Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemptions boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section 552</th>
<th>Section 552a</th>
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<td>✔️ (b)(1)</td>
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<td>✔️ (b)(3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>☐ (b)(15)</td>
<td>☐ (k)(7)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1)

392 pages were reviewed and 301 pages are being released.

Below you will also find additional informational paragraphs about your request. Where applicable, check boxes are used to provide you with more information about the processing of your request. Please read each item carefully.

✔️ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency (ies) [OGA].

☐ This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.

✔️ We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.
In accordance with standard FBI practice and pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552/552a (b)(7)(E)/(j)(2)], this response neither confirms nor denies the existence of your subject’s name on any watch lists.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under “Contact Us.” The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP’s FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following website: https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked “Freedom of Information Act Appeal.” Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing ogis@nara.gov. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state “Dispute Resolution Services.” Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

The enclosed documents represent the first interim release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.

As previously indicated, document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning another agency (ies). We are consulting with the other agency (ies) and are awaiting their response. Our office has processed all other information currently in our possession. The FBI will correspond with you regarding those documents when the consultation is completed.

A search of the FBI Headquarters electronic surveillance indices has been conducted, and no responsive record which indicates that Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky has ever been the target of electronic surveillance was located.

For your information, a search of the indices to our Central Records System reflected there were additional records potentially responsive to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request. We have attempted to obtain this material so it could be reviewed to determine whether it was responsive to your request. We were advised that the potentially responsive records were not in their expected location and could not be located after a reasonable search. Following a reasonable waiting period, another attempt was made to obtain this material. This search for the missing records also met with unsuccessful results.
EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;

(k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

(k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.
Total Deleted Page(s) = 78
Page 26 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 37 ~ Duplicate;
Page 43 ~ Duplicate;
Page 50 ~ Duplicate;
Page 57 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 58 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 59 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 60 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 61 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 62 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 63 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 82 ~ Duplicate;
Page 142 ~ Duplicate;
Page 145 ~ Duplicate;
Page 157 ~ Duplicate;
Page 174 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 183 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 184 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 200 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 201 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 202 ~ Referral/Consult;
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Page 223 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 224 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 225 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 226 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 227 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 228 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 229 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 230 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 231 ~ Referral/Consult;
Two photographs of subject are enclosed for Seattle.

On 4-5-62, Office of Security, US Department of State, advised SA RICHARD E. ROBERTS that subject, born 4-23-19, in Ordzhonikidze, USSR, had applied for a visa to enter United States for duty at the Seattle World's Fair. Subject presented Soviet Official Passport 001161 issued 3-24-62.

Copies of subject's visa application photograph were forwarded to New York on 4-18-62 and were shown to PAUL PAYNE on 4-19-62. SUBJ was unable to furnish any pertinent information on this subject.

2-Bureau
1-New York III
2-Seattle (Encls 2) II
1-WFO

AJH
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREBIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 07-20-2017

File No. ______________________

Date Received 1987

From State, Dept., WDC (Name of Contributor)

By (Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned Yes [ ] No [ ]

Description: Photo of OLEG V. PENKOVSKY
PENKOVSKI, OLEG
VLADIMIROVICH

POB: Ordzhonikidze
DOB: 4-23-19
HEIGHT: 173cm
HAIR: BROWN
EYES: GRAY

DATE TAKEN UNKNOWN

4-5-62

[Signature]
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA EDWARD F. GAMBER

DATE: 5/1/62

SUBJECT: AMTORG TRADING CORPORATION
IS - R

Source
Date of Contact
Contacted By
Characterized

An individual whose bona-fides have not been established, but
some of which has been verified, through independent sources.

Bureau authority is not necessary prior to incorporating information furnished by... into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau when such information is suitably paraphrased in such a manner that the identity of the source is not jeopardized. In the event that certain specific information is of such a nature that it should not be disseminated, the decision not to disseminate the information should be called to the attention of the Bureau on a UACB basis.

1 - NY
1 - Bureau
1 - Bureau

COPIES CONTINUED

1 - NY

EFG: htc
(119)
A classification of Confidential will be adequate for material furnished by [ ] particularly when the information relates to Soviet nationals and it can be paraphrased. Some information furnished by this source, due to its very nature, would necessitate a higher classification inasmuch as the disclosure of such information to any unauthorized persons could have a serious effect upon international relations and on the national defense.

It is suggested that information set forth in communications suitable for dissemination be set forth in a manner similar to or as follows:

"T symbol in early 1962 advised that" followed by a succinct statement reflecting what informant furnished about a given individual.

This should not include too much detail which might tend to disclose informant as our source.
Informant was shown the photographs and names of the following Soviet nationals for whom visas had been requested for their entry into the US. He was unable to identify any of these individuals:

PENKOVSKI, OLEG VLADIMIROVICH

He identified a photograph of

He stated that it was his belief that

He stated that he believes,

He indicated that

The following photographs and names of were shown to the informant and he identified them as follows:
Informant advised that however, he did not feel that he was

Informant identified the following individuals

- Informant said that while
Photographs of the following individuals, all of whom are
were shown to the informant and he identified them as follows:

Informant has seen him, however, he does not know what position he holds.

Photographs of the following individuals, all were displayed to the informant and he commented as follows:

Informant bases the above on the fact that
The following individuals, while known to the informant, are individuals whom he could furnish no information concerning their activities:

Informant did not know the name or photograph of
Re: Telegram to NPO, 4/19/62 captioned "VISIT OF SOVIETS TO SEATTLE WORLD'S FAIR, 1962, IS - R," which mentions PERKOVSKI is first of a group of Soviets to visit Seattle Fair as official representatives of Soviet Government and for possible commercial negotiations with participating firms. It was stated he expected to depart for the United States on April 18, 1962 for 30 days. Re:Telegram to Director, 5/2/62.

By communication dated May 15, 1962, local office, INS, Seattle, indicated PERKOVSKI desires to enter U.S. for a period of 30 days to visit Seattle World's Fair and his itinerary will be New York, Seattle and return to Europe via New York, dates not indicated.

It is requested if possible, Seattle be notified promptly of any indication subject has entered the United States.

- Bureau (RM)
- NPO (RM)
- New York (RM) (Info)
- Seattle

RHC/cbn
(?)
VISIT OF SOVIETS TO SEATTLE
WORLD'S FAIR, 1962

WFOlet 5/2/62, captioned "OLEG VLADIMIROVICH PENKOVSKI."

Referred 5/1/62, enclosing a copy of SElet
dated 4/26/62, captioned "SOVIET NATIONALS VISITING SEATTLE
WORLD'S FAIR." SElet reflected the Department of State
has received a large number of requests for Soviet nationals
to visit the Seattle World's Fair as tourists. This letter
also reflected the Department of State is negotiating with
INS to make Seattle a part of entry so that Soviet nationals
can fly from England to Seattle via the Polar Route.

On 5/23/62, Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff (SES), Department of State, advised
SA RICHARD E. RODERMUND that one of the new itineraries
arranged by the American Express Company at New York City
for visiting Soviet tourists provides for them visiting
Canada and subsequently the United States, entering at
Seattle, Washington. He indicated that because of this
and as visiting Soviet artists frequently re-enter the
United States from Canada to appear on the West Coast, SES
requested that the Visa Office of the Department of State to have INS
make Seattle a port of entry. He indicated this request
was being done from an administrative point of view of SES
inasmuch as at present the Department of State has to obtain
clearance from INS each time a Soviet enters the United States
at Seattle. He stated that Los Angeles and San Francisco,
California are presently ports of entry for Soviet nationals,
but the majority of the Soviet nationals still enter and
depart the United States at New York City. He indicated it
would be impossible at this time to determine the number of Soviet nationals who would enter and depart the United States at Seattle, but the majority would probably still enter and depart at New York City. He added he would furnish WFO any further information he receives regarding this matter.

On 5/21/62, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, advised SA RICHARD E. RODERMUND that visas have been authorized for OLEG V. PENKOVSKI and the other Soviet nationals who have applied to attend the Seattle World's Fair. She indicated that no information has been received to date as to when they will arrive in the United States. She added she would inform WFO as soon as she receives information indicating their scheduled date of arrival.

On 5/1/62, photographs of the below-listed Soviet nationals were shown to [REDACTED] (protect identity), by SAS MAURICE A. TAYLOR and ALEKSEO POPTANICH, advised he did not recognize the photographs or the names:

On 5/15/62, photographs of the above-listed Soviet nationals with the exception of [REDACTED] were shown to [REDACTED] by SA H. DUDLEY PAYNE, advised he did not recognize the photographs or the names. It is noted that photographs of [REDACTED] have previously been shown to [REDACTED] with negative results.
Ref: Oleg 5/2/62, captioned "Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovski" reflected that Penkovski's photograph had been shown to... Inasmuch as information regarding Penkovski has previously been furnished under instant caption, it is suggested these files be consolidated.

WFO will show the photograph of Penkovski to and will report the results as soon as available.
OLEG VLADIMIROVICH PENKOVSKI
IS - R
(CO: SEATTLE)

Re Seattle letter to Director dated 5/28/62, requesting that Seattle be notified promptly if subject has entered the US.

The NYO has received no info to date from INS, NYC, indicating that PENKOVSKI has entered the US. The NYO will remain alert for his arrival and immediately notify interested offices.

On 4/23/62, a photograph of PENKOVSKI was exhibited to who has furnished reliable info in the past by SA was unable to identify PENKOVSKI.

Seattle is requested to advise the NYC of PENKOVSKI's possible arrival in Seattle via the Polar Route.
Established reliable sources at Seattle have not furnished any information indicating the captioned individual has as yet arrived in this area. By a letter dated May 15, 1962, the local office of INS notified Seattle of the temporary admission permit to the United States; but, to date, they have no information as to the time of his expected arrival. He has INS No. A-12-731-987.

Seattle will advise the Bureau and recipient offices of the arrival and activities of PENKOFSKI.
Director, FBI

SAC, Seattle (P)

Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovski
IS - R
00 - SE

Re Seattle letter to Director, 7/25/62.

Established reliable sources at Seattle have not furnished any information indicating the captioned individual has, as yet, arrived in this area. Seattle will advise Bureau and interested offices in the event of his arrival.

If Penkovski has not arrived by October 21, 1962, which is the closing date of the Seattle World's Fair, this case will be closed.

2 - Bureau (REG)
1 - WFO (REG)
1 - New York (REG)
2 - Seattle

RHC/dap

(6)
DIRECTOR, FBI

SAC, SEATTLE

OLEG VLADIMIROVICH PENKOVSKI
IS - R
(CG - SEATTLE)

Re Seattle letter to the Bureau, 9/26/62.

This case is being closed by this office inasmuch as there is no indication the subject will visit here now that the Seattle World's Fair is over.

2 - Bureau (Reg)
1 - WPO (Reg)
1 - New York (Reg)
1 - Seattle
RHC/mo
(5)
Russian arrested as spy for West, Reds say

MOSCOW (AP) — The Soviet Union announced last night the arrest of a Russian scientific worker on a charge of giving state secrets to British businessman Greville Wynne and a U.S. diplomat.

Tass said the Russian, O. V. Penkovsky, had worked for British and U.S. intelligence services since last year.

The Soviet News agency, describing Penkovsky as an employee of the State Committee on Coordination of Scientific Research Work, said he had secret information about the Soviet Union’s scientific, technical, political and military questions. Tass said Wynne and to Richard Carl Jacob, secretary archivist of the U.S. Embassy who was expelled last month on a charge of spying.

Wynne, 42, was arrested in Budapest last Nov. 2 and is now awaiting trial on espionage charges in Moscow. Russian authorities said Wynne has pleaded guilty.

Tass said an American Embassy staff member named “Karlov” was accused, along with “some other officials of the diplomatic representations of the United States and Britain,” of receiving secret material from Penkovsky.

This raised the possibility of further expulsions.

The only officer of the American Embassy staff whose name resembles that given by Tass is Rodney Carlson, an assistant agricultural attaché. He has served in Moscow since last spring.

Diplomatic sources here said Penkovsky was head of the committee’s foreign department. His duties were said to include looking after foreign visitors to Soviet scientific institutes and industrial plants.

Tass said Soviet security agents found a cache of spy equipment in Penkovsky’s possession. It listed three miniature cameras, code books, code rapports, secret files, radio equipment, foreign addresses and a forged Soviet internal passport.

It said it was for use “to go underground” in case of imminent exposure.

Wynne, once a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union, has been held incommunicado since his transfer here from Hungary. But his wife said in England yesterday she had received permission to see him. She is expected to arrive here later this week.

Jacob was detained by Soviet authorities last Nov. 2. Three days later they ordered him out of the country, saying he had been apprehended in the act of picking up secret material from an apartment house mail box.

The U.S. State Department called the spy charge “a complete fabrication.”

Jacob was the third American diplomat to be expelled from the Soviet Union this year.

U.S. Navy Cmr. Raymond D. Smith, an assistant naval attaché, and Kenneth S. Middlin, a first secretary in the political reporting section, were thrown out in quick succession in October.

Smuggle arms

LISBON (UPI) — Soviet fishing fleets probably have been smuggling arms to rebels in the Portuguese territory of Angola, the semi-official news agency ANI reported yesterday from Luanda.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK DATE: 1/2/63

FROM: SA (#342)

SUBJECT: CLEG V. PENKOFSKI IS - R

Source
Date Contacted
Contacted By
Characterized

SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and
HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

A sensitive confidential source

1-NY 1-BU (SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; KGB)

LEG V. PENKOFSKI

TJM: dmg
(8)
When incorporating information furnished by ________ into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by ________ will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"NY T- in the middle of 1962, advised...." The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.
Informant and OLEG V. PENKOVSKY

Informant stated that

Informant said that

According to that said

that
Informant said that at that time, that all plans related that at that time, that all plans.

Informant commented it is his belief that in this regard, informant stated that as an example, informant related that during the time that informant explained that individuals who work at
Informant stated that the

Informant stated that when he

Informant stated the

Informant stated the

Informant advised that he knows the name of however, he could not recall it at the time he was relating the above information. He stated he would probably be able to furnish this
TO: SAC, NEW YORK
DATE: 12/19/62

FROM: SA (#342)

SUBJECT: IS-R

Source
Date Contacted
Contacted By: SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.
Characterized: A sensitive confidential source

TJM: dmg (8)
When incorporating information furnished by outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"NY T- in the middle of 1962, advised..." The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.
Informant stated that on [ ] he had a [ ] and has previously [ ] been identified by the informant as an [ ]

Informant said [ ]

In commenting upon the arrest of [ ] PENKOFSKY, [ ] PENKOFSKY in Moscow and indicated that PENKOFSKY had [ ] been the chief of a small department in the State Committee [ ] on the Coordination of Scientific Research Work.

Informant noted that [ ]

Informant noted that [ ] and informant, himself, noted that he knew [ ] nothing of the background of [ ] except [ ] for the fact of [ ]

Informant noted that [ ]

Commented that perhaps [ ] was due to the fact that [ ]
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (#342)

SUBJECT: OLEG V. PENKOVSFI
IS - R

Source
Date Contacted
Contacted By
SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and
HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

Characterized
A sensitive confidential
source

1-New York
1-New York
1-New York
1-New York

1-BU
1-BU
1-BU
1-BU

(SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES - KGB)

TJM: pdw
(9)
Informant's Comments Concerning
OLEG V. PENKOFSKY (PENKOFSKI)

An article in the "Newark Star-Ledger" edition of Wednesday, 12/12/62, captioned "Russian Arrested As Spy For West, Reds Say" reflected that the Soviet Union
announced last night (12/11/62) the arrest of a Russian scientific worker on a charge of giving State secrets to a British businessman and a United States diplomat, namely RICHARD CARL JACOB. This article described PENKOVSKY as an employee of the State Committee on Coordination of Scientific Research Work. The article reflected that PENKOVSKY sold secret information about the Soviet Union to the British and the U.S. The British businessman's name was GREVILLE WYNNE. It is noted that New York newspapers are on a strike and this information, therefore, did not appear in the New York press. Information regarding the arrest of PENKOVSKY, however, was broadcast on radio stations in the New York area.

Informant was shown a photograph of OLEG V. PENKOVSKY together with the above mentioned article from the "Newark Star-Ledger". Informant looked at the photograph and read through the article and then commented that he does not know this individual and could furnish no information regarding him. Informant pointed out that according to the newspaper article PENKOVSKY was an employee of the State Committee on Coordination of Scientific Research Work. In this regard, informant commented that

Informant stated it was his opinion that
Informant stated that Informant said he did not recall if but it is the informant's opinion that Informant said

Information concerning the above mentioned was set out in a previous airtel.

No Opportunity to Observe

Informant stated that Informant commented that it is a very strange thing that Informant stated that Informant said
Informant stated he feels [ ]

said he would, of course [ ]

Informant [ ]
MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA(#342)

DATE: 1/17/63

SUBJECT: OLEG V. PENKOVSKY

Source

Date Contacted

Contacted By

Characterized

SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and
HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

A sensitive confidential source

(OLEG V. PENKOVSKY)

TJM: dfm
(3)

[Handwritten notes]

[Handwritten signature]
In the course of interview on [underline] informant was asked if any additional information had come to his attention. OLEG V. PENKOVSKY, the Soviet national who was recently arrested in the Soviet Union and accused of espionage activities in concert with RICHARD CARL JACOB. Informant stated that
TO: SAC, NEW YORK
FROM: S#342

SUBJECT: SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; KGB

Source
Date Contacted
Contacted By
Characterized

SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and
HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.
A sensitive confidential
source

1-New York
1-BU
(SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES; GRU)

1-New York
1-BU
(OLEG V. PANKOVSKI)

TAM: pdw
(8)
When incorporating information furnished by communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for nondissemination.

Certain information furnished by will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"NY T- in 1953, advised...." The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.
Informant stated that in the course of this discussion, he/she stated that in view of this.
It is noted that PEIKOFSKY is said to have been the Chief of a small department in the State Committee on the Coordination of Scientific Research Work, and
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA

DATE: 1/22/63

SUBJECT: OLEG V. PENKOVSKY

IS-R

Source
Date Contacted
Contacted By
Characterized
A sensitive confidential source

SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and
HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

TJM: dmg (9)
Informant's Comments Relating to Case Involving OLEG V. PENKOFSKY

When interviewed, informant was asked whether he had any information which might explain OLEG V. PENKOFSKY who has been accused by the Soviets of espionage activity involving British and American citizens. Informant stated that he did not have any specific information as to where PENKOFSKY was but said it was his personal opinion that:

- Informant stated that he had no information reflecting that
- Informant stated that he had no information concerning
- Informant also said that he had no information indicating that
- Informant said he had no knowledge of
- Informant said he had no knowledge regarding intentions of
- Informant noted that he would be alert for any information bearing
Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT

(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority or method of mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI AND SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: IS-R

Re: Bulet to NY, 12/21/62, captioned "OLEG VIADIMIROVICH PENKOVSKI IS-R", Bulet to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, US Department of State, dated 12/31/62, captioned, "SOVIET PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES"; and Bulet to 1/17/63, captioned "SOVIET PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES" with notation and enclosed for New York.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau for appropriate dissemination are five copies of a LHM concerning OLEG V. PENKOVSKI captioned "SOVIET PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES". A copy of this LHM is being furnished to WFO for information.

Information set out in enclosed LHM was furnished by to SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, Jr. during interviews of

During these interviews informant was specifically questioned regarding PENKOVSKI for any and all information he could furnish regarding this individual.

HEM: cah

Approved: Special Agent in Charge
It is noted as furnished to the Bureau in prior
paragraph that most of informant's knowledge of PENKOFSKI
was

In addition, informant was

All points of inquiry to date are covered
except points which was
furnished to New York as an enclosure to refulet, 1/17/63.
It is anticipated these questions will be taken up with
informant when he is again available for interview. Informa-
tion set out in refulet, 12/31/62, was not included in enclosed
LHM inasmuch as received a copy of this communication.

Informant will, of course, be closely questioned
regarding additional information on PENKOFSKI on a continuing
basis and such information will be furnished to the Bureau
under SPIA caption in form suitable for dissemination.

-2-
Enclosed LHM is classified "Top Secret" pursuant to Bureau instructions in re: Bulletin, 1/17/63, in consideration of informant's [redacted]
DIRECTOR, FBI

SAC, NEW YORK

ESPIONAGE - R

All the information in the possession of the NYO relative to OLEG V. PENKOFSKI has previously been furnished to the Bureau under the SPIA caption.

By letter dated 1/2/63, under the caption, the Bureau instructed that pertinent information be submitted under this caption.

By letter dated 1/17/63, the Bureau instructed that all information from this matter be submitted under the SPIA caption.

The Bureau is requested to advise under which caption they wish any future information relative to the PENKOFSKI matter submitted.
**UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** SAC, NEW YORK  
**DATE:** 4/8/63

**FROM:** SA (#342)

**SUBJECT:** OLEG V. PENKOVSKI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date Contacted</th>
<th>Contacted By</th>
<th>Characterized</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.</td>
<td>A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past</td>
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<th>1-New York</th>
<th>1-Bureau</th>
<th>(SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: KGB)</th>
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<td>1-Bureau</td>
<td>(SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: GRU)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TJM:** pdw (9)

**Date:** 4-8-63
When incorporating information furnished by the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from , no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Informant stated that

Informant stated

Informant identified
Informant stated that

Informant pointed out that

Informant stated that as soon as

It is noted that PENKOVSKI was a GRU employee who was arrested by the KGB in Moscow during late 1962, on charges of cooperating with American and British intelligence. Informant stated that

Informant stated

Informant stated that when he asked
Re: OLEG PENKOFSKI

Informant stated

According to the informant,

stated that during this

it happened that

(Informant) stated

In this connection it is pointed out that according to the informant at no time during

Informant stated that

Informant stated that according to
Informant stated that based on the above facts the

Informant stated that on the basis of this everyone who lived at the
PENKOVSKI and in addition, these individuals were shown photographs of PENKOVSKI.
Informant stated he personally has no idea as to whether only

According to Informant, stated that after

Informant said did not describe this object, but was
did say that

Informant said but informant stated

Informant stated that, according to the personnel of the

pointed out that of course
Informant stated that the informant to be similar to a.
Informant pointed out that he had previously received information concerning

however, that in view of the fact that

he feels that this account by
The informant stated that

The informant stated that at this point

Informant said

and
Informant said

Informant stated that

Informant reiterated that

Informant stated

It is noted that
It is further noted that according to the informant, the information, which was received by the informant under somewhat restricted circumstances, could be very dangerous to the personal security of the informant if not fully controlled. It is requested that the Bureau give consideration to furnishing this information through liaison on a high level in order to avoid the necessity of this information passing through many hands within.
Transmit the following in \underline{PLAIN TEXT} (Type in plain text or code)

Via \underline{AIRTEL} \underline{(Priority or method of mailing)}

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
     SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: IS-R

Re NY airtel, 4/4/63, and Bureau airtel, 4/8/63.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING INFORMATION SET OUT IN THIS COMMUNICATION AND NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau for appropriate dissemination are five copies of a LHM concerning OLEG V. PENKOVSKI captioned "SOVIET PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES".

A copy of this LHM is being furnished to WFO for information.

HEM: cah (11)

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent
Information set out in enclosed LHM was furnished by [ ] to SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, Jr., during an interview. Informant received the information

Informant identified [ ] as the 

Informant stated that the 

Informant pointed out that 

country. He stated.

It is noted that although

Informant stated that

of PENKOFSKI, the American RICHARD CARL JACOB, and Englishman GREVILLE WYNNE.

Informant pointed out that 

Informant stated, however, that in view of the fact.
PENKOFSKI he feels that this account by [redacted] is actually and unquestionably the true facts of what happened.

Informant stated that this affair. Informant stated

Informant stated that name of RICHARD CARL JACOB or GREVILLE WYNNE. Informant also stated

In addition,

It is of course realized that the Bureau will furnish this information. In this connection it must be pointed out that this information was received by the informant under restricted circumstances and could be very dangerous to the personal security of [redacted] if not fully controlled. It is requested the Bureau give every consideration to furnish this information through liaison on a high level in order to avoid the necessity of this information passing through many hands within

The enclosed memorandum is being classified "Top Secret" in order to better protect the informant.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO : SAC, NEW YORK

FROM : SA #342

DATE: 5/16/63

SUBJECT: OLEG V. PENKOVSKY

Source
Date Contacted
Contacted By
Characterized

SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and
HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.
A confidential informant
who has furnished reliable
information in the past

TJM:11
(10)
OLEG PENKOFSKY

Informant stated that

Informant said that
Informant said that
FBI

Date: 5/17/63

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT

Via AIRTEL (Priority of Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: IS - R

Re New York airtel, 5/15/63.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING INFORMATION SET OUT IN THIS COMMUNICATION AND NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau for appropriate dissemination are five copies of a letterhead memorandum concerning OLEG V. PENKOVSKI captioned, "SOVIET PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES"

Approved: Special Agent in Charge
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. A copy of this letterhead memorandum is being furnished to WFO for information.

Information set out in enclosed letterhead memorandum was furnished by [redacted] to SAS VICENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR. during an interview on [redacted].

Informant advised that [redacted].

Informant said that [redacted].
An article in the New York Journal American, a daily newspaper, 5/11/63, page 1, captioned "Death For Red; Brat on 8 Years", reflects that the Soviet Supreme Court sentenced OLEG PENKOFSKI to death by firing squad for spying against the Soviet Union.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is being classified "Top Secret" in order to adequately protect this confidential informant.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (#342)

DATE: 5/23/63

SUBJECT: GAPKE

ESP - R

Source

Date Contacted

Contacted By

Characterized

SAS VINCENT J. CARRILL and
HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

A confidential informant who
has furnished reliable informa-
tion in the past.
When incorporating information furnished by into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

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Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Informant stated that up to the present time he has obtained no additional information concerning any contemplated
informant said
informant said he felt reasonably confident
that
informant said
informant said he could not recall the name of the
Soviet Bars 10 Aides Of West in Spy Case

BY SEYMOUR TOPPING
Special to The New York Times
MOSCOW, May 13—The Soviet Union barred today five United States and five British diplomatic officials who had been named in the Penkovsky spy case.

In protest notes sent to the United States and British Embassies, the Government accused the officials of helping Oleg V. Penkovsky, a former Soviet scientific official, and Greville M. Wynne, a British businessman, to carry on espionage.

Mr. Penkovsky, who confessed to spying for Britain and the United States, was sentenced Saturday by a military tribunal to be shot for high treason. Mr. Wynne, who pleaded guilty to having been a contact man between Penkovsky and the British and United States intelligence services, was sentenced to eight years' detention.

Only two of the diplomatic officials named in the Soviet notes are still assigned to Moscow.

One of them, Hugh Montgomery, the internal security officer of the United States Embassy, is on home leave with his family and will not return to the Soviet Union. Mr. Montgomery, 39 years old, of Springfield, Mass., left for the United States two weeks ago. He had been scheduled to return for two more years of duty here.

Gervaise Cowell, second secretary of the British Embassy, and his wife were ordered to leave the Soviet Union immediately.

The other British and United States diplomats named in the Soviet notes, who have been transferred from Moscow, were also declared persona non grata. This means that they will not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union.

The former United States Embassy aides named are Richard C. Jacob, who had been architect; Rodney W. Carlson, an assistant agricultural attaché; Capt. Alexis H. Davison, an Air Force officer who served as Embassy doctor; and William C. Jones III, second secretary, an administrative officer.

The former British Embassy aides named are Roderick Chisholm, second secretary; Lieut. Comdr. John L. Varley, assistant naval attaché; Ivor Rowell, transport officer, and Miss Felicity Stuart, a junior attaché.

Mr. Chisholm and his wife were accused during Mr. Penkovsky's trial of being the principal intermediaries between him and British intelligence.

'Gross Violation' Alleged

The Soviet notes charged that the diplomatic officials named had engaged in unlawful activities—specifically violation of the standards of behavior for such personnel.
A United States Embassy spokesman said:

"We in no way accept any of the allegations that any of our officers behaved in a manner incompatible with their official status. Nonetheless we can only adhere to the Soviet Government's decision not to permit Mr. Montgomery to resume his position here."

The British Embassy also rejected the Soviet charges but said it had "no option but to comply with the Soviet Government's decision to expel Mr. and Mrs. Cowell."

The Soviet action was foreshadowed on Sunday when the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, in sentencing Mr. Penkovsky and Mr. Wynne, added that the attention of the Foreign Ministry would be directed to the activities of the Embassy officials linked with the convicted spies at the trial.

In the cases of two United States aides who were thus implicated, action already has been taken by Soviet authorities.

Mr. Jacob left the Soviet Union in November at the demand of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. He had been detained several days earlier by Soviet security agents, who said that he had been apprehended picking up a matchbox that was said to contain intelligence data from Mr. Penkovsky.

Mr. Carlson left Moscow on Dec. 16 after a press statement of the Soviet Security Committee had accused him of having intelligence information from Mr. Penkovsky.

Captain Davison and Mr. Montgomery were accused in the indictment at the trial of having been telephone contacts for Mr. Penkovsky. Captain Davison left Moscow the day before the trial began. The Embassy said he had been transferred on normal rotation.

Mr. Jones, who left Moscow in February of last year, was named in the indictment as having lived in an apartment, subsequently occupied by Mr. Montgomery, where telephone calls were received from Mr. Penkovsky.
American Diplomatic Officials Barred by Moscow

Hugh Montgomery
Capt. Alexis H. Davison
Rodney W. Carlson
ROWSELL is an ex-soldier, aged 47, who was engaged as a Grade 6 officer in Branch B of the Foreign Service in 1960. After a tour at Togadishu, he was sent to Moscow in May 1962 as a Transport Officer. He was joined there by his wife in the middle of the following month. Before her arrival he lodged briefly in the bachelors' mess in the Embassy.

2. On 20th February, Mrs. ROWSELL went to Helsinki for medical treatment. She returned to Moscow on 27th February and on 1st March ROWSELL reported to the Embassy the following story of a brush with the R.I.S.

3. On the evening of 23rd February, when he was on his way to the Embassy to attend a dance, two Russians got into a taxi with him and took him to a building, where they questioned him for about two hours. They asked him whether he had had any "political associations" with Russians and whether he had anything to do with Greville WYNNE. They also asked him about his career and why at his age he did not have a higher position in the Embassy. Finally they told him they would like to have a further meeting with him so that he could produce his diplomatic identity card, which he was not carrying at the time. ROWSELL agreed to meet the two Russians again outside a restaurant the following afternoon at two o'clock.

4. ROWSELL kept the appointment as arranged and was taken to a private room in the restaurant, where he was again questioned on the same lines as the previous night. He was also lectured on the glories of the Soviet Union and the desirability of continuing wartime Anglo-Soviet collaboration. After about two hours the Russians told ROWSELL that he must meet them again so that they could make sure that he had had no "political associations" with Russians. He agreed to a further meeting outside the Puppet Theatre at 10.30 a.m. on 3rd March. He was told that someone else would also be present at this meeting. ROWSELL did not keep this meeting and he and his wife were flown home on 1st March.

5. ROWSELL claims that he delayed reporting to the Embassy his contact with the R.I.S. until a day when he knew there was a direct flight to London. The reasoning behind this decision is obscure but attributable probably to stupidity rather than any evil intention.

6. In recounting his story to the Embassy, ROWSELL also revealed that while he was living in the bachelors' mess he had had an affair with Nina, the Russian cook. However, he denied that the R.I.S. officers had made any reference to her.

7. There is little doubt that the Russians genuinely thought that ROWSELL was both because of his previous career in the Army and the apparent disparity between his age and his rank in the Embassy. Their suspicions that he may have had some connection with WYNNE may have been aroused by ROWSELL having been seen with Mrs. WYNNE, for whom he arranged transport. ROWSELL thinks that his wife may also have met Mrs. WYNNE and that this would have been known to the Russians.
Director, FBI

Legat, London

5/16/63

Re London letter 3/20/63 advising that such evidence would furnish any pertinent information obtained from its interview of ROWSELL.

By letter dated 5/3/63, classified

The report is furnished for the Bureau's information and a copy is being retained in London.

3 - Bureau (Enc. 1)
1 - Liaison (sent direct)
1 - London

JTM:vw
(5)
MATTER OF FACT: A Soviet Hiss Case

By Joseph Alsop

WASHINGTON.

AN ESPIONAGE case, which can easily have more explosive effects than our case of Alger Hiss, is another major element of uncertainty in the Soviet political picture.

Very little attention has been paid to date to this remarkable case, which was remanded for trial a few days ago to a special military collegium. It remains to be seen whether the trial will be open or semi-public or private.

As of now, the best guess appears to be that the prosecutor's opening and closing speeches and the sentence will be public, with the rest of the proceedings on camera.

In any case, the affair reaches into the very guts of the Soviet military and political hierarchy. On the Russian side, the chief person accused is Gen. Oleg Penkovsky, a military scientist who long held the position of Secretary of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Council of Ministers. In American terms, the arrest of Penkovsky on charges of espionage is closely comparable to the arrest on similar charges of the principal administrative assistant to the President's chief scientific advisor. The effect of such an affair in this country may too easily be imagined.

In the Soviet Union, the repercussions of the Penkovsky case must be vastly more far-reaching, not only because of the closed character of Soviet society, but also because Penkovsky, as an individual, had very high connections.

To be charged along with Penkovsky is a British business man, Grenville Wynne, who was in fact kidnapped in Hungary by the Soviet police some time ago. Wynne is expected to be accused of working for the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the British Secret Service.

One of Penkovsky's high connections was apparently the famous former head of the whole Soviet secret police apparatus, Gen. Ivan Serov. Gen. Serov has reportedly been arrested and sent to prison, which suggests that charges may also be brought against him.

When dismissed as chairman of the MRGB some years ago, Serov moved over to the Soviet Defense Ministry, to become its intelligence boss. Hence, the arrest of Serov is the precise equivalent of the arrest of the director of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, the highest personage in the American intelligence community except CIA Director John A. McCone.

Furthermore, the man who apparently sponsored Serov as intelligence chief of the Defense Ministry is none other than
the powerful Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky. Even if not Serov’s personal sponsor, moreover, Malinovsky is highly likely to be held responsible for any indiscretion committed by one of the key figures on his staff. This may explain the symptoms of acute disquiet about his own future which Marshal Malinovsky is known to have displayed while visiting Indonesia.

In addition, there are less well-confirmed reports that the Penkovsky case involves, by our familiar process of guilt-by-association, other Soviet personalities even more eminent than Malinovsky. For example, there are fairly pervasive rumors that one of the daughters of Frol Kozlov accepted presents from Penkovsky when he returned from trips into Eastern Europe with luxuries hard to obtain in Moscow. Kozlov, it will be remembered, is currently being tipped as Nikita S. Khrushchev’s successor in the Soviet Premiership.

As can be seen, therefore, the Penkovsky case can well be used as a powerful engine of political destruction. Whether it is used in this manner, which Soviet leaders, if any, will be destroyed or disgraced, and how far the affair will go, will depend almost entirely on the management of the prosecution.

Who controls the prosecution? What orders will the prosecutors have—these are the key questions. The answers to these questions just may be that this case is Khrushchev’s reserve weapon against his political adversaries. It can hardly be a coincidence that the two most important persons mentioned as being touched by the case, Kozlov and Malinovsky, are also the most probable leaders of the recent opposition to Khrushchev and his policies.

Kozlov has been conspicuous by his absence from all official occasions for a matter of a fortnight—long enough to cause vivid speculation, since his non-appearance is wholly unexplained. Malinovsky, too, can hardly enjoy the tentative but intensely curious re-emergence of the disgraced Marshal Georgi Zhukov, for the Defense Minister and Marshal Konev were Zhukov’s bitterest denouncers when he fell.

All this, it must be added, may mean everything or nothing at all. Even the Penkovsky case may be quietly disposed of, without having secondary political effects. A strange churning is clearly going on in Moscow. Very strange things are happening, or may be about to happen. But only time can tell who will be on top and who will have gone down—if anyone goes down—when the churning ceases and the situation settles down again.
Red Traitor Assails
British 'Spy' as Liar

By HENRY SHAPIRO
United Press International

MOSCOW, May 8.—A confessed Russian traitor turned angrily on his alleged British accomplice in court today and accused him of lying about spying activities against the Soviet Union.

Oleg Penkovsky denounced British businessman Greville Wynne for "not telling the story of his role honestly."

Wynne, 42, and Penkovsky, 44, a former Soviet scientific co-ordinator, pleaded guilty yesterday to charges they participated in an Anglo-American espionage ring.

Craved 'Easy Life'

The Russian agreed to accusations that he betrayed his country because of his craving for wine, women and the "easy life."

The military trial, which opened yesterday, unfolded a cloak and dagger tale of grave-yard meetings, invisible ink, false-secret boxes containing information, and secret meetings and contacts arranged by markings on a Moscow lamppost.

Yesterday Wynne insisted he did not know the content of the information he admitted passing between Penkovsky and United States and British intelligence agents during 1961 and 1962.

"Brought and Delivered"

Penkovsky turned on Wynne just after today's session started. He said the Briton "did his best to organize and perfect the espionage system."

"He brought and delivered our material," the Russian said in a booming voice. "He took me to various conspiratorial apartments."

Raising his voice even more, he said: "Please believe me, citizen judges. I cannot understand why Wynne isn't always honest. Sometimes he is, but I do not understand why he tries to minimize his role."
Briton Played Key Spy Role, Russian Says

Moscow, May 8 (AP)—The Soviet co-defendant of confessed British spy Greville Wynne disputed today the Briton's claim that he was only a courier for the information the Russian collected for Britain and the United States.

"He was not only a messenger. Wynne must not minimize his role," former Soviet scientific official Oleg Penkovsky told the military court in the second day of the Soviet trial.

Apparently reading from notes before him, Penkovsky said Wynne had constantly discussed espionage activities with him and coached him in identifying various British and American diplomats he had in contact.

"Wynne appeared to change his claim somewhat when one of the three Soviet army judges then asked him if he still felt he only served as a messenger.

"Chiefly, I was to help Penkovsky during his stay in London," Wynne replied clearly and firmly. "My actual role was not fully realized until I came here."
Wynne Confesses

Mr. Wynne, 42, a businessman who represented British engineering firms on trips to the Soviet Union, admitted yesterday that he brought packages to Penkovsky and delivered packages from him to British consul officer Roderick Chisholm and to Chisholm's wife.

But Wynne contended he did not know that the packages for the Russian contained espionage instructions and equipment, and that the package he received contained exposed film.

Chisholm, who returned to London several months ago, denied everything at his home in London last night. "It looks like a frame-up," he said.

Wynne and Penkovsky pleaded guilty yesterday to charges of espionage against the Soviet Union, and the 43-year-old Russian pleaded guilty to a charge of high treason.

Certain Reservations

"Wynne, however, told the court he made his plea 'with certain reservations, the details of which I make in my statement.'"

Informants said the trial will continue until Saturday, when the court is expected to return a guilty verdict. Wynne's wife, Sheila, is attending the trial. Both men could be sentenced to death by a firing squad. But Wynne—like all other foreigners tried on spy charges here since the war—is expected to get a long prison sentence.

Penkovsky, a colonel in the Soviet army reserve, is not expected to get such a sentence.
2 Spies Tell Court Of Work in Soviet

BY SEYMOUR TOPPING
Special to The New York Times
MOSCOW, May 8—Oleg V. Penkovsky, a former Soviet science official who is the central figure in a spy trial here, was portrayed today as an aggressive agent who had been friendly with members of the Soviet Government.

At the end of the second day of the trial before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, the motives of Mr. Penkovsky's confessed espionage contacts with British and United States intelligence services remained obscure.

Greville M. Wynne, a British businessman who is being tried as Mr. Penkovsky's contact man with British intelligence, said the former Soviet official had convinced him of his high standing in Moscow.

Mr. Wynne told the court that British intelligence officials managed to carry on exchanges with Mr. Penkovsky for 17 months before Soviet state security authorities announced the arrest of the Russian last December.

The previous August, Mr. Wynne related, he was told by Mr. Penkovsky of a letter from London that outlined for the Russian official several methods of escape from the Soviet Union, one by submarine.

Mr. Penkovsky stated earlier that he had passed about 5,000 frames of exposed miniature camera film containing photographs of classified Soviet data to British and United States agents. The information was said to have included reports on Soviet rockets, as well as military, political and economic information.

The former official said he had been asked to report on relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China and also on Soviet intentions regarding the conclusion of a German peace treaty.

The court will hold a closed session tomorrow, presumably to hear Soviet experts report on the nature of the secret information that Mr. Penkovsky is alleged to have transmitted.

Mr. Wynne, an industrial consultant who has made frequent trips to East European countries, confessed that he acted as a courier between Mr. Penkovsky and British intelligence officials of letters and packages containing intelligence data.

However, the 42-year-old Briton insisted that he initially did not know the contents of letters and packages he conveyed and had been tricked into these espionage activities by British intelligence. He said British intelligence officials had compelled him to continue as a liaison agent by threatening to interfere with his commercial business if he refused to cooperate.

Mr. Wynne testified that in April, 1961, he received instructions concerning Mr. Penkovsky from "a very powerful figure" who he thought was a senior official of the British Foreign Office.
Called Chief of Intelligence

This official was referred to by Soviet court officials as the "chief of British intelligence."

Mr. Wynne said he was told by the chief that Mr. Penkovsky was coming to London later that month to have unofficial meetings in preparation for meetings on a higher level.

Mr. Wynne said he was told that these contacts would be of a diplomatic nature and would have nothing to do with espionage.

The Briton said he later realized he had been duped and that the men he had spoken with were officials of British intelligence, rather than of the Foreign Office.

"In other words your fellow countrymen deceived you?" the prosecutor asked. Mr. Wynne replied: "Yes they did, and that is why I am here."

There were bitter exchanges in the dock between Mr. Wynne and Mr. Penkovsky, the latter insisting that the British businessman had been more than a "chauffeur" and had known the contents of the letters and packages he carried.

Was Colonel in Army

Mr. Wynne said Mr. Penkovsky told him that he had been a colonel in the Soviet Army and "had friends in high circles among members of the government and trade organizations."

The prosecutor interrupted Mr. Wynne's description of Mr. Penkovsky's background by posing a question on another subject.

Mr. Wynne added later that he had been impressed by what Mr. Penkovsky had said about the importance of his position. The Russian told him that he formerly had held a high post in Turkey.

Mr. Penkovsky, who is 43, was the deputy head of the foreign department of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research. He was able to travel abroad frequently.

The count also revealed that the Russian was a reserve colonel and had received eleven decorations.

The prosecutor did not pursue in the first two days of the trial any line of questioning about Mr. Penkovsky's official associates or friends.

Mr. Penkovsky told the court that he had been "an honorable, ordinary Soviet man" until 1960. He attributed his subsequent actions to annoyance with certain "personal annoyance" related to his job. The former official said he had been a careerist.

The indictment cited "moral degradation" as the reason for Mr. Penkovsky's alleged espionage.

However, in response to questioning, he declared: "Believe me, I did not intend to leave my family and stay in the West."

Mr. Wynne said he had been told by British intelligence that Mr. Penkovsky had refused an offer to stay in Britain after he went there in April, 1961, and had five meetings with British intelligence.

Western diplomatic officials said that the persistence and daring with which Mr. Penkovsky carried on espionage indicated that he had been strongly motivated. In court, the lean, usually imperious Russian has given the impression of being a man of high intelligence and forceful character.

Motivation Studied

Various possible reasons for Mr. Penkovsky's behavior, other than the official explanation of moral degradation, are being canvassed by Western observers.

Among the possibilities is the theory that the Russian was impelled by political considerations.

Another suggestion is that he was a double agent who was working for some Soviet service when he established ties with Western agents.

If convicted as charged, Mr. Penkovsky and Mr. Wynne face possible sentences of up to 20 years imprisonment or death.

Mr. Penkovsky has made a detailed confession in court and almost eagerly at times answered the questions of the prosecutor. The indictment states that he pleaded guilty to all charges during some six months of confinement and interrogation in Lubianka prison.

Mr. Penkovsky told the court this morning, in concluding his statement, that he made his original attempt to get in touch with United States intelligence in November, 1960. He said that he had sealed a letter and taken it to the neighborhood of the American Embassy Club: There Mr. Penkovsky said, he handed it to a foreigner and asked him to pass it on to the embassy's consular office.

In April 1961, the Russian related, he met United States intelligence officers in London and asked them why they had not got in touch with him in response to his letter. He added: "They said they had investigated me, checked my data and thought that my letter had been a provocation."

Mr. Wynne testified that Mr. Penkovsky finally made contact with British intelligence through a letter that the Russian handed him at the Moscow airport before Mr. Wynne returned to London in April, 1961.
DESCRIBES ROLE IN SPY CASE: Greville M. Wynne, left, a British businessman accused of espionage by Soviet Government, confers with Nikolai Borovik, his lawyer, during the second day of trial. He admitted being a courier for British agents.
Moscow Spy Trial

There are extraordinary implications in the current Moscow spy trial. The arrest of Oleg Penkovsky last October seems to have marked the end of one of the most successful coups in the history of Western intelligence activities. If Mr. Penkovsky's confession is credited, the United States and Great Britain were able through him to penetrate the heart of the Soviet scientific-military complex and obtain some of the Soviet Union's most carefully guarded armaments secrets. To anyone familiar with the tight Soviet security system, the possibility that the charges to which the defendants have confessed are true will appear a more impressive intelligence victory for this country and Britain than even the technical triumph achieved by the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union.

In any event, the Soviet Union has only itself to blame for the proliferation of Western intelligence organizations. The long and fairly successful Soviet espionage campaigns against the West—campaigns which presumably still continue—furnish abundant precedents to justify reciprocal efforts directed against the Soviet Union. In the past two decades, many Soviet spies have been exposed in this country, Britain, Canada, and elsewhere. Their trials have indicated the extent of Soviet efforts to learn the West's scientific, military, political and economic secrets. Moreover, the general curtain of secrecy in the Soviet Union forces the West to protect its own national security by seeking to learn what Moscow is hiding.

Espionage, of course, is dirty business, and this would be a better world if it were not necessary. But it will not be ended by pious denunciations. It can only end when political solutions have been found for international tensions, solutions which permit confidence and friendship among nations. The Soviet Union could do much to promote this goal by showing greater flexibility on such matters as the end of nuclear testing.
Spy Trial Points Up Secrecy Cloaking Much of Soviet Life

By THEODORE SHABAD
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, May 8—The current espionage trial in Moscow points up again the secrecy-shrouded character of Soviet society.

Although the country has been opened up considerably since Stalin's death in 1953, vast areas of geography and political, economic, scientific and cultural sectors remain concealed behind a curtain of national security.

The curtain hides not only obvious things such as the disposition of the armed forces, the sites of missile bases and the size of the nuclear arsenal. It conceals information ranging from detailed production statistics on common items such as steel and crude oil to the identity of prominent buildings in the center of Moscow.

A Western assessment of the Soviet Union's political and economic potential and Moscow's intentions in the world arena would rest on a penetration of this cloak, inspired chiefly by defense considerations.

Evidence of Moscow's security policy may appear anywhere and at any time, sometimes subtly, sometimes in the most conspicuous form.

Subtle evidence can be found in the censors' code numbers that appear in every newspaper edition, pamphlet, book or other printed material.

Censors posted in thousands of Soviet editorial and publishing offices are part of the ramified network of the Main Administration for the Protection of Military and State Secrets at the Press, commonly known by the name of Glavlit and headed by Pavel K. Romanov.

On the 60th anniversary of Pravda, the Communist party newspaper, last year, Mr. Romanov was among 75 journalists decorated with the Order of Lenin.

Although the building housing Glavlit in the center of Moscow is prominently identified by a huge plaque, its censors of Moscow reference books made sure only the telephone number was given.

Other substantial-looking buildings are neither listed in public directories nor identified by signs. They include agencies concerned with the most sensitive aspects of government administrative and research institutions in the nuclear and missile fields and offer top-secret or sensitive information.

One of them presumably is the agency concerned with the production of nuclear weapons, known by the cover name of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building.

A curious manifestation of security is a prohibition on taking live pigeons across the borders of the Soviet Union, presumably because they could be used for contacts with intelligence agents and the transmission of espionage data.

In dealings with the opaque sector of Soviet society, secret institutions identify themselves as Organization of Post Box 1090 or simply as “Scientific Research, Institute” or “Factory.”

During a recent election, the Moscow press listed dozens of precinct officials and election workers with no preciseprofessional affiliation.

The security shroud became especially transparent when defense considerations clash with legal requirements such as the public listing of elected officials.

The lists normally identify deputies by name and occupation. The security element in a given election district, therefore, is made quite obvious when the job of the officeholder is unspecified.

In Kirghizia, one of the Soviet republics of Central Asia, a newspaper virtually pinpointed security zones by skipping them in the numbered listing of election districts.

Tourists also are made aware of Soviet secrecy policy by stringent regulations barring the photographing of objects such as railroad and highway bridges and telegraph offices.
For Soviet's Top Killer—Demotion

By Seymour Freidin
Executive Editor, Foreign News

Under shimmering cut-glass chandeliers of a palace built for Balkan royalty, Communists were roughing it in the high style to which they had become accustomed.

It was sultry Belgrade, eight years ago, and Soviet Premier Khrushchev was having his first, post-Stalin get-together with Marshal Tito. Mr. K was having a euphoric time as a white-jacketed waiter kept pouring vodka into a glass he drained, bellowing in rhythm:

"Mir," (Peace).

Eyes hooded casing the crowded room like a security vacuum cleaner, was a wiry, little man. His red hair was thin and his slightly upturned nose dilated. Gen. Ivan Serov, then...
The bloodiest backgrounds exist in Budapest. Gen. Pal Maleter, among others, went to negotiate with the Russians.

Hardly had they entered the appointed room, when Serov stormed in. He pointed out, slightly, the Hungarians to picketed Soviet security people. "Who are you?" a Hungarian revolutionary asked, trying to free himself from the grab of security men. "Serov," was the one-word answer.

It was Serov, too, who pounced on the group of anti-Soviet Hungarians a little later. Led by the late Premier Imre Nagy, they took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy. In a deal in which they were tricked, the Hungarians were seized by Serov, who later masterminded their execution.

He did get to see the Western world, England, for example. Protests caused such a storm that even the Soviet brass kept him out of sight. It doesn't really matter what demagogical speculation centers about the significance of his fall from eminence.

Serov's a name, you see, that always will ramble on in tumultuous days of the uprising in infamy.
RUSSIAN'S DEATH AS SPY IS ASKED

Prosecutor Urges 10 Years for British Co-Defendant

By SEYMOUR TOPPING
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, May 10—The Soviet prosecution demanded today the death sentence for Oleg V. Penkovsky, the Russian scientific official on trial for espionage on behalf of Britain and the United States.

The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court was asked to impose a penalty of 10 years' deprivation of freedom on the British co-defendant, Greville M. Wynn.

Mr. Wynn, a 42-year-old businessman, has confessed to having acted as a liaison agent between the former Russian official and the intelligence services of Britain and the United States. Mr. Penkovsky has pleaded guilty to having passed secret military, political and economic data.

Summing up for the prosecution on the fourth day of the trial, Lieut. Gen. Artem Gorny said that the data conveyed by Mr. Penkovsky included information on Soviet rockets, troops in East Germany and Moscow preparations for the conclusion of a German peace treaty.

Data Held Important

The chief military prosecutor added that British and United States intelligence had placed a "high valuation" on some of the information received from Mr. Penkovsky.

A closed session of the trial will be held tomorrow morning to hear final statements by Mr. Penkovsky and Mr. Wynn that will touch on the nature of some of the information transmitted.

The verdict of the three-man tribunal headed by Lieut. Gen. Victor Y. Borisoglebsky is expected in the afternoon.

The statements in court today reinforced the impression that Mr. Penkovsky had been a trusted official in contact with highly-placed military and Government officials.

The prosecutor said that the late father-in-law of Mr. Penkovsky, who himself was a reserve army colonel, had been a "prominent military leader."

General Gorny added that Mr. Penkovsky "always sought to judge about people holding high official positions to curry favor with them, to flatter them."

At the time of his arrest last October, Mr. Penkovsky, who is 43, was the deputy head of the Foreign Department of the State Committee for Scientific Research and Coordination.

It was understood that Mr. Penkovsky's superior, D. M. Govishian, had been promoted from head of the Foreign Department of the State Committee for Scientific Research and Coordination to deputy chief of the entire committee.

Mr. Govishian was identified by Western officials as the son-in-law of Aleksei N. Kosygin, a member of the ruling Communist party Presidium who is ranked among the five most powerful political figures in the Soviet Union.

About 800 spectators who had been admitted to the courtroom by pass broke into loud applause Mr. Penkovsky remained impassive, but as the applause of his countrymen continued for about 15 seconds he flushed and stayed before gaining control.
Death for Red;
Briton, 8 Years

MOSCOW, May 11 (UPI).—The Soviet Supreme Court today sentenced a British businessman to eight years imprisonment and a Russian citizen to death by the firing squad for spying against the Soviet Union.

Both verdicts were handed down before a packed courtroom after the two men, Greville Wynne, 42, a Briton and Oleg Penkovsky, 43, a former Soviet scientific official, made final pleas in a secret hearing.

Both had testified during the five-day trial that they had passed Soviet secrets to Western intelligence agencies.

Including Wynne's wife, Sheila, jammed into the courtroom to hear the verdict.

The court announced that the first three years of Wynne's sentence must be served in jail and the last five in a corrective labor camp.

Wynne bent forward slightly in the dock and Penkovsky gulped several times when the sentences were read, but neither gave evidence of any great emotion.

Diplomatic sources in Moscow speculated that Wynne would be sent back to England quietly in a few years, perhaps as part of a diplomatic exchange.

Consentaneous applause broke out in the hall when the sentences were announced.
MOSCOW, May 10. (UPI).—The state today demanded death by firing squad for a Soviet official charged with giving the Soviet missile secrets to the West and asked 10 years in prison for his accused accomplice.

British businessman Greville Wynne. Sentencing was expected tomorrow for Wynne and for Oleg Penkovsky, who was accused of taking part in orgies and sipping champagne from women's slippers while on a spending spree in Paris with the money he allegedly received from British and American intelligence agents. Both defendants admitted spying for the U.S. and Britain.

PROSECUTOR ARTEM Gorny charged that British and American diplomats and even some British wives and children were involved in the spy ring headed by the 42-year-old Penkovsky. He did not minimize the "importance of political and military and economic secrets" which Penkovsky allegedly delivered through Wynne. He said they included secrets on rocket forces, Soviet troops in East Germany, and details of the Soviet plans for a German peace treaty.

The court yesterday held a closed session to hear testimony on the secrets allegedly stolen by Penkovsky in his job as a government scientific official. He allegedly passed them on to Western intelligence through Wynne, a business man who traveled throughout the Soviet bloc, and British and American diplomats in Moscow.
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: NEW YORK

FROM: SUPERV A. E. BANDI

DATE: 6/21/63

SUBJECT: OLEG V. PENKOVSKI 15-R

Please make copies of all newspaper clippings re Pentkovski case for use of 5A Donovan in

Date 6-11-63

OSB
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (#342)

DATE: 7/8/63

SUBJECT: IS - R (UNSEC)

Source
Date Contacted
Contacted By
Characterized

SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.
A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past.

1-New York
1-New York
1-New York
1-New York
1-New York
1-New York
1-New York
1-New York

1-Bureau
1-WFO

1-Bureau

(OLEG V. PENKOVSKY)

1-Bureau

(SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES - TBM)

1-Bureau

1-Bureau

1-Bureau

1-Bureau

1-Bureau

1-Bureau

TJM: pdw (18)
When incorporating information furnished by the Bureau, information of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by N]

will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above 'Confidential', since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of 'Confidential' will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Informant's Comments Concerning Arrest of

It is noted ____________________________ that ____________________________ at the same time two individuals using the names ____________________________ were arrested in ____________________________ in connection with their association with ____________________________.

Informant advised he learned of the arrest of ____________________________ and the others during the ____________________________ Informant said that ____________________________.

Informant has previously identified ____________________________.

Informant stated that upon viewing the ____________________________ Informant said ____________________________.

Informant said that ____________________________.
Informant said

Informant stated that

Informant stated that at this point
Informant stated:

Informant said:

Informant said that based upon:

Informant stated it is apparent also, that:

Informant said it is his opinion that:
Informant stated that during
Rebulet to NY, 12/21/62.

The NY case file on OLEG PENKOVSKI was re-opened in response to instructions in rebulet for NY to be alert for information concerning PENKOVSKI and to furnish same to Bureau immediately in form suitable for dissemination.

In this regard NYO did submit considerable information from regarding PENKOVSKI to the Bureau for dissemination.

In view of the fact that PENKOVSKI was reported to have been executed by the Soviets in May, 1963, and since the NYO has not received any additional information of pertinence regarding PENKOVSKI from or any other sources, this case is being placed in a closed status by the NYO.

If the NYO receives further information from any source regarding the PENKOVSKI matter, this case will be re-opened and the information will be submitted to the Bureau in a form suitable for dissemination.
In reporting the recent public trial of the American-British spy Penkovsky, and his British accomplice Wynne, newspapers in Canada and the USA suppressed a great deal of information that was available to the world press. This was hardly in the best interests of the Western public, since the sketchy stories of that trial left many serious questions in readers' minds. Therefore, as a public service, this translation of the trial proceedings and commentary is being offered in economy format, for wide circulation. All material was translated from the daily press of the USSR. Abbreviations were made only to avoid repetition. So far as the publishers can find out, the information given here includes everything essential to the trial, excepting, of course, evidence that was given at the in camera session of the court.

1. INTRODUCTION ("Pravda", May 8, 1963)

The austere hall of the Supreme Court of the USSR is filled to capacity. Representative of the Moscow working people and Soviet and foreign pressmen have gathered there. An open hearing of the criminal case of Soviet citizen O. V. Penkovsky, an agent of the British and U.S. intelligence services, and British citizen Greville Wynne, liaison-spy, began there on May 7.

The case of Penkovsky and Wynne is examined by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, consisting of: presiding judge -- Lieutenant General of Justice V. V. Borisoglebsky, Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR; and people's assessors -- Major-General I. S. Tsygankov and Major-General S. K. Marasnov.

The case for the State prosecution is presented by Lieutenant General of Justice A. G. Gorny, Chief Military Procurator. The defense is presented by lawyers K. N. Apraksin and N. K. Borovik....
2. THE INDICTMENT. (Pravda. May 8, 1963)

An Agent of the American and British intelligence services O. Penkovsky, committed for trial for active espionage against the Soviet Union, pleaded guilty to all the charges preferred against him and gave detailed testimony about his criminal activities.

Greville Maynard Wynne, also committed for trial for active espionage against the Soviet Union, pleaded guilty to the charge of espionage, stating that he had fulfilled the functions of a liaison-man between the spy Penkovsky and members of the British and American intelligence services.

As stated in the indictment in the case of Penkovsky and Wynne, Penkovsky stands accused of high treason. While on an official mission in London in April-May, 1961, he pledged in writing to cooperate with the British and American intelligence services and gave away information constituting a State secret of the Soviet Union. While on official missions in London, in July-August, 1961, and in Paris, in September-October of the same year, he repeatedly met with British and American agents at secret addresses, gave away top secret economic, political and military information and received instruction in espionage techniques. During his cooperation with the British and American intelligence services, up to the day of his arrest, he received coded radio messages from the spy headquarters, met regularly with representatives of the British and American intelligence services, including Wynne, Chisholm, Carlson, in Moscow streets, hallways, hotels, and at official diplomatic receptions held by staff members of the Embassies of Great Britain and the United States, received instructions and espionage equipment from agents, conveyed secret information to them verbally, in written reports and on film, -- i.e. he is accused of committing a crime covered by Paragraph "A" of Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

Wynne is accused of helping the British Intelligence Service in April, 1961, to establish contact with Penkovsky, and of carrying out till July, 1962, its assignments in the maintenance of liaison between the British and American intelligence services and the spy Penkovsky. During Penkovsky's visit to London and Paris in 1961, he met him, received espionage materials from him and passed them on to British agents, took part in arranging secret meetings between Penkovsky and representatives of the British and American intelligence services. While in Moscow in May-June and August, 1961, and in July, 1962, he delivered packages with espionage information collected by Penkovsky to the British agent Chisholm, took from Chisholm and delivered to Penkovsky packages with instructions of the spy headquarters, photographs of agents, a Minox camera and films for it, and also containers for the delivery of espionage materials by Penkovsky, i.e. of committing a crime covered by Article 65 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

3. CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST O.V. PENKOVSKY AND G.M. WYNNE. (Pravda May 11/63)

Speaking at the trial on May 10, the State Prosecutor, Lieutenant-General of Justice Artem Gorny pointed out that in the realization of their aggressive designs against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries the reactionary imperialist circles assign an important place to provocative, subversive and intelligence activities. The secret war begun by the imperialist intelligence services on the very first days after the victory of the October Revolution has never ceased. On the contrary, it became more and more active, extended, and now in a number of imperialist countries has been elevated to the level of state policy. Modern technology starting with miniature cameras lying before the judges as material evidence, and ending with "spy in the sky" satellites, serves espionage.

The imperialist intelligence services concentrate their main efforts on organizing espionage against the socialist countries. Their attention is particularly attracted by the Soviet Union's outstanding achievements in the fields of science and military technology.

Unceremoniously trampling upon standards of international law, Artem Gorny said, certain diplomatic representatives of a number of imperialist states engage in active intelligence, espionage activity. It is not only professional agents with diplomatic passports who
engage in espionage. Drawn into this dirty business are members of various delegations, scientists, businessmen, students, tourists, which of course, neither helps to increase international trust, nor promotes scientific and cultural cooperation and international trade.

Finding no social soil or basis for developing hostile activities among the Soviet people, foreign intelligence services are forced to stake on traitors who sold their homeland, on mendicant "displaced" persons and all kinds of renegades. It is from among this type of persons that they recruited after the war spies and saboteurs who were smuggled into the U.S.S.R. and here were exposed and rendered harmless by state security organs.

Along with this, persistent attempts are being made to use for their insidious purposes individual members of our society who due to their ideological instability and moral depravity, greed, place-hunting and other personal negative traits are liable to become criminals under certain circumstances.

Accused Penkovsky who held the office of assistant chief of the foreign department of the foreign relations board of the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research, being an adventurer, a time-server and a morally depraved person adopted the road of betrayal and high treason and was enlisted by imperialist intelligence services. He established contact with them through British subject Greville Wynne, the director of the "Greville Wynne, Limited" and "Mobile Exhibitions, Limited" companies, acting concurrently as a consultant for a number of British companies, who repeatedly visited the Soviet Union.

In April 1961 during Wynne's stay in Moscow he had several unofficial meetings with Penkovsky. At Wynne's suggestion, Penkovsky outlined in writing his possibilities in collecting information of interest to the British intelligence, and on April 12, 1961 handed this data to Wynne before the latter emplaned from Moscow.

After that Penkovsky began to collect espionage information for which purpose he actively used different channels: the access to documents and information he had in the line of his duty at the State Committee for Coordinating Scientific Research, the knowledge he acquired during his previous service in the Soviet Army and study, his connections and acquaintances with officials of state institutions and servicemen. From his "bosses" Penkovsky received an assignment to collect espionage information on a wide range of questions. This included seeking ways to collect espionage information about servicemen of the rocket troops, about Soviet troops stationed in the GDR, about preparations for the conclusions of a peace treaty with the GDR, and other information of political, military and economic nature.

Penkovsky received assurances that he would be guaranteed a responsible post at the British or American military department with a salary of 2,000 dollars and that he would be also paid a lump sum on the basis of 1,000 dollars a month from the moment he established contacts with foreign secret services.

In London, Wynne, with the help of a certain Hartley, met an agent of the British Intelligence who introduced himself as Ackroyd, and set out in detail the substance of his conversations with Penkovsky in Moscow. Wynne was told to provide Ackroyd with the program of the stay in Britain of the Soviet technical delegation which Penkovsky was to head.

On April 20, Wynne met the delegation at London airport and on the same day received from Penkovsky two packages with espionage materials which he delivered at once to Ackroyd. On the same day, with the assistance of Wynne, Penkovsky met with representatives of British and American intelligence services.

On May 3, Penkovsky pledged in writing to cooperate with the British and American intelligence services and also wrote an application for British or United States citizenship should need arise. At the same time he received espionage equipment which the foreign agents recommended him to keep in a secret hiding place at home.

On May 27, Wynne arrived in Moscow and received from Penkovsky a package with espionage materials on 20 rolls of film. On the same day he visited the flat of the Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Moscow, Roderick Chisholm and handed him the
package with espionage materials received from Penkovsky. Chisholm, in turn, gave him another package, for delivery to Penkovsky.

At these meetings with Wynne Penkovsky reported on the materials he had photographed and was instructed to continue photographing such documents and to find ways to photograph materials at various Soviet institutions. Describing his earlier work at military establishments he betrayed a number of important data constituting a State secret. Penkovsky was informed about the cache No. 1, selected by the American Intelligence in the hallway of No. 5/6 Pushkin Street, Moscow, and the procedure for using it.

Carrying out assignments of the British Intelligence Service, Wynne met Penkovsky at London airport on July 18, 1961, when the latter arrived with a Soviet delegation and received from him two packages for the British Intelligence. Later, in the period till August 8, 1961, Wynne accompanied Penkovsky on his trips in Britain and took him five times to assigned places in London for meetings with agents of the British and American Intelligence Services.

On August 23, 1961 Wynne met Penkovsky in Moscow and received two packages from him, one with 14 rolls of film with espionage materials, and the other with an artillery instrument.

On August 25, 1961, Wynne took from Penkovsky two small packages with a faulty Minox camera and eight rolls of film with espionage materials and handed them to Chisholm. Chisholm handed Wynne a package with rolls of film and a new Minox camera. Wynne gave these to Penkovsky along with a letter with instructions and a candy box to be used as a container for conveying espionage materials.

On instructions of the British Intelligence Service, Wynne met Penkovsky at Paris airport when he arrived there on September 20, 1961, for the Soviet Exhibition, took him to the Cayre Hotel, and received from him a parcel with 15 rolls of film with espionage information. On the same day Wynne reported to King the arrival of "Young" (the alias under which Penkovsky was known to British agents).

During Penkovsky' stay in Paris different kinds of personal and indirect contacts between Penkovsky and foreign intelligence services were agreed upon and made more precise. He received more detailed instructions on the use of the cache in the hallway of the house in Pushkin Street, and was given a reserve channel for liaison with representatives of foreign intelligence services in Moscow involving the use of special passwords. Fulfilling the instructions of 'his bosses', Penkovsky selected places for reserve caches in different districts of Moscow. One of such places was chosen in the doorway of a house at the corner of Neshchanova Street and a blind alley, opposite a church. The roots and the hollows in the trees at Sergey Essenin's grave in the Vagankovo cemetery were chosen as another such place.

All details of this liaison, involving the use of the telephone and the cache, were jotted down by Penkovsky on a separate sheet of paper which was taken from him during the arrest.

It was established that one of the telephones was in the apartment in Kutuzovsky Prospekt in which the Assistant U.S. Air Attache Alexis Davison has been living since May, 1961. Another was in the flat in which the former Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy William Jones lived from 1960 through February 1962, and which, since February 1962, is occupied by an Attache of the U.S. Embassy Hugh Montgomery.

On October 21, 1961, Penkovsky passed to a liaison man of a foreign intelligence service a detailed description of certain papers of Soviet servicemen, a description of the syllabus of a military academy, a diagram of the organization of that academy, a list of generals and officers he knew, together with their brief characteristics and other materials.

On July 2, 1962, Penkovsky gave Wynne a package of films with photographs of classified materials, as well as a written report containing information on the German problem and on the commanding personnel of the air defense system.

On July 4, 1962, at a reception Penkovsky made the acquaintance of the U.S. Embassy official Carlson, and towards the end of August, at a reception given by U.S. Embassy official Horbaly, passed to Carlson seven films with classified information, data
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...about a serviceman who interested the intelligence services and photographs of him. It was also then that Penkovsky received from Carlson a package with a forged passport to be used if
he had to go underground, and a letter of instructions ordering him to collect information about
the Moscow Military Area.

In July 1962 Wynne arrived in Moscow with assignments from the British secret service. He gave Penkovsky new instructions and coded post-cards, 3,000 rubles and an
article prepared by secret agents which Penkovsky wanted to publish in the Soviet press to make
his name popular. Penkovsky was also shown photographs of the new persons with whom he
was to maintain contact. They were Attache of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow Rodney Carlson
and the wife of Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Moscow Gervase Cowell --
Pamella Cowell.

Penkovsky also forwarded espionage information through Ann Chisholm, the wife of
a British diplomat, during meetings which took place late in 1961 and early in 1962 near the
antiquarian shop in Arbat and in the Tsvetnoi Boulevard. Through Ann Chisholm Penkovsky
received letters of instruction, photo camera, films for it and coding pads.

On October 22, 1962 Penkovsky was caught red-handed and then arrested. In
addition to the telephone numbers of foreign agents, code postcards with instructions for them,
reports and exposed films, the search in Penkovsky's flat revealed a forged passport, six code
books, three Minox cameras and instructions for them, two sheets of paper for invisible writing,
a memo with wavelengths on which Penkovsky received radio messages, the draft of a dispatch,
15 unexposed films and various instructions from foreign intelligence services, all found in a
secret compartment.

In order to check the testimony of Penkovsky, an investigation experiment was
carried out in which all the pre-arranged signals were observed. In response to telephone calls,
the names 'Davison' and 'Montgomery' were given. Davison appeared at the specified lamp-
post in Kutuzovsky Prospekt, and six hours later, a man entered the hallway of the house in
Pushkin Street and took from the cache a dispatch from Penkovsky, who was then already under
arrest. The man turned out to be U.S. Embassy official Richard C. Jacob.

The State Prosecutor pointed to a characteristic feature which sheds light on the
backstage aspects of the relations between the American and British intelligence services. In
Paris American secret agents 'Alexander' and 'Oslaf' arranged a meeting with Penkovsky, keeping
it a secret from their British partners and promised him "gold mountains" as soon as he
stepped on the American continent. Penkovsky was assured of this by a high ranking Representative
of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States who attended one of the meetings.

Analysing Penkovsky's career, his behaviour before he began his criminal activity and
while it lasted, the testimony given at the trial by the accused himself, by witnesses, the document
reviewed and the characteristics portraying the real face of Penkovsky, the State Prosecutor
convincingly demonstrated that Penkovsky's fall was not accidental.

Penkovsky's exceptional egoism, self-indulgence and ambitiousness have long since
become manifest. He always sought to hang around and about people holding high official
positions, to curry favor with them, to flatter them. Superficially Penkovsky seemed not a bad
worker and he quickly climbed the official ladder. But as his base and low inclinations grew and
festered he thought more and more not about the interest of the state and society but about his
personal career and well-being.

With haughtiness and disdain Penkovsky treated people who could not be of any use to
him. But he paid with the blackest ingratitude even those of his friends, co-workers and
superiors who were good to him, was capable of vilifying them out of their hearing and then,
when he became an agent of imperialist intelligence services, he passed along the information
he fished out of them, gave their characteristics, peddled the photographs stolen from their
desks.

These people should not be presented as victims of Penkovsky's cunning, the
Prosecutor said. In many respects they were guilty themselves and now are paying for their
lackleness to Penkovsky's vices, for their gullibility and talkativeness, for the loss of political
vigilance.
Penkovsky easily started affairs with women, regularly patronised the majority of Moscow restaurants and coming home late at night after his sprees, used to say he had been busy on a responsible official assignment.

This time-server and egoist sank lower and lower, there was nothing sacred or dear to him either in his family or in the society or in the state; he gradually ripened for treason and it remained only to pick him up and this was what actually happened.

Having turned into an agent of foreign intelligence services, Penkovsky began to peddle secrets. He was not a rank-and-file agent content with crumbs from his masters' table although it was not beneath him to accept all kinds of knick-knacks from his "dear friends". Penkovsky thought that his "30 pieces of silver" would run into a substantial sum in dollars and pound sterling, not roubles. These dollars and pounds sterling figured invariably in all his talks with foreign agents in London and Paris being constantly before the traitor's greedy eyes.

Of course, the State Prosecutor said, such degenerated and renegades like Penkovsky evoking indignation and disgust of the entire Soviet people, are singular phenomenon in our society. But this example shows forcefully how dangerous are the survivals of the past, stimulated by an ideology that is hostile to us and what they are liable to grow into unless noticed in time and resolutely nipped in the bud.

(After outlining Wynne's involvement with Penkovsky, the prosecutor continued)

All these circumstances which have been confirmed in the process of the court investigation, A.G. Gorny said, prove beyond a shade of doubt that Wynne was an active participant in espionage against the Soviet Union, the chief contact between Penkovsky, on the one hand, and the British and American intelligence services, on the other hand.

.....Wynne contends that when he became aware of the danger of this criminal activity, he repeatedly told representatives of the British Intelligence Service about his fears and tried to "quit the game" but each time was subjected to pressure for which purpose they used both promises to help him in his business and threats. "I was terribly afraid," Wynne told the court, "that the British intelligence would pick up the receiver and tell something about me at appropriate places. And I was very much afraid that my entire business would collapse."

The confessions of the accused, the Prosecutor went on, are important evidence. However under article 77 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation the accusation can be based on them only if they are confirmed by other evidence in its entirety. This requirement of the law has been fully observed in the present case.

The search at Penkovsky's flat revealed a collection of espionage documents and equipment in a secret compartment of his desk. Two diaries for 1961 and 1962 and notebooks were found on Wynne when he was arrested. Some of the entries in these diaries and notebooks convict Wynne of a conspiratorial relationship with Penkovsky.

Thus, stated Chief Military Prosecutor Gorny, there is every reason for the conclusion that numerous and irrefutable proofs existing in this case forged an unbreakable ring of evidence convicting the accused Penkovsky and Wynne, and not only them but also those who stood behind their backs, who guided them and directed their criminal activities.

The State Prosecutor stressed that the facts established at the trial prove that a number of American and British diplomats accredited in the USSR took part in the espionage work. The following were implicated in Penkovsky's and Wynne's espionage activities---British citizens Roderick Chisholm and his wife Ann Chisholm, Gervase Cowell and his wife Pamela Cowell, Ivor Roswell, John Warley and Felicity Stewart and Americans Rodney Carlson, Richard Jacob, William Jones, Hugh Montgomery and Alexis Davison.

In accordance with Article 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation the State Prosecutor asked the court to return a special ruling pointing out that the activities of the above-mentioned diplomatic officials of the United States and Great Britain in the Soviet Union were unlawful and incompatible with the standards of conduct of foreign diplomats.
In conclusion, the Prosecutor substantiated the juridical qualification of the crimes with which the accused are charged and gave his view on the punishment.

Penkovsky is charged on the strength of point "A" of the Article 64 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation which envisages punishment for the particularly dangerous state crime -- high treason, that is deliberate actions committed by the citizen of the U.S.S.R. to the detriment of state independence, territorial integrity or military might of the U.S.S.R. These actions were committed by Penkovsky in the form of spying for the intelligence services of imperialist states.

Wynne's actions which took the form of transferring espionage materials from Penkovsky to the British intelligence service and organisational activity for arranging Penkovsky's meetings with secret agents and transferring to him instructions and espionage equipment must be qualified in accordance with the Article 65 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation which envisages punishment for espionage by a foreigner or any person without citizenship.

The Prosecutor analysed the British laws on state secrets dated August 22, 1911 and December 23, 1920 and pointed out that on the strength of these laws the very fact that a person has secret data in his possession without having lawful access to them or an attempt to contact a foreign agent even without conveying any information to him are regarded as espionage. From this it follows quite clearly that the criminal nature of Wynne's activity was quite obvious to him from the position of the law of his own country.

Accused Wynne committed a grave crime against the Soviet Union. But in view of the degree of his guilt the State Prosecutor expressed the opinion that there was no necessity to apply to Wynne the highest sanction of the Article 65 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation -- death sentence and suggested that he should be sentenced to ten years of imprisonment.

The State Prosecutor declared: It is difficult to find a yardstick for measuring the graveness and baseness of the crimes committed by accused Penkovsky. There are such crimes which cannot be redeemed by anything. For the traitor and spy who sold his homeland there is no room on earth and my demand is that Penkovsky be sentenced to death.

4. **ON THE EVE OF THE VERDICT** (Pravda", May 11, 1963 abbrev.)

Part of the open session of the court was devoted to examining the witnesses. One of these was Rudovsky who knew Penkovsky for approximately ten years.

Rudovsky in the main gave evidence on what he defined as "the woman aspect of the matter". One name after another was mentioned: Galya, a grocery clerk, Lida, a nurse, Tamara and Zoya, service men's wives, a certain secretary whose name the witness did not even know; meetings with them were described at Rudovsky's apartment; the presents which these women accepted from galant Penkovsky -- wrist watches, shoes, blouses with foreign trade marks, etc.

Another witness, Finkelshtein was the director of the Applied Art studios. In the course of many years Penkovsky was for him as well as for Rudovsky, a person who had the opportunity of frequently travelling abroad. Finkelshtein was simply stunned by Penkovsky's pockets, stuffed with foreign souvenirs which he lavishly handed out to his friends.

"Penkovsky always bragged about his work in high government offices," the witness testified, "about his acquaintance with people in high positions."

Finkelshtein is an observant person. He spoke about Penkovsky trying to show off about such traits of the latter's character as vanity, arrogance and insolence, intolerance and grandiloquence. "Penkovsky's spiritual requirements," he declared, "were exceedingly limited. He had no interest in the theatre, in music or in books." Finkelshtein noted Penkovsky's desire to show off as a gourmand, a connoisseur of delicate dishes, a person who had already long ago become accustomed to "foreign cuisine".
Another witness Kazantsev, Professor at a research institute in Moscow, gave evidence concerning the trip of a delegation of Soviet specialists to Britain in April and May of 1961. Penkovsky had been the head of the delegation and Wynne "patronised" him. Prof. Kazantsev testified that Penkovsky had repeatedly left the delegation and disappeared somewhere. What for? The defendant specified this point. "To meet the intelligence men."

Also heard in evidence were experts whose finding again and again exposed the defendant. The note books found on Penkovsky were intended for coded messages and the decoding of radio messages from U.S. intelligence radio centre. The sheets of chemically treated paper were intended for espionage cryptography. A letter to London addressed to "My dear friends", i.e. British and American intelligence men, which the spy could not dispatch had been typed on the typewriter Continental which was found to belong to Penkovsky. Foreign-made transistor sets were found to be suitable for the reception of messages from the U.S. intelligence radio centre in Frankfurt-on-Main.

The court also heard the Defence: K.N. Apraksin who asked the court to preserve Penkovsky's life, and N.K. Borovik who solicited for a more lenient sentence for Wynne. Greville Wynne has done a hard rethinking, said the lawyer, and has correctly evaluated his crime. Though Wynne did much harm to the security of our country he is no professional spy and was inveigled by the British intelligence men who threatened him. If Ackroyd, King, their chief, the U.S. intelligence men, "Alexander" and "Oslof", the Chisholms and others were in the dock next to Penkovsky and Wynne, Wynne would recede far into the background, the lawyer said.

5. THE VERDICT

The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.....established in the process of a court inquiry that in April 1961, the defendant Penkovsky contacted the British and American intelligence services and till his exposure in October 1962, collected and passed over to representatives of these intelligence services top-secret information classified as state and military secrets of the Soviet Union.

(A detailed account of meetings etc. between Wynne and Penkovsky was read -- following account in part 3 of this report) ...........

Betraying his country, Penkovsky zealously and loyally served the British and U.S. intelligence bodies. One of Penkovsky's last reports to his bosses, dated September 5, 1962 and removed during the search in his flat, began with these words: "My dear friends..." and ended with: "I warmly clasp your hand... I always feel you next to me. Your friend."

Penkovsky has confessed himself before the court that he is guilty of high treason and has testified to having committed his crimes due to moral degeneration and vainglorious ambition and for careerist motives......

Wynne confessed before the court that he was guilty of espionage and testified that while at the outset he had not realized the true import and character of his actions in maintaining contact between the British Secret Service and Penkovsky, had been unable to refuse assignments when he realized that he was engaging in espionage because he had been "trapped in the net of the British secret service."

The crimes committed by Penkovsky and Wynne are corroborated likewise by expert opinion and material evidence......

On the assignment of the British and American secret services Wynne passed over to Penkovsky part of the listed material evidence as technical means of espionage. As follows from the expert inference submitted to the court during the case hearings, much of the information transferred to British and US intelligence services by Penkovsky and prepared by him for such transfer was secret or top secret, while part of it constitutes state and military secret of the Soviet Union.
In keeping with the above and guided by Articles 301–303 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court.

SENTENCED:

Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky, found guilty of high treason, to be shot and his personal property to be confiscated on the strength of Article 64, point "A" of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

On the strength of Article 36 of the Russian Federation's Criminal Code, the condemned Penkovsky shall be deprived of his military rank of Colonel in Reserve and an application shall be tendered to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on depriving him of his orders and medals.

Greville Maynard Wynne, found guilty of espionage, to eight years' confinement with the first three years to be served in prison and the remainder in a corrective labour colony with a strict regimen, on the strength of Article 65 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The property and valuables, taken from Wynne on detention, shall be confiscated.

The term of Wynne's punishment, including the preliminary detention, shall be counted as from November 2, 1962.

The material evidence, which served as weapons of crime—three Minox cameras, Soni and Zenith radios, Continental typewriter No. 213956 -- shall be confiscated.

The verdict is not subject to appeal or cassation.


The entire Soviet people warmly approved the verdict of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court on the criminal case against the traitor and British and American intelligence services agent, Penkovsky, and spy-liaison man Wynne.

Pravda, other organs of the press and the radio are receiving these days many letters in which Soviet people of various professions and ages express profound satisfaction with the fact Soviet security men checked the foul activity of the British and American intelligence services.

The Soviet state has, since its inception, been the object of unceasing hostile activity on the part of international imperialism. During the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War the enemies attempted to destroy the first socialist state by force of arms but were defeated by the Soviet people. Also failed ignominiously their hopes that the Soviet people will not be able to advance their economy, technique and science and will have to take the capitalist road again. During all these years the imperialists have been waging, alongside an open political, economic and military struggle, a "secret war" against the Soviet Union, resorting to espionage, sabotage and other forms of subversive activity. In a number of imperialist states the subversive and intelligence activity has been raised to the status of national policy. But all criminal designs and actions of the reactionary forces are doomed to failure.

Now that the correlation of forces on the world arena has changed radically in favor of socialism open military attacks against the socialist countries will end in failure for those who would undertake them. International imperialism, however, has not yet abandoned its malicious designs against the socialist states. It is still plotting various intrigues against them. The recent trial of the Anglo-American spies is only one act of the "secret war".

The imperialist states seek to obtain at any cost information about the outstanding achievements of the Soviet Union in the spheres of economy, science and technique, about the Armed Forces of the USSR. The trial revealed in an unmistakable way that, unceremoniously defying the norms of international law; they use for espionage even their diplomatic services. Businessmen, tourists and members of delegations which go to the Soviet Union are drawn into foul espionage. Does this mean, as propaganda in the West maintains, that Soviet people tend to see an enemy in every foreigner? Is it worth saying that claims of this kind are completely unfounded, foolish, a malevolent slander against Soviet people?
The peace-loving Soviet people educated by the Communist Party in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, have always come out for closer friendly relations with other nations, for broader international contacts, and for a wide exchange of cultural values. The world public knows the hospitality with which Soviet people meet everyone who comes to their country with an open heart. Let everyone know that Soviet people do not confuse vigilance with suspicion. They are far from ascribing evil intentions to all their guests. But let everyone remember that the sword of the Soviet security service will smite any snake that tries to crawl into a communist society which our people are building.

Any intrigues of foreign intelligence services are doomed to failure because they do not have, and neither can they have, any social basis in Soviet society.

In our socialist society degenerates like Penkovsky are doomed to universal contempt and destruction. Some 220 million Soviet patriots unanimously expressed their wrath towards the traitor. The Soviet people have heightened vigilance in reply to the imperialist intrigues, to the subversive activity of the British and American intelligence services which were exposed before the whole world at the recent trial in Moscow.

Alongside espionage the enemies of the Soviet Union, peace and socialism, have of late been resorting more insistently to methods of ideological subversion. In an attempt to undermine the Soviet system they are trying to seize on every opportunity of exerting a pernicious influence on morally unstable people. That is why any slackening of the struggle against bourgeois ideology, which serves a means of reviving the survivals of capitalism may create conditions most convenient for imperialist agents smuggled into our country to trap and recruit degenerates. The more vigorously Soviet people will combat the influence of bourgeois ideology, the savage morale of the capitalist world, the higher will be their political vigilance, the ability to discern the enemy no matter how masked, the more reliably they will close all the openings for the penetration of enemy agents.

To be always on the alert, to heighten revolutionary vigilance -- such is today the motto of the Soviet people -- the builders of communist society.


Correspondents: In connection with Penkovsky's and Wynne's trial the Editorial Board of Izvestia received a number of letters in which the readers ask to explain how great was the damage to our defence potential inflicted by Penkovsky's espionage activities?

A. Gorny: After the trial some Soviet citizens got the impression that Penkovsky divulged to the enemy nearly all the secrets connected with the military equipment and defence potential of the Soviet state. This impression is groundless. Penkovsky at the post which he occupied stood far from the materials connected with the arming of our forces, their location and introduction of new types of armaments. He conveyed to foreign secret services information about some technical reports of Soviet specialists who visited foreign countries, divulged some scraps of information of military nature which he succeeded to pry from his friends and prattlers or to get from classified publications and also transmitted some separate materials of internal political nature.

It should be noted that during the first period of Penkovsky's espionage activity the American and British intelligence services were studying him, checking him so as to give him in the future special assignments for the collection of materials that are of special interest to them.

But already by the beginning of 1962, Penkovsky was placed in conditions complicating his ties with the foreign intelligence services. This is testified to by the fact that a big amount of important classified materials, that he had collected, were found in his possession during his arrest, and these materials appeared at the trial as material evidence. Penkovsky
did not transmit them not of his own free will. The spy was hampered by the vigilance of the Soviet people and our security men.

On becoming a spy, Penkovsky handed over to the American and British intelligence certain important information, a part of which constituted a USSR state secret. He committed the gravest crimes against the Motherland and for this he was sentenced to death by a firing squad. But one can state with full responsibility for one’s words that the materials handed over by him could not deal any serious damage to the defence potentiality of the USSR.

Correspondents: The readers in their letters to the editorial board ask what made Penkovsky take the road of high treason and espionage?

A. Gorny: The materials of the court investigation proved convincingly that Penkovsky became a hiredling of foreign intelligence services because of his amorality, because he was a careerist and an egoist. Penkovsky, careerist and poseur, was striving for personal fame, for self-seeking successes. Angry at everything and everybody because he was demobilized from the cadres of the Soviet Army, because he was not given a permanent job abroad, Penkovsky sold himself to foreign intelligence services.

Correspondents: Some readers of Izvestia ask why Penkovsky was not arrested immediately when the state security organs began keeping an eye on him?

A. Gorny: As I have already said, after the state security organs noticed Penkovsky’s suspicious ties with foreigners he was placed in difficult conditions. Despite his strong desire to go abroad he was not given such a possibility. Certain difficulties were created for him in the collection of data, in his meetings with shady people. However there were still not enough grounds for the arrest of Penkovsky, besides not all of his criminal ties with foreigners, both abroad and in our country, had been discovered by that time. I am speaking about the diplomatic staff of the United States and British Embassies in Moscow. It was necessary not only to collect irrefutable evidence of Penkovsky’s espionage activities by also to find out his criminal contacts with the imperialist intelligence services, to prove them documentarily, to collect irrefutable proof of the subversive activities of foreign intelligence services and diplomats. The spy was trapped as a bear in its lair. As a result, the state security organs succeeded in collecting important evidence which exposed not only Penkovsky and Wynne as spies but also the subversive activities against the Soviet State of a large group of officials of the diplomatic representations of the United States and Britain in the USSR.

Correspondents: Our readers would like to know whether people who knew Penkovsky well and knew of his immoral and suspicious behaviour will be punished in any way?

A. Gorny: Penkovsky knew and met many people both at his work and in everyday life, some of them proved to be gawks and windbags, while others, drinking with Penkovsky, assisted in his disintegration. However, most of the Soviet people who met with Penkovsky were honest and loyal to our Motherland. They greatly helped the organs of state security in exposing Penkovsky as a spy. Their signals served as a basis for the active work of our security men in exposing Penkovsky and Wynne. Incidentally, I must say that a group of Soviet citizens were commended by and received recognition from the Committee of State Security under the USSR Council of Ministers.

As regards Penkovsky’s friends and boon companions, they as it was established at the preliminary investigation and during court proceedings, were unaware of Penkovsky’s espionage activities and therefore are not criminally responsible. But their conduct deserves most strict public censure. I must say that all of them are severely punished along administrative and Party lines. For instance former Chief Artillery Marshal S. Varentsov has been demoted because he believed the “complaints” of Penkovsky, with whom he became acquainted at the front, about his allegedly unlawful demobilization from the Soviet Army. S. Varentsov insisted on the revision of Penkovsky’s negative service testimonial and finally, helped him to get the job at the USSR State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research.

Close acquaintances of Penkovsky, Major-General A. Pozovny, Colonel V. Buzinov, former staff member of the USSR State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research
V. Petrochenko who, in violation of the existing rules, told Penkovsky about classified materials received strict disciplinary punishment.

His boon companions V. Finkelstein and I. Rudovsky also were condemned by the personnel of the institutions where they work.

**Correspondents**: What can be said about the activities of the Imperialist intelligence services against the USSR on the basis of the espionage cases which the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR heard in recent years?

**A. Gorny**: In a number of imperialist states espionage and subversive activities against the USSR are lifted to the level of state policy. The leading role in spying against the Soviet Union belongs to the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. Most perfect modern equipment, ranging from miniature photocameras, to space satellites, the spies in the sky, are placed at the service of espionage.

Penkovsky's and Wynne's trial pinched the tail of the old fox -- the British Secret Intelligence Service. It has existed for nearly 300 years and uses increasingly perfidious and refined methods while trying to remain in the shade, but with little success, as graphically proved by the trial of Penkovsky and Wynne.

It is becoming harder and harder for imperialist intelligence services to carry out their subversive activity in the Soviet Union and in the countries of the socialist community. There is no social base in our country for the recruiting of agents of foreign intelligence services. That is why the British and American intelligence services are staking on professional spies, who are trained in special schools and then try to get into our country by using various methods. But inevitably, they all have to face Soviet justice.

At the same time, as proved by Penkovsky's case, the intelligence services of the bourgeois states try to find some renegades among Soviet people who could serve them and betray the interests of their Homeland and people. As a rule these are corrupt persons, ideological bankrupts, careerists and egoists who are prepared to sell themselves to the enemy for Judas's silver pieces. But the renegades have no roots in our Soviet life and therefore they inevitably suffer a fiasco and are exposed by the state security organs in time with the active help of the working people.

**Correspondents**: What is the lesson that our public must draw from the case of Penkovsky?

**A. Gorny**: The trial of Penkovsky and Wynne reminded all Soviet people of the need to keep high revolutionary vigilance, to be implacable to gawks, wind-bags and complacency, which allow a spy of foreign intelligence services to carry out his foul work. I believe that the materials of the trial convincingly prove the need of increasing the struggle with philistine attitudes, lack of principles and ideas, vestiges of the past, that cripple the consciousness of some morally unstable people. There is only one step from philistine attitudes to moral corruption, while moral corruption and ideological bankruptcy can lead a person into the nets of imperialist intelligence services.

A noisy propaganda campaign has been started in the West in connection with Penkovsky's case about the alleged spy mania in our country. This, of course, is a propaganda trick. Soviet people are not inclined to see a spy in every foreigner. They hospitably fling the doors wide open for everybody who comes to our country with good intentions. We are against spy mania, against unnecessary suspicion which only introduces nervousness and in fact hampers the struggle against real enemies of the socialist states. But we are for revolutionary vigilance which must be a necessary element of the conduct of every Soviet citizen.

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Re Seattle letter to Director dated October 30, 1962.

On July 9, 1963, (Protect Identity)

Seattle prepared xerox copies of this pamphlet which reportedly presents a detailed account of the espionage trial and conviction of PENKOVSKI at Moscow, USSR. The data purports to be from issues of "Pravda" and is obviously intended to serve as propaganda for the Soviets.

Inasmuch as many prominent Soviet officials are mentioned copies of this pamphlet are being furnished the Bureau, New York and WFO for possible indexing and other use.

2 - Bureau (REG) (Enc. 1)
1 - New York (REG) (Enc. 1) (info)
1 - WFO (REG) (Enc. 1) (info)
2 - Seattle

RNC/61
(5)
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA

DATE: 8/5/63

SUBJECT: SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; GRU

Source

Date Contacted: 8/3/63

Contacted By: ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SAS
VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

Characterized

A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past

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DATE: 07-26-1963
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When incorporating information furnished by [ ] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [ ] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from [ ], no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF [ ], EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Informant stated that
be. He said he, therefore,

Information Concerning IVAN SEROV,
Former Head of the GRU

Informant stated that

Informant stated

In this connection informant was specifically asked if he feels that OLEG PENKOVSKY actually was executed as the Soviet Government claims. Informant stated that in his own mind he feels there is no doubt but that PENKOVSKY was executed.

Informant stated
Informant stated that it appears to him that

Informant stated that

Impertinent of arrest of

Best Copy Available
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (342)

SUBJECT: 

Source

Date Contacted

Contacted By

Characterized

ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past.
When incorporating information furnished by [unnamed source] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [unnamed source] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from [unnamed source] no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF [unnamed source] EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Information Concerning

At this point informant was specifically asked about the identified informant has previously identified.

Informant replied that he stated that informant stated he has no knowledge that but he pointed out that this could have some bearing on whether he stated however, that he has no personal knowledge of.

Informant recalled that.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK  DATE: 8/13/63

FROM: SA (#342)

SUBJECT: OLEG V. PENKOVSKY

IS - R

Source
Date Contacted
Contacted By
Characterized

SA VINCENT J. CAHILL and
HARRY E. MORRIS JR.
A confidential informant who
has furnished reliable informa-
tion in the past.

1-New York

1-Bureau

1-Bureau

(SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES: KGB)

1-Bureau

TJM: pdw

(6)
Informant stated that
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (#342)

SUBJECT: SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; GRU ESP - R

Source
Date Contacted
Contacted By
Characterized

SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL
and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.
A confidential informant
who has furnished reliable
information in the past.

1-New York
1-New York
1-New York
1-New York
1-New York
1-New York
1-New York
1-Bureau
1-Bureau
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1-Bureau

1-Bureau
1-Bureau
1-Bureau
1-Bureau
1-Bureau
1-Bureau

(SOVIET ESPIONAGE
ACTIVITIES; ILLEGAL
SUPPORT SECTION)

(OLEG V. PENKOVSKY)

TJM: pdw
(15)
Informant stated that
As previously reported, [name] is now back in the Soviet Union and [name] is presently incarcerated after having been arrested by FBI agents for conspiracy to commit espionage.

Informant said that

Informant said that

Informant stated that
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (#342)

DATE: 6/15/53

SUBJECT:

A Confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past.

SA VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS JR.
When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential," since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from [redacted] no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF THE INFORMANT AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
While in conversation with...

In this connection informant stated...

Informant stated...
A Flurry of Spy Cases

Penkovsky's Betrayal of Soviet Set Off Shock Waves Throughout the World

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The world of espionage is still trembling from the shocks of the Oleg Penkovsky case. Arrests, exposures, or defections of agents, paid informers and double agents in several countries have affected the intelligence apparatus of Britain, West Germany, Sweden, the United States, the Soviet Union and perhaps France. Penkovsky, the Soviet official who worked for the West, is dead—he was shot in Moscow after a summary trial in May—but the tremors in the subterranean world of spies and spying may long continue.

Despite sensational aspects of later spy cases, the Penkovsky disclosures were the most important in three years; in fact the breach in Communist security and espionage that it represented has not completely healed. As a result of the Penkovsky case, most Soviet military attachés throughout the world, and many other Soviet nationals, directly or indirectly collecting foreign intelligence, have been recalled to Moscow for interrogation. Some have returned to their posts; some have not.

Spy Had Wide Contacts

Penkovsky was a deputy head of the Foreign Department of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research.

He had access to people in high places in the Soviet bloc, he had wide contacts and he used them.

At his trial he confessed to having sold important Soviet secrets over 17 months to Greville Wynne, a British businessman, who was tried with him and sentenced to eight years in prison, and to United States Embassy officials.

Why Penkovsky was so important has never been completely disclosed. But his contacts with the army, and with scientific and space developments, and his persuasive and winning ways, made him an ideal spy for the West.

Soviet Army marshals in politics who knew Penkovsky and perhaps trusted him have suffered.

Penkovsky was presumably arrested in October, 1962, and it is assumed that he was observed by Soviet counterintelligence agents long before that. In April, 1962, an unscheduled plenary session of the Communist party's Central Committee took place. It apparently discussed military problems and was followed by extensive changes in the Soviet high command.

Marshal Filipp I. Golikov, the head of the Central Political Department of the Soviet armed forces, responsible for the political loyalties of the army, was succeeded by Aleksij I. Yeniseyev, a Communist party stalwart with almost no military record.

Marshal Sergei S. Biryuzov became chief of the Central...
Staff, the third most important
officer in the Defense Ministry,
sometime early this year and
was succeeded as commander in
chief of rocket forces by Mar-
shal Nikolai L. Krylov, the
fourth man to hold this new and
highly important post since
1960.
These signs and many others
—including the temporary re-
emergence of Marshal Georgi K.
Zhukov, who before his retire-
ment had been the most power-
ful Soviet military figure—have
indicated strong differences
within the armed forces and be-
tween the armed forces and the
party hierarchy.
The conclusion of security ex-
erts about the Penkovsky case
and the spate of other recent
espionage cases can be summed
up as follows:
The policy differences within
the Soviet armed forces have
been submerged but probably
not completely reconciled.
A comb-out of the Soviet
espionage apparatus is being
completed.
The Central Intelligence
Agency and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation appear to have
done an effective job.
West German intelligence
agencies have long used many
double agents, some of whom
defected in the past. Re-
cent disclosures that some of
its agents were Soviet spies
may not have been the com-
plete surprise they seemed to
be.
The French security services,
which before President de
Gaulle's assumption of power
were among the weakest in the
North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization, are now far more
effective. Worry about French
security, once prevalent in
Washington, has been trans-
ferred to British security.
Effect of Swedish Case
Col. Stig Wennerstrom, the
figure in the Swedish spy case,
undoubtedly passed to the Rus-
sians important Swedish secrets
and some NATO and United
States data. Sweden's defenses,
however, are key to turning
back or delaying a Soviet am-
phibious or airborne assault
across the Baltic Sea, and to
holding out until Western help
could intervene.
The sites of most of Sweden's
airfields, underground hangers
and other important works were
undoubtedly known to Moscow
before. Even if complete details
don Swedish defenses and opera-
tional plans were disclosed, the
result cannot greatly influence
European strategy; Swedish de-
fenses have never been con-
sidered a major element in the
defense of Western Europe.
Breaches in NATO security
do not necessarily mean
breaches in United States se-
curity. Not all United States
secrets are available to the
NATO allies.
United States intelligence of-
icers in Europe follow two
systems of classification —
NATO and United States, and
the United States papers are
controlled, channeled and
ghed separately.
DIRECTOR, FBI

SAC, NEW YORK

METHODS OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS IN THE US ESPIONAGE

Current issue of the "Current Espionage Digest" reflects information from PENKOVSKI to the effect that there was a GRU illegal residency in the New York City area in 1959, and that it was added to and became operational about 1961. This issue also reflects information attributed to PENKOVSKI to the effect that a GRU illegal residency consists of three to five individuals, and that they usually pose as nationals of a third country.

The information that there was an active GRU illegal residency in NY in 1961 and that the GRU illegal agents pose as nationals of a third country, runs directly opposite to all information we have gathered through our experience in the US in the past. This could mean that these statements are of monumental importance, and could well guide our actions, in the future, in locating GRU illegal residencies than have been operational in the past.

A review of the PENKOVSKI file in the NYO reflects that information from PENKOVSKI relative to the GRU, has not been made available to the NYO.

It is, therefore, requested that the three statements previously mentioned and attributed to PENKOVSKI be given to the NYO in context, and all other information relative to the GRU, and in particular the illegal operations of the GRU, and forwarded to the NYO, if possible.

2-Bureau (RM)

New York (OLEG V. PENKOVSKI)

JBK: mm (4)

[Signature]
Issue number 34 of the "Current Espionage Digest" attributes information to PENKOFSKI that "colossal importance" is attached by the GRU to illegal operations in the US. If our view of the GRU illegal operations in the US comprised its sum total, it would be hard to understand the "colossal importance" attached to GRU illegal operations in this country.

It is, therefore, felt that we may have uncovered dormant or sleeper agents in the past, and have yet to see an operational GRU illegal residency. As a first step in approaching this problem, the NYO requests all the information from PENKOFSKI that is available at the present time.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (3/42)

DATE: 10/9/63

SUBJECT: OLEG V. PENKOVKY IS-R

Source: ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SAS
        VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

Date Contacted: A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past.
Information Concerning Execution of OLEG D. PENKOVSKY

Informant stated that OLEG D. PENKOVSKY was executed. He said he has never heard any information that would lead him to believe otherwise.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (#342)

SUBJECT: IS-R (SMUN)

Source
Date Contacted
Contacted By

Characterized

ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SAS
VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY
E. MORRIS, JR.

A confidential informant who
has furnished reliable informa­tion in the past.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date Contacted</th>
<th>Contacted By</th>
<th>Characterized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SAS</td>
<td>A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TJM: mgs (16)
When incorporating information furnished by [_____] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [_____] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential," since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from [_____] no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF [_____] EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Informant's Visit with

Informant stated that
Informant stated that he met him that

Informant stated that, Informant stated that because of information furnished by

Informant stated that, Informant stated that, Informant stated that.

Informant stated that he heard nothing further about from anyone else. Informant stated that during
Informant stated it seems to be the common opinion in [ ]. It is also felt because of the present climate of coexistence between the Soviet Union and the US that [ ].

Informant stated that [ ].

Informant stated [ ] did not furnish any additional specific information regarding this matter.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (342)

DATE: 12/6/63

SUBJECT: Source

Date Contacted

Contacted by

Characterized

SA VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS JR.

A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past.
When incorporating information furnished by [ ] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [ ] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential," since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from [ ] no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF [ ], EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
It is noted that in the past, informant has furnished information concerning whom he has identified as The Mondt card maintained by the NYO on shows that and returned on 8/3/63 NYC, and is
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (#342)

SUBJECT: IS-R

Source
Date of Contact
Contacted By
Characterized

SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, Jr.
A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past.
When incorporating information furnished by Jinto communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential," since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from , no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Informant's Comments Concerning

On [Blank] informant remarked that [Blank]

however. Informant said he did not know whether [Blank]
Informant said that since he first communicated to interviewing agents the information concerning he had received no additional information concerning the meeting.

Informant remarked that

Informant said that

Informant remarked that within the past few days there

Informant said that

This individual appears identical with

Informant stated that and has several occasions to attend

Informant said/did not know whether He said he
considered it likely that ___________ may have been a

Informant said that

_________ Informant said he never had any personal
relationship with ___________ but only knew

Informant stated that ___________ is an

_________ in the
Soviet Union. Informant said he was told

_________ Informant remarked that ___________ OLEG PENKOVSKY, who was
reportedly executed by the Soviet Government for
collaboration with intelligence agencies of the
Western democracies.
TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (#342)

SUBJECT: I-S-R

(S)

Date of Contact

Contacted By SAS LEON C. KELMER and EDWARD J. MURPHY

Characterized A confidential informant with whom there has been insufficient contact to judge the reliability of his information.

DATE: 3/11/64
When incorporating information furnished by outside sources into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [ ] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from [ ] no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

In view of the highly sensitive position of the informant, extreme caution must be exercised in handling any information attributed to this source and no action taken which could conceivably jeopardize the security of the informant or reveal his identity.
OLEG VLADIMIROVICH PENKOVSKI
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

The information set forth hereinafter pertaining to captioned individual was furnished to representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by a confidential source whose reliability has not yet been fully established. [U]

Above source identified the photograph of Penkovski and stated: 

Source also said he was aware that Penkovski had worked for the important State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research. Source advised he possessed no information concerning the activities of Penkovski as an agent of United States intelligence, nor did he have any information pertaining to the arrest of subject or the investigation leading to the arrest of Penkovski. Source said:

but stated it was formally announced by the Soviet Government that the criminal spy Penkovski was executed, and he had heard. Source not recalled that:

Source stated it was his belief that Penkovski had been executed as announced by the Soviet Government. [U]
Re: WFO airtel 4/8/64 captioned ESP-R. Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies and 1 copy for NY, of LHM dated and captioned as above.

The confidential source in the LHM is...

Enclosed LHM was classified "Confidential" since it sets forth information pertaining to intelligence activity pertaining to the United States. (U)

was interviewed on... by SAS ALEKSO POPTANICH, THOMAS A. MENDENHALL, and MAURICE A. TAYLOR. (U)
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK        DATE: 5/26/64

FROM: SA (#342)          

SUBJECT: SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; KGB

Source: SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, Jr.
Date of Contact: A confidential informant who has furnished reliable
Contacted By: information in the past.
Characterized:

TJM: afb
(8)
When incorporating information furnished by into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Informant's Comments Concerning

Mentioned by Informant on

Attention is directed to NY airtel of 3/10/64, page 2, setting forth information concerning the

Complete information concerning this as known to the informant on
was set forth in the above mentioned airtel.

On 5/18/64, informant was asked whether the

to his knowledge,

Informant said that at the time,

Informant said, however,

that since that time he has heard nothing at all concerning the

Informant said to his knowledge,

Informant said it was his personal opinion that

Informant said he would be alert for any additional information and if he received any such information, he would make it available to the interviewing agents without fail.
Informant remarked that he personally felt that if the

he remarked that based on his knowledge,

said, however, that he believed that the
in passing, whom the informant previously identified as who had said that of and yet allowed said that and did assisted told the informant that

It is noted that the informant has previously advised that
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA #342

DATE: 6/25/65

SUBJECT: SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; GRU (ESP-R)

Source

Date of Contact

Contacted By

Characterized

SAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SAS
VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past.

(SOVIETS NEVER ASSIGNED TO US)

(OLEG V. PENKOVSKY)
When incorporating information furnished by [person] into communication suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [person] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential," since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental affect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from [person], no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF [person], EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Informant's Comments Concerning

Informant stated that it seems to him that the FBI in NY
Informant recalled information he had furnished to us during the interview of [redacted] concerning remarks made by [redacted]. He repeated much of this information during the interview of [redacted], stating, among other things, that

Informant also recalled that [redacted] told [redacted].

Informant said [redacted]. Informant could not readily recall the true identity of this individual, but under questioning said he believed that this individual is identical to [redacted]. (More detailed information concerning this matter is set out in NY airtel, 6/2/65, beginning on page 8. No attempt is being made to repeat all that information at this time.)

In connection with the above remarks, informant stated that on [redacted], he said that [redacted].
then stated to the informant that on the

He said that at

Informant stated in connection with that he feels that the
has known, namely, are very good men, who get along well with their personnel and will not hesitate to

Informant said that

Informant said these try to give the impression that
Concerning

Informant stated that in the recent past has made some interesting remarks

Informant said that one point made was the fact that

pointed out that

He said that this was largely the reason

At a later point in the interview, informant stated that he was quite sure that

Informant was asked what

Informant replied that

He said these

He added that
In response to a question, informant stated that he could furnish no information concerning. He said but had merely stated that in the US.

At still another point during the interview of informant remembered that

Informant was asked if anyone who said he could recall that Informant said

Informant said he recalled, in addition, another

Informant said that
Additional Comparison Between

Informant stated that another reason he feels that Informant said, in explanation of this, that it is the

Informant said that the Informant said
Informant Does Not Know Why

In connection with informant's information concerning SAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT asked the informant if he could recall telling us approximately that

He said he only knew that

Also, in this connection, informant stated that
Informant's Comments Concerning

In talking about __________ informant recalled that

Informant said that

that

On _______ informant stated that he had heard nothing more about this matter. He said perhaps he forgot about it or maybe he is too busy. He said on the other hand that but that informant had no way of knowing this.

Informant's Comments Concerning
IVAN SEROV, Former Chief of GRU

At one point during the interview of SAC SCHMIT remarked to the informant that recently, about two weeks previously, he had seen an article in the "NY Times" about IVAN SEROV, the former Chief of GRU. Informant was asked if he was cognizant of this article. Informant replied that General SEROV This remark prompted the informant to say that it was his recollection that

Informant acknowledged, in response to a question, that He said it was very interesting
to recollect that Informant said that

Informant said that during the course of the

He added that at this same

Informant said that at that time in

Informant noted, however, that

Informant said that

Informant acknowledged that he had heard in the recent past that
Comments Concerning Director HOOVER and the FBI Budget

During the interview of informant inquired of SAC SCHMIT at one point as to whether the FBI would receive the extra four million dollars which Director HOOVER had requested of the US Congress following the appearance of the "recent articles" in the "Saturday Evening Post."

It is noted that informant was referring to the article written by who was recently tried and convicted of committing espionage in favor of the Soviet Union, receiving a 30 year sentence, and another article by concerning certain KGB figures who are working or who have worked in the past in the US.
Informant's comments concerning these articles which appeared in the 5/22 and 5/29/65 issues of the "Saturday Evening Post" have been furnished to the Bureau in prior communications.

When asked to clarify his question, informant explained that

Informant said that

Informant was told that there are many reasons which exist which might make it necessary for the FBI to request supplemental amounts to the budget recently submitted to Congress for approval. The instance of large civil rights expenditures in the South were cited, as an example.

Informant stated, He reiterated that

Informant then asked SAC SCHMIT, "How is Mr. Hoover?" He was told that Mr. HOOVER is fine. Informant then remarked,
Informant repeated information he had furnished.

Informant said that...

Informant then remarked that...

Informant said that the next time...

Informant's Comments Concerning...

In line with informant's remarks concerning as set out above, informant was asked...

He replied in the affirmative, but said that in addition in NY he likes the...
He said he much prefers [insert]. He then commented that in [insert], he identified it as the [insert] and said that [insert]. Informant then related that at one time [insert]. He said this is no longer the case, and that at [insert].

In reply to a question as to [insert], informant said that [insert]. Informant said that if [insert].

In response to other questions, informant said that [insert].
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1360701-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 13
Page 81 ~ Duplicate;
Page 86 ~ Duplicate;
Page 87 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 100 ~ Duplicate;
Page 107 ~ Duplicate;
Page 116 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 117 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 118 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 119 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 120 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 121 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 143 ~ Duplicate;
Page 145 ~ Duplicate;

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TO: SAC, NEW YORK
FROM: SA #342
SUBJECT: GAPKE


Source
Date of Contact
Contacted by
Characterized

SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, Jr
A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past

All information contained herein is unclassified except where shown otherwise.

(TJM: tmm)
When incorporating information furnished by the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by the Bureau will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental affect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's KGB code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made. Such information is of no investigative value and its indiscriminate and unwarranted misuse could endanger the informant's sensitive position.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRADED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
In the course of this interview, informant was asked about OLEG PENKOVSKY, the employee of the State Committee on Coordination of Scientific Work in the Soviet Union who was arrested toward the end of 1962 on a charge of having collaborated with Western intelligence officials.

Informant considered this question briefly, and then said that no information had come to his attention, said he
It will be recalled that on 10/29/63, by FBI personnel along with others, all of them were arrested on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage against the US. After being briefly detained, they were released because of their diplomatic status, but subsequently tried in Federal District Court in Newark, and were convicted of this charge. Both have since been sentenced.

Informant said he could not recall specifically when in point of time, but said he recalled it well and noted that

Informant said that

Informant said
Informant said this was the extent of the comments made and informant commented that Informant said he did not know

The Bureau's attention is directed to NY investigative airtel of 11/2/64, beginning on page 6, setting forth details received from the informant concerning and then stated that there were after a thorough investigation arrived at

No Information Concerning

Following informant's recital of the information set out above, he was asked by interviewing personnel
Informant, in reply, said that he could not recall having heard any mention made of...
Book by Russian Spy as U.S. Spy Will Carry On Anti-Soviet Work

By MAX FRANKEL
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 1 — A Soviet official who three years ago rendered extraordinary service to the West as a spy in Moscow is said to have left a memoir full of anti-Soviet information, speculation and gossip from which intelligence agents expect to derive still further profit.

The spy, Oleg V. Penkovsky, sent out a wealth of military, economic and political intelligence in 1961 and 1962 before he was arrested, tried and shot by the Russians in 1963. The intelligence data, set down here to regard him as the most valuable agent in years. In decades. His alleged memoir is to be published this month as "The Penkovsky Papers."

The Central Intelligence Agency said that its representatives

Oleg V. Penkovsky
Wide Discontent Hinted

The papers describe some Soviet intelligence operations and by giving many names of alleged agents are certain to cause doubt upon many Russian projects and officials. They also hint at widespread popular discontent and portray the life of the Russian military and party leaders as sad and selfish.

The Penkovsky papers state that political or economic espionage is the principal or major business of Soviet embassies, delegations, and other activities. They describe acts of espionage against India but also alleged plans to damage dams and poison drinking water in other countries such as Pakistan.

They speak of tentative plans to establish missile sites in Afghanistan, to sabotage combat and non-combat operations in New York, Washington, and London. They suggest that it becomes necessary.

They provide support for opponents here of the consultative treaty with the Soviet Union, which is still awaiting Senate approval, by stating that all American military and intelligence agencies are involved.

The names of hundreds of alleged agents are given, including Karpov in London, Veselkhov in India, Penkovsky in Egypt, and Sergeyev in Japan.

Favorite techniques are described, and a long lecture on how agents are allegedly instructed to behave. The papers justify treason by expressing the certainty that unless checked, Soviet policy will lead to nuclear war. They amount to a rebuttal to a Soviet military tribunal’s finding that Penkovsky had been coerced.

Outwardly, Penkovsky had his misgivings in the Soviet State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research Work. The papers show, however, that he traveled in the highest Soviet military circles. He was the son-in-law of Soviet generals, the confidant of the former chief marshal of artillery and a friend of Gen. Ivan Serov, who headed the State Committee and the military intelligence services.

These connections appear to explain the wide range of information supplied by Penkovsky and the great shake-up of military and intelligence ranks after his trial and execution in May 1962.

The papers say that Penkovsky sent out 5,000 documents and reports, some of which he obtained through “research” in military archives, but that only a small portion contained any material.

The material appears to have included much technical military information, reports of popular riots, and labor stoppages, descriptions of intelligence operations, facts and weakness of leading Soviet officials and reports of maneuvers and policies that were probably “contingency” papers.

Some of the information about Soviet missiles appears to have helped the C.I.A. in hurried analyses of Soviet missile construction in Cuba in 1962.

The visions of President Kennedy and others at that time of Soviet counterattack in Germany or Iran and Turkey also appear to have been tested by Penkovsky’s reports.

In describing the book, which is to be published Nov. 19, the magazine Newsweek said today that Mr. Kennedy had turned to the books in the missile crisis to learn that the Soviet nuclear forces are not in a state of war readiness.

While such information was not new, the specific knowledge could not be confirmed.

Newsweek also suggested that the book might have led to Penkovsky’s arrest within a few days. The papers, however, show that he felt himself to be under surveillance as early as July 1962. Some of his exploratory reports also came under suspicion here at the time because they appeared to be less convincing.

Without challenging the accuracy of much of the material, some observers were already suspect that the memoirs may have been written after Penkovsky’s writings and oral reports to Western agents were at least broadly simplified with material that Western agents wanted published.

Penkovsky’s arrest was announced in December, 1962. It is believed that he has confessed.

Mr. Wyne, who reached London, refused to comment on the papers, saying that he was committed to protecting the names of agents who have arranged meetings with Moscow.
SAC (100-60713)

SA (343)

TASS NEWS AGENCY
IS-R

Source
Dates
Reliability

Has furnished reliable
information in the past

On 11/5/65, the source determined that

Source determined on 11/5/65, that

Source determined on 11/8/65, that

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(OLEG PENKOVSKY)

GEB: pad
(8)
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TASS NEWS AGENCY
IS - R

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Source determined on 11/14/65 that

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(PENKOFSKI)

1-New York
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11-23-65
Penkovsky’s Fellow Spy Hails His Service to West

By MAX FRANKEL

Oleg V. Penkovsky’s service to the capitalist world—considerable while he lived and still unfinished in death—reached a posthumous culmination here yesterday.

The mysterious forces of espionage and the obvious forces of commerce joined to promote a book that purports to be the secret journal of Colonel Penkovsky, the West’s best-placed Moscow spy in memory. Thus they produced yet another extraordinary chapter in an extraordinary but slippery tale.

With an expression of regret that the executed colonel was unfortunately “not with us,” the publishers of the book, Doubleday & Co., presented the next best pitcher, Greville Wynne, past 19 months out of a Soviet jail, for his contact work with Penkovsky in 1961 and 1962.

Mr. Wynne, whose dark hair and curly mustache made him look a little like the actor Terry-Thomas in repose, showed a certain flair for dramatic narrative but, as was not to spoil his own, as yet unwritten book, held back most of his own story of seven years of “business” journeys in Communist Europe.

Penkovsky’s Fact Praise

He was happy, however, to have flown the Atlantic to help drum up business for the Penkovsky papers, to be published Friday, because, he said, he Mr. Wynne or Frank Gibney wished to call attention to a courageous man, to his warning that “the West must show strength” to the Soviet Union and to the importance of their joint venture in espionage.

“After it hadn’t been for Penkovsky, you would have had more than a knockout in this fight,” Mr. Wynne remissed. “Penkovsky saved a war, in my opinion.”

The evidence for this judgment could not be drawn from
the papers’ editor, except for vague suggestions that Penkovsky passed along “very important” information during a time of crisis in Germany and Cuba. The judgment greatly exceeds even the most generous appreciation of Penkovsky ever heard in Washington.

At a news conference in the Doubleday offices, Mr. Wyne also hinted that he had gone to Moscow with the express purpose of appraising Penkovsky after the colonel had twice tried to make contact with Western intelligence. Soviet efforts to recruit Mr. Wyne for espionage and Western efforts to make their contacts appear like a back-market conspiracy at worst, also figured somehow in the story, Mr. Wyne suggested, but he kept plugging his own book whenever the interview threatened to become interesting.

Neither Mr. Wyne nor Mr. Gibney said enough to dispel the widespread doubts about the origin of the Penkovsky journal. It is said to have been smuggled out of Moscow just before the colonel’s arrest Oct. 27. Mr. Wyne said that, in more than 50 meetings with Penkovsky, the colonel never mentioned the secret diary by which he allegedly wanted one day to reveal and justify his treason to the world.

The book, called “The Penkovsky Papers,” says nothing more about how it came to be published. “Penkovsky” is a more literal rendering of a final double-vowel in Russian under a transliteration system preferred by the United States Government, including the Central Intelligence Agency.

Without necessarily questioning that Penkovsky was the author of most of the book’s anti-Soviet information, speculation and gossip, many Soviet specialists in Washington doubt that he actually duplicated many of his reports to the West in a secret diary. Some officials believe that British and American intelligence services created the memoir from the record of their three interrogations of Penkovsky in London and Paris during his 18-month career as a spy.

The C.I.A. is known to have checked the book “for security” and, according to Mr. Gibney, “took out a few things, I assume.” Mr. Gibney said he had obtained the papers already translated from Peter Derabin, a defector from Soviet intelligence, whose present job and whereabouts are secret.

Mr. Gibney would not describe the original manuscript except to say that it consisted of several hundred pages, mostly typewritten, plus pictures of Penkovsky and photopies of personal documents, including his Communist party membership card, which appear in the book.
Briton Tells Of Red Spy's Help to U.S.

By Gwen Gibson

Greville Wynne, British businessman and intelligence agent, told a news conference yesterday that he had not been, as Soviet counterintelligence Alex Penkovsky "you might have had more than a blackout in this fine city of yours."

Mr. Wynne, who was here from London, to help publicize his own projected book and "The Penkovsky Papers," which Doubleday has just published.

Mr. Wynne said Col. Penkovsky's information was vital to the West in the East Berlin military showdown and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The London businessman, who served 18 months in a Russian prison, has said that President Kennedy was supplied crucial information by Col. Penkovsky, a top man in the Soviet intelligence system, at the time those two explosive situations were reaching a showdown. The U.S. government has never confirmed this, either officially or unofficially.

At his tape-recorded, hour-long press conference yesterday in the offices of Doubleday, 257 Park Ave., Mr. Wynne said it was probably Col. Penkovsky's swift response to President Kennedy's request for top secret facts about the Soviet buildup in Cuba that led to the "Pentagon Papers," arrest and death.

Col. Penkovsky, known according to Doubleday, in intelligence circles as "the West's superspy in Moscow," was sentenced by a military tribunal in May 1963 to death by a firing squad for high treason. This announced shortly thereafter that, the Russian spy and friend of the West, had been executed.

"I believe Penkovsky is dead now," Mr. Wynne said at his press conference. "But I don't believe he was shot when they said he was. They (Russian intelligence) were waiting to see what I would say. They still aren't sure how deeply I was involved."

Mr. Wynne said that Col. Penkovsky, whom he called "Alex," was privy to the "holiest-of holies in the Russian hierarchy and, he used this to the limits for the West. They (the Russian government) haven't gotten over it yet."

Mr. Wynne, then a representative of 12 London manufacturers, first met Col. Penkovsky in Moscow in 1960 and, after elaborate consultations, served as his chief co-betrayal while Col. Penkovsky, for 18 months during 1961 and 1962, gave Soviet secrets to the West.
FREED AGENT REPORTS

Many Allied Spies Busy in Russia


By FLORA LEWIS
A Journal-American Exclusive

The Englishman who was freed from a Moscow jail in exchange for Soviet spy Gordon Lonsdale indicated that there are top Western spies now functioning in Russia.

Geoffrey Wynne, who served as contact for Western intelligence with Soviet state security Col. Oleg Penkovsky, appeared at a press conference here to help launch "The Penkovsky Papers.

The book is said to be Col. Penkovsky's memoirs which were smuggled to the West before the writer was convicted of spying and executed in Russia.

Mr. Wynne was arrested in Hungary 10 days after Col. Penkovsky was arrested in Moscow. The Englishman was taken to Russia immediately, tried, sentenced to eight years in prison but sent home after 18 months in return for Lonsdale.

ADMIRES COLONEL

Mr. Wynne spoke with ardent admiration for Col. Penkovsky, whose main aim in providing valuable information to the West was "to prevent a war," he said.

"There are other people like him" Mr. Wynne added, "but of course you don't hear about them until they get caught."

Col. Penkovsky "was in the holy of holies and he blew it sky-high," Mr. Wynne said, describing his late friend's importance. "They (the Russians) havent recovered yet and they won't for a long time."

Mr. Wynne said he did not believe the Russians were aware of his real role in the espionage link, despite his prison interrogation, and only learned the story when he came back and made public disclosures. He is writing his own book about the affair.

LONSDALE BOOK OUT

Mr. Lonsdale, now back in Russia, has also published a book about his activities in the West.

Mr. Wynne said this extraordinary change in Soviet policy against discussing Moscow's intelligence activities was almost certainly provoked by word that the "Penkovsky Papers" would be published.

Mr. Lonsdale's book naturally puts Soviet espionage in a good light while "The Penkovsky Papers" does exactly the opposite.

From The Los Angeles Times
Washington Post News Service

CLIPPING FROM THE
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DATE
PAGE
FOWARDER BY NY DIVISION
NOT FOWARDER BY NY DIVISION

ARCHIVED INDEXED
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In September, Sam Safire, The American Broadcasting Company's correspondent, was expelled because of a new report originating in the network's Washington bureau that a shake-up in the Kremlin leadership was imminent.

"The Penkovsky Papers," published as a book in London and New York this month, are random notes critical of the leadership of former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. They allegedly disclose details of the operations of Soviet intelligence organizations.

The publishers described the material as "the informal comments" of Mr. Penkovsky smuggled out of the Soviet Union shortly before he was convicted as a spy for the West and shot in 1963. The name is spelled in the book with a literal rendering of the Russian final vowel.

Post Denounces Action

WASHINGTON, Nov. 25—In an editorial prepared for publication tomorrow, The Washington Post denounces the expulsion of its Moscow correspondent as "a deplorable exercise of arbitrary power."

"It is to be regretted on many counts," the editorial says. "Chiefs, it is to be regretted because...it indicates that the short-lived relaxation following the death of Stalin has indeed proved to be a reversible process. Instead of loosening the rigorous and inhibiting control of its own writers, the Soviet Government now attempts to impose upon the press of other countries by treating correspondents from those countries as virtual hostages, a control and dictation to which no reputable newspaper can submit."

By O. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—"Any fiction, spy story you have ever read pales in comparison with Oleg Penkovsky's dramatic account, or his extraordinary personal adventure," says the advertisement for his book. Simultaneously, English readers are offered memoirs called "Spy's" by a Soviet agent known in London as Gordon Lonsdale until his arrest for espionage and recently named Konon Trofimovich Melody. Melody-Lonsdale was subsequently exchanged for Greville Wynne, a British associate of Penkovsky imprisoned in the U.S.S.R. Wynne has not yet published a book.

A C.I.A. Product?

Victor Zorza, the Manchester Guardian's Kremlinologist, believes "the Penkovsky papers are not, "wholly genuine." He contends no Russian text has been produced and the English version is "peppered with words and phrases no man with Penkovsky's background would use." Zorza adds errors in dates and "facts," asserting much of Penkovsky's memoir must have been written "by a Western pen." He concludes "the book can have been compiled only by the Central Intelligence Agency."

The genesis of Penkovsky's "papers" seems valid: whether part of the work is true cannot be judged. Whatever its origin, the work provides juicy reading and embarrasses Moscow just as Lonsdale's possibly spurious work embarrassed Washington. Penkovsky was undoubtedly an efficient Western agent in the Soviet hierarchy where his boss was Kosygin's confidant. After Penkovsky's arrest in 1962, almost 300 Soviet intelligence officers were recalled as intelligence networks were expanded.

Spies, Forgeries and Fakes

The period since World War II has been gaudy with spies, forgeries and fakes. Indeed some have been widely publicized, like the legend of a KGB agent, Rudolf Abbe, forged a U-2 pilot Gare Powers; Lonsdale, Ivan Egorov, a Soviet diplomat in the U.N., Giuseppe Martelli, an Italian who spied for Moscow in high-heeled shoes; Burgers, a German who sneaked to Russia when their cover wore thin. Yet intelligence services don't limit themselves to "ferrying out" secrets; they catalogue each other. Whenever possible, Moscow's K.B.B. has its "disinformation" section under its subsidiary branch in East Germany that disseminates false papers. Some of these have included crude "documents" bearing U.S. Cabinet or C.I.A. "signatures."

Four years ago the C.I.A. claimed it had uncovered 32 such forgeries in four years. British counter-intelligence is equally alert. Some "documents" are sold and others are given to naive newspapers... The befuddled public derives particular entertainment from the cold war's fake literary productions. Among these Professor Paul W. Blackstock of the University of South Carolina lists the purported diary of Maxim Litvinov, late Soviet Foreign Minister; the strategic thesis of Marshall, Bulgakini, "memories" of General Vlasov, who organized an army of Russian prisoners for Hitler and was later hanged; and two volumes of fascinating recollections by a nonexistent nephew of Stalin, Eduard Swoboda. Excellent works in this category, including those of Litvinov and "Swoboda"—were apparently manufactured in Paris by the literary art of a refusel. Soviet diplomat named Grigorii Bessedovsky. In 1939 Bessedovsky, then counselor at the Russian Embassy in Paris, sought political asylum.

Written for Idiots?

According to Blackstock, Bessedovsky, a gentleman of talent and imagination, wrote a fellow Emigré from Poland: "Sir, I write books for idiots. Do you imagine that anyone in the West would read what you call my apocalyptic works if, in quoting Karatayev, Zhukov, Mikoyan or Bulganin, I tried to be faithful to the manner, sense and form of their speeches?"

"But when I portray Stalin or Molotov in parodies, when I tell the dirtiest possible stories about them—never mind whether they are true or invented—the assurance that not only all intellectuals will read me, but also the most important capitalists, alistanian, on his way to a peace conference, will pick up my book before going to sleep in his pullman... Allah has given me the stupid in order, that the intelligent can live easily."

Facts, fiction, half-truths and distortions are mixed together in the strange game played by competing intelligence services and ambitious entrepreneurs. When an American politicals attends in Moscow list his diary, Russian security officially publicized it with salutary inserts such as: "War! As soon as possible! Now!"

Some Experts Fooled

Among amateur factotums, Bessedovsky's critics have been led astray. John General, Bedell Smith, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow and C.I.A. boss, was persuaded to write an introductory note for the highly suspect Litvinov diaries. Bessedovsky, and Melody may be genuine authors but, at any rate, the late Ian Fleming had many imitators. Anonymous cold war competitors. Like Fleming's works, they are more
PENKOVSKY BOOK
SCORED BY SOVIET

Anti-Russian Papers Called
"Concoction" of C.I.A.

WASHINGTON (AP) - Soviet authorities, apparently embarrassed by the publication in the West of "The Penkovsky Papers," are strongly denouncing the controversial book as a "forgery" of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.

The papers, published this month in London and New York, are a compilation of anti-Soviet information, speculation and gossip purported to have been supplied to Western intelligence agencies by Oleg V. Penkovsky, who was executed by the Russians in 1963 as a spy for the West.

"Pravda," the Communist Party newspaper, described the volume today as the "latest anti-Soviet concoction of the C.I.A. and evidently its British Associates."

In an article by V. Golikov, the newspaper said the book "does not deserve analysis," and added: "It has been compiled so crudely that self-respecting British newspapers at very first glance could not but expose its authors."

Pravda went on to quote from British press comment that cast doubt on the authenticity of the alleged memoir.

Derjavin, Cited

Soviet sources have suggested privately that the book, even if based in part on intelligence supplied by Penkovsky to the West, was embroidered with information already in the hands of Western agencies.

It was noted that a Soviet defector, Peter S. Derjavin, was identified as the translator of material from the Russian language original that allegedly was used in the volume.

Mr. Derjavin, a former official in the Ochtrana, the Soviet service responsible for guarding Soviet leaders, has refused to make the Russian manuscript public and has declined to say how it came into his possession.

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Relations, Derjavin gave a detailed view of what he described as the high lying of Soviet leaders. A large amount of material on the private lives of the Kremlin leaders is also contained in "The Penkovsky Papers."

According to reports from Washington, the C.I.A. and its representatives had read the book to guard against security violations, but the agency disclaimed responsibility for publication and refused to touch for the papers' accuracy.

Wynne Is Denounced

The Soviet denunciations of "The Penkovsky Papers" have also been directed against Isle-of-Wight M. Wynne, a British businessman who was Penkovsky's co-defendant at a partly public trial in Moscow two years ago. Wynne allegedly was Penkovsky's principal Western contact.

"Wynne was sentenced to eight years in jail but was released in April 1964, in exchange for Gordon A. Lonsdale, who had been convicted as a Soviet spy in Britain," Pravda added to the exchange today by saying Wynne had been freed "under certain circumstances."

Lonsdale's purported memoirs, titled "Spy," were published last month in London. Pravda assailed Wynne for promoting "The Penkovsky Papers" by holding widely publicized news conferences in London and New York.
Striking Back

As Greville Wynne explains it, "Penkovsky did what he did because it was one way he, as an individual, could strike back at a system which had debased his country."

This attribution of idealism to an executed spy will doubtless evoke some cynicism. Nevertheless it is a fact, and it is buttressed to the hilt by a secret journal which Penkovsky wrote, while he was working for the West.

The journal, never discovered by the Russians, was later smuggled to the West, and is now published with an extended introduction by Frank Gibney. It is a remarkable commentary on life inside the USSR.

The People

Quite apart from its valuable data on Soviet armaments, its debunking of Soviet military leaders, and its disclosures of policy, it throws a startling light on the mores and morale of the Russian people.

Making due allowance for the fact that Penkovsky was out of step with his fellow-Russians, its revelations of drunkenness and debauchery among the professional elite and the disillusionment rampant among the younger intelligentsia make one wonder just how monolithic the Soviet state really is.

It was Penkovsky who first revealed the explosion of a nuclear-powered missile engine in 1960 which killed over 800 people.

This is unquestionably the spy story of the year and one unlike any other I have ever read, if only because we of the West were the beneficiaries.
The revelations of Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, a man who single-handedly changed the course of history by giving Russia's most vital secrets to the West.
You've seen it in the headlines...
Now, get the book the Russians don’t want you to read!

Now is your opportunity to get the book which has created a news furor around the world since its recent publication. Moscow’s reaction and denial of the validity of the Penkovskiy papers was immediate... her retaliation has been expressed by expelling newsmen whose papers have syndicated portions of the story.

Oleg Penkovskiy was an intelligence colonel of the Soviet General Staff who sabotaged Krushchev’s threatened Berlin showdown in 1961. Information he supplied led to President Kennedy’s successful ultimatum in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962... and also Penkovskiy’s death by a firing squad. Now, his sensational secret memoirs, written during the dangerous years of his double life, and eventually smuggled to the West, are at last made public. Any fictional spy story you have ever read, pales in comparison with Penkovskiy’s dramatic account of his extraordinary personal adventure.

NEWSWEEK
“...certainly one of the most extraordinary documents in the history of espionage...”

TIME
“Penkovskiy was the optimum spy; unlike the mere information gatherers, he had the golden gift of evaluation. As a colonel in the GRU (Russia’s military intelligence agency), he not only had access to top defense information but was also trained by no less a lot of key figures than Top Spy Ivan Serov and Missile Boss Sergei Varentsov to spot what was the most valuable in the Soviet military treasure chest.”

John Barkham, SATURDAY REVIEW SYNDICATE
“...attests anew the adage ‘truth is stranger than fiction’... Quite apart from its valuable data on Soviet armaments, its debunking of military leaders, and its disclosures of policy, it turns a startling light on the mores and morale of the Russian people.”

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The Trial of Col. Penkovsky

"On May 7, 1963, in Moscow in the Court Session Hall of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., there began an open trial in the criminal case of the agent of the British and American intelligence services and citizen of the U.S.S.R., O.Y. Penkovsky and the subject of Britain and spy go-between, Greville Wynne."

Information release, Military Collegium, Soviet Supreme Court.

By FRANK GIBNEY

THE TRIAL OF COLONEL PENKOVSKY and Greville Wynne lasted all of four days, and one of these days was occupied by a closed session. The verdict was never in doubt; Penkovsky was sentenced to death, Wynne to 16 years’ imprisonment.

Both defendants confessed their guilt, as agreed on during the long months of brutal State Security interrogation. Wynne displayed some obvious reservations, however, and he left little doubt about the extent of his coaching and coercion.

Penkovsky had agreed to the humiliation of a Soviet "show" trial for only one reason: to safeguard the lives of his family.

As Greville Wynne later said, it was clear that he had made a bargain with his State Security interrogators.

He was probably safe in assuming the bargain would be kept. The Stalinist terror has left such a bad taste in the mouth of all Russians, that reprisals against a political prisoner's family are generally unpopular. Penkovsky's wife and children never suspected the dangerous crusade to which he had committed himself. He naturally wanted to spare them the worst of its consequences.

CLIPPING FROM THE
N.Y. \journal American

EDITION

DATE 7-10-63

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FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

NOT FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION
WINNE was released in 1964, in exchange for the Soviet spy Konon Molody, who under the name of Gordon Lonsdale had been passing information to Moscow from London.

Although "Lonsdale" espionage against the British can hardly be compared to the magnitude of Penkovsky's disclosures to the West, he was a professional Soviet intelligence officer and they wanted him back in Moscow.

Thanks to the exchange, Greville Wynne has been able to tell the West what really went on at their trial and the interrogations that preceded it.

The very fact that a trial had to be held must have been embarrassing to the KGB. However, Penkovsky had to have a public trial. Eight British and U.S. diplomats in Moscow had been declared persona non grata for their connections with him. A foreign national, Wynne was directly implicated. But Penkovsky himself was too big a fish to dismiss with the minimal notice reserved for most such offenses.

The wave of transfers and demotions in the Soviet intelligence service and the Army, following Penkovsky's arrest, was too large to avoid explaining. (Some 300 intelligence officers alone were hastily recalled to Moscow.)

For six months the prosecution had worked out the details of those four days in court. Wynne himself was interrogated steadily. Since the day-Nov. 8, 1962, when he was flown to Moscow after his abduction in Budapest by Soviet and Hungarian security men.

Inside the Lubanka Prison, the State Security arranged a meeting with both Penkovsky and Wynne. There Penkovsky beseeched Wynne to cooperate within limits. After six helpless months in a solitary cell of the Lubanka, there was little option left to him.

In the pretrial interrogations Penkovsky, who had obviously had a rough time of it, made no attempt to disguise his motives and his actions.

He told his interrogators that he had acted not primarily to help the West, but in the best interests of his own people, the Russian people. This was hardly a defense, which a Soviet court would permit him to repeat in public.

The two defense attorneys assigned to Wynne and Penkovsky went through the motions of talking to their "clients," but only after the interrogators had finished.

When the trial was finally slated, both defendants had been relieved thoroughly, even to the point of visiting the courtroom in advance. The military court, presided over by Lt. Gen. V. V. Bolotovskiy, called four witnesses, two of them acquaintances of Penkovsky's, and produced nine experts to certify the equipment found in Penkovsky's apartment, the security nature of the information which he gave, etc.

Lt. Gen. A. G. German, the chief military prosecutor, summarized it at the outset:

"The accused Penkovsky is an opportunistic, a careerist, and a morally decayed person who took the road of treason and betrayal of his country and was employed by imperialist intelligence services.

By the end of 1960 he attempted to get in touch with the American intelligence services, further exploiting the undeserved trust placed in him and his position as deputy head of the Foreign Department of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research Work — having, through the nature of his work, the opportunity to meet foreigners visiting the Soviet Union as members of the various scientific and cultural delegations.

There was no doubt that Col. Penkovsky had engaged in the most serious sort of espionage. The catalogue of material confiscated in his apartment as read off at the Soviet trial would in itself offer ample grounds for an espionage conviction.

"During the search at Penkovsky's apartment, in addition to the already-mentioned records with the telephone numbers of the foreign intelligence officers, six message postcards with instructions for them, the report and the exposed rolls of film, the following articles were discovered in a secret hiding place installed in his desk, and were attached to the file as tangible evidence: a forged passport, six cipher pads, three Minol cameras, and a description of them, two sheets of specially treated paper for writing secret text, a memorandum with an indication of the frequency on which Penkovsky received instructions for transmission from the foreign intelligence services, the draft of a report from Penkovsky to the intelligence headquarters, the article which Penkovsky had received from the foreign intelligence services and which he intended to publish in the Soviet Union, 15 unexposed rolls of film for the Minol camera, and various instruction manuals provided by the foreign intelligence services — the Soniye (Sony) radio receiver which he had received from the foreign intelligence services and which he used to receive enphorpened radio messages from the intelligence headquarters, and the typewriter on which Penkovsky typed his reports.

There was no doubt, either, whom Penkovsky had been dealing with. Witness the prosecutor's angry tirade:

"A leading role in this belongs to the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S. — the support of the most adventurist circles in the U.S. Like a giant octopus it extends, its tentacles into all corners of the earth, supports a tremendous number of spies and secret informants, continually organizes plots and murders, provocations and divorcements.

"Modern techniques are put to the service of espionage: from the miniature Minol cameras which you see before you up to space satellites, 'spies in the sky.'

"But what the Soviet prosecutor could not do was admit the two most important facts in the whole case:

1) Penkovsky's real identity, as a colonel in Military Intelligence and the real extent of his contacts with the Soviet hierarchy;

2) Penkovsky's real motive in betraying the Soviet regime. In the Soviet record, he could be a drunkard, a philandering, greedy and a girl-chaser — all these motives the
prosecution clumsily attempted to adduce.

As a result the trial showed up as a farce. (Even witnesses from Military Intelligence had to be disguised as officers from the “educational branch” of the Ministry of Defense.)

TIME AND TIME AGAIN

Penskovsky’s past credentials were certified: a war hero, a brilliant officer (and even more brilliant if one included his real record in intelligence) and a responsible Soviet official. Then suddenly came the Fall of 1960. Despite all the prosecutors’ attempts to trace the beginning of “careerism,” it was, as they depicted it, a fall as abrupt as original sin and about as rationally explainable.

“Penskovsky is dead,” the prosecutor, Gen. Gurney told Yevstia and the world, a few days after the trial ended.

The sentence was carried out on 13 May. In the second half of the day, when it was announced to him that the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. had denied his petition for mercy and he was to be executed, there was not a trace of the persecutor’s manner which he had maintained in court.

He met death like a despicable coward...

So ended the career of one of the most extraordinary volunteers of this century. In 12 months, Col. Oleg Penskovsky had alerted the West to the motives and the resources of a Soviet regime bent on a collision course of aggression which almost led to world war. Without Penskovsky’s opportunities, top-secret disclosures, the story of the Berlin crises of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 might have been a sad one for the United States and the world.

The free world is forever in his debt.

---THE END---
AN INTRODUCTION BY FRANK GIBNEY

Col. Oleg Penkovsky was arrested by representatives of the State Security, in Moscow, and taken to Lubianka Prison. On November 2, Greville Wyne was kidnapped by the State Security police in Budapest. He was flown to Moscow and thrown into Lubianka for interrogation. The "interrogation" of Penkovsky and Wyne was to last fifty-six months.

WHAT FINALLY BETRAYED Penkovsky? It was certainly not the result of a long cat-and-mouse game played by an all-seeing State Security.

The State Security's original discovery that Penkovsky's father was a White officer—a damaging item in any Soviet file—undoubtedly started an investigation. In the course of the investigation, the State Security police noticed Penkovsky's frequent meetings with foreigners.

There was another important factor.

At some point the State Security searched Penkovsky's apartment. Once the searchers found the secret drawer with Penkovsky's espionage apparatus—cameras, radio and instructions for Western contacts—the Colonel's doom was sealed.
IT IS NOT ENOUGH for Khrushchev to prepare for atomic and hydrogen warfare. He is also preparing for chemical warfare.

A special 7th Directorate in the general staff is involved in working out methods of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

The Chief, Chemical Directorate, of the Ministry of Defense is "also concerned with the problems of chemical and bacteriological warfare."

We also have the Vyshchaya Military Academy of Chemical Defense, several military-chemical schools and scientific-research institutes and laboratories in the fields of chemistry and bacteriology. They are all working on these military projects.

Near Moscow there is a special proving ground for chemical defense. I know a new gas has been invented which is colorless, tasteless, and without odor.

The gas is avowed to be very effective and highly toxic. The secret of the gas is not known to me. It has been named "American.

Why this name was chosen, I can only guess.

Many places in the country have experimental centers for testing various chemical and bacteriological devices. One such base is in Kaluga. The commanding officer of this base is Nikolay Varentsov, the brother of Marshal Varentsov."
NEAR THE CITY OF KALININ, on a small island in
the Volga, there is a special
biological storage place.
Here they keep large con-
tainers with bacillus of plagues
and other contagious dis-
cases.
The entire island is sur-
rounded by barbed wire and
is very securely guarded. But
my readers in the West must
not be under any illusions.
This is not the only place
where there are such con-
tainers.
Soviet artillery units all are
regularly equipped with
chemical warfare shells. They,
are at the gun sights, and
our artillery is routinely
trained in their use. And let
there be no doubt: If hostil-
ties should erupt, the So-
viet Army would use chemi-
ical weapons against its op-
ponents.
The political decision has
already been made, and our
strategic military planners
have developed a doctrine
which permits the com-
mander in the field to decide
whether to use chemical
weapons, and when and
where.

I recently read an
article entitled: "Prin-
ciples of the Employment of
Chemical Missiles" of the Top
Secret military publication
"Information Collection of
Missile Units and Artillery."
It is being distributed this
month, August, '61. ('This
publication is intended to ex-
plain the latest in-tactical
and operational doctrine to
the highest ranking officers,
i.e., major general and above.)
The article wastes no time
and minces no words. It opens
with the statement that
under modern conditions,
highly toxic chemical agents
are one of the most powerful
The means of destroying the enemy.

Then the article describes the characteristics of chemical weapons, and the principles of using them effectively in combat.

There is no mention made of waiting until the enemy uses chemical weapons; there is no reference to the need for a high-level political decision for the use of such weapons.

From the start to finish the article makes it clear that this decision has been made, that chemical shells and missiles may be considered just ordinary weapons available to the military commander, to be used routinely by him when the situation calls for it.

The article specifically states, "The commander of the army (front) makes the decision to use chemical weapons..."

The authors add that one of the most important uses for chemical missiles will be the destruction of the enemy's nuclear strike capability.

Specific mention is made of the "Little John," "Honest John," "Lacrosse," "Corporal," "Redstone," and "Sergeant" units; the width and depth of their dispersed formations under tactical conditions, and their vulnerabilities to the chemical attack.

Also American cruise missile and atomic artillery units.

The article contains the usual precautions about the necessity to prevent damage to friendly troops, and discussed the operational situations in which chemical weapons could be used to greatest advantage.

This is how it concludes:

"The purpose of this article is to present the main fundamental principles of using chemical missiles. These principles should not..."
any circumstances, be considered as firmly established, because they can be defined with greater precision as practical experience is accumulated."

Soviet officers generally consider Americans to be extremely lax in matters of training and discipline for defense against chemical attack.

I have heard that American soldiers even boast of throwing away their gas masks and other protective equipment, claiming they have lost them. I can hardly believe this, but even if it is only partly true, it is a training deficiency which must be corrected immediately.

Such crucial flaws in an enemy's defensive armor are not overlooked by Soviet planners.
COLONEL PENKOFSKY'S Paris visit was his last to the West. Although his superiors in Military Intelligence later made several proposals to send him on foreign assignments; it became clear that the State Security police were watching him, for some reason.

Penkovsky himself believed that the State Security's surveillance, as a result of the belated discovery that his father had been a White officer in the Revolution.

He correctly believed that they did not yet suspect the real truth: that he had volunteered to do espionage for the West.

Back in Moscow, he coolly continued to deliver information to his American and British contacts. He used three standard intelligence methods:

1) carefully arranged "chance encounters";
2) meetings at the homes of British or Americans he might normally be expected to visit;
3) the device of the "dead drop," the inconspicuous hiding-place where a package can be left for a later pickup, without the need for either party to the transaction to meet face-to-face.

On October 21, just two weeks after his return from Paris, Penkovsky had his first meeting with one of his contacts.

At 9 p.m., he was walking near the Balchug Hotel, smoking a cigarette, and holding in his hand a package wrapped in white paper. A man walked up to him, wearing an overcoat, unbuttoned, and also smoking a cigarette.

"Mr. Alex," he said in English, "I am from your two friends who send you a big, big welcome." The package changed hands. Another hoard of documents and observations on Soviet military preparations was on its way westward.

"Alex," for such was his code name, kept on collecting and transmitting information without skimping on his normal daily rounds. More than ever, he maintained contacts with his friends in the Army. He exuded confidence.

In mid-November, 1961, he took his wife off for a six-month-long vacation, first to the quiet spa at Kislovodsk in the Caucasus, where most of the Soviet ministries have rest houses, then south to the Black Sea beach resort of Sochi. They returned to Moscow on December 19.

IN DECEMBER Penkovsky resumed meetings with his Western contacts, but the risks involved grew ever more apparent.

On January 3, after he had passed some more film to Mrs. Janet Anne Chisholm, wife of a British embassy attaché, in an elaborately casual encounter, he noticed a small car, violating traffic regulations, had swung around to observe them.

Later that same car appeared again at one of his meetings, a small brown sedan with the license plate SHA 61-45, driven by a man in a black overcoat.

Penkovsky wrote a letter to a prearranged address in London, advising that no further meetings with Mrs. Chisholm be attempted.

From that time on, Penkovsky relied on the two remaining methods of communication. He either handed over material in the houses of Westerners, to which he was invited in the course of his duties, or relied on the relative anonymity of dead-drops, of course the safest way to communicate.

But they had their own peculiar suspense and horrors. In effect, an agent working through dead-drops finds himself playing a grown-up game of blindman's bluff.

Through the Spring of 1962 Penkovsky's existence was bounded, by a collection of these inconspicuous hiding places.

Drop No. 1 was located in the doorway of Number 5-6 Pushkin Street, behind a radiator, painted dark green. Messages to be sent were placed in a matchbox wrapped in light blue paper, bound with cellophane tape and wire, and hung on a certain hook behind the radiator.

When Penkovsky had something to leave there, he was to make a black mark on Post number 35 on the Kuznetsov Prospect. He would then put the materials in the drop, and make two telephone calls to numbers G 3-20-87 and G 3-28-94, each with a set number of rings. And so it went. Such are the complexities of a working intelligence operation.

Through it all, Penkovsky continued to jot down his observations and his own warning to the West. The excerpt in Column One discusses one of the most chilling aspects of Soviet war preparations: unrestricted chemical warfare.
DURING MY TRIPS to England and France during 1961, I was given the mission, just as other military intelligence officers, of collecting information of a military and scientific nature. As I was in charge of the delegation, I did not participate in "active operational work," as we call it, I established contacts, made acquaintances, collected literature which would be of interest to Soviet intelligence.

In France and England people talked to me freely, invited me to their homes, restaurants and offices. I was astonished by this because at intelligence staff school in Moscow I was taught entirely different things about the French and British "secret police." After spending some time in those two countries I saw how natural and unaffected the people behaved as though there were no such thing as the secret police. Even our military intelligence officer in London, Shapovalov, loves England—"Mother England," as he calls it.

While I was in London, I asked about the Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin's visit to England. Gagarin does not speak English, but he had some excellent translators. Everyone assigned to him was selected from our "neighbors," the secret police. Shapovalov told me that it was uncomfortable to see so many State Security police surrounding Gagarin. While he was in London, he lived in House No. 13, on the second floor (Kensington Palace Gardens). People by the hundreds stood in the streets in order to see him, and once British girl waited 18-hours to catch a glimpse of him.

DURING MY SECOND trip to London in July, 1961, there were a few representatives of the Central Committee CPSU in my delegation. They had a lengthy conference with Ambassador Soldatov. Later I was told by our deputy-rezident, Pavlov and Shapovalov that they had brought money and special instructions for the British Communist Party. Khrushchev had personally ordered Soldatov to meet with certain leaders of the British Communist Party in the expectation of obtaining information on the Berlin situation and being able to react to the British government in case of a Berlin crisis.
Pevnov, Sharovalov, and Miloniov and Associates

A directive had been received from the Central Committee and military intelligence to employ all agents and friendly contacts with England in order to collect information. The ambassador had a conference with the intelligence REZIDENTS and gave them instructions from the Center. Shortly after this, all the officers in the embassy took off in various directions all over England to gather the needed information. The entire force of operational, strategic, and political intelligence services were mobilized for this.

I cannot understand at all why the Communists are permitted to operate so freely in England and France.

Ananyev, our officer in Paris, told me that Soviet intelligence has very close working relations with Communists, especially those who work in the government, army, and NATO. Ananyev and Frokhinov had both told me that it was very easy to carry on illegal operations in France, especially in Paris.

It is true that if we approach an ordinary Frenchman and he learns that he is speaking with Russians, he will immediately run and report the contact to the police. But French Communists, generally speaking, readily agree to work for us, asking only directions on how and what to do.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE has levied a requirement on all REZIDENCIES, especially those in France, to obtain information on the new models of NATO weapons. They are to use all possible contacts, including all the representatives of the countries of the people's democracies, acquaintances, and Communists.

OTHER ASSIGNMENTS made by the GRU were to obtain a model of the NATO American rifle, equipped with a NATO cartridge; to obtain samples of some kind of new, improved American and British gas masks.

There were many other requirements regarding the collection of information of various sorts, including approximately 20 to 25 items directly concerned with electronics, especially electronic technology as used by missile troops of the American and British armies. We were also directed to obtain information about certain kinds of small American missiles launched from aircraft, which create various forms of interference in the air and disrupt radar scanning.

Information was desired on heat-resisting steel; there seemed to be reason to believe that the USA had done some very good work in this field. The GRU considers that the French have an excellent solid fuel for missiles and have made great progress in this direction.

I TOLD THE REZIDENT in Paris I would be traveling through France and could select suitable sites for drop zones. He replied that they had all the drop zones needed. He told me not to waste my time on this.

The rezident also said that it was easy to arrange agent meetings in France, to transmit and receive materials, etc. He even indicated that dead drops were seldom used, because it was simple to arrange direct meetings with agents.

At the embassies in Paris and London, TASS interceptors and print all communications which do not find their way into the Soviet press. This is done for all the ambassadors, ministers, and deputy ministers. In Military Intelligence they are read by everyone down to and including the chief of a directorate. This is now how they learn about everything that goes on in the world, but does not get into their own press.
AN INTRODUCTION BY FRANK GIBNEY

(Collected from the book "The Penkovsky Papers." Copyright 1966, Doubleday & Company, Inc.)

C OLONEL Penkovsky arrived at LeBourget Airport, near Paris, on Sept. 20, 1961. His British friend, Grenville Wyne, met him at the airport. Penkovsky obviously could not have informed Wyne of his exact arrival time without arousing suspicion among his superiors in Moscow. At the request of the British and American intelligence team, Wyne, still Penkovsky’s closest contact, had flown to Paris and gone to the airport every day for two weeks, watching the arrivals on each flight from Moscow. From the standpoint of Western intelligence, his visit was well spent. The brilliant Soviet agent had brought a huge quantity of exposed film out with him—photographs of secret intelligence documents, technical processes, oral data. Information on Soviet dispositions in Germany, and—most important of all—more top-secret details of the Scud missile’s production and deployment.

As usual, Penkovsky checked in promptly with the Paris “resident” of the Soviet military intelligence and went over details of the Soviet intelligence assignment given him in Moscow as well as his cover job of looking after the Soviet Exhibition in Paris.

Three days after his arrival, however, the colonel began the real business of his trip. Wyne drove him to one of the Seine River bridges, where he met the members of the British and American intelligence team who had worked with him in London. Through the next month, he continued his secret conferences with them at various “safe” apartments in the city. As before in London, Penkovsky gave them a vast store of military and political information, supplementing the documents he had photographed with his own informed analyses of current Soviet plans and military preparations.

When he was not engaged with either set of intelligence officers, Penkovsky again turned tourist, with his British friend, Grenville Wyne acting as guide.

The American and British intelligence officers were perfectly willing to have Penkovsky remain in Paris and there, to receive asylum and a job suitable to his talents in Europe or the United States. The information he had already given on Khrushchev’s missile and Berlin offensives was so important that they were concerned about his future personal security.

For days before his departure, Oleg Penkovsky debriefed himself, as he walked the streets of Paris. He had pressing family considerations at home—a pregnant wife, a mother, a teenage daughter. Could he cut them from his life forever?

PENKOVSKY explained his decision later in the Papers, when he wrote shortly after his return to Moscow: “I feel that for another year or two I must continue in the General Staff of the USSR in order to reveal all the villainous plans and plots of our common enemy. I am not yet ready for the front line. I must remain on this front line in order to see your eyes and ears, and be useful in the fight for our ideals, mankind.”

The following excerpt from the Penkovsky Papers suggests how powerful some of Penkovsky’s immediate efforts were. In it he discusses the extent of the Soviet intelligence network operating out of the Paris Embassy. It is now clear that Penkovsky exposed most of the Soviet spy network in Western Europe to U.S. and British intelligence, during the same month when he was a temporary member of Soviet Military Intelligence in Paris.
"I AM UNDER OBSERVATION," Colonel Penkovsky said, when his British businessman contact, Greville Wynne, arrived in Moscow for what proved to be his last visit before Penkovsky's arrest. It was July, 1962.

Penkovsky had continued to produce tremendous quantities of information for American and British intelligence, but by now he was considering means of making his escape.

He still could not be sure what the State Security police suspected, but he realized that a net of surveillance was tightening around him. A less bold or serious man would have curtailed his activities. But Penkovsky knew the extent of Khrushchev's build-up in missiles, as well as his continued plans for military provocations over Berlin.

He sacrificed caution, in his effort to get his warning across to Washington and London.

Wynne brought Penkovsky's letters from his contacts in the West, which improved his spirit. Western intelligence officers had forged a new passport for Penkovsky to use, within the Soviet Union, in case surveillance increased to the danger point.

He had previously discussed the possibilities of leaving Moscow for Leningrad and somehow making a rendezvous with a submarine in the Baltic. However far-fetched the plan seemed, he was also thinking of some way to get his family out, as well.
ON THE FOURTH of July, 1962, Penkovsky attended a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, where he apparently succeeded in turning over information on the Soviet missile build-up to U.S. officers.

On July 5, he and Wynne had a last meeting, at dinner, at the Peking restaurant in Moscow. There they ran into the most obvious kind of surveillance by the State Security.

Penkovsky wrote down this account of the event, after it happened:

"On approaching the Peking I noticed surveillance of Wynne. I decided to go away without approaching him. Then I became afraid that he might have some return material for me before his departure from Moscow.

"I decided to enter the restaurant and to have dinner with Wynne in plain sight of everyone. Entering the vestibule, I saw that Wynne was "surrounded" (and that surveillance was either demonstrative or an inept one). Having seen that there were no free tables, I decided to leave, knowing that Wynne would follow me. I only wanted to find out if he had material for me and then to part with him until morning; having told him that I would see him off.

"I went 100-150 meters beyond into a large, through courtyard with a garden. Wynne followed me, and the two of us immediately saw the two detectives following us. Exchanging a few words, we separated.

"I was very indignant about this. On the following day, after seeing Wynne off, I reported officially to my superiors that State Security workers had prevented me from dining with a foreigner whom we respect, have known for a long time; with whom we have relations of mutual trust, with whom I have been working for a long time, etc. I said that our guest felt uncomfortable when he saw that he was being tendered such "attention."

"My superiors agreed with me that this was a disgrace, and Levin (the State Security representative) was equally indignant about the surveillance. Levin said that the Committee and I as its representative, granted the necessary courtesies to Wynne and that we (State Security) do not have any claim on him..."

PENKOVSKY'S COOL-HEADED bluff bought him three months' worth. He continued to photograph secret documents in the General Staff library, relying on his good connections in Soviet military circles, to hold off further action by the State Security police.

A year later the Moscow press strenuously attempted to play down Penkovsky's influence and associations with Soviet generals and marshals. Izvestia, for example, called him "a rank and file official whose contacts and acquaintances did not go beyond a limited circle of restaurant habitues, drunkards and philanderers."

How true this characterization was may be gauged from the Papers themselves, a record of which the 'regime' was, of course, ignorant. In the following excerpt, Penkovsky describes one of the many intimate gatherings at which he hobnobbed with the Kremlin hierarchy: Marshal Vorentsov's birthday party in September, 1961.
The Extraordinary Penkovsky Papers

M A R SH A L Varentsov's birthday party was held at his country home. Many guests were invited, including the Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovsky. My whole family, including even my mother, was invited long in advance. Yekaterina Karpova, Varentsov's wife, asked me to be master of ceremonies (tamadran).

On the evening of September 16, 1961, the guests began to arrive: Marshal Malinovsky with his wife, Churayev, Khrushchev's right-hand man in the Central Committee Bureau for the Russian Republic (R.S.F.S.R.); Lieutenant Ryabchikov, Major General Semenov, and many others.

All the military were in civilian clothes with the exception of Malinovsky, who came wearing his uniform. Some of those invited could not come because they were busy, many of them out of town on business trips. The most important guests, of course, were Malinovsky and Churayev. Both arrived in Chalkas (the largest Soviet luxury car).

Malinovsky presented Varentsov with a large (3-liter) bottle of champagne. Churayev gave him a large wooden carved eagle; someone even gave Sergey Sergeyevich a black dog.

The best and the most original presents were those from me and my family. They were the things I had bought in London. Varentsov openly admitted it by declaring loudly:
"My boy has really outdone himself this time!"

And my presents went from one guest to another. Everyone asked where and how I had managed to get such beautiful things. Mrs. Varentsov and my wife quietly explained to the guests about my latest trip to London. The answer was always the same:

"Oh, well, that of course explains it."

At some point, while the party was in full swing, my mother approached Malinovsky and out of a clear sky asked him:

"Forgive me, an old woman, Comrade Minister, my dear Rodion Yakovlevich, tell me please, will there be a war? This question worries all of us so much!"

Marshal Malinovsky answered her in these words:

"It is hard to tell, Taisiya Yakovlevna, but I would rather not discuss it now because I think almost all of the time about whether there will be a war or not. But generally speaking, the situation is difficult. Our enemies refuse to yield. It is true that they swallowed one pill (i.e., the erection of the Berlin wall); the whole thing was handled very skillfully by us. As for the future, I can tell you only one thing: We are totally prepared for any eventuality. We keep our powder dry."

Soon after this, Malinovsky departed, saying that the next morning at 10 he was flying to Lvov. He was going there to attend a Party conference at which he was to be elected a delegate to the 22d Party Congress.

While Malinovsky was still at the party, I went out to the street several times to see if everything was in order, and was surprised to find security men stationed around the country house. Until then I never knew that besides his aides and various courtesies Malinovsky also had a special security force.

There was a great deal of drinking. Churayev, in particular, was drinking heavily. He approached me several times during the party asking me to buy him some Chanel No. 5, Arpege, and other perfumes for his wife if I went on another temporary duty trip abroad.

Other guests asked me to buy them razors, batteries. Some of the generals wanted at-
tache cases. At first I wrote these things down, but later I simply said I would try to get them.

Later, Churayev began to brag about having 20,000 roses and other flowers at his country house, as well as having various small structures, etc., there. I thought to myself:

“What a louse, he has 20,000 roses while ordinary people are starving.”

At the same time he told us about the unrest among the people in a small town between the towns of Mineralnaye Vody and Grozny in the northern Caucasus.

Things had gotten so bad there that several militiamen had been killed. A similar incident had occurred in the city of Aleksan-

drov near Moscow, where the local population had attacked some militiamen and members of the MVD. He also told about the city of Murom, where during a strike the militia had fired on the crowds; several people were killed and many were wounded.

When Varentsov tried to stop Churayev, the latter would not listen to him. Churayev went on to tell us about a large hunger riot that had taken place in Ivanovo, where approximately 400 people attacked the militia.

The people demanded that they be supplied the same food as people in Moscow and asked, “Why is it that they have almost everything in Moscow, while we here have nothing. In Moscow and Leningrad one can fill his stomach somehow, while here we and our families are starving.”

The militiamen aimed at the ground near the feet of the crowd in order to scare the people and make them disperse. There was a great scramble, and many were arrested.

The oblast Party committee secretary came out on a balcony and tried to quiet the crowd. The people booted him and would not listen to him. The militia then once more opened fire on the crowd but were unable to disperse it. At this point troops were called out in support of the militia.

They did not fire and just pushed the people with their own bodies and rifles, and finally drove the crowd away.
THE FOOD SITUATION in the country remains extremely serious. There is much dissatisfaction. Street holdups, burglaries, and murders are frequent. Furthermore, there have been more instances of people attacking the militia.

Those who attack the militia are not hooligans; they are ordinary citizens who want to vent their anger on somebody representing the government.

Finally Churayev started telling other guests at the party how the Central Committee employees wrangle with each other, how much drinking and gambling takes place among them, how they chase after women. Sergey Sergeyevich took him by the arm and led him outside to get some fresh air.

So, there is Churayev, an 'authoritative' representative of the Central Committee: 20,000 roses, a Chaika limousine, two maids, a personal chauffeur, an apartment in Moscow, his own country house in the outskirts of Moscow, a gambler, a drunkard, and a blabber.

But he is on the Central Committee. It is impossible to touch him because he is next to Khrushchev!

I cannot remain indifferent to this. I myself have a fairly comfortable life; my pay is about 10 times that of an ordinary laborer, but what can I do alone? I simply do not know how to help my people.

Perhaps this attitude of mine has already been detected by others. I do not care. I am even glad if this is true. After all, one has to stop and think; today the people are venting their anger on the militia, but tomorrow who knows, they may start doing this to those who are dressed well, who are fed well, to such persons as Churayev, perhaps to me, because I, too, wear civilian clothes.
Churayev was so close to him that he couldn't be touched.

MARSHAL MALINOFSKY—About the Berlin Wall he said, "They (the West) swallowed... the pill."
Our Man in the Kremlin:
The Penkovsky Papers—Part V

U-2 Was Downed

By Shock Wave

The U-2 incident: The American U-2 pilot, Gary Powers, was shot down on 1 May, 1960. Prior to the Powers flight, other U-2 flights had been made over the Kiev and Kharkov, but Krushchev kept his mouth shut, because at that time there were no missiles that could be effective at the altitudes where the U-2 aircraft were flying.

When Powers was shot down over Sverdlovsk, it was not a direct hit but rather the shock wave that did it. The aircraft simply fell apart from it. During his descent Powers lost consciousness several times.

He was unconscious when they picked him up from the ground; therefore, he was helpless to do anything and did not put up any resistance. On 1 May when this incident happened I was Duty Officer at GRU (Military Intelligence) headquarters. I was the first one to report it to the GRU officials.

At that moment the KGB did not have an English interpreter. I was supposed to talk to him because I was the only one around who had some understanding of English. I had already reported the incident to some generals.

If they had not found a KGB interpreter at the last minute, I would have been the first one to interview Powers.

Ultimately they called up to say that I was not needed. It seems that the KGB (State Security) chief, this young fellow Shelepkin, who used to run the Komsomol (he replaced Serov at the KGB), wanted to make the report to Krushchev personally.

So he got an interpreter and picked Powers up himself. But the military had knocked Powers down and Powers was considered to be a military prisoner. He should have been turned over to the General Staff. Nonetheless the KGB seized him, took him to Dzerzhinsky Square, and made their own report. He needed medical treatment, because he was still in shock.

pick up material from a dead drop which was already loaded, in order to avoid possible compromise to the agent. For this he was severely reprimanded by his superior at the GRU even though he did the right thing. Thus, despite the damage it did to the agent network, Khrushchev ordered a cessation of agent contacts during the period when he was going to capitalize on the Powers incident.

Khrushchev followed Powers' investigation and trial with great interest. He personally conducted the propaganda activity connected with the case. He was the first who began to shout about the direct hit, although actually there had been no such thing. Khrushchev wanted to brag about his missiles.

Khrushchev lied when he said that Powers was shot down by the first missile fired. Actually, 14 missiles were fired at his plane. The shock wave produced by the bursts caused his plane to disintegrate. The examination of Powers' plane produced no evidence of a direct hit; nor were there any missile fragments found on it.

One of the 14 missiles fired at Powers' plane shot down a Soviet MiG-19 which went up to pursue Powers. Its pilot, a junior lieutenant, perished.

The RB-47 Incident: The US aircraft RB-47 shot down on Khrushchev's order (on July 19, 1960) was not flying over Soviet territory; it was flying over neutral waters. Pinpointed by radar, it was shot down by Khrushchev's personal order. When the true facts were reported to Khrushchev, he said: "Well done, boys, keep them from even flying close."

Such is our way of observing international law. Yet Khrushchev was afraid to admit what had actually happened. Lies and deceit are all around us. There is no truth anywhere. I know for a fact that our military leaders had a note prepared with apologies for the incident, but Khrushchev said: "No, let them know that we are strong."
WRECKAGE OF FRANCIS POWERS' U-2 PLANE SHOT DOWN OVER RUSSIA IN MAY, 1960
Penkovsky Papers:

A 'Casual Call' Opened Door to Kremlin's Secrets

How Editor Got Explosive Series

By GUY RICHARDS
Journal-American Staff Writer

A magazine editor said today he will never forget the "casual phone call" which led ultimately to the translation and publication of the explosive and controversial "Penkovsky papers."

The documents, turned into a just-published Doubleday book, "The Penkovsky Papers," will be serialized for two weeks starting Sunday in "The Journal-American" as "Our Man in the Kremlin."

They represent the labors of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, a Russian war hero and senior officer in Soviet military intelligence (GRU). For 16 months in 1961 and 1962, and as a gesture of utter final disgust with the Russian Communist hierarchy, Col. Penkovsky passed his writings along with vital intelligence data to Western contacts. His communications were mostly in the form of minute, undeveloped film.
They eventually fell into the hands of — and were edited by — Frank Gibney, a 47-year-old editor of Atlas Magazine. A Japanese interpreter for the Navy and Marines in World War II, Mr. Gibney is familiar with six languages.

"It was an afternoon in November, 1969," he said, "and I was quite busy in my old office as publisher of Show Magazine, at 140 E. 57th St. I got a call from an old friend, Peter Derabin.

Vague 'Something'

Proved Explosive

"It was a very casual call, but Peter is always casual over the phone. He said he had something he wanted to talk to me about and I agreed to meet him at my apartment later.

"It couldn't have come at a much worse time for me.

"On the other hand, I knew Peter never called unless he had something of great importance to impart. We had once written a book together, 'The Secret World,' about his experiences as a major in the secret police arm of the Soviet regime, and in foreign intelligence, before he defected in Vienna in 1954.

(A special publication, "Murder International, Inc.") based on Derabin's testimony, was released last Monday by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.—Ed.)

"Well," continued Mr. Gibney, "when Derabin told me what he had, I knew it was important.

"I am much interested by the reactions in Moscow and elsewhere, now that the Petskovsky papers have been published."
His Simple Purposes

Dealing first with some expression of skepticism in the West that a man in a security situation, like Penkovsky's, wouldn't have kept such incriminating notes on himself—let me say, it's because it is not understood what a unique man he was and he had a motive to have his story known, not withheld.

"He was not a typical secret agent type like the 'Spy Who Came in From the Cold.' His whole purpose was to destroy the system of state security control and destroy Khrushchev's personal regime. So he wasn't primarily interested in his own security.

"It's easy to theorize and attempt to fit this unique man into some pre-determined mold of how an armchair criminologist thinks Penkovsky should act.

"He didn't defect for money. He revolted against the Soviet regime. He was an ideologist. The Soviet objections (the Kremlin) has branded the papers a forgery are an indication of just how much this truth hurt.

"Penkovsky was not just an ordinary defector. He was very high up in the Soviet hierarchy. What he tells us is not second-hand or third-hand reconstruction but first-hand accounts of conversations with marshals and generals and high party officials whom he knew personally.

Smuggled Outside

At a Great Risk

"Doroshin had obtained the papers—a mass of nasty written typed and handwritten documents, some of them
"Penkovsky Was Not Ordinary Defector": still on film—from his own contacts still inside the Soviet Union.

"They were smuggled out to the West at great personal risk, by several persons, and I have respected Deriabin's sources and done nothing to imperil their security.

"The arrest of two Soviet literary men in Moscow recently, one of them the writer of the outspoken 'Tertz' books on Soviet life today, for smuggling books and articles out of Russia, is just another instance of how tricky and dangerous these routes are.

"A month before Deriabin received the papers, Penkovsky had been arrested in Moscow. But he was still alive, obviously being interrogated in preparation for a trial. We could do nothing with the papers while there was the least hope that Penkovsky might somehow escape—or at least avoid the death penalty.

"After the Soviet announcement of his execution, in May 1963, even this thin ray of hope was gone.

"By this time Deriabin had already translated much of the papers and was fascinated by what I saw. There was, however, a vast job of editing the papers and positioning them in time, so American readers would have a god idea of their significance.

"There was no doubt in my mind about their authenticity, once I had seen all the photostats of personal documents, photographs and similar material accompanying them—including Penkovsky's security passes and Communist party membership cards.

Preparing Papers Took Entire Year

"We worked steadily on the papers for the next year.

"Penkovsky was a zealot who worked in utter secrecy, but he was enough of an opportunist to want the world to know why he had volunteered to spy for the West and what he was fighting against. At the end, we showed the manuscript to intelligence agencies of the U.S. government, to make sure no violations of security were involved.

"Deriabin was, of course, invaluable in assessing the true worth of the papers, as well as translating them.

"He knew Penkovsky and his background well. In Siberia, just after World War II, he had worked for Penkovsky's father-in-law General Gapanovich, as a political officer in the trans-Baikal Military District.

"Later, in Moscow, he had done the same sort of political Komsomol (Young Communist League) work as Penkovsky. For a time, in the Moscow Military District, Penkovsky worked for one of Deriabin's old friends.

"The papers were written hurriedly, and they showed it. The language would alternate between stiffly formal and sheer slang.

"But over the months,
were not without some notable blind spots. It was a sad and frequent occurrence when he was cut down by the reach of the State Security's extraordinary intelligence.
When Khrushchev Played With Fire

In my considered opinion, as an officer of the General Staff, I do not believe Khrushchev is too anxious for a general war at the present time. But he is preparing earnestly.

If the situation is ripe for war he will start it first in order to catch the probable enemy, i.e., the USA and the Western states, unaware. He would of course like to reach the level of producing missiles by the tens of thousands, launch them like a rain storm against the West, and, as he calls it, "dry capitalism." In this respect even our marshals and generals consider him to be a provocateur, the one who incites war.

The Western powers must do something to stop him. Today he will not start a war. Today the Soviet Union is not ready for war. Today he is playing with missiles, but this is playing with fire, and one of these days he will start a real slaughter.

Look what happened during the Hungarian events and Suez crisis in 1956. We in Moscow felt as if we were sitting on a powderkeg. Everyone in the General Staff was against the "Khrushchev adventure." It was better to lose Hungary, as they said, than to lose everything.

But what did the West do? Nothing. It was asleep. This gave Khrushchev confidence, and after Hungary he began to scream: "I was right!"

After the Hungarian incident, he dismissed many generals who had spoken out against him. If the West had slapped Khrushchev down hard then, he would not be in power today and all of Eastern Europe could be free.

Kennedy must carry out a firm and consistent policy in regard to Khrushchev. There is nothing to fear. Khrushchev is not ready for war. He has to be slapped down again and again, every time he gets ready to set off on one of his adventures.

Kennedy has just as much right to help the people of Cuba as we had when we "helped" the Hungarians.
This is not just my opinion. Everyone at the General Staff said this. It was said in Marshal Varentsov’s home, even on the streetcars in Moscow. If the West does not maintain a firm policy, then Khrushchev’s position will become stronger, he will think even more about his might and right, and in this case he might strike.

The people are very unhappy with Khrushchev’s militant speeches. One can hear this everywhere, listening to conversations. Now, at least, one can breathe a little easier than in Berlin’s time. So one can hear and say a few things.

On the other hand, the world can be thankful to Khrushchev for his militant words. They forced Kennedy, Macmillan and de Gaulle to double or triple their military budgets and defense preparedness. If Stalin were alive, he would have done all this quietly, but this fool Khrushchev’s loudmouthed. He himself forces the Western powers to strengthen their defense weapons and military potential.

The Generals on the General Staff have no love for Khrushchev; they say that he is working to his own detriment. Why is this said? Why is this devil allowed to do as he pleases? He talks too much about Soviet military successes in order to frighten the West, but the West is not stupid; they are also getting ready. What else can they do?

I believe Marshal Varentsov and Khrushchev’s assistant Churayev; it was they who claimed that Khrushchev said, “I will drop a half of missiles on them.”

At the Soviet embassy in London I saw a short comment on Mr. Kennedy’s recent speech. The speech was called “the militant speech of the President of the United States.” That is all we say officially. The TASS intercepts, however, contain the entire speech point by point: first, second, third.

First, Kennedy’s references to the increase in the budget, next, the increase in the strength of the armed forces, in connection with the new army draft, then the new specific categories of naval flyers, etc. If necessary, the increases must be even greater.

But when we speak privately, it is a different story. At our embassy, I heard many good comments on Kennedy’s speech; it was excellent. Everyone criticized Khrushchev, including the military intelligence and the security police ‘residents’.

“There is no reason to be surprised.” They all said, “Kennedy’s speech is the answer to Khrushchev’s saber rattling.”

The West must be ready. They must be prepared to retaliate with tank and antitank forces, in the event of trouble over Berlin. The troops must be trained as well as possible. The Soviet plan to create a conflict in Berlin is simply a bid to win without a fight, but to be ready for a fight if it comes.

When the time for a show-down comes, it is planned to use tanks to close all the roads and thus cut off all routes to East Germany and to Berlin.

The first echelon will consist of East German troops, the second of Soviet troops. As a whole, the plan provides for combined operations by Soviet and East German troops. If the first echelon is defeated, the second echelon advances, and so on.

Khrushchev hopes that before events have reached the phase of the second echelon, the West will start negotiations in which East Germany will also participate. This will result in recognition of East Germany.

The Soviet and German troops will participate jointly in this operation because the Germans cannot be trusted to act independently.

In the first place, the East German Army is poorly equipped and insufficiently prepared because we are afraid to supply them with everything. The Germans have no love of us, and there is always a chance that in the future they may turn against us, as it happened with the Hungarians.
VOLODYA KHOROSHILOV came home on leave. He is chief of the artillery staff of the tank army in Dresden under General Kupin. He was called back to duty, however, two weeks ahead of time. Before his departure, we went to a restaurant for dinner and he spelled it out for me:

"As soon as the treaty with Germany is signed, an alert will be declared immediately, and the troops in East Germany will occupy all the control points and will take over their defense and support. Our troops will stand by on alert, but they will not occupy these routes immediately because this might be considered a provocation.

"We will simply say, 'Please, Americans, British, and French, go to Berlin, but you must request permission from East Germany.'"

"If the Americans, British and French do not want to confer with the East Germans and try to use force, the Germans will open fire. Of course, the Germans do not have enough strength, and then our tanks will move directly into Berlin."

I heard this from many officers, specifically from General Pozovny, and also from Fedorov and Marshal Varentsov. Varentsov, however, added, "We are taking a risk, a big risk."

In 1961, WHEN KHRUSHCHEV decided to resolve the Berlin question, a tank echelon was brought to combat readiness on the border in the USSR, as well as in Czechoslovakia and Poland. That is the truth.

The NATO countries should give particular attention to antitank weapons. Why? Because East Germany has two tank armies in full readiness, this is in addition to the tank armies which are part of the second echelon located on the territories of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

Khrushchev personally attached a great deal of importance to tank troops, especially in the fight for Berlin. So much importance is attached to tanks, in connection with the Berlin crisis, that controversies have already broken out in the General Staff regarding finances. They are afraid that too much money has been allotted for the tank troops and that there will not be enough for missiles, electronics, and other types of equipment.

Khrushchev has lately become confused on the
AN INTRODUCTION BY FRANK GIBNEY

Condensed from the book, "The Penkovsky Papers."
Copyright 1964, Doubleday & Company, Inc.

BETWEEN July 18 and August 10, 1961, Col. Ole Penkovsky played out the second round of his harrowing espionage game in London.

He spent part of each day working with Soviet delegates to the trade exhibition, or running through plans for Soviet espionage work in Britain with other Russian intelligence officers in the sound-proofed basement room used by the intelligence "resident" (i.e., the officer in charge) of the Soviet embassy at 48 Kensingtone Palace Gardens.

At night, or during other off-hours, he would meet with the four American and British intelligence officers, assigned to him in one of MI-6's "safe-houses" for his real intelligence mission—explaining the documents he had obtained from the secret files in Moscow, exposing further Soviet intelligence missions in the West, elaborating on technical aspects of the Soviet missile program as well as information on Khrushchev's political and diplomatic strategy.

Rarely in the history of espionage has any country's high command been so thoroughly penetrated as the Kremlin was, during the critical 16 months when Col. Penkovsky worked for the West.

Since Penkovsky had come to Britain again on a Soviet spying mission, it was necessary for the British and Americans to give him some intelligence material of apparent value, to forward to his superiors in Moscow. This was provided.

Penkovsky thus kept sending reports to Moscow of ostensibly new information on military as well as political objectives, e.g., "in travelling from London to Sheffield (Highway A-1) I observed for the second time in the southern outskirts of the city of St. Andrews a military airfield, on which the planes were based. ..."

Such reports kept Penkovsky's superiors in Moscow happy and unsuspecting.

WITH AMAZING COOLNESS, the volunteer spy for the West also went on to advance his standing as a loyal Communist Party man with Moscow. In other ways.

One quiet morning he and Greville Wynne took a trip to see Karl Marx's grave in Highgate Cemetery and discovered it was in a bad state of neglect, Penkovsky wrote in a letter of protest directly to the First Secretary of the Central Committee in Moscow. In the letter Comrade Khrushchev that, as "A loyal Marxist" he found such neglect an appalling reflection on communism and the Soviet Union.

Moscov took swift action. The London Embassy was ordered to set things right immediately and Penkovsky was commended for his "socialist vigilance."

All the while, new assignments for Penkovsky came from Washington. It was a tense summer in Europe. The continent shook from Khrushchev's threats to sign a treaty with East Germany and force the Western allies out of Berlin. If anything, the Vienna meeting of Khrushchev and President Kennedy had increased the political electricity.

It was absolutely vital that the White House and Whitehall have every available piece of information on the extent of Khrushchev's military preparations and his political planning. Above all, they needed to know how far Khrushchev was prepared to go in pursuit of his German "objective."

Some of Penkovsky's sessions with the Anglo-American team lasted as long as ten hours at a stretch.

Now that he had switched his allegiance, his dedication to the West was as single-minded as his youthful allegiance to communism. As a literal sign that he was now "your colonel," he asked his contacts to provide him with both a British and an American colonel's uniform. They did so.

Pleased as punch, he had his picture taken in both.

As the following excerpt from the papers indicates, Penkovsky was amazed that both the Western peoples and their governments seemed disposed to accept Khrushchev's boasts at face value. This only made Khrushchev's brinkmanship or "adventurism" grow more dangerous, a firm Western stand was needed, particularly in the case of Berlin.
Soviet Seeks to Glorify Secret Police Image

MOSCOW, Jan. 3.—The year 1965 was a vintage one for spies, or rather for spy publicity.

Gordon L. Wood, Richard Sorbo, Oleg Penkovsky, all wrote or were written about, and these works caused varying degrees of irritation on the "other side." What made 1965 "unique was that the Soviets" broke a silence of decades and officially acknowledged their spies; what is more, they glorified their exploits and made overt use of them in the international war of words. Spy literature, always a staple in the West, is now available to the Soviet public.

Recently the Soviet Literary Gazette published a long and well-argued "critique" which compares Ian Fleming with John Le Carré, coming out strongly in favor of Le Carré as a first-rate literary craftsman.

Interestingly, though this move is, the Russian people themselves are much more directly affected by a parallel campaign now in full swing inside the Soviet Union to "popularize" the counter-intelligence and security force. Known in its 48 years of existence by a series
of abbreviations — Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, MVD, MGB and now KGB—the very mention of the force has been enough to chill the spine of the most loyal Soviet citizen.

Created for the legitimate defense of the fledgling Bolshevik regime against subversion, it became under Stalin and Beria the instrument of arbitrary and merciless terror. The official rehabilitation of many of its innocent victims is an implicit admission of this fact.

Now Soviet authorities seem to have realized they must take the next logical step. In an effort to wipe out the stigma of rule by terror with its corollary of profound mistrust between government and people, they have decided to go beyond Khrushchev's downgrading of the secret police force from being a "ministry" to a "committee" of state security, regarded as a mere change of name on paper and to launch a massive public relations-type campaign to brighten the image of the grim men in trench coats and green velours.

But it is obviously well within the competence of the world's old-established pub-
The relations firm—the Agit-prop Department of the Soviet Communist Party. All media are being utilized, but the main ones seem to be the cinema, the press (including the heavyweight monthlies) and books.

After a previous showing in Moscow, a week’s festival of films about “Heroes of the Secret Police” has just finished its run in Leningrad, whence it will go on to other cities of the USSR.

The “Festival” is made up of seven old feature films about Soviet spy-catchers. The Moscow and Leningrad “Secret Police” film festivals were given a big publicity build-up and the Leningrad Cinema Weekly was almost entirely taken up by articles about it—the main piece being signed by two men, Brilliantskov and Sedov, who gave their full occupation and titles as members of the KGB. The big draw was a front-page announcement that audiences at the “festival” cinemas would be able to meet and talk to members of the security forces in the foyer.
Memorandum

TO: SAC, NEW YORK
FROM: OLEG V. PENKOFSKY
SUBJECT: IS - R

DATE: 1/10/66


Source
Date of Contact
Contacted by SAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SAS
VINCENT J. CAMILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, Jr.
Characterized A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past.

1 - NY
(UNSUB: KGB AGENT RECRUITED IN FRANCE ABOUT 1958)

1 - NY 1 - BU (SIS; KGB)
1 - NY 1 - BU (SIS; GRU)

OLEG V. PENKOFSKY

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
When incorporating information furnished by
into communications suitable for dissemination
outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary
when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity
of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific
information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination,
the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by
will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification
above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information
to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental affect
upon international relations and the national defense. In all
other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be
adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and
can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from
no reference should be made to the time (date,
month or year) the information was received. This should be
set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be
disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt
will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's
KGB code name, no further dissemination of that code name should
be made. Such information is of no investigative value and
its indiscriminate and unwarranted misuse could endanger the
informant's sensitive position.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING
ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION
TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF
THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Informant's Comments Concerning "The Penkovskiy Papers"

During the interview, in response to questioning, informant commented that he had finished reading the recently issued book entitled "The Penkovskiy Papers". Informant said that:

Informant recalled that:

Informant said that:

Informant remarked that it was his impression from reading the book that:

Informant said:

Informant said he could only conclude, therefore that:

Informant also commented that:
In response to a question asked of him, informant commented that there is no doubt in his mind but that informant said that he had no personal knowledge of this as such but said informant said.

Informant was then asked if he thought it was possible within the framework of the considered this question briefly and then said that.

This prompted the informant to comment that.

In response to further questioning on this point, informant said it was his understanding that.
The above information concerning has been designed for the noted Unsub case in accordance with NY letter dated 3-18-65 as set forth in that case.
Memorandum

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA JAMES P. KEHOE (33)

SUBJECT: ESP-R

Reference: NY airtel, captioned

Source: 

Date of Contact: 

Contacted by: SA

Characterization: A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from [redacted], no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt, will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's GRU code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made. Such information is of no investigative value and its indiscriminate and unwarranted misuse could endanger the informant's sensitive position.

In view of the highly sensitive position of [redacted], extreme caution must be exercised in handling any information attributed to this source, and no action taken which could conceivably jeopardize the security of the informant or reveal his identity.
Subject then explained that

At this point, I discussed the PENKOFSKY matter briefly with subject and he indicated that

Subject said that he did not believe there was any type of
He said he did not know PENKOVSKY personally and had never heard of him until about the time of his arrest in either October or November, 1962. He said he believed that this is true. He said
Memorandum

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (33)

DATE: 3/7/66

SUBJECT: ESP-R

Reference: NY airtel, captioned

Source:

Date of Contact:

Contacted by: SA

Characterization: A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past

1-Bu (SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES - GRU)

1-Bu (SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES - KGB)

(COPIES CONTINUED)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
When incorporating information furnished by __________ into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by __________ will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from __________, no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt, will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's GRU code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made. Such information is of no investigative value and its indiscriminate and unwarranted misuse could endanger the informant's sensitive position.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF __________ EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
I then asked the subject if he had heard anything about him. He said he had heard about him never known. He said that CHEREPANOV was later shot.

I then asked him if he knew of him if the and again he vaguely recalled this name but was unable to furnish any elaborating information.

I then asked the subject if he knew anything about the name CHEREPANOV in Moscow. He then said that he had been told about CHEREPANOV and his attempt to escape to the West. He said CHEREPANOV that CHEREPANOV was later shot.
I then asked the subject if perhaps this might have been a trick.

I asked him if he was aware...

I then asked him...

He said...

I then asked about...

I then asked the subject about...
He said that thereafter, Subject said that thereafter, Thereafter.
Subject then said that

Subject continued and stated that

Subject then volunteered that

Subject then said that

Subject then said that
He said that
Memorandum

TO:
SAC, NEW YORK

FROM:
SA JAMES P. KEHOE (33)

DATE:
3/14/66

SUBJECT:
ESP-R

Reference: 
NY airtel, captioned

Source: 

Date of Contact: 

Contacted by: 
SA

Characterization: 
A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past

JPK:mjb (11)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
I then asked the subject who, in his opinion, was considered

subject considered this for several minutes and then said that

I then asked the subject that in regard to

subject replied that

then volunteered that

As an indication of this, the subject said that

Subject again indicated that he had no personal knowledge of PANKOVSKIY, did not know him or know of him, prior to the publicity in this regard.

Subject then reiterated the following in regard to
The subject said that I asked him. Subject replied that
I asked the subject. He replied that they.

I asked the subject if he

I then asked the subject.

The subject said that
Memorandum

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA JAMES P. KEHOE (33)

SUBJECT: ESP-R

Date: 3/28/66

Reference: NY airl. captioned

Source:

Date of Contact:

Contacted by: SA

Characterization: A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past

1-NY

1-NY

1-NY

1-NY

1-NY

1-NY

1-NY

1-Bu (SOVIET OFFICIALS, RANGOON, BURMA)

1-Bu (FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-BURMA)

1-Bu (OLEG V. PENKOFSKIY)

1-Bu (SIS-GRU)

1-Bu (SIS-KGB)

1-Bu

1-Bu

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1-Bu

JOE: mjb (16)
We first reconfirmed our meeting arrangements for I asked the subject
again. The subject then told

I knew nothing about this situation. He said that he was

He said that in a joking way

I asked the subject for the

The subject said that he
I then asked the subject, and the subject said, "He said he knew that."

I asked the subject, and the subject said that.

I then told the subject that.
The subject said that

Subsequently,
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK
FROM: SA #342

SUBJECT: OLEG V. PENKOVSKY
IS-R

DATE: 11/23/65


Source
Date of Contact
Contacted by
SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and
HARRY E. MORRIS, Jr.

Characterized
A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past.

11/23/65
12/7/65
When incorporating information furnished by outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential," since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental affect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's KGB code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made. Such information is of no investigative value and its indiscriminate and unwarranted misuse could endanger the informant's sensitive position.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Informant said, during the interview of that at the present time

Informant then remarked that

Informant said

Informant said he believed that

Informant said that

Informant said that
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA #342

DATE: 3/29/66

SUBJECT: SIS; KGB
ESP - R


Source
Date of Contact
Contacted by SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and
HARRY E. MORRIS, Jr.
Characterized A confidential informant who has furnished reliable
information in the past

1 - New York 1 - Bureau (SOVIETS NEVER ASSIGNED TO US)
1 - New York 1 - Bureau
1 - New York 1 - Bureau
1 - New York 1 - Bureau
1 - New York 1 - Bureau (SIS; KGB)

(TJM:11s (12)
When incorporating information, furnished by the Bureau, into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by the Bureau will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental affect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from the Bureau, no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

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IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT.
Informant's Comments Concerning

During the interview of informant, in response to questioning, said that at the present time, to his understanding.

Informant then stated that

Informant said that for

Informant, in response to another question, stated that

Informant then commented that

Informant said this was
Informant commented that OLEG PENKOVSKY was... Informant then commented that at the present time.

Informant then commented that...

Immediately after furnishing the above information, informant said that...

He stated that...

Informant said that...

Informant noted that...

Informant said...

Informant said that...
Informant, in response to questioning, said that Informant said

Informant then commented that Informant has furnished information previously concerning Informant has said that Informant commented that Informant then stated that
MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA JAMES P. KEHOE (33)

DATE: 4/5/66

SUBJECT: ESP - R

Reference: NY airtel. canteded

Source: 

Date of Contact: 

Contacted By: SA 

Characterization: A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past

1- NY
1- NY
1- NY
1- NY
1- NY
1- Bu (SOVIET OFFICIALS, RANGOON, BURMA)
1- Bu
1- Bu (SIS-GRU)
1- Bu

JPK: mzb
(13)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
I asked the subject what his meaning was in

Subject said that at the time he

Subject said that

I then asked the subject if he recalled the name

Subject said that

Subject said that
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-26-2017 BY

Director, FBI 2/18/66

Legat, London (RUC)

OLEG PENKOFSKY 1/00 - 8/60 33 - w.747p-
ESP - R

Enclosed for the Bureau are three copies of a one-page memorandum, classified TOP SECRET, furnished to this office letter dated 2/14/66, the contents of which are self-explanatory.

advised that

The Bureau may desire to place a copy of this communication and its enclosure in the Bureau file on

3 - Bureau (Enc. 3)
1 - Liaison (sent direct)
1 -
1 -
LM:yw
(6)

RECEIVED WITH BUREAU ROUTING SLIP DATED: 3-4/66
TO: SAC,

TO LEGAT:

RE: OLEG PENKOVSKY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-20-2017 BY

Date 3-4-66

For information ☐ optional ☐ action ☐ Surep, by

The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA dated

Remarks:

Done 4/13/66

MAR 7, 1966
TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA JAMES P. KEHOE (33)

SUBJECT: ESP - R

DATE: 4/5/66

Reference: NY aintel captioned

Source: 

Date of Contact: 

Contacted By: SA

Characterization: A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past

1- NY

1- NY

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COPIES CONTINUED

1- NY

JPK: mzb
(35)

1- Bu (OLEG V. PENKOVSKY)

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While on the subject of PENKOFSKIY, I asked the subject. Subject said at that time:

He said that Subject stated that:

I asked the subject. Subject said that he had told me about this previously and then repeated the following:

He said that Subject said that He said that:

I then asked the subject.
Subject said that
Memorandum

TO: SAC

FROM: SA (#342)

DATE: 5/16/66

SUBJECT: OLEG PENKOVSkiY

IS - R

Source

Reliability

Who has furnished reliable information in the past.

Date of Contact

Contacting Agents

SAS EDWARD J. MURPHY and

Renyairtel 5/3/66, captioned "ESP - R".

Information contained in this memorandum is classified "Secret" per Bureau instructions and was disseminated under the caption to the Bureau in LHM form.

Informant advised that he

During the course of the meeting informant advised

Informant advised that

WLS:dll

(2) 

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA ROBERT E. FARRELLY #342)

SUBJECT: AMERICAN EMBASSY-MOSCOW, USSR

IS-R


Source

Date of Contact

Contacted By

SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL,
JOHN J. DANAHEY,

and

SAC VICTOR TURLYN

Characterized

A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past

REF: 1fm (12)
When incorporating information furnished by into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

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IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.

IN THE EVENT KGB CODE NAMES APPEAR IN THIS COMMUNICATION, THEY ARE NOT TO BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED. THEY HAVE BEEN SET FORTH FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. SUCH INFORMATION IS OF NO INVESTIGATIVE VALUE AND ITS INDISCRIMINATE AND UNWARRANTED USE COULD ENDANGER THE INFORMANT'S SENSITIVE POSITION.
Informant, in response to a question concerning Informant stated that his comments in this regard are based on remarks
Informant then commented that

Informant said that

Informant then stated that
Informant then made the comment that

In response to a specific question posed by interviewing personnel, informant stated that
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 1/27/67

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA ROBERT E. FARRELLY #342

SUBJECT: IS-R

1/23/67.

Ref NYairtel captioned "IS - R" and dated 1/23/67.

Source
Date of Contact
Contacted By: SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and
Characterized: A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past.

REF: lfm (12)

OLEG V. PENKOVSKY
When incorporating information furnished by the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

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When disseminating information received from sources, no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

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IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF THE INFORMANT, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.

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Photographs of Soviet Nationals
Shown to Informant

On [date] informant was shown photographs of the Soviet nationals whose identities are set forth below. Comments made by the informant with respect to these individuals are being set out herewith:

Informant identified

Informant said that is presently

(Additional data concerning [name] appears in New York investigative airtel of 10/5/66, beginning on Page 9.)

Informant identified

Informant said he had previously furnished information to interviewing personnel

(Additional data concerning [name] will be located in New York investigative airtel of 10/5/66, beginning on Page 15.)
Informant said he believed this was the case. Informant said he is not certain of this, but believes that.

It is noted that [ ] arrived in the United States on [ ].

Informant commented that he did not know her personally, but believed [ ]. Informant said at the time [ ].

It is noted that [ ] arrived in the United States on [ ].
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: OLEA VLADIMIROVICH PENKOVSKIY, MSP-8

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (9) copies of a LIM pertaining to PENKOVSKIY.

The LIM is classified "Top Secret" in view of information furnished, the position of and his present and future value to American intelligence.

All information contained in the LIM was furnished by

Information contained herein was obtained from on dates indicated by SA and

is a confidential informant who is in a position to furnish reliable information but contact with whom has been insufficient to determine the reliability of his information.

bureau (name)

1. New York
2. New York
3. New York
4. New York

SUB: jvb

FBI - NEW YORK

SECRET
There should be no dissemination of the contents of this memorandum and information from [redacted] outside of the Bureau without Bureau authorization.

In the event KGB code names appear in this memorandum, they are not to be further disseminated.

The classification given any communication prepared for dissemination outside the Bureau containing information from [redacted] will depend upon the nature and content of such information, each case standing on its own merits. Under no circumstances should a classification of less than "confidential" be utilized.

CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM [redacted] AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS HIGHLY SENSITIVE INFORMANT.
Wynne Admits He Was a Spy

London, June 18 (AP)—Greville M. Wynne, the British businessman arrested by the Russians in November, 1962, on charges of espionage, admitted tonight that he had been a spy for Britain.

Wynne said his business connections with the East were a carefully built-up cover. He said even his wife did not know he was a spy until after he was freed in April, 1964, in exchange for Soviet spy Gordon Lonsdale, who had been imprisoned by the British.

Wynne was talking in a TV interview about a book he has written which describes his dealings with Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the Soviet intelligence officer who was executed after being convicted at a joint spy trial in Moscow with Wynne.
TO: CHIEF CLERK

Subject: Revelle M. Wynne

Aliases

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- Exact Spelling
- Main Criminal Case Files Only
- All References
- Criminal References Only
- Main Subversive Case Files Only
- Main Subversive (If no Main, list all Subversive References)
- Subversive References Only
- Main Subversive (If no Main, list all Criminal References)

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- Requested by
- Searched by
- Consolidated by
- Reviewed by

File Review Symbols
- I - Identical
- ? - Not identifiable
- NI - Not identical
- U - Unavailable reference
TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA ROBERT E. FARRELLY #342

SUBJECT: 1S - R


Source
Date of Contact
Contacted By

Characterized

A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past

REF: lfm (16)
When incorporating information furnished by into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

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Suitable paraphrasing of the information to be disseminated, plus concealment of the time of its receipt will materially assist in concealing the identity of the source.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's KGB code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made. Such information is of no investigative value and its indiscriminate and unwarranted misuse could endanger the informant's sensitive position.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.

IN THE EVENT KGB CODE NAMES APPEAR IN THIS COMMUNICATION, THEY ARE NOT TO BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED. THEY HAVE BEEN SET FORTH FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. SUCH INFORMATION IS OF NO INVESTIGATIVE VALUE AND ITS INDISCRIMINATE AND UNWARRANTED USE COULD ENDANGER THE INFORMANT'S SENSITIVE POSITION.
In NY investigative airtel of 4/14/67, on page seven, there is set forth some data concerning contact with Information relative to this individual, as furnished by the informant.

In furnishing this initial information, informant was unable to furnish any facts concerning.

During the interview of informant, recalled that informant stated that inform.

Informant then recalled that sometime in the past,
In view of informant's comments, informant was reminded of information he had.
previously furnished concerning likewise

Informant was asked whether he felt it possible that
that he recalls having furnished the initial information

Informant said that he is reasonably certain
that

Informant added

Informant then noted that it is interesting that

Comments Concerning

As noted previously in this communication, informant on had occasion to observe certain items

Informant said that he

Informant said he could not recall now

In addition, informant stated that
Informant said that
TO: CHIEF CLERK

Subject: Greville M. Wynne

Aliases

Address

Birth Date

Birthplace

Race

Sex
 Male
 Female

Exact Spelling
 Main Criminal Case Files Only
 All References
 Criminal References Only
 Main Subversive Case Files Only
 Main Subversive (If no Main, list all Subversive References)
 Subversive References Only
 Main Criminal (If no Main, list all Criminal References)

File & Serial Number

Remarks

re-checked 7/17/67

no addl info

Requested by

Squad

Extension

File No.

Searchd by

7/17/67

Consolidated by

(date)

Reviewed by

(date)

File Review Symbols

I - Identical
NI - Not Identical

? - Not identifiable
U - Unavailable reference
TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: Oleg Prokhnoy

DATE: APR 29 1969

SUBJECT: Attached herewith is a [ ] containing information concerning the subject.

All other names besides the subject's have been indexed in the case and therefore no indexing is necessary by the recipient of this memo.

When incorporating information furnished by [ ] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [ ] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "confidential," since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from [ ], no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's GRU code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF [ ] EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTIFICATION.
Memorandum

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA JAMES P. KEOE (#33)

SUBJECT: Attached herewith is containing information concerning the subject.

All other names besides the subject's have been indexed in the Case and therefore no indexing is necessary by the recipient of this memo.

When incorporating information furnished by into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by NY will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's GRU code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF extreme caution must be exercised in handling any information attributed to this source, and no action taken which could conceivably jeopardize the security of the informant or reveal his identity.
TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (34)

SUBJECT: IS - A

DATE: SEP 11 1968

RE New York memorandum of Supv. captioned as above, dated 12/12/67, requesting the preparation of a blind memorandum for a particular case relative to the

Attahced herewith is one (1) copy of the completed blind memorandum as it appears in the This copy is to be placed in the main case file for this particular case at the NYO.

It is to be noted that the writeup prepared for the was done in an effort to evaluate the overall material furnished by This writeup was completed during the period January - June, 1968, and in some cases, current investigation was being conducted. Therefore, this writeup should not be used in any sense as a substitute for the case file itself, and any action relative to this case should emanate from a review of all the material in the original case file and not exclusively from the writeup as is presented in the

(1) New York (2) New York

(Att. 1) Ruskovskiy

JJS: lsc

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Revolving Savings Plan
Memorandum

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (#33)

DATE: 6/9/69

SUBJECT: OLEG PENNOVSKY

Attached herewith is a containing information concerning the subject.

All other names besides the subject's have been indexed in the case and therefore no indexing is necessary by the recipient of this memo.

When incorporating information furnished by into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's GRU code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF

EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Memorandum

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SA (#33)

SUBJECT: O. Lenkovsky

Attached herewith is a [redacted] containing information concerning the subject.

All other names besides the subject's have been indexed in the Case and therefore no indexing is necessary by the recipient of this memo.

When incorporating information furnished by into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from, no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's GRU code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: [Signature]

SUBJECT: [Name]

Attached herewith is a [document type] containing information concerning the subject.

All other names besides the subject's have been indexed in the [case number] and therefore no indexing is necessary by the recipient of this memo.

When incorporating information furnished by [name] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [name] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "Confidential", since the disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "Confidential" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

When disseminating information received from [name], no reference should be made to the time (date, month or year) the information was received. This should be set forth administratively.

If the attached memorandum sets forth a Soviet's GRU code name, no further dissemination of that code name should be made.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF [name] EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE, AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE INFORMANT OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
Greville Wynne, Spy for Britain
In the Soviet Bloc, Is Dead at 71

LONDON, March 1 (AP) — Greville Wynne, who spied on the Soviet Union for Britain in the cold war and who spent 18 months in a Moscow prison after being caught, died of throat cancer on Wednesday, hospital officials said today. He was 71 years old.

Mr. Wynne died at Cromwell Hospital in London, the British domestic news agency Press Association reported, quoting unidentified close friends. A hospital spokesman, Tony Prescott, said he was admitted with "a well-known pre-existing condition." He would not elaborate.

The wealthy businessman, who described his exploits in two memoirs — "The Man From Moscow" and "The Man From Odessa" — worked for the M.I.6 British intelligence service. He said he acted as the intermediary for Col. Oleg Penkovsky, a senior Soviet military intelligence officer who passed Moscow secrets to M.I.6 and the C.I.A.

Traps to East Bloc Countries

Mr. Wynne set up his own business as an exporter of industrial engineering products in 1950. It involved a lot of foreign travel, including trips to Soviet bloc countries, and thus provided ideal cover for spying.

He was arrested on a business trip to Budapest in November 1962 and taken to the Soviet Union. He was put on trial in Moscow on May 18, 1963 for spying and jailed for eight years.

Colonel Penkovsky, who was tried with him, was sentenced to death for treason. But he reportedly committed suicide in a Soviet labor camp.

Mr. Wynne served 16 months in Lubianka Prison in Moscow. But he was treed in 1964 in exchange for Col. Molody, a Soviet spy who called himself Gordon Lonsdale in Britain.

Details of Espionage

After his release, Mr. Wynne disclosed details about his espionage career. British officials have never officially commented on his accounts.

He said he first joined the British security services in 1938 and worked for them in World War II. He began working for M.I.6 in 1960, making contact with Colonel Penkovsky.

In his memoirs, Mr. Wynne disclosed further details of his spying activities. He described Colonel Penkovsky as possibly the West's most valuable agent. He said Colonel Penkovsky provided him the names and photographs of about 200 East bloc intelligence agents, details of Soviet missile sites and an analysis of Soviet military manpower and weapon production.

Severe Beatings by Soviets

He said the double agent also told him that Nikita S. Khrushchev, the Soviet leader in the 1950's and early 1960's, had allowed important guidance equipment to be sent with Soviet missiles being installed in Cuba.

The affair developed into the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Mr. Wynne said he was subjected to severe beatings and psychological pressure by the Soviet K.G.B. But he said his training with the M.I.6 was even worse.

He said he was motivated by patriotism and a dislike of the Soviet system.

After his release from prison, he prospered as a property developer.

He was married twice. His first wife, Sheila, was present throughout his Moscow trial but divorced him after his release. They had one son.

His second wife, whom he married in 1970, was Harriet Soren, his secretary and interpreter, who spoke eight languages. They separated several years ago.

Funeral arrangements are incomplete.