable due to possible privacy considerations. These 3 sections contain several serials identifying by name only, which might raise privacy and other issues if reproduced and disseminated by us; however, due to the controlled conditions of access set forth in referenced 10-22-74 memorandum, no objection is being interposed.

Serial 5 is an October, 1941, memorandum which makes reference to Nelson Rockefeller's organization's distribution of pro-American propaganda in Central and South America. Although the activity may be public knowledge, and not objectionable from a purely legal standpoint, it is questionable that we should make this document available for perusal at this time. Rockefeller's organization is also mentioned in serial 110, but identified in this instance only as an organization serviced by the Bureau along with the State Department and military intelligence agencies.

Legal Counsel Division concurs with addendum of the Intelligence Division and interposes no additional objections.

b3



captioned Liaison Officer, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Retirement " prepared by LFS:tdp.

b3

MAIL ROOM _____ TELETYPE UNIT ____

Imin. _

omp. Syst.

t. Affairs _

Sec'y ____

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum Comp. Syst. Exeration DATE: December 17, 1974 MR. BASSETT TO DATE: 9/8/2001 iles & Com Gen I CLASSIFIED BY LACE ACLASSIFY ON: 25X3.31 Inspe R. D. COTTER FROM Cohoratory Plan. & Eval Spec. Inv. SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO FBI RECORDS Training Legal Coun. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED - In Phone Ret HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCLORED I SAL Re your memorandum 11/5/74 which was approved recommending that b3 (who is compiling detailed history of CIA and its antecedents) we allow to review three sections of our file on H Seven serials containing FILED privileged information were withheld. 0 La. (4) On 12/2/74. reviewed this material under my supervision. COPY Based on this review he has asked for our permission to use 15 particular De documents 073 The 15 items in guestion (attached) relate to They b1 b3 contain nothing which would jeopardize current operations or sources, which would damage national security, or which would constitute an invasion of privacy The Freedom of Information Act Unit of the Legal Counsel Division has reviewed these 15 documents and has expressed opinion that nine of them (serials 19, 29, 96, 110, 133, 143, 161, 180 and 192) represent inter and intra-agency memoranda and could be construed to be exempt under Section (b) (5) of the Freedom of Information Act. Even if it is conceded, however, that these nine documents could be technically regarded as intra-agency material and could be withheld, it is not believed we should pursue this course under the existing circumstances. is not proceeding through FOIA channels and it is believed our posture should be one of cooperating with him in supplying this old historical material to the extent that it will not damage national security or FBI interests. The material b3 in question, including the nine serials cited by Legal Counsel. will in no way adversely affect either the national security or the Bureau and it is believed we should make them available to <u>Bureau administrative markings will be</u> excised prior to their release to ends roturnad 110 1101800 The Master SLODE CH2643 ACTION That copies of the attached items (serials X6, 19, 24, 29, 68, 76X, 76, 96, 99, 110, 133, 143, 161, 180 and 192) be furnished to for his use. previously indicated. s. Janams, Mintz, Wannall :bhg (5

a a construction of the second se	en e	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·····		
L L	PTIONAL FORM NO. 10 AT 1902 EDITION SA G2 J. REC. NO., 37 JNITED STATES COVERN	7		- Tral	Assoc, Dir, L
min	Memorandur	n		gr	Asst. Dir.: Admin.
то : М	Ir. Jenkins	DAT	E: 12-9-74		Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs
FROM J	. J. McDermött		ALL INFORMAT HEREIN IS UNIT DATE 9 8 120	ION CONTAINED	Ident Inspection Intell Laboratory Plan. & Eval
	ONGRESSIONAL OVE		C T A		Spec. Inv Tebining } Legol Court Telephone Rm
	ttee on Government Op		arings today, 1	5, Senate 2-9-74, on	Director Sec'y
Intellig	tive proposals to stren ence Agencies. Subco nator William E. Broc	mmittee Chairman I	Edmund S. Mus)
	Testimony was Charles McC. Mathia mer Attorney General	• • •	oward H. ⁷ Baker enator Gaylord	, Jr.,(R-Ter Nelson (D-W	m.), isc.)
on Intel program wanted gatheri intellig that Co specific the CIA told the Waterg Conseq report Senate (D-Mor of eight This Co and sub is estal intellig by this establis Encloss 1 - Mr 1 - Mr 1 - Mr	Baker is the coauthon lligence Oversight, his m. In addition to his s to make it emphatical ng functions by variou ence function may be r ongress should share th ed oversight. Under q a, after initially coope committee that it cou ate Committee that it cou ate Committee would h uently, Senator Baker as the information sou Resolution 419 which ont.). This Resolution t members equally div ommittee would delve omit a final report to t blished. Senator Math sence operations is a v special Committee be shment of a Joint Com	s testimony primaril statement, Senator E ly clear that he is no s agencies and felt the nore important than he overall responsib- uestioning by Senato rating with the Senato rating with the Senato added, "there was a ght was never delived was introduced by his calls for the establis- ided between the ma- into Governmental of he Senate no later the ias pointed out that ery "murky" problem fore taking any legis	o establish a Jo y was in support aker repeated of opposed to the hat perhaps tod in the recent p ility, however, or Muskie, he p watergate Co or ther informat the CIA Oversight a gap in the Watered." Senator m and Senator I shment of a bipa jority and mino perations on inter the whole area m and needs a sector all 1 - N s 1 - N	int Committee t of the over y emphasized e intelligence ay even the ast. He stre and have som ointed out that mmittee, fin ion and that t t Committee. tergate Comm Mathias supp Mike Mansfie artisan Comm rity parties. telligence act fter the Resol concerning study and inve	all he ssed he ssed he t ally he nittee ported ld nittee ivities hution

.

;

McDermott to Jenkins Re: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE NATION'S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Senator Nelson spoke in support of S. 2738 which was introduced by him andSenator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.). This bill would establish a Joint Committee to study the need to reorganize the departments and agencies engaged in surveillance and intelligence activities.

Former Attorney General Clark testified that none of the bills or resolutions before the Subcommittee were adequate to accomplish what he believes to be necessary. He urged the creation of a Joint Committee to have oversight capacity for all intelligence, investigation, enforcement and surveillance activity, foreign and domestic, including personnel inspection. Such a Committee, according to Clark, should include the majority and minority leaders in both Houses. Clark's proposal did not appear to be received with any great enthusiasm by Senators Muskie and Brock. One of Clark's suggestions would establish a Federal Investigative and Enforcement Review Board made up of representatives of citizen groups with power to hear and act on complaints of abuse and to review and recommend practices and procedures of all Federal intelligence, investigative, and enforcement agencies.

In response to questioning from Senator Muskie, Clark stated he had never heard of COINTELPRO while he was Attorney General, that former Director Hoover was totally independent with practically no Justice Department oversight and that the FBI should not engage in any type of intelligence or investigative activities in the absence of clearcut criminal violation.

Scheduled to appear before the Subcommittee tomorrow are Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., (R-Conn.); Professor Harry Howe Ransom, Vanderbilt University; Dr. Ray S. Cline, former Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and presently the Executive Director of Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University; Dr. Harold P. Ford, former Deputy Director, Office of Political Research, CIA, and presently the Program Director, Institute for the Study of Ethics and International Affairs, Washington, D. C.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information. al us being o uch wit

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION COMMUNICATIONS SECTION .e. -Assec. Dir. Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED DEC Dep.-A.D.-Inv._ HEREIM IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT 918/2000 Asst. Dir.: SSIFIED BY 603234C/CPI DE (MAR DAI WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. Adrain. DECLASSIFY ON: 2513.36) 8/8/20 2000. 5-12 CL Fles & Com Gen. Inv. APPROPRIATE AGENCIES 12:00 N URGENT 12/17/74 GJK Reed. UNY NR 232-17 TO DIRECTOR (C) PUCIA Plan. 🍕 Eval. (PŠ 2PSpec. Inv. Training ____ Legal Coun. _ Telephone Rm. Director Sec'y . Per CIA CENTARL IN FILGENCE ANGENCY b1 b3 (५) b7C (5) b1 IGINAL FILED IN b3 Sugar END PAGE ONE 51 JANO CLASS. & EXT. BY Per CIA REASON-FCIM II. 1-2. 4.2 2 TE OF REVIEW 12-17-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Adm. __ Memorandum Dep. AD Inv. 1 - Mrs. Metcalf Asst. Dir.: 1 - Mr. Adams Admin. Mr. W.R. Wannall Mar Kil Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs DATE 12/9/74 то Files & Com. _ Gen. Inv. 1 - Mr. McDermott Ident. 1[°]- Mr. Wannall Inspection Intell H.A. Boynton, Jr 1 - Mr. Branigan Laboratory . Mr. Cregar 7 Plan. & Eval. 1 -Spec. Inv. SUBJECT: 1 -Training . Coun. b1 1 -rerephone Rm. b3 Director Sec'y This recommends that an appropriate letter and autographed photograph of the Director be delivered to by Liaison. who is known as to many Bureau officials and Supervisors, is one of our mos important liaison contacts at CIA. As he has been most helpful to the Bureau since our re-establishment of Liaison with CIA in 1972. He has been particularly effective in insuring that the various operational elements at CIA adhere to the requirements of coordination with the Bureau set forth in our 1966 agreement with CIA. has completed years of service with CIA during which he served in a variety of positions abroad and at Headquarters. He is well-known throughout the intelligence community and highly respected as a capable and b1 professional intelligence officer. b3 **RECOMMENDATIONS:** It is recommended that the attached letter be (1)by Liaison. forwarded to It is further recommen<u>ded that the Director</u> (2) 300 1 19 autograph a copy of his photograph to to be A delivered by Liaison. Enclosure- Sent 12-17-7 LFS: tdp,c(10) INFORMATION CON WINCLASSIFIEDE DEC RO 1574 O Hilling DECLASSIFY ON: 18X3.3(

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 JULY 1973 EDITION GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES GOV RNMENT Memorandum DATE: :DIRECTOR, FBI 12/20/74 то FROM SAC. WFO SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY TECHNICAL MATTERS -TRAINING b1 ReBulet 12/6/74, concerning a 2 week training b3 program designed especially for SAs assigned to the ද) to be held in the WDC area 1/20-31/75. WFO requests Bureau authority for SAs b1 to attend this training (3) school. b3 7and were trans-These men are on the ferred to the BA Office until such time as heeded on the b7C project. WFO believes it essential to the project for these men to receive this training by the CIA. No per diem will be involved. A communication should be directed to the SAC Baltimore to insure their attendance at this training session. Other selections for this session will be made in early 1975 and the other SA assigned to BA who is involved in this project will be trained at a later date. REC-31 62 - 80750 - 5013 -X-103 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. 6588 Classified by 2 Exempt from GDS, Category.... Indefinite Date of Declassification ____ Bureau WFO 6. 6. 7. JHM:jak (3) DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3((). ENV U JAN 1 3 1915 Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

62-80750-5014 **CHANGED TO** 105-274419-7

MAY 6 1975 Belent

LL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE GILLORG BY 632260 4 (DG) MG
· PCt-v

4-528

1-Office, 7133 1-Mr. White 1-Mr. Wannall (Attn: Rm. 4637 JEH) 1. b7C January 7, 1975 67 By Courier Service Honorable William E. Colby Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 Dear Bill: Reference is made to your letter of October 23, 1974. approving my request b2 b3 b7E Please advise whether training of five Special Agents instead of four is acceptable. cres. Sincerely yours, Clarence M. Kelley Director Copies of pertinent background correspondence are NOTE: attached. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED Assoc. Dir. b7C Dep. AD Adm. _ HEFLEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Dep. AD Inv. ____ sst. Dir.: DATESIL 2rsh Admin. Comp. Syst. REC=18 FPS: fdp(6)ixt. Affairs iles & Com tab en. Inv ent. spection »II. '__' ald ् ((इंग्रे oratory 19 JAN 14 1975 1. & Eva . Inv. ing ulon Coun one Rm MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT Sec'y

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 5010-106 Assoc. D UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Dep. AD A Mr. Callahan 1 -ĎЪ. ልብ' emorandum sst. Dir.: Mr. Jenkins 1 ----Admin. - Mr. McDermott 1 Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs DATE: 12/24/74Mr. J. B. Adams Files & Com. 1 - Mr. Mintz Gen. Inv. b7C Ident. 1 -Mr. Wannall Mr. W. R. Wannall Internet 1 MIL INFORMATION CONTLINED Laboratory Planes Eval. _ UNTRAIN IS UNCLASSIFIED L Spec. Inv. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) VHENE SHOWN OTHERVISE Traini. Legal cb7C Telephone Rm. ___ b1 Director Secty b3 ROO The media has reported that the CIA was involved 2001 863 in a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation during CLASSIMED BY \Im the Nixon Administration, directed against the antiwar 3 5 we movement and other dissident groups in the U.S. Attached is an article from the Sunday Edition of the "New York Times, 12/22/74, written by Seymor M. Hersh, wherein he alleges 6 DATE: To that CIA maintained intelligence files on 10,000 American citizens, as well as engaging in break-ins, wiretaps, and τ the surreptitious inspection of mail in the U.S. beginning in the 1950's. (On the morning of 12/24/74, Mr. William Colby, Director of CIA, called to speak to the Director. In his absence he spoke to Mr. Jenkins. b3 62-80750=50 **REC 68** Colby's Jenkins, the following: advised of Z JAN 10 1975 b1 b3 (3) Enclosures 3. OV LFS:j1b 4 CONTINUED -(7) Classi fiec by 12 Exempt from GDS, Category Number Date of Declassification Indefinite b7C

Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Adm. Dep. AD Adm. Dep. AD Inv. Com. C



Richard Helms



James R. Schlesinger



The New York Times William E. Colby



b7C


The Washington Post ______ Washington Star-News _____ Daily News (New York) _____ The New York Times _____ The Wall Street Journal ______ The National Observer _____ The Los Angeles Times _____


Date 12/22/74

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IN UNGLASSIFIED DATE 122113 BY 9803 COS/AC

SP 1 Cic/Alm 4/9/94 C.A.#88-1826 pea CDA Review of 6/4/94

62-807.50-50/6 1 ENCLOSURI





We will continue to follow this matter and keep the Director apprised of any significant developments.

SECRET

b2 b3

FILES ON CITIZENS

Helms Reportedly Got Surveillance Data in Charter Violation

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Dec. 21—The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administraticfn against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States, according to well-placed Government sources.

An extensive investigation by The New York Times has established that intelligence files on at least 10,000 American citi¹ zens were maintained by a special unit of the C.I.A. tha was reporting directly to Rich² ard Helms, then the Director of Central Intelligence and now the Ambassador to Iran.

In addition, the sources said, a check of the C,I.A.'s domestic files ordered last year by Mr. Helms's successor, James R. Schlesinger, produced evidence of dozens of other illegal activities by members of the C.I.A. inside the United States, beginning in the nineteen-fifties, including break-ins, wiretapping and the surreptitious inspection of mail.

A Different Category

Mr. Schlesinger was succeeded at the C.I.A. by William E. Colby in late 1973.

Those alleged operations, while also prohibited by law? were not targeted at dissiden: American citizens, the source: said, but were a different category of domestic activities that were secretly carried out as part of operations aimed at suspected foreign intelligence agents operating in the United States.

Under the 1947 act setting up the C.I.A., the agency was forbidden to have "police, subptena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions," inside the United States. Those responsibilities fall to the F.B.I., which maintains a special internal security unit to deal, with foreign intelligence threats. Mr. Heinis, who left the ... I. A. in February, 1973, for his new post in Teheran, could, not be reached despite telephone calls there yesterday and today.

Network of Informants

Charles Cline, a duty officer at the American Embassy in Teheran, said today that a note informing Mr. Helms of the yequest by The Times for comment had been delivered to Mr. Helms's quarters this morning. By late evening Mr. Helms had not returned the call.

"This is explosive, it could destroy the agency," one official with access to details of the alleged domestic spying on dissidents call in an interview.

He described the program as similar in intent to the Army domestic surveillance programs that were censured by Congress four years ago.

"There was no excuse for what the agency did," the source said. "What you had was an insulated secret police agency not under internal question or audit."

agency not under internal question or audit." The disclosure of alleged llegal C.I.A. activities is the first confirmation of rumors that have been circulating in Washington for some time. A number of mysterious burglaries and incidents have come to light since the break-in at Democratic party headquarkers in the Watergate complex on June 17, 1972.

Thoughout the public hearings and courtroom testimony on Watergate, Mr. Helms and other high-level officials insisted that the C.I.A. had been "duped"- into its Watergate involvement by the White House.

As part of its alleged effort figainst dissident Americans in the late nineteen-sixties and harly nineteen-seventies, the yources said, the C.I.A. authorized agents to follow and photograph participants in antiwar and other demonstrations. The C.I.A. also set up a network of informants who were ordered to penetrate antiwar groups, the sources said.

At least one avowedly antiwar member of Congress was among those placed under surveillance by the C.I.A., the sources said. Other members of Congress were said to be included in the C.I.A.'s dossier on dissident Americans.

The names of the various Congressmen could not be learned, nor could any specific information about domestic C.I.A. break-ins and wiretappings be obmined.

とく

It also contract the determined whether the Helms had what specific auti-offly from "top aldes to initiate the alleged domestic surveillance, or whether Mr. Holms had informed the President of the fruits, if any of the alleged operations.

Distress Reported

These alleged activities are known to have distressed both Mr. Schlesinger, now the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Colby. Mr. Colby has reportedly told cassociates that he is considering the possibility of asking the Attorney General to institute legal action against some of those who had been involved in the clandestine domestic activities.

One official, who was directly involved in the initial C.I.A. inquiry last year into the alleged domestic spying, said that Mr. Schlesinger and his assoicates were unable to learn what Mr. Nixon knew, if anything.

thing. Mr. Colby refused to comment on the domestic spying issue. But one clue to the depth of his feelings emerged during an off-the-record talk he gave Monday night at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Foreign Relations in New York. The C.I.A. chief, who had been informed the previous week of the inquiry by The Times, said at the meeting that he had ordered a complete investigation of the agency's domestic activities and had found some improprieties.

But he is known to have Widded, "I think family skeletons are best left where they are--in the closet."

He then said that the "good thing about all of this was the red flag" was raised by a group of junior employes inside the agency.

It was because of the prouding from below, some sources have reported, that Mr. Coby decided last year to inform the chairmen of the House and Senate Intelligence Oversight Committees of the domestic activities.

Mr. Schlesinger, who became Secretary of Defense after serving less than six months at the C.I.A., similarly refused to disclass the domestic spying activijies.

But he was described by an associate as extremely concerned and disturbed by what he discovered at the C.I.A. upon replacing Mr. Helms. "He found himself in a celis-

"He found himself in a cellspool," the associate said. "He was having a grenade blowing up in his face every time he turned around."

The Ellsberg Affair

Mr. Schlesinger was at the C.I.A. when the first word of the agency's involvement in the September, 1971, burglary of the office of Dr. Daniel Elisberg's psychiatrist by the White House security force known as the "plumbers" became known. It was Mr. Schlesinger who also discovered and turned over to the Justice Department a series of letters written fo Mr. Helms by James W. Mc-Cord Jr., one of the origiral Watergate defendants and a former C.I.A. security official. The letters, which told of White Fouse involvement in the Watergate burglary, had been deposited in an agency office.

The associate said one result of Mr. Schlesinger's inquiries into Watergate and the domestic aspects of the C.I.A. operations was his executive edict ordering a halt to all questionable counterintelligence operations inside the United States. During his short stay at the C.I.A., Mr. Schlesinger also initiated a 10 per cent employe cutback. Because of his actions, the associate said, security officials at the agency decided to fucrease the number of his personal bodyguards. It could not be learned whether that action was taken after a threat.

Many past and present C.I.A. men acknowledged that Mr. Schlesinger's reforms were halder to bear because he was an outsider.

Mr. Colby, these men said, i walle continuing the same bas c programs initiated by his predecessor, was viewed by some internal critics as "the saving force" at the agency because as a former high-ranking official himself in the C.I.A.'s clandestine services, he had the respect and power to ensure that the alleged illegal domestic programs would cease.

Some sources also reported that there was widespread aper shredding at the acency hortly after Mr. Schlesinger Legan to orack down on the C.I.A.'s operations.

Asked about that, however, Government officials said that they could "guarantee" that the domestic intelligence files we e still intact.

"There's certainly been to order to destroy them," one official said.

When confronted with the Times's information about the C.I.A.'s domestic operations earlier this week, high-ranking A merican intelligence officials Confirmed its basic accuracy, but cautioned against drawing "unwarranted conclusions." Espienage Feared

Those officials, who insisted on not being quoted by name, contended that all of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities, against American citizens were, initiated in the belief that foreign governments and foreign espionage may have been involved.

"Anything that we did was in the context of foreign counterintelligence and it was focused at foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence problems," one official said.

The official also said that the requirement to maintain files of American citizens emanated, in part, from the so-called Huston plan. That plan, named for its author, Tom Charles Huston, a Presidential aide, was a White House project in 1970 calling for the use of such, illegal activities as burglaries and wiretapping to combat antiwar activities and student turmoil that the White House believed was being "fomented" —as the Huston plan stated by black extremists.

Former President Richard M. Nixon and his top aides have repeatedly said that the proposal, which had been adamantly opposed by J. Edgar Hoover, then the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was never implemented. Government intelligence offi-

Government intelligence officials did not dispute that assertion, but explained that, nonetheless, the C.I.A.'s decision for maintain domestic files dh American citizens "obvious'y got a push at that time."

"Yes, you can say that the C.I.A. contribution to the Huston plan was in the foreign counterintelligence field," one official said.

'A Spooky Way'

"The problem is that it was handled in a very spooky way." "If you're an agent sitting in Paris and you're asked to findout whether Jane Fonda is being manipulated by foreign intelligence services, you've got to ask yourself who is the real target," the official said. "Is i the foreign intelligence services or Jane Fonda?"

However, this official and others insisted that al domestic C.I.A. operations against American citizens had now ceased and that instructions had been issued to insure that they could not occur again.

A number of well-informed official sources, in attempting to minimize the extent of alleged wrongdoing posed by the C.I.A.'s domestic actions, suggested that the laws were fuzzy in connection with the so-called "gray" area of C.I.A.-F.B.I. operations — that is, when an American citizen is approached inside the United States by a suspected foreign intelligence agent. The legislation setting up the C.I.A. makes the director "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." One official with close access to Mr. Colby contended at length in an interview yesterday that the C.I.A.'s domestac actions were not illegal because of the agency's legal right to prevent the possible revelation of secrets.

'Gray Areas'

"Look, you do run into gray areas," the official said, "and, unquestionably, some of this fell into the gray area. But the director does have an obligation to guard hie sources and methods. You get some foreign er snooping around and you have to keep track."

"Let's suppose as an acabi demic exercise, hypothetically," the official said, "that a foreigner believed to be an intelligence agent goes to a Washington newspaper office to see a reporter. What do you [the C.I.A.] do? Because it's a Washington newspaper office and a reporter, do you scratch that from the C.I.A.'s record? "Sure, the C.I.A. was follow-

ing the guy, but he wasn't an American."

A number of other intelligence experts, told of that is ample, described it as a victor of the 1947 statute and a clear example of an activity, even if shvolving a foreigner, from Which the C.I.A. is barred. From Which the C.I.A. is barred of the short of a state of the short of the short

cluded "a clear prohibition against any internal security functions under any circumstances."

Professor Ransom said that his research of the Congressional debate at the time the C.I.A. was set up makes clear that Congress expressed concern over any police state tactics and intended to avoid the possibility. Professor Ransom quoted one member as having said during floor debate, "We don't want a Gestapo."

Similar reservations about the C.I.A.'s role in domestic affairs were articulated by Mr. Colby during his confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee in Suptember, 1973.

Armed Services committee in Suptember, 1973. Asked by Senator Stuar Symington, Democrat of Misseuri, about the "gray" area in the 1947 legislation, Mr. Colby disavowed it, saving:

5

"My interpretation of that particular provision is that it gives me a 'charge but does not give me authority. It gives me the job of identifying any problem of protecting sources and methods, but in the event I identify one it gives me the responsibility to go to the appropriate authorities with that information and it does not give me any authority to act on my own.

'No Authority' "So I really see less of a gray area [than Mr. Helms], in that regard. I believe that there is really no authority under that act that can be used."

Beyond his briefings for Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, and Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, the respective chairmen of the Senate and House Intelligence subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees, Mr. Colby apparently had not informed other Ford Administration officials us of yesterday of the C.I.A. problems.

"Counterintelligence!" one high-level Justice Department official exclaimed upon being given some details of the C.I.A.'s domestic operations. "They're not supposed to have 'any counterintelligence in ti is country."

"Oh, my God," he said, "ch, my God."

A former high-level F.B.I. official who operated in domestic counterintelligence areas since World War I, expressed astonishment and then anger upon being told of the C.I.A.'s activities.

"We had an agreement with them that they weren't to do anything unless they checked with us," he said, "They doube-crossed me all along."

He said he had never been told by his C.I.A. counterintelligence colleagues of any of the alleged domestic operatichs that took place.

Mr. Huston, now an Ir'lianapolis attorney, said in a telephone conversation yesterday that he had not learned of any clandestine domestic C.I.A. activities while he worked in the White House.

Huston Disagrees

Mr. Huston took vigorous exception to a suggestion by intelligence officials that his proposed White House domestic intelligence plan resulted in increased pressure on the CI.A. toccollect domestic intelligence.

"There was nothing in that program that directed the C.I.A. to do anything in this country," Mir Huston said. "There was nothing that they could rely on to justify anything like this. The only thing we ever asked them for related to activities outside the United States," Two months 2go, Rolling Stone magazine published a lengthy list of more than a dozen unsolved break-ins and burglaries and suggested that they might be linked to as ygt undisclosed C.I.A. or F.B.I. at tivities.

Senator Howard H. Baker Jr¹, Republican of Tennessee, who was vice chairman of the Senete Watergate committee, has publicly spoken of mysterious C.I.A. links to Watergate. The White House transcripts of June 23, 1972, show President Nixon saying to H. R. Haldeman, his chief of staff, "Well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things."

The remark, commented upon by many officials during recent interviews, could indicate Presidential knowledge about the C.I.A.'s domestic activities.

The possible Watergate link is but one of many questionslosed by the disclosures about the C.I.A. that the Times sources say they believe can be unraveled only by extensive Congressional hearings.

The C.I.A. domestic activities

during the Nixon Administration were directed, the source said, by James Angleton, who is still in charge of the Counterintelligence Department, the agency's most powerful and y systerious unit.

Anysterious unit. As head of counterin'el'igence, Mr. Angleton is in Charge of maintaining the C.I.A.'s "sources and methods of intelligence," which means that he and his men must insure that foreign intelligence agents do not penetrate the C.I.A.

The Times's sources, who included men with access to firsthand knowledge of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities; took sharp exception to the official suggestion that the agency's domestic activities were the result of legitimate counterintelligence needs.

"Look, that's how it starte"," one man said. "They were luckin? for evidence of foreign invelvement in the antiyar movement. But that's not flow it ended up. This just grew and mushroomed internally."

"Maybe they began with a check on Fonda," the source said, speaking hypothetically. "But then they began to check on her friends. They'd see her at an antiwar rally and take photographs. I think this was going on even before the Huston plan.

'Highter Geoglinated'

"This wasn't a series of isolated events. It was highly coordinated. People were targeted, information was conlected on them, and it was all put on [computer] tape, just like the agency does with the promation about K.G.B. [Sour] agents.

"Every one of these act is was blatantly illegal."

Another official with ¹⁶ cc. Another official with ¹⁶ cc. said that the illegal activities incovered by Mr. Schlesinger its year included break-ins and electronic surveillances that had been undertaken during the fifties and sixties.

"During the fifties, this was routine stuff," the official said. "The agency did things that would amaze both of us, but some of this also went on in the late sixties, when the country and atmosphere had changed."

The official suggested that what he called the "Nixon a tiwar hysteria" may have been a major factor in the C.I.A.'s, decision to begin maintaining domestic files on American citizens.

One public clue about the White House pressure for C.I.A. involvement in the intelligence efforts against antiwar activists came during Mr. Helms's testimony before the Senate Watergate committee in August, 1973.

Mr. Helms told how the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board had once suggerted that the agency could "make a contribution" in domestic intelligence operations.

· 'No Way'

"I pointed out to them very quickly it could not, there was no way," Mr. Helms said. "Bitt this was a matter that ke coming up in the context of feelers: Isn't there somebody else that can take on some of these things if the F.B.I. isn't doing them as well as they should, as there are no other facilities?"

The Times's sources, reflecting the thinking of some of the junior C.I.A. officials who began waving "the red flag" inside the agency, were harshly critical of the leadership of Mr. Felms.

⁸ These junior officials are known to believe that the domestic spying on antiwar activists originated as an ostensibly legitimate counterintelligence operation to determine whether the antiwar movement had been penetrated by foreign agents.

In 1969 and 1970, the C.I.A. was asked by the White House to determine whether foreign governments were supplying undercover agents and funds to antiwar radicals and Black Panther groups in the United States. Those studies, conducted by C.I.A. officials who reportedly did not know of the alleged secret domestic intelligence activities, concluded that there was no evidence of foreign support.

"It started as a foreign intelligence operation and it bureau-cratically grew," one source said. "That's really the answer." The source added that Mr. Angleton's counterintelligence department "simply began using

the same techniques for foreigners against new targets here."

Along with accembling the

domestic intelligence dossiers, the source said, Mr. Angleton's department began recruiting informants to infiltrate some of the more militant dissiden?

groups. "They recruited plants, in formers and doublers [double agents]," the source said. "They were collecting information and when counterintelligence collects information, you use all of those techniques. "It was like a little F.B.I." operation."

This source and others howledgeable about the C.I.A. believe that Mr. Angleton was permitted to continue his do-nuestic operations because of the great power he wields inside the agency as director of counterintelligence.

It is this group that is charged with investigating allegations against C.I.A. personnel made by foreign agents who defect; in other words, it must deter-mine whether a C.I.A. man named by a defector is, in fact, a double agent.

Victor Marchettl, a former C.I.A. official, said in a book published this year that the 'counterintelligence staff operates on the assumption that the agency — as well as other elements of the United States Government-is penetrated by the K.G.B.

"The chief of the C.I.A. staff Mr. Marchetti did not identify Mr. Angleton] is said to keep a list of the 50 or so key posi-tions in the CIA. which are nost likely to have been in-filtrated by the opposition, and he reportedly keeps the per-sons in those positions under constant surveillance."

Fear and Awe

Dozens of other former C.I.A. men talked in recent interviews with similar expressions of fear and awe about Mr. Angleton, an accomplished botanist and Yile graduate who once edited a poetry magazine there.

A 11700 P

-by former C.I.A. officials as an unrelenting com warrior who was convinced that the Soviet Union was playing a major role: in the antiwar activities.

"He honestly has the kind of spook mentality where he can one former high-level C.I.A. of-ficial said. "For example, he's convinced that too many members of the press had ties to the Soviet Union. Anybody who writes anything friendly to the

Soviet Union he considers

Another former official charscterized counterintelligence as "an independent power in the CI.A. Even people in the agen-cy aren't allowed to deal di-rectly with the CI. [counterin-tollizeneal need by telligence] people.

"Once in it," he said, "you're in it for life."

Most of the domestic surveillance and the collection of Homestic intelligence was conducted, the sources said, by one

of the most clandestine units in. the United States intelligence community, the special opera-tions branch of counterintelligence. It is these men who perform the foreign wiretaps and break-ins authorized by higher intelligence officials.

'Deep Snow Section'

"That's really the deep snow section," one high-level intelli-gence expert said of the unit.

whose liaison with Mr. Helms was conducted by Richard Ober, a long-time counterintelligence official, who has served

Despite intensive interviews, little could be learned about the procedures involved in the alleged domestic activities except for the fact that the operation was kept carefully shielded from other units inside the C.I.A.

One former high-level aide who worked closely with Mr. Helms in the executive offices of the agency recalled that Mr. Ober held frequent private meetings with Mr. Helms in the late sixties and early seventles. "Ober had unique and very confidential access to Heinis

the former C.I.A. man said. "I always assumed he was muck-ing about with Americans who

were abroad and then would come back, people like the Black Panthers."

'Nothing I Can Say'

The official said he had learned that Mr. Ober had quickly assembled "a large staff of people who acquired enormous amounts of data, more than I thought was justified After the unveiling of the domestic operations by Mr. Schlesinger last year, sources said Mr. Ober was abruptly trans ferred from the C.I.A. to a staff position with the National Security Council.

"They didn't fire him," one well-informed source said, "but they didn't want him around. The C.I.A. had to get rid of him, he was too emparrassing, too hot."

The source added that Mr. Ober had vehemently defended his actions as justified by national security.

A Government intelligence official, subsequently asked about Mr. Ober, denied that his transfer to the National Security Council was a rebuke in any wav.

Reached by telephone at his office this week, Mr. Ober re-fused to discuss the issue.

"There's nothing I can say about this," he said.

Mr. Angleton, also reached by telephone this week at his suburban Washington home; denie that his counterintelligence de partment operated domestically "We know our jurisdiction," he s. id.

Mr. Angleton told of a report from a United States agent in Moscow who was relaying information to the C.I.A. on the underground and radical bombings in the United States during the height of the antiwar activity.

"The intelligence was not acquired in the United States," "it; Mr. Angleton declared, came from Moscow. Our source there is still active and still procuctive; the opposition still coesn't know."

Mr. Angleton then described how the C.I.A. had obtained information from Communist sources about the alleged dem-olition training of black mili-tants by the North Koreans. He also told of recent intelligence ef.orts involving the K.G.B. and Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

A number of former important F.B.I. domestic intelligence sources took issue with Mr. Angelton's apparent suggestion that the domestic antiwar activity was linked to the Soviet Union.

1

"There was a lot of stuff on adicals in the United States] hat came in from the C. A. overseas," one former official recalled, but he said a lot of it was worthless.

Other <u>stucials</u> closely involved with United States intelligence expressed amazement and dismay that the head of counterintelligence would make such random suggestions during a telephone conversation with a newsman.

tion with a newsman. "You know," said one member of Congress who is involved with the monitoring of C.I.A. activities, "that's even a better story than the domestic spying."

'The Student Movement

(me former C.I.A. official whi) participated in the 1969 and 1970 White House-directed studies of alleged foreign involvement in the antiwar movement said that Mr. Angleton "undoubtedly believes that foreign agents were behind the student movement, but he doesn't know what he's talking about."

The official also raised a question about the bureaucratic procedures of the C.I.A. under Mr. Helms.

"We dealt with Ober and we dealt with Angleton on these studies, went over them point by point, and Angleton, while not exactly enthusiastic, signed off," the official said.

The official said he could not reconcile Mr. Angleton's decision to permit the studies, which reported finding no evidence of foreign involvement, thile mounting an elaborate and secret domestic security peration to root out alleged preign activities. The results of the studies were forwarded to Henry A. Kissinger, then President Nixon's national security adviser.

A number of former F.A.^{*}. officials said in interviews that the C.I.A.'s decision to mount domestic break-ins, wiretaps and similarly illegal counterintelligence operations undoubtedly reflected, in part, the long-standing mistrust between the two agencies.

In 1970, Mr. Hoover reportedly ordered his bureau to break off all but formal liaison contact with the C.I.A., forcing lower level C.I.A. and F.B.I. offficials to make clandestine arrangements to exchange information.

By the late sixties, one former F.B.I. official said, all but token cooperation between the two agencies on counterintelligence and counterespionage had ended.

"The C.I.A. was never satisfied with the F.B.I. and I can't blame them," the former official said. "We did hit-or-miss jobs. "We were constantly cutting

the throats of the C.I.A. in our dealing with them. If the White House knew about it, they were too afraid of Hoover to do anything about it."

The former aide cited a case in the late sixties in which Mr. Angleton turned to F.B.E. for a domestic investigation because he "believed four or five guys were agents, including two guys still in the agency [C.I.A.] and three or four who hid been high-level."

"They were suspected of having dealings with fireign intelligence agents," the image

"We just went through the motions on our investigation. It was just a brushoff."

Before Mr. Hoover's decision to cut off the working relationship, the former official added, the F.B.I.—as the agency responsible for domestic counterintelligence—would, as a mateter of policy, conduct a majorclandestine inquiry into the past and present C.I.A. men. Despite Mr. Hoover's provoc-

Despite Mr. Hoover's provocative actions, the former F.B.I. man said, the C.I.A. still was, not justified in taking domestic action.


"If they did any surreptitious bag jobs [break-ins]," he said, "they'd better not have told me about it."

MR. CALLAHAN


12-24-74

T. J. JENKINS

NEW YORK TIMES REPORT ON CLA OPERATIONS IN DOMESTIC FIELD



\$ MAY 1942 EDITION - 10 5010-106 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Assoc. Dir. ... 1 - Mr. J. W. Marshall _-Dep. AD Adm. _ emorandum Dep. AD-Inv. 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall Asst. Dir.: - Mr. B. P. Fisher Admin. _ Comp. Syst. Mr. W. R. Wannall Muiling 82 Ext. Affairs DATE 1/3/75 то b7C . 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan Ident. 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar Inspection Mr. H. A. Boynton, Jr. FROM 1 1 aboratory 1 Plan. & Eval. Training ____ SUBJEC 131/2006 ALL INFORMATION CONTRACTOR b1 Legal Ĉoun. m1 { 5) Telephone Rm. _ b3 CLASSIFIED BA Director Sec'y SIMINI OTHERWISE DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3 Latter (5) b1 DIRECTOR. FBI FROM: b3 TO: SUBJECT: ()Teletypes from CIA in similar cases will be addressed as follows: DIRECTOR, FBI TO: ATTENTION: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION/CI-1 (MR. BRANIGAN) OR CI-2 SUBJECT: 62 8075 (5 LFS:tdp/jcp OVER 13 1975 CONTINUED b7C 3 JAN 2 1 1975



ACTION:

For information of the Communications Section, Files and Communications Division, and Sections CI-l and CI-2 of the Intelligence Division.

fur Julipo when 14



- 2 -

5010-106 OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA BEN, REG. N. 27 -5 a. ¹ . UNITED STATES G ERNMENT Assoc. Dir. Dep. Memorandum Dep. - Mr. Adams 1 Asst. Di Mr. Wannall Admin. Comp. Syst Mr. W. R. Wannall Ext. Affairs DATE: 1/6/75 то Files & Com. Gen. Inv. A. B. Fult 1 - Mr. Branigan 1 - Mr. Cregar FROM 1 Laboratory 1 Plan. & Eval 1 Spec. Inv. SUBJECT h7Cloun **u** b3 Telephone Rm. ___ Director Sec'y ___ FIED EX The 1/3/75 edition of The Washington Post contained an article entitled "Former CIA-FBI Liaison Man Sees Operational 'Gray Areas'" (attached) which contains results of interview of former SA Sam J. Papich, who, prior to his retirement in 1970, handled liaison between the FBI and CIA for approximately 18 years. Papich cited what he called "gray areas" where the CIA crossed into domestic operations for what he said were legitimate reasons. He blamed confusion about CIA's role on what he called a statute (the National Security Act of 1947 which established the CIA) that "goes from the vague to the ridiculous." COMMENT: b^2 bЗ The article then goes on to say that in a typical year, according to Papich, some 2000 Americans are approached by Soviet Agents in this country or overseas in an<u>attempt</u> to convert them into spies. DECLASSIFY ON: 25X REC.63 62 - 8073 COMMENT: b2 CLASSIFIED BY. DATE: 518 RECLUSES. Attachments (3) Classified by 4375 b7C FJC:ims Exempt/from GDS, Categories 2 & 3 Date of Declassification Indefinite m. CONTINUED - OVER ENVELOPE 62-80750

SECKET Memorandum from A. B. Fulton to Mr. W. R. Wannall b3 Re: b2 In this article, Papich points out that hundreds of defectors come to this country from Soviet countries and there is a procedure for processing them involving the CIA. (5) According to the article, Papich said the CIA b1 cultivated foreigners living in this country to obtain inforb3 mation on their homelands. 6 According to Papich, CIA handled its own security and this was another area where the Agency became involved in checking the backgrounds of American citizens. In policing its own employees, Papich said the CIA would require wiretaps if it had found a possible Soviet spy within the Agency. 5 CONTINUED - OVER

7			
	SECRET	b3	
.)	Memo <u>randum from A. B. Fulton to Mr. W. R.</u> Wannall Re:		
6			b1 b3
	According to the article, Papich stated that ofted delays occurred when authority for operations was being tra- ferred from CIA to the FBI.	en ans-	
	COMMENT:		
			b3
	The article also stated the CIA is accused of interferring with U.S. domestic activity when it seeks help for its overseas work from universities.	, p	
6			
	The article related that Papich stated the CIA of helped the FBI keep an eye on Soviets visiting the United States or employed here.	ften,	bi bi

(1)

CONTINUED - OVER

U

.

SECRET Memorandum from A. B. Fulton to Mr. W. R. Wannall b3 Re: (4) b1 b3

ACTION:

None. For information.


WRWLFUL

Jun Me

K

SEC

*



By Ronald Kessler Washington Post Staff Writer

The former liaison man between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation said yesterday that the statutory restriction against CIA domestic activity is impossible to follow.

Sam Papich, who was the FBI's liaison man with the CIA for 18 years until he retired in 1970, cited what he called "gray areas" where the CIA has crossed into domestic operations for what he said were legitimate reasons.

Papich, who said he dealt with these crossovers on a daily basis, blamed confusion about the CIA's role on what he called a statute that "goes from the vague to the ridiculous."

A former CIA attorney acknowledged yesterday that the 1947 statute establishing the CIA has "gray areas," but he said many examples of CIA domestic activity cited over the years have been both legal and proper.

For example, he said, a CIA training program for local police departments was widely thought to have been aimed at an war activists and therefore represented an incursion into the domestic field. In fact, said the former CIA official who said he approved the program at the time, its purpose was to share with local police several devices and methods the CIA had developed in its own work.

One device, he said, aids in the apprehension of murderers by detecting whether a suspect has held a piece of metal in the past 24 hours.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi D. Mich., who heads a congressional committee with oversight powers over the CIA, suggested when he was informed of the program that it should have been carried out by the FBI, the former CIA attorney said. But he said the program did not violate the CIA charter.

The charter says the CIA shall have "no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." But it also says the CIA director is "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." And it charges the agency with performing "such other functions and duties related to intleligence affecting the national security as the National Security Agency may from time to time direct."

Panich said areas where the CIA became involved in doIdent. _____ Inspection Intell. WW Mu Laboratory ____ Plan. & Eval. ___ Spec. Inv. ____ Training ____ Legal Coun. ____ Telephone Rm. ___ Director Sec

Assoc. Dir. ___

Asst. Dir.: Admin.

Dep. AD Adm. __ Dep. AD Inv. ___

Comp. Syst. ____ Ext. Affairs ____ Files & Com. ___

Gen. Inv. _____

b7C

1-6 The Washington Post . Washington Star-News ____ Daily News (New York) ____ The New York Times _____ The Wall Street Journal _____ The National Observer _____ The Los Angeles Times ____

Date 1-3.75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFEB DATES/1/2011 BY 037240 11 DG/my

62.80750-5018

mestic matters uded deal-

ing with A cans approached by Social agents, Soviet visitors a pies in the United States, and Americans who work for the CIA or apply for jobs there.

In these and other areas, Papich said, the CIA and FBI functions appeared to overlap, and informal guidelines had been developed for handling the situations.

In a typical year, Papich said, some 2,000 Americans are approached by Soviet agents either in this country or overseas in an attempt to convert them into spies

"If you get a report that Mollie Brown while she was in Moscow was approached, what do you do? Nine times out of 10 she's a good girl, but maybe naive, and nothing happened." But background checks will be made on her, and a file could be opened at CIA headquarters because the CIA originally discovered that she had been contacted, Papich said,

"Hundreds of defectors come to this country from Soviet countries," said Papith, who heads a New Mexico organized crime commission. "There was a procedure for processing them. Who is going to be responsible for settling them? Many are neurotic, misfits — they have to be wetnursed. Is he for real? The CIA had to stay on top of them. If they had problems, they had to get them straightened out."

In addition, Papich said, the QIA cultivated foreigners living in this country to obtain information on their homelands.

lands. "The CIA would handle Cuban nationals here to get information on Soviet missiles in Cuba," he said. Such work might also be handled by the FBI with CIA assistance.

"Maybe he [the FBI agent handling, a case] has never been abroad. It would only be logical to bring in a CIA expert," he said.

The CIA handled its own security, Papich said, and this is another area where the agency becomes involved in checking the backgrounds of American citizens.

"They had their own offices of security," he said. "What they did to protect them we never got involved in, except when it appeared an employee had violated the law." In policing its own employees, Papich said, the CIA would require wiretaps if it had found a possible Soviet spy within the agency.

Diten, Papich said, deays courrest then authority for a particular operation was being transferred from the CIA to

"A Soviet spy in Frence out of the blue travels to the U.S.," he said "You don't just pick up the phone and teil rioover. It might take a week to three months. The FBI people have to become acclimated (to the subject). Let's say the CIA knows a double agent who is a source. You don't automatically turn him over to the FBI. He might not want to deal with the FBI. You might get them (the CIA) operating for six months in the U.S."

Papich said the CIA is accused of interfering in U.S. domestic activities when it seeks help for overseas work from universities. "A fellow goes to XYZ university and contacts a professor to write an article that will be planted overseas," he said "It never runs smonthly. We (the United States) weren't cut out for it."

In addition, he said, the CIA often helped the FBI to keep an eye on Soviets visiting the United States or employed here.

"They always had one or two KGB (Soviet intelligence) agents in the group," he said. "The CIA would have an interest. They had the benefit of experience overseas."

While allowing that some abuses might have occurred, Papich said, "My feeling is some of the surveillances were misunderstood" He added, "We need time out to assess this thing in a cool, rational way to determine if the statute should be changed in light of what we want from an intelligence agency." والمتنافذ أستعد ومستعملين فستنتخ فالترجيد وعشدتا والمتعاد فالمتعادية

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

The bill provides on page 20. I think, for this Central Intelligence
 Agency. I notice there that there is no statement of any functions
 which the Central Intelligence Agency will perform. Am I correct in assuming that that is in line with the general policy of the bill, that those functions will be set forth by Executive order?

Secretary PATTERSON. I believe so.

Mr. JENKINS. Now, does that mean that there will be eliminated the existing intelligence agencies of the Army and the Navy, as they are now functioning?

Secretary PATTLEON. No.

Mr. JENKINS. They will function specifically for their own forces, is that correct?

Secretary PATTERSON. Yes, sir, and feed into the Central Intelligence group.

Mr. JENKINS. I was going to raise that question.

Secretary PATTERSON. The functions are stated here by reference to the existing functions under Executive Order.

Mr. JENKINS. Could we have a copy of that Executive order, for the information of the committee?

Secretary PATTERSON. Yes, sir; I will get it to you today.

(The Executive order is as follows:)

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE

COORDINATION OF FEDERAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, January 22, 1946.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF WAR, and THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. I hereby designate you, together with another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.

2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a nonvoting member thereof.

3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the **national** security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the stalf and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments.

b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern ns the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED LASSIFIED HEREIN

ar and you have a - some great climax w atomic bombs at ets or something of to plan, and all at ou have no control, l at the proper time, ure, and, of course, went to ask you is on words empowerit and time of some leg else?

 (\cdot)

()

(9

17

ay doubt about my acht of manpower 'work or fight bill."

inted to know.

question of power osition and that of eetly, it is that the Congress will serve military matters in necessity arises for

to have not only That is a military apacity to produce weapons are forged. In being in time of

t can have the most ten to run it, it will lish to take on the and an ineffective ganization whereby too, your military rength. That is my

quickly and most led in this bill? ace between victory nean the difference

mous Confederate ons who "get there a in the same way, dest resources, and

agness might differ ght to differ on the ne matter of detail

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be exercised under this directive.

5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of your Departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence Authority shall be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of said intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence in connection with planning functions.

6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall continued to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence.

7. The Director of Control Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the begds (or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government baving functions related to national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.

8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential directives, other departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence information relating to the national security as is in their possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence may from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the National Intelligence Authority.

 9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives.

10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods.

Sincerely yours,

150

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Mr. JENKINS. Now, how is it proposed. Mr. Patterson, that the information and material gathered by the respective intelligence agencies of the components of the Armed Forces will get to the Central Intelligence agency?

Secretary PATTERSON. Just as they do now. 'The Intelligence Service of the Army and the Intelligence Service of the Navy and the State Department are represented on a board in the office of the Central Intelligence group, and they provide procedures whereby the Army and the Navy and the State Department people feed in their material to the Director of Central Intelligence. I believe that is working very well.

Mr. JENKINS. It seems to me that the condition of our armed forces in some considerable detail, and the policies of the State Department, that is, the day-to-day policies, have a very considerable effect one upon the other or should have, and 1 was going to raise the question as to how well the various components of the Central Intelligence agency as it now exists have functioned in that fashion. In other words, what do we get there as to the day-to-day policies of the State Department and so on?

• Secretary PATTENSON. I believe that they are functioning effectively. The National Intelligence Authority has meetings about once a month with the Director of the Central Intelligence group, who serves as their executive. I believe the work is going along well.

Mr. JENKINS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN, Mr. Secretary. In what defense area is Baltimore? Secretary PATTERSON. It is in what we call the Second Army now. It used to be the Third Service Command, and now it is in the Second Army, Headquarters of the Second Army.

The CHARMAN. Here is a wire that went out to all of the installation commanders under that command:

Until further orders to cross picket lines ement with local labor

(0

0

Ü

That is back in during the war. H economy if those is livery of supplies of consent of union of

Secretary PATT: the intent of the matter should be h and there may ha main, the negotiat

The CHAIRMAN. we are preparing f before making the Secretary PATTE you had to have in: You speak of nego something like tha tions, that is differ The CHAIRMAN.

42 days while you and the Navy? Secretary PATT

them. If we need The CHAIRMAN, greater economy d

when the Army or Secretary PATTE by telephone or by time you need it. 1 collisions with civi

The CHAIRMAN, that you advocate Secretary PATE have a free ride an going to contribut

The CHAIRMAN, fact that ships the convoys going out over there. Now, ity, or centralizati go along with nege else, when you ac

If you have not ahead.

Secretary PATT given. If there is they have got to y The CHARMAN omergency; is the Secretary PATT

N

ONAL DEFENSE

Ch. 13

63 Stat. 972; Oct. 10, 1951, c. 479

al Note

consent of the Senate, Secretarles and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military department, and the Chairmen of the Munified Boart and the Research and Developterat learth.

 1 define Date. For effective date at the rection see note set out under sec.
 n 151 of Title 5, Executive Depart.
 1 ests and Government Officers and Emtheyees.

Transfer of Functions. The National Security Council, together with its functions, records, property, personnel, and uneypended balances of appropriations, rillocations, and other funds (available or to be made available) were transferred to the Executive Office of the President by 1919 Roarg.Plan No. 4, eff. Aug. 19, 1949, 14 F.R. 5227, 63 Stat. 1067. See note set out under section 1332-15 of Title 5, Executive Departments and Government Oncers and Employees.

ncy—(a) Establishment; Direcimpensation

Ational Security Council a Cen-Director of Central Intelligence, the Director shall be appointed by livice and consent of the Senate, ficers of the armed services or life. The Director shall receive 316,000 per annum.

or; powers and limitations; vioned status

cer of the armed services is

duties as Director, he shall be restriction, or prohibition (miliild be operative with respect to connected with the Department he Navy, the Department of the r any component thereof; and

ercise any supervision, control, ich as he possesses, or is authorictor) with respect to the armed , the Department of the Army, e Department of the Air Force, Ch. 15

NATIONAL SECURITY

Tit. 50, § 403

or any branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the appointment to the office of Director of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may accupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall. Ewhile serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which \$16,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.

Termination of employment of officers and employces; effect on right of subsequent employment

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 652 of Title 5, or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.

Powers and duties

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: *Provided*, That the Agency shall have no police, subpena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: *Provided further*, That the departments and other agen-

209

TH. 50, § 403 WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

cies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the mational security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

Inspection of intelligence of other departments

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: *Provided*, however, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

Termination of National Intelligence Authority; transfer of personnel, property, records, and unexpended funds

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection(a) of this section has taken office—

(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and

(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency. July 26, 1947, c. 343, Title I, § 102, 61 Stat. 497; Oct. 15, 1949, c. 695, § 4, 63 Stat. 880. Ch. 15

Ch. 15

Hist

NATION

1949 Amendment. Subsec. (a) amend by Act Oct. 15, 1949, cited to text. to crease Director's compensation from \$1 (a) to \$16,000 per annum.

Effective Date of 1919 Amendment the increased compensation provided in by Act Oct. 15, 1919, cited to text, to effect on the first day of the first preperiod which began after Oct. 15, 1949 the provisions of section 9 of spid 2 (et. 15, 1949, which is set out as a munder section 3 of Title 5, Ementive i

§ 403a. Same; definitions

When used in sections 4035-

(a) "Agency" means the Ce

(b) "Director" means the I

(c) "Government agency" massion, council, independent partly owned by the United S the United States, board, bure thority, administration, or of branch of the Government; and (d) "Continental United States)

trict of Columbia. June 20, 1

His

Codification. Section was not enace as a part of the National Security of 1947 part of which comprises whapter.

short Title. Congress in enacting tions 403a-403j of this title provided section 12 of Act June 20, 1643, said sections should be popularly kn as the "Central Intelligence Agency of 1949".

Separability Clause. Section 11 of June 20, 1049, cited to text, prov-"If any provision of this Act [see

§ 403b. Same; scal of office

The Director of Central I to be made for the Central the President shall approve. of. June 20, 1949, c. 227, § 3

Codification. Section was not of 1917 part of which comprises th

OPTIONAL FORM MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Dep. AD Ad Dep. AD Iny. Memorandum Asst. Dir.: Admin DATE: 1/7/75 Mr. Jenkins то Inspectio J. J. McDel FROM Intell. Laborator Plan. & Ev Spec. Inv. SUBJECT: Training LOS ANGELES TIMES Legal Coun Telephone Rm. WASHINGTON, D. C. ALL INFORMATION CONTAILED Director Sec'y INTERVIEW WITH DIRECTOR 1/6/75 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DG / Man DATEGIIOS In accordance with previous arrangements between and the interviewed Mr. Kelley at 3 p.m. vesterday and the introduc-Director tions were handled by Inspector Murphy of my front office. who handles the Justice Department for the "Los Angeles Times," was also to but at the last minute, due to illness. b7C accompany "Los Angeles Times" reporter who covers the White House, accompanied stated that within the past two months he has conducted/ an extensive interview with Governor Wallace concerning the shooting of Wallace by Arthur Bremer. stated that Wallace again brought up a number of questions concerning Bremer's background, motiviation, activities, etc. Governor Wallace could not furnish any definite facts to indicate that <u>Bremer</u> was part of a conspiracy but apparently he still harbors this idea. stated that he did not believe Wallace's contention and feels that Bremer acted alone; however, because of Wallace's continued contention to the contrary and the fact that Wallace will undoubtedly be running for President, he feels that these allegations will continue to be raised and would like to be able to record the FBI's denial and/or explanation discounting Wallace's many 62 allegations. D E Accordingly stated he would like to review FBI files on the attempted assassination so that he could accurately report the results of the FBI's investigation which would disclaim the many Wallace allegations. The FBI's investigation which would disclaim the many Wallace allegations. The GINAL that such a request would have to be formally made Director informed under the Freedom of Information Act, particularly the new bill which is to be implemented February 19, 1975. stated he would formally submit a request outlining all of Wallace's current allegations and specifically asking for $\overline{\mathbb{Q}}$ material from FBI files bearing on such allegations. However, he also stated he 62-807 1 - Mr. McDermott NOT RECORDED 1 - Mr. Gebhardt 191 15 iy75 (CONTINUED-OVER - Mr. Mintz - Mr. Heim .IMM:ase 5

McDermott to Jenkins memorandum Re:

would like to present to Mr. Kelley the option of responding directly to the questions from information in FBI files without resorting to the procedures under the Freedom of Information Act if the Bureau feels a public response to such questions would be helpful. Mr. Kelley stated that he would certainly consider this request when he received formally from his communication outlining the specific questions based upon the Wallace allegations.

In addition to a general discussion of Governor Wallace and related topics the Director was asked by for comments concerning the current **GIA**, controversy with respect to its alleged infringement on the FBI's jurisdiction in domestic security matters. The Director stated he could not get into a discussion on this topic in view of the President's Blue Ribbon Panel and Congressional inquiries which are about to begin, but in response to a specific question from did state that the FBI was not currently conducting an inquiry concerning the CIA alleged involvement in domestic security matters.


The interview lasted approximately one and one-half hours and both Messrs were very amiable during the interview and expressed appreciation for the Director taking the time with them.

RECOMMENDATION

b7(

For information.

SECRET To 4. 1 % OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 ANT 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 5010-106 b7C 1 - Mr, F. Putman UNITED STATES G ERNMENT Assoc. Dir 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall С.эр. Memorandum Ded Fulton 1 _ Mr. А Β. A ... ni 1 Admin. - Mr. J. B. Adams Comp. Syst. Mr. W. R. Wannall Wew Frite 1 Ext. Affairs то DATE: 1/9/75 Files & Com Mr. J. J. McDermo FRISSM SER Gen. Inv. - Mr. J. J. McDermott Ident. Inglection ľ Mintz S. Putman Mr **FROM** ۸ 1 Laboratory b3 Plan. & Eval. __ Spec. Inv. 112000 SUBJECT Training CLASSIFIED BY 40322 Auch OG Ms Legal Coun. ALL INFORMATION COMMANDE Tota ob one DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9[1 203 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIER WISE morandum classified "Secret" as it concerns b3 6 'b1 b3 6 62-80750-5019 11.22 DER TS 6) Z JAN 16 1975 6 Enclosure 5m INCLOSUR Classified by 2111 Exempt from GDS, Category <u>Number 2</u> Date of Declassification Indefinite 5.0 2019 VHN:jmr (10)ROUTE 333



Special The Year York Times

0-19 (Rev. 1-30-74)

MIAMI, Jan. 3—Cuban exiles, paid and directed by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency, engaged over a 10-year period in a series of activities that, while related to foreign affairs, had clearly a domestic character, according to Cuban participants in these actions.

In Miami and elsewhere in the United States, a large group of exiles paid by the C.I.A. were said to have watched over and compiled secret files on other Cubans and on Americans who associated with persons under surveillance.

Other refugees, while being paid by C.I.A. agents, picketed foreign consulates in New York and Miami, and waged a boycott of products manufactured by countries that traded with the government of Premier Fidel Castro, the Cuban informants said. These activities reportedly took place roughly from 1960 to 1970.

Such operations reportedly directed by the intelligence agency were reportedly carried out with the knowledge and consent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under an interagency agreement worked out in the wake of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. They were conducted in an effort to deal with a special circumstance and appendix were unrelated to the kind of domestic C.I.A. operations against dissidents that have recently come to light.

A spokesman for the F.B.I. said the agency would have no comment on the allegations. A spokesman for the C.I.A. said the agecny would not comment at this time on any reports concerning its alleged activities.

Disillusionment at End

The informants said that by 1972 central intelligence operatives severed their last connections with the Cubans, disillusioned by their proteges, some of whom they suspected of being engaged in international drug trafficking.

In the late 1960's, at the height of vigilance operations reported y supported by the gener is south Florida and several key American unless among them New York, San Juan, and Los Angeles—about 150 informants were said to be on the payroll of a special Cuban "counterintelligence" office here.

The office, originally in Miami, changed its headquarters' several times and was based in Coral Gables, Fort Lauderdale and Pompano Beach.

Cuban informants, who reportedly began their work by conducting intelligence debriefing of refugees arriving in Miami and later switched to watching other refugees living here, were said to have operated surreptitiously. Exiles who picketed foreign consulates and organized boycotts of foreign

products did so openly. Newsletters of several exile organizations, whose members say were supported by the C.I.A., printed during 1964 pictures of pickets in front of consulates of Britain, Mexico and Spain in Miami and New

York. A mysterious exile, who died here a year ago at the age of 61, was in charge of the Cuban counterintelligence office. His former associates say the exile, José Joaquín Sangenis Perdomo, was following orders of his C.I.A. "case officer," whose code name they said was Felix.

Assist With Police

In 1964 alone, Cuban refugees, who said they were told by their C.I.A. contacts what to do and even what to say on their signs, picketed the British consulate in Miami, protesting the sale of 400 English buses to Cuba; started a boycott of Shell gasoline and Scotch whisky and later a boycott of all British, French and Spanish products; picketed the French consulate in Miami protesting the sale of French locomotives and trucks to Cuba; picketed the Mexican consulate in Miami, picketed for five consecutive days the British consulate in Miguei and later the home of the British consul in Coral Guiles, watering his private

genden, picketer the Marican consulate in New York; and picketed a Japanese ship in the Port of Miami, attempting to prevent the unloading of her cargo.

"There was never a problem," one participant said. "We were detained once or twice, but each time someone would call the Miami police and we would be immediately released with no charges. This even happened when we got into the garden of the British consul who called the police."

The reported domestic operation of Mr. Sangenis was an outgrowth of his still mysterious "Operation 40," an adjunct to the Bay of Pigs invasion. Created in 1960, Operation 40 was described by Cubans as a C.I.A.-devised plan to set up a parent intelligence agency in Cuba after the expected overthrow of the Castro Government by Bay of Pigs invasion.

\$2-Million Budget Cited

Following the defeat of the Bay of Pigs brigade in April 1961, Mr. Sangenis, his former friends say, expanded his activities here with "full backing of the Cant

A	Set. Dir.:
	Admin
	Comp. Syst.
	Ext. Affairs
	Files & Com
	Gen. Inv
	ldent
2	Inspection
	Intell
Ş	Laboratory
J	Plan. & Eval
	Spec. Inv
	Training
L	_egal Coun
٦	Felephone Rm
1	Director Sec'y

The Washington Post ______ Washington Star-News _____ Daily News (New York) _____ The New York Times _____ The Wall Street Journal _____ The National Observer _____ The Los Angeles Times _____

2

(Perdomo) bate JAN ALL INFORMATION CUNTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/1/2006 BY 100 32240

XHEUSS

62.80750-5019

TAP 17 1975

ENCLOSURE

105-84664

"It began like a counterniligome operation," said one Cuban with close ties to other Federal agencies and who in 1962 was asked but did not join the Sangenis group. "But it soon became domestic encou

ing plain the simplet As far as I know they haven't discovered a single Castro spy here, but they sure made many detailed reports, including gossip, about personal lives of all prominent Cubans, if anything usurping the functions of the F.B.I."

Other sources said that, with the exception of the chiefs of the Sangenis operation, salaries of informants were low, ranging from \$100 to \$350 a month.

These sources estimated that by the mid-1960's, when the operation was in full swing, it had a budget of about \$2-million a year, not counting logistics support, which included private aircraft in which top members of the groupu were traveling in the United States and between south Florida and several American countries.

"It was like a small secret army," one Cuban recalled, "and some of its members were making personal threats and demanding personal favors."

The winding down of the operation began in the late 1960's as a result, according to some exiles, of an accidental crash in southern California of a small plane piloted by one of Mr. Sangenis's men. In the wreck, the police reported by found several kilos of cocaine and heroin.

Soon afterward, another Cu-

and who was accused by the Federal authorities of being a large cocaine smuggler, was killed in a gun battle with the Miami police.

By 1970, the Sangenis operation was reportedly reduced to a few men who kept updating the existing files. Mr. Sangenis remained in good graces with the C.I.A. until his retirement in 1972 when, his friends say he was awarded a secret merit medal by the agency.

While many Cubans here believe that with the closing of the Sangenis office the files on the persons under surveillance were sent to Washington several informants assert that a copy of the files was made and is still in this area and that it is being still for blackmail pur-

~2`

optional form no. 10 may 1962 Edition gsa gen. Reg. no. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT - Memorandum			Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Addit Dep. AD Inv Asst. Dir.: Admin
TO MR. JENKINS FROM : J. J. MC DERMOTT	DATE:	1-7-75	Comp. Syst Files & Com Gen. Inv Ident Inspection Intell
SUBJECT PRESS INQUIRIES CONCERNING INVESTIGATION OF CIA			Laboratory Plan. & Eval Spec. Inv Training Legal Coun Telephone Rm Director Sec'y
At this morning's briefin	a in the Dir	natoria Offica il	Director Sec'y

At this morning's briefing in the Director's Office it was noted that Deputy Attorney General Silberman on 1-6-75 indicated he desired any press inquiries concerning an investigation by the Department of Justice of CIA to be answered with a "No Comment."

Today I discussed with Bob Havel of the Public Information Office of the Department the fact that Director Kelley had already specifically denied that the FBI was conducting any investigation of CIA. I suggested to Havel that the use of "No Comment" invites the press to draw an inference that we may well be investigating CIA. Havel agreed and stated that he took this matter up with Silberman on the evening of 1-6-75 and Silberman was apparently agreeable to our responding to inquiries as follows:


"The FBI is not investigating CIA and we have not received any requests to do so."


I told Havel that we would be referring any inquiries concerning Departmental activities to his office for handling. He agreed to this arrangement.


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 911 2006 BY 60322446 04/mg **RECOMMENDATION:** For information. JJMcD: 5 JAN 10-1975 (5) 1 - Mr. Callahan 1 - Mr. Jenkins 1 - Mr. Adams

へ3) 多子、135名子服務

OPTIONAL FORM NO. MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum Mr. Jenkins то J. J. McDerm FROM : DATE: 9/7/2001 Gland 4 CLASSIFIED BY 60322416 SUBJECT: DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C)_9 REPORTER **NBC EVENING NEWS** b7C NEW YORK CITY ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN **INFORMATION CONCERNING** HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCE HEREIN IS UNGLASSINE WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. a reporter for NBC Evening News, New York contacted my office at 5 p.m. on 1/14/75 and City, phone b7C advised that she would like a comment concerning the following information by 6 p.m. that evening. She stated that \lceil had interviewed on that date had furnished thb7D following information: (5) b1 b3 (5) b3 b7D JAN 21 1975 5 Z (5) b1 RIGINAL FL b3 80750 TNIMI NOT PECARDED 1 - Mr. McDermott (CONTINUED-OVER)70 JAM 24 197 1 - Mr. Wannall b7C THE OF CREETEL Mr. Heim b7C 51 84 JAN 30 197 1:asg (5)








ACTION:

í.

	If approved, Mr. Cregar will handle the lecture and so adverse telephonically.
· . i	CLASSIFIED BY 911 2000 60 3220 (10) 06/ pr45 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C) 9(1) 2031
	(5) de
~	1 - External Affairs Division
	$\frac{1 - 1}{1 - Mr. Cregar}$
	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED EXCERT 104 HEEPEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCERT 104
	ALL INFORMUNCLASSINERVINISE HEREIN IS UNCLASSINERVINISE HEREIN IS UNIT OTHER VINISE JAN 21 1975
5	PRO 1995 DUST YOU THE DATE AND A DOWNERS
, ([EB 2 1975 HIS L XEL CORRESPONDENCE



Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED \$10G/~

Subject _____ JUNE MAIL C.I.A.


Removed By _____

79 JAN 1 9 1976

File Number _____ 62-80750-5023X

Permanent Serial Charge Out

Assoc, Dir. Dep.-A.D.-Adm FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Dep.A.D.-Inv. COMENUNICATIONS SECTION Asst. Dir.: 85-0780 \$ 5-1479 Admin. NR Ø19 SF CODE Comp. Syst. 84-19 Ext. Affairs 8:00PM NITEL 1/17/75 CJC Files & Com. 10,48 Gen. Inv. . Ident. ---TO: D IRECTORON Inspection Intell. N FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (62 - 4236)Laboratory . Plan. & Eval. _ Spec. Inv. ____ AL Training -Legal Coun. ---INQUIRY INTO CAL, DOMESTIC OPERATIONS - INFORMATION CIRRENT Telephone Rm. Director 670 CONCERNING. I.A. THIS INSTANT, ADVISED THAT HE RECENTLY b3 b7C b7D IT IS NOTED THAT WAS COOPERATIVE WITH SPECIAL AGENTS OF THIS OFFICE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM IN PROVIDING THIS OFFICE WITH ACCE 80 JAN 23 1975 CLASS REASON-F CIM II DATE OF ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IN UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT A481 1876 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. CLASS HIEL CAR 192 1048DEm/J b7C BA DEEN DATE:







4

4 ...

MAY 6 1975 cnit

(j d

4-528

· Constant			
EX-10) REC	63 63 63 63 Honorable William E. Co Director Central Intelligence Ag Washington, D. C. 2050 Dear Bill: 1 have been a rendered our Alexandria	ALL INFORMATION/CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE, DATE: <u>8/3/2006</u> CLASSIFTED BY <u>CO3220</u> DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(assistance
	for cooperation the FBI wou ments and responsibilit	nd graciously to this Burea Wi Id have been unable to meet	have always b3 au's requests thout their tits commit- leagues in
J	MAILED 6	Sincerely yours, G. M. Kelley	
a V V		Clarence M. Kelley Director	
Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Adm. Dep. AD Inv. Asst. Dir.: Admin. Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs Files & Com. Gen. Inv. Ident. Inspection Intell Aboratory Plan. & Eval. Spec. Inv. Training Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. Director Sec'y	the SID concurred. Buf	recommended letter of appr iles and AX files contain r r. Title and salutation pe	no information

ن`

OPTIONAL FORM[®]NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 Assoc. Dir. .. Dep.-A.D.-Adm Dep.-A,D.-Inv.-UNITED STATES G **ERNMENT** Acst. Hir. *1emorandum* & Com. Gen. Inv. DIRECTOR, FBI 1/22/75 то DATE: Ident. (ATTENTIÓN: SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION) Inspection Intell. SAC, ALEXANDRIA FROM Laboratory ... Pier. & Eval. Spec. Inv. Training. CIME-SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENGYSIFIED Logal Coun. ... Telephone Rm. **DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3** Director Sec'y The Alexandria Office receives this regard without the valuable assistance of n the FBI would have been unable to consistently meet its commitments and responsibilities in this important area. have over an extended period of time always responded immediately and graciously to the FBI's requests for b1 bЗ In view of the above, it is recommended that a letter over the Director's signature be directed to Mr. WILLIAM E. COLBY, Director, Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C., 20505, commending for their assistance to the Bureau are negative Alexandria indices regarding the above mentioned individuals. Bureau , $\overline{1}$ - Alexandria (80-24) ECR:pdh 27 CULTURE (3) v 12 14 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT, OP 100 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWIS See Addendum Special Investigative Division



ADDENDUM OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Bureau indices contain no information which would preclude honoring the request of the Alexandria Division to direct a letter to the Director of the CIA commending specified personnel of that agency for their assistance to the Bureau. The Special Investigative Division therefore concurs with the aforementioned request made by the Alexandria Division.

WC


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINING HEREIN AS UNGLASSIFIED 2244 LA Dalma DATE

2-80750-5027

ىتۇر. يەنت

Director Sec'y

February 6, 1975




Your communication of January 29th concerning the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been received and I thank you for bringing your observations to my attention. Since I know your comments will be of interest to the CIA, b7C I am taking the liberty of forwarding copies of your letter; and of my reply, to that Agency.

٦

MAILED 7 FEB G 1975	Sincerely yours, ADJ JEWORMATION CONTAINED C. M. Kelley HERROW IS UNCLASSIFIED DAADI: SIJE BY Clarence M. Kelley Director
	lisclose prior cordial correspondence with ce 1954 when he wrote the Bureau stating he
D Adm D Inv 	active all
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	





Dear Director - Clarence M. Kelley,

Our C.I.A. Agents are America's silent heroes. They protect, the interests of our great country and abroad. If mistakes have been made let, Congress pass laws to correct them. But we must be careful not to wreck, the Agency's efficient intelligence gathering activities.

Thank you and God Bless you, alway's with the best of

Sincerely yours,

COPY:dss

all.

- for the second

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ELEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED BATE S/3/201 BY 607 224410/06/

EX-107

62-80750 -5001 REC-73


Aque



Assoc. Dir. Dep.-A.D.-Adm._ Dep.-A.D.-Inv.__ Asst. Dir.: Admin. Comp. Syst. Dxta/ fairs Files & Com. Gen. Inv. Ident. Inspection _ Intell. Laboratory _ Plan. & Eval. ___ Spec. Inv. Training ____ Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. Direct Sec

b7C

i ân e e~ : 4 b7C January 29, 1975 Dear Director Clarence m. Kelley, our C. cl. a. agents are america's silent heroes. Shey protect, the interests of our great country and abroad. If mistakes have been made let Congress pass laws to correct them. But we must be careful not to mech, the agency's efficient intelligence gathering activities. Bhank you and God Kless you alwarps with the best of all. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/31/2015 BY 56322 4 (19/04/ 8/811-5



Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall b3 RE: (८) b1 b3 There is no indication of any coordination between CIA and FBI in the preparation of these documents, although it is possible that some material in the documents could have been originally furnished to the FBI by CIA d N ACTION: For information. gm wen And the and the second - 2 -

5 - T.

UNITED STATES CEVERNMENT

Memorandum

то

and the second and a second and the second and the

MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: December 17, 1974

Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs

b3

b2

b3

b3

2

FROM H. N. BASSETT

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION-GSA GEN. REG. NO. 277

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO FBI RECORDS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Re my memorandum 10/22/74 recommending we permit review of certain FBI records by who is conducting study of events (1940-47) which led to establishment of CIA. Intelligence Division recommended that any such material first be reviewed by that Division and Legal Counsel. Director instructed he should see any data critical of other agencies or of Major General William Donovan.

One particular matter in which has expressed an interest is the results of 7/5/40 meeting between FBI, Army and Navy officials, ordered by President Roosevelt to discuss better coordination of Million de matters among these agencies.

Our files contain a memorandum for the Director dated 7/5/40 prepared by Mr. E. A. Tamm concerning this meeting which was attended by Tamm and two representatives each of Army and Navy intelligence (62-9798-88).

While there appears to be no reason from a strictly FBI viewpoint not to disclose this material to ______ in view of the Army's paramount interest it is felt that we should check with that Department to ascertain their position prior to making this item available to _______ b7C

BRIG GEN EUGENE KENDEN, ACTING ASSINGLES, Should check with The Intelligence Division, through liaison channels, should check with an appropriate representative of the Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army, to determine whether Army would object to the release of this material to

1 - Messre! Adams, Mintz, Wannall RDC:bhg/GD

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES O VERNMENT Assoc. Bir. J. B. Adams Dep. AD Adm. _ Dep. AD Inv. ____ Memora**n**dum W. R. Wannall 1 Asst. Dir.: 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton Admin. _ Comp. Syst. Mr. W. R. Wannall WR W/ fut-DATE: 2/10/75 TO Files & Com. Gen. Inv. Ident. Inspect FROM Mr. H. A. Boynton, Jr. Intellin Laboratory Plan & Fuel. b7C SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HARRY ROSITZKE Training Legal Coun. IN "THE WASHINGTON POST" Telephone Rm. __ 2/2/75 "The Washington Post" of Sunday, 2/2/75, contained an article entitled "The Names in CIA Files: Some Belong, Some Don't," by Harry Rositzke, copy of which is attached. Mr. Adams requested that the article be reviewed for any inaccuracies. R OLIVI X SOO STATE b3 **REC-53** 10d=0 Rositzke's attree appears to be a carefully S expressed explanation of the roles of the CIA and the FBI . and the manner in which the responsibilities of both agencies relate to each other. He cites valid examples of the types of cases in which the two agencies cooperate with each other. With one minor exception, there do not appear to be any significant inaccuracies in the article. The exception is in the following example of a hypothetical case in which narcotics is Rositzke states, "A CIA penetration of a heroin involved. ring in Istanbul comes up with the name of an American connec-If the connection is in the United States, the action tion. goes to the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration." Enclosuff INFORMATION CONTAINER HEP HIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8/31/06 BY 603 FE3 1.4 1975 PIDG/maj 06 BY 60322 UC LFS:jcp (6) CONSINUED -- OVER 197 FEB 28 1975 b7C

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall RE: ARTICLE BY HARRY ROSITZKE IN "THE WASHINGTON POST" 2/2/75

This statement is inaccurate in that the action in such matters lies with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and not with the FBI.

b3

ACTION:

43. 4

For information. BURNAU

	Routing Slip FD-4 (Rev. 3-1-27)	1/2/75	
	To: To Ding or	Date	5 .
\mathbf{X}	Att.: FOREIGN LIAISO	66-95	F 1
K.			
Y	SAC	Title The	
A^{I}	ASAC		
	Supv		
	Agent		
	☐ SE		
	□ s≈	Test 1 told	
	□ CC	RE PILE La La la la	
,	Steno		
	Clerk	Rotor #:	
`. 	A (CTION DESIRED	
and the second	C Acknowledge	Open Case Processe	
J.	🦳 Assign Reassign 🦳 Bring file	Prepare lead cards Prepare tickler	
N.	Call me	Return assignment card	
	Correct	Return file	
	Deadline Deadline passed	Search and return See me	
	Delinquent	Secial #	
	Discontinue	Post Recharge Return	
	Expedite	Send to Submit new Charge out On Submit new Charge out	
	For information	Submit reputs 2 - 8075050	
	Handle	Type NOT RECORDED	b7C
	Initial & return		
	Leads need attention Return with explanation or	r notation as to action taken.	
		a copy of an article appearing	
	in "The Jerusalem Post,"	' on (1/16/75)	
	in "The Jerusalem Post," Description Bureau (Enc 1)	MCL. C. F. Plm	
	1 - Tel Aviv	0 5-1121	
	HR:mcm (2)	YXXX	
		XSXXX	
	See reverse side	Office LEGAT, TEL AVIV	
		✿ GPO : 1973 526-720	
		ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED	
		DATE 9/ 2006 BY 663224/01,	
		La	
		1. 1997	• '
	2)		

51FEB251975

FD-350 (Rev. Z-16-63) (Mount Clipping in Space Below) (Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) "The Jerusalem Post" A admits domestic spying Jerusalem, Israel SHINGTON (UPI). - William to kill former Vice-President Spiro Page 4 Colby, Director of the Central In- Agnew and kidnap former CIA telligence: Agency, yesterday ac- Director Richard Helms, knowledged for the first time that This resulted in the CIA carryknowledged for the first time that This resulted in the CIA carry-the spy agency set up a counter- ing out "physical surveillance in intelligence unit in 1967, which two American cities," after alert-gathered files on 10,000 American ing both the FBI and secret ser-citizens. But he denied that the vice, Colby said. activity was illegal. In testimony before a Senate tivity could be classified as illegal appropriations subcommittee; Colby domestic intelligence gathering, alex disclosed that a longetending saving that all current CIA. also disclosed that a longstanding saying that all current CIA activi-CIA source informed the agency in ties are within the limits of its 1971 and 1972 of an alleged plot charter. MYL INFORMATION CONTAINED Date: Thursday, 1/16/75HEREIN IS, UNCLASSIFIED Edition: Author: Ma: FBI Interest Articles Title: 62-80 Character: ot ENCLOSUKE Classification: Submitting Office: Tel Aviv Being Investigated

FD	-36 (Rev.) 22-64)			Assoc. Dir. DepA.DAdm.
	and the second second	•		DepA.DInv Asst. Dir.: Admin
		F	ВІ	Corres Syst
			Date <u>2/11/75</u>	6/10
Tra	nsmit the follow	ving in(Type in	plaintext or code)	
Via	AIPMEL		(Priority)	Prim. & Eval Spec. Inv Praining by
1	mo:	DIRECTOR, FBI		/Telephone Rm Director Sec'y
E b7C	FROM:	SAC, MEO (52-MEN)	(PUC) Pal Interligence	b7C
4	'iscellane	cous Information	Agency	
b7C		Ammenditon Legal di	Personal Secretary to	Senator
	JOHN O. PA informatic	ASTORE (Rhode Island), fu		C and a second
	State, Jus call at hi	Senator PASTOL, a riations, and Chairman of stice, Commerce, and the is residence on the event ing himself as	f the Senate Subconmit Judiciary, received a	tee on telophone
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	advised he resides	at
b3	Re said th	nat during the past eight		
b7C				
		-A let al		FEB 18 1975
b7C	3) Bureau	(1- Legal Division)	lik & Sen	Pastore,
	$\lambda = \alpha \tau + \alpha \tau \tau$	NIT AMATION CONTAINED	William care	LEGAPCOUNSEL
	RTT: kr tis, i (6) <u>FERI</u>	\$131/2000 6032 Mar 105/	Widm lest. & Sen alunsed care v investigation	17-15
		The	ـــــــ	N
t	58177 519499:05	Ser OK	nt M Per	ISMA .
e	1815.63 V c	Special Agent in Charge		GPO: 1970 O - 402-735

WFO 62-NEW

said he was motivated in calling Senator PASTORE at his residence because of recent newspaper accounts of Senator PASTORE'S interest in the recently formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, and of the Select Committee's interest in reviewing CIA overseas operations.


Senator PASTORE requests to be advised whether Bureau files contain any information relating to the identity of and his bona fides.

b3 b7C

> Atlanta Division will review its files regarding Bureau will recontact Senator PASTORE'S Office as deemed appropriate.

5010-106 b3 NMENT Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Adm. __ Mr. J.J. McDermott 1 ,.... Dep. AD Inv. _ Mr. W.R. Wannall \mathcal{m} 1 ----Asst. Dir.: Wannall WWW 1 Admin. _ Comp. Syst. _ Ext. Affairs ... DATE: February 11, 1975 $_{
m b7C}$ # . R . Ĺ Files & Com. ___ Gen. Inv. _ ident. _ 1 Mr. W.A. <u>Branigan</u> Inspection _ FROM W.O. Cregar 1 . Intell. _ ΰÅ 1 -Laboratory _ Plan. & Eval. 1 Mr. W.O. Cregar -Spec. Inv. _ SUBJECT Training _ 6 Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. _ Contenal Intelligence Aquay Dilector Sec B b7C 1 (ي) Ċ, b1 b3 0%0 **ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED** IN IN CEPT (S) (ح) CLASSIFIED BY 602244 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(DATE: 21/1206 **REU-4**b (5) ACTION: For information of the Communications Section, b7C Files and Communications Division, and for Sections CI-1 and CI-2 of the Intelligence Division. in france R:bcw 54 4

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 21AY 1962 EDITION GSA DEN. REG. 120, 27 5010-106 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Assoc Der B. Adams J. 1 - Mr. Memorandum Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 -- Mr. F. S. Putman Adm Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs 3/12/75 W. R. Wannall (то Mr. DATE: Files & Com Gen. Inv. Α. B. Fulton ident. Mr. Mr. W. O. Cregar FROME & H. A. Boynton, J Untall. Branigan Mr. W. Α. Laborator 6 Legal Cour Plan. & Eval UBJECT Bermingham R Α. b2 Inv 32244/10/0G/ma 1 b SSIFT 3 uing eleohone LASSIFY ON: 25X3.31 9 283 1 (5) areneri CENTRAL G 3 9 ٩ 0 b1 All and b3 FLED ORIGINAL 62- 80 NOT RECORDED (5) Ŕ (9) 3Q RAB:mam SE CONTINUED OVER LUCTRED SAAPR3 Inte



ACTION:

None. For information. You will be kept advised of progress made in the above regard.

p.B

20U Tal ME V downe



whi)

- 2 -

	• Mr. J. B. Adams • Mr. E. W. Walsh 1 - Mr. W. L. Reed 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan b7C
March 14, 1975	
Director Central Intelligence Agency	10 Falls and the
Attention:	Set Vine no

Date:

To:

b3

10.5

51 APR 0 1 197500M [

Attention:

From:

Clarence M. Kelley, Director

Subject: REGIONAL CONFERENCE REGARDING TERRORIST/EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION AND THE XXI OLYMPIAD, 1976

The Federal Bureau of Investigation will hold a regional conference at the New York State Police Academy, Albany, New York, April 15-18, 1975. This regional conference will be held in order to have an exchange of views as to the responsibilities and roles of local, state, Federal and Canadian police agencies during the American Revolution Bicentennial celebration and the XXI Olympiad scheduled to be held in Montreal, Canada, in 1976.

Invitees to this regional conference include local and state law enforcement authorities from the Northeast corridor of the United States, Federal agencies having direct or indirect jurisdictional interest, as well as Canadian representatives of local and provincial law enforcement agencies and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Items to be covered during the conference will include, but are not limited to, the following:

62-80750 oc. Dir. Roles and Responsibili NOT RECORDESIES - Identify p. AD Adm. _ AP have the role, as well as capability, each agency has for the various facets of intelligence, protecties 4975 and enforcement responsibilities,

DJM:med Str. INFORMATION CONTAINING SEE NOTE PARE 2 THEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 22104 (11) N⁴ DATE.

MAP 25 1975

TELETYPE UNIT

WRW/FSP

PERS. REC. UNIT.

AAR

GPO 931-555

ŧ.

A. S. S.

(V)

N 193

M

Į

Z

E

ORIGINAL'

975

20

Director Central Intelligence Agency

Dissemination of Information - Method and limitations of disseminating information between agencies to insure timely information is made available to the proper agency in order for that agency to effect a necessary response.

Threat Assessment - Identity, capabilities and modus operandi of individuals or organizations having both the potential and propensity for violent acts.

Contingency Planning - Necessity of formulating and coordinating contingency plans to insure that there will be an effective response posture to a terrorist/extremist action.

You are cordially invited to send a representative from your Agency to this regional conference. Meals and lodging will be provided.

It is requested that you advise this Bureau no later than April 1, 1975, of the identity of the representative who will attend. You may notify this Bureau by contacting the office of _______ FBI Headquarters, Washington, D. C., telephone number ______

> b2 b7C

NOTE:

See memorandum F. S. Putman to Mr. W. R. Wannall, captioned as above, dated 3/13/75, prepared by DJM:sjg.

2

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-100 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 ERNMENT UNITED STATES G Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Adm. ___ Dep. AD Inv. __ Memorandum 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams Asst. Dir.: - Mr. D. W. Moore Admin. _ Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs то Mr. W. R. Wannall WR DATE: 2/25/75 Files & Com. Gen. Inv. Ident. Mr. W. R. Wannall FROM H. A. Boynton hist. Laboratory Plan. & Eval. Spec. Inv. SUBJECT : "WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS" ARTICLE b7C Training 2/16/75 CONCERNING CENTRAL Legal Coun. 19 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 Telephone Rm. ___ INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) BY ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED Director Sec'y ARNOLD BEICHMAN HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. The "Washington Star-News" 2/16/75 contained an article entitled "The CIA, It Turns Out, Is a Front for SUBMAG" by Arnold Beichman (copy attached). In the article, the author asserts that he was allegedly involved in setting up an agency within CIA called "SUBMAG" which functions secretly with the official CIA acting as a front for SUBMAG. Review of the article indicates that it is an attempt at humourous journalism similar to the Art Buchwald type of column. Through Liaison we have confirmed this at CIA and have been advised by responsible CIA officials that the article is "pure fiction." b1 b3 - 80150 (A. ENCLOSURE ACTION: NOT RECORDED MAR 25 1975 For information. Enclosure LFS: dde dde (6) DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(b7C 57MAR 2

February 24, 1975

REC-38 62-80750-5033

Honorable Marie M. Runyon Assemblywoman 70th District State Office Building 163 West 125th Street New York, New York 10027

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERFON IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8/31/244 BY GO 32244 LA DG/MI,

Dear Miss Runyon:

6

S

റു മ

111

Ē

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 12th inviting a spokesman for the FBI to testify at a public hearing on Saturday, March 1st, concerning matters arising out of an article in "The New York Times" alleging domestic operations by the CIA.

Since representatives of the FBI will be appearing before several Congressional committees investigating the same matters, I feel it would be inappropriate for an FBI spokesman to appear before your commission. I trust you will understand the reason for my position and regret I cannot be of assistance to you.

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley Director

1 - New York - Enclosure
1 - Albany - Enclosure

Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Adm. Dep. AD Inv. Asst. Dir.: Admin. Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs Files & Com. Gen. Inv. Ident.	NOTE: Bufile 100-450911 discloses that correspondent has been active in the past in the "Women Strike for Peace" and other anti-Vietnam War activities. In 1968 she was Director of Development for the "National Conference for New Politics," a coalition of new left and civil rights groups. In 1968 she coordinated a rally supporting Dr. Benjamin Spock and others indicted for conspiracy to violate Selective Service laws. She is a former employee of the American Civil Liberties Union
Loboratory Plan. & Evol Spec. Inv Training Legal Coun Director Sec'y	Bufiles list correspondent as single. JWS:bjy (5) MAR 1975 MAIL ROOM TEATTYPE UNIT 2 C 1975 BAN C 1975



MARIE M. RUNYON ASSEMBLYWOMAN 70만 DISTRICT STATE OFFICE BUILDING 163 WEST 125TH STREET NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10027 (212)678-2323

Also: 525 W. 125th St. N.Y., N.Y. 10027 (212) MO 2-8186

THE ASSEMBLY STATE OF NEW YORK

7700

ILP DG/m

C.T.

February 12, 1975

ALBANY

ALL PEI INFORMATION CONTAINED

20052-032240

Assoc. Elin: Den-A.D.-Ad Den-A.D.-Env Asst. Dir.: Admin. Comp. Syst. Ext Affanits Files & C.m. Gen. Inv. Ident. Inspection . Intell. Laboratory Plan. & Eval Spec. Inv. Training ____ Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. Director Sec'y

b7C

Mr. Clarence M. Kelley, Director -Federal Bureau of Investigation -506 Old Post Office Building Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Mr. Kelley:

I have formed a commission of Morningside Heights citizens' to hold a public hearing regarding recent NY TIMES allegations of C.I.A. domestic operations in our community (the Columbia University area) during the late 1960's and early 1970's.

As a member of the NY State Assembly, I hope that the information \bigvee and viewpoints provided at this hearing will be helpful in drafting state legislation to strengthen the civil liberties of New Yorkers. The results of the hearing will be embodied in a report that will be made available to state legislators, members of Congress, and the general public.

The members of the Morningside commission feel that testimony from the Federal Bureau of Investigation will be important to our deliberations, since the F.B.I. is the agency legally authorized to conduct the types of investigation that the C.I.A. (allegedly) engaged in illegally. EX-104

We wish a report on the F.B.I.'s surveillance activities on Morningside Heights during the period of the alleged C.I.A. violations. We also want to hear the F.B.I.'s current views on the types of domestic political surveillance required for national security. 7 - FEB-1-3 1475

The hearing will be held at Riverside Church (490 Riverside Drive) on Saturday, <u>March 1st</u>, <u>beginning at 1:00 p.m.</u> The members of the citizens' commission hope that a spokesman for the F.B.I. can offer testimony at that time. Please let us know what hour of the afternoon will be most convenient for your spokesman.

Sincerely, yours, Marie M. Runyon

CORRESPO

Now The Want It to Be Told The CIA, It Turns Out, Is a Front for SUBMAG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

DATE 8 3 2016 BY 6032244 CELOG/m

By Arnold Beichman

0-19 (Bav. 1-30-74)

The following document, whose authenticity is beyond dispute, is the introduction to a bulky work about a ... phase of American intelligence activity which I am certain few people know anything about. In making public this document, I can assure readers that I am not violating security. Infact — though this is only my opin-ion — it might well be that I am assisting national security by having persuaded this journal to allow the document which follows to be read by its large audience, friendly and hos-tile. In any case, I have persuaded the editors that not only is there no breach of security in their publication of this document but that SUB-MAG executives want, for their own reasons, the material to reach the widest possible public, here and abroad.

At the outset in 1945, we were aware that the insuperable obstacle to creation of an efficient intelligence. agency was that the American ethos cannot tolerate the idea of secret, behind-the-scenes activity, even though Americans ambivalently know that secret intelligence is essential to national security. While it is exciting to read and see clockand-dagger operations in films, talevision or in books, the American democratic spirit relishes even more exposes of intelligence. (is it because the thrills about such adventures; vicariously shared are vaguely immoral?)

Such an ethos, we know, does not exist in France, Britain and most other courtries where the people do not expect to know much about searct service agencies. (Indeed, lew British or American journalisty even

Ident. Inspection . Intell. Loboratory __ Plon. & Eval. Spec. Inv. _ Training_ Legol Coun. Telephone Km. Director Sec'y

Files & Com. ____ Gan. Inv. _____

Assoc. Dir. Dap. AD Adm. Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.: Admin. Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs

The Washington Post ______ Washington Star-News _____ Daily News (New York) _____ The New York Times ______ The Wall Street Journal _____ The National Observer _____ The Los Angeles Times _____

7-11-11 Date

ENCLOSURE ENCLOSURE

Arnold Beichman is assistant professor of political science at the University of Massachutetts, Boston, and this year a visiting professor at the University of British Columbia.

know who heads MI-5 or MI-6). It is a particular weakness characteristic of our countrymen — particularly among enlightened opinion, whether left or right — which could preclude efficient intelligence activity.

That is why the recommendations of the committee headed by Prof. D. B. and his committee were immensely valuable in the creation of our intelligence community. Their yearlong analysis of the problems which would face an American intelligence system drew upon the World War II experiences of the Office of Strategic Services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. No activity in which OSS or the FBI were involved, it was noted by the B Committee, remained unknown for long either to newspapermen or to competitive agencies.

The B Committee consequently recommended that there be organized two intelligence agenices, one to front for the other. Thus it would be possible for critics of "spying" to shoot at something, yet miss the real target.

Specifically, they proposed that the Congress and the president would ap-

prove organization of what later became the Central Intelligence Agency. Meanwhile, the president also would set up within CIA - and then withdraw it from the agency (so as to remain legally within the congressional authorization) - a separated, unidentified operation whose existence would be known to but three persons - the president of the United States, the Operations Director and one other person to be chosen by the Director but to remain unknown even to the president unless the Director died, suffered a disabling illness or was otherwise incapacitated. The submerged agency - SUB

MAG — would be financed from the CIA purse, which would be drawn upon by the president personally. SUBMAG was to be organized along "cell" lines and its participants so buried that they themselves would have only the most limited knowledge of the SUBMAG structure.

I was chosen by the Director as the

third man for the following reasons: 1. As a middle echelon New York State political leader I had a fair understanding of government. 2. I had a friendship with many politicians in both parties so I could travel regularly without exciting interest. 3. Most importantly, the Director and I had known each other from early prep school days.

The B Committee's second recommendation — and the most crucial was that a system be created to publicize, without seeming to, the activities of the "front" CIA. Since this recommendation became our major policy directive and still is, it is important to quote it in full:

By publicizing CIA activities wherever feasible, we would be able to protect the activities of the submerged agency. It is important, however, to

See CIA, Page C-4

Continued from C-1


emphasize that "publi does not mean only favorable publicity. It is even more important to focus blame - whether for moral reasons or operational reasons — on CIA for all con-ceivable reasons. Occasionally one might disclose some praiseworthy operation, but only occasionally. CIA must operate as an open agency while seeking secrecy. Our committee feels that the CIA director and his close aides should maintain regular contacts with media executives, foreign correspondents, even hold a press conference now and then, appear at a Kiwanis or Rotary luncheon — all, of course, in moderation.

Thus when CIA was organized and our parallel agency set up at the same time, there began a series of contretemps which, experience has proven, have made it possible for U.S. intelligence to function successfully. In short, CIA took certain approved risks (approved, that is, by our Director in consultation with the president) in furtherance of American national interests. These risks were deliberately created so as to keep competing foreign agencies busy planning counter-operations against CIA.

Our first success brought noteworthy embarrassment to the CIA. This affair, which really established SUB-MAG, saw the president publicly assume responsibility for the U-2 overflights in 1959. Nothing before this event had worked so well in the interests of SUBMAG.

(I had better explain: By "exposing" the president, one would "embarrass" the CIA because CIA would be blamed for involving the presidential office and prestige in shabby intelligence operations. Of course, it is when such distractions occur, and soul-searching national debate over CIA ensues, that our SUBMAG people can go about their business even more efficiently, undisturbed by the prolanum vulgue.)

The president realized that assuming responsibility for U-2 would mean senatorial investigations and terrible publicity for CIA as well as for himself. However, he saw the value of our strategy while at the same time accepting our evaluation of its minimal effects on the balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR. He therefore assumed full responsibility for the affair. It will be recalled that the affair was abit of flummery because overflights anywhere and everywhere over Soviet and Chinese territory never stopped; they go on day and night.



SUBMAG was quite properly apprehensive that the operation would fail so we turned it to our advantage by arranging that CIA's effort to overthrow Castro be publicized. Thus, whatever happened at Bay of Pigs — success or failure would be in our national interest.

As usual the identity of CIA agents was quickly "blown" by the media. Broadcasters competed with each other to expose, minutes ahead of their competitors, "secrets." Congressmen knew all about the Bay of Pigs and toid favored Washington newsmen, piedging them to secrecy. It was a typical example of how American public opinion and American intelligence activities interact course, for SUBMAG.



In any case, the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs was a presidential commission which, after studying the planning and the results, recommended changes to improve CIA. However, the president was by now fully cognizant of SUBMAG and he ignored the recommendations except for the retirement of the CIA director.

Cuba Two was an entirely different matter. Here we had a confrontation with cosmic disaster as a potential outcome, a confrontation which involved the relationship of statecraft to possible mental aberration, irrationality. No intelligence agency can look into some person's head — despite the nonsense of "psychohistory" and psychological "profiles" and predict specific behavior in a specific case.

The intelligence operation in this crisis was directed exclusively by SUBMAG, although quite properly a specific role was assigned to CIA just as the Pentagon had its tasks.

During these critical days, the president met with our Director at the Carlyle Hotel suite which we maintained for SUBMAG. (As usual, the president used the fire-exit backstairs to descent.) The memorandum of the discussion between the two makes clear that CIA would work in the open as usual while SUBMAG would see to it that the missiles

SUBMAG had had a taste of thiskind of negotiation following the confrontation in Vienna between the president and Chairman N.S. Krushchev in June 1961. He shouted at the president that unless the USSR obtained a Berlin settlement on Soviet terms, there would be war. The president accepted the challenge, telling Khrushchev that the U.S. would not leave West Berlin under any circumstances.

Three days after his return to the U.S., the president and the Director met at the Carlyle. It now became apparent to the President why absolute secrecy about SUBMAG had to be maintained. For the Director had brought with him a film for the president's eyes only of a Politburo meeting in the heart of the Kremlin with sound track. It was Khrushchev's report to his colleagues of his meeting with the president in Vienna. The report and the discussion which followed (the President had a translation from the Russian) made itquite clear that Politburo sentiment, which Khrushchev did not oppose, was to avoid the risk of military confrontation over Berlin.

In order to avert any possible suspicion that the American policy on Berlin was based on intimate inside knowledge, it was agreed that the U.S. should surrender P---- to the USSR. P had been a CIA catch of value but the moment had come to "release" him, i,e., to uncover him. As usual, CIA came out of it, commeci, comme-ca. It got credit for having made such a catch of a high Soviet civil servant in the heart of the military-industrial complex, but discredit for having lost their man and for having been unable to protect him. Our movie-making continued unimpaired.

After 20 years, we have learned and it is an axiom we ignore at our neril - that without frequent and carefully selected leaks about CIA, serious intelligence work could not be conducted by our government. Naturally, CIA people are unaware of what they might regard as their deliberate victimization by a competing government agency but it is as much in their interest as it is in the national interest. So long as there is a CIA under editorial attack, under congressional investigation, under threat of exposure, so long will it be possible for serious intelligence work to be conducted.

In time perhaps, but it is doubtful, the American people will learn, as have the peoples of other democracies, that one cannot run intelligence along the lines of a community meeting. However, after years of observation I am persuaded, as is the Director and were all presidents since 1942, that our contrapuntal intelligence system must continue, with CIA as the seemingly dominant solo.

So ends the introduction by the "third man", the New York politician: This introduction is followed by appendices and by the report of Prof. D's committee. I had hoped the remainder could be published along with this introduction, but that was vetoed for the time being. It may be that SUBMAG is preparing to "go public" as a "front" for a new agency; I don't know.

AL FORM NO 5010-106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Dep. ~ 1 - Mr Adams Memorar**S**um Dep. AD 1 -Mr Vannall Asst. Dir.; Admin. _ Comp. Syst. Mr. W.R. Wannall WEW Ful Ext. Affairs . то 3/4/75 DATE: Files & Com. ___ Gen. Inv. _ Ident. Inspection Intell. FROM H.A. Boynton, Jr. Laboratory b7C ^{1 Eval.} SUBJECT Training . (5) Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. Director Sec'y _ Concerning a news article appearing in the 2/28/75edition of the Washington Post newspaper (copy attached) 103 entitled "Colby Will Lift CIA Secrecy Pledge to Cooperate With Senate Probe," the Director noted "Can we determine what the agreement includes?" WHECOEVED COPY FILED IN 6.2 -1/6 b1 b3 Char (ENGLUS **E1** MAR 13 1975 60322. ULLO 06/ ma. Enclosures **SONTINUED** - OVER CLASSIFICD BY BPM: tepT DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(C HEREIN IS LEVEL AN IS INCLUDED MAR b7C WHERE SHOWN OTHER

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall RE: 6 b1 b3

The FBI, of course, utilizes Form FD-291 "Employment Agreement," which has been executed by all current employees and must be signed by all new personnel entering on duty, to cover the foregoing situation. The "Employment Agreement" (copy attached) covers essentially the same (5) points noted in the attached While we do not have an exit secrecy agreement signed by the terminating employee, Form FD-193 "Report of Exit and Separation" requires (under Paragraph D, Page 2) that the exiting employee be cautioned regarding divulging confidential information and reminded that such improper action may violate Department of Justice regulations as well as Federal statutes providing for substantial fines and lengthy imprisonment or both.

ACTION:

Above for information.

BPM



wand

2

Colby Will Lift CIA Secrecy Pledge To Cooperate With Senate Probe

By George Lardner Jr. Washington Post Staff Writer, The head of the Central Intelligence Agency agreed to

<u>77. 1-</u>30-74)

cooperate with Senate investigators yesterday by lifting the pledge of secrecy that the CIA requires of all its employees.

CIA Director William E. Colby promised the waiver at a closed meeting on Capitol Hill yesterday morning with Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the newly formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, and Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.), the committee's ranking Republican.

Church told reporters afterwards he was satisfied that Colby plans to provide all the information the committee needs for its investigation of CIA activities, including charges that the agency engaged in illegal domestic spying on American citizens.

The CIA requires everyone it hires to sign an agreement promising not to disclose any information they might ob-tain concerning "intelligence sources and methods" without the agency's authorization.

Church emphasized that Colby agreed to drop the requirement only for the "purposes of this Senate inquiry." However, a similar waiver probably will be provided to a new House committee that has also been assigned to investigate the government's intelligence agencies.

Later in the day, in a luncheon speech at the National Press Club, Church voiced doubts that the White House inquiry into the CIA's activites, under а commission Vice President hondod could resolve the

allegations that have been made against the agency.

"The executive branch cannot, with sufficient credibility, investigate itself," Church declared. He said he hoped it would wind up its work soon "and make its records available, as a starting point, for the more comprehensive congressional investigations to come."

Promising a "muted and restrained" inquiry and not "a televisi/on extravaganza,"

Church said he intends at the same time to make public as much information as possible during the course of the investigation.

"Our rule of thumb," the senator said, "will be to hold public hearings whenever we can and closed hearings whenever we must." He indicated that the committee would pursue allegations of illegal or improper activities by the CIA and other agencies in public. while conducting its examination of "legitimate national security" operations largely in executive session.

The committee chairman, called the investigation inng overdue, pointing out that neither the CIA nor the FBI, which also will be scrutinized, have ever undergone a thorough congressional inquiry.

Promising strict precautions against news leaks, Church said any committee staffer who discloses unauthorized information "will be fired on the the agreement volceder?" spot."

In response to a question, he acknowledged that there was no way to control what senators on the committee might say, but said they were onderd of 8 1600

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATEZ

Assoc. Dir.

Dep. AD Adm. Dep AD

Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs . Files & Com. Gen. Inv. _ ldent. __

Laboratory . Plan. & Eval. ___ Spec. Inv. ____

Training _____

Telephone Rm. __

Director Sec'y ____

Legal Coun.

The Washington Post . Washington Star-News_ Daily News (New York) ____ The New York Times _____ The Wall Street Journal ____ The National Observer ____ The Los Angeles Times ____

FEB 2 8 1975 Date ___

Can we determine what

62 80700 5034

UPI 02-27 05:52 PED BETALIONS MITH FOREIGN COVERNMENTS, WE SAID. EMBARRASS THE UNITED STATES WITH REVELIONS WHICH COULD INJURE OUR CIA., NOR JEOPARDIZE THEIR SOURCES, NOR ENDANCER THEIR ACENTS, NOR ANT THE COMMITTEE'S PURPOSE TO UNDERMINE OR DISMMILLE THE SI 1I. TO REFORM LNEW INTEND TO TEAR APART THE NATION'S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, BUT RATHER CHURCH PLEDGED THAT THE NATION'S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, BUT RATHER LAE BECINNINCS OF A SECRET POLICE. BRITOZOBRIČVT AIENZ HVAT BEZOTAED ŽHORTD NEAEB EWEBCE IN LHIZ TVND COMMUNILY "INVOLVE THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD SOMETHING AMERICANS OF ALL CHABCH VDDED LAVI THE CHARGES AGAINST THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SO9. ANY SOSEI SPIED ON THOUSANDS OF DISSIDENT AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE THE INVESTIGATION WAS PROMPTED BY CHARGES THAT THE CLA MAY HAVE WARCHY IF KCHY: IF IT TIPS TOO FAR TOWARD THE LATTER, THE RESULT ST INE RESULT IS EVIVICE BELAEEN INDIAIDAVE FIBERLA VAD COFFECTIAE OBDEB CHRECH ZVID INE CIV VND LBI "ODEWVIE ON INE LAICEAN OL INVI ANERA COMMIENVICED BA INE FVA" NE LOID V NVIIONVI DEESE CINE FUNCHEON ATTINVIELA RESLORGIBLE ZHONID INVI ODEWVION BE ONE INVI IZ NOI ONDERS OL INE DERIDENT' II IZ INE LEESIDENI AHO WAZI BE HEID .IL' IN LVCI AE LIND INE CIV CONDACLED V CIAEN ODERVION ON ONDERS OL INE DERIDENT. IFFEEVE VCLIONS BEEN OKDEBED BY FORMER PRESIDENT MIXON OR MIS AIDES TO UNDERTAKE VIZO LEOMIZED IO DELEBRINE ANELNER THE CIA OR OTHER AGENICES MAY HAVE CHAIRMAN OF THE SEMATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE нэилнэ INAEZLICULION OF THE CIA AND FBI. POLICE, BUT HE PLEDCED A JUDICIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE SENATE UNRESTRAINED INTELLICENCE AGENCIES COULD LEAD TO TYRAWY AND SECRET WASHINGTON (UPI) -- SEN, FRANK CHURCH TODAY WARNED THAT J, (VID) Sti-dn 1/30/07/7000 100241213 Pirector Sec'y THE L CAN VILLE ON MERICANONAL See See Telephone Rm.

- eninio1^T .vnl .bed2 Plan. & Eval .nuo long Γαροιάτοιλ .lletul noitceqan .tnebl .vnl .ne0 mod & selia S104 VAKE is Ksir dwoy .nimbA strid .teeA Dep. Dep. AD

Assoc. Dir.

WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

0-20 (Rev-8-74)

FD-291 (Rev. 11-1-73)

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure or production of national security information, other classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is in a better position than I to make that determination;

(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any material relating to such information or property in my possession;

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

(Sign	ature)	
U		
	.5	

(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on


, 19 ____ , by __

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN, REG, NO. 27 Assoc. Dir. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Dep. AD Adm. __ Dep. AD Inv. Memorandum Asst. Dir.; Admin. Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs : Mr. W.R. Wannall with DATE: March 10, 1975 то Files & Com. Gen. (nv. ldent. _ External Affairs Div. Inspection . W.O.\Chegar FROM Mr. W.R. Wannall Intell. _ Laboratory _ 1 Mr. W.O. Cregar Legal Coun. Plan. & Eval. SUBJEC₇ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) Spec. Inv. . Trainina ____ **REQUEST FOR BUREAU SPEAKER** Telephone Rm. ___ Director Sec'y On 3/7/75 telephonically inquired if Mr. W.O. Cregar, Section Chief, CI-2 Section, Intelligence Division, and the Bureau's b1 alternate member on the U.S. Intelligence Board, could b3 appear before CIA's to speak to approximately 25 career officers of CIA on the afternoon of 4/11/75 between the hours of 1:30 and 3:00 p.m. The presentation would be confined to a discussion of the structure of the Bureau, its jurisdiction in the foreign intelligence field and the Bureau's role on the U.S. Intelligence Board. Mr. Cregar has given this presentaof CIA and it has tion many times before proven useful in that it provides the opportunity to explain the Bureau's role in the field of foreign intelligence and clarifies some misconceptions CIA personnel have regarding the Bureau's jurisdiction. A question-and-answer period will follow the presentation. b3 ACTION: If approved, Mr. Cregar will handle the lecture and so advise telephonically. WOC:bcw (4) Ken in Ull ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. 2-80750-5036 DATE: 5/31/2006 .14 MAR 11 1975 CLASSIFIED BY 6022 uc/LP/0G/m-s DECLASSIFY ON: 26X3.3(C) 8/31/2 031 58 MAR 1 7 1975 AUG 2 0 1975 A.--

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 9962 EDITION 5010-106 GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES G VERNMENT Assoc. Dir Dep. AD Memorandum Asst. D Mr. W. R. WannallwRW/ Comp. Syst Ext. Affairs 11/75 то Files & Com. M**r**. Adams Gen. Inv. 1-Mr. Wannall Ident. Inspection Hard FROM : H. A. Boynton, Jr Laboratory 150 b7C 6 Plan. & Eval. Spec. Inv. ... SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL Training _ INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. ___ Director Sec'y _ There is set forth hereafter a brief summary of the relations between the CIA and the FBI from 1947 to date The CIA, which was established as a result of the National Security Act of 1947, had limited liaison with the FBI during the early stages of its existence. Many of the problems which were encountered at that time were handled through contact with high-level officials of the Bureau. When problems arose, they were generally handled on a onetime basis by such officials. During the approximate period of 1948 to 1952, several Headquarters Special Agents maintained liaison with CIA. During the period 1952 to 1970, CIA liaison was handled by former Special Agent Sam Papich. During this period, liaison was conducted on a daily basis on matters of extreme importance to both agencies. While problems did occur, the liaison was most effective in areas of potential conflict between the two agencies. During the late 1950s and early 1960s. Considerable negotiation took place between the CIA and the b2 FBI, resulting in guidelines being developed which were b3 acceptable to both agencies and which were set forth in what is referred to as the February 7, 1966, understanding between the CIA and the FBI (copy attached). Basic 1975 DATE: CILDO LFS:hc CLASSIFIED BY Laszeur / 108/Mª (5) CLASSIFY ON: 25X3. b7C Enclosur CONTINUED - OVER AUG 20 1975




Memorandum H. A. Boynton, Jr., to Mr. W. R. Wannall Re: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)



Between February, 1970, and November, 1972, although we did not have a personal Bureau liaison representative dealing daily with CIA, we did continue to have considerable contact with CIA at various levels concerning operational matters and were able to carry out our responsibilities. However, it was recognized that, during this period, certain problems had arisen which might have been more promptly resolved had there been existing a personal direct liaison mechanism. With the re-establishment of the Liaison Section of the Intelligence Division in November, 1972, we again designated a Bureau liaison representative to CIA who has been carrying out that responsibility since that time. During this period, a very close and cordial relationship has developed to the mutual benefit of both agencies. In addition to the direct liaison relationship, there has been frequent contact at all levels between the two agencies.

<u>ACTION</u> : For infor	mation. -2	Ind me	SECRE
---------------------------	--------------	--------	-------

b1 b3



÷


•

b3 APTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GAA GEN, REG. NO. 27 - 5010--- 104 Tolson DeLoach UNITED STATES G MENTY H; Mohr Memorandum 1 - Mr. DeLoach Callahan 1 - Mr. Gale Conrad 1 - Mr. Wick Felt W. C. Sullivan DATE TO March 6, 1967 SuDÉ Tavel Trotter 1 - Mr. Sullivan Tele, Room W. R. Wannall FROM : Holmes 1 - Mr. Papich Gandy 1 - Mr. Wannall 1 - InspectorSUBJECT: In accordance with instructions, attached letter has been prepared for Attorney General setting forth all data in our files concerning captioned matter. Briefly, information being furnished is as follows: \mathcal{N} Steral Tatin Matter first came to our attention in Spring of 1961 in connection with our investigation of violation of Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications Statute on the part of b2 arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, by local Classifiert by b7D authorities on wire tapping charge. Wire tap involved was on telephone of Dan Rowan, member of Rowan and Martin comedy team, Rowan at the time reportedly was ١X Through our investigation we determined involvement of 12780 b3 b7C By letter 5/22/61 we furnished former Ľ, Kennedy a memorandum containing a rundown on Attorney General The originals of the letter and COPY PULLED memorandum were returned to us for filing purposes. A copy of that memorandum is being attached to instant letter being sent to Attorney General. 5/9/62 Kennedy discussed with the Director a number of matters. REC-1411 3-6-67 Enclosure A.e. OVER CONTINUED GCM: ams. 8 13 1967

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan Re: b3 Q b3 b7C b7D In furnishing this information we were asked that it be held within this Bureau on a strictly need-to-know basis. We have, however, included it in the attached proposed letter, to the Attorney General noting $\mathcal{V}(u)$ b3 b7D an article in the 8/16/63 issue of the "Chicago Sun Times" reporting that CIA agents had contacted Giancana to obtain Cuban intelligence. ACTION: If approved, attached letter will be sent to the Attorney General, with a copy for the Deputy Attorney General. The Attorney Generalis asked for this information on friday. 3/3/61-

STE IN ENVELOP ir, DeLoach 1 - Mr. Gale 1 - Mr. Wick 1 - Mr. Sullivan The Attorney General March 6. 1967 Mr. Papich Mr. Wannall Director, FBI 1 Inspector DECLASSIFIED BY SP4- Juni 707fa # 22,330 ON 3/10/81 Declassed per CIA INFO 8/27/80 Our files contain the following information concerning the captioned matter. much of which has been furnished by the on a strictly highly In view of this, it is confidential "need-to-know" basis. requested that it be handled on a most restrictive basis. pThis matter first came to our attention in the Spring of 1981 in connection with our investigation of a violation of the Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications Statute on the part of who had been arrested by local authorities in Las Vegas, on a local wire tapping Nevada. charge. วัท October, 1960, had reportedly placed a wire tap on the telephone b3 b7D of Dan Novan, a member of the comedy team of Rowan and Martin. b7C Rowan at the time reportedly was 1367 <u>е</u> 2 During the course of investigation it ŝ was ascertained that Was Sinvolved. MAR during interview claimed DEC 20 The essence of the above was furnished to former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy by Tetter dated May 22, 1961, which enclosed a memorandum of the same date containing data olson made available on May 3, 1961, by et.oach. lick asper allahan Since our files show that Mr. Kennedy returned the original onrad of our letter and its enclosed memorandum dated May 22, 1961 elt. ale . losen. uilivan . GCM:ams())) GROUP 1 (ave) SEE NOTE. PAGE 4 totia Excluded from automatic eie. Ros 3,1967 TELETYPE UNIT downgrading and olmerig ENCLOS declassification

The Attorney General to us for filing purposes, a copy of the May 22, 1961, memo-randum is attached hereto for your information. $\chi(\omega)$ $\mathbf{x}(u)$ Further with respect to this matter, I was informed of the following on a highly confidential basis by former Attorney General Kennedy during a conference in my office on May 9, 1962: b3 b7C




Also of possible interest is a news article carried in the August 16, 1963, issue of the "Chicago Sun Times." This article carried the headline, "CIA Sought Glancana's Help For Cuba Spying," and it was reported therein that CIA agents had contacted Giancana in an effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after Castro came into power.

Enclosure

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)

- 3 -




The Attorney General

NOTE:


See cover memorandum Wannall to Sullivan, same caption, March 6, 1967, GCM:ams.

Classified "Tep Secret" inasmuch as information contained herein is so classified by CIA.





57 MAR 2 0 1975







Memorandum F. S. Putman to Mr. W. R. Wannall Re:

b3

On 5/9/62, Kennedy <u>discussed a number of matters</u> with the Director. including


b3 b7C

> With reference to Trujillo, Time magazine reportedly stated its sources claimed CIA backed the successful drive to overthrow Trujillo, whose 31 years as dictator of the Dominican Republic ended with his shooting death in May, 1961. The sources said CIA thought Trujillo was getting too friendly with the Communists and that several sources insist that some of the guns used in the killing were smuggled into the Caribbean island by CIA operatives.


With reference to Duvalier, Time magazine stated that CIA collaborated with the Haitian leaders of a group of at least 200 rebels who tried unsuccessfully to overthrow Duvalier in 1963. The group of rebels reportedly was stopped at the Dominican border when they tried to invade Haiti.

ACTION:

For information. VMS



OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Dep. AD Memorandum 1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott Asst. Diff 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall Admín. Comp. Sys Mr. W. R. Wannall Ext. Affairs TO DATE: 1/21/75Files & Com S UNCLASSIFIED 1 - Mr, H. A. Boynton Ident WHERE SHOWN Inspection 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan FROM A. B. Fulton Intell. **OTHERWISE** 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar Laboratory Plan. & Eval: 🛴 'INSIDE THE COMPANY--CIA DIARY'' 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman Spec. Inv. SUBJECT: (BOOK REVIEW) 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton Training Legal Coun. _ **RESEARCH MATTER** 1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin Telephone Rm. Director Sec⁴ The purpose of this memorandum is to review the book "Inside the Company--CIA Diary" by author Philip Burnett Franklin Agee. b1 SYNOPSIS: b3 Captioned book is a devastating attack on CIA (c) cia 018207 ຟີ) The book was recently published in England for distribution in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. (5) cia 018207 In view of the numerous accurate but slanted revelations made by Agee concerning CIA, it is bound to have numerous repercussions around the world. DECLASSIFV CLASSIFIED Agee makes brief mention of the FBI activities of SIS in Latin èd America during and immediately after World War II. DATE:b2 ACTION: None. For information. DETAILS - OVER 1 - 62-46855 (Book Review File 1 b7C LM:aso,(II) CLASS. & EXT. BY MULLiple Source MAR 11 1975 REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4 ENCLOSURE DATE OF REVIEW b7C



Agee also briefly mentions Legal Attache offices in Latin America but with the exception of our office in Mexico City makes no statement concerning them outside from informing that these offices look out for FBI interests in Latin America.

b2 b3

- 3 -

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall Re: "Inside the Company--CIA Diary" (Book Review)

Conclusions of Book

نې د د. د د د د د

> Agee continuously asserts that he is now convinced that the primary purpose behind CIA operations in countries such as those in which he served is to back and support the monopolistic capitalists who rule, regardless of the effect it has on the populace. He, therefore, urges the abolition of CIA. He further urges socialist forms of government in mid- and undeveloped countries of the world which will concern themselves primarily with the welfare of the masses rather than the welfare of the select few who reign.

PLA

went

b2 b3





OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA. GEN. REG. WO. 27 JUNITED STATES G RNMENT lssoc. Dir (.)Dep. AD.Ad Memoranāum 1 - Mr. JY B. Adams Dep. AD inv 1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott Asst. Dirt Admin - Mr. W. R. Wannall 1 Comp. Syst. Mr. W. R. Wannally 2/5/75 Ext. Affairs то DATE: Files & Com. Gen. Inv. _ 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton Ident. - Mr. W. A. Branigan Inspection FROM : H. A. Boynton, Jr Intell - Mr. H. A. Boynton, Jr. Laboratory _ Mr. R. A. Bermingham Plan. & Eval. ALL THFORMATION CONTAINED IN C)EBA9 SUBJECT > HANTS UNCLASSIFIED est Coun. BASELT WHERE SHOWN ---Telephone Rm. Director Sec'y OTHERNY SE 24.25 This is in response to the Director's question noted on Fulton to Wannall memorandum, dated 1/21/75, entitled, ""Inside the Company--CIA Diary," (Book Review), Research Matter." b1 70) FBI 9788 b3 diminicipantari • FBI ंत्र (C) ~ d RAB:mam (8)mm CONTINUED - OVER CLASS. & EXT. BY REASON-FCIM II, 2 8/31/04 DATE OF REVIEW 51 MAR 2 6 1975 ASSIFICI 202 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall Memorandum 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan Admi (Mr. A. E. Smith) Comp. Syst. Mr. W. R. Wannall With Agent Ext. Affairs DATE: 3/11/75 то Files & Com. Gen. Inv. 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar Ident. FROM Mr. A. B. Fulton WAV TU b7C - aboratory Plan. & Eval. __ Spec. Inv. SUBJECT : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) Training Legal Coun. b3 Telephone Rm. Diversitor Sec'y Recommends representatives of Intelligence Division appear before captioned course $3/27/75_{\star}$ 6°**S** b7C has advised that his office is 🦲 sponsoring a Course for career CIA personnel from 3<u>/20/75 to 4/4/75</u>. There will be 30 members in the class. requested a three-hour presentation by the Bureau in a panel sitting to present an overall picture of the Bureau's CI operations and responsibilities. He specifically requested that this presentation include FBI/CIA operational cooperation (Sg and liaison. and FBI CI training b1 program. b3 has been the liaison contact for our CI training staff for the past two years and has been most cooperative in scheduling CIA speakers for our various CI training schools. He has twice been commended for his performance in this area by letters from the Director, FBI, 5) to Director, CIA. In view of CIA's outstanding cooperation with us in the past with respective jour. CI training, it is felt that his request should be monored. The three-hour preserve is directly responsible for captioned school, ON CONTAINED LASSIFIED EXCEPT 1 GTUGRWISE The three-hour presentation is scheduled for 9:00 am to 12:00 noon, 3/27/75, at the Section Chief William O. Cregar, CI-2, UNCLAS has had extensive experience in CIA liaison and has a current 25 CIZ MAR 19 1975 EWL:jvl REIN (6) CONTINUED - OVER Ψ Ĺ b7C 51M/R2 6 1975 DATE: Del mai 603224614 **CLASSIFIED** BY DECLASSITY ON: 25X3.3(

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall Re: <u>Central Intelligence Agency (CIA</u>

b3

b2 b3 b7C knowledge of Unit Chief New York Unit, CI-1, has had extensive field and Headquarters experience and has current operational knowledge in the Soviet field. Unit Chief Training Unit, IS-3, has also had extensive CI experience in the field and at Headquarters, and is also in a position to discuss our CI training.

That Special Agents Cregar,


designated to appear before captioned school 3/27/75.

RECOMMENDATION:

b7C

WRW/FSP DK ABAS

be



- 2 -

DATE: 5/30 /2016 CLASSIFIED DY 607224 March 12 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.31 BY LIAISON Honorable William E. Colby 1 - Mr. Wannall (Attn:)Director 1 - Mr. White b7C Central Intelligence Agency 1 -Washington, D.C. 20505 1 51 ALL INFORMATION OF HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCLE Dear Bill: For WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE (5) five years b1 in your Agency has b3 served in a technical liaison capacity primarily with the FBI Laboratory. My Laboratory associates have advised me that has been reassigned to another position within your Agency. I want to take this opportunity to thank you for services. He was an efficient and effective representative of the CIA and participated in many delicate and sensitive conferences and in approved projects of mutual He has contributed greatly toward the excellent interest. working relationship between our agencies in the technical His enthusiasm, competence, interest and dedication area. to the United States intelligence effort are appreciated, and we in the FBI wish him continued success in his career. Your cooperation in matters of mutual interest in the foreign intelligence field is most gratifying, and I sincerely hope our continued cooperative spirit will be of material benefit to the United States intelligence effort. - X.O Sincerely De 🔞 MAR 18 1975 Wer (Assoc, Dir. WDC:Iğw Clarence M. Xelley Dep. AD Adm. _ Director (8)Dep. AD Inv. Asst. Dir. S) NOTE : had been assigned to a tech-Admin. nical ITaison position dealing with the Laboratory Division and Comp. Syst. other Bureau personnel for the past five years. Ext. Affairs <u>He has recently</u> Files & Com. been reassigned to Gen. Inv. has been honest. sincere. dependable and responsive ldent. Inspection '. b1 Intell. Laborator b3 Over the past five years, Plan. & Eval, Of spent large amount of his personal time on behalf a the Bureau Spec. Inv. Training Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. GPO 954-546 TELETYPE UNIT MAIL ROOM [🛛 Director Sec'y


on. William E. Colby

~


Note: (cont'd)

?

for which he received no compensation. The Laboratory Division is very appreciative of _________ efforts and feels a letter to the CIA would show our appreciation and help in our future relationship on the working level with the CIA Audio Operations Branch.



b1 b3





ā

.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall Re: Relations with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

G b1 b3 ٠ ACTION: For information. por Amer gra My

•

Ŧ

í





AND INFORMATION CONTAINED ON TAVE LOP-AND INFORMATION CONTAINED ON TAVE LOP-AND INFORMATION CONTAINED ON TAVE LOP-43 67.807.00-50

Mr. DeLoach
 Mr. Sullivan
 Mr. J.A. Sizoo
 Mr. D.E. Moore
 March 11, 1970

BY COURIER SERVICE

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

Honorable Richard Helms Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C.

ON 8/31/01 BY 6032240/20/man

Dear Mr. Helms:

As I am sure you will agree, the need for close coordination of the intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence efforts of the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is celf-evident. This matter is one which requires a continuing analysis to assure that both agencies have established working agreements whereby we can most effectively realize positive results with a minimum of duplication, misplaced effort, and jurisdictional problems.

SECRET

During January, 1965, representatives of this Bureau met with officials of the CIA to consider coordination of our mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. As a result of these conferences, a set of ground rules was drawn up and agreed to by both agencies. A copy of this agreement was transmitted in my letter of February 7, 1966, to then CIA Director Vice Admiral William E. Raborn, Jr. A copy of the agreement is enclosed for your information. This agreement has proven generally effective and no wajor problems have been encountered since its adoption in the areas it covers.

The FBI has primary responsibility with regard to matters involving the internal security of the United States as well as for conducting counterintelligence operations in

	States and Sexter as a Marca Marca	(1)。2014年1月1月1日日日本)
WCS:mea (7)	Group 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	see note, page 2

Honorable Richard Helms

this country. While this Bureau does not have any statutory responsibilities with regard to the collection of foreign intelligence, I have always recognized that the potential for the development of such intelligence in this country is considerable. The FBI has, in fact, made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U. S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA. and policy-making officials of the Government.

b2 b3

I know that you will share my belief that this matter requires a periodic reexamination to assure that the national security interests continue to be served in the most effective and complete manner possible. After reviewing this matter, including the attached 1966 agreement, I would welcome any observations you may desire to make.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

NOTE:

See memo W. C. Sullivan to DeLoach 3/11/70 re "Relationships with CIA," prepared by WCS:mea.

Classified "Secret" since disclosure would seriously damage the internal security interests.

SEXRET

SEGRET

1 - Mr. DeLoach

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Sizoo

March 31, 1970

BY COUPIER SERVICE

Honorable Richard Helms Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C.

ELECTRASSIFIED BY 6032241/4/09/mg

Dear Mr. Helms:

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 20 setting out your observations with respect to various matters of mutual interest. I certainly appreciate your kind comments concerning me and I share your convictions as to the need for close coordination of our intelligence collection activities in behalf of the national security.

Your letter suggested nine particular areas which might be the subject of further discussions aimed at improving the coordination of our operations. A number of these topics are highly sensitive and complex and I will therefore make no effort here to set forth my views in detail. However, in response to your letter and as a prelude to any direct discussions on these matters, certain observations on my part may be appropriate.

With regard to electronic surveillance and mail coverage, there is no question as to the frequent value of such operations in developing needed intelligence. On the other hand, the use of these measures in domestic investigations poses a number of problems which may not be encountered in similar operations abroad. There is widespread concern by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type coverage. Moreover, various legal considerations must be borne in mind, including the impact such coverage may have on our numerous prosecutive responsibilities. The FEI's effectiveness has always depended in large measure on our capacity to rotain the full confidence of the American people. The use of any investigative measures which infringe on traditional rights of privacy must therefore be scrutinized most carefully. Within this framework, however, I would be willing to consider any proposals your Agency may make.

WCS:mea (5)	SECRET Group Landsterry	see note, page 3	، د دور د
થી મું?ી, પ્રકેશનુ કે તે છે કરે કંઈ છે. મુંડ પ્રક્રો અને કરે છે આ પૈકી અને કે કે પ્રત્યે છે. તે તે અને	Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification		

1

Bonorable Richard Helms

With respect to the inclusion of positive intelligence courses in our training curricula, I am sure you will recognize that our training programs must be designed primarily to fulfill our own widespread and demanding responsibilities. While I appreciate your offer, I do not feel it would be feasible at this time to include the proposed courses in our training schedules. I would certainly have no objection to the holding of seminars between specialists of our two agencies in selective areas of interest when justified by specific circumstances.

Concerning the coordination of FEL-CIA activities in the exploitation of live sources, both in the communist bloc field and with regard to key nonbloc establishments. I are not aware of any significant problems. The 1966 agreement between our agencies was concerned directly with this question and I have no changes to suggest in the ground rules at this time. However, in the event your Agency has some specific proposals to make, I would welcome hearing further from you in this connection.



b3

b3

Honorable Richard Helms

Similarly, I am not aware of any major problems which exist at this time in connection with the coordination of our field liaison operations. It has been my long-standing policy that serious questions affecting the coordination of our activities with other Government agencies should be handled and controlled at a headquarters level in order to avoid administrative confusion and misunderstanding.

SEC

In line with my letter of March II and the observations contained in your letter of March 20, I will in the immediate future designate appropriate officials of the Eureau to meet with your representatives for detailed discussions of these matters. It is my earnest hope that such conferences will lead to a sharpened understanding of the responsibilities and objectives of our respective agencies and will serve to promote more effective cooperation in our joint commitment to the national intelligence needs.

Sincerely yours.

NOTE:

See memo Sullivan to DeLoach 3/30/70 captioned "Relations With CIA" prepared by WCS: mea.

March 5, 1970

The Director

Sam J. Fapich

RELATIONS VITH CEA

Reference is made to my letter of 3/2/70. I made the statement, "Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always set in a forthright methor, and the Agency undenbtedly could present a list of grievances." It is my understanding that you want such grievances if attified. There is enclosed berowith a list of eases or situations which prose over the years.

Based upon a review of files and my personal recollection, this list would be representative of esters which CIA could use for making thereas such as: not belog iorthrheat, not playing fairly and squarely, not cooperating, not being of assistance, rot recognizing the read for concrete FDA contributions to the forsign intelligence be readers. That Call may have complied ever the years is unbown. Must siterify and and have not come to our attention cannot be answered at this time. I am thinking of leaks including distorted information which may have been passed to CIA from exclusion employees and CIA informants and sources.

It should be clearly exphasized that there is no indication whatsoever within CIA that the Agency has been seeking any kind of a showdown or controntation with the FBI. Contrary to what some people may believe, the relationship between the two agencies up to the recent crisis was never better despite the problems which have arisen from time to time. I am confident that a thorough and impartial examination will conclusively support the foregoing.

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding, it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances. We can also produce an excellent record of support which we have given CIA; presumably CIA could do the same. There are ingredients for continuing conflict and there is also adequate machinery for maintaining sound working relations and producing badly needed intelligence information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED Enclosure CONTINUED - OVER NOLASSIFIED DE BY 60322 UC/LO 06/m3 SJP:chs/wak (4)ATE 1 - Mr. DeLoach 1 - Mr. Sullivan D- Mr. Papich

Memorandum to the Director RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

I believe that it would be most helpful to you and interested Bureau officials when evaluating and passing judgment on the attached material if we analyzed very briefly the role of the Bureau Minison Agent. A Minison Agent can be a simple mail courier or he can be the true Bureau Agent ready to confront any problem or issue with another grency, very often working with very limited information. It is expected that the Bureau Agent carry out his instructions forcefully and efficiently. He must be prepared to handle all types of personalities under various conditions. He must be alert for pitfalls and express himself in a most judicious and prudent manner but always making certain that the Bureau position is well fortified.

In evoluating the attached and my encounters with CIA. it should be noted that protests from the Eureau plways vere easy to handle because the Agent had J. Edgar Moover behind him. Nowever, when an Agent struck at an official on one day and solicited his cooperation the next day, it did require some resourceful action. It is believed that other liaison Agents Pervioriv encourter athilist extractions. On annorma eccentions I have bitterly lended with CLA officials and this has included rough_langue_0. I have volked out on CIA officials when I felt they were unreasonable. They took the institutive by esting the Agent to return. I did try to play fairly and squarely with all of them and nover hesitated to accept a controntation; this included the Director of the Agency. When I lectured to CIA personnel over the years I always made a point to challenge them to present any grievances or raise any subject matter relating to the Burcau. I never left a discussion with any CIA official without being positive that our position was obsolutely understood. The approaches utilized by me night be open to criticism. I can only refer to the records of the Bureau and CIA and I believe the Bureau's position is most favorable. I don't think CIA has ever transmitted a letter of protest to the Bureau during the cighteen years during which the Agent handled the assignment.

ACTION:

For information.

March 9, 1970

Mr. DeLoach

W. C. Sullivan

RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Reference is made to the memorandum W. C. Sullivan to C. D. Deleach dated 3/5/70, captioned as above. At that time the Director was advised this Division would make an analysis of each situation cited in the memorandum of Epecial Agent Sam J. Papich relative to grievances which CIA might hold in connection with relations with the FBI.

Enclosed will be found an analysic of 30 items (2 are contained in one memorandum, making a total of 37 memoranda). In substance our analysis does not show any real reason why CIA would rates any issue in connection with ్ కొరిస్తుంది. సినిమా సంస్థులు సంస్థులు సార్క్ స్పథులు స్పథులు స్పథులు స్పథులు స్పథులు స్పథులు స్పథులు స్పథులు సార్కెట్టులు స్పథులు సార్కెట్ స్పథులు సంస్థులు స్పథులు స్పథులు స్పథులు స్పథులు స్పథులు సంస్థులు సార్కెట్ పార్కె these cases would lo locally close the nattor. In one memorandum the 37th itom listed, it is recommended that a carefully worded lettor to GIA cuplining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and counserintelligence work affecting the United States be sent to that Agoncy. Whe purpose of this is to protect the Bureau by giving CIA a chance to make any comments, if it has any, in reward to the current utilization of sources and facilities affecting both CIA and the Bureau. If CIA replies that it is satisfied with the current intelligence conditions in this area, we will put this particular matter to rest and we will have their letter in the file.

This Division will take any and all steps to comply with the Director's wishes in this matter and in any other concerning which this Division is involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

for the information of the Director.

Enclosure WCS:chs (6) 1 - Mr. DeLeach 1 - Mr. Sullivan 1 - Mr. J.A.Sizoo 1 - Mr. D.E.Moore 1 - Mr. D.J.Brennan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEFEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED ulle/06/mar

FD-654 (Rev. 1-3-91) Date 10/14/05 Classification of Mail: Mail Category: Unclassified Letter Airtel Cop Memo LHM Other Report Teletype on S 🗆 sci* Other 0 FD-502 Number FD-501 Number b3 Subject Date of N 62-80750. 5045 Description of Material (include identity of originating office or agency) This serial has been removed and placed in: Despecial File Room, Room 3997, FBIHQ / FOIPA # 368692 (Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other location where material is stored) This action taken based upon authority of: □ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065 Field Office Manager -_ File and Serial number ALL INFORMAT TON CONTAINED Del Day May (Signature and Title of Approving Official) Date *requires special handling PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

5010-106 OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES GO RNMENT Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Adn. Dep. AD Inv. Mr. J. B. Adams 1 Memorandum 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz Asst. Dir.: Mr. J. B. Hotis Admin. 1 -Comp. Syst. ____ Ext. Affairs Mr. W. R. Wannall DATE: 4/14/75 b7C то Files & Com. ___ Gen. Inv. _ Ident. 1 - Mr. Wannall W Inspection Cregar FROM 1 Intell. VI \vec{P} Mr. Laboratory . 1 W. ο. Cregar Plan. & Eval. ... \mathcal{O} Spec. Inv. SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75 ALL FBI ION CONTAINED Training THURN Dalmay elephone Rm. OC. Tak Director Secty . This memorandum reports the results of an Executive Committee Meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review for the Intelligence Community on 4/11/75. 124 r, OTHER Executive Session (US Congress) Ξ. 6 (γ) ٩ 5 Charle C A MARKA 62-80,150 C. F. South Enclosures NOT REAL PHET 15 MAY 13 1975 170 MAY 1.6 1975 WOC: 1mh/mh (7.)WFED" FOVER ENCLOSURE MAY 2 0 1975

÷,

t

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

554-7530 for authority

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN AS UNCLASSIFIED DATES 31 05 BY 0022ULLA RG MAS

JUNE MAIL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Removed By _____ 7 9 APR 1 4 1975

j/FBI

File Number _____62-80750-5047

Permanent Serial Charge Out