U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535

November 26, 2019

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD JR. SUITE 1203 27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD CASTAIC, CA 91384

> FOIPA Request No.: 1451140-000 Subject: Radioplane Company (1935 to 1970)

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed 15 pages of records were determined to be responsive to your subject and were previously processed and released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Please see the selected paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

V	In an effort to provide you with responsive records as expeditiously as possible, we are releasing documents from previous requests regarding your subject. We consider your request fulfilled. Since we relied on previous results, additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may request an additional search for records. Submit your request by mail or fax to – Work Process Unit, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, fax number (540) 868-4997. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence.
	Please be advised that additional records responsive to your subject exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you must advise us that you want the additional records processed. Please submit your response within thirty (30) days by mail or fax to—Work Processing Unit, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, fax number (540) 868-4997. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence. If we do not receive your decision within thirty (30) days of the date of this notification, your request will be closed.
	One or more of the enclosed records were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession.
	If this release of the previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may file a FOIPA request with NARA at the following address:

National Archives and Records Administration Special Access and FOIA 8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500 College Park, MD 20740-6001

Records potentially responsive to your request were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and they were not previously processed pursuant to the FOIA. You may file a request with NARA using the address above.



One or more of the enclosed records were destroyed. Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.

- Records potentially responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) according to Title 44 United States Code Section 3301, Title 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Chapter 12 Sub-chapter B Part 1228, and 36 CFR 1229.10.
- Documents or information referred to other Government agencies were not included in this release.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **"Part 1"** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **"Part 2"** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **"Part 3"** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the <u>www.fbi.gov/foia</u> website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Sixth Floor, 441 G Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following website: <u>https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home</u>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at <u>ogis@nara.gov</u>; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing <u>foipaquestions@fbi.gov</u>. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Sincerely,

David M. Hardy Section Chief, Record/Information Dissemination Section Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) Intelligence Records. To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) Record Searches. The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.
- (ii) FBI Records. Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets. The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative "FBI file." An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) National Name Check Program (NNCP). The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigations, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FORM NO. 1 THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT LOS ANGELES

FILE NO. 98-1545

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	REPORT MADE AT	DATE WHEN	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE	Report made by		
	LOS ANGELES	9-18-51	9/12,17/51	FREDERICK G. TILIMAN	bak	
	UNKNOWN SUBJECT;			CHARACTER OF CASE		
	Damage to Target Plan			SABOTAGE		
	C Radioplane Company, V	an Nuys, C	alifornia			
-	<u>August 13, 15, 1951</u>			2 ⁷ - <u>21</u> - <u>21</u> - <u>1</u>		
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SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

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ANDREW MORTON, assembler, Radioplane Company, Van Nuys, California, said to have damaged radio cables but no damage attributable to him found and he does not have access to target plane radios. No additional similar incidents have occurred at company.

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DETAILS:

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Mr. SLANE STUMP, Industrial Relations Manager, Radioplane Company, 8000 Woodley Avenue, Van Nuys, California, advised by telephone that ROSE BOWMAN, an employee of the company and an officer of the company union, informed him that another employee, AGNFS MILNER, had observed a man pushing holes in radio cable with a sharp instrument. At the same time Mr. STUMP advised that his company had had a number of rejections because of faulty radio cables and thought that this may have some bearing on these rejections.

On August 17, 1951 Mr. STUMP advised the writer that CLARENCE E. LANG, the Works Manager, was informed by ROSE BOWMAN that AGNES MILNER saw a man pushing holes in tubing while this tubing was in a roll and not assembled into target planes or any of its components. This damage occurred at their Plant No. 2 situated at 7901 Woodley Avenue about five hundred feet from Plant No. 1 where the captioned damage was done.

Mr. JUD ROBERTS, Secretary of the Radioplane Company, advised that ROSE BOWMAN is an officer of the company union and a reliable employee.

APPROVED AND SPECIAL AGENT	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
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COPIES OF THIS REPORT 5- Bureau 1 - OSI, District 18, Maywood 1 - ZIO, Los Angeles	RECORDED = 31
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ROSE BOWMAN, employed in the Shipping Department, Radioplane Company, advised on September 17, 1951 that AGNES MILNER told her just before or after Labor Day, 1951, that she saw a man, whose name was given to her but which she does not recall at this time, pushing holes into vinylite tubing which is used in waterproofing electrical cable. Mrs. BOWMAN was of the impression that the conversation related more to wasting material rather than a wanton damage.

AGNES MILNER, employed as an assembler in the Electrical Department, stated she was in the restroom several weeks ago and there heard one of the women employees, whose name she cannot recall, remark that ANDY MORTON, an assembler, was was ting material, particularly vinylite tubing. She does not know in which manner the material was wasted but assumes that he was wasteful in cutting it. She said that she did not believe this woman mentioned his pushing holes in the tubing while it was on the rolls but her remarks were more in the nature that MORTON was an unsatisfactory employee.

KAY HAMMILL, Foreman, Electrical Department, Radioplane Company, advised that ANDREW MORTON was employed at the Radioplane Company on May 25, 1951 as an assembler at \$1.20 per hour. He said that because of the low starting rate he inquiried if MORTON had any other source of income and was advised that he had a printing business on the side. HAMMILL noted from his records and stated from personal observation MORTON had a bad attendance record, was usually tardy, often absent, and on occasion left work early. He said that he presumed his erratic hours were because of his outside interests but subsequently learned that he was using company time to organize and further the interests of the International Association of Machinists which will soon be involved in an election with the Radioplane employees union to determine which shall represent the employees of the company.

HAMMILL said that MORTON admitted that he was organizing on the company's time during an interview had in connection with a job review and reclassification as to salary about September 1, 1951. At this time MORTON was advised by Mr. HAMMILL that due to his wasting time in the plant and his poor attendance record he was not being recommended for an increase in pay. At the same time EANMILL said that he suggested to MORTON that he quit his job as he was not doing well. Following this interview MORTON's attendance became more regular.

HAMMILL stated several weeks ago when the rumor concerning an unknown man destroying material reached him, he placed MORTON under close observation as he was the only male employee in the Assembly Department or in a position to cut cable. HAMMILL said that his observation and his check up of the stock of vinylite and materials for making these cables failed to disclose any undue waste. He pointed out that MORTON'S job is to cut the vinylite tubing to proper lengths for the assemblers.

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
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LEADS

LOS ANGELES OFICE

At Van Nuys, Calinsniea:

Will interview BILL COPE and his assistant, WILLIAM HAYES, upon COPE'S return from vacation. as set out in report of SA FREDERICK G. TILLMAN dated September 4, 1951 at Los Angeles.



designated as model number R - 196C/A RW - 26Y.

Mr. ROBERTS said that the tuning access cap to the radio receivers controlling the planes, Model 0Q19D, was removed on six of them and the trimming condensers were backed off or screwed down so as to alter their frequency from 73 megacycles to either about 60 or 85 megacycles. Mr. ROBERTS said that three of these radios were found detuned on August 15, 1951, and the other three on August 13, 1951. He felt that the last three were apparently detuned on the previous evening while the first three may have been altered at anytime from over the weekend from the evening of August 10, 1951, until the following Monday morning. The antenna leads which were found damaged were apparently cut on Tuesday evening as they were found in the aircraft on the morning of August 15, 1951. These antenna leads which were found cut had been installed in aircraft on three different shifts and apparently not by the same persons.

Mr. ROBERTS stated that the cutting of these wires appeared after the first inspection and after installation in the ship. He said the radios pass inspection twice by the company and once by Air Force inspectors prior to their acceptance by the United States Air Force. He indicated that the electrical inspection and a subsequent pre-flight inspection would disclose that the antenna leads were cut and that there was no possibility that any attempt would be made to fly these target planes without the inspections mentioned.

These target planes are radio controlled and the radio receivers in them are set at a pre-determined frequency, 73 megacycles. The radios which are made by an affiliated company are checked for quality and, at the same time, are checked for the accuracy of their setting on the frequency stated. It was during this inspection that the detuning of the six radios was disclosed.

Mr. ROBERTS said that prior to the trial runs of these aircraft by the Radioplane Company, the tuning of the radio is again checked against the frequency of the control transmitter. During this final check as well as the electrical check previously mentioned, damage such as a detuned or cut antenna lead would be immediately discovered as the plane would be inoperative. He further advised that following the receipt by the United States Air Force, the tuning of the radio is again examined often for the purpose of changing the frequency to match that of the particular control transmitter in use by the Air Force at the point where the planes are to be flown.

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Mr. ROBERTS advised that the detuning of the radios caused no material damage and that the three leads which were cut were valued at about \$15. On August 17, 1951, Mr. ROY L. BISBEE, Chief Inspector, Radioplane Company, advised that the radios are made by the Babcock Radio Engineering Company, an, affiliate of the Radioplane Company, situated about 200 yards away from the Radioplane plant. He said that approximately 83 radios were delivered by truck on August 10, 1951, and were examined in the electrical inspection section on August 15, 1951. Mr. BISBEE said that five radios were loaded on a hand truck. placed on a main aisle leading through the plant, and that on August 15, 1951, three of them were found detuned. These three radios were arranged on the truck in sequence and, in Mr. -BISBEE'S opinion, were deliberately detuned by someone standing near the truck. It was found by trial that the tuning access cap could be removed, the trimming condenser turned, and the cap replaced easily in 30 seconds. Mr. BISBRE stated that after the finding of these three radios, all of them were checked and five were found detuned and that these five were on the top tier of the truck on the aisle aide. He said that the sixth radio was checked in the electrical inspection room, a screened enclosure, after it was taken from stock to the final assembly and rejected by the swing shift crew. This. radio, according to Mr. BISBEE, was not situated with the other five radios and may have been defuned accidentally, or not tuned to the proper frequency when it left the Babcock company.

It will be noted that no written record was made of the exact time, date, and hour when these radios werefound in a detuned condition.

Mr. BISBEE advised that five of the radios were found defective by HARRY ROGERS, the day inspector, and one radio by BJLL COPE, the night inspector.

With reference to the cut antenna leads, Mr. BISBEE advised the damage to them was done in the same shop area and at a time when the planes on which these leads were installed were not more than 20 feet from the truck containing the detuned radios. These leads, according to Mr. BISBEE, were apparently cut by someone who inserted their hand and diagonal cutters into the radio access hatch of the planes and cut them. The wires were found to have been cut at about a 45 degree angle.

Mr. BISBEE and Mr. ROBERTS advised that most of the employees in that section of the plant use these diagonal cutters

in their work and that no comment would be aroused by any person carrying them or using them inside of one of the target planes as a good deal of the electrical work is done on the plane with the use of these tools.

Nr. BISBEE believes that these wires could have been cut at anytime from midnight on Friday, August 10, 1951, until 7:00 a.m., August 13, 1951.

On August 29, 1951, Mr. ROBIRTS telephoned the Los Angeles office and advised that three more additional wires used in the assembling of these target planes were found cut. He pointed out that although these wires were not installed in the aircraft and had caused no damage, the company officials were concerned for fear that the person doing this damage might cut wires following the final inspection of the plane by their company and the Air Force which would result in possible uncontrolled flight of the plane and its ultimate destruction. On August 30th, Ir. BISBEE advised that the three wire cables were found cut on the previous morning by the leadman in the electrical shop, HAROLD STRUMER. He said one of them was found on top of a bench and two underneath the He expressed concern because the other halves or part bench. of these leads were not found. Mr. BISBES expressed the opinion that the incident occurred on the swing shift, which is from 3:30 p.m. until 12:00 midnight. WILLIAN HAYAS, Assistant Chief Inspector, is in charge of inspection on that There is also a night shift with about 12 men on a crew shift. in the paint shop and wing section department, who have access to the entire plant, although they do not work on the electrical installation or upon planes in which any electrical equipment has been installed. Ir. BISBLE pointed out that RALPH B.ATTY is the regular leadman in the department where the cut leads were found but he is presently on a two weeks' vacation.

HAROLD STAULA, 18343 Bessener Street, Reseda, California, advised that he found a cut lead on a bench back of the tool box immediately after coming on shift at 7:00 a.m. on August 28, 1951. He said he did not find the other part of this lead and went through the storage bin for these leads, which is under the bench mentioned. There he found another cut lead. Following the finding of this lead, he began a cleanup in the shop and found an employee, AL LCKDAHL, had found a third cut lead on the shelf across the room from the storage bin. Fr. STIULA said that he knows of no damage to any of these leads while installing them in the ships and has no information

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on how these leads were cut or who may have cut them. He said that his first thought was that some person needed a wire for their automobile and saw fit to cut off the lead so as to utilize the wire.

Mr. STEUTER said that during this cleanup, and on August 27th and 28th, he found a stabilizer section behind a work bench which had on it the name "Babe" or "Babs" scratched on it apparently with an electric drill. This stabilizer was unpainted and was subsequently utilized in a plane after buffing. Mr. STEUTER said that he does not know how long this stabilizer was behind the bench but feels that it could not have been there for more than two months, the date of their prior cleanup period.

Hr. ROBLETS and Hr. BISBLE pointed out that any person familiar with the manufacture of these target planes, as are the employees in the factory, would know that detuning the radios or cutting the antenna leads would be immediately discovered upon inspection and no material damage would arise from such actions. He said that these employees would also know that the only real damage which could be done to the electrical equipment without detection would be that done following final inspection and acceptance by the Air Force.

BISBEE, STEULER, and HARRY ROGERS, a day inspector, were of the opinion that if these radios were deliberately damaged, such occurred on the swing shift rather than on the day shift.

CHARLES CRADDOCK, Inspector, United States Air Force, stationed at Radioplane Company, advised that he had knowledge of this damage and that the Air Force's Inspectors were on the alert for further evidences of such damage.

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ADMINISTRATIVA PAGE


LEADS

LOS ANGELES OFFICE

At Van Nuys, California: Will at Radioplane Company interview EILL COPE, night inspector, who rejected a radio on August 16, 1951, with the remark "Jon't work", following its being detuned. Will also interview WILLIAM HAY S, Assistant Chief Inspector assigned to the swing shift, regarding the damage done to these radio controlled target planes.

REFERENCE:

Los Angeles teletype to the Bureau, dated August 17, 1951.



WASH-56 FROM LOS ANGELES 17 7-40 PM DEFERRED JAcuelly

UNSUB, DAMAGE TO TARGET PLANE RADIOS, RADIOPLANE COMPANY, VAN NUYS, CALIF. AUG. THIRTEEN AND FIFTEEN, FIFTYONE. SABOTAGE. JUD ROBERTS, SECRETARY, RADIOPLANE COMPANY, ADVISES SIX RADIO RECEIVERS USED TO CONTROL TARGET PLANES DETUNED AND THREE ANTENNAE CUT. NO DAMAGE TO RADIOS BUT ANTENNAE DAMAGE ABOUT TEN DOLLARS. INSTRUMENTS AND PLANE ON MAIN PASSAGEWAY USED BY TWO HUNDRED EMPLOYEES AND DAMAGE COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO EACH ITEM IN HALF A MINUTE. RADIOPLANE COMPANY PRIME CONTRACTOR TO AIR FORCE.

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PROPERTY OF FBI

This confidential report and its contents are loaned to you by the FBI and are not to be distributed outside of agency to which loaned.


FEDERAL BUREAU OF. INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1 This case originated at LOS AUGULES

FILE NO. 98-1545

report made at LOS ANGELES	DATE WHEN MADE	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 9/28/51	report made by FREDERICK G. TILLMAN	BAJ
TITLE UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Damage to Target Pl Radioplane Company, California, August	Van Muys,		character of case SABOTAGE	

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:



WILLIAM EAYES, Inspector, and WILLIAM COPE, Electrical Inspector, swing shift, Radioplane Company, Van Nuys, California, have no information concerning instant damage. SLANE STUMP, Industrial Relations Manager, advises no further incidents have occurred. Company employees as a whole feel they are underpaid and at present effort is being made to oust company union.

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DETAILS:

WILLIAM HAYES, Assistant Chief Inspector, Radioplane Company, Van Nuys, California, advised on September 28, 1951 that he has no information concerning the detuning of radios found in that condition on August 15, 1951. He said that quite often detuned radios or radios not properly tuned are found when they are checked out and that he placed no special significance on the fact that these were detuned inasmuch as it was a very simple job to place them in order.

With reference to the two antenna wires found cut in one of the target planes, MAYES said that there has been no repetition of incidents of this kind and that he has had no conversation or seen anything which would either lead him to the identity of the person cutting the wires or indicate that the wires were cut accidentally during the manufacturing process.

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Mr. MAYES said that many of the workers in the Radioplane Company were dissatisfied in that they felt they were underpaid. However, he said so many felt that way that it would be impossible to pin any particular worker down as being a disgruntled employee. He said that recently a substantial pay raise had been granted all workers.

WILLIAM COPE, Electrical Inspector, Radioplane Company, advised he did not recall the six radios which were found detuned in the period just prior to August 15, 1951, although it is noted that he rejected a radio on August 16, 1951 with the comment, "won't work."

Mr. COPE said that the detuned radios or radios not on the proper frequency are a relatively common occurrence. He said that this is a matter easily corrected and that the Radioplane Company has a special test room to determine whether or not the radios are in working order and also has the proper electronic equipment to tune these radios and to determine if they are within the specifications. Mr. COPE also placed no particular significance to the radios being detuned as this detuning does not damage them. He also indicated that the radios are so made that the frequency may be varied so as to match the control transmitter at the various air force stations where the target planes are used.

Mr. COPE had no information concerning the wires cut in the fuselage of the target planes. He has noted nothing among the employees of the swing shift which would lead him to suspect any of them of cutting the wires.

It was observed that on September 28, 1951 handbills were being passed at the plant in the interest of the International Association of Machinists which was then endeavoring to represent the employees of the Radioplane Company in competition with the UAW-CIO and RPA, the latter being the Radioplane Employees Association, a company union. This handbill indicated that an election was to be held on September 28, 1951 to determine if another union should replace the company union.

Mr. SLANE STUMP, Industrial Relations Manager, Mr. HAYES and Mr. COPE advised that they do not believe the labor activity had anything to do with the damage to the antenna wires or the detuned radios. However they did indicate that there was some unrest in the plant because of this activity. Mr. STUMP also stated that no further incidents of a like nature have occurred.

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ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

REFERENCE: Report of SA FREDERICK G. TILIMAN dated September 18, 1951 at Los Angeles.

MARLE

NAME CHECK

June 2, 1955

RADIOPLANE CONPANY - Source + R14605 Keswick Van Nuys, California

You are referred to the reports of Special Agent Frederick G. Tillman, dated September 4, 1951, September 18, 1951, and October 3, 1951, in the case entitled "Unknown Subject; Damage to Target Plane Radios, Radioplane Company, Van Muys, California, August 13, 15, 1951; - Sabotage" which were furnished to the Headquarters Office of the OSI on September 18, 1951, September 26, 1951, and October 11, 1951. These reports have also been furnished to the District Nurber 18, OSI, Maywood, California, by the Los Angeles Field Office of this Bureau. You are referred to these reports inserved as they contain information pertinent to your inquiry. (98-39341): 2: 4)

Thé fóregoing information is furnished to you as the result of a request for an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or a nonclearance of the individual involved. This information is furnished for your use and is not to be disseminated outside of your agency.

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