

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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- Baker \_\_\_\_\_
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- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- Ms. Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- Mrs. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM*

DATE: 1/12/73

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS*

SUBJECT: *16* NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON TERRORISM  
FBI ACADEMY, QUANTICO, VIRGINIA,  
JANUARY 14 - 17, 1973

*Police Training Manual*

Attached for approval is document entitled "Terrorism-- Its Tactics and Techniques." This study of terrorist methods used in other countries was prepared for distribution at captioned symposium. It contains only public source data or information furnished our Legal Attaches by foreign police contacts specifically to incorporate in an unclassified document for police officers.

*AN F.B.I. Special Study 1-12-73*

This symposium consists of command policy making level police officers from around the country who are familiar with terrorist or extremist activity.

ACTION:

That attached study on terrorism be approved for distribution at captioned symposium.

Enclosure

TJD:ikm *ikm*  
(6)

EX-105

*EM/WRD*  
*bd*

- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. D. N. Lloyd
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

REC-11



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**ENCLOSURE**

17 JAN 22 1973

59 JAN 29 1973

*5-TJD*

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

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January 12, 1973

# TERRORISM

## -- ITS TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES



- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Baker \_\_\_\_\_
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- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Kinley \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Armstrong \_\_\_\_\_
- Ms. Herwig \_\_\_\_\_
- Mrs. Neenan \_\_\_\_\_

TJD:lkm  
(150)

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### AN FBI SPECIAL STUDY

*EM/wrw*


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MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE



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## INTRODUCTION

Terrorism, the dark side of political history, disputes man's goal of establishing stable societies. Law enforcement authorities are charged with the initial treatment of the current epidemic of political violence. Many nations have been infected; thus the techniques used by terrorists in one area are of vital interest to police officials in other areas--the terrorist, if nothing else, is imitative.

A survey of major terrorist operations around the world from the viewpoint of tactics and techniques of the terrorist should, then, help law enforcement authorities plan responses to terrorist actions. The incidents of kidnappings, hijackings, bombings, and other terrorist acts described in this study have been selected not to condemn or condone, but to provide study data.

The primary tactics used by terrorists in various countries today include hijackings, kidnappings, murders or assassinations, massacres, and bombings, including use of letter bombs and firebombs. Some terrorists also use the tactic of expropriation (robbery to gain funds for political purposes). These tactics have also been those of urban guerrillas throughout the world. Political terrorists and urban guerrillas differ, however, in the goal sought by each. The political terrorist has a specific cause, such as focusing world attention on Palestinian refugees or forcing the British to end their jurisdiction in Northern Ireland, while the urban guerrilla of today is looking towards causing a revolution.

## PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ATTACKS

Early in 1972, Palestinian guerrillas began a new series of attacks designed to focus world attention on the Palestine problem. Guerrillas of Al Fatah and other Arab nationalist groups had been relatively quiet for the previous eight months since their expulsion from camps in Jordan.

Arab guerrillas began with the hijacking of a West German airliner for ransom and eventually received \$5 million. Five Arab guerrillas, armed with pistols and grenades, commandeered the Lufthansa flight from New Delhi, India, to Athens and diverted it to Aden. There, the guerrillas freed women and children and later the 118 male passengers. The 14 crew members were held for two days until the ransom was agreed upon.

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In May, an Israeli aircraft bound from Brussels to Tel Aviv was hijacked by two male and two female guerrillas of the Black September organization (the leader of this group was later identified as a participant in the 1970 simultaneous hijacking of three jets to the Jordanian desert). The terrorists landed in Tel Aviv and threatened to blow up the plane unless 317 imprisoned guerrillas were freed.

The Israeli response to this hijacking was to uniform commandos as airline mechanics while negotiating with the terrorists. Commandos practiced assaulting a similar aircraft until they were able to force the doors and board the aircraft within a period of ninety seconds. The commandos' weapons were hidden in their boots and toolboxes and they assaulted the hijacked plane. The two male skyjackers were killed, one of the female skyjackers was wounded, and three passengers were wounded.

Arab terrorists recruited members of a Japanese revolutionary group to carry out a massacre at Tel Aviv's Lod International Airport in May, 1972. Using automatic weapons and throwing hand grenades, the three Japanese terrorists opened fire without warning in the airport waiting room; 26 persons were killed and 72 others were wounded. Two of the terrorists were killed and one was captured. The massacre was claimed by the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. A leader of this group was killed in July by a bomb hidden under the right front fender of his car. Ten pounds of plastic explosives, with a hand grenade detonator, were wired to the ignition.

In September, eight terrorists of the Black September group invaded the Olympic Village in Munich, Germany, seized nine Israeli athletes as hostages, and killed two others. Members of this terrorist group traveled separately to Munich by several means of transportation and brought with them Russian-made Kalashnikov submachine guns, pistols, and hand grenades. They made a 4:20 a.m. entry into the Olympic Village, dressed in sport clothes and carrying what appeared to be athletic equipment. Many of the Olympic athletes had broken training and re-entered the Olympic Village in the same manner, by climbing a six-and-one-half-foot fence around the complex.

The Arabs demanded 200 prisoners held in Israel be freed along with leaders of a German leftist terrorist group linked to bank robberies, bombing of U. S. Army posts, and the murder of three policemen in Germany. They also asked for freedom for the Japanese terrorist captured in the Lod Airport massacre. The Palestinians demanded that they and their prisoners be flown out of West Germany to any Arab nation except Lebanon or Jordan. While negotiating with the terrorists, West German officials made preparations at a military airport to rescue the hostages and capture the Arabs.

Because preparations for an assault had to be made at several different places, only five police officers armed with sniper rifles could be deployed. G 3 rifles by Heckler and Koch, fitted with Zeiss telescopic sights, were used under flood-lit conditions. Other police at the scene were equipped with armored vehicles, bulletproof vests, and machine pistols. The cautious terrorists never exposed more than three of their members at any one time, however, and immediately killed the hostages when German police opened fire.

The next major campaign by the Black September group involved the sending of letter bombs to Israeli diplomats. Within a week, at the end of September, 64 letter bombs were sent to Israeli diplomatic offices in New York City, Ottawa, Montreal, Paris, Vienna, Geneva, Brussels, Buenos Aires, and Kinshasa as well as Tel Aviv. An Israeli diplomat in London was fatally wounded in the first wave of letter bombs.

Since then, letter bombs have been sent to British businessmen named in the "Zionist Yearbook," officers of a Jewish women's group in the U. S., and Israelis reportedly intercepted letter bombs addressed to the President of the U. S. and other Government officials.

Letter bombs have taken different forms. Some have used TNT in a powdered form, others have used plastic explosives in thin strips. Detonators have included tiny springs or the act of opening the envelope and removing the letter ignites the fuse or scratches a percussion cap to set off the explosive. The letters can weigh less than an ounce and can be only an eighth of an inch thick. Most have been hand-addressed and have been sent from overseas addresses by airmail.

In December, 1972, four Black September terrorists invaded the Israeli Embassy in Thailand, seizing six Israeli hostages. Two of the terrorists, dressed in formal attire to deceive the Thai guard into thinking they were diplomats returning from the investiture of the Thai heir to the throne, simply walked into the embassy while the other two terrorists climbed the wall around the building. In this case, the demand was again for the release of prisoners held in Israel--36 Palestinian terrorists were named. Officials in Thailand enlisted the aid of the Egyptian Ambassador in negotiating with the terrorists and succeeded in persuading them to release the hostages in return for safe conduct by air to Egypt.

Black September terrorists have also been credited with the assassination of the Jordanian Premier in Cairo in November, 1971, in addition to an attempted assassination of Jordan's Ambassador to London. They are believed responsible for the murder of five Jordanians living in West Germany whom they suspected of spying for Israel. A German plant making electronic

components for sale to Israel and a refinery in Yugoslavia (thought to be dealing with "pro-Zionist interests" in Germany have been bombed, probably by Black September followers. Black September operates in small cells, has specialized in exporting terrorists, and has developed some of the most spectacular means used by terrorists to date.

### NORTHERN IRELAND

The present guerrilla warfare in Northern Ireland is generally dated from August, 1969, when 300 British troops were sent to the six counties in Northern Ireland with heavy Catholic populations and extensive Irish Republican Army (IRA) activity. Since then, some 600 deaths, over 7,000 injuries, and over 2,000 bomb explosions have occurred in Northern Ireland according to British Army estimates.

The IRA of today is an often youthful guerrilla group, utilizing even young teenagers to carry out terrorist attacks. While British authorities estimate the strength of the IRA at approximately 500, or perhaps less today, these guerrillas are well armed with automatic weapons and other small arms and a plentiful supply of the explosive gellignite. Snipings, assassinations, and bombings, including firebombings and the use of antipersonnel nail bombs, are the primary tactics of the IRA (and of anti-Catholic, Protestant guerrilla forces also operating in the Irish Republic).

British authorities have over 20,000 troops in Northern Ireland in their attempt to restore order there. Troops used combat bulldozers and other armored vehicles in the August, 1972, siege of the "no go" areas in Northern Ireland. Some two tons of explosives, 11,000 rounds of ammunition, and 50 weapons were seized during the invasion of the IRA's barricaded sanctuary. The IRA has not been noted for innovative tactics but has used such extreme measures as rolling a bulldozer with a 50-pound bomb on it into an army post and then firing on the bomb to explode it. Bus service in Northern Ireland ends at 7:00 p.m. because of the IRA tactic of setting buses afire to lure security forces into an ambush. Violence has been mostly confined to Northern Ireland and the IRA has not exported terrorism, although there are IRA sympathizers in the United States. One of the few instances of violence outside the six counties occurred at Aldershot on January 30, 1972, when a bomb was exploded in an officers' mess in the British Army base there. Seven were killed and 19 injured.

## LATIN AMERICA

Terrorists in Latin America have been noted for the kidnaping of diplomats, expropriations, and the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*. The author of this textbook on terrorism, Carlos Marighella, was a leader in the Communist Party in Brazil until he broke with the communists over his theory of urban guerrilla warfare. Marighella, who organized the kidnaping of U. S. Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick, theorized that revolution could be effected if the masses were shown that their government was powerless. The methodology advocated by Marighella was to commit acts of terrorism, particularly the murder of police officers, to show the impotence of the government or the "establishment."

Police officers are the primary target on the theory that they are the first line of defense of a stable society and if police officers cannot protect themselves, the urban guerrilla reasons, the masses will feel they and their governments are powerless to protect themselves. Marighella was killed in a confrontation with Brazilian police in 1969. His successor, Carlos Lamarca, who organized the kidnaping of the Swiss Ambassador in 1970, was also killed by police.

Probably the best known terrorist group in South America is the Tupamaros in Uruguay. Composed of many intellectuals, the Tupamaros began with a "Robin Hood" image by robbing casinos to finance activities. These robberies were followed by kidnapings and other forms of terrorism, but the activities of the Tupamaros have never been as bloodthirsty as those of some other terrorist groups. A high point of Tupamaro activity was the occupation of a village in Uruguay for a brief period while an expropriation was carried out and propaganda was distributed.

Prison escapes organized by the Tupamaros in April, 1972, were followed by an escalation of violence on the part of the group. Six ambushes, which cost the lives of two police officers, a former Cabinet member, and a Naval officer, took place. The Tupamaros, like most guerrilla and terrorist groups, operate in small cells, following the teachings of the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* and the classic guerrilla tactics developed in the Algerian rebellion.

Other nations in Latin America are plagued with terrorist activity designed to foment revolution. In Argentina last year, the Major General in charge of antiguerrilla activity was killed by terrorists and the Italian manager of the local Fiat plant was kidnaped. The kidnapers were located



by police and a gun battle ensued until the terrorists shouted for the shooting to cease as the plant manager was in their hands and was alive. After officers ceased firing, they heard two more shots and when they rushed the terrorists' refuge they found the manager dead.

In Costa Rica, airline hijackers from the Nicaraguan National Liberation Front attempted to seize an aircraft in November, 1971. The President of Costa Rica ordered an assault on the aircraft while it was on the ground and one hijacker was killed. The other two were captured. Guatemala saw the kidnaping of the West German Ambassador by the Rebel Armed Forces, a group which has killed a number of police officers in that country.

### CANADIAN SEPARATIST TACTICS

The separatist movement in Canada began bombing English and Federal establishments there in 1963. The Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ) also attempted to establish an armed guerrilla apparatus similar to the Algerian guerrillas, but without success. The second FLQ, which emerged in 1965 with a Marxist orientation, adopted tactics of international revolutionaries, beginning with the bombings and escalating to political kidnapings in 1970. These culminated in the imposition of a type of martial law in Canada.

Recent bombings by mail on the part of Palestinian guerrillas caused the FLQ to plan similar activity, but lack of access to plastic explosives has so far precluded the use of mail bombs in Canada. Bombers there have utilized mainly dynamite, detonated by electric blasting caps, with a clock-work mechanism used as a delay device.

In this type device a clock, usually a wrist watch, is used. A

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Improvised explosives have also been used in Canada, frequently a mixture of [REDACTED]. These ingredients are available in school laboratories and improvised igniters have been made from [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] This dangerous process has caused accidents to the bombers in Canada.

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## OTHER ACTIVITY

In addition to Arab terrorist activity exported to Europe, primarily to Germany, a number of European nations have political terrorist or urban guerrilla problems. Germany has been the scene of pitched battles between police and the revolutionary Meinhof-Baader gang. In June, 1972, police supported by an armored car trapped student revolutionary Andreas Baader and another leader of this group in a garage, successfully capturing them after a fire fight. This guerrilla group, numbering about 24 members, has engaged in bank robberies, car thefts, and shoot-outs with police in Germany during the past two years. In addition, during the two weeks prior to the capture of Baader the group was believed responsible for six major bombings, including two at U. S. Army bases that killed four U. S. servicemen and injured 41 other persons.

According to an interview with Ulrike Meinhof, female leader of this group, *What we want to do and show is that armed confrontation is feasible--that it is possible to carry out actions where we win, and not the other side. Cops have to be fought as representatives of the system. Cops are pigs, not human beings.* This group was also involved in a sensational rescue of its leader, Baader. While in prison he received permission to travel under guard to a Berlin library for research. Meinhof was in the library and with two companions using tear gas grenades and guns, the group freed Baader. Two guards and a librarian were wounded.

Another type of terrorism now being exported is that practiced by Croatian nationalists, anti-Tito Yugoslavs, or Yugoslavian refugees. In September, 1972, three Croatian nationalists hijacked a flight bound for Stockholm and forced the pilot to land in Spain. They demanded \$105,000 in ransom and the release of seven convicted Croatian terrorists. With the ransom and the released terrorists, the hijackers flew to Madrid--where they were imprisoned by Spanish authorities.

Another group of Croatian nationalists actually invaded Yugoslavia last June 26 with an arsenal of submachine guns, other weapons, and a portable radio station. Reportedly, they penetrated 375 miles into Yugoslavia. The most extreme of Croatian nationalists have set up headquarters in Sweden, where they assassinated the Yugoslav Ambassador in 1971. They also claimed responsibility for placing bombs on a plane and on a train bound for Yugoslavia.

Japanese terrorists, besides their role in the Lod Airport massacre, have been involved in numerous bombings and other terrorist activity in that country. In March, 1972, one of the longest confrontations between terrorists and police took place. Japanese police located five terrorists in a mountain

resort. The five, sought for a number of bank robberies (other Japanese terrorists have been involved in shootings and a hijacking of an airliner to North Korea), were armed with a rifle, three shotguns and several bombs. Police attempted to [REDACTED] by the terrorists, and began a nine-day siege.

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There were 1,200 police officers with armored cars, loudspeakers, and a mobile crane, and much of the siege was carried on nationwide television. Police talked to the terrorists via loudspeakers and the terrorists fired at the amplifying devices. Authorities brought in psychologists for consultation and airlifted the terrorists' mothers to the scene to plead with their offspring. This tactic was also unsuccessful. Authorities tried flooding the lodge with blinding lights and playing loud recordings of marching troops and traffic noise to preclude the terrorists from resting. After 200 hours of this, police used a mobile crane with a one-and-one-half-ton demolition ball to smash holes in the walls of the lodge. Police fired some 300 tear gas rounds through these holes and flooded the lodge with 60 tons of freezing water. In spite of this, when police rushed the lodge, two officers were killed.



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Subject: FBI Document Terrorism - Its Tactics and Techniques (January 12, 1973)

[Redacted]

The FBI has completed its review of records subject to the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) that are responsive to your request. The enclosed documents were reviewed under the FOIPA, Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

**Section 552**

**Section 552a**

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

50 U.S.C. 3024(i)(1)

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(9)

(k)(6)

(b)(6)

(k)(7)

10 pages were reviewed and 10 pages are being released.

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

Based on the information you provided, we conducted a main and reference entity record search of the Central Records System (CRS) per our standard search policy. For more information about records searches and the standard search policy, see the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum General Information Section.

This is the final release of information responsive to your FOIPA request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.

A record that may be responsive to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request has been transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). If you wish to review these records, submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to NARA, Special Access and FOIA, 8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500, College Park, MD 20740-6001. Please reference the file number 100-HQ-457650.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. “**Part 1**” of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. “**Part 2**” includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. “**Part 3**” includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Additional information about the FOIPA can be found at [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia). Should you have questions regarding your request, please feel free to contact [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). Please reference the FOIPA Request number listed above in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP’s FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP’s website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by emailing the FBI’s FOIA Public Liaison at [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). The subject heading should clearly state “Dispute Resolution Services.” Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel  
Section Chief  
Record/Information Dissemination Section  
Information Management Division

Enclosures

## FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

### Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

### Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Confidential Informant Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of confidential informant records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F) [5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F)] and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552a (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records would reveal confidential informant identities and information, expose law enforcement techniques, and endanger the life or physical safety of individuals. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

### Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches and Standard Search Policy.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems, such as the Central Records System (CRS), or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. The CRS is an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. The standard search policy is a search for main entity records in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include a search for reference entity records, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files.
  - a. *Main Entity Records* – created for individuals or non-individuals who are the subjects or the focus of an investigation
  - b. *Reference Entity Records*- created for individuals or non-individuals who are associated with a case but are not known subjects or the focus of an investigation
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Foreseeable Harm Standard.** As amended in 2016, the Freedom of Information Act provides that a federal agency may withhold responsive records only if: (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the nine exemptions that FOIA enumerates, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law (5 United States Code, Section 552(a)(8)(A)(i)). The FBI considers this foreseeable harm standard in the processing of its requests.
- (iv) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at [www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks](http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks). Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at [www.edo.cjis.gov](http://www.edo.cjis.gov). For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.

## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.