

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 22, 1946

FROM : Mr. D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: U.S. WAR PLANS

b7E

[redacted] advises that [redacted]

1946, [redacted] during the first week of March, [redacted] learned that the U.S. General Staff had ordered its Survey Department to speed the production of maps of the Soviet Union devoting particular attention to all Soviet installations constructed during 1945.

[redacted] continues that if the United Nations Security Council Conference currently being held in this country is unsuccessful, Anglo-American military cooperation will immediately become public knowledge and embark upon concrete action.

b7E

LW:edm

SE 7

62-81484-X

RECORDED

19 APR 26 1946

EX-19

7 MAY 1946


Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Coffey	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Beahm	
Miss Gandy	

American War Plans

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

14376

DATE: July 12, 1946

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : C. H. Carson

SUBJECT: ~~POSSIBLE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES~~

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Coffey	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Beahm	
Miss Gandy	

[redacted] advises that [redacted]

[redacted] construction of airfields and defense works north of the Spanish Pyrenees and in northern Italy on the part of England and America were discussed. It was also reported that large quantities of provisions were being stored by the Allies on the coasts of Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, and Denmark.

An alleged plan of operations was outlined in the message. It provided for the British and United States forces to withdraw from the European plain after hostilities break out with the idea of holding firmly the coastal regions of Belgium, France, Germany, and Holland, to an extent of approximately 80 miles. Mechanized troops were to be used with naval and air support. It was stated that the mountainous region in northern Spain and northern Italy would be held by signal troops. A separate body of troops would support them in occupation of Germany, Austria, and the Swiss Alps "to contain the Soviet forces."

[redacted] also alleged that efforts would be made to properly indoctrinate the public in Great Britain and United States for support in the war and that thereafter atomic bombs would be used to obtain quick results. It was stated that urgent efforts were being made to complete these plans. France was said to be aware of them and consequently to be greatly concerned.

SE 17

162-81484-1

F B I

31 JUL 16 1946

RECORDED &amp; INDEXED

357

08 - XI

DVH:KK

57 JUL 26 1946

RECORDED

08 - XI

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON ✓

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT:

DATE: September 9, 1946

Mr. Tolson  
 Mr. E. A. Tamm  
 Mr. Clegg  
 Mr. Glavin  
 Mr. Ladd  
 Mr. Nichols  
 Mr. Rosen  
 Mr. Tracy  
 Mr. Carson  
 Mr. Egan  
 Mr. Gurnea  
 Mr. Harbo  
 Mr. Hendon  
 Mr. Pennington  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm  
 Tele. Room  
 Mr. Nease  
 Miss Beahm  
 Miss Gandy

Lynne Celdon, formerly of the Washington Post, now with War Assets, called Mr. McGuire to advise that he has been handling the advertising in connection with sales of various Army surplus goods. He had a large number of parachutes declared surplus. The Army today ordered all the parachutes back into active inventory, removing them from surplus property. Celdon stated that the Army has likewise removed all "ducks." This is an amphibious tank, and the Army has returned these to active inventory. Celdon stated the implication is, of course, being prepared for trouble ahead.

JJM:RC

RECORDED  
 &  
 INDEXED  
 70

162-81484-44  
 29 SEP 13 1946

90 SEP 15 1946



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: August 20, 1946

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Beahm  
Miss Gandy

Colonel Forney of G-2 called at my office on August 19, 1946, at which time he stated he desired to impart some extremely confidential information, that he must be, under all circumstances, protected as the source of the information, otherwise he would be court martialed if he were found out. Colonel Forney was definitely "scared" at furnishing this information, but stated that in view of the fact that the echelon in the War Department was not passing it on to the Bureau, he thought he should do so because of the importance of the FBI working closely with the War Department in any emergency.

Colonel Forney stated that in the event Russia persists on going into Turkey, that Turkey has indicated she will fight and that the United States has committed itself to enter the fight on behalf of Turkey. He stated that if this takes place, we will be embroiled in a war with Russia within the next few weeks. Colonel Forney stated however that in the event Russia backs down and permits the Turkey question to be taken before the Counsel of Ministers or the United Nations, that the danger of an immediate war will be lessened.

DML:da

RECORDED

EX-29

162-81484-5  
F B I  
32 SEP 9 1946

8/22/46

per  
L  
Fleming

70 SEP 17 1946

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6-3-43

FROM : SAC, ANCHORAGE

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Recently it has been necessary for me to visit various points in the Territory, even though for a short period of time, in connection with the regular office investigative work. An occasion has presented itself for me to meet Commander LLOYD C. KERSEY, Director of Naval Intelligence in the 17th Naval District, and to meet on various occasions with Colonel L. E. TOOLE, Director of Security and Intelligence in the Alaskan Department, Fort Richardson, Alaska. Various items of information have been developed and the Bureau should not make this matter known to any outside sources.

Referral/Consult


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62-81484-6

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211 NOV 17 19

59 JUN 27 1946

*o United States was planned**Harvey  
F. Miller  
elgym  
Fitch  
Carson*



In connection with the Army operations and plans, Colonel TOOLE has advised that the only real installations which will be kept under present plans are as follows:

1. Headquarters of the Alaskan Department at Fort Richardson, on which considerable construction work will be made during the coming Summer months
2. Increase in the Army personnel at Adak
3. Additions to the Air Base at Shemya
4. Additions to the Army Base at Ladd Field, Fairbanks

At present there are approximately 20,000 men assigned to the Alaskan Department. About 10,000 are assigned to Fort Richardson, some 7,000 to Adak and the remaining are assigned to Ladd Field, Shemya, about 500 on Attu and caretaker forces at various small Army Camps, such as Unimak, Cold Bay, Amchitka, Nome and a few at Wales and Teller. Probably the ~~top secret~~ on the Army as far as the Alaskan Department is concerned are the bases at Wales and Teller, Alaska and the Bureau will note from the map their strategic importance. A survey was conducted during the war months by the Engineering Department in connection with the Alaska Railroad and a railway line was surveyed from Fairbanks to Wales and Teller. At both Wales and Teller there were a number of under-ground installations made and runways have been constructed which are about 10,000 feet long. The Army contemplates these bases as points of operation should any hostilities arise nearby. They are considered as bases adequate for the handling of planes carrying atomic bombs.

It is not known whether the railroad will be run from Fairbanks to the above mentioned points. However, the plans have been drawn and whether this work is done will depend on Congressional appropriations for the Army and the final size of the Army and the amount of personnel which will be assigned to the Alaskan Department.

Colonel TOOLE has advised that any amount of men who are normally assigned to Alaska are really of no benefit as far as

fighting forces are concerned, it being recalled that Alaska is between 1/5 and 1/4 the size of the entire United States. Travel in the territory, except between Anchorage and Fairbanks, is entirely by plane and consequently it would take a force of at least 100,000 to make any sort of adequate assignment of Army personnel to the Territory of Alaska, according to Army authorities.

As soon as any additional information in regard to the above matters are known to this office, the Bureau, of course, will be advised.

LOT:MW

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : C. H. Carson

SUBJECT: *Field* MARSHAL MONTGOMERY

DATE: September 26, 1946

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Coffey	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

Recently [ ] has given some information regarding Marshal Montgomery's departure from England and his visits to Canada and the United States. On August 27, 1946, [ ] had advised that the Turkish Ambassador to the United States had disclosed that Marshal Montgomery had spent two months in Canada where rocket experiments were being made. The Turkish Ambassador also conjectured that it was believed that a military union between England and America <sup>was</sup> were in the offing. He also advised that prior to his departure from England, Marshal Montgomery held a conference in England in which twenty-six Generals, who had shown progress in the various fronts, had participated. The purpose of this conference was (1) use of atomic bomb in war and (2) plans of operation against the Soviet Union.

On September 4, 1946, the Turkish Ambassador again advised [ ] that Montgomery and Eisenhower will meet in Canada. After this meeting, the American Chief of Staff will tour the air and V-2 bases which were established a year ago in Northern Canada, Greenland, and Iceland. These bases are reported to be ready for use and the studies which were made from the viewpoint of operations, especially weather conditions, clothing and equipment of various units, have been completed. The necessary materials, equipment and clothing, according to the Turkish Ambassador, will go into prompt production based on these investigations.

The Turkish Ambassador further discloses that the tests of directing the atom bomb by rockets ~~and~~ possibly the V-2 has given satisfactory results. He adds further that a rumor is existent that the Soviets have obtained information concerning the mentioned bases and tests.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This memorandum is prepared for your information. It is requested, however, that it be circulated in the Internal Security Section.

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F B I  
32 SEP 23 1946

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SEP 23 1946

ap

Director, FBI ~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/23/46

SAC, Anchorage

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Correspondence has been previously directed to the Bureau that Army Task Forces commonly referred to as "Williwaw" and "Frigid" will be assembled in the Territory to conduct certain Army cold weather tests. Recently I have received information of Army plans which I believe would be of interest to the Bureau in order that a proper appraisal of intelligence matters and counter-espionage matters might be made.

The Task Force "Frigid" will consist of approximately 1800 men. These men have already arrived and are stationed at their base, which is Ladd Field, Alaska. Ladd Field is immediately adjacent to the City of Fairbanks. This unit will actually make tests of arctic clothing, equipment, and material of all sorts, however, they will function as a cover for Reconnaissance Group No. 46, consisting of 1500 men who will map all of the ground from Ladd Field across the North Pole. This latter project to be undertaken by Reconnaissance Group No. 46 is reported to be the second highest priority on the Army list immediately under the atomic bomb.

Referral/Consult

In recent conversations with Naval personnel, information has been received that [REDACTED]

The information set forth above has been confidentially obtained and should be so held by the Bureau.

LOT:lmr  
63-35

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EX-10

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F B I  
75 OCT 1 1946

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

55 OCT 15 1946

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: November 18, 1946

FROM : SAC, Oklahoma City

SUBJECT: FLIGHT OF B-29s OVER RUSSIA~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Recent articles in the press indicate that the War Department, planned a large flight of B-29s over Russia, which was allegedly opposed by the State Department, and the War Department subsequently announced that this flight of B-29s could not be made due to "inadequate landing facilities" in Europe.

b6 Per Army

[ ] Chief Civilian Investigator, OCAD, Tinker Field, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, is a very close friend of this office. [ ] has advised that he has observed "~~top secret~~" War Department orders at Tinker Field indicating that a number of B-29s are presently being prepared for the above flight.

Under no circumstances should [ ] name be revealed in connection with the above information.

The above is furnished for the information of the Bureau.

JCR/ms

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&  
INDEXED

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431  
57 DEC 3 1946

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-12-2014 BY NSICG/ J75J65T61  
Army information classified per letter d. 12/9/2010

June 5, 1947

~~SECRET~~  
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Special Agent S. W. Reynolds of the Liaison Section while at the War Department on June 4, 1947, learned the following items of information confidentially which might be of interest to the Bureau:

Colonel L. R. Forney advised Mr. Reynolds in extreme confidence that he had learned that General Chamberlain has become very much disgusted with the operations of the Central Intelligence Group in Europe. Colonel Forney stated that General Chamberlain had an opportunity to observe the operations of the Central Intelligence Group agents while on a recent trip through Europe. According to Colonel Forney, General Chamberlain observed that the identity of the CIG secret agents is known by everybody and, in addition to this, the agents are "messing up" the situation tremendously. (S) (U)

Colonel Forney also pointed out that Dr. Gialotti (phonetic), who is the individual you will recall who has furnished Colonel Forney information on Communist activities in Italy, advised Colonel Forney that the CIG representative in Italy is a 26-year old young man whose only bid to recognition appears to be that he is the heir to the National Cash Register fortune. Colonel Forney stated that, according to Dr. Gialotti, this individual spends all of his time at teas and mixing with the so-called Italian society. As a result this activities and identity are well known and he is not getting an accurate picture as to the true conditions in Italy. (S) (U)

Colonel Forney further advised in confidence that Dr. Gialotti told him that Togliatti, the Italian Communist leader, is alleged to have stated that he will be prepared to take over the Italian Government within six months. Colonel Forney pointed out to Mr. Reynolds that this could well lead to a Communist attempted coup in Italy, or in any event could lead to an Italian Civil War. (S) (U)

Colonel Carter W. Clarke informed Mr. Reynolds in extreme confidence that he has learned that [redacted] are carefully rading the Russian plain text messages with a view to determining the movement of Russian scientists and "captured" German scientists who are known or suspected to be authorities in nuclear fussion and bacteriological warfare. Colonel Clarke advised Mr. Reynolds further in extreme confidence that he has learned that the Army is planning a top secret mission in Russia. He stated that this mission will consist of utilizing the sixty B 29's which are to make a "good will tour" of Europe. These airplanes will be equipped with especially devised photographic equipment, which is expected to be ready this Summer. They will when the weather is right fly over the Ural. (S) (U)

Classified by SP1 GSK/ALP  
Declassify on: OADR  
10/17/83

RECORDED 62-81484-14  
F B I  
JUN 18 1947

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-81484-14



Memorandum for Mr. Ladd

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Basin at an estimated height of 42,000 feet and attempt to photograph all vital Russian installations in the Ural Basin. Colonel Clarke advised that these airplanes would be equipped with special type detonators so that in the event they run into any mechanical difficulties or any difficulties from intercepting Russian planes, the airplanes can be destroyed without disclosing to the Russians the mechanical equipment on board or the purpose of the mission. He indicated that it was felt that of the sixty airplanes a reasonable number should be successful in returning with the desired information. (S) (U)

Colonel Clarke also informed Mr. Reynolds that he had heard, but has been unable to verify the fact, that Stalin on Red Army Day decorated a Russian flyer for flying his airplane to the United States and returning. (S) (U)

It should be noted that all of the above information was obtained by Special Agent Reynolds from Colonel Forney and Colonel Clarke in extreme confidence and should be handled with the utmost caution in the Bureau and disclosed to no one outside of the Bureau.

Respectfully,

E. G. Fitch

SWR:AJB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice

940 First National Building  
Oklahoma City 2, Oklahoma  
August 13, 1947

Mr. Tolson .....  
Mr. E. A. Tamm .....  
Mr. Clegg .....  
Mr. Glavin .....  
Mr. Ladd .....  
Mr. Nichols .....  
Mr. Rosen .....  
Mr. Tracy .....  
Mr. Egan .....  
Mr. Gurnea .....  
Mr. Harbo .....  
Mr. Mohr .....  
Mr. Pennington .....  
Mr. Quinn Tamm .....  
Mr. Nease .....  
Miss Gandy .....

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI

RE: RECONVERSION OF AIRPLANES

b6 Per Army

Dear Sir:

Please be advised that [redacted] Investigator, Security Section, Oklahoma City Air Technical Service Command, Tinker Field, Oklahoma City, who is extremely cooperative with this office and who has requested that under no circumstances should his identity be divulged, has furnished the information that is set forth hereinbelow.

b6 Per Army

[redacted] stated that recently the Army had initiated a top secret program and is taking immediate steps to modify the P-47 and B-29 airplanes, and he feels that this modification or reconversion is for the purpose of installing more and heavier fire power and to equip these planes to carry a greater capacity of bombs. [redacted] stated that he was recently designated to inspect the security of one of the reconversion establishments on the west coast, which, like Tinker Field, has been designated as a reconversion center for these airplanes. He stated he was astounded to learn of the security measures that are being taken by the army in this regard. He further advised that recently while he was in Albuquerque, New Mexico, one of the reconverted planes landed at Kurtland Field in Albuquerque and that before the plane was permitted to land a caravan of guards was established on the field; that when the plane did land guards were placed around this particular plane, and no individual was permitted to approach the plane.

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~

He further advised that information has been received by him to the effect that in all probability by the first of January, 1948, the reconversion of the B-36 planes will likewise be placed into effect, and he is of the opinion that Tinker Field will be one of the reconversion centers designated for modification of the B-36.

He stated that the instructions that have been received regarding the security of these particular type planes have lead him and others engaged in security work to feel that the Army is possibly expecting an outbreak of hostilities.

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EX-30

62-81484-17  
36 AUG 27 1947


254  
6 1947

To the Director  
From SAC, Oklahoma City  
August 13, 1947

b6 Per Army

These facts are being pointed out to you for your information, and it is respectfully requested that  identity be protected at all times, as he has promised to keep me advised of the progress of these reconversion plans and other restricted information relayed to him.

Very truly yours,

  
D. A. BRYCE  
SAC

DAB/ms

Mr. D. M. Ladd

September 30, 1947

J. P. Coyne

RAYMOND MURPHY  
Department of State  
Source of Information

Pursuant to prior authorization, Supervisor Lish Whitson of the Internal Security Section called on Mr. Murphy in his office at Room 2008, State Department Annex No. 2 (former Temporary Building F) on 23d Street between C and D, N. W. Mr. Murphy stated that he might be leaving the European Desk in the near future to teach in the Foreign Service School of the Department of State. He is Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs.

He advised that it was his opinion that the Department of State had made its last effort to stop Soviet expansion in the Marshall Plan and that if this Plan fell through, as it well might fall through, our foreign relations would be in the hands of the newly created Department of Defense. In commenting upon the Bureau's jurisdiction over Soviet agents, Mr. Murphy stated that we might be in a position to have to round them up within a year.

Mr. Murphy made available eight copies of an enlarged map with attached text relating to Gulag, which is the forced labor camp administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). These copies are attached. Mr. Murphy stated that they were being distributed through the State Department contacts in Italy, France, Belgium and Holland and were having good effect on non-Communist governmental leaders in those countries. He stated that they were not being distributed in the satellite areas because there was absolutely no way of effecting any such distribution.

Counter Propaganda

Mr. Murphy observed that the above mentioned chart was the only real counter propaganda the State Department was handling at the present time. He pointed out that the radio broadcasts to Russia did not contain counter propaganda and, moreover, were not beamed to the people we wished to influence. He pointed out that the "Voice of America" programs were picked up only by those leaders of the government or of the Communist Party who were highly enough placed to own private radios, and a presentation of American life, mixing the bad stories with the good features, was of no real benefit from a propaganda standpoint. It was Mr. Murphy's feeling that we should at this time start to concentrate on counter propaganda on a 24-hour a day basis beamed to all of the Western European countries.

House Un-American Activities Committee

Mr. Murphy stated that during the past week he had attended the hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee on the visa matter of Hanns Eisler.

He commented that he was particularly pleased when Representative Thomas verbally castigated Messersmith of the State Department who, in his testimony, had gone out of his way to besmirch Mr. Alexander, the Assistant Chief in the State Department's Visa Division, who has a reputation of being anti-Communist.

Mr. Murphy stated that the House Un-American Activities Committee could review many cases, particularly those where the Appeal Board permitted the visa applicant to enter the United States over the objection of all or the majority of the various organizations represented on the lower visa panels.

Mr. Murphy offered odds at two to one that the Raissa Irene Berkman Browder visa case would be taken up by the House Un-American Activities Committee before they were through.

Mr. Murphy also discussed the cases of Albert Felerabend, was., and George Schneweis Wise (formerly referred to as George Schneiweiss Weiss), which individuals are subjects of separate memoranda, as are Frank Kleges and Noel Field.

## ACTION

Mr. Murphy will be contacted again periodically regarding matters relating to Communists and Soviet activities.

Attachment

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9-22-47

FROM : SAC, ANCHORAGE

SUBJECT: GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS  
ANCHORAGE OFFICE

Mr. Tolson	.....
Mr. E. A. Tamm	.....
Mr. Clegg	.....
Mr. Glavin	.....
Mr. Ladd	.....
Mr. Nichols	.....
Mr. Rosen	.....
Mr. Tracy	.....
Mr. Egan	.....
Mr. Gurnea	.....
Mr. Harbo	.....
Mr. Mohr	.....
Mr. Pennington	.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm	.....
Mr. Nease	.....
Miss Gandy	.....

This is to advise the Bureau that a recent congressional committee which was in the Territory of Alaska was the Security committee of the Foreign Service Committee of the United States Congress. Members of this party visiting the Territory of Alaska included Congressman CHIPPERFIELD (R), Chairman of the Committee, from Illinois, Congressman JONKMAN (R) of Michigan, Clerk of the General Committee Mr. CRAWFORD, Mr. SHILLCH of the State Department, Colonel DEERWESTER of the headquarters of the War Department in Washington, and a Canadian Army Major, Major ACKERLY, in addition to JOSEPH FLACKNE of the Interior Department.

This party left Chicago, Illinois, stopping at various points in Canada and coming to Anchorage on September 19, 1947. They left on the morning of the 20th and were to remain in Fairbanks for one day and then proceed to Whitehorse and return through Canada to the States. Apparently all of the above men were being escorted by military personnel and they did not make any effort to contact this office or any members of the naval service. I wanted to point this out to the Bureau inasmuch as it may be entirely possible that upon their return to Washington they will make a number of recommendations as to what is and what is not proper to be done in the Territory of Alaska and I wanted the Bureau to have the benefit of the knowledge that they will have probably spent three days in the Territory and will have contacted but very few people and did not contact this office.

As a point of information for the Bureau, I wanted to set forth information that from a observation of the numerous air bases that are being placed in the Territory of Alaska it is obvious that a tremendous amount of construction and defensive-offensive military bases are being built in the vicinity of Fairbanks, Alaska. It is interesting to note from a map of the Territory that there are presently air bases through Canada, the points of which are known to the Bureau, and at Snag on the Canadian-Alaskan border. There are also bases at Northway, Tanana, Big Delta, 26 Mile, Ladd Field, Clear and Nenana. It will be noted that Nenana Airfield, or Clear, as it is commonly referred to, and 26 Mile are very close to Ladd Field in Fairbanks. Clear is approximately 40 miles from Fairbanks in a south-westerly direction and 26 Mile is 26 miles from Fairbanks in a south-easterly direction. Both of these bases are made especially for the heaviest of the heavy bombers made by the military forces. One of the runways

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19 OCT 25 1947

51 OCT 25 1947

at 26 Mile is seven miles long, according to information furnished to me by Navy Captain HUCKINS and Major PHILLIP REED of the Army. However, it will be noted that 26 Mile is not considered as the best field for heavy bombers inasmuch as Clear is reported to be preferred and to have runways that are able to withstand the shock of any type of bomber on the planning boards of the Army or Navy.

I have received the information that three squadrons of the heaviest type of Army bomber now existing were ordered to 26 Mile airfield. They will consist of 30 bombers to the squadron, making a total of 90 B-50 bombers. It is believed that the bombers will be B-50s instead of B-36s.

It is observed that these airfields are spaced closely together around Fairbanks and I have inquired of the G-2 officer as to the reasons for putting the airfields close together, as a matter of information. They have advised that the type of country is suitable for building airfields in the vicinity of Fairbanks.

Referral/Consult

During the spring and summer, the Army has been building a railroad spur track from the northern terminus of the Alaska Railroad, which is at Fairbanks, paralleling the Alcan Highway to the 26 Mile airfield.

According to Special Agents DANIEL B. BRYAN and GENE S. NORRIS, the Army has indicated that they intend to abandon the placing of this railroad track between 26 Mile airfield and Fairbanks. It will be noted that it has been maintained wherever completed.

There are a number of outer perimeter fighter bases and the principal one of these is located at Galena. It is reported that this will be a fighter base for jet propelled planes.

LOT:MR  
65-35



November 28, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TAMM  
MR. LADD  
MR. TOLSON

During the course of the Intelligence Conference at the Office of Naval Intelligence last Tuesday, General McDonald representing the Air Force stated that the Air Force had made extensive survey of very strategic points in the United States in anticipation of any trouble that might develop domestically or internationally. He offered to make available to me for my information a copy of this report and his Aide has since delivered it to the Bureau and I have handed it to Mr. Tamm and would like to have it reviewed as soon as possible in order that I may return it to General McDonald. I also want it to be given very careful study by the Security Division to make certain that we have very adequate coverage in the areas indicated in this report. I recall that General McDonald referred particularly to the Sault Sainte Marie Locks and the Atomic Energy Project in the State of Washington and to an area near Daton Rouge, Louisiana where the bulk of high octane gas used by planes is produced. I was familiar, of course, with the first two but I was not familiar as to the later. There are, no doubt, other areas mentioned in the Air Force survey which are probably high in the point of being strategic and we should very carefully check these now and take steps to see immediately that we have adequate coverage as to subversive and security measures in these areas. This is vitally important.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RECORDED 165-744-24  
INDEXED 315 NOV 29 1947

# Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. H. Ladd

DATE: 11-1-47

FROM : Mr. J. P. Coyne

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - TURKEY  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

There is being set forth hereinafter an analysis of the present international situation as set forth by Turkish Minister Baydur in a message to his Foreign Ministry in Turkey as furnished by [redacted]. This analysis is believed of interest in view of the succinct manner in which it is made and the personal observations set forth by Baydur.

b7E

ea

Shag

Mr. D. M. Ladd

b7E

b7E

Mr. D. M. Ladd



RECOMMENDATION:

No action. This is being set forth for informational purposes only.

RJL:esb

*esb*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MATTERS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

DATE: March 9, 1948

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Beahm  
Miss Gandy

Colonel L. R. Forney of the Intelligence Division of the Army advised Special Agent S. W. Reynolds of the Liaison Section that he had ascertained that the activities of Amtorg Trading Corporation had been very much curtailed. He stated that he had been advised that Amtorg was liquidating their orders placed with manufacturing concerns in the United States, and were having them shipped without a preshipment inspection. He stated that taking delivery without a preshipping inspection is practically unheard of by the Russians. He stated he had further ascertained that Amtorg were recalling one hundred of their employees in the United States to leave about April 1, 1948. Colonel Forney advised that the above information may have no significance at all since the Department of Commerce had placed a restriction on the issuance of export licenses to Russia.

Colonel Forney advised Mr. Reynolds that he is bringing his "grab list" up to date and is preparing the necessary policies to permit him to seize any Communists in the Army. He stated that he sincerely hopes that the Bureau is bringing its "grab list" up to date and that the Attorney General has legislation prepared that would permit the Bureau to seize United States citizens who are key Communists.

Colonel Forney requested that Mr. Reynolds advise you that he, Colonel Forney, would like to have the Bureau alert its field offices as to any possible changes or developments among Communists, Russians and Russian satellites in the United States. He stated that he would like very much to be advised as to any change whatsoever as soon as possible. Mr. Reynolds advised Colonel Forney that this information and his request would be made known to you.

SWR:AM

RECORDED

INDEXED

M.F.V.

31 MAR 13 1948

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

62 MAR 16 1948

Shouldn't we again with  
Dept re what its plans  
are?

Follow-up on detention  
program to A.G. 3-10-48.

UP TO DATE EACH  
6 MONTHS. EN  
Field HAS BEEN  
THREATENED

5-AM

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

# F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

FROM HONOLULU 3-13-48 NR 130535 11-16 AM EST

DIRECTOR ----- URGENT -----

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND USSR. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, U.S. ARMY, PACIFIC, ADVISED TODAY THAT FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION RECEIVED FROM IDA HAVE INDICATED THAT IT WAS NOT BELIEVED THAT USSR COULD WAGE WAR BEFORE 1953 DUE TO NECESSITY OF REBUILDING MILITARY MACHINE. HOWEVER, ON MARCH 10 IDA INDICATED THAT IN VIEW OF CONDITIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE, SOVIET-S POTENTIAL NOT DEFINITELY KNOWN. COMMUNICATION RECEIVED FROM IDA MARCH 11 WHICH STATED THAT HISTORICAL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN STARTED IN SPRING AND THAT THEREFORE, OPERATIONS WESTERN EUROPE WOULD HAVE TO BE CLOSELY OBSERVED. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF NORTH G-2, CONFIDENTIALLY ADVISED THAT ON MARCH 11 ADMIRAL D. \_\_\_\_ RAMSEY, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC, AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, CALLED PACIFIC STAFF CONFERENCE ATTENDED BY MAJOR GENERAL G. H. DECKER, CHIEF OF STAFF, USARPAC, AND ACTING COMMANDER, USARPAC, AND MAJOR GENERAL RALPH H. WOOTEN, COMMANDING GENERAL, PACIFIC AIR COMMAND, AT WHICH TIME HE INSTRUCTED THEM TO IMMEDIATELY REVIEW WAR PLAN INDICATING INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM ADMIRAL LOUIS DENFELD, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. ONLY TOP STAFF OFFICERS ARE APPRISED OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION FURNISHED TO THIS OFFICE IN CONFIDENCE. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DRAW UP OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR G-2 IN EVENT OF WAR.

UNDERLINED PORTION OF THE ABOVE MESG. PENDING CORRECTION.

RECEIVED, 3-13-48

2-03 AM EST

RECORDED

INDEXED

162-81484-31  
 MAR 18 1948

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems:

54 MAR 18 1948

TO : MR. KEAY

DATE: March 15, 1948

FROM : S. W. REYNOLDS

SUBJECT: DETENTION OF COMMUNISTS IN EVENT OF SUDDEN DIFFICULTY  
WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Reference is made to the memorandum to Mr. Ladd from Mr. J. P. Coyne in the above-captioned matter dated March 11, 1948,

The referenced memorandum indicates a request that a check be made with the Army, Navy and Air Force to determine the size of their so-called "Grab" lists and to determine whether these lists include civilian members of the Department of Defense and its components, as well as the Military and Naval personnel. It indicated that it should also be determined what the respective military establishments intend to do with respect to furnishing the Bureau with the identity of the civilians included in their lists, together with the data for referral to the Attorney General.

Colonel L. R. Forney, of the Intelligence Division of the Army, advised the writer that the Army has two lists: an A list and B list. The A list includes those individuals who are dangerous; the B list, those individuals who are suspected. He stated that the A list is composed of sixty military personnel and forty-nine civilians in the Zone of the Interior. He stated that the Army in the event of a sudden emergency would seize the military personnel and the civilian personnel would be immediately suspended. The B list is composed of approximately one hundred military personnel and the civilian personnel would be immediately suspended. The B list is composed of approximately one hundred military personnel and one hundred and sixty civilian personnel. The military personnel on the B list would be closely observed and the civilian personnel would be denied access to any classified information. Colonel Forney stated regarding the civilians on the A list and the B list that these individuals are or will be the subject of Loyalty investigations by the FBI. He pointed out that as a matter of fact the number of civilians on the A list has decreased due to the recent action taken by the Army under Public Law 808.

SWR:tlc

RECORDED &amp; INDEXED

62-51484-33  
E B  
43 MAR 31 194841  
59 APR 5 1948

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓  
Mr. Clegg ✓  
Mr. Glavin ✓  
Mr. Ladd ✓  
Mr. Nichols ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Tracy ✓  
Mr. Egan ✓  
Mr. Gurnea ✓  
Mr. Harbo ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. Pennington ✓  
Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓  
Mr. Nease ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓

March 31, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Colonel L. R. Forney advised Supervisor S. W. Reynolds in extreme confidence that he had contacted Mr. Ladd confidentially and advised that the Bureau should watch their Embassy coverage on an hourly basis.

Colonel Forney pointed out that the Port of Bremerhaven is used by the American Forces for embarkation and disembarkation; that Bremerhaven is surrounded by the Russian Zone. He pointed out that the trains traveling from Bremerhaven to Frankfort have to travel through the Russian Zone and through Berlin. He stated that the Russians have issued regulations that all trains will be stopped and thoroughly searched. Colonel Forney stated that the Russians have been advised that the American Forces will not permit their trains to be searched and any attempt to search these trains by the Russians will be met with gunfire.

Subsequently, the radio reported that all trains leaving Berlin for Frankfort had been stopped by the American authorities until the travel regulations are straightened out, however, an American military train did leave Berlin for Frankfort. The guard force on this train allegedly had been greatly augmented and were armed with carbine rifles. The radio, of course, made no comment as to the orders that had been issued inasmuch as this is highly secret at the present time.

As previously advised, Colonel Forney stated that it should never be disclosed that he had furnished this information to the Bureau.

Respectfully,

D. M. Ladd

SWR:esb

RECORDED

162-81484-35  
F B I  
31 APR 3 1948

54 APR 3 1948

THIS MEMORANDUM IS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES  
TO BE DESTROYED AFTER ACTION IS TAKEN AND NOT SENT TO FILES



## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

DATE: March 31, 1948

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E.A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Holmes  
Miss Gandy

At 12:25 PM today, Colonel Forney called me and asked if he could furnish me some information without any danger of it ever being traced back to him. I told him that he could. He then stated that we should watch our Embassy coverage on an hour to hour basis. He then hung up. Apparently Colonel Forney was trying to pass on to the Bureau information indicating that there is an important development breaking at the moment and accordingly I called ASAC Belmont of New York at 1:00 PM and advised him of the above. I instructed that he alert the personnel on the techs in New York, that he review his coverage to be sure that he has ample coverage and that any information is immediately called to his attention and to the Bureau's attention.

I also called ASAC Hennrich in the absence of SAC Hottel, gave him the same information and instructed him to also include in this coverage the satellite countries.

A call is also being made to the San Francisco Office to likewise alert them with reference to the coverage of the Russian Consulate in that city.

It would appear from the above that there is some indication of a possible break in diplomatic relations with the Russians or possibly even something of a more serious nature.

DML:da

of course we will protect source but it is one hell of a situation where FBI charged with Int. Security has to be advised *unofficially*

RECORDED

162-81484-36  
FBI  
31 APR 3 1948  
FBI-DEAC

54 APR 3 1948

American War Plans

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3/31/48

SAC, Anchorage

CONFERENCES WITH MILITARY AUTHORITIES

On 3/30/48, ASAC GEORGE FLETCHER and myself conferred with Colonel MICHAEL IRVINE and Major RALPH SIMS, Assistant Chief of Staff and Head of CIC, respectively, at Major SIMS' office.

In connection with Bureau letter 3/25/48, entitled, "Soviet War Plans; Internal Security - R", wherein it was stated that there were rumors in various circles in Washington that the Soviets may have stationed a number of troop carrying planes and parachute troops in northeast Siberia, IRVINE and SIMS said that they have received no such report and that they doubted that the rumor is true. They were not told the source of the rumor. They said that there were some airfields in northeast Siberia, but that they are isolated. They can not be supplied by water or by land. There are no roads to them. They said it is possible that they could be supplied by air for a brief period of time with sufficient supplies and then they could make a "jump" into Alaska.

IRVINE said that the headquarters of the Army in Alaska is somewhat concerned over the recent publicity given to the Army's airfield at Mile 26 near Fairbanks, especially because the newspaper stories said that the field is sufficient to base B-36s. He said that apparently the only information given about Mile 26 came from the War Department in Washington, but that the heads of the Air Force were going to make an effort to suppress such information hereafter and to place it in a "secret" classification.

IRVINE said that a number of jet planes will be sent to Anchorage and to Fairbanks where they will be able to provide a protective cover should there be an attack from Siberia. He said that they also plan to improve their detection instruments so that the Army would be aware of any planes coming from Siberia.

IRVINE said that as yet the Army Air Force has not taken over any intelligence work in Alaska, but that he has heard a rumor that a complete CIC Detachment of the Army Air Corps will proceed from Great Falls, Montana, on 4/12/48.

Colonel IRVINE was also asked about a statement that GRANT R. JACKSON, President, Miners and Merchants Bank, Nome, Alaska, made recently before a House Committee in Washington, D.C., to the effect that Russia

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162-81454-39  
F B I


55 APR 17 1948

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-36111-1

AN File 66-82

has a submarine base on its side of the Bering Sea across from Nome, and that eleven submarines are based there. This statement received considerable Associated Press publicity and must have come to the attention of the Bureau. Colonel IRVING said that the Army has no information whatsoever regarding such a base if one does exist.

Referral/Consult



For your information, there is currently visiting in Alaska, a group of newspaper correspondents, approximately 20 in number, who are the guests of the Army and Navy and will make a tour of the Alaskan bases, including the Aleutian Islands. Unquestionably, a great number of articles will appear in papers throughout the United States upon the completion of this trip.

It is planned to hold a weekly conference on 4/13/48 at Kodiak, where Captain GAZZE will be the host.

GWS:LMR  
66-82

F.B.I. TELETYPE

D E C O D E D C O P Y

FBI EL PASO 3-16-48 3:02 PM MST FCG

DIRECTOR, FBI U R G E N T

ATTENTION MR. D. M. LADD

DETENTION OF COMMUNISTS IN THE EVENT OF SUDDEN DIFFICULTY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, INTERNAL SECURITY - C. ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT, SANDIA BASE, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO. MAJOR KENNETH K. KOLSTER, SECURITY OFFICER, ADVISED SA J. PHILLIP CLARIDGE THIS OFFICE CONFIDENTIALLY PURSUANT TO A TELEPHONE CALL RECEIVED BY HIS COMMANDING OFFICER MARCH 15 FROM WASHINGTON HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THIS BASE WAS CONSIDERED THE NUMBER ONE TARGET IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE EVENT A SNEAK ATTACK WAS CONTEMPLATED BY THE SOVIET UNION. HE ALSO INTIMIDATED THAT IT IS CONTEMPLATED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD INVOKE THAT SECTION OF THE AEA WHICH REQUIRES AEC TO TURN OVER OR FURNISH TO ARMY ANY WEAPONS OR IMPLEMENTS OF WAR IN ITS POSSESSION FOR THE USE OF THE ARMY. HE ALSO ADVISED THAT TO PROTECT THIS PROJECT GROUND TROOPS HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO BE STATIONED NEARBY AS WELL AS AIR COVER. HE FURTHER INFORMED IT WAS BELIEVED BY THE ARMY THAT ANY ATTEMPTED ATTACK ON THIS BASE FROM THE EAST, WEST OR NORTH COULD POSSIBLY BE REPELLED BY FORCES ON THE EAST OR WEST COAST BUT HE WAS PERTURBED ABOUT ANY ATTEMPTED ATTACK FROM THE SOUTH OF UNITED STATES BORDER IN MEXICO. HE FELT IN VIEW OF SPARSE SETTLEMENT THIS WESTERN COUNTRY PLANES COULD COME TO ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO FROM MEXICO UNDETECTED IN AN ATTACK AND REQUESTED ALL INFORMATION THIS OFFICE HAD REGARDING SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS SOUTH OF BORDER. HE FURTHER INFORMED THAT SHOULD THIS ONE INSTALLATION BE KNOCKED OUT IT WOULD COMPLETELY DISRUPT PROGRAM RELATIVE TO ATOMIC BOMB AS THIS APPARENTLY FINAL KEY ASSEMBLY POINT. THIS OFFICE HAS FURNISHED MAJOR KOLSTER ALL KNOWN PERTINENT DETAILS RELATIVE TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS WITHIN THIS DIVISION. BUREAU REQUESTED IF DEEMED ADVISABLE TO FURNISH ANY INFORMATION REGARDING SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS IN OLD MEXICO TO THIS OFFICE FOR TRANSMITTAL TO MAJOR KOLSTER. THIS INFORMATION

Director's Notation:  
 "No this is CIA function.  
 H."

Director's Notation:

"A very good example of why subversive coverage should never have been divided.  
 H."

Director's Notation:

"Another instance of Army here not alerting us.  
 H."

62-81484-43  
 F B I  
 41 MAY 19 1948  
 ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

331  
 MAY 21 1948

202-1A-JH

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

FROM : H. B. FLETCHER

SUBJECT: ARMY MANEUVERS  
RICHLAND, WASHINGTON  
ATOMIC ENERGY INSTALLATION

DATE: April 22, 1948

SAC Wilcox, Seattle, called at 2:00 P.M. and stated that he had been contacted this morning by Major Gustorf of G-2, 6th Army Presidio, San Francisco. He advised that within the next few days 700 troops would take part in maneuvers in Richland, Washington. They will leave Fort Lewis, Washington, tomorrow. He stated that these maneuvers have been instructed because the international situation and the domestic situation indicated that there might be some type of demonstration on May 1st. He stated that there was no definite information that any overt act would occur on that date but that they had pieced together little pieces of information and the Army had been alerted.

In explanation of this, he stated that radar is being established throughout the entire West. The Army Air Force in California in the vicinity of San Francisco is being armed. A regiment has recently been sent to Alaska for maneuvers though, in fact, it is a maneuver "on the ground." The group participating in the maneuvers at Richland will consist of two battalions which are not of full strength and some aircraft artillery. There will also be a cavalry reconnaissance group.

General Pate, Head of G-2 at Presidio, has been advised by Army Headquarters, Washington, that no significance is to be attached to the instructions for these maneuvers. However, Brigadier General Myer of Fort Lewis who will be in charge of maneuvers will be told that it is not just a maneuver. Major Gustorf stated that there would be also a Counter Intelligence maneuver and approximately four CIC Agents will maneuver in the area and question civilians and law enforcement officers concerning strangers in the vicinity and Air Corps flights.

In other words, there would be an overlapping into the field of the Bureau and they want the Delimitation Agreement ignored during the period of maneuver to last for 2 or 3 weeks. Major Gustorf explained that some of the Agents might blunder into our sources. He suggested that Agents participate in the maneuvers with the CIC Agents. He also stated that there would be considerable patrolling done and these patrols might come across some civilian and might take him for a ride to question him. He wanted to know whether or not the Bureau would want to handle the questioning of such civilians.

SAC Wilcox stated that he told Major Gustorf that he would not place Agents into this maneuver as indicated nor would he undertake the questioning of any civilians picked up by Army patrols because they had been illegally detained and arrested. I asked SAC Wilcox whether or not the Seattle Office had furnished to G-2 locally all available information about subversive groups in the vicinity of

RECORDED - 41

HBf:mk

11 MAY 20 1948

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

MEMORANDUM TO MR. LADD

Richland and he answered "certainly".

SAC Wilcox further pointed out to Major Gustorf that if Army personnel were going around questioning people on the street most anything could happen and the Major stated that of course the men would handle their contacts under pretext and believes that they had planned to take the law enforcement officers into their confidence. It was noted, however, that Major Gustorf explained that the CIC men were inexperienced.

Major Gustorf also said that if no actual disorder occurred they would have one simulated or set up for training purposes. Major Gustorf emphasized throughout that they had no definite information that any disorder was going to occur.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SAC Wilcox be instructed not to participate in these maneuvers in any manner. He should inform Major Gustorf that G-2 had been fully informed as to all subversive organizations and individuals in the Richland area. Having in mind the needs of the Bureau to maintain its coverage not only during the maneuvers but afterwards, the Bureau will not consent to any waiver of the provisions of the Delimitation Agreement.

Addendum:

SAC Wilcox was advised at 5:10 p.m. today that Agents are not to participate in these maneuvers in any manner. He was further informed that the Bureau will not consent to the waiver of the provisions of the Delimitations Agreement for the purpose of this maneuver. I further advised him that G-2 Headquarters in Washington, D. C., had expressed the opinion that this was in fact ridiculous and they were communicating with Army authorities on the West Coast.

HBF:cmv

Director's Notation:

"I most heartily agree.  
See that G-2 puts a stop  
to this atrocious plan.  
H."

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
940 First National Building  
Oklahoma City 2, Oklahoma  
May 4, 1948

Tolson ✓  
Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓  
Mr. Clegg ✓  
Mr. Glavin ✓  
Mr. Ladd ✓  
Mr. Nichols ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Tracy ✓  
Mr. Egan ✓  
Mr. Harbo ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. Pennington ✓  
Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓  
Mr. Nease ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI

Dear Sir:

*0 American War Plans*

RE: ~~CONVERSION OF AIRPLANES~~

Remylet dated August 13, 1947, captioned as above.

b6 Per Army

Please be advised that [ ] Chief Investigator, Security Office, Oklahoma City Air Depot, has confidentially advised this Office that the B-36 bomber has failed to meet the Army Air Force test and will not get into production as originally planned by the Army Air Force. [ ] stated that the Army is now outfitting B-29 bombers with additional gas tanks for longer-range bombing missions. He advised that the Army at the present time does not have any long-range bombers capable of flying to Russian occupied territory and return from outside bases in Alaska or in the United States.

[ ] likewise advised that all bombardiers presently assigned to the Oklahoma City Air Depot have been ordered to attend a school of two months duration.

b6 Per Army

He stated the general consensus among the "brass" was that we would move out of Berlin and leave it to the Russians. This opinion has been formed by these officers due to the fact that we are not now in a position to meet any challenge from the Russians. He stated he has heard nothing concerning the remainder of occupied Germany but advised that the Air Force realizes that it has to have closer bases in order to effectively bomb Russia in the event of war.

b6 Per Army

[ ] advised that plans have been formulated for a three shift work day at the Oklahoma City Air Depot and this could be put into operation in three hours time in the event of hostilities. According to [ ] the Oklahoma City Air Depot has a sufficient backlog of employees to carry out this program with no difficulty.

[ ] stated that plans have been formulated for the detention of employees employed at the Oklahoma City Air Depot who are considered to be Communist Party members or sympathizers. He did not state whether the plans were for the detention of civilian or military employees.

RECORDED - 41

INDEXED - 41

62-81484-45  
JUN 2 1948

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-6200-100-944

52 JUN 11 1948  
Ladd  
N 11 1948

Letter to the Director - May 4, 1948

b6 Per Army

According to [redacted] the Army Air Force Command is revamping its Security Division into four sections. He was unable to furnish the breakdown of these sections by States but stated that it was his understanding that the headquarters for one section would be located in Oklahoma City. In this respect, he advised that efforts are presently being made to obtain space in the First National Bank and Trust Company Building, Oklahoma City, as headquarters for one section. As the Bureau is aware, this is the building in which the Oklahoma City Division offices are located. b6 Per Army

[redacted] name should be kept confidential at all times and should not be divulged outside the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

DRS:GAC  
67-

*D. A. Bryce*  
D. A. BRYCE  
Special Agent in Charge



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: May 19, 1948

FROM : V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: DETENTION OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES*American Union*

The Special Agent in Charge at Oklahoma City has advised the Director by letter dated May 4, 1948, entitled "Conversion of Airplanes" that it had been ascertained that plans have been formulated for the detention of employees at the Oklahoma City Air Depot who are considered to be Communist Party members or sympathizers.

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Coffey  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room

b6 Per AFOSI

b7C iss Gandy

Pursuant to your instructions, Mr. Reynolds contacted Lieutenant Colonel [ ] of the Intelligence Division of the Air Force. Colonel [ ] stated that the Air Force has given some thought to the detention of Air Force personnel but these thoughts have not taken any definite form. Colonel [ ] pointed out that it is contemplated in the event of hostilities that the Air Force military personnel would be detained in special military units. He indicated that as far as the civilian employees of the Air Force are concerned, it is contemplated that they will have been previously investigated by the FBI under the Loyalty Program, and if sufficient information is developed, they will have been separated. He pointed out that short of this, the individuals will probably be denied access to any classified information and all of the facts turned over to the FBI for any action the Bureau desires to take regarding internment.

Colonel [ ] was quite desirous of assuring Mr. Reynolds that the Air Force would formulate no definite plans regarding the handling of civilian subversives in the Air Force without prior consultation and coordination with the FBI.

b6 Per AFOSI

b7C

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-622-1-1-94

SWR: 16

RECORDED - 41

162-81484-46  
JUN 2 1948

INDEXED - 41

52 JUN 11 1948

RECEIVED

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, ~~VI~~

DATE: August 11, 1948

FROM : Mr. ~~D. M. Ladd~~

SUBJECT: ~~EVACUATION PLANS RE~~ U. S.  
~~CITIZENS IN WESTERN EUROPE~~  
~~AND THE MIDDLE EAST~~

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Holmes  
Miss Gandy

The Bureau is in receipt of a top secret outgoing telegram forwarded by the Department of State to various missions and consulates in Western European and Middle Eastern countries. This telegram bearing the date July 26, 1948 reads as follows:

"Imperative all completed plans for evacuation Amcits your district be submitted immediately. Admiral Conolly, Commander-in-Chief, USNF, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean and that those in preparation be submitted soonest possible. Please report.

Marshall"

On August 4, 1948 an incoming telegram was received from the State Department through Liaison channels. This telegram was submitted to the Secretary of State by a State Department representative in Cairo, Egypt, bearing the date July 28, 1948. The telegram indicated that a source closely connected with exiled Royalty in Egypt reported that King Farouk of that country is transferring a great deal of his fortune to Switzerland, the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Farouk, according to this same source, stated that in the event of serious disorders in Egypt he has no intentions of remaining in that country but will depart immediately by private plane. His destination was not named.

The telegram also stated that reasonably reliable sources reported that Farouk has counseled members of the Royal family to put away "nest eggs" abroad.

**ACTION:**

None.

The above is submitted for your information.

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55 AUG 27 1948

RM

W. W. W.

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: September 27, 1948

FROM : H. B. FLETCHER

SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY  
September 27, 1948ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS CLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Pennington	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

In accord with your instructions, Messrs. Fletcher, Whitson and Cleveland attended a briefing at Room 2E789, Pentagon Building, beginning at 1:00 p.m. today on the subject matter of the Strategic Vulnerability of the United States from the Standpoint of its Industrial Potentials. This briefing, which was merely a preliminary to the three-day briefing occurring from September 29 through October 1, 1948, covered five main subject matters. The first dealt with the broad strategic vulnerability of United States industry, in which it was pointed out that many of the necessary materials for industry were produced in single plants and that our big industrial concentration for the most part was in the Northeast Central region. The second phase of the briefing dealt with the vulnerability of communications. This involved not only the vulnerability of long lines, but also of outside and inside apparatus, as well as the difficulty of replacement parts. Here again, it was pointed out that a relatively small number of key factories provided all of the various components of the electronics industry which are necessary for communications.

The third phase of the briefing covered the strategic vulnerability of the chemical industry in the United States where, more than in any other field, production is limited to one factory and even operates under one roof. Here, for the first time, was stressed the dependence of many phases of American industry on imports of raw materials from abroad. An example of concentration of pure chemicals was given in the case of metallic sodium in which, as is already well known to the Bureau, a plant at Niagara Falls, New York, and a plant at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, furnish the entire output for the United States. It was indicated that both of these plants could be sabotaged 100 per cent by a short circuit of the power lines used in the process.

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The fourth portion of the briefing covered the world aspect of United States dependence on imports for its war potential. It was shown that 60 per cent of the raw materials needed in the war effort must be imported; 26 per cent from Latin America; 5 per cent from Mexico; five per cent from Southeast Asia; four per cent from the South Pacific area; eight per cent from Canada and Greenland and twelve per cent from Africa. It was pointed out that strategically we receive nothing of importance from any area outside the Western Hemisphere north of the 38th meridian and that the strongest Soviet thrusts are occurring in those areas along the 38th meridian which would effect our actual sources of raw materials.

The fifth portion of the briefing dealt with the possible Soviet means of exploiting our strategic vulnerability. Mention was made of Soviet use of the atomic bomb, of guided missiles, of biological warfare, of long-range bombing of either the conventional type bomb or atomic bomb, and of controlled sabotage immediately prior to a hostile attack or coincidentally.

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American War Plans

Memo for Mr. Ladd

~~SECRET~~

with a hostile attack. The Soviet war potential was for the most part negligible as a factor for an attack against the United States at this time, with the exception of their submarine fleet, which, of course, could prevent the receipt of raw materials and might be used as firing platforms for guided missiles and other such weapons. (S) (U)

Of possible interest to the Bureau it was pointed out that the Soviet merchant fleet and the supply vessels of the Soviet Navy are not believed at this time sufficiently numerous to provide supplies for a division of troops which the Soviets might land in Alaska. (S) (U)

A definite impression was gained that in considering the strategic vulnerability of the United States they were disregarding any possibility of the United States having bases in Europe or that Western Europe could be counted upon for supplying anything of military value to the United States. (S) (U)

One point was stressed by the last speaker to the effect that with air bases on the British Isles or even in Iceland the Soviet air fleet at the present time could not stage any more than one-way bombing runs on the Continental United States with their present B-29, of which it was estimated they have approximately 100 and which fleet could not be materially increased up to and including the year 1955. A rather flat statement was made that the Russians do not have the atomic bomb, and the earliest estimate as to when it could be perfected would be 1950 or more possibly 1953. (S) (U)

The destructive power of the present atomic bomb was described as total destruction for 2 1/2 square miles and partial destruction for an area of 10 square miles. Possible radiation effects were said to be 20 square miles. One bomb dropped over the reflecting pool of Washington would make the City of Washington uninhabitable. Seven such bombs well placed would destroy New York City, Newark and Jersey City. (S) (U) ✓

HBF:LW:cmr

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR

DATE: 9/17/48

FROM : CLYDE TOLSON

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is a copy of a confidential memorandum transmitted by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal to Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington requesting Symington to undertake a study and analysis of internal security on a Government-wide basis.

Mr. Symington called me on Thursday, September 16, with further reference to this matter, he having discussed it with me previously. I told Mr. Symington that I had discussed the matter briefly with you; that you felt he should undertake the job with the assistance of General Carroll and the ex officio assistance of the Bureau. I pointed out the fact that it is obvious domestic security and intelligence is in a much better condition than foreign intelligence at the present time and I called his attention to the existing foreign intelligence setup under CIA which, although we are not intimately familiar with its operations, certainly has rendered very little assistance to the Bureau since its formation. I also referred to the comic setup of OSS which was infiltrated with subversives, fellow-travelers and misfits. I explained the SIS jurisdiction of the Bureau in the Western Hemisphere during World War Two and its effectiveness and accomplishments. I pointed out that you did not feel that you should undertake a survey of this kind, since Mr. Symington wanted to make such a recommendation, because of the unfriendly attitude of certain elements of the government. I also explained the situation pertaining to the special study of CIA presently being made by Mr. [REDACTED]

b6 Per AFOSI  
 b7C

Mr. Symington advised me on Thursday that he had in mind writing a letter to Secretary Forrestal declining to make the survey because of the due date of October 15 and because of his responsibilities as Secretary of the Air Force. He planned to recommend that it was obvious that one man should head up the job of running internal and foreign intelligence and security. He stated he was not planning to place your name in the letter but he thought it would be obvious that he was referring to you.

Mr. Symington went on to state that he felt there should be set up a policy committee with one man as chairman and with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General

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American War Plans

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as members. I pointed out to Mr. Symington that I thought his letter was very bad; that obviously it would not be possible for you to accept the Chairmanship of a committee consisting of cabinet officers and that if anyone other than you were placed in such a position it would mean that that individual would, in effect, take over the operation of the FBI, Army, Navy and Air Force. He had not thought of this angle and stated that obviously this was not intended by him. He then stated he would have General Carroll come over this morning and show me the letter to see if we could work out some other procedure.

I conferred with General Carroll this morning. I pointed out the same objections to Mr. Symington's plan to him and he was in entire agreement with my observations. I then told him that I had mentioned the matter briefly to you and that you felt the solution to this whole problem was to reinstitute a program similar to that of SIS wherein Army, Navy and Air Intelligence would handle intelligence matters within their own jurisdictions and the FBI would handle domestic intelligence and security and, if desired, could expand a program similar to SIS on a worldwide basis. I reminded him of the effectiveness of this setup in World War Two, explained the frequent conferences between the intelligence heads of the various agencies. I also explained to him that as was true during World War Two such a setup as this could call before it representatives of other interested agencies such as Treasury, Commerce, Immigration, etc, and when matters arise within their jurisdictions of interest in the internal security and intelligence fields they could be worked out by the joint intelligence heads. General Carroll was in complete agreement and will try to convince Mr. Symington that he should make a general recommendation along this line to Secretary Forrestal in the event he continues in his view that he should not make the survey.

General Carroll indicated that possibly Secretary Forrestal, who has not been in agreement with Secretary Symington in all respects, may have unloaded his problem on Symington on the theory that regardless of what recommendation he makes it will get Symington "in dutch" with various agencies of the government.

General Carroll wondered what the position of the National Security Council would be in the event of a setup such as the one to which I referred. I told him that I was not entirely familiar with the responsibilities of the Council. General Carroll feels that some recommendation will come out of the various studies with respect to internal and foreign security and intelligence but apparently the "powers that be" are reluctant to make any recommendation at this time which would indicate a lack of confidence in CIA since to do so might reflect unfavorably upon the present administration in the forthcoming election. He stated he would discuss the entire matter further with Secretary Symington and if anything arose in which we were interested he would keep us advised.

CT:DSS

✓

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : CLYDE TOLSON

SUBJECT:

DATE: 9/17/48

G. I. R. 3

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

Late Friday General Carroll called me stating he had conferred further with Secretary Symington, who is writing Secretary Forrestal declining to make the security survey but recommending a setup similar to the old SIS plan whereby Army, Navy and Air Forces will operate their intelligence services and one civilian agency will operate domestic intelligence and foreign intelligence so far as subversive, economic and political matters are concerned. Carroll stated that he was present when Symington telephoned Forrestal of his decision; that Symington stated in his opinion only one man was qualified to operate the civilian world-wide intelligence setup and that was yourself.

CT:DSS

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD *DL*

FROM : V. P. KEAY *VPK HBT*

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY CONFERENCE AT THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF THE ARMY

DATE: September 24, 1948

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

Pursuant to your direction, Mr. Reynolds advised Major General A. R. Bolling that Mr. H. R. Fletcher, Mr. Lish Whitson, and Mr. W. V. Cleveland have been designated by the Bureau to attend the three-day briefing in strategic vulnerability commencing at 9:00 a.m., September 29, through October 1, 1948, in Room 2E789, Pentagon.

In accordance with your instructions, General Bolling was advised that Mr. Fletcher, Mr. Whitson and Mr. Cleveland would also attend a special four-hour briefing on September 27 at a time to be designated prior to that date.

STR:tlc

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*Mr. Reynolds also advised Gen Bolling that Mr. Lish's coordination of this briefing at this time*



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: September 20, 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Holmes  
Miss Gandy

With reference to the attached letter from G-2 suggesting that they would be glad to brief you with reference to the strategic industrial locations in this country, I would suggest that liaison orally advise G-2 that by reason of your illness, you will not be available for such briefing during this week.

It is noted that they also request that three members of your staff attend a three day presentation of this same subject matter September 29 to October 1 inclusive. I would suggest that Mr. H. B. Fletcher of the Security Division Mr. Lish Whitson, Unit Chief in the Espionage Section and Mr. W. V. Cleveland, #1 Man in the Internal Security Section, be designated to attend this three day briefing.

It is believed it would be helpful to the Bureau to know the area considered by the military forces as the most vulnerable.

If you approve, this will be handled orally by the liaison section.

DML:dad

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OK  
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✓

W. B. Baumgardner

MR. D. H. LADD

October 5, 1948

MR. H. B. FLETCHER ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

~~TOP SECRET~~

As instructed, Mr. Lish Whitson, Mr. W. V. Cleveland, Mr. H. B. Fletcher attended a three-day briefing on the strategic vulnerability of the United States conducted by the Intelligence Division of the Army at the Pentagon Building, September 29, 30 and October 1, 1948.

On August 12, 1948, the various Army Commands had been instructed to make a survey of their areas of critical and vital installations and facilities which was apparently based upon the Vital Facility List furnished to the Bureau by Secretary of Defense Forrestal and which was likewise furnished to our Field Divisions. The survey was also initiated because the Intelligence Division of the Army since July, 1946, has been engaged in a study of the strategic vulnerability of the United States. It appeared that the various Army Commands had previously had representatives in Washington and they were given the results of this study of the strategic vulnerability. Their directive of August 12 was designed to round out and make positive the results of the study which had been going on for more than two years. The program of the conference, therefore, involved principally the reports of the various Army Commands.

The various reports submitted by the Commands are now being studied so that they will come up with an over-all broad, complete study of the strategic vulnerability of the United States. It was understood that the Bureau will be furnished with either the copy of the completed study or will be furnished copies of the individual reports submitted by the various Army Commands or both.

The six different Army Commands were each allotted a two-hour period to present their studies. It is to be noted that the Military District of Washington, which is actually a part of the Second Army area, also individually presented the results of its survey. It appeared that the surveys conducted by each Army covered the following:

1. Population.
2. Transportation facilities - railroad, highway, and inland water.
3. Telecommunications and the electronics industry.
4. Basic industry - steel, coal, and petroleum.
5. Natural resources - food, timber, ore deposits, cotton.
6. Chemicals.
7. Ordnance.
8. Power and water supply.
9. Subversive influences.

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

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
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~~TOP SECRET~~

It was obvious that the study and survey had not included the industry involving machine tools and it was contemplated that the survey as it was continued would cover the industrial facilities with particular reference to machine tools. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

It was noted that in presentation of the material the various Army Commands apparently went along with the results of the study which had been going on for two years but they did in some instances indicate that somethings which had been pointed out as critical and vital, as a result of the study were not, in fact, critical and vital and recommended their deletion. In contrast thereto they made recommendations for the addition of other installations and facilities as being critical and vital. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

It was apparent throughout the entire conference that the Intelligence Division of the War Department has reached the conclusion that the Continental United States is not subject to enemy attack, having the USCR in mind as the enemy. At best there would be air attack which could not be sustained and which would be merely psychological in effect. It is to be noted, however, that the Fourth Army, which covers principally the Mexican Border, pointed out the distinct possibility of commando raids originating from Mexico and the Fourth Army's particular concern was the Sandia Army Base and the Los Alamos Atomic Energy Installation. The Intelligence Division of the Army apparently reached the conclusion that direct attack or assault is most improbable. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

The whole tenor of the conference was that the survey pointed out that sabotage was the most potent weapon and that the industrial facilities of the nation and other vital installations, particularly with reference to transportation and power, were good targets for sabotage agents. With reference to sabotage, the thinking of all of the Commands was that it would be organized and built up within the existing Communist Party organization. Particular concern was expressed with reference to the infiltration of labor unions which would afford the most effective sabotage weapon through the instigation of slow-downs and strikes as well as individual acts of physical sabotage. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

The various Army representatives commented that it had been difficult for them to obtain information from certain segments of industry because of similar inquiries being made, presumably for similar purposes, by representatives of the Navy and Air Force since representatives of industry were reluctant to continually furnish the same type of information to different representatives of the National Military Establishment. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

In summary, each Army Command presented recommendations along the following lines: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

1. Screening of plant personnel in the vital industries.
  2. Increased plant guard forces plus training for them.
  3. A plan for continuity of the survey.
  4. Effective civilian defense organization.
  5. Increased use of mechanical protective devices by industrial facilities such as trenches, lights, alarms, watch towers.
  6. Education of plant management and civilian authorities to assume responsibility for effective protection.
- ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

Mr. Stites of the Intelligence Division, during the course of the conferences attended, outlined the views of the Intelligence Division of the Army in a rather startling fashion. With reference to the atom bomb he stated that Russia does not have the atom bomb and the earliest date for them to have the atom bomb would be 1950 and more probably mid 1953. Even then, by 1955 they would have only a very small number of bombs. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

With reference to air attack on the United States he explained that the Russians have at the best 150 planes of the B-29 type; that these are the only planes which would have any chance at all of attacking the United States and they could only make a one-way trip with a maximum bomb load of five tons. A bomb load of five tons would permit the carrying of one atom bomb only. Their potentiality for the building of additional planes was such that it could be expected by 1955 they would not have more than 250 to 300 planes. Their potentiality of attack would not be increased by the fact that they would overrun Europe or even Iceland. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

With reference to bacteriological warfare, he more or less brushed it aside, indicating that it would be difficult to introduce bacteriological agents as means of mass destruction and without the ability to spread this material by air the potentialities were very limited with the possible exception of plant diseases. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

With reference to attack on Alaska, he stated that the USSR does not have sufficient shipping facilities to sustain a division in Alaska. He stated that they have not more than 430 ocean-going vessels in the merchant fleet, many of them at least 30 years old. Their shipbuilding facilities are ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

such that all they could hope for is to replace existing ships up to 1955; that if all of their shipbuilding facilities were put to the task of making aircraft carriers they could perhaps by 1955 build one good aircraft carrier and 15 of the smaller escort type, which would leave them with carriers but with no supply ships to keep them going. ~~TS~~ (U)

With reference to Soviet naval capabilities, he pointed out that the Soviets have a fleet of approximately 250 submarines, many of which were large vessels which could be used as firing platforms for guided missiles against targets not too far distant from the coast line of the United States. He indicated that the Soviet submarine fleet was the most effective unit of the Red Navy and could probably be used tellingly against our shipping at the immediate outset of any hostilities. He did not anticipate any appreciable number of Soviet submarines equipped with the most highly developed German submarine equipment before 1953. With reference to the launching of guided missiles from submarines he indicated that would only have a nuisance value apparently because accuracy would be uncertain. ~~TS~~ (U)

On the subject of sabotage he made particular reference to the Potomac River Railroad Bridge at Washington, D. C., which is perhaps one of the most vital transportation installations in the United States since it carries all direct rail traffic from the East to the South. He indicated it would take considerable explosives properly placed to destroy this bridge and that this was highly improbable because, having in mind the quantity of explosives, it would be difficult for anyone to get it carried out and properly placed without being observed over a considerable period of time. ~~TS~~ (U)

A further illustration of this impossibility of sabotage of such installations as bridges came up during the conference when one of the Army Commands indicated that a truck load of explosive driven out on the George Washington Bridge at New York City and exploded would do nothing. Even a truck exploded in Holland Tunnel similarly laden with explosive would not destroy the Tunnel. ~~TS~~ (U)

Mr. Stites also discussed civilian morale and his talk dealt particularly with air attack on the United States. He stated that a surprise air attack would be the most effective as it would seriously break up civilian morale but that intermittent and saturation bombing apparently does not have the effect of breaking morale unless it is sustained over a very long period of time. He pointed out that in Germany and Great Britain, which did not experience surprise attacks such as Pearl Harbor, it was found that the people were very prone to stay at home regardless of the destruction which was being created around them. With reference to Germany, so long as the anti-aircraft ~~TS~~ (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

defense was kept up the bombings did not have a demoralizing effect but as soon as anti-aircraft and fighter planes were exhausted the people's morale broke and they were convinced they lost the war. In Japan the Doolittle raid caused some panic because the people had all been built up to the fact that it couldn't happen there. However, after intermittent bombing started, they, too, stayed at home. Even the big fire raid on Tokyo caused no panic. The atom bomb had no particular effect on morale immediately because it was kept quiet. Actually the atom bomb attacks on both cities were of a surprise nature. When the first atom bomb was dropped apparently no one was expecting any trouble because there was only one plane in the air. When the second atom bomb was dropped the people were similarly lulled in security because they were not advised of the attack of the one plane at the other point. After word got around about the atom bomb in Japan the people in the various communities or cities were prone to run out of town when even a single plane appeared in the sky and it was unfortunate but true that the officials of the city were the first out. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

He stated that if a bomb were dropped on Washington it could be expected that the people would move out and a big problem would occur because others hearing of the attack would move in to see what had happened. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

In summing up he stated this: Any type of air attack coupled with propaganda could create a panic but if Governmental officials would give the proper reassurance at the time, the panic could probably be averted. However, if an atom bomb were used he stated that a panic could be expected. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

During the course of the conference Colonel Beers, Director of the Office of Civilian Defense in the Office of Secretary Forrestal, explained the development of the Civilian Defense Organization to date. He indicated that it was believed the proposed organization would be approved and would be in the press in a matter of days. The civilian defense program outlines three steps in organization: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

1. The development in the individual of self-help.
2. A policy of mutual assistance between individuals or groups of individuals within a certain community.
3. A reserve mobile unit be set up on a state-wide basis in battalions of approximately 500 well-organized, well-trained groups who could be moved in to take care of any disaster or eventuality which proved to be beyond the control of the local community. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

With reference to plant protection, the Civilian Defense Organization apparently will not concern itself too greatly with this problem. Their proposal is to pour a lot of ideas into a funnel on plant protection, have an over-all basic plant protection program and then have it applied by the interested military agency, whoever that might be. This basic plant protection program or plan would become a part of the contract entered into by the interested armed service and then in their inspection and supervision of the work being conducted under the contract, they would check up on the plant protection system which would be a contractual obligation of the industrial facility. ~~(S)~~ (U)

One of the speakers pointed out that the civilian defense has been already organized in Great Britain and was in part implemented. In contrast to the American approach the civilian defense plan of Great Britain is considered a problem of the Army rather than a civilian group or organization. In Great Britain civilian defense takes precedence for the military over everything but the actual repelling of an invasion although in Great Britain the primary responsibility in a given area rests with the civilian government. ~~(S)~~

On the last day of the conference the Intelligence Division presented for the consideration of those in attendance a sabotage plan. It was indicated that certain assumptions were made that a D-Day had been set, at which time the USSR would open a broad scale offensive. The assumption also was that there had been set up in the United States an effective, trained sabotage group which had certain targets outlined for them. The sabotage efforts were to begin seven days before D-Day and, of course, the main effort would be made on D-Day. It was also assumed that the Soviets were not in possession of the atom bomb. The development of the sabotage plan was presented by means of wire news ticker service and illustrated that the first move would probably be slow-downs and strikes in key industries with a few targets of opportunity being made. subjects of direct sabotage such as a ship being set on fire. ~~(S)~~ (U)

In development of the plan the targets of priority were as follows: ~~(S)~~

1. Strategic aircraft.
  2. Atomic bomb crews.
  3. Aviation fuel.
  4. Aviation engines.
  5. Signal communications.
  6. Oceanic shipping.
  7. Basic industries.
- ~~(S)~~ (U) ~~TOP SECRET~~

8. Transportation.

9. Industrial plant of the United States generally.

Among interesting developments of the sabotage plan were race riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, Chicago and Washington. William Z. Foster, Chairman of the Communist Party, was shot and killed so as to give the Soviets and the Communists in the United States some propaganda ammunition. An attempt was made to assassinate President Truman. He was critically wounded. Attempts were made on the lives of the Commanders of the Army areas, one particularly being killed. The FBI became the target for sabotage in that Communist Party members phoned FBI offices all across the United States furnishing false reports on sabotage and Communists so as to divert the FBI Agent personnel to useless projects. ~~(S)~~ (U)

There was also a short discussion on anti-aircraft defenses which would indicate that anti-aircraft gun batteries are not effective by themselves in creating an ideal defense. At 25,000 feet with an ideal arrangement of batteries it is possible to hit one attacking bomber traveling 350 miles an hour 90% of the time. The more attacking planes and the higher their altitude the less probability of a killing hit. ~~(S)~~ (U)

There was some discussion for providing continuity in the survey; that is, so that it would be continued and kept current. The immediate suggestion was a card index system. The card index system will be set up primarily using the product of the industry as the control and all pertinent information would be contained on the card. ~~(S)~~ (U)

The conference was also advised that defense plans for the United States had already been sent to the various Army Commanders. One plan covers the period up to June 30, 1949, and another plan covers the next fiscal year. Due to their obvious confidential character they were not discussed in detail at the conference, but were the subject of a special conference involving the Plans and Operations Officers. ~~(S)~~ (U)

It was also pointed out that at this time several programs were receiving attention which had direct reference to the national defense. For example, the National Security Council is studying the problem of unconventional attack upon the United States. This study, which includes biological warfare, is being handled by the State, Army, Navy, Air Forces Coordinating Committee. A plan is also being considered for a dispersal of Government functions from Washington, D. C. in the event of hostility. Another planning program relates to the coordinated efforts of the Army and Navy for the defense of ports and harbors. The military establishment is engaged in active planning with Canada for the defense of the northern portion of the Continent and, of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force ~~(S)~~ (U)



~~TOP SECRET~~

are engaged in offensive planning. It was announced by the Plans and Operations Officers that the responsibilities of the Military Establishment in connection with the enemy alien program would constitute an annex to the basic defense plan when that had been settled. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

During the course of the conference several references were made to the FBI which were complimentary. First it was noted that all of the Army Commands had placed reliance on the Bureau's ability to weed out subversives and to give proper warnings of possible sabotage. All of their language was to the effect that the FBI would handle this problem properly. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

It was the unanimous opinion of those that were in attendance that the Bureau should be cognizant of the results of the survey being made and should be kept current on the identities of vital facilities and industries because in that way the Bureau could effectively direct its investigative effort. The Second Army representative said that Special Agent strength of the FBI should be kept at the top limit at all times. A Signal Officer, Colonel A. Pulsifer, Second Army representative, also made constant reference to screening personnel at key facilities to meet "FBI standards." He did not explain what FBI standards were but everyone apparently understood that the standards were high. An explanation of FBI standards was found in the Colonel's remarks when he pointed out that their civilian personnel at their communication facilities were screened under the Loyalty Program but thereafter that messages were handed over to commercial facilities where there was no screening and so he obviously intended screening in line with the Loyalty Program. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

Major General Charles L. Bolte commented concerning the results of the various surveys submitted by the six Armies and warned that they should be practical at all times and stated that in his opinion the information they were gathering and compiling was of value to other agencies and pointed out that particularly the FBI was intimately concerned and proper steps should be taken by the various Armies to be certain that the FBI is kept fully informed. He also stated that the FBI had these people (referring to the Communists) pretty well covered and identified and that they could rely on it. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

During the course of the remarks of Colonel Beers on the civilian defense organization, a direct question was asked of me as to whether or not the Bureau was going to make any plant surveys. I told him that we did not have any plan, program or appropriations to handle anything dealing with plant surveys at this time. Colonel Beers also inquired whether the Bureau was in agreement with the theories proposed by the Office of Civilian Defense as regard to plant protection. No direct response was made to this question. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

as it was pointed out that Bureau representative Assistant Director H. H. Clegg undoubtedly had been consulted with regard to the civilian defense planning. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

ACTION:

Through liaison it is recommended that the proper follow up be made so that the Bureau secures copies of the survey materials submitted by the various Army Commands and the over-all strategic vulnerability study when available so they could be provided to the field to indicate the critical industrial facilities and other installations as to which the Military Establishment is concerned.

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
**United States Department of Justice**  
206 Dillingham Building  
Honolulu, T. H.

October 18, 1948.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

J. Edgar Hoover, Director,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Glavin.....
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Rosen.....
Mr. Tracy.....
Mr. Egan.....
Mr. Gurnea.....
Mr. Harbo.....
Mr. Mohr.....
Mr. Pennington.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
Mr. Nease.....
Miss Gandy.....

On October 17, 1948, Special Agent [redacted] had occasion to be in the company of Major [redacted] U. S. Air Force, who is en route to Nanking, China, as aide to an Air Force Colonel. She commented with amazement at the lack of any show of concern in the local Hawaiian press over the seriousness of the world situation and its blind concentration on minor local news.

I might note this is a fact and that except for members of the military, no one in the Islands seems to have any feeling of urgency about world conditions.

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

This WAC officer, strictly confidentially, told SA [redacted] she is connected with the Air Advisory Group. She stated she has spent the past two years at the Pentagon and that everyone there is sitting tensely just waiting for the shooting to begin. She stated she and the Colonel she is accompanying are en route to Nanking to join approximately eighty other Air Force officers already there and she understands she is to assist in a survey and evaluation of the situation in China; that it is her present understanding the Communists have so infiltrated and disrupted the Kuomintang Government that it is about to disintegrate. She confidentially advised Mr. [redacted] it is the feeling of many in her Group that the shooting to involve us in war is much more apt to start in China than in Berlin and she expressed some doubt that she would arrive in Nanking before the disintegration actually taken place and the Communists taken over.

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

It might also be noted that Colonel [redacted] Intelligence Staff Officer for Pacific Air Command, confidentially advised me on October 15, 1948, that he understands the Higher Eschelon of the Air Force is expecting the shooting war to start not later than December 31, 1948, and feels that it may start momentarily with the most minor incident.

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211 NOV 17 1964


Mr. Hoover..

October 18, 1948.

The above matters are undoubtedly in line with information you have in Washington but I am sending them on as they are comparatively startling here from any source other than your own admonitions to "be ready." Actually, the press, radio, and the general public here are completely oblivious to any such feeling as reflected above. There is no feeling whatever of urgency or even concern.

This office, of course, is extending every effort to comply with your instructions but being extremely discreet because of the lackadaisical attitude of local press and officials, which would make any unusual activity on our part all the more noticeable.

Very truly yours,

  
J. K. MUMFORD,  
Special Agent in Charge.

JKM:PB

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. V. P. KEAY

DATE: November 12, 1948

FROM : MR. R. W. LAWRENCE

SUBJECT: PLANS FOR ALERTING KEY ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
INSTALLATIONS IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. E. A. Tamm	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Egan	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Pennington	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Quinn Tamm	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Attached is a copy of a document received October 29, 1948, from Mr. Bruce Uthus, Chief, Physical Security, AEC, which sets out the general instructions in connection with the plan for alerting key AEC installations in the event of an emergency. In general, these instructions provide that certain designated individuals shall be notified in the event it is determined by the Commission that increased precautions are necessary due to the existence or the imminence of a situation indicating possible danger to Commission installations. It provides for the notification to all area managers to be on the alert in the event of such an emergency. It appears that the emergency particularly referred to includes the possibility of sabotage and that the plan for emergency action includes the implementation of particular anti-sabotage procedures.

It appears that nothing contained therein is of particular interest to the Bureau and, therefore, no action should be taken in connection with the attached instructions.

Attachment

RWL:arm

G. I. R. - 7

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11-30-48

FROM : SAC, ANCHORAGE

SUBJECT: CONFERENCES WITH MILITARY AUTHORITIES

**AMERICAN WAR PLANS**

On 11-24-48 Lt. Col. MIKE IRVINE, J-2, and liaison officer with the FBI, U. S. Army, Alaska, furnished me a copy of EMERGENCY PLAN WHITE for the U. S. Army in Alaska dated 11-1-48. This plan is to be put into effect in the event of war or civil disturbances of a major nature. It will be summarized as follows:

Protection of life and property and maintenance of law and order within the Territory is primarily responsibility of the Territory. Intervention with Federal troops will take place only after the Territory has utilized all of its forces and is unable to control the situation or when it is apparent that the situation is beyond the capabilities of the Territory.

Intervention with Federal troops may take place with or without Presidential action or proclamation, depending upon the purpose of the intervention.

When the purpose is

- 1 To aid the Territory or
- 2 To enforce the laws of the United States within Alaska or
- 3 To protect the civil rights of citizens within Alaska.

Intervention of Federal troops will take place only after the Secretary of Defense has so ordered and the President has published a proclamation demanding that the insurgents disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within a specified time. (See Section 5300 Revised Statute).

When the purpose is

- 1 To protect the property of the United States or
- 2 To protect vital national defense materials, premises and utilities.

Unless a labor dispute is involved, no Presidential proclamation or action is necessary other than an executive order in the case of Government seizure of private property. When a labor dispute is involved, instructions must be obtained from the Secretary of Defense unless danger or destruction is imminent.

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Glavin	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Egan	✓
Mr. Gurnea	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Pennington	✓
Mr. Quinn Tamm	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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G.I.R.-7

Except in rare cases requiring Martial law, the character of action to be taken by Federal troops when ordered to quell civil disturbances will be that of the exercise of police powers. Military commanders must answer writs of a Federal Court, but Federal troops will not be subordinate to State, Territory or Federal civil authorities, because in such situations they operate under orders of the President.

Civilians apprehended and charged with offenses against the law of the land or against rules and regulations issued by the military commanders will be detained only until they can be safely turned over to Territory or Federal civil authorities, except where otherwise specifically directed by the President or by the Secretary of Defense.

A combat force of sufficient strength could be used to insure the apprehension of the leaders of the unlawful elements and to disperse their organized supporters.

It may be necessary to use Federal troops to safeguard public utilities, transportation systems, etc., but ordinarily deputized civil authorities will provide the necessary protection.

All of the troops present, Army, Navy and Air are available for the execution of this plan. Ordinary military police units will be used to quell minor domestic disturbances.

There are no indications that any radical element in Alaska is in a position to bring about an overt rebellion with a view to overthrowing the Government. However, there is an element in Alaska inimical to the interest of the Government which might attempt to incite disorders and would eventually require the intervention of Federal troops to restore order. This element falls into two general classes. The first is nationals who may be loosely labeled as Communists and the second is agents and sympathizers of foreign powers, whose principles and ideals are contrary to a democratic form of Government.

In the event of an emergency, forces available to combat such groups would be the local police, U. S. Marshals, FBI, National Guard when organized, Civil Air Patrol, Coast Guard, Army, Navy, and Air Force units of the Alaskan Command.

The FBI is considered a civilian intelligence agency which would cooperate closely with the Army, but would not be subordinate.

Alaska would be broken up into two priority areas. The first priority area would be Southeastern Alaska and the Anchorage-Whittier-Seward area. The second priority area would be anywhere in the Aleutian Islands or Alaskan mainland.

Colonel IRVINE advised me that should there be any change in these plans, he will inform me.

CWS:MR

66-82



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
206 Dillingham Building  
Honolulu, T. H.

December 7, 1949.

PERSONAL

J. Edgar Hoover, Director,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
Washington, D. C.

Re: SECURITY STATUS OF HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.b6 Per OSI  
b7C

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Lt. Colonel [ ] Army Intelligence, Captain [ ]  
Navy Intelligence, and Colonel [ ] Air Force Intelligence, have  
advised me confidentially that they have jointly agreed and reported to their  
superiors what they call "an estimate of the situation." Translated from the  
military jargon, this is their evaluation of the potential dangers, from a  
security and military viewpoint, faced by the mid-Pacific area, which is to  
them the Territory of Hawaii.

These men list the primary danger as being one of internal security,  
i.e., the potential sabotage and subversive effects of the Communist element,  
sabotage but sabotage through labor and political organizations.

In this regard, I have brought to your attention before the almost  
complete dominance by the Communist element here of the local Democratic  
Party of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, which  
controls not only all shipping but practically all local industry.

In second place these men place the possibility of submarine attack  
by Russia against the Hawaiian Islands and in third place they rate the  
possibility of an air attack. I was not advised just how far they went in  
belittling the probability or the effect of a submarine or air attack on the  
Islands but verbally they thoroughly discount such attacks, first, for the  
reason that they could not be carried out with sufficient strength to have  
any real or lasting effect and, secondly, that an attack by either means in  
sufficient force to have more than a questionable morale value would be much  
too costly to justify against an objective with as little present military  
value as the Hawaiian Island.

It should be noted that according to the above three individuals,  
in case of an emergency in this area, Admiral Dewitt C. Ramsey, who is  
Commander-in-Chief of the entire Pacific area, would automatically be the  
ranking officer but that in the local area of the Territory of Hawaii,  
Lt. General John E. Hull would be the ranking officer and should therefore  
be responsible for military protection of the Islands as differentiated from  
the entire Pacific area.

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EX-118

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-411-241

Mr. Hoover.

12/7/48.

Both from the above-named intelligence officers and from my personal conversations with General Hull and Admiral McMorris, who is Commandant of the Hawaiian Area for the Navy, there is no doubt that these Command Officers are kept fully advised of the local Communist situation and are personally very much concerned regarding it. This has now become merely a staging base for the Air Force and they, accordingly, take only passing interest in the local situation.

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

Lt. Colonel [ ] and Captain [ ] have indirectly indicated that although their superiors are deeply concerned over the internal security situation, their concern is for the substantive situation and not in any way over the coverage we maintain. They appear to be entirely satisfied way over the coverage we maintain. They appear to be entirely satisfied that the FBI has adequate coverage and is fully on top of the situation.

Respectfully,

J. K. MUMFORD,  
Special Agent in Charge.

JKM:PB

Director's Notation:

"Have we satisfied ourselves that we have this adequately covered? H."

Director, FBI

May 17, 1949

SAC, Atlanta

14388

LIAISON RELATIONS, G-2, THIRD ARMY.

For the information of the Bureau and interested offices, the Third Army Area has instituted under an overall general emergency plan a planning board which is setting up various functions of the Third Army Area so that it can act as an autonomous unit in the event of a national emergency. Colonel JOHN MEADE advised that each Army Area was supposed to have ready a plan and would be expected to operate as an independent unit in the event they are cut off from central headquarters in Washington.

Under these instructions Colonel JOHN MEADE, G-2, Third Army, called together a meeting of personnel for the planning of the setting up of a Southeastern Area Intelligence Center which would go into operation as a unit under situations as described in Prefix B of the Delimitations Agreement as set forth in SAC Letter #25, Series 1949.

A planning meeting was held on May 16, 1949, in which the Sixth Naval District was represented by Lieut. Commander K. B. BROWN, ONI, and Commander T. H. LUCKING, USNR, Communications Officer. The 14th Air Force, which encompasses the same area as the Third Army, was represented by Major EDWARD A. DAUGHERTY, A-2 of the 14th Air Force, and Major JACK B. CONEY, Communications Officer. The Third Army was represented by Colonel JOHN MEADE, G-2, Lieut. H. A. VEST, Communications Officer, and Captain J. E. ECHOLS, JR. G-2, and Lt. Col. DANIEL T. WORKTIZER, Staff Planning Officer.

SA JOSEPH T. SYLVESTER, JR. attended instant meeting in an observatory capacity.

At instant meeting it was noted that no OSI representative was present, and it was determined from Colonel MEADE that Major DAUGHERTY was the Intelligence Representative in charge of the 14th Air Force but that as Intelligence Officer he received no information of an intelligence nature from OSI. The purpose of instant meeting

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66-707

cc: Birmingham  
Charlotte  
Knoxville  
Mobile  
Savannah

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ORIGINAL

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was for the setting up of an agreement which would be signed by the Admiral of the Sixth Naval District, Commanding Generals of the 14th Air Force, and Third Army. The agreement proposed was that the Southeastern Area Intelligence Center would be formed and consist of ONI, G-2, and A-2 14th Air Force, and have as a central base Headquarters Third Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia; that this Southeastern Area Intelligence Center would not come into operation until an emergency arose or it was requested by any of the Commanding Officers of these particular districts and/or areas.

Under the agreement, upon the declaration of the emergency or the request for the setting up of the Southeastern Area Intelligence Center because of facts which would indicate the probability of an emergency, intelligence representatives from the Sixth Naval District and 14th Air Force would be immediately transported to the Third Army Area and these representatives in conjunction with G-2 representative of the Third Army Area would be the Southeastern Area Intelligence Center and would channelize and obtain all pertinent information of an intelligence nature which would be necessary for their individual commands.

For the information of the Bureau and other offices this planning group will run a test run on a proposed plan on July 6 and 7, and the last week in July.

The Atlanta office has again been invited to be present as observer during the running of this plan.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR



DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 03-30-2011  
PER OGA LETTER DATED 12-10-2010

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.  
January 5, 1950

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON  
MR. LADD


On January 4, Mr. William Borden, Executive Director of the Joint Committee of Congress on Atomic Energy, called to see me to show me a copy of a letter which Senator Brien McMahon, Chairman of that Committee, had sent to the President concerning the development of a super bomb. Senator McMahon had orally discussed this matter with me at Miami Beach last week and had stated then he would have shown to me a copy of the letter which he wrote to the President of the United States. I read the letter, which dealt with the possibility of the development of a super atom bomb with devastating power of one thousand square miles. I returned the letter to Mr. Borden to return to the sender. Present during my conference with Mr. Borden was Assistant Director Nichols.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Glavin.....
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Rosen.....
Mr. Tracy.....
Mr. Egan.....
Mr. Gurnea.....
Mr. Harbo.....
Mr. Mohr.....
Mr. Pennington.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
Mr. Nease.....
Miss Gandy.....

JEH:mpd



74 JAN 8 1950

YELLOW

100-1087-94

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. V. P. KEAY

DATE: February 17, 1950

FROM : S. W. REYNOLDS

SUBJECT: ARTICLE IN U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,  
2-10-50, ENTITLED, "U.S. TESTS GERMAN STAFF IDEA"

The writer discussed the referenced article with Major General Irwin of the Intelligence Division. General Irwin stated that he is aware of the fact that the Army have been using General Guderian for certain work. He stated that he had never heard of the Guderian plan for the U. S. General Staff and stated that the Secretary of Defense has been considering a plan for wartime operations, but that it does not parallel with the so-called Guderian plan as outlined in the referenced article. General Irwin stated that this plan is being worked over at the present time but that when it is completed he will discuss it in detail with the writer. General Irwin pointed out that the plan presently being considered does not contemplate putting CIA under the General Staff nor is it designed in any way to interfere with the investigative jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The writer will follow this matter with General Irwin and any information of value that is obtained will be brought to your attention.

SWR:mk

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2 1950

*Sounds like some more  
empire building.*

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Holmes  
Miss Gandy

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 7, 1950

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: WAR ACTIVITIES

Tolson ✓  
 Ladd ✓  
 Clegg ✓  
 Glavin ✓  
 Nichols ✓  
 Rosen ✓  
 Tracy ✓  
 Harbo ✓  
 Mohr ✓  
 Tele. Room ✓  
 Nease ✓  
 Gandy ✓

Mr. Roach, while in conversation with Mr. Matthew J. Connolly, Secretary to the President, this afternoon, Connolly advised that at 3:00 p.m. this afternoon the President called to his office Senators Tydings and Bridges and Congressmen Sasser and Arends, of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and briefed them on the present war situation.

According to Mr. Connolly, the situation is very bad. As a result, the President is becoming exceedingly concerned over the meddling of Members of Congress into military affairs. The President told the Senators and Congressmen that they should not in the future meddle in such matters and leave the operation of the war to General Bradley and himself. The President also informed these gentlemen that a number of men under the draft will be called up as an emergency measure. The principal item of discussion, however, was the statement of the President that they should not meddle in military affairs. Mr. Connolly stated that the President made very definite statements to these gentlemen along these lines. Assurances were received from them that they would desist from further military criticism and leave the operation of the war to the military.

ERR:hke

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EX-16

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WPK

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SHT

454

Continued on next page

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. V. P. KNAY

FROM : S. W. REYNOLDS

SUBJECT: Civil War PLANS

DATE: July 25, 1950

General A. R. Bolling of the Intelligence Division advised the writer in confidence that the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Army do not have any definite and complete evacuation plans however, should a situation develop which would necessitate the Joint Chiefs of Staff moving out of the Washington area, they would move undoubtedly to Fort Monroe, Virginia since this is the only place in the immediate vicinity that would have the necessary communication facilities.

SWR:lae

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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 JUL 27 1950  
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71 AUG 7 1950



Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

May 31, 1950.

Memo to Mr. Ladd

From E. S. Sanders.

Pursuant to our conversation, I am submitting this memorandum for your information.

General Carroll asked that I brief you on the following information so that you and the Director will be aware of what is being planned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised the Air Force that they will call upon them sometime subsequent to June 30th to immediately pick up an atom bomb and drop it on Bikini. This is in no way connected with the tests that are being planned for next year. It is to be a test to determine the ability of the Air Force to deliver on short notice an atom bomb to any designated point in the world and is also a test of security measures connected with all phases of such a delivery.

It is contemplated that a B-36, upon being ordered, will depart from Fort Worth, Texas, fly to California and pick up the atom bomb delivered to that point from storage by another plane, proceed via Hawaii picking up escort planes enroute and proceed to Bikini where the bomb will be dropped. It is to be a full size and real bomb.

Atomic

General Carroll stated that he will see you within a few days and brief you fully in this connection but wanted you to be aware of these plans. He is most anxious that at the proper time the Bureau be alerted to pick up any leaks or references to this project through our regular informants, any embassy coverage, or other manner in order that it can be determined if such a mission can be fully carried out without harmful leaks.

He pointed out that this project is so highly classified that there is only one other officer in OSI who knows about it and he knows it only because he is helping Carroll make the necessary plans. He stated that he is aware that should a leak occur the Russians might feel that the bomb is intended for Moscow.

I have advised no one else in the Bureau of these plans and, inasmuch as I was formerly a stenographer, have typed this memo myself.

The Navy will have a small part in the project insofar as keeping the sea lanes in the area cleared. The Army is not being brought in at all. CIA will be briefed at the appropriate time in order that they can observe results, etc, abroad.

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51 AUG 22 1950

Atomic War Plans

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd *lb*

FROM : Mr. E. H. Winterrowd *EW*

SUBJECT: \*AIR RAID ALERT

DATE: December 6, 1950

b6 Per OSI  
b7C

*[Handwritten signatures and initials over routing slip]*

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Air Force Intelligence advised Mr.   of the Liaison Section at approximately 12:25 P.M., that there had been only one radar reading or interception reflecting a number of planes headed toward the East coast of the United States. This one reading had definitely identified one of the planes as being "friendly" -- presumably a United States plane. The one reading indicated that there were approximately 40 planes at 32,000 feet.

Air Force Intelligence has advised that the Washington alert has been called off but that the interceptor planes were continuing on their mission as a test run.

EHW: WMJ

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54 DEC 12 1950

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: December 6, 1950

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: UNIDENTIFIED PLANE APPROACHING EAST COAST  
DECEMBER 6, 1950

Tolson	✓
Ladd	✓
Clegg	✓
Glavin	✓
Nichols	✓
Rosen	✓
Tracy	✓
Harbo	✓
Belmont	✓
Mohr	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Nease	✓
Gandy	✓

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Nichols to Mr. Tolson dated December 6, 1950, relative to an air raid warning resulting from an unidentified plane sighted over the northeastern section of the U. S.

Information concerning this was furnished by General Bolling to Mr. [ ] of the Liaison Section, who advised that radar had reflected a group of planes over the ocean off the East Coast of the U. S.

b6 Per OSI  
b7C

General Bolling secured his information from A-2, which advised that arrangements were being made by the Air Force to check on this immediately and make appropriate preparations in the event they were enemy planes.

Supervisor [ ] of the Liaison Section was in immediate contact with A-2 and OSI. At 11:50 A.M. Mr. [ ] advised that radar had picked up what appeared to be a group of planes about 250 miles east of Newfoundland shortly before 11:00 A.M. The Air Force had made all appropriate arrangements to intercept these planes if they proved to be enemy planes. Mr. [ ] pointed out that the possibility existed that this was "Ghosts on the screen." The Air Force stated it would be about a three-hour run from the point of location to cities in the vicinity of Philadelphia or Washington, D. C. Therefore, it would be an hour or two before this matter was completely settled.

b6 Per OSI  
b7C

At 12:00 noon Mr. [ ] advised that another reading had been obtained on radar. It appeared that this was a group of about 40 planes at 32,000 feet. One of the planes had been identified definitely as ours - a C-47.

b6 Per OSI  
b7C

At 12:45 P.M. Mr. [ ] advised that no new readings had been obtained but in view of the fact that one of the planes had been identified as ours, the alert had been called off in the Washington area. The Air Force is carrying on in the New York area and on the East Coast as a dry run in view of the fact that planes had been dispersed and arrangements had been made to handle this as an enemy attack.

b6 Per OSI  
b7C

At about 12:55 P.M. Mr. Rowley of the White House advised Mr. Roach that in view of the fact that the planes had been identified as friendly planes, the alert was off.

RECORDED - 2

INDEXED - 2

AHB:mar

54 DEC 12 1950

124

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, San Francisco

SUBJECT: U. S. ARMY WAR PLANS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 3-30-51

ATTENTION: ASSISTANT TO DIRECTOR D. M. LADD

Mr. Nichols ✓

Mr. Rosen ✓

Mr. Tracy ✓

Mr. Harbo ✓

Mr. Belmont ✓

Mr. Laughlin ✓

Mr. Mohr ✓

Tele. Room

At the Weekly Intelligence Conference on Thursday, 3-29-51, Colonel ALEXANDER G. KIRBY, Executive Officer, G-2, Sixth Army, volunteered the information that the U. S. Army within the United States was making what are in effect war plans, and that the Sixth Army had been requested to make various recommendations to the Department of the Army in Washington as to its plans.

Colonel KIRBY indicated that G-2, Sixth Army, had recommended to the Department of the Army that all counter intelligence and security files be immediately at this time deposited at Fort Douglas, Utah as the Army in this area had done early in 1942 when the Pacific Coast was threatened with a Japanese invasion. Colonel KIRBY volunteered the information that G-2, Sixth Army, felt that the Presidio of San Francisco was vulnerable to destruction by an attacking nation and that the counter intelligence files were so voluminous that they could not be hurriedly moved and, therefore, G-2, Sixth Army, had suggested that they be moved at the present time. He stated that intelligence operations under the plan would be centered at Fort Douglas, Utah, but that liaison would be maintained in San Francisco.

Colonel KIRBY also indicated that the Army had surveyed incinerators on Army property in the San Francisco area, and apparently the Army has considered the possibility of destruction of security files in the event of a national emergency.

The above is being set out for your information in order that the Bureau might be aware that the Army is apparently making war plans similar to the Bureau's war plans.

HFC:mht  
100-27336

RECORDED 66

INDEXED 66

66 APR 16 1951

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. M. Belmont *AB*  
 FROM : V. F. Keay *VFK*  
 SUBJECT: WAR PLANS IN HANDLING OF AMERICAN CITIZENS RETURNING FROM ABROAD

DATE: April 27, 1951

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. A. J. Nicholas, Passport Division, State Department informed Mr. Roach on March 26, 1951, that the State Department is attempting to work out a program with the Department of Justice and other interested agencies the matter of handling returning American citizens in the case of hostilities abroad. Mr. Nicholas mentioned that the State Department has had some discussions with Colonel Naramore (phonetic) of the Department of Justice and he, Nicholas, desired to know whether the Bureau has considered this matter and if so, what plans we have made to handle the matter should it be necessary to put the program into effect.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be referred to supervisor Whitson in the Espionage Section for information and consideration. The Liaison Section should be informed of what reply should be given to the State Department.

REE:mhm  
 mhm

*Nicholas was  
 at the meeting  
 of 4-27-51 when  
 this was discussed  
 with Ramsey and Jones*

RECORDED - 34  
 INDEXED - 34

62-81484-144  
 MAY 1 5 1951

274

100-100000-100000

*ELJ*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 15, 1951

FROM : V. P. KEAY *pln*SUBJECT: \*LOSS OF TWO U. S. JET PLANES  
OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

Major General A. R. Bolling of G-2 confidentially advised Mr. Reynolds that the Pentagon is very much concerned over the loss of two U. S. jet planes in Czechoslovakia. He confidentially advised Mr. Reynolds that the planes were equipped with all sorts of photographic devices, and it is feared that this material might have fallen in the hands of the Russians. He stated confidentially that the aviators, one of whom was a Norwegian, who had been trained by the U. S. Air Force, were on a confidential mission taking photographs over Czechoslovakia.

It should be noted that the above information was furnished to Mr. Reynolds confidentially by General Bolling.

*SWP:hke*

RECORDED - 54

INDEXED - 54

JUN 27 1951

62-81454-146

66 JUL 16 1951

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AIR MAIL

Date: August 30, 1951

To: [REDACTED]

b7D

From: Director, FBI

Subject: ARMY WAR PLANS

147

RECORDED - 38 On August 10, 1951, a conference was held in Detroit, which conference was attended by representatives of various U.S. agencies, as well as representatives from the Canadian Army, the Canadian Immigration and Naturalization Service, and [REDACTED]

EX - 110

b7D

[REDACTED] At the meeting various aspects of sabotage in international institutions, such as railroad bridges, vehicular bridges and tunnels, in and around the Detroit Area, were discussed. The discussions centered primarily around protective measures to be taken in the event of an emergency.


At this meeting, Colonel Innes Randolph, G-2 of the Fifth Army, indicated that he was interested in establishing liaison with [REDACTED] and indicated that he would attempt to obtain the instructions which have been issued to [REDACTED] in order to assist those charged with the responsibility in the U.S. of surveying key international facilities. The Bureau has voiced no objection to Colonel Randolph establishing this relationship since it pertains to a purely local situation. This, however, is being submitted to you for your information in the event the matter is brought to your attention by the officials of [REDACTED] in Ottawa.

b7D

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Alsen \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Shhke

cc - Foreign Service Desk



44 SEP 19 1951

RECEIVED  
SEP 1 1951  
FBI  
COMM - FBI  
87

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. L. LAUGHLIN

DATE: August 29, 1951

FROM : V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: ARMY WAR PLANS

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

b7D

A letter has been received from the SAC at Detroit dated August 14, 1951, which discusses a meeting held on August 10, 1951, with representatives of the Headquarters, Fifth Army; Detroit Police Department; U.S. Coast Guard; Michigan State Police; Immigration and Naturalization Service (U.S. and Canada); Office of Naval Intelligence; Michigan State Guard; Canadian Army and [redacted]

[redacted] An Agent from the Detroit Field Office attended as an observer. At the meeting various aspects of sabotage in international institutions, such as railroad bridges, vehicular bridges and tunnels, were discussed. The discussions centered primarily around protective measures to be taken in the event of an emergency.

The plans discussed and the action to be taken in connection with these plans would appear to fall within the nature of plant protection and consequently not within the jurisdiction of the Bureau. It is believed, however, that the Detroit Field Office should follow this matter closely to make certain that no plans are promulgated which might involve the basic jurisdiction of the Bureau.

Referenced memorandum indicates that Colonel Innes Randolph, G-2 of the Fifth Army, stated he was interested in establishing liaison with [redacted] and indicated he would attempt to obtain instructions which have been issued to [redacted] in order to assist those charged with the responsibility in the U.S. in surveying key international facilities. The Bureau handles liaison with [redacted] in Canada; however, since the contact to be made by Colonel Randolph involves a local situation, it is not believed that the Bureau should voice any objection; however, it is believed that Mr. Bethel should be informed of this situation.

b7D

Attachments

SRR:hke

RECORDED - 38

162-81484-147  
SEP 5 1951

INDEXED - 38

EX-119



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Detroit

SUBJECT: ARMY WAR PLANS

DATE: August 14, 1951

On August 10, 1951, at the request of Major ALFRED STANSBURY, Fifth Army Regional Office, a meeting was held with representatives from the Headquarters, Fifth Army, Detroit Police Department, U.S. Coast Guard, [redacted] Michigan State Police, Immigration and Naturalization Service (U.S. and Canada), Canadian Army, Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Michigan State Guard. An agent from this office attended as an observer at the request of Major STANSBURY. b7D

The meeting was chaired by Colonel INNES RANDOLPH, Headquarters, Fifth Army, Chicago, Illinois, who discussed aspects of sabotage in international institutions. He referred to railroad bridges at Detroit and Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, as well as vehicular bridges at Detroit and Port Huron and the vehicular tunnel at Detroit. He stated that the Army, in connection with its plans in the event of national emergency, was attempting to pre-determine courses of action to be taken.

Colonel RANDOLPH obtained information from those present as to the jurisdiction of the organizations they represented and was advised by [redacted] b7D

Inspectors of the Detroit Police Department informed that the Detroit police considered the Detroit vehicular bridge and tunnel to be of vital interest and were on the Detroit Police Department list for emergency attention in the event of an emergency.

Lieutenant [redacted] representing the Coast Guard, advised that he had been authorized to set up an Advisory Council of shipping interests to work out proper safeguards for waterfront facilities. b6 b7C

Colonel RANDOLPH emphasized that the Army has plans drawn for action to be taken in the event of an emergency and requested that surveys of the bridge and tunnel facilities mentioned above be conducted by the Detroit Police and the Michigan State Police. This was agreed to by representatives of those two organizations, who agreed to submit their findings to Major STANSBURY. Colonel RANDOLPH was interested in establishing liaison with the Commander of the RCMP and indicated that he would attempt to obtain the instructions which have been issued to surveying officers of the RCMP in order to assist those charged with the responsibility in the U.S. in surveying key international facilities.

JP:JC  
100-11880

RECORDED - 38  
INDEXED - 38

AUG 16 1951

EX - 119

COPIES DESTROYED  
211 NOV 17 1964

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: ~~PROJECT PARABEL~~;  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: January 28, 1952

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_

Ladd \_\_\_\_\_

Clegg \_\_\_\_\_

Glavin \_\_\_\_\_

Harbo \_\_\_\_\_

Tracy \_\_\_\_\_

Belmont \_\_\_\_\_

Mohr \_\_\_\_\_

Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_

Nease \_\_\_\_\_

Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

There is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum dated January 15, 1952, entitled, "Vulnerability to Guerrilla Action." It was confidentially made available to Mr. Reynolds by Major Bartlett of G-2. Major Bartlett indicated that he felt the Bureau should be aware of this activity for any value that it might be to the Bureau.

Major Bartlett indicated that Project Parabel is a project of the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University dealing with a study of guerrilla action. The memorandum concerns a conference held at the Pentagon concerning a Sub-Project of Project Parabel entitled, "Sabotage Potential of Guerrilla Forces." The conference was attended by representatives of the CIC, CIA and G-2. Major Bartlett pointed out that the sub-project is primarily concerned with a study of the utilization of guerrilla forces in wartime operations to utilize the device of sabotage against the potential enemy. The study will also deal with counter-sabotage as it might be used in overseas theaters of operation by guerrilla forces of the enemy. The study will also be extended to establish certain targets for sabotage in overseas areas. Major Bartlett pointed out that in the latter instance the Operations Research Office will not be permitted access to highly classified information and will confine the study to typical or general targets.

ACTION:

This memorandum is submitted primarily as a matter of general interest. However, liaison will be maintained with Major Bartlett in order that the Bureau may procure a copy of the study for whatever value the same might have.

Attachment

EX - 28

RECORDED - 24

INDEXED - 24

FEB 1 1952

SWR:hke

ENCL.

10-1-1952

## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. HOOVER

DATE: July 17, 1952

FROM : SAC AUERBACH

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SUBJECT: ~~AIR~~ FORCE DEFENSE

b6 Per OSI

b7C

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

I was today confidentially advised by SAC Contact  
 Captain [redacted] of OSI as to the above-captioned matter.

[redacted] states that the Air Force has now discovered that it has practically no protection for the United States through Aircraft Control and Warning radar sites along the United States-Canadian border, and with a prognosis that the best two places for attack on the country from Russia are over Alaska and down from the North Pole, it would appear that they should have better protection. Accordingly, arrangements are now being made between the Air Force and the Canadians for the United States to finance and build with American crews radar sites up in Canada and along the United States-Canadian border, so that any attack from the north would result in successive waves of alarm and interception as invaders came down from the North Pole to the United States.

In connection with this, a whole set of Aircraft Control and Warning radar sites are being constructed along the Northwest Pacific Ocean and San Juan channel areas through British Columbia by American contractors. One construction is complete, and the contractor is endeavoring to turn over the arrangements to the Air Force which has now found that while the buildings are complete there are no arrangements for our handling of communications, sewerage, water, power, etc. Thus the finished product will be delayed some months while they make the contractor go back and correct it.

In connection with the setting up of sites in Canada, the three divisions of Eastern, Central and Western Air Command Areas in the United States are now going to be extended all the way up through Canada for responsibility areas. It appears that the Canadians feel that as far as they are concerned any invaders would merely fly over Canada because there is nothing of potential war value for air strikes in Canada proper but instead it is all in the United States. They are willing to let the United States do whatever it wants in the financing and construction of these sites but are not greatly concerned about the situation themselves.

The Air Force is pressing very hard for the completion of these plans, inasmuch as they have been advised that definitely identified Russian submarines have been sighted off Labrador and Newfoundland in the Northeastern Command Area, which submarines of course would be capable of launching guided missiles. [redacted] does not know the source of this last data but states it is general rumor in OSI.

RDA:LM

RECORDED - 75

62-81484-154

b6 Per OSI  
b7C

INDEXED - 75

AUG 5 1952

EXPEDITE PROCESSING  
 JUL 22 1952

America War Plans.

Director, FBI

7/24/53

SAC, Butte

MOUNTAIN HOME AIR FORCE BASE

MOUNTAIN HOME, IDAHO

b6 Per OSI

b7C

*American War Plans*

On July 10, 1953, Major [redacted] Provost Marshal, Ninth Air Base Group, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Mountain Home, Idaho, advised SAs JOHN J. SWEENEY and DAVID W. MURRAY that certain key personnel at the Mountain Home Air Force Base with the rank of major and above were being given permission to carry firearms off duty at the Base.

[redacted] said that the officers being granted permission to carry sidearms were key men in the Strategic Air Command who are highly trained in carrying out specific duties in the event of a national emergency.

b6 Per OSI

b7C

Approximately twenty men at the Mountain Home Air Force Base will be granted authority to carry weapons.

Permission to carry sidearms at all times has been granted for the following reasons:

1. To prevent assassination of key personnel by enemy agents.
2. In order that officers may protect brother officers in the event they are attacked by enemy agents.
3. To prevent sabotage to Strategic Air Command equipment and plans.

The above information is being furnished the Bureau for completion of its files.

PW:iap

62-81484- ✓  
**NOT RECORDED**

146 JUL 30 1953

210  
56 AUG 6 1953

INITIALS & ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-85557-655

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: September 11, 1953

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: U. S. WAR PLANS

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On September 10, 1953, during the course of a discussion at the Department of State on the question of access to enemy diplomatic establishments in the event of hostilities, Supervisor Whitson was informed by Mr. Walworth Barbour of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, that the Army had sent to our Embassy in Moscow, by pouch, a quantity of highly unstable "jelly" which could be used for destroying files and material in the Embassy Code Room. When the material was shipped by pouch, the Department of State was not fully aware of its characteristics, but they now realize that it would have been possible for this material to have destroyed not only the pouch, but the plane on which it was being carried.

This matter was mentioned in connection with a discussion of a need to gain prompt access to enemy establishments, in order to prevent not only destruction of documents of intelligence value, but destruction of the premises as well.

This matter has been mentioned to Mr. Parsons of the Bureau Laboratory, who advises that the Laboratory has been following closely the development of this jellylike substance by the Army, as well as developments in other means for destroying files.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

CC - R. T. Harbo

LW:fk  
ke

RECORDED - 41

162-81484-159  
18 SEP 18 1953

50 SEP 21 1953

124

O AMERICAN WAR PLANS

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. Rosen

DATE: January 8,  
1954

FROM : L. N. Conroy

SUBJECT: REPRESENTATIVE ALFRED D. SIEMINSKI  
NAME CHECK REQUESTTolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gearty \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_SYNOPSIS: AMERICAN WAR PLANS

Reference is made to my memorandum, 12-16-53, on name checks from G-2 on Congressmen to attend conference at Pentagon in January, 1954, on war plans. Indices search confined to main files and G-2 being furnished only results of FBI investigations. Name check received from G-2 regarding Congressman Alfred D. Sieminski. Investigation conducted 1942 regarding telegram Sieminski sent President alleging sale of oil to Germany by British and American companies. Sieminski apologized for telegram stating allegations had little basis in fact and telegram sent on impulse. Persons contacted incidental to handling this matter described Sieminski as loyal; however, it was determined in 1942 that Sieminski was active in American Slav Congress which was cited by Attorney General in 1948. Results of investigation transmitted to G-2 in 1943. Information received from G-2 in 1951 that Sieminski's wife, Marie, was previously married to a Pole; however, deserted said Pole and her two children to live with German Gestapo Lieutenant. Alleged that they separated when it appeared Germany would lose war. She met Sieminski in Europe and later entered US as a GI bride to marry Sieminski. Sieminski has expressed a strong anti-Communist feeling, and has, on numerous occasions, displayed a friendly attitude toward Bureau. Bureau contacted in 1952 and 1953 by Sieminski and wife in regards to children of Mrs. Sieminski still living in Poland whom she desired to have come to U. S. They were referred to State Department. In March, 1953, Sieminski, while at White House, made remarks that Senator McCarthy may be getting information in FBI files from FBI Agents or former Agents. He apologized when informed of sanctity of FBI files. Attached memorandum refers G-2 to information previously furnished them, and advised that FBI has not conducted investigation concerning Sieminski.

Recommendation:

If you approve, the attached memorandum will be transmitted to G-2 by the Liaison Section.

Attachment

C. E. St. Vincent:mdc

1 - V. P. Key

62-81484- ✓  
NOT RECORDED  
JAN 12 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-60521-

DETAILS:

Reference is made to my memorandum dated December 16, 1953, concerning name check requests submitted by G-2 on 129 United States Senators and Representative. These members of Congress are to attend a conference at the Pentagon in January, 1954, where they will be briefed on future United States war plans. As previously indicated, the indices search was confined to main files only, and G-2 is being furnished information only in instances where the FBI has conducted an investigation.

FBI files reflect that in June, 1942, the State Department requested an investigation as a result of a telegram Alfred D. Sieminski had sent to President Roosevelt. This telegram charged that the British Persian Oil Company was selling oil to Germany and that the Adam Opel Foreign Branch of General Motors in Germany had declared 13 million dollars profit to American investors for the quarter ending in January, 1942. Sieminski, when interviewed, explained that an unknown individual, whom he had met in a restaurant in New York, had furnished him the information on which he based his telegram to the President; that when he sent the telegram he was emotionally upset as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor and also because he had a brother in the Pacific area. He subsequently wrote a letter to the Director explaining his action in sending the telegram, and apologizing for his impulsive behavior which caused the investigation.

No one interviewed during the course of the investigation indicated that Sieminski was anything but a patriotic citizen; however, it was revealed that in 1942 he was connected with the American Slav Congress as Executive Secretary to the President.

It is to be noted that an investigation by the FBI in 1943 failed to reveal that leadership of the American Slav Congress was actually under control of the Communist Party at that time. The American Slav Congress was cited by the Attorney General as subversive on June 1, 1948.

Results of the afore-mentioned investigation were furnished to G-2 in September, 1943, inasmuch as Sieminski was attending Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

In January, 1951, the Bureau received information from G-2 concerning Sieminski, which presumably originated with James F. Murray, Jr., an attorney who was defeated by Sieminski in the Congressional election of 1950. According to the information,

b6 Per Army

Sieminski's wife, Marie Czarowski, was born in [redacted] to well-to-do parents of the nobility class. She married Stanislaus Mychielwski of Poxnan, Poland, and two children were born as a result of this union. In 1941, when the Germans invaded Warsaw, she allegedly deserted her family and became mistress of a German Gestapo Lieutenant. She had a child, Christine, as a result of this affair. It was further alleged that when it became evident that Germany would lose the war, the Gestapo Lieutenant helped Marie destroy records of her past and then disappeared while she obtained employment with UNRRA in Vienna, Austria. Sieminski, who met her while he was serving as an officer on the staff of General Mark Clark, filed the necessary papers to bring Marie to the United States as a GI bride; however, when she arrived he was indecisive about marrying her and stayed with her for approximately two weeks at the Sulgrave Hotel in New York City. He subsequently married her.

In March, 1952, and in July, 1953, the FBI was contacted by Representative Sieminski and his wife, for advice and information regarding a son and daughter of Mrs. Sieminski, by a former marriage, who were living in Poland. Efforts had been made to effect their escape from Poland to the United States without success, and it was the opinion of Mrs. Sieminski that possibly the Polish Ambassador to the United States could be of some help. Congressman Sieminski stated in July, 1953, that he was considering resigning his position as a United States Congressman, and as a private citizen go to Sweden and use Sweden as a base in an attempt to personally enter Poland and effect the release of the two children. The Congressman and his wife were informed that the facts as furnished by him and his wife would be made a matter of record, but that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Department of State.

In March, 1953, Congressman Sieminski attended a luncheon at the White House at which time a discussion arose concerning FBI "raw" files. Sieminski advanced the opinion to General Persons, Deputy Assistant to the President, and other Congressmen that Senator McCarthy may be getting information contained in FBI files from FBI Agents or former FBI Agents. Sieminski was immediately contacted by a representative of the Bureau and advised of the sanctity of FBI files and how highly this responsibility is held



Mr. A. Rosen

January 7, 1954

L. N. Conroy

CONGRESSMAN HARRY R. SHEPPARD  
 DEMOCRAT \* CALIFORNIA  
 NAME CHECK REQUEST

SYNOPSIS:

b6 Per OSI  
 b7C

AMERICAN AIRPLANE

Reference is made to my memorandum, 12-16-53, concerning name checks from G-2 on 129 Congressmen to be invited to the Pentagon in January, 1954, where they are to be briefed on war plans. Indices serach confined to main files and G-2 is being furnished information only where we have conducted investigations. Bufiles reflect "Fraud Against the Government" investigation instituted in September, 1942, concerning the sale of a California hotel for which the Government was allegedly charged an excessive amount. In the course of investigation two persons made statements indicating dishonesty on part of Sheppard. Both persons found to be unreliable and that no basis in fact existed for the allegations. No investigation conducted concerning Sheppard. The Department was furnished results of the investigation and on 9-23-53 advised charges not substantiated and stated matter should be closed. OSI, by letter 9-14-53, furnished information from [redacted] Arcturus Manufacturing Corporation, alleging that Congressman Sheppard and two associates had solicited campaign contributions from the corporation in exchange for any aid the Congressman might give in having an Air Force facilities contract "reinstated" for the corporation. Information furnished Department which requested on 10-2-53 that further inquiries be made. Persons interviewed advised no contributions discussed with Congressman but that contract was discussed and Sheppard stated he would help obtain the contract. Anderson advised that Willard G. Herron, a friend and associate of Sheppard's, did suggest donation to aid in campaign. He stated Herron later raised price for any help the Congressman might furnish which was to be paid through an attorney ostensibly as a retainer fee. Another person advised Herron helped Sheppard and solicited contributions through friendship, and stated Herron always within legal bounds. Results furnished Department, 11-6-53. On 12-21-53, Department advised matter under consideration and decision will be furnished Bureau when reached. G-2, in the attached memorandum is being furnished information re the basis of the election

Attachment

ADS:res

1 - V. P. Keay

46-2471  
 56-1291

163-81484 -  
 NOT RECORDED  
 176 JAN 14 1954

5  
 57 JAN 10 1954

By letter dated September 14, 1953, the OSI furnished to this Bureau information received from [redacted] Sales Manager, Arcturus Manufacturing Corporation, Venice, California, alleging that Congressman Harry R. Sheppard and two of his representatives had solicited campaign contributions from the Arcturus Corporation. The Congressman, in return, was to aid in having an Air Force facilities contract "reinstated" for the corporation. The foregoing information was furnished to the Department who requested on October 2, 1953, that interviews of two persons be made for more information in this matter and to determine, if possible, if Congressman Sheppard agreed to furnish aid in obtaining the reinstatement of the contract in exchange for a campaign contribution. The persons interviewed advised that no contributions were discussed directly with the Congressman, but the contract was discussed and Sheppard said he would be glad, to help obtain the contract. Mr. Anderson stated that Willard G. Herron, a personal friend and associate of Sheppard's had stated Sheppard could cause review of matter and suggested that the corporation donate money to help the Congressman in his campaign. Anderson advised that Herron subsequently informed him the price for help had gone up and payment of the contribution was to be made through an attorney ostensibly as a retainer fee. Another person contacted stated that Herron helped the Congressman and solicited contributions through friendship and always within legal bounds. The results of the foregoing inquiries were furnished to the Department on November 6, 1953. The Department, by memorandum, December 21, 1953, advised that matter presently under consideration and that the Bureau will be informed of the decision when reached.

b6 Per OSI  
b7c

The attached memorandum for G-2 sets forth the allegation concerning the above-mentioned campaign contributions solicited by Congressman Sheppard and two of his associates and reflects that the results of our inquiries in the matter have been furnished to the Department, to which G-2 is referred in the event further information is desired by them.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: AIR DEFENSE WARNING SYSTEM

DATE: December 1, 1953

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_

Ladd \_\_\_\_\_

Nichols \_\_\_\_\_

Belmont \_\_\_\_\_

Clegg \_\_\_\_\_

Glavin \_\_\_\_\_

Harbo \_\_\_\_\_

Rosen \_\_\_\_\_

Tracy \_\_\_\_\_

Mohr \_\_\_\_\_

Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

Nease \_\_\_\_\_

Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is the standard operating procedure of the Headquarters, USAF Command Post, regarding the dissemination of information concerning air defense warnings. As you know, this matter was recently considered by the Bureau, and it was determined that any air defense warnings should be transmitted by the USAF Command Post to the Office of Assistant Director Belmont and the Command Post was so advised. The attached standard operating procedure, in accordance with these instructions, provides that both in the case of air defense warnings and in the case of notification concerning an overt hostile act by a foreign power, during official duty hours, the Command Post will contact Mr. Belmont or Mr. Cleveland, and during other than normal duty hours, it will contact the Agent on duty in Mr. Belmont's Office.

There is also attached a pamphlet captioned, "USAF 1615-7(A) Authenticator." The purpose of this is so that the Bureau can immediately verify that they are actually talking with the USAF Command Post and so that the Command Post can also immediately verify they are talking with the FBI. It was pointed out by Philcox of Liaison to Officers at the Command Post that this did not appear to be necessary inasmuch as the Bureau has a direct tie line with the Command Post and there could be no doubt as to the authenticity of the call. They explained, however, that, in the event of an actual attack, it is possible that the direct line may be destroyed and it would then be necessary to contact the Bureau through either the code line or the regular outside dialing system. They pointed out that it would be of value to the Bureau as well as the Command Post to erase any doubt as to the authenticity of a call concerning an air defense warning. They pointed out that, in the event of an emergency, it would be impossible for the Command Post to accept return calls verifying the original call. They pointed out they would be extremely busy and, if they accepted return calls from every agency to verify the original call, their switchboard would be swamped, and their system would suffer a complete breakdown. This authenticator system is fully explained in the attached pamphlet. It merely involves the use of a code word by the Command Post and a code word in reply

Attachments (2)  
cc - Mr. L. H. Martin

NWP:hke

52 JAN 23 1954

162-81484 -

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Memorandum for Mr. Belmont, 12/1/53

by the Bureau. These words are listed starting on page one. As a word is used, it is crossed off the list.

ACTION:

It is recommended that this authenticator pamphlet be maintained in Mr. Belmont's Office. Instructions are being issued for Agents on night and week-end duty so they will be familiar with this system.

ADDENDUM: 12/8/53

Copies of this memorandum have been placed in the night and week-end duty instruction folders and the authenticator has been placed in a manila envelope in the instruction folder maintained in the center drawer in Mr. Belmont's desk.

LHM:hke

SAC, DENVER

December 21, 1953

DIRECTOR, FBI

AIR FORCE LIAISON

b6 Per OSI  
b7C

Brigadier General W. M. Burgess, Deputy for Intelligence, Air Defense Command, and Colonel [redacted] Commander of the 4602nd Air Intelligence Service Squadron, appeared at the Bureau on December 15, 1953, together with several officers from Air Intelligence Headquarters. The purpose of their visit was to discuss with Bureau Representatives the handling of the police contacts by the Bureau for the AISS.

They advised that they are in complete agreement with the Bureau in that the Bureau should handle contacts with law enforcement agencies. They are also in complete agreement with the Bureau's views regarding training exercises involving outside law enforcement agencies. They agreed that no exercises involving outside agencies would be held in the future and that their exercises would be held in areas which they can control and would involve only Air Force personnel.

They stated that they are willing to handle the contacts with civil defense agencies, and this is being made the subject of an SAC Letter. They stated that they have no objection to this matter being discussed at FBI Law Enforcement Conferences and that, in fact, they would make one of their representatives available for these conferences if so requested by the Bureau. This is also being set forth in an SAC Letter.

General Burgess and Colonel [redacted] promised full cooperation and close coordination on a field level with the Bureau. Colonel [redacted] advised that he plans to contact you personally in the very near future. You are reminded that you should maintain close and continuous liaison with General Burgess and Colonel [redacted] and you should keep them fully informed as to the Bureau's part in this project as well as attempting to work out any problems which may arise.

b6 Per OSI  
b7C

NWP:hke

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

JAN 21 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: DECEMBER 16, 1953

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: AIR FORCE LIAISON

SYNOPSIS: AMERICAN WAR PLANSb6 Per OSI  
b7C

Brigadier General W. M. Burgess, Air Defense Command; Colonel [redacted] Commanding Officer, 4602nd Air Intelligence Squadron (AISS), Colorado Springs, Colorado; and Colonel [redacted] Assistant to General Samford, Air Intelligence Director, Pentagon, called at the Bureau on December 15, 1953. They outlined the mission of the AISS, that is, quick detection of enemy missiles or downed airplanes from enemy missiles or downed airplanes United States with sufficient speed to utilize information immediately, that is, in the same battle. They stated frankly they had made an error in not better coordinating with the Bureau prior to initiating this project involving peace officers and the public. They indicated they wanted to coordinate closely with the Bureau in connection with our advising law enforcement officers of their mission regarding Civil Defense, indicating they thought that Civil Defense Representatives should be contacted at a local level. Bureau instructions to field offices had instructed they contact Civil Defense through their regular liaison, which would be on the local level. General Burgess indicated they would be willing to contact Civil Defense, particularly since they are frequently called upon by Civil Defense Directors to outline their mission at meetings and conferences on civil defense. Since these contacts involve many thousands of individuals and since the Bureau is handling the law enforcement aspects of Civil Defense, General Burgess, AISS mission at law enforcement was offered to be the one before conferences when a great deal of effort is put forth by law enforcement officers. General Burgess stated that we do not wish to interfere with AISS wartime mission, but at same time do not desire that they create confusion and misunderstandings in law enforcement field and thus interfere with our responsibilities. General Burgess was in complete agreement.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the attached SAC letter be sent to the field advising that the Bureau will continue to handle contacts with law enforcement

AHL:ike/mls

Attachment APPROVAL

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Gearty  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
 Sizoo  
Miss Gandy

62-85557-

NOT RECORDED

176 JAN 18 1954

Memorandum for Mr. Ladd  
Re: Air Force Liaison

December 18, 1953

agencies, but that AISS will handle civil defense contacts. This SAC letter also advises the field that the Bureau has no objection to this matter being discussed at law enforcement conferences and that the AISS will make a representative available for these conferences if it is so desired.

✓ 1 per y  
12-21

OK.  
H.

(2) That the attached letter be forwarded to the SAC at Denver advising him of the discussion held here and reiterating that he is expected to maintain close liaison with the AISS Headquarters at Colorado Springs.

✓ 1 per y  
12-21

OK.  
H.

12/21/53 J. L. ...  
... ..

Memorandum for Mr. Ladd, 12/18/53

DETAILS:

On December 15, 1953, Brigadier General W. M. Burgess, Deputy for Intelligence, Air Defense Command, Colorado Springs; Colonel [redacted] Air Intelligence Headquarters; and Colonel [redacted] Commanding Officer of the 4602nd Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS), Colorado Springs, appeared at the Bureau for a discussion with Inspector V. Keay and Liaison Supervisor N. W. Philcox regarding the 4602nd AISS. These officers were accompanied by Colonel [redacted] of Air Intelligence Headquarters and Major [redacted] of the 4602nd AISS. b6 Per OSI b7C

General Burgess specifically pointed out at the beginning of this discussion that the Air Force had set up the 4602nd AISS on March 1, 1952, for the specific purpose of collecting positive intelligence from foreign airmen and through the examination of foreign aircraft landing in the United States. He pointed out that this must be done immediately upon receiving word that a foreign airman or foreign aircraft has landed inasmuch as the intelligence information gathered must be used immediately in order to combat the second wave of aircraft possibly en route to attack the U.S. He pointed out, therefore, that their mission is extremely important in gathering positive intelligence for tactical purposes and that, if the information is not obtained promptly and handled promptly, it will be of no use. The 4602nd AISS presently has 194 men which includes 40 officers. They are equipped, of course, with airplanes, skis, horses and other equipment enabling them to reach any spot where a foreign airman or aircraft may be located. They have technical experts and foreign language experts available to interview the foreign airmen and examine the aircraft.

You will recall that we took over the handling of contacts with law enforcement agencies for this group in order to avoid confusion in the law enforcement field. You will also recall that we strenuously objected to Major General J. A. Samford, Director of Air Intelligence, regarding the staging of training exercises by this group involving outside law enforcement agencies.

General Burgess specifically pointed out that he thoroughly agrees with the Bureau's views on these points.



Memorandum for Mr. Ladd, 12/18/53

He feels that the Bureau should certainly handle the contacts with law enforcement officers in view of the long standing direct liaison which the Bureau has established with the law enforcement officers. He stated that the AISS undubtably had made a serious error in that they had failed to coordinate this matter with the Bureau when the organization was originated. He also pointed out that the AISS had made a serious error in staging the training exercise near Urbana, Illinois, on September 22, 1953. He stated that he completely agrees with the Director's view and that the AISS has strict orders to hold no more of these training exercises involving outside law enforcement agencies. Any further exercises of this type will be in areas which they can control and will involve their own personnel.

You will recall that we previously instructed the field to contact civil defense officials in this project through their previously established liaison channels. This would mean that we would contact only a few officials on a high level, such as State Directors, etc. General Burgess pointed out, however, that it was their conception that all civil defense people should be contacted down to the lowest level. This would place an intolerable burden upon the Bureau and would necessitate several thousand contacts in addition to those being handled by the Bureau in the law enforcement field. General Burgess advised that they are willing to handle the civil defense contacts. He stated that occasionally they are requested to appear before a civil defense group to explain their wartime mission. It is pointed out that the Bureau originally took over this project in order to avoid confusion in the law enforcement field, and it is not believed that their contacts in civil defense circles will have an effect on the law enforcement field providing their activities are completely coordinated with ours on a local level. General Burgess advised that the AISS is making numerous contacts in addition to those being handled by the Bureau. Their contacts include Civil Air Patrol, Ground Observer Corps, Power Line Inspectors, etc.

The question of discussing this matter at FBI law enforcement conferences was raised by the Bureau's

Memorandum for Mr. Ladd, 12/18/53

representatives. General Burgess advised that in so far as the Air Force is concerned, this information is not classified, and that they have no objection to the Bureau discussing the matter at FBI law enforcement conferences. He stated, in fact, that if the Bureau so desires, they would be glad to make a representative available for an FBI law enforcement conference upon request.

Inspector Keay made the Bureau's position clear by stating specifically that the Bureau did not wish to interfere with the wartime mission of the AISS. It was pointed out that we did, however, wish to avoid confusion in the law enforcement field and to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of police officials in so far as the Bureau's long standing liaison with the police in internal security matters is concerned. It was pointed out that close coordination between the AISS and the Bureau on the field level is necessary, as well as at Headquarters level.

(d) Non-Chinese on The Security Index Who  
Are Sympathetic to Communist China

The Director stated that this list is now composed of thirteen individuals and in the event of an emergency we would immediately furnish the names to the Department. As these thirteen are all United States citizens, in an emergency we would intensify our coverage of them but would not, of course, make arrests. Mr. Rankin raised the question as to the danger of Russian officials who would, of course, be sympathetic to the Chinese in the event of a Formosan emergency. The Director pointed out that the only action we could take there would be in intensifying our coverage of them which we would do.

4. Executive Order Freezing Prices, etc., in Absence  
of National Law.

Mr. Rankin stated a proclamation has been drafted but he does not think it has a sound legal basis. The Attorney General stated that the Defense Production Act going before Congress would give legality to the procedure. He instructed that a copy of the draft be placed in the Portfolio.

5. Result of INS Talks with Army as to Guarding of  
The Borders

General Howard said that the talks with the Army had not been fruitful, that the Army was opposed to taking on the protection of the borders. General Partridge said that INS is going ahead with its plans and has three possible plans: (1) reinforcement force which would utilize 6,000 personnel on the border patrol; (2) maximum force which would require 15,000 men; (3) use of troops (in a dire emergency, INS would recommend this to the President).

The Attorney General asked that copies of these plans be furnished to him and stated that two copies should be given to the FBI also. INS will furnish the Department four copies of which two will come to the FBI. General Partridge said that INS would have to recruit to get the additional personnel

for either plan I or 2; that the maximum personnel INS could make available for additional border coverage now would be 500.

General Partridge said that INS is meeting with CIA next week with a view to seeing what advance information CIA can furnish on the possibility of subversives coming through the Mexican border (We will have Liaison follow with CIA to get the results of this meeting.).

The Director stressed the importance of proper coverage on the Mexican border particularly. He suggested that if adequate coverage was not possible due to manpower shortage, that ICIS present a factual picture to the National Security Council so that the exact situation will be realized on a high level.

#### 6. Discussion of Department of Justice Relocation Plan

Walter Yeagley went over the relocation plans of the Department, much of which have not been resolved. The Attorney General stated that Deputy Attorney General Rogers should go to Quantico when evacuation occurs. (Rogers is being added to our list of Departmental personnel to be at Quantico.)

Yeagley said that the Department is figuring on additional land telephone lines to Quantico. He said that INS will have portable radio equipment at the Winchester site by this coming June.

Yeagley said that during office hours an alert would be sounded by the Captain of the Guard in the Justice Building. In the event of an imminent alert there will be a series of ten second buzzers. For a yellow alert there will be a series of two ten second buzzers followed by a pause. On off duty hours the alert, according to Yeagley, will come through Conelrad.

TO

FROM : J. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN THE EVENT OF FORMOSAN OPEN HOSTILITIES

This memorandum is for record purposes in connection with the conference held in the Attorney General's office starting at 3:00 pm, February 7, 1955, relative to the Justice Department's plans in the event of Formosan open hostilities. In addition to the Attorney General and the Director, the following were present:

From the Department - Deputy Attorney General Rogers, Legal Counsel Rankin, Walter Yeagley, William Foley and Frederick Ford, office of Legal Counsel;

From Immigration & Naturalization Service - General Swing and General Howard;

From FBI - Belmont.

The Attorney General followed the agenda set forth in his memorandum to Rogers dated February 3, 1955:

A. Supervision of the Activities of Alien Chinese in this Country, Particularly Alien Chinese Scientists and Students

General Swing stated there were about 15,000 non immigrant Chinese in this country, of which approximately 5,000 are students. He said there were about 30,000 other Chinese who are permanent residents, or a total of about 45,000 Chinese aliens in the United States. [redacted] of Immigration and Naturalization Service, advised us on February 4, 1955, that there were about 49,000 Chinese aliens. (We are checking as to the difference in these figures.)

b6 Per ICE  
b7C  
k2

The Director pointed out that of the 181 Chinese students and scientists who have been temporarily restrained from leaving this country, 5 are on our Security Index, and therefore, it would be very desirable that I&NS furnish us

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117 MAR 15 1955

ALL (7)  
CC - Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Keay  
Mr. Branigan  
Mr. Baumgardner

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE L. L. ROYCE

with a list of the 5,000 students in order that they could be checked out as to dangerousness. General Swing stated that the cards on these 5,000 students are mixed in with the 15,000 cards on nonimmigrant Chinese at Central Headquarters but that he could pick the cards out in about 24 hours in the event of an emergency. The Director pointed out that we should not wait until a "shooting war" has hit us, but that this information should be available now. General Swing said he would start a project to get the names to us. The Director pointed out this should not be delayed in order that we would have a chance to do our checking in advance of any emergency. ✓

The Director further pointed out that under the revised Portfolio the arrest of dangerous aliens and a number of other functions performed during World War II by the United States Attorneys and the FBI have been placed under the jurisdiction of I&NS. The Attorney General questioned the advisability of this and after discussion made the ruling that the apprehension of any dangerous individuals under an emergency program should be the function of the FBI and the Portfolio is to so state. ✓

B. Chinese on Security Index

The Director stated that there are 101 persons of Chinese national extraction in this country on the Security Index, 37 of whom are aliens and 64 United States citizens. The Director pointed out that as to the aliens, there was no problem, inasmuch as in an emergency they could be picked up on deportation warrants. As to the citizens, he pointed out that they could not be arrested unless the writ of habeas corpus was suspended but that the FBI could intensify its coverage of these 64 in the event of an emergency which was short of implementing the entire Security Index program.

After discussion, the Attorney General agreed that in the event of a Formosan emergency, the 37 aliens would be picked up by the FBI on deportation warrants; that the FBI would see that the warrants were prepared for the Attorney General's \* signature and that we would intensify the coverage on the citizens. The Director pointed out we had located all of the aliens mentioned above within the last 48 hours. ✓

\*We are checking with the Department as to the form of these warrants.

Subject: Chinese Employed by UN

The Director stated that of the Chinese employed at the UN, our investigations have reflected it to be dangerous and that the Department of State advised us on February 1, 1955, that the Chinese employed by the UN Secretariat should be considered as natives of a friendly power and each case would be considered on its merits. Therefore, as these individuals cannot be arrested, if an emergency occurs, we will intensify our coverage of them and immediately take their cases up with Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, who can discuss them with the Department of State.

The Attorney General agreed with the above procedure.

D. Non-Chinese on the Security Index Who Are Sympathetic to Communist China

The Director stated that there are 34 individuals on our Security Index who are not Chinese but who are strongly sympathetic to Communist China. The Director pointed out that logically these would be treated in the same manner as the American citizens of Chinese extraction and, therefore, the FBI would increase and intensify its coverage on them in the event of an emergency.

The Attorney General agreed.

E. Status of Portfolio

Mr. Ford explained that the Legal Counsel's office is working on the Portfolio and is re-working the revised Portfolio in line with the comments made by the FBI. He said it would be necessary to take the matter up again with I&NS. General Swing stated that as the question of apprehensions has been settled by the Attorney General, he saw no need to have a long discussion with I&NS. The Attorney General asked Ford when this would be completed. Ford said that Part I was practically finished, but that Part II would take longer to get into focus and he would try to complete the Portfolio by February 18. Meanwhile, the Attorney General stated that the Portfolio as it stood prior to the revisions would be operative in the event of an emergency.

The Director pointed out that the revised Portfolio contains a number of fundamental changes as to who would make

## H. Results of IGNS Talks with Army as to Guarding of Borders

General Swing discussed this to the effect that nothing had been done. The Attorney General wanted to know the risk involved in our borders in the event of an emergency. Swing said he would have to check with CIA and the Army. The Director pointed out that it stands to reason that care must be taken with respect to our borders in the event of an emergency; that there is a definite peril and this is primarily a civilian problem, rather than an Army problem and, therefore, the border patrol should be augmented.

The Attorney General asked Swing to make a study as to whose responsibility this was. Rogers pointed out it might be possible to set up road blocks north of our borders with Canada to cut off persons coming down from Alaska.

On the Attorney General's instruction, General Swing is to develop a plan in connection with border coverage in an emergency.

We are preparing a memorandum for the Director's information which we will send to the Attorney General, if approved, pointing out the sabotage and espionage potential at our Canadian and Mexican borders.

## I. Discussion of Department of Justice Emergency Evacuation Plan

Copies of a memorandum dated February 7, 1954, were made available concerning Relocation Plans of the Department of Justice. It was pointed out that no one had had an opportunity to see the plans. Therefore, the Attorney General requested that the copies be made available to all concerned.

This is being done in conjunction with the Department of Justice Division.

General Swing requested that the Department of Justice be kept advised of the progress of the work on the Relocation Plans of the Department of Justice. It was pointed out that the Department of Justice was the only one who had had an opportunity to see the plans. Therefore, the Attorney General requested that the copies be made available to all concerned.



Memorandum which, after being checked by the Bureau to insure that the information will not jeopardize our responsibilities, is sent to the Secretary of State, who submits it to the American Ambassador to the United Nations, for transmittal to the Secretary General. The State Department's position is that Justice will have to go one step further and recommend whether or not the individual should be treated as an enemy alien in the event of open hostilities.

After discussion, the Attorney General ruled that the Internal Security Division of the Department should follow this procedure, including the recommendation.

Mr. William Foley requested that we send investigative reports on these individuals direct to him or Yeagley, so that they could be handled on a special basis. He was informed that we would do this. He also requested that we advise him when the reports were sent to the Department on the 7 individuals on whom investigation has been completed. He was advised that this would be done.

*Give this affair the attention. H.*

3. (D) NON-CHINESE ON THE SECURITY INDEX WHO ARE SYMPATHETIC TO COMMUNIST CHINA

The Director noted the status of these 13 cases, and stated in the event of hostilities we would intensify our coverage.

4. EXECUTIVE ORDER FREEZING PRICES

No comment was made as to this.

5. RESULTS OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE TALKS WITH ARMY AS TO GUARDING OF BORDERS

The INS representatives stated they had submitted a border plan today. Yeagley said the Department had just received it today. (We received a copy today and are analyzing it.)

General Swing said the picture at the border is not as bad as it has been painted. He said INS has better control on the Mexican border than the Canadian border; that foreigners, other than Mexicans, cannot enter the border towns in Mexico without INS knowing about it, as they have developed better coverage. He said that INS has developed

*This directly referred to memo of J.B.P. I want to know how it comes that with intensified coverage along the border & our large staff in Mexico City we have no information to justify the statement we made. H.*

b6 Per ICE  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E  
k2

and [redacted]

and thus knows the names of Communist Party members in that area. *Strange & W.B. should accomplish this & B. Phas*

*Swing* said that he is less optimistic about the Canadian border, as many displaced persons come into Canada and can more readily come through the Canadian border; that INS is going to try to get the same type of control over the Canadian border as it feels it has on the Mexican border.

b6 Per IC  
b7C

The Director stated that the FBI is not so optimistic about the Mexican border. He pointed out the Mexican espionage potential and mentioned the case of our informant who has been in touch with the Russian Embassy in Mexico and was given an assignment of "casing" the power facilities, water, et cetera, in California. The Director pointed out the size of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. (See "Action" - we are preparing a memorandum regarding this.)

*from particularly concerned in this as being directly challenged contents of your report. The report to be made must be based on generalities and specifics & intended to*

6. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RELOCATION PLAN *as a general case*

Rankin said he had a memorandum prepared for the Attorney General as to whether instructions to the Bureau to relocate should come from the President or the Attorney General. He said he would submit it to the Attorney General.

Relative to the question of the system of alerts, the Director pointed out that the National Security Council subcommittee headed by Commander Beach had met and was considering clarification of the method whereby the Department should be alerted in connection with an evacuation. The Director pointed out that the alert system now in effect between the Bureau, the White House and the Air Command Post at the Pentagon would give the Bureau notice in advance of civil defense notification.

Yeagley said that he had been in touch with General Paul relative to securing a boat to move personnel in an emergency, but this has not been resolved. He said the Navy's position is that the Potomac channel may not be navigable at night. General Paul is trying to straighten this out, and Yeagley will follow it.

The Director mentioned that he would like to negotiate separately for a boat for FBI personnel in an emergency. This question was not answered, but Yeagley will follow with General Paul concerning the question of a boat.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BOARDMAN

of the proposed plan of I&NS to cover the borders. Tompkins said his memorandum may raise a question regarding advanced security screening of the recruits whom I&NS will use on border coverage. Yeagley said that he has referred the I&NS proposed program to the ICIS as this Committee studied this problem in 1951 and made a number of recommendations which, however, were not carried out because of budgetary problems. Yeagley further said that the proposed I&NS plan does not appear to cover "D-Day" or shortly before which would be a most important period. He said that ICIS would review the I&NS program and suggest any weaknesses in connection therewith.

General Howard said that if an emergency arose on short notice, 1112 I&NS officers now engaged on other I&NS work would be flown to the borders. The Attorney General stated he wanted I&NS to certify to him that I&NS would be able to do this and that I&NS should contact the Department of Defense to be sure that the necessary priorities would be granted.

The Attorney General asked if CIA has given information to I&NS which would be helpful to the border coverage. General Howard said CIA has given everything it has; that I&NS needs further intelligence information from CIA and that CIA has a list of the items that I&NS needs in the way of information.

The Attorney General furnished to General Howard our memorandum dated April 8, 1955, in which we pointed out additional specific facts reflecting potential security weaknesses on the Mexican border. The Attorney General stated that this memorandum should be very helpful to General Swing.

4. Implementation of the Department of  
Justice Relocation Plan

Mr. John Airhart, newly-appointed Relocation Coordinator of the Department, stated that there is a need to "organize the organizers" within the Department on relocation planning. He asked that relocation officers be set up in each of the Divisions of the Department and requested that Bernard Schmid be made available as a budget officer. He said the Department would also need a paymaster. He pointed out that during relocation tests the Bureau of the Budget would probably have observers sent out to the various relocation sites.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BOARDMAN

b6 Per ICE  
b7C  
k2

5. Status of the Warrants for the 36 Chinese Aliens on the Security Index

[ ] of I&NS, pointed out that there are now only 35 aliens, as one has died. He said that of the 35, 5 are under deportation now and I&NS is trying to get them out of the country. He said that 15 additional appear to be open to deportation on the basis that they are illegally in the country and not in connection with subversive activities and that 9 of these are to be served with deportation warrants this week. He said that relative to certain of the others, the FBI was being requested on a local level to furnish the identities of informants or witnesses who could testify. (We have received requests on certain cases from New York and we submitted a memorandum on this on April 9. Liaison is getting from [ ] the exact status of their planning on these 35 cases so that we can see just where we stand. A memorandum will be submitted as to this.)

The Attorney General stated that the 35 warrants in possession of the FBI should be maintained for action by the FBI until I&NS has worked out these cases.

6. Chinese at the United Nations

Mr. Tompkins stated that the Department has received full reports on 11 of these subjects and 6 have been reviewed. He said that in certain of these cases there was insufficient derogatory information to prepare summaries to be delivered to the State Department for delivery to the United Nations. He said in the other cases summaries are being prepared and will be submitted to the FBI prior to being sent to the State Department. (This is a problem of evaluation by the Department. We work the cases and furnish the information, and the determination as to whether summaries should be sent to the State Department rests with the Department of Justice.)

b6 Per ICE  
b7C  
k2

7. Chinese Students in the United States

[ ] of I&NS, stated that I&NS is going to attempt to deport Chinese students who are illegally in this country. He said that General Swing had changed I&NS policy so that those students who have previously been in the country under the China Student Aid Act should now be removed from the country. I&NS is

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BOARDMAN

b6 Per ICE  
b7C  
k2

checking individually on these cases. These, according to [redacted] are included among the 5,000 names sent to the FBI dealing with alien Chinese students and scientists now in this country. We are checking the files on these individuals on a special project basis to be completed by May 1, 1955, and investigations will be conducted where the information warrants. This is receiving special handling.

ACTION:

(1) We are reviewing the cases of the Prominent Individuals whom the Department has already approved for the Security Index under the old standards. We will submit our findings by individual memorandum to the Department with the request that the Department advise in each case whether the subject should or should not be included on the Index.

(2) As soon as the Attorney General's memorandum is received approving the revised criteria, an SAC Letter will be sent at once to the field instructing that these criteria be applied to the Security Index and that the review of the Security Index cases be reinstituted. We will set the same deadlines as we had on the previous review, namely, 60 days for all offices having less than 1,000 subjects; 90 days for those over 1,000, except New York which will be given 6 months. We will stress that the reviews should be completed prior to these deadlines, if possible. However, as the field will have to again go over all Security Index cases, based on the new criteria, it is believed that we will have to give them this much time.

(3) We will go over the revised agreement between the Defense Department and the Attorney General to make sure that it meets our requirements as soon as the Department sends it to us.

(4) Inasmuch as the proposal that the Bureau be responsible for the Attorney General's family and for getting the Attorney General to the relocation site arises from the Internal Security Division of the Department, if you agree, we will discuss this further with Mr. Tompkins and require

4/11/55  
AG's  
memo  
rec'd -  
SAC  
letter  
prepared  
4/11  
Q

Date: June 23, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Madrid

Subject: SAFE HAVEN AND EVACUATION OF  
AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM EUROPE  
ADMINISTRATIVE

American War Plans

On 6/23/55 the writer was informed by Mr. ROBERT HALE, Supervising Consul General in Spain, that he had been appointed by the Ambassador to collaborate with a representative of the military missions in this country in developing plans for the safe haven and evacuation of American citizens coming to this country in case of war.

Mr. HALE stated that such safe haven and evacuation areas were being established in Spain, Portugal, England and North Africa. He explained that safe haven meant that evacuees arriving in these countries would be subject to an evacuation priority lower than that for evacuees arriving in other countries of Europe. The present plans in Spain are being made up on the basis of safe haven and evacuation of 150,000 Americans from Spain and the transit of another 70,000 through Spain to Portugal. The lower priority would mean that persons in these safe haven areas would probably remain in these areas for a period up to 45 days after their arrival here.

Mr. HALE explained that there would be a staging area established in Bordeaux, France, for those persons who could reach that point, and they would then be brought by trucks into Spain. Other persons, it is expected, would be arriving by any means available at points along the land and sea frontiers of this country. When these persons make contact with the nearest American Consul, they would be directed to safe haven areas to be established at various points in this country, and evacuation to the United States would be by boat or airplane from numerous seaports and airports. The plan is that when these persons contact the nearest Consul and are dispatched by him to a safe haven area, identifying information concerning each individual would be sent to the headquarters of the project in Madrid. When transportation is available, the Americans would be sent from the safe haven area to a port of embarkation.

The Consul General stated that he recognized the possibility that among some of these evacuees may be persons who could be a security risk once they reached the United States, and some might be carrying false documentation.

JEP:CM

61 AUG 19 1955

162-81484 ✓  
NOT RECORDED  
133 AUG 18 1955  
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

FILED IN 65-36220-211

Director

6/23/55

The Consul General stated that the consular problem will be to determine the authenticity of the passports presented to establish if the individual is an American citizen and, therefore, entitled to U. S. protection. There will be also among these evacuees a number of non-Americans. These non-Americans will include alien members of American families, persons whom the U. S. desires to protect because they have been of important service to the United States, alien individuals who are of political value and who, therefore, should not fall into enemy hands, etc. These individuals will be presenting alien passports to the U. S. Consulates, and this will also afford an opportunity for security risks to be included among the evacuees.

This matter is being called to the Bureau's attention since the Bureau may wish to consider how best it can be informed as to the identities of those individuals coming to the United States, their means of transportation and at which U. S. port they would be arriving, inasmuch as the Bureau may desire to carry out interrogations of some of these individuals on their arrival in the United States. Since within the area covered by this office there will be three headquarters established, that is, in Spain, Portugal and North Africa, the Bureau may desire to give consideration to the best way to effect liaison with these headquarters so as to receive the information promptly and accurately. It may possibly be that information concerning these evacuees will be available to the Bureau at Washington through some central world-wide evacuation organization there.

Mr. HAILE advised that these plans are classified "~~Top Secret~~."

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 5/18/55

FROM: JAH SAC, Anchorage (66-82)

SUBJECT: DEW LINE

62-81484-1165  
JAH

D. J. Sullivan  
L. B. Conroy

Remylet 4/1/55 captioned DEW LINE, EARLY WARNING  
RADAR NET.

By letter of April 13, 1955, the Department of the Air Force advised various units of the Alaskan Command of the Air Force policy with regard to security aspects of the distant early warning system project.

The only classified information regarding the construction of stations is as follows:

- (1) Reference to one or more stations by brevity code alone is unclassified.
  - (2) Reference to one station by unit designation, post office address, or general geographical location, unclassified.
  - (3) Reference to one or more stations by geographical coordinates classified "Confidential."
  - (4) Reference to loading and staging bases, unclassified.
  - (5) Reference to more than one station by unit designation plus post office address and/or geographical location classified "Confidential."
  - (6) Reference to theoretical or calibrated detection coverage, operational capabilities and effectiveness of one or more stations classified "Secret."
  - (7) References to equipment installed at one or more stations classified in accordance with the equipment classification.
- EX-125

Since the employees of the contractors who are installing the technical equipment requiring security clearances have been previously handled by the Air Force, and since the

JAH/mer

RECORDED - 15  
INDEXED - 15

EX-125

62-81484-1165  
26  
10 MAY 23 1955meap  
81

JAH

EX-125

62

American War Plans



Orig

Storage  
low

1-Mr. McCardle  
1-Mr. D. J. Sullivan  
1-Section Tickler  
July 18, 1955

SAC, ANCHORAGE (66-82)

DIRECTOR, FBI

RECORDED-52 DEW LINE

INDEXED-52

62-81484-169  
Reurlet 7/6/55.

15327

EX-107

For your information, Major [redacted] Special Activities Branch, Office of Special Investigations, Washington, D. C., has advised Bureau Liaison that the distant early warning radar sites are to be operated for the Air Force by Western Electric personnel on a contract basis. Major [redacted] suggested that you contact OSI, Anchorage, for further information concerning proposed operations.

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

DA:shke  
(6)

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Instant information obtained from Major [redacted] by SA D. J. Sullivan on July 14, 1955.

b6 Per AFOSI  
b7C

R  
AB  
LB

5/14

COMM - FBI

JUL 18 1955

MAILED 30

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

EDI - INCLICE  
REC'D DEPT

59  
63 JUL 26 1955

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 7/6/55

FROM ~~SA~~ SAC, Anchorage (66-82)

SUBJECT: ~~X~~ DEW LINE

Remylet 5/18/55 captioned as above.

The following information was obtained from General T. ALLEN BENNETT, CG, 11th Air Division, Ladd Air Force Base, Fairbanks, on June 29th. *Alaska*

The distant early warning radar sites may be operated and serviced by civilian personnel under contract with the Air Force, inasmuch as there is some effort being made by unnamed elements in the Air Force in this direction.

General BENNETT said that he may be "talking out of school" on this subject matter since he did not know what determination would be made of the matter, and said that in fact it may already have been resolved at Washington without his knowledge.

It is suggested that an inquiry may be in order in so far as the Bureau is concerned, in light of the jurisdictional problems as far as both criminal and security matters are concerned in connection with these installations.

I would appreciate any information the Bureau is able to obtain along this line so that proper plans can be made to adequately fulfill the Bureau's responsibility.

JAH/mer

memo to SAC,

Anchorages

7/18/55

QTS

RECORDED-52

INDEXED-52

62-81484-169

20

1-cc memo  
Det. Levine  
7.19.55/8

*M. J. J.*

LIASON

November 1, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON  
MR. BOARDMAN  
MR. BELMONT  
MR. NICHOLS

From a letter which I have received from SAC Auerbach at Seattle, I quote the following covering a conversation which he had with Senator Henry M. Jackson, of the State of Washington, who has just finished a trip to Alaska as one of the ranking members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and who is particularly interested in the DEW LINE, which is the distant enemy warning system where they are putting in remote radar installations as a perimeter defense:

"Jackson states that his handling by the Air Force on his trip, he feels, is a 'shame and a scandal', and he believes that the situation probably should be aired. In a nutshell, he said there was nobody in the Air Force who could give him an over-all briefing on the DEW LINE. He talked with Air Force personnel all over the place and even took one of their patrol scouting trips where you are 18 hours in the air and up in the Antarctic regions on patrol, and the high brass apparently were unable to give him an over-all picture. He says that he finally got the best story from a civilian engineer employed there representing Western Electric, which is providing the materials and know-how for the installation. The conclusion Jackson comes to is that the Air Force has completely capitulated to Western Electric any control over what's going on up there as to the building of the DEW LINE. This puts Western Electric in the position of wearing two hats, i. e. ordering materials and giving instructions and directions on the situation on one hand and on the other hand receiving and filling the orders, i. e. selling the materials to the Government. He feels that this puts Western Electric in a disputable position and places the Air Force in a disgraceful situation. He made some comment to the civilian engineer and said that he didn't want to give Western Electric a hard time but pointed out his feelings on the matter. As a result, even though he arrived unannounced back in Seattle from Alaska, there was waiting to meet him a vice-president of Western Electric who had especially flown up from San

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

NOV 26 1955 RECORDED - 77  
INDEXED - 77

16 NOV 3 1955

RTT-12

UNRECORDED

Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Belmont, Nichols

November 1, 1955

Francisco to talk with him and who was much disturbed about the situation. Jackson said that the fellow just made no sense in trying to explain Western Electric's position in the matter and that he personally foresees the possibility that the Air Force would be publicly considered the goat if anything goes wrong, since Western Electric could always claim that it had to do the best it could because it got no direction nor even much of any interest."

Very truly yours,

*J. E. H.*

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

JEH:tlc

(7) *sh*

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME <i>6:44 PM</i>
DATE <i>11-1-55</i>
BY <i>ds</i>

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*

DATE: August 12, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *RR*SUBJECT: ~~CESSATION OF U. S. NUCLEAR TESTS~~

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Nease	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Clayton	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

On August 11, 1958, Mr. Bryan F. LaPlante, Congressional liaison man for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), advised in extreme confidence that he had learned that State, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Security Council (NSC) have been collaborating on a proposed announcement of cessation of U. S. nuclear tests. He said that he had had an opportunity to see the draft of the announcement which calls for stopping tests for a three-year period and if safeguards and inspection procedures can be worked out, it will extend beyond the three-year period. LaPlante said that it is indicated that the U. S. tests will be stopped on the assumption that sufficient safeguards can be set up later. He added that as he recalls, there was a provision in the draft that if such safeguards and inspection procedures cannot be worked out, the U. S. will resume testing.

LaPlante said that AEC has had no part in drafting this proposed announcement and knew nothing about it until Friday, August 8, 1958. He said that since that time, Brigadier General Starbird, Director of the AEC Division of Military Application, has been involved in the discussions with State, DOD and NSC. According to LaPlante, the proposed announcement is still being worked over and he understands that the timing of the announcement is now the most important thing. He ventured the opinion that the U. S. might time this announcement for sometime during the current special UN General Assembly meeting or during the Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy which is to be held from September 1 to 14, 1958. LaPlante said that his personal feeling is that it would be unwise for the United States to cease its testing before adequate safeguards and inspection procedures are worked out; however, he feels that the announcement which is apparently forthcoming, is indicative of the desire of some of the people at State and of Dr. Killian, Special Assistant to the President, to make some sort of an announcement indicating that the United States will stop its testing. LaPlante emphasized that this proposed announcement is most closely held and, in fact, the copy of the draft which he saw was later recalled along with all the others.

ACTION:

For information.

REC-3

62-81484-175

EX-135

AUG 20 1958

JMF:bjt (5) *bjt*  
 1 - Mr. Nease  
 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Liaison Section  
 1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

55 AUG 22 1958

O AMERICAN WAR PLANS

~~SECRET~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 13, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

EXEMPTION CODE: 25X(1)

DATE 02-12-2014 by: J75J65T61

olson \_\_\_\_\_  
cardman \_\_\_\_\_  
elmont \_\_\_\_\_  
hr \_\_\_\_\_  
ase \_\_\_\_\_  
rsons \_\_\_\_\_  
sen \_\_\_\_\_  
amm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
b1 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
b3 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_SUBJECT: ~~POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION~~  
CONCERNING RECENT SERIES OF  
U. S. NUCLEAR TESTS

oga information handled per letter d. June 30, 2011

On August 12 1958 Liaison Supervisor M. W. Kuhrtz

MWK:bjt  
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Donahoe
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Kuhrtz

EX-140

23 AUG 25 1958

1 auto copy  
8-26-58~~SECRET~~

67 SEP 3 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 22, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

AMERICAN WAR PLANS

SUBJECT: CESSATION OF U. S. NUCLEAR TESTS

My memorandum of August 12, 1958, copy enclosed, reflected that on August 11, 1958, we were advised in confidence by Mr. Bryan F. LaPlante of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) that an announcement was imminent that the United States would cease its nuclear tests.

On August 21, 1958, Mr. LaPlante referred to the current newspaper speculation about such an announcement and said that the announcement would undoubtedly be made within the next several days. He said that Chairman McCone of AEC had gone to the White House on August 20, 1958, and vigorously, but vainly, opposed stopping our testing. According to LaPlante, Dr. Killian, Special Assistant to the President, and Secretary of State Dulles are the main proponents of the idea of the U. S. stopping its testing. In addition, LaPlante said that the argument presented to McCone was that the United States has just ceased its own series of tests anyway and that another series of tests could not possibly take place for about a year which would give the U. S. plenty of time to see if the test ban would work out satisfactorily.

Also, on August 21, 1958, Captain John H. Morse, Jr., U. S. Navy, Special Assistant to McCone, expressed bitter disappointment at the way things were going on the question of the test ban and indicated that on behalf of AEC he had fought hard against the idea because he felt it was unrealistic and was being done only for political purposes. It should be noted that LaPlante had previously advised on August 11, 1958, that AEC had no part in the drafting of the proposed announcement of the test ban and knew nothing about it until August 8, 1958. It should also be noted that the comments of LaPlante and Captain Morse were made in strict confidence.

ACTION:

For information.

JMF:bjt (5)

- 1 - Mr. Nease
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

Enclosure

60 SEP 3 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

REC-10 62-81484-177

15 AUG 27 1958

ESP 580

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: September 5, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 25X(1)  
DATE 02-12-2014 by: J75J65T61

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE LEAK OF INFORMATION  
CONCERNING RECENT SERIES OF  
U. S. NUCLEAR TESTS

oga information handled per letter d. June 30, 2011

b1

b3

## ACTION:

None. For information.

SJP:bjt  
(7)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Donahoe
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

59  
55 SEP 15 1958

REC-97

62-81484-178

13 SEP 10 1958

~~SECRET~~



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 20, 1959

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING

On January 19, 1959, the following information was furnished in confidence by Mr. Richard X. Donovan, Congressional liaison man for Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), who derived same from attendance at executive sessions of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy during the previous week:

In the light of recent revision downward in the estimate of the technical capabilities of this country to detect nuclear explosions, the consensus of the Joint Committee appears to be that it would be to the advantage of this country to withdraw from the current Geneva talks with the Soviets on test cessation, even though this would give the Soviets propaganda materials to make us look bad in the eyes of the rest of the world. Further, the attitude of the Joint Committee is that the U. S. should resume testing after honoring its one-year suspension which began October 30, 1958. It would take about a year and a half anyway, starting right now, to get ready for a new series of tests which would include tests under water, under ground and in outer space.

Dr. Edward Teller, who, with former AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss, was one of the foremost opponents of stopping tests in the first place, told the Joint Committee last week that he thinks the Soviet "Lunik," which was shot past the moon and is supposed to be orbiting the sun, has an H-Bomb in it to be set off in outer space as a Soviet test. Donovan explained that AEC scientists now consider it technically feasible to do such nuclear testing in outer space. He added that none of several scientists present when Teller expressed the above opinion disputed the possibility. Dr. Hans Bethe, described by Donovan as originally somewhat aligned with Dr. Linus Pauling in advocating cessation of tests because of their possible adverse physical effect on mankind, was present when Teller spoke. Bethe disputed Teller's opinion only to the extent of saying he did not believe the Soviets have the electronic equipment capable of performing such a test with their "Lunik." Donovan further explained that as he understands it, Teller thinks the Soviets will be able to separate the H-Bomb from the remainder of "Lunik," and cause the bomb to proceed in orbit ahead of "Lunik." Then the bomb will be set off and telemetering equipment in "Lunik" will proceed to pick up various forms of data such as amount of radiation, blast effect, etc., from the bomb burst, for eventual transmission back to the Soviets.

JMR:bjt (8)

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Nease

1 - Mr. Mohr

1 - Mr. Rosen

1 - Mr. Whitson

1 - Liaison Section 1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

EX-124

REG-33

JAN 28 1959

66 FEB 2 1959

Tolson  
Boardman  
Belmont  
Mohr  
Nease  
Parsons  
Rosen  
Tamm  
Trotter  
W.C. Sullivan  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-82221-

100-343044

100-343044

81484-180

3/10/59

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 20, 1962

FROM : D. J. Brennan *DB* UNITED STATES WAR. *PA*SUBJECT: ~~X~~ RELOCATION PLANS - WHITE HOUSE

Tolson ☒  
 Belmont ☒  
 Mohr ☒  
 Callahan ☒  
 Conrad ☒  
 DeLoach ☒  
 Evans ☒  
 Malone ☒  
 Rosen ☒  
 Sullivan ☒  
 Tavel ☒  
 Trotter ☒  
 Tele. Room ☒  
 Ingram ☒  
 Gandy ☒

On April 19, 1962, while Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section was at the White House, he saw Mr. David Palmer, U.S. Navy civilian who is serving as the Navy Projects Engineer at the White House. He works directly under the Naval Aide, Captain Tazewell T. Shepard. Bartlett has known Palmer for several years. Palmer recently served as the Navy's Project Engineer at Quantico and was extremely helpful to the Bureau in that capacity.

Palmer said he wanted to mention something to Bartlett in extreme confidence and Bartlett told him his information would be handled just that way. Palmer said that he is extremely worried about information appearing in the press and on radio within the past few weeks which deals directly with the relocation plans of the President in the event of war. He said that the press carried the story last weekend while the President was aboard the cruiser "Northampton" that this ship was one of the places the President might go and carry on his duties in the event of war. Palmer further said that recent publicity has stated the President might use an airplane which is based at Andrews Air Force Base in the event of emergency. Presumably this aircraft could be refueled in flight and the President could stay away from danger areas for a long period of time. Palmer said that both of these plans are accurate and he can see no reason in the world for them being made public.

Palmer said that following the expose regarding the aircraft, Captain Shepard became incensed and reported his feelings directly to Mr. P. Kenneth O'Donnell, the Special Assistant to the President.

Palmer said that it was his feeling that Brigadier General Godfrey T. McHugh, the Air Force Aide, had leaked this to the press for the purpose of building up the prestige of the Air Force. Palmer said he does not know this is actually true. Palmer said that he knows that the Bureau can do nothing about this matter unless officially requested by the President to check into it but that he felt so strongly about it he wanted to get it off his chest.

ACTION:

REC- 57

ST-105

62-81484-184  
25 APR 27 1962

Inasmuch as the above appears to be a conflict within the President's official family and further that it has been reported to the President's top assistant, no action need be taken by this Bureau.

OHB:gp/nph (6)

SECRET

1-Mr. Belmont  
1-Mr. Sullivan

1-Mr. Bartlett

AEROX

APR 27 1962

1-Mr. H. Anderson  
MAY 3 1962

SENT DIRECTOR

4-23-62

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN