



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

January 8, 2021

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD JR.
THE BLACK VAULT
SUITE 1203
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request No.: 1484347-000
Subject: BALDWIN, HANSON WEIGHTMAN

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed 839 pages of records were determined to be responsive to your subject and were previously processed and released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Please see the selected paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☐ In an effort to provide you with responsive records as expeditiously as possible, we are releasing documents from previous requests regarding your subject. We consider your request fulfilled. Since we relied on previous results, additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may request an additional search for records. Submit your request by mail or fax to – Work Process Unit, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, fax number (540) 868-4997. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence.
- ☒ Please be advised that additional records responsive to your subject exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you must advise us that you want the additional records processed. Please submit your response within thirty (30) days by mail or fax to—Work Processing Unit, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, fax number (540) 868-4997. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence. **If we do not receive your decision within thirty (30) days of the date of this notification, your request will be closed.**
- ☒ One or more of the enclosed records were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession.

If this release of the previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may file a FOIPA request with NARA at the following address:

National Archives and Records Administration
Special Access and FOIA
8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500
College Park, MD 20740-6001

Reference file number 100-HQ-79595 in your correspondence.

- ☐ Records potentially responsive to your request were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and they were not previously processed pursuant to the FOIA. You may file a request with NARA using the address above.

- ☐ One or more of the enclosed records were destroyed. Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) , Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.
- ☐ Records potentially responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) according to Title 44 United States Code Section 3301, Title 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Chapter 12 Sub-chapter B Part 1228, and 36 CFR 1229.10.
- ☐ Documents or information referred to other Government agencies were not included in this release.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **"Part 1"** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **"Part 2"** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **"Part 3"** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1484347-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 56

Page 5 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 6 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 7 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 8 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 9 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 10 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 11 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 12 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 13 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 49 ~ Duplicate;
Page 52 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 53 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 54 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 56 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 57 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 58 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 59 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 60 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 61 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 62 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 64 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 66 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 68 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 69 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 70 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 71 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 72 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 73 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 74 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 80 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 81 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 82 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 83 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 84 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 85 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 86 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 87 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 88 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 91 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 92 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 97 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 98 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 100 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 101 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 103 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 108 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 109 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 110 ~ Referral/Consult;

Page 112 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 113 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 114 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 115 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 116 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 117 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 118 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 126 ~ Referral/Direct;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1252712-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 56

Page 5 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 6 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 7 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 8 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 9 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 10 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 11 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 12 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 13 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 49 ~ Duplicate;
Page 52 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 53 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 54 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 56 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 57 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 58 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 59 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 60 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 61 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 62 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 64 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 66 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 68 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 69 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 70 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 71 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 72 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 73 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 74 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 80 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 81 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 82 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 83 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 84 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 85 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 86 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 87 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 88 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 91 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 92 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 97 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 98 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 100 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 101 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 103 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 108 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 109 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 110 ~ Referral/Consult;

Page 112 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 113 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 114 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 115 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 116 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 117 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 118 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 126 ~ Referral/Direct;


XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

*Harry
Hall
this to Harry
Trans Caters*

HAWAII HOOKI
Honolulu
Hawaii

Jap.



PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE \$300 4

DEFENSE SAVINGS
BONDS AND STAMPS

*Yes
Stuck*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/4/96 BY SP3 BJ/cmm
9/93/96 SP3 BTJ/qek

b6
b7C

JCN:klb

April 16, 1942

RECORDED

100-79595-1

Special Agent in Charge
New York, New York

Re: Japanese Propaganda Mailed
from New York City to Honolulu
in Department of Justice Envelope;
Internal Security - J.

Dear Sir:

For your assistance in conducting an investigation
in this matter, there are enclosed herewith photostatic copies
of a communication received by the Bureau from the Office of
Naval Intelligence which is self-explanatory.

The New York Office is requested to endeavor to ascer-
tain the sender of the above captioned material which was mailed
on January 7, 1942 from New York City inasmuch as the material
has been classed by the Navy Department as being propaganda in
nature and was mailed in a Department of Justice franked envelope.


Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosure

CC - Honolulu

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____



b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **NEW YORK CITY, N. Y.**

Honolulu FILE NO. **100-2200**

REPORT MADE AT Honolulu, T. H.	DATE WHEN MADE 5/5/42	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 4/30/42	REPORT MADE BY J. STERLING ADAMS ms
TITLE JAPANESE PROPAGANDA MAILED FROM NEW YORK CITY TO HONOLULU IN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ENVELOPE			CHARACTER OF CASE INTERNAL SECURITY - J

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS: Three page article, written in Japanese, received at offices of HAWAII HOCHI and NIPPUN JIJI, Japanese language newspapers, Honolulu, contained in Department of Justice "franked" envelope and bearing Post Mark New York City. Referred by Army Censors to Office of Naval Intelligence, Honolulu, which office considered article not suitable for publication and referred matter to Naval authorities, Washington, D. C. Investigation discloses article and "franked" envelope first of a series of what appears as official Government news releases being sent to foreign language newspapers, instant article presumably having originated at Common Council for American Unity, New York City. Instant envelope also contained release regarding statement made by Attorney General BIDDLE cautioning against discrimination against aliens in business, thereby perhaps explaining use of Department of Justice envelope.

-RUC-

REFERENCE: Letter from the Bureau to the New York City Field Division dated April 16, 1942, Bureau File 100-79595.

DETAILS: AT HONOLULU, T. H.

This investigation is predicated upon reference letter from the Bureau to the New York City Field Division, a copy of which was indicated for

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>R. L. [Signature]</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
COPIES OF THIS REPORT 5-Bureau (CLIPPER) 2-New York (CLIPPER) 4-Honolulu		<div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;">77</div>

COPIES DESTROYED

the instant article is the only one he recalled having received in a Department of Justice envelope.

Mr. SHIGEO SOGA, Editor of the NIPPON JIJU, was also interviewed concerning this article but had no personal recollection of same since it had been handled by Mr. NORWOOD before reaching his hands. Mr. SOGA advised, however, that he has had no correspondence with either New York City or Washington regarding any arrangement to be made for such releases to be sent him; therefore this is apparently a voluntary move on the part of the government in supplying these releases for the use of foreign language newspapers.

Mr. NORWOOD advised that he has made it a practice of forwarding any such releases received, in the Japanese language, to the Military Intelligence Division for translation and approval before allowing them to be published in the NIPPON JIJU. Mr. NORWOOD at this time exhibited the original of several such releases received from the Common Council for American Unity, Inc., New York City, Office of Civilian Defense, and the War Production Board at Washington, D. C., and it was apparent these are releases which are being prepared and approved under government supervision.

At the offices of the HAWAII HOCHI, also a Japanese language newspaper in Honolulu, interview was had with Mr. KENNETH BARR, representative of the Public Relations Office of the Military Intelligence Division, who acts as Army Censor at the newspaper. Mr. BARR verified the information received from Mr. NORWOOD and also recalled having received instant article and the Department of Justice franked envelope as the first of this group of what appears to be official government news releases prepared for the benefit of foreign language newspapers. Mr. BARR, too, has made it a practice of referring all such releases, written in the Japanese language, to the Military Intelligence Division for translation and approval before allowing them to be published in the HAWAII HOCHI.

Mr. WILSON GADDIS, Public Relations Officer at the Military Intelligence Division, Honolulu, recalled having handled instant article personally and having referred same to the Office of Naval Intelligence at their request. Mr. GADDIS identified the writing appearing on the face of the photostatic copy of the Department of Justice franked envelope as his own and stated that he had questioned the origin of this article at the time since it was the first of this nature to be received in Honolulu. However, he pointed out, that, contained in the same Department of Justice franked envelope along with the article on the Navy, was a Department of Justice release referring to certain statements made by Attorney General Biddle cautioning against discrimination against aliens engaged in business. Mr. GADDIS remarked that it was probably because of the Department of Justice release that the Department of Justice franked envelope had been used,

however, only that article reporting on the Navy's activities had been referred to the Office of Naval Intelligence since that article was the only one in which they were interested. Mr. GADDIS also verified the fact that articles of this same nature are still being received at periodic intervals, mainly from Washington, D. C., to be published in the foreign language newspapers in Honolulu; that in each instance these articles are apparently originating at the War Production Board, the Office of Facts and Figures, or the Office of Civilian Defense.

Since the foregoing information seems to adequately explain the origin of instant article and the use of the Department of Justice franked envelope, no further inquiries are being conducted by the Honolulu Office, however the New York City Field Division is being requested to contact the Common Council for American Unity, Inc., at New York City and verify the dispatch of instant article by that office to the newspapers in Honolulu and the use of the Department of Justice franked envelope.

REFERRED UPON COMPLETION TO
THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN

the Honolulu Office. Photostatic enclosure received with reference letter was a copy of a communication sent by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Honolulu, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C. In this communication, a copy of an English translation of a three-page article written in the Japanese language and reportedly received at the offices of the NIPPON JIJU and the HAWAII KOKU, Japanese language newspapers in Honolulu, was contained. This article was captioned, "What the Navy is Doing" and was dated January 2, 1942. The article was written in a manner consistent with other newspaper articles published during that same period and did not appear on its face to be of a propaganda nature. However, the Office of Naval Intelligence at Honolulu, in its communication to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C., had indicated it was of the opinion that this article is not suitable for publication in the Japanese language newspapers of the Territory of Hawaii. It was also pointed out that the article had been received in Honolulu enclosed in a Department of Justice "franked" envelope which was post-marked at New York City, January 7, 1942.

Since the source of this article, written in the Japanese language, was not indicated other than New York City, reference letter requested the New York City Field Division to endeavor to ascertain the sender of this material inasmuch as the material had been classed by the Navy Department as being propaganda in nature and was mailed in a Department of Justice franked envelope.

Confidential Informant N advised he had no additional information to offer concerning this matter.

Mr. WILLIAM NORWOOD, connected with the Public Relations Division of the Military Intelligence, Honolulu, and who is assigned as Army Censor at the office of the NIPPON JIJU, a Japanese language newspaper, in Honolulu, was interviewed and furnished the following information: Mr. NORWOOD recalled having received the article in question contained in a Department of Justice franked envelope, and since it was the first article of this nature received, he had referred it to his headquarters office of the Military Intelligence in the Dillingham Building, which office in turn referred same to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Mr. NORWOOD had been suspicious of the article because there was a question in his mind concerning the origin of same. The copy has not since been returned to him, and therefore the article was never published by the NIPPON JIJU. Since that time, however, other articles of a similar nature have been received at periodic intervals from Washington, D. C., and New York City. These press releases are apparently being distributed under government supervision since they are prepared in both the Japanese and English languages on mimeographed forms, those from Washington, D. C., bearing the letterhead, "Office of Civilian Defense", "War Production Board", or "Office of Facts and Figures", and those from New York City bearing the letterhead, "Common Council for American Unity, Inc., 222 Fourth Avenue, New York City." According to Mr. NORWOOD, these releases are all being received in government franked envelopes, but

100-2200

UNDEVELOPED LEADS

THE NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION:

AT NEW YORK CITY, will, at the offices of the Common Council for American Unity, Inc., 222 Fourth Avenue, New York City, ascertain whether instant article was dispatched by that office to the newspapers in Honolulu and whether a Department of Justice franked envelope was used for that purpose.

REFERRED UPON COMPLETION TO

THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN

my

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
New York, New York

CMT:GBH

May 18, 1942

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-6-89 BY SP8/JS/JS

4/1/96
9/13/96

SP3051/JS

b6
b7C

Re: Japanese Propaganda Mailed from
New York City to Honolulu in
Department of Justice Envelope;
Internal Security - J

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated April 16, 1942,
(Bureau file 100-79595) concerning the above captioned matter,
with which were enclosed photostatic copies of a communication re-
ceived by the Bureau from the Office of Naval Intelligence.

In order to conduct an investigation in this matter, it is
desired that the Bureau make an effort to obtain the original docu-
ments in this case inasmuch as it is felt that valuable leads may
be obtained therefrom.

Very truly yours,

P. E. Foxworth
P. E. FOXWORTH
Assistant Director

Hand Sent Mr. Boardman

*200 32
7/1/42
6/11/42
RHW*

513 12/1/58

COPIES DESTROYED

RECORDED

7

100-79595-3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

7 MAY 18 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ENC

JCN:klb

June 11, 1942

RECORDED

100-79595-3

Special Agent in Charge
New York, New York

RE: JAPANESE PROPAGANDA MAILED FROM
NEW YORK CITY TO HONOLULU IN
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ENVELOPE;
INTERNAL SECURITY - J.

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter dated May 18, 1942,
requesting the Bureau to obtain the original documents in this
case.


Your attention is directed to the report of Special
Agent J. Sterling Adams dated May 5, 1942, at Honolulu, T. H.,
in the above entitled matter, stating that the envelope in-
volved in this case contained a release regarding a statement
made by Attorney General Biddle cautioning against discrimina-
tion of aliens in business, which thereby perhaps explains the
use of the Department of Justice envelope.

The Bureau will make no effort to obtain the original
documents in this matter unless requested again by the New York
Field Office after reviewing the above mentioned report.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____



32 JUN 13 1942

b6
b7C



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

October 27, 1942

JKM:mm

Received: 12:30 PM

Typed: 2:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

b6
b7C

Hanson W. Baldwin

ASAC Donegan of the New York Office called and advised me they had received a cablegram from Honolulu, dated October 26th at 5:50 PM reading as follows:

"PLEASE FORWARD ME CLIPPER MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY A COPY OF ALL ARTICLES IN THE NEW YORK TIMES BY HANSON BALDWIN, NAVAL EXPERT FOR THAT PAPER."

Mr. Donegan inquired of me whether I had any idea as to what was meant and pointed out that there is no time limitation mentioned in connection with this request. He advised that Baldwin has been writing for the "Times" for a number of years; that he has something in each day and that it would be somewhat difficult for the New York Office to comply with this request under these circumstances.

I told Mr. Donegan that I knew nothing about the matter but that I would make an appropriate check and call him back.

Respectfully,

J. K. Mumford

Addendum: I called Mr. Donegan back at 3:15 P.M. this afternoon and advised him we know of no basis for the above request and suggested he wire Honolulu and ask what limitation should be placed on their request.

Mr. Donegan stated that he would do this.



3106.6022

BK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-6-8 BY SP-5 PCH/STP

4/1/96 5:03 PM

9/13/96 SP-3 BJS/STP

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **NEW YORK CITY**

NY FILE NO. **100-25728** of

REPORT MADE AT NEW YORK CITY	DATE WHEN MADE 6/22/43	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 6/9/43	REPORT MADE BY WALTER A. CROW
TITLE JAPANESE PROPAGANDA MAILED FROM NEW YORK CITY TO HONOLULU IN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ENVELOPE			CHARACTER OF CASE INTERNAL SECURITY - J

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS: Mimeographed article written in Japanese, entitled "What the Navy is Doing", dated 1/2/42, was originally written by HANSON W. BALDWIN and published in NY Times. Upon telephonic order of ALLEN CRANSTON, Chief of Foreign Language Division, Office of Facts and Figures, the Common Council for American Unity, Inc., translated article into 27 languages and distributed it to mailing list of foreign language publications. Department of Justice release distributed at same time by Common Council for American Unity and the Japanese article apparently placed in Department of Justice franked envelope through error.

- C -

REFERENCE: Report of Special Agent J. Sterling Adams, dated May 5, 1942 at Honolulu, T.H.

DETAILS: AT NEW YORK CITY

Mr. Y. J. CHYZ, manager of the Foreign Language Press Department, and Mr. RICHARD COLLINS, editor of the Foreign Language Press Department, of the Common Council for American Unity, Inc., were interviewed by the writer on June 9, 1943 at their offices, 222 4th Avenue. The information furnished by them is in substance as follows:

At the outbreak of the present war the Common Council for American Unity, Inc. had a contract with the Office of Facts and Figures whereby releases in various foreign languages were

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>C. E. Cressy</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES	
COPIES OF THIS REPORT 5 - Bureau (enc) 2 - Honolulu (info) 3 - New York		100-25728-5	RECORDED

COPIES DESTROYED

b6
b7C

5-6-89
 4/1/96
 9/13/96

made in behalf of the Office of Facts and Figures up to a certain number of words per month. The Common Council for American Unity had during the preceding 25 years developed a mailing list of various foreign language publications and had followed the practice of sending from three to five articles per month to foreign language publications. Ordinarily, material prepared by the Common Council for American Unity was released on paper bearing the letterhead "Flis Press Releases" a copy of which is being enclosed for the Bureau with this report. Flis was an abbreviation of Foreign Language Information Service which organization later changed its name to the Common Council for American Unity. The Foreign Language Information Service had functioned in World War I as the Office of War Information and is now functioning in the present war.

On December 31, 1941 a telephonic order was received from Mr. ALLEN CRANSTON, Chief of the Foreign Language Division, Office of Facts and Figures, whereby the Common Council was directed to translate into 27 languages and release to foreign language publications on its mailing list numbering between 800 and 900, an article written by HANSON W. BALDWIN which had appeared in the New York Times. Permission was secured from the New York Times for such release and the material was sent out by the Common Council. BALDWIN's article was entitled "What the Navy is Doing" and the release dated January 2, 1942 bore index #5052G. A copy of the Japanese translation of this article is being enclosed with this report and is identical with the translated article previously furnished the Bureau and the New York Field Division by the Honolulu Field Division in a photostat form.

At the time this release was made, the Office of Facts and Figures did not have suitable letterheads for such releases and in fact had not been organized to distribute any material to the Foreign Language Press although the Office of Facts and Figures was beginning to become so organized. The situation at that time was rather chaotic and some articles were prepared by the staff of the Common Council for American Unity and sent out by them, whereas other articles were prepared by the Office of Facts and Figures and sent out by the Common Council after translation.

The Office of War Information later became the centralized organization handling the release of material to foreign language organizations, but before such centralization was achieved, the Common Council for American Unity had been deluged with material from various federal government agencies such as the War Production Board, the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice and the Office of Civilian Defense, in addition to the Office of Facts and Figures previously mentioned. This is indicated by a list of articles translated and distributed by the Common Council between January 1 and June 30, 1942, a copy of which is being enclosed with this report, and by a list of articles released to the Foreign Language Press during that period, a copy of which is also being enclosed with this report.

The Common Council for American Unity had been sending out some material in behalf of the Department of Justice at least one month before it sent out a release dated January 5, 1942 entitled "Department of Justice Summarizes Alien Enemy Regulations". A copy of this release is being enclosed with this report inasmuch as it is believed that this particular release accompanied the Japanese translation of the BALDWIN article previously mentioned. The file copy of the Department of Justice release indicated that a Department of Justice envelope was used in mailing out the release and the envelope would not have been so used in the absence of specific instructions to that effect.

Both Mr. CHYZ and Mr. COLLINS stated that they believed the article by BALDWIN was to be mailed out at about the same time as the Department of Justice release and since they were both going to the same addressee both enclosures were placed in Department of Justice envelopes. In this connection it was pointed out that the article in Japanese did not bear the usual "Flis Press Releases" letterhead due to the length of the mimeographed Japanese article, and accordingly, some clerk who was placing enclosures in envelopes might have assumed that both releases had been authorized by the Department of Justice and thus placed both enclosures in Department of Justice envelopes.

It was further stated that in March or April 1942 the Common Council for American Unity adopted a procedure of sending all material which was ultimately to be distributed in Hawaii to a central point in San Francisco where it was actually determined whether or not the material should be sent onto Hawaii.

Prior to contacting the Common Council for American Unity the writer had secured the following information regarding this organization from confidential informant T1:--

The Common Council for American Unity, Inc. was formerly known as the Foreign Language Information Service. The latter grew out of the Committee on Public Information conducted by the Federal Government in the year 1918. The Committee on Public Information was liquidated in 1921 and the Foreign Language Information Service undertook to carry through press releases in foreign language newspapers, various items about the Government of the United States.

In June 1940 the organization changed its name to the Common Council for American Unity. The emphasis of the organization, now, is to combat intolerance and discrimination which the Council feels is running through American life with increasing impetus. Under its new name

the Council states that it will put less emphasis on the education and assimilation of the immigrant and more emphasis on the education of all American citizens toward tolerance of different ideologies. One of the new activities of the Council is the publication of a magazine called "Common Ground". This is edited by Louis Adamic and is issued quarterly.

The officers of the Common Council are: Chairman, Nicholas Kelley; John Palmer Gavit and Will Irwin, Vice-Chairmen; Eliot D. Pratt, Treasurer. Among those on the Board of Directors are: Louis Adamic, Mrs. George Backer, Elizabeth Eastman, Sylvan Gotshal, Mrs. Jacob A. Riis, Josephine Roche and Graham R. Taylor. The Executive Director is Read Lewis.

An audited financial statement made by a certified public accountant for the year ended December 31, 1941 shows receipts, \$81,207.30, which includes balance on hand January 1, 1941 of \$63.69; disbursements for the same period were \$81,180.45. For the year 1942 the Common Council for American Unity presents a budget of \$150,000 which points toward and expansion of present work with additional projects such as: Peace Study Conference, Development of active National Committee, making "Common Ground" a monthly.

Substantially similar information regarding the Common Council for American Unity was possessed by confidential informant T2, but to avoid duplication it is not being set out here.

ENCLOSURES - BUREAU

Copy of mimeographed release in Japanese language dated January 2, 1942 entitled "What the Navy is Doing".

Copy of mimeographed release dated January 5, 1942 entitled "Department of Justice Summarizes Enemy Alien Regulations".

Copy of list of articles released to the Foreign Language Press January 1 to June 30, 1942 by the Common Council for American Unity.

Copy of list of articles translated and distributed by the Common Council for American Unity in the name of federal government agencies, January 1 to June 30, 1942.

Copy of letterhead used by the Common Council for American Unity for FLIS Press Releases.

- C L O S E D -

NY 100-25728

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

The confidential informants mentioned in the report of Special Agent Walter A. Crow, dated June 22, 1943 at New York City are as follows:

T1 - [redacted] National Information Bureau,
Inc., 330 W. 42nd Street, New York.

b7D

T2 - Dun and Bradstreet, 290 Broadway, New York.

Both informants are so designated at their specific request.

DVH:map

RECORDED

EX - 100 - 79595 - 6

Date: October 30, 1944

To: Mr. M. J. Lynch
Legal Attache
The American Embassy
London, England

~~SECRET~~
VIA U.S. ARMY AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND

DECLASSIFIED BY SP8 BT/CL
ON 3-6-89

1192

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject:

Reference is made to your letter dated October 13, 1944, in which you requested that the Bureau secure an article in the October 6, 1944, issue of the "New York Times" written by Hanson W. Baldwin. The desired article is attached.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Jones _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

Attachment

cc - European Desk, Room 2242

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

★ OCT 30 1944 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3 BT/CL
4/13/96 SP3 BT/CL

b6
b7C



~~SECRET~~
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

American Embassy
London, England
October 13, 1944

Communication 3951
VIA US ARMY COURIER SERVICE

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ATTENTION: SIS EUROPEAN DESK

Director, FBI
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I have received the following request from [redacted] (u)

b7D

"I am informed that in the New York Times of 6.10.44 there appeared an article by Hanson Baldwin, the military correspondent, giving an account of the arrival of V.2. in this country. I wonder whether it would be possible for you to obtain a copy of this article for me?" (u)

It would be appreciated if this article which appeared in the October 6, 1944, issue of the New York Times could be immediately secured and forwarded to this office. It is suggested that this matter be given expeditious attention in view of its importance to the British.

For the information of the Bureau, several V-2's have been sent over England and exploded in the London area since about the first of September. However, they have been explained as various types of explosions and the British authorities have not told the public that V-2 has been sent over and no accounts of the arrival of V-2 have appeared in the press or on the radio.

Very truly yours,

M. Joseph Lynch

M. Joseph Lynch
Legal Attache

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-24-2001 BY SP3-BTS/m

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/m
ON 7-24-2001

MJL:FML

PAGE 1,2 DECLASSIFIED
PER LETTER DATED 7-17-2001

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BT/cir
DECLASSIFY ON: 25
4/8/96 SP3-BTS/m

b6
b7C

EA-7

3-6-89 SP8 BT/fah
Ret: Legal Attache: London
DVH 10-30-44

Censorship Cannot Guard Our Security Without Infringing Our Basic Freedoms

The problem of preserving essential military secrecy in the atomic age without infringing basic democratic freedoms cannot be solved by Government censorship, no matter in what guise.

A sense of far greater responsibility to the national interest than ever before in history on the part of all information media is basic to the solution of this problem. The press, the radio, the magazine and the motion picture, individually and collectively, must accept the responsibilities of freedom as well as its advantages.

The advisability of publishing military information must be weighed in each instance in the scales of the national interest and must be viewed against the background of the greatest good for the greatest number.

Press associations, radio organizations and the Government itself must constantly stress and emphasize the responsibility of the media, not only in defending the basic freedoms but in promoting the national security. The industry must police itself.

But the Government, too, has obligations that it must assume if vital military information is not to fall into the hands of potential enemies. These obligations cannot be satisfied by restricting or classifying information or by imposing greater and greater secrecy upon its own employees; reasonable steps of this nature may help, but they will not suffice and they may well reduce efficiency by too much compartmentalization.

First and foremost, the military must eliminate some of their own mistakes. The Poles discovered that we were attempting to take aerial photographs of their terrain from a plane assigned to our military attaché in Poland because Army orders transferring the aerial photographer to Warsaw were misdirected from this country, addressed to "Chief of Staff, Warsaw." The orders were delivered to the Polish Army headquarters.

During the war a similar mis-

take sent some important "top secret" papers dealing with the projected invasion of Normandy to a civilian address in Chicago.

At Los Alamos the atom bomb were dealing with the files by some of the Army's own enlisted personnel, who obviously were not well checked, although entrusted with highly confidential work.

Security "checks" of persons engaged in highly secret Government research sometimes are completed after the person concerned has finished the job.

In other words, the information media of the country are not responsible for many of the most important "leaks": Government's own inefficiency and carelessness are often to blame.

The other major threat to the country's real military secrets is espionage. Espionage rings ordinarily are subject to reasonable surveillance and control; today they have become more dangerous than ever before, because they are aided within the country by Communists and Left Wingers whose strange philosophy of "loyalty" puts Moscow before Washington. To meet treason, disloyalty, the termite tactics of communism and espionage, more deftness and skill and effort than ever before are necessary.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is entrusted — properly — with this counter-espionage and

counter-treason mission, and the bureau must have ample funds and facilities to carry out its work.

But the FBI is primarily a criminal investigation agency and it has often applied these methods to the far more delicate task of counter-espionage. Improvement in its tactics and techniques and quieter and less self-advertising methods are essential to a sound security. The bureau may need the help of modified legislation, but any such proposals ought to be examined with the greatest of care, for espionage acts, improperly legislated, can have grave consequences to freedom.

The FBI also has been entrusted with the important and difficult job of making "loyalty checks" of Government employees. In pursuance of this task the FBI has insisted that its reports and records cannot possibly be open to those it accuses and its position has been upheld. This ruling is repugnant to American tradition, which believes that the accused has the right to face the accuser and to examine the evidence against him. Perhaps equally important, it assumes on the part of the FBI an infallibility and efficiency which the FBI has not always had.

The failure to subject the "evidence" of the FBI to examination and cross-inspection in "loyalty check" cases can encourage sloppy investigative work; shadowy accusations, rumors and hearsay might tend to substitute for fact.

Secrecy of some of the FBI records is, of course, essential to sound counter-espionage and counter-treason work. But to promote the efficiency of that work as well as to protect American basic freedoms, the FBI, now endowed with this new grant of power, ought to be subject to the same sort of quiet close Congressional scrutiny to which the Atomic Energy Commission is subject. Only by some such means can we both safeguard our liberties and increase the efficiency of our spy-catching organization.

But these means, rather than attempts to abridge or restrict the flow of information, should be the real safeguards of our vital military secrets. "Freedom of the press" is a basic freedom; it must be guarded well, for eternal vigilance is the price of all freedom. We have few real secrets, but we should keep them well. If we are strong we need not fear spies or "leaks." Super-secrecy, and censorship—tacit or actual—is not only inimical to freedom; it may be revelatory of something wrong within the Government. It is a sign of weakness, not of strength.

As Byron Price said in discussing his wartime experience at the Office of Censorship:

"No one who does not disown censorship should ever be permitted to exercise censorship. The first and last principle to be remembered * * * is that censorship should come into being solely as an instrument of war."

b6
b7C

ENCLOSURE

The New York Times

March 7, 1922

Page 12

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nichols

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: HANSON WEIGHTMAN BALDWIN
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: 3-9-48

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-6-89 BY SP8 WJ/ST

4/1/96

4/12/96

SP3 BT/SA

b6

b7C

Mr. Tolson
Mr. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

The attached column by Hanson N. Baldwin entitled "The Problem of Secrecy," which appeared in the New York Times for March 7, 1948, prompted the Director to inquire about Baldwin. Although Baldwin's by-line sets out his middle initial as "N," it is believed that this is an error and it should be "W."

BACKGROUND

Baldwin, according to "Who's Who in America (1946-1947)," was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on March 22, 1903, the son of Oliver P. and Caroline (Sutton) Baldwin. His father was managing editor and editorial writer on the Baltimore Sun.

Hanson Baldwin was educated at Boys' Latin School in Baltimore and was graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1924. He was commissioned an Ensign in the United States Navy in that year and later advanced to the rank of Lieutenant, Junior Grade. He served aboard battle ships and a destroyer on the East Coast, in the Caribbean and with the European Squadron until 1927.

From 1927 to 1928 he was a cub reporter on the Baltimore Sun. He served as a quartermaster aboard a Munson liner in 1928-1929, and took a trip to Labrador as director of a group of volunteer college boys in Sir Wilfred Grenfell's work.

In 1929, Baldwin joined the New York Times as a general assignment reporter. On June 8, 1931, he married Helen Bruce, and two daughters were born of this union.

Baldwin became military editor and naval correspondent for the New York Times in 1937, and has held the position of military editor for that paper since 1942. In 1943, he was awarded the Pulitzer prize for distinguished correspondence.

Baldwin maintains his residence at 229 West 43rd Street, New York, New York.

Writings

Baldwin has written several books and has contributed articles to various publications.

In 1935, he authored with W. F. Palmer the book Men and Ships of Steel. His book "The Caissons Roll - A Military Summary of Europe," was published in 1938. In the following year his book "Admiral Death" was published. Baldwin's

COPIES DESTROYED 3/3 12/3/58

MAY 21 1948

RECORDED
INDEXED
361

79595-7

FIVE

FIVE

FIVE

"What the Citizen Should Know About the Navy" and "United We Stand" were both published in 1941. In the following year a book "Strategy for Victory" was published. He has contributed to the "New York Times Magazine," "The United States Navy Institute Proceedings," "Esquire," "Harper's," "Aviation," "North American Review," etc.

BALDWIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BUREAU

✓ On April 11, 1947, former SA Jerome Doyle, of New York City, wrote the Director calling attention to a column written by Baldwin in the New York Times on April 10, 1947, entitled "Scope of Intelligence." Baldwin in his column generally discussed the problems of an adequate intelligence system. The last sentence of his column read, "The FBI, rightly praised as a splendid criminal investigating agency, does not deserve its over-publicized reputation as a counter-espionage agency." (94-4-6593-3)

OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING BALDWIN

On February 12, 1943, William Z. Foster, National Chairman of the Communist Party, addressed the Lincoln-Douglas meeting held at the National Press Club Auditorium, 14th and F Streets, Northwest, Washington, D. C. During the course of his talk, he pointed out that the Red Army had Hitler on the run and that it was time for the United States to strike "with everything it has." Foster stated, "Recently, an individual named Hanson Baldwin, who is one of the most reactionary news commentators in the country, came out with an editorial which might have been printed in the Daily Worker without a word changed. Baldwin advocated the opening of a second front in Europe. When such a man as he advocates a second front, it must be the time to do it." (100-3-60-211, pp. 41, 47, 50)

Sender Garlin, in his column of June 20, 1943, in "The Worker," said of Baldwin, "The holder of the world's record for cockeyed predictions is, of course, Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, the military analyst of the New York Times. One week after the Nazi attack upon the USSR (June 29, 1941), Baldwin, after consulting his map and boning up on the science of horoscopy, announced that the Russians, 'in staff work and leadership, in training and equipment, are no match for the Germans.'" (100-49101-A, The Worker, 6-20-43)

An Army Intelligence report from the Sixth Service Command Headquarters in Chicago, Illinois, was received on August 26, 1943. It reported that Dr. T. Tehyi Hsieh of the Chinese Service Bureau in Boston took Hanson W. Baldwin to task for declaring that "Chinese communiques are almost worthless for obtaining a true picture," and for suggesting that "Chinese forces are of only slight allegiance to the Chungking government," and for speaking apologetically of Japanese sins against Chinese economic life. Dr. Hsieh claimed Baldwin's views were "contradictory, erroneous and misleading." (100-7660-1612, miscellaneous, p.1)

A news clipping from the Daily Worker under the by-line of Art Shields, for October 11, 1946, mentioned the two-hour demonstration on October 10th of picketing seamen at the New York Times Building, protesting the reported attack by Hanson Baldwin, the Times military critic, on Merchant Seamen. The article

pointed out that Baldwin had slandered the war record of the seamen and suggested that "slugging brutes" were needed to rescue the Merchant Marines from unions, "sea-lawyers" and Communists, who, Baldwin reported, assertedly had destroyed efficiency at sea. The article pointed out that Baldwin's attack did not reflect the New York Times' policy, according to Edwin James, Managing Editor of the paper. (94-8-51-A, Daily Worker, 10-11-46, p. 12)

George Moorad's book, "Behind the Iron Curtain," points out on page 139 that among the Soviet list of "bad boys" at one time or another appeared the name of Hanson Baldwin.

ACTIVITIES

According to a news dispatch dated June 2, 1940, Baldwin was scheduled to appear with 100 other authorities at the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia from June 12-14, 1940, to discuss problems which face the United States in a world at war. (94-1-18129-1)

Our Los Angeles Office reported on February 19, 1942, that upon the apprehension of Victor Wolfgang Von Hagen, an author and explorer who was investigated under an Internal Security - G character, it was learned that Von Hagen had in his possession a letter written by Hanson W. Baldwin, military and naval correspondent for the New York Times, in which Baldwin recommended Von Hagen to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Baldwin, in the letter, stated that he knew Von Hagen personally and believed he would be of considerable value because of his knowledge of South and Central America.

b3
b7E

In December of 1942, information was received that the name of Hanson Baldwin appeared on the 1941-1942 list of speakers of the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, in New York City. (61-7802-8, p.3)

According to a news account in the New York Times for October 2, 1947, Hanson W. Baldwin, military analyst of that paper, declined on October 1, 1947, "with some regret" the invitation of Marshal Tito to be a member of a six-man committee of prominent Americans to investigate the Yugoslav-Greek border. In his letter to the Yugoslavian ambassador in the United States, he said that it would be more beneficial if a United Nations committee were extended the same privilege which had been tendered to an unofficial group. (100-32820-A, New York Times, 10-2-47)

On January 18, 1948, William Z. Foster addressed a Lenin Memorial Meeting sponsored by the Cuyahoga County Communist Party in Cleveland, Ohio. Foster mentioned an article by Hanson Baldwin entitled, "The Military Moves In," which appeared in the December, 1947, edition of Harper's magazine, and in which Baldwin pointed out how the military was taking over control of the United States. Foster described Baldwin as "one of the most reactionary writers." (61-330-454, p.5)

WZ

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, Philadelphia

DATE: March 9, 1948

SUBJECT: HANSON W. BALDWIN, Author
of "The Price of Power"
MISCELLANEOUS--INFORMATION CONCERNING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-8-89 BY SP8 BTJ/STW

Recently [redacted] an employee of [redacted]

[redacted] who is a personal friend of Special Agent George R. Tucker of this Office, advised, in a strictly confidential statement, that the International Correspondence Schools had been engaged to print a new book by HANSON W. BALDWIN entitled "The Price of Power" for Harper and Brothers, Publishers, New York and London.

[redacted] advised that he was calling this book to the attention of Special Agent Tucker because it contained critical passages about the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He stated that [redacted]

[redacted] permitted the manuscript in question to be reviewed, and the pertinent portions were photographed by Special Employee Albert Cooper on March 9, 1948, and the exposed film is being submitted to the Bureau as an enclosure with this letter.

~~RECORDED RECORDING~~

A cursory examination of this manuscript reveals that the only chapter which deals with the work of the Bureau is Chapter 9, entitled "Intelligence - Overt and Covert". In this chapter, the Bureau is called a jealous and sacrosanct organization which has great power, chiefly by virtue of its secret files and the personality and political know-how of its chief. The book continues--"Taught to combat criminals, the FBI sometimes has utilized its anti-criminal methods in anti-subversive and counter-espionage work--a process that is not always efficient and may be dangerous to democracy."

Under no circumstances should the identity of the informant or his position be revealed to anyone. This information is being furnished to the Bureau for whatever action is deemed advisable.

GRT:mjs.
62-

Encl. —

RECORDED
INDEXED

100-79575-8
37 APR 9 1948

53 MAY 12 1948

E.I.R.-6

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
HDS:SL

TO : Mr. Nichols

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: "THE PRICE OF POWER"
Book by Hanson W. Baldwin

DATE: 4/10/48

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-8-89 BY SP8UJ/ST

4/1/96

SP3 BTJ/92

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Tele. Room
Mr. Quinn
Miss Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

REASON FOR THIS MEMORANDUM

On March 9, 1948, the Philadelphia office sent the Bureau photographs of galley proof pages of a new book by Hanson W. Baldwin entitled "The Price of Power" to be published soon by Harper and Brothers. The galley proofs were lent -- very confidentially -- to SA George R. Tucker of the Philadelphia office by [redacted] an employee of [redacted]

[redacted] permitted the galley to be reviewed by Agent Tucker and pertinent pages photographed because the book contains passages critical of the Bureau.

From the photographs sent in by Philadelphia, the following review of "The Price of Power" was made.

BACKGROUND ON THE BOOK

Baldwin claims that in the spring of 1947 he was chairman of the Study Group on National Power and Foreign Policy of the Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York City. He and the group held 18 meetings (the last on April 10, 1947) to study and discuss "the meaning of the technological and political revolution (occasioned by the atom bomb) to the strategic position of the United States and to determine...the consequential effects upon our military and foreign policies."

Baldwin says that "The Price of Power" represents the collective thought of the Study Group although it is not an official publication of that group. He also says that the book, although published under the sponsorship of the Council on Foreign Relations, does not speak for the council or any government department. Baldwin lists the following members of the Study Group as his collaborators (apparently because they endorse all ideas in the book although Baldwin did all the writing.)

Secretary, Caryl P. Haskins - President, Haskins Laboratories
Frank Altschul - President, General American Investors Company
Captain George W. Anderson - U. S. Navy

COPIES DESTROYED

FEB 14, 1978

71 MAY 8-1348

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

EX-137

4/10/48

Hamilton Fish Armstrong - Editor, "Foreign Affairs"
Perev W. Bidwell - Council on Foreign Relations
Franklin S. Cooper - Haskins Laboratories
George S. Franklin, Jr. - Council on Foreign Relations
Brig. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. - formerly U. S.
Army Air Forces, Peruvian International Airways
H. Struve Hensel - former Assistant Secretary of the
Navy; Carter, Ledyard and Milburn
Frederick L. Houde - formerly with the Rockets Division
(Division 3) of the National Defense Research Committee
of the wartime Office of Scientific Research and
Development; President, Purdue University
Joseph E. Johnson - formerly, Department of State;
Professor of History, Williams College
R. Keith Kane - former Special Assistant to the Secretary
of the Navy; Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft
Grayson Kirk - Professor of International Relations,
Columbia University
Oliver J. Lissitzyn - Professor of Public Law and
Government, Columbia University
Walter H. Mallory - Council on Foreign Relations
Stacy May - formerly with the War Production Board;
International Basic Economy Corporation
I. I. Rabi - Professor of Physics, Columbia University
Roland L. Redmond - Carter, Ledyard and Milburn
Winfield W. Riefler - Institute for Advanced Study,
Princeton
James Grafton Rogers - formerly Assistant Secretary of
State; Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council
James T. Shotwell - Trustee and Director, Division of
Economics and History, Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace
Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor - Superintendent, U. S.
Military Academy
Captain A. B. Vosseller - U. S. Navy
Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland - U. S. Air Force
Langbourne M. Williams - President, Freeport Sulphur Co.
Eugene E. Wilson - Vice-Chairman, United Aircraft Corp.

In his preface Baldwin also pays tribute to "Arthur H. Sulzberger and the editors and management of the New York Times who envisaged this book as a public service and made it possible for the author to write it."

GENERAL ARGUMENT OF THE BOOK

As a result of the war, the world has fallen into two armed and hostile camps: the USA and friends versus Russia and satellites. The strength of the USA is overwhelmingly greater than that of Russia. Even if Russia achieves miracles of improvement and we rock along pretty much as is, Russia will not be able to match us in economic, industrial and technological strength for a decade or more. In Russia's favor is her physical size, geographical position, superior manpower and the virulent (if false) appeal of Communism among dissatisfied people in all lands. The United States, therefore, should keep itself in "combat readiness" to meet at any time any challenge of the Soviet, ideologically, scientifically, economically, industrially, and militaristically.

CRITICISM OF THE BUREAU

In Chapter 9, "Intelligence -- Overt and Covert," the Bureau is discussed. The Bureau is called a "jealous and sacrosanct organization" which has great power chiefly by virtue of its secret files and the personality and political know-how of Mr. Hoover. "Taught to combat criminals, the FBI sometimes has utilized its anti-criminal methods in anti-subversive and counterespionage work - a process that is not always efficient and may be dangerous to democracy."

The Philadelphia Office supplied photographs of only a very small portion of Chapter 9 of this book. It is, therefore, impossible to tell what else Baldwin may have said about the Bureau or what general recommendations he may have made with regard to the Bureau.

✓ HON
JRM,

The New York Times

TIMES SQUARE, NEW YORK 18, N. Y.
LACKAWANNA 4-1000

July 29, 1948

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Thank you for your letter of July 26th to Mr. Merz which was referred to me. I appreciate your frankness in writing and I am particularly happy to have your version of the relationships between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. You are quite right; I should have consulted you personally before publishing my article but the facts I stated were so well documented in my mind that I neglected to do so. I still feel that the article represented a fair statement of the case but I shall be very glad to publish your denial.

I assure you that I wish to be completely fair in this matter. The articles relating to our Central Intelligence Agency and to other intelligence agencies of the government were written with a view to encouraging improvements in the vital function of collecting and evaluating intelligence.

Very sincerely yours,

Hanson W. Baldwin

Hanson W. Baldwin

HWB/eam

No Ans for
All material, this incident used in CIA running memo
CRB

RECORDED - 91
6/30

100-79596-10

DEFERRED RECORDING

34 AUG 19 1948

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: July 27, 1948

FROM : H. B. Fletcher

SUBJECT: CRITICISM OF FBI BY HANSON BALDWIN

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Pursuant to your instructions, Agent DeLoach of the Liaison Section discussed the proposed communication to Mr. Charles Merz, Editor, New York Times, with Admiral Hillenkoetter of Central Intelligence Agency at 10:30 A.M. today. You will recall that reference letter makes known to Mr. Merz the feeling of this Bureau with regard to the recent articles published in the New York Times by Hanson Baldwin. Admiral Hillenkoetter, after reading a copy of the proposed letter, advised Agent DeLoach that he was fully in accord with the statements contained therein. However, to make certain of CIA's position in this matter he felt that he must first discuss the situation with Admiral Souers of the National Security Council. He stated that Admiral Souers would, no doubt, bring this matter to the attention of certain White House officials whom he planned to have lunch with today. Admiral Hillenkoetter continued that he would telephonically contact Agent DeLoach at 2:30 P.M. this date regarding an answer.

Colonel Galloway, Assistant Director of CIA, Special Operations Branch, advised Agent DeLoach that he fully agreed with all phases of the letter in question and that he would be perfectly willing to testify or render a sworn statement containing his beliefs in this matter. He stated that in his opinion Hanson Baldwin should "be put on the spot" for causing such unfavorable publicity to be brought to the public's attention, particularly inasmuch as the said publicity involved two intelligence agencies of the U. S. Government.

Colonel Galloway was specifically questioned as to any isolated incidents which might lead a disinterested individual to believe that perfect cooperation had not existed between the FBI and CIA insofar as his transfer of coverage in South America was concerned. He specifically stated that Admiral Hillenkoetter had contacted him this morning and had ordered a memorandum to be written before 2:30 P.M. (the time Admiral Hillenkoetter was to contact Agent, DeLoach) regarding the interchange of intelligence coverage and possible friction that might have been caused in such an exchange. He stated there were only two incidents, very minor in circumstance, that could possibly be brought to bear on the situation, and in those incidents complaints had been written up by two CIA "soreheads" who have since been dismissed from that agency. Colonel Galloway continued that had it not been for the graciousness of the Director in allowing Agents to render valuable assistance to CIA that that agency could not possibly have begun operating in South America with the foundation they assumed.

It was also Colonel Galloway's statement that he had received word that he was to resume duties with the U. S. Army at an early future date and that "he didn't give a damn for CIA" inasmuch as it was merely an interim assignment. He stated, therefore, that he was perfectly willing to lay his cards

RECORDED

INDEXED - 91

CDD:AM

1001281948

31/27-7727-11

5-11

on the table at any time regarding the valuable assistance rendered CIA by this Bureau, plus the fact that he considered the FBI to be the outstanding intelligence organization in the world today.

To more or less substantiate his remarks, as mentioned above, Colonel Galloway called in [redacted] CIA, and introduced him as the official who had arranged all transfers of CIA Agents replacing FBI personnel in South America. [redacted] advised at this point that he had read the articles in question and had considered them preposterous. He stated that CIA had always received the fullest cooperation from the FBI.

b3

Colonel Galloway, in resuming his remarks, advised that Hanson Baldwin, without any doubt whatsoever, had received all the information contained in his articles from Allen Dulles, Chairman of the Committee presently surveying CIA. Colonel Galloway stated that the reason he knew this was that Dulles had questioned him along the same lines of the articles that had appeared written by Hanson Baldwin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter telephonically contacted Agent DeLoach at 3 P.M. and advised that he had discussed this matter with Admiral Souers. He stated that he and Admiral Souers were both fully in accord with the Director's decision to write Hanson Baldwin regarding this situation, and that he would be most happy to back up the Director in any remarks or any proof of perfect cooperation that the Director might desire to present in refuting Baldwin's critical statements. It was further the Admiral's statement that he definitely knew that the information in question came into Baldwin's hands as a result of Baldwin being advised by a Mr. Eberstadt to attend meetings of the Hoover Committee regarding the streamlining of Federal Agencies. Admiral Hillenkoetter explained that Mr. Eberstadt, a New York Banker, had been appointed by former President Hoover as a Committee Member to help reorganize the Federal Government. He stated that Eberstadt was a good friend of Hanson Baldwin and had, therefore, invited Baldwin to attend the specific meetings regarding evidence presented concerning intelligence agencies of the U. S. Government.

This matter will be followed closely by the Liaison Section and any further information that is ascertained concerning CIA's "possible pipeline" to Hanson Baldwin will be promptly brought to your attention.

Letter to NY Times
Sent
vbm

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 23, 1948

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

Colonel Galloway of CIA endeavored to call me on July 22, 1948. I finally reached him on the afternoon of July 23, 1948. He stated that the purpose of his call was to advise that an article on Intelligence, written by Hanson Baldwin, had been called to his attention, in which article there were indications that there was friction between the Bureau and CIA; specifically, that the Bureau did not cooperate in turning over the Latin American Offices, etc. Colonel Galloway stated that as soon as he saw this article, he instituted an investigation at CIA, and he is convinced that no one presently with CIA gave out any such information.

Colonel Galloway stated that the purpose of his call was to advise me that he would be glad at any time to testify, under oath, that he was in charge of the arrangements effecting the transfer of coverage from the FBI to CIA, and that he could testify that CIA received only the fullest cooperation.

I expressed my appreciation to Colonel Galloway for his call.

cc - Mr. Fletcher

DML:FA

RECORDED

100-72595-1
F B I
34 AUG 19 1948

WP-5-
eng
p(1)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-8-89 BY SP-8 BJS/BJD

4/14/96 SP-8 BJS/BJD
10/13/96 SP-8 BJS/BJD

16
OCT 1948

Intelligence—II

Older Agencies Resent a Successor And Try to Restrict Scope of Action

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Friction between Government Intelligence agencies is in a major degree responsible for the current study, headed by Allen W. Dulles, of the Government's intelligence organizations.

Friction is not new to Washington, but the newly-established Central Intelligence Agency, successor to the Central Intelligence Group and to the wartime Office of Strategic Services, has had more than its share. A new agency always has trouble in establishing itself in politically-jealous and power-conscious Washington, and this has been especially true in the case of CIA, which "inherited" some of the Office of Strategic Services' wartime feuds, and which found itself a "nouveau riche" in the field of intelligence amongst old established agencies.

Some gross mistakes of its own and a much too rapid expansion by CIA which led to "empire-building" and retention of some incompetent personnel fed the flames of controversy, but major friction has resulted because of the attempts of the older agencies to "retain" all their powers and prerogatives and to restrict and confine and reduce CIA's scope of action.

Catalogue of Friction

A brief catalogue of this friction reveals its seriousness:

1. CIA and G-2 were locked in a bitter feud until some months ago; today relations are more correct but not cordial. The issue, in part, was whether or not CIA should take over collection of secret intelligence as well as its evaluation. CIA won out and theoretically, at least, controls all espionage agents operating for this country overseas, but there is still reason to believe that G-2 continues to operate its own agents, although it denies this.

2. Prime antagonists today are the State Department and CIA, or at least personalities in both agencies. CIA representatives overseas have been in virtually all cases attached to American Embassies and have usually used State Department communications facilities. Differences of opinion as to the exact power of the Ambassador over the CIA representative and other issues finally crystallized into open "name-calling" after the unexpected rebellion flared at the Bogota conference in April.

The full intelligence story of the Bogota conference never has been told, and probably never can be. Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, produced—at the quickly dropped Congressional investigation—messages which were hailed in some quarters as proof of our foreknowledge of the revolt.

A careful reading of these messages, however, indicated that they were virtually unevaluated and undigested intelligence; most of them read like clippings from The Daily Worker and were so generalized that they could scarcely be interpreted as accurate forecasts of the revolt.

It was learned, however, that the messages produced for Congress and published were not, by any means, the only indications gleaned of the Colombian situation. Other messages—at least one of them forecasting the participation of some of the Bogota police and the Communist use of mobile sound trucks to incite revolt—were received, and the factual advance information con-

tained in some of them was accurate and of considerable importance. The full scope of the uprising, and particularly the extensive participation of the Bogota police in it, were not anticipated, however. The incident clearly revealed some weaknesses in collection of intelligence, greater weaknesses in evaluation and the creaky nature of the mechanism for exchange and transmission of information between the State Department and the CIA overseas and in this country.

Improvements in the latter weakness have been made, due in large measure to the Dulles inquiry, but the State Department is still hostile, not to the concept of the CIA, but to the present organization staffed as it is, and feels that many of its reports and evaluations merely duplicate its own.

3. Friction between the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation really began fourteen months ago when, under a Presidential directive, the CIA took over the intelligence functions that the FBI had expressed in Latin America during the war. The turnover of responsibility in various offices that had been established in Latin America followed no common pattern but generally was a good example of lack of teamwork.

In some Latin-American offices FBI agents offered full cooperation to their CIA successors and delayed their departure to permit a period of overlap and a gradual and orderly turnover. But in a number of instances the CIA agents arrived in the morning to find the FBI files burned and the FBI agents booked for departure that afternoon. The excuse given was that some of the CIA agents assigned to Latin America were not sufficiently "security-conscious."

Shift on Loyalty Checks
More recently, the FBI, which conducts loyalty and security checks for personnel of all Government departments, stopped performing that function, in so far as the CIA was concerned. The CIA was forced, because of this FBI action, to set up its own security check department—now part of the office of inspection and security—to check records of prospective employees. The FBI recently rescinded its action and is again undertaking CIA checks, but the expense to the CIA and to the Government in personnel and money was large.

4. Considerable difficulties between the Atomic Energy Commission and the CIA were evident until recently. The CIA, criticized by older intelligence agencies because of its alleged lack of security, refused to divulge to the AEC on the grounds of security the sources of its atomic energy information. The AEC insisted that it required these sources for proper evaluation of scientific information. This difficulty seems to have been at least temporarily straightened out by the appointment of a liaison officer within the CIA—a young scientist, whose word as to the reliability of scientific reports is satisfactory to the Atomic Energy Commission. Neither the father commission, nor for that matter the CIA itself, are satisfied, however, with our scientific intelligence, and we know very little about Russian atomic energy progress.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-8-82 BY SP3 BJS/ML

4/1/96 SP3 BJS/ML
9/13/96 SP3 BJS/ML

NEW YORK TIMES

ack
7-26-48
mef

b6
b7C

JULY 22, 1948

ENCLOSURE

34 AUG 19 1948

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 22, 1948

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: ARTICLE APPEARING IN NEW YORK TIMES
JULY 22, 1948

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Beahm	
Miss Gandy	

Colonel Sheffield Edwards, CIA, telephonically contacted Special Agent DeLoach of the Liaison Section at 1:00 P.M., July 22, 1948, and advised that Admiral Hillenkoetter, Director of CIA, had instructed him to contact the FBI and advise that the article appearing on Page Two of the New York Times of July 22, 1948, was definitely not the result of any release made by the CIA. Colonel Edwards advised that the statements in question appearing in the New York Times were merely a supposition on the part of Harrison W. Baldwin, a New York Times reporter.

It is noted that the attached article makes specific reference to friction between CIA and various governmental agencies. Mr. Baldwin, in reference article, is totally sympathetic to the CIA and lays blame of friction on the State Department, G-2, AEC, and the FBI. Vague references as to FBI Agents burning files and in booking immediate departure from South American countries is made in an attempt to show how difficult it was for CIA to take over from the FBI in South America.

Further reference in the article is made to applicant investigations conducted by the FBI for CIA. These statements reflect that CIA had been "forced" to set up its own security section because of the FBI refusing to undertake the investigation in question. It further made the statement that the FBI recently rescinded this action and is now undertaking CIA checks, "but the expense to the CIA and to the government in personnel and money was large."

This matter will be followed closely by the Liaison Section with reference to possibly picking up any information which might indicate the above statements were released to the press by CIA, or by any individual who is closely allied with that organization.

Attachment

CDD:KK:mrl

maybe not a "release" of CIA
but certainly inspired by
some pipe line in it.

RECORDED - 60

INDEXED - 60

H.

14512-13

July 26, 1948

Mr. Charles Merz
Editor
The New York Times
New York, New York

b6
b7C

Dear Mr. Merz:

I have read the article by Hanson C. Baldwin, "Intelligence - II, Older Agencies Resent a Successor And Try to Restrict Scope of Action," which appeared in The Times on July 22, 1948, and was astounded to note the allegations concerning friction between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. The facts as I know them are distinctly contrary to the statements and inferences in this regard contained in Mr. Baldwin's article. As a matter of fact, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter and other high officials of the Central Intelligence Agency have vigorously denied the existence of any friction at any time between this Bureau and their Agency.

While, of course, Mr. Baldwin has the privilege of writing anything that he desires, it would seem that any responsible newspaperman would have the courtesy of giving any government agency an opportunity to answer such allegations which are not based on fact before disseminating them widely to the public.

Sincerely yours,

CC - New York

MAJ:ecb

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

RECORDED
INDEXED

91

5- even

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY *VPK*

SUBJECT: CRITICISM OF THE FBI BY HANSON W. BALDWIN

DATE: September 21, 1948

Pursuant to the Director's request concerning the criticism of the FBI by Hanson W. Baldwin, the following information is set forth.

Baldwin is a reporter for the New York Times and during the latter part of July, 1948; the New York Times published a series of articles by Baldwin entitled "Intelligence." In his article of July 22, 1948, Baldwin shows great favor to the Central Intelligence Agency where he sets forth a friction existing between the CIA and the FBI at the time CIA took over intelligence functions in Latin America. This article states in part, ".... in a number of instances the CIA Agents arrived in the morning to find the FBI files burned and the FBI Agents booked for departure that afternoon. The excuse given was that some of the CIA Agents assigned to Latin America were not sufficiently 'security-conscious.'" The article further commented that the FBI which had been conducting loyalty and security checks for personnel for the CIA stopped this function and later undertook to make the CIA checks, "but the expense to the CIA and to the Government in personnel and money was large." On the same date the article appeared and the day following various officials of the CIA contacted the Bureau and advised that the information appearing in the above-mentioned article was definitely not the result of any release made by CIA. On July 26, 1948, the Director protested this article to the Editor of the New York Times. By letter dated July 29, 1948, Mr. Baldwin wrote the Director and stated that he neglected to clear this information with the Director because he felt that the article represented a fair statement of the case but that he would be glad to publish the Bureau's denial.

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-8-89 BY SP3 BJS/CM

OHB:arm

4/1/96 SP3 BJS/CM
9/13/96 SP3 BJS/CM

RECORDED - 138

INDEXED - 138

1/80 - 79595 - 15
IN I I
32 OCT 4

EP 21 2 49 PM '48
RECEIVED-TOLSON
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

b6
b7C

60
33 OCT 14 1948

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 ATTENTION: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR D. M. LADD
 FROM : SAC, Chicago
 SUBJECT:

DATE: October 27, 1948

I am transmitting herewith two photostatic copies of an article entitled "Intelligence" by Hanson W. Baldwin. This article is from the New York Times and was made available to me by Colonel Robert P. Bell, G-2, Fifth Army.

GPM:MG
 Encls. (2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-8-89 BY SP8 LK/JSK

4/1/96

SP3

b6
 b7C

9/13/96 SP3 BTJ/JSK

G.I.B.-7

RECORDED - 59

INDEXED - 59

100-79592
 IF
 19 NOV 4 1948

Key
 10/16
 Bf
 W. J. Wilson

17

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. H. B. Fletcher *HBF*
 FROM : V. P. Keay *VPK*
 SUBJECT: HANSON WEIGHTMAN BALDWIN

DATE: December 30, 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-9-83 BY SP8 [REDACTED]

4/1/96

SP3 [REDACTED]

b6

b7C

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Gurnea
 Mr. Harbo
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Pennington
 Mr. Quinn Tamm
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Nease
 Miss Holmes
 Miss Gandy

On November 1, 1949, and December 5, 1949, requests for name checks were received from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, respectively, on the above-captioned individual.

The Bureau has conducted no investigation of Baldwin. However, there is information in the Bureau files reflecting that on occasion he has been critical of the Bureau.

In an article published in the "New York Times" under date of July 22, 1948, Baldwin shows great favor to the CIA in emphasizing friction which he alleged existed between the CIA and the FBI at the time the CIA took over intelligence functions in Latin America. According to the article, CIA agents arrived in some Latin American countries to find FBI files burned and the FBI agent booked for departure in the afternoon of the day of their arrival. In addition he commented that the FBI which had been conducting loyalty and security checks for personnel of the CIA stopped this function and later undertook to make CIA checks, "but the expense to the CIA and to the Government in personnel and money was large".

As a result of this release, CIA contacted the Bureau and reiterated that CIA received only the fullest cooperation at the time of transfer of jurisdiction in Latin American countries and further, that an investigation at CIA reflected that no one presently within that organization gave out any such information.

A letter was written by the Director to the Editor of the "New York Times" wherein it was pointed out that the statements of Baldwin as indicated above were contrary to facts. The letter to the Editor of the "New York Times" was answered by Baldwin himself and was rather apologetic in tone.

In the April 10, 1947, issue of the "New York Times", Baldwin, in his column discussed the problem of an adequate intelligence system in this country and in so doing made the following remark about the Bureau: "The FBI, rightly praised as a splendid criminal investigating agency, does not deserve its over publicized reputation as a counter-espionage agency."

As of March 9, 1948, it was ascertained through a confidential source that Baldwin in his book entitled "The Price of Power", yet unpublished at the time this information was obtained, called the Bureau a "jealous and sacrosanct organization" which has great power chiefly by virtue of the secret files and the personality and political know-how of Mr. Hoover. "Taught to combat criminals, the FBI has utilized its anti-criminal methods in anti-subversive and counter-espionage work - a process that is not always efficient and may be dangerous to democracy."

DE-INDEXED

DATE: 1/16/58

RECORDED - 93

JAN 13 1950

5-J.F.M.

100-29575-17

Recommendation:

This is for your information and of possible interest because of Baldwin's apparent opposition to the Bureau as an intelligence organization and the fact that he is presently a subject of inquiry by the CIA.

Unless advised to the contrary the forms from OSD and CIA which have both been stamped "No Investigation Conducted by FBI Pertinent to Your Inquiry" will be returned to those organizations in routine manner.

If approved, please return to Liaison Section for transmittal to appropriate agencies.

*2 agree
1/7/50
Laguerie
think liaison
might well
orally inform
CIA
H-*

*OSD + CIA form returned
in routine manner
1/5/50
J.F.M.*

*Daneman, CIA, orally
informed 1/5/50, pursuant
to Director's instruction.
C.F.B.*

California Tech Survey Says Strategic
Weapon Idea Upsets Force's Balance
Report Says Pentagon Controversy

The image is a severely degraded, high-contrast black and white scan, likely of a document page. It is almost entirely black, with significant vertical banding and horizontal streaking, suggesting severe damage or corruption. Faint, illegible shapes are visible, particularly along the top edge where some text might have been.

The Japanese Army's synthesis is upon tactical air power, which is used in support of ground operations. It stresses its strength as power that is employed on independent missions against an opponent's industries and communications. Its conclusions are summarized by the Army, by the Navy and by some in the Air Force as a definite blow to the "big bomber" phase of thinking that dominated the Air Force and the striking concept of the Army. These

100-443887-100

100

WILSON, J. M. (Jr.)

...for the defense
...though dwarf

The device is just that, and not a bomb. However, the fact, if true,

hydrogen bonds will have major
practical application as model

Based on Project Vista's prior recommendations, it was said

... should be controlled by a
... and declared
... control of the
... squadron engaged on a
... of the ...
... rail line ...

control doctrine would also re-
affirm and decentralize the power

1. The first step is to identify the problem or goal. This involves understanding the current situation and what needs to be achieved.

The net result of all these recommendations is interpreted by

1980

1. The purpose of this section is to provide a brief overview of the project's objectives and scope.

The Strategic Air Command's bombers have not, hitherto, been

Although the report stressed strongly the importance of the development of the tactical atomic

costs, it said, would have to be in addition to the costs of "conventional" arms.

b6
b7C

100-79595

VIA LIAISON

DATE: September 9, 1952

TO: Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

FROM: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: HANSON F. BALDWIN
(New York Times Article of June 5, 1952)
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference is made to our memorandum dated August 15, 1952, in which we requested to be advised whether or not you were of the opinion Baldwin's article of June 5, 1952, could have been based on the Alsops' column of May 5, 1952, or whether the source of the two articles could have come from a common source.

It would be appreciated if you could furnish this Bureau an early answer to our request.

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

cc - 1 - Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 805B
333 Third Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

AJM:djb

9/12/52 ERIC To L/C FREE
DSI
JUL 10 12 57 PM '52

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

RECEIVED READING ROOM
JUL 10 12 57 PM '52

RECORDED - 135

EX. 80

100-79595-21
HEREIN IS DECLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3 BTJ/cem
9/16/96 SP3 BTJ/pch

SEP 9 6 22 PM '52
RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

62 SEP 22 1952

b6
b7c

RECORDED-114
100-79595

22

VIA LIAISON

EX-25

DATE: September 12, 1952

TO: Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Elmer M. Neville
Lt. Colonel, U. S. Air Force

FROM: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: HANSON T. BALDWIN
(New York Times Article of June 5, 1952)
ESPIONAGE

Reference is made to your memorandum dated September 4, 1952, your file number 34-1920, in the captioned matter.

For your information, there is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum to Assistant Attorney General Charles B. Murray, dated September 12, 1952, in the captioned matter, in which we advise Mr. Murray that no investigation is being contemplated by this Bureau in the absence of a specific request by him.

Attachment

AJM:djb

9/16/52 ORIG TO LK FREE OSI

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/11/96 BY SP3BJ/cmr

9/16/96 SP3BJ/yc

RECEIVED
SEP 15 1952
FBI
COMM. DIV.

WAB
20
AM

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

71 SEP 23 1952

Assistant Attorney General
Charles E. Murray
Director, FBI

October 1, 1952

HANSON W. BALDWIN
(New York Times Article of
June 5, 1951)
ESPIONAGE - R

RECORDED - 96

Reference is made to your memorandum dated September 25, 1952, your reference CBM:JHD:ub 146-7-5598, in which you requested that the Air Force furnish you with copies of their investigative reports in captioned matter.

For your information, there is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum directed to the Department of the Air Force, to the attention of Elmer M. Neville, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Air Force, requesting that they furnish you with copies of their investigative reports concerning captioned matter.

Attachment

100-79595

AJM:kcj

RECEIVED
OCT 1 5 51 PM '52

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3 BJS/cm
9/16/96 SP3 BJS/jcl

b6
b7C

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

RECEIVED

71 OCT 1 1952

~~SECRET~~
~~INFORMATION~~

CC - Mr. Belmont

Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray

October 14, 1952

Director, FBI

HANSON W. BALDWIN
(New York Times Article of
August 23, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

JM 1-1
[Signature]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-10-89
Classified by *[Signature]*
Declassify on: OADR

There is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum dated October 8, 1952, from Mr. J. A. Waters, Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission, in which Mr. Waters calls our attention to an article entitled, "End of a Chapter," appearing in the New York Times issue of August 23, 1952, written by the subject, Hanson W. Baldwin, which comments on the operational hydrogen bomb. Mr. Waters reported the matter to us for consideration as to the feasibility of instituting investigation to identify Mr. Baldwin's sources of information. *[Signature]*

There is also attached herewith a copy of this Bureau's memorandum dated October 14, 1952, to Mr. Waters requesting that he furnish us with a Photostat of Mr. Baldwin's article, together with necessary data upon which it could be determined whether or not it would be feasible to conduct the requested investigation.

Upon receipt of the desired information from Mr. Waters, it will be furnished you for your consideration and opinion as to whether or not an investigation should be undertaken by this Bureau.

Attachment

RECORDED 100-49595-27
OCT 15 1952

DECLASSIFIED BY *[Signature]*
ON 7-28-97

AJM:djb

FOI/PA # 288,611
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
E.O. # 12356
DATE 3-10-89 INITIALS *[Signature]*
3-1-89 AEC

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Laughlin
- Mohr
- Tele. Rm.
- Holloman
- Gandy

COMM - FBI
OCT 14 1952
MAILED 26

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

63 NOV 3 1952

b6
b7C

SECURITY INFORMATION

b3
b7E

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

100-79595-26

DATE: October 14, 1952

TO: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 805B
333 Third Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

FROM: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: HANSON W. BALDWIN
(New York Times Article of
August 23, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to your memorandum dated October 8, 1952, in which you called to our attention an article written by Hanson W. Baldwin, entitled, "End of a Chapter," appearing in the New York Times issue of August 23, 1952, and advised that the matter was being reported for consideration as to the possibility of instituting an investigation to determine the source or sources of Baldwin's information. ~~SECRET~~

In order to make a determination as to the possibility of such an investigation, it will be necessary for your Agency to furnish this Bureau with certain data upon which a determination can be made as to the practicability of instituting an investigation. Therefore, you are requested to furnish this Bureau with the following data and material:

1. A Photostat of Mr. Baldwin's article entitled, "End of a Chapter," appearing in the New York Times issue of August 23, 1952.

18 OCT 15

COMM - FBI

SECURITY INFORMATION

AJM:djb

APPEAL #	289,611
CIVILACT #	
E.O. #	12355-6
DATE	3-10-89 INITIALS
	3-1-89 AEL

80 OCT 23 1952

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by 5542/2/2
Declassify on: OADR
CLASSIFIED BY 5542/2/2
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
3-9-89

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTG
ON 2-28-97
Per AEL dtd 7-31-96

b6
b7C

2. Advise whether any official document has been released for publication reflecting the development of an airlift operation hydrogen bomb. ~~SECRET~~ *EX-100*

3. Advise whether any testimony or documents have ever been furnished Congressional committees or government officials pertaining to the same.

4. The identity of all official government documents, including pamphlets, memoranda, letters, etc., which were issued prior to August 23, 1952, in which the development of an operation hydrogen bomb that can be airlifted was discussed, together with their dissemination and number, and identities of persons who had actual access or possible access to the documents within your Agency. ~~SECRET~~ *EX-100*

5. It is further requested that you furnish the number of copies prepared of each document containing the pertinent information and the dissemination of the same, together with the identity of the persons receiving them.

6. If the pertinent documents have been disseminated to Atomic Energy Commission branches and installations throughout the country, it is requested that you ascertain from appropriate officials within Atomic Energy Commission branches and installations whether or not any of the pertinent documents were released, summarized and disseminated, and if so, obtain the dissemination and identities of persons receiving the disseminated copies.

This Bureau does not desire that copies of the pertinent documents be furnished at this time. If, at a later date it appears necessary to obtain the documents, a request will be made for the same.

For your further information, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice is being furnished with a copy of your memorandum dated October 8, 1952, together with a copy of this memorandum, so that they will be apprised of your request. The Department is being advised that no action will be taken by this Bureau until the requested information is received from your Agency.

It would be appreciated if this matter could be handled immediately and expeditiously, so that a determination can be made as to the feasibility of initiating the requested investigation.

- 2 -

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray

October 17, 1958

Director, FBI

**MONTHLY REPORT TO THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY**

Reference is made to your memorandum received October 17, 1958, your reference CBM:JJCn:rfr, 148-41-15, requesting that this Bureau, as expeditiously as possible, advise of any observations regarding three cases which the Atomic Energy Commission desires to include in its report to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.

The status of these cases is as follows:

- (1) **JOSEPH WOODROW WEINBERG**
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
PERJURY

As you are aware, this case has been set for trial on December 8, 1958, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Your attention is called to our letter dated October 15, 1958, furnishing the results of our investigation. You will note that in our letter of October 15, 1958, we advised that the investigation of Weinberg is substantially completed and with the exception of several interviews, no additional investigation is contemplated.

(100-333474)

- (2) **ROBERT SHELDON MATTHEWS**
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

As you are aware, Matthews was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury at Tulsa, Oklahoma, on January 9, 1958, for violating 42 USC 1905 (b) (2). Your attention is called to our letter dated September 23, 1958, informing that United States Attorney Whit T. Maury at Tulsa, Oklahoma, advised that this case would not be set for trial as long as Matthews was in the United States Army.

(117-1147)

42-83326

DUPLICATE YELLOW

NOT RECORDED

138 OCT 21 1958

SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL

CO - 100-79595

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-10-89

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3BJS/cmr

9/16/96 SP3BJS/92

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 12 12624-909

b7E

JEM:brg

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(3) ⁰**HANSON W. BALDWIN**
("NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE OF JUNE 3, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

Your attention is called to our letters of September 12, 1952, and October 1, 1952, furnishing background data concerning this case and informing that the United States Air Force was conducting the investigation in this matter. As you are aware, the United States Air Force was requested by letter dated October 1, 1952, to furnish copies of their investigative reports to you.

The propriety of releasing ⁽¹⁰⁰⁻⁷²⁵⁹⁵⁾ information in connection with the above cases is being left for your discretion.

- 2 -

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of a Pessimism on Strength of Shadows: Short-Term Gain

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Short-Term Outlook Assayed

In assessing short-term prospects, leaders here are more concerned with the effects upon Moscow's policy of any letdown in United States rearmament efforts, or in any severe cutback of the defense and foreign-aid budgets, within the next year. The defense budget for the next fiscal year (1954), starting July 1, 1953, as now envisaged, contemplates a total expenditure approximately equivalent to the more than \$46,000,000,000 provided this year, but the process of budget-shaping between now and Jan. 1 and Congressional action next year may reduce this materially. Any such policy would delay achieving that long-planned plateau of strength two to three years from now.

Moreover, evidences of some complacency in Europe and in this country—in part the result of the stalemate in Korea, in part the natural confidence that springs from increased strength and the belief that imminent war is unlikely—worry officials here. Nevertheless, despite this worry and the numerous uncertainties incident to the end of a chapter in history, the short-term dangers, probably the only ones with which man, struggling to control the tide of events, can cope, seem minuscule compared with the long-term threats.

False Optimism Feared

First and foremost, the comforting comparisons of the goals of the new Soviet Five-Year Plan with production statistics in the United States may tend to give rise to false optimism. The new Five-Year Plan—if it succeeds, as it probably will—will make the Soviet, despite various weaknesses, industrially capable of sustaining a protracted war. Nor will all of its industries be exposed to de-

struction; geogra- sion is emphasized in and officials here be- fa- facilities are being built underground.

The Soviet's weakness in petroleum production will be materially reduced by the new plan, and it must be remembered that its petroleum products can be diverted to military and agricultural needs since very little is needed to support the civilian economy. The same thing is true of steel. Even if the Soviet plan succeeds, 1955 production of some 44,700,000 tons will be considerably less than half the United States' production. But a far greater percentage of Soviet steel can be funneled into military uses than is possible in the United States.

Anyone who takes undue comfort from this United States leadership need only recall that it took more than three years of terrific fighting to subdue Japan, which had a steel production of only about 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 tons and yet was able to produce hundreds of fighting ships and thousands of planes.

Moreover, and most important, it seems possible—and indeed, probable—if the Five-Year Plan goals are an accurate guide, that

the rate of Soviet industrial expansion, particularly in the capital goods industries, will exceed that in the United States. If this should prove to be true, the danger will come, not in 1955, but perhaps some twenty to thirty years hence, when the huge undeveloped Soviet heartland may have girded its strength and become an industrial giant.

Still another factor that casts a shadow across the long-term future is the continued enslavement of the puppet peoples of Eastern Europe. New generations growing up in Eastern Europe have never known the light of freedom and have been nurtured solely on communism; ties with the West are dying out. The prospects for a continued strengthening of the Soviet empire would be highly likely if it were not for the internal strains and stresses that continuously assail dictatorship, and particularly Communist dictatorship, and if it were not a historical fact that the seeds of nationalism (Titoism, for example) burgeon eternally, despite repression.

The Blackest Shadow

But the blackest shadow cast across the long-term picture is the shadow of growing military insecurity. New technological developments in weapons are creating less security, not more.

The first test of a hydrogen fusion device in history, to be made at Eniwetok in the fall, is expected

most unimaginable power—of an order of magnitude far greater than the most powerful atomic bomb—is about to be practicable in the middle half of the dangerous twentieth century.

Moreover, the United States' development of guided missiles and of submarines from which to launch them indicates that the Kremlin may soon be in a position, if war should come, to launch missiles with atomic warheads against American coastal cities. As a matter of fact, the air defense program of tomorrow must contemplate a time interval of only twenty minutes between the moment a submarine surfaces somewhere off the Virginia Capes and the moment an explosion occurs over Washington.

These grim facts—now facts and not just blueprint and laboratory dreams—provide the reason why officials, already wrestling with the difficult problems of the moment, more or less throw up their hands at the problems of the more distant future. The great hope is that mutual fear will breed restraint and that political change will reduce tension.

Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray

December 10, 1952

Director, FBI

HANSON W. BALDWIN
(New York Times Article of
August 23, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3 BT/TTC
ON 7-29-97

b6
b7C

Reference is made to our memorandum dated October 14, 1952, in which we called your attention to Hanson W. Baldwin's article entitled "End of a Chapter" appearing in the New York Times issue of August 23, 1952, in which he comments on the operational Hydrogen Bomb.

You were also furnished a copy of a memorandum dated October 8, 1952, from Mr. John A. Waters, Director, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission, in which Mr. Waters requested that we consider the feasibility of instituting investigation to identify Mr. Baldwin's source of information, together with a copy of the Bureau's memorandum dated October 14, 1952, to Mr. Waters requesting that he furnish the Bureau a Photostat of Mr. Baldwin's article, together with necessary data upon which it could be determined whether or not it would be feasible to conduct the requested investigation. ~~SECRET~~

There is attached hereto for your information Mr. Waters' reply consisting of the following which are enclosed herewith:

(1) A Photostat of Mr. Waters' memorandum dated November 26, 1952.

(2) Photostats reflecting the identity of documents wherein information pertaining to the Hydrogen Bomb appears, and their dissemination.

(3) A Photostat of Mr. Baldwin's article entitled "End of a Chapter" which appeared in the New York Times issue of August 23, 1952.

You will note from Mr. Baldwin's article that he makes reference to the Hydrogen Bomb in two instances. In the first, in speaking of the technological developments that are changing the whole face of war and giving examples of such developments he cites the first test in history, scheduled for the Eniwetok Proving Ground, of a hydrogen device. The second reference to the Hydrogen Bomb is mentioned later in his article where he says: "The first test of a hydrogen fusion device in history, to be made at Eniwetok in the fall, is expected to lead, within a year or so, to the development of an operational hydrogen bomb that can be airlifted. This means that a weapon of almost unimaginable power - of an order of magnitude far greater than the most powerful atomic bomb - is about to be practicable in the middle half of the dangerous twentieth century."

100-79595-30
AJM:elk

CC - AEC (Under Separate Cover)

3-10-59
Multiple Source
SP8 BT/fch

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

RECORDED-1

DEC 15 1952

~~SECRET~~

In connection with the above statement made by Baldwin concerning the proposed test at Eniwetok, it should be noted that similar information was published by Joseph and Stewart Alsop in their column, "Matter of Fact," appearing in the Washington Post newspaper on April 11, May 5, and June 18, 1952, which was prior to Baldwin's article of August 23, 1952. You are aware that our investigation relative to the disclosure of the above information by the Alsops failed to reveal the person or persons responsible.

Your attention is called to the report of Special Agent Joe E. Craig dated September 8, 1952, at Washington, D. C., in the case captioned "Joseph Alsop; Stewart Alsop; Unknown Subject (Columns of May 5 and June 18, 1952), Espionage - X," which sets forth the results of our investigation conducted on the unauthorized disclosures by the Alsops in their columns.

It was ascertained in the Alsop investigation that the classified information pertaining to the Hydrogen Bomb which, as mentioned heretofore, was similar to the information published by Baldwin, that is, as to the time of the Hydrogen Bomb test, appears in twenty-two official government documents. Although these documents received somewhat limited dissemination, in considering the number of departments, agencies and military establishments interested in the Hydrogen Bomb experiment, it is interesting to note that over two thousand persons had access to the pertinent documents. The above estimate was computed on only a partial determination of the dissemination of the documents since it was ascertained from our investigation that these classified documents were not only disseminated in their original form but were reproduced and reissued by a number of establishments and agencies for further dissemination.

Ralph C. Smith, Assistant Director for Classification and Security at the Los Alamos, New Mexico, Scientific Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission, has estimated that the fact that the principal of the Hydrogen Bomb was to be tested at Eniwetok this fall was known to about one thousand persons at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and between two thousand and ten thousand other persons in other agencies involved in national defense. ~~SECRET~~ U

You will note from the attachments that information pertaining to the development of a deliverable Hydrogen Bomb appeared in numerous official government documents and received wide and diversified dissemination. ~~SECRET~~ U

Within the Atomic Energy Commission seven documents were located containing information pertaining to the development of a deliverable Hydrogen Bomb. However, it should be noted that this figure does not ~~SECRET~~ U

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

~~SECRET~~

include any documents that might have been disseminated, reissued or summarized within Atomic Energy installations throughout the country. ~~SECRET~~ U

According to the Division of Military Application (DMA), twenty-one documents are contained in its files pertaining to the development of a deliverable Hydrogen Bomb. From the attachments you will note that these documents received wide and diversified dissemination. According to DMA it was unable to assure that no additional "series documentation" has been made on the documents which originated outside of DMA. Such information, according to DMA, can only be developed at the source of the original documentation.

It should be further noted that the Atomic Energy Commission in its memorandum of November 26, 1952, calls our attention to the fact that matters relating to the development of a carrier for the Hydrogen Bomb is the primary responsibility of the Department of the Air Force and suggested that the Department of the Air Force be contacted concerning any documents which it has prepared. ~~SECRET~~ U

Since the Department of the Air Force has the primary responsibility for the development of "delivery capability" for the Hydrogen Bomb, it can be assumed that documents concerning the same are in existence, thereby adding to the known existing documents and possibly increasing to some extent the overall dissemination of information pertaining to the development of a deliverable Hydrogen Bomb. ~~SECRET~~ U

According to Mr. Waters' memorandum of November 26, 1952, inquiries are being made by the Atomic Energy Commission at its Santa Fe Operations Office as to whether or not any of the pertinent documents were reissued, summarized and disseminated. Upon the receipt of the information from the Atomic Energy Commission you will be furnished with the same. ~~SECRET~~ U

Concerning any inquiry of the Department of the Air Force relative to the existence and dissemination of any documents pertaining to the development of "delivery capability" for the Hydrogen Bomb, such an inquiry will be held in abeyance pending an opinion from you as to the desirability of pursuing such an investigation. ~~SECRET~~ U

Therefore, it is requested that, in view of the above, you advise whether an investigation should be conducted in captioned matter.

For your further information a copy of this memorandum is being furnished to the Atomic Energy Commission for its information.

Attachment

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

100-79595

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Date: December 10, 1952

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 805B
333 Third Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: HANSON W. BALDWIN
(New York Times Article of
August 23, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to your memorandum dated November 26, 1952, in which you furnished this Bureau information concerning pertinent documents relative to captioned matter. You requested that you be advised of any action contemplated by this Bureau in the matter.

For your information there is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum to Assistant Attorney General Charles D. Murray of the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, in which we asked Mr. Murray to advise whether investigation should be conducted in captioned matter.

You will be advised of Mr. Murray's desires in this matter.

Attachment

AJM:elk

RECORDED 100-79575-31
102 DEC 1952

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

BY CPL. MOED
87 DEC 11
COMM 52

353842
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3 BJS/cen
9/16/96 SP3 BJS/92

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

60 DEC 19 1952

, 1952

TO:

Director

Mr. Tolson

Mr. Nichols

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Clegg

Mr. Glavin

Mr. Harbo

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Tracy

Mr. Q. Tamm

Mr. Mohr

Miss Gandy

Mr. Holloman

Mr. Laughlin

Mr. Hennrich

Mr. Cleveland

M

Mr. Baumgardner

Mr. Branigan

Mr. Keay

Mr. Stanley

Mr.

Mr.

Mr. Ferris

Foreign Serv. Desk

Mr. Pennington

Mr. Callan

Mr. Scatterday

Mr. G. C. Gandy Tolson See Me

Mr. Winterrowd Ladd Call Me

Mr. Malley Nichols Appropriate action

Mr. Price Belmont Note & return

Mr. Glavin Send file

Mrs. Henley Harbo Bring up-to-date

Miss Jess Rosen Correct

Mr. Tracy Re-date

Mrs. Davidson Mohr Please initial

Mr. Winterrowd & return

Ch. Clerk's Off. Tele. Room Place on record

Records Section Mr. Holloman & return

Personnel Files Miss Gandy Place on record

Mechanical Sec. Per conversation

Ident. Division Advise status

Technical Lab. Deferred Recording

Reading Room & Routing

For future info.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-10-89 BY SP8HJ/6

4/1/96 503 65/cum

9/16/96 D. M. Ladd - Rm. 5736

SP3 BTJ/gw Telephone Ext. 555

AIR - TEL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NEW YORK, N.Y.
December 31, 1952

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

73
HANSON W. ⁽²⁾BALDWIN PARENTHESIS QUOTE NEW YORK TIMES UNQUOTE
ARTICLE OF JUNE FIFTH, NINETEEN FIFTY TWO END PARENTHESIS;
ESPIONAGE DASH R. BALDWIN CONTACTED FOR APPOINTMENT. HE
ADVISED THAT HE HAS JUST RETURNED FROM EUROPE AND IS TOO BUSY
TO SEE AGENT UNTIL JANUARY SIX NEXT. APPOINTMENT MADE FOR
THAT DATE AT THREE THIRTY PM. REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED AS
SOON THEREAFTER AS POSSIBLE.

BOARDMAN

- BUREAU (REGULAR MAIL)

cc Branigan

RECORDED-14

1/50 - 79595-35
12 JAN 3 1953

TJB:MZM (#6)
65-16201

Approved: 1438
JAN 14 1953

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FD-36
Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

G.I.R. 9

X

March 1953

6-201

B

3-10-88
4/1/96
9/16/96
SP3 817796

b6
b7C

Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray

January 5, 1953

Director, FBI

HANSON vs. BALDWIN
(New York Times Article of
August 23, 1952) **EX-107**
ESPIONAGE - R

INDEXED-97

RECORDED-37

Reference is made to our memorandum dated December 10, 1952, in which we set forth the results [redacted] check on the dissemination of pertinent documents in which the pertinent information which appeared in Baldwin's article of August 23, 1952, appears. You will recall that we advised that [redacted] was still making inquiry at [redacted] as to whether or not any of the pertinent documents were reissued, summarized and disseminated, and that upon the receipt of the information from [redacted] you would be furnished the same.

b7E

For your information, by memorandum dated December 29, 1952, the [redacted] submitted the results of its inquiry at its [redacted] Office, a copy of which is attached hereto.

Further reference is made to your memorandum dated December 24, 1952, your reference CSM:JAC:tm 146-7-5998, in which you advised that further inquiry concerning captioned case would appear unwarranted with the exception of contacting Mr. Baldwin for the purpose of asking him the source of his information.

Mr. Baldwin will be contacted in accordance with your request.

Attachment

AJM:elk:jdb

[redacted] CONTAINED

FOUR IN ONE UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/19/96 BY SP3 BJS/clm


9/16/96 SP3 BJS/clm

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Hosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gand _____

JAN 6 - 1953
JAN 15 1953

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-10-89 BY SP8 JF/pet

4/8/96 SP3 BJS/CLM

9/16/96 SP3 BJS/CLM

b6
b7C

100-14595-37 ENCLOSURE

End of a Chapter

Long-Term Pessimism on Strength of Soviet Overshadows Short-Term Gain

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES

WASHINGTON, Aug. 23.—The construction: geographical dispersion, end of a chapter in the history of our times and the opening of a new and uncertain period are at hand.

The picture of two worlds in conflict, as seen from Washington, gives cause for increasing short-term optimism but long-term pessimism. However, the prospects in both the immediate and distant future are highly uncertain. But that a new chapter is opening is certain.

In the United States, the November Presidential elections mean new faces and new methods—and probably new policies—in Washington.

In Korea, the stalemated war drags on, but the visit of Chinese Communist leaders to Moscow and the signs of a split between the North Korean puppets and the Chinese Communists may, in time, indicate some change in the bloody pattern. United States arms producers, despite all past gloomy diagnoses, now are turning out hundreds of new medium tanks and hundreds, soon thousands, of new planes every month.

The nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are far stronger than they were two years ago. The West, slowly but steadily, is beginning to lead from strength and not from weakness. There are deficiencies; in many respects the West does not yet match the ready military strength of the Communist powers, but the West no longer is a "pushover"; the first chapter of rearmament is finished.

Evidence From Soviet Side

The announcement in Moscow of the Soviet Communist party's internal reorganization and of the goals of the current Five-Year Plan offers additional evidence of the opening of a new chapter.

Finally, technological developments that are changing the whole face of war—the launching of missiles from submarines, for instance, and the first test in history, scheduled for the Eniwetok proving ground, of a hydrogen device—are opening completely new and dangerous vistas.

As seen from Washington, the long-term dangers now are beginning to loom even larger than the United States' short-term fears. Admittedly, the meaning of the meeting of Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders in Moscow, and of the impending internal reorganization of the Soviet Communist Party, is not yet clear, and it is possible that in the immediate future communism may assume an even more aggressive policy than it has in the past. But it still seems unlikely that the Soviet Union will risk everything in the near future in all-out war, particu-

larly since the United States and its Allies have gained strength in the last two years.

Still another factor that casts a shadow across the long-term future is the continued enslavement of the puppet peoples of Eastern Europe. New generations growing up in Eastern Europe have never known the light of freedom and have been nurtured solely on communism; ties with the West are dying out. The prospects for a continued strengthening of the Soviet empire would be highly likely if it were not for the internal strains and stresses that continuously assail dictatorship, and particularly Communist dictatorship; and if it were not a historical fact that the seeds of nationalism (Titism, for example) burgeon eternally, despite repression.

The Blackest Shadow

But the blackest shadow cast across the long-term picture is the shadow of growing military insecurity. New technological developments which had a steel production of only about 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 tons and yet was able to produce hundreds of fighting ships and thousands of planes. The first test of a hydrogen fusion device in history, to be made at Eniwetok in the fall, is expected to lead, within a year or so, to the development of an operational hydrogen bomb that can be airlifted. This means that a weapon of al-

most unimaginable power—of an order of magnitude far greater than the most powerful atomic bomb—is about to be practicable. The danger in the middle half of the twentieth century, should prove to be true, the danger will come, not in 1955, but perhaps some twenty to thirty years hence. Moreover, the United States' development of guided missiles and of submarines from which to launch them indicates that the Kremlin may soon be in a position, if war should come, to launch missiles with atomic warheads against American coastal cities. As a matter of fact, the air defense program of tomorrow must contemplate a time interval of only twenty minutes between the moment a submarine surfaces somewhere off the Virginia Capes and the moment an explosion occurs over Washington.

These grim facts—now facts and not just blueprint and laboratory dreams—provide the reason why officials, already wrestling with the difficult problems of the moment, more or less, throw up their hands at the problems of the more distant future. The great hope is that mutual fear will breed restraint and that political change will reduce tension.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Short-Term Outlook Assayed

In assessing short-term prospects, leaders here are more concerned with the effects upon Moscow's policy of any letdown in United States rearmament efforts, or of any severe cutback of the defense and foreign-aid budgets, within the next year. The defense budget for the next fiscal year (1954), starting July 1, 1953, as now envisaged, contemplates a total expenditure approximately equivalent to the more than \$46,000,000,000 provided this year, but the process of budget-shaping between now and Jan. 1 and Congressional action next year may reduce this materially. Any such policy would delay achieving that long-planned plateau of strength two to three years from now.

Moreover, evidences of some complacency in Europe and in this country—in part the result of the stalemate in Korea, in part the natural confidence that springs from increased strength and the belief that imminent war is unlikely—worry officials here.

Nevertheless, despite this worry and the numerous uncertainties incident to the end of a chapter in history, the short-term dangers, probably the only ones with which man, struggling to control the tide of events, can cope, seem minuscule compared with the long-term threats.

False Optimism Feared

First and foremost, the comforting comparisons of the goals of the new Soviet Five-Year Plan with production statistics in the United States may tend to give rise to false optimism. The new Five-Year Plan—if it succeeds, as it probably will—will make the Soviet, despite various weaknesses, industrially capable of sustaining a protracted war. Nor will all of its industries be exposed to de-

These grim facts—now facts and not just blueprint and laboratory dreams—provide the reason why officials, already wrestling with the difficult problems of the moment, more or less throw up their hands at the problems of the more distant future. The great hope is that mutual fear will breed restraint and that political change will reduce tension.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 1/7/53

FROM : SAC, New York b3
b7ESUBJECT: HANSON W. BALDWIN
("NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE
OF JUNE 5, 1952)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-10-89 BY SP8ugj/gh

G. I. R. - 8

HANSON W. BALDWIN
("NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE
OF AUGUST 23, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of report of SA THOMAS J. BARRY, 1/7/53, NY, entitled "HANSON W. BALDWIN, ("NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE OF JUNE 5, 1952); Espionage - R, and five copies of report of SA THOMAS J. BARRY, 1/7/53, NY, entitled "HANSON W. BALDWIN, ("NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE OF AUGUST 23, 1952); Espionage - R. Also enclosed for Bureau information are two photostatic copies of BALDWIN's article of 8/23/52, entitled "End of a Chapter".

REGISTERED

ENCS. (12)

3-10-89 SP8ugj/gh

RECORDED - 79

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3 BJS/cw
9/16/96 SP3 BTJ/92

EX - 107

JAN 9 1953

TJB:JAR

100-79595

Date: January 14, 1953

To: Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Elmer M. Yeville
Lieutenant Colonel
United States Air Force

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: HANSON F. BALDWIN
("NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE OF JUNE 5, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to prior correspondence in the captioned matter.

For your information, Assistant Attorney General Charles B. Murray, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, by memorandum dated December 17, 1952, requested that we interview Hanson F. Baldwin for the purpose of ascertaining the source of the material which was contained in his article of June 5, 1952.

In the above connection, there is attached a copy of the closing report of Special Agent Thomas J. Barry dated January 7, 1953, at New York, New York, which sets forth the results of our interview with Mr. Baldwin. You will note that Mr. Baldwin refused to divulge to Special Agent Barry the source of the material contained in his article of June 5, 1952.

For your information, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice is being requested to advise what action it contemplates taking in this matter. You will be advised of the Criminal Division's reply.

Attachment

AJM:epa

RECORDED-36

JAN 22 1953

137

38

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3 BT/CLM

b6
b7C

Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray

January 10, 1953

Director, FBI

HANSON W. BALDWIN
(NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE OF JUNE 5, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 17, 1952, in which you requested that we interview Hanson W. Baldwin concerning the basis for his June 5, 1952, article.

For your information, there is attached a copy of the closing report of Special Agent Thomas J. Barry dated January 7, 1953, at New York, New York, which sets forth the results of our interview with Mr. Baldwin. You will note that Mr. Baldwin refused to divulge to Special Agent Barry the identity of the source of the material contained in his article of June 5, 1952.

You are requested to advise what action you contemplate taking in the captioned matter.

Attachment

100-79595

39

RECORDED-20

AJM:epa.

EX - 107

3-10-89

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-10-89 BY SP8WJ/bat

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3 BTJ/cm
9/16/96 SP3 BTJ/cm

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Laughlin
- Mohr
- Tele. Rm.
- Holloman
- Gandy

b6
b7C

100-79595

BY SPECIAL MESSAGE

Date: January 16, 1953

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 805B
333 Third Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: HANSON W. BALDWIN
("NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE OF AUGUST 23, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 29, 1952, and to our memorandum dated January 5, 1953, in which we advised that at the request of the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Hanson W. Baldwin was being contacted and asked to furnish the source of the information contained in his article of August 23, 1952.

In the above connection, there is attached a copy of the report of Special Agent Thomas J. Parry dated January 7, 1953, at New York, New York, which sets forth the results of our interview with Mr. Baldwin. You will note that Mr. Baldwin refused to divulge to Special Agent Parry the source of his information.

For your information, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice is being requested to advise what action it contemplates taking in this matter. You will be advised of the Criminal Division's reply.

Attachment

AJM:eda

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

JAN 22 1953
137

b6
b7C

INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3/ewm
9/16/96 SP3 BJS/96

Assistant Attorney General
Charles B. Murray

January 10, 1953

Director, FBI

HANSON W. BALDWIN
("NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE OF AUGUST 23, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 24, 1952, your reference CRM:JAG:tn 140-7-5598, in which you requested that we interview Hanson W. Baldwin for the purpose of asking him the source of the information which he set forth in his article of August 23, 1952.

For your information, there is attached a copy of the report of Special Agent Thomas J. Barry dated January 7, 1953, at New York, New York, which sets forth the results of our interview with Mr. Baldwin. You will note that Mr. Baldwin refused to divulge to Special Agent Barry the source of his information.

It is requested that you advise what action you contemplate taking in the captioned matter.

Attachment

100-79535

AJM:eda

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3 BJS/cmr
9/16/96 SP3 BJS/ks

RECORDED
JAN 22 1953
187

EX - 107

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

60 FEB 8 1953

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

100-79595

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Date: February 11, 1953

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 805B
333 Third Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: HANSON W. BALDWIN
("NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE
OF AUGUST 23, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3BJT/cmr
9/16/96 SP3 BJS/96L

Reference is made to my memorandum of January 16, 1953, forwarding to you a copy of the report of Special Agent Thomas J. Barry dated January 7, 1953, at New York, New York, and advising you that the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice was being requested to advise what action it contemplated taking in this matter.

For your information, the Criminal Division advised on February 3, 1953, that it is of the opinion that in view of the wide dissemination of the security information involved and in view of the investigation conducted to ascertain the individuals responsible for its disclosure, no further investigation is warranted at this time.

In view of the opinion of the Criminal Division, no further investigation is contemplated in this matter.

RECORDED - 47

NOTE: The memorandum of Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney III, Criminal Division, dated 12-3-53 in this case bears the caption "Hanson W. Baldwin ('New York Times' Article of June 5, 1952) Espionage - R." It is apparent that this memorandum should also have contained the caption "'New York Times' Article of August 23, 1952," inasmuch as the first line of the memorandum makes reference to our two memoranda of January 16, 1953. The cases entitled "Hanson W. Baldwin ('New York Times' Article of August 23, 1952) Espionage - R" and "Hanson W.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gand _____

JWL:brg SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

Baldwin ('New York Times' Article of June 5, 1952)
Espionage - R" have been consolidated in our file; however,
for the sake of clarity, separate memoranda dated
January 16, 1953, were forwarded to former Assistant
Attorney General Murray under the separate captions.

00112 1983

4-22

Subj: James Thomas Wright

Address: _____

Birthdate: _____ SUPV: _____

Misc: _____

R# 84 Date 10-7 Searcher Initial 110

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-10-89 BY SP3 BJS/cia
FILE NUMBER 44-196 SERIAL SP3 BJS/cia

1 1 _____

b3
b7E

NP _____

NP _____

SECURITY INFORMATION

100-79595

RECORDED-1
Date:

February 11, 1953

To:

Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

X-123

Attention: Mr. Elmer M. Neville
Lieutenant Colonel
United States Air Force

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: HANSON W. BALDWIN
("NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE
OF JUNE 5, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to our memorandum of January 16, 1953, forwarding to you a copy of the report of Special Agent Thomas J. Barry dated January 7, 1953, at New York, New York, and advising you that the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice was being requested to advise what action it contemplated taking in this matter.

For your information, the Criminal Division advised on February 3, 1953, that it is of the opinion that in view of the wide dissemination of the security information involved and in view of the investigation conducted to ascertain the individuals responsible for its disclosure, no further investigation is warranted at this time.

In view of the opinion of the Criminal Division, no further investigation is contemplated in this matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3BJS/cen

9/10/96 SP3 BTJ/142

JWL:brg

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 12 1953

MAILED 10

b6

b7C

FEB 12 1953

NUMERO

NCE

4-22a

SEARCH SLIP

Subj:

B. Quinn **JUN 25 1954**

Supervisor

Room

R#

21

Date

4/18/54

Searcher

Initial

5244

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

100-79595

112

Hanson W.

7-18-5007-202, 207, 11

Hanson

[Redacted Box]

b3

b7E

H. W.

7-185307-204

intd 100 F

11-53

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-10-89 BY SP8 HJ/6

4/1/96 SP3 BT/CLW
6/16/96 SP3 BT/CLW

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

November 12, 1953

HANSON, WIGSTON BALDWIN
Born: March 22, 1903
Baltimore, Maryland

In response to your name check request on the above-mentioned individual there is transmitted a copy of the report of Special Agent Thomas J. Parry dated January 7, 1953, at New York, entitled "Hanson W. Baldwin ('New York Times' Article of June 5, 1952) Espionage-R." It is to be noted that the data set forth in this report was obtained as the result of an inquiry only and does not represent a complete investigation of Hanson W. Baldwin.

Regarding the above inquiry, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice advised on February 3, 1953, that it was of the opinion in view of the wide dissemination of the security information involved and in view of the investigation conducted to ascertain the individuals responsible for its disclosure, that no further investigation was warranted at that time.

Your attention is also directed to information concerning Baldwin that is contained in reports furnished your agency in July, 1943, entitled, "Japanese Propaganda Mailed From New York City to Honolulu in Department of Justice Envelope; Internal Security-J."

In furtherance of your inquiry concerning Hanson W. Baldwin you may desire to consult the files of the Office of Special Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The foregoing information is furnished to you as a result of your request for an FBI file check only and is not to be construed as a clearance or a nonclearance of the individual involved. It is for your confidential use only and should not be disseminated to unauthorized individuals or agencies.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gandy _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Zoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

(100-79595-37)

Orig. to ONI
Rec. Rec. 10-6-53

VMS

SE 10

MAILED

NOV 12 1953

NAME CHECK

NOV 10 1953

NOV 10 1953

NAME CHECK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/19/96 BY SP3 B3/CAW
9/16/96 SP3 B3/CAW

b6
b7c

NOV 23 1953

SECURITY INFO. ATTN - SECRET

~~SECRET~~

A further review of the records of this Bureau has disclosed that you have been furnished with a copy of the report of Special Agent John T. Minnich, dated December 23, 1953, at Washington, D.C., in the case entitled [redacted] Internal Security - R and CF." Your attention is directed to that report inasmuch as a name similar to that of the individual inquired about appears therein on pages 6 and 7. [redacted]

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

The foregoing information is furnished to you as the result of your request for an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or a nonclearance of the individual involved. This information is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated outside of your agency.

December 15, 1954

HANSON WEIGHTMAN BALDWIN
Born: March 22, 1903
Baltimore, Maryland

In response to your name check request, submitted to this Bureau through Liaison, there is attached hereto one copy of an investigative report entitled "Hanson W. Baldwin ('New York Times' article of August 23, 1952); Espionage-R" dated January 7, 1953, at New York.
(100-79595-37)

The information furnished to you is the result of your request for a check of the files of the FBI and should not be construed as a clearance or a nonclearance of the individual involved. The information furnished to you is for your use and should not be disseminated outside of your agency.

Attachment

Orig. to G-2
Req. rec'd: December 2, 1954
[redacted] vms

b6
b7C

NOTE: G-2, Department of the Army, has advised SA J. F. SULLIVAN, of the Liaison Section, that Baldwin is one of a group of individuals who may be invited to attend an Army War College seminar at which data of a classified nature will be discussed. G-2 requested that the results of these name checks requests be furnished to them by December 15, 1954, and stated that in view of the prominence of the individuals and the short period of time available in which to complete the checks they desired to only be advised whether or not this Bureau has conducted an investigation of these persons. Inasmuch as the G-2 request was for results of security or applicant-type investigations, indices search and file review were limited to main files in those categories.

(Report furnished G-2 classified "Secret")

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/1/96 BY SP3 BTJ/cms
4116196 SP3 BTJ/cms

SECRET

DEC 15 1954

DEC 21 1954

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

NUMEROUS REFERENCE

4-22a

SEARCH SLIP

Subj: American High School

Supervisor _____ Room _____

R# 1934 Date 7-14 Searcher Initial 5-87

355846

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

DATE 3-10-89 5P8 1/6 9116147
4/61/86 503313/cum/SP3 015194

NY 100-64700 - 1207 encl

WP [redacted] b3 b7E

NY [redacted] b7E

NY 100-64700 - 1212 encl

#3801: 1211 encl #3700

American High School
SI

H. J. Eldredge

NI 62-92847 - 20

JUL 18 1955

JUL 21 1955

NUMEROUS REFERENCE

4-22a

b6

b7C

SEARCH SLIP

Subj:

3-10-89

SP8 up/80

Supervisor

4/11/96

Room 911

SP3815

R#

93 JUL 20 1955

Searcher

Date

Initial

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

100-77595

100-77595

-44

7-2-54

100-185307

-207

b3

b7E

100-64700

1215

5040, 5041, 5359

100-346774

-36 p12

100-3-

-2035 p40

100-64700

-1310

b3

b7E

3070, 3154

~~SECRET~~

MAILED

AUG 4 1955

NAME CHECK

b6
b7C

August 1, 1955

CC TO: State (Confidential- AA)
REQ. REC'D. 3/30/64

APR 16 1964

ANS.
BY:...

HANSON WRIGHTMAN BALDWIN
Born: March 22, 1903
Baltimore, Maryland

Hanson Wrightman Baldwin

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

In response to your name check request concerning the captioned individual, there is enclosed one copy each of the report of Special Agent Thomas J. Barry, dated January 7, 1953, at New York, in the case entitled "Hanson W. Baldwin ('New York Times' article of June 5, 1952); Espionage - R," and the report of Special Agent Thomas J. Barry, dated January 7, 1953, at New York, in the case entitled "Hanson W. Baldwin ('New York Times' article of August 23, 1952); Espionage - R." Your attention is directed to these reports inasmuch as they relate to the person about whom you inquire. It is to be noted that the data set forth in these reports does not represent a complete investigation of Hanson W. Baldwin.

Regarding the above inquiry, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice advised on February 3, 1953, that it was of the opinion in view of the wide dissemination of the security information involved and in view of the investigation conducted to ascertain the individuals responsible for its disclosure, that no further investigation was warranted at that time. (100-79595-37)

You may also desire to consult the files of the Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force, and the Atomic Energy Commission for information relating to the captioned individual.

The foregoing information is furnished to you as a result of your request for an FBI file check and is not to be construed as a clearance or a nonclearance of the individual involved. This information is furnished for your use and should not be disseminated outside of your agency.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Enclosures (2)

Orig. and one to OSD
Req rec'd: 7-12-55

tar

(4)

58 AUG 9 1955

RECORDED - 81

INDEXED - 81

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-B/DBM
ON 4-26-2001

~~SECRET~~

AUG 4 1955

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter to Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State

The files of this Bureau contain no derogatory security information identifiable with the afore-mentioned three individuals.

The above is being furnished as a matter of possible interest to you and should not be disseminated outside of your Department.

cc - 1 - Director BY COURIER SERVICE
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

NOTE:

[Confidential informant is] (S) (u)

b7D

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

6/21/56

FROM: SAC, WFO

(FNU) VAN DYKE (ph), IS - R
(WFO file [redacted])

(FNU) BACHWALD (ph), IS - R
(WFO file [redacted])

(FNU) MR. BALZUTH (ph), IS - R
(WFO file [redacted])

(FNU) ADLER (ph), IS - R
(WFO file [redacted])

(FNU) O'CONNOR (ph), IS - R
(WFO file [redacted])

(FNU) YUDIN (ph), IS - R
(WFO file [redacted])

(FNU) KEELER (ph), IS - R
(WFO file [redacted])

(FNU) FOREMAN (ph), IS - R
(WFO file [redacted])

b3
b7E

[redacted] advised 6/18/56 that an unidentified female at Cosmos Travel Bureau, NY, contacted employee IVAN F. BUKANOV at Soviet Embassy. BUKANOV stated that a Mr. VAN DYKE, Mr. and Mrs. O'CONNOR, Mr. and Mrs. KEELER, BACHWALD, ADLER, YUDIN and FOREMAN (all names phonetic), have received their visas. (S)(u)

b7D

WFO unable to identify subjects on basis of available information.

b3
b7E

NY is requested to conduct appropriate investigation at Cosmos Travel Bureau to identify subjects and handle in accordance with Section 105-K, Manual of Instructions. (S)(u)

RUC

LAUGHLIN

- 10 - Bureau
- 16 - New York
- 9 - WFO

(1 - 100-16597)(SODAC)

LEW:jcr
(35)

AIRTEL

NOT RECORDED
151 JUN 27 1956

RECORDED-46

SP3-BTS/m

4-26-2001

00-4417

b6
b7C

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

4/8/98
CLASSIFIED BY 583 BTL/AM
DECLASSIFY ON 25X 1-1-80
3-10-89
158845/1006
HANSUN BALDWIN

F B I

Date: 7/2/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

FROM SAC, NEW YORK
TO BUREAU

HANSON BALDWIN
IS-R

2-14-01 SP3-BTS/m
PAGE 1 00-4417

HANSON W. BALDWIN

[redacted] advised on 6/20/56, that HANSON (X)
BALDWIN, Aviation Editor, "NY Times" had reservations
to depart the United States for the Soviet Union on
6/20/56, via Scandinavian Airlines System, Flight 912. (S)(u)

b7D

The above is furnished for info and no
investigation is being conducted in view of his
employment. [It is believed subject traveled to the
Soviet Union in connection with the visit of General
NATHAN TWINING to the Soviet Union.] (S)(u)

KELLY

4-26-2001

SP3-BTS/m

00-4417

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - WFO (Info) (RM)
1 - New York [redacted] 4

100-79595-46X1

b3
b7E

RFL:MIM (#17)

6

Mr. Belmont

b6
b7C

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Boardman _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mason _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Parsons _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

3-10-88
CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BT/leu
DECLASSIFY ON 25X 16
SP3 BT/leu
9/16/56

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tic: Mr. Deegan
Liaison

~~SECRET~~

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: July 5, 1956 (Orig. & 1)

To: Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/m
DATE: 2-14-02
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
PAGE 1, 2 00-4417

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: HANSON BALDWIN
GEORGE CARROLL
RAYMOND JORDAN
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

4-30-2001
CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/m
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
00-4417

A confidential informant, who is in a position to furnish information concerning travel to the Soviet Union, advised on June 19, 1956, that a visa for travel to the Soviet Union had been approved for Hanson Baldwin of the "New York Times," who was leaving for Moscow on June 20, 1956. (u)

On June 19, 1956, the same informant advised that a visa had been approved for George Carroll of the "New York Journal American" for travel to the USSR. The informant also stated that George Carroll indicated he was leaving on June 19, 1956, for Amsterdam and thence to Budapest before going to Moscow. (u)

On June 20, 1956, the informant also advised that Raymond Jordan of the "New York Times" contacted Counselor Konstantin G. Fedoseev at the Soviet Embassy concerning a visa for himself, his wife and his son. Jordan and his family plan to go to Russia during the last week in July. (u)

cc - 1 - AAG, Tompkins (By 0-6 same date)
1 - (Hanson Baldwin)
cc - 1 - (George Carroll)
cc - 1 - (Raymond Jordan)

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

JGD:kg

See note

RECORDED -
EX-120
BY COURIER SVC.
17 JUL 6
COMM - FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b3
b7E

b3
b7E



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

201 East 69th Street
New York 21, New York
August 1, 1956

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Re: Hanson Baldwin

An informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised June 24, 1956, that Hanson Baldwin, military expert of the "New York Times", was granted a visa on June 18, 1956, to visit the U. S. S. R. According to the informant Hanson Baldwin intends to visit the U. S. S. R. in connection with the visit of high United States Air Force Officers at the Moscow Air Show. (u)

4-30-2001

SP3-BTJ/M

00-4417

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b3
b7E

100-79595-216X3

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-11-2011

I

Date: 8/1/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

To: DIRECTOR, FBI

"CHANGED"
HANSON BALDWIN
IS-R

2-17-02 SP3-BIS/sm
PAGE 1,2 00-4417
4-26-2001
SP3-BIS/sm
1
00-4417

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Mr. Tele. Rm.	
Mr. Nease	
Mr. Holloman	
Mr. Gandy	
Miss Gandy	

Re WFO Airtel to Bureau dated 6/21/56, captioned
"(FNU) MR. BALDWIN (ph); IS-R."

The title is marked changed to reflect subject's
name as HANSON BALDWIN as reflected in records of Cosmos
Travel Bureau, NY.

Re airtel stated that [redacted] advised 6/18/56,
that an unidentified female at Cosmos Travel Bureau, NY,
contacted employee IVAN F. BUKANOV at Soviet Embassy.
BUKANOV stated that a (FNU) Mr. BALDWIN (ph) along
with several persons have received their visas. (u) *incl. photo. OSD 5-27-58*

Re NY airtel to Bureau dated 6/7/56, captioned
[redacted] Re airtel reported that [redacted]
[redacted] (protect identity)
was attempting to expedite securing of a Soviet visa
for HANSON BALDWIN, military expert of the "NY Times",
to visit Russia in connection with the visit of high
US Air Force Officers at the Moscow Air Show.

On 6/24/56, [redacted]
[redacted] (protect identity), made
available voluminous info which is still being reviewed
by the NYO. Among this info furnished to SE [redacted]
[redacted] and SA [redacted] was info to the effect
that HANSON BALDWIN was granted a visa on 6/18/56.

- Bureau (Registered Mail) (Enclosures 5)
- WFO (Registered Mail)
- NY [redacted] b7D
- NY [redacted] b3

RT0:hdb (#17-1)
(8)

b6
b7C

Mr. Belmont

TO AUG 2 1956

Approved: [signature]
Special Agent in Charge

Sent [redacted] M Per [redacted]

3-10-89
CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BIS/sm
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
4/19/96

incl. photo - Oni
11-19-59
11-27-59
alf hjd

100-79595-46X3
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~
FBI

Date: 8/1/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK

To: DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: "CHANGED"
HANSON BALDWIN
IS-R

Re NY airtel to Bureau dated 7/2/56, captioned.
 "HANSON BALDWIN; IS-R." [Re airtel stated that [redacted] (S)
 advised on 6/20/56, that HANSON BALDWIN, Aviation Editor,
 "NY Times" had reservations to depart the US for the
 Soviet Union on 6/20/56, via Scandinavian Air Line System;
 flight 912.] (S)(u)

b7D

It appears to the NYO that (FNU) Mr. BALDWIN (ph)
 is identical with subject, and therefore this matter has been
 consolidated into case captioned HANSON BALDWIN, NY file
 [redacted]

b3
b7E

The NYO indices reflect numerous references
 to BALDWIN but inasmuch as there is to be no active
 investigation in this matter because of subject's
 position and nature of his visit they are not being
 reviewed.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies
 of blank memo suitable for dissemination concerning
 the subject. C.

KELLY

b3
b7Eb6
b7C

- 2 -

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

4/18/96
 CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTK/m
 DECLASSIFIED ON 25X 1/2/96
 3-10-89
 5884566
 1714 1543 original
 No dissemination
 Info. [unclear]
 [unclear]
 [unclear]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 9/2/59

FROM : Legat, Tokyo [redacted]

b3
b7ESUBJECT: HANSON P. BALDWIN
PC FM [redacted]b6
b7C

On 8/31/59 Capt. [redacted] U. S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Pacific, G-2, Japan, advised that his office is concerned over an article by HANSON P. BALDWIN, Military Editor of the New York Times, which was quoted in the 8/28/59 issue of the South China Sunday Post Herald, Hong Kong, B.C.C. The article stated in part:

"American Servicemen have gone soft. They are no longer good fighting men. Many are 'slow-witted, vacuous adolescents' whose only interest is comic books...."

"The fault, says Mr. Baldwin, a graduate of the U.S. Navy College, is the 'welfare state,' which has robbed many Americans of their former daring, initiative, and push.

"He says that 40 per cent of American youths called up for national service are unqualified, mentally, physically, or morally, for any kind of military service."

ALATORRE stated his office would like to know whether Bureau files contain any derogatory information concerning BALDWIN.

As a matter of cooperation with USACRPAIC, it will be appreciated if a check of Bufiles can be made, and this office advised of the result.

HLC:uw
(3)

EX 100 REC-34

MGT-8

25 SEP 8 1959

FEB 14 1960

EXP. PROC.

Name [redacted]

2B

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-351585) (S)(u)

2/25/57

SAC, WFO

b3
b7E

[VISITORS TO IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES] (S)(u)

ReBulet to WFO entitled INPRO dated 1/4/57, with an

b1
b3

Reflet requested WFO, in certain instances, to check passport records of persons on the enclosure and furnish results to the Bureau and office of residence, for handling in accordance with SAC Letter 56-68.

As set forth in SAC Letter 56-68, dated 12/28/56, the office covering the residence of the person or persons listed in this memo will index the names and search its files. No further action is necessary unless unusual circumstances surround this travel, such as an indication of involuntary repatriation, possible intelligence activity, or where there is an informant potential. Instances of these types should be furnished immediately to the Bureau, utilizing the caption of the individual involved and briefly indicating what investigation is being conducted. (S)

(5) On 9/23/57, Lawrence J. ..., Liaison Representative, Passport Office, U. S. Department of State, made available the passport file of ...

b1
b3

A review of this person's passport application by SA JAMES A. [REDACTED] on 9/23/57 reflected the following information:

Date & Place of Application: 6/13/56 at New York, N.Y.
Passport No. & Date Issued: 7-1-53 Issued 6/14/56
Identifying Witness: Prior passport 100 78595

2-Bureau
2-New York
1-WFO

(RM)

4-26-2001

SP3-~~6157~~

1,6
60-4417

NOT RECORDED
124 OCT 10 1957

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2-14-62 SP3-BIS/62
Phos 1,2 EO-4417

~~SECRET~~

WFO

(u)

b3
b7E

Passport Restrictions:

None indicated.

Travel Plans:

Accompany General NATHAN W. TWINING on visit to the USSR for the occasion of Soviet Aviation Day.

Previous Foreign Travel:

Numerous overseas trips on behalf of the New

Passport Issued:

361502 on 1/14/37; 720497 issued 12/11/41;

By Special Order:

Name:

Sex: HANSON WEIGHTMAN BALDWIN

Race: Male

Age: White

Residence: 3/22/03 at Baltimore, Maryland

Height: Morton Place, Chappaqua, New York

Hair: 6' 2"

Eyes: Gray

Scars & Marks:

Occupation: None

Naturalization: Journalist

Relatives: Native citizen

Father: OLIVER PERRY BALDWIN, deceased

Mother: CAROLINE FRANCES BALDWIN, nee SUTTON, deceased

Wife: HELEN BRUCE BALDWIN

DOB 11/18/06 at Springfield, Ohio

Married on 6/8/31

Morton Place, Chappaqua, New York

On 6/6/56, under letterhead of the New York Times, Times Square, ROBERT E. GARST, Assistant Managing Editor, advised the Passport Office that BALDWIN was the New York Times military editor assigned to cover the visit to the USSR by General NATHAN W. TWINING.

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

_____, 1959

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
<input type="checkbox"/>	Service Unit - Room 6524
<input type="checkbox"/>	Forward to File Review
<input type="checkbox"/>	Attention _____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Return to <u>Maguire 612526</u>
	Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Regular Request (Analytical Search)
<input type="checkbox"/>	All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Subversive References Only
<input type="checkbox"/>	Nonsubversive References Only
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Maintain <u>active</u> References Only

Type of Search Requested:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Restricted to Locality of _____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Buildup <input type="checkbox"/> Variations

Subject Baldwin, Howard
 Birthdate & Place _____
 Address 100 10 1959

Localities

R# 115 Date 11/20 Searcher Initials 5025
 FILE NUMBER SERIAL

100-79595
[Redacted] b7E

Howard Weightman
Baldwin

100-79595-46 sum 8/55
-44 sum 7/54
51

[Redacted] b6
 b7C

3-10489 SP3 AS/CCM
4/1/96
9/17/96 SP3 AS/CCM

1 - Name Check Section

b6
b7C

1 - [redacted]

Legal Attache, Tokyo [redacted]

September 16, 1959

REC-34 Director, FBI (100-79595) - 47

b3
b7E

HANSON P. BALDWIN
PCFM

EX 100

Reurlet dated September 2, 1959, captioned as above wherein you requested information concerning Baldwin.

Baldwin has for the past several years been engaged by the "New York Times" as military editor. He has been described by one individual as "one of the most reactionary writers." In January, 1953, Baldwin was interviewed by Bureau Agents in connection with his publication in the "New York Times" of classified data. During the interview he declined to furnish his source for the material. He has published classified information on other occasions. For your confidential information, he has been critical of the Bureau in the past and has published falsehoods concerning the Bureau's operations in South America. [redacted]

b3
b7E

Inasmuch as information concerning Baldwin has been furnished to G-2, you are requested to advise Captain [redacted] mentioned in referenced letter, that he may desire to contact the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for information contained in our memorandum to the Army dated December 13, 1954, which memorandum enclosed one copy of an investigative report entitled "Hanson W. Baldwin ('New York Times' article of August 23, 1952); Espionage-R" dated January 7, 1953, at New York.

b6
b7C

In order that your records will be correct, you will note that the individual of interest to Captain Alatorre is Hanson W. Baldwin and not Hanson P. Baldwin as reported to you.

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)

WFW:msb

(6)

LESAT

COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

1959

MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MAILED
NOV 27 1959
NAME CHECK

November 25, 1959

HANSON BALDWIN
Born: March 22, 1903
Baltimore, Maryland

Reference is made to your request that you be furnished the results of any investigation conducted concerning the captioned person, wherein information of a subversive nature was developed. There is attached herewith one memorandum revealing information concerning Hanson Baldwin. (100-79595 - 46X3)

In addition, you are referred to the memorandum entitled "Hanson Weichtmar Baldwin," which was previously furnished to the Office of Naval Intelligence on November 12, 1953. (100-79595-43)

Enclosure

Orig. and one to ONI
Reg. rec'd 11/19/59

(4)

b6
b7C

NOTE: Mr. [redacted] ONI, requested a search for main subversive files only. He advised that only copies of investigative reports of the results of investigation were requested. Reason: Global Strategy Conference to be held at Naval War College in June, 1960.

REC- 73

EX 109

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
DeLoach _____
McGuire _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

11/17, 1966

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
<input type="checkbox"/>	Service Unit - Room 6524
<input type="checkbox"/>	Forward to File Review
<input type="checkbox"/>	Attention _____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Return to _____
	Supervisor Room Ext.

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☒ Main References Only

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject Ordinary Member
Birthdate & Place _____
Address _____

R# 17 Date 11/17 Searcher Initials 307
Prod. 54

SERIAL

I 100-79595 I
 I 100-79595 46) Jan 21/55
 I 100-79595-44 Jan 11/55
 I [redacted] b7E
 I 102-5-591
 I Hanson P (✓)
 I IT-

b7E

-b6
-b7C

100-443887-100

3-10-89. NY SP8 utj/0

9/8/94

5p36

BT/Am

9/17/96

SP3 8177

MAILED
JAN 26 1960
COMM-FBI

January 25, 1960

HANSON W. BALDWIN
Born: March 22, 1903
Baltimore, Maryland

Reference is made to your name check request concerning the captioned individual requesting only the results of any investigation conducted regarding him wherein information of a subversive nature was developed.

FBI files reveal that the Department of the Army, by letter dated December 15, 1954, regarding Hanson Weightman Baldwin, was furnished a report pertaining to Baldwin dated January 7, 1953.

No investigation pertinent to your inquiry has been conducted by the FBI concerning Baldwin subsequent to that mentioned above. (100-79595-45)

Orig. and one to ARMY
Rec. rec'd 1/12/60

(4)

b6
b7C

NOTE: Refer memo Scatterday to Belmont 1/5/60 re: "Army War College Strategy Seminar; Name Check Requests." Instant request indicates Baldwin among those under consideration for invitation to attend AWC Seminar, 1960.

REC-19

100-79595-45
JAN 26 1960

Tolson _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Belmont _____
Callahan _____
DeLoach _____
Malone _____
McGuire _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

51 FEB 1 1960

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

July 2, 1954

MAILED

JUL 10 1954
CLERK-9
RECEIVED

HANSON BEIGHTMAN BALDWIN
Born: March 22, 1908
Baltimore, Maryland

SECRET

Transmitted for your consideration are copies of the reports of Special Agent J. Sterling Adams, dated May 5, 1942, at Honolulu, T.H., and of Special Agent Walter A. Crow, dated June 22, 1943, at New York City, in the case entitled "Japanese Propaganda Mailed From New York City to Honolulu in Department of Justice Envelope; Internal Security - J."

In addition, there are transmitted herewith a copy of the report of Special Agent Thomas J. Barry, dated January 7, 1953, at New York City, in the case entitled "Hanson W. Baldwin ("New York Times" Article of June 5, 1952); Espionage - R," and a copy of the report of Special Agent Thomas J. Barry, dated January 7, 1953, at New York City, in the case entitled "Hanson W. Baldwin ("New York Times" Article of August 25, 1952); Espionage - R." Your attention is directed to those reports inasmuch as they relate to the individual inquired about. (100-79595-2&5)

Regarding the above inquiries, dated January 7, 1953, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice advised on February 3, 1953, that it was of the opinion in view of the wide dissemination of security information involved, and in view of the investigation conducted to ascertain the individuals responsible for its disclosure, that no further investigation was warranted at that time.

In addition to the foregoing, you are referred to an article appearing in the "New York Times" on July 22, 1948, entitled "Older Agencies Resent a Successor and Try to Restrict Scope of Action" by Hanson W. Baldwin.

You may also desire to INDEXED the files of the Office of Special Investigations and the Atomic Energy Commission for information relating to the individual inquired about.

Attachment

Orig to CIA
RE: 6-14-54

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED-16
EX-100 (100-79595)

b6
b7C

MAILED
NOV 2 1960
NAME CHECK

November 22, 1960

HANSON WEIGHTMAN BALDWIN
Born: March 22, 1903
Baltimore, Maryland

Reference is made to your request that you be furnished the results of any investigation conducted concerning the captioned person, wherein information of a subversive nature was developed. You are referred to the memorandum entitled "Hanson Baldwin" which was previously furnished to the Office of Naval Intelligence on November 25, 1959. (100-79595)

ORIGINAL AND ONE to ONI
Request received: 11/16/60
ALF:el
(4)

b6
b7C

NOTE:

Mr. [] ONI, requested a search for main subversive files only. He advised that only copies of investigative reports of the results of investigation were requested. Reason: Global Strategy Conference to be held in early 1961.

EX 100

REC-44 100-79595-50

NOV 23 1960

Tolson _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Belmont _____
Callahan _____
DeLoach _____
Malone _____
McGuire _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

57 NOV 29 1960

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ST-104

100 - 7-55-51

December 6, 1963

b6
b7C

Dear [redacted]


Your letter dated December 3rd has been received.

Although I would like to be of service, I am unable to comment concerning the article you mentioned since the FBI does not make evaluations nor draw conclusions as to the character or integrity of any organization, publication or individual. I would like to point out, however, that the FBI has never attempted to in any way "manage news." This Bureau does have responsibilities in connection with the violation of laws relating to espionage, and whenever there is an indication of a violation within our jurisdiction, we are obligated to conduct a prompt and thorough investigation.

Sincerely yours,

L. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director



DEC 6 3 31 PM '63
REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI

NOTE: Correspondent cannot be identified in Bufiles. The article mentioned is critical of the Kennedy administration and alleges that there were efforts to manage the news and that the FBI was used to intimidate newsmen and other government agencies. We have, of course, conducted some investigations under the espionage laws involving the leaking of classified information.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

JH:ped (3)

DEC 13 1963
212

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

, 1959

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention _____
☐ Return to _____

Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☒ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☒ Main *Section* References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject *Baldwin, Hanson W.*
 Birthdate & Place _____
 Address _____

Localities

JAN 13 1960

R# *2985* Date *1/13* Searcher Initials *LS*
 FILE NUMBER SERIAL

Baldwin, Hanson Weightman
(B.W.)

I 100-19595

I 100-79595-46 sum. 9/1/55
 -44 sum. 7/2/54

*Hanson W.**Hanson**Hanson**Hanson W.**Hanson W.**Hanson W.**Hanson W.**Hanson W.**Hanson W.**Hanson W.**Hanson W.**Hanson W.**Hanson W.**Hanson W.*

b7E

b6

b7C

CONTAINED

3-10-89 5P847/64 9/17/96
 4/2/96 5P3 3/1/96/5P3 8/1/96

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

December 3, 1963

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20224

Dear Mr. Hoover:

An article, "Managed News: ~~Our~~ Unique Peacetime Censorship", by Hanson W. Baldwin, appeared in June 1963, Reader's Digest. The controversial issues of this article interested me so that I have chosen it as a basis for my research paper entitled "Government Management of Facts Distributed to News Media", which is required of 10th grade students at Cross Keys High School, Atlanta, Georgia.

Your name was mentioned prominently in this article and I would appreciate your views on the subject, and any other appropriate information you may be able to send me.

Respectfully yours,

[Redacted Signature]

b6
b7C

ST-103

REC 36

100-75595-51

17 DEC 9 1963

Writter
Baldwin

H6

3-10-82 SP803/626
4/8/96 SP335/100
9/17/96 SP3 651/92

ack 1/6/64

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: HANSON W. BALDWIN
ESPIONAGE - X~~SECRET~~

July 27, 1962

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____

Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

In connection with our current inquiries regarding Baldwin, based on his article in "The New York Times" issue of 7/26/62, Bufiles have been thoroughly reviewed concerning the subject, and pertinent data is set forth in this memorandum.

"Who's Who in America" for 1962-63 shows Baldwin was born 12/22/03, Baltimore, Maryland. He graduated from U. S. Naval Academy in 1924, was commissioned Ensign, and subsequently advanced to rank of Lt. (j.g.), resigning from Navy in 1927. He worked for "Baltimore Sun" as reporter, and has been employed as reporter and editor with "The New York Times" since 1929. He has held position of Military Editor of "Times" since 1942. During the same year he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize. He has written a number of books dealing with military strategy and has also contributed numerous articles to various periodicals.

Baldwin has never been subject of full-scale Bureau investigation. However, he has been subject of three prior inquiries based on articles he wrote in "Times" (issues of 6/5/52, 8/23/52 and 10/10/55), which contained classified information relating to U. S. defense plans. In connection with articles of 6/5/52 and 8/23/52, at specific request Criminal Division of Department, we had our New York Office interview Baldwin on 1/6/53 to determine if he was willing to divulge the sources of his information. Subject said that as a good newspaperman he would be unable to divulge his sources. Department subsequently advised that, in view of this refusal of the subject and since prior inquiries had shown that the security information involved had been widely disseminated, further investigation was not warranted, and there was no way to determine whether the subject committed a violation of Federal espionage laws.

Concerning Baldwin's article of 10/10/55.

_____ subsequently advised that information disclosed by Baldwin was not contained in any specific _____

100-79595
 RDC:djw
 (8)

AUG 1 1962
 SENT DIRECTOR
 7-30-62

AUG 14 1962

100-79595-
 18 AUG 13 1962
 NOT RECORDED
 128 AUG 14 1962

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
RE: HANSON W. BALDWIN
100-79595

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

document but had appeared in numerous documents issued by AEC or Defense Department which had been disseminated to hundreds of persons. As a result, in February, 1956, Internal Security Division of Department advised that, in its opinion, there was insufficient evidence to establish a violation of espionage statutes and that further investigation did not appear warranted. No actual investigation was undertaken by Bureau in this matter.

Review of Bufiles has shown that Baldwin, in connection with his newspaper assignment, has been in frequent contact with various U. S. Government officials and is, of course, well known in Government circles. However, there is no indication as to any particular high-level contact he may have who might have provided him data in his 7/26/62 article.

Baldwin is not known to have any specific subversive connections; however, he has been critical of the FBI on several occasions. For instance, in 1947 he wrote article in "Times" to the effect that while the FBI was rightly praised as a splendid criminal investigative agency, it did not deserve its "over-publicized" title as a counterespionage agency. In 1948 Baldwin wrote an article in the "Times" in which he alleged there was friction between Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Bureau during transfer of intelligence responsibilities in Latin America from the Bureau to CIA following World War II. Baldwin's article placed the blame for this on FBI and contained several unfounded statements along these lines. During 1947, in our investigation of Alger Hiss case, we learned that Hiss wrote letter to an official at Stanford University in which he referred to Baldwin as "my friend." No other information is available regarding Hiss-Baldwin relationship.

Results of our prior inquiries concerning Baldwin, based on his articles in "Times," have been furnished to Department, AEC, military intelligence agencies and CIA.

ACTION:

This is for information. A memorandum, containing Baldwin's background, was sent to the Attorney General on 7/30/62.

Keene - 2 -
~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt *Tw/lt*

FROM : A. B. Fulton *AF*

SUBJECT: "THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE"
BY HANSON W. BALDWIN

1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson

DATE: 10/22/76

1 - Mr. L. McWilliams
(Attn: J. W. McCaffrey)
1 - Mr. R. P. Finzel
1 - Mr. S. R. Stroup

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Serv. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Fin. & Pers. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

PURPOSE:

To review an article entitled "The Future of Intelligence," written by Hanson W. Baldwin published in the Summer, 1976, edition of "Strategic Review," a quarterly publication of the United States Strategic Institute.

SYNOPSIS:

Proposals are set forth for the reorganization of the U. S. intelligence community incorporating President Ford's proposals with the writer's specific recommendations. Although a broad spectrum of issues are addressed, special attention is given to areas including covert operations, the process of analysis, evaluation and estimation, and FBI duties in counterespionage, countersubversion and counterintelligence.

RECOMMENDATION:

b6

b7C

None. For information only.

62-46855 *SRS*

SRS:dedded

(6)

ST-108

APPROVED:

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Serv. _____

Ext. Affairs _____
Fin. & Pers. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. *Tw/lt*

Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____

CONTINUED - OVER

DE-31
REC-37

100-79595-52

24 OCT 27 1976

OCT 29 1976



54 NOV 10 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-46855-

Memorandum to Mr. T. W. Leavitt
Re: "The Future of Intelligence"
By Hanson W. Baldwin
62-46855

AUTHOR:

Hanson W. Baldwin was a reporter, military correspondent and Military Editor for the New York Times from 1929 until his retirement in 1968. He has since been Roving Editor for the Readers' Digest.

DETAILS:

Although the author concurs with several of the President's proposals for the reorganization of the U. S. intelligence community, including an emphasis on the protection of sources and methods through the implementation of criminal and civil sanctions, it is the omissions in these proposals which are emphasized throughout Hanson W. Baldwin's article "The Future of Intelligence."

Specifically, these omissions include issues involving covert operations, the improvement of the end product of the intelligence community - analysis and evaluation, and FBI duties in counterespionage, countersubversion, and counterterrorism.

Baldwin's primary concern regarding covert operations centers around a lack of centralization and high level control evidenced by the well publicized "intelligence failures" of the past. To prevent a recurrence of such episodes the author recommends:

- 1) intelligence community input in evaluation and risk determination decisions;
- 2) careful monitoring at the top level of Government;
- 3) Defense Department control of any military covert operations.

Memorandum to Mr. T. W. Leavitt
Re: "The Future of Intelligence"
By Hanson W. Baldwin
62-46855

As for the collection and interpretation of intelligence information, Baldwin emphasizes the value of decentralization and the autonomy of the various intelligence agencies. It is in this context that the dual role of the DCI and Director of CIA is criticized as restrictive and, in some instances, potentially counterproductive if this powerful position holds line command over all intelligence agencies.

Of vital concern to the author is an area left almost untouched by the recent reorganization proposals - analysis, evaluation, and estimation of intelligence information.

It is this end product of the intelligence community "upon which depends the future of our nation." To achieve more reliable and accurate estimates of foreign capabilities and intentions Baldwin recommends:

- 1) the insulation of those engaged in this process from the political, policy-making and decision-making atmosphere which may significantly alter their product.
- 2) the incorporation of the military viewpoint in final estimates to add balance to the currently civilian-dominated process.
- 3) the inculcation of "new blood and fresh minds" into the process with the use of new and improved analytical techniques and procedures.

The critical need for these and other changes in the estimative process is repeatedly emphasized. Baldwin concludes, "Unbiased, comprehensive, thorough and accurate evaluation and analysis of all the millions of facts and opinions that are gathered, collated, culled, and sifted by all the agencies of Government are, by far, the most important aspect of the entire intelligence process and - in the past two decades - this process has too often been our weakest link."

Memorandum to Mr. T. W. Leavitt

Re: "The Future of Intelligence"

By Hanson W. Baldwin

62-46855

The internal threat of espionage, subversion and terrorism is another area the author observes deserving of considerably more attention than the President's reforms have thus far given. Recognizing this is primarily a function of the FBI, Baldwin calls for a strengthening of the number and improvement in the quality of Agents commensurate to the increased threat. Whether politicization, Presidential direction and/or plain avoidance are responsible for past diversion of manpower from this critically important task the scope and nature of the current threat to our internal security necessitates effective "reanimation of personnel with a sense that they are working in these fields to defend their country."

Each of these areas is emphasized as fertile ground for needed reform and action. And, though the political atmosphere of 1976 may not be entirely conducive to positive reform the author clearly feels that reform, rejuvenation, change is needed - not as a reaction to the "self-flagellation and distortion" of the past few months, but as a recognition that intelligence must change, grow, improve in response to the sophistication and technical complexity of the times.

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 08-24-2010

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

June 5, 1968

BY LIAISON

Mrs. Mildred Stegall
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Stegall:

Reference is made to your name check
request concerning some individuals scheduled to attend a
White House affair on June 18, 1968.

The central files of the FBI reveal no pertinent
derogatory information concerning the following individuals:

The fingerprint files of the Identification
Division of the FBI contain no arrest data identifiable with the
above individuals based on background information submitted
in connection with this name check request.

Attached is a memorandum concerning
Mr. and Mrs. Hanson Baldwin.

A copy of this communication has not been sent
to the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach-Enc. (sent direct)
- 1 - Mr. Gale - Enc. (sent direct)

NOT RECORDED

JUN 10 1968

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

SECRET

Forwarded to: Mildred Stegall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-13-89
Classified by SP8 BJB/bak
Declassify on: OADR

b6
b7C

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

ORIGINAL FILED IN 102--5-31193

June 5, 1968

MR. AND MRS. HANSON BALDWIN

Hanson Weightman Baldwin, who was born on March 22, 1903, at Baltimore, Maryland, has been the subject of inquiries conducted by the FBI in 1952, 1955 and 1962 concerning articles written by him which contained classified information. Mr. Baldwin refused to disclose the sources of the information appearing in the articles.

Our files contain no additional pertinent information concerning Mr. Baldwin.

The central files of the FBI contain no pertinent information concerning Mrs. Baldwin.

The fingerprint files of the Identification Division of the FBI contain no arrest data identifiable with captioned individuals based upon background information submitted in connection with this name check request.

b6
b7C

NOTE: Per request of Mrs. Mildred Stegall, White House Staff.

LSL:emt (7)

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE

100-795-95

5/4/66

1-Mr. Bunker

AIRTEL

To: SAC, Los Angeles

From: Director, FBI

Re: UNSUB; Article Entitled
"Crank Calls Harass Families
of G.I.'s Serving in Vietnam"
by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York
Times, 4/4/66


Captioned article was introduced in the Senate and reported in the Congressional Record 4/18/66 by Senator George A. Smathers. The article contains reference to "In the most recent reported incident, on March 11, a bogus officer, dressed in a Marine Corps uniform, visited the home of a Marine officer serving in Vietnam and told his wife that her husband had been seriously wounded. The wife detected the fraud and notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So far no arrest has been made."

The Bureau has not yet been able to identify the case involved. Information was received from the Department of Defense 5/4/66, that on 3/12/66 an unknown subject identified himself as Captain James Lindker contacted [redacted]

[redacted] claiming that her son had been killed in Vietnam, and attempting to pick up \$200 to have his body shipped home. This matter was allegedly reported to your office on 4/5/66. No record thereof found in Bureau files.

Immediately identify case and submit airtel showing results of investigation therein.

LHB:mkm
(4)



MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-110385-20

FBI

Date: 4/20/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

Via _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]

b3
b7ESUBJECT: UNSUB; Article Entitled
"Crank Calls Harass Families
of G.I.'s Serving in Vietnam"
by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York
Times, April 4, 1966Re Bureau telephone call by [REDACTED]
to NY, 4/19/66 and NY telephone call to Bu, 4/20/66.b6
b7CEnclosed are original and one xerox copy of
captioned article.It is noted article attributes source of
information as "An incomplete Defense Department compilation".The following pertinent information appears in
the article:

100-79595-

"In the most recent reported incident, on
March 11, a bogus officer, dressed in a Marine Corps
uniform, visited the home of a Marine officer serving
in Vietnam and told his wife that her husband had been
seriously wounded. The wife detected the fraud and notified
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So far no arrest has
been made."

3-Bureau (Encls. 2)
2-New York (47-NYM)
1-New York (100-156000)
1-New York

JJR:pml
(3)

WGA

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

Per _____

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116385-20

[REDACTED]

b3
b7E

UACB by close of business April 21, NYO will proceed to make arrangements to interview HANSON W. BALDWIN at the office of the "New York Times" for specific information about the incident involving Bogus Officer dressed in an Marine Corps uniform.

Files of the NYO reflect HANSON W. BALDWIN is a Military Editor of the "New York Times", is listed in Who's Who in America, a graduate of the US Naval Academy and a very prominent newspaperman. He has contacts at the highest levels of government in Washington, D.C.

He was the subject of an investigation in case captioned "HANSON W. BALDWIN (NY Times of June 5, 1952) ESP-R", NY file [REDACTED] BALDWIN was interviewed 1/6/53 as reflected in report of SA THOMAS J. BARRY, 1/7/53, at NY, regarding his source of classified material which appeared in his article in the "New York Times", June 5, 1952. He refused to divulge the source of his information.

b3
b7E

BALDWIN was also subject of case captioned "ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN THE NEW YORK TIMES OF JULY 26, 1962, ESP-X" Bufile [REDACTED] NY file [REDACTED] This article contained data of a highly classified nature and it had only been discussed at top government circles in Washington at that time. President JOHN F. KENNEDY personally had ordered investigation concerning the source of BALDWIN'S information.

b3
b7E

When BALDWIN was approached by Bureau Agents, on the evening of 7/30/62, at Chapaqua, NY, he declined to consent to interview. He informed Agents he resented "this kind of approach" and said he would be available for interview at his office the following morning. No further effort was made to interview BALDWIN at that time.

Full details concerning this latter investigation is set forth in report of SA ROBERT C. BYRNES dated 8/18/62 at WFO, Bu file [REDACTED]

b3
b7E

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Crank Calls Harass Families of G.I.'s Serving in Vietnam

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

An incomplete Defense Department compilation showed yesterday that families of military personnel serving in Vietnam had received 100 threatening, abusive or crank telephone calls or communications in the last year.

A considerable number of the calls have been made to widows or dependents of men killed in Vietnam. The anonymous callers have used obscenity or abuse, or have gloated over the death of the servicemen involved.

In one case, in a call to a home where the widow of a captain killed in Vietnam had been staying, a man and a woman said in unison over the telephone:

"Slaughtered sheep sound like this . . ."

The words were followed by a bleating noise.

False Injury Report

Many of the ghoulish calls have been much more specific: The caller has said he was glad the serviceman was killed, or has used profanity to express his pleasure.

Other communications have involved threats. One Navy wife in the Norfolk, Va., area was threatened with physical violence if she attended a homecoming celebration for the aircraft carrier Independence, which had served in Vietnamese waters.

In the most recent reported

incident, on March 11, a bogus officer, dressed in a Marine Corps uniform, visited the home of a Marine officer serving in Vietnam and told his wife that her husband had been seriously wounded. The wife detected the fraud and notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So far no arrest has been made.

Most to Army Families

According to the Defense Department, there appears to be no common pattern to the calls and letters. However, the servicemen themselves, particularly some of those who have served aboard carriers, believe that the calls are so widespread that organization is evident. They believe that the number is considerably larger than that reported by the dependents to the services and that Communists or left-wing sympathizers in the United States have in part been responsible.

Dependents of Army personnel have received the majority of the recorded telephone calls. Almost 50 have been reported; most of them to dependents of the First Cavalry (AirMobile) Division, and to the next of kin of paratroopers serving in Vietnam. Most of these calls have been made in the Third Army area in the vicinity of Fort Bragg, N.C., and Fort Benning, Ga.

The majority of the calls or communications to Navy and Marine personnel, which total at least 25, were made in the vicinity of the Naval Air Station, Lemoore, Calif., and in the

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

1 NEW YORK TIMES

b6
b7CALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-10-89 BY SP8 BTJ/olb4/8/96 SP3 BTJ/clw
9/10/96 SP3 BTJ/pcl

Date: 4/4/66

Edition: LATE CITY

Author: HANSON W. BALDWIN

Editor: CLIFTON DANIEL

Title: UNSUBS; ARTICLE ENTITLED "CRANK CALLS HARASS FAMILIES OF GI'S SERVING IN

Character: VIET NAM" BY HANSON

W. BALDWIN

Classification:

Submitting Office: NYO

☐ Being Investigated

100-79595-

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

Norfolk area. The relatively few recorded calls involving Air Force personnel—about 7—were in scattered geographical areas.

In addition to the calls centrally compiled by the Defense Department, a great many additional calls, letters or communications have been reported in New York, Pennsylvania, the Middle West, California and elsewhere.

According to the Defense Department, the types of telephone calls have included "silence, hoarse breathing, obscenity, abuse or gloating over death of the servicemen involved."

"None of the calls," it says, "have been identified, either as

to name or association with a group."

Whenever such calls or communications are reported, the local military intelligence services, local police authorities and the F.B.I. have been informed, but so far the originators of the calls or the abusive communications have not been identified.

Legal action that can be taken varies widely with local laws. Apparently there is no Federal statute that applies, although Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, has introduced a bill that would make it a Federal offense to make threatening and abusive communications to members of

the armed forces and their families.

Vigorous local investigation of each such communication and the voluntary withholding by many public relations media of the home addresses of dependents of Vietnamese casualties has apparently resulted in some diminution of the communications.

The information programs by the services to inform dependents of what to do if such calls are received serves, the Defense Department says, to "reduce the impact of families—however, there is still shock, humiliation and anger."

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: 4-2-65

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

Pages 6382-6387. Senator Mundt, (R) South Dakota, spoke concerning the need for legislation to establish a Freedom Academy. He included an article, written by Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor, New York Times, entitled "U. S. Global Strategy." Mr. Mundt stated "Establishment of the Freedom Academy would be consistent with, and responsive to Mr. Baldwin's understanding. It would lead to better comprehension of the struggle we are in and to far superior dissemination of this understanding among people who need it." Mr. Mundt also included another editorial and article with his remarks.

Original filed in

66-1731-2667

100-79595-
NOT RECORDED
126 APR 14 1965

b6
b7C

ON CONTAINED

WHICH IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-10-89 BY SP3BSP/KC

4/16/96 SP3BSP/KC
9/17/96 SP3BSP/KC

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for 4-2-65 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in the appropriate base or subject matter files.

66 APR 27 1965

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **NEW YORK**

~~SECRET~~

JAR

REPORT MADE AT NEW YORK	DATE WHEN MADE 1/7/53	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 12/30/52; 1/6/53	REPORT MADE BY THOMAS J. BARRY
-----------------------------------	---------------------------------	--	--

TITLE HANSON W. BALDWIN ("NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE OF AUGUST 23, 1952)	CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - R
---	---

DECLASSIFIED BY <u>SP3 BD JJS</u> SYNOPSIS OF FACTS: <u>OGA 7-31-96</u>	AGENCY _____ REQ. REC'D _____ REP'T FORW. _____ BY _____
--	---

Subject interviewed as to the source of classified material contained in an article written by him which appeared in the NEW YORK TIMES. He refused to divulge the source.

AGENCY _____
 REQ. REC'D - C - 7-1-55
 REP'T FORW. _____
 BY _____

DETAILS: At New York, New York

In the NEW YORK TIMES for Sunday, August 24, 1952 there appeared on page forty, section one an article written by HANSON W. BALDWIN, date line Washington, D. C., August 23, 1952, entitled "End of a Chapter", "Long Term Pessimism on Strength of Soviet Overshadows Short-Term Gain". Under subheadings entitled "The Blackest Shadow" BALDWIN stated the following: "The first test of a hydrogen fusion device in history, to be made at Eniwetok in the Fall is expected to lead, within a year or so, to the development of an operational hydrogen bomb that can be air lifted....." The above statement according to officials of Confidential Informant T-1, another Government agency, is classified as "Restricted Data". E-1-127U

On January 6, 1953 Mr. BALDWIN was interviewed by the writer at BALDWIN's office in the New York Times building, 229 West 43 Street, New York City. The above article was discussed with Mr. BALDWIN and it was pointed out to him that it contained classified information as outlined above. Mr. BALDWIN was asked to divulge the source of this information and he refused to do so by stating that as a good newspaper man he would be

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <u>[Signature]</u>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
COPIES OF THIS REPORT: 5 - Bureau REGISTERED 3 - New York b3 b7E		100-76525-37 JAN 9 1953 RECORDED - 79 b6 b7C EX - 107

PROPERTY OF FBI - THIS CONFIDENTIAL REPORT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE LOANED TO YOU BY THE FBI AND ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE OF AGENCY TO WHICH LOANED.

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]

unable to divulge the source of the material contained in the article. He stated further that as a patriotic American and one who has wide knowledge of military affairs he always tried to be careful when writing an article not to mention information which might be of assistance to a foreign country. Mr. BALDWIN added that it was his belief that many articles published in newspapers and scientific journals contain material concerning the hydrogen bomb which he would consider more of a breach of security than anything which appeared in his article. He referred specifically to the publication BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS.

- C -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

INFORMANTS

T-1

Atomic Energy Commission
reflected in Bureau teletype
to New York, 1/2/53.

MISCELLANEOUS

This report is classified as ~~secret~~ in accordance
with instructions set out by the Bureau in referenced teletype.

REFERENCE

Bureau teletype to New York, 1/2/53.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~
UNITED STATES

CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED Does Not
Contain DOE Office of Classification
Unclassified Controlled [] DP, DC,
RO Date: 7/23/2018 Nuclear Information

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO:

SV:EFL

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 3 pages

No. 1 of 6 copies, Series A

b6

b7C

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Victor P. Keay

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Reference is made to your letter of December 10, 1952,
your file 100-79595, and AEC letter of November 26,
1952 concerning the Hanson W. Baldwin article which
appeared in the New York Times on August 23, 1952.

Inquiries made by our Santa Fe Office have reflected
that within the Sandia Corporation, the following
have had access to information relating to the
development of a carrier for a hydrogen bomb:

b6
b7C

Mechanical Design	-	5 Draftsmen 9 Engineers
Electrical Design	-	2 Draftsmen 5 Engineers
Aerodynamicists		
Shop Personnel	-	8
Management	-	6
Documents Department	-	B&W Print Room - 4 Report Reproduction, editing and distribution - 10 Photo Lab - 3

ALL FBI INFORMATION OBTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/16/94 BY SP3BTD/92

b6
b7C

This material contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States within the
meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.,
Section 793 and 794, and the transmission or revelation
of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person
is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~SECRET~~

Declassified per DOE letter dated
7/31/96

Let to A8e
1-5-53
AG mieu

Brannigan
Marchant
1-1

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~~~SECRET~~

In addition, two reports have been issued, one which was Top Secret, and the other which was Secret. Their distribution is as follows:

Distribution: SC-2570(Tr), XLIII-1438

- 1,2/17A - Director, Division of Military Application, US AEC
- 3/17A - Commanding General, Air Research and Development Command
- 4/17A - Maj. Gen. H. G. Bunker, Air Force, Office of Atomic Energy (AFOAT), Hq/USAF
- 5/17A - N. E. Bradbury, Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
- 6/17A - D. A. Quarles, President, Sandia Corporation
- 7/17A - Commanding General, Air Force Special Weapons Center (AFSWP)
- 8/17A - Robert LeBaron, Chairman, Military Liaison Committee
- 9,10/17A - Commanding General, Field Command, AFSWP
- 11/17A - Manager, AEC Santa Fe Operations Office
- 12/17A - Field Manager, AEC Sandia Office
- 13/17A - Commanding General, Strategic Air Command
- 14/17A - Commanding General, Air Materiel Command
- 15/17A - M. G. Holloway, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
- 16/17A - R. E. Poole, Sandia Corporation
- 17/17A - R. W. Henderson, Sandia Corporation

1/1B - Maj. Gen. James E. Briggs, Deputy Chief of Staff
for Development, Hq/USAF

Distribution: Technical Memorandum No. 16-52-12, Ref. Sym: 1921-3-(11),
Q-13315

- 1-10/25A - Commanding General AFSWC, Kirtland Field
- 11/25A - D. F. Worth, Jr., AEC Field Mgr. Sandia
- 12/25A - C. L. Tyler, SFOG
- 13-14/25A - Brig. Gen. K. E. Fields, DMA
- 15/25A - N. E. Bradbury, LASL
- 16/25A - M. G. Holloway, LASL
- 17/25A - R. E. Poole, 1000
- 18/25A - R. P. Petersen, 5100
- 19/25A - W. A. MacNair, 5000
- 20/25A - E. J. Burda, 1242
- 21/25A - J. J. Kane, 1241
- 22-23/25A - R. W. Henderson, 1200
- 24/25A - W. A. Hawkins, American Car and Foundry
- 25/25A - G. Byrne - 1921-3 (Central Files)

~~SECRET~~~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Honorable

Hoover

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The number of people in the AEC Field Office having had access to technical information relative to this matter is fifteen (15).

It would be appreciated if you would furnish the AEC with the opinion of the Criminal Division as to any action taken in this case.

Sincerely yours,

J. A. Waters
J. A. Waters
Director
Division of Security

~~SECRET~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~SECRET~~

37

RECORDED-39

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Date: January 5, 1953

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 805B
333 Third Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: HERBERT W. BALDWIN
(New York Times Article of
August 23, 1952)
ESPIONAGE - R

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3BTJ/TS
ON 7-31-97
OGA 7-31-96

b6
b7C

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 29, 1952, in which you furnished the results of your inquiry conducted at your Santa Fe Operations Office and requested that you be furnished with the opinion of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice as to any contemplated action in captioned matter. ~~SECRET~~

For your information the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice by memorandum dated December 24, 1952, advised that it was its opinion that, in view of the Alsops' prior unauthorized disclosure in their columns concerning the proposed test at Eniwetok and in view of the fact that the information in question was accessible to thousands of individuals, it was its opinion that further efforts by the Bureau to ascertain the source of Mr. Baldwin's article would appear unwarranted. However, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice desired that Mr. Baldwin be contacted and asked to furnish the source of his information which appeared in his column of August 23, 1952.

Mr. Baldwin is being contacted and you will be advised of the results.

AJM:elk:jdb

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

b6
b7C~~SECRET~~

370-88
SP3BTJ/TS
4/19/96
DECLASSIFIED BY SP3BTJ/TS

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

"INTELLIGENCE"

by

Hanson W. Baldwin

[From New York Times issue of July 24, 1948, and preceding issues.]

One of Weakest Links in Our Security, Survey Shows--Omissions, Duplications

America's first line of defense in the atomic age--a world-wide intelligence service--is today one of the weakest links in our national security.

This is the conclusion of this correspondent after a careful survey of our intelligence activities, and it is a conclusion with which most of our informed authorities emphatically agree.

The evidences are legion. Friction has been pronounced between various intelligence agencies of Government--notably between the new post-war Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department; between the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and between the CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission.

There is unnecessary duplication and overlapping; at the same time, there are serious omissions of intelligence, and there is considerable expensive "empire-building." Worst of all, many of the personnel being utilized to evaluate intelligence reports are definitely second-rate, able to earn more money in Washington in Federal employment than they could earn on college campuses or in other civilian occupations.

Know Little of Soviet Strength

The result today is a marked depreciation in the quantity and quality of our intelligence as compared to the war years. Our knowledge of Russian strength is admittedly fragmentary, and many of the estimates by different Government agencies are conflicting--so widely divergent in some cases that they are impossible to reconcile. Our information about Russian atomic energy activities is notable for its scarcity.

These facts, a growing sense of frustration and discouragement among some intelligence personnel, which has led to the resig-

nations from CIA and Army G-2 of some of the best civilian personnel, and several intelligence fiascos since the war, climaxed by Bogota, have brought about an investigative survey of the whole intelligence structure of Government, it was learned.

Allen W. Dulles, who occupied a prominent role in Switzerland with the Office of Strategic Services during the war; William H. Jackson, New York lawyer and wartime intelligence officer, and Mathias F. Correa, former OSS official, have been surveying our intelligence organization and its operations at the request of the White House, Secretary of Defense Forrestal and the National Security Council.

The survey, a continuing one which will end with a report by next January, is studying not only the Central Intelligence Agency, but also the inter-relationship of this agency with the intelligence activities of the State, Army, Air Force, and Navy Departments and the FBI. As a result of the study some changes already have been made, and others--perhaps of a sweeping nature--are predicted. Considerable shifts of personnel, particularly in the Central Intelligence Agency, have occurred, or are occurring, although some of them pre-dated the Dulles commission's appointment.

Changes Going On in CIA

Apparently as a direct result of the Dulles inquiry some strange "finaglings" have been going on in the Central Intelligence Agency. Last year, coincident with the transfer of its director, the office of collection and dissemination, one of six principal offices in the agency, was abolished. Today it has been restored under another head and is bigger than ever.

After the Dulles survey started a considerable section of the office of administration and management, a lopsidedly large and over-staffed office which was supposed to shuffle paper work for the benefit of the operating forces but had become in some ways the tail that wagged the dog, was seemingly "eliminated." But the elimination, it has now developed, merely involved the paper shift of a large number of personnel to the newly reconstituted office of collection and dissemination, with no net reduction in employees.

At the same time some of those in the intelligence picture--particularly a few "empire builders" in the CIA, who were being studied with particular interest by the Dulles commission--have apparently started an attempted "back-fire" against the Dulles group in an attempt to discredit it.

Mr. Dulles' survey, in other words, already has struck sparks, but if it is to achieve its purpose it must inevitably lead--in the opinion of those who have studied our intelligence agencies closely--to major personnel changes in our intelligence agencies, to some

reorganizational and perhaps functional modifications, and to insistence upon better cooperation between all intelligence agencies.

Older Agencies Resent a Successor And Try to Restrict Scope of Action

Friction between Government Intelligence agencies is in a major degree responsible for the current study, headed by Allen W. Dulles, of the Government's intelligence organizations.

Friction is not new to Washington, but the newly-established Central Intelligence Agency, successor to the Central Intelligence Group and to the wartime Office of Strategic Services, has had more than its share. A new agency always has trouble in establishing itself in politically-jealous and power-conscious Washington, and this has been especially true in the case of CIA, which "inherited" some of the Office of Strategic Services' wartime feuds, and which found itself a "nouveau riche" in the field of intelligence amongst old established agencies.

Some gross mistakes of its own and a much too rapid expansion by CIA which led to "empire-building" and retention of some incompetent personnel fed the flames of controversy, but major friction has resulted because of the attempts of the older agencies to retain all their powers and prerogatives and to restrict and confine and reduce CIA's scope of action.

Catalogue of Friction

A brief catalogue of this friction reveals its seriousness:

1. CIA and G-2 were locked in a bitter feud until some months ago; today relations are more correct but not cordial. The issue, in part, was whether or not CIA should take over collection of secret intelligence as well as its evaluation. CIA won out and theoretically, at least, controls all espionage agents operating for this country overseas, but there is still reason to believe that G-2 continues to operate its own agents, although it denies this.

2. Prime antagonists today are the State Department and CIA, or at least personalities in both agencies. CIA representatives overseas have been in virtually all cases attached to American Embassies and have usually used State Department communications facilities. Differences of opinion as to the exact power of the Ambassador over the CIA representative and other issues finally crystallized into open "name-calling" after the unexpected rebellion flared at the Bogota conference in April.

The full intelligence story of the Bogota conference never has been told, and probably never can be. Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, produced--at the quickly dropped Congressional investigation--messages which were hailed in some quarters as proof of our foreknowledge of the revolt.

A careful reading of these messages, however, indicated that they were virtually unevaluated and undigested intelligence; most of them read like clippings from The Daily Worker and were so generalized that they could scarcely be interpreted as accurate forecasts of the revolt.

It was learned, however, that the messages produced for Congress and published were not, by any means, the only indications gleaned of the Colombian situation. Other messages--at least one of them forecasting the participation of some of the Bogota police and the Communist use of mobile sound trucks to incite revolt--were received, and the factual advance information contained in some of them was accurate and of considerable importance. The full scope of the uprising, and particularly the extensive participation of the Bogota police in it, were not anticipated, however. The incident clearly revealed some weaknesses in collection of intelligence, greater weaknesses in evaluation and the creaky nature of the mechanism for exchange and transmission of information between the State Department and the CIA overseas and in this country.

Improvements in the latter weakness have been made, due in large measure to the Dulles inquiry, but the State Department is still hostile, not to the concept of the CIA, but to the present organization staffed as it is, and feels that many of its reports and evaluations merely duplicate its own.

3. Friction between the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation really began fourteen months ago when, under a Presidential directive, the CIA took over the intelligence functions that the FBI had expressed in Latin America during the war. The turnover of responsibility in various offices that had been established in Latin America followed no common pattern but generally was a good example of lack of teamwork.

In some Latin-American offices FBI agents offered full cooperation to their CIA successors and delayed their departure to permit a period of overlap and a gradual and orderly turnover. But in a number of instances the CIA agents arrived in the morning to find the FBI files burned and the FBI agents booked for departure that afternoon. The excuse given was that some of the CIA agents assigned to Latin America were not sufficiently "security-conscious."

Shift on Loyalty Checks

More recently, the FBI, which conducts loyalty and security checks for personnel of all Government departments, stopped performing that function, in so far as the CIA was concerned. The CIA was forced, because of this FBI action, to set up its own security check department--now a part of the office of inspection and security--to check records of prospective employees. The FBI recently rescinded its action and is again undertaking CIA checks, but the expense to the CIA and to the Government in personnel and money was large.

4. Considerable difficulties between the Atomic Energy Commission and the CIA were evident until recently. The CIA, criticized by older intelligence agencies because of its alleged lack of security, refused to divulge to the AEC on the grounds of security the sources of its atomic energy information. The AEC insisted that it required these sources for proper evaluation of scientific information. This difficulty seems to have been at least temporarily straightened out by the appointment of a liaison officer within the CIA--a young scientist, whose word as to the reliability of scientific reports is satisfactory to the Atomic Energy Commission. Neither the latter commission, nor for that matter the CIA itself, are satisfied, however, with our scientific intelligence, and we know very little about Russian atomic energy progress.

Errors in Collecting Data Held Exceeded by Evaluation Weakness

Several intelligence fiascos since the war, major service differences in our estimates of Russian strength and intelligence evaluations too much influenced by prejudice have hampered and are still hampering a sound intelligence analysis of the world situation.

The fiascos--they might be called intelligence "catastrophies"--have occurred in Rumania, Hungary, Finland and elsewhere.

The Rumanian case of last fall offered an almost opera bouffe example of how intelligence should not be gathered; the episode might well have been "graustarkian" had it not resulted in tragedy and in considerable embarrassment to the United States Government.

Two young and exuberant army officers attached to the Central Intelligence Agency as carry-overs from the old Office of Strategic Services organization made contacts almost openly with anti-Communist and opposition leaders in Rumania, urged the formation of an anti-Communist group in that country and recorded their efforts, the names of the conspirators and even the minutes of the "secret" meetings held--apparently in order to impress their superiors with their industry.

"Duck Soup" for Soviet MVD

Naturally such naive attempts were "duck soup" for the Russian MVD; the officers left Rumania hastily, but their native associates soon landed in jail. The Russians utilized the information, including the seized documents, with considerable embarrassment to this Government at the trial of Dr. Julius Maniu and his associates which subsequently resulted in Dr. Maniu's imprisonment for life.

The details of the Hungarian and Finnish fiascos have understandably been guarded with considerable secrecy, but apparently "rings" of agents established in the old OSS days and inherited willy-nilly by the Central Intelligence Agency were responsible for much loose work which resulted in easy detection and ultimate elimination of the "rings."

Perhaps more dangerous today than the heritage of the mistakes of the past, and even more glaringly weak than our system of collection of intelligence, is our evaluation of it. That evaluation is too often subjective and prejudiced, and is too often made by men without adequate background for the task.

Each service--Army G-2, Air Force A-2, Navy-ONI--is making subjective estimates of Russian strength, each of which varies in important particulars from the other estimates. The Navy emphasizes Russian submarine strength; the Air Force, Russian air power; the Army, numbers of Russian divisions.

Each service's estimates are, of course, affected, if only subconsciously, by the inter-service struggle for funds and by their own service loyalties and service interests. The men who are making these estimates are thinking first as naval officers, air officers or Army officers, not as intelligence officers.

The result is a distorted picture of Russian strength. The Navy probably exaggerates the numbers of modern Russian submarines; the Air Force's estimates of Russian combat planes are not wholly accepted by G-2, and at least one well informed British air officer believes the A-2 estimate of Russian long-range bombers is far too high.

CIA Tries to Reconcile Data

The CIA is attempting to reconcile these divergent estimates with the aid of service information and its own sources, and the resultant compromise estimate is, in this writer's opinion, more accurate--or at least, less in error--than that of any one of the services. Yet the CIA estimate cannot yet command the respect it must have, if it is to mean much, partly because of past CIA mistakes, partly because of some inferior CIA personnel, partly because of the newness of the CIA and its history of frictions and duplications.

Another mistake now currently being made--exemplified in the February and March crisis when the CIA was right but General Clay and the Army were wrong--was a mistake constantly made during wartime, the confusion of enemy "capabilities" with enemy "intentions." The Russians, for instance, may have the physical "capability" of overrunning western Europe in forty-five days--though this seems a dubious estimate--and the military services may be perfectly correct in so estimating, for this involves a military judgment. But a Russian "intention" to overrun western Europe must imply political as well as military judgment, and the services are not particularly competent to make such judgments.

This is the function of the CIA, to couple the political judgments of the State Department with the military judgments of the services and to supplement them with data gathered by itself and other Government agencies and to evaluate all this and present a definitive whole view. Too often it has not done this, at least not comprehensively; too often it has simply repeated the political views of state and the military views of the services.

Occasionally it has produced a careful synthesis, and it has certainly produced many detailed reports of great value. Its judgment in the so-called "spring crisis," for instance, was far closer to being correct than the Army's was.

But the CIA does not yet have sufficient stature to command the full confidence of the other services. Nor can the other intelligence services--subjective in their approach--fulfill alone the functions which CIA is supposed to fill.

Competent Personnel Held Key To Success--Reforms Suggested

The current survey of the nation's intelligence agencies, which have been beset by factionalism and friction, can lead only to one major conclusion: that adequate personnel is the key to adequate intelligence.

The study now being conducted under the chairmanship of Allen W. Dulles must undoubtedly recognize this fact, even though it may make suggestions for improvements in organization and perhaps a redefinition of functional activities by the various agencies.

Personnel weaknesses undoubtedly are the clue to the history of frustration and disappointment, of friction and fiasco which have been, too largely, the story of our intelligence services since the war.

Present personnel, including many of those in the office of research and estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency, suffer from inexperience and inadequacy of background. Some of them do not possess the "global," objective mind needed to evaluate intelligence, coldly, logically and definitively. Others, in offices of operations or special operations in the CIA are chair warmers. Some--in CIA and service agencies--are "empire builders," anxious for prestige and rank.

Civilian Executive Urged

The first requirement is to induce into government service civilians of high capacity and willing anonymity. The CIA should be headed by a civilian, not by a military or naval man as its first three directors have been. Its senior executives and office chiefs should be largely civilian.

The concept that CIA could be staffed in large measure by service personnel and that the services would then owe greater loyalty and support to this agency because of their personnel stake in it has failed. The officers sent to CIA are not always the best and most of them have a psychological aversion to the duty; they consider themselves, in a professional sense, "lost."

Civilians, therefore, must be induced into CIA and into other government intelligence agencies, but they probably cannot be persuaded unless some of the restrictions of Civil Service are relaxed and more security and sense of accomplishment is provided. A corps of junior civilian intelligence experts might be established gradually by enlisting picked men from the colleges or graduate schools to serve four or five years in government intelligence work.

The best 10 per cent might, if they wished, make intelligence a career; the rest would return to civilian life--available, if necessary, for a later tour of duty or for service in an emergency. The services themselves must emphasize intelligence even more greatly than they have yet done and they must provide a greater continuity of career and chance for promotion to officers who make intelligence their specialty.

Some Reforms Suggested

A solution of the personnel problem is of prime importance, but these additional reforms ought to be considered carefully:

1--A thorough house-cleaning of the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies to rid the services of drones, incompetents and "empire-builders."

2--Reorganization of the CIA on a more efficient basis. The office of collection and dissemination probably ought to be eliminated or greatly reduced and the office of administration and management ought to be cut down; these two offices have become too much the tail that wags the dog. Friction between the vital offices of operations and special operations must be eliminated; these two offices probably ought to be combined under one head and reduced in size. Neither one needs an evaluation section as at present; these sections somewhat duplicate the work of the office of research and estimates. The latter office is a key to sound intelligence; it must be strengthened. One means of doing so and of eliminating duplication with the State Department is to transfer the State Department's intelligence analysts to CIA. The residue of the Office of Strategic Services was split up after the war between the Central Intelligence Agency (then the Central Intelligence Group) and the State Department. This, it is now clear, was a major mistake; the two ought to be rejoined.

Functions Need Redefining

3--The functional purposes of each of the government's intelligence agencies ought to be redefined clearly and unmistakably, but the CIA must be clearly established as the top-echelon agency with powers to coordinate the activities of all the others. Organizationally, the present structure seems sound; certainly it is better than any prior system. The CIA probably should continue to collect information by both overt and covert means as well as to analyze it. If, however, official approval should be given to the collection of secret information by spy rings operated by other agencies the "master mind" control of all such rings must be in the hands of the CIA.

4--Secret intelligence operations must be conducted on a broader and far more secure base than heretofore. The State Department's embassies and missions have offered "cover" up until now for nearly all overseas CIA activities, largely because this was the easiest way. But other types of "cover" can and must be provided. Ingenuity and secrecy are the keys to sound operational procedures.

F B I

Date: 4/21/66

Transmit the following in Plaintext

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via Airtel

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (47-NEW)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (47-NEW)

SUBJECT: UNSUB; Article Entitled
"Crank Calls Harass Families
 of G.I.'s Serving in Vietnam"
 by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York
Times, April 4, 1966
 IMPERSONATION

Remyairtel 4/20/66, captioned as above.

The New York Office has been unable, on the basis of the limited information available in the news item which was enclosed with referenced airtel, to identify any such Impersonation case in the New York Office as referred to by BALDWIN.

Pursuant to telephone call from [REDACTED] on 4/21/66, no contact will be made with BALDWIN pending specific Bureau authority.

b6
b7C

- 3 - Bureau
 1 - New York [REDACTED]
 1 - New York (100-156700)
 2 - New York (47-)

b3
b7E

EFF:hjr
 (8)

REC 20

MCT-42

5268

APR 22 1966

Approved: JFM

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1484347-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 4
Page 51 ~ Duplicate;
Page 52 ~ Duplicate;
Page 53 ~ Duplicate;
Page 54 ~ Duplicate;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1252712-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 4
Page 51 ~ Duplicate;
Page 52 ~ Duplicate;
Page 53 ~ Duplicate;
Page 54 ~ Duplicate;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED

July 26, 1962

Mr. Tolson (U)

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Sullivan

Mr. Evans

Mr. DeLoach

3-15-89

Classified by SP8 BTJ/cm

Declassify on GADR

288,611

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/cm

DECLASSIFY ON GADR

5/9/96 11/17/96 SP3 BTJ/cm

b6

b7C

The Attorney General called and stated he had just talked to Secretary of Defense McNamara and in connection therewith he, the Attorney General, did not know if I had had a chance to read the New York Times article by Hanson Baldwin (phonetic). [The Attorney General stated this is most unfortunate in that it gives some information regarding the intelligence we have now on the missile sites of the Soviet Union and the sources for that intelligence. The Attorney General stated this was a very closely held paper within the Government and the President spoke specifically about it at the last National Security Council meeting where they had planned to distribute a number of the copies and the President limited the number drastically so it was closely watched and despite that, it came out in the New York Times.] (S) [X] [X]

The Attorney General stated the President is anxious and the Secretary of Defense is anxious, as is he, the Attorney General, to see if once again we can do anything with this and he, the Attorney General, would like to have me assign somebody to look into it. I stated I would get somebody to start on it right away and upon inquiry, the Attorney General stated General Joseph Carroll has the facts and information and somebody can get in touch with him. I told the Attorney General I would get on it right away. (S) [X] [X]

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

REC-22

116

5 JUL 28 1962

b3

b7E

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 TAP/mg

DECLASSIFY ON GADR

288,611

7/26/82

4/23/82

Miss Holmes

Media (9)

7 JUL 30 1962

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

SENT FROM D. O.	
TIME	5:24 PM
DATE	7/26/62
BY	[Signature]

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 28 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

URGENT 7-28-62 PM AJO

TO DIRECTOR FBI AND SAC, WFO

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

b3
b7E

SUBJECT.. HANSON W. BALDWIN, ESP - X

REBUTEL CALL THIS DATE INSTRUCTING INTERVIEW OF SGT. [REDACTED]
OF AIR FORCE OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, SIX THREE THREE FIFTH
AVENUE, NYC, CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF CONTACT BY NY TIMES
STAFF MEMBER " CONCERNING " HARDENED SITES".

b6
b7C

INQUIRY AT SIX THREE THREE FIFTH AVENUE, NYC, DISCLOSED THAT
US AIR FORCE NEW YORK OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES LOCATED ON
THIRD FLOOR OF THESE PREMISES IS CLOSED ON WEEKENDS. OFFICER IN
CHARGE, OSI, NYC, ADVISED NO PERSONNEL RECORDS NECESSARY TO IDENTIFY
[REDACTED] WOULD BE AVAILABLE UNTIL MONDAY, SUGGESTED CONTACT OF
FACILITY COMMANDER, COL. H. D. WOODRUFF. CONTACT OF WOODRUFF- S
RESIDENCE DISCLOSED WOODRUFF ON TRAINING FLIGHT TO NEW MEXICO.
[REDACTED] NYO WILL IDENTIFY AND INTERVIEW SGT. [REDACTED] MONDAY. SEVEN

b6
b7C

THIRTY.

EX - 102

b3
b7E

BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED ALL DEVELOPMENTS.
CORRECTION - OUR FILE NUMBER ON HEADING SHD RD [REDACTED]

END AND ACK PLS

NY R 5 WA JDS

TWO COPIES WFO

53 AUG 6 1962

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☐
 Callahan ☐
 Conrad ☐
 DeLoach ☐
 Evans ☐
 Malone ☐
 Rosen ☒
 Sullivan ☒
 Tavel ☐
 Trotter ☐
 Tele. Room ☐
 Holmes ☐
 Gandy ☐

TO : MR. SULLIVAN

DATE: July 26, 1962

FROM : MR. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; LEAK OF
 CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN
 HANSON W. BALDWIN ARTICLE IN
 "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
 JULY 26, 1962

94643

Supervisor L. W. Oberndorf, Washington Field, called to advise that a check made by that office disclosed that Hanson W. Baldwin maintains no residence in the Washington area, he has no telephone service either listed or unlisted, and inquiry at the local office of "The New York Times" disclosed that Baldwin works out of New York.

The New York Office is independently endeavoring to establish Baldwin's location.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

WAB:hrt

(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/23/82 BY SP2TTP/mg

3-15-89 SP8/ab
 4/29/96 SP3 BJS/cen
 9/17/96 SP3 BJS/cen

EX-100

REC-22

25 JUL 31 1962

b3

b7E

873
 AUG 6 1962

5- [signature]

TELETYPE

10 JUL 31 1962

PAGE TWO

BALDWIN REMARKED THAT HIS ASSISTANT IS ON VACATION. INFORMANT
FURTHER STATED IN EARLY AFTERNOON OF SEVEN TWENTY NINE SIXTY TWO
THAT BILL LNU WAS GIVEN DIRECTIONS BY UNKNOWN WOMAN AT BALDWINS
RESIDENCE ON HOW TO REACH THE BALDWIN HOUSE.

END AND ACK PLS

NY R 1 WA HFL

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 7-30-62

Investigation being conducted to determine source of Defense Dept. leak of information to Hanson W. Baldwin of N. Y. Times. Attached sets forth conversation between Baldwin and an unknown individual, and fact Baldwin going to University of Wisconsin Tuesday and returning Wednesday.

CJV:dac

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8 BWT/et

4/29/96 SP3 BTJ/cun

9/17/96 SP3 BTJ/et

UNITED STATES GOV

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2016 BY [REDACTED]

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : MR. SULLIVAN

DATE: 7/26/62

FROM : A. H. Belmont

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Wannall
Mr. D.J. Brennan

SUBJECT:

ARTICLE IN NY TIMES RE

MISSILE SITES OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT] (U)

At 1:12 p.m. the Director called and advised that the President and the AG are very much concerned about an article by Hanson Baldwin in the NY Times, [furnishing information regarding missile sites of the Soviet Government.] (U)

The AG advised that when this paper was prepared the President instructed that only a certain number of copies be made, and he specifically cautioned that it be handled on a highly restricted basis, as he did not want any leaks. (U)

The Director advised that the Secretary of Defense and the President had been in touch with the AG on this matter and that General Joseph Carroll of the Department of Defense had the information concerning it. The Director requested that we immediately get a copy of the NY Times, secure this article, and also contact Carroll at once and get such information as he has, and launch an immediate investigation into this leak. The Director will inquire about this when he contacts the Bureau tomorrow morning; therefore, this should be started at once.

This probably pertains to [National Intelligence Estimate 11862, "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack."] [My memorandum of yesterday reflected that the number of copies of this estimate had been cut down by the President personally, inasmuch as the President wanted to keep the number of copies to a minimum.] (U)

You should have an official of the Domestic Intelligence Division immediately personally contact General Carroll and get the facts as to what document is involved; what information Baldwin put out, and where it ties into the document in question; how many copies were made; the dissemination given these copies; and launch an immediate investigation in an effort to determine how this got to Baldwin.

AHB:CSH (5)

1962

25 JUL 31 1962

CLASSIFIED BY 503-0134
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
00-4417

~~TOP SECRET~~

Document downloaded to [REDACTED]
4/5/2010
6/20/95

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-15-88 multiple source
Classified by 508-0134
Declassify on: OADR
CLASSIFIED BY 503-0134
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
5/9/96

FBI

Date: 7/28/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

b3

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

b7E

Article by HANSON W. BALDWIN in
"The New York Times", July 26, 1962
ESP - X

Colonel STANLEY GROGAN, Assistant to JOHN A. MC CONE, Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on 7/27/62 advised SAs CHARLES A. MAY and MAURICE A. TAYLOR that he handles matters pertaining to the press. GROGAN said he has known HANSON W. BALDWIN for the past 30 years and possesses some knowledge of his method of operation and his contacts. GROGAN stated BALDWIN is a journalist of excellent background and experience and his contacts are at the highest level. BALDWIN would not pay for information and would not have to do so. GROGAN said the "The New York Times" does not operate that way although this not true of some other publications.

GROGAN advised that the Washington Bureau of the "The New York Times" is currently headed by JAMES "SCOTTY" RESTON and he "runs the show." In the past top reporters from New York made their own appointments and operated somewhat independently but under RESTON the arrangements for contacts are made by "Times" secretaries such as [REDACTED]. GROGAN recalled that for a long time appointments were made by NONA BROWN, long time and current employee at the Washington Bureau of "The New York Times".

Colonel GROGAN advised that BALDWIN, in common with many journalists, will call a high official for an appointment with a particular subject in mind which he has developed or picked up from various sources and wants to confirm or develop further. Thereafter the conversation may cover a number of different subjects. GROGAN said it was his recollection that

- (3) - Bureau
- 1 - New York (RM)
- 1 - WFO

REC-36 [REDACTED]

b3
b7ELWRO:pap
(5)

L. D. Wick

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

EX-108

b3
b7E

[redacted] when [redacted] phoned for BALDWIN last week, she indicated he wanted to discuss with Mr. MC CONE matters pertaining to reorganization, personnel changes and plans for the future, in other words, what MC CONE was doing. GROGAN said he also believed that was the proposed agenda of BALDWIN when he called for an appointment last April and was not granted audience.

b6
b7C

In connection with the current article of BALDWIN which is the subject of this investigation, Colonel GROGAN related that last Saturday, 7/21/62, he received a phone call from PETER BRAESTRUP of "The New York Times" who desired background data on two items: one, the subject of the 375 mile rocket launched by NASSER of the United Arab Republic; and two, the recent statement of NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV that Soviet submarines had fired a Polaris type missile. GROGAN recalled BRAESTRUP mentioned that Dr. ECKER, a German scientist, is assisting NASSER and the French have been helping Israel. GROGAN indicated he drew no conclusions from the above call of any connection with this matter.

Colonel GROGAN advised Miss LAURA WALTZ, Washington Bureau, "The New York Times", phoned him last week to arrange appointment for BALDWIN with JOHN A. MC CONE, Director of CIA. Miss WALTZ advised BALDWIN would be in WDC on Monday, 7/16/62, and remain until Friday noon. She said BALDWIN had pressing business on Monday but would be available any time thereafter until noon Friday, 7/20/62. GROGAN said MC CONE did not want to see BALDWIN and he told BALDWIN through Miss WALTZ, that MC CONE would be available at 4 p.m. on 7/20/62. In a final conversation, Miss WALTZ said BALDWIN could make it at 3 p.m., however, GROGAN told her that 4 p.m. was the earliest time available.

Colonel GROGAN said he did not talk with BALDWIN at all on this visit to WDC. GROGAN advised from past experience he knows BALDWIN stays at different hotels on visits to WDC. As GROGAN recalled, on his last visit BALDWIN stayed at the Jefferson Hotel, 16th and M Sts., N.W. GROGAN mentioned that about 1 1/2 years ago, Mrs. SIDNEY SHALLITT, wife of the correspondent for U.S. News and World Report, told him at a party that she was manager of the Jefferson and invited him to patronize the hotel. GROGAN said to his knowledge BALDWIN stopped at the Raleigh, Statler, and Hay Adams hotels in the past. He said he never knew BALDWIN to stay with friends or at a private home.

Colonel GROGAN recalled BALDWIN had been here about 1/25/62 and also from 4/9-13/62. On the latter visit he also wanted to see MC CONE but did not make it because MC CONE "was tied up." GROGAN explained that MC CONE has instituted a new policy at CIA with the idea of avoiding too much publicity. It includes curtailment of photographs, speeches, releases, and interviews.

Colonel GROGAN recalled that BALDWIN had made a trip to Poland in about May, 1962, with a group which included ELLIOTT BEALL (PH) of "Business Week", and Dr. GEORGE B. KISTIAKOWSKY, former advisor to the President. GROGAN believed the trip was arranged by SHEPHERD STONE of "The New York Times".

Colonel GROGAN said that on 12/15/61, BALDWIN had furnished him with a bit of information gained from BALDWIN's attendance at a meeting between FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS and ROBERT BOWIE, who was once Political Advisor for JOHN J. MC CLOY in Germany. The topic which resulted in heated argument was Atomic Submarines for NATO naval forces. STRAUSS advocated the addition of these boats and urged that the crews remain on nationalist basis. BOWIE, whom GROGAN described as an extreme liberal, was not opposed to Atomic Subs for NATO but contended vehemently they should be manned by crews integrated from the various NATO powers.

Colonel GROGAN advised the principal contacts of BALDWIN are undoubtedly at the Pentagon. BALDWIN is a graduate of the Naval Academy and veteran writer of the subject of military and naval affairs. According to Colonel GROGAN BALDWIN goes on naval maneuvers. GROGAN did not believe BALDWIN had retained his reserve commission in the U.S. Navy. GROGAN mentioned that BALDWIN's father was managing editor for the "Baltimore Sun" for more than 40 years.

Colonel GROGAN said he did not know of any contacts of BALDWIN at CIA other than himself and Director MC CONE whom BALDWIN has tried to contact as indicated herein. GROGAN said he did not believe the leak in this case came from CIA, adding it was his opinion it emanated from a high level source at the Pentagon, and he had expressed this opinion to MC CONE.

[REDACTED]

With regard to CIA, Colonel GROGAN recalled that BALDWIN had been a member of the Hoover Commission "Task Force" headed by FERDINAND EBERHARDT which investigated CIA, and BALDWIN is thoroughly familiar with the Agency from this experience.

Colonel GROGAN advised BALDWIN was a friend of Admiral ARLEIGH BURKE and it was his guess BALDWIN knows BURKE's successor Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR. GROGAN could not recall any additional naval officers with whom BALDWIN is acquainted.

Colonel GROGAN identified the following high officials and officers who are friends of BALDWIN:

Major General C.V. "TED" CLIFTON, military aide to the President who handles matters pertaining to CIA, sometimes including intelligence items. He was formerly Director of Information for the Department of the Army.

ROSWELL GILPATRICK, Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Lieutenant General WILLIAM F. QUINN, Deputy Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, formerly Director of Information for the Army, and also formerly of CIA.

Lieutenant General JOSEPH F. CARROLL, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Dr. HAROLD BROWN, Science Advisor, and Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense.

ARTHUR SYLVESTER, Deputy Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Defense, and formerly Chief of the Washington Bureau of "Newark News."

Major General WILLIAM K. MARTIN, new Director of Information, Department of the Air Force.

ROGER HILLSMAN, Director of Intelligence, Department of State, whose varied background includes Yale, OSS, CIA, and the Army. He is the son of an Army Colonel veteran of the Bataan Death March. HILLSMAN wrote a book on Strategic Intelligence which GROGAN said "touched on CIA" and recently did an article on guerrilla warfare in which he had some experience. GROGAN expressed opinion that HILLSMAN was not averse to publicity.

[REDACTED]

ROBERT AMORY, Bureau of the Budget, formerly Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, who had many contacts with BALDWIN on variety of subjects (matter of index card record) from 1955-6/13/59. AMORY was once Political Advisor for JOHN J. MC CLOY in Germany.

In conclusion Colonel GROGAN said he thinks the material for the article was obtained from discussion with someone in high position who had seen the 11/8 source material and was well informed on intelligence matters. As he indicated previously GROGAN felt language used and logical location of BALDWIN's contacts suggested the Pentagon and possibly Army contacts as source. GROGAN said he felt the article was somewhat boastful in tenor and a reply to current Soviet claims and threats. He thought it possible that some person may have furnished the information to satisfy some inside ego or urge.

Colonel GROGAN mentioned that ARTHUR KROCK, senior Washington Bureau man for "The New York Times" was a close friend of Mr. MC CONE and conceivably could help on this matter but was very skeptical that MC CONE would be receptive to contacting KROCK for such purpose.

On 7/23/62, SA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] b6
[REDACTED] b7C
ascertained under appropriate pretext from [REDACTED] Clerk, The Jefferson Hotel, 1200 16th St., N.W., WDC, that HANSON W. BALDWIN of "The New York Times" had registered at that hotel on 7/16/62, with intentions to remain until 7/19/62. In view of the sensitive nature of this investigation it was not deemed appropriate to explore this matter further in the absence of a regularly established source of WFO at that hotel which source will not be available until the evening of 7/29/62.

WFO will interview the officials and officers described as friends of BALDWIN by Colonel GROGAN and will, when established source at Hotel Jefferson is available, make more detailed inquiry regarding BALDWIN's stay at that hotel from 7/16 to 19/62, giving special attention to the development of information concerning his activities during that period, the availability of telephone records and any other information having a bearing on this matter.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON BALDWIN
IN NEW YORK "TIMES"
RE MISSILE SITES OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT

DATE: 7/26/62

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D.E. Moore
Mr. Wannall

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

CLASSIFIED SECRET
EXTENDED BY SP2 [REDACTED]
REASON FOR EXTENSION
DATE OF REVIEW 7/26/82
DECLASSIFICATION FOR 7/27/82

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Hanson Baldwin

At 3:45 p.m., General Carroll of the Defense Department called to advise that Inspector Don Moore and two other Bureau representatives were in his office in connection with the requested investigation into the Hanson Baldwin article.

He pointed out that certain top clearances are necessary for persons having access to the information in question, and that these clearances are handled on a very restricted basis through CIA. I told General Carroll that we had been requested to conduct this investigation and suggested that he arrange for our representatives to have whatever clearances are necessary. He said he would call Chairman McCone of the US Intelligence Board and arrange temporary clearances, which could be verified later.

He called me back in a few minutes to advise he had talked to General Carter, Deputy Director of CIA, who had agreed that Carroll should clear our three men and also that further clearances for other personnel could be arranged when the personnel are picked.

I then received a call from [REDACTED] of CIA, who is in charge of the security clearances on this highly restricted material. He said that he will be glad to brief and clear any of our personnel necessary in connection with this investigation. He said that his group has been meeting all day analyzing the Baldwin article to determine what is classified and where the information came from, that is could it be traced to a particular document or documents. He said this analysis will be completed tonight and he will make extra copies for us. He said he will also have a list of the dissemination of the documents. He said he felt it may be possible to pinpoint this in view of the [REDACTED] and that the investigation required may not be widespread. [REDACTED] noted that Hanson Baldwin was in Washington last week, from Monday through Friday.

I told [REDACTED] we would need ten men on this investigation and I would have those ten men in his office at 9:30 tomorrow morning, 7/27 (Room [REDACTED] CIA building, Langley) to be briefed and cleared. At this time the analysis can be furnished to us, together with the dissemination and any other information that will be helpful to the investigation.

AHB:CSH (5)

DATE

BY

5- [REDACTED]

Classified by SP3-GTW/2001
Declassify on: OADR ON 5-1-2001
CO-4477

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BIK/2001
DECLASSIFY ON 25X 1-6-2001

b6
b7C

EX-108 MCL-46
REC-52 25 JUL 31 1962

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr. Tolson

At 4:40 p.m. I received a call from Director McCone of CIA. He said he had been greatly concerned with the Hanson Baldwin article and he took this up early with [redacted] with instructions that a thorough analysis of the article be made to trace the document or briefing, so that Baldwin's source could be determined. He said he had talked to the AG, and the AG had talked to the President, who had instructed that an investigation be launched immediately with a view toward discovering Baldwin's source, and also to demonstrate to all concerned the seriousness of the leak; that the President felt this investigation should be conducted by the FBI if possible. I told McCone we were conducting an investigation. b3

McCone said that it was his impression that certain peculiar words were used in the article and certain information was contained therein through which it may be possible to pinpoint this leak. He indicated it was from a briefing, rather than a document. He said that Baldwin had been in the building at the Pentagon on Tuesday and Wednesday, all day, and a check could be made as to whom he saw in the Pentagon. He said, further, that Baldwin sought an appointment with him, McCone, last Friday, 7/20, through Colonel Grogan, Press Officer of CIA, but that McCone was busy and had not seen him. He said that Baldwin may have seen someone else at CIA and this could be checked.

McCone said that CIA would not go beyond the analysis they are presently making, but he wanted it understood that CIA or Defense or any of the other agencies would give us full support and make any inquiry we desired.

I told McCone that I had talked to [redacted] and had arranged to get this analysis tomorrow morning and that our men on the investigation would be in [redacted] office at 9:30 a.m., 7/27/62, to be briefed and to secure any information that would be helpful. b3

I called SAC Johnson of the Washington Field Office and advised him to select nine additional men who should be in [redacted] office by 9:30 a.m. tomorrow morning for the purpose indicated. I acquainted Assistant Director Sullivan and Inspector Moore with these developments.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEEKING
SADDER
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

b6
b7C

The Attorney General 1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. D.E. Moore
1-Mr. J.F. Wacks

July 27, 1962

Director, FBI

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
JULY 26, 1962

SP2 TOP / M
3
7/27/82
4/23/82

Document forwarded
to Secret per [redacted]

b6
b7C

Immediately following your advice to me on the
afternoon of July 26, 1962, that inquiry was desired in an
attempt to determine the source from which Hanson Baldwin
secured the information used in the preparation of his article
on Soviet missile sites, representatives of this Bureau called
on General Joseph Carroll of the Department of Defense for
facts and information pertinent to the inquiry. (S) u

Interviews with General Carroll and other Department
of Defense officials and interviews with officials of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have indicated that material
which could have been utilized by Baldwin in preparing his
article was published as early as the first part of June, 1962.
This material was published in the form of drafts which
culminated in the production of National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) 11-3-62 which was used to brief the National Security
Council on July 9 and 10, 1962. Approximately 71 copies of
this Estimate were disseminated originally; however, at the
President's instructions all were recalled and dissemination
was limited to approximately 33 copies. (S) u

According to CIA officials, there were approximately
40 to 50 people present at the National Security Council Briefings
and, at the conclusion of the briefing, the President instructed
that a study be made of the political and military implications
of the information in the Estimate. (S) u

Copies of NIE 11-3-62, numbering approximately 33, were
redissemated on July 16 and 17, 1962. However, it should be
noted that as a result of previous drafts, previous dissemination,
briefings, etc., CIA officials estimate that between three and
four hundred persons had knowledge of the information which was
contained in this Estimate. (S) u

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

AHB:jdd
(7)

~~TOP SECRET~~

7-27-62
TELETYPE UNIT

b3
b7E

5 AUG 2

5-P-2001
SP3-BT/SM

00-444

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Director McCone of CIA advised on the afternoon of July 20, 1962, that CIA was making an analysis of the Baldwin article to determine what information was classified and whether the information could be traced to a particular document or documents. This analysis was made available to us today and indicates that the classified intelligence in Baldwin's article "clearly appears to be based on information from NIE 11-3-62." The CIA analysis further reflects that Baldwin arrived in Washington, D. C., on Monday, July 16, 1962, and reportedly spent July 18 and 19, 1962, at the Pentagon as he was seen a number of times in different parts of the Pentagon. He departed Washington for New York at 3 p.m., July 20, 1962. CIA has advised that Baldwin did not talk to anyone at CIA although he attempted to arrange an interview with Director McCone. (TS) [X] (U)

CIA notes that the phraseology and other clues contained in Baldwin's article point to the probability that Baldwin received a general, non-technical, briefing or review of the conclusions reached in the National Intelligence Estimate and their implications. CIA also notes that the release of NIE 11-3-62 on July 16 took place on the day Baldwin arrived in Washington. It was during this same week that various drafts and working papers were prepared and circulated on this subject matter in carrying out the President's instructions to conduct a study of the political and military implications of NIE 11-3-62. (U) [X] (TS)

I wish to advise you that 12 Agents of this Bureau were immediately assigned to make this inquiry and have undergone the briefings insisted upon for clearance purposes. We have requested the Department of Defense to furnish us a complete list of all personnel in the Department visited by Baldwin during the week of July 16, 1962. We intend to interview each of these individuals thoroughly in an attempt to determine whether information was furnished to Baldwin on this matter. In addition, we are determining where Baldwin stayed while in Washington for the purpose of checking at available sources as to telephone calls or personal contacts. (TS) u

In accordance with our discussion today, technical coverage will be effective on Baldwin on the morning of July 23, 1962, at his residence in New York. (TS) In addition, we have u b6
learned that Baldwin normally utilizes [] of b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

The New York Times' Washington office as his secretary to arrange appointments when he comes to Washington. Consequently, we have placed technical coverage on her residence and intend to interview her and request a list of persons contacted by Baldwin during his recent trip to Washington.

(U) While we are concentrating immediately on obtaining a list of persons contacted by Baldwin and interviewing them, we have also requested from [CIA] a full list of the documents, (S) including drafts which contain the information in question, together with a list of persons to whom these documents were disseminated. Of course, to secure the names of all persons having access to these documents it will be necessary to conduct inquiry at each agency where the document was disseminated. Such a check will undoubtedly reflect that hundreds of persons had access to the information. (S)(U)

I have instructed that this matter be given continuous, aggressive attention. You will be advised of further developments.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 7/29/62

We are investigating this leak of highly sensitive data at the request of Attorney General. Pertinent data in attached will be furnished Attorney General.

JFW:cop

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8 *[signature]*

4/29/96

SP3 BTJ/jum

9/19/96

SP3 BTJ/jel

Date of Mail 7-27-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8 BTJ/CLW

4/29/96 SP3 BTJ/CLW
9/17/96 SP3 BTJ/CLW

Subject

JUNE MAIL

New York Times

65 AUG 8 1962

Removed By

File Number

[Redacted File Number Box]

b3
b7E

Date of Mail 7-31-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-5-89 BY SP8 *gjt/tdc*

4/29/96 SP3 BTJ/clm
9/17/96 SP3 BTJ/clm

Subject JUNE MAIL *New York Times*

Removed By 65 AUG 6 1962

File Number

b3

b7E

Permanent Serial Charge Out

8/99

Date of Mail 7-31-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8 *[signature]*
4/29/96 SP3 BTJ/cum
9/17/96 SP3 BTJ/pet

Subject JUNE MAIL New York Times

Removed By 65 AUG 6 *[signature]*

File Number

b3
b7E

3199

Permanent Serial Charge Out

F B I

Date: 7/31/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted] (P)

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES, JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8 BTJ/okt
4/29/96 SP3 BTJ/cun
4/17/96 SP3 BTJ/pe WJ

Re WFO airtel 7/30/62, setting forth results of
interview of [redacted]

The following additional data was furnished by
WF 1384-S* on 7/30/62, pertaining to the interview of [redacted]

At approximately 6:45 p.m. (outset of the interview),
[redacted] contacted a friend known only to the informant as
[redacted] and explained that she had been detained since two
gentlemen from the FBI desired to interview her.

b6
b7C

Subsequent to the interview at approximately
7:28 p.m., [redacted] recontacted [redacted] remarking that it was
too late to go to the movie. When [redacted] asked what "they"
wanted, [redacted] stated they wanted to know something about
an article which appeared in the paper. When [redacted] asked
whether it was something [redacted] was a witness to, [redacted]

- ③ - Bureau
1 - New York (Info) (RM)
1 - WFO

HJM:mdc
(5)

REC-51

AIRTEL

AUG 1 1962

b3
b7E

Approved: [redacted]

Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

[redacted]

b3
b7E

stated, "No, they just wanted to know if I knew anything about it. You know, how the information is obtained etc., and I didn't." [redacted] commented that she had been contacted at home when she did not have any advisors around and further commented that they were "strictly business."

At approximately 9:20 p.m., [redacted] was contacted by [redacted] (LNU) who was later identified as [redacted] at the Washington Office, New York Times. [redacted] desired the telephone number of ARTHUR KROCK, Washington Office, New York Times, and was advised by [redacted] that KROCK could be reached in Newport, Rhode Island, Viking 6-3870. It was revealed this phone was listed under the name of [redacted] at [redacted]. During the conversation, [redacted] remarked, "I hear you had visitors." [redacted] replied, "Yep, I did. Are you working on my visitors?" [redacted] revealed that it might be in connection with the visitors, but he did not know for sure. [redacted] commented that it made the night slightly unusual.

b6
b7C

At approximately 9:33 p.m., [redacted] mentioned above, recontacted [redacted] and was told that [redacted] had been contacted by [redacted]. Upon hearing this, [redacted] remarked that [redacted] was going to call KROCK and tell him about the situation. [redacted] remarked that she might be out on the street 7/31/62, with a little tin cup. [redacted] reassured her by stating that she believed [redacted] had handled the situation very well. [redacted] commented that she hoped everyone else thought so also.

b6
b7C

[redacted] related to [redacted] that "It is a peculiar thing", and she felt very strongly about both sides of the matter. [redacted] stated she did not know what to do and would just wait and see what happened. She terminated the conversation by saying that she was going to sit down and ~~write~~ down what happened, what was said, etc.

b6
b7C

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Date 7/31/62

DATE 3-13-89 BY SP8 BTJ/pah

4/29/96

SP3 BTJ/SCM

19/16/96 SP3 BTJ/pah

Attached relates to current inquiries into leak of highly sensitive defense information involving Hanson Baldwin of "The New York Times". We are interviewing Department of Defense and CIA officials in attempt to determine source of leak. Attached reports results of several of these interviews as well as results of interview 7/30/62 of [redacted]

[redacted] in Washington Office of "The New York Times", who made appointments for Baldwin in Washington.

Being disseminated to Attorney General.

BCR:cop

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 31 1962

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8 BTJ/ab

URGENT 7-31-62 11-55 PM JAA

TO DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED] -21- AND SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD

b3
b7E

[REDACTED] -WFO VIA WASHINGTON-

FROM SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN, ESP-X.

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT - S ASTERISK ADVISED INSTANT DATE THAT
SUBJECT CHANGED PLANES IN CHICAGO THIS PM FOR MADISON, WISC. WHILE
IN MADISON ON AUGUST ONE NEXT SUBJECT IN CARE OF [REDACTED]
DEPT. OF JOURNALISM, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN AND WILL STAY AT EDGE-
WATER HOTEL. INFORMANT ADVISED SUBJECT TO RETURN TO NYC IN PM AUGUST
ONE NEXT AND WOULD STAY WITH HIS WIFE AT BILTMORE HOTEL THAT NIGHT.

b6
b7C

END

NY R 21 WA NH

TU NH

REC- 61

AUG 1 1962

b3
b7E

EX-111
TWO COPIES WFO

313
58 AUG 8 1962


~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

FBI

b3:10USC424, b6 per DIA

Date: 7-30-62



Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] b3
FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted] b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

ReWFOairtel 7-28-62.

Interviews at Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
today included interviews of [redacted]
to [redacted]
[redacted] USAF, DIA representative to [redacted] and
First Lieutenant [redacted] USAF. Intelligence
(Security) Officer, [redacted] DIA.

b3
b6

[redacted] had no information as to source of leak to
HANSON BALDWIN or other facts pertinent to investigation.
He expressed opinion that information on which BALDWIN
based his article of 7-26-62, possibly came from "11/8"
but more likely from briefings covering material later
included in "11/8." These briefings, which began as early
as 7-1-62, were in three series, as new information was
developed, and each series consisted of from 10 to 12 groups,
each group being comprised of from two to 70 persons. All
of these briefings have stressed "hardening," "coffin" type
construction; and in describing Soviet missile sites, the
figure "8" has been generally used. [redacted]

[redacted] considers it significant that the BALDWIN
article, as did the recent briefings, stressed "hardening"
and mentioned the newly learned intelligence that most of
the Soviet installations are comprised of eight or more
launching sites. However, [redacted] says "hardening" also
applies to protection by earthen embankments as well as
concrete. This point was apparently missed by BALDWIN [redacted]

b3
b6

- 3 - Bureau
- 1 - New York (Info) (RM)
- 1 - WFO

DMB:ctw

(5)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

CC: Sullivan
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Sent _____

Per _____

b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~b3
b7E

[redacted]

who either assumed or was led to believe that "hardening" refers only to protection by concrete, since his article of 7-26-62, in its opening paragraph, defined "hardening" as "protected by concrete." [S] [X]

With regard to the term "image interpretation" as used by BALDWIN, [redacted] stated this term has recently been adopted by personnel making the final evaluation of the production of sophisticated photo techniques. He stated that high military personnel have tended to use this term increasingly as a result of their briefings. According to [redacted] this expression is used also by employees of private concerns supplying technical equipment used in the operation. [S] [X]

b3
b6

[redacted] is responsible only for administrative handling of the security of documents, is not familiar with their contents, although they are accessible to him and he furnished no information of value. [redacted] furnished no information pertinent to this investigation, except that he recalled that sometime in the Fall of 1961.

b3
b6

[redacted] and U. S. in the field of guided missiles so as to indicate to the Soviets the preponderance of strength on the part of this country. He did not recall who made the proposal but the entire military representation on USIB were opposed to it and no action was taken to his knowledge along these lines. [S] [X]

In addition to the above individuals, interviews were conducted with [redacted] USAF, Chief;

[redacted] USN, [redacted] both of [redacted] DIA. Both believed an expert on military affairs could have written the article of 7-26-62, [redacted] without access to or knowledge of "11/8/62" or its contents. [S] [X]

b3
b6

(U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted] USAF, [redacted] DIA, expressed the opinion that with two or three leading questions, BALDWIN could have obtained information for article without direct access to "11-8-62" or knowledge of its contents; but his question could only have been answered by someone who had read or had been briefed on information in "11-8-62." ~~(S)~~

b3
b6

per
DIA

[redacted] ^{U.S. NAVY} USN, [redacted] DIA, was of the opinion that the above article was based on information obtained from "11-8-62." [redacted]

b3
b6

[redacted] and [redacted] all agreed that the critical points in the article were those which referred to "hardening" of the Soviet installations and the number of Soviet missiles in existence. ~~(S)~~

[redacted] Security Officer; [redacted] Special Assistant, Executive Staff, Office of Security; and HOWARD STOERTZ, JR., member, Staff of Board of Nationality Estimates, all CIA, interviewed today and none furnished information of value. ~~(S)~~

b3

[redacted] secretary, Washington Office, "The New York Times," 2700 Wisconsin Avenue, N. W., interviewed by SAs [redacted] and ROBERT C. BYRNES at her residence from 6:45 p.m. to 7:20 p.m. this date. [redacted] stated that BALDWIN arrived in Washington, D. C., on Monday, July 16, and remained until the evening of Thursday, 7-19-62. The first information she had regarding his visit was on the Thursday preceding his arrival; at which time, [redacted]

[redacted] (Phonetic), called from New York requesting that she make appointments with nine individuals in Washington, D. C. She was to advise these individuals that the purpose of BALDWIN's contacts was with regard to current defense matters. BALDWIN stayed at the Jefferson Hotel, Washington, D. C., where he normally stays, during his current visit. She believed BALDWIN arrived in Washington sometime around Noon on 7-16-62. No appointments for him on that date were known to [redacted] She attempted either prior to the arrival of BALDWIN or following his arrival to arrange appointments with the following individuals: Mr. JOHN A. MC CONE, Director, CIA; Mr. ROBERT S. MC NAMARA, Secretary of Defense; Mr. (FNU) Anderson, Navy; and Mr. ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK, Deputy Secretary of Defense. She felt that possibly

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]
an appointment was made with General L. L. LEMNITZER, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. [] could not recall the identities of other individuals with whom she made appointments for BALDWIN. She recalled, however, that she had contacted the following persons in order to set up appointments: Lieutenant [] (Phonetic), Navy; Commander [] Navy; Lieutenant Colonel [] Army, or someone in [] office; Colonel GROGAN, CIA; [] office of ARTHUR SYLVESTER, Assistant Secretary of Defense, for the appointment with Mr. MC NAMARA. b6 b7C

Through past experience, [] stated that with the exception of CIA, generally all appointments for BALDWIN are made with individuals at the Pentagon. She stated that an appointment at the State Department would be an exception and could recall only one instance when an attempt was made for an appointment which was not during the most recent BALDWIN visit. This attempt was unsuccessful since the person, name unrecalled, was out of the country.

[] stated that BALDWIN had "a couple" of luncheon dates while visiting WDC; however, she did not know with whom he met nor the dates. She believed these engagements were set up by [] from New York. b6 b7C

She stated BALDWIN deals mainly with persons of Secretary stature but felt that he must have "back door" contacts. She stated his visits to WDC were at three- or four-month intervals and the pattern of appointments is the same for each visit. She has never made appointments for BALDWIN with press information officers at any Government agency. She stated that she had not seen the article in question at the time of publication but, from a cursory perusal, felt that he possibly could have gotten the data from a "back door" contact. She stated no one else in WDC, to her knowledge, makes appointments for BALDWIN other than herself. She pointed out that she did not have personal contact with BALDWIN on his most recent visit, however, she did converse with him several times by telephone.

[] was requested to furnish the identities of any contacts BALDWIN has in WDC below the Secretary and general officer level. She stated that she knew of none. When furnishing from memory the above appointments made by her, she related that she kept in her office an exact list of appointments made for BALDWIN on each visit. She stated she ~~can~~ make this list available to the FBI. Upon

b6
b7C

Would

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted]
further reflection, she felt that she should advise her superiors that she had been interviewed and that she had offered to make the material available. [redacted] was advised that there would be no objection to this. She observed that JACK RAYMOND has the Pentagon beat for "The New York Times" but that ordinarily he handles matters of a different nature than those handled by BALDWIN.

WFO will attempt to fully identify persons mentioned during [redacted] interview.

b6
b7C

WF 1384-S* advised on 7-30-62, that [redacted] at 7:25 p.m. contacted WALLACE CARROLL of "The New York Times," WDC. She advised she had just had a visit from two FBI men and it was very confidential. She informed CARROLL that she explained to the FBI men she was going to tell her boss about the visit. [redacted] explained the Agents were interested in the movements of HANSON BALDWIN, particularly the last time he was in WDC. She stated that "apparently the Attorney General took exception to one of his columns" and the FBI is trying to find out who gave BALDWIN the information for his column. She believed the article was dated 7-26-62, and was about missiles, etc.

She stated she told the FBI about some of BALDWIN's appointments made by her which were all with Secretaries "and that sort of thing." According to [redacted] the FBI is not interested in Secretaries but "what they want is the indians and not the chiefs." She related that the FBI desired she furnish them a list of appointments made by her for BALDWIN during his last visit and she stated she told the FBI she was going to call CARROLL about this.

b6
b7C

CARROLL stated that he was glad she informed him of the above and stated, "Let's sit on it tomorrow until I can go into it further and I might call BOBBIE KENNEDY." [redacted] stated she would do nothing until she saw CARROLL on 7-31-62. At this point, CARROLL stated, "Don't give them any more." [redacted] assured him she would not and stated she had the FBI Agents' names and number and had told the FBI men she would call them 7-31-62, and tell them whether she would give them further information or not. [redacted] hoped she had done nothing wrong and was assured by CARROLL that she had not.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
b3
b7E

CARROLL stated that generally newspaper practice is to tell them nothing concerning people who furnish information to newspapermen. [REDACTED] reiterated that the only names she has are the "top Secretaries of the Services, etc., Mr. MC NAMARA, etc." When CARROLL asked when she had been interviewed, [REDACTED] stated, "They have just left."

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 30 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

URGENT 7/30/62 P 3-30 PM BK
TO DIRECTOR, FBI -2- AND SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD
FROM SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN

ESP-X Espionage - X

REFERENCE NEW YORK TELETYPE

RENYTEL JULY TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTY TWO.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP3 BTJ/96

4/29/96 SP3 BTJ/96
9/16/96 SP3 BTJ/96

STAFF SERGEANT [REDACTED] UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
[REDACTED] ASSIGNED TO THE

OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES, US AIR FORCE, SIX SIX THREE FIFTH
AVE., NEW YORK, ADVISED SAS [REDACTED]

THIS DATE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION..

[REDACTED] WAS TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED ON THE MORNING OF JULY
TWENTYFOURTH OR JULY TWENTYFIFTH BY ONE [REDACTED]

ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] FOR HANSON W. BALDWIN,
MILITARY EDITOR, NEW YORK TIMES. [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT MISSILE

INQUIRIES ARE REFERRED TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED] OR
CAPTAIN [REDACTED] US AIR FORCE, ASSIGNED TO THIS OFFICE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WERE IN CONFERENCE AT THE TIME OF THIS INQUIRY FROM
[REDACTED] ANSWERED THE INQUIRY FROM [REDACTED]

QUOTED THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE FROM A PROPOSED ARTICLE AS FOLLOWS
[REDACTED]

END PAGE ONE

CC: Sullivan

REC-15

AUG 1 1962

55 AUG 8 1962
NO COPIES WFO

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

PAGE TWO

"IN THESE INSTALLATIONS THE MISSILES UNTIL READY FOR LAUNCHING LIE HORIZONTALLY IN A LARGE CONCRETE BOX FLUSH WITH, OR SLIGHTLY ABOVE", AND INQUIRED "IS THIS TRUE". [] REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AND THE CONVERSATION WAS THEN TERMINATED. [] DID NOT CONSIDER THIS QUESTION UNUSUAL SINCE HE WAS ANSWERING THIS QUESTION WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES AND WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT [] WAS REQUESTING INFORMATION RE AMERICAN MISSILE BASES. THE INFORMATION THAT [] IS AUTHORIZED TO DISSEMINATE TO COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA IS ALL UNCLASSIFIED AND THE FUNCTION OF HIS OFFICE IS TO ANSWER INQUIRIES OF THIS NATURE.

LT. COLONEL [] AND CAPT. [] US AIR FORCE OFFICERS, WERE ALSO INTERVIEWED THIS DATE CONCERNING THIS MATTER. THEY ADVISED THAT THEY ARE WELL ACQUAINTED WITH [] WHO FREQUENTLY CONTACTS THEM IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLES CONCERNING MILITARY MATTERS. [] IS WELL REGARDED AS A PATRIOTIC CITIZEN BY THESE OFFICERS. COL. [] HAD ALREADY CLIPPED THE BALDWIN ARTICLE APPEARING IN THE NEW YORK TIMES ON JULY TWENTYSIX, SIXTYTWO, AND STATED THAT HIS OFFICE WONDERED WHERE THIS INFORMATION HAD

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

COME FROM. AT NO TIME DURING THE TELEPHONIC CONTACT OF [] BY [] WAS ANY MENTION MADE THAT THE "PROPOSED ARTICLE" HAD TO DO WITH SOVIET MISSILES. IT IS NOTED THAT THE PHRASE [] READ TO [] APPEARS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE ARTICLE IN QUESTION.

IT IS NOTED THAT COL. [] STATED THAT HE HAD INTENDED TO QUESTION [] ABOUT THIS ARTICLE AND HAD LEARNED THAT [] IS PRESENTLY ON VACATION AND IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THE NEW YORK TIMES AT THE END OF JULY.

SERGEANT [] HAS BEEN IN THE US AIR FORCE SINCE NINETEEN FIFTYTWO ASSIGNED TO PUBLIC INFORMATION DUTIES THROUGHOUT HIS MILITARY CAREER AND HAS BEEN ON HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR. NYO INDICES ON [] NEGATIVE.

END AND ACK

NY R 2 WA MSL

b6
b7C

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date July 30, 1962

With regard to leak case involving subject, one of most significant items in the 7/26/62 article was the relationship between missiles and "concrete box." Attached reveals [] was queried re this item by researcher for Baldwin. While significant, it still does not tie down where Baldwin or the researcher got the original data. Consideration will be given to interviewing [] the researcher, at proper stage in this investigation.

Attorney General being advised.

JFW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDDATE 3-15-89 BY SP3 BTJ/cun

4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/cun

9/17/96 SP3 BTJ/cun

F B I

Date: 8/1/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED] (P)

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

Enclosed for the Bureau is a memo furnished WFO
by Lieutenant General WILLIAM W. QUINN, DIA, on 7/31/62.
Copies of this memo have been prepared for use by WFO and
all individuals named in the memos are being interviewed by
WFO.

3 - Bureau (Enc.
1 - WFO

RCB:mdc
(4)

ENCLOSURE

b6
b7C

REC-20

AIRTEL

AUG 2 1962

b3
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-15-89 BY SP-8/BJC

8/30/96 SP-3 BJB/BJC
11/17/91 SP-3 BJB/BJC

[REDACTED]

EX-10

Approved: 31 153
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

67 AUG 7 1962

of HB. He is reported to have talked to HB during his recent visit to Washington. is now on TDY, or on leave. b6 per NGB

As a result of the above information, which he received from General Mock, the Chief of Staff does not believe that the Army is responsible for this compromise.



WILLIAM W. QUINN
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

31 July 1962

At 6:00 p.m., 30 July, General Underwood, Deputy Chief of Information, Department of Army, and Major General Mock, Secretary of the General Staff, DA, called to give me a report on the Hanson Baldwin case.

The major items they covered were as follows:

On 16 July, Hanson Baldwin called General Dodge. He stated, "I am in the Navy Department, and I would like to talk to you about a few matters." General Dodge agreed to see Hanson Baldwin at 4:30 p.m. At that meeting HB desired to have any information available on the Nike ZEUS Program, there was some discussion about a Cavalry tape recording, and he asked General Dodge to intercede for him in getting an interview with Secretary Vance. No mention was made of the items appearing in HB's column on 26 July.

On 19 July at 3:00 p.m., HB interviewed General Hamlett, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. He made his appointment directly with General Hamlett, and did not go through OCINFO, DA. He was interested in finding out from General Hamlett about his reaction to the Taylor appointment, the situation in South Vietnam, and the Nike ZEUS Program. General Hamlett indicated to the Secretary of the General Staff that he had not discussed the matters in HB's 26 July article.

General Mock reports a complete negative on the remainder of the Army staff and technical services, as it relates to their contact with Hanson Baldwin during the period 16 - 26 July (less those on leave or out of the city).

Hanson Baldwin visited Dr. Konn and Dr. Zienke of the Office of Military History, Department of the Army, from 9:30 to 11:50 on 18 July. The subject of this conversation was a book regarding Russian campaigns that HB is writing. He was seeking some unclassified historical background, particularly on the Battle of Stalingrad. Subsequent to this meeting Dr. Konn (or Dr. Zienke) accompanied HB to the Army Library, located in the Pentagon; to look up a particular reference. While in the library, HB talked to several officers--their identity unknown to the Doctor who accompanied him.

[REDACTED] assigned to the National Guard Bureau, located in the Department of Army area, and a subordinate of Major General McGowan, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, is an old friend and contact

b6 per NGB

Received from General Quinn 7/31/62. DHR x CEE

28388 x 74028

1. The following information was received from [redacted]
Office Chief National Guard Bureau, reference information previously
submitted.

b6 per NGB

RE: [redacted] (File [redacted])

"The subjects discussed were the fact that upon the demobilization or the return to inactive status of the Air Guard units that some of the units were to lose several of their airplanes. In the instance of the F-84 they might go down to 6 or 7 airplanes per squadron. In the instance of the F-104, what is to happen to them is under discussion but no decision has been made. This is about all they discussed. Everything else that was in the article by Mr. Baldwin in the Sunday New York Times is a matter of record in the Congressional Record and in testimony given to various committees by the Assistant Chief of the NGB for Air National Guard. There was no one present during the discussion between Mr. Baldwin and [redacted]

[redacted]"

b6 per NGB

2. ODCSOPS has determined from Dr. Konn, Office Chief of Military History, that the following civilian historians talked to Mr. Baldwin during the period indicated. To Dr. Konn's knowledge Mr. Baldwin did not talk to any officers, only to civilians:

- Mr. Romanus
- Mrs. McCutcheon
- Mr. McDonald
- Mr. Bluemenson
- Mr. Falk

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 09-09-2015 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 06-03-2010 BY [redacted]~~

F B I

Date: 7/31/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Malone	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted] (P)

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

On 7/31/62, Mr. BROMLEY SMITH, Executive Secretary, NSC, furnished information concerning copies of the 11-8-62 document which were furnished to the office of MC GEORGE BUNDY, Special Assistant to the President. SMITH is responsible for the inventory of these copies. His records reflect that Copy #2 of the above document which was delivered on 7/16/62 was furnished to Dr. JEROME B. WIESNER, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. This copy was returned to Mr. SMITH on 7/27/62. As the Bureau is aware, WIESNER has been in contact with press representatives in the past and in particular with [redacted] reporter for "Newsweek" magazine. [redacted] was interviewed regarding a leak of classified information during the summer of 1961. In view of the fact that BALDWIN was in Washington, D. C., during the period that WIESNER had the pertinent document in his possession, WFO will proceed with interview of WIESNER, UACB.

3 - Bureau
1 - WFO

RCB:mdc
(4)

REC-100

AUG 2 1962

AIRTEL

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-25-89 BY SP-5 BJS/CLM
1/30/96 SP-3 BJS/CLM
9/17/96 SP-3 BJS/CLM

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: July 28, 1962

FROM : Mr. D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: HANSON W. BALDWIN
ESPIONAGE - X2 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. DeLoach1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Putnam
1 - Mr. Wacks

Tolson	✓
Belmont	✓
Mohr	
Callahan	
Conrad	
DeLoach	
Evans	
Malone	
Rosen	
Sullivan	
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Holmes	
Gandy	

We are looking into the leak in an article under subject's by-line which appeared in "The New York Times" of 7-26-62.

With respect to Inspector Moore's request of General Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), for the identities of individuals at the Pentagon with whom subject has been in contact, [redacted] of General Carroll's office was contacted by Liaison Agent Putnam at 6:50 p.m. and 7:40 p.m., 7-27-62. [redacted] said the only Pentagon contact by Baldwin that General Carroll's office has come up with is that of Secretary of Defense McNamara. This contact was made by Baldwin at 5:30 p.m., 7-19-62.

[redacted] explained that General Carroll's office has contacted the logical Army, Navy and Air Force press representatives within the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs as well as representatives of the Army and Navy Offices of Information. These offices have absolutely no idea of any recent contacts made by Baldwin. [redacted] said there will be no one available in the Air Force Office of Information until Monday, 7-30-62. He will advise us Monday of the results of the contact. He said he holds little hope for any additional names from Air Force.

[redacted] pointed out the observation of General Carroll that Baldwin is a "high statured" individual who is not famous for following the established procedure of going through the public information offices. He has been around the Pentagon for a long time and his Pentagon contacts are usually high-level ones. He speaks to the "Chiefs" and not the "Indians."

[redacted] confidentially mentioned that he understands that Pat Coyne who is scheduled to leave town Monday, 7-30-62, may have to cancel his trip to meet on this matter with the "Big Boy" (implying the President) Wednesday, 8-1-62. He asked that this latter information not be made a matter of record and explained he was merely mentioning this to indicate the importance that is being attached to this matter. He pointed out it is his responsibility to make arrangements for Coyne's trip out of town and consequently he has become aware of Coyne's meeting.

RDP:peb
(9)


25 AUG 2 1962

b6
b7C

I understand

did go on trip

Watts



840
586

72

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8/BJL/CAK

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
Re: HANSON W. BALDWIN

[redacted] added that DIA is currently compiling, insofar as records permit, the names of all people who had access to the classified material. DIA will also analyze the classified material and compare it with the information which appeared in Baldwin's article.

b3
b6

The foregoing information was furnished to Supervisor Jack Wacks at 8:00 p.m., 7-27-62.

ACTION:

Liaison will follow with [redacted] for the results of [redacted]

b3
b6

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

F B I

Date: July 30, 1962

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plain text or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR AND SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, JULY TWENTYSIX, NINETEEN SIXTYTWO, ESP DASH X.

ON SEVEN THIRTY SIXTYTWO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HOTEL JEFFERSON, TWELVE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH

STREET, N.W., ADVISED THAT HOTEL RECORDS REFLECT HANSON W.

BALDWIN REGISTERED THAT HOTEL TWO ZERO TWO PM SEVEN SIXTEEN

SIXTYTWO AND CHECKED OUT NINE ZERO SEVEN AM SEVEN NINETEEN

SIXTYTWO. RECORDS REFLECT BALDWIN MADE FIVE LONG DISTANCE

TELEPHONE CALLS AS FOLLOWS: SEVEN SEVENTEEN: CHAPPAQUA,

NY CE EIGHT THREE SEVEN EIGHT ONE, NY CITY CI FIVE NINE

THREE EIGHT EIGHT, NY CITY TE EIGHT TWO SEVEN ONE ZERO,

CHAPPAQUA NY CE EIGHT THREE FOUR EIGHT ONE. SEVEN EIGHTEEN:

NY CITY CI FIVE NINE THREE EIGHT EIGHT. IT IS NOTED THAT

THE CHAPPAQUA NUMBERS ARE IDENTICAL EXCEPT FOR ONE DIGIT.

2 - Bureau
2 - Teletype Unit
2 - WFO
HDP/pcn
(6)

REC- 35

EX-103

Approved: M. W. Johnson
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

57 AUG 3 1962

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b3
b7E


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-88 BY SP8 JY/BJA
4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/len

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)



PAGE TWO

b3
b7E

IT IS POSSIBLE AN ERROR WAS MADE BY THE HOTEL OPERATOR IN
RECORDING ONE OF THE NUMBERS. [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT
BALDWIN MADE FOURTEEN LOCAL CALLS, ALTHOUGH NO RECORD IS
MAINTAINED OF LOCAL CALLS.

b6
b7C

NEW YORK WILL IDENTIFY SUBSCRIBERS.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE


Date 8-7-62

Attached contains results of interviews of several Defense Department and CIA officials in Baldwin leak case.

Summary of attached being prepared for Attorney General.

GOR:dao

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8 Ljy/Feb

 1/20/96

SP3 BJS/cmr

b6
b7C

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 06-03-2010

~~SECRET~~

FBI

b6
b7C

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-26-2017 BY: [REDACTED]

Date: 7/31/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

SECRET
SIF
CLASS
ACTION

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Callahan ✓
Mr. Conrad ✓
Mr. DeLoach ✓
Mr. Evans ✓
Mr. Malone ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel ✓
Mr. Trotter ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Miss Holmes ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED] (P)

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

The following interviews were conducted on this date
by WFO:

Dr. OTTO GUTHE, Assistant Director, Office of
Research and Reports, CIA, advised that he was acquainted
with BALDWIN having met him in 1949. He has had no
association with him since that time. GUTHE stated he
is also acquainted with HARRY SCHWARTZ of "The New York
Times" and has corresponded with him with respect to
unclassified reports furnished to him by CIA. GUTHE had
no information regarding instant leak.

Lieutenant General WILLIAM P. ENNIS, U. S. Army,
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG), advised
that on 7/20/62, BALDWIN appeared at his office seeking
information concerning an unclassified directive captioned
"WSEG Operations," which was dated 7/11/62. BALDWIN informed

- 3 - Bureau
- 1 - New York (Info) (RM) (PERSONAL ATTENTION)
- 1 - WFO

RCB:mdc
(5)

b3
b7E

EX-108

REC-26

AIRTEL

10 AUG 2 1962

b6
b7C

57 AUG 8 1962

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

~~SECRET~~

M

Per _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-15-89 multiple copies
Classified by SP4 GAB
Declassify on: OADR

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTI/Ken
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1.6
5/9/96 19/1/196 SP3 BTI/Ken

C. C. Wick
C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

ENNIS he was aware of the contents of this directive but desired to see a copy of it. BALDWIN informed him that he always "protects his sources of information." ENNIS refused to allow BALDWIN to see the directive and would not discuss it with him in detail. BALDWIN's article published in "The New York Times" dated 7/28/62, captioned "Pentagon Edict Upsets Military," is apparently based on the above-mentioned directive. ENNIS never met BALDWIN prior to the above incident. ENNIS suggested that BALDWIN being a Naval Academy graduate probably still had classmates in service who might be possible sources of information.

SHERMAN KENT, Assistant Director for National Estimates, CIA, advised BALDWIN acquainted with Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT, described as number three man in U. S. Navy, member Board of National Estimates and Chairman, Naval Academy Alumni Association. WRIGHT described by KENT as security conscious, close mouthed and professional officer. KENT also advised BALDWIN well acquainted with ROBERT AMORY, JR. of Budget Bureau, formerly Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA. Described AMORY as careless director and menace to security. Recalled that AMORY kept advance copy of NIE for three days and returned it after the chief, presumably JOHN MC CONE, called him. KENT advised there was possibility last paragraph of BALDWIN's news article of 7/26/62, stating this country must demonstrate a greater sense of urgency in the antiballistics missile and antisatellite fields, may have come from one of two documents prepared about 7/17/62 and 7/20/62, in Joint Strategic Council of Joint Chiefs of Staff. Comparison of the material suggests some possibility this was source of single small item in BALDWIN's article. ~~SECRET~~

b6 per NGB

[redacted] Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau, advised that in civilian life he is a military writer for the "Ledger Star," Norfolk, Virginia. He has been reactivated in the National Guard in his present position since October, 1961. [redacted] has known HANSON BALDWIN for the past ten years on a professional and social basis. He and BALDWIN had dinner in Washington, D. C., on the evening of 7/19/62. During this engagement, they discussed the recent boast of NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV concerning Soviet antimissile missiles which BALDWIN believed was not a cause of concern to informed military people

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted] who knew this boast to be unfounded. There was no discussion during the evening relative to information published by BALDWIN in his article of 7/26/62, and [redacted] had no information as to BALDWIN's sources for this article. When [redacted] and [redacted] met BALDWIN for dinner on the evening of 7/19/62, BALDWIN was having a cocktail with an individual believed to be Major General DAVID A. BURCHINAL, Director of Plans, USAF. BURCHINAL had wanted BALDWIN to spend the evening with him, but BALDWIN had declined in view of his dinner appointment with [redacted] and [redacted]. BALDWIN mentioned during the evening that he had appointments for the following day to see Secretary of Defense MC NAMARA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General LEMNITZER. The only other individual who may have been contacted by BALDWIN during the week of their dinner engagement is [redacted] b6 per NGB [redacted] mentioned above. BALDWIN had mentioned to [redacted] when they made their dinner appointment on 7/18/62, that he expected to see [redacted] during that evening, explaining that [redacted] and had a matter to discuss in that connection. BALDWIN did not mention subsequently whether or not he had seen [redacted] [redacted] also admitted having discussed to some length with BALDWIN while they were having dinner information directly related to the return of Air National Guard units from Europe which was the subject of BALDWIN's article published 7/29/62. However, [redacted] stated that none of this information was classified as it had appeared previously in the Congressional Record and had been the subject of considerable testimony before Congressional committees. This evaluation of the material was verified by Major General D. W. MC GOWAN, Chief, National Guard Bureau.

Inspector General, Lieutenant General W. H. BLANCHARD, USAF, was interviewed as suggested by Secretary MC NAMARA in conference with Inspector MOORE. General BLANCHARD furnished no information pertinent to investigation.

(U) [The following individuals at National Security Agency (NSA) were interviewed this date without developing any pertinent information: [redacted] 62-05]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E



b3 P.L.86-36



Special Projects Officer; LEONARD P. BIENVENU, Director of Security; *also* Brigadier General JACK E. THOMAS, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USAF; EDWARD W. PROCTOR, Division Chief, Office of Research and Reports, CIA; BROMLEY SMITH, Executive Secretary, NSC. Mr. SMITH furnished lists of those in attendance at NSC meetings on 7/9 and 10/62, as well as information regarding circulation of copies of the 11-8-62 document among personnel of the White House staff. ~~SECRET~~ (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 8-1-62

Attached contains results of interviews of several Defense Department and CIA officials in Baldwin leak case.

Summary of attached being prepared for Attorney General.

BCR:dac

done 8-1

D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *3-15-89* BY *SP3 BTJ/cin*



4/20/96 SP3 BTJ/cin
9/17/96 SP3 BTJ/gel

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 7/30/62

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Belmont

1 - Evans

1 - Sullivan 1 - D.E. Moore

1 - Wannall 1 - Wacks

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES" JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - XTolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____b6
b7C

[REDACTED] of the Washington, D. C. office of "The New York Times" ("NYT") should not be interviewed in this case.

In connection with our investigation of the leak in the captioned article, we are endeavoring to ascertain Baldwin's contacts in U.S. Government circles to determine if any such contacts could be the source for the classified data in his article of 7/26/62. We have been told that [REDACTED] at the local office of "NYT" makes appointments for Baldwin at his request. We plan to interview her tonight.

b6
b7C

Colonel Stanley Grogan, who handles press matters at Central Intelligence Agency, advised on 7/27/62 that [REDACTED] whom he described as a long-time and current employee of the Washington Bureau of "NYT" for a long time handled appointments for "NYT" reporters from New York City. Bufiles contain no derogatory data on [REDACTED] however, she has contacted the Bureau on various occasions during the past several years in connection with her newspaper work. The "Congressional Directory" indicates that [REDACTED] represents "NYT" and as such is entitled to admission to the Senate and House press galleries. As such she would be a bona fide correspondent of "NYT."

b6
b7CRECOMMENDATION:

We have considered interviewing [REDACTED] to endeavor to ascertain the identities of Baldwin's contacts in Washington.

JFW:br
(7)

EX 100

REC-41

10 AUG 2 1962

b3
b7E

56 AUG 7 1962

5-10

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-16-83 BY SP8 BTJ/MLM
11/19/96 243 B27/MLM

MOORE

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

RE: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN

"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962

In view of the fact that she is a correspondent, her chances of cooperating are remote. In addition, it is not believed we should in this case interview fellow reporters of Baldwin's. b6
If you agree, will not be interviewed in this case. b7C

JS

Wes
[Signature]

HEMS

[Signature]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 2 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

b3
b7E

URGENT 8-2-62 2/// 12-20 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI [REDACTED] AND SAC [REDACTED]

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED] /1/

SUBJECT HANSON W. BALDWIN, ESP-X

NY 3698-S ASTERISK ADVISED SUBJECT/S WIFE PLANNED TO MEET
SUBJECT AT BILTMORE HOTEL, NYC IN EVENING OF AUGUST ONE WHERE
THEY WOULD SPEND NIGHT.

b3
b7E

INFORMANT FURNISHED NO OTHER PERTINENT INFO RE SUBJECT.

END AND ACK

NY R 1 WA JS

9 AUG 2 1962

b6
b7C

TWO COPIES WFO

04 AUG 10 1962
F116

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8BJ/101
4/30/96 SP3BJ/101

F B I

Date: 8/1/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL RM
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]
 SUBJECT : HANSON W. BALDWIN
 ESP-X

b3
b7E

Re WFO tel 7/30/62.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8 BTJ/STB
 4/30/96 SP8 BTJ/STB

New York telephone number [REDACTED] CI 5-9388, a non-published
 number, is a semi-coin box telephone at the Roosevelt Hospital,
 9th Avenue and 59th Street, New York, NY.

b6
b7CTE 8-2710 is listed to the offices of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

It is noted that [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] is hospitalized with a broken pelvis and according to
 NY 3698-S* appears to have been hospitalized for several weeks.

b6
b7C

CE 8-3781 is the subject's home phone number at
 Chappaqua, New York.

CE 8-3481 is also at Chappaqua, New York, and is
 listed to [REDACTED]

NY 3698-S* has reported no contact with this number.

No further investigation contemplated with respect
 to above numbers.

For info.

REC- 26

301-X3

- 3 - Bureau [REDACTED] (RM)
 1 - Washington Field [REDACTED] (Info) (RM)
 1 - New York [REDACTED]

5 AUG 2 1962

b3
b7E

WDD:HC (33)
 (7)

Approved: _____
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 30 1962
TELETYPE

URGENT 7-30-62 10-6XX 10-06 PM JAA
TO DIRECTOR, FBI -9- AND SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD

WFO VIA WASHINGTON

FROM SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN, ^{ESPIONAGE} ~~ESP~~
REFERENCE NEW YORK TELEPHONE
RENYTELE CALL TO BUREAU JULY THIRTY INSTANT.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP3BTS/92

4/30/96 SP3BTS/92

SUBJECT APPROACHED AT HIS RESIDENCE SIX FIFTY EIGHT PM JULY THIRTY INSTANT FOR INTERVIEW. IMMEDIATELY AFTER AGENTS IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AND PRIOR TO THEIR HAVING OPPORTUNITY TO STATE PURPOSE OF THE INTERVIEW BALDWIN INTERJECTED THAT HE COULD NOT TALK TO AGENTS AT THIS TIME. BALDWIN SAID HE HAD JUST ARRIVED HOME AND WAS PREPARING TO HAVE HIS DINNER. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE HAD THE AGENTS MAKE AN APPOINTMENT WITH HIM AT HIS OFFICE. BALDWIN THEN SAID IF THE AGENTS WANTED TO INTERVIEW HIM THEY COULD SEE HIM AT HIS OFFICE AT TEN THIRTY AM JULY THIRTY ONE NEXT. WHEN AGENTS ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN THAT THEY WANTED TO TALK TO HIM FOR ONLY A FEW MINUTES AND WOULD GLADLY WAIT UNTIL HE FINISHED HIS DINNER BALDWIN REFUSED TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION. FOR INFO OF BUREAU, INTERVIEWING AGENTS OBSERVED THAT BALDWIN APPEARED SHAKEN AND UPSET. HE DID NOT EVEN PERMIT OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN PURPOSE OF INTERVIEW. IN VIEW OF HIS ATTITUDE BALDWIN WILL NOT BE INTERVIEWED AT HIS OFFICE JULY THIRTY ONE NEXT AS REQUESTED, UACB.

CC: Sullivan

REC-23

25 AUG 2 1962

END
NY R-9 WA RAC
TWO COPIES WFO

Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau

b3
b7E

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☐
 Callahan ☐
 Conrad ☐
 DeLoach ☐
 Evans ☐
 Malone ☐
 Rosen ☒
 Sullivan ☒
 Tavel ☐
 Trotter ☐
 Tele. Room ☐
 Holmes ☐
 Gandy ☐

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: July 30, 1962

FROM : MR. W. A. BRANIGAN

cc Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Sullivan
 Mr. D. E. Moore
 Mr. Wannall
 Mr. Wacks

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
 IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
 7-26-62
 ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-15-89 BY SP3 BTJ/cum
 4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/cum

ASAC Schmit of the New York Office called during the morning of July 30th. Through our confidential coverage of Baldwin, it was ascertained that late during the evening of July 29, 1962 [redacted] invited [redacted] and [redacted] (phonetic) to dinner at the Baldwin residence on July 30th. [redacted] indicated that Hanson would be home tonight for dinner about 7:00 PM.

b6
 b7C

ACTION:

None. This is submitted for information. Present plans call for the interview of Baldwin at his residence during the early evening hours of July 30th.

WAB:td (6)

JP

Wes.

C

b3
 b7E

REC-21

AUG 2 1962

EX-108

55 AUG 8 1962


3-1-1000

Date of Mail 7-30-62.

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-88 BY SP8 BTJ/cat




1/20/96 SP3 BTJ/cm
1/17/96 SP3 BTJ/94

b6
b7C

Subject JUNE MAIL Hansen W. Baldwin *BT 13*

Removed By 65 AUG 8 1962

File Number



b3
b7E

Date of Mail 7-30-62.

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8 BTJ/fab



4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/clm b6
9/17/96 SP3 BTJ/gel b7C

Subject

JUNE MAIL

New York Times 3/13/62

85 AUG 8 1962

Removed By

File Number



b3
b7E

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : LTGEN Quinn

DATE: 31 July 1962

FROM : RADM Lowrance

SUBJECT: Conversations with Hanson Baldwin

1. The below named officers have been determined to have had conversations with Hanson Baldwin at the time and dates indicated:

Admiral Anderson, CMC, 1430, 19 July

Admiral Ricketts, VCNO, 1530, 16 July

VADM Smedberg, DCNO(Personnel), 1230, 18 July

(Lunch with subject and Admiral Jerauld Wright at
Carlton Hotel. Entire conversation concerned
changes at Naval Academy.)

VADM Firie, DCNO(Air), 1050, 19 July

VADM Raborn, DCNO(Development), 1630, 18 July

V. L. Lowrance
V. L. Lowrance

Copy to:
Op-09

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *9/11/96* BY *SP3 BDP/bk*

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

ENCLOSURE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan

The Attorney General

July 31, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Wannall
1 - D.E. Moore
1 - Wacks

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

CLASSIFIED BY SP8ay/cab
ON 3-15-89

Reference is made to my letter dated July 30, 1962, in this matter.

JUL 31 11 35 AM '62
FBI
REC'D-READING ROOM

On July 30, 1962, [redacted]
Washington, D. C. Office of "The New York Times," was
interviewed at her residence, [redacted]
Washington, D. C., from 6:45 p.m. to 7:20 p.m. [redacted]
stated that Hanson W. Baldwin arrived in Washington, D. C.,
on Monday, July 16, and remained until the evening of July 19.
She stated that on the Thursday preceding his arrival, [redacted]
[redacted] called her from New York requesting
that she make appointments with nine individuals in
Washington, D. C. She was instructed by [redacted] to advise
these persons that Baldwin desired to talk to them with
respect to current defense matters. [redacted] stated that
she attempted either prior to the arrival of Baldwin in
Washington, D. C., on July 16, 1962, or following his arrival
to arrange appointments with the Honorable John A. McCone,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency; the Honorable Robert S.
McNamara, The Secretary of Defense; a Mr. Anderson of the
Department of the Navy; and Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy
Secretary of Defense. [redacted] also felt that possibly an
appointment was made with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b6
b7C

[redacted] also furnished the identities of the
individuals in the Department of Defense and the Central
Intelligence Agency whom she had contacted to arrange
appointments. We plan to interview the individuals mentioned
by [redacted]

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

JFW:br (9)

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

7-31-62

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

The Attorney General

[] stated that Baldwin deals mainly with persons of the "Secretary" level, but she did feel that he must have "backdoor" contacts. She advised that she has never made appointments for Baldwin with any press information officers at any United States Government agency and that to her knowledge no one else in Washington makes appointments for Baldwin other than herself.

[] stated she knew of no contacts Baldwin has had in Washington below the Secretary and General level and that she was furnishing from memory the appointments of Baldwin's mentioned above. She related that she kept in her office the exact list of appointments made for Baldwin on each visit and that she would make this list available to the FBI. She also advised that she intended to inform her superiors that she had been interviewed and that she had offered to make the material available.

Our coverage of [] indicated that immediately following the interview she contacted Wallace Carroll of the Washington Office of "The New York Times" to advise that she had had a visit from two FBI men. She advised Carroll that the FBI was trying to find out who gave Baldwin the information for his column and that "apparently the Attorney General took exception to one of his columns." She also told Carroll that she had informed the FBI about some of Baldwin's appointments made by her. Carroll told [] "Don't give them any more." Carroll also advised [] to do no more until July 31, 1962, and he indicated that he might call you.

On July 30, 1962, at 6:58 p.m., we attempted to interview Baldwin at his residence in Chappaqua, New York. Immediately after the FBI Agents identified themselves and prior to their having the opportunity to state the purpose of the interview, Baldwin stated that he could not talk to them at that time since he had just arrived home and was preparing to eat his dinner. Baldwin stated that he would

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

have preferred to have had the Agents make an appointment with him at his office and he pointed out that if the Agents wanted to interview him they could see him at his office at 10:30 a.m., July 31. When the Agents attempted to explain that they wanted to talk to him for only a few minutes and would gladly wait until he finished his dinner, Baldwin refused to continue the discussion. In view of his resentment and arrogance, we think it best not to follow up and attempt to interview him, particularly as we anticipate his office will be "bugged." If he calls our New York Office, we will advise him we offered the courtesy of an interview and if he desires to be interviewed, we suggest he come to our New York Office.

You will be furnished additional developments in this case.

NOTE: Classified ~~Secret~~ to protect the sensitive nature of the source which furnished us the results of the [] - Carroll discussion.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 2, 1962

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*
CR-816

SUBJECT:

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - XALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-15-89 BY SP8/LT

4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/gh

9/17/96 SP3 BTJ/gh

Tolson _____
Belmont ☒
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen ☒
Sullivan ☒
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

b6

b7C

Yesterday, at a meeting of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), I referred to the above-captioned leak case. I pointed out that those members of the Board not yet interviewed by our Agents, would be, during the course of our investigation. However, I added that if any of those present had any information which they wished to pass on immediately, they could see me after the meeting and I would be glad to discuss the matter with them. I told them in connection with discussing the matter with me that they should keep in mind three questions: (1) did they talk with Baldwin and if so, what was said?; (2) did they know other persons who talked with Baldwin?; and (3) what additional information or suggestions did they have to offer relative to a solution of this case? Following the meeting, none approached me to volunteer any information.

Those present at this Executive Session of the meeting are as follows: Mr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency; Mr. Roger Hilsman, State Department; Lieutenant General William Quinn, Defense Intelligence Agency; [redacted] Army; Rear Admiral V. L. Lowrance, Navy; Brigadier General Jack E. Thomas, Air Force; Dr. Louis Tordella, National Security Agency; Major General Richard Collins, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr. Charles Reichardt, Atomic Energy Commission, and General Carter, presiding.

b6

per
ArmyRECOMMENDATION:

For your information.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. J. A. Sizoo

WCS:baw
(5)

REC-44

9 AUG 6 1962

b3

b7E

EX 113


56 AUG 9 1962

Date of Mail 7-31-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-15-89 BY SP3 BTJ/cem




4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/cem
9/17/96 SP3 BTJ/gel

b6
b7C

Subject JUNE MAIL Hanson W. Baldwin

Removed By _____

File Number



b3
b7E

F-146

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DECODED COPY

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

☐ Radio

☒ Teletype

URGENT

8-6-62

2:02 AM

PH

TO DIRECTOR 1

FROM SAC, NEW YORK

060519

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN "NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962, ESPIONAGE-X. FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU, ON AUGUST 5, 1962, NEW YORK 3698-S* REPORTED NO PERTINENT ACTIVITY CONCERNING SUBJECT, OTHER THAN HE AND HIS WIFE HAVE BEEN AT HOME.

RECEIVED:

2:06 AM

RN

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-15-82 BY SP8 BTJ/bat

SP5 BTJ/cum

4/30/96

9/11/96 SP5 BTJ/bat

REC- 26

11 AUG 7 1962

b3
b7E

DECODED COPY

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan ☒ _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

☐ Radio

☒ Teletype

URGENT 8-4-62

1:06 PM TMP

TO DIRECTOR 2

FROM SAC NEW YORK 041645

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN "NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962, ESPIONAGE-X. FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU, ON AUGUST 4, 1962, NEW YORK 3698-S REPORTED NO PERTINENT ACTIVITY CONCERNING SUBJECT, OTHER THAN HE AND HIS WIFE HAVE BEEN AT HOME.

b6
 b7C

RECEIVED:

1:09 PM CTF

REC- 37

b3
 b7E

17 AUG 1962

5- wj

FIYO 227
 AUG 1962

F B I

Date: 7/31/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI []

FROM: SAC, WFO [] (P)

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

On 7/31/62, BROMLEY SMITH, Executive Secretary, National Security Council (NSC), was contacted by SA ROBERT C. BYRNES to obtain information regarding distribution of the copies of the 11-8-62 document received by Mr. BUNDY, Special Assistant to the President. It is noted that the distribution list furnished by CIA reflected that Copies 1, 2 and 3 were furnished to the office of Mr. BUNDY. Mr. SMITH stated with respect to the above copies which were distributed on 7/6/62, that Copy #3 of this document was furnished to Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY on an unknown date. Mr. SMITH advised that the Attorney General was not on the normal distribution list for this document but that at the special request of the Attorney General, he had forwarded a copy of this document by special courier. SMITH stated that on at least two occasions he has requested return of this document, but that according to his records, Copy #3 of this document continues to be charged out to the Attorney General. Additional information regarding the distribution of pertinent documents received by the office of Mr. BUNDY or NSC will be reported under separate cover. However, the Bureau may be interested in the above information.

b6
b7C

3 - Bureau
1 - WFO

RCB:mdc
(4)

CC: Sullivan

REC-37

1-THORNS FAX - EVANS
1- " WANNALL
AIRTEL

AUG 8 1962

b3
b7E

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent: _____ M Per: _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-15-83 BY SP-8 PJS/bat
3/10/96 SP-3 BTJ/CLM
9/17/96 SP-3 BTJ/CLM

Memo to Sullivan
10/16/62 PAF:MAW

DATE 06-03-2010

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~~~EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN~~~~OTHERWISE~~

b6

b7C

3-16-89

Classified by SP8 *gaf*

Declassify on: OADR

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date July 31, 1962

Attached indicates Attorney General received copy of [NIE 11-8-62] when first distributed ~~(S)~~ 7-6 and although return of document has been requested, record indicates it is still charged to him.

Recommend Assistant Director Evans determine if Attorney General still has document and whether anyone else has had access to it.

FOI/PA # 288,611

APPEAL # _____

CIVIL ACT. # _____

E.O. # 12356DATE 3-16-89 INITIALS *gaf*

JFW

RS

010150010

~~SECRET~~CLASSIFIED BY SP3 *BJK*DECLASSIFY ON: *100-100*5/15/96/19/11/46 SP3 *BJK*

Document downgraded to Secret per

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-26-2017 BY: [REDACTED]

b3-10 USC 424, b6 per DIA

b6
b7C

The Attorney General

July 31, 1962

Director, FBI

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Evans
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - D.E. Moore
- 1 - Wannall
- 1 - Wacks

ARTICLE BY HANSON E. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES,"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Document declassified
to [REDACTED] per 60324 uc BAO/KCS
on 4/5/2010

b6
b7C
FBI
AUG 1 6 07 PM '62
RECORD-READING ROOM

In connection with this matter a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council was called on July 30, 1962, by Honorable Robert S. McNamara, The Secretary of Defense. Mr. McNamara advised of our investigation being conducted at his request to attempt to determine the source of Baldwin's information in the July 26, 1962, article. A representative of this Bureau requested those present to determine within their own departments who had been in contact with Baldwin on his visit to Washington, D. C., during the week of July 16. In addition, our representative requested something more than mere acquiescence and cooperation in what we are doing and asked for any positive action which they could take or suggest in order to make inquiry productive.

On July 30, 1962, interviews were conducted at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) with [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] U. S. Air Force, DIA representative to the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-62 Drafting Committee, and with First Lieutenant [REDACTED] U. S. Air Force, Intelligence (Security) Officer, Special Activities Office, DIA.

per DIA
b3
b6

[REDACTED] could furnish no information as to Baldwin's source or as to other facts pertinent to this investigation. He did express the opinion that information on which Baldwin based his article of July 26 possibly came from NIE 11-8-62 but, more likely from briefings covering material later included in the NIE. According to [REDACTED] these briefings which began as early as July 1, 1962, were in three series, as new information was developed, and each series consisted of from ten to twenty groups with each group being comprised of from two to twenty persons. [REDACTED] pointed out that all of [REDACTED]

b3
b6

RECEIVED

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

JFW:smf
(9)

E26 W 1 C B BVAHC
125EC10B
REC-DEE NOTE PAGE 4

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENT BY
8-1-62

67 AUG 9 1962

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3:10USC424, b6 per DIA

The Attorney General

these briefings stressed "hardening," "coffin" type construction and in describing Soviet missile sites the figure "8" has been generally used. [] considered it significant that the Baldwin article, as well as the recent briefings, stressed "hardening" and mentioned the newly learned intelligence that most of the Soviet installations are comprised of eight or more launching sites. With regard to the term "image interpretation" as used by Baldwin, [] stated this term has recently been adopted by personnel making the final evaluation of the production of sophisticated photographic techniques. He stated that high military personnel have tended to use this term increasingly as a result of their briefings. According to [] this expression is used also by employees of private concerns supplying technical equipment used in the operation. (S) b3 b6

[] is responsible only for administrative handling of the security of documents and is not familiar with their contents although they are accessible to him. He could furnish no information of value in this investigation. b3 b6

[] recalled that during the Fall of 1961 [] and U. S. in the field of guided missiles so as to indicate to the Soviets the preponderance of strength on the part of this country. He did not recall who made the proposal but the entire military representation on the USIE was opposed to it and no action was taken along these lines to his knowledge. [] could furnish no other information pertinent to this investigation.

In addition to the above individuals [] U. S. Air Force, Chief, Special Activities Office, DIA, and [] DIA, were interviewed on July 30, 1962. Both of these persons believed that an expert on military affairs could have written the article of July 26 without access to, or knowledge of, [NIE 11-8-62] or its contents. (U) b3 b6

[] U. S. Air Force, [] DIA, expressed the opinion that with two or three leading questions Baldwin could have obtained information for his article without direct access to [NIE 11-8-62] (U) (S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

or knowledge of its contents; however, his questions could only have been answered by someone who had read or had been briefed on the information in the classified document.

(U) [redacted] DIA, was of the opinion that the July 26 article was based on information obtained from [NIE 11-8-62.] ~~(S)~~

b3

b6

(U) [redacted] all agreed that the critical points in the article were those which referred to "hardening" of the Soviet installations and the number of Soviet missiles in existence. ~~(S)~~

[redacted] Security Officer; [redacted]

[redacted] and Mr. Howard Stoertz, Jr., member, Staff of Board of Nationality Estimates, all of the Central Intelligence Agency, were interviewed on July 30, 1962, and none could furnish any information of value to this investigation.

b3

On July 30, 1962, Staff Sergeant [redacted] U. S. Air Force, was interviewed. He is a clerk assigned to the Office of Information Services, U. S. Air Force, 663 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York. [redacted] advised that on the morning of July 24 or July 25, 1962, he was telephonically contacted by [redacted] for Baldwin.

[redacted] advised that missile inquiries are referred to either Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] or to Captain [redacted] assigned to this U. S. Air Force office but at the time of [redacted] call these two individuals were in conference.

[redacted] quoted to [redacted] the following passage from a proposed article: "In these installations the missiles until ready for launching lie horizontally in a large concrete box flush with, or slightly above," and inquired "Is this true?"

b6

b7C

[redacted] replied in the affirmative and the conversation was terminated. [redacted] did not consider the question unusual since he was answering the question within the scope of his official duties and under the impression that [redacted] was requesting information concerning American missile bases. It is noted that [redacted] is authorized to disseminate to communications media information of an unclassified nature and the function of his office is to answer inquiries of this nature.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Inquiries at the Hotel Jefferson, 1200 Sixteenth Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., disclosed that Baldwin registered at that hotel at 2:02 p.m. on July 16 and checked out at 9:07 p.m. on July 19. No record was maintained of local telephone calls he made from his room; however, we are checking out the long-distance calls he made during this period from his room.

You will be furnished additional developments in this matter.

NOTE:

Investigation in this matter is being conducted at the request of the Attorney General to ascertain the source of Baldwin's information in the captioned article. [This letter classified "~~Top Secret~~" because according to CIA the mere mention of NIE 11-8-62 warrants such classification.] ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

(U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Wacks

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2016 BY

8/6/62

b6
b7C

Airtel

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BETH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1.6
5/9/96 / 9/17/96 SP3 BETH/gch

To: SAC, WFO

From: Director, FBI

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANCON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," 7/26/62
ESPIONAGE - X

3-16-89 SP3 BETH/gch

Reurairtel 7/31/62 indicating that the Attorney General
had been furnished copy number 3 of the classified document
involved in this case.

On 8/2/62 the Attorney General was contacted by Assistant
Director C. A. Evans at which time the Attorney General advised
that he does have copy number 3 of the National Intelligence Estimate
document involved in this investigation; that he maintains the
document in a safe in a specially sealed envelope; that he has
continually maintained possession of this document in his office;
and that he has not discussed it with anyone outside the White House.
He displayed the document to Mr. Evans.

JFW:smf
(4)

Document downgraded to ~~Secret~~

PER RS

EX 4/5/2010

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____

FBI/DOJ 288,611
1235-6
3-16-89 gch

3-1 is app. Sav. Agency

51 AUG 13 1962

MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 8 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-14-89 BY SP3 BTJ/cab

4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/cum
9/17/96 SP3 BTJ/yel

URGENT 8-8-62

2-15 AM CAS

AND SAC

161

TO DIRECTOR FBI

FROM SAC NEW YORK

SUBJECT HANSON W. BALDWIN ESP-X

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK ADVISED BALDWIN IS
CONSIDERING TAKING VACATION BUT HAS NO DEFINITE PLANS. NO OTHER
PERTINENT INFO FURNISHED.

END AND ACK

NY R 06 WA NH

REC-31

25 AUG 8 1962

ST-100

COPIES WFO

57 AUG 10 1962

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

August 8, 1962

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

ARTICLE BY MANSION W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

In connection with our continuing investigation in this case, Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, on August 7, 1962, advised that he has known Manson W. Baldwin for the past forty years. Admiral Anderson stated that Baldwin visited him in his office from 2:30 p.m. until 3 p.m. on July 19, 1962, but no discussion of intelligence matters took place. According to Admiral Anderson, during this meeting Baldwin implied that Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric had told him that General Maxwell Taylor had been appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Anderson pointed out that this information had not been released at that time.

Admiral Anderson also advised that on July 3, 1962, Richard Fryklund, correspondent for the Washington, D. C., "Star," advised him that there had been considerable discussion among correspondents assigned to the Pentagon concerning the June 16, 1962, speech of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at Ann Arbor, Michigan. Fryklund stated that the correspondents felt that the speech presented a new concept in United States military policy and they concluded that the United States had attained a breakthrough in intelligence concerning Soviet military strength which suggested an effective photographic reconnaissance satellite.

In our letter of August 1, 1962, it was pointed out that Lieutenant General William R. Ennis, Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Department of the Army, had advised that Baldwin contacted him on July 20, 1962. General Ennis has pointed out that after checking his records he discovered that he had talked with Baldwin from 9:40 a.m. to 10:05 a.m. on July 19, 1962, instead of July 20, 1962.

JFW:djw

(9)

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

TOP SECRET

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/30/96 BY SP3 BJS/cut
9/17/96 SP3 BJS/944

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2
ACTION CONTAINED

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Interviews with officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Department of State, Departments of the Navy, the Air Force and the Army, and the Bureau of the Budget were also conducted on August 6 and 7, 1962; however, no information pertinent to this investigation was developed.

Investigation is continuing, and you will be furnished pertinent developments.

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the caption pinpoints the location of "~~Top Secret~~" information in an article available to the public.

Date of Mail 8-17-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-16-89 BY SP8 BTJ/ab



4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/cum
9/17/96 SP3 BTJ/92

b6
b7C

Subject JUNE MAIL Hansen W Baldwin

Removed By 65 AUG 10 1962

File Number



b3
b7E

[Handwritten mark]

FWD

Permanent Serial Charge Out

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-26-2017 BY: [redacted]

FBI

Date: August 6, 1962

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. DeLoach
- Mr. Evans
- Mr. Malone
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Miss Holmes
- Miss Gandy

b6
b7C

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]
FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

RECEIVED
SPECIAL
COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION
AUG 10 1962
Wannan

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

5-1-3001
CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/JM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
00-4417

Re WFO airtel 8/6/62.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted
by WFO 8/6/62:

Dr. HAROLD BROWN, Director, Defense Research
and Engineering, DOD, advised only contact with BALDWIN
was about six months ago arranged by ARTHUR SYLVESTER,
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), at which
time discussion held re BROWN's duties and general defense
problems. Advised acquainted with following "New York
Times" representatives: [redacted] and
[redacted] whom he knows only socially. Has not
seen [redacted] in past two months, but understands
recently tried to contact him re nuclear testing and
detection matters. Only contacts of BALDWIN during
recent visit known to BROWN are ROBERT S. McNAMARA,
Secretary of Defense, and Lieutenant General WILLIAM P.
ENNIS, seeing latter on matters of interest to Weapons
Systems Evaluation Group.

b6
b7C

REC-41 [redacted]

b3
b7E

- 3 - Bureau
- 1 - New York [redacted]
- 1 - WFO
- HJM/pcn
- (5)

(Info)(PERSONAL ATTENTION)(RM)

EX-116

23 AUG 8 1962

A I R T E L

b6
b7C

Wick
Sullivan

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-16-82 Multiple Signatures
CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/JM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
00-4417

CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/JM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
00-4417

Document downgraded to Secret
per 02/15/2010

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted] National Aeronautics and Space Council, did not attend NSC session of 7/9/62, nor has he read [NIE 11-8-62] or related papers. While on staff of Senator STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri, recalls having met BALDWIN, but has not been in contact with BALDWIN during past five years.

b6
b7C

Major General CHESTER V. CLIFTON, Military Aide to the President, advised did not attend NSC meeting of 7/9/62. Has only read "summary" version of [NIE 11-8-62] and received no briefings on that subject matter. Has known BALDWIN over period of years, but has not seen or talked to him in over year. Said from his recollection of BALDWIN's method of operation, about ninety-five per cent of BALDWIN's contacts were "senior officials in the Government" and it was "beneath BALDWIN's dignity" to see any lesser officials. Acquainted with JAMES RESTON and ARTHUR KROCK, "New York Times", but has not spoken with them in several months. Also acquainted with E. W. KENWORTHY, "New York Times", and recalled saw KENWORTHY in Hyannis, Massachusetts, week end of 7/7-8/62. Said has never discussed subject matter of [NIE 11-8-62] with any unauthorized person.

[redacted] DIA, DOD, reported it was his understanding that in USIB discussions of [NIE] information, the USDS member, ROGER HILSMAN, [advocated U. S. knowledge of Soviet military strength should be made public. This advocated as deterrent to Soviet acts of aggression.]

b3
b6
per
DIA

Major General J. STANLEY HOLTNER, USAF, Joint Strategic Survey Council, JCS; Major General DAVID W. GRAY, USA, Joint Strategic Survey Council, JCS, and Rear Admiral GEORGE H. MILLER, USN, Joint Strategic Survey Council, JCS, were interviewed jointly. General HOLTNER advised he was the action officer for the Chairman, JCS, in the preparation of a study by Joint Strategic Survey Council which got under way first at a meeting 7/11/62 in the office of U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. Others attending included PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs, FOY D. KOHLER, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, SHERMAN KENT, CIA, General MAXWELL TAYLOR,

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]
Military Advisor to the President, ROGER HILSMAN, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Colonel THOMAS W. WOLFE, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), and another representative from the Department of State whose identity General HOLTNER could not recall.

(U) General HOLTNER said this meeting on 7/11/62 was to discuss the problem of the implications of the [NIE] ~~[S] [X] [X]~~ study, and to assign the tasks of preparing a paper or report. The task of intelligence was assigned to KENT at CIA, the assessment of implications as to defense policy was assigned to PAUL NITZE (OSD), the matter as pertained to political policy was assigned to ALEXIS JOHNSON. ~~[X]~~

(U) General HOLTNER said subsequent meetings were held on 7/17, 7/23, 24, 27 and 8/1/62 and on 8/2/62 a draft of "Report of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Implications of [NIE 11-8-62] and Related Intelligence" was submitted, to be distributed from ALEXIS JOHNSON's office. General HOLTNER said this document or its initial drafts would not have been, in his opinion, the source of the HANSON BALDWIN news article of 7/26/62. With regard to BALDWIN's article using the terminology "greater sense of urgency", HOLTNER said this phraseology has been in rather common usage and he attributed little significance to the fact that BALDWIN used it. ~~[X]~~

General HOLTNER said he does not know HANSON BALDWIN and he had no idea as to BALDWIN's source for his 7/26/62 column. He said his personal opinion is that the leak could very well have been a deliberate one or "controlled" leak at high policy levels, although he said he considered the column contained bits and pieces of information which could have been gathered over a long period of time.

General GRAY said he knew HANSON BALDWIN years ago, but had not had any contact with him since 1958 at Fort Benning. He said he had no suggestion as to how BALDWIN may have obtained his information, but is of the personal opinion the 7/26/62 column could have been a deliberate "leak".

Admiral MILLER said he knew HANSON BALDWIN and last saw him on Monday, 7/16/62 during lunch at the Army -

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Navy Club. Admiral MILLER noted BALDWIN was having lunch with some other people and MILLER and BALDWIN merely exchanged greetings. Later that same day, in mid-afternoon, BALDWIN called him on the telephone and asked MILLER if he could see him. Admiral MILLER said he was tied up in conference and could not see BALDWIN and BALDWIN did not attempt to see him thereafter.

Admiral MILLER said his feeling about the news article was that it was very possibly a deliberate or "controlled" leak. He added that BALDWIN's mention of "There is confidence in Washington . . ." sounds to him like a statement from someone high in the administration. MILLER added he had no idea from whom or in what area BALDWIN obtained his information for this article.

Following individuals interviewed with negative results:

Colonel [] USAF, Operations, JCS

Brigadier General BENJAMIN O. TURNAGE, USA, Plans and Policy, JCS

Major General PAUL S. EMRICK, USAF, Plans and Policy, JCS

[] USA, DIA

b3

[] USAF, DIA

b6

[] USAF, DIA

per DIA

Lieutenant Colonel [] USAF, DIA

[] DIA

Major General F. T. UNGER, USAF, Director of J-3 (Operations), JCS

Brigadier General PAUL J. FONTANA, USMC, Deputy Director, J-3, JCS

Brigadier General EDWIN H. BURBA, USA, Deputy Director, J-3, JCS

Lieutenant Colonel [] Assistant Chiefs of Staff, Intelligence, USA

b6

DAVID E. BELL, Director, Bureau of Budget

b7C

[] Special Assistant, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, USDS

ARTHUR LUNDAHL, Director, NPIC, CIA

[] Operations Officer, NPIC, CIA

[] Assistant to Operations Officer, NPIC, CIA

[] Chief, Publications Division, NPIC, CIA

b3

[] Chief, [] Photo Analysis Division, NPIC, CIA

[] Chief, Photo Analysis Division, NPIC, CIA

502
7/20/10
b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

REC- 62

b3
b7E

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wacks

~~SP3-BT3/57~~

~~8-13-2001~~
PER OGA LETTER DATED 9-18-00

REC'D READING ROOM
AUG 7 11 14 PM '67

b6 per Army

LEB

RECEIVED 95204

7(E)(4)

b3
b7E

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2

FW:djw
(8)

Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____ (8)
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

AUG 16 1962

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

All Army Information contained herein was regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 22 Mar 11 By USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

[information since the article used the estimate of Soviet missile strength indicating United States Air Force thinking. He pointed out that also characteristic of United States Air Force conclusions is the "coffin" construction theory which the United States Army considers a premature conclusion of the Air Force. [redacted] commented that it is possible the Air Force may have supplied background on "coffin" sites to support the United States Air Force's desire to increase its attack capability.] (S)(u)

Investigation in this matter is continuing, and you will be furnished pertinent developments.

b6 per ARMY

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the caption itself pinpoints the location of "~~Top Secret~~" information.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

DATE 04-26-2017

BY: [REDACTED]

F B I

b6

b7C

Date: August 6, 1962

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

b3

b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
THE NEW YORK TIMES, JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

8-13-2001

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/m

ON 8-13-2004

Re WFO airtel 8/3/62. *per letter dated 9-18-2000*

There follows a summary of interviews conducted
by WFO 8/4/62:

ROGER HILSMAN, USIB Member, State Department, advised had met BALDWIN on one occasion only approximately one year ago in HILSMAN's office. Discussed general matters and importance of conventional war forces, which discussion based on previous writings of HILSMAN. HILSMAN had survey made of his office, which revealed no one had contact with BALDWIN for past several months. HILSMAN acquainted with three "New York Times" representatives, MAX FRANKEL, known socially; TAD SZULC, with whom HILSMAN discussed Cuban situation at time of April 1961 invasion; E. W. KENWORTHY, who has not been seen by HILSMAN for several months.

Several weeks ago (exact date being determined by HILSMAN) he received call from WARREN ROGERS, Reporter, "New York Herald Tribune", at which time ROGERS stated, "I get emanations from Air Force friends that the Soviets are

3 - Bureau

1 - New York (Info)(PERSONAL ATTENTION)(RM) [REDACTED]

1 - WFO

HJM/pcn

(5)

1 copy detached for [REDACTED]

b3

b7E

A I R T E L

AUG 8 1962

CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/cun

DECLASSIFY ON: [REDACTED]

Approved: [REDACTED]

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

b6

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-16-84
Classified by [REDACTED]
Declassify on: OADR

1-10-96
5-27-62
[REDACTED]

REC-42

5- [REDACTED]
EST. SEC.

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted] hardening some of their missile sites". HILSMAN told ROGERS he knew nothing concerning that sort of thing. ROGERS indicated that since HILSMAN unaware of this data, there was probably nothing to it. HILSMAN knew nothing re BALDWIN's contacts during week July 16 and stated he definitely did not have luncheon engagement with BALDWIN.

Secretary of the Navy FRED KORTH advised that he saw BALDWIN in his office on 7/16/62. Reception log shows visit on that date from 3:01 to 3:42 P.M. They discussed BALDWIN's recent trip to Poland and KORTH's directive expanding civilian personnel on faculty of Naval Academy. BALDWIN wrote a "New York Times" editorial opposed to this trend. They discussed their respective views in this matter. No discussion of intelligence matters. Secretary KORTH has known BALDWIN since he has been Secretary of the Navy and has seen him about three times, the last previous visit being before June 1962, date not recalled. Secretary KORTH had no information pertinent to BALDWIN's sources or contacts, but speculated that his information may have come from JCS personnel.

b6 per Army

[redacted] advised he has known BALDWIN since 1959 and has seen him about three times, the last time recalled as during 1961, probably November. BALDWIN has never asked for or received any intelligence data from [redacted] stated BALDWIN knows many people in the intelligence community, but did not name any not previously interviewed during this investigation. After 7/26/62 article published, [redacted] had an analysis made which pointed to U. S. Air Force as probable source of BALDWIN's information, [since article used estimate of Soviet missile strength reflecting U. S. Air Force thinking. Also characteristic of U. S. Air Force conclusions is the "coffin" construction theory which U. S. Army considers a premature conclusion of Air Force. [redacted] attaches no significance to use of term "image interpretation". He concluded that it is possible U. S. Air Force may have supplied background on "coffin" type sites to support U. S. Air Force desire to increase its attack capability.] (u)

Following persons interviewed with negative results: [redacted]

b3


[redacted] CIA; LOUIS
MARENGO, Member, Board of National Estimates, CIA; [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

 Bureau authority is requested to locate and interview WARREN ROGERS, "New York Herald Tribune", who is listed in current Congressional Directory as being accredited to Congressional Press Gallery. It is pointed out that in event ROGERS submitted story re data in his possession to Defense Department and story was killed, he may be in frame of mind to furnish sources for data in view of BALDWIN subsequently publishing same. //

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 06-03-2010

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan ☒ _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 8/2/62

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES,"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

The Attorney General was contacted with reference to the matter covered in Washington Field airtel of 7/31/62. He advised he had copy number three of [NIE Document 11-8-62] located in a safe in a specially sealed envelope. The copy of the document was personally observed. The Attorney General said he had continually maintained possession of the document in his office and had not discussed it with anyone outside the White House.

Document downgraded to ~~Secret~~
 per [] VRS
 on 4/5/2010

b6
 b7C

1 - Mr. Sullivan

CAE:maw
 (8)

FOI/PA # 288,611
 APPEAL #
 CIVIL ACT. #
 E.O. # 12354
 DATE 3-16-89 INITIALS

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/cen
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1-6

5/21/96
 7/20/96 SP3 BTJ/gcl

REC- 51

EX. - 102

AUG 8 1962

b3
 b7E

8 AUG 13 1962

FNV

~~TOP SECRET~~

2-16-89
 Classified by SP3 BTJ/cen
 Declassify on: OADR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

M8-1

Mozambique
 W. R. R. 10

5-11-62
 (U)

T

5/6/6 5-1 is app. Sec. Agency

5- [signature]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2017 BY [redacted] ADG

F B I

b6

b7C

Date: 8-6-62

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3

b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

Perusal of information furnished by CIA
relating to the Hyland Panel reveals that Dr. GEORGE B.
KISTIAKOWSKY, a professor of chemistry at Harvard
University, was a member of this panel. The panel
met at CIA, 6-4, 5, 6-62 and briefing data regarding the
agenda and items for specific discussion was furnished
to the members during early May, 1962.

It is noted that during the interview of
Colonel STANLEY GROGAN, CIA, on 7-20-62, Colonel GROGAN
mentioned the fact that GEORGE B. KISTIAKOWSKY, former
adviser to the President, was a member of the party
which accompanied BALDWIN to Poland in May, 1962.

In view of this, it is felt by WFO that the
Bureau should authorize interview of KISTIAKOWSKY,
bearing in mind that two Agents having the necessary
clearance should conduct the interview.

REC-39 [redacted]

1 copy detached for Mr. Wacker, L. Lewis

- 3 - Bureau
- 1 - New York (PERSONAL ATTENTION) (Info) (RM)
- 1 - WFO

HJM:ctw
(5)

AIRTEL

b3

b7E

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 4 1961
TELETYPE

URGENT 8-4-61 7-35 PM JFA

TO DIRECTOR /7/

AND SAC, WFO

FROM SAC, NEW YORK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-16-89 BY SP8/BJT/61

4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/KLM
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/96

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN NY TIMES JULY TWENTY SIX SIXTY
TWO. ESP-X.

[REDACTED] INTERVIEWED FIVE PM EIGHT FOUR BY NYO AGENTS
AT HIS VACATION COTTAGE AT [REDACTED] STATED
THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW SOURCES WHO GAVE BALDWIN INFORMATION FOR
ARTICLE OF SEVEN TWENTY SIX. WHEN ASKED IF HE DID KNOW SOURCES BUT
WOULD NOT REVEAL THEM [REDACTED] REFUSED TO COMMENT POINTING OUT THAT
A GOOD NEWSPAPERMAN MUST PROTECT SOURCES. [REDACTED] WOULD NOT IDENTIFY
ANY OTHER PERSONS WHO MIGHT KNOW SOURCES.

IN CONNECTION WITH BALDWIN'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON, DC IN JULY
[REDACTED] ADMITTED THAT HE HAD MADE APPOINTMENT FOR BALDWIN BUT REFUSED
TO IDENTIFY ANY PERSONS BALDWIN WAS TO SEE. [REDACTED] STATED BALDWIN
WAS NOT CALLED TO WASHINGTON, DC FOR THIS TRIP AND NEVER IS CALLED.
HE GOES THERE PERIODICALLY AS HIS WORK REQUIRES. [REDACTED] STATED, BALDWIN
WROTE JULY TWENTY SIXTH ARTICLE AND FURTHER THAT BALDWIN WRITES ALL

END PAGE ONE
57 AUG 20 1962
TWO COPIES

MR. BELMONT FOR THE DIRECTOR

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

PAGE TWO

HIS ARTICLES HIMSELF.

[] ADMITTED DOING SOME EDITING OF ARTICLE. [] CLAIMED ARTICLE CONSISTED OF GENERAL PUBLIC INFORMATION. HE FEELS THIS SORT OF ARTICLE DOES A PUBLIC SERVICE. [] REFUSED TO SAY WHEN ARTICLE WAS PREPARED OR WHETHER IT WAS PREPARED BEFORE OR AFTER WASHINGTON TRIP. [] HAS HAD NO DISCUSSION WITH BALDWIN RE ARTICLE SINCE PUBLICATION.

AT OUTSET OF INTERVIEW, [] WAS ADVISED IT WAS BEING CONDUCTED AT THE REQUEST OF THE AG. THROUGHOUT INTERVIEW [] APPEARED FRIENDLY AND EXPRESSED NO RESENTMENT OR ANTAGONISM.

END

NY R 7 WA ELR

JP

CC-MR. SULLIVAN

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-14-2016 BY: [REDACTED]

The Attorney General

August 9, 1962 b6
b7C

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

ARTICLE BY HENSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

In connection with our continuing investigation in this case, we interviewed Secretary of the Air Force Eugene W. Zuckert on August 8, 1962. Mr. Zuckert has not seen Baldwin since last winter, and could furnish no information of interest to this investigation.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Advisor to the President, on August 8, 1962, advised that he has known Baldwin for years but has not seen him during the past six months. He could furnish no information of interest to this investigation.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, advised that he is acquainted with Baldwin but has not seen or talked with him during 1962. Mr. Bundy advised that a few days after the publication of the July 26, 1962, article he was contacted by James Reston of the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times." Mr. Bundy said that he told Reston he was unable to comment concerning this investigation and that inquiries in this regard would have to be directed to the President and the Secretary of Defense. This interview was conducted on August 8, 1962.

On August 8, 1962, Mr. Orville Splitt, Directorate for News Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), advised that, as a result of a speech given by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16, 1962, there was much speculation among the various Pentagon correspondents that the United States

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JFW:djw
(9)

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2

67 AUG 10 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

(U)

had achieved a breakthrough in intelligence in identifying Soviet military targets by means of photographic satellites. Mr. Splitt said that Thomas B. Ross, of the Chicago, Illinois, "Sun - Times" newspaper, was the first reporter to arrive at this conclusion. Mr. Splitt referred to an article by Ross in the June 22, 1962, issue of this newspaper. It is noted that this article contained the sentence, "Apparently startling progress has been made during the last year with electronic listening apparatus along the Iron Curtain and with the super-secret 'spy-in-the-sky' satellite." The article also pointed out, "The Russians may be able to protect some of their weapons by making them mobile or pouring concrete shields. But Pentagon's planners insist that most have been precisely pinpointed." ~~(S)~~

Mr. Splitt also stated that Ross and Warren Rogers, Jr., a correspondent for the New York, New York, "Herald Tribune" frequently worked together and shared information. In this regard, Mr. Splitt pointed out that Rogers published an article on June 22, 1962, which was apparently based on the conclusions drawn by Ross.

Additional interviews were conducted on August 8, 1962, at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force; however, no information pertinent to this investigation was developed.

Investigation in this matter is continuing, and you will be furnished pertinent developments.

NOTE: This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the caption pinpoints the location of "~~Top Secret~~" information in an article available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 06-07-2010

~~TOP SECRET~~

FBI

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-14-2016 BY: [redacted]

b6

b7C

Date: 8/2/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted] (P)

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

8-13-2001
CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/m
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X-1
per OGA letter dated 9-18-00
PAGE 5 PARA 4 EXCEPT BRACKET
DECLASSIFIED

b3

b7E

ReWFOairtel 8/1/62.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted
by WFO 8/2/62.

ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense, advised 8/2/62, he has known HANSON BALDWIN about ten years; sees him about four times yearly on BALDWIN's periodic visits to WDC. During week of 7/9/62, Bureau of "N. Y. Times" made appointment for BALDWIN to see GILPATRIC 3:30 p.m. 7/17/62. Interview lasted about 45 minutes. BALDWIN said two things he had in mind: the speech made at Ann Arbor, Michigan, by Secretary of Defense McNAMARA and the status of the National Guard Reserve. Following discussion on these points, BALDWIN brought up topic of changes in military command regarding NATO, JCS, and retirement of General NORSTAD from NATO. He tried to probe as to successor of LEMNITZER at JCS and indicated his only specific knowledge was retirement of NORSTAD which BALDWIN tried to link to changes in U. S. weapons policy in Europe. GILPATRIC stated at no time did their discussion touch on intelligence matters; that he never at any time had furnished BALDWIN any information whatsoever of a classified nature.

b6
b7C

With regard to BALDWIN's article of 7/26/62, AUG 6 1962
GILPATRIC says he first read it 7/26/62, en route to NYC
to attend luncheon given for him by Board of Editors at

- 3- Bureau
1- New York (Info) (RM) (PERSONAL ATTENTION)
1- WFO

RCB:rps
(5)

AIRTEL

b3

b7E

b6

b7C

CC: Sullivan
Approved: [Signature]

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

30 AUG 8 1962

140

~~SECRET~~

5-111

Document downgraded to Secret

3-16-89 Multiple copies
CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/m
DECLASSIFY ON 25X-1
5/24/96

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]

"N. Y. Times." Prior to departure, ADAM YARMOLINSKY, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense, brought article to his attention and requested GILPATRIC not mention it at the luncheon which was attended by about eight persons. BALDWIN was present at luncheon and dominated conversation. Following luncheon, GILPATRIC spoke privately to ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, Publisher, "N. Y. Times," about the 7/26/62, column, stating this leak was a matter of serious concern and indicated insensitivity of BALDWIN to security matters. GILPATRIC cited to DRYFOOS several instances wherein BALDWIN had come close to or crossed over security limits; also complained of BALDWIN's critical judgments of Defense policy without first discussing it prior to publication in his column.

(U) GILPATRIC then referred to instant leak, advised Agents he had no idea where BALDWIN got the information; personally believes BALDWIN had talked to two classes of people: those who had back-up material and then someone who had read [NIE paper.] GILPATRIC says he feels the source was exclusively military. ~~(S)~~

(U) In response to specific question, GILPATRIC states he never had discussed the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group with BALDWIN and noted that on 7/28/62, the "N. Y. Times" came out with an article by BALDWIN dealing with the administrative change now taking place within the Department of Defense (DOD) in this area. GILPATRIC's conclusion as to this article was that BALDWIN had seen a JCS paper which he described as "Secret" in classification. He said he had no suggestion as to how BALDWIN obtained this data. ~~(S)~~

(U) GILPATRIC was then informed, without disclosing source, that on 7/18/62, BALDWIN had made the statement he had learned from GILPATRIC the decision had been made about the successor to the B-52 bomber and that it would not be the RS-70 (Reconnaissance Strike) airplane. After some hesitation GILPATRIC stated that BALDWIN's allegation was not true. He then related he had a conversation with BALDWIN concerning the controversial matter of the successor to the B-52 and stated this discussion took place at their meeting in April or May, 1962. In that conversation BALDWIN criticized the DOD by saying it was the first time ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]

(U) in his experience that we had gone eighteen months without a new weapons program. In reply, GILPATRIC told BALDWIN this was not true, but BALDWIN pointed out there had been no provision made for manned bombers. In this exchange GILPATRIC replied, "There are some things even you don't know." GILPATRIC stated that they discussed advanced weapons such as the TFX (Tactical Fighter - Experimental) and the MMRBM (Mobile Mid-Range Ballistic Missile). In this vein he and BALDWIN discussed the "follow-on" for the B-52, but they did not discuss the RS-70. GILPATRIC explained actually there had been no change in the decision not to make the RS-70 a major weapons program, but he did not furnish this information to BALDWIN. GILPATRIC stated the studies involved relating to a successor to the B-52 were classified "~~Top Secret~~" and some of the information pertaining thereto was "very closely held." GILPATRIC said that during the luncheon in New York on 7/26/62, one of the editors in the group had raised the question, asking whether a decision had been reached concerning the RS-70; and in answer GILPATRIC stated the DOD had not yet reached the point where they had to make a decision as to any change in policy in this area. (S)

GILPATRIC stated he had no information as to other contacts BALDWIN may have made while in Washington during the week of 7/19/62, with exception he knew BALDWIN had an appointment to see Secretary McNAMARA.

He said from BALDWIN's discussions concerning personnel changes it was evident BALDWIN had had previous talks with Navy people and Army people, and from BALDWIN's comments regarding the National Guard it was evident he had been talking to Army people. He said BALDWIN regularly talks to all high-ranking civilian officials in DOD, and it was GILPATRIC's belief many of these calls were "courtesy calls."

Rear Admiral THOMAS H. MOORER, Director, Long Range Objectives Group, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, advised 8/2/62, he first met BALDWIN during the Fall of 1960 when BALDWIN attended an Atlantic Fleet operation known as "Swordthrust."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

MOORER stated about 3 p.m. on 7/18/62, BALDWIN called him on the telephone to arrange a meeting and almost immediately thereafter came to MOORER's office and stayed approximately twenty minutes. The conversation was almost entirely devoted to reminiscences about their experiences during the Fleet operation in which MOORER headed the Task Force, and the only matter of current interest was BALDWIN's bringing up the probable successor to the office of Chairman, JCS. In the conversation BALDWIN stated he had talked about this to various people, including Deputy Secretary GILPATRIC, but he still did not know who was going to become head of JCS. BALDWIN named numerous people whom he speculated might get the Chairmanship at JCS. MOORER stated all of the various people named by BALDWIN as possible successors to LEMNITZER proved to be wrong guesses on BALDWIN's part. He said that they also had a short talk about the Navy of the future as to new ships, nuclear power, and Navy projects for the 1970's. MOORER said there was no discussion whatsoever touching on intelligence matters.

Admiral MOORER had not read the pertinent BALDWIN article, but after reading same in Agents' presence, said the material discussed therein was of no interest to his position or duties and he did not have the necessary clearances to be knowledgeable in this field.

MOORER said he learned this week, through casual conversation, that after BALDWIN had left his office he had seen Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral CLAUDE V. RICKETTS, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, advised he is not personally acquainted with BALDWIN but knows of BALDWIN. BALDWIN visited RICKETTS' office for about thirty minutes on 7/16/62. Admiral RICKETTS is aware BALDWIN also contacted Secretary Navy, FRED KORTH; the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral GEORGE ANDERSON, and several other Admirals during BALDWIN's recent visit to Pentagon. RICKETTS stated BALDWIN principally interested in speech Secretary McNAMARA made at Ann Arbor, Michigan, and whether new policy or directive issued as result of speech. BALDWIN also inquired regarding contemplated change in JCS and Army Nike-Zeus program.

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

(U) [No mention was made of NIE 11-8-62 or material in this document.] RICKETTS could identify no associates of [3-11-62] BALDWIN.

Major General C. G. DODGE, Chief of Information, USA, advised that BALDWIN's office contacted Department of Army on 7/11/62, attempting to arrange interview with Secretary of Army. BALDWIN contacted DODGE 7/16/62, and was informed the Secretary of the Army desired no news contacts until after 8/15/62. DODGE not personally acquainted with BALDWIN, but during contact on 7/16/62, BALDWIN attempted to solicit information concerning Nike-Zeus program and rotation of senior Army officers. DODGE furnished BALDWIN no information. DODGE unable to identify BALDWIN's sources of information.

Lt. Col. JAMES GIBSON, Assistant Executive Officer to STEPHEN AILES, Under Secretary of the Army, advised BALDWIN has not been in recent contact with that office.

(U) ROBERT AMORY, Jr., Chief, International Division, Bureau of the Budget, [indicated he had read the "Advance Conclusions" draft on 7/9 or 10/62, that he had not discussed NIE 11-8-62] material with any unauthorized sources and that he has not seen or heard from BALDWIN since April, 1962, when he spoke to BALDWIN briefly in Cosmos Club following lunch. AMORY explained his retention of the Bureau of Budget copy of "Advance Conclusions" as follows: When General CARTER, Assistant of JOHN McCONE, called about the copy, AMORY said that since Budget was part of White House staff, the White House order recalling all copies would not apply. He stated McCONE personally called later and the copy was then returned. [3-11-62]

(U) Dr. JEROME B. WIESNER, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, denied knowing BALDWIN or ever talking to him. Has contacts with press occasionally, including RESTON, OAKES, and FINNEY of "N. Y. Times." Never received any inquiry at anytime relative to material [in 11-8-62] nor has he discussed matter with anyone but his assistant. [He observed that references to "hardening" of missile sites, submarine info and possibly reference to "coffin" type would lead him to believe person furnished NIE info to BALDWIN.] [3-11-62] (U)

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lt. Gen. EARLE W. BARNES, Member, Board of National Estimates, CIA, advised on 8/2/62, that he had met BALDWIN approximately ten years ago while in command of Air Command and Staff School, Maxwell Field. BALDWIN was a guest speaker and following the speech BALDWIN was a guest in his home. He last saw BALDWIN approximately two years ago on a social occasion. Unable to furnish additional pertinent info.

The following negative interviews were conducted:

- (1) SPURGEON M. KEENY, Jr., Technical Assistant to Dr. JEROME B. WIESNER, White House
- (2) RAY S. CLINE, Deputy Director Intelligence, CIA
- (3) Major General LAWRENCE W. DEWEY, Member, Board of National Estimates, CIA

Investigation at National Airport, WDC, reflects BALDWIN departed 8 p.m. on Northeast Airlines Flight en route New York, ^{ON} 7/19/62.

WFO airtel 7/31/62, set out results of interview of [REDACTED] On 8/2/62, [REDACTED] advised b6 per NGB he was in error as to date of meeting with BALDWIN and that [REDACTED] dined with BALDWIN on evening of 7/18/62, instead of 7/19/62, as he previously reported.

Interviews continuing with all logical suspects.

*Summary Being Kept
for Attorney General
RK*

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 8/2/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

AIRTEL

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: HANSON W. BALDWIN
ESPIONAGE - XALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-16-89 BY SP8 BTJ/CLM
4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/CLM
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/CLM

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau and WFO are the results of interviews with Lt. Col. [redacted] Captain [redacted] and Staff Sergeant [redacted] of the United States Air Force, Office of Information Services, 663 Fifth Avenue, NY, NY.

These interviews were conducted on 7/30/62, by SAS [redacted] and [redacted]

There is also enclosed the result of the interview with HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of the "New York Times". This interview was conducted at BALDWIN's home, 39 Morton Place, Chappaqua, NY, on 7/30/62, by SAS [redacted] and [redacted]

- 3- Bureau [redacted] (Encls. 3)
- 2- Washington Field [redacted] (Encls. 2)
- 1- New York [redacted]

WDD:ald
(8)

REC- 42

9 AUG 2 1962

NAT. INT. SEC.

Approved: [signature]
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

b3
b7Eb6
b7Cb3
b7E

b3
b7E

[redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel [redacted]
United States Air Force
Office of Information Services,
633 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York

Colonel [redacted] advised on July 30, 1962, that one of the primary functions of the Office of Information Services is to provide United States Air Force Information to communications media.

b6
b7C

On July 24 or 25, 1962, Staff Sergeant [redacted] a Clerk in his office, told [redacted] that he received a telephone call from [redacted] Staff Researcher for HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of the "New York Times". [redacted] inquiry concerned accuracy of a phrase pertaining to the semi-hardened or hardened state of missile emplacements. According to [redacted] answered [redacted] that the ~~except~~ from a proposed story was accurate and the conversation was terminated.

[redacted] stated that it was [redacted] impression that [redacted] inquiry referred to the United States Missile Sites, although [redacted] had not specified when talking with [redacted]

[redacted] added that it is the usual practice when an inquiry comes into his office that the inquiry is usually handled by himself or Captain [redacted] United States Air Force but neither he nor Captain [redacted] was available when [redacted] called.

b6
b7C

[redacted] added that when [redacted] advised him of [redacted] call, it surprised him that [redacted] had made such an inquiry in that [redacted] thought that [redacted] should have known the military terminology concerning missile emplacements.

COPIES DESTROYED

101 JUN 19 1970

ENCLOSURE
[redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted] also advised that all the information which the Office of Information Services has at its disposal for dissemination to the communications media and is of an unclassified nature.

b6
b7C

[redacted] also stated that [redacted] was acting in line with his official duties in replying to [redacted] inquiry.

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

Staff Sergeant [REDACTED]
United States Air Force
Office of Information Services,
663 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York

b6
b7C

On July 30, 1962, Sergeant [REDACTED] advised that in the absence of Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] and Captain [REDACTED] who were unavailable, he received a telephone call from [REDACTED] Staff Researcher for HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of the "New York Times".

[REDACTED] read the following statement to [REDACTED]
"In these installations, missiles, not yet ready for launching, lie horizontally in a large concrete box flush with or slightly above", "is this true?"

[REDACTED] stated that he answered the question in the affirmative. In reading this excerpt, it was [REDACTED] impression that [REDACTED] was referring to American Missile Sites in that he gave [REDACTED] no indication to the contrary.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that shortly after this conversation, he advised his superiors, Colonel [REDACTED] and Captain [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-16-89 BY SP8 BT/bk
4/30/96 SP3 BT/bk
9/20/96 SP3 BT/bk

COPIES DESTROYED
101 JUN 19 1970

[REDACTED]

ENCLOSURE

[REDACTED]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

b3
b7E

Captain [redacted]
United States Air Force
Office of Information Services,
663 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

On July 30, 1962, Captain [redacted] advised that [redacted] Staff Researcher for HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of the "New York Times" was a frequent caller at this office requesting Air Force information and that this information is provided if available to the office.

b6
b7C

Captain [redacted] confirmed the information provided by Colonel [redacted] but could add no further information concerning [redacted] inquiry.

3-16-89 SP8 RJ/jab
4/30/96 SP3 BJS/can

COPIES DESTROYED

100 JUN 19 1970

ENCLOSURE

[redacted]

b3
b7E



b3
b7E

HANSON W. BALDWIN
39 Morton Place
Chappaqua, New York

On July 30, 1962, at 6:58 PM, HANSON W. BALDWIN was approached at his home for the purpose of interviewing him in connection with an article containing this byline which appeared in the "New York Times" of July 26, 1962. Mr. BALDWIN came to the door and when the Agents identified themselves, he told them that he had just arrived home, was about to have his dinner and could not receive them at that time.

He was asked if the Agents could interview him following his dinner. BALDWIN said no and told the Agents that he resented "this kind of approach"; was at his office all day and thought they should have the courtesy to have made an appointment with him. He declined to be interviewed at that time but suggested that he would be available at his home on the following day at 10:30 AM.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED


DATE 3-16-88 BY SP8 JLB/60

9/20/96 203875/100

503875/100


COPIES DESTROYED

10 1 JUN 19 1970



b3
b7E

ENCLOSURE



1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

The Attorney General

July 31, 1962

Director, FBI

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/30/96 BY SP3 BTJ/led

Reference is made to my letter dated July 31, 1962,
in which you were furnished the results of our interview with
[redacted] and our attempt to interview Hanson W. Baldwin.

Our coverage of Baldwin disclosed that on the evening
of July 30, 1962, he was contacted by James B. Reston of the
Washington, D. C., Office of "The New York Times." Reston and
Baldwin advised that they were "mad" about the afore-mentioned
interviews. Reston pointed out that [redacted] had been contacted
at her home by an FBI man who had properly identified himself and
who had asked whom Baldwin had seen in Washington, D. C. Baldwin
stated that two FBI men had called at his home during the evening
of July 31 and he had refused to see them saying that he would
see them at his office. Reston remarked that it was an "outrage
and we ought to print the whole thing." Baldwin agreed and
suggested that Reston tell "Orville" (possibly Orville Dryfoos,
the publisher of "The New York Times").

Baldwin remarked, "This is going very far in this
administration. I think it is extremely dangerous." Reston
replied, "There is a strange feeling in Congress that a dossier
is being kept on all these people. Probably a great deal comes
out of their imagination and guilty conscience but there is this
suspicion that this kind of tactic is being used." Baldwin agreed
that "this" is a new and different tactic "similar to what
happened with reporters in the middle of the night at the time of
the steel price rise." Baldwin also said, "I think the real
answer to this is Bobbie Kennedy and the President himself, but
Bobbie Kennedy particularly putting pressure on Hoover."

Baldwin said that the "curtain around the Pentagon"
is just as pronounced as in other places and he stated that he
had always been most discreet about the military in protecting
sources. He also pointed out that he had held back on certain

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JFW:mek
(8)

67 AUG 7 1962

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

SECRET

SEN

7-31-62

AUG 7 1962

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

things "as in the August project and then they went ahead and printed it. I resent this kind of pressure." Reston commented at this point, "I resent that these guys had enough guts to come knock on your door, but what is really sneaky is calling up a poor. . . ." Baldwin interrupted at this point to say he hoped Reston had apologized to her (apparently [redacted] for him, and then said, "She simply told them that I saw everybody, didn't she?" Reston said that was correct.

Reston commented, "When they begin to do this thing in Washington, it becomes a question of whether we are going to report the news or not." Baldwin pointed out, "When I reported that Kennedy ordered the FBI into the Pentagon before the Berlin crisis, Kennedy became angry, and then there was a story [redacted] wrote in 'Newsweek' about various solutions for the Berlin crisis and Kennedy blew his top. They actually went to [redacted] and did some of these crummy intimidating tactics." In this instance Baldwin probably was referring to our investigation conducted in 1961 in the matter entitled "Unknown Subject; Leak of Classified Information Appearing in the July 3, 1961, 'Newsweek' Magazine Article Captioned 'Pentagon Plan.'" You have been furnished the results of our investigation in that matter.

b6
b7C

Reston told Baldwin, "All it takes to deal with Kennedy who essentially is a politician and not a cop is for us to print the news. This is more damaging to him than the information he would gain by talking to everybody you saw." Reston also commented, "If we printed a story of what's going on down here, I don't propose to take it up as a policy matter. I propose, if you agree, after we know what more is back of all this, merely to file a story, then if they want to take the responsibility of killing it, we'll know where we are."

You will be furnished additional developments in this matter.

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Secret~~" to protect the sensitive source which furnished the details of the Reston-Baldwin conversation.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 3 1962

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-16-88 BY SP8 BTJ/cwr

4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/cwr
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/cwr

URGENT 8-3-62 12-28 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI [REDACTED] AND SAC WFO [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN, ESP-X.

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK COULD FURNISH NO INFO
RE SUBJECT/S ACTIVITIES ON AUGUST TWO. INFORMANT DID LEARN SUBJECT
AND WIFE WERE AT RESIDENCE THIS DATE AND WIFE PLANNED TO VISIT
NYC ON AUGUST THREE.

END AND ACK

NY R 01 WA NH

TU

REC-16

9 AUG 7 1962

22 TWO COPIES WFO

54 AUG 13 1962

FIX

b3
b7E

b3
b7E

5

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 5 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____
b3
b7E

URGENT 8-5-62 12-15 AM JFA

TO DIRECTOR [REDACTED] 1 AND SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

FROM SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN, ESP-X.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-16-89 BY SP8 BTJ/ovr

4/30/96 SP3 BTJ/ovr

4/20/96 SP3 BTJ/ovr

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT - S ASTERISK FURNISHED NO PERTINENT INFO
RE BALDWIN-S ACTIVITIES THIS DATE. NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT - S ASTERISK
BELIEVES BALDWIN AROSE NOON AND PLANNED DAY AT TYPEWRITER.

END

R NY 1 WA JS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EX-114

REC-16

8 AUG 7

5

b3
b7E

54 AUG 13 1962

TWO COPIES WFO

F B I

Date: 8/1/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED] (P)

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
 "THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
 ESP - X

The following contains the identity of individuals or departments receiving copies of document 11-8-62 dated 7/16/62. It is noted that the distribution of the advance copy dated 7/6/62 is essentially the same and is not being repeated. However, the advance distribution list is being thoroughly covered to assure that all individuals receiving copies even though they were subsequently retracted will be covered during this investigation:

#1	President JOHN F. KENNEDY
#2	Vice President LYNDON B. JOHNSON
#3	MC GEORGE BUNDY, White House
#4	Secretary of the Treasury
#5	Director of the Budget
#6	Secretary of State
#7-8	Director, Intelligence and Research - State Dept.
#9	Director, Arms and Disarmament - State Dept.
#10	Director, CIA
#11	Secretary of Defense via DIA

(3) - Bureau
 1 - WFO

RCB:mdc
 (4)

CC: Sullivan
 CC: WASHALL

REC-61 AIRTEL

NO Summary Report Prepared
 For Attorney General

Approved: _____
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

53 AUG 14 1962

10 AUG 3 1962

b3
 b7E

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

#12 Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA
#13 & 14 ACSI via DIA
#15 & 16 ONI
#17 & 18 Air Force
#19 & 20 SAC via DIA
#21 Director, DIA
#22 Director, NSA
#23 Director, FBI via DDI
#24 Director/Intelligence AEC via OSI
#25 Deputy Director Central Intelligence
#26 Executive Director Central Intelligence
#27 Deputy Director, Planning/HELMS
#28 Dr. SCOVILLE (CIA)
#29 Deputy Director Intelligence [REDACTED] (CIA)
#30 ONE/KENT (CIA)
#31 ONE [REDACTED] (CIA)
#32 ORR/GUTHE (CIA)
#33 OSI/PROCTOR (CIA)
#34 & 35 OSI [REDACTED] (CIA)
#36 Dr. SMITH (CIA)
#37 NIC [REDACTED] (CIA)
#38 Office of the Director, CIA [REDACTED]
#39 & 40 SAC, via DIA
(Strategic Air Command via District Intelligence Agency)
#41 - 50 Internal CIA
#51 DIA for delivery
#52 Major General COLLINS via DIA
#53 DIA for delivery
#54 DIA for delivery

b3

The following is the list of individuals who were
in attendance at the NSC meeting 7/9/62:

The President of the United States, Presiding
The Vice President of the United States
Colonel BURRIS

AEC

GLENN T. SEABORG, Chairman

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

WILLIAM C. FOSTER, Director

b3
b7E

ATTORNEY GENERAL

ROBERT KENNEDY

BUDGET

DAVID E. BELL, Director

CIA

JOHN A. MC CONE, Director
General M. CARTER
HOWARD STOERTZ
ABBOTT SMITH
ED PROCTOR

DEFENSE

ROBERT S. MC NAMARA, Secretary
ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK, Deputy Secretary
PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary (ISA)

JCS

General LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, USA, Chairman
General GEORGE H. DECKER, USA, Chief of Staff, Army
Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, USN, Chief of Staff, Navy
General CURTIS E. LE MAY, USAF, Chief of Staff, Air Force
[redacted] of the Marine Corps

b7C per USMC

NASA

JAMES E. WEBB, Administrator

OEP

EDWARD A. MC DERMOTT, Director

STATE

DEAN RUSK, Secretary
GEORGE W. BALL, Under Secretary
U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

[REDACTED]

TREASURY

C. DOUGLAS DILLON, Secretary
HENRY FOWLER

WHITE HOUSE

CARL KAYSEN, Deputy Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
JEROME B. WIESNER, Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology
General MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, Military Representative of
the President
BROMLEY SMITH, Executive Secretary, National Security
Council

The changes in the above list for the NSC meeting
held 7/10/62, reflected the following:

Mr. HENRY FOWLER, representing the Treasury Department, was absent from this meeting. [REDACTED] of CIA; [REDACTED] Executive Secretary, NASC; Mr. EDWARD R. MURROW, Director, USIA and MC GEORGE BUNDY, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs all were present on 7/10/62. b3 b6 b7C

With respect to the identity of individuals described above, it is noted that the teletype of the New York Office dated 7/31/62, contained information regarding a contact between J. B. "SCOTTY" RESTON of "The New York Times", Washington, D. C., and BALDWIN in New York City. During this contact, BALDWIN commented he had "always been most discreet about the military in protecting sources." In view of this comment, WFO is directing its investigation at this time primarily toward interview with potential military sources.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 02-28-2017 BY:

~~TOP SECRET~~b6
b7C

FBI

Date: 8/2/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (P)

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

During the interview with Colonel STANLEY GROGAN, Assistant to CIA Director JOHN A. MC CONE, he named several individuals who were friends of BALDWIN. Among those named by Colonel GROGAN was Major General CHESTER V. "TED" CLIFTON, Military Aide to the President, the White House. It is noted that CLIFTON attended the NSC meeting 7/9/62, at which time the NIE 11-8-62 document was discussed. WFO will proceed with interview of CLIFTON, UACB.

3 - Bureau
1 - WFO

RCB:mdc
(4)

Document downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per RS 04 4/5/2010

REC-1

AIRTEL

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2017 BY:

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/km
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6/8
5/2/96 9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/km

FOI/PA # 288,611

FOI/PA #

FOI/PA #

FOI/PA #

FOI/PA #

FOI/PA #

FOI/PA #

FOI/PA #

FOI/PA #

FOI/PA #

FOI/PA #

FOI/PA #

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

51 AUG 13 1962

5- JFW

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Evans
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - D.E. Moore
- 1 - Wannall
- 1 - Wacks

The Attorney General

August 1, 1962

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-11-2016 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES,"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Aug 1 4 38 PM '62
REC'D READING ROOM
FBI

With reference to our investigation of the captioned matter, we continued our interviews at the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on July 31, 1962, and we also conducted a number of interviews at the National Security Agency on the same date.

Lieutenant General William P. Ennis, Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG), Department of Defense, on July 31 advised that on July 20, 1962, Baldwin, whom General Ennis had never met before, had appeared at his office seeking information concerning an unclassified directive captioned "WSEG Operations" which was dated July 11, 1962. Baldwin informed General Ennis he was aware of the contents of this directive but desired to see a copy of it. Baldwin also told General Ennis that he always "protects his sources of information." General Ennis pointed out that he refused to allow Baldwin to see the directive and did not discuss the contents thereof with Baldwin in detail.

In connection with the information furnished by General Ennis, it is noted that in the July 28, 1962, issue of "The New York Times" Baldwin has an article entitled "Pentagon Edict Upsets Military." In my July 30, 1962, letter to you, it was pointed out that Honorable Robert S. McNamara, The Secretary of Defense, on July 28 commented that this article was another example of "loose talk" and a lack of discipline with regard to disclosure of information. The article pertains to changes in the organization of WSEG. The information in the article possibly was obtained by Baldwin from the "WSEG Operations" directive which could have been furnished to Baldwin by one of his sources at the Pentagon.

CLASSIFIED BY 6032/CEC
7/25/62 NO DISSEMINATION
b6
b7C

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

JFW:mhd

SENT DIRECTOR
8-1-62

ENCLOSURE

67 AUG 8 1962

REC-23

b3
b7E

AUG 7 1962

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

[redacted] Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau, Department of the Army, on July 31 advised that in civilian life he is a military writer for the Norfolk, Virginia, "Ledger Star." He stated he has known Baldwin for the past ten years on a professional and social basis and, in fact, had dinner with Baldwin on the evening of July 19, 1962. [redacted] stated that there was no discussion during the evening concerning the information in Baldwin's article of July 26. [redacted] also said he could furnish no information as to who sources for this information were. [redacted] stated that when he met Baldwin for dinner on July 19 Baldwin was in company with [redacted] b6 per NGB

[redacted] According to [redacted] Baldwin mentioned during the evening that he had appointments for the following day (July 20) with Mr. McNamara and with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Baldwin, when he contacted [redacted] on July 13, 1962, to arrange the dinner engagement, commented that he expected to see Admiral Jerauld Wright during the evening of July 13 and explained that [redacted] b6 per NGB

[redacted] It is noted that [redacted] is a member of [redacted]

[redacted] admitted that during his contact with Baldwin on July 19 they had discussed at some length information related to the return of the Air National Guard units from Europe. [redacted] stated that none of the information discussed was classified since it had appeared previously in the Congressional Record and had been the subject of considerable testimony before Congressional committees. [redacted] classification evaluation of this information was verified through interview with Major General D. W. McGowan, Chief, National Guard Bureau. b6 per NGB

With respect to the conversation between [redacted] and Baldwin concerning National Guard units, it is noted that in the July 29, 1962, issue of "The New York Times" Baldwin

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

devotes his article to the return from Europe of National Guard units. This article is captioned "Guard To Keep Few Planes On Return From Europe." It is very possible that Baldwin used [redacted] as one of his sources for the information appearing in this article.

b6 per NGB

Copies of the aforementioned articles which appeared in the July 28 and 29 issues of "The New York Times" are enclosed.

Additional developments in this matter will be furnished to you.

Enclosures (2)

PENTAGON EDICT UPSETS MILITARY

Officers Fear Curb on Role in Weapons Evaluation

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

A projected change in the organization, relationships and functions of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in the Pentagon has aroused the strong opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military leaders.

A directive issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and scheduled to go into effect next Wednesday would, in the opinion of these military leaders, change the whole concept of the group.

Unless the wording of the directive is changed, these leaders say, the strategic and weapons studies conducted for the group will be virtually independent; they will no longer be responsive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the influence and judgment of professional military officers in the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group will be virtually eliminated.

The Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, often called a "think factory," was originally established as a Pentagon "in-house" organization to advise and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in strategic studies and the evaluation of various weapons systems. I was directly responsive to the Joint Chiefs' requirements, civilian scientists on the Government's payroll and some military men staffed the agency.

Leadership Rotates

The group is headed by a senior three-star officer, supplied by each of the services in turn, and all of its reports have, in the past, been reviewed by a board composed of three senior military representatives of the services and the civilian director of research and two other senior scientists.

Two changes in recent years have altered the relationships and composition of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. First, the Institute of Defense Analysis, a nonprofit organization supported by nine universities and staffed primarily by civilian scientists, with a few retired officers, was created to do evaluation work, under contract, for the group and later for other agencies in the Pentagon and in other Government departments.

The institute's civilian scientists formed a Weapons Systems Evaluation Division to work hand in hand—at the Pentagon and within the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group—with their military counterparts under a military director.

Second, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group was made responsive also to the civilian Director of Research and Engineering, who is the number two man in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Institute of Defense Analysis is headed by Richard M. Bissell, formerly Director of Operations for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Bissell said yesterday that, as he understood it, the new directive was intended to provide more clarity in reports and the process of reporting. He said that he regarded "close military collaboration" in the studies conducted by the institute and by the evaluation group as absolutely essential, and that he felt that most military men were reading into the directive "more than was intended."

In the opinion of military men, the directive would just about eliminate any military control over the evaluation process and would make the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, as distinct from the Institute of Defense Analysis, virtually a fifth wheel.

Under the directive the institute would have almost total control over the group's studies, methods and reports. The institute's reports would go directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The group's review board of three senior military men and three scientists would become purely advisory.

Military men say that this change would effectively freeze out military officers from the group's studies; more important, it would, they say, reduce or eliminate the responsiveness of such studies to professional requirements.

There is also some concern about security requirements, which have been very stringent in the group's organization. The institute, it is said, wants to rotate its scientists among its various divisions; the military fear that this would reduce security and make vital intelligence information available to too many men who are under contract to the Government but not directly on the Government's payroll.

The Primary Fear

The overriding worry in the military, however, is that the projected change will reduce still further the influence of professional military judgment in the decision-making process. A week that he had told a Pentagon civilian official:

"I think I'm going to let you have my uniform and you can fight the next war with the weapons you design."

The Institute of Defense Analysis, on the other hand, which is negotiating new contracts with the Pentagon, apparently believes that it is carrying out the intent of a recent governmental study of nonprofit organizations under contract to the Government.

The study, conducted by a special Presidential committee under the chairmanship of David E. Bell, Director of the Budget, held that the Government must continue to rely on private companies and nonprofit groups for research projects, but warned against transferring "significant decision-making responsibility" from responsible Government officials to contractual agencies.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-16-88 BY SP3 BTJ/peh
15-2-96

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

ENCLOSURE

Guard to Keep Few Planes On Return From Europe

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Many squadrons of the Air National Guard, after duty during the Berlin crisis, will return to state service as skeletonized units, according to a National Guard survey.

When twenty-nine squadrons of the Guard were called to Federal service last fall, twelve of them were flying approximately 300 Republic F-84F jet fighter-bombers.

Most of these aircraft, though equipped and ready for nuclear delivery mission, were earmarked during their months of service in Europe for conventional support roles.

In fact, the Guard provided the Air Force in Europe with a major share of the strengthened conventional-warfare capability that Kennedy Administration policies have stressed.

By the end of the year, after the Guard squadrons have returned to state status, they will retain approximately forty-five F-84F aircraft, only enough for three or four aircraft a squadron (compared with the normal twenty-five).

The other aircraft are being turned over to the Regular Air Force to retain the augmented air strength in Europe and to help the Tactical Air Command activate five new wings (about seventy-five aircraft a wing) designated primarily for conventional support roles. Three of the five new wings will be F-84 wings, and the National Guard planes are the only ones now available to equip them.

F-104's to Be Transferred

In addition to the National Guard F-84's, the reserve units will probably turn over to the regulars at least two squadrons of Lockheed F-104 fighter-interceptors.

A squadron from Knoxville, Tenn., which established a record for number of flying hours while in active service, will be converted to the older Convair F-102, or possibly to the still older F-86L. A squadron from Phoenix, Ariz., which was flying F-104's when it went into service, is scheduled tentatively for conversion to multi-engine C-97 transports.

To compensate for the lack of F-84's, the Air National Guard plans to convert about six Guard squadrons now re-

Continued on Page 28, Column 1

AIR GUARD OUTFITS WILL LOSE PLANES

Continued from Page 1, Col. 6

turning from active duty to the North American F-86H, the Republic F-84F (the reconnaissance version of the F-84) and the North American F-100.

Another six F-84 squadrons may divide the forty-five F-84's that the Guard is being allowed to keep. These units will augment their approximately eight planes per squadron with Lockheed T-33 jet trainers, in order to keep pilots jet-qualified.

A shortage of pilots and other personnel will also greatly handicap the Air Guard in the next year or so. The Regular Air Force, as appealed to Air Guardsmen to remain on active duty, to help activate the five new Tactical Air Command wings.

About 20 Air Guardsmen who had been mobilized for the Berlin crisis have applied for extended active duty. Of these, 114 are pilots.

New Pilots Authorized

In the fiscal year 1963 the Air Guard is programmed for only fifty-seven new pilots (second lieutenants); in the next year, 1964, 110.

Difficulty is expected in replacing the pilots who are remaining on active duty and those who will leave the Guard, and also in replacing the ground technicians. Some of the technicians have been serving full time in Guard units even before mobilization.

It is estimated that some squadrons may comprise only eight to twelve pilots, as compared with the normal complement of about thirty-three.

Prospects are, therefore, that for some years to come the tactical squadrons of the Air National Guard, which proved their high state of readiness last fall by flying to Europe within a few weeks of mobilization, will have very little combat effectiveness. The personnel problem may be eased sooner than the aircraft shortage, although both are serious.

Present plans contemplate the return of the F-84's and probably of the F-104's to the Guard two or three years hence, when the Regular Air Force is more fully equipped with the new Republic F-105 and the McDonnell F-110.

The real bottleneck, however, is aircraft production. No replacement for the current generation of fighter-bombers, specifically designed for conventional as well as nuclear capability, had been programmed.

Production Line Inadequate

The recent Air Force adoption of the F-110, which in its original version was the Navy's F-4H, places a requirement for a considerably increased number of these record-breaking planes on a production line that does not now have the capacity to meet the expanded needs quickly.

Thus, for some time to come, a considerable part of the Air National Guard, highly ready last fall, will be at a very low state of readiness, through no fault of its own. And it may be quite a few years before it is equipped with really modern aircraft.

There are some feelings of bitterness about this in the Guard pilot said that "this is rather shoddy treatment of an outfit that really proved the concept of reserve forces in the Berlin build-up."

This bitterness is increased by the fact that the United States has been equipping some of its allies with F-100s and F-104's, more modern aircraft than the Guard will have following its reversion to state status. Some nations of the North Atlantic Treaty organization also will be equipped apparently with the Northrop F-105 lightweight fighter.

"The Air Guard is losing out while foreign nations are getting better equipment," an officer said.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-16-89 BY SP3 BTJ/62

5/2/96 SP3 BTJ/62

The New York Times

7/29/62

Sunday

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - D. E. Moore

The Attorney General

July 30, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

ARTICLE BY HANCOCK M. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - R

Document downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per [redacted] RS on 4/5/2010

Reference is made to my letter dated July 27, 1962, wherein it was pointed out that investigation in this matter was being conducted.

b6
b7C

The inquiries by the Department of Defense to ascertain who in the Department of Defense was visited by Baldwin during the period July 16 - 20, 1962, did not disclose the identities of any such persons with the exception of Honorable Robert S. McNamara, The Secretary of Defense, who was contacted by Baldwin on July 19, 1962.

On July 23, 1962, Mr. McNamara was interviewed concerning his contact with Baldwin on July 19. Mr. McNamara advised that arrangements for his interview by Baldwin were made by Baldwin through Mr. Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) who was also present during the Baldwin interview. Nothing was said during this interview to indicate that Baldwin had knowledge of the information contained in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-62 and there was no discussion which was pertinent to the material contained in Baldwin's article in the July 26, 1962, issue "The New York Times."

Mr. McNamara said he had no information as to Baldwin's source for his article but stated that Baldwin has innumerable contacts on a "very high level." Mr. McNamara did not feel the article was of any particular benefit to any specific department or agency of the United States Government. He felt that the potential source of the article was not [redacted]

JFW:br
(9)

SENT FIRST D.C.
THIS [redacted]
DATE 7-30-62
BY [redacted]

REC-61

SEE NOTE PAGE 2 AUG 7 1962

SENT DIRECTOR
7-30-62

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

b3
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-24-89
Classified
Declassify on: 25X 1-1-80

BY SP3 BT/lan
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1-1-80
Tavel b6
Trotter b7C
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

(U) necessarily restricted to those individuals who received copies [of NIE 11-8-62 or who had knowledge of drafts leading up to this document.] ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ ~~(X)~~ ~~(X)~~

With regard to Baldwin's sources, Mr. McNamara pointed out that an article captioned "Pentagon Edict Upsets Military" appeared in "The New York Times" of July 28, 1962. He said this is another example of "loose talk" and a lack of discipline with regard to disclosure of information. In his opinion Baldwin undoubtedly gathered information for this article on his visit to Washington, D. C., during July 16 - 20. He felt Baldwin must have obtained the information from "high level sources." This article mentioned that Baldwin had talked to Mr. Richard M. Bissell of the Institute of Defense Analysis on the previous day (July 27, 1962) and Mr. McNamara suggested we contact Mr. Bissell. This is being done.

We requested Mr. McNamara's assistance in determining who else was contacted by Baldwin in the Pentagon during the July 16 - 20 period and he was most cooperative. On the morning of July 30, 1962, he is issuing the necessary instructions to the various Secretaries of the Armed Forces, their assistants and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to secure this information. At his request, a representative of this Bureau will attend this meeting.

On July 27, 1962, an interview was conducted with Colonel Stanley Grogan, assistant to Mr. John A. McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Colonel Grogan advised that he handles matters pertaining to the press for CIA and that he has known Baldwin for the past 30 years. He described Baldwin as a journalist of excellent background and experience whose contacts are "at the highest level" and one who would not pay for information. Colonel Grogan stated that Baldwin's appointments in Washington, D. C., are made for him by secretaries at the local office of "The

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

New York Times," such as [] He recalled that for a long time such appointments were made by [] who is still employed at the Washington, D. C., office of the newspaper.

b6
b7C

It was Colonel Grogan's recollection that [] called him recently to arrange an appointment for Baldwin to see Mr. McCone during the week of July 16, 1962. Colonel Grogan advised her that Mr. McCone could not see Baldwin until 4 p.m. on July 20. Since Baldwin was unable to stay in Washington, D. C., until that time, he did not see Mr. McCone. Colonel Grogan pointed out that Mr. McCone did not want to see Baldwin.

(U) Colonel Grogan advised that Baldwin's principal contacts are undoubtedly at the Pentagon. He was of the opinion that the material for the captioned article was obtained from discussions with someone "in a high position" who had seen [NIE 11-8-62] and who was well informed on ~~SECRET~~ intelligence matters. In view of Baldwin's contacts at the Pentagon and the wording in the article, he thought that it was quite likely that Baldwin had secured his information from contacts within the Department of the Army. Colonel Grogan also thought that the article was boastful and a reply to current Soviet claims and threats.

Colonel Grogan did not know of Baldwin's contacts at CIA other than Mr. McCone and himself. He did not believe the leak in this case came from CIA. In this regard, he advised that Mr. McCone has instituted a new policy at CIA which curtails photographs, speeches, releases and interviews.

Our coverage of Baldwin and [] has not produced any pertinent information. We have determined that Baldwin registered at the Jefferson Hotel, 1200 Sixteenth

b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., on July 16 and additional inquiries are being conducted at the Hotel.

This investigation is being pressed and you will be kept advised of developments.

NOTE: Mr. McNamara was interviewed by Inspector Donald E. Moore and Special Agent [redacted] (WFO).

b6
b7C

(U) [This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because, according to CIA, the mere mention of NIE 11-8-62 warrants such classification. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ ~~(Y)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-26-2017 BY

F B I

b6

b7C

Date:

8/7/62

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Malone	
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI FROM: SAC, WFO

b3

b7E

Wannall

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

Re WFO airtel 8/6/62.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted
by WFO 8/7/62:

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR., CNO, advised he has been personally acquainted with BALDWIN for the past 40 years. BALDWIN visited ANDERSON's office from 2:30 p.m. until 3:00 p.m. on 7/19/62. No discussion of intelligence items. BALDWIN inferred that Deputy Secretary of Defense ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK had told him that General MAXWELL TAYLOR had been appointed Chairman, JCS. This information had not been released at that time. Admiral ANDERSON stated correspondent for "The Washington Star", told him on 7/3/62, there had been considerable discussion by Pentagon correspondents

b6

b7C

3 - Bureau

1 - New York

1 - WFO

(Info) (RM) (PERSONAL ATTENTION)

HJM:mdc

(5)

JOINT CHIEFS

AIRTEL

b3

b7E

COPIES DESTROYED

EX - 102

15 AUG 9 1962

101 JUN 19 1970

b6

b7C

Sent

M

Per

Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3/16/89
DECLASSIFIED BY 2338/10/10
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1.1
DATE 9/20/14 BY 513
5/19/96

Document downgraded to Secret
on 4/5/2010
JRS

APPROVED
11 AUG 1962
C. C. Wick
Sullivan

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]
that the recent Ann Arbor, Michigan, speech of Secretary of Defense MC NAMARA presented a new concept in U. S. military policy. Correspondents concluded the U. S. had attained a breakthrough in intelligence concerning Soviet military strength which suggested an effective photographic reconnaissance satellite.

(U) U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, USDS, advised he attended NSC meeting of 7/9/62, when [NIE 11-8] under consideration, and is familiar [] with contents. Also is Chairman of inter-departmental committee working on implications report. Said is casually acquainted with BALDWIN and last saw in about April, 1962, at meeting of Board of Consultants, National War College, of which both are members. Has no information as to BALDWIN's contacts or activities during pertinent period, but has heard BALDWIN well known and well received in Pentagon. Could furnish no information as to possible identity of BALDWIN's source.

(U) FOY D. KOHLER, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs, USDS, advised was out of US from 7/16-25/62. Attended meetings of committee working on implications of [NIE 11-8] and [] has read [NIE 11-8.] Said last contact with BALDWIN was in [] 1950, in NYC, when KOHLER in charge of VOA and stationed in NYC at which time had lunch with BALDWIN. Has no information as to BALDWIN's activities during pertinent period and only specific acquaintances of BALDWIN, known to KOHLER are Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. MC NAMARA and PAUL NITZE, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. Could furnish no information as to possible identity of BALDWIN's source.

(U) [] advised is familiar with all phases [NIE 11-8] and served as [] [] Said he has known BALDWIN since about 1955, but has only seen on about three occasions since that date, the last time being in early 1959. Stated knows none of BALDWIN's contacts, has no information as to BALDWIN's activities during pertinent period or possible identity of BALDWIN's source.

b6
b7C

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]

(U) WILLIAM C. FOSTER, Director, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, advised attended 7/9/62, NSC meeting at which time [NIE 11-8] discussed and is familiar with contents. Said possibly had met BALDWIN or seen him while he, FOSTER, served as Deputy Secretary of Defense, but has had no contact with him for past ten years. Could furnish no information as to identity of BALDWIN's contacts, but has heard he is well known in Pentagon. Could furnish no information as to possible identity of BALDWIN's source.

Rear Admiral GEORGE H. MILLER, Joint Strategic Survey Council, JCS, on recontact 8/7/62, advised he cannot fix date in week of 7/16/62, when he saw HANSON BALDWIN at lunch at Army Navy Club but noted BALDWIN in company of two men; one Brigadier General JAMES D. HITTLE, USMC (Retired), well known to MILLER, and another unidentified man. Admiral MILLER recalled later on same day when BALDWIN called him on telephone to seek interview, BALDWIN commented he had just talked to Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR., Chief of Naval Operations, and was on his way to see Secretary of Defense MC NAMARA. (According to interviews with ANDERSON and MC NAMARA, this date would have been 7/19/62.)

The following individuals were interviewed with negative results:

Rear Admiral SAMUEL B. FRANKEL, Chief of Staff, DIA
Rear Admiral DRAPER L. KAUFFMAN, Plans and Policy, JCS
Admiral ARLEIGH BURKE, Retired, former CNO, USA
Brigadier General PRENTISS D. WYNNE, JR., USAF
Major General RICHARD M. MONTGOMERY, USAF
Brigadier General WILLIAM V. MOMEYER, USAF
Major General CHARLES B. WESTOVER, USAF
Lieutenant General GORDON A. BLAKE, Director, NSA

b6
b7C

[] NSA
[] NSA
Lieutenant (USN) []

JAMES S. LAY, JR., Deputy Assistant for Coordination,
Office of Director CIA and
Executive Secretary to USIB.
ABBOT E. SMITH, Vice Chairman, BNE. CIA

b3

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

b3

Dr. HERBERT SCOVILLE, Deputy Director for Research, CIA

WFO airtel 7/31/62, reflected results interview of Lt. General WILLIAM P. ENNIS, U. S. Army, Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG). ENNIS stated BALDWIN contacted him on 7/20/62. ENNIS was recontacted to establish the correct date of BALDWIN's interview, and he advised that after checking his records he found he had talked with BALDWIN from 9:40 a.m. to 10:05 a.m. on Thursday, July 19, 1962, instead of July 20 as he previously indicated.

It was determined this date that PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, on vacation until 8/20/62, address School House Ridge, Northeast Harbor, Maine, telephone Browning 6-5453. Since NITZE should be interviewed by Agents cleared for this investigation, WFO will make arrangements to interview him immediately upon return to duty 8/20/62, so data can be included in report UACB. Any deviation from this will be furnished to the Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2017 BY [REDACTED] ADG

F B I

b6
b7C

Date: August 6, 1962

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Re WFO airtel 8/1/62.

Reairtel reported results interview of
Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT, Retired, Member, National
Board of Estimates, CIA. WRIGHT stated he was not
certain of luncheon dates with BALDWIN, but believed
they were July 17 and 19, 1962. He also stated first
luncheon arranged by Secretary, Naval Academy Alumni
Association, at Annapolis. Luncheon held at Army -
Navy Club, Washington, D. C., and attended by Admiral
GEORGE C. DYER, Retired, and Admiral WILLIAM R. FITZGERALD,
Retired, both of Annapolis.

WFO requests authority for WFO SAs to
attempt contact and interview Admirals DYER and FITZGERALD
at Annapolis for following reasons: (1) to resolve the
correct date of luncheon with BALDWIN (2) to determine
identity of any additional contacts of BALDWIN of pertinence
to this investigation (3) to determine date arrangements
made by Alumni office for luncheon with BALDWIN.

3 - Bureau
1 - New York [REDACTED] (Info)(PERSONAL ATTENTION)(RM)
1 - WFO
RCB/pcn
(5)

EX-100

A I R T E L

REC-22

16 AUG 7 1962

5 AUG 13 1962

CC: Wick

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

NAT. INT. SEC.

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

b6

b7C

Date 8/3/62

[redacted] is an employee of the Washington office of the "New York Times," and handles Baldwin's appointments. We interviewed her early in the investigation. She furnished names that she could recall of individuals whom Baldwin was to see while here, but was later told by her superior to furnish no more data.

Information in attached being summarized in letter to Attorney General.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-16-89 BY SP8BUT/cak

5/2/96 SP3 BTJ/can
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/gak

D

F B I

Date: 8-2-62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Belmont _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Callahan _____
 Mr. Conrad _____
 Mr. DeLoach _____
 Mr. Evans _____
 Mr. Malone _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Sullivan _____
 Mr. Tavel _____
 Mr. Trotter _____
 Mr. Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Holmes _____
 Miss Gandy _____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

b3

SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
 IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
 ESP - X

On the evening of 8-1-62, WF 1384-S* furnished the following information concerning a conversation had by [REDACTED] and a friend, known only to the informant as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] desired to know whether the office was "all calmed down"; at which point, [REDACTED] stated she was being referred to as [REDACTED]. She indicated that people look at her and ask whether she had any visitors the previous night. [REDACTED] stated that the only thing she had heard concerning the matter on 8-1-62, was the fact that [REDACTED] (inaudible, but sounded like [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]) had called her and wondered if [REDACTED] kept any records about BALDWIN's last visit. The secretary desired to know what day BALDWIN had seen the General and when the appointment had first been scheduled. In answer to a question concerning this, [REDACTED] stated she believed the secretary had kept a record of the appointment but it had been changed. [REDACTED] recalled one appointment had been made with the General but had been changed to a later date in the week "or something."

b6
b7C

With reference to the General, [REDACTED] asked whether [REDACTED] believed he was being questioned; and [REDACTED] in a joking manner, stated she felt everyone was being questioned. [REDACTED] indicated she had told the secretary to obtain the information from BALDWIN in New York.

b6
b7C

③ - Bureau
 1 - New York (PERSONAL ATTENTION) (Info) (RM)
 1 - WFO
 HJM:ctw
 (5)

11 AUG 7 1962

Approved: [Signature]
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

NAT. INT. SEC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-16-88 BY SP3BJS/CLW
 5/2/96 SP3BJS/CLW
 9/20/96 SP3BJS/CLW

[redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted] stated that she had read the article and commented that she could certainly see why "they" did not want it published. She described the article as one concerning Russian missiles and rockets, also setting forth new methods of detection, Russian types of equipment, etc. [redacted] stated "They gave away too much - - -"; at which point, [redacted] stated "Yeah, it sounds sort of as though it shouldn't have been let out really." [redacted] then asked what "his reaction" to it was and whether "they" felt he should not have printed it. [redacted] stated that yesterday (7-31-62) "he" called her and apologized since she had been bothered in the matter. "He" indicated that you don't expect things like this to happen in the United States, concerning the attitude "they" take with regard to "that Gestapo knocking on the door." [redacted] stated, however, that she still thought "the person who let that out ought to be caught." [redacted] agreed and believed "they" should knock on doors. [redacted] was in agreement with this statement. They both felt, however, that "they" should have gone to "him" and pointed out that it was a serious security violation.

b6
b7C

[redacted] felt that the reason a person gives a tip to a newspaperman is because of revenge or some other personal gain is involved. She felt that nine times out of ten revenge or spite was the motive. She continued by saying that since they get so many scoops in this manner, they have this high-grade rule in the trade not to reveal a source. She felt that her name had been obtained as a person making appointments for BALDWIN through the individuals who had seen BALDWIN. [redacted] further commented that it was possible that "they" had approached someone else from "The New York Times" who furnished her name and has not admitted it. [redacted] felt this would be a dirty trick and opined that one of the telephone operators could have done it since that was all they have to do. They both agreed that everything would be all right if [redacted] did not get a "pink slip" with her check this week.

~~TOP SECRET~~

b6
b7C

FBI

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Holmes
Miss Gandy

Date: August 1, 1962

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via: AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/JM

DECLASSIFY ON: [redacted] 00-4417

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]
FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted] (P)

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
THE NEW YORK TIMES, JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Re WFO airtel 7/31/62.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted by WFO 8/1/62:

General LYMAN LEMNITZER, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), interviewed 8/1/62. Advised he has known HANSON BALDWIN for many years. He last saw BALDWIN at about 6:00 P.M. 7/19/62 in his office for about fifteen minutes. At this time BALDWIN asked LEMNITZER about his future plans and LEMNITZER declined to answer. LEMNITZER knew then that he was to be appointed Supreme Commander of NATO. This fact was known only to President KENNEDY, Secretary McNAMARA, Deputy Secretary GILPATRIC, Secretary of State DEAN RUSK and General LEMNITZER, but was not to be publicly released until 7/23/62. The following day at about 3:30 P.M. LEMNITZER's wife called to tell him she had just learned from a CBS news cast that he had been selected for NATO.

b6
b7C

- 3 - Bureau
- 1 - New York (Info)(PERSONAL ATTENTION)(RM)
- 1 - WFO
- HJM/pcn
- (5)

A I R T E L
EX 100
REQ-38

Summary Being Prepared
for ATTORNEY GENERAL

Wick
CC: Sullivan

Approved: [signature]
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

10 AUG 3 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-20-89 multiple copies
Classified by SP3-BTS/JM

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1.1
5/16/96 SP3-BTS/JM

Document downgraded to Secret

Per [redacted] 8/15/2010

RS

5-1107
A

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

LEMNITZER said BALDWIN also asked him during their conversation of 7/19 about his successor as Chairman of JCS. LEMNITZER also declined to answer this question. BALDWIN also inquired about the elimination of Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) which was to be supplanted by a civilian group which would be responsible for this function for the Department of Defense. LEMNITZER also declined to comment on this point. He had seen a directive dated 7/11/62, not classified, which was to effect this change, but the change had not been finally approved. BALDWIN mentioned that he had seen this directive and read it, but did not say where or when. LEMNITZER had no further information pertinent to the article of 7/26/62.

Lieutenant Colonel BAYLOR P. GIBSON, Aide to General LEMNITZER, advised that immediately after the above interview he called a taxicab for BALDWIN at his request to take him to National Airport and arranged for BALDWIN to be escorted from The Pentagon, an escort being required after 6:00 P.M. GIBSON stated BALDWIN's appointment with LEMNITZER initially was for 4:00 P.M. 7/19/62, but was re-scheduled due to commitments of the General and was finally arranged for 6:00 P.M. Meanwhile, at approximately 5:00 P.M., BALDWIN had seen Secretary of Defense McNAMARA.

Lieutenant General DAVID A. BURCHINAL, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, USAF, also interviewed 8/1/62. Advised he has known BALDWIN for many years on a friendly, personal basis. On 7/16/62 he talked to BALDWIN by telephone at New York Times Washington Bureau and invited him to dinner at his home for the evening of 7/18/62. At 4:00 P.M. 7/18/62 BALDWIN telephonically advised BURCHINAL he would be unable to make it since he had arranged to have dinner with a young couple of his acquaintance. (See airtel summary of 7/31/62 [REDACTED])

b6 per NGB [REDACTED] BALDWIN suggested that BURCHINAL instead join him for cocktails at the Jefferson Hotel before dinner. Accordingly, BURCHINAL met BALDWIN at said hotel at about 6:30 P.M. and they remained together for about 35 minutes.

BURCHINAL stated that about one year ago, during a visit with BALDWIN, the latter had asked him a question relating to a classified matter which he had refused to discuss and that since that time they seem to understand each other on this point and their conversations have avoided

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

classified matters. During their visit of 7/18/62 they discussed the possible successor to General NORSTAD, Commander of NATO; also centralization of the administration of the Department of Defense, and the increasing influence of civilians in setting policy and planning of military matters. On this last topic BALDWIN commented that he was watching closely the civilian influence in weapons evaluation. They also discussed the successor to General LEMNITZER as Chairman of JCS. BALDWIN mentioned having discussed this last matter with Secretary of the Navy FRED KORTH, who had indicated that the Navy would not be unhappy about this post being filled by an officer of the Army rather than the Navy since it has been the practice for the position to be rotated by the three services. There was no conversation relative to intelligence matters.

BALDWIN mentioned that he was unhappy about his job, feeling his column no longer expressed his true feelings and thoughts because his superiors were very close to The White House and pro-administration; thus, BALDWIN was not free to express himself as in the past.

General BURCHINAL said BALDWIN told him he had recently seen Deputy Secretary of Defense ROSWELL GILPATRIC, whom he considered to be one of his closest friends. BURCHINAL believed that this contact and that with KORTH were probably on Tuesday 7/17/62, but possibly could have been on 7/16 or 7/18. BURCHINAL said he was shocked to learn from BALDWIN that on the above occasion GILPATRIC had told BALDWIN that the [successor to the B-52 airplane had been chosen and it would not be the RS-70, (u) but involved a very "hush-hush" project. According to BURCHINAL, this is highly classified information which BALDWIN was not entitled to have.

BURCHINAL advised that it is his impression that BALDWIN, in order to write his article of 7/26/62, must have seen classified documents in order to comment as he did concerning hardening, coffins and image interpretation.

It will be noted that the above dates of appointments mentioned by General LEMNITZER, Lieutenant Colonel GIBSON and General BURCHINAL are in conflict with dates of activity previously reported, although these are the dates positively furnished by those interviewed. Investigation being conducted to resolve these discrepancies.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Publications

b3
b7E

Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT, Retired, member, National Board of Estimates, advised he has known BALDWIN since, before and during World War Two and is presently closely associated with him in the Naval Academy Alumni Association of which WRIGHT is President and BALDWIN Chairman of the Publishing Committee. They communicate regularly by phone and WRIGHT sees BALDWIN every two to three months. WRIGHT advised BALDWIN visited Washington week of 7/15/62 and stayed about a week. WRIGHT had two luncheon engagements of approximately one and one-half hours each, not certain of dates but estimates luncheons took place 7/17 and 7/19/62. WRIGHT explained first lunch appointment arranged by Secretary, Naval Academy Alumni Association at Annapolis to discuss selection of advertising representative for publications of the Alumni Association. This luncheon was held at Army - Navy Club, Washington, and attended by Admiral GEORGE C. DYER, Retired, Admiral WILLIAM R. FITZGERALD, Retired, both of Annapolis, and the candidate for the advertising job, (fnu) COLLINS. Nothing was discussed except business pertaining to the selection of the advertising representative. Upon the conclusion of the luncheon WRIGHT invited BALDWIN to lunch with him at the Carlton Hotel on 7/19. The purpose of the second luncheon was to discuss a letter which WRIGHT was preparing for the Secretary of the Navy based upon an editorial of BALDWIN which appeared in "The New York Times" on 6/6/62 and was captioned "Weakening The Naval Academy". WRIGHT advised Admiral WILLIAM R. SMEDBERG, Chief of Naval Personnel, attended this second luncheon and the conversation concerned only the letter referred to above. SMEDBERG left the luncheon shortly before BALDWIN and WRIGHT separated.

(U) WRIGHT recalled that during the conversation BALDWIN mentioned he had conferred with Secretary of the Navy FRED KORTH and the editorial article of BALDWIN was mentioned in their conversation. When BALDWIN left WRIGHT after the luncheon he mentioned that he was going to The Pentagon. WRIGHT advised he is familiar with the [NIE] in question in this investigation, but denied that he had discussed any of its contents with BALDWIN and declared BALDWIN had not interrogated him concerning it or even mentioned the topic. [WRIGHT commented that only two items in the article appeared to be new to public print; namely, the reference to "hardening" of Soviet missile sites and the successful firing of a missile from a submerged Soviet] (S)(U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E



(S)(U)

(U) [submarine. He thought the remainder of the] information in BALDWIN's article could have been obtained from source material previously published. [He observed that the two disclosures were significant and believed from all things considered the conclusion should be reached that the BALDWIN article was based on information obtained from someone who had seen the [NIE] or had been briefed concerning its contents.] (S)(U) ~~(S)(U)~~

WRIGHT was queried as to whether he would be willing to attempt to ascertain from BALDWIN sources for 7/26/62 article. Stated he would be willing to call BALDWIN for this purpose if so directed by Mr. McCONE, Director, CIA. Subsequently stated would probably see BALDWIN within one to two weeks, at which time would ask BALDWIN identity of source and thereafter contact interviewing agents.

ARTHUR SYLVESTER, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Information, advised on 8/1/62 that he could furnish no information regarding BALDWIN's contacts. SYLVESTER has only limited and casual knowledge of BALDWIN. BALDWIN bypasses SYLVESTER's office in making Pentagon appointments, except appointments with Secretary of Defense McNAMARA and Deputy Secretary of Defense GILPATRIC. SYLVESTER saw BALDWIN on 7/19/62 and was present at BALDWIN's interview with McNAMARA at 5:00 P.M. on 7/19/62 in accordance with McNAMARA's instructions. SYLVESTER unaware of any other individual contacted by BALDWIN. SYLVESTER commented that BALDWIN is considered "mouthpiece for the Navy". Considers BALDWIN's articles slanted to Navy viewpoint. SYLVESTER stated BALDWIN an associate of Vice Admiral WILLIAM F. RABORN, who is classmate of BALDWIN, but knows of no other associates. SYLVESTER suggested that ORVILLE SPLITT, Director of News Services, DOD, may have additional information regarding BALDWIN's contacts at the Pentagon.

ORVILLE SPLITT, Director of News Services, DOD, furnished substantially the same information as SYLVESTER. SPLITT has personal contact with all Pentagon correspondents and frequently sees BALDWIN when BALDWIN periodically visits Pentagon. SPLITT stated that BALDWIN is a "loner" who remains aloof from other correspondents. SPLITT is not aware of the identities of BALDWIN's contacts, but feels relatively certain that they are probably high-ranking Naval personnel. SPLITT further commented that BALDWIN, in his opinion, is anti-McNAMARA because of the trend of centralizing control of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and reducing the responsibilities of the Service Chiefs.

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

General BARKSDALE HAMLETT, Vice Chief of Staff, USA, advised on 8/1/62 that he has known BALDWIN for the past several years, although not personally, and he sees him infrequently. On 7/19/62 BALDWIN requested an interview with General HAMLETT. General HAMLETT saw him on that date for about 15 minutes. At the outset of the interview, BALDWIN asked HAMLETT how he liked the appointment of General MAXWELL TAYLOR as the new Chairman of the JCS. This information had not been released; however, HAMLETT was aware of it. This information was released a day or so later. General HAMLETT is of the opinion that BALDWIN knew of this appointment. BALDWIN also asked leading questions re the Army's Nike Zeus program implying that he had additional information re this matter. BALDWIN did not make mention nor was anything discussed re the contents of article of 7/26/62. General HAMLETT stated that BALDWIN is a highly regarded military expert and is well known by high ranking military personnel, particularly in the Navy.

(U) ~~(S)~~ RICHARD M. BISSELL, Jr., President, Institute for Defense Analysis, advised he had not had access to 11-8-62 or any predecessor material. States met BALDWIN year or two ago, but does not consider him acquaintance. Advised last contact with BALDWIN was 7/27/62 re controversy between WSEG and JCS. Says permitted BALDWIN to quote him in this article. Could furnish no information as to specific contacts of BALDWIN, but had heard BALDWIN also in contact with Lieutenant General WILLIAM P. ENNIS, WSEG, recently re above article, but understands ENNIS refused to discuss matter with BALDWIN. *when Baldwin called him from ASX*

(U) Dr. STETSON CONN, Chief Historian, Office of Chief of Military History, Department of Army, states received telephone call from New York from unrecalled assistant editor of "The New York Times" three or four days before 7/18/62 to arrange for BALDWIN to discuss and obtain info for BALDWIN's new book "Battle of Stalingrad". Says BALDWIN came to his office about 9:30 A.M. 7/18/62 and used facilities of reference library in building for this purpose until about 11:50 A.M. when left by cab for luncheon engagement. CONN could furnish no info as to contacts other than at CONN's office. CHARLES B. McDONALD, STANLEY L. FALK and MARTIN BLUMENSON, all in CONN's office who also were in contact with BALDWIN on 7/18/62, interviewed; all stated contact in connection with BALDWIN's presence at office in connection with book, above. None could furnish any pertinent info or info re contacts. Noted none of above in Office of Chief of Military History had access to any phase [of 11-8-62. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

b3
b7E

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, Executive Director, CIA, advised he is acquainted with BALDWIN, having met him during World War Two while on the staff of General OMAR BRADLEY. He last saw him in 1953 and has no knowledge of present source. He also knows JAMES RESTON and WALLACE CARROLL, but has had no association in last two to three years with either.

The following persons were interviewed with negative results: [REDACTED] Chief [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA;
[REDACTED] Deputy Chief, above office; Lieutenant
Colonel [REDACTED] Office of ACSI, USAF; Commander
[REDACTED] ONI.

b3
b6
b7C

WFO will pursue the above-suggested interviews.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont *W.B.*

DATE: July 31, 1962

FROM : C. A. Evans *C*SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

W.B.

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

W.B.

In a discussion with the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General today, the Deputy Attorney General advised that he had been contacted this morning by Scottie Reston, the Chief of the Washington Bureau of the "New York Times." According to Katzenbach, Reston told him that a clerical employee of his office had been contacted by the FBI at her residence last evening. Reston complained about this stating his belief she should have been contacted at the office and that the FBI should not have gone behind the back of the superiors of this clerical employee. In addition, Katzenbach said that Reston had indicated dissatisfaction with the investigation and had implied publication of the facts in this regard would reflect most unfavorably upon the Attorney General and the President. He did not amplify these remarks as Katzenbach told him he didn't know anything at all about the situation.

I told the Attorney General we had sent over to him a letter earlier today relative to this particular interview which was conducted with a [redacted] at her residence in the District of Columbia, which interview was conducted early in the evening; that the interview lasted only about one-half hour and was concluded before 7:30 p. m. The Attorney General asked why the interview was conducted at her residence and he was informed that this was the only way that any information could be developed as was evidenced by the circumstances in this situation. As a matter of fact, [redacted] was cooperative and supplied, to the best of her knowledge, action which she had taken to make appointments with people in the Federal Government for Mr. Baldwin. She said she had more detailed records at the office which she would check. She also said she would make available this additional information but she would have to check with her supervisors.

The Attorney General was further informed that following this interview we learned from a highly confidential source [redacted] had called her supervisor and told him about the interview. On this occasion, [redacted] was instructed.

CAE:pew(10) *Red*

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

REC-61

SENT DIRECTOR

8-1-62

AUG 10 1962

b6
b7C*K226**AKG**5*ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP-8/BJ/STP

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN

b6
b7C

) not to furnish any additional information to the FBI. The Attorney General was told that it was thus evidenced that if [] had been first contacted at her office, we would have gotten no information at all. The Attorney General seemed satisfied with the explanations although he made no specific comment. I also pointed out to the Attorney General that there could well be more behind Reston's complaint than the incident involving the interview with []. An additional memorandum was delivered to his office today outlining the circumstances surrounding attempts to interview Mr. Baldwin himself early last evening. When Baldwin was contacted, he was very abrupt and said he was getting ready for dinner. Although the Agents explained that their interview would take only a few minutes and that they were willing to wait until after Mr. Baldwin had had his dinner, he refused and said the Agents should contact him at 10:30 in the morning at his office. I told the Attorney General we had learned that thereafter, Baldwin had been in contact with Reston; that there had been a good deal of talk about this whole investigation being aimed at intimidating newspapermen, with the blame for this being attributed to the Attorney General and the President. The Attorney General avoided any direct comment but asked ^{how} the investigation was progressing. I outlined for him the facts surrounding our interview with Secretary McNamara on Saturday and the steps being taken within the Defense Department to interview those persons having knowledge as to the briefings given concerning this particular subject matter. The Attorney General explained to Katzenbach, who was unfamiliar with the facts of this matter, the sensitive nature of the information contained in the Baldwin article and its effect on our security, saying that he hoped we would be able to get to the bottom of this one.

ACTION BEING TAKEN:

Our investigation in this matter is being expedited and regular reports are being submitted to the Attorney General by memorandum.

✓
Q

W.A.
f/1
R

F B I

Date: 8/6/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL RM
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]
 SUBJECT : HANSON W. BALDWIN
 ESP-X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-20-81 BY SP8 BTJ/ab
 5-2-96 SP3 BTJ/km
 9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/km

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau and WFO are the
 results of interview with [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of "The New York
 Times".

This interview was conducted on 8/4/62 at Lake
 Winnisquam, New Hampshire, by SAS [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] of the NYO.

ENCLOSURE

- 3 - Bureau [REDACTED] (Encs.-3) (RM)
- 2 - Washington Field [REDACTED] (Encs.-2) (RM)
- 1 - New York [REDACTED]

WDD:HC (33)
 (8)

REC-16

AUG 7 1962

NAT. INT. SEC.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

On 8/4/62, [redacted] was interviewed at 5:00 PM at his summer cottage at [redacted]. He said he has been BALDWIN's [redacted] for the last twenty years.

He said he did not know HANSON W. BALDWIN's sources with respect to the column written by BALDWIN which appeared on the first page of "The New York Times" on 7/26/62. He said in response to the question "Do you in fact know the sources but decline to furnish them" that historically a newspaper man protects his sources of information. Again pressed for an answer to the question quoted, [redacted] said he would decline to answer the question.

He declined to identify anyone whom he knew who might know BALDWIN's sources.

He said that he had set up some appointments for BALDWIN prior to BALDWIN's trip to Washington, DC, on 7/16/62. Some were made directly with the person involved, others indirectly through others. He declined to identify those with whom appointments were made directly or otherwise.

He stated that BALDWIN was not called to Washington, DC, prior to his trip there and he received no special call to come to develop the story which appeared on 7/26/62 over BALDWIN's name. He declined to say whether any portion of the article was prepared before or after BALDWIN's visit to Washington.

He declined to say when it was written.

He said that to appear in the paper on 7/26/62, it would have to be ready by 8:30 PM on 7/25/62 and perhaps earlier.

[redacted] said he did not write the article or any portion of it. BALDWIN writes all his own material.

When [redacted] writes, he writes in his own name.

COPIES DESTROYED

101 JUN 19 1970

ENCLOSURE [redacted]

b3
b7E

1 CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-22-88 BY SP8 BT/BJ

5/2/96 SP3 BHT/BJ

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

[redacted]
He did say he did some editing of the article. In reading the article to refresh his recollection, [redacted] stated that it was all public knowledge and considers this type article a real public service.

In reading over paragraph four of the article [redacted] commented: "That's very carefully worded--very general."

He was asked whether he knew if any portion of the material contained classified information. He said he did not.

He said BALDWIN and he had no discussion concerning the article as to care in its preparation due to the nature of the material in it, nor was there any suggestion by BALDWIN that it might contain classified information. He said there were no questions about it by any other member of the Times staff.

He was asked if in all instances he is equally knowledgeable with BALDWIN as to the sources, background and development of a story such as the one in question. He said not necessarily.

He said he had not been in touch with BALDWIN since the article appeared, and he had not contacted BALDWIN.

Date of Mail 8-1-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/gh
353842-5/21/96 SP3 BTJ/gh
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/gh

Subject JUNE MAIL The New York Times
F146
25 AUG 20 1962

Removed By

File Number

[Redacted Box]

b3
b7E

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan

DATE: August 1, 1962

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES,"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - XALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8UJ/ab5/21/96 SP3 BTJ/lem
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/lem[redacted] for Baldwin in
New York, has indicated that he was working for Baldwin on
preparation of the captioned article.b6
b7C

On 7-30-62, we interviewed Staff Sergeant [redacted]
[redacted] U.S. Air Force, in connection with this case. [redacted]
stated that within the scope of his official duties he has the
responsibility to furnish to newspapermen information of an
unclassified nature and to answer inquiries on the same type data.
He advised that on 7-24 or 25-62 he was telephonically contacted
by [redacted] who quoted the following passage from a proposed article:
"In these installations the missiles, until ready for launching,
lie horizontally in a large concrete box flush with, or slightly
above." In response to [redacted] inquiry, [redacted] told him this
information was true. It is noted that this information is included
in the captioned article. [redacted] did not tell [redacted] the
passage related to Soviet missiles and [redacted] assumed [redacted]
was referring to American missiles.

b6
b7COBSERVATIONS:

It appears that [redacted] was working with Baldwin in the
preparation of the captioned article. Whether Baldwin confided in
him as to his sources for the information in the article, of course,
is not known. [redacted] however, probably could furnish information
pertinent to this investigation if he so desired. Bureau files
contain no information on [redacted]

b6
b7CRECOMMENDATION:

Since [redacted] is so close to Baldwin professionally as
well as to "The New York Times" it is recommended that we request

Enc. *Report 8-2-62*
JFW:dmd
(7)

1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

67 AUG 13 1962

W. R. Wannall
10/2/62
4-2-62
CA 2-62
EX-116

15 AUG 13 1962

E. B. I.
RECEIVED-DISTCLOUb3
b7E

5-10

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES,"
JULY 26, 1962

b6
b7C
the Attorney General to advise whether he desires that he be interviewed. In this regard it is noted that James Reston, head of the Washington Bureau of the "Times" has already protested to the Deputy Attorney General about our interviews with Baldwin and [redacted] an employee of the Washington "Times" office.

Attached is a letter to the Attorney General *To be*
delivered by [redacted]

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

August 2, 1962

REC-63

Mr. Assistant General

[Redacted]

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

b3
b7E

EX-116

RECEIVED BY THE DIRECTOR
FBI
AUG 26, 1962
10:11 AM - 1

REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI

AUG 7 11 21 AM '62

Reference is made to my letter dated July 31, 1962, in which it was pointed out that [Redacted] for [Redacted] [Redacted] whether certain information concerning the location of missiles was accurate. It is noted that the language used by [Redacted] in his inquiry is identical with that contained in paragraph two of the captioned article.

b6
b7C

In view of the possibility that [Redacted] may possess information pertinent to this investigation, it is requested that we be advised whether you desire that he be interviewed in this investigation.

Note: Cover memorandum Wannall to Sullivan prepared by JFW:d.d on 8-1-62 same subject.

JFW:d.d
(9)

- Tolson _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

67 AUG 13 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP-8 JWS/STP
5/2/96 SP-8 JWS/STP
7/10/01 SP-8 JWS/STP

[Handwritten signatures and stamps]

15 AUG 1962

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: August 2, 1962

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES,"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Bureau letter of August 2, 1962, to the Attorney General requesting advice as to whether [redacted] for Baldwin, should be interviewed, was personally delivered to the Attorney General. He advised he desired we go ahead and interview [redacted] I told him there was some indication [redacted] might be away on vacation. The Attorney General said he thought, nevertheless, we should go ahead and interview him.

b3
b7E

CAE:pew
-8-

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

REC-63

EX-116

15 AUG 10 1962

ASAC Belmont filed
by WES on 8/2/62
5-1127-1
5-1127-1

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-20-82 BY SP-6
5/21/86

9/20/96
5/23/87

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 7 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

URGENT 8-7-62 12-15 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI

FROM SAC NEW YORK

SUBJECT HANSON W. BALDWIN /ESP-X

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK DEVELOPED NO PERTINENT
INFO RE SUBJECT/S ACTIVITIES ON AUGUST SIXTH.
END AND ACK

NY R 01 WA NH

TWO COPIES WEO

5- AUG 15 1962
F146

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/cn

8/21/96 583 BTJ/cn
AND SAC WFO

REC-56

EX-108

15 AUG 10 1962

5- WOOD

b3
b7E

Memorandum

TO : MR. SULLIVAN *wey*DATE: 8/7/62 *wey*FROM : A. H. Belmont *alt*

SUBJECT:

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
7/26/62 - ESPIONAGE-X

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Evans
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D.E. Moore
Mr. Wacks

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

[] of the National Security Council staff, called me on the evening of 8/6/62 to advise that the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee (the Killian Committee) is considering, among other things, the problem of leaks of intelligence information to the press (it is recalled that, according to advice given Mr. Evans by the AG, the Killian Committee advised the President that the leak in the Baldwin article was extremely damaging to the United States intelligence collection effort).

[] said that McGeorge Bundy of the White House had asked when the Baldwin investigation would be completed; that he did not mean this as a "needle" but merely wanted to know in the event the President asked him during a discussion of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee.

I told [] that this case was being handled as a special and has been from the outset, but that I could not tell him when the investigation would be complete. I pointed out that originally we were advised that Baldwin only talked to one person in the Defense Department, namely Secretary McNamara, but we had now found that he had talked to about twenty.

I did not tell [] that we are keeping [] of the White House advised of the progress of this investigation. We sent a summary memorandum over to [] on 8/7 and are sending supplemental memoranda over showing the investigation as it progresses.

REC-41

AHB:CSH (6)

25 AUG 9 1962

b3
b7E

56 AUG 17 1962

AUG 10 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-20-88 BY SP-8 BTJ/bat

5/21/96 SP-8 BTJ/bat

9/20/96 SP-8 BTJ/bat

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-98194

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - D. E. Moore
1 - Wannall
1 - August 2, 1962
1 - Wacks

The Attorney General

REC-63

Director, FBI

ARTICLE BY MARSHALL BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Document downgraded to
~~SECRET~~ for [redacted] VRS m 9/5/22

In connection with our continuing investigation in this case, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, was interviewed on August 1, 1962. He advised that he has known Hanson Baldwin for many years and last saw him at approximately 6 p.m. on July 19, 1962, in his office. This meeting lasted for about 15 minutes.

Baldwin asked the General about his future plans and General Lemnitzer declined to answer. Baldwin also asked him about his successor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but General Lemnitzer also declined to answer this question.

Baldwin inquired about the elimination of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. General Lemnitzer advised he had declined to comment on this point. He had seen a directive dated July 11, 1962, not classified, which was to effect this change, but the change had not been finally approved. Baldwin mentioned he had seen this directive and had read it, but he did not say where or when. The data in the July 26 article was not mentioned.

Major General David A. Burchinal, Director of Plans, Department of the Air Force, on August 1, 1962, advised he has known Baldwin for many years on a friendly personal basis and had seen him at approximately 6:30 p.m. on July 18, 1962. They remained together for about 35 minutes. General Burchinal stated that no classified information was discussed during this visit. According to the General, Baldwin mentioned having discussed the successor to General Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth, who had indicated that the Navy would not be unhappy about this post being filled by an Army officer rather than a Navy officer since it had been the practice for the post to be rotated by the three services. General Burchinal advised that Baldwin

SENT DIRECTOR

6-3-62

JFW:smf:jwh

(9)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

5-1-2001

00-11

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-20-89 BY 5809/SPB/STP

MAILED 3
AUG - 3 1962
COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

had told him he had recently seen Mr. Roswell Leavitt Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, whom Baldwin considered to be one of his closest friends. General Burchinal pointed out that he was shocked to learn from Baldwin that Mr. Gilpatric had told Baldwin that the [successor to the B-52 airplane had been picked; that it would not be the RS-70; but instead involved a very "hush-hush" project.] According to General Burchinal, this is (u) highly classified information which Baldwin was not entitled to have. General Burchinal stated that it is his impression that Baldwin, in order to write his article of July 26, must have seen classified documents.

(U) Admiral Jerauld Wright, a member of the National Board of Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, on August 1, 1962, advised that he has known Baldwin for many years and is at present closely associated with him in the Naval Academy Alumni Association. Admiral Wright advised that he is familiar with (U) the National Intelligence Estimate 11-8-62] but denied that he had discussed any of its contents with Baldwin. Admiral Wright also declared that Baldwin had not mentioned the topics covered (U) in this Estimate.] Admiral Wright commented that only two items appeared to be newly published information. In this regard (U) he made reference to "hardening" of missile sites and the successful firing of a missile from a submerged Soviet submarine. He thought the remainder of the information in Baldwin's article could have come from source material previously published. He pointed out, however, that the conclusion should be reached that the Baldwin article was based on information obtained from someone [who had seen the Estimate or had been briefed concerning its contents.]

Various individuals who have previously been interviewed in this matter have indicated that Baldwin was in Washington, D. C., on July 20, 1962. On August 1, 1962, Lieutenant Colonel Taylor P. Gibson, Aide to General Lemnitzer, advised that on July 19, immediately after Baldwin's interview with the General, he (Colonel Gibson) called a taxicab for Baldwin at his request to take him to Washington National Airport. This would indicate that possibly Baldwin left Washington on the evening of July 19. We are checking into this.

Additional developments in this matter will be furnished to you.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

~~SECRET~~

(U) Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because the mere mention of the National Intelligence Estimate 11-8-62 according to CIA warrants such classification. ~~(S) (ZS)~~

" 3 "

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: August 2, 1962

FROM : C. A. Evans

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/sm
ON 5-1-2001

00-4417

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN THE "NEW YORK TIMES"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

✓ 150
Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

W. J. Sullivan
W. J. Sullivan
W. J. Sullivan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

The Attorney General advised that he had called for the Director earlier this morning, it having slipped his mind that the Director was out of the city. The Attorney General is fully aware that the Director is available by telephone. He indicated that in view of the time differential of the West Coast, he would not call him on the telephone but asked that the following information be passed on to Mr. Hoover.

The Attorney General said the President did not want to accept just the evaluation of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department as to the seriousness of the disclosures in the Baldwin story. Accordingly, the President asked for an independent evaluation of this matter by the Killian Committee. (James R. Killian is Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.) The Attorney General said he had been informed telephonically as to Killian's report to the President in this regard and he thought the Director would be interested in it.

3-20-89
Classified by SP3 BTJ/CMW
Declassify on 25X-44
5/2/96

The Killian report characterized the Baldwin disclosure as being the most damaging security breach in its experience, that it is bound to result in a diminution of our "intelligence take" as to Soviet missile plans. The report further classified this Baldwin disclosure as a tragic breach of security. It continued by indicating it was incomprehensible that Baldwin would write such a story and that the editors of the "New York Times" would publish it. This indicated that the only result can be a quick and further concealment of missile plans by the Soviets and hamper our plans to develop information in this regard. (S) (U)

REC-63

The Attorney General commented that in view of this evaluation by the Killian Committee, any complaints about our interviewing a stenographer employed by the "New York Times" at her home at 6:30 or 7:00 in the evening 1962 certainly seemed ridiculous.

The Attorney General was informed that this information would, of course, be made promptly available to the Director.

CAE:pew (8)
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

SENT DIRECTOR
8-2-62~~SECRET~~b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

The Attorney General

August 3, 1962

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore

ARTICLE BY HANSON N. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES,"

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

JULY 20, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Document forwarded to
to ~~SECRET~~ per [redacted]
on 4/5/2010

b6
b7C
/PS

REC'D-READING ROOM

AUG 3 2 57 PM '62

In connection with our continuing investigation in this case, Mr. Roswell Leavitt Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, was interviewed on August 2, 1962. He stated he has known Benson Baldwin for approximately ten years and has met with him about four times a year when Baldwin visits Washington, D. C.

Mr. Gilpatric stated that on July 17, 1962, he had a meeting with Baldwin which started at 3:30 p.m. and lasted about 45 minutes. Baldwin told Mr. Gilpatric he desired to discuss a speech made at Ann Arbor, Michigan, by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the status of the National Guard Reserve. Following discussion on these points, Baldwin inquired concerning the changes in the military commands of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). He inquired concerning retirement of General Mauris Horstad from NATO; attempted to obtain information concerning the successor to General Lyman L. Lemnitzer as chairman, JCS; and indicated his only specific knowledge was the retirement of General Horstad, which he tried to link to change in United States weapons policy in Europe. Mr. Gilpatric stated at no time did the discussion between Baldwin and himself touch on intelligence matters and that he never, at any time, had furnished Baldwin any information whatsoever of a classified nature.

DECLASSIFIED ON 25X
1-2-2010
b6
b7C
b3
b7E

With regard to Baldwin's July 20, 1962, article, Mr. Gilpatric stated that he first read it on July 26 when he was en route to New York, New York, to attend a luncheon given for him by the Board of Editors at "The New York Times."

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

JFW:djw

SEE NOTE, PAGE 4

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Mr. Gilpatric said that, prior to his departure, Adam Yarmolinsky, The Special Assistant, Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense, brought the article to Mr. Gilpatric's attention and requested that Mr. Gilpatric not mention it at the luncheon. Mr. Gilpatric stated that eight persons were at the luncheon, including Baldwin. Following the luncheon, Mr. Gilpatric spoke privately to Orville Dryfoos, the publisher of "The New York Times," about the July 26 article. Mr. Gilpatric said that he told Dryfoos that this leak was a matter of serious concern and indicated insensitivity of Baldwin to security matters. Mr. Gilpatric said he cited to Dryfoos several instances wherein Baldwin had come close to or had crossed over security limits. With respect to the leak in the July 26 article, Mr. Gilpatric advised that he had no idea where Baldwin got the information but believed that Baldwin had talked to either individuals who had "back-up" material [for the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-62 or someone who had read the NIE document.] ~~(S)~~ Mr. Gilpatric also pointed out that he felt that Baldwin's source was exclusively military.

Mr. Gilpatric was then informed by the interviewing Agents, without our source being disclosed, that on July 16, 1962, Baldwin had made the statement that he had learned from Mr. Gilpatric the decision had been made concerning [the successor to the B-52 bomber and that it would not be the RS-70 (Reconnaissance Strike) airplane.] After some hesitation, Mr. Gilpatric stated that Baldwin's allegation was not true. Mr. Gilpatric related that he had had a conversation sometime during April or May, 1962, with Baldwin concerning [the successor to the B-52] and, during the conversation, Baldwin criticized the Department of Defense for having gone so long (18 months) without a new weapons program. Mr. Gilpatric contended that he told Baldwin this was not true and, when Baldwin pointed out there had been no provisions made for manned bombers, Mr. Gilpatric replied, "There are some things even you don't know." Mr. Gilpatric said that they then discussed [advanced weapons] ~~(S)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

(U) [such as the TFX (Tactical Fighter - Experimental) and the
MRBM (Mobile Mid-Range Ballistic Missile). Mr. Gilpatric
said that they discussed the "follow-on" for the B-52 but
that they did not discuss the RS-70. Mr. Gilpatric explained
that actually there had been no change in the decision not
to make the RS-70 a major weapons program but he did not
furnish this information to Baldwin. According to
Mr. Gilpatric, the studies relating to a successor to the
B-52 were classified "~~Top Secret~~" and some of the information
pertaining thereto was "very closely held." Mr. Gilpatric ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ ~~(S)~~
said that, during the luncheon in New York on July 26, one
(U) of the editors in the group had raised a question as to whether
a decision had been reached concerning [the RS-70] and
(U) Mr. Gilpatric had replied that the Department of Defense
had not yet reached the point where they had to make a decision
as to any change in policy in this area.

(U) Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology, was interviewed on
August 2, 1962, but stated he did not know Baldwin and had
never talked to him. He pointed out that he had never received
(U) any inquiry at any time concerning the material [in NIE 11-8-62] ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ ~~(S)~~
and had not discussed the matter with anyone other than his
assistant. [He observed that references to "hardening" of
missile sites, submarine information and possibly reference
to "coffin" type would lead him to believe some individual
(U) furnished the information in NIE 11-8-62 to Baldwin. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ ~~(S)~~

On August 2, 1962, [redacted] b6 per NGB
[redacted] Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau,
Department of the Army, whom we interviewed on July 31, 1962,
advised that he erred with respect to the date he met with
Baldwin and actually he had dined with Baldwin on the evening
of July 18, 1962, instead of July 19, 1962, as he had previously
advised.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Our coverage of [] determined that, during the evening of August 1, 1962, she was in contact with a friend known only to the informant as [] desired to know whether the office (apparently the Washington, D. C., Bureau of "The New York Times") was "all calmed down." [] stated she was being referred to as [] and she indicated that people looked at her and asked whether she had had any visitors the previous night. [] stated that she had read "the article" and she commented that she could certainly see why "they" did not want it published. She described the contents of the article for [] and [] stated, "They gave away too much...." [] replied, "Yeah, it sounds sort of as though it shouldn't have been let out really." [] then inquired as to what "his reaction" to it was and whether "they" felt he should not have printed it. [] stated that, on July 31, 1962, "he" called her and apologized for her having been "bothered" in the matter. "He" indicated that "you don't expect things like this to happen in the United States." [] stated that "he" referred to the attitude "they" take with regard to "that Gestapo knocking on the door." [] stated, however, that she still thought "the person who let that out ought to be caught." [] agreed and believed "they" should knock on doors. [] was in agreement with this statement. They both felt, however, that "they" should have gone to "him" and pointed out that it was a serious security violation. [] also indicated that, since "they" get so many "scoops" in this manner, "they have this ironclad rule in the trade not to reveal the source."

b6
b7C

Any additional developments in this matter will be furnished to you.

(U) NOTE: Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because the mere mention of the NIE 11-8-62, according to CIA, warrants such a classification. []

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 8/8/62

FROM : W. R. Wannall *Wannall*

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

1 - Belmont
1 - Mohr
1 - Tavel
1 - Sullivan
1 - D.E. Moore
1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

[Handwritten initials]
[Handwritten initials]

(U) This unauthorized disclosure of classified information involved information appearing in the National Intelligence Estimate 11-8-62 which bears the highest "Top Secret" classification. The information disclosed by our investigation is of a most sensitive nature and merits careful handling of the file.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the instant file be maintained in the Confidential Mail Room, Files and Communications Division.

JFW:smf
(8)

Document downgraded
to ~~Secret~~ per [redacted]
[redacted] RS on 4/5/2010

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/clw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1.8
5/4/96 9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/pk

FOI/PA # 288,611
APPEAL # _____
CIVIL ACT. # _____
E.O. # 12352
DATE 3-20-89 INITIALS *[initials]*

3-1 is app. Gov. Agency

7 AUG 13 1962

b3
b7E

~~NAT. INT. SEC.~~

65 AUG 21 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-20-89
Classified by SP3 BTJ/clw
Declassify on: OADR

File placed in
Spec. Mail Rm. *Wannall*
8-10-62

Removed
10-15-64
Per memo
Sand - Sullivan 9.29.64

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dec 13, 1962

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Evans

1 - Mr. Sullivan

ARTICLE BY THOMAS W. BALDWIN

1 - Mr. D. E. Moore

IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"

1 - Mr. Wannall

JULY 26, 1962

1 - Mr. Wacks

ESPIONAGE - A

Document Documented by
~~Secret~~ per [redacted] (R)
b-2 4/5/2012

b6
b7C

Aug 12 2 46 PM '62
READING ROOM

3-20-89
BY SPW/scr
JAN 27 01:03

Figure 1. Schematic representation of the experimental design. The subjects were divided into three groups: (a) control group, (b) group with a 10% reduction in the number of subjects, and (c) group with a 20% reduction in the number of subjects. The subjects were divided into three groups: (a) control group, (b) group with a 10% reduction in the number of subjects, and (c) group with a 20% reduction in the number of subjects.

REC-23

b3
b7E

353842
CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/C SEE NOTE PAGE 2
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

NOTE:

(U) This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the mere mention of the National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-62, according to CIA, warrants this classification. ~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECODED COPY

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

☐ Radio

☒ Teletype

URGENT 8-9-62 7:07 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR AND SAC WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM SAC NEW YORK 091025

HANSON W. BALDWIN, ESP - X.

NY 3698-S* ADVISED [] CALLED SUBJECT LATE WEDNESDAY EVENING. INFORMANT UNABLE TO OBTAIN MOST REMARKS MADE BY [] INFORMANT BELIEVES [] IS TO RECEIVE A PERSONAL LETTER AND OR DOCUMENT FROM PRESIDENT WHICH WILL BE DELIVERED BY A NAVAL ATTACHE. [] APPARENTLY SOUGHT SUBJECTS OPINION WHO ADVISED HIM TO TELL ATTACHE [] AND ANSWER LETTER AFTER STUDY AND AFTER ATTACHE LEAVES. [] ALSO SAYS "THEY HAVE A COMPLETE REPORT ON THE INCIDENT," POSSIBLY RELATING TO SUBJECT. BALDWIN INQUIRES WHETHER [] RECEIVED LETTER SENT TO HIM BY BALDWIN FROM THE "YOUNG CHAP IN THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU." BALDWIN SAYS ADMINISTRATION CAN'T WIN LOYALTY THAT WAY. HE ADVISED [] TO MAKE A STRONG POINT IN HIS REPLY TO THE LETTER APPARENTLY THAT THE PRESS CAN'T BE BOUND BY THE FACT THE GOVERNMENT IS EMBARRASSED. BALDWIN BELIEVES SYMPATHY WILL BE ON "OUR SIDE OF THE FENCE" BECAUSE OF THE FACT THEY WERE SO WARY ABOUT HAVING ANYTHING IN PRINT ON THIS. POSSIBILITY [] MAY BE ORVILLE DRYFOOS, TIMES PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER. MATERIAL BEING STUDIED. TRANSCRIPT FOLLOWS []

b6
b7C

RECEIVED:

REC-50
7:15 AM

MJC

b3
b7E

2 CC WASHINGTON FIELD

15 AUG 10 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

REC-23

The Attorney General

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
July 30, 1962

b3
b7E

Director, FBI

1 - D. E. Moore
1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

JUL 30 2 34 PM '62
READING ROOM
L B I

Reference is made to my letter dated July 27, 1962, in which it was pointed out that investigation in this matter was being conducted.

For your information Hanson W. Baldwin has never been the subject of a full-scale investigation by this Bureau. He has, however, been the subject of three inquiries based on articles he wrote in "The New York Times," issues of June 5, 1952, August 23, 1952, and October 10, 1955, each of which contained classified information. He interviewed Baldwin on January 3, 1953, at the specific request of the then Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, in connection with the unauthorized disclosures of classified information in the June 5, 1952, and August 23, 1952, issues of the newspaper. Baldwin at that time was asked to divulge the source for the information in the articles, but he refused to do so stating that as a good newspaperman he would be unable to divulge his source.

The then Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, by letter dated February 3, 1953, advised that in view of the refusal of Baldwin to disclose his source in addition to the wide dissemination of the information involved, further investigation was not warranted in these cases. Our inquiries in the leak in Baldwin's article in the October 10, 1955, issue of "The New York Times" disclosed that the data involved was not contained in any specific document but had appeared in numerous documents issued by the Atomic Energy

b6
b7C

- Tolson _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

JFW:br
(9)

INVESTIG
REC-D

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

CONFIDENTIAL

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

7-30-62

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 5/2/93 BY 9303/2/93

7/26/1983 3:56 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Attorney General

Commission and the Department of Defense which had been disseminated to hundreds of persons. As a result the then Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, by letter dated February 23, 1956, advised that there was insufficient evidence to establish a violation of the espionage statutes and further investigation by this Bureau was not warranted.

The 1962 - 1963 issue of "Who's Who in America" indicates that Baldwin was born March 22, 1903, in Baltimore, Maryland; that he graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1924 when he was commissioned as an Ensign; that he resigned from the United States Navy in 1927 with the rank of Lieutenant (junior grade); that he has been employed as a reporter and editor with "The New York Times" since 1929; and that he has held the position of Military Editor of "The New York Times" since 1942.

The files of this Bureau indicate that Baldwin in connection with his newspaper assignments has been in frequent contact with various United States Government officials and is, of course, well known in United States Government circles; however, there is no indication as to any particular contact he may have who might have provided him information included in his July 26, 1962, article in "The New York Times."

We are conducting investigation of the captioned matter in a most expeditious manner and you will be kept advised of developments.

NOTE: This letter classified "~~Confidential~~" since it indicates the location of an article in the public domain so classified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: July 27, 1962

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: HANSON W. BALDWIN
ESPIONAGE - XALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE3-20-87
Classified by *SP3/BJ*
Declassify on: OADR1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

SEE REV
SIDE
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

W. E. Moore
Wannall

In connection with our current inquiries regarding Baldwin, based on his article in "The New York Times" issue of 7/26/62, Bufiles have been thoroughly reviewed concerning the subject, and pertinent data set forth in this memorandum.

Hanson W. Baldwin
Summary
"Who's Who in America" for 1962-63 shows Baldwin was born 3/22/03, Baltimore, Maryland. He graduated from U. S. Naval Academy in 1924, was commissioned Ensign, and subsequently advanced to rank of Lt. (j.g.), resigning from Navy in 1927. He worked for "Baltimore Sun" as reporter, and has been employed as reporter and editor with "The New York Times" since 1929. He has held position of Military Editor of "Times" since 1942. During the same year he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize. He has written a number of books dealing with military strategy and has also contributed numerous articles to various periodicals.

Baldwin has never been subject of full-scale Bureau investigation. However, he has been subject of three prior inquiries based on articles he wrote in "Times" (issues of 6/5/52, 8/23/52 and 10/10/55), which contained classified information relating to U. S. defense plans. In connection with articles of 6/5/52 and 8/23/52, at specific request of Criminal Division of Department, we had our New York Office interview Baldwin on 1/6/53 to determine if he was willing to divulge the sources of his information. Subject said that as a good newspaperman he would be unable to divulge his sources. Department subsequently advised that, in view of this refusal of the subject and since prior inquiries had shown that the security information involved had been widely disseminated, further investigation was not warranted, and there was no way to determine whether the subject committed a violation of Federal espionage laws.

Concerning Baldwin's article of 10/10/55, [this concerned data regarding antiaircraft guided missiles which Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) reported was Secret-Restricted Data.] AEC subsequently advised that information disclosed by Baldwin was not contained in any specific

100-79595)
RDC:djw
(8)

SENT DIRECTOR

7-30-62

AUG 14 1962

18 AUG 13 1962

SECRET

b3
b7E

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-79595

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
RE: HANSON W. BALDWIN
100-79595

document but had appeared in numerous documents issued by AEC or Defense Department which had been disseminated to hundreds of persons. As a result, in February, 1956, Internal Security Division of Department advised that, in its opinion, there was insufficient evidence to establish a violation of espionage statutes and that further investigation did not appear warranted. No actual investigation was undertaken by Bureau in this matter.

Review of Bufiles has shown that Baldwin, in connection with his newspaper assignment, has been in frequent contact with various U. S. Government officials and is, of course, well known in Government circles. However, there is no indication as to any particular high-level contact he may have who might have provided him data in his 7/26/62 article.

Baldwin is not known to have any specific subversive connections; however, he has been critical of the FBI on several occasions. For instance, in 1947 he wrote article in "Times" to the effect that while the FBI was rightly praised as a splendid criminal investigative agency, it did not deserve its "over-publicized" title as a counterespionage agency. In 1948 Baldwin wrote an article in the "Times" in which he alleged there was friction between Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Bureau during transfer of intelligence responsibilities in Latin America from the Bureau to CIA following World War II. Baldwin's article placed the blame for this on FBI and contained several unfounded statements along these lines. During 1947, in our investigation of Alger Hiss case, we learned that Hiss wrote letter to an official at Stanford University in which he referred to Baldwin as "my friend." No other information is available regarding Hiss-Baldwin relationship.

Results of our prior inquiries concerning Baldwin, based on his articles in "Times," have been furnished to Department, AEC, military intelligence agencies and CIA.

ACTION:

This is for information. A memorandum, containing Baldwin's background, was sent to the Attorney General on 7/30/62.

W. H. R. - 2 -

AW

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 8/9/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

Document downgraded
to ~~Secret~~ per
[redacted] /RS b6
on 4/5/2010 b7C

Re WFO airtel 8/8/62.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted
by WFO 8/9/62:

[redacted] advised
[redacted] had seen BALDWIN during
period 7/16-19/62. Although [redacted] acquainted with
BALDWIN has not seen him since fall, 1960.

b7C per USMC

[redacted] confidentially and as an aside
furnished following data which he did not desire disseminated
outside the Bureau:

b7C per USMC

[redacted] stated it is pretty well known that
ROSWELL GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense, is the
person responsible for giving the information to BALDWIN

- 3 - Bureau
- 1 - New York [redacted] (Info) (RM) (PERSONAL ATTENTION)
- 1 - WFO

b3
b7E

HJM:mde
(5)

C. C. Wick
cc: Sullivan

REC-28

AIRTEL

11 AUG 13 1962

b3
b7E

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

EX-108

~~TOP SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-20-89
Classified by SP-5 BT/CLC
Declassify on: OADR

CLASSIFIED BY SP-3 BT/CLC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
5/6/96 9/20/96 5/23/05/96

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

b7C per USMC

[] which appeared in 7/26/62 article. [] did not feel free to name sources in this regard but said it was generally believed by responsible people in the military community that GILPATRIC was the person who disclosed the data to BALDWIN.

Inquiry in Annapolis, Maryland, indicated Rear Admiral WILLIAM F. FITZGERALD, JR. (Retired), Executive Director, Naval Academy Alumni Association, left Annapolis by auto on 8/8/62, and will be travelling to West Point, NY; New York City, and Camden, NJ, and will return to Annapolis late in the evening on 8/11/62. Further inquiry established that Vice Admiral GEORGE C. DYER (Retired) is residing in Melvin Village, N.H., and is not expected to return to Annapolis until Labor Day. DYER can be reached through P.O. Box 112 or phoned at Liberty 4-3354 in Melvin Village. In the absence of the above, Mrs. BARBARA CURTIS, Administrative Assistant to FITZGERALD, was unable to locate any information which was of assistance in establishing the date of the BALDWIN, WRIGHT, FITZGERALD, DYER luncheon during the week of 7/16/62.

FITZGERALD to be interviewed 8/13/62, and based on results recommendations will be made re future interview of DYER.

Mr. EDWARD R. MURROW, Director of the United States Information Agency, advised that he has known BALDWIN for many years and has a high regard for his professional ability. He has not seen BALDWIN for the past year, and did not know that BALDWIN was in WDC during July, 1962. He was unable to identify the source of BALDWIN's information, however, he suggested that "The New York Times" may have had a staff of reporters working on this article.

Vice Admiral JOHN SYLVESTER, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) has known BALDWIN since they attended Naval Academy together. He did not see BALDWIN during July, 1962. Admiral SYLVESTER stated that it is his opinion and the opinion of other high ranking Naval officers that BALDWIN's source on which his article of 7/26/62, was based is a high placed civilian employee with the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense or above.

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted]
General CURTIS E. LE MAY, Chief of Staff, USAF, furnished no facts of value to investigation but expressed the opinion that no one wearing a uniform had furnished BALDWIN with information contained in 7/26/62, article. He stated he believes that the information was deliberately furnished to BALDWIN by the Administration but has no opinion as to the purpose to be served or the person who made the information available.

(U) Secretary of State DEAN RUSK advised he attended NSC briefing on 7/9/62, and is familiar with contents of [11-8-62.] Stated is acquainted with BALDWIN but cannot recall seeing or being otherwise in contact with him for about five years. Stated definitely has not seen or talked to him since he, RUSK, has held present position. Stated knows of no contacts of BALDWIN, nor could he furnish any information as to BALDWIN's activities during pertinent period. Could furnish no information as to possible identity of BALDWIN's source for article. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHESTER L. COOPER, Deputy Assistant Director, ONE, CIA; Captain [redacted] USN, Acting Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence; and Colonel [redacted] USAF, [redacted] of Aerospace Force Division, Air Force Intelligence Center, all interviewed with negative results.

b6
b7C

Data set forth above furnishing opinions of [redacted] LE MAY and SYLVESTER to be included in administrative section of WFO report UACB.

b7C per USMC

F B I

Date: 8/11/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via A I R T E L _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

b3

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

On 8/10/62, [REDACTED] advised SA WILFRED L. BERGERON
that the following long distance calls were made from telephone
[REDACTED] listed to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]:

b6
b7C
b7D

7/13/62	TR 9-3000	NYC
7/19/62	WH 3-8900	NYC
7/20/62	PL 2-3734	NYC

NY identify subscribers to above numbers.

BUDED for all investigation 8/17/62.

3 - Bureau
2 - New York [REDACTED] (RM) (PERSONAL ATTENTION)
1 - WFO
RCB:sh
(6)

REC-28

A I R T E L

11 AUG 13 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/6/96 BY 803 BTJ/km
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/96

b3
b7Eb6
b7C

C. C. Wick

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/fat

5/6/96 SP3 BTJ/cem
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/cem

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Malone	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

URGENT 8-10-62 12-40 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI /1/ [REDACTED] AND SAC WFO [REDACTED]

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN, ESP-X

b3
b7E

Wendell

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK ADVISED BALDWIN
CONTACTED HIS WIFE INLATE AFTERNOON AND INDICATED THER WAS QUOTE
NO SWEAT UNQUOTE EVERYTHING WOULD BE ALL RIGHT. NO PERTINENT INFO
RE HIS ACTIVITIES REPORTED.

END AND ACK

NY R 01 WA NH

TU

REC-26

11 AUG 13 1962

b3
b7E

5-Work

53 AUG 16 1962

EX-116

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 12 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/fat

URGENT 8/12/62 8-42 PM JQ

TO DIRECTOR, FBI /6/ [REDACTED]

AND SAC WASHINGTON FIELD [REDACTED]

FROM SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN

ESPIONAGE - X

N. Y. 3698-S ASTERISK REPORTED NO PERTINENT INFORMATION REGARDING
BALDWIN/S ACTIVITIES AUG. ELEVEN OR TWELVE.

END ACK

NY R 6 WA DA

REC- 26

11 AUG 13 1962

EX-116

53 AUG 16 1962

TWO COPIES WFO

b3

b7E

b3

b7E

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan *WC8 82-8110*

DATE: 8-6-62

FROM : W. R. Wannall *Wannall*

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - D.E. Moore
1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

Investigation in this matter was instituted 7-26-62 and since that date 84 individuals have been interviewed. Of these persons 19 have advised that they were contacted by Baldwin during the week of July 16.

While this investigation to date has not disclosed who furnished the information to Baldwin on which he based his 7-26 article, we have determined the identities of two persons who apparently are sources of Baldwin in the Pentagon.

82-8110
Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, is one of these individuals. General David A. Burchinal, Director of Plans, Air Force, advised us on 8-1-62 that Baldwin informed him that Gilpatric had told Baldwin that the [successor to the B-52 had been picked; that it would not be the RS-70; but instead involved a very "hush-hush" project. General Burchinal described this information as highly classified. Gilpatric, of course, when interviewed on 8-2-62 denied furnishing these data to Baldwin but admitted having a conversation with Baldwin concerning the B-52 in April or May, 1962. It is interesting that during a luncheon in New York on 7-26 given for Gilpatric by editors of "The New York Times" Gilpatric was asked whether a decision had been reached concerning the RS-70.

[redacted] Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau, apparently is another Baldwin source in the Pentagon. He has advised he has known Baldwin for the past 10 years on a professional and social basis and in civilian life is a reporter for a Norfolk, Virginia, newspaper. It was he who admittedly on 7-19 furnished Baldwin data on National Guard units returning from Europe. Baldwin's column of 7-29 was devoted entirely to this topic. While the information in this instance was unclassified it is very possible that Baldwin could use and may have used [redacted] albeit unwittingly, as a source for more sensitive data. [redacted] was not cleared for the information in the 7-26 article.

REC-31

101-X3
SENT DIRECTOR
8-6-62

10 AUG 13 1962

b3
b7E

JFW:smf:bjn
(6)
FIVE
58 AUG 17 1962
F226

5- [signature]

Memorandum Wannall to Sullivan

Re: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN

IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962

b3

b7E

We have interviewed [REDACTED]

b6

b7C

[REDACTED] He refused to comment when asked if he knew any of Baldwin's sources. He used the familiar refrain that a good newspaperman must protect his sources. His attitude is an indication that he probably does know at least some of Baldwin's sources. At the conclusion of this investigation, in the event we are not successful in determining Baldwin's sources for his 7/26 article, consideration will be given to suggesting to the Attorney General that [REDACTED] be called before a Grand Jury.

ACTION:

For your information. Investigation in this matter is continuing as a special.

oww
mcg *[Signature]* *[Signature]*

[Signature]

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - U. S. House
1 - Connell
1 - Sachs

9

3-20-8 spray and

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

b6
b7C

DATE 5/16/96 BY SP3 BTJ/Cm
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/96

In my letter of August 7, 1941, you were furnished pertinent information obtained through our coverage of Hanson ¹¹²⁻⁷¹⁰ showing whom we are investigating as a result of the inclusion of classified information in his article in the July 20, 1941, issue of 'The New York Times.'

Our coverage has now disclosed that during the course of August 1967, he was contacted by a person believed to be David G. Lybourn, resident and ally of the law firm of Lybourn, advised airtel that they received the airtel of 10/1/67 relating to our investigation of the same. Lybourn expected to receive a personal letter from the Commission together with a document telling the who, the what, the why, evidently the fact that airtel airtel has been called as a point of contact. Lybourn did not know when the man was coming, although the man's secretary had called and Lybourn's had called. (Later Lybourn indicated to airtel that he would deliver the document.)

...again? Well, now Carson had something in his column" (Exhibit 10).
...again? The question is: why not in the "column" on it.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

3 AUG 16 1962

DEC 11 3 23 PM '65
FBI NEW YORK
INSPECTOR
REC-D

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC- 39 [REDACTED]

W/C
Jett
8-13-62

Honorable R. Kenneth O'Donnell

There was a NY story as a result. It simply said that Arthur Sylvester had no comment on this. They brought in also [redacted] of the Washington [redacted] the Pearson story said in effect the FBI was following, questioning after reporters and so on. And then it went on to mention specifically the Military Editor of 'the New York Times' without specifying the story."

When Bayless asked if that was what Pearson had said Baldwin answered, "That's what Pearson said and Arthur Sylvester was asked about this by the President. And he said he had no comment on whether or not the FBI was looking into any story written by me but he denied that 'MacNamara' (probably Secretary of Defense Robert S. MacNamara) " had ever ordered the FBI to follow or investigate any newspaperman and then he further said--this is amusing, it indicates the state of mind of the reporters in the Pentagon--he said he denied that the press room telephones in the Pentagon were tapped. Then he went on to mention [redacted]--he's the Washington [redacted] [redacted] some weeks ago had an exclusive story which he had discussed with Mr. MacNamara. I had heard this before from [redacted] And Mr. MacNamara apparently had told him not to use it. He didn't use it. Mr. MacNamara then went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and" (inaudible) "then to find out where [redacted] had gotten it. Of course it irked [redacted] quite a lot. And Sylvester mentioned this" (inaudible) "What was the gist of the story."

b6
b7C

"I would like to point out that the President had done this same thing before. He sent General Taylor to see Mr. Luce, Harry Luce, after the Cuban invasion and complaining about the story that 'Fortune' magazine carried by Jimmy. The President denounced this story at a press conference and very wisely, I think, sent General Taylor to see Mr. Luce."

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable D. Kenneth O'Connell

And [] did have [] and also [] the Managing Editor of [] in at the time [] case and [] made some nine (innocent) "certifications of what he alleged were errors. And both [] refuted them. At least that's the story I got. [] at the end said let's forget it. He was ordered to do the job. I don't think [] would have undertaken this unless he was ordered. [] was alleged to have said that we won't forget it because the President called us a liar in public or words to that effect. But this sort of thing has been done before. I think the great danger here, Ory, and I think it's something you're very conscious of because we talked about it the other day, because the President may attempt to tie your hands completely, not only for now but for the future. And I think this can be a great danger. So I think that all you can do is play it by ear."

b6
b7C

Oryless advised Baldwin that "they have a complete report on the incident" indicating "what the facts are." Baldwin then asked, "They don't allege to have said who said what to me?" In reply Oryless advised, "I haven't seen it. I don't know. That's the kind of thing that after I see, I won't be able to discuss afterward." Baldwin said, "The point of the thing that I think you ought better to worry of, because I think this involves the paper. It seems to me that is the sort of thing that you shouldn't let yourself be tied up on, if I just may offer that suggestion. I think that if it's a question of secret sources, I mean by that information we may be getting from Russia, or ways of getting it, that's another thing altogether."

Oryless commented that he could not be "tied" by the document and he would not be able to discuss it. He also said that if it was a personal document from the Ambassador he would look at it and give it back to the local Attache." Baldwin commented that he understood.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Connell

Baldwin also stated that "you have to be pretty careful of what you say to the Naval Attache and to the President afterwards." Baldwin also commented, "We're all on the same team. What I mean is that we're all as interested in America as he is or is anyone else." When Dryfoos stated he would take the responsibility Baldwin indicated he did not want Dryfoos to do so and he would be "glad" to share the responsibility with him.

Baldwin inquired if Dryfoos had received "that letter I sent you from the young chap in the National Guard Bureau, because this is the sort of thing that I think is deplorable. The Administration is going to suffer for this because you cannot win loyalty that way." Dryfoos indicated he had to "stick with this particular episode." (By "the young chap" Baldwin was possibly referring to Major James C. Elliott, Deputy Chief, Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau, Department of the Army, mentioned in my August 7, 1962, letter.)

Dryfoos and Baldwin agreed they were "talking blind" and Dryfoos commented, "Maybe I can talk less blind after I get this thing." Baldwin then remarked, "Well, it seems clear that when the President brings up a subject like this, you obviously have to acknowledge it and be polite. There is another point of view to it that the methods employed can never be forgotten and I think this is vital for a free press. And it's vital for any sense of loyalty for the people who are wearing the uniforms. This has happened twice now in the Pentagon. It's created a terrific amount of distress. And it naturally would."

Baldwin also told Dryfoos that if "they can reveal this out at all you can say that you know nothing of what the source is." To which Dryfoos commented, "Well, that's why I'm delighted I can't." Baldwin replied, "And you must be careful. This is a safeguard of the press and it always has been. That you don't intend to violate it. I think you have to state that point."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Connell

Baldwin stated, "I would like to get at the background of this. I didn't see Scotty" (probably James Easton of the Washington, D. C., office of 'The New York Times') "I wish I had seen him personally, but when Scotty talked to you, apparently he gave you the impression before. I don't know whether he did this time. One of the chief worries of the Administration was the fact that the right hand didn't know what the left hand was doing." Brylson pointed out that Baldwin's statement was correct and "there is no question about it." To which Baldwin replied, "Well then, if this is true, then it seems to me this is something you had better take up very strongly." Brylson stated, "That goes beyond this episode. It's involving myself in a governmental function and this is a game I don't want to play."

Baldwin replied, "Well, perhaps not but on the other hand I think you want to make the strong point that the press can't be bound by the fact the Government is embarrassed. After all, you're talking to a Naval Attache here. I don't think you have to say anything to him and I wouldn't." When Brylson pointed out that the "Naval Attache" was acting as a messenger Baldwin said, "I know, but he's bringing a letter, and I personally think your letter ought to be left to the President after he's left. The less you say to the Naval Attache, the better. That's my feeling. I don't know."

Baldwin expressed his sorrow for giving Brylson "bad dreams" but Brylson stated that "if there was a violation it's their violation." Baldwin doubted this and said he thought that "they may be making a big show about how wrong the 'Times' was." Brylson did not "think they'll be saying anything to anybody on the outside" and Baldwin indicated he did not mean "on the outside" but rather "in the letter to you." When Brylson pronounced, "It's only wrong if they're wrong too,"

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

Baldwin stated, "I don't think we're wrong either. I don't see that the 'Times' has any great responsibility for this. I think that they are really trying to put the blame where it doesn't belong. This isn't the first time. And it's pretty notorious around the Pentagon especially on the working press. I think that all the sympathy probably would be on our side of the fence. The fact they were so chary about having anything in print indicates this."

In addition to the above our coverage of Baldwin indicated that on August 9, 1962, Baldwin contacted his wife in the late afternoon and stated there was "no sweat" and everything would be all right.

It should be noted that our source was not able to give the complete details of all conversation between Baldwin and his associate; however, the above has been set forth in as much detail as possible.

Investigation in this case is continuing and you will be furnished pertinent developments.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

J. Edgar Hoover

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because the location of ~~top~~ secret information in an article available to the public is identified therein.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Date of Mail 8-10-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/cun

b6
b7C

5/6/96 SP3 BTJ/cun
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/gcl

Subject JUNE MAIL Hanson W. Baldwin *FD*

Removed By

FMY
65 AUG 20 1962

File Number

[Redacted Box]

b3
b7E

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 06-03-2010

FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-29-2015 BY: [redacted]

Date: 8-8-62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRETL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Bishop _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Gale _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of the
press release reflecting the remarks of Secretary ROBERT S.
MC NAMARA at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16, 1962.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted by
WFO August 8, 1962:

Brigadier General JAMES D. HITTLE, USMC (Ret.),
Director, National Security and Foreign Affairs, Veterans
of Foreign Wars, advised he was an old and dear friend of
BALDWIN and usually sees him when BALDWIN is in Washington.
Some time, one or two weeks prior to July 16, BALDWIN called
him from New York and advised him of his plans to come to
Washington and they made a tentative date for lunch. After
he arrived in town, BALDWIN called HITTLE two or more times
and they firmed up luncheon arrangements for Thursday, July 19,
1962, at the Army-Navy Club, at 12:00 Noon. A prior,
tentative luncheon engagement between HITTLE and NORMAN S.
PAUL, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, fitted
in, so HITTLE arranged so all three had lunch together.
Discussion did not touch on intelligence matters and HITTLE
BALDWIN and PAUL discussed various military battles, probable
changes ahead at JCS and NATO and problems dealing with
military personnel. HITTLE was unable to speculate as to
the source of BALDWIN article. He stated he was not
familiar with the identities of BALDWIN contacts

- 3 - Bureau (Enc 1)
- 1 - New York (PERSONAL ATTENTION) (Info) (RM)
- 1 - WFO

25 AUG 14 1962

RCB:ctw

AIRTEL

BECG SUB ATTACH. IN [redacted]

To HC AND O'Donoghue

b6
b7C

Sent

M

Per

Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

APPROVED: [Signature]
5 AUG 17 1962

Document downgraded to
[redacted]
per 4/5/2010

3-20-89
CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BT/iam
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1)
5/16/93
Wannall

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

(U) NORMAN S. PAUL, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, advised he had met BALDWIN on one occasion prior to the luncheon engagement, July 19, 1962, with General HITTLE. He stated conversation did not touch on any matter relating to intelligence. Further, PAUL said he was privy to classified information relating to intelligence matters, such as, [NIE] had no suggestion as to how BALDWIN [X] obtained information for news article.

(U) EUGENE M. ZUKERT, Secretary of the Air Force, knows BALDWIN on a professional basis, and last saw him during the past winter. ZUKERT had no information as to BALDWIN's sources or persons contacted by BALDWIN during the past two months. He believes the source of BALDWIN's article was probably actual perusal of [NIE 11-8-62] by [X] BALDWIN or possibly a briefing by someone thoroughly familiar with its content. He had no facts or speculations as to the possible source of the leak. ZUKERT had no opinion as to any agency, group or individual who could benefit by release of this information.

(U) Undersecretary of the Air Force JOSEPH V. CHARYK furnished substantially the same information as ZUKERT, with the exception that he believed BALDWIN probably did not see [NIE 11-8-62 document] but obtained his information from [X] conversation with an individual familiar with its content. He had no information as to possible source of leak.

(U) General MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, Military Representative of the President, advised that he is familiar with [NIE 11-8-62 and previous drafting documents.] He has known BALDWIN for years but has not seen him for the past six months. TAYLOR also knows JAMES RESTON of "The New York Times" but has not talked with him during the past several months. TAYLOR indicated he has not discussed "missile field" with press during recent contacts nor has he been approached for such information. He was unable to furnish any possible suspects for leak of information. TAYLOR noted at outset of interview that he had just returned from Newport, Rhode Island; and, while there, he learned that an investigation was being

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

MC GEORGE BUNDY, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, advised that he is familiar with [NIE 11-8-62] and previous documents on this matter ~~SECRET~~. He is acquainted with BALDWIN but has not seen or talked with him this year. BUNDY also knows JAMES RESTON of "The New York Times" but had not talked with RESTON for an extended period of time until a few days after the publication of the July 26, 1962, article. RESTON contacted BUNDY following publication of this article; at which time, BUNDY advised RESTON he was unable to comment regarding the investigation which was being conducted regarding BALDWIN and that inquiries would have to be directed to the President and the Secretary of Defense. BUNDY is not aware of BALDWIN's contacts or his itinerary for the week of July 16, 1962.

- 3 -

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Negative interviews were as follows:

Rear Admiral VERNON L. LOWRANCE, USN, Director
of Naval Intelligence

Rear Admiral HAROLD G. BOWEN, JR., USN, Deputy
Director of Naval Intelligence

Brigadier General JOHN W. O'NEILL, JR., USAF,
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Brigadier General RICHARD D. CURTIN, USAF

Major General CECIL H. CHILDRE, USAF

WALTER N. ELDER, Executive Assistant to the
Director, CIA

ROLAND S. INLOW, Deputy Chief of Military
Economics Division, CIA

R. JACK SMITH, Assistant Director for Current
Intelligence, CIA

General PHILIP G. STRONG, Deputy Assistant Director
for Collection, Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA

HUNTINGTON SHELDON, Assistant Deputy Director for
Intelligence, CIA

LOUIS MARENGO, Office of National Estimates, CIA,
Member of Board of National Estimates Part of Panel
for [NIE 11-8-62] (X)

(U)

(STRONG, SHELDON and MARENGO were interviewed by
M. A. TAYLOR, with negative results.)

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

b3
b7E

Contact at the office of EDWARD H. MC DERMOTT, Office of Emergency Planning, who attended NSC briefings, established that MC DERMOTT at present is in Dubuque, Iowa, and will not return to his office until August 20, 1962; although he may be in the Washington, D. C., area by about August 15, 1962. WFO will interview at earliest possible date.

Major General CHARLES F. LEONARD, DIA, is on leave and unavailable for interview prior to August 24, 1962. Arrangements being made to interview him then, since he is presently in Maine.

ReWFOairtel dated August 6, 1962, reporting information received from ROGER HILSMAN, USDS, re conversation "several weeks ago" with WARREN ROGERS. "New York Herald Tribune." [redacted] advised no memorandum or conversation made; but it has been determined that call from ROGERS was at 3:17 p.m. on July 11, 1962.

b6
b7C

(U) [Inquiry at CIA determined Dr. GEORGE KISTIAKOWSKY is in Indonesia and scheduled to return to Boston August 11, 1962. CIA is determining if KISTIAKOWSKY will proceed to WDC on his return, for debriefing; and, if so, he will be interviewed by WFO.] Bureau will be advised.

Investigation continuing.

WF 1384-S* has furnished no additional pertinent information regarding [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

NEWS RELEASE

PLEASE NOTE DATE



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Washington 25, D. C.

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 6:30 P.M. (EDT)
SATURDAY, JUNE 16, 1962

NO. 980-62

OXford 53201-53176

REMARKS OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
AT THE COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN
SATURDAY, JUNE 16, 1962

**ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/20/96 BY SP3 BJS/96**

I am glad to be home, and I am particularly glad to be here for a university occasion. For this University gives meaning and focus to life in Ann Arbor -- even for those who are not privileged to be associated with it directly -- as the academic community serves to clarify the objectives and focus the energies of the Free World.

b6
b7C

President Kennedy aptly described the function of the university when he said: "The pursuit of knowledge ... rests ... on the idea of a world based on diversity, self-determination, and freedom. And that is the kind of world to which we Americans, as a nation, are committed by the principles upon which the great Republic was founded. As men conduct the pursuit of knowledge, they create a world which freely unites national diversity and international partnership."

Commencement orators like to point to the fact that what we celebrate here is not an end, but a beginning. I prefer to take my text from another aspect of the occasion which we are observing today.

The ancient formula for the award of academic degrees admits you into a long-established community, whether it be the fellowship of educated men, or the ancient and honorable company of scholars, of which you are the newest members. This community embodies the

b3
b7E

MORE

ENCLOSURE

highest ideals of the Free World. Its membership includes people of every race, color, and creed. They share a common language, the language of ideas. They are dedicated to the fullest possible development of the individual human potential. And the only requirement for admission is a demonstrated capacity for and commitment to the use of one's powers of reason.

What I want to talk to you about here today are some of the concrete problems of maintaining a free community in the world today. I want to talk to you particularly about the problems of the community that bind together the United States and the countries of Western Europe.

Europe is the source of many of our traditions. One of these is the tradition of the university, which we can trace back to the groves of Academe, on the same site where only a few weeks ago the foreign ministers and ministers of defense of the European nations and the United States met to discuss their common problems.

I need scarcely remind you that Europe is one of the great sources of the American idea of freedom, and that it was the European philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who shaped the thinking of our own founding fathers. For all of us, Europe has been our teacher since we first learned to read.

One of the most impressive lessons that Europe has provided us recently is the lesson of her revival from the ashes of destruction at the end of the Second World War. The national economies of Europe were almost at standstill 15 years ago. Their capital plant was largely destroyed, either directly by bombing, or indirectly by years of neglect and patchwork repair. The people were exhausted by six years of war,

and a large part of the most productive age group has been wiped out. Yet in the last 10 years, they have managed to increase the production of steel and electricity by over 130 percent each, and this has been typical of the recovery pattern.

The pump-priming help of the American Marshall Plan came at a crucial time in the process of European recovery. But the genius of the plan as envisaged by men like George Marshall and Harry Truman, was to help the Europeans help themselves.

At the same time that the nations of Europe were rebuilding at home, they were going through the difficult and often painful process of re-establishing their relationships with the peoples of Africa and Asia, no longer as a master and servant, but as members of the human race, all equally entitled to develop their individual capabilities. This process of change is by no means complete, and there are still difficult times ahead. But the joint achievement of Europe and its former colonies in revising their relations with each other is at least as impressive as the economic recovery of Europe itself.

What may be the greatest post-war European achievement is still in the making. The nations of Europe have begun to level the outmoded barriers that confined their individual economies within national boundaries. As Jean Monnet, the principal architect of the new Europe puts it,

"An entirely new situation has been created in the world, simply by adding six countries together. It's not an addition; in fact, it's a multiplication. You multiply the capabilities of the countries you unite. A dynamic process is beginning that is changing the face of Europe and the role of Europeans in the world."

The making of Europe has only begun, and indeed it is perhaps at its most critical stage. But we should not overlook the fact that French coal and German steel now move freely across the continent, and that German refrigerators and Italian shoes are being sold increasingly without restriction in Belgian department stores.

All of these achievements have been accomplished under pressure from titanic forces which make a rational organization of human society increasingly difficult both for the Europeans and for ourselves. Let me mention some of these forces.

We are confronted with a population explosion resulting from our own success in coping with disease and abnormalities, and by now threatening to double the earth's population by the end of this century. Unless we can control this explosion in the poor and resource-limited countries, the effects of economic growth may be cancelled out by population growth, and unsatisfied rising expectations, particularly in the younger nations, may upset the delicate balance of political stability.

We are borne along by the accelerating pace of science and technology. In this country alone, new inventions are patented at a rate of 50,000 a year. Our population of scientists and engineers has increased by more than 40 per cent in the last eight years. In fact, 80 per cent of all scientists and engineers who have lived throughout history are alive today.

We are faced with an extraordinary increase in the number of national states. Since World War II, 35 new nations have been formed. Each new nation expresses the natural desire for self-determination and self-government. But their numbers complicate the problem of international diplomacy at the same time that military and economic developments increase our interdependence. Every nation is more and more directly affected by the internal situation of its neighbors, and the globe has shrunk to the point where we are all each other's neighbors.

MORE

Lastly, we live in the shadow of the Sino-Soviet drive for world domination--surely not the only shadow on the world today, but one of the longest and deepest. By itself it represents the most serious military force this nation has ever faced; by its exploitation of the entire world's troubles, it is a threat of a kind that is as new to the world as the rising technologies and populations and national sovereignties themselves.

In the face of all these challenges, the ultimate objective of the free world is to establish a system of peaceful world order, based on the dignity of the individual and dedicated to the free development of each man's capacities. The members of the North Atlantic community -- the Europeans and ourselves -- bear a special responsibility to help achieve this objective. This responsibility derives from the strength of our internal institutions and the wealth of our material resources.

But we cannot hope to move toward our objective unless we move from strength. Part of that strength must be military strength. But I want to emphasize that we see our military strength not as the means of achieving the kind of world we seek, but as a shield to prevent any other nation from using its military strength, either directly or through threats and intimidation, to frustrate the aspirations we share with all the free peoples of the world. The aggressive use of military strength is foreign to the best traditions of the United States. And, as the President pointed out last week, "the basic problems facing the world today are not susceptible of a final military solution."

What the military component of our national power must do, and what we must see that it is capable of doing, is to assure to the peoples of the Free World the freedom to choose their own course of development.

Yet the nature and extent of the military power base needed to meet the entire spectrum of challenges confronting the Free World is beyond the capacity of any single nation to provide. Since our own security cannot be separated from the security of the rest of the Free World, we necessarily rely on a series of alliances, the most important of which is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO was born in 1949 out of the confrontation with the Soviet Union that ensued from the breakdown in relations between the former wartime allies. The Soviet Union had absorbed the states of eastern Europe into its own political framework, most dramatically with the Czechoslovakian coup of 1948. It had been fomenting insurrection in Greece, menacing Turkey, and encouraging the Communist parties in Western Europe to seize power in the wake of postwar economic disorder. The sharpest threat to Europe came with the first Berlin Crisis when the Russians attempted to blockade the western sectors of the city. Our response was immediate and positive. President Truman ordered an airlift for the isolated population of West Berlin which, in time, denied the Soviets their prize. The Marshall Plan, then in full swing, was assisting the economic recovery of the Western European nations. The Truman Doctrine had brought our weight to bear in Greece and Turkey to prevent the erosion of their independence.

But Western statesmen concluded that it would be necessary to secure the strength and growth of the North Atlantic community with a more permanent arrangement for its defense. The effective defense of Western Europe could not really be accomplished without a commitment of the United States to that defense for the long term. We made this commitment without hesitation. Arthur Vandenberg, one of the chief architects of NATO, expressed the rationale of the organization in the Senate debate preceding passage of the treaty,

"this is the logical evolution of one of our greatest American idioms, 'united we stand, divided we fall.'".

The North Atlantic Alliance is a unique alignment of governments. The provision for the common defense of the members has led to a remarkable degree of military collaboration and diplomatic consultation for a peacetime coalition. The growth of the alliance organization has accelerated as the task of defending the treaty area has increased in scope, size and complexity. NATO has had its stresses and strains, but it has weathered them all.

Today, NATO is involved in a number of controversies, which must be resolved by achieving a consensus within the organization in order to preserve its strength and unity. The question has arisen whether Senator Vandenberg's assertion is as true today as it was when he made it 13 years ago. Three arguments have raised this question most sharply:

It has been argued that the very success of Western European economic development reduces Europe's need to rely on the U.S. to share in its defenses.

It has been argued that the increasing vulnerability of the U.S. to nuclear attack makes us less willing as a partner in the defense of Europe, and hence less effective in deterring such an attack.

It has been argued that nuclear capabilities are alone relevant in the face of the growing nuclear threat, and that independent national nuclear forces are sufficient to protect the nations of Europe.

I believe that all of these arguments are mistaken. I think it is worthwhile to expose the U.S. views on these issues as we have presented them to our allies. In our view, the effect of the new factors in the situation, both economic and military, has been to increase the interdependence of national security interests on both sides of the Atlantic,

and to enhance the need for the closest coordination of our efforts.

A central military issue facing NATO today is the role of nuclear strategy. Four facts seem to us to dominate consideration of that role. All of them point in the direction of increased integration to achieve our common defense. First, the Alliance has over-all nuclear strength adequate to any challenge confronting it. Second, this strength not only minimizes the likelihood of major nuclear war, but makes possible a strategy designed to preserve the fabric of our societies if war should occur. Third, damage to the civil societies of the Alliance resulting from nuclear warfare could be very grave. Fourth, improved non-nuclear forces, well within Alliance resources, could enhance deterrence of any aggressive moves short of direct, all-out attack on Western Europe.

Let us look at the situation today. First, given the current balance of nuclear power, which we confidently expect to maintain in the years ahead, a surprise nuclear attack is simply not a rational act for any enemy. Nor would it be rational for an enemy to take the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons as an outgrowth of a limited engagement in Europe or elsewhere. I think we are entitled to conclude that either of these actions has been made highly unlikely.

Second, and equally important, the mere fact that no nation could rationally take steps leading to a nuclear war does not guarantee that a nuclear war cannot take place. Not only do nations sometimes act in ways that are hard to explain on a rational basis, but even when acting in a "rational" way they sometimes, indeed disturbingly often, act on the basis of misunderstandings of the true facts of a situation. They

misjudge the way others will react, and the way others will interpret what they are doing. We must hope, indeed I think we have good reason to hope, that all sides will understand this danger, and will refrain from steps that even raise the possibility of such a mutually disastrous misunderstanding. We have taken unilateral steps to reduce the likelihood of such an occurrence. We look forward to the prospect that through arms control, the actual use of these terrible weapons may be completely avoided. It is a problem not just for us in the West, but for all nations that are involved in this struggle we call the Cold War.

For our part, we feel we and our NATO allies must frame our strategy with this terrible contingency, however remote, in mind. Simply ignoring the problem is not going to make it go away.

The U. S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.

The very strength and nature of the Alliance forces make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy society if driven to it. In other words, we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities.

The strength that makes these contributions to deterrence and to the hope of deterring attack upon civil societies even in wartime does not come cheap. We are confident that our current nuclear programs are adequate and will continue to be adequate for as far into the future as we can reasonably foresee. During the coming fiscal year, the United States plans to spend close to \$15 billion on its nuclear weapons to assure their adequacy. For what this money buys, there is no substitute.

In particular, relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. If they are small, and perhaps vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, a major antagonist can take a variety of measures to counter them. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of it being used independently, this force would be inviting a pre-emptive first strike against it. In the event of war, the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict. Meanwhile, the creation of a single additional national nuclear force encourages the proliferation of nuclear power with all of its attendant dangers.

In short, then, limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. Clearly, the United States nuclear contribution to the Alliance is neither obsolete nor dispensable.

At the same time, the general strategy I have summarized magnifies the importance of unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central direction. There must not be competing and conflicting strategies to meet the contingency of nuclear war. We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible, and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled.

We know that the same forces which are targeted on ourselves are also targeted on our allies. Our own strategic retaliatory forces are prepared to respond against these forces, wherever they are and whatever their targets. This mission is assigned not only in fulfillment of our treaty commitments but also because the character of nuclear war compels it. More specifically, the U. S. is as much concerned with that portion of Soviet nuclear striking power that can reach Western Europe as with that portion that also can reach the United States. In short, we have undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis. This will continue to be our objective. In the execution of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are only one resource among many.

There is, for example, the POLARIS force, which we have been substantially increasing, and which, because of its specially invulnerable nature, is peculiarly well suited to serve as a strategic reserve force. We have already announced the commitment of five of these ships, fully operational, to the NATO Command.

This sort of commitment has a corollary for the Alliance as a whole. We want and need a greater degree of Alliance participation in formulating nuclear weapons policy to the greatest extent possible. We would all find it intolerable to contemplate having only a part of the strategic force launched in isolation from our main striking power.

We shall continue to maintain powerful nuclear forces for the Alliance as a whole. As the President has said, "Only through such strength can we be certain of deterring a nuclear strike, or an overwhelming ground attack, on our forces and allies."

But let us be quite clear about what we are saying and what we would have to face if the deterrent should fail. This is the almost certain prospect that, despite our nuclear strength, all of us would suffer deeply in the event of major nuclear war.

We accept our share of this responsibility within the Alliance. And we believe that the combination of our nuclear strength and a strategy of controlled response gives us some hope of minimizing damage in the event that we have to fulfill our pledge. But I must point out that we do not regard this as a desirable prospect, nor do we believe that the Alliance should depend solely on our nuclear power to deter actions not involving a massive commitment of any hostile force. Surely an Alliance with the wealth, talent, and experience that we possess can find a better way than extreme reliance on nuclear weapons to meet our common threat. We do not believe that if the formula, $e=mc^2$, had not been discovered, we should all be Communist slaves. On this question, I can see no valid reason for a fundamental difference of view on the two sides of the Atlantic.

With the Alliance possessing the strength and the strategy I have described, it is most unlikely that any power will launch a nuclear attack on NATO. For the kinds of conflicts, both political and military, most likely to arise in the NATO area, our capabilities for response must not be limited to nuclear weapons alone. The Soviets have superiority in non-nuclear forces in Europe today. But that superiority is by no means overwhelming. Collectively, the Alliance has the potential for a

successful defense against such forces. In manpower alone, NATO has more men under arms than the Soviet Union and its European satellites. We have already shown our willingness to contribute through our divisions now in place on European soil. In order to defend the populations of the NATO countries and to meet our treaty obligations, we have put in hand a series of measures to strengthen our non-nuclear power. We have added \$10 billion for this purpose to the previously planned level of expenditures for fiscal years 1962 and 1963. To tide us over while new permanent strength was being created, we called up 158,000 reservists. We will be releasing them this summer, but only because in the meantime we have built up on an enduring basis more added strength than the call-up temporarily gave us. The number of U. S. combat-ready divisions has been increased from 11 to 16. Stockpiled in Europe now are full sets of equipment for two additional divisions; the men of these divisions can be rapidly moved to Europe by air.

We expect that our allies will also undertake to strengthen further their non-nuclear forces, and to improve the quality and staying power of these forces. These achievements will complement our deterrent strength. With improvements in Alliance ground force strength and staying power, improved non-nuclear air capabilities, and better equipped and trained reserve forces, we can be assured that no deficiency exists in the NATO defense of this vital region, and that no aggression, small or large, can succeed.

I have described very briefly the United States' views on the role of nuclear forces in the strategy of the Alliance. I have pointed out that the Alliance necessarily depends, for the deterrence of general nuclear war, on the powerful and well protected nuclear forces of the United States, which are necessarily committed to respond to enemy nuclear

strikes wherever they may be made. At the same time, I have indicated the need for substantial non-nuclear forces within the Alliance to deal with situations where a nuclear response may be inappropriate or simply not believable. Throughout I have emphasized that we in the Alliance all need each other.

I want to remind you also that the security provided by military strength is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the achievement of our foreign policy goals, including our goals in the field of arms control and disarmament. Military security provides a base on which we can build Free World strength through the economic advances and political reforms which are the object of the President's programs, like the Alliance for Progress and the Trade Expansion legislation. Only in a peaceful world can we give full scope to the individual potential, which is for us the ultimate value.

A distinguished European visited the United States last month as a guest of the President. Andre Malraux, French Minister of State for Cultural Affairs, is an eminent novelist and critic. He led an archaeological expedition to Cambodia and fought in the Spanish Civil War and the French Resistance Movement. Malraux paid a moving tribute to our nation when he said: "The only nation that has waged war but not worshipped it, that has won the greatest power in the world but not sought it, that has wrought the greatest weapon of death but has not wished to wield it... May it inspire men with dreams worthy of its action."

The community of learning to which you have been admitted carries with it great privileges. It also carries great responsibilities. And perhaps the greatest of these is to help ensure the wise use of our national power. Let me paraphrase Malraux: May your dreams be worthy of action and your actions be shaped by your dreams.

END

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 02-28-2017 BY: [REDACTED]

8/9/62

b6
b7C

Airtel

1 - Belmont
1 - Mohr
1 - DeLoach
1 - Sullivan
1 - D.E. Moore
1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

b3
b7E

To: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

From: Director, FBI [REDACTED]

REC-20

ARTICLE BY HANSON N. DALEMAN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Reurairtel 8/6/62.

An interview with Warren Rogers is not desired in this case at this time. There is no indication that he would be cooperative to the extent of furnishing information pertinent to this investigation; that he has ever considered writing a story based on information in the [REDACTED] 11-3-62; or that he knowingly was in possession of classified information. ~~SECRET~~

JFW:snf
(10)

NOTE:

See cover memo Wannall to Sullivan re same subject, dated 8/8/62, prepared by JFW:snf.

FOI/PA # 288,611
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
E.O. # 12356
DATE 3-20-89 INITIALS *gab*

Document declassified
to ~~SECRET~~ per [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] /RS
EX 4/5/2010

b6
b7C

Tolson
[REDACTED]
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

AUG 22 1962

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan *WC Sullivan*

DATE: 8/8/62

FROM : W. R. Wannall *WR Wannall*

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

1 - Belmont
1 - Mohr
1 - DeLoach
1 - Sullivan
1 - D.E. Moore
1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NY DC
Warren Rogers, correspondent for "New York Herald Tribune"
should not be interviewed.

*ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE*
We are endeavoring to ascertain Baldwin's sources for the information in captioned article. We have determined that his information probably came from [National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-62.] Interviews are being conducted with those persons who had access to this document for information of assistance in our investigation. We, of course, are also attempting to determine just how widespread the information in the document was. We have been advised that the information was disseminated on a limited basis and CIA has estimated that only 300 to 400 persons had access to the classified data. It has been the consensus of opinion of those interviewed that Baldwin was furnished the information for his article by someone who had read the [Estimate.] *(U)*

*3-20-88
Classified by 15882/64
Declassify on: OADR*
It has been our theory based on information developed that Baldwin probably got the information from someone on a high level in the Government since he customarily only contacts such persons. Accordingly, to date we have limited our investigation to such individuals. On 8/4/62, however, we learned that Baldwin apparently is not the only newspaperman who possessed information prior to the July 26 article. On 8/4/62 Roger Hilsman of State Department advised that several weeks ago (he is obtaining the date) Warren Rogers, a reporter for the "New York Herald Tribune," told Hilsman, "I get emanations from Air Force friends that the Soviets are hardening some of their missile sites." When Hilsman told Rogers he knew nothing about it Rogers commented there was probably nothing to it.

*353842
CLASSIFIED BY 503 BTL/kan
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1*
Washington Field Office (WFO) has requested authority to interview Rogers. WFO pointed out that in the event Rogers had submitted a story concerning the pertinent information in his possession to Defense and the story was killed, he may be in a frame of mind to furnish sources for the information in view of the fact that Baldwin subsequently published the data.

Enclosure

JFW:smf
(8)

REC-20

25 AUG 14 1962

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

5- [signature]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum Wannall to Sullivan
Re: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
[REDACTED]

b3
b7E

OBSERVATIONS:

(U) We have interviewed a number of newspapermen* and never have any revealed their sources. This appears to be their established code. There is no indication that Rogers would be different. In addition, the chances of his furnishing Baldwin's sources are remote. Although we have interviewed a number of individuals in this case, none has indicated that Rogers ever submitted a story to Defense for clearance which contained pertinent classified data. [In fact, CIA has indicated that Baldwin's article was the first leak of information from the National Intelligence Estimate involved.] Rogers' inquiry of Hilsman appears to be speculative and it is noted he did not push the issue. It is also noted that no one else has indicated in this case that Rogers contacted him. In addition, there is no indication that Rogers was knowingly in possession of classified data. To interview Rogers would open up this investigation further and possibly subject the Bureau to criticism for interviewing a newspaperman who was not even involved in the leak.

ACTION:

If you approve, the enclosed airtel to WFO will be forwarded. Therein it is indicated no interview with Rogers should be conducted since he cannot be expected to provide any information of interest.

* IN SIMILAR CASES IN THE PAST

Wannall
Wc 44
JS

~~TOP SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 8/11/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via A I R T E L _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - XALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-29-89 BY SP8 BTJ/CLW

5/3/96

9/10/14

b6
b7Cb3
b7E

On 8/10/62, Col. EDWIN M. KIRTON, DIA, telephonically contacted WFO and advised he had been instructed to find out for Gen. CURTIS E. LEMAY, Chief of Staff, USAF, when a report would be submitted in this case. Col. KIRTON further stated that Gen. LEMAY desired a copy of the report.

Col. KIRTON was informed that dissemination would be handled by the Bureau and inquiry should be made at that point re Gen. LEMAY's desires.

3 - Bureau
1 - WFO
HJM:sh
(4)

A I R T E L

B. [signature]

[signature]

RF

EX-108

16 AUG 14 1962

b3
b7E

C. C. Wick

Approved: [signature]

Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

53 AUG 16 1962

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 7-31-62

Attached relates to current inquiries into leak of highly sensitive defense information involving Hanson Baldwin of "The New York Times". Attempt was made to interview Baldwin evening of 7-30-62 but he refused to cooperate. [redacted]

[redacted] is [redacted] in Washington Bureau of "The New York Times" who reportedly made appointments for Baldwin in Washington. We interviewed [redacted] 7-30-62. Being disseminated to Attorney General.

BCR: dc

b6

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-20-89 BY SP3 BTJ/cwr
5/31/96 SP3 BTJ/cwr
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/cwr

DECODED COPY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 06-07-2010 BY [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

☐ Radio

☒ Teletype

URGENT 7-31-62 3:00 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR 2 AND SAC WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM SAC NEW YORK 310615

HANSON W. BALDWIN, ~~FSP~~ ^{ESPIONAGE - X}.

DURING EVENING OF JULY 30, 1962 NY 3698-S* ADVISED THAT J. B. RESTON, NY TIMES, CONTACTED HANSON W. BALDWIN, SAYING HE WAS "GOD DAMN MAD" ABOUT SOMETHING. BALDWIN SAID HE WAS MAD TOO AND THOUGHT HE KNEW WHAT RESTON WAS GOING TO SAY.

RESTON SAID THAT TODAY [REDACTED] WAS CONTACTED AT HOME BY AN F. B. I. MAN WHO PROPERLY IDENTIFIED HIMSELF. SHE WAS MERELY ASKED THE QUESTION, "WHOM HAD YOU SEEN WHEN YOU WERE DOWN HERE." [REDACTED] TOLD FBI AGENT TO CALL WALLY CARROLL OR RESTON, BUT DID SAY THAT BALDWIN HAD SEEN EVERYBODY, MC NAMARA, GILPATRIC AND EVERYBODY ELSE. BALDWIN THEN SAID THAT TWO FBI MEN HAD CALLED AT HIS HOME THIS EVENING, AND HE HAD REFUSED TO SEE THEM, SAYING THAT HE WOULD ONLY SEE THEM AT HIS OFFICE. RESTON REMARKED "IT'S A GOD DAMN OUTRAGE AND WE OUGHT TO PRINT THE WHOLE THING." BALDWIN AGREED AND SUGGESTED RESTON TELL ORVILLE (BELIEVED TO BE ORVILLE DRYFOOS, NY TIMES PUBLISHER). BALDWIN SAID, "THEY ARE AFTER MY SOURCES." BALDWIN AND RESTON AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD HEAR THEM (FBI) OUT. BALDWIN THEN REMARKED "THIS IS GOING VERY FAR IN THIS ADMINISTRATION. I THINK IT IS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS." RESTON SAID, "THERE IS A STRANGE FEELING IN CONGRESS THAT DOSSIER IS BEING KEPT ON ALL THESE PEOPLE. PROBABLY A GREAT DEAL

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

2 CC: WASHINGTON FIELD

SENT DIRECTOR

MR. BELMONT FOR THE DIRECTOR

10/1/62

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

53 AUG 21 1962 FIVE

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

DECODED COPY

☐ Radio

☒ Teletype

PAGE 2 FROM SAC NEW YORK 310615

COMES OUT OF THEIR IMAGINATION AND GUILTY CONSCIENCE BUT THERE IS THIS SUSPICION THAT THIS KIND OF TACTIC IS BEING USED." BALDWIN AGREED THAT THIS IS A NEW AND DIFFERENT TACTIC SIMILAR TO WHAT HAPPENED WITH REPORTERS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT AT TIME OF STEEL PRICE RISE. BALDWIN SAID, "I THINK THE REAL ANSWER TO THIS IS BOBBIE KENNEDY AND THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF, BUT BOBBIE KENNEDY PARTICULARLY PUTTING PRESSURE ON HOOVER. I'M GOING TO HEAR THEM OUT TOMORROW, BUT IF THESE PEOPLE ARE IMPOLITE OR PERSISTENT, I'M GOING TO CALL (ORVILLE DRYFOOS) AND [REDACTED] (BELIEVED TO BE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] NY TIMES EDITOR) AND YOU TOO, IF NECESSARY, AND I AM THEN PROBABLY PLANNING TO WRITE A LETTER TO MR. HOOVER HIMSELF, WHOM I HAVE CORRESPONDED WITH IN THE PAST, AND TELL HIM WHAT I THINK OF THIS."

b6
b7C

BALDWIN SAID THAT THE IRON CURTAIN AROUND THE PENTAGON IS JUST AS PRONOUNCED AS IN OTHER PLACES. HE STATED THAT HE HAD ALWAYS BEEN MOST DISCREET ABOUT THE MILITARY IN PROTECTING SOURCES, AND HAD ALSO HELD BACK ON CERTAIN THINGS, "AS IN THE AUGUST PROJECT AND THEN THEY WENT AHEAD AND PRINTED IT. I RESENT THIS KIND OF PRESSURE."

RESTON THEN SAID, "I RESENT THAT THESE GUYS HAD ENOUGH GUTS TO COME KNOCK ON YOUR DOOR, BUT WHAT IS REALLY SNEAKY IS CALLING UP A POOR-" BALDWIN INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE HOPED RESTON HAD APOLOGIZED TO HER FOR HIM, AND THEN SAID, "SHE SIMPLY TOLD THEM THAT I SAW EVERYBODY, DIDN'T SHE?" RESTON SAID THAT WAS CORRECT.

RESTON THEN SAID, "WHEN THEY BEGIN TO DO THIS THING IN WASHINGTON, IT BECOMES A QUESTION OF WHETHER WE ARE GOING TO REPORT THE NEWS OR NOT."

DECODED COPY

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

☐ Radio☒ Teletype

PAGE 3 FROM SAC NEW YORK 310615

BALDWIN SAID THAT "WHEN I REPORTED THAT KENNEDY ORDERED THE FBI INTO THE PENTAGON BEFORE THE BERLIN CRISIS, KENNEDY BECAME ANGRY, AND THEN THERE WAS A STORY [REDACTED] WROTE IN NEWSWEEK ABOUT VARIOUS SOLUTIONS FOR THE BERLIN CRISIS AND KENNEDY BLEW HIS TOP. THEY ACTUALLY WENT TO [REDACTED] AND DID SOME OF THESE CRUMMY INTIMIDATING TACTICS."

b6
b7C

RESTON THEN SAID, "AFTER ALL IT TAKES TO DEAL WITH KENNEDY WHO ESSENTIALLY IS A POLITICIAN AND NOT A COP, IS FOR US TO PRINT THE NEWS. THIS IS MORE DAMAGING TO HIM THAN THE INFORMATION HE WOULD GAIN BY TELLING TO EVERYBODY YOU SAW."

TALKING

BALDWIN SAID HE WOULD CALL RESTON AFTER TALKING TO THESE PEOPLE (FBI).

RESTON SAID, "IF WE PRINTED A STORY OF WHAT'S GOING ON DOWN HERE, I DON'T PROPOSE TO TAKE IT UP AS A POLICY MATTER. I PROPOSE, IF YOU AGREE, AFTER WE KNOW WHAT MORE IS BACK OF ALL THIS, MERELY TO FILE A STORY, THEN IF THEY WANT TO TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF KILLING IT, WE'LL KNOW WHERE WE ARE."

TRANSCRIPT OF INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NY 3698 - S*
FOLLOWS:

RECEIVED: 3:24 AM ENT

CC-MR. SULLIVAN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : MR. SULLIVAN *8/10*

DATE: 8/10/62

FROM : A. H. Belmont

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D.E. Moore
Mr. Wacks

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN THE "NEW YORK TIMES"
7/26/62 - ESPIONAGE - X

General Carter of OCIA called this morning. He said one of the CIA employees interviewed by our agents in this case had suggested that our agents add one additional question to those being asked of persons interviewed, namely "Are you prepared to take a polygraph test on this matter?" General Carter thought he would just pass this thought along to us.

I told General Carter that we have not lost sight of the possible use of the polygraph in this case, but we have not considered it advisable to ask this question across the board during the current interviews; if we are going to ask it of one person we would, of course, ask it of all. I told him that, as the investigation progresses, it may well be that this technique will be used where considered feasible. I thanked him for calling.

You will recall that in the initial stages of this matter, when the AG requested us to conduct investigation, he commented on the possibility of requiring Defense officials who talked to Baldwin to undergo a polygraph test. We should keep this in the back of our minds in the event we consider it feasible or desirable to use this technique during this investigation at some stage.

b6
b7C

AHB:CSH/ (5)

REC- 51

b3
b7E

11 AUG 13 1962

56 AUG 16 1962
F146

NO REVERSE
OF THIS
ACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

August 14, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Evans

1 - Mr. Sullivan

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"

1 - Mr. D. E. Moore

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Wacks

JULY 26, 1962

ESPIONAGE - X

Document downgraded
to Secret per [redacted] VRS
on 4/5/2010

REC'D-READ
b6
b7C

In connection with our continuing investigation in this matter, we interviewed Colonel Thomas W. Wolfe, United States Air Force, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Department of Defense, on August 13, 1962. Colonel Wolfe advised that Bruno Augenstein, Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Intelligence and Reconnaissance), Department of Defense, had prepared a paper dealing with satellites, antisatellites and Soviet capabilities in this field. Colonel Wolfe stated this paper was dated around the middle of July, 1962. It is noted that the last three paragraphs of Baldwin's article of July 26, 1962, deal with the subject matter of the afore-mentioned paper.

[On August 13, 1962, Mr. Augenstein advised that his office had prepared a paper upon instructions of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara captioned, "Measures to Reduce the Vulnerability of Our Reconnaissance Satellite." Mr. Augenstein stated this paper was dated July 14, 1962, and was classified "Top Secret - Special Handling." According to Mr. Augenstein, only four copies of this paper were made, and they were distributed to Secretary of Defense McNamara; to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric; to the Under Secretary of the Department of the Air Force; and to Dr. Herbert Scoville, Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Augenstein pointed out that discussion of this paper would necessitate a special clearance being obtained by Special Agents of this Bureau.] Accordingly, two Special Agents of the FBI are obtaining this special clearance so that proper inquiry can be made with respect to the document.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes

JFM:GJW
(9)

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

11 AUG 15 1962
SEE NOTE, PAGE 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

On August 13, 1962, Brigadier General George S. Brown, United States Air Force, Military Assistant to The Secretary of Defense, advised that he knows Baldwin but has had no close association with him. General Brown did point out that he did not know Baldwin's associates or sources of information; however, he did know that Baldwin contacts all the senior officials at the Pentagon. General Brown was of the opinion that Baldwin's source for the July 26 article is "so highly placed" that "nothing will be done" about the July 26 leak.

Commander Thomas Mazapis, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center, Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, on August 13, 1962, advised that he could furnish no information regarding Baldwin's source for his article. [Commander Mazapis did recall that, in the Fall of 1961, a "Top Secret" document regarding estimates of Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles was discussed at a meeting of the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMIC), which is a subcommittee of the United States Intelligence Board and has the same members as the Board. According to Commander Mazapis, about a week after this information was presented to the United States Intelligence Board much of the GMIC information appeared in an article in "The New York Times" by Baldwin.] ~~(S)~~

(U) Various officials of other United States Government agencies were also interviewed on August 13, 1962, but no information pertinent to this investigation was obtained.

Investigation in this case is continuing, and you will be furnished pertinent developments.

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the caption pinpoints the location of information so classified in an article available to the public. (S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

August 6, 1962

Director, FBI

REC- 37

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. EALDWIN

IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"

JULY 26, 1962

ESPIONAGE - X

1 - Mr. Belmont b3
1 - Mr. Evans b7
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Nicks

In connection with our investigation in this case, General Jerry D. Page, Deputy Director of Plans, Air Force, was interviewed on August 3, 1962. Page stated he has known Baldwin for approximately 15 years, and during the week of July 16, 1962, (exact date recalled by Page) he met with Baldwin for approximately five minutes pursuant to Baldwin's request. During the meeting Baldwin was mainly concerned about the military space and he asked questions as to whether provisions were made for adequate requirements for the coming era of man. He generally discussed the future possibilities in space and the necessity of a sound military program. Page stated that Baldwin also tried to ascertain if Page knew who was to be the next Chairman of the Joint Staff (JCS) and who would replace General Lauris Norstad, Allied Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). General Page advised that he told Baldwin not to help him with respect to these matters. According to Page, Baldwin advised he had seen Deputy Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric immediately prior to his meeting with the General, but Mr. Gilpatric had not supplied him with respect to personnel changes in the JCS and

General Page pointed out that he had never discussed anything of a classified nature with Baldwin; did not discuss anything pertaining to intelligence matters with Baldwin on the occasion of his last meeting with him; and had no suggestions as

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

65-67669

JFW:djw

(9)

7 AUG 15 1962 MAIL ROOM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 06-07-2010~~

Page 4

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENT DIRECTOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

(U) to how Baldwin might have obtained the information for the July 26, 1962, article. In this regard, it was General Page's personal opinion that Baldwin must have seen some paper relating to National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-62 in order to have written the article. ~~(S)~~

(U) Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, United States Air Force, on August 3, 1962, advised that, with the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), he testified on July 17, 1962, before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee with respect to the Air Force estimate of the number of bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles possessed by the Soviet Union. General Breitweiser said that this information was taken in part from NIE 11-8-62. He advised, however, that, to the best of his knowledge, neither he nor any other Air Force officer testified regarding the "hardening" of Soviet installations. ~~(S)~~

(U) In connection with this briefing, Major General Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director, CIA, advised on August 3, 1962, that he had furnished approval for this briefing to be given to the Subcommittee, after he had cleared this with CIA Director John A. McCone. General Carter pointed out, however, that his approval was limited to information from NIE 11-8-62 not having higher than a "Top Secret" classification. ~~(S)~~

The following officials, when interviewed, advised that although they had recently been in contact with Baldwin, they did not discuss classified information with him.

Vice Admiral William R. Smedberg, III, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy, who had lunch with Baldwin and Admiral Jerauld Wright on July 18, 1962;

Vice Admiral Robert D. Pirie, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), Department of the Navy, who saw Baldwin on July 19, 1962, for approximately twenty-five minutes; and

- 2 -
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Development, Department of the Navy, who saw Baldwin for approximately thirty minutes on July 18, 1962.

Major Daniel O. Graham, Estimates Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, on August 3, 1962, advised that he did not know Baldwin. He could furnish no information concerning Baldwin's sources or contacts. (Major Graham did state, however, that all information necessary for the July 26 article was brought together for the first time, to his knowledge, in a briefing which was presented on or about June 12, 1962, at CIA, to the Hyland Committee, an advisory group for the CIA Board of National Estimates. (The Hyland Committee actually met on June 4, 5 and 6, 1962, at Langley Field, Virginia. This group was formed at the suggestion of the United States Intelligence Board, and its members included officials from private industrial concerns; a member of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, faculty; and members of CIA and the Department of the Navy.) According to Major Graham, the briefing given the Hyland Committee emphasized "hardening" for the first time in such a briefing and discussed United States-Soviet submarine capabilities. Major Graham attached significance to the term "50-or-100-megaton warheads" used by Baldwin in paragraph twelve of the July 26 article. Major Graham stated that the only warheads available to the Soviets would have a yield of either one of these amounts and not some intermediate amount. He believed that this fact was known to Baldwin, who otherwise would have used the expression "50-to-100-megaton warheads." Concerning the reference to "coffin" construction in the July 26 article, Major Graham advised that this was discussed at the afore-mentioned briefing, but, by the time NIE 11-8-62 was finalized, this information was beginning to be discredited.] ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ ~~(3)~~

Additional interviews were also conducted on August 3, 1962, with officials at the Bureau of the Budget, CIA and JCS, but none of these interviewees could furnish any information pertinent to this investigation.

- 3 -
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

b6
b7C

On August 4, 1962, []
[] was interviewed at Winnisquam, New Hampshire.
[] stated he does not know who gave Baldwin the information for the July 26 article, but, when asked if he knew of any of Baldwin's sources, he refused to comment pointing out that a good newspaperman must protect his sources. [] would not identify any other persons who might know Baldwin's sources. Furthermore, [] refused to identify any persons Baldwin planned to see when he came to Washington, D. C., during the week of July 16, 1962, although [] admitted that he had made an appointment for Baldwin. [] did state that Baldwin was not called to Washington, D. C., on this occasion and never is summoned to Washington, D. C. According to [] Baldwin comes to Washington, D. C., as his work requires. [] pointed out that Baldwin wrote the July 26 article but that he [] did some editing in connection therewith. According to [] the July 26 article consisted of general public information. He felt that this type of article does a public service. He refused to say when the article was prepared, including whether it was prepared before or after Baldwin came to Washington, D. C. He also pointed out that he has had no discussion with Baldwin concerning the article since it was published.

You will be furnished additional developments in this case.

(U) NOTE: This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because the mere mention of the NIE 11/8/62, according to CIA, warrants such classification. [31052]

~~TOP SECRET~~

8-13-2001

~~TOP SECRET~~

B I

SP3-BTS/m

Date: 8-3-62

PER OGA LETTER DATED 10-11-2000

DECLASSIFY PAGE 3

Transmit the following in

CLASSIFY PAGE 3 PENDING ANOTHER (Type in plain text or code)

GOV AGENCY RESPONSE

Via

AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED] (P)

b3

b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

ReWFOairtel 8-2-62.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted
by WFO 8-3-62:

Major General JERRY D. PAGE, Deputy Director of Plans, USAF, advised he first met HANSON BALDWIN about 15 years ago when PAGE was on the staff of Secretary FORRESTAL; since then, he has seen him on military exercises attended by BALDWIN. One day during the week of 7-16, exact date not recalled by PAGE, he received a telephone call from BALDWIN and agreed to see him at 5:00 p.m. that day. The meeting lasted about 25 minutes. PAGE stated BALDWIN mainly was concerned about military program in space, indicating he was questioning whether sufficient provisions being made for adequate requirements for coming era of man in space. He generally discussed the future possibilities of this new field and the necessity of sound military program. HANSON BALDWIN then tried to find out from PAGE if he knew who would be the next JCS Chairman and who would take the NATO post upon NORSTAD's retirement. PAGE said he told BALDWIN he couldn't help him in these areas. BALDWIN said he had just come from seeing Deputy Secretary GILPATRIC, where he had mentioned the JCS and NATO changes but had not obtained the answer on these personnel changes.

PAGE said he had never discussed anything classified with BALDWIN; did not discuss anything pertaining to intelligence matters on this last meeting with him; had no suggestion as to how BALDWIN obtained the information for the 7-26-62, article. It was his personal feeling that BALDWIN must

HJM:ctw (3) - Bureau
(5) 1 - New York (PERSONAL ATTENTION)(Info)(RM)

1 - WFO

Approved: _____

Sent _____

M

Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/m
DECLASSIFICATION: 25X 1-8-81
5/6/96 4-20-96 SP3-BTS/m

b6
b7C

Document is important to [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8WJ/gh

3-20-89 SP8WJ/gh

1-20-89 SP8WJ/gh

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]
(U) have seen some paper relating to [NIE] in order to have written the article. ~~(S)~~

Vice Admiral WILLIAM R. SMEDBERG, III, Chief of Naval Personnel, USN, had lunch with BALDWIN and Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT in WDC on 7-18-62. Only matter discussed was effect of recent proposal to replace military instructors at the U. S. Naval Academy with civilians. SMEDBERG has never discussed classified information with BALDWIN. According to SMEDBERG, BALDWIN is acquainted with top Department of Defense officials and senior military officers in the Pentagon.

(U) Vice Admiral R. B. PIRIE, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), advised that since May, 1958, BALDWIN has visited PIRIE's office once every three or four months. PIRIE saw BALDWIN 7-19-62, for about 25 minutes. No discussion or mention was made of [NIE 11/8/62 or back-up material] PIRIE ~~(S)~~ has never discussed classified information with BALDWIN. PIRIE does not know BALDWIN's sources of information but knows that BALDWIN is acquainted with top Department of Defense and military officers in the Pentagon.

(U) Vice Admiral WILLIAM F. RABORN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Development, advised that he has been personally acquainted with BALDWIN for the past 20 years. BALDWIN visited his office for 30 minutes at 4:30 p.m., 7-18-62. No discussion re material [in NIE 11/8/62.] Admiral ~~(S)~~ RABORN never discussed with BALDWIN any classified information and does not know the source for his article.

Major General ROBERT A. BREITWEISER, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USAF, advised that after securing CIA authority, he testified before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 7-17-62, [re the Air Force's estimate of the number of bombers and ICBMs possessed by the USSR. This information was taken in part from NIE 11/8/62. He stated that, to the best of his knowledge, neither he nor any other Air Force officer testified regarding the "hardening" of Soviet installations.] ~~(S)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Major DANIEL O. GRAHAM, USA, Estimates Office, Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, USA, advised that he does not know BALDWIN and could furnish no information re his sources or contacts. GRAHAM stated that in his opinion all information necessary for the 7-26-62, article was brought together for the first time, to his knowledge, in a briefing which was presented on or about 6-12-62, at CIA to the "HYLAND Committee" (Panel), an advisory group for the Board of National Estimates. This briefing emphasized "hardening" for the first time in such a briefing and discussed U. S. - Soviet submarine capabilities. GRAHAM attached significance to the term "50 or 100-megaton warheads" used by BALDWIN, stating the only warheads available to the Soviets would have a yield of either one of these amounts and not some intermediate amount. He believes that this fact was known to BALDWIN, who otherwise would have expressed this as "50- to 100-megaton." Concerning the reference to "coffin" construction, GRAHAM advised that this was discussed at the briefing but by the time NIE 11/8/62 was finalized, this information was beginning to be discredited. ~~TOP SECRET~~

Major General WILLIAM K. MARTIN, Director, Office of Information, Department of Air Force, advised he had met BALDWIN on one or two occasions in connection with employment and last saw him about six months ago. He said BALDWIN has never come to him for information nor has he talked to BALDWIN on Air Force matters. MARTIN was on leave, 7-13 through 8-1-62, and could furnish no information as to BALDWIN's contacts or associates. MARTIN's aide, Colonel MAURICE CASEY, on duty during the pertinent period, advised a canvass of the office failed to develop that BALDWIN had been there during the pertinent period.

Dr. EARL F. ZIEMKE, Chief, Foreign Branch, Office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, confirmed previous information furnished by Dr. STETSON CONN, of the above office, to the effect that BALDWIN was at that office from approximately 9:15 a.m. to 12:00 Noon, 7-18-62, in connection with research on the battle of Stalingrad. He stated he talked with BALDWIN on the above subject, but did not know of any prior or future plans of BALDWIN during the pertinent period.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Following were interviewed with negative results:

b6
b7C

[redacted] International
Division, Bureau of Budget

[redacted] International
Division, Bureau of Budget.

[redacted], East European/USSR
Staff, Office of National Estimates

[redacted] Estimates Officer, East European/USSR
Staff, Office of National Estimates

b3

[redacted]
Office of Research and Reports

[redacted]
Office of Scientific Intelligence

[redacted] are all Representatives
of the Board of National Intelligence Estimates, CIA)

b6
b7C

[redacted] Weapons System
Evaluation Group

[redacted]
OSD (ISA)

Rear Admiral JOHN M. LEE, Director, Policy Planning
Staff, International Security Affairs, OSD

Major General RICHARD COLLINS, Intelligence Directorate,
JCS (member, USIB)

b6
b7C

Captain [redacted] USN, Intelligence Directorate,
JCS

Colonel [redacted] USA, Intelligence Directorate,
JCS

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEE REFERENCE
ACTION

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

Document downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per [REDACTED] RS 4/5/2010
August 7, 1962

b6
b7C

BY COURIER SERVICE

843-2001

CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/m
DECLASSIFY ON [REDACTED]
PER OGA LETTER DATED 10-11-2000
BRACKET PAGE 2 DECLASSIFIED
BRACKET PAGE 2 CLASSIFIED
PENDING ANOTHER GOVT. AGENCY
RESPONSE.

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In connection with our investigation concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times," issue of July 28, 1962, we interviewed Mr. Roger Hilsman, a member of the United States Evaluation Board, on August 4, 1962, at the Department of State. While Mr. Hilsman could be of no assistance as to Baldwin's sources for the July 26 article, b7C he did advise that several weeks ago he received a call from Warren Rogers, a reporter for the "New York Herald Tribune." At that time Rogers stated, "I get emanations from Air Force Friends that the Soviets are hardening some of their missile sites." Mr. Hilsman pointed out that he told Rogers that he knew nothing concerning the matter, and Rogers indicated that since Mr. Hilsman was unaware of this information there was probably nothing to it.

REC- [REDACTED]

Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth, when interviewed on August 4, 1962, advised that he saw Baldwin in his office on July 16, 1962, but no discussion of intelligence matters took place. Mr. Korth had no information concerning Baldwin's sources or contacts; however, he had the opinion that Baldwin's information may have come from personnel of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b3
b7E

SENT DIRECTOR

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

3-20-83
Classified by SP3-BTS/m
Declassify on: OADR

MAILED 19
AUG - 7 1962
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

7 AUG 15 1962
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable R. Kenneth O'Donnell

[redacted]
[redacted] Department of the Army, was interviewed
on August 4, 1962. He stated that, after the July 26 article
was published, he had an analysis made which pointed to the
United States Air Force as the probable source of Baldwin's
information [since the article used the estimate of Soviet
missile strength indicating United States Air Force thinking.
He pointed out that also characteristic of United States b6 per ARMY
Air Force conclusions is the "coffin" construction theory
which the United States Army considers a premature conclusion
of the Air Force. [redacted] commented that it is possible
the Air Force may have supplied background on "coffin" sites
(U) to support the United States Air Force's desire to increase
its attack capability. ~~TOP SECRET~~

Investigation in this matter is continuing, and you
will be furnished pertinent developments.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the letter pinpoints
the location of an article containing classified information
in the public domain.

also memo sent to AB 8-7-62

~~TOP SECRET~~

10-2-1000
LBI-1012-100
SEC-1-1000


**No Comment on
Report Newsman
Being Shadowed**

The Defense Department yesterday refused to comment on a published report that Secretary Robert S. McNamara asked the FBI to investigate the information sources of Hanson Baldwin, military writer for the New York Times.

Although he refused comment on that report, Assistant Defense Secretary Arthur Sylvester denied Mr. McNamara has ordered or approved "shadowing" of any newsmen in or out of the Pentagon. (UPI).

Tolson _____
Belmont ☒
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach *[Signature]*
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen ☒
Sullivan ☒
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

b3
b7E



Hanson W. Baldwin

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/cum
5/6/96 SP3 BTJ/cum
9/20/96

NOT RECORDED
176 AUG 14 1962

The Washington Post and Times Herald _____
The Washington Daily News *[Signature]*
The Evening Star _____
New York Herald Tribune _____
New York Journal-American _____
New York Mirror _____
New York Daily News _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Worker _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
Date _____

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

AUG 8 1962

53 AUG 14 1962

Pentagon Mute On Press Quiz

United Press International

The Defense Department refused to comment yesterday on a published report that Secretary Robert S. McNamara had asked the FBI to investigate information sources of the New York Times military editor.

Although refusing comment on that report, Assistant Defense Secretary Arthur Sylvester denied that any newsmen have been "shadowed" inside or outside the Pentagon at McNamara's direction or with his approval.

The report of an FBI inquiry was published yesterday in the Drew Pearson column, written in Pearson's absence overseas by his associate, Jack Anderson.

Sylvester said that the Pentagon "of course" attempts to find out how sensitive information leaks into the press.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

b3
b7E

File
5-*[initials]*
Hanson W. Baldwin

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 WJ/fak

5/6/96

9/20/96

SP3 BTJ/crm
SP3 BTJ/92

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

NOT RECORDED

176 AUG 14 1962

The Washington Post and Times Herald _____
The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star _____
New York Herald Tribune _____
New York Journal-American _____
New York Mirror _____
New York Daily News _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Worker _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
Date _____

53 AUG 14 1962

AUG 8 1962

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 14 1962

~~URGENT~~
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

URGENT 8-14-62 12-2-/// 12-21 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI /1/ [] AND WFO []

FROM SAC NEW YORK []
HANSON W. BALDWIN ESP-X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP3 BTJ/clr-19-20-96 SP3 BTJ/clr

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED NO PERTINENT INFO
CONCERNING BALDWIN. THIS DATE.

END AND ACK
NY R 1 WA JS

15-132

REC-27

4 AUG 14 1962

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

37B
54 AUG 20 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~
FBI

b6
b7C

Date: 8/10/62

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

Document downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per [redacted] /RS
on 4/5/2010

ReWFOairtel 8/9/62.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted
by WFO 8/10/62:

General GEORGE H. DECKER, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army advised that he has been acquainted with Mrs. BALDWIN since World War II; that during past two years BALDWIN has infrequently visited his office; however, he has not seen BALDWIN for past six months. He could furnish no concrete information as to the identity of BALDWIN's source for article. He is of the opinion that BALDWIN's source was a high-placed civilian official of the Department of Defense with the position of at least Assistant Secretary or higher.

Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT upon reinterview fixed dates of his luncheon dates with BALDWIN as 7/17/62, and 7/19/62. WRIGHT recalled several additional bits of information, but furnished nothing of significance.

3- Bureau

1- New York [redacted] (Info) (RM) - PERSONAL ATTENTION [redacted]

1- WFO

HJM;rps
(5)

AIRTEL

CC: Sullivan

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

Approved: _____

Sent ~~URGENT~~ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge
57 AUG 21 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-20-89
CLASSIFIED BY 603 BIL/CL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
8/6/96/9-20-96 SP8/CL
FOR AT-let dtd 7-31-96

b3
b7E

Rear Admiral LEVERING SMITH, Technical Director, Special Projects Office, Department of Navy, and a member of the Hyland Panel, advised that material presented in briefings to Hyland Panel on 6/4,5/62, was too general to have been the basis for the BALDWIN article.

SMITH admitted knowing BALDWIN, but last saw him on July 17 or 18, 1960.

(U) CARL H. KAYSEN, Deputy Special Assistant to the President, advised he is familiar with [NIE 11-8-62 and attendant material,] but does not know BALDWIN. He said he is familiar with several "N. Y. Times" representatives, but has not talked with them or any reporters on military matters in many weeks and has not discussed material such as found in article in question with any "outsider." KAYSEN had no knowledge of BALDWIN's contacts or itinerary for week of 7/16/62. He had no idea how BALDWIN obtained the information and was unable to offer any further assistance.

Dr. GLEN T. SEABORG, AEC, presently traveling on vacation and unavailable until 8/27/62, at which time he will be interviewed.

The following interviews were conducted with negative results:

Major General NILS O. OHMAN, USAF
Senior Air Force Member, WSEG

Colonel [] USAF
Assistant Executive, DIA

Colonel []
USA, Inspector General, DIA

b6
b7C

[] Special Requirements
Staff, Office of Special Activities and
Chairman of Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

General FREDERIC H. SMITH, Jr., Retired,
Former Vice Chief of Staff, USAF

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted]
Assistant General Counsel, OSD

[redacted]
Assistant General Counsel, OSD

b6
b7C

CHARLES J. HITCH
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

[redacted] NSC,
Information Liaison

Vice Admiral RUFUS E. ROSE, Commandant,
Industrial College of the Armed Forces

GEORGE W. BALL
Under Secretary of State

C. DOUGLAS DILLON
Secretary of the Treasury

Attempts to locate Lieutenant General JOHN K. GERHART, USAF, reveals he is presently assigned to Ent AFB, Colorado. It has been determined that Lieutenant General THOMAS P. GERRITY, USAF, has been reassigned to an overseas post. No efforts will be made to interview these persons in the absence of information revealing they were in contact with BALDWIN, UACB.

On 8/9/62, WF 1384-S* revealed that [redacted] informed a friend, [redacted] that she had read the column of JACK ANDERSON published 8/7/62, wherein he mentioned the FBI investigating BALDWIN at the direction of Secretary McNAMARA. [redacted] stated this was not accurate. She said she had been told that the investigation was at the instruction of [redacted] No other pertinent data was furnished by WF 1384-S*.

b6
b7C

Date of Mail 8-9-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8BJ/fab
5/6/96 SP3BJ/clm
9/20/96 SP3BJ/clm

b6
b7C

Subject JUNE MAIL Hanson W. Baldwin

Removed By 65 AUG 19 1962

File Number

[Redacted Box]

b3
b7E

Permanent Serial Charge Out

R/S

The Attorney General

Page 11. 100

Director, FBI

ARTICLE BY LAWSON R. ALLEN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESTABLISHED - X

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - D.E. Moore
1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

Reference is made to my letter dated August 9, 1960, in which pertinent developments in this case were set out.

b6
b7C

Our coverage of Hanson N. Baldwin disclosed that during the evening of August 8, 1962, he was contacted by a person believed to be Drvil E. Dryfoos, President and Publisher of "The New York Times." Dryfoos advised Baldwin that "they" received "the FBI part of it" (possibly referring to our investigation in this matter) and Dryfoos expected to receive a personal letter from the President together with "a document telling the who, the what, the why, evidently the background" although "this man hasn't called for an appointment." Dryfoos did not know when the man was "coming up" although the man's Secretary had called and Dryfoos had called back. (Later, Dryfoos indicated to Baldwin "the Naval Attache" would deliver the document.)

Malvin inquired of Byrnes, "You saw the NY article [redacted]?" [redacted] then turned in [redacted] to his column (ignoring [redacted]). Apparently they queried Arthur Sylvester in the Pentagon [redacted] in it. There was a NY story as a result. It simply said that Arthur Sylvester had no comment on this. They brought in also [redacted] of the Washington [redacted] The London story said in effect the FBI was following, [redacted] after reporters and so on. And then it went on to mention specifically the Military Editor of 'The New York Times' without specifying the story."

b6
b7C

When Bryfons asked if that was what [redacted] had said Baldwin answered, "That's what [redacted] said and Arthur Sylvester was asked about [redacted] by the President. And he said he had no comment on whether or not the FBI was looking into any story written by me but he said that MacLure" (probably Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara) "had ever ordered the FBI to

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SENT DIRECTOR
FOR APPROVAL

SEC NOTE PAGE 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

follow or investigate any newspaperman and then he further said--this is amusing, it indicates the state of mind of the reporters in the Pentagon--he said he denied that the press room telephones in the Pentagon were tapped. Then he went on to mention [redacted]--he's the Washington 'Evening Star' [redacted] some weeks ago had an exclusive story which he had discussed with Mr. McNamara. I had heard this before from [redacted] And Mr. McNamara apparently had told him not to use it. He didn't use it. Mr. McNamara then went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and" (inaudible) "them to find out where [redacted] had gotten it. Of course it irked [redacted] quite a lot. And Sylvester mentioned this" (inaudible). "That was the gist of the story.

b6
b7C

"I would like to point out that the President has done this same thing before. He sent General Taylor to see Mr. Luce, Harry Luce, after the Cuban invasion and complaining about the story that 'Fortune' magazine carried by [redacted] The President denounced this story at a press conference and very unwisely, I think, sent General Taylor to see Mr. Luce. And Mr. Luce did have [redacted] and also [redacted] of 'Fortune' in at the time Taylor came and Taylor made some nine" (inaudible) "specifications of what he alleged were errors. And both [redacted] refuted them. At least that's the story I got. Taylor at the end said let's forget it. He was ordered to do the job. I don't think Taylor would have undertaken this unless he was ordered. [redacted] was alleged to have said that we won't forget it because the President called us a liar in public or words to that effect. But this sort of thing has been done before. I think the great danger here, Orv, and I think it's something you're very conscious of because we talked about it the other day, because the President may attempt to tie your hands completely, not only for now but for the future. And I think this can be a great danger. So I think that all you can do is play it by ear."

Dryfoos advised Baldwin that "they have a complete report on the incident" indicating "what the facts are." Baldwin then asked, "They don't allege to have said who said what to me?" In reply Dryfoos advised, "I haven't seen it,

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

I don't know. That's the kind of thing that after I see, I won't be able to discuss afterward." Baldwin said, "The point of the thing that I think you ought better be wary of, because I think this involves the paper. It seems to me that is the sort of thing that you shouldn't let yourself be tied up on, if I just may offer that suggestion. I think that if it's a question of secret sources, I mean by that information we may be getting from Russia, or ways of getting it, that's another thing altogether."

Dryfoos commented that he could not be "bound" by the document and he would not be able to discuss it. He also said that if it was a personal document from the President he would look at it and give it back to "the Naval Attache." Baldwin commented that he understood. Baldwin also stated that "you have to be pretty careful what you say to the Naval Attache and to the President afterwards." Baldwin also commented, "We're all on the same team. What I mean is that we're all as interested in America as he is or is anyone else." When Dryfoos stated he would take the responsibility Baldwin indicated he did not want Dryfoos to do so and he would be "glad" to share the responsibility with him.

Baldwin inquired if Dryfoos had received "that letter I sent you from the young chap in the National Guard Bureau. Because this is the sort of thing that I think is deplorable. The Administration is going to suffer for this because you cannot win loyalty that way." Dryfoos indicated he had to "stick with this particular episode." (By "the young chap" Baldwin was possibly referring to [redacted] Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau, Department of the Army, mentioned in my August 1, 1962, letter.)

b6 per NGB

Dryfoos and Baldwin agreed they were "talking blind" and Dryfoos commented, "Maybe I can talk less blind after I get this thing." Baldwin then remarked, "Well, it seems clear that when the President brings up a subject like this, you obviously have to acknowledge it and be polite. There is another point of view to it that the methods employed can never be forgotten and I think this is vital for a free press. And it's vital for any sense of loyalty for the people who are wearing the uniform. This has happened twice now in the Pentagon. It's created a terrific amount of distress. And it naturally would."

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Baldwin also told Dryfoos that if "they can spell this out at all you can say that you know nothing of what the source is." To which Dryfoos commented, "Well, that's why I'm delighted I don't." Baldwin replied, "And you must so report and this is a safeguard of the press and it always has been. That you don't intend to violate it. I think you have to make that point."

Baldwin stated, "I would like to get at the background of this. I didn't see Scotty" (probably James Reston of the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times") "I wish I had seen him personally, but when Scotty talked to you, apparently he gave you the impression before. I don't know whether he did this time. One of the chief worries of the Administration was the fact that the right hand didn't know what the left hand was doing." Dryfoos pointed out that Baldwin's statement was correct and "there is no question about it." To which Baldwin replied, "Well then, if this is true, then it seems to me this is something you had better take up very strongly." Dryfoos stated, "That goes beyond this episode. I'm involving myself in a governmental function and this is a game I don't want to play."

Baldwin replied, "Well, perhaps not but on the other hand I think you want to make the strong point that the press can't be bound by the fact the Government is embarrassed. After all, you're talking to a Naval Attache here. I don't think you have to say anything to him and I wouldn't." When Dryfoos pointed out that the "Naval Attache" was acting as a messenger Baldwin said, "I know, but he's bringing a letter, and I personally think your letter ought to be back to the President after he's left. The less you say to the Naval Attache, the better. That's my feeling. I don't know."

Baldwin expressed his sorrow for giving Dryfoos "bad dreams" but Dryfoos stated that "if there was a violation it's their violation." Baldwin doubted this and said he thought that "they may be making a big show about how wrong the 'Times' was." Dryfoos did not "think they'll be saying anything to anybody on the outside" and Baldwin indicated he did not mean "on the outside" but rather "in the letter to you." When Dryfoos pronounced, "We're only wrong if they're wrong too,"

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Baldwin stated, "I don't think we're wrong either. I can't see that the 'Times' has any great responsibility for this. I think that they are really trying to put the blame where it doesn't belong. This isn't the first time. And it's pretty notorious around the Pentagon especially on the working press. I think that all the sympathy probably would be on our side of the fence. The fact they were so chary about having anything in print indicates this."

In addition to the above our coverage of Baldwin indicated that on August 9, 1962, Baldwin contacted his wife in the late afternoon and stated there was "no sweat" and everything would be all right.

It should be noted that our source was not able to give the complete details of all conversation between Baldwin and his associate; however, the above has been set forth in as much detail as possible.

Investigation in this case is continuing and you will be furnished pertinent developments.

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~TOP SECRET~~" since the caption pinpoints the location of top secret information in an article available to the public.

like memo to O'Connell, White House

8-10-62

SW

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: July 30, 1962

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE *DEM*

cc Mr. Belmont

Mr. Evans

Mr. Sullivan

Mr. D.E. Moore

Mr. Wannall

Mr. Wacks

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES" 7-26-62
ESPIONAGE - X

SEE REVERSE
8:37 PM
CLAS. ACTION

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

At 9:30 AM, 7-30-62, I met with Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretaries of the Armed Forces, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other high level officials of the Department of Defense.

Mr. McNamara at the outset introduced me and stated he had asked me to be present and that at his request the Attorney General had prevailed on the Director for the FBI to conduct an investigation into the very serious leak of information which appeared in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" of 7-26-62. Mr. McNamara pointed out that the information was so sensitive that even all those in the room were not cleared for it and the President had specifically instructed that every precaution be taken to prevent disclosure of the information, but it had happened any way.

He said he had been in touch with the Director on similar matters in the past and the Director had told him that this was something for the Department of Defense to do itself, that it was necessary for the Department of Defense to put its own house in order and take steps to prevent such leaks. He said he felt that some progress had been made, but that the information involved in this instance was most widely known in the Department of Defense and he was very glad that the Director had approved our conducting an investigation and that I was present to request assistance. Mr. McNamara also referred to articles which appeared in "The New York Times" of 7-28* and 7-29* which clearly indicated to him that Baldwin had secured information from the Pentagon.

These deal with Pentagon information.

I then told those present that as requested we are making inquiry to attempt to determine the source of Baldwin's material in the article in "The New York Times" of 7-26. In our inquiry as we go along, we are also attempting to determine who was not the source. Information in [N.I.E.#11-8-62] is closely related to the article and the timing is such that we are determining those who have had access to this information, either in its final form or during drafting and are interviewing them wherever appropriate.

SENT DIRECTOR
7-30-62

~~TOP SECRET~~

AUG 14 1962

Document downgraded to Secret
per [redacted] RS on 4/5/2010

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by SP8/BJK
3-20-83
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3 BJK/ma
3-20-83
DEM:td (7) 1962

b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. MOORE - MR. SULLIVAN
ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES" 7-26-62
ESPIONAGE - X

great many, of course, are in the Department of Defense and we are appreciative of the cooperation shown us.

I also advised the group that in addition to pressing this line of inquiry, we would like to determine Mr. Baldwin's contacts on his visit to Washington during the week of 7-16. Mr. Baldwin stayed at the Jefferson Hotel, made various contacts in Government and was at the Pentagon for at least part of two days. Inquiry by General Carroll's office determined only that Mr. Baldwin was in contact with the Secretary of Defense on 7-19. We feel he must have contacted others and would like the opportunity of talking to anyone present or anyone in their departments or staffs who were in contact with Mr. Baldwin during this week. I requested that each of these present take the necessary action within their own department or staff to determine who Baldwin was in contact with.

I also told them that we would like to request during our inquiry something more than merely acquiescence and cooperation in what we do, but any positive action which they can take or suggest in order to make the inquiry productive.

I advised them that in accordance with Secretary McNamara's original suggestion, we have been in contact with General Carroll's office and can be contacted through that office and are most willing and anxious to talk to anyone at any time.

After I concluded, some questions were asked with regard to the article by Baldwin and with regard to his visit to Washington and thereafter Mr. McNamara thanked me for being present.

ACTION:

For information. All investigation in this matter is being pressed vigorously.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-26-2017 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

FBI

Date: August 13, 1962

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Gale _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____

SEE RE: Miss Gandy
SIDE: _____
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION: _____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Re WFO airtel 8/10/62.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted
by WFO 8/13/62:

JAMES E. WEBB, Administrator, NASA, advised attended July 9-10, 1962, NSC meeting at which info in [NIE 11-8-62] discussed. Had no previous briefing or other info on subject matter and does not recall reading document itself. Said does not, as rule, attend NSC meetings where such matters brought up, but did in this instance as representative of Committee of Principles in connection with Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Switzerland. Stated has met BALDWIN few times over years, but not in contact with him past two or three years and surely not since WEBB in present position. Said also knew JOHN WARREN FINNEY, JAMES RESTON and ARTHUR KROCK, "The New York Times", but has not seen any past nine to twelve months. Said in telephonic contact with RESTON during past two or three weeks re future astronaut training and invited RESTON to office to discuss matter but RESTON has not accepted invitation. Could furnish no info as to possible suspect for BALDWIN's source.

EX - 102

REC- 44

3 - Bureau

1 - New York [redacted]

1 - WFO

HJM/pcn

(5)

(Info)(PERSONAL ATTENTION)(RM)

b3
b7E

A I R T E L

C. Wick

CC: MR. SULLIVAN

b6
b7C

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M

Per _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

53 AUG 21 1962

Classified by 6032/BJ/K...
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
5/4/96 9/20/96 5/3/01/96

Document downgraded
to Secret per [redacted]
[redacted] 25 M 4/5/2010 b6
b7C

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rear Admiral WILLIAM F. FITZGERALD, Jr., (Ret.), Executive Director, Naval Academy Alumni Association, Annapolis, Maryland, advised he last saw BALDWIN on 7/17/62, on which date the above association's Publication Committee met in Washington, D. C., from 10:00 A.M. to 2:15 P.M. In attendance at the meeting, at which advertising and publication matters were discussed, were BALDWIN, FITZGERALD, Vice Admiral GEORGE C. DYER (Ret.), Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT (Ret.), Captain P. F. WAKEMAN (USN, Ret.), Rear Admiral E. B. FLUCKEY. For about 20 minutes M. S. COLLINS of American Publishing Company, Washington, D. C., was in attendance. FITZGERALD does not recall BALDWIN soliciting information the type of which appeared in the 7/26/62 article. BALDWIN's contacts and itinerary were not known to FITZGERALD, who stated that he arranged for date, time and place of the meeting several weeks before 7/17/62.

General DAVID W. GRAY, upon reinterview, explained that the proposed addendum to CIA contribution to "Implications" paper and sent by special courier on 7/17/62 to CIA was handwritten by him on morning of 7/17/62 without reference to any document and with consultation of only Admiral GEORGE H. MILLER. GRAY stated the use of the phrase "sense of urgency" was pure coincidence insofar as there is similarity in the last paragraph of the BALDWIN article and that different subjects were under consideration in the two items. (S)

(U) Colonel THOMAS W. WOLFE, USAF, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA), was interviewed, results negative in general. WOLFE advised he was action officer for PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary for ISA, in preparation of "Implications" paper assigned to Department of Defense and contacted numerous officials in this connection. In relating his activity, WOLFE advised that BRUNO AUGENSTEIN, Office of Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, had prepared a paper dealing with satellites, antisatellites and Soviet capabilities in this field, and that this paper was dated about the middle of July 1962. Since the last three paragraphs of the BALDWIN article, including the reference to sense of urgency, deal with this subject, inquiry was made of AUGENSTEIN. (S) ~~(S)~~

BRUNO W. AUGENSTEIN, Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Intelligence and Reconnaissance),

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted]

Department of Defense, [advised his office had prepared paper upon express instructions of Secretary McNAMARA captioned, according to his recollection, "Measures to Reduce the Vulnerability of Our Reconnaissance Satellite". This paper was dated 7/14/62 and was classified "Top Secret - Special Handling". Only four copies were made and distributed to Secretary McNAMARA, Deputy Secretary ROSWELL GILPATRIC, and the Under Secretary of the Department of Air Force. The fourth copy was later sent to Dr. HERBERT SCOVILLE, CIA. Special clearance for two WFO SAs being obtained 8/14/62 through CIA for inquiry re this paper.] ~~(S-200)~~

(U) Brigadier General GEORGE S. BROWN, USAF, Office of Secretary of Defense, advised he casually has known BALDWIN for about five years and has had no personal contact with him other than to greet him at OSD. General BROWN does not know BALDWIN's associates or sources of information, but knows BALDWIN contacts all senior officials of Pentagon and perhaps other agencies. General BROWN believes BALDWIN's source for article is so highly placed that nothing will be done about leak.

(U) Commander THOMAS HAZAPIS, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center, ONI, advised that he has no information regarding the identity of BALDWIN's source for article of 7/26/62. He stated that he is the Navy's representative to Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), which is a subcommittee of USIB and has the same membership as USIB. He recalls that in the Fall of 1961 GMAIC discussed and considered certain information which was classified "Top Secret" regarding estimates of Soviet ICBMs. About a week after this information was presented to USIB, much of the GMAIC information appeared in an article in "The New York Times" by BALDWIN. HAZAPIS also stated that he has personally heard on three or four occasions at meetings of GMAIC, in a joking manner, the thought that if information is released outside of GMAIC it would appear within a week in an article by BALDWIN. He has never heard any other newspaper reporter or writer mentioned at GMAIC. He does not recall who made these statements, but knows they were made only in jest. ~~(X)~~

The following interviews were conducted with negative results:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

b3 [REDACTED] Director, National Indications Center

Major [REDACTED] USAF

Dr. CHARLES H. REICHARDT, Director of Intelligence, AEC

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] for Administration, AEC, and USIB Representative

GEORGE B. PLEAT, Deputy to Director of Intelligence, AEC

[REDACTED]
AEC

b6
b7C

Major General J. M. REYNOLDS, USAF, Vice Director, JCS

[REDACTED] ONI

Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] USAF, Special Weapons
Branch, Director of Plans, DOD

JP

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

August 10, 1962

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 01 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

REC'D - READING ROOM
FBI
8-13-62
11/15

b6
b7C

In connection with our continuing investigation of the captioned matter, Mr. Edward R. Murrow, Director, United States Information Agency, was interviewed on August 9, 1962. He advised he has known Baldwin for many years, but has not seen him for the past year. He was unable to identify the source of Baldwin's information for the captioned article; however, he suggested that "The New York Times" may have had a staff of reporters working on the article.

Vice Admiral John Sylvester, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), Department of the Navy, advised on August 9, 1962, that he has known Baldwin since they attended the United States Naval Academy together; however, he did not see Baldwin during July, 1962. Admiral Sylvester stated that it is his opinion and the opinion of other high-ranking Naval officers that Baldwin's source for the information in the July 26, 1962, article was a highly placed civilian employee with the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense or above.

General Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff, Department of the Air Force, when interviewed on August 9, 1962, could furnish no facts pertinent to this investigation. It was his opinion, however, that no one wearing a uniform had furnished Baldwin with the information contained in the July 26 article.

General LeMay expressed his belief that the information was deliberately furnished to Baldwin by the Administration. In this regard General LeMay advised that he had no opinion as to what purpose would be served or as to the person who made the information available.

JFW:djw

SENT DIRECTOR
FOR APPROVAL
8-11-62

REC-26

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2
11 AUG 15 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Secretary of State Dean Rusk was interviewed on August 9, 1962. He could furnish no information as to the possible identity of Baldwin's source for the article.

b7C per USMC

[redacted]
[redacted] on August 9, 1962, advised that [redacted]
[redacted] had seen Baldwin during the period July 16-19, 1962. [redacted] furnished the following information in confidence which, however, is being furnished to you because of its pertinence to this case. [redacted] stated that it is "pretty well known" that Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, is the person responsible for giving the information to Baldwin which appeared in the July 26 article. [redacted] pointed out that he did not feel free to name sources in this regard, but he said it was generally believed by responsible people in the military community that Mr. Gilpatric was the person who disclosed the data to Baldwin.

Additional interviews were conducted on August 9, 1962, at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force; however, no information pertinent to this investigation was obtained.

You will be furnished additional developments in this matter.

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the caption pinpoints the location of "~~Top Secret~~" information in an article available to the public.

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 1 1 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/crm

URGENT 8-11-62 2-48 AM TDM

TO DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED] AND SAC WASHINGTON FIELD [REDACTED]
FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED] 1P

HANSON W. BALDWIN, ESP-X.

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERICK LEARNED THAT BALDWIN
MAY BEGIN HIS VACATION ON AUGUST THIRTEEN BUT DOES NOT PLAN TO
TRAVEL. HE WILL PROBABLY REMAIN AT HIS RESIDENCE. NO OTHER
PERTINENT INFO REPORTED ON AUGUST TEN.

END AND ACK

MESS 2

NY R 01 WA NH

TWO COPIES WFO

REC-45

EX-114

10 AUG 15 1962

b3
b7E

SEE REV 7-2-82
SIDE F.B.I.
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

August 15, 1962

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

5-1-2001
DECLASSIFIED
SP3-BTJ/AM
00-4417

b6
b7C

Document downgraded to Secret
Per [redacted] RS 4/5/2010

In connection with our continuing investigation into this case, Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon advised on August 14, 1962, that on the evening of August 13, 1962, he had as guests at his home Mr. John A. McCone, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Mr. James L. Reston, head of the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times." Mr. Dillon advised that during the evening Reston brought up the subject of the investigation of the captioned article, indicating that he thought this was an excessive use of the FBI. He stated this was not the right way to obtain information and intimated that some high official in the United States Government should have taken the matter up personally with Baldwin.

Mr. Dillon advised that Reston stated he did not know why Baldwin would publish such an article and he did not know who may have furnished the information to Baldwin. During the conversation Reston said that "they" had been preparing a "blast" because the FBI had been used, and he mentioned the fact that the FBI contacted a secretary of "The New York Times" at 7 p.m. in the evening (this probably is in reference to our interview with [redacted] details of which have been previously furnished you). Reston continued by stating that someone had called "The New York Times" and explained the importance of the subject matter involved in the news article and, thereafter, Reston felt better.

Mr. Dillon pointed out that he received the impression that someone in a high position in the Administration had talked to Reston, but he stated that Reston did not so comment.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

JFW:djw

AUG 16 1962

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

SEE NOTE, PAGE 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY 303 BTJ/AM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
26/05/85 2602-1/321/5
26/05/85 2602-1/321/5

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Mr. Dillon said, however, that Reston did say that he did not realize the importance of the information, although he knew when he read the article that it would be embarrassing. Reston indicated he now realized that the "complaint" was not merely a political tactic for bargaining or pressure purposes. Mr. Dillon advised that Reston stated that he had heard only three persons were in possession of the information and the phrases used in the article, and he thought Baldwin must have obtained the information from some friend who divulged it to him but did not make the proper "off-the-record injunctions" of those portions which should be protected. It appeared to Mr. Dillon that this subject was uppermost in Reston's mind.

On August 14, 1962, Mr. Lowell R. Dailey, Assistant to Mr. Bruno W. Augenstein, Assistant Director of Defense, Research and Engineering (Intelligence and Reconnaissance), Department of Defense, [made available for examination the document captioned, "Protection of Satellite Reconnaissance Vehicles." This document, dated July 13, 1962, is classified "~~Top~~ Secret - Special Handling Required." According to Mr. Dailey, only four copies of this document were prepared. One copy was furnished to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on July 14, 1962, and returned on the same date; one copy was furnished to Mr. Joseph V. Charyk, Under Secretary of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force, on July 16, 1962, which he still has in his possession; and one copy was furnished to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric on July 16, 1962, and returned on the same date. The fourth copy was retained as a file copy. On August 7, 1962, the copy previously in the possession of Mr. Gilpatric was furnished to CIA, which has retained possession.] ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ ~~(S)~~

(U) A comparison of the above document with the last three paragraphs of the July 26, 1962, news article indicated that certain information in the document appeared in the article, although not in the continuity set forth in the document. ~~(S)~~ (u)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

On August 14, 1962, officials of various United States Government agencies were interviewed; however, no information pertinent to this investigation was developed.

Investigation in this matter is continuing, and you will be furnished pertinent developments.

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the caption pinpoints the location of "~~Top Secret~~" information in an article available to the public.

10-3-62

~~TOP SECRET~~

8-5, 1962

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527 b6
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524 b7C
☐ Forward to File Review
☒ Attention
☒ Return to

Supervisor	Room	Ext.
------------	------	------

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject _____
Birthdate & Place _____
Address _____

Localities _____

R# _____ Date 8/15 Searcher Initials 12

Prod. _____

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
100-334332	1
100-334332	2
100-334332	3
100-334332	4
100-334332	5
100-334332	6
100-334332	7
100-334332	8
100-334332	9
100-334332	10
100-334332	11
100-334332	12
100-334332	13
100-334332	14
100-334332	15
100-334332	16
100-334332	17
100-334332	18
100-334332	19
100-334332	20
100-334332	21
100-334332	22
100-334332	23
100-334332	24
100-334332	25
100-334332	26
100-334332	27
100-334332	28
100-334332	29
100-334332	30
100-334332	31
100-334332	32
100-334332	33
100-334332	34
100-334332	35
100-334332	36
100-334332	37
100-334332	38
100-334332	39
100-334332	40
100-334332	41
100-334332	42
100-334332	43
100-334332	44
100-334332	45
100-334332	46
100-334332	47
100-334332	48
100-334332	49
100-334332	50
100-334332	51
100-334332	52
100-334332	53
100-334332	54
100-334332	55
100-334332	56
100-334332	57
100-334332	58
100-334332	59
100-334332	60
100-334332	61
100-334332	62
100-334332	63
100-334332	64
100-334332	65
100-334332	66
100-334332	67
100-334332	68
100-334332	69
100-334332	70
100-334332	71
100-334332	72
100-334332	73
100-334332	74
100-334332	75
100-334332	76
100-334332	77
100-334332	78
100-334332	79
100-334332	80
100-334332	81
100-334332	82
100-334332	83
100-334332	84
100-334332	85
100-334332	86
100-334332	87
100-334332	88
100-334332	89
100-334332	90
100-334332	91
100-334332	92
100-334332	93
100-334332	94
100-334332	95
100-334332	96
100-334332	97
100-334332	98
100-334332	99
100-334332	100

FILE NUMBER *NR* b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *3-20-89* BY *SP8 JTB/CLM*
5/7/96 SP3 BTJ/CLM
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/CLM

IN CONTAINERS

ALL INFO CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-20-89 BY S

5/7/96

SP3 BTJ/CLM

9/20/90

5/3 BJO/94

F B I

Date: 8/13/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL RM
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]
SUBJECT : HANSON W. BALDWIN
ESP-X

Re WFO airtel to Director 8/11/62.

Telephone number TR 9-3000 listed to Memorial Hospital for Cancer and Allied Diseases, 444 E. 68 Street, New York, NY.

WH 3-8900 listed to FAHNESTOCK & CO., 65 Broadway, New York, NY, a stock brokerage house.

PL 2-3794 listed to [redacted]

No record of [redacted] indices NYO. No record phone number NYO indices.

No further investigation contemplated UACB re phone numbers.

3 - Bureau [redacted] (RM)
2 - Washington Field [redacted] (RM)
1 - New York [redacted]

WDD:HC (33)
(8)

REC-61

16 AUG 13 1962

50 AUG 17 1962

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

Per _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 1 5 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/cw

5/7/96 SP3 BTJ/cw
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/cw

URGENT 8-15-62 12-21 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI [redacted] /2/ AND WFO [redacted]

FROM SAC NEW YORK [redacted]

HANSON W. BALDWIN ESP-X

Wannall 7

b3
b7E

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED NO
PERTINENT INFO THIS DATE.

REC-39

15 AUG 15 1962

EX-113

END AND ACK
NY R 2 WA HFL
TWO COPIES WFO.

303
AUG 10 1962
F146

5. [signature]

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

August 10, 1962

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In my previous letters to you, the last being August 9, 1962, you were furnished pertinent details concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962. You were also advised that you would be furnished pertinent developments in this continuing investigation.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow, Director, United States Information Agency, was interviewed on August 9, 1962. He advised he has known Baldwin for many years, but has not seen him for the past year. He was unable to identify the source of Baldwin's information for the July 26 article; however, he suggested that "The New York Times" may have had a staff of reporters working on the article.

Vice Admiral John Sylvester, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), Department of the Navy, advised on August 9, 1962, that he has known Baldwin since they attended the United States Naval Academy together; however, he did not see Baldwin during July, 1962. Admiral Sylvester stated that it is his opinion and the opinion of other high-ranking Naval officers that Baldwin's source for the information in the July 26 article was a highly placed civil position of Assistant Secretary of Defense or above.

SENT DIRECTOR
FOR APPROVAL

11 AUG 15 1962
SEE NOTE, PAGE 3

53 AUG 22 1962
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Donnell

General Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff, Department of the Air Force, when interviewed on August 9, 1962, could furnish no facts pertinent to this investigation. It was his opinion, however, that no one wearing a uniform had furnished Baldwin with the information contained in the July 26 article. General LeMay expressed his belief that the information was deliberately furnished to Baldwin by the Administration. In this regard General LeMay advised that he had no opinion as to what purpose would be served or as to the person who made the information available.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk was interviewed on August 9, 1962. He could furnish no information as to the possible identity of Baldwin's source for the article.

b7C per USMC

[redacted]
[redacted] on August 9, 1962, advised that [redacted]
[redacted] had seen Baldwin during the period July 16-19, 1962. [redacted] furnished the following information in confidence which, however, is being furnished to you because of its pertinence to this case. [redacted] stated that it is "pretty well known" that Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, is the person responsible for giving the information to Baldwin which appeared in the July 26 article. [redacted] pointed out that he did not feel free to name sources in this regard, but he said it was generally believed by responsible people in the military community that Mr. Gilpatric was the person who disclosed the data to Baldwin.

Additional interviews were conducted on August 9, 1962, at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force; however, no information pertinent to this investigation was obtained.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

You will be furnished additional developments in this matter. The above information has been furnished to the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because the location of "~~Top Secret~~" information in an article available to the public is identified therein.

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

August 9, 1962

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable A. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In my previous letters to you, the last being August 8, 1962, you were furnished pertinent details concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962. You were also advised that you would be furnished pertinent developments in this continuing investigation.

We interviewed Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert on August 8, 1962. Mr. Zuckert has not seen Baldwin since last winter, and could furnish no information of interest to this investigation.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Advisor to the President, on August 8, 1962, advised that he has known Baldwin for years but has not seen him during the past six months. He could furnish no information of interest to this investigation.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, advised that he is acquainted with Baldwin but has not seen or talked with him during 1962.

Mr. Bundy advised that a few days after the publication of the July 26, 1962, article he was contacted by James Reston of the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times." Mr. Bundy

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

JFW:GJW

(6) ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SENT DIRECTOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

REC-59

11 AUG 15 1962

SEE NOTE, PAGE 3

b3
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/26/85 BY SP8/ML/STW

AUG 9 6 21 PM '62
READING ROOM
FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY SP8/ML/STW
ON 3-20-89

AUG - 9 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Donnell

said that he told Reston he was unable to comment concerning this investigation and that inquiries in this regard would have to be directed to the President and the Secretary of Defense. This interview was conducted on August 8, 1962.

On August 8, 1962, Mr. Orville Splitt, Directorate for News Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), advised that, as a result of a speech given by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16, 1962, there was much speculation among the various Pentagon correspondents that the United States had achieved a breakthrough in intelligence in identifying Soviet military targets by means of photographic satellites. Mr. Splitt said that Thomas B. Ross, of the Chicago, Illinois, "Sun - Times" newspaper, was the first reporter to arrive at this conclusion. Mr. Splitt referred to an article by Ross in the June 22, 1962, issue of this newspaper. It is noted that this article contained the sentence, "Apparently startling progress has been made during the last year with electronic listening apparatus along the Iron Curtain and with the supersecret 'spy-in-the-sky' satellite." The article also pointed out, "The Russians may be able to protect some of their weapons by making them mobile or pouring concrete shields. But Pentagon's planners insist that most have been precisely pinpointed."

Mr. Splitt also stated that Ross and Warren Rogers, Jr., a correspondent for the New York, New York, "Herald Tribune" frequently worked together and shared information. In this regard, Mr. Splitt pointed out that Rogers published an article on June 22, 1962, which was apparently based on the conclusions drawn by Ross.

Additional interviews were conducted on August 8, 1962, at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force; however, no information pertinent to this investigation was developed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Donnell

Investigation in this matter is continuing, and you will be furnished pertinent developments. The above information has been furnished to the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because the location of "~~Top Secret~~" information in an article available to the public is identified therein.

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

August 8, 1962

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable R. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/7/96 BY SP3 BTJ/cag
9/20/96 SP3 BTJ/cag

By dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In our letter dated August 7, 1962, you were furnished information pertaining to our investigation of the leak of classified information which appeared in an article by Hanson W. Baldwin in the July 26, 1962, issue of "The New York Times."

Additional interviews were conducted on August 6 and 7, 1962, with officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Department of State; Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Bureau of the Budget; and the Departments of the Navy, the Air Force and the Army.

On August 7, 1962, Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, was interviewed. He advised that he has known Hanson W. Baldwin for the past forty years and, on July 19, 1962, Baldwin visited his office from 2:30 p.m. until 3 p.m. Admiral Anderson stated that on this occasion no discussion of intelligence matters took place. According to Admiral Anderson, Baldwin did imply that Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell H. Gilpatric had told him that General Maxwell Taylor had been appointed as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Anderson said that this information had not been released at the time.

JFW:djw

(8)

SENT DIRECTOR

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

Admiral Anderson also advised that Richard Fryklund, correspondent for the Washington, D. C., "Star," told him on July 3, 1962, that there had been considerable discussion by correspondents assigned to the Pentagon about the speech given on June 16, 1962, at Ann Arbor, Michigan, by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Fryklund pointed out that the correspondents felt that this speech presented a new concept in United States military policy and they concluded that the United States had attained a breakthrough in intelligence concerning Soviet military strength which suggested an effective photographic reconnaissance satellite.

In our letter of August 7, 1962, it was indicated that Lieutenant General William P. Ennis, Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Department of the Army, had stated that he had been contacted by Baldwin on July 20, 1962. General Ennis has advised that actually Baldwin contacted him on July 19, 1962, instead of July 20, 1962, from 9:40 a.m. to 10:05 a.m.

You will be furnished additional developments in this case. The above has been furnished ^{to} the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

J. EDGAR HOOVER

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since it pinpoints the location of an article containing "~~Top Secret~~" information available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~
FBIb6
b7C

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Malone	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

Date: August 14, 1962

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)SEE REVERSE
SIDE
ACTION

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Re WFO airtel 8/13/62.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted by WFO 8/14/62:

C. DOUGLAS DILLON, Secretary of the Treasury, on 8/14/62 contacted this office and subsequently advised in person that last evening, 8/13/62, JOHN A. McCONE, Director, CIA, and JAMES B. RESTON, Chief, Washington Bureau, "The New York Times", and his wife were guests at his home to hear and view the speech of President KENNEDY. The guests remained for dinner and some after-dinner conversation before departing about 9:30 P.M.

DILLON stated that during the after-dinner conversation RESTON brought up the subject of the investigation of the BALDWIN news article. He indicated that there was excessive use of the FBI and stated this was not the right way to obtain information, intimating that some very high official in Government should have taken up the matter personally with HANSON BALDWIN

Bureau
1 - New York [redacted]
1 - WFO
HJM/pcn
(5)

EX 100

REC- 25

AUG 16 1962

b3
b7E

(Info)(PERSONAL ATTENTION)(RM)

A I R T E L

C. C. Wick

b6
b7C

CC: MR. SULLIVAN

Sent

~~TOP SECRET~~

M

Per

Approved

Special Agent in Charge

53 AUG 21 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-20-89 Multiple release
Classified by SP3 BTJ/pcn
Declassify on: 25X 1-6-96
9/25/96 530594

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/pcn
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1-6-96
9/25/96 530594

Document downgraded to ~~Secret~~
Per 82 4/5/2010
RS
Am

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]

In response to queries of McCONE and DILLON as to why BALDWIN would publish a thing like this as he should know better, RESTON said he did not know why. He remarked that BALDWIN had not been writing for some time and perhaps wanted to make a comeback with a strong story. DILLON said they inquired as to who may have leaked information to BALDWIN and RESTON said he did not know and observed that BALDWIN operated more or less independently and did not work through the Washington Bureau.

During the conversation RESTON said that they had been preparing a "blast" because of the use of the FBI and mentioned the fact that they had contacted "The New York Times" secretary and called at 7:00 in the evening, but said that someone had called them ("The New York Times") and explained the importance of the subject matter involved in the news article and thereafter RESTON felt better. DILLON stated he inferred that someone in high position in the administration had conferred with RESTON, but stated RESTON did not make this statement. RESTON commented that he, himself, did not realize the importance of the information, but remarked that when he read the article he knew it would be embarrassing, but still did not realize the significance of it. He indicated he realized now that the complaint was not merely a political tactic for bargaining or pressure purposes. DILLON stated that RESTON stated, perhaps for the purpose of obtaining some information, that he had heard only three people were in possession of the information and the phrases used, etc., and that it should be relatively easy to identify the person who gave the information.

RESTON also stated that he thought BALDWIN must have obtained the information from some friend who divulged all of the information, but without receiving the proper off-the-record injunctions of those portions which should be protected. DILLON commented that this remark made him think that the substance of the material in the BALDWIN article was received from one person. DILLON commented that it appeared that RESTON pursued the conversation to the extent that he felt it was uppermost in his mind.

DILLON advised that McCONE mentioned to him that later this week he would take this matter up with someone from FBI.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]

With reference to the highly classified document referred to in referenced airtel prepared under direction of BRUNO W. AUGENSTEIN, Assistant Director of Defense, Research and Engineering (Intelligence and Reconnaissance), his assistant, LOWELL R. DAILEY, today made available for examination the pertinent document captioned "Protection of Satellite Reconnaissance Vehicles" which was dated 7/13/62, classified "~~Top Secret~~ - Special Handling Required", of which document only four copies were prepared. According to Mr. DAILEY, one copy was furnished to Secretary of Defense McNAMARA on 7/14/62, one copy was furnished to Mr. JOSEPH V. CHARYK, Under Secretary, USAF, and one copy was furnished to Deputy Secretary of Defense GILPATRIC on 7/16/62. The copy furnished Secretary McNAMARA was returned on 7/14/62, the copy furnished CHARYK is still in his possession, and the copy furnished to GILPATRIC was returned to DAILEY on 7/16/62. The fourth copy was retained as a file copy and on 8/7/62 the copy previously directed to Mr. GILPATRIC was furnished to CIA, which has retained possession. ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

(U) Comparison of the Government document above with the last three paragraphs of the BALDWIN news article reflected that several items or bits of information set forth in the last and penultimate paragraphs of the BALDWIN article are referred to in the Government document, although there does not appear to be any continuity in the BALDWIN article indicating he had seen the classified document or received briefing on this document as such. It appears quite possible anyone who had recently read the classified document could have readily furnished several items, although as in the case of the [NIE] some references appear to have been subject of news articles in the past. The highly secret Government document did consider the possibility of Soviet attack on a satellite by nuclear blast and in other ways. Reference is also made to a sense of urgency in developing and testing defense measures to protect our reconnaissance vehicles, including the use of decoys and several other suggested methods. ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

The following interviews were conducted with negative results:

HENRY H. FOWLER, Under Secretary of the Treasury

THOMAS L. HUGHES, Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, USDS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
ADAM YARMOLINSKY, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense

[REDACTED] Photo Interpreter, Photo Analysis
Division, and [REDACTED] Chief, Graphical
Analysis Branch, Publications Division, both National
Photographic Interpretation Center, CIA

b3

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. MOORE - MR. SULLIVAN
ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES" 7-26-62
ESPIONAGE - X

(USIA) and Mr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the AEC. It is believed that Agents presently cleared to conduct investigation in this matter could complete these interviews no later than 8-17-62 and a report could be submitted to the Bureau by 8-20-62. This report would contain the results of interviews of approximately 250 high ranking officials, would show the dissemination of the information within the Government and would show the contacts made by Baldwin with various individuals having access to the information.

It is believed that on receipt of this report it would be proper, if desired, to furnish copies of the report to the Attorney General, the White House, the Secretary of Defense and Mr. John A. McCone in his capacity as the head of the U. S. Intelligence Board and at the same time in disseminating the report to the Attorney General we could highlight what our investigation has disclosed, advise him we will not complete inquiries of the various remaining individuals having access to the information unless so requested by him and suggest to him the possibility of having Baldwin appear before a grand jury in an attempt to obtain his source of information. It is believed that interviews with approximately 600 individuals of a lower rank and not likely to have been in contact with Baldwin would be unproductive and if conducted with the limited personnel cleared for this investigation, would run on for a considerable period of time and might subject the Bureau to criticism for prolonging the investigation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) The Washington Field Office be instructed to continue to press interviews with the high ranking officials having access to the information (or those individuals known to have been in contact or friendly to Baldwin) and make every effort to complete these interviews no later than 8-17-62 and submit a report to reach the Bureau by 8-20-62.

OK H. suggest initially we restrict dissemination to these
OK H. ed later it was
OK H. ed later it was
(2) That dissemination of the report be made to the Attorney General, the White House, the Secretary of Defense and Mr. McCone and that the Attorney General be specifically requested to advise whether additional interviews are desired and further that he consider the advisability of having Baldwin appear before a grand jury in an attempt to determine his source.

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

August 16, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Evans

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. D. E. Moore

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Wacks

ARTICLE BY HANSON J. BALDWIN

IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"

JULY 26, 1962

ESPIONAGE - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/17/96 BY SP3 BTJ/CLM
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/CLM

b6

b7C

In connection with our continuing investigation in this case, Rear Admiral Eugene B. Fluckey, President, United States Naval Board of Inspection and Survey, was interviewed on August 15, 1962. Admiral Fluckey advised that he has seen Baldwin every two or three months, the last occasion being on July 17, 1962. He has not heard Baldwin soliciting information of the type which appeared in the July 26, 1962, article. Admiral Fluckey, on the basis of prior conversations he has had with Baldwin, is of the opinion that Baldwin deals with members of the President's Cabinet and officials at the Pentagon. In addition, Admiral Fluckey believed that Baldwin has "White House connections." Admiral Fluckey noted that Baldwin, on July 17, had indicated he had been "on the Hill" on July 16.

Interviews were also conducted on August 15, 1962, with Mr. H. Lennartson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Department of Defense, and with Mr. Edward A. McDermott, Director, Office of Emergency Planning, Executive Office of the President. No pertinent information was obtained.

Investigation in this matter is continuing, and you will be furnished pertinent developments.

NOTE: This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the caption pinpoints the location of "~~Top Secret~~" information in an article available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JFW:djw

(9)

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAILED 2

AUG 16 1962

COMM-FBI

RECEIVED

AUG 16 1962

REC'D-READING ROOM

AUG 16 2 16 PM '62

REC'D-107

AUG 16 1962

REC-50

AUG 17 1962

b3

b7E

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 06-07-2010

~~TOP SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 8/13/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Malone	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI []

FROM: SAC, WFO []

5-12001

CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/DM

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1/6

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

353442
CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/DM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1/6

5/7/96 9/13/96 SP3-BTJ/DM

Re WFO airtel 8/2/62, which set out the results of interview of ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense. There is set out hereafter an analysis of this interview, including observations of WFO which have been considered in the light of additional investigation in this matter indicating that GILPATRIC at this time is the most logical suspect for having leaked the pertinent information contained in the article of BALDWIN in "The New York Times" issue of 7/26/62.

1. GILPATRIC stated that he had attended a luncheon given for him by the Board of Editors of "The New York Times" held at New York City on 7/26/62.

OBSERVATION

The question arises as to when GILPATRIC was invited to this luncheon and by whom.

- 3 - Bureau
1 - New York [] (Info) (RM) (PERSONAL ATTENTION)
1 - WFO

RCB:mdc
(5)b3
b7E

AIRTEL REC-36 12 AUG 17 1962

CC - Wameo P

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

8/15/62
JFW/mek

airtel to WFO

JFW/mek

8/15/62

53 AUG 22 1962

Document downgraded to Secret
b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

Further, ARTHUR SYLVESTER, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, would ordinarily be the logical person to attend such a function in his capacity as liaison with the press. It appears reasonable to assume that GILPATRIC had previously furnished certain confidential information to BALDWIN on previous occasions indicating an interest in keeping the reliable employees of "The New York Times" advised of current developments. During the interview with GILPATRIC on 8/2/62, he offered no voluntary comments as to the subject matter discussed by him with the Board of Editors of "The New York Times."

2. GILPATRIC indicated that BALDWIN dominated the conversation during the above luncheon.

OBSERVATION

It would appear from the above comment that undoubtedly BALDWIN arranged the entire luncheon in order that the Board of Editors would be acquainted with current developments in the Department of Defense.

3. After the luncheon, GILPATRIC alleged that he talked with ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, Publisher of "The New York Times," stating that the leak contained in the July 26 column of BALDWIN was a matter of serious concern and further indicating the insensitivity of BALDWIN to security matters.

OBSERVATION

There is no indication that GILPATRIC was curious as to where BALDWIN obtained the sensitive information nor did he ask, and it would be reasonable to assume that GILPATRIC did not ask, because he himself was the source. In any event, he obviously did not resent the fact that BALDWIN had the sensitive information but rather only that he had printed it.

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

4. GILPATRIC cited to DRYFOOS several instances wherein BALDWIN had come close to or crossed over security limits in his articles.

OBSERVATION

GILPATRIC offered no information as to what these specific instances were nor any interest in the source of BALDWIN for such security information. It is again noted that GILPATRIC indicated no interest in trying to determine any source for BALDWIN's information nor did he indicate any positive action to prevent BALDWIN from obtaining sensitive data. Again, his only criticism was the fact that BALDWIN had printed such information in his column.

5. GILPATRIC complained to DRYFOOS of BALDWIN's critical judgments of defense policy without first discussing it prior to publication in his column.

OBSERVATION

GILPATRIC in the above comment solicited a review of all information with respect to Defense Department data prior to its publication with the apparent objective of justifying the activities of the current administration of the Defense Department. It cannot be overlooked that GILPATRIC hoped to suppress criticism of his administration which he could not be reasonably expected to accomplish without exposing and divulging classified information such as is contained in the article of BALDWIN on 7/26/62. It also appears that GILPATRIC in making the above comment places himself as more or less a liaison representative of the administration in keeping the press advised of significant developments in the defense field in order to preclude public criticism.

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

6. GILPATRIC stated that he was not aware of the source of instant leak but felt the source was exclusively military.

OBSERVATION

GILPATRIC offered no basis whatsoever for the above opinion.

7. GILPATRIC stated that he had never discussed Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) changes with BALDWIN noting that in the 7/28/62, issue of "The New York Times" BALDWIN dealt with this subject. GILPATRIC concluded from the above that BALDWIN had seen a Joint Chiefs of Staff paper classified "Secret" dealing with the above subject matter.

OBSERVATION

BALDWIN, according to Lieutenant General ^{WILLIAM P.} ~~DAVID A.~~ BURNHALL, ~~Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, USAF~~ ^{DIRECTOR, WSEG,} had apparently seen such a document. This document was also discussed by BALDWIN with Admiral ANDERSON. However, it appears that GILPATRIC also would have been in possession of this same document and most certainly would have been cognizant of the content. According to General BURCHINAL, BALDWIN indicated during his contact with him, BURCHINAL, that BALDWIN was aware that the WSEG memo dated 7/11/62, originated in the office of Dr. HAROLD BROWN.

8. In April or May, 1962, GILPATRIC stated that BALDWIN was in contact with him at which time BALDWIN criticized the Department of Defense stating that it was the first time in his experience that we have gone 18 months without a new weapons program. GILPATRIC denied this. BALDWIN then pointed out that there had been no provision made for manned bombers. GILPATRIC alleged that he replied, "There are some things even you don't know." GILPATRIC claimed that they then discussed advanced weapons such as the Tactical Fighter and the Mobile Mid-Range Ballistic Missile. Continuing on this same

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]
(U) [defensive theme, they discussed the "follow-on" for the B-52. GILPATRIC claimed they did not discuss the RS-70 as a successor to the B-52. GILPATRIC stated that actually there had been no change in decision at that time to make the RS-70 a major weapons program. However, he denied having furnished this to BALDWIN. GILPATRIC stated that the studies regarding the successor to the B-52 were classified "Top Secret." GILPATRIC also stated that during the luncheon in New York on 7/26/62, one of the editors in the group inquired if a decision had been reached concerning the RS-70. GILPATRIC replied to this question that the decision had not been reached.] ~~(S)~~

OBSERVATION

(U) Regarding the above, Lieutenant General BURCHINAL when interviewed on 8/1/62, stated that he had cocktails from 6:30 p.m. to 7:05 p.m. on 7/18/62, with BALDWIN. [BURCHINAL stated that he was shocked to learn from BALDWIN that GILPATRIC had told him, BALDWIN, that the successor to the B-52 airplane had been chosen and that it would not be the RS-70 but involved a very "hush hush" project. According to BURCHINAL this is highly classified information which BALDWIN was not entitled to have.] ~~(S)~~

It would appear from the above that BALDWIN through skillful interview of GILPATRIC was critical of the Defense Department for its inadequacies in development of good weapons. GILPATRIC was immediately on the defensive and was obviously trapped into a discussion [of the RS-70 at least or possibly a similar weapons program.] (u) It may be of significance (u) that at the same approximate time as the April-May meeting between BALDWIN and GILPATRIC, a [breakthrough in aerial reconnaissance occurred.] (u) GILPATRIC in his high position would certainly be cognizant of this development. In order to avoid criticism of the administration and DOD it would appear logical to assume that GILPATRIC



~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

would use all available means to bolster the prestige of the DOD in order to avoid unfavorable comments in "The New York Times." It also appears reasonable to assume that the July 17 contact with BALDWIN may have started or continued his comments regarding the reconnaissance breakthrough.

From the general over-all information available including the information contained in New York airtel dated 8/9/62, it again appears reasonable to assume that BALDWIN is in possession of a vast amount of classified information. The only objection GILPATRIC has indicated to such a situation is that BALDWIN in the July 26 column and in several other unidentified instances has published information which GILPATRIC felt indicated insensitivity to security matters. It would also appear that GILPATRIC desired appropriate reliable personnel of "The New York Times" be aware of important military intelligence developments in order to preclude public criticism in the press. At the same time, GILPATRIC was dependent on the reliability and integrity of BALDWIN to the extent that he may not have felt BALDWIN would use the extremely sensitive information in his column.

It is also noted that GILPATRIC during the current interview by WFO stated that BALDWIN was in his office from 3:30 p.m. on 7/16/62, for about 45 minutes. Inquiries at the office of Brigadier General JERRY D. PAGE, USAF, indicate that BALDWIN had an appointment with PAGE at 4:00 p.m. on 7/16/62. BALDWIN did not appear for this appointment until 4:45 and on his arrival he advised General PAGE that he had just left the office of GILPATRIC.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

It is noted that investigation has established through other sources that GILPATRIC was not truthful in his statements on the following items:

GILPATRIC when first approached on the matter of the RS-70 program denied having discussed this with BALDWIN. When confronted with the information that BALDWIN had stated he discussed this matter with GILPATRIC his composure was visibly shaken according to interviewing Agents. After a moment to regain his composure, GILPATRIC recalled having had a brief discussion with BALDWIN during April-May, 1962, as set forth above. Likewise, GILPATRIC during the interview denied having furnished information regarding the replacements for the JCS Chairman and Supreme Commander NATO positions. Investigation has indicated that BALDWIN attributed information to GILPATRIC identifying General MAXWELL TAYLOR and General LEMNITZER as the replacements for these positions. (U) ~~(S)~~

In view of the above, WFO strongly recommends authority to reinterview GILPATRIC and further that GILPATRIC's consent be requested for a polygraph examination. In the event GILPATRIC executes a polygraph waiver, it is recommended that the Bureau designate two qualified experts from the Seat of Government to conduct this examination.

In addition, it is suggested that the Bureau may desire to consider requesting through appropriate channels details regarding the document and letter referred to by ORVIL E. DRYFOOS in his conversation with BALDWIN on 8/8/62, and which indicated that DRYFOOS was to receive such information by courier. The latter information is set forth in New York airtel 8/9/62.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEE REVERSE	Tolson
SIDE FOR	Belmont
CLASSIFIED	Mohr
	Callahan
	Conrad
	DeLoach
	Evans
	Malone
	Rosen
	Sullivan
	Tavel
	Trotter
	Tele. Room
	Holmes
	Gandy

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Belmont 1 - D. A. Moore
1 - Evans 1 - Wannall
1 - Sullivan 1 - Wacks

DATE: 8/15/62

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES" JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/CM
DECLASSIFY ON 25X 1.6
5/1/90 9/23/94 3/3/95 7/9/97

Declassify on OADR

b6
b7C

A reinterview of Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric would be of assistance in this case.

Gilpatric, when interviewed on 8/2/62, displayed unmistakable signs that he was withholding information. [In fact, he denied discussing the RS-70 airplane with Baldwin, but when confronted with the information Baldwin had told at least one person that Gilpatric furnished him information concerning the RS-70 Gilpatric reluctantly admitted that he had at one time actually talked about the airplane with Baldwin.] In the interview of 8/2 Gilpatric advised he did not know who Baldwin's source for the 7/26 article was, and he blamed the leak on the military, although he offered no basis for his opinion. Gilpatric also denied furnishing Baldwin any classified information, but pointed out that on 7/26 the Board of Editors of "The New York Times" gave a luncheon for him in New York City, at which Baldwin was in attendance. Gilpatric did not furnish the reason why he was so honored.

b6
b7C

Gilpatric offered the information that immediately following the luncheon he complained to Orvil Dryfoos, the publisher of the "Times," about Baldwin's leak in the 7/26 article. It is noted that Gilpatric advised that when he talked to Dryfoos he complained that Baldwin criticized the Administration's defense policy without first discussing the matter prior to publication in his column. He also admittedly told Dryfoos that Baldwin on other occasions had "come close or crossed over security limits" in his articles.

Did Gilpatric deliberately not ask Dryfoos how Baldwin got his information because he already knew? Is it possible that Gilpatric or someone else in the Administration was feeding Baldwin inside information concerning defense policies of the Administration with the understanding that Baldwin would not print certain of the data, the purpose being to have the most influential newspaper in the U. S. present either a consistently favorable response or limited criticism of the Administration's defense plans? Is it possible that Baldwin

b3
b7E

Enclosure

JFW:mek (7)

5-13001
CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/CM
DECLASSIFY ON 25X 1
00-4417

REC-3

[Redacted Box]

12 AUG 17 1962

57 AUG 21 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

Document downgraded to Secret per [Redacted Box] on 4/5/2010

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum Wannall to Sullivan
Re: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962

b3
b7E

(U) was furnished the [National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) document] on which certain information in his article was based, by Gilpatric or someone else with the admonition that he should be chary in what he published, but he went too far with the result that the Secretary of Defense, not being aware of the situation, pressed so vigorously for an investigation that the Attorney General requested it? Is it a coincidence that Gilpatric the day before he saw Baldwin had a most sensitive document (not the [NIE]) in his possession, disseminated to only two other persons prior to the 7/26 article, which contained some of the sensitive information published in the 7/26 article; that James B. Reston, head of the Washington office of the "Times," on 8/13 made the comment that he thought Baldwin got his information from one person, a friend; and that Reston believed the information was known to only three persons? One wonders why the President would have to send a letter and unidentified document to Dryfoos (as indicated in the Baldwin - Dryfoos conversation of 8/8) to explain, as Reston has indicated, the importance of the subject matter involved.

= Through discreet reinterview of Gilpatric it may be possible to resolve these questions. We may also clarify discrepancies in statements made by Gilpatric discovered through our investigation subsequent to the original interview with him. For instance, he has denied that he furnished information regarding replacements for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commander of NATO. Baldwin reportedly told others that Gilpatric told him who these replacements would be.

WFO has recommended reinterview of Gilpatric, at which time Gilpatric would be asked to consent to a polygraph examination. WFO has also suggested that we may desire to attempt to ascertain through proper channels details of the letter and document Dryfoos expected to receive from the President.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Gilpatric be discreetly reinterviewed to determine if he will furnish any information pertinent to this case.

Sup. Mangano, WFO, told to reinterview 8/16/62.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum Wannall to Sullivan
Re: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
- "THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
[redacted]

b3
b7E

(2) The request to ask Gilpatric to undergo a polygraph is a logical step in the investigation; however, it is not believed we should undertake this on our own. In this regard, it is recommended that when our report is submitted to the Attorney General indicating completed investigation in this case, we will point out to the Attorney General that a polygraph examination of Gilpatric makes sense and suggest that he may desire to have us conduct this test or he may desire to talk to Gilpatric himself.

(3) It would be most helpful in our investigation to note what was in the President's letter to Dryfoos and in the document enclosed therewith. We cannot, of course, make such direct request of the White House, and it would appear that the Attorney General and Mr. O'Donnell at the White House, both of whom know that we know the documents were expected to be received by Dryfoos, would advise us if they wanted us to know what the President said. It is recommended that we not attempt to ascertain what was in the letter and document.

~~An airtel to WFO is enclosed authorizing reinterview of Gilpatric.~~

over
WFO
conduct the reinterview
& then see where we
stand

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 1 6 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Mr. Woom _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

b6
b7C

URGENT 8-16-62 12-11 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI [REDACTED] /1/ AND SAC WFO [REDACTED]

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN ESP-X

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED NO PERTINENT
INFO THIS DATE CONCERNING BALDWIN.

END AND ACK

NY 8-01 WA NH

TU

TWO COPIES WFO

REC- 62 8 AUG 16 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

August 17, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Evans

1 - Mr. Sullivan

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN

1 - Mr. D. E. Moore

IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"

1 - Mr. Wannall

JULY 26, 1962

1 - Mr. Wacks

ESPIONAGE - R

In connection with our continuing investigation in this matter, there is enclosed a memorandum containing information obtained on August 15, 1962, from our coverage on Hanson W. Baldwin, as well as the results of an interview conducted with Rear Admiral William M. McCormick, Assistant Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, on August 16, 1962.

Baldwin's expressions of confidence, as well as concern, that his source will not be compromised; his comments concerning the President; and his opinion of Orvil Dryfoos, publisher of "The New York Times," as of August 15, 1962, are included in the enclosed memorandum.

You will be furnished additional developments in this matter.

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/2/96 BY SP3 BTJ/cm
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/96

NOTE: This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the caption pinpoints the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

REC-16

JFW:djw
(9)

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

67 AUG 20 1962

TELETYPE UNIT

16 AUG 20 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-26-2017 BY

b6
b7C

SECRET
NO FORN DISSEM
EXCLUDED FROM
AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

SA 1740 2 31 JUL
Aug 13 1962

BY COURIER SERVICE

*Document forwarded to ~~Secret~~
per AS on 4/5/2010*

Honorable r. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In my previous letters to you, the last being August 10, 1962, you were furnished pertinent details concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962. You were also advised that you would be furnished pertinent developments in this continuing investigation.

On August 10, 1962, General George M. Decker, Chief of Staff, United States Army, was interviewed. He could furnish no factual information as to Baldwin's source for the data in the July 26 article; however, he was of the opinion that Baldwin's source was a highly placed civilian official of the Department of Defense with the position of at least Assistant Secretary or higher.

During the course of this investigation, we have determined that briefings based on National Intelligence Estimate 11-8-62 were presented on June 4, 5, and 6, 1962, to the Hyland Committee, an advisory group for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Board of National Estimates. The Hyland Committee was formed at the suggestion of the United States Intelligence Board and the members included

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

JFW:djw (8)

SENT DIRECTOR
8-12-62

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

3 AUG 22 1962

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable r. Kenneth O'Donnell

officials of private industrial concerns; a member of the Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, faculty; and members of CIA and the Department of the Navy. On August 10, 1962, Rear Admiral Levering Smith, Technical Director, Special Projects Office, Department of the Navy, advised that he was a member of the Hyland Committee and that the material presented in the afore-mentioned briefings was too general to have been the basis for the Baldwin article.

Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, as well as other officials of various United States Government agencies, were interviewed on August 10, 1962; however, no information pertinent to this investigation was developed.

Investigation in this matter is continuing, and you will be furnished pertinent developments. The above information has been furnished the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

(U) [This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the mere mention of the National Intelligence Estimate 11-8-62 according to CIA, warrants this classification. ~~SECRET~~]

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

All Army information contained herein was regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 22 Mar 11 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 09-09-2015 BY [redacted] ADG

F B I

b6
b7C

Date: 8/15/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

On 8/14/62, Major [redacted] Investigations Branch, ACSI, advised SA [redacted] that through certain confidential coverage available to his office b6 per ARMY he had learned that LLOYD NORMAN of "Newsweek" magazine had attempted to contact a Mr. [redacted] at the Government Information Office, apparently at the Capitol. In the absence of [redacted] NORMAN conversed with a [redacted]. NORMAN indicated that he was interested primarily in the following two situations: 1. What the committee has done on the report of the press representatives being shadowed, or interviewed by law enforcement agencies like the FBI or government intelligence agencies; and 2. If the committee has recently or in the recent past received any reports from reporters such as is published in the 8/28/62, issue of "Look" magazine by FLETCHER KNEBEL. Specifically, NORMAN stated he was interested in the story about military reporters being investigated for breaking stories that have leaked out of the Pentagon.

3 - Bureau
1 - WFO

RCB:mdc
(4)

REC-8
EX-116

12 AUG 17 1962

C. C. Wick COPIES DESTROYED AIRTEL

101 JUN 30 1970

Approved: F144
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

AUG 23 1962

AUG 23 1962

b3
b7E

[] in response indicated that from time to time the committee has received such information and that the last and most current matter involving above subject was when the committee was in contact with General JOSEPH CARROLL who conducted a survey and issued a specific directive as to the handling of classified information. NORMAN expressed considerable interest in the directive of General CARROLL and inquired whether it was available. [] replied that the committee had requested the directive but the request had been declined. NORMAN and [] thereafter discussed their knowledge of this directive which they both believed had received some sort of classification such as for "official use only" or a similar classification. NORMAN indicated that he had received certain information regarding this directive. He requested [] to furnish him any additional data at the office of "Newsweek" after 4:00 p.m. on 8/14/62. Major [] stated that his office was preparing a complete report concerning the above, a copy of which would be made available to WFO when completed. When available, this information will be furnished the Bureau. b6 per ARMY

On 8/15/62, SA PAUL F. DOUGHERTY obtained the following information from [] House of Representatives, Disbursing Office, that [] and [] are staff members on the Subcommittee on Special Government Information of the House Committee on Government Operations. The Chairman of this Subcommittee is JOHN E. MOSS of California. [] entered on duty 1/3/53, as a clerk of Congressman MOSS and on 7/9/55, he became staff administrator of the above subcommittee which position he presently holds. [] entered on duty as a clerk of the subcommittee 4/15/60 and since 1/4/61, he has been on the staff of the subcommittee.

b6
b7C

The Bureau will be furnished any additional data received in this matter.

~~TOP SECRET~~DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 06-07-2010

F B I

Date: 8/16/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Callahan	✓
Mr. Conrad	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Evans	✓
Mr. Malone	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Miss Holmes	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI []

FROM: SAC, WFO []

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

Records furnished by BROMLEY SMITH, Executive Secretary, NSC, indicates that Copy #2 of [NIE 11-8-62] [15-10-37] was read by Mr. SORENSEN and returned, date not indicated, to office of SMITH. The above SORENSEN is Mr. THEODORE C. SORENSEN, Special Counsel to President, Executive Office of the President. As the Bureau is aware, no interviews have been conducted or recommended by WFO with respect to interviews of the President or Vice President or their aides. Accordingly, UACB, no interview will be conducted with SORENSEN in view of his high position.

3-20-89
Classified by 5/20/89
Declassify on: OADR
3-20-89
5/4/96
9/25/96 SP-107
Let report reflect this with no comment

3 - Bureau
1 - WFO
RCB:mdc
(4)

REC-8
EX-116

12 AUG 17 1962

AIRTEL

Document downgraded to ~~Secret~~

Per [] RS

on 4/5/2010

FOI/PA #288,611

APPEAL #

CIVIL ACT. #

E.O. #12356

DATE 3-20-89 INITIALS []

Approved: []

Special Agent in Charge

54 AUG 23 1962

F B I

Date: 8/15/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Malone	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

b3

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

ReWFOairtel 8/14/62.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted
by WFO 8/15/62:

Rear Admiral EUGENE B. FLUCKEY, President, Navy Board of Inspection and Survey, advised he has not had access for some time to information used in BALDWIN article. FLUCKEY has known BALDWIN "over the years," sees him every two or three months, and last saw BALDWIN at Naval Academy Alumni Association's Publications Committee meeting in Army-Navy Club, WDC, on 7/17/62. This meeting lasted from about 11 a.m. to about 3:30 p.m., including luncheon. Members present and purpose of meeting previously provided by Rear Admiral WILLIAM F. FITZGERALD. FLUCKEY did not overhear BALDWIN soliciting information, the type of which appeared in 7/26/62, article. FLUCKEY, on basis of prior conversations, felt BALDWIN deals with Cabinet members, Congressmen, Pentagon officials and has "White House connections." FLUCKEY noted BALDWIN indicated he had been "on the hill" on 7/16/62. On 7/17/62, following Publications Committee meeting, FLUCKEY and BALDWIN driven to Pentagon, where they entered at about 4 p.m. BALDWIN's destination or contacts in Pentagon not known to FLUCKEY. He felt BALDWIN probably had no definite appointment, but just intended "to wander around." FLUCKEY unable to provide additional information.

b6
b7C

REC-8 [REDACTED]

- 3- Bureau
1- New York [REDACTED]
1- WFO

HJM:rps
(5)

C. C. Wick

(Info) (RM) - PERSONAL ATTENTION

b3
b7E

AIRTEL

COPIES DESTROYED

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge JUN 19 1970

34 AUG 2 3 19 2 1962



b3
b7E

The following persons were interviewed with negative results:

EDWARD A. McDERMOTT, Director, OEP

NILS A. LENNARTSON, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

~~SECRET~~

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
August 20, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

ARTICLE BY RANSOM W. LADD
IN THE NEW YORK TIMES
JULY 26, 1962
RE: LORRAINE - X

In connection with our investigation in this matter, there is enclosed a memorandum setting forth the results of our reinterview with Mr. Russell G. Gilpatrick, Deputy Secretary of Defense, conducted on August 17, 1962.

Mr. Gilpatrick in this reinterview was unable to furnish the source for the information in the captioned article. Mr. Gilpatrick also pointed out that he has not consciously furnished Ladd with any sensitive data or classified material. Mr. Gilpatrick did, however, advise that when Ladd contacted him on July 17, 1962, the latter of the (S-7) airplane was mentioned. (S) (U)

You will be furnished additional developments in this matter.

Enclosure

cc-Bureau

Note: This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the caption pinpoints the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

REC-10

JFW:dmd
(9)

19 AUG 21 1962

MAILED 25
AUG 20 1962
COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____

AUG 21 1962

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BT/ken
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
5/6/96 7/23/96 SP3 BT/ken

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

SP3-BT/ken

00-4747

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

August 17, 1962

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. McKamara:

With reference to our investigation of the leak of classified data in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The ^ONew York Times" issue of July 26, 1962, there is enclosed a memorandum containing information which supplements the data in the documents we furnished you on August 16, 1962. *He [unclear] [unclear]*

Baldwin's expressions of confidence, as well as of concern, that his source will not be compromised; his comments concerning the President; and his opinion of Orvil Dryfoos, publisher of "The New York Times," as of August 15, 1962, are included in the enclosed memorandum. There are also enclosed the results of an interview with Rear Admiral William M. McCormick, Assistant Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, conducted on August 16, 1962.

REC- 24

15 AUG 20 1966
You will be furnished additional developments in this case.

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

NOTE: This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because information herein discloses the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

Enclosure
JFW:djw
(8)

MAIL ROOM ☐TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 17 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/cen
5/6/96 SP3 BTJ/cen
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/cen

URGENT 8-17-62 1-00 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI [REDACTED] AND SAC WFO [REDACTED]

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN ESP-X

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED NO PERTINENT
INFO CONCERNING BALDWIN THIS DATE.

END AND ACK

NY R 3 WA HFL

REC-36

5 AUG 20 1962

TWO COPIES WFO

57 AUG 23 1962

b3
b7E

b3
b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 18 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

URGENT 8-18-62 12-44 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI [REDACTED] AND SAC WASHINGTON FIELD [REDACTED]

-----2-----

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN, ESP-X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/6

5/6/96 19123/6 SP3 BTJ/6

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED AT SEVEN TEN PM
THAT BALDWIN, IN CONVERSATION WITH HIS SON IN LAW, AGAIN STATES HIS
OBJECTION TO FBI APPROACH TO HIM AND TO [REDACTED] IN WASHINGTON,
DC. STATES EISENHOWER WOULD NEVER USE FBI TO GO INTO PENTAGON.
SHOCKED BY THREAT TO USE LIE DETECTOR ON OFFICERS SWORN TO FIDELITY,
LOYALTY AND OBEDIENCE. HE CONSIDERS INTERESTING AND SIGNIFICANT THAT
FBI DID NOT SHOW UP AT HIS OFFICE DAY FOLLOWING APPROACH TO HIM.
ATTRIBUTES KENNEDY/S ATTITUDE TO FACT THAT BROTHER IN ATTORNEY
GENERAL/S POST. NO DISCUSSION OR IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE.

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT FOLLOWS.

END AND ACK

NY R 2 WA JS

ST-104

REC-3

cc Waples
TWO COPIES TO
57 AUG 23 1962 1-140

5- Jo

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 19 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/cen
5/6/96 SP3 BTJ/cen
4/23/98 SP3 BTJ/cen

URGENT 8-19-62 11-42 PM NMS

TO DIRECTOR FBI

FROM SAC NEW YORK

HANSON W. BALDWIN., ESP-X

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT-S ASTERISK REPORTED NOTHING PERTINENT
REGARDING SUBJECT ON EIGHT EIGHTEEN-NINETEEN SIXTY-TWO.

END PLS ACK

NY R 2 WA HFL

TWO COPIES WFO

REC-3

ST-104

12 AUG 20 1962

b3
b7E

F B I

Date: 8/16/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Callahan	✓
Mr. Conrad	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Evans	✓
Mr. Malone	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Miss Holmes	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26,
1962
ESP - X

Re WFO airtel 8/15/62.

There follows a summary of interviews conducted by
WFO 8/16/62:

Rear Admiral WILLIAM R. MCCORMICK, USN, Assistant Director, DIA, advised he was interviewed by BALDWIN in 1954 in connection with article BALDWIN was preparing. Information BALDWIN desired was classified and was not discussed with him. Subject matter of material not recalled by MCCORMICK. MCCORMICK served as military aide to Deputy Secretary of Defense ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC from January, 1961, to February 27, 1962. BALDWIN had 4 or 5 appointments with GILPATRIC during that period and was greeted on these occasions by MCCORMICK. MCCORMICK was not present during BALDWIN's interviews with GILPATRIC, and he has no knowledge of subjects discussed. MCCORMICK advised that GILPATRIC normally did not have a third person present during press interviews.

The following persons were interviewed with negative results:

[redacted] USA,
[redacted] DIA

COPIES DESTROYED

101 JUN 19 1970

③ - Bureau

1 - New York [redacted]

1 - WFO

(Info) (RM) (PERSONAL ATTENTION)

C. C. Wick HJM:teb

CC: Sullivan (5)

Approved: [signature]

Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

54 AUG 23 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/62

5/4/96 SP3 BTJ/62
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/62

b3
b7Eb6
b7Cb3
b7E

b3

b6 per DIA 80-102

DIA

b3
b7E



b3
b7E

[Redacted] USN
[Redacted]
DIA

b3
b6 per DIA

Date of Mail 8-16-62.

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/clm
5/6/96 SP3 BTJ/clm
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/clm

b6
b7C

Subject JUNE MAIL Hanson W. Baldwin

Removed By _____

File Number

[Redacted Box]

b3
b7E

Permanent Serial Charge Out

F142

Date of Mail 8-17-62.

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/CLM
5/6/96 SP3 BTJ/CLM
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/CLM

b6
b7C

Subject JUNE MAIL Hanson W. Baldwin

Removed By

65 AUG 23 1962

File Number

[Redacted]

b3
b7E

F146

624

Date of Mail 8-16-62.

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-20-89 BY SP8 BTJ/ck
5/6/96 SP3 BTJ/cw
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/ck

b6
b7C

Subject JUNE MAIL. Hanson W. Baldwin

Removed By SP3 BTJ/ck

File Number

[Redacted]

b3
b7E

F146

Permanent Serial Charge Out

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

August 14, 1962

BY COURIER SERVICE

Document downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per [redacted] RS on 4/5/2010

b6
b7C

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In my previous letters to you, the last being August 13, 1962, you were furnished pertinent details concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962. You were also advised that you would be furnished pertinent developments in this continuing investigation.

We interviewed Colonel Thomas W. Wolfe, United States Air Force, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Department of Defense, on August 13, 1962. Colonel Wolfe advised that Bruno Augenstein, Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Intelligence and Reconnaissance), Department of Defense, had prepared a paper dealing with satellites, antisatellites and Soviet capabilities in this field. Colonel Wolfe stated this paper was dated around the middle of July, 1962. It is noted that the last three paragraphs of Baldwin's article of July 26 deal with the subject matter of the aforementioned paper. [redacted] (U)

b6
b7C

REC-20

On August 13, 1962, Mr. Augenstein advised [redacted] office had prepared a paper upon instructions of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara captioned, "Measures to Reduce the vulnerability of Our Reconnaissance Satellite." Mr. Augenstein [redacted] (U)

b3
b7E

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

65-67669

JFW:djw

(6)

SENT DIRECTOR

SEE NOTE, PAGE 3

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Donnell

(U) stated this paper was dated July 14, 1962, and was classified "~~Top~~ Secret - Special Handling." According to Mr. Augenstein, only four copies of this paper were made, and they were distributed to Secretary of Defense McNamara; to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric; to the Under Secretary of the Department of the Air Force; and to Dr. Herbert Scoville, Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Augenstein pointed out that discussion of this paper would necessitate a special clearance being obtained by Special Agents of this Bureau. Accordingly, two Special Agents of the FBI are obtaining this special clearance so that proper inquiry can be made with respect to the document. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

On August 13, 1962, Brigadier General George S. Brown, United States Air Force, Military Assistant to The Secretary of Defense, advised that he knows Baldwin but has had no close association with him. General Brown did point out that he did not know Baldwin's associates or sources of information; however, he did know that Baldwin contacts all the senior officials at the Pentagon. General Brown was of the opinion that Baldwin's source for the July 26 article is "so highly placed" that "nothing will be done" about the July 26 leak.

(U) Commander Thomas Hazapis, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center, Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, on August 13, 1962, advised that he could furnish no information regarding Baldwin's source for his article. Commander Hazapis did recall that, in the Fall of 1961, a "~~Top~~ Secret" document regarding estimates of Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles was discussed at a meeting of the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), which is a subcommittee of the United States Intelligence Board and has the same members as the Board. According to Commander Hazapis, about a week after this information was presented to the United States Intelligence Board much of the GMAIC information appeared in an article in "The New York Times" by Baldwin. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Donnell

Various officials of other United States Government agencies were also interviewed on August 13, 1962, but no information pertinent to this investigation was obtained.

Investigation in this case is continuing, and you will be furnished pertinent developments. The above information has been furnished to the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since information herein pinpoints the location of "~~Top Secret~~" data in an article available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: August 16, 1962

FROM : MR. D. J. BRENNAN, JR.

cc Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Evans
 Mr. D. E. Moore
 Mr. Sullivan
 Mr. Wannall
 Mr. Wacks
 Liaison
 Mr. Bartlett

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
 IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
 7-26-62
 ESPIONAGE - X

b6
 b7C

In connection with the above-captioned case, Mr. P. Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the White House, indicated that he wanted to see Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section at 9:30 AM today. Mr. Bartlett called on Mr. O'Donnell in his office at which time Mr. O'Donnell said that in looking this case over the President and he have it figured out that the finger of suspicion seems to point to one man, namely, Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Mr. O'Donnell said that on behalf of the President he would like to have the Bureau reinterview Gilpatric and go over with him again the same points which were covered in the previous interview and any other points that may have arisen since. Mr. O'Donnell said that the President's name should not be used by the Bureau during this reinterview with Gilpatric. Mr. Bartlett advised Mr. O'Donnell that this would be done.

The Washington Field Office had previously proposed a re-interview of Mr. Gilpatric and a memorandum from Mr. Wannall to you of 8-15-62 recommended that this be done.

ACTION:

If approved, appropriate instructions will be issued to the WFO to have the reinterview of Gilpatric conducted as soon as possible.

DEM:OHB:td (9)

b3
 b7E

7 AUG 23 1962

EX-108

Sup. Morgan, WFO
 advised 8/16/62
 3-jan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 5/6/96 BY SP3/JC/CL

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - Wannall
- 1 - Weeks

5-1-2001

SP3 BTJ/CM

00-4417

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/CM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1.6
SIC 196 9/25/14 SP3 BTJ/CM

August 7, 1962

BY COURIER SERVICE

b6
b7C

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

Document declassified
to [redacted]
[redacted] 9/5/2010

REC'D-READING ROOM
AUG 7 4 32 PM '62

b6
b7C

At the request of the Attorney General we instituted investigation on July 26, 1962, into the unauthorized disclosure of information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin which appeared in "The New York Times," issue of July 26, 1962. A copy of the article is enclosed. The Attorney General indicated that the classified data involved came from a very closely held paper which the President had instructed should be limited in distribution. - [The document in question is National Intelligence Estimate (NEI) 11-8-62 dated July 6, 1962, entitled "Soviet Capabilities for Long-Range Attack."]

We have determined that Baldwin customarily contacts only high-ranking officials of the Government and, accordingly, our investigation to date has included such individuals. In order to determine Baldwin's source or sources for the information in his July 26, 1962, article, we have conducted interviews with officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including Honorable Robert S. McNamara, The Secretary of Defense; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Bureau of the Budget; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have also attempted to interview Baldwin and have interviewed [redacted] of the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times" who advised that she had made certain appointments for Baldwin for the week of July 16, 1962. Ch.

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

JFW:agg (6)

SENT DIRECTOR [redacted]

SEE NOTE PAGE 7

b3
b7E

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

67 AUG 28 1962 MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

had no other data pertinent to this investigation. We have ascertained that during the period July 16 to July 19 or 20, 1962, Baldwin was in Washington, D. C., and stayed at the Jefferson Hotel, 1200 Sixteenth Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C. To date it has not been learned who Baldwin's sources were for the information contained in the July 26 article; however, we have developed certain information of interest.

An attempt was made to interview Baldwin on July 30, 1962, when Special Agents of our New York, New York, Office contacted him at his home in Chappaque, New York, at 6:53 p.m. Immediately after the FBI Agents identified themselves and prior to their having the opportunity to state the purpose of the interview, Baldwin stated that he could not talk to them at that time since he had just arrived at his home and was preparing to eat his dinner. Baldwin stated that he would have preferred to have had the Agents make an appointment with him at his office, and he pointed out that if the Agents wanted to interview him, they could see him at his office at 10:30 a.m. on July 31. When the Agents attempted to explain that they wanted to talk to him for only a few minutes and would gladly wait until he finished his dinner, Baldwin refused to continue the discussion. In view of his resentment and arrogance, we thought it best not to follow up an attempt to interview him, particularly as we anticipated his office would be "bugged." In the event he calls our New York Office, which he has not done to date, we will advise him we offered the courtesy of an interview and if he desires to be interviewed, we will suggest he come to our New York Office.

Our coverage of Baldwin disclosed that on the evening of July 30, 1962, he was contacted by James B. Reston of the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times." Reston and Baldwin agreed that they were "mad" about the attempted interview with Baldwin and the interview with [redacted] Baldwin said he had refused to see the FBI Agents. Reston indicated that he considered the attempt

b6
b7c

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

to interview Baldwin an outrage. Baldwin told Reston, "This is going very far in this administration. I think it is extremely dangerous." Reston in reply pointed out, "There is a strange feeling in Congress that a dossier is being kept on all these people. Probably a good deal comes out of their imagination and guilty conscience, but there is this suspicion that this kind of tactic is being used." Baldwin agreed that "this" is a new and different tactic "similar to what happened with reporters in the middle of the night at the time of the steel price rise." Baldwin also said that he thought "the real answer to this is Bobby Kennedy and the President himself, but Bobby Kennedy particularly putting pressure on Hoover." Concerning the interviews Reston commented, "When they begin to do this thing in Washington, it becomes a question of whether we are going to report the news or not." Baldwin pointed out, "When I reported that Kennedy ordered the FBI into the Pentagon before the Berlin crisis, Kennedy became angry, and then there was a story [redacted] wrote in [redacted] about various solutions for the Berlin crisis and Kennedy blew his top. They actually went to [redacted] and did some of these crummy intimidating tactics." In this instance Baldwin probably was referring to our investigation conducted in 1961 concerning the leak of classified information which appeared in the July 3, 1961, issue of [redacted] magazine in the article captioned [redacted]. Reston indicated to Baldwin that he might attempt to induce the editor and publisher of "The New York Times" to publicize the attempted interview with Baldwin and our interview with [redacted].

b6
b7C

On July 30, 1962, Staff Sergeant [redacted] assigned to the Office of Information Services, U. S. Air Force, 663 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, advised that on the morning of either July 24 or July 25, 1962, he was telephonically contacted by [redacted] [redacted] quoted to [redacted] the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Donnell

following passage from a proposed article: "In these installations the missiles until ready for launching lie horizontally in a large concrete box flush with, or slightly above." [] asked, "Is this true?" [] replied in the affirmative and the conversation was ended. It is noted that this exact language appeared in the July 26 article.

On August 4, 1962, [] was interviewed at [] He stated he did not know who gave Baldwin the information for the July 26 article, and refused to comment concerning Baldwin's sources pointing out that a good newspaperman must protect his sources. [] refused to identify any persons Baldwin planned to see when he came to Washington, D. C., during the week of July 16 although [] admitted that he had made an appointment for Baldwin. [] pointed out that Baldwin wrote the July 26 article but that he [] did some editing in connection therewith. According to [] the July 26 article consisted of general public information and he felt that this type of article does a public service. He refused to say when the article was prepared, including whether it was prepared before or after Baldwin came to Washington, D. C.

b6
b7C

As indicated above, we have interviewed numerous individuals in various agencies of the U. S. Government. On July 31, 1962, Lieutenant General William P. Ennis, Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG), Department of Defense, advised that on July 20, 1962, Baldwin, whom General Ennis had never met before, had appeared at his office seeking information concerning an unclassified directive captioned "WSEG Operations" which was dated July 11, 1962. Baldwin informed General Ennis he was aware of the contents of this directive but desired to see a copy of it. Baldwin also told General Ennis that he always "protects his sources of information." General Ennis pointed out that he refused to allow Baldwin to see the directive and would not discuss the contents thereof with Baldwin in detail.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

It is noted that in the July 28, 1962, issue of "The New York Times," Baldwin has an article entitled "Pentagon Edict Upsets Military," a copy of which is enclosed. In our interview with Secretary of Defense McNamara on July 30 he commented that this article was another example of "loose talk" and a lack of discipline with regard to disclosure of information. The information in the article could have been obtained by Baldwin from the "WSAG Operations" directive furnished to Baldwin by one of his sources at the Pentagon. In this regard it is noted that General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, advised us that when Baldwin contacted him on July 19, 1962, he mentioned he had seen this directive and had read it but he did not say where or when.

b6 per NGB

[redacted] Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau, Department of the Army, was interviewed on July 31, 1962. He advised that in civilian life he is a military writer for the Norfolk, Virginia, "Ledger Star" and that he has known Baldwin for the past ten years on a personal and social basis. On July 18, 1962, he had dinner with Baldwin in Washington, D. C., and they discussed at some length information related to the return of the Air National Guard units from Europe. Major Elliott stated that none of the information discussed was classified since it had appeared previously in the Congressional Record and had been the subject of considerable testimony before Congressional committees.

It is noted that in the July 29, 1962, issue of "The New York Times" Baldwin devotes his article to the return from Europe of National Guard units. This article is captioned "Guard to Keep Few Planes on Return from Europe." It is possible that Baldwin used Major Elliott as one of his sources for the information appearing in this article. A copy of Baldwin's July 29 article is enclosed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

(U) On August 1, 1962, Major General David A. Burchinal, Director of Plans, Department of the Air Force, advised that he had conferred with Baldwin on July 18, 1962, at which time Baldwin told him he had recently seen Mr. Roswell Leavitt Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense. Baldwin described Mr. Gilpatric as one of his closest friends. [General Burchinal pointed out that he was shocked to learn from Baldwin that Mr. Gilpatric had told Baldwin that the successor to the B-52 airplane had been picked; that it would not be the RS-70; but instead involved a very "hush-hush" project. According to General Burchinal this is highly classified information which Baldwin was not entitled to have.] ~~[S-2]~~

On August 2, 1962, Mr. Gilpatric advised he could furnish no information of pertinence concerning the July 26 article. He did believe, however, that Baldwin's source was exclusively military. He said that Baldwin's July 26 article had been brought to his attention immediately prior to his leaving Washington, D. C., on July 26 to attend a luncheon given for him by the Board of Editors at "The New York Times" in New York, New York. He stated that eight persons were at the luncheon, including Baldwin, and following the luncheon he (Mr. Gilpatric) spoke privately to Grville Dryfoos, publisher of the newspaper, concerning the serious nature of this leak. Mr. Gilpatric said that he cited to Dryfoos several instances wherein Baldwin had come close to or had crossed over security limits.

Mr. Gilpatric, during this interview, was informed, without our source being disclosed, that on July 18, 1962, Baldwin had made the statement that he had learned from Mr. Gilpatric the decision had been made [concerning the successor to the B-52 bomber and that it would not be the RS-70 airplane.] (u) After some hesitation Mr. Gilpatric stated that Baldwin's allegation was not true. Mr. Gilpatric related that he had had a conversation sometime during April or May, 1962, with Baldwin concerning [the successor to the B-52 during] (u)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

which Baldwin criticized the Department of Defense for having gone 18 months without a new weapons program. Mr. Gilpatric said that they discussed the "follow-on" for the B-52 but they did not discuss the RS-70. (u) According to Mr. Gilpatric the studies relating to a successor to the B-52 were classified "~~Top Secret~~" and some of the information pertaining thereto was "very closely held." (U) Mr. Gilpatric also said that during the luncheon in New York on July 26 one of the editors in the group had asked a question as to whether a decision had been reached concerning the RS-70. (U) and Mr. Gilpatric had replied that the Department of Defense had not yet reached the point where it had to make a decision as to any change in policy in this area.

We are continuing investigation in this matter, and you will be furnished pertinent developments.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures - 3

NOTE:

(U) [Classified "~~Top Secret~~" since the mere mention of NIE 11-8-62 according to CIA warrants such classification. (S-10)]

- 7 -
~~TOP SECRET~~

58 1-22-1962 896

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 21 1962

TELETYPE *gfc*

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-88 BY SP8 *gfc*

URGENT 8-21-62 12-01 AM JAA

TO DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED] -1- AND SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD [REDACTED]

--WFO VIA WASHINGTON--

FROM SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]
HANSON W. BALDWIN. ESP-X.

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT - S ASTERISK REPORTED NO PERTINENT
INFORMATION CONCERNING BALDWIN EIGHT TWENTY SIXTY TWO.

END

NY R WA HFL

REC-63

25 AUG 21 1962

TWO COPIES WFO
F146
AUG 24 1962
1307

EX-113

Wendall

b3
b7E

Date of Mail 8-15-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFO CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 *[signature]*

5/9/96 SP3 BTJ/cem
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/cem

Subject JUNE MAIL Hanson W. Baldwin

Removed By _____

File Number

b3
b7E

1046

Permanent Serial Charge Out

Date of Mail 8-13-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTJ/fab


5/9/96 SP3 BTJ/clm
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/peh

b6
b7C

Subject JUNE MAIL Hanson W. Baldwin

Removed By _____

File Number



b3
b7E

F146

Permanent Serial Charge Out

244

Date of Mail 8-16-62.

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTJ/6

5/9/96 SP3 BTJ/cen
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/pet

b6
b7C

Subject JUNE MAIL Hanson W. Baldwin

Removed By 65 AUG 23 1962

File Number

[Redacted Box]

b3
b7E

F B I

Date: August 17, 1962

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Callahan	✓
Mr. Conrad	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Evans	✓
Mr. Malone	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Miss Holmes	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTJ/bak

Re WFO airtel 8/16/62.

Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of the
insert pertaining to the interview of ROSWELL L.
GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense, conducted
8/17/62. This will be included in the forthcoming
report.

/ ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Enc 1)

1 - WFO

HJM/pcn

(4)

EX-100
REC-1

25 AUG 21 1962

A I R T E L

To AG, WH, Defense
7/20

C. C. Wick

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
DECLASSIFICATION
ACTION

b3

b7E

CEG/MAT:pcn

GILPATRIC, upon re-interview August 17, 1962, was queried concerning the luncheon July 26, 1962, with the Board of Editors of "The New York Times", and advised the luncheon was held at the officers' dining room in The New York Times Building on West 43rd Street, New York City. GILPATRIC said the invitation was extended by BALDWIN during the latter's visit with him on July 17, 1962. He said he had made a similar appearance about a year ago and BALDWIN told him on July 17, 1962, that ORVIL DRYFOOS, Publisher of "The New York Times", asked BALDWIN to remind GILPATRIC he would like for him to again be their guest. GILPATRIC mentioned that "The New York Times" Editors AMERY (ph) BRADFORD and JOHN OAKES (OCHS), chief editorial writer, were friends of long standing and said the inspiration for his attendance really originated with BRADFORD.

b6

b7C

GILPATRIC said he was the guest of honor and advised that they made a small ceremony introducing him and having him sign a book. He stated it was not an unusual occasion and mentioned Secretary of Defense McNAMARA had appeared at one of these luncheons in April 1961 and he understood others have made similar appearances. He stated Secretary McNAMARA was aware of his plans to attend the Editors luncheon and advised he had not made a written report of it. He said the objective of "The New York Times" Editors was to obtain background data and decisions to aid them in their interpretation of the news. He explained his purpose was to convey to the Board some picture of over-all defense policies and what our objectives are in terms of cutting down the impact of overseas expenditures on the balance of payments and the effect of procurement here on the domestic economy. He said he also tried to do a bit of selling of the administration's defense policies. GILPATRIC added, in addition to the above, one topic discussed was political issues involved in the test ban negotiations being conducted in July at Geneva, Switzerland. He said "The New York Times" people were interested and inquired whether GILPATRIC was satisfied from a security standpoint whether our interests were safeguarded in the discussions should a compromise be reached on our reduced demands of on-the-site inspections of Soviet atomic tests.

GILPATRIC stated those in attendance at the Editors Luncheon included the following in addition to himself: LESTER MARKEL, "who puts out the Sunday edition of 'The New York Times'",

b6

b7C

b3

b7E

ENCLOSURE ~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/m
DECLASSIFY ON: 1
60-4417
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
3-21-89
Classified by SP3-BTJ/m
Declassify on: 1
DECLASSIFY ON: 1
5/9/96

Document downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per [redacted] PS on 4/5/2010

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN, AMERY BRADFORD, ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, Publisher, and a couple individuals whom he did not know and whose names he does not recall. JOHN OAKES, referred to above, was not present. GILPATRIC said the discussion was somewhat informal around the dining table, but those present were interested and attentive. GILPATRIC did most of the talking and the editors asked questions. He said BALDWIN did not have too much to say and the questions were propounded by the others present.

Mr. GILPATRIC related he first became aware of the HANSON BALDWIN article of July 26, 1962, while en route to New York. He said when he arrived at "The New York Times" offices, there was a call waiting for him and it was ADAM YARMOLINSKY, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense McNAMARA, and YARMOLINSKY advised him with regard to the BALDWIN article that he had been in conference with Mr. McNAMARA and had learned the matter was being investigated. In his telephone call with YARMOLINSKY, Mr. GILPATRIC and YARMOLINSKY decided it would be unwise to discuss the BALDWIN article at the luncheon. He said on his way to New York he had previously decided that he would not talk to DRYFOOS concerning it.

GILPATRIC said he had not been instructed to contact ORVIL DRYFOOS, but had told Secretary McNAMARA he intended to do so and mentioned both were disturbed about the BALDWIN news article. He also said he had informed Mr. McNAMARA verbally upon his return to Washington about his conversation with DRYFOOS.

In previous interview GILPATRIC stated he had complained to ORVIL DRYFOOS that BALDWIN was insensitive to security and had breached the limits of security on several occasions and that this article of July 26, 1962, was an example and constituted a danger to our security interests. He also stated in previous interview that he complained to DRYFOOS about BALDWIN's critical judgment of defense policy without first discussing it prior to publishing. He stated he did not furnish DRYFOOS with any specific instances, but had in mind an instance approximately a year ago when BALDWIN wrote a series of critical articles concerning the organization of the Defense Intelligence Agency when such material was still classified, although the BALDWIN articles occurred a short time prior to public release. He also said he had in mind an instance when BALDWIN had written in critical vein about the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

"missile gap" and on another occasion in his column had gone into the numbers of U. S. weapons. Mr. GILPATRIC said he had in mind that in October 1961 he had made a speech at Hot Springs, Virginia, to the Business Council, at which time the Department of Defense first released heretofore classified information concerning our defense weapons and numbers of bombers and other information relating to our strategic weapons system. He said this speech, with approval of the President, was for the purpose of acquainting the American public with the extent of our defenses and at the same time calling attention to the Russians as to how strong we were, particularly with regard to nuclear strength. He said this occurred at a time when the Russians were putting new pressure on the Berlin question. He said that prior to his making this speech, earlier in 1961, BALDWIN had written a piece on practically the same material and this indicated to GILPATRIC that BALDWIN had access to classified information.

GILPATRIC observed that he believed BALDWIN's best sources were located in the Pentagon and he always felt his primary sources were in the Navy Department because BALDWIN had a Navy background and in his writings appeared to take a "Navy position" in any controversial issue. GILPATRIC stated he did not know any of BALDWIN's sources by name. He mentioned that WILFRED J. McNEIL, former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in 1959 and 1960 who is now President of W. R. Grace Company, is a close friend of BALDWIN and was always visited by him and used to be a BALDWIN source in Defense.

With reference to GILPATRIC's earlier statement that he meets members of the press alone, GILPATRIC explained that this custom applies only to old and trusted friends whom he has known for more than ten years and includes such journalists as JOSEPH ALSOP, WALTER LIPPMANN, ARTHUR KROCK and HANSON W. BALDWIN. GILPATRIC stated when meeting correspondents outside the above category, his practice usually is to have a third person present such as NILS LENNARTSON or another professional from the Public Affairs Division of his department. He stated he never records interviews with members of the press. GILPATRIC stated sometimes he makes memoranda of such interviews, but said he did not make a memorandum of the BALDWIN interview of July 17, 1962, until he was interviewed by representatives of the FBI, at which time he reduced his recollections to writing.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

GILPATRIC admitted he had been concerned for some time about BALDWIN's sources of information at the Pentagon and was aware that they were extremely good sources. He said he never inquired of BALDWIN concerning his sources or made any effort to identify them. GILPATRIC stated he continued to receive BALDWIN despite his concern, explaining that BALDWIN is the senior military editor of a great newspaper and it is important that he give BALDWIN an audience in order to permit him to express himself, stating that it is part of his job to see BALDWIN. He declared he has not consciously furnished BALDWIN with any sensitive data or classified material.

GILPATRIC said he had not seen or heard from BALDWIN or ORVIL DRYFOOS since the BALDWIN article was published and he did not think he had been in contact with anyone from "The New York Times". He stated that JAMES B. RESTON, and his wife, had been a week end guest at GILPATRIC's farm at Queenstown, Maryland, remaining over Saturday night and departing on the following afternoon. GILPATRIC could not recall the date of this visit, but after consultation with his secretary and reference to a calendar believed it was possibly on the week end of July 15, 1962. He could not state that the date was accurate and could not fix the time of the visit as being before he had seen BALDWIN or after he had seen BALDWIN.

During this week end visit with RESTON, GILPATRIC said they discussed defense policy and other matters which should be brought to the public attention, all unclassified, and early that following week he sent some additional material to RESTON, who prepared and published an article based upon this data.

GILPATRIC stated when the present investigation was initiated, RESTON had become upset and made a complaint to Secretary McNAMARA, and it was his understanding that McNAMARA had gone to see RESTON. GILPATRIC also advised that sometime later President KENNEDY mentioned to GILPATRIC that he had sent his Naval Aide, Captain TAZEWEEL SHEPARD, to deliver a letter to DRYFOOS prepared by JAMES R. KILLIAN of The White House Staff, concerning the seriousness of the disclosures which appeared in the BALDWIN article and the possible adverse effects on American security.

On the previous interview with Mr. GILPATRIC on August 2, 1962, he advised that his discussion with HANSON

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted] (S)(U)
BALDWIN concerning the successor to the B-52 bomber had taken place during an interview in April or May 1962 and he had advised his interview with BALDWIN on July 17, 1962, had not touched on that point. In response to a specific question concerning this same matter during instant interview, Mr. GILPATRIC stated that upon reflection BALDWIN may have asked him some question about the weapons program with (regard to the successor to the B-52) during their conversation on July 17, 1962. He said as he now recalls it, BALDWIN asked what he was going to do about the RS-70 airplane and the problem of the successor to the B-52, and in reply GILPATRIC said he advised BALDWIN a decision had not been made. (U)

GILPATRIC was informed that a reliable person had advised that BALDWIN intimated to him that GILPATRIC was the source of BALDWIN's knowledge that General MAXWELL TAYLOR had been appointed as the new Chairman of the JCS. GILPATRIC replied he was sure that this is wrong and said he recalled BALDWIN had told him he heard Admiral HARRY D. FELT would succeed General LYMAN LEMNITZER in that post. GILPATRIC said he thought at the time that BALDWIN was surely wrong about this matter. GILPATRIC stated the subject of successors to General LEMNITZER and General LAURIS NORSTAD was discussed, but he did not furnish BALDWIN with any information on the subject. He recalled BALDWIN mentioned that he knew, or understood, NORSTAD was going to retire. GILPATRIC said he did not recall whether BALDWIN mentioned General LEMNITZER or General EARLE G. WHEELER as possible successor to General NORSTAD. He said he recalled they did discuss the fact there would probably be a new Chief of Staff.

(U) GILPATRIC advised he had read the 11-8-62 document, (S)(U) as well as the advance copy, and was familiar with their contents and had also been currently briefed on the subject matter. He said his previous conclusion that the information in the BALDWIN article came from both 11-8-62 and back-up people was because the 11-8-62 received a very small distribution and for the further reason the document did not mention the coffin lids in referring to hardened Soviet missile sites. (S)(U)

(U) GILPATRIC also stated that his previously-expressed thought that the source of BALDWIN's article was purely military

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]
was based on his knowledge that BALDWIN's sources are primarily military ones whom he has built up over a period of fifteen or twenty years in the military and naval establishments, and the fact that his background is in this area. He stated a further reason was that these departments have the necessary motivation and want to circulate a point of view. He stated, however, he did not see a service interest motive in the present BALDWIN news article.

(U) GILPATRIC stated he was familiar with all of the items in the BALDWIN article which could have possibly originated from [the 11-8-62 material] and denied furnishing any information to BALDWIN concerning these topics. In response to specific questions, he stated he had no recollection that his discussion with BALDWIN [included hardening of Soviet missile sites, the number of Soviet ICBMs, or the manner of deployment of missile sites, image interpretation, first firings of missiles from submerged Soviet submarines, or satellite photography. GILPATRIC stated it was his impression that BALDWIN had not seen the 11-8-62 document but had talked with someone familiar with the document.] ~~[S] [S]~~

(U) GILPATRIC was also specifically questioned concerning several items appearing in the last three paragraphs of the BALDWIN article of July 26, 1962, and he said he had no recollection, whatsoever, of any mention of protection of our satellites, or of any reference to the use of decoy devices as a means of protecting our satellites. He said BALDWIN may have made some mention of our capacity to penetrate Soviet defenses. He also stated he believed BALDWIN may have made reference to our Nike-Zeus system, but did not have a clear recollection that he did. He said he knows that other correspondents have mentioned this subject, noting that on this date, August 17, 1962, LLOYD NORMAN of "Newsweek" inquired of him during interview whether they were going to adopt the Nike-Zeus system for the purpose of attacking unfriendly satellites, as well as using it for a defense weapon against hostile missiles. GILPATRIC commented he understood that no great technical problem was involved here. GILPATRIC stated he did not recall any reference to Soviets shooting down a reconnaissance vehicle or about the Soviet capacity to do so. ~~[S] [S]~~

In connection with the discussion immediately above, GILPATRIC advised he had received the highly classified document

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E



(U) captioned ["Protection of Reconnaissance Satellite Vehicles" ~~TOP SECRET~~ dated July 13, 1962, and prepared by the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. He stated he had read the document and returned it the same day, as he recalled. He stated he had not displayed this document to BALDWIN, nor had he discussed its contents with him.

In conclusion, GILPATRIC advised although BALDWIN is a journalist of great talent and ability, he possesses a certain pride, even arrogance, and decides what he will publish and what should be published. He further described BALDWIN as being very brilliant and having a great store of knowledge, but also being opinionated and authoratative. GILPATRIC stated, however, that BALDWIN apparently has exercised restraint in the past, since BALDWIN told him he knew about the U-2 reconnaissance plane and the Cuban invasion plans long in advance of any publicity concerning them.

~~TOP SECRET~~

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-02-2017 BY: [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

APR 21 1962

5-1-2004

SP3-BTS/jm

00-4417

Samuel R. Carter, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Phillips:

In my previous letters to you, the last being August 11, 1962, you were furnished pertinent details concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson et al. which is in the New York Times issue of July 26, 1962.

In connection therewith, there is enclosed a
 1. a summary setting forth the results of our reinterview
 of R. G. Goss, a Electric, Laundry Secretary of Defense,
 C. I. Case on August 18, 1953.

Mr. Gilpatrick in this reinterview was unable to furnish the source for the information in the above-mentioned article. Mr. Gilpatrick also pointed out that he has not consciously furnished information with any sensitive data or classified material. Mr. Gilpatrick did, however, advise that when he had contacted Mr. [redacted] in 1975, the latter of the [redacted] [redacted] was a [redacted].

They will be furnished additional development in this matter. The above information has been furnished to the Attorney General and the Honorable Robert F. Kennedy, the Secretary of Defense.

3. cerat 11.

b3
b7E

Note: This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because information herein discloses the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 06-18-2010 BY 60324 UCBAW/DK/SBS~~

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-02-2017 BY: [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

APR 21 1962

5-1-2004

SP3-BTS/jm

00-4417

Samuel R. Carter, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Phillips:

In my previous letters to you, the last being August 11, 1962, you were furnished pertinent details concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson et al. which is in the New York Times issue of July 26, 1962.

In connection therewith, there is enclosed a
 1. a summary setting forth the results of our reinterview
 of R. G. Goss, a Electric, Laundry Secretary of Defense,
 C. I. Case on August 18, 1953.

Mr. Gilpatrick in this reinterview was unable to furnish the source for the information in the above-mentioned article. Mr. Gilpatrick also pointed out that he has not consciously furnished information with any sensitive data or classified material. Mr. Gilpatrick did, however, advise that when he had contacted Mr. [redacted] in 1975, the latter of the [redacted] [redacted] was a [redacted].

They will be furnished additional development in this matter. The above information has been furnished to the Attorney General and the Honorable Robert F. Kennedy, the Secretary of Defense.

3. cerat 11.

b3
b7E

Note: This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because information herein discloses the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date: August 20, 1962

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

b3

b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
 "THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962
 ESPIONAGE - X

Captain TURNER F. CALDWELL, Jr., USN, Assistant Director, Strategic Plans Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, interviewed 8/20/62. Advised his only contact with BALDWIN occurred in 1953 when CALDWELL was Executive Officer on aircraft carrier "FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT" and this ship took part in a NATO fleet exercise "MAIN BRACE". BALDWIN was among press people who covered this maneuver. CALDWELL has not had any contact with BALDWIN since that time; stated he had no information as to how leak occurred. In response to specific question, CALDWELL said his personal opinion was leak occurred in OSD and said his personal conviction was the leak probably occurred through ROSWELL GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

b6

b7C

CALDWELL related his reason for such personal belief went back to 1961 shortly after new administration took office and CALDWELL was assigned to a study group under Dr. ALAIN ENTHOVEN to prepare a "Top Secret" "Strategic Forces Study". This paper was for Mr. McNAMARA to present to President. On completion the document went to McNAMARA, to Assistant Secretary HITCH (Comptroller) and also to Mr. GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense. CALDWELL said even

3 - Bureau

1 - New York [REDACTED]

1 - WFO

HJM/pcn

(5)

(PERSONAL ATTENTION) (Info) (RM)

b3

b7E

TO AG, WH + M. [REDACTED]
 8/21/62
 101-13

A I R T E L

AUG 21 1962

Approved: _____

Sent _____

Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-21-83 BY SP8/STJ/STJ

5/8/96 SP8 BT/STJ
 9/23/96 SP8 BT/STJ

50 AUG 24 1962
 F-140

254
 1962

100
 100
 100

[REDACTED]

before study was given to President, a paraphrased, detailed draft of the study appeared in HANSON BALDWIN's column. He said there was considerable consternation about this leak and Dr. ENTHOVEN personally blamed Captain CALDWELL for the leak. CALDWELL said he was incensed by this false accusation so he conducted ~~some~~ inquiries on his own to try to pinpoint leak. He said the results of his inquiry convinced him that GILPATRIC was the leak; also he had ascertained BALDWIN had been in town and had seen GILPATRIC immediately prior to the appearance of BALDWIN's column on this matter.

PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), advised today he has known BALDWIN for years, but has had no contact since NITZE took office as Assistant Secretary of Defense. He said some months ago BALDWIN wrote an article concerning NITZE's presentation of a defense policy matter before NATO in Paris and the BALDWIN article was completely at variance with the facts in that NITZE's presentation took a policy position in alignment with military and JCS thinking; contrary to a stand advocated by State and other civilian agencies. Mr. NITZE was incensed over this matter and BALDWIN never did anything to correct his erroneous article. Since that time BALDWIN has not sought to see NITZE. NITZE had no suggestions or information as to how instant leak occurred.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 22 1962

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP3 BTJ/cen

URGENT 8-22-62 AM CAS 12-30 AM
TO DIRECTOR FBI #1 [REDACTED] AND SAC WFO [REDACTED]
FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]
SUBJECT HANSON W. BALDWIN ESP-X

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED NO PERTINENT
ACTIVITY THIS DATE CONCERNING BALDWIN. THE INFORMANT INDICATED THAT
BALDWIN WILL BE ON VACATION AT HOME UNTIL AFTER LABOR DAY.
END AND ACK

NY R 1 WA JGE

TWO COPIES WFO

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

Wannick

b3
b7E

REC-59

AUG 22 1962

5- *[Signature]*

F146

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

1 - Belmont
 1 - Sullivan
 1 - D.E. Moore
 1 - Wacks

DATE: August 16, 1962

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

Weak of Classified Information in

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTJ/cmr
 5/9/96 4/23/96 SP5 BTJ/gk

b6
 b7C

Director advised he talked with the Attorney General regarding this matter and we should go ahead with the reinterview of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, but we should not propose the use of the Polygraph regarding Gilpatric at this time.

Director instructed also that we furnish the Secretary of Defense McNamara copies of reports we have sent so far to the Attorney General and O'Donnell; that these reports should be delivered personally to McNamara at which time he should be advised that the investigation is still in progress but we thought he would like to see the results to date. The "Top Secret" nature of the reports should be pointed out to him.

AHB:hmm
 (5)

REC-9

ST-104

25 AUG 22 1962

b3
 b7E

50 AUG 24 1962
 F144

5- JH

~~TOP SECRET~~

- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Evans
1- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. D.E. Moore
1- Mr. Wannall
1- Mr. Wacks

b6
b7C

The Attorney General

August 21, 1962

Director, FBI

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Document declassified to
SECRET per [redacted] RS on 4/3/5-10

In connection with our investigation in this matter, there is enclosed a copy of a memorandum dated August 18, 1962, which sets forth in detail the results of our investigation in this matter as requested by you. The two sources not identified by name in the memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

The memorandum includes the results of interviews conducted from July 26, 1962, through August 18, 1962, and your attention is specifically called to the synopsis contained on pages one through nine. Of particular note are certain interviews in which Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, is mentioned. Lieutenant General David A. Burchinal, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Department of the Air Force, stated that on July 18, 1962, Baldwin advised him that Mr. Gilpatric had told Baldwin that the successor to the B-52 bomber had been selected and it would not be the RS-70, but would involve a very "hush-hush" project. According to General Burchinal, this information is highly classified and Baldwin is not entitled to have it (page 92). Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, advised that on July 19, 1962, he saw Baldwin, who implied that Mr. Gilpatric had informed him that General Maxwell Taylor was to be the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Anderson said that this information had not been released to the public at that time (page 107).

[redacted] on August 9, 1962, advised that it was generally believed by responsible people in the military community that Mr. Gilpatric was the person who disclosed the information for the July 26 article to Baldwin (page 239). The results of our interviews [redacted] conducted on August 2 and 17, 1962, are contained in [redacted]

b7C
per
USMC:OW
b3
b7E

JFW:jwh (9)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(SEE NOTE PAGE 4)
19 AUG 23 1962

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

b6
b7C
oom

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

on pages 69 through 70 of the memorandum which is enclosed.

With regard to Mr. Gilpatric, this Bureau in 1952 conducted an investigation relative to the compromise of two "Security Information - Secret" documents in articles in "Aviation Week" of July 21 and 29, 1952. During this investigation, Mr. Edward K. Moss, Assistant Administrator for Public Information, Defense Production Administration - National Production Authority, advised on September 29, 1952, that it was his personal belief that the "leak" came from the office of Mr. R. L. Gilpatric, the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Also during this investigation, Colonel Arno Luehman, Deputy Director of Public Information, Department of the Air Force, advised on October 1, 1952, that on an unrecalled day in July (1952) Mr. Gilpatric had made available for his reading a classified document. Later on the same day, Ben Lee, Military Editor of "Aviation Week," appeared at his office with a telegram which Lee claimed he had received from the offices of McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Incorporated, publishers of "Aviation Week," in New York City. After Lee read two or three excerpts from this telegram, it was apparent to Colonel Luehman that the information contained therein was substantially the same as he had read in Mr. Gilpatric's office earlier that morning.

On the following day, Mr. Lee again appeared in Colonel Luehman's office, requested an interview with Gilpatric and, after his interview with Mr. Gilpatric, displayed to Colonel Luehman a two-page onionskin paper which he stated Mr. Gilpatric gave him and Colonel Luehman noted that it bore the classification "Secret." After Lee left, Colonel Luehman reported to Mr. Gilpatric the fact that Lee had shown him the document bearing the classification "Secret" and stated Lee had claimed Mr. Gilpatric had given it to him and Mr. Gilpatric at that time emphatically denied to Colonel Luehman he had furnished any such document to Mr. Lee.

During the instant investigation, we have interviewed 238 individuals including many who were in contact with Mr. Baldwin during his visit to Washington from July 16 through July 19, 1962. Certain additional individuals who were not available for interview will be interviewed in the immediate future and you will be advised of the results of these interviews as soon as completed. Some officials at the White House and at various other departments who are not known to have been in contact with Baldwin have not been interviewed in connection with this investigation.

2 -
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

It was originally estimated that approximately 300 to 400 people had access to information which could have been the source of Baldwin's article. Our investigation has indicated that approximately 710 individuals are believed to have had access to this information. Inasmuch as our investigation has indicated that Baldwin deals on an extremely high level, we do not contemplate interviewing the various individuals at a lower level believed to have had access to this information in the absence of a specific request.

It is noted that during the investigation, we were able to establish that while Baldwin was in Washington, D. C., he contacted 22 individuals currently on a high level in the Government as well as three recently retired high-level officials. According to the facts developed, Baldwin apparently has almost unlimited access to sources on a high echelon within the Government, either friends or acquaintances of many years. It appears that Government officials have talked to him quite freely. The very fact that Baldwin was able to contact in a period of four days so many persons knowledgeable of highly classified data creates a presumption that information of value was imparted to him. Investigations of previous leak cases have indicated a like entree by other well-known reporters.

It is noted that the investigation indicates that Baldwin probably also gathered information during his July trip to Washington, D. C., which was used for his articles in "The New York Times" issues of July 28 and 29, 1962.

This situation to me again emphasizes the conviction that investigations are not the answer to the problem of leak of classified information. Rather a general strengthening of procedures within the various agencies relating to the handling of classified information would appear to be the solution. Unless this is accomplished, there can be no assurance that other serious unauthorized disclosures of classified information will not occur.

Enclosure

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since it indicates the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

4 -
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Belmont
 1 - Evans
 1 - Sullivan
 1 - Wannall
 August 22, 1962

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

1 - D. E. Moore
 1 - Wacks

ARTICLE OF HENRY W. BALDWIN IN
 "THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
 REFIDING - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 5/9/96 BY SP3 BTJ/klm
 7/25/92 SP3 BTJ/klm

In connection with our investigation in this matter, our coverage of Hanson L. Baldwin disclosed that on August 17, 1962, he was in contact with his son-in-law, Mark Potter. Baldwin referred to "a very good article" in "Look" magazine on "Kennedy and the Press" pointing out that the article cited "some of these incidents that have occurred in the past." Baldwin said, "It doesn't cite them all and doesn't cite this recent one, of course." (Baldwin apparently referred to the article in the August 20, 1962, issue of "Look" entitled "Kennedy vs. the Press" by Fletcher Knebel.) Mark Potter commented, "But if someone doesn't stand up to him - -. Who does he think he is? I'd punch him in the nose."

Baldwin again referred, in a critical vein, to our interviews with the "secretary in Washington," apparently Miss Emma L. Walts, employed at the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times," and with Rear Admiral William J. Fitzgerald, Jr., Executive Director of the U. S. Naval and Alumni Association. Baldwin indicated with respect to the latter interview that he thought it was "a tacit kind of intimidation." Baldwin also pointed out that the thing that "makes me maddest is that they go into the Pentagon with officers who have sworn oaths of fidelity, loyalty and obedience and they threaten them with lie detector tests. This is incredible. ... with the kind of country which I was brought up in ... this has happened not only in this case but in too many cases." As was indicated in my communication

VRS SS 5 03 11 23

b3
 b7E

REC-22 19 AUG 23 1962 PAGE 2

Tele. Rm.
 Holmes
 Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

37 AUG 23 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

of August 17, 1962, FBI Agents in conducting interviews in this case have made no mention of lie detector tests or polygraph examinations.

Baldwin commented that former President Dwight D. Eisenhower never "sent the FBI as such into the Pentagon" although he did become quite upset about leak cases. Baldwin was of the opinion that it was "peculiar to this Administration" and he thought that the explanation lies in the fact that "Kennedy" has some type of "a Boston-Irish inferiority complex." Baldwin also believed that "Kennedy" was "snubbed when he went to Harvard." As a further reason for investigations into unauthorized disclosures of classified information, Baldwin thought that "Bobby Kennedy" was close to the President and influenced the President in instituting such investigations. Mark Potter commented that "these Kennedys" were "big on hopping right on the phone and going and doing something without thinking something really through." Baldwin in reply pointed out that that was "the trouble" and it was "the trouble with Cuba."

You will be furnished additional information developed in this case.

NOTE: This letter classified ~~Top Secret~~ because the caption indicates the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1484347-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 1
Page 300 ~ Duplicate;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1252712-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 1
Page 300 ~ Duplicate;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Date 8/18/02

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☐ Secret
☒ ~~Top Secret*~~
☐ SCI*

Mail Category:

Letter _____ Airtel _____
LHM _____ Memo _____
Report X _____ Other _____
Teletype _____

FD-501 Number HQ-85-2179 FD-502 Number _____
Subject Nansen W Baldum
Date of Mail 8/18/02

Description of Material Report-00-WFO
(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☒ Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ

☐ _____
(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other
location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☐ Field Office Manager —

File and Serial number

b3
b7E

(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

Date

*requires special handling

~~Per Act 144 731-96~~
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTJ/pat
#288,611

4/11/96 SP3BJ/CLM

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

353842
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/pat
11/10/00 10327 HCS/SAL/pat

CONTROL FORM FOR ~~TOP SECRET~~ (S) -
SENSITIVE COMPARTMENT INFORMATION (SCI) -
NON-SCI CODE WORD MATERIAL

To verify security clearances call Security Programs Unit,
FBIHQ, extension 3605.

Instructions: 1. Complete front side. 2. Complete All blanks that apply. 3. Obtain signature of receiver. 4. Separate original from copy.
5. Send copy to: ☐ FBIHQ Room 5991 or ☐ _____

Field Office, Attn.: Security Officer

<input type="checkbox"/> SCI	<input type="checkbox"/> NON-SCI
<input type="checkbox"/> BYE	Code Word Identifier
<input type="checkbox"/> TK	
<input type="checkbox"/> SI	
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET
<input type="checkbox"/> SECRET
<input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL

Control Number HQ-85-2179 Copy 1 of 1 copies

Employee initially handling material Moncock / Howdenschelt

Originator of Material WFO

(FBI Field Division, FBIHQ or outside agency)

Dated 8/18/62 ☐ LTR ☐ LHM ☒ REPORT ☐ TELETYPE ☐ AIRTEL ☐ MEMO ☐ OTHER

Captioned: Namoon W. Baldwin

Field or FBIHQ file and serial number _____

Each employee handling this material will:

(1) Notify: FBIHQ, Room 5991 or ☐ _____; and, (2) Note on reverse side of this form the following action which applies:

Field Office, Attn.: Security Officer,

- A - Relinquished to another employee within Field division or within FBIHQ, or
- B - Delivered between field divisions and/or FBIHQ or outside agency, or
- C - Downgraded, declassified or destroyed.

Downgraded to ~~Secret~~ on 4/12/10
per OK/CUS

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIELD OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
WASHINGTON FIELD	WASHINGTON FIELD	8/18/62	7/26/62 - 8/17/62
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962		ROBERT C. BYRNES 4/10/99	kmm
		CHARACTER OF CASE	CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NID/ST/17
			DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

b6
b7C

Classified by 60267 NID/ST/17
Declassify on: OADR
288,611

245058
Classified by [redacted]
Declassify on: OADR
S-1 Dept of Defense
S-2 000 9th Agency
S-3 CIA
REFERENCE
3-24-89 SP5 [redacted] # 288,611

ESPIONAGE - X

REFERRAL DOCUMENT
FOI/PA # 245058
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
Z.O. # 12350
INITIALS [redacted]

(U) Bureau telephone call to WFO 7/26/62

- P -

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

During the 7/30/62, interview of [redacted] Washington, D.C., office of "The New York Times", she indicated she had contacted one Lieutenant [redacted] (phonetic) and Commander [redacted] at the Department of the Navy to arrange for appointments for BALDWIN. The current Department of Defense Telephone Directory lists one Lieutenant [redacted] Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR., Chief of Naval Operations. Inasmuch as ANDERSON was interviewed and acknowledged meeting with BALDWIN, Lieutenant [redacted] is not being interviewed. [redacted] through whom [redacted] reported she made an appointment for BALDWIN, is not being interviewed inasmuch as he

b6
b7C

APPROVED	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
COPIES MADE:		
7 - Bureau [redacted] (Info) (RM)		
1 - New York [redacted]		
2 - Washington Field [redacted]		

b3
b7E

Copy to B.C. dist.
per [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

22 AUG 21 1962

~~SECRET~~

Downgraded to Secret on
4/12/10 per [redacted]

DK/AS

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

is not on a level contacted by BALDWIN. (U)

(U) Major General F. T. UNGER, Director, J-3 (Operations), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who succeeded Major General FRED M. DEAN on 8/1/62, advised when interviewed on 8/6/62, that DEAN had been transferred to the 12th Air Force, Waco, Texas. UNGER stated that prior to DEAN's departure they had attended a JCS briefing at which instant investigation was discussed. At UNGER's request DEAN left a memorandum setting forth the names of all persons in his command who had actually seen NIE 11-8-62. According to UNGER, DEAN furnished no other information during their discussion of this matter. In the absence of additional information dictating otherwise, DEAN is not being interviewed regarding this case. S-3

During the 8/13/62, interview of Rear Admiral WILLIAM F. FITZGERALD (Retired), Executive Director, Naval Academy Alumni Association, Annapolis, Maryland, FITZGERALD included the names of Captain P. F. WAKEMAN (USN, retired) and Vice Admiral GEORGE C. DYER (retired) as participants with BALDWIN at a meeting of the Association's Publications Committee on 7/17/62, in Washington, D.C. According to FITZGERALD, WAKEMAN is employed by the Naval Academy Alumni Association in Annapolis and resides at Port Republic, Maryland. At the time of the 8/13/62, interview WAKEMAN was on leave in Connecticut and was due to return to duty in Annapolis on 8/15/62. According to FITZGERALD, DYER at the time of the 8/13/62, interview was vacationing in Melvin Village, New Hampshire, until Labor Day, 1962. No efforts are being made to interview WAKEMAN or DYER in view of the fact that other participants at that meeting, Admirals JERAULD WRIGHT and FITZGERALD and Rear Admiral EUGENE B. FLUCKEY, who were also present, were interviewed regarding the meeting.

Page one of the enclosure to WFOairtel 8/1/62, a memorandum furnished by Lieutenant General WILLIAM W. QUINN on 7/31/62, lists the names of the following persons who, according to Dr. STETSON CONN, Office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, were in contact with BALDWIN: ROMANUS and Mrs. MC CUTCHEON. On 8/1/62, it was ascertained from CONN that BALDWIN visited the above office on 7/18/62, and engaged in military-historical research. According to CONN, ROMANUS and Mrs. MC CUTCHEON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted] X
are clerical employees of the office's Records Branch.
In the absence of any overriding reason, ROMANUS and
MC CUTCHEON are not being interviewed.

In view of their immediate unavailability in
the Washington, D.C., area and in the absence of additional
information dictating to the contrary, the following indivi-
duals, familiar in some degree with the subject matter on
which this investigation was based or with BALDWIN, are not
being interviewed:

General CLYDE D. EDDELMAN (retired)
Route 4, Box 356,
Lake Charles, Louisiana

Lieutenant General JOHN K. GERHART
ENT Air Force Base,
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Lieutenant General THOMAS P. GERRITY
Commander, Ballistic System Division,
Air Force Unit, P.O. Box 45,
Los Angeles, California

Colonel H. M. HENINGTON, USAF,
Joint Strategic Survey Council,
who is on a "critically ill" list

Lieutenant Commander [redacted]
who departed for Singapore on 7/11/62

Lieutenant General HOWELL M. ESTES
(Hyland Panel member),
Air Force Systems Command,
Inglewood, California

Colonel EARL MC FARLAND, Former Chairman,
GMAIC, who left on 6/29/62, for
assignment in Alaska. MC FARLAND's
address is 6981 Radio Group (Mobile),
USAFSS, APO 942, Seattle, Washington

b6
b7C

[redacted] whose return from
[redacted] is indefinite according to [redacted]
[redacted] Office of Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency

~~SECRET~~ X

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

General MAXWELL TAYLOR, Military Representative of the President, at the outset of the interview of him on 8/8/62, commented that he had just returned from Newport, Rhode Island, and had learned while there that an investigation was being conducted concerning the BALDWIN article of 7/26/62. In this connection, TAYLOR said he was told that "someone had contacted ARTHUR KROCK's secretary".

(U) JAMES Q. REBER, Chief, Special Requirements Staff, Office of Special Activities; Chairman of Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, advised on 8/10/62, that the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) is an interagency group which is a subcommittee of USIB. It is responsible for presenting and justifying the operational aspects of the various projects undertaken for the purpose of obtaining information desired by the intelligence community. Mr. REBER advised the members of COMOR are well informed on the operational aspects of material contained in NIE 11-8-62; however, they are not intimately knowledgeable of [NIE] and to his knowledge have had no access to any of the drafts of [NIE 11-8-62]. He noted that he had not seen [NIE 11-8-62] although he does have access to it. Some of the more prominent members of this committee have been interviewed. No interviews are contemplated with the remainder since it is not felt BALDWIN would be in contact with them due to their lack of prominence.

(U) During a review on 8/14/62, of a "Top Secret" document, "Protection of Satellite Reconnaissance Vehicles", dated 7/13/62, prepared by Mr. BRUNO W. AUGENSTEIN, Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, his assistant, Mr. LOWELL R. DAILEY, advised as follows:

On 8/13/62, ORLANDO V. GALLEGOS, Staff Member, NSA Staff Group, OSD, reported to DAILEY that while on active duty with a National Guard unit described as an Army (Intelligence) ACSI - Reserve Unit, MOBDES #27, under command of Colonel TED BRUSKIN, National Guard Officer (Reserve) whose business telephone number was given as Government Code 182 (State) extension 4544, GALLEGOS and his unit were given a secret briefing. According to DAILEY, GALLEGOS stated the briefing included the showing of high altitude photographs, also referred to Russian "hardened" missile sites. Mr. DAILEY said he

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]

had called this matter to the attention of some appropriate authority in ACSI (Intelligence) who indicated inquiry would be made to ascertain who conducted the briefing and the nature of the information dealt with in the briefing. (S) (X)

Lieutenant General W. H. BLANCHARD, Inspector General of the Air Force, and his deputy (Security), Major General J. M. BREIT, were interviewed 7/31/62, as suggested by Mr. MC NAMARA in conference with Inspector DONALD E. MOORE of the Bureau. It is noted OSI, USAF, conducted an inquiry some months previously concerning a leak of highly classified information to RICHARD FRYKLUND, a reporter for the Washington, D.C., "The Evening Star". Also General BREIT said OSI had conducted an investigation regarding a leak to HANSON BALDWIN in 1959. General BREIT suggested more complete information could be furnished by his Counter Intelligence Division where the investigations had been supervised by Assistant Chief, OSI, CID, Mr. FRANCIS L. WELCH.

On 8/10/62, Mr. F. L. WELCH, OSI, advised that Special Agent [] was personally familiar with all facets of the "leak" to FRYKLUND and also an investigation relating to a leak of information which appeared in HANSON BALDWIN's column on 3/25/59, in "The New York Times", captioned "Soviet's Missile Bases".

Concerning the HANSON BALDWIN article in the 3/25/59, issue of "The New York Times", Special Agent [] advised that on 5/4/59, the office of General Counsel, Department of Defense (DOD), requested OSI, (USAF), to conduct an investigation throughout the various branches of the military service and in civilian channels as well as within OSD inasmuch as BALDWIN's article on 3/25/59, appeared to contain classified information which had been contained in a document dated 3/10/59, disseminated by the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC). [] stated the OSI investigation disclosed that the classified data in BALDWIN's column of 3/25/59, had appeared previously in the press and in other public source materials prior to its appearance in BALDWIN's article. By memorandum 6/2/59, the General Counsel, OSD, advised OSI it appeared that BALDWIN's 3/25/59, column was an "accumulation of information from numerous documents, studies, and estimates appearing in recent years" and OSD suggested that OSI conduct no additional inquiry. [] said OSI discontinued

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted]

its inquiry in view of the time which had elapsed and the large number of persons who had access to the type of information that BALDWIN's article contained. According to [redacted], the office of General Counsel, DOD, advised OSI on the initiation of the investigation in May, 1959, that [redacted] Office of General Counsel, DOD, would handle the question as to whether HANSON BALDWIN would be interviewed personally with regard to his 3/25/59, news column.

b6
b7C

[redacted] related this 1959 inquiry with relation to BALDWIN's news article "did not get off the ground" before the case was closed, and no inquiry was made then to determine BALDWIN's sources or contacts.

[redacted] said that on 4/23/62, OSI initiated, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, an investigation concerning RICHARD FRYKLUND as a result of his having written an article which originally had been intended for publication in the March 30, 1962, issue of "The Evening Star". According to [redacted] prior to use of the article in the newspaper, FRYKLUND brought the article to Mr. ARTHUR SYLVESTER, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and after reading it, Mr. SYLVESTER told FRYKLUND he should not publish it because it contained highly classified information relating to defense planning. [redacted] said FRYKLUND left the article with Mr. SYLVESTER and did not publish it. Apparently some time later SYLVESTER showed it to Secretary MC NAMARA and an investigation by OSI was started.

b6
b7C

[redacted] said this inquiry concerning FRYKLUND's source of information, not yet completed, has established that in all probability the person responsible for the leak to FRYKLUND is Dr. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, former employee of the Rand Corporation, and now employed in OSD as head of Directorate for Systems Analysis (Programming) in the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

b6
b7C

[redacted] said the OSI investigation disclosed Dr. ENTHOVEN had met FRYKLUND through Dr. MARVIN STERN, former Deputy Director (Defense Research and Engineering, OSD), now a Vice President at North American Aviation Company, and that ENTHOVEN had talked to FRYKLUND on many occasions.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

During the interview of Dr. ENTHOVEN by WFO in instant investigation, Dr. ENTHOVEN referred to a series of discussions he had with FRYKLUND and stated he did not desire to go into the FRYKLUND matter as he had previously discussed it at great length with OSI representatives. It is noted that ENTHOVEN was noticeably distracted during the interview as he continually paced back and forth across his office.

The August 3, 1962, issue of "Time" magazine carried an article relating to Department of Defense and "those young men in Mufti". In this [REDACTED] along with [REDACTED] and ADAM YARMOLINSKY were described as "the Pentagon's whiz kids".

The identities of Agents participating in this investigation are as follows:

b6
b7C

Inspector DONALD E. MOORE

SA DOUGLAS M. BROWN
SA ROBERT C. BYRNES
SA CARL E. GRAHAM

SA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]

SA HOMER W. SCHWEPPE
SA MAURICE A. TAYLOR
SA RICHARD M. WOOLF

(U) At the outset of this investigation CIA gave an estimate of 300 - 400 people as the number of persons who would have had access to material contained in NIE 11-8-62. Set out below are the numbers of persons in various agencies who had access to the document itself, drafts of same, collateral material in connection therewith, and who had the benefit of briefings regarding the material. The DIA furnished data regarding agencies within the Department of Defense with the exception of the Air Force and the Navy, which agencies furnished separate lists. These lists and those furnished by other agencies were complimented through inquiry during the investigation. The NSA figure includes briefings at NSA of NSA personnel as furnished by DIA. The

(U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

numbers set forth below total 710 and are derived from figures obtained during the investigation. It is pointed out that the CIA figure of 111 is an approximate number as furnished by that agency of persons who had access to the final version of the document. No figures were available regarding persons exposed to the material in other forms previously mentioned.

Air Force

160

Office Secretary of Defense

77

Army

12

Navy

16

AEC

8

State Department

34

Budget Bureau

4

Treasury

1

CIA

111

USIB Secretariat

3

DIA

116

WSEG

8

JCS

36

White House

8

Joint Staff

16

(U)

[NSA
100]

~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

INFORMANTS

Identity

~~(S)~~ [WF T-1 is] WF 1384-S*
[WF T-2 is, NY 3698-S*] ~~(S)~~ U

~~TOP SECRET~~

Careful consideration was given to the sources concealed and T symbols were utilized only in those instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed.

LEADS

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Will interview the following individuals at the earliest possible occasions following their scheduled returns to the Washington, D.C., area:

- (U) ~~(S)~~ 1. Rear Admiral TURNER CALDWELL, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, who will be available about 8/20/62.
2. Lieutenant Colonel [redacted], Office of Assistant Chief, Intelligence, (ACSI), Department of the Army, who will be available about 8/24/62.
3. Dr. GEORGE KISTIAKOWSKY, Professor of Chemistry at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, who, according to information furnished by CIA, may return to Washington, D.C., for debriefing following return from his trip to Indonesia. Contact will be maintained with CIA in this regard.
- (U) ~~(S)~~ 4. Major General CHARLES F. LEONARD, JR., ACSI, who will be available about 8/24/62.
- (U) ~~(S)~~ 5. PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), who will be available about 8/20/62.
- (U) ~~(S)~~ 6. Dr. GLENN T. SEABORG, Chairman, Atomic

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]
Energy Commission, who will be available
about 8/27/62.

- (U) ~~7~~. Colonel [] Air Force Systems
Command, who will be available about 8/20/62.

b6
b7C

This report is classified "~~Top Secret~~" in order
to protect the "~~Top Secret~~" classification of National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-62, which document and
attendant documents similarly classified presented the
(U) bases for interviews in this investigation. (~~S-3~~)

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

August 18, 1962

b3
b7E

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

~~TOP SECRET~~

K

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Synopsis	Page 1
	Introduction	10
	Index of Abbreviations	11
	Article by HANSON W. BALDWIN Appearing in "The New York Times" 7/26/62	13
(U)	[History of NIE 11-8-62 Document] SECRET	17
	Analysis of BALDWIN Article	20
(U)	[Information re: Distribution of NIE 11-8-62 Document] SECRET	21
	Biographical Information Regarding HANSON W. BALDWIN	26
	Interview of HANSON W. BALDWIN	31
	Interview of [redacted] Secretary, Washington Office, "The New York Times"	32
	Information from [WF T-1] <i>gu</i>	35
	Information from [WF T-2]	36
	Interview of Staff Sergeant [redacted] [redacted] USAF, New York City	42
	Interview of [redacted] [redacted] to HANSON W. BALDWIN	43
	Interview of Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] USAF	45
	Interview of Captain [redacted] USAF	47
	Chart of Known Contacts and Activities of BALDWIN 7/16/62, through 7/19/62	48

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page

Information From Records of Jefferson Hotel, Washington, D.C.	50
Interview of Secretary of the Navy FRED KORTH	52
Interview of Vice Admiral CLAUDE V. RICKETTS, Vice Chief of Naval Operations	53
Interview of Major General C. G. DODGE, Chief of Information, U.S. Army	57
Interview of Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT (retired) CIA	59
Interview of Rear Admiral WILLIAM F. FITZGERALD, JR. (retired)	65
Interview of Rear Admiral EUGENE B. FLUCKEY (retired)	67
Interview of ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense	69
Interview of Brigadier General JERRY D. PAGE, Deputy Director of Plans, USAF	81
Interview of Dr. EARL F. ZIEMKE, Chief, Foreign Branch, Office of Military History	83
Interview of Dr. STETSON CONN, Office of Military History	84
Interview of Vice Admiral WILLIAM R. SMEDBERG, III, Chief of Naval Personnel	86
Interview of Rear Admiral THOMAS H. MOORER, Director, Long Range Objectives	88
Interview of Vice Admiral WILLIAM F. RABORN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations	90

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Page ~~X~~ ~~X~~

[]
Interview of Lieutenant General DAVID A. BURCHINAL, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, USAF

92

Interview of [] National Guard Bureau, U. S. Army

b6 per NGB

94

Interview of Lieutenant General WILLIAM P. ENNIS, U. S. Army, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group

98

Interview of Vice Admiral R. B. PIRIE, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)

101

Interview of General JAMES D. HITTLE, U. S. Marine Corps (retired)

103

Interview of NORMAN S. PAUL, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower

105

Interview of Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR., Chief of Naval Operations

107

Interview of General BARKSDALE HAMLETT, Vice Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

109

Interview of Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. MC NAMARA

111

Interview of General LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

113

Information Regarding Departure of BALDWIN from Washington, D. C., 7/19/62

115

Interviews with White House Staff

116

Interviews with Members of National Security Council (NSC)

124

~~SECRET~~



Page

~~TOP SECRET~~

Interviews with Personnel of Department of Air Force	143
Interviews with Personnel of Department of Army	153
Interviews with Personnel of CIA	163
Interviews with Personnel of Department of Defense (DOD)	191
Interviews with Personnel of Defense Intelligence Agency, DOD	213
Interviews with Personnel of Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD	228
Interviews with Personnel of Department of Navy and Marine Corps	234
Interviews with Personnel at Department of State	240
Miscellaneous Interviews	246
Content of Speech by Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. MC NAMARA delivered at Ann Arbor, Michigan, 6/16/62	256
List of Individuals Interviewed Who Could Furnish No Information Pertinent to this Investigation	270

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] ~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

SYNOPSIS

(U) On July 26, 1962, the Attorney General requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to conduct investigation to determine the source of a leak of classified information which was contained in an article by HANSON W. BALDWIN in the July 26, 1962, issue of "The New York Times." The article is entitled "Russian Missiles Guarded by Concrete Installations" in one edition and in another edition of the same date, it is captioned "Soviet Missiles Protected in 'Hardened' Positions." Investigation determined that certain information contained in the article was referred to in a classified report known as National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-62. Distribution of the advance copies of NIE 11-8-62 dated July 6, 1962, was initiated July 10, 1962. On the instructions of the President, these copies were recalled on the same date. Thirty eight copies of this same document were distributed on July 11, 1962, to top government officials. On July 17, 1962, distribution of 54 copies of the "all sources" or final NIE 11-8-62 document was made. ~~SECRET~~

(U) On July 30, 1962, HANSON W. BALDWIN was contacted at his residence, Chappaqua, New York, by Special Agents of the FBI. BALDWIN declined interview stating that he could be contacted at "The New York Times" on the following morning at 10:30 a.m. No further contact has been had with BALDWIN.

On July 30, 1962, [REDACTED] Washington Office. "The New York Times," was contacted at her residence. [REDACTED] stated that BALDWIN arrived in Washington, D. C., on July 16, 1962, and departed on July 19, 1962. On instructions from the New York Office of her employer, [REDACTED] made, or attempted to make, appointments for BALDWIN with JOHN A. MC CONE, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. MC NAMARA; (FNU) ANDERSON, Department of Navy; ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and possibly with General L. L. LEMNITZER,

b6
b7C

Downgraded to ~~Secret~~ on
4/12/02 per [REDACTED] /DK/CLS

~~TOP SECRET~~

b6
b7C

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). She could not recall additional names but volunteered to check her office records to identify additional individuals.

On July 30, 1962, following the above contact with [redacted] [WF T-1] learned that she was in contact with (S) u WALLACE CARROLL of the Washington Office of "The New York Times." [redacted] advised CARROLL that she had been contacted by Special Agents of the FBI. CARROLL stated, "Don't give them any more."

b6
b7C

Subsequent to the contact with BALDWIN, WF T-2 learned on July 30, 1962, that JAMES L. RESTON of "The New York Times" in Washington, D. C., was in contact with BALDWIN. RESTON complained about the interview of [redacted] and BALDWIN complained about his contact with the FBI on that same evening. BALDWIN stated that "they" desired to identify his sources of information which he would not identify. BALDWIN commented that the real reason for these tactics was the President and "BOBBY" KENNEDY. BALDWIN stated he felt he had been discreet in everything regarding the military and had held back information for a long time. He stated he felt he knew what could be printed and what could not. (S) u

(U) Investigation at the Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other agencies of the government indicated that BALDWIN is well known on the highest levels of the military and would consider it beneath his dignity to contact minor officials. The following persons who were in contact with BALDWIN during the period of July 16, 1962, through July 19, 1962, were identified and interviewed. All of these individuals denied furnishing any information from the NIE 11-8-62 document to BALDWIN. (S) u

On July 16, 1962, BALDWIN checked in at the Jefferson Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 2:02 p.m.

Secretary of the Navy FRED KORTH was visited by BALDWIN from 3:01 to 3:42 p.m., on July 16, 1962. They

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

discussed a trip of BALDWIN to Poland and a directive of Secretary KORTH recommending expansion of civilian personnel on the faculty of the Naval Academy. X

Vice Admiral CLAUDE V. RICKETTS, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, was visited by BALDWIN from approximately 3:45 p.m. to 4:17 p.m. on July 16, 1962. BALDWIN inquired regarding the civilian faculty replacements on the Naval Academy staff; the possible successor as Chairman of the JCS; proposed change in the Chief of Staff of the United States Army; the Nike-Zeus Missile concerning which BALDWIN inquired why the Army was delaying development; BALDWIN commented that the first nation to obtain an effective anti-missile missile would gain a distinct psychological advantage; BALDWIN inquired whether the Soviets have an anti-ballistic missile; also, inquired regarding the release of Naval reserve units and whether Naval personnel were adequately trained to man nuclear powered ships. He also inquired several times regarding the speech of Secretary MC NAMARA delivered at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16, 1962, as to whether any new directives had been issued as a result of this speech. He called attention to references in the speech of striking military targets rather than cities.

Major General C. G. DODGE, Chief of Information, United States Army, was visited by BALDWIN from 4:30 p.m. to 4:40 p.m. on July 16, 1962. BALDWIN was advised that the Secretary of Army desired no press contacts prior to August 15, 1962, after BALDWIN had inquired as to the possibility of seeing the Secretary. BALDWIN attempted to obtain information regarding the Nike-Zeus program and the rotation of senior Army officers.

Admiral JERARD WRIGHT (Retired), member of Board of National Estimates, CIA, lunched with BALDWIN at the Army-Navy Club, Washington, D. C., from 12:00 noon to 1:30 p.m. on July 17, 1962. (Other interviews with individuals attending this luncheon indicated that the meeting continued from 10:00 a.m. until about 3:30 p.m. on July 17, 1962.) Also at this luncheon were Admiral GEORGE C. DYER (Retired)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]

and Admiral WILLIAM B. FITZGERALD (Retired), both of Annapolis, and a candidate for an advertising job for the Naval Academy Alumni Association. Nothing was discussed at this luncheon other than the candidate for the advertising job. On re-interview WRIGHT recalled discussion of successors to General LEMNITZER at JCS and General NORSTAD at NATO.

At 3:30 p.m. on July 17, 1962, BALDWIN visited ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense. GILPATRIC stated that BALDWIN remained with him about 45 minutes. BALDWIN stated that he had two things in mind: The Ann Arbor speech of Secretary MC NAMARA and the status of the National Guard. BALDWIN also brought up the topic of changes in the military command of NATO and JCS and the retirement of General NORSTAD, inquiring as to the successor of the Chairman of the JCS. BALDWIN tried to link changes in United States weapons policy in Europe to the change of the command in NATO. GILPATRIC stated that he had attended a luncheon given for him by the Board of Editors at "The New York Times" in New York City on July 26, 1962. The luncheon was attended by eight individuals including BALDWIN. Following luncheon, GILPATRIC complained to ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, Publisher of "The New York Times," about the July 26, 1962, article of BALDWIN, stating that this leak was a matter of serious concern and indicating that BALDWIN was insensitive to security matters. GILPATRIC cited several instances to DRYFOOS wherein BALDWIN had come close to or crossed over security limits. GILPATRIC also complained of BALDWIN's critical judgments of Defense Department policy without first discussing it prior to publication. During interview of GILPATRIC by FBI Agents, he was questioned as to information he might have discussed with BALDWIN regarding the "follow on" to the B-52 airplane. This information was alleged by another military officer to have been discussed by GILPATRIC with BALDWIN. GILPATRIC denied discussing this program with BALDWIN but admitted that he did have a conversation with BALDWIN in April or May, 1962, concerning the successor project to the B-52. BALDWIN at that time was critical of the Defense Department stating that it was the first time in his, BALDWIN's, experience that we had no new weapons over an 18 month period. GILPATRIC told BALDWIN this was not true and that there were "some things even he did not know." GILPATRIC then referred to advance weapons such as the TFX (Tactical Fighter) and the Mobile Mid-Range Ballistic Missile and then discussed the successor to the B-52 program.

X 4 ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Brigadier General JERRY D. PAGE, Deputy Director of Plans, United States Air Force, was visited by BALDWIN from 4:45 to 5:20 p.m. on July 17, 1962. BALDWIN had this appointment at 4:00 p.m. and was 45 minutes late. BALDWIN informed PAGE he had just left GILPATRIC. BALDWIN indicated an interest in the space program and requirements for the coming era of "man in space" and had extensive discussion regarding this matter generally. He also inquired as to the possible successors as Chairman of JCS and Commander of NATO.

From 9:15 a.m. to 12:00 noon on July 18, 1962, BALDWIN was occupied with Dr. EARL F. ZIEMKE, Chief, Foreign Branch, and Dr. STETSON CONN, both of the Office of Military History, Department of the Army, in connection with research on the Battle of Stalingrad, concerning which BALDWIN is writing a book.

From 12:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. on July 18, 1962, BALDWIN lunched with Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT, referred to above, and Vice Admiral WILLIAM R. SMEDBERG, III, Chief of Naval Personnel, at the Sheraton-Carlton Hotel. They discussed the proposal to replace military instructors at the United States Naval Academy with civilians.

From 3:00 p.m. to about 3:20 p.m. on July 18, 1962, BALDWIN visited Rear Admiral THOMAS H. MOORER, Director, Long Range Objectives Group, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. BALDWIN inquired as to the possible successor as Chairman of the JCS and also discussed new ships, nuclear power, hydrofoil, condition of ships and projection of equipment to 1970.

From 4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on July 18, 1962, BALDWIN was in the office of Vice Admiral WILLIAM F. RABORN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Development. They discussed information regarding the Navy's Anti-Submarine Warfare Program; also, the reassignment of senior Naval officers and the Navy's Polaris Program.

From 6:30 p.m. to about 7:05 p.m. on July 18, 1962, Lieutenant General DAVID A. BURCHINAL, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, United States Air Force, visited with BALDWIN over cocktails at the Jefferson Hotel. They discussed the possible successor as leader of NATO; the influence of civilians in positions of authority at the Pentagon;

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted]

civilian influence in weapons evaluation; the successor as Chairman of JCS and the possible replacement of the B-52 airplane. BALDWIN stated that GILPATRIC, whom he considered as one of his closest friends, had told him, BALDWIN, that the successor to the B-52 had been chosen and it would not be the RS-70 but involved a very "hush hush" project. BURCHINAL stated he was shocked to learn that BALDWIN had this information as it was highly classified and BALDWIN was not entitled to this information.

From about 7:05 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., July 18, 1962, BALDWIN dined and visited with [redacted]

[redacted] National Guard Bureau, and [redacted] They discussed the boast of Soviet Premier KHRUSHCHEV regarding anti-missile missiles; the return of the Air National Guard Units from Europe (which was the subject of an article by BALDWIN in the July 29, 1962, issue of "The New York Times") [redacted] in civilian life is a military writer for the "Ledger Star" newspaper, Norfolk, Virginia, and was reactivated in the National Guard in October, 1961. He has known BALDWIN for the past ten years. b6 per NGB

On July 19, 1962, BALDWIN checked out of the Jefferson Hotel at 9:07 a.m.

From 9:40 a.m. to about 10:05 a.m., on July 19, 1962, he visited with Lieutenant General WILLIAM P. ENNIS, United States Army, Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG). BALDWIN inquired regarding a directive of Dr. HAROLD BROWN of the Defense Department. BALDWIN stated he was personally aware of the WSEG directive of Dr. BROWN and wished to see it. BALDWIN stated he always "protects his sources of information." ENNIS declined to exhibit the directive but commented the directive took the military out of WSEG position. (WSEG information was contained in the article of BALDWIN in the July 28, 1962, issue of "The New York Times".)

Vice Admiral R. B. PIRIE, Deputy of Naval Operations (Air), advised that he was visited by BALDWIN from 10:50 a.m. to 11:15 a.m. on July 19, 1962. PIRIE has known BALDWIN since

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

the 1920s, and BALDWIN has visited his office at the Pentagon every three or four months since May, 1958. BALDWIN during the current contact expressed interest in the program of WSEG and the trend toward civilian control in weapons evaluation; also, the pending retirement of Admiral PIRIE and a new aircraft to be utilized by both the Navy and Air Force.

From 12:00 noon to about 1:20 p.m. on July 19, 1962, BALDWIN lunched with Brigadier General JAMES D. HITTLE, United States Marine Corps (Retired) and NORMAN S. PAUL, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, at the Army-Navy Club, Washington, D. C. They discussed various military battles; probable changes in the JCS and NATO commands and problems dealing with military personnel.

From 2:30 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., July 19, 1962, BALDWIN was in contact with Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR., Chief of Naval Operations. BALDWIN implied that ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC had told him that General MAXWELL TAYLOR had been appointed Chairman, JCS. This information had not been released at that time.

From 3:00 p.m. to about 3:30 p.m. on July 19, 1962, BALDWIN visited General BARKSDALE HAMLETT, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army. BALDWIN inquired how HAMLETT received the appointment of General MAXWELL TAYLOR as Chairman of JCS. HAMLETT commented that this information was not officially released until one or two days later. BALDWIN also inquired regarding the Army's Nike-Zeus Program implying that he had received additional information regarding this subject.

(U) At 5:00 p.m., July 19, 1962, BALDWIN met with Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. MC NAMARA. No discussion of the NIE 11-8-62 material was carried on.

At 6:00 p.m. on July 19, 1962, BALDWIN met with General LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, Chairman, JCS. BALDWIN expressed interest in future plans of LEMNITZER; the replacement of the NATO command and the elimination of WSEG from military control in favor of a civilian group. LEMNITZER declined comment on these matters. BALDWIN mentioned that he had seen the WSEG directive and had read it but would not identify the source.

7
~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Records of Northeast Airlines, Washington, D. C., reflect that H. W. BALDWIN departed from Washington National Airport at 8:00 p.m., July 19, 1962, on flight number 2728 en route to New York City.

On August 8, 1962, WF T-2 learned that BALDWIN was in contact with an individual believed to be ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, President and Publisher of "The New York Times." BALDWIN and DRYFOOS speculated at considerable length as to the reasons for the investigation of BALDWIN and commented on the investigation of other unrelated leaks of information. DRYFOOS during this contact indicated he was to receive a letter and a document which was to be delivered by the "Naval Attache." DRYFOOS referred to the President, in this connection, indicating he would make a response to his letter. (S) U

(U) Divergent opinions are held by many persons interviewed regarding the source of BALDWIN's information for his July 26, 1962, article. A CIA official expressed the opinion that the person or persons who briefed or discussed the matter with BALDWIN had broad knowledge of both United States military capabilities and intelligence material which were utilized [in the NIE 11-8-62 report.] (S) (U) This official did not think the article represented a compilation of bits of isolated information but rather he felt that BALDWIN probably received a general, non-technical briefing or review of the conclusions reached in the [NIE 11-8-62.] (S) (U)

(U) Certain government officials interviewed felt that BALDWIN could have written his article by piecing together bits of information originating in material related to [NIE 11-8-62] (S) (U) Others felt BALDWIN must have seen various classified documents relating to [NIE 11-8-62] (S) (U) or been briefed by a person who had complete knowledge of the subject matter. Others felt BALDWIN could have been briefed by a person or persons who themselves had only participated in various briefings on the pertinent material. Several officials felt that the information used by BALDWIN was deliberately leaked to him by a knowledgeable, highly placed person.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC was re-interviewed on 8/17/62. He furnished additional details regarding the luncheon he attended in New York as guest of the Board of Editors of "The New York Times". BALDWIN invited him to this luncheon during interview on 7/17/62. GILPATRIC's purpose in attending luncheon was to convey to the Board a picture of over-all defense policies, reducing overseas expenditures and the effect of procurement on domestic economy.

(U) Denied, to his recollection, furnishing any information to BALDWIN from NIE 11-8-62 for a highly ~~SECRET~~ classified document regarding protection of satellites; denied furnishing identity of replacement of JCS Chairman. He admitted, after reflection, having discussed with BALDWIN the successor to B-52 bomber, stating he advised him no decision had been reached. He stated he has never consciously furnished BALDWIN any classified information. He stated he only meets with BALDWIN and other trusted journalist friends alone. He sometimes makes memorandum of interviews but did not make a memorandum of the BALDWIN interview of 7/17/62 until after he was interviewed in this investigation.

- P -

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(HJM:ctw)

b3
b7E

INTRODUCTION

At the request of the Attorney General on July 26, 1962, an investigation was instituted to determine the source of a leak of classified information contained in an article by HANSON W. BALDWIN which appeared in "The New York Times" on July 26, 1962.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:kjl

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACSI	Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Army
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
BNE	Board of National Estimates
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
FNU	First Name Unknown
GMAIC	Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
ISA	International Security Affairs
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Agency
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NPIC	National Photographic Inter- pretation Center
(U) [NSA	National Security Agency (S)
NSC	National Security Council
OEP	Office of Emergency Planning
ONE	Office of National Estimates
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI, CIA	Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]
RMW:mfd

b3
b7E

SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAO	Special Activities Office
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIB	United States Intelligence Board
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WSEG	Weapons Systems Evaluation Group

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HJM:ddt

b3
b7E

There is quoted below the article by HANSON W. BALDWIN which appeared in "The New York Times" on July 26, 1962. This article was entitled "Soviet Missiles Protected In 'Hardened' Positions" in one edition, and was entitled "Russian Missiles Guarded By Concrete Installations" in another edition.

"Some Soviet ballistic missile sites are now being 'hardened'--protected by concrete--according to reliable reports reaching Washington. The hardening, so far, is not comparable to the underground silo type of launching tubes now being constructed in the United States for the Air Force's Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile. It is comparable to the 'coffin-type' installations for some of this country's Atlas missiles.

"In these installations the missiles, until ready for launching, lie horizontally in a large concrete box flush with, or slightly above, the surface of the ground. Before launching, the 'coffin' lid opens and the missiles are raised to a vertical position.

"How Data Are Gathered

"This type of construction provides some protection from the blast and heat of a nuclear explosion. But it is now considered minimum protection; the underground silo type of launching tube, lined with concrete and steel and capped by a heavy steel hatch, provides far greater protection from blast, heat and the earth shock of a near miss.

"Intelligence data on Soviet missiles, presumably gathered by electronic and communications intelligence and by satellite cameras and other devices, are considered quite reliable by Washington, although some details are, of course, missing.

"The new science of 'image interpretation,' which has replaced World War II's photo interpretation, includes the composite interpretation of photographs of all types, infrared and radar images, electronic emanations, radio evesdropping, and so on.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HJM:ddt

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

"This science, plus some old-fashioned agent reports on such things as construction projects and car loadings, has yielded a pretty clear picture of Soviet missile development.

"There is confidence in Washington, as a result, that the United States today has both a quantitative and qualitative, or technological, lead vis-a-vis Soviet Russia in intercontinental ballistic missiles.

"Number Estimated

"Soviet ICBMs, in operational readiness and in advanced stages of construction, apparently number considerably less than 100. Most of them stand in closely clustered, above-ground, open launching sites, where one large nuclear blast would knock out eight or more sites. The 'coffin' type of semi-hardened construction is just beginning.

"Some of the Soviet sites apparently have two missiles for each launcher. United States land-based missile sites have only one missile per launcher on the assumption that the sites would survive a nuclear interchange only long enough to launch a single missile.

"The United States has close to 100 land-based Atlas and Titan missiles ready in finished launching sites with 200 to be ready by the end of the year. About 1,200 ICBMs have been authorized or planned, including the solid-fueled Minuteman. The first Minuteman missiles will become operational this fall.

"The United States appears to be well ahead of Soviet Russia in the strength and diversity of its launching sites. The United States' missiles are believed to be more reliable and more accurate.

"In one respect the Soviet missiles have an advantage: They have greater thrust and can carry larger warheads. The current United States nuclear

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HJM:ddt

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

weapons tests in the Pacific have proved the development feasibility of a ten-megaton warhead for the Titan. This would have an explosive power equivalent to that of 10,000,000 tons of TNT, or almost twice the power of the United States largest missile warhead of today. The Russians, on the other hand, have the potential capability of mating 50-or-100 megaton warheads to their ICBMs.

"In fact, some experts believe that the Russians are deliberately building only a few of their huge, ponderous and expensive first-generation missiles, but are deliberately fitting the largest possible warheads to them in order to achieve maximum political and psychological effect and, in case of war, widespread damage and destruction by means of pattern bombardment.

"Missile Submarines

"In the development of nuclear-powered missile-firing submarines, there are indications that this country is technologically several years ahead of the Russians. The United States has nine Polaris submarines completed, a total of forty-one built, building or authorized. Russia's first submarines capable of launching missiles from submerged positions are just being built, and one of the first successful Soviet tests of a submerged missile launching was recently held.

"The advent of Russian missile-firing submarines and hardened land-based missile sites indicates to many in Washington that Soviet strategic thinking is roughly along the same lines as our own. Moscow, like Washington, is trying to make its nuclear deterrent and retaliatory power less and less vulnerable to surprise attack.

"As the invulnerability of missile launching sites increases and each side finds it impossible to knock out the other's nuclear capability by a surprise first strike, the stability of the deterrent is expected to increase, so that, in this respect at least, technological developments may help to ease world tension.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HJM:ddt

b3
b7E

"In the anti-ballistic missile field, Premier KHRUSHCHEV's boast about a rocket able 'to hit a fly in space' is taken with many grains of salt in Washington. Nevertheless, some Washington experts believe that the Soviet Union may be somewhat, though not much, ahead of the United States in this field.

"Some top Pentagon officials credit the Russians with the capability of intercepting a single Atlas, or perhaps a Titan, in flight. The United States Nike-Zeus system has just made its first successful intercept, over the Pacific, of an Atlas-type target missile. But neither Russia nor the United States, it is believed, has the capability of meeting a large-scale missile attack, or of intercepting missiles equipped with decoy devices or other penetration aids. The offense still appears to be well ahead of the defense.

"Many United States military officers are convinced that this country must demonstrate a greater sense of urgency in the anti-ballistic missile, and anti-satellite fields and in the military applications of space. Some of them anticipate uneasily another spectacular Soviet feat in space within the next few months. Some believe that this may take the form of shooting down a satellite."

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
CAG:kjl

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

HISTORY OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
AND PREPARATION DATES FOR NIE 11-8-62

The following information with respect to National Intelligence Estimates, (NIE), was furnished on August 9, 1962, by Mr. CHESTER L. COOPER, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of National Estimates and [REDACTED]

b3 per CIA

The Office of National Estimates was established in October, 1950, and was designed to create an executive agent for the coordination of intelligence data from the entire intelligence community in order to furnish to the President and appropriate agencies of the United States Government factual intelligence data from which to make plans and policy. (S) (3) (K)

National Intelligence Estimates are written on (1) an annual basis, (2) request of an agency within government; or, (3) generated in the intelligence community as a result of new information or situations in areas which represent problems. Approximately 15 to 20 NIE's are prepared on the Soviet Union in a year. With respect to NIE 11-8-62, the number 11 designates "Estimates on the Soviet Union"; the number 8 designates "Estimates on Long Range Capabilities" and the latter number indicates the year. (S) (3) (K)

The first NIE 11-8 was commenced in 1959, being treated with other subjects prior to this time. This particular estimate is now prepared on an annual basis with additional supplements being issued occasionally during intervening periods. (S) (3) (K)

The following tabulation shows in chronological order the agenda and meetings of the various groups for the preparation of drafts from which NIE 11-8-62 was produced and its implications were analyzed for dissemination. (S) (3) (K)

Abbreviations:

BNE	Board of National Estimates
TR	Terms of Reference
REPS	Representatives of the USIB Members
USIB	United States Intelligence Board
IMPL	Implications of NIE 11-8-62
S&C	Summary and Conclusions
PC	Principal Conclusions

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAG:KJL

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT DATE (1962)	MEETING DATE (1962)	TYPE OF DRAFT	FOR SUBMISSION TO
19 Apr		TR	BNE
24 Apr	24 Apr	TR	BNE
		TR	REPS
30 Apr	30 Apr	TR	REPS
		TR	USIB
31 May-6Jun	2 May	TR	USIB
7 Jun		TEXT	STAFF
		TEXT	STAFF &
			BNE PANEL
	11 Jun	TEXT	BNE
	13 Jun	TEXT	BNE
14 Jun	14 Jun	TEXT	BNE
20 June		TEXT	REPS
21 Jun	20 Jun	CHAPT V	BNE
		TEXT	REPS
		INSERT PARAS	
	21 Jun	TEXT	REPS
22 Jun	22 Jun	CHAPT V	BNE
		CHATP V	REPS
	25 Jun	TEXT	REPS
	26 Jun	TEXT	REPS
27 Jun	27 Jun	TEXT	REPS
27 Jun		S&C	BNE
28 Jun		TEXT	USIB (w/o S&C)
		PARAS/WORK-SHEET	
29 Jun	28 Jun	S&C	BNE
30 Jun	29 Jun	S&C	REPS
2-Jul		S&C	USIB
2 Jul		PC	BNE
		PC	REPS
3 Jul	3 Jul	CLEANUP	REPS
4 Jul		PC	USIB
		REVISED PAGES	USIB
6 Jul	5 Jul	TEXT, SC	USIB
6 Jul	6 Jul	TEXT, S&C	USIB
6 Jul		FINAL S&C	
		FINAL TEXT	
		FINAL TOP	
9 Jul		SECRET VERSION	
		BRIEFING NOTES NSC/STOERTZ	

~~SECRET~~

[]
CAG:kjl

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~


DOCUMENT
DATE (1962)

MEETING
DATE (1962)

TYPE OF
DRAFT

FOR SUBMISSION
TO

11 Jul	10 Jul	MEMO FOR RECORD IMPL IMPL IMPL	NSC BRIEFING
12 Jul			NSC BRIEFING
16 Jul	16 Jul		STAFF
16 Jul			BNE
			DRAFT FOR
			R.L. GARTHOFF



53
17 Jul
18 Jul

18 Jul

IMPL
~~TOP SECRET~~
VERSION
~~TOP SECRET~~
VERSION
~~TOP SECRET~~
VERSION

BNE b3 per CIA

19 Jul

19 Jul

19 Jul

IMPL
FOLLOW UP
ACTIONS
IMPL

BNE & REPS

USIB
MEMO FOR []

20 Jul

REPS
MEMO FOR []

b3 per CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS:mpc

b3
b7E

Following an analysis of the BALDWIN news article in question, [REDACTED] Deputy Director of Security, CIA, on July 27, 1962, stated that he considers the BALDWIN article of July 26, 1962, to be an unauthorized disclosure of classified information and that a portion of the article appears to be based on information [from NIE 11-8-62]. According to [REDACTED] principal disclosures in the BALDWIN article pertain to intelligence information not previously known to have been made available to the public. These disclosures, according to [REDACTED] reveal certain U. S. intelligence successes, the U. S. estimate of Soviet capabilities based on such intelligence successes and U. S. reliance on such an estimate.

~~s-3~~ (U)
b3 per CIA

[REDACTED] stated further that an analysis of the article tends to indicate that the person or persons who briefed or discussed the information with BALDWIN had broad knowledge of both U. S. military capabilities and the intelligence material utilized in the preparation [of NIE 11-8-62]. [REDACTED] observed that the BALDWIN article does not appear to him to be a compilation of isolated pieces of information obtained from technical personnel with limited knowledge. [REDACTED] observed further that the phraseology of the BALDWIN article points to the probability that BALDWIN received a general, non-technical briefing or review of the conclusions reached [in NIE 11-8-62] and their implications.

~~s-3~~ (U)
b3 per CIA

(U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(HJM:ctw)

b3
b7E

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

(U) On July 27, 1962, [REDACTED] advised he was charged with the responsibility for the dissemination of NIE 11-8-62. He explained that an advance copy of the document, dated July 6, 1962, containing a summary and conclusions was disseminated by his organization on July 10, 1962, and recalled within two hours at the instruction of the President. There were one hundred and forty copies printed and seventy-one were distributed. All seventy-one copies were returned to his office. b3 per CIA

Limited dissemination was again made of the above-dated document, at Presidential instruction, on July 11, 1962, at which time, thirty-eight copies were delivered by [REDACTED] office.

The final or "all sources version" of the document, dated July 16, 1962, was disseminated by [REDACTED] office on July 17, 1962, with fifty-four copies being delivered. b3 per CIA

From his records, [REDACTED] furnished the following distribution of the above documents:

(U) [NIE 11-8-62, dated July 6, 1962, distributed July 10, 1962]

COPY NUMBER

RECIPIENT

- | | |
|-----|--|
| 1. | President |
| 2. | Special Assistant to the President |
| 3. | Brigadier General CLIFTON |
| 4. | Deputy Special Assistant to the President KAYSEN |
| 5. | Office of Naval Aide to President |
| 6. | Vice-President |
| 7. | Special Adviser to the President |
| | WIESNER |
| 8. | General TAYLOR |
| 9. | Board of Consultants - COYNE |
| 10. | Secretary of Treasury |

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
(HJM:ctw)

COPY NUMBER

RECIPIENT

11.	Director, Bureau of Budget
12.	WILLIAM C. FOSTER, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
13.	Secretary of State
14.	Secretary of Defense
15.	Director, National Indications Center
16.	Director, Central Intelligence
17.	Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
18.	Executive Director, Central Intelligence
19.	Assistant for Coordination, Central Intelligence
20.	Inspector General, Central Intelligence
21.	General Counsel, Central Intelligence
22.	Deputy Director, Research, CIA
23.	Deputy Director, Security, CIA
24 - 26.	Deputy Director, Intelligence, CIA
27.	Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence, CIA
28.	Comptroller, CIA
29.	Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
30 - 36.	Office of Research and Reports, CIA
37 - 42.	Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA
43 - 44.	Office of Current Intelligence, CIA
45.	Deputy Director, Plans, CIA
46 - 51.	Office of National Estimates, CIA
52.	Director, National Security Agency
53.	Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
54.	Director, FBI
55 - 56.	Director, Intelligence and Research, State Department
57 - 58.	Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Army

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(HJM:ctw)

b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

COPY NUMBER

RECIPIENT

59 - 60.	Office of Naval Intelligence
61 - 64.	Air Force
65.	Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
66.	Defense Department (International Security Affairs)
67.	Director, Defense Research and Engineering
68 - 70.	Strategic Air Command
71.	Office of Director, CIA
72 - 100.	NPIC Files
101 - 140.	Director, Central Intelligence

(U) [NIE 11-8-62, dated July 6, 1962, ~~SECRET~~
distributed July 11, 1962]

1.	President
2.	Vice-President
3.	MC GEORGE BUNDY
4.	Secretary of Treasury
5.	Director, Bureau of Budget
6.	Secretary of State
7 - 8.	Director, Intelligence and Research, State Department
9.	Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, State Department
10.	Director, CIA
11.	Secretary of Defense
12.	Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
13 - 14.	Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence
15 - 16.	Office of Naval Intelligence
17 - 18.	Air Force
19 - 21.	Defense Intelligence Agency
22.	Director, National Security Agency
23.	Director, FBI
24.	Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
25.	Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
26.	Executive Director, Central Intelligence
27.	Deputy Director, Plans, CIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(HJM:ctw)

b3
b7E

COPY NUMBER

RECIPIENT

28.	Deputy Director, Research, CIA
29.	Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA
30 - 31.	Office of National Estimates, CIA
32 - 33.	Office of Research and Reports, CIA
34 - 35.	Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA
36.	Office of National Estimates, CIA
37.	National Indications Center, CIA
38.	Director, NPIC

(U) [NIE 11-8-62, dated July 16, 1962, ~~SECRET~~
distributed July 17, 1962]

1.	President
2.	Vice-President
3.	MC GEORGE BUNDY
4.	Secretary of Treasury
5.	Director, Bureau of Budget
6.	Secretary of State
7 - 8.	Director, Intelligence and Research, State Department
9.	Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, State Department
10.	Director, CIA
11.	Secretary of Defense
12.	Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
13 - 14.	Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence
15 - 16.	Office of Naval Intelligence
17 - 18.	Air Force
19 - 20.	Strategic Air Command
21.	Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
22.	Director, National Security Agency
23.	Director, FBI
24.	Director for Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
25.	Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
26.	Executive Director, Central Intelligence
27.	Deputy Director, Plans, CIA
28.	Dr. SCOVILLE, CIA

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
(HJM:ctw)

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NUMBER

RECIPIENT

29.	Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA
30 - 31.	Office of National Estimates, CIA
32 - 33.	Office of Research and Reports, CIA
34 - 35.	Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA
36.	Dr. SMITH, CIA
37.	National Indications Center, CIA
38.	Office of the Director, Central Intelligence
39 - 40.	Strategic Air Command
41 - 50.	Office of National Estimates, CIA
51.	General LEMNITZER
52.	Major General COLLINS
53.	Commanding General (CONAD)
54.	NPIC

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW/pcn

The following biographic and descriptive information concerning HANSON BALDWIN was obtained from the records of the Accreditation and Travel Section, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and from the 1962-1963 edition of "Who's Who In America".

~~TOP SECRET~~

Name: HANSON WEIGHTMAN BALDWIN
Birth data: Born March 22, 1903, at
Baltimore, Maryland
Sex: Male
Race: White
Height: 6'2"
Weight: 170 pounds
Hair: Grey-brown
Eyes: Grey-green
Build: Slender
Marital status: Married
Wife: [REDACTED]

Children:

[REDACTED]

Parents:

Father - OLIVER P. BALDWIN
deceased
Mother - CAROLINE F. BALDWIN
deceased

b6
b7C

Sister:

[REDACTED]

Parents-in-law:

ELIZABETH BALDWIN (deceased)
WILLIAM BRUCE (deceased)

Address:

Mrs. WILLIAM BRUCE
905 East High Street
Springfield, Ohio
Morton Place
Chappaqua, New York

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Education:

U. S. Naval Academy
Class of 1924

Military service:

U. S. Navy, 1920 - 1927;
Resigned 1927 with rank
of Lieutenant (jg)

Employment:

1928-1929
Reporter, "Baltimore Sun"
Baltimore, Maryland

1929 to date
"The New York Times"
New York City

Organizations:

U. S. Naval Institute
Annapolis, Maryland

National Press Club
Washington, D. C.

U. S. Military Institute
Washington, D. C.

Society of American Historians
Princeton, New Jersey

Silurians (press organization)
New York City

U. S. Naval Academy Alumni
Association, Annapolis,
Maryland

Eberstadt Task Force on the
National Security
Washington, D. C.
(1948-1949)

Organization of the Hoover
Commission, Washington, D. C.
(1948-1949)

Pulitzer Prize 1942

Author:

Men and Ships of Steel, 1935
(with W. F. PALMER)

The Caissons Roll - A Military
Survey of Europe, 1938

Admiral Death, 1939

What the Citizen Should Know
About the Navy, 1941

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Author:
(Cont'd)

United We Stand, 1941
Strategy for Victory, 1942
The Price of Power, 1948
Great Mistakes of the War,
1950
Sea Fights and Shipwrecks,
1955
The Great Arms Race, 1958

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RBL:mdc

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED] Bureau of Personnel, United States Navy, made available on August 2, 1962, the 1962 edition of the "Register of Alumni" published by the United States Naval Academy Alumni Association, Incorporated, Annapolis, Maryland, which reflects that of the 523 graduates of the Naval Academy Class of 1924, nine officers are presently on active Naval duty. A review of the records of the Officer Locator, Bureau of Personnel, by [REDACTED] confirmed the active duty status of the following officers:

b6
b7C

BERNARD LIGE ~~AUSTIN~~, Vice Admiral, date of birth December 15, 1902, in South Carolina, presently serving as Commandant, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

WALLACE MORRIS ~~BEAKLEY~~, Vice Admiral, date of birth January 20, 1903, in New Jersey, presently assigned to the Atlantic Fleet Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia

ROBERT LORD ~~CAMPBELL~~, JR., Rear Admiral, date of birth September 12, 1903, in Michigan, presently serving as Deputy Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, U. S. Naval Command, APO 128, New York, New York (Europe)

CLARENCE EUGENE ~~EKSTROM~~, Vice Admiral, date of birth February 10, 1902, in Wisconsin, presently assigned as Commander, Naval Air Pacific, Naval Air Station, North Island, San Diego, California.

ROBERT (no middle initial) ~~GOLDTHWAITE~~, Vice Admiral, date of birth September 20, 1903, in Alabama, presently assigned as Commander, Western Sea Frontier, and Commander Pacific Reserve Fleet, Treasure Island, San Francisco, California.

RUFUS EDWARD ~~ROSE~~, JR., Rear Admiral, date of birth July 10, 1903, in Florida, presently assigned as Commandant, Industrial College of Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

HAROLD PAGE SMITH, Vice Admiral, date of birth February 11, 1904, in Alabama, assigned as Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe, EPO 100, New York, New York.

GEORGE CROSBY TOWNER, Rear Admiral, date of birth March 19, 1901, in Montana, presently assigned as Commandant, 13th Naval District, Seattle, Washington.

ELMER EUGENE YEOMANS, Rear Admiral, date of birth May 17, 1902, in Indiana, assigned as Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Japan, EPO, San Francisco, California. Admiral YEOMANS will be assigned as of October, 1962, as Commandant, 12th Naval District, San Francisco, California.

The "Register of Alumni", previously described, also lists with the Naval Academy graduating class of 1924 HANSON WEIGHTMAN BALDWIN, date of birth March 22, 1903, in Maryland. BALDWIN's present employment was noted as "The New York Times", 229 West 43rd Street, New York 36, New York, and his residence as 39 Morton Place, Chappaqua, New York. BALDWIN's Naval service was listed as being terminated November 5, 1927, when he resigned holding the rank of Lieutenant.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

WDD/DVL;ald:rps

HANSON W. BALDWIN
39 MORTON PLACE
CHAPPAQUA, NEW YORK

On July 30, 1962, at 6:58 p.m., HANSON W. BALDWIN was approached at his home for the purpose of interviewing him in connection with an article containing his by-line which appeared in "The New York Times" of July 26, 1962. Mr. BALDWIN came to the door and when the Agents identified themselves, he told them that he had just arrived home, was about to have his dinner and could not receive them at that time.

He was asked if the Agents could interview him following his dinner. BALDWIN said no and told the Agents that he resented "this kind of approach"; was at his office all day and thought they should have the courtesy to have made an appointment with him. He declined to be interviewed at that time, but suggested that he would be available at his office on the following day at 10:30 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RCB/HJM:mdc/kjl

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WASHINGTON OFFICE
"THE NEW YORK TIMES"
2700 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N. W.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] Washington Office,
"The New York Times", residence [REDACTED]
was interviewed from 6:45 p.m. till 7:20 p.m., July 30, 1962.
She stated that BALDWIN arrived in Washington, D.C., on Monday,
July 16 and remained until the evening of Thursday, July 19,
1962. The first information she had regarding his visit was
on the Thursday preceding his arrival, at which time the
[REDACTED] of BALDWIN in New York City, [REDACTED] called from
New York requesting that she make appointments with nine
individuals in Washington, D.C. She was to advise these
individuals that the purpose of BALDWIN's contacts was with
regard to current defense matters. BALDWIN stayed at the
Jefferson Hotel, Washington, D.C., where he normally stays,
during his current visit. She believed BALDWIN arrived in
Washington sometime around noon on July 16, 1962. No appoint-
ments for him on that date were known to [REDACTED] She
attempted either prior to the arrival of BALDWIN or following
his arrival to arrange appointments with the following
individuals: Mr. JOHN A. MC CONE, Director, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA); Mr. ROBERT S. MC NAMARA, Secretary
of Defense; Mr. (FNU) ANDERSON, Navy; and Mr. ROSWELL L.
GILPATRICK, Deputy Secretary of Defense. She felt that
possibly an appointment was made with General J. L. L.
LEMNITZER, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. [REDACTED] could
not recall the identities of other individuals with whom
she made appointments for BALDWIN. She recalled, however, that
she had contacted the following persons in order to set up
appointments: Lieutenant [REDACTED] (Phonetic), Navy; Commander
[REDACTED] Navy; Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] Army, or someone
in [REDACTED] office; [REDACTED] office
of ARTHUR SYLVESTER, Assistant Secretary of Defense, for the
appointment with Mr. MC NAMARA.

Through past experience, [REDACTED] stated that with
the exception of CIA, generally all appointments for BALDWIN
are made with individuals at the Pentagon. She stated that
an appointment at the State Department would be an exception
and could recall only one instance when an attempt was made
for an appointment which was not during the most

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[] recent BALDWIN visit. This attempt was unsuccessful since the person, name unrecalled, was out of the country.

[] stated that BALDWIN had "a couple" of luncheon dates while visiting Washington, D. C.; however, she did not know with whom he met nor the dates. She believed these engagements were set up by [] from New York.

b6
b7C

She stated BALDWIN deals mainly with persons of Secretary stature but felt that he must have "back door" contacts. She stated his visits to Washington, D. C., were at three or four month intervals and the pattern of appointments is the same for each visit. She has never made appointments for BALDWIN with press information officers at any Government agency. She stated that she had not seen the article in question at the time of publication but, from a cursory perusal, felt that he possibly could have gotten the data from a "back door" contact. She stated no one else in Washington, D. C., to her knowledge, makes appointments for BALDWIN other than herself. She pointed out that she did not have personal contact with BALDWIN on his most recent visit, however, she did converse with him several times by telephone.

[] was requested to furnish the identities of any contacts BALDWIN has in Washington, D. C., below the Secretary and general officer level. She stated that she knew of none. When furnishing from memory the above appointments made by her, she related that she kept in her office an exact list of appointments made for BALDWIN on each visit. She stated she would make this list available to the FBI. Upon further reflection, she felt that she should advise her superiors that she had been interviewed and that she had offered to make the material available. [] was advised that there would be no objection to this. She observed that JACK RAYMOND has the Pentagon beat for "The New York Times" but that ordinarily he handles matters of a different nature than those handled by BALDWIN.

b6
b7C

[] also recalled that BALDWIN indicated his daughter in New York City was seriously ill and that he was greatly concerned with her welfare. BALDWIN contacted his home probably on Wednesday, July 18, 1962, to determine the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted]
condition of her health and was reassured that some improvement had been noted. Accordingly, BALDWIN decided to remain in Washington an additional day.

[redacted] has not contacted the Washington Field Office to furnish the identities of additional individuals with whom she attempted to make appointments for BALDWIN, and no efforts have been made to contact [redacted] since the above occasion.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

X

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

[WF T-1]^{8u} learned that on the evening of July 30, 1962, [REDACTED] Washington, D. C. Office of "The New York Times," contacted WALLACE CARROLL of the Washington Office of "The New York Times." [REDACTED] advised CARROLL that she had a visit from two FBI men. She advised CARROLL that the FBI was trying to determine who furnished BALDWIN the information for his column and that "apparently the Attorney General took exception to one of his columns." She also told CARROLL that she had informed the FBI about some of BALDWIN's appointments made by her. CARROLL, according to the informant, told [REDACTED] "Don't give them any more." CARROLL also advised [REDACTED] to do nothing more until July 31, 1962, and indicated that he might call the Attorney General.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RCB:mdc

b3
b7E

On the evening of July 30, 1962, WF T-2 learned that JAMES B. RESTON of the Washington Office of "The New York Times" was in contact with HANSON W. BALDWIN. They each indicated they were "mad" about the interviews with [redacted] Washington Office of "The New York Times" and BALDWIN in New York City. RESTON pointed out that [redacted] had been contacted at her home by an FBI man who had properly identified himself and who had asked whom BALDWIN had seen in Washington, D. C. BALDWIN stated that two FBI men had called at his home during the evening of July 30 and he had refused to see them saying that he would see them at his office. RESTON remarked that it was an "outrage and we ought to print the whole thing." BALDWIN agreed and suggested that RESTON tell "ORVILLE" (possibly ORVILLE E. DRYFOOS, the publisher of "The New York Times") (S) u

b6
b7C

BALDWIN remarked, "This is going very far in this administration. I think it is extremely dangerous." RESTON replied, "There is a strange feeling in Congress that a dossier is being kept on all these people. Probably a great deal comes out of their imagination and guilty conscience but there is this suspicion that this kind of tactic is being used." BALDWIN agreed that "this" is a new and different tactic "similar to what happened with reporters in the middle of the night at the time of the steel price rise." BALDWIN also said, "I think the real answer to this is BOBBY KENNEDY and the President himself, but BOBBY KENNEDY particularly putting pressure on HOOVER." (S) u

BALDWIN said that the "Iron Curtain around the Pentagon" is just as pronounced as in other places and he stated that he had always been most discreet about the military in protecting sources. He also pointed out that he had held back on certain things "as in the August project and then they went ahead and printed it. I resent this kind of pressure." RESTON commented at this point, "I resent that these guys had enough guts to come knock on your door, but what is really sneaky is calling up a poor. . . ." BALDWIN interrupted at this point to say he hoped RESTON had apologized to her (apparently [redacted] for him, and then said, "She simply told them that I saw everybody, didn't she?" RESTON said that was correct. (S) u

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HJM:mhc/rps

b3
b7E

RESTON commented, "When they begin to do this thing in Washington, it becomes a question of whether we are going to report the news or not." BALDWIN pointed out, "When I reported that KENNEDY ordered the FBI into the Pentagon before the Berlin crisis, KENNEDY became angry, and then there was a story [REDACTED] wrote in 'Newsweek' about various solutions for the Berlin crisis and KENNEDY blew his top. They actually went to [REDACTED] and did some of these crummy intimidating tactics." (In this instance BALDWIN probably was referring to an investigation conducted in 1961 in the matter entitled, "Unknown Subject; Leak of Classified Information Appearing in the July 3, 1961, 'Newsweek' Magazine Article Captioned 'Pentagon Plan.'") *(S) u*

b6
b7C

RESTON told BALDWIN, "All it takes to deal with KENNEDY who essentially is a politician and not a cop is for us to print the news. This is more damaging to him than the information he would gain by talking to everybody you saw." RESTON also commented, "If we print a story of what's going on down here, I don't propose to take it up as a policy matter. I propose, if you agree, after we know what more is back of all this, merely to file a story, then if they want to take the responsibility of killing it, we'll know where we are." *(S) u*

WF T-2 learned that on the evening of August 8, 1962, HANSON W. BALDWIN was contacted by a person believed to be ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, President and Publisher of "The New York Times." DRYFOOS advised BALDWIN that "they" received "the FBI part of it" (possibly referring to our investigation in this matter) and DRYFOOS expected to receive a personal letter from the President together with "a document telling the who, the what, the why, evidently the background" although "this man hasn't called for an appointment." DRYFOOS did not know when the man was "coming up" although the man's secretary had called and DRYFOOS had called back. (Later DRYFOOS indicated to BALDWIN "the Naval Attache" would deliver the document.) *(S) u*

BALDWIN inquired of DRYFOOS, "You saw the UP story today? Well, DREW PEARSON had something in his column" (inaudible). "Apparently they queried ARTHUR SYLVESTER in the Pentagon on it." *(S) u*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

There was a UP story as a result. It simply said that ARTHUR SYLVESTER had no comment on this. They brought in also RICHARD FRYKLUND of the Washington 'Star.' The PEARSON story said in effect the FBI was following, gumshoeing after reporters and so on. And then it went on to mention specifically the Military Editor of 'The New York Times' without specifying the story. ~~(S)~~ U

When DRYFOOS asked if that was what PEARSON had said BALDWIN answered, "That's what PEARSON said and ARTHUR SYLVESTER was asked about this by the President. And he said he had no comment on whether or not the FBI was looking into any story written by me but he denied that MC NAMARA" (probably Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. MC NAMARA) "had ever ordered the FBI to follow or investigate any newspaperman and then he further said--this is amusing, it indicates the state of mind of the reporters in the Pentagon--he said he denied that the press room telephones in the Pentagon were tapped. Then he went on to mention RICHARD FRYKLUND--he's the Washington 'Evening Star'. FRYKLUND some weeks ago had an exclusive story which he had discussed with Mr. MC NAMARA. I had heard this before from FRYKLUND. And Mr. MC NAMARA apparently had told him not to use it. He didn't use it. Mr. MC NAMARA then went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and" (inaudible) "them to find out where FRYKLUND had gotten it. Of course it irked FRYKLUND quite a lot. And Sylvester mentioned this" (inaudible) "That was the gist of the story. ~~(S)~~ U

"I would like to point out that the President has done this same thing before. He sent General TAYLOR to see Mr. LUCE, HARRY LUCE, after the Cuban invasion and complaining about the story that 'Fortune' magazine carried by MURPHY. The President denounced this story at a press conference and very unwisely, I think, sent General TAYLOR to see Mr. LUCE. And Mr. LUCE did have MURPHY and also HEADLEY DONOVAN, the Managing Editor of 'Fortune,' in at the time TAYLOR came and TAYLOR made some nine" (inaudible) "specifications of what he alleged were errors. And both DONOVAN and MURPHY refuted ~~(S)~~ U

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

them. At least that's the story I get. TAYLOR at the end said let's forget it. He was ordered to do the job. I don't think TAYLOR would have undertaken this unless he was ordered. Mr. LUCE was alleged to have said that we won't forget it because the President called us a liar in public or words to that effect. But this sort of thing has been done before. I think the great danger here, ORV, and I think it's something you're very conscious of because we talked about it the other day, because the President may attempt to tie your hands completely, not only for now but for the future. And I think this can be a great danger. So I think that all you can do is play it by ear. (S) u

DRYFOOS advised BALDWIN that "they have a complete report on the incident" indicating "what the facts are." BALDWIN then asked, "They don't allege to have said who said what to me?" In reply DRYFOOS advised, "I haven't seen it, I don't know. That's the kind of thing that after I see, I won't be able to discuss afterward." BALDWIN said, "The point of the thing that I think you ought better be wary of, because I think this involves the paper. It seems to me that is the sort of thing that you shouldn't let yourself be tied up on, if I just may offer that suggestion. I think that if it's a question of secret sources, I mean by that information we may be getting from Russia, or ways of getting it, that's another thing altogether." (S) u

DRYFOOS commented that he could not be "bound" by the document and he would not be able to discuss it. He also said that if it was a personal document from the President he would look at it and give it back to "the Naval Attache." BALDWIN commented that he understood. BALDWIN also stated that "you have to be pretty careful what you say to the Naval Attache and to the President afterwards." BALDWIN also commented, "We're all on the same team. What I mean is that we're all as interested in America as he is or is anyone else." When DRYFOOS stated he would take the responsibility BALDWIN indicated he did not want DRYFOOS to do so and he would be "glad" to share the responsibility with him. (S) u

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED] X

BALDWIN inquired if DRYFOOS had received "that letter I sent you from the young chap in the National Guard Bureau. Because this is the sort of thing that I think is deplorable. The Administration is going to suffer for this because you cannot win loyalty that way." DRYFOOS indicated he had to "stick with this particular episode." (By "the young chap" BALDWIN was possibly referring to [REDACTED])

b6 per NGB

[REDACTED] National Guard Bureau, Department of the Army, mentioned elsewhere in this report. (S) u

DRYFOOS and BALDWIN agreed they were "talking blind" and DRYFOOS commented, "Maybe I can talk less blind after I get this thing." BALDWIN then remarked, "Well, it seems clear that when the President brings up a subject like this, you obviously have to acknowledge it and be polite. There is another point of view to it that the methods employed can never be forgotten and I think this is vital for a free press. And it's vital for any sense of loyalty for the people who are wearing the uniform. This has happened twice now in the Pentagon. It's created a terrific amount of distress. And it naturally would." (S) u

BALDWIN also told DRYFOOS that if "they can spell this out at all you can say that you know nothing of what the source is." To which DRYFOOS commented, "Well, that's why I'm delighted I don't." BALDWIN replied, "And you must so report and this is a safeguard of the press and it always has been. That you don't intend to violate it. I think you have to make that point." (S) u

BALDWIN stated, "I would like to get at the background of this. I didn't see SCOTTY" (probably JAMES RESTON of the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times") "I wish I had seen him personally, but when SCOTTY talked to you, apparently he gave you the impression before. I don't know whether he did this time. One of the chief worries of the Administration was the fact that the right hand didn't know what the left hand was doing." DRYFOOS pointed out that BALDWIN's statement was correct and "there is no question about it." To which BALDWIN replied, "Well then, if this is true, then it seems to me this" (S) u

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[] X

is something you had better take up very strongly." DRYFOOS stated, "That goes beyond this episode. I'm involving myself in a governmental function and this is a game I don't want to play." (S) u

BALDWIN replied, "Well, perhaps not but on the other hand I think you want to make the strong point that the press can't be bound by the fact the Government is embarrassed. After all, you're talking to a Naval Attache here. I don't think you have to say anything to him and I wouldn't." When DRYFOOS pointed out that the "Naval Attache" was acting as a messenger BALDWIN said, "I know, but he's bringing a letter, and I personally think your letter ought to be back to the President after he's left. The less you say to the Naval Attache, the better. That's my feeling. I don't know." (S) u

BALDWIN expressed his sorrow for giving DRYFOOS "bad dreams" but DRYFOOS stated that "if there was a violation it's their violation." BALDWIN doubted this and said he thought that "they may be making a big show about how wrong the 'Times' was." DRYFOOS did not "think they'll be saying anything to anybody on the outside" and BALDWIN indicated he did not mean "on the outside" but rather "in the letter to you." When DRYFOOS pronounced, "We're only wrong if they're wrong too," BALDWIN stated, "I don't think we're wrong either. I don't see that the 'Times' has any great responsibility for this. I think that they are really trying to put the blame where it doesn't belong. This isn't the first time. And it's pretty notorious around the Pentagon especially on the working press. I think that all the sympathy probably would be on our side of the fence. The fact they were so chary about having anything in print indicates this." (S) u

In addition to the above, WF T-2 learned that on August 9, 1962, BALDWIN contacted his wife during the late afternoon and stated that there was "no sweat" and everything would be all right. (S) u

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
JRF:mpc

b3
b7E

STAFF SERGEANT [REDACTED]
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
663 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

On July 30, 1962, Sergeant [REDACTED] advised that in the absence of Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] and Captain [REDACTED] who were unavailable, he received a telephone call from [REDACTED] Staff Researcher for HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of "The New York Times."

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] read the following statement to [REDACTED]
"In these installations, missiles, not yet ready for launching, lie horizontally in a large concrete box flush with or slightly above. Is this true?"

[REDACTED] stated that he answered the question in the affirmative. In reading this excerpt, it was [REDACTED] impression that [REDACTED] was referring to American missile sites in that he gave [REDACTED] no indication to the contrary.

[REDACTED] stated that shortly after this conversation, he advised his superiors, Colonel [REDACTED] and Captain [REDACTED]

42
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
WDD:HC/rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

On August 4, 1962, [REDACTED] was interviewed at 5:00 p.m. at his summer cottage at [REDACTED]. He said he has been [REDACTED] for the last twenty years.

He said he did not know HANSON W. BALDWIN's sources with respect to the column written by BALDWIN which appeared on the first page of "The New York Times" on July 26, 1962. He said in response to the question, "Do you in fact know the sources but decline to furnish them?" that historically a newspaperman protects his sources of information. Again pressed for an answer to the question quoted, [REDACTED] said he would decline to answer the question.

He declined to identify anyone whom he knew who might know BALDWIN's sources.

He said that he had set up some appointments for BALDWIN prior to BALDWIN's trip to Washington, D. C., on July 16, 1962. Some were made directly with the person involved, others indirectly through others. He declined to identify those with whom appointments were made directly or otherwise.

He stated that BALDWIN was not called to Washington, D. C., prior to his trip there, and he received no special call to come to develop the story which appeared on July 26, 1962, over BALDWIN's name. He declined to say whether any portion of the article was prepared before or after BALDWIN's visit to Washington.

He declined to say when it was written.

He said that to appear in the paper on July 26, 1962, it would have to be ready by 8:30 p.m. on July 25, 1962, and perhaps earlier.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]
WDD:HC/rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted] said he did not write the article or any portion of it. BALDWIN writes all his own material.

When [redacted] writes, he writes in his own name.

He did say he did some editing of the article. In reading the article to refresh his recollection, [redacted] stated that it was all public knowledge and considers this type article a real public service.

b6
b7C

[redacted] In reading over paragraph four of the article commented: "That's very carefully worded--very general."

He was asked whether he knew if any portion of the material contained classified information. He said he did not.

He said BALDWIN and he had no discussion concerning the article as to care in its preparation due to the nature of the material in it, nor was there any suggestion by BALDWIN that it might contain classified information. He said there were no questions about it by any other member of the "Times" staff.

He was asked if in all instances he is equally knowledgeable with BALDWIN as to the sources, background and development of a story such as the one in question. He said not necessarily.

He said he had not been in touch with BALDWIN since the article appeared, and he had not contacted BALDWIN.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
JFR:mpc

b3
b7E

LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED]
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
663 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

~~TOP SECRET~~

Colonel [REDACTED] advised on July 30, 1962, that one of the primary functions of the Office of Information Services is to provide United States Air Force Information to communications media.

b6
b7C

On July 24 or 25, 1962, Staff Sergeant [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that he received a telephone call from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of "The New York Times." [REDACTED] inquiry concerned accuracy of a phrase pertaining to the semi-hardened or hardened state of missile emplacements. According to [REDACTED] answered [REDACTED] that the excerpt from a proposed story was accurate and the conversation was terminated.

[REDACTED] stated that it was [REDACTED] impression that [REDACTED] inquiry referred to the United States missile sites, although [REDACTED] had not specified when talking with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] added that it is the usual practice when an inquiry comes into his office that the inquiry is usually handled by himself or Captain [REDACTED] United States Air Force, but neither he nor Captain [REDACTED] was available when [REDACTED] called.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] added that when [REDACTED] advised him of [REDACTED] call, it surprised him that [REDACTED] had made such an inquiry in that [REDACTED] thought that [REDACTED] should have known the military terminology concerning missile emplacements.

[REDACTED] also advised that all the information which the Office of Information Services has at its

45

~~SECRET~~

~~X~~ ~~X~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
JFR:mpc

b3
b7E

disposal for dissemination to the communications media .
is of an unclassified nature.

[REDACTED] also stated that [REDACTED] was acting
in line with his official duties in replying to [REDACTED]
inquiry.

b6
b7C


~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~






JFR:bjn

b3
b7E

CAPTAIN 
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
663 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

On July 30, 1962, Captain  advised that  for HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of "The New York Times" was a frequent caller at this office requesting Air Force information and that this information is provided, if available to the office.

b6
b7C

Captain  confirmed the information provided by Colonel  but could add no further information concerning  inquiry.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Investigation has identified the following contacts of HANSON W. BALDWIN at the time and dates indicated during his visit to Washington, D. C., July 16, 1962, through July 19, 1962.

<u>Monday</u> <u>July 16, 1962</u>	<u>Tuesday</u> <u>July 17, 1962</u>	<u>Wednesday</u> <u>July 18, 1962</u>	<u>Thursday</u> <u>July 19, 1962</u>
2:02 p.m., checked in at Jefferson Hotel	10:00 a.m. - 2:15 or 3:30 p.m., Army- Navy Club with Admirals	9:15 a.m. - 12:00 noon Military Library	9:07 a.m. BALDWIN checked out of Jefferson Hotel
3:01 p.m. - 3:42 p.m. Secretary of Navy KORTH, Pentagon	WRIGHT, FITZERALD, FLUCKEY, DYER Capt. [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	9:40 a.m. - 10:05 a.m. Lt. Genl. WILLIAM P. ENNIS
3:45 p.m. - 4:17 p.m. Vice Admiral CLAUDE V. RICKETTS	3:30 p.m. - 4:15 p.m. Deputy Secy. of Defense ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC	12:30 p.m. - 1:45 p.m. lunch at Sheraton- Carlton Hotel with Admirals JERAULD WRIGHT and W. R. SMEDBERG	10:50 a.m. - 11:15 a.m. Vice Admiral R. B. PIRIE
4:30 p.m. - 4:40 p.m. Major General C. G. DODGE, Pentagon	4:45 p.m. 5:25 p.m. Brig. Genl JERRY D. PAGE USAF	3:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m. Rear Admiral THOMAS H. MOORER	12:00 p.m. - 1:20 p.m. lunch at Army-Navy Club with Brig. Gen. J. D. HITTLE (ret.) and Asst. Secy. Defense NORMAN S. PAUL
		4:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m. Vice Admiral WILLIAM F. RABORN	2:30 p.m. - 3:00 p.m. Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON
		6:30 p.m. - 7:05 p.m. Lt. Gen. DAVID A. BURCHINAL at Jefferson Hotel	3:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m. Gen. BARKSDALE HAMLETT

b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E



Monday
July 16, 1962

Tuesday
July 17, 1962

Wednesday
July 18, 1962

Thursday
July 19, 1962

7:05 p.m. -
10:00 p.m.



dinner

5:00 p.m.
Secy. of
Defense
ROBERT S.
MC NAMARA

b6 per NGB

6:00 p.m.
General
LYMAN
LEMNITZER

8:00 p.m.
departed
Washington,
D.C., via
Northeast
Airlines
en route
New York City

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(HDP:ctw)

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
HOTEL JEFFERSON
1200 16th STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

b6
b7C

On July 30, 1962, [REDACTED] advised, from records of the Hotel Jefferson, that HANSON W. BALDWIN registered at 2:02 p.m., July 16, 1962, and checked out at 9:07 a.m., July 19, 1962. While at the hotel, BALDWIN was charged for five long-distance telephone calls and fourteen local telephone calls. According to [REDACTED] the numbers to which local telephone calls are made are not recorded.

The long-distance calls made by BALDWIN were recorded as follows:

July 17, 1962

Chappaqua, New York
CE 8-3781

New York City
CI 5-9388

New York City
TE 8-2710

Chappaqua, New York
CE 8-3481

July 18, 1962

New York City
CI 5-9388

With regard to the above telephone numbers, investigation in the New York City area has established the following:

New York telephone number CI 5-9388 is a semi-coin box telephone at the Roosevelt Hospital, 9th Avenue and 59th Street, New York City.

New York telephone number TE 8-2710 is listed to the offices of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(NDP:ctw)

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

CE 8-3781 is the telephone number of HANSON W. BALDWIN at his residence in Chappaqua, New York.

CE 8-3481 is listed to [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

With regard to the calls to CI 5-9388 and TE 8-2710, it is noted that WFT-2 advised on August 1, 1962, that [REDACTED] was hospitalized with a broken pelvis. (S) u

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

DMB:teb

FRED KORTH
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. KORTH was interviewed on August 4, 1962, at which time he stated that he saw BALDWIN in his office on July 16, 1962, for a visit of approximately twenty minutes. At the beginning of their visit, Mr. KORTH stated that he questioned BALDWIN at some length concerning his recent trip to Poland and this consumed approximately one-third of the time they spent together. The remainder of the time, according to Mr. KORTH, was spent discussing matters regarding to the U. S. Naval Academy, of which Mr. BALDWIN is a graduate and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Alumni Association. Mr. KORTH explained that recently he had taken action to strengthen the faculty of the Naval Academy by appointing additional civilian personnel. He stated that "The New York Times" had opposed this move editorially and that after some questioning, BALDWIN admitted he had written the editorial and they discussed their divergent views on this matter.

Mr. KORTH stated that during their conversation, there was no discussion whatsoever of intelligence matters and he has not seen BALDWIN since. He stated that since he assumed office as Secretary of the Navy, he has seen BALDWIN, to his recollection, three times, their last visit having preceded June 1, 1962. In answer to a specific question, Secretary KORTH advised that BALDWIN has at no time attempted to draw him out on intelligence matters. He stated that BALDWIN has the reputation of a person who can be trusted but he has not seen fit to place trust in him.

Mr. KORTH said that he had no definite idea as to the possible source of BALDWIN's information for the article of July 26, 1962, but is convinced that it did not come from the Navy Department. He stated that on a purely speculative basis, it occurred to him that this information could have originated from the Joint Chiefs of Staff where BALDWIN has many contacts.

Immediately after the above interview, a check was made of the visitors' log in Mr. KORTH's office which showed that BALDWIN was present from 3:01 PM to 3:42 PM on July 16, 1962.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

RMW:teb

ADMIRAL CLAUDE V. RICKETTS
VICE-CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES NAVY

Admiral RICKETTS advised on August 2, 1962, that he is ~~only casually~~ acquainted with BALDWIN and has been in BALDWIN's presence on four occasions only during the past two years.

Admiral RICKETTS stated he first met BALDWIN in the office of Admiral ARLEIGH BURKE, Former Chief of Naval Operations, about two years ago. He also saw BALDWIN during the Spring of 1962 when BALDWIN visited in RICKETTS's office. The conversation during this latter meeting was very general and not specifically recalled by Admiral RICKETTS. Admiral RICKETTS was again in the company of BALDWIN at the graduation exercises held at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, during June, 1962. Admiral RICKETTS indicated that BALDWIN was the moderator at a seminar conducted at the conclusion of the graduation exercises and was invited to a luncheon following the seminar by Admiral AUSTIN, the President of the Naval War College. Admiral RICKETTS also attended this luncheon.

Admiral RICKETTS stated he last saw BALDWIN on July 16, 1962. He said BALDWIN arrived in his office at 3:45 PM and departed at 4:17 PM. He said it was his understanding that BALDWIN, who was about fifteen minutes late for his appointment, had come directly from an interview with Mr. FRED KORTH, the Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral RICKETTS stated that one of the items BALDWIN discussed with him was a letter prepared by the Secretary of the Navy which proposed the replacement of certain military instructors at the Naval Academy with civilians. BALDWIN indicated to Admiral RICKETTS that he had discussed this matter with Mr. KORTH.

Admiral RICKETTS pointed out that BALDWIN seemed genuinely interested in this matter, inasmuch as BALDWIN is a member of the Naval Academy Alumni Association.

Admiral RICKETTS stated BALDWIN also attempted to discuss with him the pending assignment of a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral RICKETTS said he did not feel that BALDWIN had any advance information regarding this matter and he merely commented to BALDWIN that the Army probably would retain Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an additional two years since other services had held this position for a four-year

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:teb

b3
b7E

term in the past. BALDWIN also attempted to elicit information from Admiral RICKETTS regarding a proposed change in the Army Chief of Staff. ~~TOP SECRET~~

Admiral RICKETTS advised he furnished BALDWIN with no additional information regarding the above-mentioned matters.

Admiral RICKETTS continued that BALDWIN also discussed the Nike-Zeus Program and inquired why the Army was delaying the development of this successful weapon. Admiral RICKETTS replied that he was aware of no delay in the development of this weapon.

BALDWIN indicated it was his opinion that the first nation to obtain an effective anti-missile missile would gain a distinct psychological advantage. Admiral RICKETTS agreed with this statement.

BALDWIN also inquired of Admiral RICKETTS whether the Soviet Union has an anti-missile missile. Admiral RICKETTS told BALDWIN he had no information concerning this.

BALDWIN also discussed with Admiral RICKETTS the release of Naval Reserve units and the type of equipment which would be utilized by the Air National Guard. Admiral RICKETTS said he was not familiar with the operations of the Air National Guard and indicated certain Air and Naval Reserve units were being de-activated.

BALDWIN also inquired whether or not Admiral RICKETTS considered Naval personnel was adequate to man the nuclear-powered ships contemplated by the Navy of the future. Admiral RICKETTS informed BALDWIN he thought the Navy would be able to handle this problem as the situation arose.

Admiral RICKETTS stated that BALDWIN appeared primarily to be interested in the recent speech made at Ann Arbor, Michigan, by the Secretary of Defense, McNAMARA, which had to do with the desirability of striking military targets in the Soviet Union in the event of war, rather than cities. BALDWIN frequently returned to McNAMARA's address and, according to Admiral RICKETTS, this subject matter occupied most of their interview. Admiral RICKETTS said BALDWIN particularly desired to know if Secretary McNAMARA had issued any new policy or directive as a result of this speech. Admiral RICKETTS told BALDWIN that, to his knowledge, no new policy had been issued.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

RMW:teb

Admiral RICKETTS stated that BALDWIN did not ask any questions or make any references as to how the United States military would identify location of Soviet military targets.

Admiral RICKETTS also stated he is aware that during BALDWIN's recent visit to the Pentagon, that in addition to himself, and the Secretary of the Navy, BALDWIN contacted the following:

Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR.
Chief of Naval Operations

Vice-Admiral WILLIAM R. SMEDBERG
Chief of Naval Personnel

Vice-Admiral R. B. PIRIE
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)

Rear Admiral THOMAS H. MOORER
Office of Naval Operations

Admiral RICKETTS said he did not know if BALDWIN is personally acquainted with the above-mentioned individuals.

Admiral RICKETTS said he knows that Vice-Admiral RUFUS E. ROSE, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington, D. C., is a classmate of BALDWIN, but he does not know the degree of their association. Admiral RICKETTS does not know the identity of any other classmates of BALDWIN located in the Washington area.

Admiral RICKETTS said he does not know any of BALDWIN's associates and he has no information concerning any of BALDWIN's contacts.

(U) Admiral RICKETTS said he had never discussed the contents of NIE 11-8-62 or any material contained in this document with BALDWIN or any other unauthorized individual.

Admiral RICKETTS said he is not acquainted with the term, "image interpretation."

Admiral RICKETTS stated he was surprised and disturbed that BALDWIN would have the information contained in "The New York Times" article of July 26, 1962, and he has no idea how BALDWIN obtained this information.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

RMW:teb

~~TOP SECRET~~

Admiral RICKETTS said he could not see how any branch of the services or any individual could benefit from BALDWIN's article.

Admiral RICKETTS said it was his opinion the information in BALDWIN's article is so sensitive, particularly the point concerning the hardening of Soviet missile sites and the number of Soviet missiles, that it would not have been given to BALDWIN through an indiscreet remark by a knowledgeable person, but would have had to be a deliberate act.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

RMW:teb

MAJOR GENERAL C. G. DODGE
CHIEF OF INFORMATION
UNITED STATES ARMY

General DODGE advised on August 2, 1962, that he first recalls meeting HANSON BALDWIN during the Fall of 1961 in the office of GEORGE H. DECKER, Army Chief of Staff. General DODGE said this was shortly after he (DODGE) assumed his present position. General DODGE continued that he has seen BALDWIN infrequently since that time; inasmuch as BALDWIN (unlike most other reporters covering the Pentagon) does not use the Public Information Offices to arrange for Pentagon interviews.

General DODGE stated that on July 11, 1962, the Washington Bureau of "The New York Times" called the Office of the Secretary of the Army and stated that BALDWIN planned to be in Washington, D. C., in the near future and requested an appointment for Mr. BALDWIN with Mr. CYRUS R. VANCE, who recently was appointed Secretary of the Army. General DODGE said that "The New York Times" advised that BALDWIN would be in Washington from July 16 - 20, 1962, and planned to depart Washington at 3:00 PM on Friday, July 20, 1962. General DODGE said this inquiry was referred to his office since Mr. VANCE had directed that he desired no press interviews prior to mid-August, 1962, while he became orientated in his new position.

General DODGE advised that BALDWIN personally contacted him at his office at approximately 4:30 PM on July 16, 1962, and remained in General DODGE's office about ten minutes. At the outset of their conversation, General DODGE explained to Mr. BALDWIN the Secretary's decision regarding news interviews. General DODGE commented that Mr. BALDWIN accepted the decision without complaint.

General DODGE continued that Mr. BALDWIN attempted to discuss with him the Army's Nike-Zeus Missile Program and the ability of the Nike-Zeus Missile to distinguish between the actual missile and decoys. Mr. BALDWIN also inquired about the reassignment of senior Army officers. General DODGE furnished Mr. BALDWIN with no information concerning the above matters.

General DODGE stated he has never discussed any classified information with Mr. BALDWIN and he has no information regarding the source or sources of information for the BALDWIN article on July 26, 1962, or any other contacts or sources of information BALDWIN might have.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:teb

~~SECRET~~

X

b3
b7E

General DODGE stated he understood that Mr. BALDWIN had made an appointment sometime after July 16 to see General BARKSDALE HAMLETT, Vice-Chief of Staff, United States Army. He knew of no other appointments which BALDWIN had made.

General DODGE said that in the past he knew BALDWIN had made appointments with the former Secretary of the Army, Mr. ELVIS J. STAHR, JR., and with the former Vice-Chief of Staff, United States Army, General CLYDE D. EDDLEMAN, now retired.

General DODGE stated that he could furnish no information regarding the identity of any individuals who could have informed BALDWIN concerning the information contained in "The New York Times" article of July 26, 1962. General DODGE further stated that he personally is not familiar with the expression, "image interpretation" which BALDWIN used in the above-mentioned article.

X

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

ADMIRAL JERAULD WRIGHT, RETIRED
MEMBER, BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT, Retired, was interviewed August 1, 1962, at his office, Room [] Central Intelligence Agency Building.

b3 per CIA

Admiral WRIGHT advised he has known HANSON BALDWIN a great many years and has been associated with him since before and during World War II, when BALDWIN was a military correspondent. He mentioned he has had BALDWIN on Naval maneuvers when WRIGHT was a Commanding Officer in the United States Navy. He stated also that he and BALDWIN are closely associated in the Naval Academy Alumni Association in which he is President and BALDWIN is Chairman of the Publications Committee and in charge of publishing the Alumni Register and the Alumni Association magazine "Shipmate." Admiral WRIGHT stated he and BALDWIN communicate regularly by phone, and he sees BALDWIN every two or three months. Admiral WRIGHT mentioned he saw BALDWIN in May at Washington, D. C., and again between that time and his most recent visit during the week of July 15, 1962, when BALDWIN stayed in Washington, D. C., for some time, probably a week.

Admiral WRIGHT advised that he had luncheon engagements on two occasions with BALDWIN during his most recent visit to Washington. He was uncertain of the exact dates and advised his best estimate was that they occurred on Tuesday, July 17, 1962, and Thursday, July 19, 1962. He explained the first luncheon appointment was arranged from Annapolis by the Secretary of the Naval Academy Alumni Association for the purpose of discussing selection of an advertising representative for the association publications. This luncheon was held from about 12:00 to 1:30 p.m., at the Army-Navy Club and was attended by Admiral GEORGE C. DYER, Retired, and Admiral WILLIAM F. FITZGERALD, Retired, both of Annapolis and officers of the Naval Academy Alumni Association, and Mr. (FNU) COLLINS, who was the candidate under consideration. Admiral WRIGHT advised that nothing was discussed except the business referred to and at the conclusion of the luncheon he invited BALDWIN to have lunch with him on July 19, 1962, at the Carlton Hotel.

9/6

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]

X ~~SECRET~~

Admiral WRIGHT stated that in addition to the social aspects of renewing his contact with BALDWIN, the principal purpose of the second meeting was to discuss a letter which WRIGHT had prepared for the Secretary of the Navy based upon an editorial written by BALDWIN and published in "The New York Times" of June 6, 1962, captioned "Weakening the Naval Academy." At this luncheon, Admiral WILLIAM R. SMEDBERG, Chief of Personnel, Department of the Navy, was present. This luncheon lasted from approximately 1:00 to 1:45 p.m., and Admiral SMEDBERG departed shortly before BALDWIN and Admiral WRIGHT separated. Admiral WRIGHT recalled that when BALDWIN departed he said he was going to the Pentagon. He also stated that in connection with this discussion with BALDWIN of the letter he was preparing BALDWIN mentioned he had conferred with FRED KORTH, Secretary of the Navy, and the Times editorial written by BALDWIN was mentioned.

(U) Admiral WRIGHT advised that he is familiar with the [NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) 11-8-62] and ~~S-3~~ earlier drafts of that document which were prepared under the direction of a panel of which he is a member along with General EARL W. BARNES and General ROBERT DEWEY. He advised that no copies of this material were routed to him although he has access to this material and stated he had not briefed anyone or discussed any of the subject matter with anyone not specifically cleared for such information, nor with anyone on the outside. He stated specifically that (U) he had not discussed any phase of the [NIE] data with HANSON W. S-3 BALDWIN during the latter's recent visit to Washington nor on any prior occasion and stated positively that BALDWIN had not questioned him on this subject. Admiral WRIGHT had no comment to make to an observation that it appeared unusual despite BALDWIN's awareness that WRIGHT was a member of the National Board of Estimates that BALDWIN did not discuss or attempt to discuss the subject matter referred to above when it appeared that he was engaged in the preparation of an article of unusual news significance.

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

[]

Admiral WRIGHT reviewed the HANSON BALDWIN news article of July 26, 1962, and he believed that only two items appeared in the article which had not received publicity before, namely, the subject of "hardened" Soviet missile sites and the first successful Soviet missile launching from a submerged submarine. Admiral WRIGHT expressed the opinion that if BALDWIN were asked about the article he would say that he had prepared it from material obtained from public sources such as magazines and periodicals and indicated it was quite possible for a man of BALDWIN's background and knowledge to do this. In reply to a direct question, Admiral WRIGHT stated the conclusion should be reached, however, that the article in general was based on information received from someone who had knowledge of or access to the [National Intelligence Estimate]. ~~(S)~~ ~~(U)~~

(U) Admiral WRIGHT advised that the term "image interpretation" was a new term to him and one with which he had had no knowledge prior to preparation of the [National Intelligence Estimate]. He also observed in connection with BALDWIN's reference to intelligence data gathered by satellite photography and communications intelligence that these topics have been made subject matter of news articles before.

Admiral WRIGHT advised although he could not be specific he knows that BALDWIN has numerous contacts at the Departments of ~~Army~~ and Navy. He mentioned that the top officers of the Navy at this time are about his age bracket and some attended the Naval Academy at or about the same time as BALDWIN. In this connection, he mentioned Admiral R. B. PIRIE, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, and Vice Admiral JOHN SYLVESTER, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics, both of whom were two years junior to BALDWIN at the academy. He stated he believed that the top Naval officer, Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR., Chief of Naval Operations, and Rear Admiral V. L. LOWRANCE, Director of Naval Intelligence, were acquainted with BALDWIN although he was not positive. Admiral WRIGHT stressed the extensive experience and knowledge possessed by BALDWIN in his field and the high caliber of his contacts at the Pentagon. He

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

mentioned in passing that BALDWIN has an all service point of view, that he is not parochial in his approach to subjects, that he is objective, and would not slant an article in favor of a single service. In connection with the above, Admiral WRIGHT stated he did not think the article of July 26, 1962, was slanted and that no worthwhile clue could be deduced from the wording and contents.

Admiral WRIGHT mentioned that he is acquainted with ARTHUR KROCK, former Chief of the Washington Bureau of "The New York Times," but has not seen him for a couple of months, and also knows JAMES "SCOTTY" RESTON, Chief of the Washington Bureau but has not seen him for a year or so.

Upon reinterview on August 10, 1962, Admiral WRIGHT advised after reflection and reference to a small pocket notebook that he felt certain his two luncheon engagements with BALDWIN took place on Tuesday, July 17, 1962, and Thursday, July 19, 1962. WRIGHT explained that when he saw BALDWIN in Washington last May, BALDWIN proposed to arrange a meeting to consider a candidate for handling the advertising for the publications of the Naval Academy Alumni Association. WRIGHT learned by telephone from Admiral WILLIAM F. FITZGERALD, Secretary of the Alumni Association of the time of the meeting and met with a group at the Army-Navy Club at Noon on July 17, 1962. WRIGHT mentioned on this occasion there were present the following: Captain (FNU) WAKEMAN (Retired Navy Captain), editor of the alumni publication, "Shipmate"; Admiral FITZGERALD; and Admiral GEORGE DYER, in addition to BALDWIN.

WRIGHT advised the alumni group discussed Alumni Association matters for about one-half hour and then ate lunch. Thereafter, (FNU) COLLINS came in and discussion of his candidacy for the advertising position took place. Admiral WRIGHT said he now recalls that prior to the arrival of COLLINS, the group, including BALDWIN, discussed several topics of current general interest, including the successor to General L. L. LEMNITZER, the efficiency of the British Navy and the successor to LAURIS NORSTAD. As indicated previously, Admiral WRIGHT stated he left the luncheon early in order to attend a board meeting at CIA, at which there was discussion of a paper prepared by SHERMAN KENT concerning Eastern Europe, or possibly Berlin. WRIGHT stated before leaving the luncheon, he inquired of BALDWIN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
MAT:CTW

b3
b7E

how long he would be in town; and, upon learning BALDWIN would be in Washington all week, he invited BALDWIN to lunch later in the week. He said as he departed BALDWIN made a wise crack, asking whether the subject of his meeting was "missiles or Cuba." WRIGHT said he flung back the answer, "both to you."

Admiral WRIGHT advised he subsequently attempted to reach BALDWIN at the Hotel Jefferson and left word he would like to have lunch with BALDWIN on Thursday, July 19, 1962, at the Metropolitan Club. On a date which he believed was July 19, 1962, BALDWIN phoned him and said it would be impossible to have lunch with WRIGHT at the Metropolitan Club but he was having lunch with Admiral WILLIAM SMEDBERG at the Carlton Hotel and would like Admiral WRIGHT to join them, which he did. WRIGHT repeated that he had remained with BALDWIN for a few minutes after Admiral SMEDBERG departed and again mentioned that BALDWIN told him he was going to the Pentagon and in the opposite direction after WRIGHT offered to drive BALDWIN where he liked.

Admiral WRIGHT stated he did not know exactly when BALDWIN arrived in Washington, D.C., and had no idea whom BALDWIN saw on Monday, July 16, or where he went. He stated he was sure BALDWIN did not visit Annapolis, Maryland, during his trip to Washington and observed he had seen his alumni associates from Annapolis on July 17, 1962.

Admiral WRIGHT was queried concerning any top-ranking civilian contacts of BALDWIN in the agencies or departments interested in the subject matter of this case. He said he did not know whether BALDWIN was friendly with PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary of Defense; ROSWELL GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense; ROBERT AMORY, JR., Bureau of the Budget; or ROGER HILSMAN, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. WRIGHT said he presumed BALDWIN knows NITZE and GILPATRIC, particularly the former, who served in the Department of State as Liaison Officer with JCS during the TRUMAN Administration. He thought it less likely that HILSMAN would be acquainted with BALDWIN because of his position.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(MAT:ctw)

b3
b7E

[REDACTED] With reference to the statement of [REDACTED] that on July 17, 1962, BALDWIN advised he could not have dinner with [REDACTED] since he expected to see JERRY WRIGHT during the evening, WRIGHT stated that he had not seen BALDWIN on the evening of July 17, 1962, or on any other occasion during the week of July 16, 1962, except during the two luncheons described above. WRIGHT stated it was quite possible that during the luncheon on July 17, 1962, he had invited BALDWIN to drop by his home for a drink or a visit as this would be a normal thing to do and BALDWIN has visited his home on several previous occasions. WRIGHT resides at 2706 36th Street, N. W. Admiral WRIGHT said he has also invited BALDWIN as his guest at the Alibi Club on several occasions in the past.

b6 per NGB

Admiral WRIGHT advised he would like to be of assistance in this matter. He stated he believed that inquiry should be made of the aides of persons whom BALDWIN has been known to contact as he had found aides to be of great assistance in the past. He stated important visitors frequently request aides to make phone calls and perform other services which might provide clues. Admiral WRIGHT also advised he believed that Admiral ROBERT B. PIRIE and Admiral VERNON L. LOWRANCE were well acquainted with BALDWIN.

In conclusion, Admiral WRIGHT advised he had learned from Admiral FITZGERALD above that BALDWIN would probably call another conference in the near future in an effort to fill the advertising position with the Naval Academy Alumni Association and he anticipated he would see BALDWIN shortly after Labor Day. Admiral WRIGHT stated he was going on vacation, August 10, 1962, at Virginia Beach and could be located by phone at Virginia Beach 428-8807.

~~SECRET~~

REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. FITZGERALD, JR. (USN, RET.)
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NAVAL ACADEMY
ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND

~~SECRET~~

On August 13, 1962, FITZGERALD advised that he had not read the July 26, 1962, article by HANSON BALDWIN and that he does not have access to information the type of which appeared in BALDWIN's article.

FITZGERALD also advised that he has known BALDWIN for many years and that by virtue of his position, he sees BALDWIN several times a year. FITZGERALD pointed out that BALDWIN serves as Chairman of the Naval Academy Alumni Association's Publications Committee. FITZGERALD said he last saw BALDWIN in that capacity on July 17, 1962. At that time, the Publications Committee held one of its regular meetings at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, D. C.

According to FITZGERALD, this meeting, which included a luncheon period, ran from about 10:00 a.m. to 2:15 p.m. BALDWIN served as Chairman of the meeting. Others in attendance, in addition to FITZGERALD and BALDWIN, were the following: Vice Admiral GEORGE C. DYER (USN, Ret.), Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT (USN, Ret.), Captain P. E. WAKEMAN (USN, Ret.) and Rear Admiral E. B. FLUCKEY. FITZGERALD indicated that for a period of about twenty minutes following the luncheon, M. S. COLLINS of the American Publishing Company, Washington, D. C., was invited to join the meeting.

FITZGERALD said the purpose of the above-mentioned meeting was to discuss advertising problems pertaining to the Association's publications and to consider the use of a new publisher. FITZGERALD stated that, to the best of his recollection, BALDWIN did not solicit any information the type of which appeared in his July 26, 1962, article during the course of the luncheon or meeting. FITZGERALD said he did not hear BALDWIN mention any prior or future commitments in Washington, D. C.

FITZGERALD related that he is not aware of any other contacts made or meetings attended by BALDWIN during the week of July 16, 1962, and added that he does not know the identities of any of BALDWIN's contacts in Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~X~~

[REDACTED]
(HWS:ctw)

b3
b7E

FITZGERALD pointed out that arrangements for the July 17, 1962, meeting were begun in about mid-June, 1962. Following receipt of replies from the committee members, FITZGERALD said he sent out notices of the meeting date, time and place, to the members a week or two before July 17, 1962. FITZGERALD indicated that BALDWIN had been contacted along with the other committee members regarding the date and had agreed to the date, time and place originally suggested and agreed upon by the other members.

66

~~SECRET~~

~~X~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS:kjl

b3
b7E

REAR ADMIRAL EUGENE B. FLUCKEY
PRESIDENT, U.S. NAVAL BOARD OF INSPECTION
AND SURVEY

On August 15, 1962, FLUCKEY advised that he had not read the July 26, 1962, article by HANSON BALDWIN and that he has not had access for some time to information the type of which appeared in BALDWIN's article, which article had been exhibited to Admiral FLUCKEY.

FLUCKEY advised that he has known BALDWIN "over the years" and that he sees BALDWIN every two or three months at the Naval Academy Alumni Association's Board of Trustees meetings and Publications Committee meetings, on both of which groups BALDWIN and FLUCKEY serve. FLUCKEY said BALDWIN serves as the chairman of the latter group.

FLUCKEY said he last saw BALDWIN at a meeting of the Publications Committee in the Army-Navy Club in Washington, D.C., on July 17, 1962. Although FLUCKEY said he arrived late for the meeting, he said it is his recollection that the meeting was called for 11 a.m. on July 17, 1962. To the best of his recollection, FLUCKEY said the meeting, interrupted by luncheon, lasted till about 3:30 p.m.

FLUCKEY advised that the meeting concerned itself with advertising and publishing problems faced by the committee. He said he did not overhear BALDWIN soliciting information, the type of which appeared in his July 26, 1962, article, from any one of the committee members present.

FLUCKEY provided the names of the following committee members, in addition to BALDWIN and himself, who were present for all or a portion of the July 17, 1962, meeting:

Vice Admiral GEORGE C. DYER (USN, retired)
Rear Admiral WILLIAM F. FITZGERALD, JR., (USN, retired)
Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT (USN, retired)
Captain P. R. WAKEMAN (USN, retired)

FLUCKEY said that MILTON COLLINS of the American Publishing Company in Washington, D.C., joined the group after luncheon for a short period.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS:kjl

b3
b7E

FLUCKEY said he is not aware of any specific contacts made by BALDWIN in Washington, D.C., although he felt BALDWIN, on the basis of conversations with him over the years, frequently talked with cabinet members and congressmen as well as Pentagon officials. FLUCKEY said he also has gained the impression that BALDWIN had "White House connections". FLUCKEY was not able to be more specific in this regard.

Regarding BALDWIN's itinerary in Washington, D.C., during the week of July 16, 1962, FLUCKEY noted that at the July 17, 1962, meeting BALDWIN had commented that the day before the meeting he was delayed about thirty minutes "on the hill" waiting for a cab. FLUCKEY added that following the termination of their July 17 meeting, at about 3:30 p.m., Rear Admiral FITZGERALD drove BALDWIN and FLUCKEY to the Pentagon, where he and BALDWIN got out and went their separate ways. FLUCKEY said BALDWIN made no comment regarding the identities of the persons he intended to see. FLUCKEY added that he felt BALDWIN did not have any firm commitment for any appointment on arrival at the Pentagon but rather intended "to wander around" since FLUCKEY felt BALDWIN would not have been in a position to know when the Publications Committee meeting would end. FLUCKEY felt they arrived at the Pentagon at about 4 p.m., although he said he has no way of definitely verifying the arrival time.

FLUCKEY recalled that the date for the Publications Committee meeting was set about two or three weeks prior to the meeting date, following a polling of the members for an agreeable date. FLUCKEY said he had no idea how BALDWIN came into possession of the information used in the article in question and added that he was unable to provide any further information which might be of assistance.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

DMB/CEG:bjj

ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. GILPATRIC was interviewed on August 2, 1962, at which time he stated he has known HANSON BALDWIN for about ten years and sees him about four times annually when he makes periodic visits to Washington. Mr. GILPATRIC said that during the week of July 9, 1962, the Washington Bureau of "The New York Times" made an appointment for BALDWIN to see him at 3:30 P.M. on July 17, 1962. BALDWIN came to his office at that time and they were together for approximately 45 minutes.

BALDWIN stated that he had two things in mind: namely, Defense Secretary McNAMARA's speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, and the status of the National Guard. These two points were discussed and thereafter BALDWIN brought up the subject of changes in the military commands of NATO and JCS, and the retirement of General NORSTAD from NATO. According to GILPATRIC, BALDWIN attempted to probe as to the successor to General LEMNITZER of the JCS, indicating that his only specific knowledge in this matter was that NORSTAD was to retire. In this vein BALDWIN tried to link the NORSTAD retirement with a change in the U. S. policy concerning control of atomic weapons in Europe, but GILPATRIC assured him no changes were anticipated in Europe and the true reason for NORSTAD's retirement was his desire to leave the job; as early as January, 1962, NORSTAD personally told GILPATRIC he planned to retire this year. GILPATRIC denied their discussion dealt with intelligence matters and stated he had never at any time furnished BALDWIN any information of a classified nature.

With regard to their discussion of Mr. McNAMARA's commencement speech at Ann Arbor, BALDWIN indicated he had arrived at an interpretation at variance with that of GILPATRIC, so Mr. GILPATRIC suggested that BALDWIN should take this matter up with McNAMARA himself. In reply, BALDWIN indicated he planned to do so. With regard to their touching on National Guard matters, Mr. GILPATRIC stated they discussed Congressional decisions in this area, and conversation-wise BALDWIN indicated he had talked to Army people about this matter.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Mr. GILPATRIC said he first read BALDWIN's article of July 26, 1962, while en route to New York City on that morning to attend a luncheon with the Board of Editors of "The New York Times". Prior to departure, ADAM YARMOLINSKY, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, had brought GILPATRIC's attention to this article and they had agreed that GILPATRIC would not mention it at the luncheon. He stated the luncheon was attended by about eight persons, including BALDWIN, who dominated the conversation. Following the luncheon, GILPATRIC stated, he spoke privately to ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, Publisher of "The New York Times", concerning BALDWIN's article of July 26, 1962. GILPATRIC stated this leak and other instances wherein BALDWIN had shown insensitivity to security were a matter of serious concern to the Department of Defense. He said he cited to DRYFOOS several instances wherein BALDWIN had come close to or crossed over the limits of security. He also complained of BALDWIN's critical judgments of Defense Department policies without first discussing them with the Department.

GILPATRIC mentioned also that about one year ago he had personally called BALDWIN's attention to his carelessness with security information, at which time BALDWIN disclaimed responsibility, stating he published only what he was told by responsible people. Furthermore, BALDWIN said in reply, it was not his job to police security regulations. Also at this time BALDWIN criticized GILPATRIC because he had issued a directive forbidding publication of material on satellite photography. Specifically, this directive was prompted by an announcement of the launching of the Samos satellite. In rebuttal BALDWIN cited the unsuccessful Cuban expedition and noted "The New York Times" had not published any information relating thereto which might injure the United States, and pointed out "The New York Times" purposely had withheld publishing certain information because of an official request not to do so. GILPATRIC stated BALDWIN had never asked him for any "off the record" information and a discussion such as that had never come up in any conversation with BALDWIN.

Mr. GILPATRIC stated when BALDWIN is in Washington he generally talks to all principal civilian figures in the Department of Defense. GILPATRIC stated it is his custom to see members of the press alone, a practice not followed by

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Defense Secretary McNAMARA, who consistently requires the presence of a third person when talking to any press representative. Mr. GILPATRIC related BALDWIN sees a lot of people in high places, but it was his opinion he uses his meetings with statutory appointees as a means of satisfying his vanity by talking to "top" people. GILPATRIC said he feels that his real sources of information are "exclusively military".

(U) With respect to the BALDWIN article of July 26, 1962, GILPATRIC expressed the belief a perusal of [NIE 11-8-62] would not have given BALDWIN sufficient information for this article and that he must have talked to someone who knew not only the contents [of NIE 11-8-62] but other things not contained therein, such as information pertaining to "coffins" and the estimated number of Soviet missiles. He stated he had no idea as to BALDWIN's source for this information, but was of the belief that BALDWIN had talked to two classes of people, those who had back-up material and, in addition, (U) someone who had read [NIE 11-8-62].

In response to a specific question, Mr. GILPATRIC stated BALDWIN rarely asks for information; contrarily, he usually tells GILPATRIC what the Defense Department is doing wrong. GILPATRIC stated the only time he recalls when BALDWIN came right out and asked him for information was in their discussion about the pending changes in military commands in JCS and NATO. BALDWIN did specifically ask him for information concerning these changes and GILPATRIC stated he refused to furnish any information to BALDWIN about it. He said generally their discussions are on broad policy matters and administration matters in general terms.

Mr. GILPATRIC was asked whether BALDWIN, on the occasion of their visit of July 17, 1962, had asked any questions concerning the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and GILPATRIC replied he had not, although to his knowledge BALDWIN had written an article on this subject which appeared in the July 28, 1962, issue of "The New York Times". GILPATRIC's conclusion was, with regard to this article, that BALDWIN had seen a JCS paper which he described as "SECRET" in classification. He said he had no suggestion as to how BALDWIN obtained this information. In response to a specific question, Mr. GILPATRIC stated he had not shown BALDWIN any classified paper

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]
within the past year and a half and had not even shown BALDWIN any unclassified paper during that time.

GILPATRIC was then informed, without disclosing any source, that on July 18, 1962, BALDWIN had made the statement to a responsible person that he had learned from GILPATRIC the decision had been made about the successor to the B-52 bomber and it would not be the RS-70 (Reconnaissance Strike) airplane. After some hesitation, Mr. GILPATRIC stated that BALDWIN's allegation was not true. He recalled, however, he had a conversation with BALDWIN concerning this controversial matter of the successor to the B-52 and said this discussion took place in his office in April or May, 1962. On reflection GILPATRIC said BALDWIN had criticized the Defense Department by saying it was the first time in his experience that we had gone eighteen months without a new weapons program. GILPATRIC replied by pointing out that they had the TFX (Tactical Fighter - Experimental), which was very advanced, and the MMRBM (Mobile Mid-Range Ballistic Missile). BALDWIN pointed out that the Defense Department, however, had not developed any new manned bombers. In this exchange GILPATRIC replied, "There are some things even you don't know". They discussed the "follow-on" for the B-52, but did not discuss policy relating to the RS-70. GILPATRIC explained to interviewing agents that actually there had been no change in the decision not to make the RS-70 a major weapons program, but he had not furnished this information to BALDWIN.

GILPATRIC stated the studies relating to a successor to the B-52 and decisions relative thereto were classified "TOP SECRET" and some of the information pertaining to these policy matters was "very closely held". GILPATRIC related on this topic that during the luncheon with the Editors of "The New York Times" in New York on July 26, 1962, one of the editors in the group had asked whether a decision had been reached concerning the RS-70 airplane. GILPATRIC stated he answered this query by saying the Department of Defense had not yet reached the point where they had to make a policy decision as to any change in policy in this area.

In conclusion, Mr. GILPATRIC stated he had no information as to the identity of any other contacts of BALDWIN, or whom he may have seen while in Washington during

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

the week of July 16, 1962, with one exception; he knew BALDWIN had an appointment to see Secretary McNAMARA. He added that from his discussion with BALDWIN concerning personnel changes in JCS and NATO, it was evident BALDWIN had had previous talks with Navy people and Army people, and from BALDWIN's comments regarding the National Guard matter, it was evident to GILPATRIC that BALDWIN had been talking to Army people. He said BALDWIN regularly talks to all high-ranking civilian officials in the Department of Defense, but it was GILPATRIC's belief many of these calls were "courtesy calls".

~~SECRET~~

CEG/MAT:pcn/rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

GILPATRIC, upon re-interview August 17, 1962, was queried concerning the luncheon July 26, 1962, with the Board of Editors of "The New York Times," and advised the luncheon was held at the officers' dining room in The New York Times Building on West 43rd Street, New York City. GILPATRIC said the invitation was extended by BALDWIN during the latter's visit with him on July 17, 1962. He said he had made a similar appearance about a year ago and BALDWIN told him on July 17, 1962, that ORVIL DRYFOOS, Publisher of "The New York Times," asked BALDWIN to remind GILPATRIC he would like for him to again be their guest. GILPATRIC mentioned that "The New York Times" Editors AMERY (ph) BRADFORD and JOHN OAKES (OCHS), chief editorial writer, were friends of long standing and said the inspiration for his attendance really originated with BRADFORD.

GILPATRIC said he was the guest of honor and advised that they made a small ceremony introducing him and having him sign a book. He stated it was not an unusual occasion and mentioned Secretary of Defense McNAMARA had appeared at one of these luncheons in April, 1961, and he understood others have made similar appearances. He stated Secretary McNAMARA was aware of his plans to attend the Editors luncheon and advised he had not made a written report of it. He said the objective of "The New York Times" Editors was to obtain background data and decisions to aid them in their interpretation of the news. He explained his purpose was to convey to the Board some picture of over-all defense policies and what our objectives are in terms of cutting down the impact of overseas expenditures on the balance of payments and the effect of procurement here on the domestic economy. He said he also tried to do a bit of selling of the administration's defense policies. GILPATRIC added, in addition to the above, one topic discussed was political issues involved in the test ban negotiations being conducted in July at Geneva, Switzerland. He said "The New York Times" people were interested and inquired whether GILPATRIC was satisfied from a security standpoint whether our interests were safeguarded in the discussions should a compromise be reached on our reduced demands of on-the-site inspections of Soviet atomic tests.

GILPATRIC stated those in attendance at the Editors luncheon included the following in addition to himself: LESTER MARKEL, "who puts out the Sunday edition of 'The New York Times,'"

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED] X

HANSON W. BALDWIN, AMERY BRADFORD, ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, Publisher, and a couple of individuals whom he did not know and whose names he does not recall. JOHN OAKES, referred to above, was not present. GILPATRIC said the discussion was somewhat informal around the dining table, but those present were interested and attentive. GILPATRIC did most of the talking and the editors asked questions. He said BALDWIN did not have too much to say and the questions were propounded by the others present.

Mr. GILPATRIC related he first read the HANSON BALDWIN article of July 26, 1962, while en route to New York. He said when he arrived at "The New York Times" offices, there was a call waiting for him and it was ADAM YARMOLINSKY, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense McNAMARA. YARMOLINSKY advised him, with regard to the BALDWIN article, that he had been in conference with Mr. McNAMARA and had learned the matter was being investigated. Mr. GILPATRIC and YARMOLINSKY decided it would be unwise to discuss the BALDWIN article at the luncheon. He said on his way to New York he had previously decided that he would not talk to the group concerning it.

GILPATRIC said he had not been instructed to contact ORVIL DRYFOOS, but had told Secretary McNAMARA he intended to do so. He also said he had informed Mr. McNAMARA verbally, upon his return to Washington, about his conversation with DRYFOOS.

In the previous interview, GILPATRIC stated he had complained to ORVIL DRYFOOS that BALDWIN was insensitive to security and had breached the limits of security on several occasions and that this article of July 26, 1962, was an example and constituted a danger to our security interests. He also stated in the previous interview that he complained to DRYFOOS about BALDWIN's critical judgment of defense policy without first discussing it prior to publishing. He stated he did not furnish DRYFOOS with any specific instances, but had in mind an instance approximately a year ago when BALDWIN wrote a series of critical articles concerning the organization of the Defense Intelligence Agency when such material was still classified, although the BALDWIN articles occurred a short time prior to public release. He also said he had in mind an instance when BALDWIN had written in a critical vein about the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[] X

"missile gap" and on another occasion in his column had gone into the numbers of U. S. weapons. Mr. GILPATRIC said he had in mind that in October 1961 he had made a speech at Hot Springs, Virginia, to the Business Council, at which time the Department of Defense first released heretofore classified information concerning our defense weapons and number of bombers and other information relating to our strategic weapons system. He said this speech, with approval of the President, was for the purpose of acquainting the American public with the extent of our defenses and at the same time calling attention to the Russians as to how strong we were, particularly with regard to nuclear strength. He said this occurred at a time when the Russians were putting new pressure on the Berlin question. He said that prior to his making this speech, earlier in 1961, BALDWIN had written a piece on practically the same material and this indicated to GILPATRIC that BALDWIN had access to classified information.

GILPATRIC observed that he believed BALDWIN's best sources were located in the Pentagon and he always felt his primary sources were in the Navy Department because BALDWIN had a Navy background and in his writings appeared to take a "Navy position" in any controversial issue. GILPATRIC stated he did not know any of BALDWIN's sources by name. He mentioned that WILFRED J. McNEIL, former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in 1959 and 1960 who is now President of W. R. Grace Company, is a close friend of BALDWIN and was always visited by him and used to be a BALDWIN source in Defense.

With reference to GILPATRIC's earlier statement that he meets members of the press alone, GILPATRIC explained that this custom applies only to old and trusted friends whom he has known for more than ten years and includes such journalists as JOSEPH ALSOP, WALTER LIPPMANN, ARTHUR KROCK and HANSON W. BALDWIN. GILPATRIC stated when meeting correspondents outside the above category, his practice usually is to have a third person present such as NILS LENNARTSON or another professional from the Public Affairs Division of his department. He stated he never records interviews with members of the press. GILPATRIC stated sometimes he makes memoranda of such interviews, but said he did not make a memorandum of the BALDWIN interview of July 17, 1962, until he was interviewed by representatives of the FBI, at which time he reduced his recollections to writing.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

GILPATRIC admitted he had been concerned for some time about BALDWIN's sources of information at the Pentagon and was aware that they were extremely good sources. He said he never inquired of BALDWIN concerning his sources or made any effort to identify them. GILPATRIC stated he continued to receive BALDWIN despite his concern, explaining that BALDWIN is the senior military editor of a great newspaper and it is important that he give BALDWIN an audience in order to permit him to express himself, stating that it is part of his job to see BALDWIN. He declared he has not consciously furnished BALDWIN with any sensitive data or classified material.

GILPATRIC said he had not seen or heard from BALDWIN or ORVIL DRYFOOS since July 26, 1962, and he did not think he had been in contact with anyone from "The New York Times." He stated that JAMES B. RESTON, and his wife, had been a week end guest at GILPATRIC's farm at Queenstown, Maryland, remaining over Saturday night and departing on the following afternoon. GILPATRIC could not recall the date of this visit, but after consultation with his secretary and reference to a calendar, believed it was possibly on the week end of July 15, 1962. He could not state that the date was accurate and could not fix the time of the visit as being before he had seen BALDWIN or after he had seen BALDWIN.

During this week end visit with RESTON, GILPATRIC said they discussed defense policy and other matters which should be brought to the public attention, all unclassified, and early that following week he sent some additional material to RESTON, who prepared and published an article based upon this data.

GILPATRIC stated when the present investigation was initiated, RESTON had become upset and made a complaint to Secretary McNAMARA and it was his understanding that McNAMARA had gone to see RESTON. GILPATRIC also advised that sometime later, President KENNEDY mentioned to GILPATRIC that he had sent his Naval Aide, Captain TAZEVELL SHEPARD, to deliver a letter to DRYFOOS prepared by JAMES R. KILLIAN of The White House Staff, concerning the seriousness of the disclosures which appeared in the BALDWIN article and the possible adverse effects on American security.

On the previous interview with Mr. GILPATRIC on August 2, 1962, he advised that his discussion with HANSON

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED] X

BALDWIN concerning the successor to the B-52 bomber had taken place during an interview in April or May 1962 and he had advised his interview with BALDWIN on July 17, 1962, had not touched on that point. In response to a specific question concerning this same matter during instant interview, Mr. GILPATRIC stated that upon reflection BALDWIN may have asked him some question about the weapons program with regard to the successor to the B-52 during their conversation on July 17, 1962. He said as he now recalls it, BALDWIN asked what he was going to do about the RS-70 airplane and the problem of the successor to the B-52, and in reply GILPATRIC said he advised BALDWIN a decision had not been made.

GILPATRIC was informed that a reliable person had advised that BALDWIN intimated to him that GILPATRIC was the source of BALDWIN's knowledge that General MAXWELL TAYLOR had been appointed as the new Chairman of the JCS. GILPATRIC replied he was sure that this is wrong and said he recalled BALDWIN had told him he heard Admiral HARRY D. FELT would succeed General LYMAN LEMNITZER in that post. GILPATRIC said he thought at the time that BALDWIN was surely wrong about this matter. GILPATRIC stated the subject of successors to General LEMNITZER and General LAURIS NORSTAD was discussed, but he did not furnish BALDWIN with any information on the subject. He recalled BALDWIN mentioned that he knew, or understood, NORSTAD was going to retire. GILPATRIC said he did not recall whether BALDWIN mentioned General LEMNITZER or General EARLE G. WHEELER as possible successor to General NORSTAD. He said he recalled they did discuss the fact there would probably be a new Chief of Staff.

(U) GILPATRIC advised he had read the 11-8-62 document, [S-3] as well as the advance copy, and was familiar with their contents and had also been currently briefed on the subject matter. He said his previous conclusion that the information in the BALDWIN article came from both [11-8-62] and back-up people [S-3] was because the [11-8-62] received a very small distribution and [S-3] for the further reason the document did not mention the coffin lids in referring to hardened Soviet missile sites.

GILPATRIC also stated that his previously-expressed thought that the source of BALDWIN's article was purely military

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]

X

was based on his knowledge that BALDWIN's sources are primarily military ones whom he has built up over a period of fifteen or twenty years in the military and naval establishments, and the fact that his background is in this area. He stated a further reason was that these departments have the necessary motivation and want to circulate a point of view. He stated, however, he did not see a service interest motive in the present BALDWIN news article.

(U) GILPATRIC stated he was familiar with all of the items in the BALDWIN article which could have possibly originated from the [11-8-62] material and denied furnishing any information to BALDWIN concerning these topics. In response to specific questions, he stated he had no recollection that his discussion with BALDWIN included hardening of Soviet missile sites, the number of Soviet ICBMs, or the manner of deployment of missile sites, image interpretation, first firings of missiles from submerged Soviet submarines, or satellite photography. GILPATRIC stated it was his impression that BALDWIN had not seen the [11-8-62] document but had talked with someone familiar with the document. (S-)

(U) GILPATRIC was also specifically questioned concerning several items appearing in the last three paragraphs of the BALDWIN article of July 26, 1962, and he said he had no recollection, whatsoever, of any mention of protection of our satellites, or of any reference to the use of decoy devices as a means of protecting our satellites. He said BALDWIN may have made some mention of our capacity to penetrate Soviet defenses. He also stated he believed BALDWIN may have made reference to our Nike-Zeus system, but did not have a clear recollection that he did. He said he knows that other correspondents have mentioned this subject, noting that on this date, August 17, 1962, LLOYD NORMAN of "Newsweek" inquired of him during interview whether they were going to adopt the Nike-Zeus system for the purpose of attacking unfriendly satellites, as well as using it for a defense weapon against hostile missiles. GILPATRIC commented he understood that no great technical problem was involved here. GILPATRIC stated he did not recall any reference to Soviets shooting down a reconnaissance vehicle or about the Soviet capacity to do so.

In connection with the discussion immediately above, GILPATRIC advised he had received the highly classified document

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

captioned "Protection of Reconnaissance Satellite Vehicles" dated July 13, 1962, and prepared by the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. He stated he had read the document and returned it the same day, as he recalled. He stated he had not displayed this document to BALDWIN, nor had he discussed its contents with him.

In conclusion, GILPATRIC advised although BALDWIN is a journalist of great talent and ability, he possesses a certain pride, even arrogance, and decides what he will publish and what should be published. He further described BALDWIN as being very brilliant and having a great store of knowledge, but also being opinionated and authoritative. GILPATRIC stated, however, that BALDWIN apparently has exercised restraint in the past, since BALDWIN told him he knew about the U-2 reconnaissance plane and the Cuban invasion plans long in advance of any publicity concerning them.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DMB:kjl

b3
b7E

MAJOR GENERAL JERRY D. PAGE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLANS
USAF

Major General PAGE was interviewed August 3, 1962, at which time he recalled he first met HANSON BALDWIN approximately fifteen years ago when PAGE was on the staff of then Secretary of Defense FORRESTAL. Since that time, PAGE has seen BALDWIN on numerous military exercises and he sees him from time to time. General PAGE stated one day during the week of July 16, 1962, exact date not recalled by General PAGE, he received a telephone call late in the afternoon from HANSON BALDWIN who asked if he could drop by to see General PAGE for a few moments. General PAGE stated he assumed BALDWIN was calling from within the Pentagon as shortly after he indicated he would be available to BALDWIN, BALDWIN arrived at his office approximately 5 p.m. and remained for about 20 to 25 minutes.

General PAGE said BALDWIN was mainly concerned about our military program in space; was questioning whether sufficient provision was being made for requirements for the coming era of "man in space". BALDWIN discussed the general field of this topic and the future possibilities and the necessity of a sound military program with regard to it. General PAGE stated BALDWIN then tried to find out from PAGE if he knew who would be the next Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff succeeding General LEMNITZER; also inquired for any information available as to who would succeed General NORSTAD upon his retirement from NATO. General PAGE said he told BALDWIN he could not help him in these questions, whereupon BALDWIN told General PAGE he had just come from having seen Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. GILPATRICK, where BALDWIN had made inquiry about the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NATO changes but had not obtained the answers on these changes.

(U) General PAGE said he never had discussed anything classified with BALDWIN; did not discuss anything pertaining to intelligence matters on the instance of this meeting with BALDWIN; had no suggestions as to how BALDWIN obtained the information for the July 26, 1962, newspaper article. General PAGE offered his personal feelings that BALDWIN must have seen some paper relating to [NIE] in order to have written the article or have had an excellent knowledge of the contents

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
DMB:kjl

b3
b7E

(U) ~~SECRET~~ of [the NIE] General PAGE stated he believed BALDWIN to be an honest individual. He said it is his guess that a civilian in the Office of the Secretary of Defense is probably responsible for the leak which may have been deliberate or "controlled".

General PAGE suggested a recontact at his office with his secretary, [redacted] then on leave, could resolve the exact date and time he saw BALDWIN. [redacted] was contacted on August 6, 1962, and advised that according to her records, BALDWIN's appointment with General PAGE was at 4:45 p.m., July 17, 1962. [redacted] commented the appointment was originally set for 4 p.m. but BALDWIN was quite late in keeping it and he arrived at the office at exactly 4:45 p.m. that date.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

CAM/HWS:pen

DR. EARL F. ZIEMKE
CHIEF, FOREIGN BRANCH
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

On August 3, 1962, ZIEMKE advised he does not have access to the type of information which appeared in the HANSON BALDWIN article in the July 26, 1962, edition of "The New York Times".

ZIEMKE said he met BALDWIN in the office and the company of Dr. STETSON CONN, Temporary Building "C", Second and R Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., from about 9:15 A.M. to 10:00 A.M. on July 18, 1962. ZIEMKE said his conversation with BALDWIN concerned itself with the "Stalingrad Campaign" and with books already written on that subject. It was ZIEMKE's understanding that BALDWIN intends to publish articles on that subject. ZIEMKE said this was the only time he ever talked with BALDWIN.

At about 10:00 A.M. on July 18, 1962, ZIEMKE escorted BALDWIN to a reference library in Temporary Building "C", where BALDWIN reviewed various unclassified military-historical papers. When ZIEMKE returned to the library at about noontime, BALDWIN had already departed. ZIEMKE said it was his understanding that BALDWIN had left in order to keep a luncheon appointment. ZIEMKE said he had no knowledge regarding any of BALDWIN's associates and knew nothing regarding BALDWIN's earlier or future plans.

~~SECRET~~

CHM.CJJ

~~TOP SECRET~~

DR. STETSON CONN,
CHIEF HISTORIAN,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF MILITARY
HISTORY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

On August 1, 1962, CONN advised that he and Dr. EARL ZIEMKE, an associate of CONN's, visited with HANSON BALDWIN on July 18, 1962, at CONN's office in Temporary Building "C," Second and R Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., from about 9:30 a.m. to 10:15 a.m. CONN advised that this appointment was made for BALDWIN by an assistant editor of "The New York Times" by phone call from New York City a few days prior to July 18, 1962.

CONN stated that BALDWIN indicated he is planning to write a book on German-Russian operations on the "Eastern Front" during World War II, to be entitled "The Battle of Stalingrad," and that he wanted to know what military-historical material is available for research purposes.

At about 10:15 a.m. on July 18, 1962, BALDWIN was shown to a reference library in Temporary Building "C," where he perused material pertaining to German operations in Russia in 1942 and 1943. At 11:50 a.m., CONN called a cab for BALDWIN, who had indicated earlier that he had a luncheon appointment at 12:30 p.m.

According to CONN, he prepared a list of research items for BALDWIN, all dealing with German-Russian matters on the "Eastern Front." CONN noted that BALDWIN did not talk to any military people assigned to CONN's group and that BALDWIN's conversation dealt with military-historical matters. CONN referred to BALDWIN's visit as "a scholarly visit."

CONN indicated he had met BALDWIN about a year ago at the Jefferson Hotel in Washington, D. C. At that time, BALDWIN asked questions concerning the launching of a series of books on great battles contemplated by BALDWIN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
(CAM/HWS:ctw)

CONN indicated he does not have access to information, the nature of which appeared in BALDWIN's article on July 26, 1962, and that he has no idea how or from whom BALDWIN might have obtained such information. CONN said he is not acquainted with any of BALDWIN's contacts and that he has no knowledge of BALDWIN's itinerary while in Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

RMW: kmm

VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM R. SMEDBERG, III,
CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL, UNITED
STATES NAVY

Vice Admiral SMEDBERG on August 3, 1962, said he and HANSON BALDWIN have been good friends since 1922 and he has seen BALDWIN both socially and officially on many occasions over the years. Admiral SMEDBERG said he last saw BALDWIN on Wednesday, July 18, 1962, from approximately 12:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m., when he had lunch at the Carlton-Sheraton Hotel, Washington, D.C., with BALDWIN and Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT.

Admiral SMEDBERG said BALDWIN arranged to have lunch with him and Admiral WRIGHT in order to discuss with them the effect of a recent proposal to replace military instructors at the naval academy with civilian instructors. Admiral SMEDBERG pointed out that both Admiral WRIGHT and BALDWIN are officials in the Naval Academy Alumni Association and are strongly opposed to the proposal and therefore wanted to discuss this matter with Admiral SMEDBERG. Admiral SMEDBERG said that he formerly was superintendent of the academy and was personally interested in the above proposal.

Admiral SMEDBERG said this was the only subject discussed at the luncheon.

Admiral SMEDBERG added that he was pressed for time and left BALDWIN and Admiral WRIGHT at the hotel. He is not aware how long Admiral WRIGHT and BALDWIN remained together after his departure.

Prior to the above-mentioned luncheon, Admiral SMEDBERG said he had neither seen nor talked to BALDWIN for about six months, except for one brief occasion in New York when he saw BALDWIN at a social gathering.

(U) Admiral SMEDBERG said he has never discussed the contents or the back up material of NIE 11-8-62 with BALDWIN or any unauthorized individual. Admiral SMEDBERG continued that he did not attend the briefings on the NIE document and was not generally familiar with the intelligence items mentioned in BALDWIN's article. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RAW:kmm

b3
b7E

Admiral SMEDBERG advised that he has the highest regard for Mr. BALDWIN personally and professionally and that he was shocked to learn BALDWIN had published information affecting the national security. Admiral SMEDBERG said it was his opinion that BALDWIN sincerely has the best interest of this country at heart and normally publishes only information which he feels the public should have.

Admiral SMEDBERG stated he has always been amazed at the number of high placed individuals with whom BALDWIN has private audiences. BALDWIN gave Admiral SMEDBERG the strong indication he had private audiences with Secretary of Defense MC NAMARA.

Admiral SMEDBERG said he knows BALDWIN is acquainted with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and ranking officers in the military service. He said he does not know any sources of information or news contacts BALDWIN might possess.

~~SECRET~~

CEG/DMB:pgn

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER
DIRECTOR, LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES GROUP
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

On August 2, 1962, Admiral MOORER advised he first met HANSON BALDWIN in the Fall of 1960 when BALDWIN attended, along with many other news correspondents, Operation "SWORDTHRU", an exercise of the Atlantic Fleet which extended over a period of 26 days. Admiral MOORER was Commander of the Task Force Group in this operation and BALDWIN visited on board his ship on several occasions.

He related about 3:00 P.M. on July 18, 1962, BALDWIN contacted him directly by telephone and inquired if MOORER would be available for an interview. Admiral MOORER said he would be and BALDWIN came to his office a few minutes thereafter, having apparently telephoned him from within the building, and he stayed approximately 20 minutes. Admiral MOORER said they first reminisced about their experiences and then BALDWIN went into his conjecture about the probable successor of General LEMNITZER as Chairman at JCS. He said BALDWIN was attempting to find out who would succeed LEMNITZER and indicated he had talked to various people, including Mr. GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense, but BALDWIN still did not know the answer. Admiral MOORER said BALDWIN named many possible candidates for the JCS job, but all those named in speculation by BALDWIN later proved to be wrong guesses on his part. Admiral MOORER stated they also discussed the Navy in the future with regard to new ships, nuclear power, hydrofoil, conditions of ships and projection of the Navy into the 1970's as regards ships and equipment.

Admiral MOORER stated that at no time did his discussion with BALDWIN touch on intelligence matters. Admiral MOORER stated within the past few days he had learned of the July 26, 1962, newspaper article by BALDWIN, but he had not had an opportunity to read it. After perusal of same in the presence of Agents, Admiral MOORER stated the material discussed by BALDWIN in this article was in an area entirely outside his knowledge and responsibility. He said he was not concerned with intelligence matters in his duties

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

CEG/DMB:pcn

and for that reason did not possess the necessary security clearances to make him knowledgeable in the area wherein BALDWIN's article discusses. He mentioned that BALDWIN's article disclosed the firing of a missile by the Soviets from a submerged submarine and stated that this would have been a breach of security had it not previously appeared in "Tass".

MOORER said he did not know who else BALDWIN may have visited or intended to see, but he believed BALDWIN had talked to Secretary of the Navy KORTH, and only this week, through casual conversation, learned BALDWIN had seen Admiral GEORGE ANDERSON, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, sometime after he had talked to Admiral MOORER.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
GJL:bjn

b3
b7E

VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. RABORN
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (DEVELOPMENT)
UNITED STATES NAVY

Admiral RABORN advised on August 3, 1962, that he has been personally acquainted with Mr. BALDWIN for the past 20 years and he has the highest regard for him as an individual and for his ability as a professional writer.

Admiral RABORN stated that he last saw Mr. BALDWIN when BALDWIN visited him at his office at 4:30 p.m., July 18, 1962. BALDWIN remained in his office for about 30 minutes. During this time he and Mr. BALDWIN discussed information regarding the Navy's Anti-Submarine Warfare program (ASW), the reassignment of senior naval officers and the Navy's Polaris program. Admiral RABORN added that he did not discuss any classified information with Mr. BALDWIN. He also stated that Mr. BALDWIN did not ask him any leading questions regarding classified information.

(U) Admiral RABORN stated that he did not discuss with BALDWIN any information contained in NIE 11-8-62 and that, in fact, he has not had an occasion to read this document or to be briefed on its contents. He continued that he did not discuss with BALDWIN any information regarding the number of missiles possessed by the Soviets or any information regarding Soviet missile launching ability. He added that at no time during this discussion was any reference made to "hardening".

Admiral RABORN also stated that he has never heard the expression "image interpretation" which is used by Mr. BALDWIN in his article of July 26, 1962.

Admiral RABORN also stated that Mr. BALDWIN has excellent sources of information in his Pentagon contacts, however, he could not identify any of these sources of information except to state that they included the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and most of the senior ranking officers of the various military services. Admiral RABORN added that Mr. BALDWIN is clever when it comes to protecting his sources of information and not revealing with whom he associates.

Admiral RABORN also stated that he is of the opinion that the type of information which appeared in Mr. BALDWIN's article of July 26, 1962, was deliberately leaked to him by some

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
GJL:kjl

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

knowledgeable person, probably not military since military personnel are so well schooled in the sensitivity of classified information. He also stated that he could furnish no information regarding the identity of Mr. BALDWIN's source.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

DMB:CEG:kmm

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID A. BURCHINAL,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS AND
PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

General BURCHINAL was interviewed August 1, 1962, at which time he advised that he has known BALDWIN for many years on a friendly personal basis. He stated that on July 16, 1962, at 4:00 p.m. approximately, he talked to BALDWIN by telephone at "The New York Times", Washington, Bureau*, and invited him to have dinner in his home on the evening of July 18, 1962. At 4:00 p.m. on July 18, 1962, BALDWIN telephonically contacted General BURCHINAL stating he would be unable to have dinner with him since he had arranged to have dinner with a young couple of his acquaintance. BALDWIN suggested that BURCHINAL meet him instead for cocktails at the Jefferson Hotel before dinner. Accordingly BURCHINAL met BALDWIN at the Jefferson Hotel Bar at approximately 6:30 p.m. and they remained together for about 35 minutes.

BURCHINAL explained that about one year previously during a visit with BALDWIN the latter had asked him a question relating to a classified matter which BURCHINAL had refused to answer and that since that time they seemed to understand each other on this point and their conversations have avoided classified matters since then.

During their conversation of July 18, 1962, they discussed the possible successor to General NORSTAD, Commander of NATO. They also talked about centralization and decentralization of the administration of the Department of Defense and the increasing influence of civilians in setting policies and participating in the planning of military matters. On this last topic BALDWIN commented that he was watching closely the civilian influence in weapons evaluation. They also discussed the successor to General LYMAN L. LEMNITZER as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. BALDWIN mentioned having discussed this last matter with Secretary of the Navy FRED KORTH.

*NOTE: Investigation has disclosed that BALDWIN, according to visitors' log, was in the office of Admiral CLAUDE V. RICKETTS at the Pentagon from 3:45 p.m. to 4:17 p.m. on July 16, 1962.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

DMB:CEG:kmm

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

There was no conversation relative to intelligence matters during their visit.

General BURCHINAL said that BALDWIN told him that he had recently seen Deputy Secretary of Defense ROSWELL GILPATRIC, whom BALDWIN described as one of his closest friends. General BURCHINAL believed that this contact and the contact with KORTH were probably on Tuesday, July 17, 1962, but possibly could have been on July 16 or July 18, 1962. BURCHINAL said he was shocked to learn from BALDWIN that on the above occasion GILPATRIC had told BALDWIN that the successor to the B-52 bomber had been selected and it would not be the RS-70 but would involve a very "hush hush" project. According to BURCHINAL this is highly classified information which BALDWIN was not entitled to have.

General BURCHINAL advised that it is his impression that BALDWIN, in order to write his article of July 26, 1962, must have seen classified documents in order to comment as he did concerning hardening, coffins, and image interpretation.

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
CEG:DMB/rps

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, AIR NATIONAL
GUARD, ROOM 2E337, PENTAGON

b6 per NGB

In interview July 31, 1962, [redacted] advised that until October, 1961, he was a newspaperman, military writer for the "Ledger Star," Norfolk, Virginia. He has known HANSON BALDWIN since 1950-51 when [redacted] was attending Columbia University and worked part time as a copy boy for "The New York Times" in New York City. He stated he considers BALDWIN a close personal friend.

[redacted] stated since he has been on duty, October, 1961, BALDWIN has been to Washington on two occasions, the first in late June or early July, 1962, and again during the week July 16-20, 1962. [redacted] recalled on Tuesday, July 17, 1962, about 3 to 4:30 p.m. he received a telephone call from BALDWIN while he was in his office. BALDWIN was calling from somewhere in the Pentagon. They discussed plans for getting together, and BALDWIN stated he already was committed for that evening, planning to have cocktails with an officer and also mentioned, in addition, he planned to get in touch with Admiral "JERRY" WRIGHT at CIA. During the conversation, BALDWIN indicated Admiral WRIGHT wanted to see him on some matter of mutual interest, as both WRIGHT and BALDWIN are members of the Naval Academy Board of Trustees. [redacted] had the impression that BALDWIN was to see Admiral WRIGHT separately later in the evening, after having cocktails with the other unidentified officer.

b6 per NGB

During this conversation with BALDWIN, [redacted] and BALDWIN made arrangements to have dinner the following evening, July 18, 1962, provided BALDWIN's daughter, who was ill, had improved sufficiently so that he could stay in Washington, D. C., for another day. He was to advise [redacted] if he found himself unable to keep the engagement.

b6 per NGB

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
CEG:DMB/rps

b3
b7E

X
[redacted] related he and his wife met BALDWIN at the Jefferson Hotel bar about 7 p.m.; and when they met him, he was just finishing having a drink with an individual whom [redacted] believes was Major General DAVID A. BURCHINAL, Air Force, Office of Director of Plans. [redacted] stated this person had wanted BALDWIN to go with him some place; but BALDWIN explained he had made a prior dinner commitment to [redacted] and his wife, so this other individual left almost immediately after having been introduced to [redacted] and his wife. Following cocktails, [redacted] along with BALDWIN, walked to Harvey's Restaurant and had dinner. They parted about 10:30 p.m., when [redacted] walked with BALDWIN back to the hotel. b6 per NGB

[redacted] related their discussion that evening touched mostly on family matters, but at one point [redacted] mentioned to BALDWIN the recently publicized claim of NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV to the effect the Soviets could hit a fly in the sky with antimissile missiles. [redacted] said in reply BALDWIN merely commented that the people he had talked to did not seem very much concerned about the Soviet claims, which they believed to be untrue. BALDWIN said his impression was the people he had talked to believed the Russians could possibly knock down one missile, but could not probably knock down a whole lot of missiles. b6 per NGB

[redacted] said most of the discussion relating to military matters with [redacted] centered around their speculation as to what would happen to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a topic which has been the subject of recent news articles in various papers. At no time during this conversation did BALDWIN indicate he was writing an article pertaining to missiles. b6 per NGB

BALDWIN mentioned to Major [redacted] that he had appointments for the following day with Secretary of Defense McNAMARA and with General LEMNITZER, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

X
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
CEG:bjn

b3
b7E

It was [redacted] impression that BALDWIN intended to return to New York the following day, but he had no contact with him after the evening of their dinner engagement. X

[redacted] had invited BALDWIN to come to his office for the purpose of being introduced to [redacted] Major General W. P. WILSON, Deputy Chief, National Guard Bureau, but BALDWIN was unable to do so.

b6 per NGB

[redacted] recalled that on BALDWIN's prior trip to Washington, D. C., he had mentioned to [redacted] having seen Rear Admiral THOMAS H. MOORER, Director, Long Range Objectives Group, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He explained that Admiral MOORER was Carrier Division Commander of a Navy exercise known as "Swordthrust" in the Fall of 1960. [redacted] and BALDWIN covered this operation on news assignments and spent a portion of their time on Admiral MOORER's ship and had considerable contact with him.

With regard to the BALDWIN article of July 29, 1962, concerning the Air National Guard being returned to state service and having their aircraft components reduced, BALDWIN and [redacted] discussed this matter at some length during their dinner engagement on July 18, 1962. [redacted] explained all of the material discussed previously had appeared in print in the "Congressional Record" and also was a subject of considerable testimony before Congressional bodies and did not involve any classified information.

b6 per NGB

[redacted] stated that he has a "Secret" clearance, that he read BALDWIN's article of July 26, 1962, on the day of its publication, but that he had no information as to the source of the data used by BALDWIN in writing this article. He stated that BALDWIN, in his opinion, would never knowingly publish any information which he considered harmful to the United States, but that he was inclined to form his own opinions as to what might be harmful from a security standpoint. X

~~SECRET~~

CEG:DMB/rps

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

In connection with the above information concerning the information in BALDWIN's article of July 29, 1962, relating to the Air National Guard, this article was also discussed with Major General D. W. McGOWAN, Chief, National Guard Bureau, whose interview is set forth separately herein. He also stated that the above article, with which he was familiar, contained no classified information.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RMW/GJL:ctw)

b3
b7E

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM P. ENNIS,
USA, DIRECTOR, WEAPONS SYSTEMS
EVALUATION GROUP (WSEG), DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE

On July 31, 1962, General ENNIS advised that he had talked with HANSON BALDWIN of "The New York Times" on Thursday, July 19, 1962. General ENNIS stated he had returned to his office at the Pentagon after keeping an appointment, at about 9:55 a.m., and had found BALDWIN seated in the WSEG reception room, waiting for him. General ENNIS said his secretary indicated BALDWIN arrived at his office at about 9:40 a.m. General ENNIS talked with BALDWIN until about 10:05 a.m. General ENNIS said he knew of BALDWIN by reputation only but had never met BALDWIN prior to this occasion. He did state, however, that he had corresponded with BALDWIN several years ago in an effort to get BALDWIN to lecture at the National War College when he, General ENNIS, was Commandant of the school. His efforts to obtain BALDWIN were negative.

General ENNIS said BALDWIN introduced himself and stated he wanted to discuss a recent directive issued by Dr. HAROLD BROWN, Director of Defense Research and Engineering. General ENNIS commented that on July 11, 1962, Dr. BROWN had prepared a directive entitled "WSEG Operations." This directive ordered a projected change in the organization of WSEG.

BALDWIN informed General ENNIS that he personally was aware that Dr. BROWN had prepared a directive concerning the operation of WSEG. BALDWIN requested that General ENNIS permit him to see a copy of the directive and indicated to General ENNIS that he was well aware of the contents of the directive. BALDWIN also informed General ENNIS that he always "protects his sources of information."

General ENNIS informed BALDWIN that he would not permit him to see this directive, although the directive is unclassified, since it was a "controlled document" and

50
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RMW/GJL:ctw)

b3
b7E

available to authorized personnel only. He did inform BALDWIN, however, that the directive took the military out of business so far as WSEG was concerned. BALDWIN then asked General ENNIS if the JCS was taking action on the directive and if General L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, JCS, was aware of the directive. General ENNIS told BALDWIN that he did not know what action the JCS was taking and that General LEMNITZER was aware of the directive. BALDWIN further told General ENNIS he was trying to see General LEMNITZER.

(U) General ENNIS said he had no further discussion with BALDWIN and that no mention was made in his discussions with BALDWIN of the [NIE 11-8-62 document] or any information contained in the document. ~~(S-3)(S)~~

General ENNIS said BALDWIN's article, which appeared in "The New York Times" dated July 28, 1962, and which was captioned "Pentagon Edict Upsets Military," apparently was predicated upon Dr. BROWN's directive of July 11, 1962.

General ENNIS stated he feels relatively certain that BALDWIN either had a copy of Dr. BROWN's directive or had been briefed personally by a source regarding its contents in order to write the article of July 28, 1962. He continued that this directive was a "controlled document" and his reply to this directive, written July 16, 1962, had rather limited distribution. General ENNIS said the directive was disseminated to appropriate WSEG personnel, and that his reply to the directive was distributed to the various heads of the military services.

General ENNIS stated that he does not know how BALDWIN obtained the information contained in the above-mentioned directive dated July 11, 1962, or the information contained in "The New York Times" article of July 26, 1962. He pointed out that since BALDWIN is a graduate of the Naval Academy, Class of 1924, and some of BALDWIN's classmates are still on active duty, this may indicate a possible source of information for BALDWIN.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RMW/GJL:ctw)

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

(U) General ENNIS stated he had never seen the NIE 11-8-62 document but had been briefed on it. He has discussed the contents of the document with no unauthorized individuals.

(U) General ENNIS said, in his opinion, no branch of the services or any individual would benefit from the release of the information in the article of July 26, 1962. He has no ideas or suspicions as to how BALDWIN obtained the information but believes the article must be based upon the [NIE or NIE briefings.]

General ENNIS further said he was not familiar with the term, "image interpretation."

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RMW:kmm

b3
b7E

VICE ADMIRAL R. B. PIRIE,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
(AIR), UNITED STATES NAVY

Admiral PIRIE advised on August 3, 1962, that he has known HANSON W. BALDWIN since the 1920s when they were both midshipmen in the naval academy. Admiral PIRIE said he is not a close associate of BALDWIN but has seen BALDWIN on a number of occasions during the past several years.

Admiral PIRIE said he has held his present assignment in the Pentagon since May, 1958, and estimates that BALDWIN has visited his office once every three or four months since that time. Generally, Admiral PIRIE's conversations with BALDWIN have concerned naval aviation and naval aircraft.

Admiral PIRIE said that he considers himself to be schooled and disciplined in intelligence matters and has never discussed classified information with BALDWIN.

Admiral PIRIE said he last saw BALDWIN on July 19, 1962, from 10:50 a.m. to 11:15 a.m. He said BALDWIN had called at his office on the morning of July 19, 1962, and had made this appointment.

Admiral PIRIE said BALDWIN discussed the following items:

1. The program of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and the trend toward civilian control in weapons evaluation.
2. Admiral PIRIE's pending retirement plans and suppositions concerning PIRIE's replacement.
3. A new aircraft to be utilized by both the Navy and Air Force.

Admiral PIRIE continued that neither he nor BALDWIN mentioned anything which appeared in BALDWIN's recent articles in "The New York Times". Admiral PIRIE also stated he was generally cognizant of the information in the [NIE 11-8-62] that he has not read this document; and

(U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:RMH

b3
b7E

to his knowledge was not briefed on this document. ~~SECRET~~

Admiral PIRIE advised that he is not familiar with the term "image interpretation".

Admiral PIRIE said he does not know how BALDWIN obtained the information which appeared in "The New York Times" article of July 26, 1962, and he does not know any sources of information or news contacts BALDWIN may possess.

Admiral PIRIE said that although he has known BALDWIN for many years he has never had any social association with BALDWIN and does not know BALDWIN's friends. He said BALDWIN has impressed him as being "sort of a lone wolf". Admiral PIRIE said he knows that BALDWIN sees the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and senior officers in the Navy, but BALDWIN has never discussed with him the identities of individuals he sees in the various branches of the services.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CEG/pcn

b3
b7E

BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES D. HITTLE, USMC (RETIRED)
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES

General HITTLE advised on August 8, 1962, he was an old and dear friend of HANSON BALDWIN and generally read his writings regularly, although had not read the news article by BALDWIN in the July 26, 1962, issue of "The New York Times". He said he became aware of the fact an investigation was being conducted concerning BALDWIN when he read the DREW PEARSON column in the August 7, 1962, issue of "The Washington Post" authored by JACK ANDERSON, PEARSON assistant. General HITTLE read the article in Agent's presence and stated the material contained therein was in an area of knowledge generally unfamiliar to him since he had retired from the Marine Corps in December 1960.

General HITTLE related he usually sees HANSON BALDWIN when the latter is in the city and said he had lunch with BALDWIN at the Army - Navy Club from 12:00 Noon until approximately 1:20 P.M. on Thursday, July 19, 1962. He said possibly one or two weeks prior, BALDWIN called him from New York and advised him of his plans to come to Washington, at which time they made a tentative arrangement to meet for lunch. He said this is a usual thing and he generally always manages to have either lunch or dinner with BALDWIN when BALDWIN is in town. General HITTLE said appointments with BALDWIN are never made by anyone acting in BALDWIN's behalf; such appointments are never made by the Washington Bureau, rather BALDWIN usually calls him personally from New York. On this instance, specifically, General HITTLE said he could not recall when it was BALDWIN advised him in advance of his intended visit to Washington during the week of July 16, 1962. He stated after BALDWIN got in town their luncheon engagement probably was preceded by two or more telephone calls which could have lasted for a few moments or as long as many minutes. At any rate, he said, after BALDWIN came to Washington that week they had some telephone conversations confirming their luncheon appointment for Thursday, July 19, 1962. General HITTLE stated for some days prior he had had a tentative luncheon engagement with NORMAN PAUL, Assistant Secretary of Defense

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U)

b3
b7E

[]

for Legislative Affairs, and HITTLE stated that today, August 8, 1962, PAUL was being sworn in as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, succeeding CARLISLE P. RUNGE. General HITTLE stated he knew NORMAN PAUL had met BALDWIN previously, and since both PAUL and BALDWIN are close friends of his, he suggested that all three join for lunch.

~~TOP SECRET~~

During the lunch at the Army - Navy Club, General HITTLE stated the conversation dealt primarily with a discussion of famous battles in history inasmuch as BALDWIN is editing a series of books on that subject and it is a matter of intense interest to General HITTLE. He said their conversation also dealt with public problems of a general nature and with personal problems of military personnel, generally. He said at no time did their conversation deal with any matters pertaining to intelligence. He said since the matter was of primary interest at the time, the conversation naturally touched on their individual speculations as to who would be the new Chairman of JCS and who would succeed General NORSTAD as Commanding Officer of NATO Forces. He said all of them made numerous speculative guesses and all of them proved to be wrong guesses on the part of each one of them. General HITTLE stated during the lunch he was pressed for time and so the luncheon broke up at 1:20 P.M. and they parted at the Army - Navy Club. He stated on the way out he noted HANSON BALDWIN shook hands with several individuals and General HITTLE recalled one of these was General ALFRED GRUENTHER, President of the American Red Cross.

During his contacts with BALDWIN, General HITTLE stated BALDWIN never mentioned having seen anyone or talked to anyone on this visit and BALDWIN made no mention of persons he intended to see. He said from past experience with BALDWIN he knows BALDWIN never "cross-checks" information received by attempting to verify or confirm it by conversation with others. General HITTLE stated he did not know who BALDWIN's contacts were among civilian or military sources and he said he could not offer any speculation as to the source of BALDWIN's information in the article under discussion.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CEG:teb

b3
b7E

X

NORMAN S. PAUL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER

Mr. PAUL, interviewed August 8, 1962, advised that on this date he succeeded to his present office, and formerly was Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs). Mr. PAUL advised he became cognizant of the "leak" in the HANSON BALDWIN article shortly after it appeared in print and he also attended Secretary McNAMARA's briefing session on the Monday following, at which time Secretary McNAMARA indicated the seriousness of BALDWIN's publication of classified information. PAUL stated he was familiar to some extent with the intelligence matter relating thereto, but said the duties of his official position did not make him privy to the highly classified intelligence matter involved in the over-all National Intelligence Estimate.

He said that he had no suggestion as to how the leak occurred; furthermore, he had never discussed classified information with any individual not entitled to receive it.

Concerning HANSON BALDWIN, Mr. PAUL stated he had met BALDWIN on two occasions; once some years ago, and the next and last occasion occurred on Thursday, July 19, 1962, when he had lunch with BALDWIN and Brigadier General JAMES D. HITTLE, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired), now Director of National Security and Foreign Affairs, Veterans of Foreign Wars. Mr. PAUL explained he had a previous engagement for lunch with General HITTLE and BALDWIN had joined them at the suggestion of General HITTLE. Mr. PAUL related the luncheon convened at a few minutes past 12:00 o'clock on July 19, and they broke up following lunch at approximately 1:20 or 1:30 PM. He said he recalled their conversation during lunch was general and among other things, BALDWIN discussed a trip he had made to Europe and explained his concern that the National Guard units being returned to inactive-duty status would not be equipped with the airplanes they had been flying while on active duty. In response to questioning, BALDWIN said he had discussed this with people in the Air Force.

Mr. PAUL stated the conversation with BALDWIN also turned to the problem of morale in the Armed Forces, and since BALDWIN was aware that Mr. PAUL was to become Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, they discussed the problem of morale to some extent as it was a matter of interest to PAUL. PAUL stated it was his recollection

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CEG:teb/rps

b3
b7E

their luncheon occurred only a very short time, possibly a day or so, prior to the announcement of who had been chosen to succeed General LEMNITZER as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the successor to General NORSTAD as head of NATO Forces. At any rate, he stated the conversation turned to their individual speculation as to who would head the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NATO, and PAUL stated all of their guesses proved to be wrong. He said at this time BALDWIN, if he did know for sure, did not indicate he had any specific information on these Joint Chiefs of Staff and NATO personnel changes. Sometime during the conversation, Mr. PAUL said he innocently inquired of HANSON BALDWIN how he operated in obtaining his information and asked if BALDWIN had an office in Washington. To this BALDWIN replied his office was in New York and he generally came to Washington for a day or two every month or so.

Mr. PAUL stated the luncheon conversation at no time touched on matters relating to intelligence. He said he had no suggestion as to where or how the leak may have occurred and said he was not knowledgeable as to the identity of any of BALDWIN's contacts in Washington or elsewhere.

~~SECRET~~

RMW/pcn

b3
b7E

ADMIRAL GEORGE W. ANDERSON, Jr.
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
U. S. NAVY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Admiral ANDERSON advised on August 7, 1962, that he has known HANSON BALDWIN for the past forty years. Admiral ANDERSON stated that he has seen BALDWIN on many occasions over the years and he considers BALDWIN a personal friend. He added that in his opinion BALDWIN is a man of high integrity and an astute and capable writer.

Admiral ANDERSON stated that BALDWIN visited him from 2:30 P.M. until 3:00 P.M. on July 19, 1962. During this visit BALDWIN discussed matters relating to a recent directive of the Secretary of the Navy concerning the replacement of military instructors at the U. S. Naval Academy with civilian personnel; Navy public relations matters; the trend to remove traditional military influence from the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group; and the contemplated appointment of a new chairman of the JCS.

Admiral ANDERSON stated that regarding the appointment of a new chairman of the JCS, BALDWIN implied that Deputy Secretary of Defense ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK had informed him that General MAXWELL TAYLOR would receive this appointment. Admiral ANDERSON said he did not confirm or deny this information for BALDWIN. He said this information had not been released to the public at that time.

Admiral ANDERSON advised that BALDWIN previously had visited him at 2:00 P.M. on April 12, 1962. He said that BALDWIN apparently contacts him every time that BALDWIN makes his periodic visits to Washington, D. C.

Admiral ANDERSON said BALDWIN has very wide contacts in Washington, D. C., and in the Pentagon. He said most of these contacts are high-placed individuals and include both civilians and military personnel. He said these contacts include the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. He said he believes BALDWIN is also acquainted with General MAXWELL TAYLOR and with Major

5/5/62

~~TOP SECRET~~

General CHESTER V. CLIFTON of The White House. Admiral ANDERSON said it is his feeling that BALDWIN has a more sympathetic relationship with Mr. GILPATRIC than with Secretary McNAMARA. He stated, in fact, that he has personally heard Secretary McNAMARA make derogatory remarks concerning BALDWIN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Admiral ANDERSON stated that BALDWIN did not discuss, nor make any effort to discuss, the recent speech Secretary of Defense McNAMARA made at Ann Arbor, Michigan. Admiral ANDERSON continued that he had heard from either Mr. LOU KRALL, correspondent for "Time" magazine, whom he saw on July 19, 1962, or from RICHARD FRYKLUND, correspondent for "The Evening Star", Washington, D. C., whom he saw on July 3, 1962, that there had been considerable discussion by the Pentagon news correspondents that Mr. McNAMARA's speech presented a new concept in U. S. policy. The correspondents concluded the U. S. had attained a new breakthrough in intelligence in obtaining material relative to Soviet military strength. This suggested to the correspondents, since the U. S. was no longer using U-2 aircraft, that the U. S. must have an effective photographic reconnaissance satellite. Admiral ANDERSON said he made no comment to the above observation.

Admiral ANDERSON pointed out that BALDWIN is a skilled individual in interviewing; that he can draw a knowledgeable person into a seemingly innocuous discussion and obtain meaningful answers to leading questions without giving an indication he was seeking that particular data.

(U) Admiral ANDERSON continued that from a review of the article which appeared on July 26, 1962, in "The New York Times", he is of the opinion that BALDWIN obtained this information from an individual who had knowledge of NIE 11-8-62 or the back-up material used in preparing this material. Admiral ANDERSON said he had never furnished classified information to BALDWIN or any other unauthorized individual. Admiral ANDERSON was unable to furnish any additional information regarding BALDWIN's sources of information.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
GJL:RMW/rps

b3
b7E

**GENERAL BARKSDALE HAMLETT
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY**

~~SECRET~~

On August 1, 1962, General HAMLETT advised that he has been acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN, although not personally, for the past several years. He has never considered BALDWIN as a social acquaintance and sees him infrequently when BALDWIN visits the Pentagon.

General HAMLETT stated that on the morning of July 19, 1962, General C. G. DODGE, Chief of Information, United States Army, informed him that BALDWIN desired to see him, probably desiring to obtain information regarding the contemplated reassignment of senior Army officers or about the Army's Nike-Zeus Program. An appointment was arranged for General HAMLETT to see BALDWIN at 3 p.m. July 19, 1962.

General HAMLETT continued that BALDWIN arrived at his office approximately 15 or 20 minutes after his scheduled three o'clock appointment on July 19, 1962. He stated that at the outset of the interview BALDWIN attempted to obtain sensitive information from him by trapping him into divulging information regarding the appointment of General MAXWELL TAYLOR as the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General HAMLETT stated that although he was aware that General TAYLOR had been appointed to this position, this information had not been released at that time and would not be released until done so by the White House. General HAMLETT stated that he is unaware of the identities of the individuals who were cognizant of this information on that date. He continued that he did not furnish BALDWIN any information regarding this matter, but that he had the feeling that BALDWIN was aware of the fact that General TAYLOR had been appointed to this position. He pointed out that this information was not made public until a day or so later. He also stated that he was unaware of how BALDWIN had obtained information regarding this matter.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
GJL:RMW/rps

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

General HAMLETT also stated that BALDWIN had attempted to obtain information regarding the Army's Nike-Zeus Program, and inferred in a leading question that the Army had previous successes in this program. General HAMLETT stated that it was obvious that BALDWIN was attempting to either confirm information he already had or attempting to gain new information regarding this program. General HAMLETT also stated that BALDWIN asked leading questions about the Viet-Nam situation. However, General HAMLETT informed him that this was a policy matter of the United States Government.

General HAMLETT also stated that BALDWIN did not make any mention of information which appeared in the article of July 26, 1962, written by BALDWIN; and that after 15 or 20 minutes, the interview was terminated.

General HAMLETT also stated that BALDWIN is a graduate of the 1924 class of the United States Naval Academy, that he is highly regarded as a military expert, and is well known by top-ranking military personnel, particularly in the Navy. General HAMLETT stated, however, that he personally knows the identity of none of BALDWIN's contacts or friends, but that his reputation is well established.

General HAMLETT stated that, in his opinion, BALDWIN is such a competent writer in his field that he can write an excellent story with very little information. He added that considering BALDWIN's ability to obtain tidbits of information by asking leading questions of knowledgeable people, it is highly possible for him to have written the story which appeared in the July 26, 1962, edition of "The New York Times" with only a minimum amount of accurate information.

(U) General HAMLETT stated that he has never discussed the contents of NIE 11-8-62 with anyone other than personnel authorized to receive this information. He also stated that he is unfamiliar with the term "image interpretation."

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEM/HJM:pcn/mfd

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

On July 28, 1962, Mr. McNAMARA was interviewed at his office in The Pentagon. Mr. McNAMARA advised that he had met with HANSON BALDWIN of "The New York Times" on July 19, 1962, at BALDWIN's request. Arrangements were made through Mr. ARTHUR SYLVESTER, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and Mr. SYLVESTER was present during the entire interview.

(U) According to Mr. McNAMARA, nothing was said during the interview to indicate that BALDWIN had knowledge of the information contained in the [NIE 11-8-62] and there was no discussion which was pertinent to the material contained in BALDWIN's article in the July 26, 1962, issue of "The New York Times."

(U) Mr. McNAMARA advised that he has no information as to the source of Mr. BALDWIN's material in this article. He stated that BALDWIN has innumerable contacts on a "very high level." Mr. McNAMARA did not feel the article was of any particular benefit to any specific department or agency of the United States Government. He felt that the potential source of the article was not necessarily restricted to those individuals who received copies of [NIE 11-8-62] or who had knowledge of drafts leading up to this document. He said in his opinion various individuals on the Joint Staff and Air Staff who might not have seen [NIE 11-8-62] would have had the necessary information.

(U) In addition to the article by BALDWIN in the July 26, 1962, issue of "The New York Times," Mr. McNAMARA pointed out that an article captioned "Pentagon Edict Upsets Military" appeared in the same newspaper on July 28, 1962. In Mr. McNAMARA's opinion BALDWIN undoubtedly gathered information for this article on his visit to Washington during July 16 - 19, 1962. He felt that BALDWIN must have obtained information for this article from high-level sources and must have talked to someone in the WSEG or JCS. This article mentioned that BALDWIN had talked to Mr. RICHARD M. BISSELL of the Institute of Defense Analysis on the preceding day (July 27, 1962).

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEM/HJM:pcn/mfd

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. McNAMARA, while unable to furnish information with regard to contacts of BALDWIN at The Pentagon during the week of July 16, 1962, did advise that Mr. ARTHUR SYLVESTER would know his social acquaintances and possibly his usual business contacts while in this area. He also advised that Lieutenant General DAVID A. BURCHINAL might be able to be of assistance and that Lieutenant General W. H. BLANCHARD has been conducting an inquiry with regard to another similar situation and might have information of assistance.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DMB:CEG:kmm

b3
b7E

GENERAL LYMAN L. LEMNITZER,
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

General LEMNITZER was interviewed on August 1, 1962. He advised that he has known HANSON BALDWIN for many years. He last saw BALDWIN at about 6:00 p.m. on July 19, 1962, in his office for about 15 minutes. At this time BALDWIN asked him about his future plans. LEMNITZER declined to answer this question although at that time he knew he was to be appointed Supreme Commander of NATO. This fact was known only to President KENNEDY, Secretary MC NAMARA, Deputy Secretary of Defense GILPATRIC, Secretary of State DEAN RUSK, and General LEMNITZER but was not publicly released until July 23, 1962. The following day at about 3:30 p.m. LEMNITZER's wife called to tell him she had just learned from a CBS newscast that he had been selected for NATO. He did not know how this information became public.

LEMNITZER said BALDWIN also asked him during their conversation of July 19, 1962, about his successor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. LEMNITZER also declined to answer this question. BALDWIN inquired about the elimination of Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) which was to be supplanted by a civilian group which would be responsible for this function in the Department of Defense. LEMNITZER also declined to comment on this point stating the matter had not been settled. Actually LEMNITZER had seen a directive dated July 11, 1962, not classified, which was to effect this change but the change had not received final approval. BALDWIN volunteered that he had seen this directive and had read it but did not say where or when. LEMNITZER had no information pertaining to BALDWIN's article of July 26, 1962.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DMB:CEG:kmm

b3
b7E

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BAYLOR P. GIBSON,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, AIDE TO
GENERAL LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Lieutenant Colonel GIBSON was interviewed on August 1, 1962. He advised that immediately after BALDWIN's meeting with General LEMNITZER on July 19, 1962, at BALDWIN's request, he called a taxicab to take him to the National Airport and arranged for BALDWIN to be escorted from the Pentagon, an escort being required after 6:00 p.m. GIBSON stated that BALDWIN's appointment with LEMNITZER initially was for 4:00 p.m., July 19, 1962, but it was rescheduled due to commitments of General LEMNITZER and was finally arranged for 6:00 p.m. Meanwhile at approximately 5:00 p.m. BALDWIN had seen Secretary of Defense MC NAMARA. GIBSON said that in addition BALDWIN had mentioned to him having a reservation on an 8:00 p.m. flight for New York.

Concerning BALDWIN's appointment to see General LEMNITZER, originally scheduled for 4:00 p.m., July 19, 1962, Colonel GIBSON stated this appointment had been scheduled through Colonel ANDERSON in the Office of Public Affairs by BALDWIN personally. Colonel GIBSON said the usual routine was that he received a telephone call from Miss WALTZ, Washington Bureau of "The New York Times", and Colonel GIBSON heretofore had handled these appointments. When General LEMNITZER was not available that date at 4:00 p.m. BALDWIN made a later appointment because he had made a prior commitment for 5:00 p.m. with Secretary MC NAMARA.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RBL:mdc

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mrs. LUCILLE DRAGOO, Reservations Clerk, Northeast Airlines, Washington National Airport, advised on August 2, 1962, that the passenger manifest list for Northeast Flight #2728, Washington, D. C. to New York City, on July 19, 1962, reflects the name H. W. BALDWIN. Mrs. DRAGOO stated that this flight departed Washington National Airport at 8:00 p.m. and was scheduled to arrive at the New York LaGuardia Airport at 9:08 p.m.

Mrs. DRAGOO further advised that the airline records reflect that BALDWIN's flight reservation was made July 18, 1962, by a Miss (FNU) [REDACTED] (Phonetic), and that BALDWIN's local Washington, D. C. address was given as the Jefferson Hotel. Airline records also reflect that BALDWIN's ticket was picked up on July 19, 1962, at the Northeast Airlines Ticket Office located at the Statler Hotel, 16th and K Streets, N. W.

b6
b7C

Mrs. DRAGOO informed that she was on duty at the Northeast ticket counter at Washington National Airport during the evening of July 19, 1962, and that she recalled a white man who identified himself as Mr. BALDWIN checking in for New York flight #2728. She stated that she particularly recalled the name BALDWIN inasmuch as his name was paged over the airport public-address system after he departed the Northeast ticket counter. Mrs. DRAGOO informed that it was her recollection that BALDWIN was being paged to accept a telephone call, but she did not know whether he was ever reached through the paging.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

INTERVIEWS WITH WHITE HOUSE STAFF

~~SECRET~~

X

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

(U) On August 8, 1962, TAYLOR advised that he was familiar with [NIE 11-8-62] and with some of the documents preceding its release and that he also had the benefit of various briefings relating to the subject matter contained in [NIE 11-8-62].

(U) TAYLOR advised he has known HANSON BALDWIN over a period of some years but that he has not seen or talked to him during the past six months or more. TAYLOR indicated further that he knows JAMES RESTON of "The New York Times" but that he has not seen or talked to RESTON during the past several months. TAYLOR indicated that within the recent past he has had several contacts with press representatives but that he never discussed the "missile field" with any of them. He added that he has not been approached by any "outsider" for information the type of which is contained in [NIE 11-8-62].

(U) TAYLOR indicated he felt that BALDWIN possibly obtained sufficient data on which to base the news article in question by piecing together little bits of information originating in source material leading up to [NIE 11-8-62]. TAYLOR said he had no idea regarding the sources of BALDWIN's information.

TAYLOR pointed out that the phrase "coffin-type" in BALDWIN's article had been used in certain briefings he had attended but that the phrase "image interpretation" was new to him.

TAYLOR said he was not aware of BALDWIN's contacts or itinerary in Washington, D.C., during the week of July 16, 1962. He said the article, in his opinion, did not benefit any particular department or agency and that he was unable to provide any additional information which might be of assistance.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS:kmm

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~
Colonel J. J. EWELL, aide to General TAYLOR, made available a listing of TAYLOR's press contacts for the month of July, 1962. This list reads as follows: MAX JOHNSON, "U.S. News and World Report"; LOUIS KRAAR, "Time"; and WARREN ROGERS, "New York Herald Tribune".

Colonel EWELL also advised a check of office records indicated that TAYLOR had two contacts with BALDWIN within the past fourteen months, the last of which was in December, 1961.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS:Kmm

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

MC GEORGE BUNDY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
THE WHITE HOUSE

(U) On August 8, 1962, BUNDY advised that he was familiar with [NIE 11-8-62] and that he had had the benefit of various material leading up to [NIE 11-8-62] as well as the benefit of various briefings on its subject matter. BUNDY indicated he was not in attendance at the July 9, 1962, session of the National Security Council but that he did attend the July 10, 1962, session.

(U) BUNDY said he is acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN but has not seen or spoken to him this year. BUNDY also indicated he is acquainted with JAMES RESTON of "The New York Times" and that he had not spoken to him for an extended period until he received a call from RESTON a few days after the appearance of BALDWIN's article of July 26, 1962. At that time he told RESTON he was unable to comment about the investigation initiated regarding the article and that inquiry would have to be directed to the President and Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. MC NAMARA.

(U) BUNDY stated that, to the best of his recollection, except for the above instance, there had been no recent discussions by anyone in his office with any representatives of "The New York Times". BUNDY also said he had received no inquiries from the press regarding material contained in [NIE 11-8-62].

(U) BUNDY said he feels BALDWIN is knowledgeable in certain areas referred to in his article, and that by piecing together a series of bits of information, BALDWIN would have been able to write the article in question. BUNDY said that, in his opinion, BALDWIN did not necessarily need direct access to one of the various documents preceding [NIE 11-8-62, or NIE 11-8-62 itself] to write the article.

BUNDY said he is not aware of BALDWIN's contacts or itinerary in Washington, D.C., during the week of July 16, 1962, and that he is not aware of BALDWIN's contacts in general. BUNDY said he felt the article by BALDWIN was of no special benefit to any one agency or department. He added that he was unable to provide any other information which might be of assistance.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
(HWS:ctw)

CARL H. KAYSEN
DEPUTY SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE PRESIDENT

(U) On August 10, 1962, KAYSEN advised that he was familiar with the contents of NIE 11-8-62 and attendant material and that he had had access to documents containing similar-type information for over a year.

KAYSEN advised further that he is not acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN and has never spoken with him. KAYSEN said he is not aware of any of BALDWIN's contacts or his itinerary in Washington, D. C., during the week of July 16, 1962.

KAYSEN said he knows the following representatives of "The New York Times" on a somewhat professional or social basis: MAX FRANKEL, THOMAS WICKER, JAMES RESTON, E. W. KENWORTHY, TAD SZULC and PETER BRAESTRUP. KAYSEN indicated that in the past he has received calls from the latter three mentioned above concerning information on matters of current interest. KAYSEN indicated further that on occasion he would provide them background data "consciously and deliberately," all such matters having been cleared through Press Secretary to the President PIERRE SALINGER. KAYSEN added he had not talked with reporters on military matters "in weeks" and had not talked with any of them on Soviet missile capabilities. KAYSEN stated he had not been contacted by any "outsiders" for information the type of which is contained in the BALDWIN article in question.

KAYSEN also related that shortly following the delivery of a speech by Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. MC NAMARA in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16, 1962, he discussed in generalities with MORTON REICHEK of "Business Week" the difference between United States capabilities and strategy.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

(U) KAYSEN said he has no idea how BALDWIN obtained the information for his July 26, 1962, article. He pointed out that articles on subjects like missiles and rockets frequently include much speculation and are cast in military terminology. He said he did not feel that BALDWIN of necessity had to see a particular draft of the [NIE 11-8-62] project to write the article in question. KAYSEN said it did not seem to him that the BALDWIN article benefited any particular Government agency or department. He said further that he had no further information which would be of assistance.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DR. JEROME B. WIESNER
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dr. WIESNER was interviewed on August 2, 1962. He advised that he was aware of the article by HANSON BALDWIN published in the July 26, 1962, issue of "The New York Times." Dr. WIESNER stated that he did not know BALDWIN nor had he ever talked with him. He has never heard of him making any contacts with individuals in government service. Dr. WIESNER advised that he has occasional contacts with various press representatives including Mr. RESTON, Mr. OAKES, and Mr. FINNEY all of "The New York Times" Washington office. He has never received any inquiry at any time from the press or other individuals outside the government, relative to the material contained in NIE 11-8-62. (U) He has he discussed this material with anyone in the government other than his assistant. With respect to the article authored by BALDWIN, Dr. WIESNER reviewed the material contained therein and commented as follows:

Dr. WIESNER stated that the estimate of the number of Soviet ICBMs has been a matter of conjecture on the part of various writers over an extended period of time and accordingly, he did not feel that the number estimate of less than 100, contained in the article, would necessarily reflect any information had been leaked to BALDWIN from the NIE document. (U) He noted that the reference to "hardening" is a new term and could possibly be attributed to information in the NIE document. (U) [The reference in the article to the number of missiles per missile site was new information within the past few months and again could be attributed to information contained in the NIE document. Again the article makes reference to information concerning Soviet submarine missile development which is (U) relatively new and in the opinion of WIESNER, he did not believe this material had previously appeared in the press. With regard to the term "image interpretation", he stated that he had never heard of this term being used in technical discussions and that, generally, he would assume that the term "photo interpretation" would be used in official reports. In conclusion, Dr. WIESNER stated that in his opinion there was a possibility that certain information in the NIE document was made available to BALDWIN prior to his preparing the above article. (U)]

Dr. WIESNER stated that the only other individual who was known by him to have read the NIE reports was SPURGEON M. KEENEY, Jr., his assistant. (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAM/HWS:pcn

b3
b7E

MAJOR GENERAL CHESTER V. CLIFTON
MILITARY AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

(U) On August 6, 1962, CLIFTON advised that, although scheduled to attend the meeting of the National Security Council on July 9, 1962, he did not attend inasmuch as he was engaged in other official duties. CLIFTON stated he never read NIE 11-8-62 or related material other than the "summary" version. He said he received no briefings on the subject matter included in NIE 11-8-62. ~~(S)~~

(U) CLIFTON said he has known HANSON BALDWIN over a period of years, but that he has not seen or talked to BALDWIN in over a year.

Concerning his previous contacts with BALDWIN, CLIFTON advised he served as aide to General OMAR BRADLEY from 1948 to 1953. During that time he can only recall one instance when BALDWIN came to his office. Prior to his present assignment, while CLIFTON served as Deputy Chief of Information, Department of the Army, he advised that on occasion he would see BALDWIN in the Pentagon.

CLIFTON stated further that, from his recollection of BALDWIN's method of operation, about ninety-five per cent of BALDWIN's contacts were "senior officials in the Government" and that it was "beneath BALDWIN's dignity" to see any lesser officials.

(U) CLIFTON said he is acquainted with JAMES RESTON and ARTHUR KROCK of "The New York Times" but has not spoken to them in several months. He said he also is acquainted with E. W. KENWORTHY of "The New York Times" and recalled that he last saw KENWORTHY in Hyannis, Massachusetts, the week end of July 7 and 8, 1962. He stated he has never discussed the subject matter of NIE 11-8-62 with KENWORTHY or any other unauthorized person. ~~(S)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

INTERVIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEM/pcn

b3
b7E

JOHN A. McCONE
DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. McCONE was interviewed on August 17, 1962, and advised that he has no information as to the source for the material in BALDWIN's article. He advised that he has known BALDWIN for many years and last saw him in approximately February 1962. At this time BALDWIN tried to ascertain through Mr. McCONE who his deputy would be at CIA and inferred that he had information that the President or others at The White House would dictate who his deputy was to be. Mr. McCONE said he gave BALDWIN no information and BALDWIN was entirely incorrect in what he had inferred on this occasion.

According to Mr. McCONE, BALDWIN is a senior newspaperman, well known in higher Government circles, and he has many contacts on a high level in the Government. He is known to have many close associates in the Navy and presumably has many other contacts at the Pentagon. Mr. McCONE stated that BALDWIN knows Secretary of Defense McNAMARA and also knows Deputy Secretary of Defense GILPATRIC. With regard to Mr. GILPATRIC, Mr. McCONE advised he first brought Mr. GILPATRIC into the Government in 1950 during the time Mr. McCONE was Under Secretary of the Air Force. He said he believed that he, himself, introduced Mr. GILPATRIC to Mr. BALDWIN in about 1950. He is under the impression Mr. BALDWIN sees Mr. GILPATRIC during BALDWIN's visits to Washington, but he does not know how friendly they are.

Mr. McCONE advised that since investigation was instituted by the FBI in this matter, he has talked to Mr. ARTHUR KROCK and Mr. JAMES RESTON of "The New York Times", and both Mr. KROCK and Mr. RESTON stated that they did not know BALDWIN's source in this instance. Both Mr. KROCK and Mr. RESTON indicated that they were convinced that BALDWIN did not know the sensitivity of the information and feel that he would not have written the article had he been aware of the sensitivity.

Mr. McCONE said that he is of the opinion that it might be possible for BALDWIN to have secured his infor-

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]

mation from more than one source. He does not believe that BALDWIN could have secured the information from anyone who did not know what he was disclosing. Mr. McCONE is also of the opinion that since BALDWIN is so well informed on matters of this nature, he must have been aware of the sensitivity of the information in his article.

Mr. McCONE advised that in his recent conversation with Mr. RESTON, the latter indicated that he had been advised that the information contained in BALDWIN's article supposedly was only known by three people. This, of course, is incorrect, but may have been indicated to Mr. RESTON to stress the seriousness of the publication of this information.

According to Mr. McCONE, he has no additional information which might be of assistance in this investigation. He did say, however, he was surprised that BALDWIN wrote this story because in the past he has been in possession of sensitive information and has not printed it. In this connection Mr. McCONE stated that BALDWIN was aware of the U-2 flights for approximately three years prior to the FRANCIS GARY POWERS incident, but retained the information in confidence.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CAM:kmm

b3
b7E

DEAN RUSK,
SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

X

(U) On August 9, 1962, Mr. RUSK advised that he had attended the NSC briefing of July 9, 1962, concerning [NIE 11-8-62]. He also stated that he had read a summary of the document itself. He indicated he did not know whether or not this had been prepared by someone in the Department of State for his use, but nevertheless he is familiar with the contents of the document.

Mr. RUSK stated that he is acquainted with BALDWIN, but said he had not seen or otherwise communicated with BALDWIN for approximately five years. He said that he recalls that he, Mr. RUSK, appeared before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York about three years ago, but does not know if BALDWIN was in attendance. Mr. RUSK advised that he definitely has not seen or been in contact with BALDWIN in any manner since he, Mr. RUSK, assumed his present position. Mr. RUSK advised that he has no information as to the identity of any of BALDWIN's contacts, but stated that since he, BALDWIN, is a military writer, he assumed that he must have contacts in that field. Mr. RUSK said that he did not mean to imply from this statement that he, in any way, suspected that BALDWIN's source for his article was anyone in military service or connected in any manner with the military. Mr. RUSK further stated that the only other representative of "The New York Times" with whom, he, Mr. RUSK, is acquainted, is JAMES RESTON. He said that he has not been in contact with RESTON in any manner for approximately the past three months.

Mr. RUSK stated that from a review of BALDWIN's article, he could not conclude that its publication would be to the benefit of any particular branch of the government. He stated that it appeared to him that the person, if such be the case, who furnished BALDWIN with the material contained therein, was someone who "enjoys playing a big shot" and was trying to impress BALDWIN with his knowledge and the possibility that BALDWIN would do him a favor at some time.

Mr. RUSK said that he has no information as to BALDWIN's activities during the week of July 16, 1962, nor

77
~~SECRET~~

X

[Redacted]

CAM:kmm

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~
has he any indication or suspicion as to the person who might have furnished BALDWIN with information which is the basis for his article.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

MAT:teb

b3
b7E

C. DOUGLAS DILLON
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

(U) Mr. DILLON on interview, August 10, 1962, advised that he had attended the meetings of the National Security Council on July 9, 10, 1962, and had read the final version of [11-8-62 (National Intelligence Estimate)] and the news article by BALDWIN dated July 26, 1962. DILLON advised he had not discussed the contents or subject matter of the [11-8-62 document] with any newspaper representative or with any unauthorized person and had given no briefings on the material. DILLON stated he did not know HANSON W. BALDWIN and could suggest no one who may have been a source of BALDWIN in this matter. DILLON stated he knew several individuals connected with "The New York Times" and mentioned ORVILLE DRYFOOS, Publisher of the "Times," and JAMES B. RESTON, current Chief of the Washington Bureau, but said he had not seen either in recent months.

(U) Upon re-interview on August 14, 1962, Secretary DILLON related that on the previous evening, August 13, 1962, JOHN A. McCONE, Director, CIA, and JAMES B. RESTON, Chief, Washington Bureau, "The New York Times," and his wife were guests at his home to hear and view the speech of President KENNEDY. The guests remained for dinner and some after-dinner conversation before departing about 9:30 PM.

DILLON stated that during the after-dinner conversation, RESTON brought up the subject of the investigation of the BALDWIN news article. He indicated that there was excessive use of the FBI and stated this was not the right way to obtain information, intimating that some very high official in Government should have taken up the matter personally with HANSON BALDWIN.

In response to queries of McCONE and DILLON as to why BALDWIN would publish a thing like this as he should know better, RESTON said he did not know why. He remarked that BALDWIN had not been writing for some time and perhaps wanted to make a comeback with a strong story. DILLON said they inquired as to who may have leaked information to BALDWIN and RESTON said he did not know and observed that BALDWIN operated more or less independently and did not work through the Washington Bureau.

During the conversation, RESTON said that they had been preparing a "blast" because of the use of the FBI and mentioned the fact that they had contacted "The New York Times" secretary and called at 7:00 in the evening, but said that someone had called them ("The New York Times") and explained the importance of the

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
MAT:teb

b3
b7E

X

subject matter involved in the news article and thereafter RESTON felt better. DILLON stated he inferred that someone in high position in the administration had conferred with RESTON, but stated RESTON did not make this statement. RESTON commented that he, himself, did not realize the importance of the information, but remarked that when he read the article he knew it would be embarrassing, but still did not realize the significance of it. He indicated he realized now that the complaint was not merely a political tactic for bargaining or pressure purposes. DILLON stated that RESTON stated, perhaps for the purpose of obtaining some information, that he had heard only three people were in possession of the information and the phrases used, etc., and that it should be relatively easy to identify the person who gave the information.

RESTON also stated that he thought BALDWIN must have obtained the information from some friend who divulged all of the information, but without receiving the proper off-the-record injunctions of those portions which should be protected. DILLON commented that this remark made him think that the substance of the material in the BALDWIN article was received from one person. DILLON commented that it appeared that RESTON pursued the conversation to the extent that he felt it was uppermost in his mind.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW/pcn

b3
b7E

EDWARD R. MURROW
DIRECTOR
U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY

~~TOP SECRET~~

On August 9, 1962, Mr. MURROW advised that he had read HANSON BALDWIN's article which appeared in "The New York Times" on July 26, 1962, on the morning of that date, recognized that the article contained extremely sensitive information which the President had directed should be closely guarded, and contacted the Secretary of State to draw his attention to this astounding leak of information. Mr. MURROW said he was amazed that BALDWIN, who has a solid reputation for loyalty, integrity and good judgment, would write this damaging article revealing military intelligence data.

Mr. MURROW said that BALDWIN, an expert military analyst and a writer of considerable sophistication, recognized, of course, the significance of the intelligence information in the article. However, Mr. MURROW questioned whether "The New York Times" realized the value of the information. Had "The New York Times" realized the importance of the information, according to Mr. MURROW, in all probability "The New York Times" would have prepared a more significant article or continuing articles.

Mr. MURROW said he has been acquainted with BALDWIN for many years, but has had no contact with him for the past year. Mr. MURROW added that BALDWIN did not contact him during July of 1962 and, in fact, he was not aware BALDWIN visited Washington, D. C., during the week of July 16-19, 1962.

Mr. MURROW stated he is aware that BALDWIN is widely known as the dean of American military reporters and has numerous high-placed friends and associates. Mr. MURROW added, however, that he is not aware of BALDWIN's close friends, associates or his sources of news information.

Mr. MURROW advised that he could furnish no information as to the identity of BALDWIN's source of information on which "The New York Times" article is based. Mr. MURROW said it is his opinion the information appearing in the article is so detailed that even an astute writer such

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

(U) as BALDWIN could not have prepared the article without access to the information contained in [NIE 11-8-62] or without being ~~SS~~ informed of the information contained in this document.

Mr. MURROW suggested that from his knowledge of the way in which "The New York Times" operates, it is highly possible that the information appearing in the article was not obtained solely by Mr. BALDWIN; that "The New York Times" frequently assigns a staff of four or five reporters to obtain information on a given matter; that each staff member obtains bits of information; and the final article is a compilation of the joint efforts of the staff published under the name of a well-known writer.

Mr. MURROW concluded he considered this leak of intelligence information affecting the national security to be so serious that the individual who divulged the information to BALDWIN should be prosecuted.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CAM:rps

b3
b7E

H
U. ALEXIS JOHNSON 1962
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(U) On August 7, 1962, JOHNSON advised that he was in attendance at the National Security Council, held on July 9, 1962, at which meeting [NIE 11-8-62] was discussed. ~~S~~
He stated he recalls that he probably received advanced briefings on the matter and has read and is cognizant of the contents of [NIE 11-8-62]. He also mentioned that he served ~~S~~ as chairman of the inter-departmental committee charged with the responsibility of preparing information on the implications of [NIE 11-8-62], the first meeting of which was ~~S~~ held on July 11, 1962.

(U) JOHNSON advised that he is casually acquainted with BALDWIN and, as he recalls, last saw BALDWIN in approximately April, 1962, at a meeting of the Board of Consultants, National War College, Washington, D. C., of which both are members. He has neither seen nor heard from BALDWIN since the latter date and specifically had no information as to BALDWIN's activities while BALDWIN was in Washington, D. C., during the week of July 16, 1962. He further stated that he had not seen or talked to any member of the press in recent weeks. He stated that he had not discussed the contents of [NIE 11-8-62] or any related papers ~~S~~ with any unauthorized person.

JOHNSON stated that he has no information as to the identity of BALDWIN's contacts other than he has heard that BALDWIN is well-known and well-received in the Pentagon. He stated that, to his knowledge, he has never seen BALDWIN in the Department of State.

JOHNSON stated he had no information as to the identity of the individual who might possibly be responsible for furnishing BALDWIN material which would be the basis for BALDWIN's article.

CAM:teb

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~
JAMES E. WEBB
ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION

(U) On August 13, 1962, WEBB advised that he had read the article by BALDWIN which appeared in the July 26, 1962, issue of "The New York Times." WEBB stated that he had attended NSC meetings of July 9-10, 1962, and recalls that at these meetings information from [NIE 11-8-62] was discussed. He stated that this was the only time he had been exposed to information which appeared in this document and that he had not been previously briefed, nor did he have access to preliminary information on the subject matter. WEBB stated that he does not, as a general rule, attend NSC meetings wherein matter such as that contained in [NIE 11-8-62] is taken up, but did attend in this instance as a representative of the Committee of Principles in connection with the Disarmament Conference being held in Geneva, Switzerland. WEBB stated that he has no recollection of having read [NIE 11-8-62] itself and that inasmuch as his agency is primarily a civilian agency, there would be no reason for such information to be in its possession.

(U) WEBB advised that he has met BALDWIN a few times over the years, but has not seen or otherwise been in contact with him in at least two or three years and surely not since he, WEBB, has been in his present position. He stated that he is not familiar with any of BALDWIN's contacts and had no information as to BALDWIN's activities in Washington, D. C., during the week of July 16, 1962. WEBB said other representatives of "The New York Times" known to him are JOHN WARREN FINNEY, JAMES RESTON and ARTHUR KROCK. He stated that he cannot recall seeing any of these individuals in the past nine to twelve months. He did state, however, that within the past two or three weeks he had been in telephonic communication with JAMES RESTON concerning future astronaut training in which RESTON had expressed an interest and had invited RESTON to his office to discuss the matter, but as yet RESTON has not accepted this invitation.

WEBB advised that from his cursory reading of BALDWIN's article, he could not read into it that any particular branch of the service or any Government agency would benefit by its publication. He stated that he could furnish no information as to the identity of a possible source for BALDWIN's article.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAM:rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

WILLIAM C. FOSTER
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

(U) On August 7, 1962, FOSTER advised that he had read (NIE 11-8-62) had previous briefings and that preliminary papers on the subject matter had been brought to his attention. He also advised that he was in attendance at the National Security Council of July 9, 1962, at which time (U) (NIE 11-8-62) was brought to the attention of the Council. ~~(S)~~

FOSTER stated that he recalls that he possibly had met and seen BALDWIN in the Pentagon while he, FOSTER, served as Deputy Secretary of Defense, but that he has not seen or heard from BALDWIN during the past ten years. He further stated that he is not in possession of any information as to the identity of BALDWIN's contacts. However, he has heard that BALDWIN is well-known in the Pentagon.

(U) FOSTER indicated he is acquainted with the following representatives of "The New York Times," but indicated that he had not seen or heard from any of them during the recent past: JAMES RESTON, ARTHUR KROCK and MAX FRANKEL. In addition, FOSTER stated he is also acquainted with JOHN FINNEY of "The New York Times" and that although he has not seen FINNEY in the recent past, he did receive a telephone call from him on approximately July 7, 1962, at which time they discussed the nuclear test ban upon which FINNEY wrote an article. FOSTER stated he has never discussed the information in (NIE 11-8-62) or related papers with any unauthorized individual. ~~(S)~~

FOSTER said he had no information as to BALDWIN's activities during the week of July 16, 1962, in Washington, D. C., nor has he any idea as to the possible identity of any individual who might have furnished BALDWIN with information to form the basis for his article.

~~SECRET~~

CAM/HWS:pcn

b3
b7E

DR. EDWARD C. WELSH
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE COUNCIL

(U) On August 6, 1962, WELSH advised that although he was scheduled to attend the July 9, 1962, session of the National Security Council, he was not present during the time [NIE 11-8-62] was discussed. He further stated that although [NIE 11-8-62] is available to him, he has not read it or any related papers. He added that his last briefing on Soviet missile sites was in May, 1961, and that he considers himself to have very limited knowledge of the material dealt with in [NIE 11-8-62].

(U) WELSH stated further that while on the staff of STUART SYMINGTON, U. S. Senator from Missouri, he recalls having met HANSON BALDWIN. He stated he has not seen nor been in contact with BALDWIN during the past five years. WELSH said he had no knowledge of BALDWIN's visit to Washington, D. C., during the week of July 16, 1962, and has heard no recent mention of him.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RCB:mdc

b3
b7E

BROMLEY SMITH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(U) Mr. SMITH was interviewed on July 31, 1962. He advised that in connection with this investigation his records reflected that Copies Number 1, 2 and 3 of the document known as [11-8-62] first version, were delivered to the office of ~~Mr. MC GEORGE BUNDY~~, Special Assistant to the President, on July 6, 1962. Copy Number 1 of this document has been retained in the office of Mr. BUNDY. Copy Number 2 was read by Vice President ~~JOHNSON~~ and his military aide, Colonel ~~BURRIS~~. Copy Number 2 was also read by General MAXWELL TAYLOR and his aide, Major SMITH. Copy Number 2 was also read by Mr. THEODORE C. SORENSON, Special Counsel to the President. Copy Number 2 has been returned and is now in the possession of Mr. SMITH. Copy Number 3 at the special request of the Attorney General was delivered to the Attorney General by special courier and has been retained since the date of the request by the Attorney General.

(U) [11-8-62] With regard to the second issue of the document which was received in the office of Mr. BUNDY on July 16, 1962, records of Mr. SMITH reflect that Copy Number 1 is retained in the office of Mr. BUNDY. Copy Number 2 is in the possession of Mr. SMITH but had been previously issued to Dr. JEROME B. WIESNER, Special Assistant to the President, July 17, 1962, and returned by Dr. WIESNER on July 27, 1962. Copy Number 3 was retained in the custody of Mr. SMITH from the time of its receipt until July 27, 1962, when it was furnished to Mr. RUSSELL ASH of the National Security Council staff for delivery to Mr. PATRICK COYNE, Executive Secretary, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In addition to the above information regarding the distribution of [11-8-62] Mr. SMITH furnished a list of individuals who attended the National Security Council meetings on July 9 and 10, 1962, which are set out hereafter:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]
The President of the United States, Presiding
The Vice President of the United States
Colonel BURRIS

AEC

GLENN T. SEABORG, Chairman

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

WILLIAM C. FOSTER, Director

ATTORNEY GENERAL

ROBERT KENNEDY

BUDGET

DAVID E. BELL, Director

CIA

JOHN A. MC CONE, Director
General M. CARTER
HOWARD STOERTZ
ABBOTT SMITH
ED PROCTOR

DEFENSE

ROBERT S. MC NAMARA, Secretary
ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK, Deputy Secretary
PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary (ISA)

JCS

General LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, USA, Chairman
General GEORGE H. DECKER, USA, Chief of Staff, Army
Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, USN, Chief of Staff, Navy
General CURTIS E. LE MAY, USAF, Chief of Staff, Air Force
General DAVID M. SHOUP, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps

NASA

JAMES E. WEBB, Administrator

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

OEP

EDWARD A. MC DERMOTT, Director

STATE

DEAN RUSK, Secretary
GEORGE W. BALL, Under Secretary
U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

TREASURY

C. DOUGLAS DILLON, Secretary
HENRY FOWLER

WHITE HOUSE

CARL KAYSEN, Deputy Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
JEROME B. WIESNER, Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology
General MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, Military Representative of
the President
BROMLEY SMITH, Executive Secretary, National Security
Council

The NSC meeting on July 10, 1962, was attended by
the same individuals as the July 9, 1962, meeting with the
exception of the following absentees or additions:

Additions

CIA

PETER SCOVILLE

NASC

USIA

EDWARD R. MURROW, Director

Absent

TREASURY

HENRY FOWLER

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

Additions

WHITE HOUSE

MC GEORGE BUNDY, Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

(U)
[S * S] Mr. SMITH advised that he knew HANSON BALDWIN by reputation only, inasmuch as he had been prominent in the newspaper business for many years. He has never met BALDWIN nor has he ever talked with him. To his knowledge, BALDWIN has never been in contact with any officials attached to the White House. SMITH recalled that several years ago when he was in frequent contact with General OMAR BRADLEY, then Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, BRADLEY had commented to him that BALDWIN visited him at regular intervals. BRADLEY also indicated that BALDWIN usually contacted only the top officials in the various branches of the military and the government, describing BALDWIN as an arrogant individual. Mr. SMITH stated that undoubtedly BALDWIN had received information on a confidential basis which was contained in the [11-8-62 document.] He had no information as to the possible leak of this information.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


CEG:ctw/rps

b3
b7E

GENERAL LEON W. JOHNSON
DIRECTOR, NET EVALUATIONS
COMMITTEE

(U) On interview, August 7, 1962, General JOHNSON stated he is familiar with the information in [NIE 11-8-62] and added that his committee functions directly under the National Security Council. He stated his deputy is Rear Admiral SAMUEL R. BROWN, who is completely cognizant of all phases of information and intelligence in which his committee operates. Concerning the HANSON BALDWIN article, July 26, 1962, in "The New York Times," General JOHNSON stated he had no suggestion or specifics as to how this leak to BALDWIN had occurred. He noted that he had known HANSON BALDWIN personally for a good many years but he said he had had no contact whatsoever with BALDWIN for the past five years. He stated he did not know who BALDWIN's contacts were and was not aware BALDWIN had been in Washington during the week of July 16, 1962. In response to Secretary MC NAMARA's request for assistance in this investigation, General JOHNSON stated he personally contacted members of his staff and received from them negative answers as to whether they knew BALDWIN, had seen him or had any information as to how the leak to BALDWIN had occurred. He named these individuals on his staff as:

Colonel DE WITT S. SPAIN, USAF

Captain R. L. FOWLER, USN

Colonel KIRBY GOLDBLOOM, USA

 CIA

Captain WILLIAM PARHAM, USN

Colonel EDWIN WANN, USMC

Colonel SHERMAN WILKINS, USAF

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

CEG:ctw/rps

REAR ADMIRAL SAMUEL R. BROWN
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NET EVALUATIONS
COMMITTEE

(U) On interview, August 7, 1962, in the presence of Colonel TRACY B. HARRINGTON, USAF, Executive Officer for Admiral BROWN and General LEON W. JOHNSON, Admiral BROWN advised he was familiar with the [NIE 11-8-62] material discussed in HANSON BALDWIN's news column, July 26, 1962; and he had no suggestion as to how this leak may have occurred. Admiral BROWN stated he had never met BALDWIN; had never been contacted by him; and did not know any of HANSON BALDWIN's contacts. Colonel HARRINGTON stated he did not know BALDWIN; never had been contacted by him; and had not discussed any classified information with unauthorized persons.

Neither Admiral BROWN nor Colonel HARRINGTON were able to furnish any information pertinent to this investigation.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL OF
DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE

~~TOP SECRET~~

DMB:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

EUGENE M. ZUCKERT, SECRETARY,
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Mr. ZUCKERT was interviewed on August 8, 1962, at which time he stated that he was familiar with HANSON BALDWIN's article on July 26, 1962, and that he has known BALDWIN on a professional basis for a number of years.

(U) He stated that the last time he saw BALDWIN was during the winter of 1961 - 1962 and that he could not recall the date. Secretary ZUCKERT stated that he knew of no contacts of BALDWIN with the defense establishment during the past two months. He stated that he did not know any individual who had discussed with any unauthorized person the contents of the [NIE 11-8-62] nor did he have any suspicions in this regard. Secretary ZUCKERT stated he knew of no organization or group who would have benefited from the disclosure of the classified information in BALDWIN's article but recognized that the Air Force could profit by exaggerating the Soviet missile threat. However, he pointed out that BALDWIN's article does not follow the Air Force estimate of Soviet missile strength which is in excess of BALDWIN's estimate of "considerably less than 100". Mr. ZUCKERT stated he did not discern any bias in BALDWIN's article for or against any of the armed services.

(U) Mr. ZUCKERT expressed the opinion that the source of BALDWIN's information was either [NIE 11-8-62] or some individual who had a thorough knowledge of its contents. He stated he is inclined to think that BALDWIN actually saw the [NIE document] and read it thoroughly because of (U) similarity of expressions in BALDWIN's article with the (U) terms used in the [NIE]. However, he stated that he had no facts or suspicions as to how BALDWIN had gained access to such information. He mentioned that on one occasion at least a year ago he had a conversation with BALDWIN during which the latter asked for his opinion concerning an intelligence estimate which had been made by the armed forces and he told BALDWIN that this question was improper and he would not entertain a discussion of it.

b3
b7E

ORIG

PART 1

PAGES 1-144

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

DMB: Rmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

(DR.) JOSEPH V. CHARYK,
UNDER SECRETARY,
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

(U) Dr. CHARYK was interviewed on August 8, 1962, at which time he stated that he was familiar with the HANSON BALDWIN article of July 26, 1962. He stated that he has met BALDWIN several times during recent years but is not personally acquainted with him. He stated that he last saw BALDWIN some time prior to June, 1962, date not recalled. Dr. CHARYK stated that he knows of no one who has improperly discussed the contents of [NIE 11-8-62] or any of the input material connected with it. He was not aware of any contacts or associates of BALDWIN.

(U) Dr. CHARYK stated that he is convinced BALDWIN's article was not written on the basis of speculation and that it would have been necessary for him to be familiar with the contents of [NIE 11-8-62]. Some of the information, he stated, could have come only from [NIE 11-8-62] or some one familiar with its contents. It was his belief that BALDWIN had not actually been shown the document but had probably been briefed on its contents by someone thoroughly familiar with the [NIE]. He had no information which could possibly lead to the person or persons responsible for this disclosure. He also expressed the opinion that the terms "image interpretation" and "hardening" are not in themselves of any significance and could have been learned from sources other than [NIE 11-8-62].

[Redacted]

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

DMB:rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

GENERAL CURTIS E. LEMAY
CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

General LEMAY was interviewed on August 9, 1962, at which time he stated that he had read HANSON BALDWIN's article of July 26, 1962, and he reviewed a copy of the article in its entirety at the time of interview. General LEMAY stated that he has known HANSON BALDWIN since 1946, but has had no close association with him. The last time he saw BALDWIN he recalled as having been in 1959 at a party at one of the embassies in Washington, D. C. General LEMAY stated he knows of no contacts or sources of BALDWIN and that he has never seen BALDWIN in the Pentagon.

(U) General LEMAY advised that he has never read [NIE 11-8-62] but has been briefed and is very familiar with its contents. He expressed the opinion that BALDWIN could not have written his article of July 26, 1962, without having been familiar with the contents of [NIE 11-8-62]. He stated he had no idea whatever as to the source of BALDWIN's information, but pointed out that there have been two or three instances wherein the present Administration has deliberately "leaked" important military information to the press. General LEMAY stated that, in his opinion, this was the source of BALDWIN's information for the article of July 26, 1962. He advised that he had no idea as to the purpose which was intended to be served and had no information whatever indicating who might have been involved in furnishing the information to BALDWIN, except that he could not imagine anyone in uniform having been responsible.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(CEG:ctw)

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

LIEUTENANT GENERAL W. H. BLANCHARD
INSPECTOR GENERAL, USAF

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN M. BREIT
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL (SECURITY), USAF

General BLANCHARD was suggested as a possible source of information by Secretary of Defense MC NAMARA, who recalled General BLANCHARD had supervised two security-leak investigations a few months previous. It was his suggestion that the inquiry conducted by General BLANCHARD might possibly be of assistance in instant investigation.

(U) On interview July 30, 1962, General BLANCHARD and his Deputy, Major General BREIT advised they had no information or suggestion as to how HANSON BALDWIN obtained the data used in his July 26, 1962, news article. BLANCHARD had met BALDWIN some years ago and BREIT said he knew BALDWIN by sight; neither has seen him in recent years. General BLANCHARD said he had not read the NIE 11-8-62 but was familiar with its contents. He said in perusal of BALDWIN's article, it struck him that the terminology "image interpretation" was new to him and he did not consider it to be of Air Force origin or usage.

General BREIT said in 1959, BALDWIN wrote an article in "The New York Times" regarding Soviet missile bases and, as a result, the Office of Special Investigations, USAF, conducted investigation in an attempt to uncover BALDWIN's source; but no conclusions were reached.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
CAM/HWS:pon

b3
b7E

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM K. MARTIN
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

(U) On August 3, 1962, MARTIN advised that he was not familiar with the HANSON BALDWIN article in the July 26, 1962, edition of "The New York Times". He stated he did not have access to [NIE 11-8-62] or any associated documents. (S)

He said that in connection with his duties in the Office of Information he has met BALDWIN once or possibly twice within the past year. BALDWIN has never come to MARTIN for information, and MARTIN said he has never talked to BALDWIN in detail on Air Force matters. He pointed out he last saw BALDWIN about six months ago. He added that he does not know any of BALDWIN's contacts or acquaintances.

MARTIN said he was not in his office during the week of July 16, 1962. MARTIN stated he was on annual leave from July 13 through August 1, 1962.

MARTIN stated, after reading the BALDWIN article in question, that in his opinion terminology used by BALDWIN in the article would not necessarily have to come from a classified document inasmuch as technical writers would be knowledgeable of such terminology.

Colonel MAURICE CASEY, MARTIN's aide, who was on duty during MARTIN's absence, advised that a previous canvass by him of the employees of the Office of Information indicated that BALDWIN had not contacted that office during the week of July 16, 1962, or in the recent past.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:GJL/rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT A. BREITWEISER
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

On August 3, 1962, General BREITWEISER advised that he had read "The New York Times" article of July 26, 1962, written by HANSON BALDWIN and that he had no idea how BALDWIN had been able to obtain this information. General BREITWEISER said that he knows of BALDWIN by reputation only and that he is not acquainted with him. He further said that he knows of no associates or contacts that BALDWIN might possess.

General BREITWEISER stated that from a reading of "The New York Times" article it was his impression that BALDWIN could not have put this article together from fragments of information, but that he must have obtained the information from a knowledgeable person. General BREITWEISER said he was unable to make any suggestions or recommendations as to how the source of BALDWIN's information could be located.

General BREITWEISER also advised that he has heard the term "image interpretation," but that this term is not commonly used by Air Force Intelligence.

(U) General BREITWEISER also advised on August 3, 1962, that in connection with testimony of senior Air Force officers before the Preparedness Investigative Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee to be given during July, 1962, it was considered likely that the Subcommittee would want to hear information regarding the Air Force's position on the Soviet capabilities for long range attack. General BREITWEISER stated that since the Air Force's estimate in this matter was taken from information set forth in NIE 11-8-62 and the President had instructed that ~~such~~ personnel should not even discuss the contents of this document, the Air Force was in a dilemma about the use of certain material from NIE 11-8-62 for use in the hearings. (U) General BREITWEISER continued that on July 11, 1962, Brigadier General P. D. WYNNE, Jr., contacted General CARTER of the Central Intelligence Agency regarding this matter.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
RMW:GJL/rps

(U) General CARTER shortly thereafter recontacted General WYNNE and stated he had discussed this matter with Mr. McCONE, and Mr. McCONE saw no objection to the Air Force using extracts of material in NIE 11-8-62 if this material was classified "Top Secret" and was used as little as possible to support the position of the Air Force.

(U) General BREITWEISER continued that he testified before this Subcommittee on July 17, 1962, and he used information in his testimony regarding the number of bombers and ICBMs possessed by the Soviet Union. He stated that this information was taken, at least in part, from material appearing in NIE 11-8-62. He also stated that none of his testimony nor, to the best of his knowledge, testimony of any other Air Force officer referred to the configuration of Soviet missile installations, that is, information referring to "hardening."

(U) General BREITWEISER stated that in connection with his testimony the Air Force prepared a chart which graphically depicted the number of Soviet heavy bombers and Soviet ICBMs as set forth in NIE 11-8-62. And, in addition, the number of bombers and missiles was projected to 1967. He said at the bottom of this chart was the notation NIE 11-8-62. This chart was made available to the Subcommittee, but no question was asked and no explanation was given of the notation NIE 11-8-62. General BREITWEISER stated that in addition to himself, Air Force Secretary ZUCKERT, Air Force Chief of Staff LeMAY and their staffs appeared before this Subcommittee.

(U) General BREITWEISER stated that he cannot recall the identities of the Congressional members at this Subcommittee hearing with the exception of Senator JOHN STENNIS, Chairman of the Subcommittee, Senator STUART SYMINGTON, and a Subcommittee member by the name of Mr. (FNU) KENDALL.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RMW/GJL:ctw)

b3
b7E

BRIGADIER GENERAL JACK E. THOMAS,
USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

On July 31, 1962, General THOMAS advised that he is not acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN and that he has no personal information as to how BALDWIN obtained the information which appeared in the article of July 26, 1962. General THOMAS also stated that he does not know anyone who is acquainted with BALDWIN.

(U) General THOMAS also stated that he had never discussed the contents of NIE 11-8-62 with anyone other than personnel working on his staff or individuals cleared to receive this type of information. General THOMAS added that he had never used the term "image interpretation" and that, to the best of his knowledge, this term is not used by the Intelligence Division of the Air Force.

General THOMAS did state, however, that he personally was a newspaperman prior to entering the Air Force. He stated that, from his knowledge of the newspaper field as well as his knowledge of the science of military intelligence, it is his opinion that with an effective filing system of public source material, plus the benefit of some indiscreet remarks by knowledgeable people with whom BALDWIN is surely acquainted, it would be possible for BALDWIN to write this article without having any type of access to information regarding NIE 11-8-62. General THOMAS stated that the indiscreet remarks he referred to would be information regarding

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RMW/GJL:CTW)

b3
b7E

(U) "hardening" or the number of missiles possessed by the Soviets, both of which points appear in BALDWIN's article of July 26, 1962. General THOMAS related, however, that considering that these two particular points were mentioned in an article dated July 26, 1962, and the fact that NIE 11-8-62 was released during the first part of July, there is reason to be suspicious as to BALDWIN's source or sources for the article. ~~6-26-62~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL OF
DEPARTMENT OF ARMY.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
GJL:RMW:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

GENERAL GEORGE H. DECKER
CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY

General DECKER advised on August 10, 1962, that he has been acquainted with Mr. HANSON BALDWIN since World War II. However, he does not consider this to be a personal acquaintanceship. He stated that since he has been Chief of Staff of the Army Mr. BALDWIN has infrequently visited his office; however, he has not been in personal contact with BALDWIN during the past six months.

(U) General DECKER stated that he does not know how Mr. BALDWIN obtained the information on which his article dated July 26, 1962, was based. However, he is of the opinion that Mr. BALDWIN talked to a knowledgeable individual who either had access to [NIE 11-8-62] or the back up material contained in this estimate. ~~SECRET~~

General DECKER continued that he has no information as to who furnished Mr. BALDWIN with this information; however, it is his feeling that Mr. BALDWIN's source was probably a high placed civilian official employee of the Department of Defense with at least the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense or higher.

General DECKER concluded that BALDWIN is widely known in the Pentagon as a military writer and he has numerous high placed acquaintances with both civilian and military personnel.

General DECKER stated that he does not know Mr. BALDWIN sufficiently well to identify the latter's personal friends and associates.

~~TOP SECRET~~

All Army information contained
herein was regraded
UNCLASSIFIED on 22 Mar 11 By
USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth Para
4-102, DOD 5200.1R

[REDACTED]
DMB:teb

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES ARMY

b6

[REDACTED] who was interviewed on August 4, 1962, stated that he has known HANSON BALDWIN for approximately four or five years, having first met him in Belgium. Since having been assigned to the Pentagon in 1959, [REDACTED] has seen BALDWIN on three occasions, the last of which was during the closing months of 1961. They have had no social contact. On no occasion has BALDWIN attempted to engage [REDACTED] in a discussion of intelligence information.

b6

Concerning other contacts among Pentagon personnel, [REDACTED] mentioned a number of individuals who have been previously reported as in contact with BALDWIN and the names of these individuals are therefore not being set out.

Immediately after the appearance of the July 26, 1962, article, according to [REDACTED] he had an analysis made which reached the conclusion that the information probably originated with the U. S. Air Force although there were no definite facts to support this theory. The conclusion was based largely on the fact that BALDWIN's article speaks of the Soviets having less than one hundred missiles which [REDACTED] stated is an Air Force figure not supported by the Army which has consistently held to the opinion that the Soviet strength is not more than fifty. In addition, the theory of "coffin" installations is one which has been adopted and supported by the Air Force, but is a theory in which the Army has had little or no confidence. Concerning the expression, "image interpretation," [REDACTED] was of the opinion that BALDWIN's use of this term has no particular significance since the term has been widely used for the past two years by the entire military.

b6

[REDACTED] stated that the only advantage which would accrue to any branch of the service, as a result of deliberately publishing the information in BALDWIN's article, would be an advantage to the Air Force of indicating the Soviet strength which would require additional attacking capabilities by the Air Force. [REDACTED] also expressed the belief that

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
DMB:teb

b3
b7E

it would have been to the advantage of the Air Force to furnish information for public consumption concerning "coffins" which would tend to serve the same purpose, but he did not believe that there had been any attempt to furnish BALDWIN complete information for the writing of his article. In other words, according to [REDACTED] the most that possibly could have happened was to have [REDACTED] furnished small bits of information to BALDWIN.

b6

All Army information contained
herein was regraded
UNCLASSIFIED on 22 Mar 11
By USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth
Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS/CAM:KJ1

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES M. GIBSON
ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE OFFICER TO THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

On August 2, 1962, Colonel GIBSON advised that he is Assistant Executive Officer to Mr. STEPHEN AILES, Under Secretary of the Army. He stated that Mr. AILES' office is concerned primarily with manpower and personnel of the Army. He stated that to the best of his recollection, BALDWIN has been to see Mr. AILES on one or two occasions, the last time possibly during November or December, 1961, to discuss the reserve program.

Colonel GIBSON could not recall any contact with Mr. AILES' office on the part of BALDWIN of a more recent nature, particularly during the week of July 16, 1962. He had Mr. AILES' appointment secretary review her appointment book and she was unable to locate any mention of BALDWIN during the pertinent period. Colonel GIBSON advised that he is not personally acquainted with BALDWIN and his only contact with him has been when BALDWIN came in to see Mr. AILES.

~~TOP SECRET~~

All Army information
contained herein was regraded
UNCLASSIFIED on 22 Mar 11
By USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth
Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

[REDACTED]
DMB/pcn

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

MAJOR DANIEL O. GRAHAM, USA
ESTIMATOR, ESTIMATES OFFICE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF INTELLIGENCE
U. S. ARMY

Major GRAHAM was interviewed on August 3, 1962, at which time he stated that he does not know HANSON BALDWIN and could furnish no information concerning his contacts or sources. GRAHAM stated that in his opinion all information necessary for writing of the article of July 26, 1962, was brought together for the first time to his knowledge in a briefing which was presented on or about June 12, 1962, at CIA to the "Hyland Committee", an advisory group for the Board of National Estimates. Members of this committee are as follows, according to Major GRAHAM:

Dr. LAWRENCE A. HYLAND, Chairman
Vice President and General Manager
Hughes Aircraft Company

Dr. HENDRIK W. BODE, Member
Vice President, Bell Telephone Laboratories

Lieutenant General HOWELL M. ESTES, Member
Deputy Commander, Aerospace Systems

Dr. GEORGE B. KISTIAKOWSKY, Member
Professor of Chemistry, Harvard University

[REDACTED] Member
Engineering Manager
Sylvania Electronics Defense Laboratory

b6 per Army

Mr. ARTHUR E. RAYMOND, Member
Vice President and Director of Research
Rand Corporation

Rear Admiral LEVERING SMITH, Member
Director, Technical Division, Special Projects
Office, Bureau of Naval Weapons

The briefing emphasized "hardening" for the first time in such a briefing and discussed Soviet - U. S. submarine

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
DMB/pcn

b3
b7E

capabilities. Concerning the expression in the July 26, 1962, article, "something less than 100", there was a discussion at this briefing of the number of Soviet missiles (estimated), but the estimates were at considerable variance among the services, ranging from 30 to 600. For this reason GRAHAM believed that BALDWIN's figure was a guess based on public information.

GRAHAM attached significance to the expression in BALDWIN's article, "50 or 100-megaton warheads", stating that warheads available to the Soviets would have a yield of either 50 or 100 megatons and not some intermediate amount. He believes that this fact was known to BALDWIN, who would otherwise have expressed this as "50 to 100 megaton".

(U) Concerning the reference to "coffin" construction, GRAHAM advised that this was mentioned at the above briefing, but that by the time NIE 11-8-62 was finalized, this information was beginning to be discredited.

GRAHAM also advised that in reviewing the article he saw no reflection of bias in favor of any of the armed services which might indicate which of the services, if any, had been the source of BALDWIN's information.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS/CAM:mdc

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

MARTIN BLUMENSON
HISTORIAN, WORLD WAR II BRANCH
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

On August 1, 1962, BLUMENSON advised that he met HANSON BALDWIN in the Reference Library, Temporary Building "C", Second and R Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., on the morning of July 18, 1962. It was BLUMENSON's understanding that BALDWIN was in the building for the purpose of conducting research in connection with his contemplated book about the battle of Stalingrad.

BLUMENSON, who is writing a book on his own time for a series on which BALDWIN is General Editor, had never met BALDWIN and took the above opportunity to introduce himself. BLUMENSON's conversation with BALDWIN was short and concerned itself with BLUMENSON's book, which deals with a certain phase of the Italian Campaign in World War II. BLUMENSON said it is his impression that, in departing, BALDWIN indicated he had a 12:30 p.m. luncheon appointment at "The Times Bureau" in Washington, D. C., on July 18, 1962.

BLUMENSON said he does not have access to information, the type of which appeared in BALDWIN's article on July 26, 1962. BLUMENSON said he has no knowledge of BALDWIN's contacts or itinerary while in Washington, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS/CAM:mdc

b3
b7E

CHARLES B. MAC DONALD
CHIEF, WORLD WAR II BRANCH
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

On August 1, 1962, MAC DONALD advised that he met HANSON BALDWIN in the Reference Library, Temporary Building "C", Second and R Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., on the morning of July 18, 1962. MAC DONALD said it was his understanding that BALDWIN was in the building for the purpose of conducting research in connection with his contemplated book about the battle of Stalingrad.

MAC DONALD, who is writing a book on his own time for a series on which BALDWIN is General Editor, had never met BALDWIN and took the above opportunity to introduce himself. MAC DONALD's conversation with BALDWIN was short and concerned itself with MAC DONALD's book which deals with a certain phase of military activity in Germany during World War II.

MAC DONALD said he does not have access to information, the type of which appeared in BALDWIN's article on July 26, 1962. MAC DONALD said he has no knowledge of BALDWIN's contacts or itinerary while in Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS:CAM/rps

b3
b7E

W
STANLEY L. FALK
HISTORIAN, WORLD WAR II BRANCH
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

On August 1, 1962, FALK advised that he met HANSON BALDWIN in the Reference Library, Temporary Building "C," Second and R Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., on the morning of July 18, 1962. FALK said it was his understanding that BALDWIN was in the building for the purpose of conducting research in connection with his contemplated book about the battle of Stalingrad.

FALK, who has written a book on his own time, said he was desirous of having BALDWIN review the book and consequently took the above opportunity to introduce himself. FALK's conversation with BALDWIN was brief and concerned itself with FALK's book, which deals with the "Bataan Death March."

FALK said he does not have access to information, the type of which appeared in BALDWIN's article on July 26, 1962. FALK said he has no knowledge of BALDWIN's contacts or itinerary while in Washington, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL OF CIA

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEM/pcn

b3
b7E

MAJOR GENERAL MARSHALL S. CARTER
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Major General CARTER advised on August 3, 1962, that he does not recall ever having met HANSON BALDWIN. He said as far as he knows, BALDWIN has never attempted to arrange an interview with him, and he has no knowledge concerning BALDWIN's contacts. He said he has no information as to the possible source for the information in BALDWIN's article of July 26, 1962.

(U) General CARTER stated that he has no information concerning anyone having discussed the contents of [NIE 11-8-62] with unauthorized individuals. Subsequent to the briefing of the National Security Council, July 9 and 10, 1962, Brigadier General PRENTISS D. WYNNE, Jr., called him to request clearance for a top secret briefing on Soviet capabilities to the Senate Preparedness Committee. This was in connection with an appearance before the Committee of Secretary of Air ZUCKERT and General LeMAY, and General CARTER said he subsequently heard from Major General ROBERT A. BREITWEISER that he, General BREITWEISER, had briefed the Committee on Soviet capabilities in Executive Session. General CARTER said that he had cleared this briefing with Mr. McCONE and the briefing was to be limited to that information in the [NIE] which was not classified higher than Top Secret.

(U) General CARTER also advised that subsequent to the National Security Council briefing Mr. WILLIAM C. FOSTER, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament, had requested a briefing of approximately six staff members in connection with [NIE 11-8-62] but General CARTER had not approved this and had advised Mr. FOSTER that any necessary briefing concerning the estimate should be done by Mr. FOSTER from his own access to the document.

(U) According to General CARTER, his own personal observation is that whoever furnished BALDWIN the information for this article had access to [NIE 11-8-62] or drafts leading up to it. While information used in the preparation of the [NIE] was available some months before, General CARTER believes

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

the way the article is written indicates that the information was received by BALDWIN subsequent to the preparation of at least drafts of the estimate and from someone who had personally seen drafts or the estimate itself. General CARTER stated that in his opinion no certain service or department appears to be benefited from the article, and while some of the language used might tend to indicate military background, the language in his opinion does not necessarily indicate any specific branch of the military in connection with the possible source. He advised that he had no suspicions and no information which might aid in identifying BALDWIN's source for the article.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEM/pcn

b3
b7E

RICHARD HELMS
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. HELMS advised on August 3, 1962, that he has met BALDWIN only on one occasion, which was several months ago, and on this occasion he had lunch with BALDWIN in Washington at the latter's invitation. This was shortly after Mr. HELMS became Deputy Director (Plans) at CIA. He said subsequent to this he received one letter from BALDWIN in which BALDWIN recommended an individual for possible employment with CIA.

Mr. HELMS advised that he has no information concerning BALDWIN's contacts and no information concerning any individuals BALDWIN may have seen in Washington during the week of July 16, 1962. He said that from what he has heard about BALDWIN and from his own one luncheon meeting, he has the impression that BALDWIN has a great number of friends in Washington and especially in military circles.

(U) From his knowledge of [NIE 11-8-62] and from his analysis of the article of July 26, 1962, by BALDWIN, Mr. HELMS feels that the information could have been obtained by BALDWIN from a person or persons knowledgeable concerning the information in the [NIE], but not necessarily having access to the document itself. Mr. HELMS advised that he is a former newspaperman and feels quite definitely that BALDWIN never had access to the [NIE] and, in fact, was not informed that there was a new [NIE] in existence. He says he is of this opinion because he feels that a newspaperman such as BALDWIN could not have restrained himself from mentioning the existence of a new document and the sensitivity of it and therefore making it apparent to readers that he had secured a real "scoop".

(U) Mr. HELMS advised that he knew of no one who had discussed the contents of the [NIE] with unauthorized personnel, possessed no information which might assist in identifying BALDWIN's source or sources, and stated that he had no information which might identify any individual, agency or department which might benefit from the article.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
CAG:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
CIA

(U) Mr. KIRKPATRICK advised on August 1, 1962, he had read most of the contents of the [NIE 11-8-62] having discussed it with the Director of CIA and was cognizant of the restrictions placed upon this particular document. However, he was not aware of the importance of the terms mentioned in the BALDWIN article appearing in "The New York Times" on July 26, 1962, until these items were discussed at an Executive meeting following the appearance of the article.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK admitted knowing HANSON W. BALDWIN, having met him while on the staff of General OMAR BRADLEY during World War II; however, he asserted he has not seen BALDWIN since approximately 1953 - 1954, noting that on this occasion it was purely a social association. He also admitted knowing JAMES RESTON and WALLACE CARROLL of the Washington Bureau of "The New York Times" but last saw them approximately two or three years ago. KIRKPATRICK also advised that he was acquainted with Dr. HOWARD RUSK, Associate Editor of "The New York Times", who is also Director of New York University, Bellevue Medical Center, Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, New York City. KIRKPATRICK asserted that his association with Dr. RUSK pertains usually to medical subjects and that he has had no association with him since early Spring of 1962.

[REDACTED]
b3 per CIA

KIRKPATRICK expressed the opinion that BALDWIN pursued his usual paths and contacts and that somebody briefed him orally on certain aspects contained in the above document and that he did not necessarily have access to or read the contents of the NIE document. He based his conclusion on the fact that there was not enough details to indicate that he had "hot stuff".

227
~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
MAT:mdc

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

COLONEL STANLEY J. GROGAN
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Colonel GROGAN upon interviews July 27, 1962 and August 7, 1962, advised his duties include handling matters pertaining to the press. GROGAN said he has known HANSON W. BALDWIN for the past 30 years and possesses some knowledge of his method of operation and his contacts. GROGAN stated BALDWIN is a journalist of excellent background and vast experience and his contacts are at the highest level. BALDWIN would not pay for information and would not have to do so. GROGAN said "The New York Times" does not operate that way although this is not true of some other publications.

GROGAN advised that the Washington Bureau of "The New York Times" is currently headed by JAMES "SCOTTY" RESTON and he "runs the show." In the past top reporters from New York made their own appointments and operated somewhat independently, but under RESTON the arrangements for contacts are made by "Times" [REDACTED] such as [REDACTED] GROGAN recalled that for a long time appointments were made by NONA BROWN, who is still employed at the Washington Bureau of "The New York Times."

b6
b7C

Colonel GROGAN advised that BALDWIN, in common with many journalists, will call a high official for an appointment with a particular subject in mind which he has developed or picked up from various sources and wants to confirm or develop further. Thereafter the conversation may cover a number of different subjects. GROGAN said it was his recollection that when [REDACTED] phoned for BALDWIN to arrange an appointment, she indicated BALDWIN wanted to discuss with Mr. MC CONE matters pertaining to reorganization, personnel changes and plans for the future, in other words, what MC CONE was doing. GROGAN said he also believed that was the proposed agenda of BALDWIN when he called for an appointment last April.

b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Colonel GROGAN advised [redacted] Washington Bureau, "The New York Times," phoned him about July 12 or 13, 1962, to arrange an appointment for BALDWIN with JOHN A. MC CONE, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). [redacted] advised BALDWIN would be in Washington, D. C., on Monday, July 16, 1962, and remain until Friday noon. She said BALDWIN had pressing business on Monday but would be available any time thereafter until noon Friday, July 20, 1962. GROGAN said MC CONE did not want to see BALDWIN and he told BALDWIN through [redacted] that MC CONE would be available at 4:00 p.m. on July 20, 1962. In a final conversation, [redacted] said BALDWIN could make it at 3:00 p.m., however, GROGAN told her that 4:00 p.m. was the earliest time available, and BALDWIN did not see MC CONE.

b6
b7C

Colonel GROGAN said he did not talk with BALDWIN at all on this visit to Washington, D. C. GROGAN advised from past experience he knows BALDWIN stays at different hotels on visits to Washington, D. C. As GROGAN recalled, on his last visit BALDWIN stayed at the Jefferson Hotel, 16th and M Streets, N. W. GROGAN said to his knowledge BALDWIN stopped at the Raleigh, Statler and Hay Adams Hotels in the past. He said he never knew BALDWIN to stay with friends or at a private home.

Colonel GROGAN recalled BALDWIN had been in Washington, D. C., about January 25, 1962 and February 1, 1962, and also from April 9 to 13, 1962. On the last mentioned visit, he also wanted to see MC CONE but did not make it because MC CONE "was tied up." GROGAN explained that MC CONE has instituted a new policy at CIA with the idea of avoiding too much publicity. It includes curtailment of photographs, speeches, releases and interviews.

Colonel GROGAN recalled that BALDWIN had made a trip to Poland in May, 1962, with a small group of distinguished Americans and on February 1, 1962, had contacted him for guidance. BALDWIN stated the trip had been organized by SHEPHERD STONE of the Ford Foundation, New York City, formerly

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

with "The New York Times," who had invited BALDWIN to accompany the group. The purpose of the visit was to meet with groups of Polish representatives under the auspices of the Ford Foundation. Colonel GROGAN advised that he had presented the matter to the Director, CIA, and the White House and displayed a memorandum dated February 16, 1962, indicating that the government had no objection to the American participation as described above. The memorandum mentioned that BALDWIN was in Alaska that week. In connection with the visit to Poland, Colonel GROGAN advised that Dr. GEORGE B. KISTIAKOWSKY, former Science Advisor to the President, was scheduled to go, according to BALDWIN, however, Colonel GROGAN did not know whether KISTIAKOWSKY accompanied the group.

Colonel GROGAN advised the principal contacts of BALDWIN are undoubtedly at the Pentagon. BALDWIN is a graduate of the Naval Academy and veteran writer on the subjects of military and naval affairs. According to Colonel GROGAN, BALDWIN goes on naval maneuvers. GROGAN did not believe BALDWIN had retained his reserve commission in the United States Navy. GROGAN mentioned that BALDWIN's father was managing editor for the "Baltimore Sun" for more than 40 years.

Colonel GROGAN said he did not know of any contacts of BALDWIN at CIA other than himself and Director MC CONE whom BALDWIN has tried to contact as indicated herein. GROGAN said he did not believe the leak in this case came from CIA, adding it was his opinion it emanated from a high level source at the Pentagon, and he had expressed this opinion to MC CONE.

With regard to CIA, Colonel GROGAN recalled that BALDWIN had been a member of the Hoover Commission "Task Force" headed by FERDINAND EBERHARDT which investigated CIA, and BALDWIN is thoroughly familiar with the Agency from this experience.

Colonel GROGAN advised BALDWIN was a friend of Admiral ARLEIGH BURKE and it was his guess BALDWIN knows

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

BURKE's successor Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR. GROGAN could not recall any additional Naval officers with whom BALDWIN is acquainted.

Colonel GROGAN identified the following high officials and officers who are friends of BALDWIN:

Major General C. V. "TED" CLIFTON, Military Aide to the President who handles matters pertaining to CIA, sometimes including intelligence items. He was formerly Director of Information for the Department of the Army.

ROSWELL GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Colonel GROGAN advised that from his conversations with BALDWIN he knows that BALDWIN calls GILPATRIC by the familiar name of "ROSS" and it is his opinion that GILPATRIC is BALDWIN's best friend in Washington, D. C., and one whom he sees on every visit to Washington.

The 1962-63 edition of "Who's Who" reflects that GILPATRIC was Assistant Secretary for Air Force Materiel in 1951 and Under Secretary of Air Force, 1951 - 1953. He is also a Director of the Foreign Policy Association.

Lieutenant General WILLIAM F. QUINN, Deputy Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, formerly Director of Information for the Army, and also formerly of CIA.

Lieutenant General JOSEPH F. CARROLL, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Dr. HAROLD BROWN, Science Advisor and Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense.

ARTHUR SYLVESTER, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Defense, and formerly Chief of the Washington Bureau of "Newark News."

Major General WILLIAM K. MARTIN, new Director of Information, Department of the Air Force.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED] X

ROGER HILSMAN, Director of Intelligence, Department of State, whose varied background includes Yale, Office of Strategic Services, CIA and the Army. He is the son of an Army Colonel veteran of the Bataan Death March. HILSMAN wrote a book on strategic intelligence which GROGAN said "touched on CIA" and recently did an article on guerrilla warfare in which he had some experience. GROGAN expressed opinion that HILSMAN was not averse to publicity. Colonel GROGAN stated it was his belief that HILSMAN is also a very good friend of HANSON BALDWIN.

ROBERT AMORY, Bureau of the Budget, formerly Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, who had made contacts with BALDWIN on a variety of subjects (matter of index card record) from 1955 - June 18, 1959. AMORY was once Political Advisor for JOHN J. MC CLOY in Germany. Colonel GROGAN noted that when AMORY was an official of CIA, his meetings with BALDWIN were invariably held outside the Agency (S-38P)

In connection with the current news article of July 26, 1962, which is the subject of this investigation, Colonel GROGAN related that last Saturday, July 21, 1962, he received a phone call from PETER BRAESTRUP of "The New York Times" who desired background data on two items: one, the subject of the 375 mile rocket launched by NASSER of the United Arab Republic; and two, the recent statement of NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV that Soviet submarines had fired a Polaris type missile. GROGAN recalled BRAESTRUP mentioned that Dr. ECKER, a German scientist, is assisting NASSER and the French have been helping Israel. GROGAN indicated he drew no conclusions from the above call of any connection with this matter.

Colonel GROGAN said that on December 15, 1961, BALDWIN had furnished him with a bit of information gained from BALDWIN's attendance at a meeting between FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS and ROBERT BOWIE, who was once Political Advisor for JOHN J. MC CLOY in Germany. The topic which resulted in heated argument was atomic submarines for NATO Naval forces. STRAUSS advocated the addition of these boats and urged that the crews remain on a nationalist basis. BOWIE, whom GROGAN described as an extreme liberal, was not opposed to atomic subs for NATO but contended vehemently they should be manned by integrated crews selected from the various NATO powers.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

Colonel GROGAN mentioned that ARTHUR KROCK, senior Washington Bureau man for "The New York Times" was a close friend of Mr. MC CONE.

(U) In conclusion Colonel GROGAN said he thinks the material for the article was obtained from discussion with someone in a high position who had seen the [11-8-62 (instant National Intelligence Estimate)] source material and was well informed on intelligence matters. As he indicated previously, GROGAN felt the language used and the logical location of BALDWIN's contacts suggested the Pentagon and possibly Army contacts as a source. GROGAN said he felt the article was somewhat boastful in tenor and a reply to current Soviet claims and threats. He thought it possible that some person may have furnished the information to satisfy some inside ego or urge.

~~SECRET~~

CAG:Kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

WALTER N. ELDER, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE DIRECTOR, CIA

(U) Mr. ELDER advised on August 8, 1962, that he has been closely connected with NIE 11-8-62, having kept the Director advised on all drafts as they were completed, in view of the importance of the material contained in this estimate. ~~s3~~

(U) Mr. ELDER went on to say that the National Security Council meeting of July 9, 1962, was called at the request of the Director of CIA and that it was specifically for the purpose of discussing NIE 11-8-62, although there was a second item relating to outer space on the agenda. He noted that the Director of CIA had obtained authorization from the President in approximately June, 1962, to call NSC meetings whenever a National Intelligence Estimate was completed. ~~s3~~

(U) Mr. ELDER stated that with respect to the NSC meeting on July 9, 1962, it was decided the participants would be briefed and while the briefing was taking place the advance draft of the NIE 11-8-62 would be distributed so that the participants would have the draft upon returning to their office. It was felt, according to Mr. ELDER, that additional time for the participants to study this particular estimate was needed following the briefing and prior to returning to the NSC meeting on July 10, 1962, which dealt only with the NIE 11-8-62. ~~s3~~

(U) Mr. ELDER noted that with respect to the distribution of the draft on July 9, 1962, the President, upon seeing it, ordered it recalled and the distribution limited. He pointed out that the President acted independently on limiting the distribution due to the nature of the source of the information and because he felt another "gap argument" would ensue.

Mr. ELDER asserted he did not know HANSON BALDWIN although he had talked with him on the phone, recalling that he arranged for a meeting between BALDWIN and Director MC CONE in December, 1961. He recalled that Colonel STANLEY GROGAN also attended this meeting with the Director.

Mr. ELDER made available a memorandum dated July 16, 1962, disclosing briefly facts of a conversation on this

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CAG:kmm

b3
b7E

date by a secretary in his office and Colonel GROGAN. This memorandum disclosed that BALDWIN had called Colonel GROGAN, advising he was in Washington, D.C., and would like to see the Director at noon on July 20, 1962. Due to other commitments, the time was not convenient for the Director and the meeting was arranged for 4:00 p.m. on July 20, 1962.

Another memorandum dated July 18, 1962, made available by Mr. ELDER, reveals that information was received by a secretary in his office sometime after 2:30 p.m. on this date noting that BALDWIN would not be able to keep his appointment and requested that it be cancelled.

Mr. ELDER had no additional information concerning additional contacts by BALDWIN with Director MC CONE or other personnel of CIA.

275

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
MAT:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

SHERMAN KENT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES, CIA,
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Mr. KENT upon interview on July 31, 1962, advised he had read the news article of HANSON W. BALDWIN from "The New York Times" dated July 26, 1962, and was familiar with its contents. KENT stated that he does not know HANSON W. BALDWIN and had no specific information as to the source of BALDWIN's article. KENT advised he knew two individuals with whom BALDWIN is acquainted and added that he possessed no information associated with the preparation of the BALDWIN article. The two individuals were identified briefly by KENT as follows:

Admiral JERAULD WRIGHT, retired, member of the National Board of Estimates and chairman of the Naval Academy Alumni Association, who formerly occupied a very high position in the United States Navy, is a "professional officer" and believed to be "close mouthed" in matters pertaining to security.

(U) ROBERT AMORY, JR., presently with the Bureau of Budget and formerly Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, described as a careless talker and from an intelligence security standpoint a "menace to security". KENT mentioned that AMORY had kept the advance copy of the NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) dated July 16, 1962, for three days after it was ordered recalled and he had heard that the top man, presumably JOHN A. MC CONE, called AMORY before it was returned.

With reference to the BALDWIN article, KENT advised the term "image interpretation" was unfamiliar to him prior to the preparation of the estimate document in question. Mr. KENT mentioned that he had been out of the country from June 15, 1962, to July 10, 1962, during which time the document was in preparation. KENT also advised he could not specifically recall previous references to "coffin like" or "coffin type" installations but said that there is a great amount of comment prevalent today concerning "hardened sites" for missiles and any reference to protection for missiles in horizontal positions might result in a natural reference to them as "coffin type".

KENT stated he is personally acquainted with JAMES RESTON, Chief of the Washington Bureau of "The New York

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MAT:kmm

b3
b7E

Times" on a first name basis; however, he has not seen him in recent months and sees him only in intervals of three or four years.

(U) KENT expressed doubt that HANSON W. BALDWIN saw the original NIE document or an earlier draft but stated that a correspondent of his caliber and experience needed only "a little cream on the top" plus current background data from newspaper archives. As an example KENT mentioned that the subject of satellite spying has been featured recently in "Aviation Week" and in the British press. KENT expressed the opinion BALDWIN may not have necessarily been handed the information but may have obtained it through clever conversation or provocative questioning. KENT discussed the last paragraph of the BALDWIN news article of July 26, 1962, the first part of which is quoted as follows:

"Many United States military officers are convinced that this country must demonstrate a greater sense of urgency in the anti-ballistic missile, and anti-satellite fields and in the military applications of space."

He stated he realized the reference to a greater sense of urgency was an expression in common usage but advised that it was possible that it was taken from a document which originated in the Pentagon with the Joint Strategic Survey Council of JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), about July 16, or July 17, 1962, as indicated hereafter.

(U) KENT explained that following the release of the NIE document the President instructed that a paper outlining the implications of the estimate be prepared by Department of State, Department of Defense, and CIA. He stated his office prepared the contribution of CIA on the week end of July 14, 15, 1962, and a copy was furnished to the Joint Strategic Survey Council on the evening of July 16, 1962. Chairman General J. STANLEY HOLTNER was away on leave and the copy was sent to General DAVID W. GRAY, a member of the council. On the following day KENT's committee held a meeting and no representative of the council was present; however, as the committee meeting adjourned a courier delivered a suggested addendum for the CIA document on instructions of General GRAY. KENT mentioned that it was

177

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
MAT:kmm

X ~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

felt the import of the suggested paragraph was too political in character and it was not inserted. Suggested addendum is quoted as follows:

"The great risk for the future lies not in whether the USSR estimates that it will achieve relative balance with the United States in nuclear war capabilities. This is a development which we probably cannot avoid at any rate. The real risk lies in whether the Soviets estimate at a future date that they may gain a temporary military advantage in nuclear power and that we recognize this advantage. If this situation should occur then the Soviets would seek every opportunity to exploit this temporary advantage in pursuit of their political objectives to the maximum before the United States could redress the balance. For this reason it is fundamentally important that the US increase the sense of urgency in the development of weapons systems or elements of weapons systems which give any indications that unilateral possession would allow a relative military power advantage to accrue to the possessor of this new capability."

(U) KENT advised on July 20, 1962, a memorandum was received from General HOLTNER containing comments and suggested changes of six items of the draft from the implication of [NIE 11-8-62] and related intelligence for Soviet policy - task one. The change suggested on page ten was to add paragraph fourteen as follows:

"The great risk for the future lies not in whether the USSR estimates that it will achieve relative balance with the United States in any nuclear war capabilities, but that the Soviets estimate at a future date they may gain a temporary military advantage in nuclear power and that we recognize this advantage. If this situation should occur, the Soviets would seek every opportunity to exploit this temporary advantage in pursuit of their political advantage to the maximum before the U.S. could redress the balance. Consequently, it is fundamentally important that the U.S. increase the sense of urgency in the development of weapons systems or elements of weapons systems

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


MAT:kmm

b3
b7E

which give any indication that unilateral possession would allow a relative military power advantage to accrue to the possessor of this nuclear capability."

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS/CAG:pcn

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

HOWARD STOERTZ, JR.
STAFF, BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

(U) On July 30, 1962, STOERTZ advised he was the individual to whom responsibility for the preparation of [NIE 11-8-62] was assigned. He pointed out that at a ~~SECRET~~ "Terms of Reference" meeting on April 30, 1962, he set out the call for [NIE 11-8-62] and placed general questions, (U) the responses to which ultimately, following numerous drafts, official briefings and meetings with "outside" consultants such as the Hyland Panel and representatives of Space Technology Laboratories, Los Angeles, California, led to the approval and dissemination of [NIE 11-8-62]. (U) STOERTZ said he worked on this project from its inception. ~~SECRET~~

STOERTZ pointed out he is not acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN or any other press representative and that he has no idea how or from whom BALDWIN obtained material for the article in question. He said he is not acquainted with anyone whom he knows to be friendly with BALDWIN.

(U) STOERTZ said he never discussed [NIE 11-8-62] or associated drafts or working papers with any unauthorized persons. He felt a person informed as a result of the examination of the project papers during various stages of their development might have been able to provide sufficient background on which to base an article similar to the BALDWIN news item. ~~SECRET~~

(U) STOERTZ went on to say that he had made an analysis of the drafts and final version of [NIE 11-8-62] following the appearance of the BALDWIN article on July 26, 1962, and concluded that no elimination could be made of any particular document as not being the source of the information. He reiterated that as a result of his analysis he was of the opinion the information in the article came from an individual who had participated in a briefing and not necessarily one who had the actual document. (U) STOERTZ pointed out that a study of [NIE 11-8-62] was directed by the President on July 10, 1962. ~~SECRET~~

(U) STOERTZ noted that he did not make an analysis of the "sanitized" version of [NIE 11-8-62]; however, based on his knowledge of it, he stated the material in the BALDWIN article could not have originated from this particular document. ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
CAG:kmm

b3
b7E

[REDACTED] CHIEF
[REDACTED] DIVISION
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
CIA

b3 per CIA

[REDACTED] advised on August 8, 1962, that the Hyland Panel was organized and met for the first occasion on August 24, 25, 26, 1959. There have been two subsequent meetings of the Hyland Panel, namely September 6, 7, 1961, and June 4, 5, 6, 1962.

The Hyland Panel acts as a consultant for CIA and renders independent reports on specific items requested by CIA.

The present membership of the Hyland Panel consists of the following individuals:

Dr. LAWRENCE A. HYLAND, Chairman,
Vice President and General Manager
Hughes Aircraft Company
Culver City, California

Dr. HENDRIK W. BODE, Member,
Vice President
Bell Telephone Laboratories,
Whippany, New Jersey

Lieutenant General HOWELL M. ESTES, Member,
Deputy Commander
Aerospace Systems
Inglewood, California

Dr. GEORGE B. KISTIAKOWSKY, Member,
Professor of Chemistry
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dr. WILLIAM J. PERRY, Member,
Engineering Manager
Sylvania Electronics Defense Laboratory
Palo Alto, California

Mr. ARTHUR E. RAYMOND, Member,
Vice President and Director of
Research, Rand Corporation
Santa Monica, California

~~SECRET~~

CAG:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Rear Admiral LEVERING SMITH, Member,
Director, Technical Division,
Special Projects Office, Bureau
of Naval Weapons,
Washington, D.C.

(U) Basic facts contained in [NIE 11-8-62] were discussed orally before the Hyland Panel during meetings in June, 1962; however, no drafts were given to members of this panel nor were any notes taken during any of the sessions. An agenda was given to the participants and was picked up at the conclusion of the meetings. Panel members do not have access to any of the drafts or the final copy of [NIE 11-8-62].

The comments of Rear Admiral LEVERING SMITH, the only member of the Hyland Panel residing in the Washington, D.C., area, are set forth elsewhere in this report.

b3 per CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
CAG:kmm

b3
b7E

DR. OTTO GUTHE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(U) Dr. OTTO GUTHE advised on July 31, 1962, that the Military Economic Division of his office produced the major contribution to the [NIE 11-8-62] document as it pertains to Soviet missiles, Soviet military expenditures, and other Soviet military activities.

(U) He went on to say that a task force was originally established within the Military Economic Division and that their mission was to study the Soviets' long range ballistic missile program. This task force, according to Dr. GUTHE, produced an exceptional contribution relative to the production and development of Soviet missiles, some of the material which was brought into the [NIE 11-8-62].

Dr. GUTHE expressed the opinion that the terms "hardened" and "coffin" and other terms which he observed in the BALDWIN article appearing in "The New York Times" dated July 26, 1962, were old terms and had no knowledge that they originated in his section or in the above noted task force group.

(U) Dr. GUTHE advised he is not a member of the USIB; however, he has attended meetings of the USIB as a support representative but participated in only two meetings where the [NIE 11-8-62] was discussed.

Dr. GUTHE stated he is acquainted with HANSON W. BALDWIN having met him in 1949 during the "Portex Exercise" held in the Caribbean by the combined military forces. He related that he was on the flag ship of this particular exercise as were the newspapermen among whom was BALDWIN. Dr. GUTHE asserted that he has had no association with BALDWIN since 1949.

Dr. GUTHE went on to say that he is acquainted with HARRY SCHWARTZ of "The New York Times" and that he has written to him concerning unclassified reports furnished to him by CIA. He stated that such material was furnished to SCHWARTZ as a scholar and not necessarily as a reporter;

[REDACTED] b3 per CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
CAG:kmm

b3
b7E

(U) [REDACTED] He is also acquainted with SCHWARTZ as a result of b3 per CIA
their membership in the Cosmos Club but asserted that no
discussion of the contents of the [NIE 11-8-62] has ever ~~been~~
taken place between him, SCHWARTZ or any other individual
outside of CIA.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
CAM/pcn

b3
b7E

EDWARD W. PROCTOR
DIVISION CHIEF
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

On July 31, 1962, Mr. PROCTOR was interviewed
in [REDACTED] Langley Building, Langley, Virginia.

b3 per CIA

PROCTOR advised that he had read the article in question, but stated he was not acquainted with BALDWIN, nor does he know anyone with whom BALDWIN is acquainted. He said that the only representative of "The New York Times", or the press in general, with whom he has ever had any contact is JACK RAYMOND of "The New York Times". In the latter connection, he explained that several years ago Colonel STEPHEN GROGAN, CIA, requested him to speak with RAYMOND on the subject of Soviet submarines. He said that Colonel GROGAN introduced him to RAYMOND under an assumed name in order, according to Colonel GROGAN, that RAYMOND would not know his true identity and thus would not further bother or contact him. He said that he discussed unclassified material concerning Soviet submarines with RAYMOND and that the conversation later encompassed the subject of missiles, likewise unclassified material. PROCTOR made the observation that RAYMOND appeared to be very uninformed on both subjects.

(U) PROCTOR stated that he had seen the document NIE 11-8-62 and, in fact, the work on the document was performed in his particular section. He said that he had never discussed its contents or any of the preliminary drafts with any unauthorized individual. However, since the document was prepared in his section, he had discussed facets of it with persons under his supervision who worked on the document and were entitled to access to it. He said that some of these individuals, in the regular course of their duties, had read the document. He made available a list of individuals under his supervision who had access to the document.

From PROCTOR's close association with the document, he expressed some opinions which he believed might be of possible assistance in this investigation.

265

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

GAM/pcn

b3
b7E

X

b3 per CIA

PROCTOR advised that it was his considered opinion that the information which appeared in the article, from its context, did not emanate with the Army, Navy or CIA, but thought that the tenor of the article indicated that it was more in line with Air Force thinking. He stated further that it was his opinion that the type of person who would be responsible for imparting such information to BALDWIN would be one with political ideas or interests, one whose personal vanity would cause him to impart the information and the type who was unaware of strict security requirements and not completely aware of the significance and full details of the information in his possession. He indicated that this could be the consultant type individual or an official at a fairly high level who did not have full regard for security. Conversely, PROCTOR said he would exclude the "working level intelligence type" as they are, in his opinion, too disciplined and indoctrinated in security and are only interested in meticulous detail.

X

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[Redacted]

CAM/pcn

~~X~~

b3 per CIA

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
HWS:CAG/rps

[REDACTED]
SECURITY OFFICER, OFFICE OF SECURITY, CIA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(U) [REDACTED] advised on July 30, 1962, that he had no knowledge of the contents of NIE 11-8-62 or any working papers or briefings leading to its publication until the morning of July 26, 1962, when he was called in by [REDACTED] Deputy Director of Security, CIA. At that time, NIE 11-8-62 and other pertinent documents were made available to him and he was instructed by [REDACTED] to assist in the preparation of an analysis of the news item in question. CROSS said that he does not know HANSON BALDWIN, that he does not know anyone who knows BALDWIN and that he has no idea where or how BALDWIN received the information appearing in the article in question. b3 per CIA

(U) [REDACTED] said he determined that WALTER ELDER, an assistant to the Director, Central Intelligence (DCI); ARTHUR LUNDAHL, Director, National Photo Interpretation Center (NPIC); and [REDACTED] Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA, are cognizant of certain briefings and meetings held in connection with information appearing in NIE 11-8-62. b3 per CIA

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS:CAG/rps

[REDACTED]
SPECIAL ASSISTANT, EXECUTIVE STAFF
OFFICE OF SECURITY,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b3 per CIA

(U) [REDACTED] informed on July 30, 1962, that he had no knowledge of the contents of NIE 11-8-62 or any of the working papers thereof until called into the office of [REDACTED] Deputy Director of Security, CIA, on July 26, 1962, to aid in preparing data as to who had access to this particular material. ~~(S)~~

[REDACTED] asserted he had no knowledge of HANSON BALDWIN or of any individuals who may know him.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAG:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

ARTHUR LUNDAHL, DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC
INTERPRETATION CENTER, CIA

On August 6, 1962, Mr. LUNDAHL stated that he had read the article by HANSON BALDWIN appearing in "The New York Times" on July 26, 1962. Mr. LUNDAHL stated the term "coffin type" is an old term and did not originate with NPIC. He also stated that the term "image interpretation" did not originate with NPIC and pointed out that this term is used to a considerable extent by army personnel.

(U) Mr. LUNDAHL went on to say that he does considerable briefing of individuals in Government, the briefings being requested through and approved by the Director of CIA; and that his briefings for the most part are a general summary of photographic interpretation which covers a broad range of items dealing primarily with the missile threat. He asserted that he has never had the [NIE 11-8-62 document] in his possession during any briefing and has never discussed this document as such before any group or individual being briefed.

Mr. LUNDAHL advised that he had no knowledge of HANSON BALDWIN.

Mr. LUNDAHL recalled that at a USIB meeting during late 1961 or the early part of 1962, ROGER HILSMAN, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, made the proposal that data being obtained by NPIC with respect to what the Russians were doing militarily should be prepared in a form which could be presented by President KENNEDY to Soviet Premier KHRUSHCHEV. Mr. LUNDAHL believed that a paper was prepared by HILSMAN with respect to this proposition, however, he had no further details concerning it or the subsequent disposition that was made of it.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

X

INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL OF
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)

101

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:GJL/rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

ARTHUR SYLVESTER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTHUR SYLVESTER, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, advised August 1, 1962, he has known HANSON BALDWIN by reputation for many years, but has only a limited and casual personal knowledge of him. Mr. SYLVESTER said he had no information concerning any of BALDWIN's contacts or sources of information. Mr. SYLVESTER explained that normally correspondents contact his office to arrange appointments with ranking civilians and military officials, and, thereby, some indication is given of whom correspondents are contacting in the Pentagon. However, BALDWIN completely by-passes SYLVESTER's office in making Pentagon appointments, except for appointments with Secretary of Defense McNAMARA and Deputy Secretary of Defense ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC. Mr. SYLVESTER said BALDWIN apparently personally makes his own appointments with other Pentagon personnel.

Mr. SYLVESTER said that to his recollection he has seen BALDWIN only once or twice during the past year. He stated that on July 19, 1962, he was informed by his secretary that BALDWIN's secretary had called to make an appointment with Mr. McNAMARA. Pursuant to this request, an appointment was made for BALDWIN to see Mr. McNAMARA at 5 p.m. on July 19, 1962.

In accordance with Mr. McNAMARA's instructions, Mr. SYLVESTER said he sat in on the BALDWIN interview. He said the interview was cursory and generally concerned a recent address made by Mr. McNAMARA at Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Mr. SYLVESTER said that he has made inquiry but has been unable to determine if BALDWIN saw anyone besides Mr. McNAMARA during the week July 16-20, 1962.

Mr. SYLVESTER said he knows BALDWIN is acquainted with Vice Admiral WILLIAM F. RABORN, who is a classmate of BALDWIN's, but he knows of no other associates. Mr. SYLVESTER commented that BALDWIN is considered a

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


RMW:GJL/rps

b3
b7E

"mouthpiece for the Navy" and slants his articles to the Navy viewpoint. Mr. SYLVESTER added that in his opinion, based on the fact that most articles written by BALDWIN are slanted in favor of the Navy, he feels that BALDWIN's best sources of information are high-ranking individuals in the Navy Department.

Mr. SYLVESTER commented that ORVILLE SPLITT, Director of News Services, Department of Defense, who works directly with Pentagon news correspondents, probably could furnish additional information regarding BALDWIN.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RMW/GJL:ctw)

b3
b7E

MR. ORVILLE SPLITT, DIRECTOR
OF NEWS SERVICES, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE

Mr. ORVILLE SPLITT, on August 1, 1962, advised that he has been employed in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs for the past several years. He stated that in his present position as Director of News Services, he is in daily contact with correspondents at the Pentagon and he sees HANSON BALDWIN when BALDWIN periodically visits the Pentagon. Mr. SPLITT stated that, generally speaking, when BALDWIN visits the Pentagon, he remains in the Pentagon for two or three days and operates out of the Press Room. He then returns to his office in New York City and generally prepares several articles which are apparently based on information he has learned during his visit to the Pentagon. Mr. SPLITT pointed out that frequently BALDWIN is able to "scoop" the other reporters with information that he has obtained from his highly placed sources.

Mr. SPLITT stated that BALDWIN never makes requests to conduct interviews with any high-ranking individuals, either civilian or military, at the Pentagon, with the exception of Secretary MC NAMARA and Deputy Secretary of Defense ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC. Mr. SPLITT said the only reason BALDWIN makes these appointments through the Public Affairs Office is because Secretary MC NAMARA has so directed.

Mr. SPLITT commented that BALDWIN is considered aloof to the run-of-the-mill person and talks only to high-ranking individuals. He said it has been generally rumored that BALDWIN doesn't even talk to a person with the rank of Colonel; that he talks only with the very top people. Mr. SPLITT stated that while at the Pentagon BALDWIN spends considerable time on the News Room telephone. Mr. SPLITT also stated that he is unaware of the identities of any of BALDWIN's contacts, although BALDWIN gives the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RMW/GJL:ctw)

b3
b7E

appearance of being extremely busy and occupied. He apparently thoroughly covers the Pentagon. He also stated that based on the fact that articles written by BALDWIN are slanted in favor of the Navy, he feels sure that BALDWIN's best sources of information are in the Navy Department. He also stated that since BALDWIN is probably regarded by other correspondents, if not most military personnel at the Pentagon, as an expert in military affairs, he is treated as one of the military family and is thus able to obtain information unavailable to the average correspondent.

Mr. SPLITT was recontacted on August 8, 1962, in order to obtain copies of the speech made by Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. McNAMARA at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16, 1962. Mr. SPLITT advised after Secretary McNAMARA made this commencement speech there was considerable agreement among the Pentagon correspondents that the speech presented a new concept in United States policy and indicated the United States had achieved a breakthrough in intelligence. According to the correspondents, this concept was predicated upon that portion of Mr. McNAMARA's speech which stated, "...principal military objectives, in the event of nuclear war..., should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population."

Mr. SPLITT said the correspondents concluded from this portion of the speech that if the United States planned to attack only military targets, the United States, therefore, had been able to identify Soviet military targets. Because the U-2 Airplane no longer was being used, the correspondents theorized the United States must have perfected a photographic satellite. Mr. SPLITT pointed out that THOMAS B. ROSS of the "Chicago Sun - Times" first expressed this theory and published an article in the "Chicago Sun - Times" dated June 22, 1962, concerning this. Mr. SPLITT said it was his opinion that ROSS's article was purely speculative and that he had not obtained any information appearing in this article from any knowledgeable person or from any classified source and it was a conclusion based entirely upon the McNAMARA speech.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RMW/GJL:rps)

b3
b7E

Mr. SPLITT said that ROSS and WARREN ROGERS, Jr., of the "New York Herald Tribune" apparently have a working agreement to share information and ideas in their coverage of the Pentagon. Mr. SPLITT continued it was his opinion that ROGERS adopted ROSS's article as the basis of an article ROGERS published in the "New York Herald Tribune" also dated June 22, 1962. Mr. SPLITT based this on the fact that Mr. ROSS has more of an analytical mind in comparison with Mr. ROGERS. Mr. SPLITT said the "Denver Post" on June 22, 1962, also published part of ROSS's article.

The text of ROSS's article as made available by Mr. SPLITT is set forth below:

"Chicago Sun-Times, June 22, 1962

"THOMAS B. ROSS

"Washington Dateline--The U. S. has reportedly achieved a major intelligence breakthrough that provides a valid picture of how many weapons the Soviet Union possesses and where they are located.

"The penetration of Russian secrecy has convinced the Kennedy Administration that it could now launch a pinpointed atomic attack on the bomber and missile bases inside the Soviet Union.

"The breakthrough accounts for Secretary ROBERT S. McNAMARA's disclosure Saturday that the U. S. plans to strike at military sites rather than cities in the event of nuclear war.

"The nature of the breakthrough was being held as a highly classified and sensitive secret. But it was understood to involve a refinement of technique rather than a revolutionary new method.

"Apparently startling progress has been made during the last year with electronic listening apparatus along the Iron Curtain and with the super secret 'spy-in-the-sky' satellite.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RMW/GJL:rps)

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

"The underpinning of the breakthrough is the mass of clear photos brought back by the U-2 spy plane before it was grounded in May 1960 when FRANCIS GARY POWERS who was down 1,200 miles inside Soviet Russia.

"Defense officials report that new intelligence information is so convincing that the Army, Navy and Air Force which previously differed radically in their estimates are now in virtual agreement.

"On the basis of the intelligence McNAMARA has declared on several occasions that the U. S. possesses an overwhelming nuclear superiority.

"This amounts to a dramatic about-face from the contention of President KENNEDY in the 1960 Presidential campaign that the U. S. was threatened by a missile gap.

"Former President DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER declared in his 'farewell address' that the missile gap showed every sign of being a 'fiction.'

"McNAMARA conceded as much shortly after taking office and examining the intelligence secrets.

"Fears of Soviet atomic power diminished rapidly over the last year as the intelligence breakthrough became more pronounced and convincing.

"The Administration is not contending that current intelligence sources are fool-proof, but as one important adviser put it, there is a 'very high level of confidence' in the information.

"The Russians may be able to protect some of their weapons by making them mobile or pouring concrete shields. But Pentagon planners insist that most have been precisely pinpointed.

"The intelligence breakthrough is said to have enabled McNAMARA to pronounce the new city-sparing nuclear strategy -- the offer to avoid decimating civilian populations in Russia, if the Russians abide by the same rules should war break out.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
(RMW/GJL:rps)

"Administration officials admitted strategy was adopted partly because it has proved extremely difficult to persuade the nations of Western Europe to build up their conventional manpower and weaponry.

"Mr. KENNEDY came into office proclaiming the necessity of the major conventional weapons effort but the Administration has now decided it will be politically impossible both at home and abroad to match Soviet ground forces for many years.

"The Red Army is to be contained by the old threat of atomic retaliation. But it is hoped that such a nuclear defense can be achieved without too much bloodshed.

"The argument runs that the Kremlin might not believe the United States would swap some of its cities to save Europe, but it would surely pause if it realized this country could wipe out Russian military power in a quick retaliatory blow."

~~SECRET~~

CEG/pcn

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

MR. CHARLES J. HITCH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMPTROLLER)

(U) Mr. HITCH advised on August 10, 1962, he was familiar with the information contained in the [NIE 11-8-62] study and only two people on his staff, in addition to himself, were cleared for and had access to this information. He identified them as Dr. ALAIN ENTHOVEN, Chief, Directorate for Systems Analysis (Programming), and Mr. FRANK TRINKL, Operations Analyst, both individuals within Mr. HITCH's staff. He said ordinarily Mr. HENRY GLASS, Economic Advisor in his office, would also have access to any material dealing with budget problems, although in the case of the [NIE] material mentioned, GLASS was not involved in that matter.

(U) Mr. HITCH stated he had no suggestion as to how the leak to HANSON BALDWIN occurred in connection with the July 26, 1962, newspaper column, and added he was not familiar at all with any of BALDWIN's contacts within the Government. Personally, Mr. HITCH stated, his only encounters with HANSON BALDWIN occurred once several years ago when he met BALDWIN at the Army War College, and later he met him socially at a dinner party in 1961. He said he had a personal dislike for BALDWIN because shortly after Mr. HITCH took office BALDWIN wrote a news column in which he attacked Mr. HITCH. He said he had never had any personal interviews with BALDWIN and because of the personal affront as a result of the news column criticizing him (HITCH), he said he would not see BALDWIN if he sought an interview.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
GJL/RMW:kjl

b3
b7E

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE S. BROWN
USAF, MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

Brigadier General BROWN advised on August 13, 1962, that he has known Mr. BALDWIN for about the last five years. He first met Mr. BALDWIN when he, General BROWN, was an aide to General WHITE, former Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. He has seen Mr. BALDWIN when Mr. BALDWIN periodically visits the Pentagon in connection with visits to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

General BROWN stated that his acquaintanceship with Mr. BALDWIN is nothing more than greeting him when he visits the officials of the Pentagon, and he does not think that Mr. BALDWIN would know him by name. He also stated that he did not see Mr. BALDWIN when he visited the Pentagon during July, 1962.

General BROWN stated that he is aware that Mr. BALDWIN is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and a military writer of some renown for "The New York Times" newspaper. He stated that because of these facts, BALDWIN has entree to the offices of the senior military and civilian officials of the Pentagon. General BROWN could not identify these officials other than to state that they generally include all of the civilian officials with the rank of Assistant Secretary of Defense and above, as well as the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Chairman of the JCS. General BROWN opined that Mr. BALDWIN associates with only the very top officials, both military and civilian in the Pentagon or other United States Government agencies where he may visit.

General BROWN stated that for about the first year after Secretary of Defense McNAMARA took office, Mr. BALDWIN did not contact McNAMARA because McNAMARA required that a third party be present during any interviews with members of the press. This requirement was offensive to Mr. BALDWIN. General BROWN continued that it is his understanding that this regulation applies to the other officials of the Pentagon; however, it is his opinion that some officials do not follow this regulation.

~~SECRET~~

GJL/RMW:kjl

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

(U) General BROWN stated that he considers the information which appeared in Mr. BALDWIN's article of July 26, 1962, to be a "very serious leak" of highly sensitive intelligence information. He stated that he does not know the identity of Mr. BALDWIN's source of information for this article, however, he feels that this individual or the individuals who furnished the information to Mr. BALDWIN had access to either [NIE 11-8-62] or the back up material used in preparing the document. General BROWN does not think that this article is slanted in favor of any one of the United States military services.

General BROWN said it is his opinion that many people talk very frankly to Mr. BALDWIN and that it is possible that someone naively gave him the information on which the article was based merely as background information and did not intend it to be used as basis for an article. General BROWN stated that this is his speculation only. General BROWN concluded by stating that after giving this leak of information serious thought, it is his opinion that Mr. BALDWIN's source is such a high placed official of the U. S. Government that, even if identified, no action will be taken against him. General BROWN said this is his personal opinion only and is not based on any evidence.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

CAM/HWS:pcn

DR. HAROLD BROWN
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

On August 6, 1962, BROWN advised that his only contact with HANSON BALDWIN was about six months ago. He stated the meeting was arranged for by ARTHUR SYLVESTER, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). Matters discussed related to BROWN's duties and general defense problems. He stated this was his only contact with BALDWIN, either officially or socially.

BROWN advised he is acquainted with the following representatives of "The New York Times": JOHN FINNEY, JACK RAYMOND and ANTHONY LEWIS, whom he knows socially only. He said he has not seen RAYMOND within the last two months. According to BROWN, FINNEY recently tried to get in touch with BROWN concerning nuclear testing and detection matters.

BROWN said he is not familiar with BALDWIN's contacts, except that he had been informed that during BALDWIN's recent visit to Washington, D. C., BALDWIN met with Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. McNAMARA and Lieutenant General WILLIAM P. ENNIS. BROWN understood that that visit dealt with matters of interest to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group.

(U) BROWN said he has not read [NIE 11-8-62] but has had the benefit of periodic briefings on subject matter contained in it by the Defense Intelligence Agency. BROWN indicated he had never had any inquiry regarding the subject matter of [NIE 11-8-62] from any outside source.

[REDACTED]
(CEG:ctw)

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

DR. ALAIN ENTHOVEN
CHIEF, DIRECTORATE FOR SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
OFFICE OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
PROGRAMMING
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMPTROLLER)

Dr. ALAIN ENTHOVEN advised August 7, 1962, he was with Secretary MC NAMARA on July 26, 1962, along with HENRY S. ROWEN, OSD, International Security Affairs (ISA), when he became aware of and read the BALDWIN article of that date. ENTHOVEN, Secretary MC NAMARA and [REDACTED] all considered it a breach of security of the most sensitive kind. ENTHOVEN stated he does not know BALDWIN or any of BALDWIN's contacts; has no suggestion as to how this leak occurred. He recalled that early in 1961, shortly after MC NAMARA took office, he headed a task force to review the 1961-62 fiscal year budget, to prepare a study for the Secretary of Defense, of recommendations to be presented to the President. The final draft, classified "TOP SECRET" and dated February 12, 1961, was captioned, "Strategic Offense and Continental Air Defense in Connection With the Budgets for FY 1961 and 1962." This study dealt with projections in the areas of general warfare, thermonuclear warfare, and research and development, and material in it was "closely held." ENTHOVEN stated that before Secretary MC NAMARA presented this study to the President, it came out in HANSON BALDWIN's column, and BALDWIN's article followed the exact order, in discussing various items, as the order in which they appeared in the completed study. ENTHOVEN said he had full confidence in all personnel who took part in the preparation of this budget matter, with one possible exception. He said he had no grounds or basis for his distrust of Rear Admiral TURNER CALDWELL but felt CALDWELL was a "spy for the Navy." In response to specific questions relative to his singling out CALDWELL, ENTHOVEN said that when Mr. CHARLES J. HITCH took office as Assistant Secretary of Defense - Comptroller, he brought in an Air Force officer as one of his special assistants; and, due to Navy pressure to be equally represented in the Comptroller's area, Captain (now Rear Admiral) CALDWELL was also assigned

b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(CEG:ctw)

b3
b7E

ENTHOVEN said it was after working with CALDWELL for about two months in the budget study group that he came to feel CALDWELL was a "spy for the Navy." He said it also had come to his attention that CALDWELL had been noted to appear to make efforts to examine papers on desks of other occupants in his area when the person or persons assigned to the desks were temporarily away from their desks. For this reason, ENTHOVEN had the feeling that CALDWELL was "snooping." ENTHOVEN said he had no information that CALDWELL might know HANSON BALDWIN.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

CEG/pcn

COLONEL JOHN W. DEAN, Jr., USAF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, OFFICE OF ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

(U) Colonel DEAN, Executive Officer to Mr. PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), advised on August 3, 1962, that Mr. NITZE had requested him to conduct an inquiry within ISA with regard to NIE 11-8-62 and the leak to HANSON BALDWIN. (U) Colonel DEAN related the summary document of NIE 11-8-62 had been read only by Mr. NITZE, and by Colonel THOMAS W. WOLFE, USAF, Regional Director, Sino-Soviet Affairs, ISA. Later, according to Colonel DEAN, the complete, all-sources NIE paper was read by Colonel WOLFE on July 27, 1962, and on the following day by Mr. NITZE. Colonel DEAN stated he, along with Colonel WOLFE, Mr. HENRY S. ROWEN, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and National Security Council (ISA), and Rear Admiral JOHN M. LEE, Director, Policy Planning Staff (ISA), attended a briefing relating to NIE material in the JCS War Room.

(U) Also, on July 16, 1962, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) sent people to brief Mr. NITZE personally, and this briefing was attended by Mr. NITZE, Colonel WOLFE, Colonel DEAN and Mr. FRANK H. TRINKL, Operational Analyst (ISA). In addition to these persons, Colonel DEAN stated, Dr. ALAIN ENTHOVEN, Chief, Directorate for Systems Analysis, had access to the information in NIE 11-8-62 by reason of discussions with Mr. TRINKL, HENRY ROWEN and himself. He added that Mr. ROWEN of ISA also had attended discussions relating to NIE in the office of Secretary McNAMARA along with ADAM YARMOLINSKY, Special Assistant to Mr. McNAMARA.


Colonel DEAN related that in the course of his inquiry conducted at Mr. NITZE's request, he ascertained none of the people named by him as having access to NIE material in ISA had been in touch with HANSON BALDWIN. Colonel DEAN said BALDWIN had not been to Mr. NITZE's office during the week of July 16, 1962, and had not sought an appointment to see him.

He related that approximately six or eight months ago HANSON BALDWIN saw Mr. NITZE about matters relating to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

 X
the North Atlantic Council; thereafter BALDWIN wrote an article which Mr. NITZE considered grossly inaccurate and which caused Mr. NITZE to be very angry with BALDWIN. According to Colonel DEAN, BALDWIN had not attempted to see Mr. NITZE since that occasion.

Colonel DEAN stated he did not know HANSON BALDWIN; never discussed classified matters with any unauthorized person or persons; had no suggestion how BALDWIN obtained the information for the July 26, 1962, news article.

~~SECRET~~ X

CEG:ctw/kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

COLONEL THOMAS W. WOLFE, USAF
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, SINO-SOVIET AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
REGIONAL AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (ISA)

Colonel WOLFE advised, August 13, 1962, he met HANSON BALDWIN in 1959, while accompanying General NATHAN TWINING with a delegation which toured the Soviet Union; and BALDWIN, as a member of the press, went on this trip. Colonel WOLFE has not seen BALDWIN since that time and has had no contact with him whatsoever. He said he has no idea how the information was leaked to BALDWIN to enable him to write the July 26, 1962, news article.

Colonel WOLFE related he read the BALDWIN article on July 26, 1962, and discussed it with PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) and with [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] National Security Council (NSC); and at that time, they speculated about the possibility the BALDWIN newspaper article was the result of a "controlled leak" from a high level. In his opinion, WOLFE said, he did not believe the leak reflected any single "service" advantage; possibly it could be interpreted as an "all-service pitch" or possibly in the general national interest with regard to Soviet-American diplomatic relations.

(U) Colonel WOLFE said he had read the [NIE document] (c) and many of the items in BALDWIN's article were subjects of wide public knowledge. However, he felt there were a number of items within the [NIE document] specifically touched on in the BALDWIN article and it indicated BALDWIN's information was based on a leak. In particular, WOLFE said he noted the reference to "hardening," successful first firings of Soviet missiles from submerged submarines and the estimates of the numbers of Soviet ICBM's. He said it was the reference by BALDWIN to Soviet missile sites being "hardened" that "rocked me the most."

Colonel WOLFE related he was action officer for Mr. NITZE in the preparation of the Defense Department's

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CEG:ctw/kmm

b3
b7E

(U) portion of a paper which had been requested by the President for the purpose of assessing the implications of [NIE 11-8-62] While relating his activity in this connection, Colonel WOLFE stated there was also a paper dealing with the subject of satellites and antisatellites and Soviet capabilities or possibilities in this field. He said this paper was prepared around the middle of July, 1962, by BRUNO W. AUGENSTEIN, Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Intelligence and Reconnaissance).

~~SECRET~~

CEG:ctw/kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

MR. BRUNO W. AUGENSTEIN
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING (DR&E)
(INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE)

Mr. AUGENSTEIN advised on August 13, 1962, he had never met HANSON BALDWIN and he had no suggestion as to how BALDWIN came into possession of the classified information which appeared in the news column of July 26, 1962. He said he had no knowledge of any of BALDWIN's contacts.

(U) AUGENSTEIN related that when he read the HANSON BALDWIN column, it occurred to him there were items in the news article somewhat similar to a paper which had been prepared by him and which dealt with the vulnerability of our reconnaissance satellites. He related, in response to Secretary MC NAMARA's request, a survey had been instituted among the people in Research and Engineering who were cleared for the [NIE material]; and, in conducting this survey, a questionnaire was executed by each of some 25 or 30 employees. AUGENSTEIN said only one questionnaire returned indicated any association with BALDWIN and this questionnaire had been received from Brigadier General J. W. "JACK" O'NEILL, Director, Directors Staff Group, DR&E. On his questionnaire, Brigadier General O'NEILL indicated he had met BALDWIN in the Spring of 1960 but had not seen HANSON BALDWIN for more than a year.

With regard to the paper previously mentioned by Mr. AUGENSTEIN, he stated that under the direction of Secretary MC NAMARA and at his expressed request on June 6, 1962, AUGENSTEIN supervised the preparation of a report and work took place during the last week of June and first two weeks of July. The title of this paper, as best recalled by AUGENSTEIN, was "Measures to Reduce the Vulnerability of Our Reconnaissance Satellites" and it was classified "TOP SECRET - SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED". AUGENSTEIN said there were only four copies of this document produced, each copy consisting of nine or ten pages, single spaced; and the finished product was dated either July 13 or July 14, 1962, and delivered to

~~SECRET~~

CEG:ctw/kmm

b3
b7E

X

Secretary MC NAMARA on the day following. Mr. AUGENSTEIN stated this paper was disseminated by giving one copy to Mr. MC NAMARA; one copy to Mr. GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense; one copy to Mr. CHARYK, Under Secretary of the Air Force; and one copy was retained by AUGENSTEIN as a file copy. He said that later a copy of this document was sent to Dr. HERBERT/SCOVILLE, Deputy Director for Research, CIA. AUGENSTEIN said he now had two copies of this document in his safe, one being the copy furnished to Mr. MC NAMARA, and he believed the other copy is the one which initially was directed to Deputy Secretary of Defense GILPATRIC.

Mr. AUGENSTEIN advised that his assistant, LOWELL R. DAILEY, could furnish complete information on the dissemination of this document and, as well, the exact title and date of issuance.

X

~~SECRET~~

CEG:ctw/kmm

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. LOWELL R. DAILEY
STAFF ASSISTANT
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE
RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
(INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE)

Mr. DAILEY advised that the document referred to by Mr. BRUNO AUGENSTEIN was "Protection of Satellite Reconnaissance Vehicles," classified "~~TOP SECRET~~ - SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED," and dated July 13, 1962. Mr. DAILEY stated there were only four typed copies of this document prepared. He said on July 14, 1962, a single copy was delivered personally to Secretary of Defense MC NAMARA by Dr. HAROLD BROWN, Director of Defense Research and Engineering. This copy was returned to Mr. AUGENSTEIN's office on the same date. DAILEY stated the second copy of this document was delivered to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. GILPATRIC, on July 16, 1962, and was returned to Mr. AUGENSTEIN's office on the same date. He stated Copy Number Three was delivered to Mr. JOSEPH V. CHARYK, Under Secretary of the Air Force, on July 14, 1962, and that copy has not been returned. The fourth and final copy of this document remained in the custody and control of Mr. AUGENSTEIN; and on August 7, 1962, the copy which previously had been furnished to Mr. GILPATRIC was furnished to Dr. HERBERT SCOVILLE, CIA. CIA has retained possession of this copy.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
MAT:rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

The highly classified document referred to above was reviewed on August 14, 1962. It was prepared under direction of BRUNO AUGENSTEIN and consists of ten single spaced pages and cover memorandum by Dr. HAROLD BROWN, Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The document is captioned "Protection of Reconnaissance Satellite Vehicles."

The last three paragraphs of the BALDWIN news article of July 26, 1962, deal with the subjects of anti-missiles and anti-satellites and states that some Pentagon officials credit the Russians with the capability of intercepting a single Atlas, or perhaps Titan in flight, and makes reference to the recent successful interception over the Pacific Ocean of an Atlas-type missile by the Nike-Zeus system, but indicates neither Russia nor the United States is believed capable of meeting large scale missile attack or intercepting missiles equipped with decoy devices or other penetration aids. The final paragraph sets forth that many United States military officers are convinced this country must demonstrate a greater sense of urgency in the anti-ballistic missile, and anti-satellite field and in the military applications of space, and concludes with the statement many of them anticipate, uneasily, another spectacular Soviet feat in space within the next few months and some believe this may take the form of shooting down a satellite.

The classified document referred to above is concerned with satellites and contains, in part, the following wording. The document states that the Soviets may already have the capability, through their ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) and electronic abilities, to attack a satellite by nuclear explosion and indicates this may not be too difficult a problem, citing the recent success of the Nike-Zeus system in intercepting an Atlas missile. The document also contains references to decoy satellites listing decoys prominently as one of several means of providing protection to satellites and declaring there is urgent need to expedite a program to test decoys and other suggested methods. The classified document also expresses the opinion that the Soviets have the motive and desire as well as the probable capabilities to attack a satellite and voices the fear that they may utilize the cover afforded by the current (then projected) series of Soviet nuclear tests to shoot one down.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

X

INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL OF
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DOD

~~SECRET~~

X

SECRET

DEM/RCB:pcn

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL
DIRECTOR
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

On July 26, 1962, General CARROLL advised that he had no information as to the source of the material utilized by HANSON BALDWIN in his article of July 26, 1962. General CARROLL stated he is acquainted with BALDWIN, but has not seen him in the recent past and did not see BALDWIN during the latter's visit to Washington during the week of July 16, 1962.

He described BALDWIN as an individual who has extremely important contacts and General CARROLL stated that he is very well known at The Pentagon. He said, however, he has no information which might indicate who may have been in contact with BALDWIN recently or may have been responsible for furnishing information utilized in the July 26th article.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEM:mpc

~~TOP SECRET~~

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM W. QUINN
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(U) Major General QUINN advised on July 30, 1962, that he has no information as to the source of the material in HANSON BALDWIN's article in "The New York Times" of July 26, 1962. In his opinion, however, the source of this information definitely had access to [NIE 11-8-62] or drafts leading up to the document and the person also must have had some operational background. ~~S-3~~ ~~(S)~~

General QUINN stated that he has known BALDWIN for several years and in General QUINN's former position as Chief of Information for the Army was in fairly frequent contact with BALDWIN. He said, however, he did not see BALDWIN during the week of July 16, 1962; in fact, has not seen BALDWIN for many months.

General QUINN described BALDWIN as one of the "elite" in that he has entree to the higher officials. According to him, BALDWIN is pretty much of a "lone wolf" and it is his personal opinion that BALDWIN undoubtedly acquired the information for the article personally.

(U) General QUINN was unable to advise concerning contacts made by BALDWIN during the week of July 16, 1962. He had no information which might assist as to how BALDWIN may have obtained the information which appears in this article. With regard to individuals possessing information contained in [NIE 11-8-62], General QUINN recalled that on July 18, 1962, at a meeting of the USIB, Major General ROBERT A. BREITWEISER had mentioned appearing before a Senate Committee headed by Senator STUART SYMINGTON and apparently some information related to [NIE 11-8-62] came up. General BREITWEISER indicated that in response to a question from Senator SYMINGTON he advised that this was from a "new estimate". ~~(S)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
RMW KJ L

REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM R. McCORMICK
USN
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Admiral McCORMICK advised on August 16, 1962, that he first met HANSON BALDWIN in approximately 1954 when BALDWIN was referred to him in connection with some information BALDWIN was seeking. Admiral McCORMICK said the information BALDWIN desired was classified and he told BALDWIN that he could not discuss the material. Admiral McCORMICK said he is now unable to recall the subject matter in which BALDWIN was interested and he could not recall who referred BALDWIN to him.

Admiral McCORMICK said that from about January, 1961, to February 27, 1962, he served as a military aide to Deputy Secretary of Defense ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC. During that period of time, Admiral McCORMICK said BALDWIN visited Mr. GILPATRIC on four or five occasions, and on each visit he greeted BALDWIN and ushered BALDWIN into Mr. GILPATRIC's Office.

Admiral McCORMICK said he was not present during any of the interviews BALDWIN had with Mr. GILPATRIC and he does not know the subject matters Mr. GILPATRIC and BALDWIN discussed during these interviews. Admiral McCORMICK added that normally Mr. GILPATRIC did not have a third person present during press interviews.

Admiral McCORMICK said the above-mentioned circumstances are the only times he has had any personal contact with BALDWIN. He said he has seen BALDWIN in the corridors of the Pentagon on other occasions and has exchanged greetings with him but he has had no conversations with him. Admiral McCORMICK added that he believes he is just a familiar face to BALDWIN and that BALDWIN does not know his identity.

Admiral McCORMICK said he does not know who BALDWIN sees in the Pentagon and he does not know his friends, contacts or sources of information. Admiral McCORMICK said he does not know how BALDWIN obtained the information contained in "The New York Times" article of July 26, 1962. Admiral McCORMICK said he also casually knows JACK RAYMOND, the Pentagon

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:kjl

~~TOP SECRET~~

correspondent for "The New York Times" but has had no social association with RAYMOND. He said he does not know RAYMOND's sources of information or his contacts.

(U) in [NIE 11-8-62] inasmuch as the DIA has certain responsibilities in connection with this document. Admiral McCORMICK said he has discussed the document and the material in the document only with authorized individuals in DIA. Admiral McCORMICK said he had no recommendations or suggestions as to how the source of BALDWIN's information could be identified.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:GJL/rps

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~
[REDACTED]
UNITED STATES ARMY, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

On August 6, 1962, [REDACTED] advised that he is not acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN and has no information as to how BALDWIN obtained the information which appeared in "The New York Times" article of July 26, 1962. [REDACTED] stated that he does not know anyone who is acquainted with BALDWIN, nor is he acquainted with any other individuals associated with "The New York Times" newspaper. [REDACTED]

b3 10 USC 424
b6

(U) [REDACTED] stated that he has never discussed the contents of NIE 11-8-62 with anyone other than personnel in his department who are cleared to receive this information. [REDACTED] added that he has never used the term "image interpretation." (S) per DIA

(U) [REDACTED] said he had heard a rumor, the source of which he could not recall, that in connection with discussions of NIE 11-8-62 by the United States Intelligence Board, that the United States State Department member, ROGER HILSMAN, advocated the theory that the United States knowledge of the Soviet military strength should be made public. This theory was based on the premise that Soviet acts of aggression might be reduced if the Soviets were aware the United States had exact information regarding the Soviet military potential. [REDACTED] stated HILSMAN's theory was not adopted. (S) per DIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
RMW/GJL:pcn

[REDACTED] USAF

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b3 10 USC 424
b6

On July 30, 1962, [REDACTED] advised that he is not acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN and that he has no information as to how BALDWIN obtained the information which appeared in the article of July 26, 1962. [REDACTED] also stated that he does not know anyone who is acquainted with BALDWIN, nor does he know any other individual associated with "The New York Times" newspaper.

per DIA

(U) [REDACTED] advised that he has never discussed the contents of NIE 11-8-62 with anyone other than personnel working in his agency who are cleared to receive this type information. [REDACTED] added that he had never used the term "image interpretation" and that this term to his knowledge is not used within the DIA.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

[REDACTED] further stated that he had heard a rumor, the source of which he could not recall, to the effect that BALDWIN travels in very high circles and has numerous contacts. He also stated that he had heard that BALDWIN recently had lunch with Mr. ROGER HILLSMAN, the State Department Member of the USIB.

per
DIA

(U) [REDACTED] stated that in his opinion the two critical areas in the article are the ones which refer to the "hardening" of the Soviet missile installations and the number of Soviet missiles. He stated that these two points are particularly significant since the article of July 26, 1962, was published just after the completion of NIE 11-8-62. [REDACTED] stated, however, that he is of the opinion that the article of July 26, 1962, could have been written by an astute military writer such as BALDWIN without knowledge of the document by piecing together bits of information from public source material and from conversation by him with various friends and sources.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per
DIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW/GJL:pcn

b3
b7E

[REDACTED] USN

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

On July 30, 1962, [REDACTED] advised that he is not acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN and that he has no information as to how BALDWIN obtained the information which appeared in the article of July 26, 1962. [REDACTED] further stated that he does not know anyone who is acquainted with BALDWIN, nor does he know anyone associated with "The New York Times" newspaper.

(U) [REDACTED] said he had never discussed the contents of NIE 11-8-62 with anyone other than personnel working in the [REDACTED]. He further stated that he had never heard the term "image interpretation" prior to reading it in BALDWIN's article.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

[REDACTED] said it was his opinion that an astute writer of military affairs such as BALDWIN could have pieced together the article in question from little pieces of information obtained from a variety of sources. He said he believed the article could have been written without having access to the document or to specific information in the document.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
DMB:kjl/rps

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b3 10 USC 424
b6

[REDACTED] was interviewed on July 30, 1962, at which time he said he had no information as to the source of HANSON BALDWIN's article of July 26, 1962. He stated he had no personal knowledge of BALDWIN's contacts and was not personally acquainted with him. However, he stated he had been told by [REDACTED] that morning that the latter had heard that during the week of July 16-20, 1962, BALDWIN had had lunch with Mr. HILSMAN of the United States Department of State.

per DIA

(U) He expressed the opinion that information on which BALDWIN based his article of July 26, 1962, possibly came from NIE 11-8-62, but more likely originated from briefings covering material later included in NIE 11-8-62. He stated that these briefings, which began on July 1, 1962, were in three series and each series consisted of from 10 to 12 groups, each group being comprised of from 2 to 70 persons. All of these briefings, according to [REDACTED] stressed "hardening," "coffin" type construction; and in describing Soviet missile sites, the figure 8 was generally used.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

In the opinion of [REDACTED] it is significant that the BALDWIN article, as did the recent briefings, stressed "hardening" and mentioned the newly learned intelligence that most of the Soviet installations are comprised of eight or more launching sites. However, the term "hardening" does not necessarily involve the use of concrete, but may consist of simply an earthen embankment used to shield the installations from blast. This point, according to [REDACTED] was not understood by BALDWIN as is illustrated by the fact the opening paragraph of his article of July 26, 1962, defines "hardening" as "protected by concrete."

b3 10 USC 424
b6

Concerning the term "image interpretation" which was used by BALDWIN, [REDACTED] stated that this term has been used recently by personnel making the final evaluation of sophisticated photograph techniques. He stated that high-level personnel have tended to use this term increasingly as a result of their briefings. On the other hand, according to [REDACTED] this expression is used also by employees of private concerns supplying technical equipment used in reconnaissance operations.

per DIA

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
DMB:KJL/rps

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

[redacted] when interviewed on July 30, 1962, furnished no information of value to this investigation by way of direct information or supposition as to the source of BALDWIN's information. However, he mentioned that during the Fall of 1961, he recalled that [redacted]

[redacted] and the United States in the field of guided missiles. The purpose behind this proposal was to indicate to the Soviets that the preponderance of strength in the missile area rests with the United States. [redacted] had no recollection as to who made this proposal, but stated that the entire military representation on USIB opposed it, and to his knowledge, no action was taken on these lines.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

[redacted] advised that he had no information as to any individuals who might have been in contact with BALDWIN during the week of July 16-20, 1962.

Shortly after the conclusion of the above interview, [redacted] telephonically contacted the interviewing Agents and stated that earlier that morning he had been told that BALDWIN had had lunch with Mr. HILSMAN of the United States Department of State during the week of July 16-20, 1962, and that he had mentioned this fact to [redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency. [redacted] stated, however, that subsequent to his telling [redacted] of this he had recontacted his original source and found that the information given to him was in error, for which reason he had stated, during the interview set forth above, that he had no information relative to BALDWIN's contacts.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

[redacted] was reinterviewed on August 8, 1962, concerning his statement previously made relative to the rumor of a luncheon meeting between HANSON BALDWIN and Mr. HILSMAN of the United States Department of State. [redacted] stated that on the morning of July 30, 1962, he had been told by [redacted] of DIA that

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
DMB:kmm/rps

b3
b7E

Mr. HILSMAN had told him at the last meeting of the United States Intelligence Board that he had lunch with a newspaperman during the week of July 16-20, 1962. When this information was originally given to [REDACTED] he believed that [REDACTED] was speaking about HANSON BALDWIN. Subsequently, on the same morning and before being interviewed in connection with this investigation, [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] and learned that the latter had not been speaking about BALDWIN, but some other unidentified newspaperman and that at the time of their luncheon engagement their conversation had been confined to the military problem in the Taiwan Straits. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] did not indicate to him the identity of this individual, but he was certain that it was not HANSON BALDWIN, for which reason he had not mentioned this matter when previously interviewed on July 30, 1962.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
RMW:GJL/rps

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
[redacted]
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

b3 10 USC 424
b6

(U) On August 8, 1962, [redacted] advised that he knows of HANSON BALDWIN by reputation, but does not know him personally. [redacted] said he has no information as to how BALDWIN obtained the information which appeared in "The New York Times" article of July 26, 1962, but that, in his opinion, BALDWIN must have talked to someone with knowledge of NIE 11-8-62 for the back-up information of this document. [redacted] stated he does not know anyone who is acquainted with BALDWIN, nor does he know any other individuals associated with "The New York Times" newspaper.

per DIA

(U) [redacted] advised that he has never discussed the contents of NIE 11-8-62 or the back-up material of this document with anyone other than personnel working in his agency who are cleared to receive this information. [redacted] also said he had never used the term "image interpretation" and that this term was not used within the Defense Intelligence Agency.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

[redacted] said apparently he has been falsely quoted as the source of a rumor that ROGER HILSMAN, at the United States Department of State, USIB member, recently had lunch with BALDWIN. [redacted] explained that about a month ago he attended a USIB meeting with Lieutenant General WILLIAM W. QUINN of the Defense Intelligence Agency. At the meeting HILSMAN reported to the board that he recently had lunch with the well-known columnist JOSEPH ALSOP and that ALSOP, unsuccessfully, had attempted to solicit information from HILSMAN concerning United States intelligence data on the communist build-up in the Taiwan Straits. [redacted] said the USIB meeting was held shortly before or after ALSOP had written an article which was published in "The Saturday Evening Post," which apparently was based upon United States intelligence data. [redacted] said it appeared to him that the ALSOP article contained information from a [redacted]

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:GJL/rps

b3
b7E

[REDACTED] said that following the above-mentioned USIB meeting he had related to [REDACTED] one of his subordinates, the fact HILSMAN had lunch with ALSOP and that ALSOP was interested in the Taiwan Straits.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

[REDACTED] said shortly after the HANSON BALDWIN "New York Times" article of July 26, 1962, and the resulting investigation, [REDACTED] apparently confused BALDWIN with ALSOP and the false story had circulated through the Defense Intelligence Agency, quoting [REDACTED] as the source that BALDWIN recently had lunch with HILSMAN. [REDACTED] said as soon as he heard the story he immediately informed [REDACTED] of his mistake, and the circulation of this story was stopped.

per DIA

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
RMW/GJL:pcn

COMMANDER [REDACTED] USN
[REDACTED]
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

On July 30, 1962, [REDACTED] advised that he is not acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN and that he has no information as to how BALDWIN obtained the information which appeared in the article of July 26, 1962. [REDACTED] stated that he does not know of anyone who is acquainted with BALDWIN, nor does he know anyone associated with "The New York Times" newspaper.

(U) [REDACTED] said he did not read [NIE 11-8-62] until after July 26, 1962, but that he was aware of some of the information which made up this document. He added that he had never discussed this information with any unauthorized individual.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

[REDACTED] stated that although he did not use the term "image interpretation", he recalls that in a recent photo interpretation study prepared by a planning group he saw the term "interpretation of images". He said that "interpretation of images" and "image interpretation" probably are synonymous.

(U) [REDACTED] said in his opinion the information contained in BALDWIN's article must have been obtained either from [NIE 11-8-62] or from someone who had seen this document.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

[REDACTED] pointed out that the two critical points in Mr. BALDWIN's article are the hardening of Soviet missile installations and the number of Soviet missiles in existence. He added the fact that the Soviets are hardening their missile sites has been known only for the past few months.

per DIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:mpc

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED] USAF
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b3 10 UCS 424
b6

On July 30, 1962, [REDACTED] advised that he is not acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN, and that he has no information how BALDWIN obtained the information which appeared in the July 26, 1962, article. [REDACTED] also stated that he does not know anyone who is acquainted with BALDWIN, nor does he know any other individual associated with "The New York Times" newspaper.

per DIA

(U) [REDACTED] advised that he has never discussed the contents of NIE 11-8-62 with anyone other than [REDACTED] personnel working in his agency who are cleared to receive this type information. [REDACTED] added that he had never used the term "image interpretation" and that to the best of his knowledge this term is not used within the DIA.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

[REDACTED] added that it is his understanding that a recent issue of the "London Daily Mirror" had an article concerning the photographic ability of a U. S. satellite. He also stated that JOSEPH ALSOP, the well-known columnist, recently had an article in a magazine thought to be "The Saturday Evening Post" wherein he estimated that the Soviet Union had approximately one hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles. ALSOP also made mention in this article of intelligence type U. S. satellites equipped with camera equipment. [REDACTED] stated that based on the information appearing in the "London Daily Mirror" and ALSOP's article, he is of the opinion that a knowledgeable military writer could have written this article without knowledge of the document. [REDACTED] continued that BALDWIN could have accomplished this by piecing together public source information and by asking two or three leading but innocuous questions of highly placed associates of his.

b3 10 USC 424
b6

per DIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

X

INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL OF
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DOD

~~SECRET~~

X

CEG/pcn

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

MAJOR GENERAL J. STANLEY HOLTNER, USAF
MAJOR GENERAL DAVID W. GRAY, USA
REAR ADMIRAL GEORGE H. MILLER, USN
JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COUNCIL
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General HOLTNER, General GRAY and Admiral MILLER were interviewed jointly August 6, 1962.

General HOLTNER advised he was the action officer for this group and for the Chairman of JCS in the preparation of a study by Joint Strategic Survey Council which got under way at its first meeting July 11, 1962, in the office of U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Others attending this meeting included:

PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Political Affairs

FOY D. KOHLER, Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of European Affairs

SHERMAN KENT, CIA

General MAXWELL TAYLOR, Military Representative
of the President

ROGER HILSMAN, Director of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State

Colonel THOMAS W. WOLFE, Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs

In addition to the foregoing, General HOLTNER stated there was one other representative from the Department of State whose identity he did not recall.

(U) Concerning this meeting of July 11, 1962, General HOLTNER stated the purpose was to discuss the problem of the implications of the [NIE 11-8-62] study and to assign the tasks of preparing a paper or report. The problem relating to intelligence was assigned to KENT of CIA, the assessment of implications as to defense policy was assigned to PAUL NITZE,

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[]
OSD, ISA, and the matter as related to political policy was assigned for study to ALEXIS JOHNSON, State.

(U) General HOLTNER stated this group held subsequent meetings July 17 and July 23 in NITZE's office; July 24, July 27 and August 1, 1962, in ALEXIS JOHNSON's office at State; and on August 2, 1962, a draft of "Report of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Implications of [NIE 11-8-62] and Related Intelligence" was submitted to be distributed from ALEXIS JOHNSON's office. General HOLTNER stated this paper or its initial drafts would not have been, in his opinion, the source of the HANSON BALDWIN news article of July 26, 1962. With regard to BALDWIN's use of the terminology "greater sense of urgency", HOLTNER said this phraseology had been, in rather common usage and he attributed little significance to the fact that BALDWIN used it.


General HOLTNER stated that he went to Nevada July 16, 1962, to observe some testing and in his place General GRAY and Admiral MILLER acted in his stead. On receipt of a copy of CIA's contribution on July 17, 1962, General GRAY insisted that the text of the paper should include this comment as an addendum to the CIA in-put:

"The great risk for the future lies not in whether the USSR estimates that it will achieve relative balance with the United States in nuclear war capabilities. This is a development which we probably cannot avoid at any rate. The real risk lies in whether the Soviets estimate at a future date that they may gain a temporary military advantage in nuclear power and that we recognize this advantage. If this situation should occur, then the Soviets would seek every opportunity to exploit this temporary advantage in pursuit of their political objectives to the maximum before the United States could redress the balance. For this reason it is fundamentally important that the U. S. increase the sense of urgency in the development of weapons systems or elements of weapons systems which give any indications that unilateral possession would allow a relative military power advantage to accrue to the possessor of this new capability."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

 Generals HOLTNER and GRAY and Admiral MILLER pointed out the thought in the BALDWIN news article was the sense of urgency as it relates to defense preparation and not from the standpoint of offensive strength as urged by JCS.

General HOLTNER stated that General GRAY's comments were not accepted for inclusion in CIA's contribution and when he returned to Washington he felt so strongly about it he drafted a memorandum for SHERMAN KENT under date of July 20, 1962, and resubmitted General GRAY's comments. He added that at this time the Inter-Departmental Committee "bought it" and when the document was finally put in draft form August 2, 1962, General GRAY's comments came out among the material attributed to Department of State.

General HOLTNER said he does not know HANSON BALDWIN; has never discussed classified information with unauthorized persons; and has no idea as to BALDWIN's source for his July 26, 1962, column. He added his personal opinion is the leak very well could have been a deliberate one or "controlled" leak at high policy level, although HOLTNER said he considered it likely that at least a large amount of the information in the BALDWIN article could have been bits and pieces of information gathered over an extended period of time.

General GRAY commented he has known HANSON BALDWIN for many years, but has not had any contact with him since 1948 at Fort Benning. He said he had no suggestion as to how BALDWIN may have obtained the information, but his own personal opinion was the July 26, 1962, column could have been a deliberate "leak" from a highly-placed source. GRAY pointed out the BALDWIN article, in using the terminology "sense of urgency" used it in connection with our proposed build-up of anti-ballistic missiles and anti-missile missiles, an area of defense which is being "pushed" by State Department thinking with a view of fighting defensively. Contrary to this, General GRAY pointed out the stand of JCS is that JCS wants big weapons capable of complete and thorough destruction on a massive scale.

Admiral MILLER said he knew HANSON BALDWIN and last saw him during a lunch at the Army - Navy Club during

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

the week of July 16, 1962, although he was unable to fix the specific date. On this occasion Admiral MILLER said he noted BALDWIN was having lunch with two other men, one of whom, well known to Admiral MILLER, was Brigadier General JAMES D. HITTLE, U. S. Marine Corps, Retired, now a representative of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Admiral MILLER stated HITTLE noticed him and spoke and then BALDWIN spoke in turn and he merely exchanged greetings with them and did not meet the unidentified man accompanying BALDWIN and HITTLE. He said later that same day in mid-afternoon BALDWIN called him on the telephone and asked MILLER if he could see him. Admiral MILLER said he was tied up in conference at the time and so advised BALDWIN and they did not get together; BALDWIN did not attempt to see him thereafter. During his phone conversation with BALDWIN, the latter commented he had just talked to Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, and added that he was on his way to see Secretary of Defense McNAMARA. Admiral MILLER stated he had no idea who BALDWIN's sources were, although he said he knew BALDWIN saw people in high places on his trips to Washington. Admiral MILLER stated he had never discussed classified information with any unauthorized person or persons. He said his own feeling about the BALDWIN article was it was very possibly a deliberate or "controlled" leak. He added that BALDWIN's mention of "there is confidence in Washington . . ." sounds to Admiral MILLER like a statement from someone high in the administration.


(It will be noted, as set forth elsewhere in this report, the luncheon date Admiral MILLER noted BALDWIN having with Brigadier General HITTLE occurred on Thursday, July 19, 1962.)

General GRAY was re-interviewed August 13, 1962, concerning the preparation of his addendum to the CIA "Implications" paper. He explained a draft of the CIA in-put was received by his office (Joint Strategic Survey Council) on July 17, 1962, or the preceding evening. After reading the paper, he felt it was very good but that an additional thought

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

 ~~X~~

should be added; so on the morning of July 17, 1962, he wrote the paragraph quoted above in longhand at the end of the CIA draft. On this date there was a committee meeting at CIA on their portion of the "Implications" paper. As neither General GRAY nor Admiral MILLER could attend, GRAY had a copy of his handwritten notation sent by special courier to SHERMAN KENT and the committee. As previously mentioned, the CIA portion of the in-put did not use the proposed addendum, but the substance of the suggestion was included later in the State Department contribution dealing with foreign policy.

General GRAY said the wording of the addendum was his own and he relied on no other document or assistance, other than consultation with Admiral MILLER. General GRAY stated no copies of the addendum were distributed within the Pentagon. He said he feels certain that his use of the phrase, "increase the sense of urgency" is only coincidentally similar to the phrase in the BALDWIN article, "must demonstrate a greater sense of urgency", and that there was no similarity in the subject matter in the two instances.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

X

INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL OF
DEPARTMENT OF NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

RMW/GJL:pcn

~~TOP SECRET~~

VICE ADMIRAL JOHN SYLVESTER
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS)
UNITED STATES NAVY

Admiral SYLVESTER advised on August 9, 1962, that he has been acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN on a first-name basis since they attended the Naval Academy together during the mid-1920's. He stated that he is not socially acquainted with Mr. BALDWIN and has seen him rather infrequently over the years. He last saw Mr. BALDWIN in April 1962 when BALDWIN visited the Pentagon.

(U) Admiral SYLVESTER advised that he does not specifically recall reading [NIE 11-8-62] but stated that he must have been briefed on the document or the material in the document. Admiral SYLVESTER said he does not know how BALDWIN obtained the information on which the article is based; however, he is of the opinion that Mr. BALDWIN must have talked to someone who had access to either [NIE 11-8-62] or the back-up material contained therein.

(U) Admiral SYLVESTER stated that he has no information as to who furnished Mr. BALDWIN with this information; however, it is his opinion and the opinion of other high-ranking officials in the Navy that Mr. BALDWIN's source was a civilian employee of the Department of Defense in a very highly-placed position such as the Secretary, Deputy Secretary or one of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense. This opinion based strictly on supposition.

Admiral SYLVESTER said that BALDWIN is widely known in the Pentagon and has numerous high-level acquaintances and contacts which he could utilize as sources of information for articles dealing in military affairs.

~~SECRET~~

CAG:rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

REAR ADMIRAL LEVERING SMITH
TECHNICAL DIRECTOR
SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICE
DEPARTMENT OF NAVY

(U) Admiral SMITH advised on August 10, 1962, that he is a member of the Hyland Panel and sat with this panel during meetings on September 6, 7, 1961, and June 4, 5, 1962. He stated his only knowledge of [NIE 11-8-62] is derived from briefings given to the Hyland Panel during the latter meetings and expressed the opinion that the facts presented to the Panel on this occasion were too general to have been the background for the BALDWIN article.

(U) Admiral SMITH asserted he has not seen any of the drafts of [NIE 11-8-62] and stated that he did not believe any member of the Hyland Panel would have had access to it.

Admiral SMITH went on to say that he met HANSON BALDWIN in early 1950 while on an assignment in California and last saw him on July 17 or 18, 1960, during the first firing of the Polaris from the "U. S. S. George Washington" near Cape Canaveral, Florida.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

GJL/RMW:kjl

COMMANDER THOMAS HAZAPIS
USN
ORDNANCE, MISSILES AND ASTRONAUTICS UNIT
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Commander HAZAPIS stated on August 13, 1962, that he is not acquainted with Mr. HANSON BALDWIN nor is he acquainted with any individual to his knowledge who is acquainted with Mr. BALDWIN. He continued that he is aware that BALDWIN is a military writer for "The New York Times" newspaper and has a reputation of associating with individuals in the military services of very senior rank.

(U) Commander HAZAPIS stated that as Unit Chief of the Ordnance, Missiles and Astronautics Unit of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center, he serves as the Navy member on the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), which is a subcommittee working under the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Commander HAZAPIS stated that some time during the Fall of 1961, GMAIC made a contribution concerning the updating of certain estimates appearing in (NIE 11-8-61). This information had to do with Soviet ICBM capabilities. He stated that as he recalls about a week after this information had been considered by USIB, Mr. HANSON BALDWIN had an article in "The New York Times" newspaper which contained parts of the information considered by USIB. This information was classified "~~Top Secret~~". He noted that as he recalls about half of Mr. BALDWIN's information was accurate and the remaining portion had either been discussed by GMAIC or was inaccurate.

(U) Commander HAZAPIS stated that because of the inaccuracies in BALDWIN's article published during the Fall of 1961, it was his opinion that BALDWIN did not have access to (NIE 11-8-61) but received this information orally from a knowledgeable individual.

Commander HAZAPIS stated that he personally recalls that on three or four different occasions while discussing classified material at a meeting of GMAIC, it was jocularly suggested that if the information under consideration were released outside of GMAIC, the information would appear within

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
GJL/RMW:kjl

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

a week in a BALDWIN article in "The New York Times".
Commander HAZAPIS stated that he does not recall the identity of any of the GMAIC members who made these remarks and that the remarks were only made facetiously. He also noted that he personally has never heard any other newspaper writers' names mentioned in connection with a leak of information, while attending a meeting of GMAIC.

Commander HAZAPIS stated that he could furnish no additional information regarding the identity of Mr. BALDWIN's source for this article, however, he is of the opinion that Mr. BALDWIN's source is very highly placed, possibly a member of some congressional committee who has been briefed on this material by the military.

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
CEG:kmm

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]
b7C per USMC

(U) [redacted] advised on August 9, 1962, he was knowledgeable as to information contained in the NIE 11-8-62 but thus far had never seen or read the NIE; that none of his staff had seen or read it. He said that [redacted] on Monday.

July 30, 1962, he had conducted inquiry [redacted] and ascertained no one had seen HANSON BALDWIN or talked to him; further [redacted] had not even known BALDWIN was in Washington, D.C., during the week preceding the publication of the July 26, 1962, news column.

b7C per USMC

[redacted] advised he last was contacted by BALDWIN in late summer or early fall, 1960, but since then BALDWIN had not sought him out. [redacted] recalled his first encounter with BALDWIN was in 1948 or 1949 when [redacted]

[redacted] He said his recollection of all events then is somewhat hazy because of passage of time, but he remembered he was instructed to have BALDWIN briefed on anything and everything regardless of security classification. When [redacted] specifically questioned this procedure, [redacted] told [redacted] his orders were from "higher-up" and the word was to give BALDWIN carte blanche access to anything. [redacted] said it is his speculation that BALDWIN may still have such entree, so far as some military or civilian authorities are concerned.

b7C per USMC

[redacted] stated he had no suggestion as to how this leak to BALDWIN had occurred, although he said in instances of this kind, he always considers the possibility of a deliberate "leak" from someone in a highly placed position.

b7C per USMC

Confidentially and as an aside, [redacted] said it is pretty well known that ROSWELL GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense, is the person responsible for the information given to BALDWIN for the July 26, 1962, column.

[redacted] said he did not feel free to name names of his sources in this regard, but he said it was generally believed by responsible people in the military community that GILPATRIC was the person who disclosed the information to BALDWIN.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL
AT DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
CAM: rps

FOY D. KOHLER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(U) On August 7, 1962, KOHLER advised that he had read
(U) NIE 11-8-62 and had attended the meeting held on July 11, 1962,
(U) of the inter-departmental committee formed to prepare the
(U) study on the implications of NIE 11-8-62. He said he recalls
(U) that he also attended probably two or three other meetings
(U) of this committee. He indicated he had not read or had access
(U) to preliminary documents relating to NIE 11-8-62, nor was he
briefed on matters pertaining to the document.

KOHLER stated his last recalled contact with
BALDWIN, personally or otherwise, was in 1950 in New York City
when he had lunch with BALDWIN and at which time he, KOHLER,
was in charge of the Voice of America and was stationed in
that city. He said he had no information as to BALDWIN's
activities while in Washington, D. C., during the week of
July 16, 1962, and stated, in fact, he, KOHLER, had accompanied
Secretary of State DEAN RUSK to Geneva, Switzerland, and
was absent from the United States from July 16 through
July 25, 1962.

(U) KOHLER stated that he knows JAMES RESTON,
MAX FRANKEL, WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE and E. W. KENWORTHY, who
are also representatives of "The New York Times," but has
not seen or heard from them during the recent past, other
than in passing at some official function. He stated he had
never discussed the contents of NIE 11-8-62 or any of its
related papers with any unauthorized individual.

Concerning BALDWIN's contacts, KOHLER stated that
he knows that BALDWIN is well-known in the Pentagon and is
acquainted with Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. McNAMARA;
PAUL NITZE, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International
Security Affairs and "people" in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

KOHLER said that he had no information as to the
possible identity of the person who might have been responsible
for furnishing BALDWIN with material which was the basis for
BALDWIN's article.

~~SECRET~~

CAM:tps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR SOVIET BLOC
POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS
OFFICE, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(U) On August 7, 1962, GARTHOFF advised that he was fully cognizant of the contents of NIE 11-8-62 and has had the benefit of briefings in connection therewith as well as material used in its preparation. He further advised that he served as Executive Secretary of the inter-departmental committee formed to prepare the study on the implications of the material contained therein. In this capacity he has attended meetings of the committee beginning on July 11, 1962.

(U) GARTHOFF stated that he has known BALDWIN for approximately the past eight years, but last saw or had contact with him, either personally or otherwise, in early 1959. In the latter connection, GARTHOFF stated that he, GARTHOFF, had attended a conference on Civil Military Relations held at Ohio State University on that date and recalled that he saw BALDWIN, socially, on that occasion. He advised that he does not recall specifically when he first met BALDWIN, but said that it was possibly at an annual Policy Seminar held in 1955 at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The only other time he can recall being in BALDWIN's company was at conference of Global Warfare Strategy held in 1957 or 1958 at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He stated that he had never discussed any classified material with BALDWIN. He also stated that he had never discussed the contents of NIE 11-8-62 with any unauthorized person.

(U) GARTHOFF advised that other representatives of "The New York Times" with whom he is acquainted are HARRY SCHWARTZ and MAX FRANKEL. He stated that he last saw SCHWARTZ at a conference on Russian History held at the Arden House in New York in April, 1958. He stated he met FRANKEL in 1957 and last saw him in 1959 or 1960 when he, GARTHOFF, was at an official, but informal, debriefing of FRANKEL after FRANKEL's return to the United States from a trip to Moscow.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAM:rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

GARTHOFF stated that he has no information as to the identity of BALDWIN's contacts, nor did he have any knowledge of BALDWIN's activities while BALDWIN was in Washington, D. C., during the week of July 16, 1962. GARTHOFF further stated that he has no idea as to the identity of the individual from whom BALDWIN might have obtained information which was the basis for BALDWIN's article.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(CAM:HWS/ctw)

b3
b7E

ROGER HILSMAN,
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

On August 4, 1962, HILSMAN advised he is the Department of State's representative on the USIB. He stated that several years ago he had written articles on political-military matters and that HANSON BALDWIN had quoted from HILSMAN's writings. HILSMAN added that about a year ago BALDWIN communicated with HILSMAN by letter and asked to see him. On that occasion, HILSMAN met with BALDWIN in HILSMAN's office and discussed general matters, including the importance of conventional war forces as well as HILSMAN's previous articles. HILSMAN stated this was the first and only time he had met BALDWIN, either officially or socially.

HILSMAN advised further that, as a result of a canvass of his office, no one under his supervision had seen or been in contact with BALDWIN within the recent past. HILSMAN indicated that occasionally press inquiries are referred to him through official channels.

Other representatives of "The New York Times" known to HILSMAN are MAX FRANKEL, whom HILSMAN met socially on one occasion; TAD SZULC, with whom HILSMAN discussed a matter relating to Cuba; and E. W. KENWORTHY, whom HILSMAN has not seen in months. HILSMAN pointed out that he had received a phone call several weeks ago from WARREN ROGERS of "The New York Herald Tribune," at which time ROGERS stated as follows: "I get emanations from Air Force friends that the Soviets are hardening some of their missile sites." HILSMAN stated that he told ROGERS he knew nothing about that. According to HILSMAN, ROGERS then commented that there probably was nothing to the report since HILSMAN was not aware of it. HILSMAN said he does not know any of BALDWIN's contacts and is not aware of BALDWIN's itinerary in Washington, D. C., during the week of July 16, 1962.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(CAM:HWS/ctw)

b3
b7E

(U) HILSMAN said he had never discussed the contents of [NIE 11-8-62] or related material with any unauthorized source. ~~(S)~~

On August 8, 1962, JOSEPH W. NEUBERT, Special Assistant to HILSMAN advised that although there is no memorandum on the conversation between HILSMAN and WARREN ROGERS, above, it has been determined that ROGERS had called HILSMAN at 3:17 p.m. on July 11, 1962.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

MISCELLANEOUS INTERVIEWS

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAG:kmm

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

DR. CHARLES H. REICHARDT
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
AEC, (GERMANTOWN)

(U) Dr. REICHARDT advised on August 13, 1962, that none of the advance drafts or the final draft of NIE 11-8-62 were ever in the possession of AEC inasmuch as this agency does not have storage facilities for this material. He stated AEC copies are maintained at CIA and that if there is a need to review them, they are perused at CIA.

(U) Dr. REICHARDT advised that he has reviewed the advance drafts and the final draft of NIE 11-8-62 inasmuch as he is the alternate representative to the USIB. Dr. REICHARDT noted that the only material pertaining to NIE 11-8-62 maintained at AEC is one copy of the "Principal Conclusions" of NIE 11-8-62 dated July 3, 1962, and one copy of the Top Secret "sanitized version" of the final draft dated July 23, 1962. The former document was reviewed by General A. R. LUEDECKE, General Manager, Mr. CHRISTOPHER HENDERSON, Staff Assistant to the Chairman, AEC, and Dr. REICHARDT. Dr. REICHARDT recalled that the Chairman was briefed on this document by Mr. HENDERSON. The latter document was reviewed by Dr. REICHARDT, Mr. JOHN A. ANDERSON, Intelligence Specialist, and Mr. GEORGE B. PLEAT, Deputy to the Director of Intelligence.

In addition to the above individuals, and Mr. HARRY S. TRAYNOR, Assistant General Manager, and AEC representative to USIB, GEORGE D. MONK, Intelligence Specialist, is the only other individual at AEC cleared to see this material, according to Dr. REICHARDT.

(U) There were no briefings at AEC concerning any NIE 11-8-62 material.

Dr. REICHARDT advised he does not know BALDWIN.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
CAG:kmm

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

HARRY S. TRAYNOR
ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER
FOR ADMINISTRATION; AND
AEC REPRESENTATIVE TO USIB

(U) Mr. TRAYNOR advised on August 13, 1962, that
(U) AEC was not a major contributor to [NIE 11-8-62] and as
a result only a limited number of personnel are aware
of the nature of the material contained therein. He
informed that he had seen the advance copy of [NIE 11-8-62]
but that this was reviewed at CIA on the occasion of a
visit to that facility.

Mr. TRAYNOR had a search made of visitor's
records at both the Germantown and H Street facilities
of AEC for the period July 16 through July 19, 1962,
and stated they failed to disclose any record of a visit
by HANSON W. BALDWIN.

Mr. TRAYNOR advised he had no knowledge of
BALDWIN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CAM/HWS:kjl

b3
b7E

ROBERT AMORY, JR.
CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL DIVISION
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

On August 2, 1962, AMORY advised that he had seen the July 26, 1962, article by HANSON BALDWIN in "The New York Times". He said he has known BALDWIN since July, 1942, and since that time has seen him on the average of two or three times a year. His last contact with BALDWIN was in April, 1962. He indicated he had lunched at the Cosmos Club in Washington, D.C., and on leaving his table, noticed BALDWIN lunching with RICHARD HELMS of CIA. He stopped briefly to chat with BALDWIN and HELMS. According to AMORY, this was his last contact, either in person or by phone, with BALDWIN. The only other representative of "The New York Times" with whom AMORY is acquainted is JAMES RESTON, whom he last saw about two months ago at a social function.

AMORY stated positively that he had not seen BALDWIN during the week of July 16, 1962, nor had he heard from him.

(U) AMORY pointed out that he had seen and read the "Advance Conclusions" of NIE 11-8-62. He stated it is his recollection that DAVID BELL, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, brought the copy to him following a meeting of the National Security Council on July 9 or 10, 1962. It remained in his possession until he received a telephone call from General MARSHALL CARTER, Assistant to JOHN McCONE, Director, Central Intelligence, who advised AMORY that the President had directed that all disseminated copies be recalled. He said he told General CARTER that since the Bureau of the Budget is part of the White House staff, the directive did not apply to the Bureau of the Budget copy. He stated that at about 5:30 p.m. on the same day he received a personal call from McCONE instructing him to return the copy. According to AMORY, a messenger picked up the document from him at about 6 p.m. the same day. He indicated the document was in his possession about seven hours, and was seen only by BELL and himself. AMORY stated further that he had not read NIE 11-8-62, although it was available to him in his official capacity, since he had read the "Advance Conclusions" draft. AMORY referred to the Bureau of the Budget copy of NIE 11-8-62 and advised that the following, in addition to himself, had initialled the document, indicating to AMORY that they had read it:

Mr. BELL, GERRY PETTIBONE and DONALD SMITH.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CAM/HWS:kjl

b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

AMORY stated that he had not seen any working papers or drafts on this project other than the "ORR Contribution" by CIA in about May, 1962. He indicated he received a copy of the above document from EDWARD W. PROCTOR of CIA. He stated this was furnished without any request on his part. He said the only briefing he participated in was in May, 1962, when HOWARD STOERTZ, JR., and PROCTOR, both of CIA, briefed Mr. BELL, AMORY, ELMER STAATS and possibly some others at the Bureau of the Budget, on the then current thinking on the project.

(U) ~~SECRET~~ AMORY stated he had never discussed any material relating to [NIE 11-8-62] with any unauthorized source. ~~SECRET~~

AMORY indicated that while he, AMORY, was at CIA, BALDWIN occasionally saw ALLEN DULLES and Colonel STEPHEN GROGAN. AMORY said he is not aware of any other persons with whom BALDWIN associates.

~~SECRET~~

CAM:rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR
DEFENSE ANALYSIS

On August 1, 1962, Mr. BISSELL was interviewed at his office, Fifth Floor, 1710 H Street, N. W., Washington, D.C.

Mr. BISSELL advised that he had read the article by BALDWIN which appeared in the July 26, 1962, issue of "The New York Times." He stated that he knows BALDWIN but does not consider him to be an acquaintance. He said that he met BALDWIN perhaps a year or two ago, but cannot recall having seen or talked to him since that time except that on July 27, 1962, BALDWIN called him from New York with reference to an article BALDWIN was preparing for subsequent release, and which article appeared under BALDWIN's by-line in the July 28, 1962, issue of "The New York Times." BISSELL said that the article was with reference to a controversy between the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

According to BISSELL, BALDWIN, in this article, quoted BISSELL with his, BISSELL's, permission. He advised that he has no recollection that he has had any other conversation with BALDWIN in recent months. He advised that he had no information as to the identity of BALDWIN's contacts although, in BISSELL's opinion, BALDWIN obviously has many contacts among officials in the Pentagon. The only contact at the Pentagon he has heard of is that during the week that the above article was published, he, BISSELL, was told that BALDWIN saw Lieutenant General WILLIAM P. ENNIS in connection with the above article, but that ENNIS refused to discuss the position of the WSEG on the matter. He stated it was his definite impression that BALDWIN had sought out ENNIS and he, BISSELL, has no information that BALDWIN was acquainted with ENNIS.

BISSELL stated that the only representative of "The New York Times" known to him is JAMES RESTON, whom he recalls meeting, probably at a social function, possibly during January, 1962. He stated he never discussed any classified matter with RESTON.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

CAM:rps

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

(U) ~~SECRET~~ BISSELL stated he did not see the final draft of ~~SECRET~~ NIE 11-8-62 and has no recollection of seeing any of the analytical papers which preceded the final draft. In fact, (U) BISSELL stated he has not seen any NIE papers for the past (S) four or five months. ~~SECRET~~

(U) BISSELL stated that from his review of the article he could not see that its publication would further the interests of any particular branch of the service or any other Government Agency. He indicated that, in his opinion, the tone of the article suggested loose talk by someone familiar with fairly recent intelligence, both substantive content as well as recent acquisition. He further stated that, in his opinion, the information could have come from someone knowledgeable in the field and not necessarily from someone who had access to or had read NIE 11-8-62. ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


CEG:DME/rps

b3
b7E

MAJOR GENERAL D. W. McGOWAN
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Major General McGOWAN was interviewed July 31, 1962, with regard to the HANSON BALDWIN article captioned, "Guard to Keep Few Planes on Return From Europe," which appeared in "The New York Times" on Sunday, July 29, 1962. Major General McGOWAN stated he was familiar with the contents of this article, and the article did not contain any classified information. He stated further this material was already available in the "Congressional Record" and also had been the subject of considerable testimony before Congressional committees.

With regard to the HANSON BALDWIN article which appeared in "The New York Times" July 26, 1962, Major General McGOWAN stated he was not familiar with the materials discussed by BALDWIN in this news article, and he had no suggestion as to how BALDWIN may have come into possession of the information. He furnished no other information pertinent to this inquiry.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS/pon

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

DR. LOUIS TORDELLA
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

On July 31, 1962, Dr. TORDELLA advised that he was not acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN and that he had no idea how or from whom BALDWIN received sufficient information to prepare the news item in question. Dr. TORDELLA said he is not familiar with the identity of any of BALDWIN's acquaintances and, to his knowledge, has never seen BALDWIN. He said he had no knowledge of any contact by BALDWIN with any NSA personnel. Dr. TORDELLA said he is not familiar with any press representatives and that he is not aware of any "outside" requests for information regarding [NIE 11-8-62] (S-2)(u)

(S-3)(u) He indicated he had never discussed the contents of [NIE 11-8-62] or related documents with any unauthorized (S-3)(u) persons. He pointed out that he had briefed the former Director of NSA, Admiral LAURENCE FROST, prior to his departure, on the general contents of the material contained in [NIE 11-8-62]. At that time, according to Dr. TORDELLA, (S-3)(u) Admiral FROST possessed the proper clearances for access to such information. (S-2)(u)

Dr. TORDELLA indicated he became familiar with the terms "image interpretation" and "hardened" sites from the various briefings and meetings he attended in his official capacity. (S-2)(u)

Dr. TORDELLA was of the opinion that a person would not have needed access to [NIE 11-8-62] or prior drafts to possess (S-3)(u) sufficient data to draft an article along the lines of the item in question. He felt that any person familiar with the results of recent "overhead reconnaissance" obtained from pertinent briefings and visual examination of the results of such reconnaissance would have possessed sufficient material to draft an article similar to that written by BALDWIN. (S-2)(u)

Dr. TORDELLA felt the news item by BALDWIN would be of some benefit to the Department of the Air Force in its desire to obtain additional armament and to the Department of the Army in its desire for additional funds for anti-ballistic missile research. (S-2)(u)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

HWS/pcn

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

~~5~~ [LIEUTENANT COLONEL [redacted]]
~~5~~ SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICER
~~5~~ NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

b3 P.L. 86-36 per NSA

On July 31, 1962, [redacted] advised that he was not acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN or any other press representatives and that he knows of no one acquainted with BALDWIN. (S-2)(u)

[redacted] indicated he had never discussed the contents of [NIE 11-8-62] or related documents with any [S-3(u)] unauthorized source and that he had no idea how or from whom BALDWIN received sufficient background to write the article in question. (S-2)(u)

[redacted] indicated his familiarity with phrases like "hardened" sites and "image interpretation" stemmed from oral briefings received by virtue of his official position. He was of the opinion, in view of the "timing" of its appearance in print, that the BALDWIN article probably was based on [NIE 11-8-62]. In this regard he [S-3(u)] added, however, that a person benefitting from several briefings on recent successes in "overhead reconnaissance" could have provided sufficient information upon which to base a news item similar to that written by BALDWIN. (S-2)(u)

[redacted] felt publication of the article did not serve the interests of any specific agency or department. (S-2)(u)

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTENT OF SPEECH BY SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
DELIVERED AT ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN
JUNE 16, 1962

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

In view of BALDWIN's expressed interest in the commencement address made by Secretary of Defense MC NAMARA on June 16, 1962, at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and because of the comments of Mr. ORVILLE SPLITT, Director of News Services, that Pentagon correspondents believed the address indicated a breakthrough in intelligence, the commencement address is set forth as follows:

"I am glad to be home, and I am particularly glad to be here for a university occasion. For this University gives meaning and focus to life in Ann Arbor -- even for those who are not privileged to be associated with it directly -- as the academic community serves to clarify the objectives and focus the energies of the Free World.

"President KENNEDY aptly described the function of the university when he said: 'The pursuit of knowledge ... rests ... on the idea of a world based on diversity, self-determination, and freedom. And that is the kind of world to which we Americans, as a nation, are committed by the principles upon which the great Republic was founded. As men conduct the pursuit of knowledge, they create a world which freely unites national diversity and international partnership.'

"Commencement orators like to point to the fact that what we celebrate here is not an end, but a beginning. I prefer to take my text from another aspect of the occasion which we are observing today.

"The ancient formula for the award of academic degrees admits you into a long-established community, whether it be the fellowship of educated men, or the ancient and honorable company of scholars, of which you are the newest members. This community embodies the highest ideals of the Free World. Its membership includes people of every race, color, and creed. They share a common language, the language of ideas. They are dedicated to the fullest possible development of the individual human potential. And the only requirement for admission is a demonstrated capacity for and commitment to the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:kmm

b3
b7E

use of one's powers of reason.

"What I want to talk to you about here today are some of the concrete problems of maintaining a free community in the world today. I want to talk to you particularly about the problems of the community that bind together the United States and the countries of Western Europe.

"Europe is the source of many of our traditions. One of these is the tradition of the university, which we can trace back to the groves of Academe, on the same site where only a few weeks ago the foreign ministers and ministers of defense of the European nations and the United States met to discuss their common problems.

"I need scarcely remind you that Europe is one of the great sources of the American idea of freedom, and that it was the European philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who shaped the thinking of our own founding fathers. For all of us, Europe has been our teacher since we first learned to read.

"One of the most impressive lessons that Europe has provided us recently is the lesson of her revival from the ashes of destruction at the end of the Second World War. The national economies of Europe were almost at standstill 15 years ago. Their capital plant was largely destroyed, either directly by bombing, or indirectly by years of neglect and patchwork repair. The people were exhausted by six years of war, and a large part of the most productive age group had been wiped out. Yet in the last 10 years, they have managed to increase the production of steel and electricity by over 130 percent each, and this has been typical of the recovery pattern.

"The pump-priming help of the American Marshall Plan came at a crucial time in the process of European recovery. But the genius of the plan as envisaged by men like GEORGE MARSHALL and HARRY TRUMAN, was to help the Europeans help themselves.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

"At the same time that the nations of Europe were rebuilding at home, they were going through the difficult and often painful process of re-establishing their relationships with the peoples of Africa and Asia, no longer as a master and servant, but as members of the human race, all equally entitled to develop their individual capabilities. This process of change is by no means complete, and there are still difficult times ahead. But the joint achievement of Europe and its former colonies in revising their relations with each other is at least as impressive as the economic recovery of Europe itself.

"What may be the greatest post-war European achievement is still in the making. The nations of Europe have begun to level the outmoded barriers that confined their individual economies within national boundaries. As JEAN MONNET, the principal architect of the new Europe puts it,

"'An entirely new situation has been created in the world, simply by adding six countries together. It's not an addition; in fact, it's a multiplication. You multiply the capabilities of the countries you unite. A dynamic process is beginning that is changing the face of Europe and the role of Europeans in the world.'

"The making of Europe has only begun, and indeed it is perhaps at its most critical stage. But we should not overlook the fact that French coal and German steel now move freely across the continent, and that German refrigerators and Italian shoes are being sold increasingly without restriction in Belgian department stores.

"All of these achievements have been accomplished under pressure from titanic forces which make a rational organization of human society increasingly difficult both for the Europeans and for ourselves. Let me mention some of these forces.

"We are confronted with a population explosion resulting from our own success in coping with disease

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

and abnormalities, and by now threatening to double the earth's population by the end of this century. Unless we can control this explosion in the poor and resource-limited countries, the effects of economic growth may be cancelled out by population growth, and unsatisfied rising expectations, particularly in the younger nations, may upset the delicate balance of political stability.

"We are borne along by the accelerating pace of science and technology. In this country alone, new inventions are patented at a rate of 50,000 a year. Our population of scientists and engineers has increased by more than 40 percent in the last eight years. In fact, 80 per cent of all scientists and engineers who have lived throughout history are alive today.

"We are faced with an extraordinary increase in the number of national states. Since World War II, 35 new nations have been formed. Each new nation expresses the natural desire for self-determination and self-government. But their numbers complicate the problem of international diplomacy at the same time that military and economic developments increase our interdependence. Every nation is more and more directly affected by the internal situation of its neighbors, and the globe has shrunk to the point where we are all each other's neighbors.

"Lastly, we live in the shadow of the Sino-Soviet drive for world domination--surely not the only shadow on the world today, but one of the longest and deepest. By itself it represents the most serious military force this nation has ever faced; by its exploitation of the entire world's troubles, it is a threat of a kind that is as new to the world as the rising technologies and populations and national sovereignties themselves.

"In the face of all these challenges, the ultimate objective of the free world is to establish a system of peaceful world order, based on the dignity of the individual and dedicated to the free development of each man's capacities. The members

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

of the North Atlantic community--the Europeans and ourselves--bear a special responsibility to help achieve this objective. This responsibility derives from the strength of our internal institutions and the wealth of our material resources.

"But we cannot hope to move toward our objective unless we move from strength. Part of that strength must be military strength. But I want to emphasize that we see our military strength not as the means of achieving the kind of world we seek, but as a shield to prevent any other nation from using its military strength, either directly or through threats and intimidation, to frustrate the aspirations we share with all the free peoples of the world. The aggressive use of military strength is foreign to the best traditions of the United States. And, as the President pointed out last week, 'the basic problems facing the world today are not susceptible of a final military solution.'

"What the military component of our national power must do, and what we must see that it is capable of doing, is to assure to the peoples of the Free World the freedom to choose their own course of development.

"Yet the nature and extent of the military power base needed to meet the entire spectrum of challenges confronting the Free World is beyond the capacity of any single nation to provide. Since our own security cannot be separated from the security of the rest of the Free World, we necessarily rely on a series of alliances, the most important of which is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"NATO was born in 1949 out of the confrontation with the Soviet Union that ensued from the breakdown in relations between the former wartime allies. The Soviet Union had absorbed the states of eastern Europe into its own political framework, most dramatically with the Czechoslovakian coup of 1948. It had been fomenting insurrection in Greece, menacing

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Turkey, and encouraging the Communist parties in Western Europe to seize power in the wake of postwar economic disorder. The sharpest threat to Europe came with the first Berlin Crisis when the Russians attempted to blockade the western sectors of the city. Our response was immediate and positive. President TRUMAN ordered an airlift for the isolated population of West Berlin which, in time, denied the Soviets their prize. The Marshall Plan, then in full swing, was assisting the economic recovery of the Western European nations. The Truman Doctrine had brought our weight to bear in Greece and Turkey to prevent the erosion of their independence.

"But Western statesmen concluded that it would be necessary to secure the strength and growth of the North Atlantic community with a more permanent arrangement for its defense. The effective defense of Western Europe could not really be accomplished without a commitment of the United States to that defense for the long term. We made this commitment without hesitation. ARTHUR VANDENBERG, one of the chief architects of NATO, expressed the rationale of the organization in the Senate debate preceding passage of the treaty, 'this is the logical evolution of one of our greatest American idioms, "united we stand, divided we fall." '

"The North Atlantic Alliance is a unique alignment of governments. The provision for the common defense of the members has led to a remarkable degree of military collaboration and diplomatic consultation for a peacetime coalition. The growth of the alliance organization has accelerated as the task of defending the treaty area has increased in scope, size and complexity. NATO has had its stresses and strains, but it has weathered them all.

"Today, NATO is involved in a number of controversies, which must be resolved by achieving a consensus within the organization in order to preserve its strength and unity. The question has arisen whether Senator VANDENBERG's assertion is as true today as it was when he made it 13 years ago. Three arguments have raised this question most sharply:

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

"It has been argued that the very success of Western European economic development reduces Europe's need to rely on the U.S. to share in its defenses.

"It has been argued that the increasing vulnerability of the U.S. to nuclear attack makes us less willing as a partner in the defense of Europe, and hence less effective in deterring such an attack.

"It has been argued that nuclear capabilities are alone relevant in the face of the growing nuclear threat, and that independent national nuclear forces are sufficient to protect the nations of Europe.

"I believe that all of these arguments are mistaken. I think it is worthwhile to expose the U.S. views on these issues as we have presented them to our allies. In our view, the effect of the new factors in the situation, both economic and military, has been to increase the interdependence of national security interests on both sides of the Atlantic, and to enhance the need for the closest coordination of our efforts.

"A central military issue facing NATO today is the role of nuclear strategy. Four facts seem to us to dominate consideration of that role. All of them point in the direction of increased integration to achieve our common defense. First, the Alliance has over-all nuclear strength adequate to any challenge confronting it. Second, this strength not only minimizes the likelihood of major nuclear war, but makes possible a strategy designed to preserve the fabric of our societies if war should occur. Third, damage to the civil societies of the Alliance resulting from nuclear warfare could be very grave. Fourth, improved non-nuclear forces, well within Alliance resources, could enhance deterrence of any aggressive moves short of direct, all-out attack on Western Europe.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

"Let us look at the situation today. First, given the current balance of nuclear power, which we confidently expect to maintain in the years ahead, a surprise nuclear attack is simply not a rational act for any enemy. Nor would it be rational for an enemy to take the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons as an outgrowth of a limited engagement in Europe or elsewhere. I think we are entitled to conclude that either of these actions has been made highly unlikely.

"Second, and equally important, the mere fact that no nation could rationally take steps leading to a nuclear war does not guarantee that a nuclear war cannot take place. Not only do nations sometimes act in ways that are hard to explain on a rational basis, but even when acting in a 'rational' way they sometimes, indeed disturbingly often, act on the basis of misunderstandings of the true facts of a situation. They misjudge the way others will react, and the way others will interpret what they are doing. We must hope, indeed I think we have good reason to hope, that all sides will understand this danger, and will refrain from steps that even raise the possibility of such a mutually disastrous misunderstanding. We have taken unilateral steps to reduce the likelihood of such an occurrence. We look forward to the prospect that through arms control, the actual use of these terrible weapons may be completely avoided. It is a problem not just for us in the West, but for all nations that are involved in this struggle we call the Cold War.

"For our part, we feel we and our NATO allies must frame our strategy with this terrible contingency, however remote, in mind. Simply ignoring the problem is not going to make it go away.

"The U.S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

"The very strength and nature of the Alliance forces make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy any enemy society if driven to it. In other words, we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities.

"The strength that makes these contributions to deterrence and to the hope of deterring attack upon civil societies even in wartime does not come cheap. We are confident that our current nuclear programs are adequate and will continue to be adequate for as far into the future as we can reasonably foresee. During the coming fiscal year, the United States plans to spend close to \$15 billion on its nuclear weapons to assure their adequacy. For what this money buys, there is no substitute.

"In particular, relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. If they are small, and perhaps vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, a major antagonist can take a variety of measures to counter them. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of it being used independently, this force would be inviting a pre-emptive first strike against it. In the event of war, the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict. Meanwhile, the creation of a single additional national nuclear force encourages the proliferation of nuclear power with all of its attendant dangers.

"In short, then, limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. Clearly, the United States nuclear contribution to the Alliance is neither obsolete nor dispensable.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

"At the same time, the general strategy I have summarized magnifies the importance of unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central direction. There must not be competing and conflicting strategies to meet the contingency of nuclear war. We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible, and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled.

"We know that the same forces which are targeted on ourselves are also targeted on our allies. Our own strategic retaliatory forces are prepared to respond against these forces, wherever they are and whatever their targets. This mission is assigned not only in fulfillment of our treaty commitments but also because the character of nuclear war compels it. More specifically, the U.S. is as much concerned with that portion of Soviet nuclear striking power that can reach Western Europe as with that portion that also can reach the United States. In short, we have undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis. This will continue to be our objective. In the execution of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are only one resource among many.

"There is, for example, the POLARIS force, which we have been substantially increasing, and which, because of its specially invulnerable nature, is peculiarly well suited to serve as a strategic reserve force. We have already announced the commitment of five of these ships, fully operational, to the NATO Command.

"This sort of commitment has a corollary for the Alliance as a whole. We want and need a greater degree of Alliance participation in formulating nuclear weapons policy to the greatest extent possible. We would all find it intolerable to contemplate having only a part of the strategic force launched in isolation from our main striking power.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:kmm

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

"We shall continue to maintain powerful nuclear forces for the Alliance as a whole. As the President has said, 'Only through such strength can we be certain of deterring a nuclear strike, or an overwhelming ground attack, on our forces and allies.'

"But let us be quite clear about what we are saying and what we would have to face if the deterrent should fail. This is the almost certain prospect that, despite our nuclear strength, all of us would suffer deeply in the event of major nuclear war.

"We accept our share of this responsibility within the Alliance. And we believe that the combination of our nuclear strength and a strategy of controlled response gives us some hope of minimizing damage in the event that we have to fulfill our pledge. But I must point out that we do not regard this as a desirable prospect, nor do we believe that the Alliance should depend solely on our nuclear power to deter actions not involving a massive commitment of any hostile force. Surely an Alliance with the wealth, talent, and experience that we possess can find a better way than extreme reliance on nuclear weapons to meet our common threat. We do not believe that if the formula, $E=mc^2$, had not been discovered, we should all be Communist slaves. On this question, I can see no valid reason for a fundamental difference of view on the two sides of the Atlantic.

"With the Alliance possessing the strength and the strategy I have described, it is most unlikely that any power will launch a nuclear attack on NATO. For the kinds of conflicts, both political and military, most likely to arise in the NATO area, our capabilities for response must not be limited to nuclear weapons alone. The Soviets have superiority in non-nuclear forces in Europe today. But that superiority is by no means overwhelming. Collectively, the Alliance has the potential for a successful defense

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

against such forces. In manpower alone, NATO has more men under arms than the Soviet Union and its European satellites. We have already shown our willingness to contribute through our divisions now in place on European soil. In order to defend the populations of the NATO countries and to meet our treaty obligations, we have put in hand a series of measures to strengthen our non-nuclear power. We have added \$10 billion for this purpose to the previously planned level of expenditures for fiscal years 1962 and 1963. To tide us over while new permanent strength was being created, we called up 158,000 reservists. We will be releasing them this summer, but only because in the meantime we have built up on an enduring basis more added strength than the call-up temporarily gave us. The number of U.S. combat-ready divisions has been increased from 11 to 16. Stockpiled in Europe now are full sets of equipment for two additional divisions; the men of these divisions can be rapidly moved to Europe by air.

"We expect that our allies will also undertake to strengthen further their non-nuclear forces, and to improve the quality and staying power of these forces. These achievements will complement our deterrent strength. With improvements in Alliance ground force strength and staying power, improved non-nuclear air capabilities, and better equipped and trained reserve forces, we can be assured that no deficiency exists in the NATO defense of this vital region, and that no aggression, small or large, can succeed.

"I have described very briefly the United States' views on the role of nuclear forces in the strategy of the Alliance. I have pointed out that the Alliance necessarily depends, for the deterrence of general nuclear war, on the powerful and well protected nuclear forces of the United States, which are necessarily committed to respond to enemy nuclear strikes wherever they may be made. At the same time, I have indicated the need for substantial

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
RMW:kmm

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

non-nuclear forces within the Alliance to deal with situations where a nuclear response may be inappropriate or simply not believable. Throughout I have emphasized that we in the Alliance all need each other.

"I want to remind you also that the security provided by military strength is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the achievement of our foreign policy goals, including our goals in the field of arms control and disarmament. Military security provides a base on which we can build Free World strength through the economic advances and political reforms which are the object of the President's programs, like the Alliance for Progress and the Trade Expansion legislation. Only in a peaceful world can we give full scope to the individual potential, which is for us the ultimate value.

"A distinguished European visited the United States last month as a guest of the President. ANDRE MALRAUX, French Minister of State for Cultural Affairs, is an eminent novelist and critic. He led an archaeological expedition to Cambodia and fought in the Spanish Civil War and the French Resistance Movement. MALRAUX paid a moving tribute to our nation when he said: 'The only nation that has waged war but not worshipped it, that has won the greatest power in the world but not sought it, that has wrought the greatest weapon of death but has not wished to wield it... May it inspire men with dreams worthy of its action.'

"The community of learning to which you have been admitted carries with it great privileges. It also carries great responsibilities. And perhaps the greatest of these is to help ensure the wise use of our national power. Let me paraphrase MALRAUX: May your dreams be worthy of action and your actions be shaped by your dreams."

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIST OF INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED
WHO COULD FURNISH NO
INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS INVESTIGATION (u)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~b3
b7E

The individuals listed hereinafter have been interviewed concerning their knowledge of the activities of HANSON W. BALDWIN and any information they possessed as to how he obtained the material appearing in his article in "The New York Times" dated July 26, 1962. These individuals were asked basically the following questions and were unable to furnish any information of pertinence.

Have you read an article by HANSON BALDWIN which appeared in "The New York Times" July 26, 1962?

Do you know HANSON BALDWIN?

Do you know how he obtained the information which appeared in this article?

Do you know anyone who does know HANSON BALDWIN?

Have you seen HANSON BALDWIN in contact with anyone during the past two months?

Do you know any press representatives of "The New York Times"?

(U) Have you ever discussed the contents of [NIE 11-8-62] with any unauthorized person?

(U) Who have you discussed the contents of [NIE 11-8-62] with?

Are you familiar with the term "image interpretation"?

(U) Have you seen [NIE 11-8-62] or any of the drafts prepared prior to the final approval of [NIE 11-8-62]?

Do you feel the publication of BALDWIN's article is in the special interest of any specific agency, department or any specific program?

Do you have any information which might assist in determining how BALDWIN obtained the information which appears in this article?

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAG:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted]
to Dr. JEROME B. WIESNER, Special
Assistant to the President for Sciences
and Technology, The White House
EDWARD A. MC DERMOTT, Director, Office of
Emergency Planning

b6
b7C

[redacted] Information
Liaison, NSC
DAVID E. BELL, Director, Bureau of Budget

[redacted] International Division, Bureau of Budget
[redacted] Budget Examiner,
International Division, Bureau of Budget
JAMES S. LAY, JR., Deputy Assistant for
Coordination, Office of Director;
Executive Secretary to USIB, CIA
RAYMOND S. CLINE, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, CIA
KARL WAGNER, Special Assistant to Deputy
Director for Intelligence, CIA
R. JACK SMITH, Assistant Director for
Current Intelligence, CIA
DR. HERBERT SCOVILLE, Deputy Director for
Research, CIA
CHESTER L. COOPER, Deputy Assistant
Director, ONE, CIA

b3 per CIA

[redacted]
ABBOTT E. SMITH, Vice Chairman, BNE, CIA
LIEUTENANT GENERAL EARLE W. BARNES, USA
(retired), Member, BNE, CIA
MAJOR GENERAL LAWRENCE W. DEWEY, USA
(retired) Member, BNE, CIA
LOUIS MARENGO, Member, BNE, CIA
ROLAND S. INLOW, Deputy Chief, Military
Economic Division, CIA

b3 per CIA

[REDACTED]
CAG:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
GENERAL PHILIP G. STRONG, Deputy Assistant
Director for Collection, OSI, CIA

b3 per CIA

[REDACTED] Chief, Graphical
Analysis Branch, Publications Division,
NPIC, CIA

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Photo Interpreter,
Photo Analysis Division, NPIC, CIA
JAMES Q. REBER, Chief, Special Requirements
Staff, Office of Special Activities;
Chairman of Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance, CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
HWS:ctw)

b3
b7E

ADAM YARMOLINSKY, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN W. O'NEILL, USAF,
Director of Defense Research and
Engineering
MAJOR GENERAL NILS O. OHMAN, USAF, Senior
Air Force member, WSEG

[REDACTED]
(Planning and NSC) [REDACTED]
Secretary of Defense (ISA)

REAR ADMIRAL JOHN M. LEE, Director, Policy
Planning Staff, Office of Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Office of Assistant Secretary of
Defense (ISA)

[REDACTED] Operational Analyst, Office of
Directorate for Systems Analysis, Office
of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

[REDACTED] Assistant General Counsel, Office
of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics)

[REDACTED] Assistant General Counsel, Office
of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)

[REDACTED] Security Services Branch,
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

CAPTAIN [REDACTED] USN, Joint Strategic
Survey Council, JCS

COLONEL [REDACTED] USA, Joint Strategic
Survey Council, JCS

VICE ADMIRAL HERBERT D. RILEY, USN, Director,
Joint Staff, JCS

MAJOR GENERAL J. M. REYNOLDS, USAF, Vice Director,
JCS

MAJOR GENERAL J. A. HEINTGES, USA, Deputy
Director, Joint Staff, JCS

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAG:kjl

b3
b7E

MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD COLLINS, USA,
Director, Intelligence Directorate,
JCS, Member USIB
CAPTAIN [REDACTED] USN, Joint
Intelligence Objectives Agency,
Intelligence Directorate, JCS
COLONEL [REDACTED] USA, Long
Range Projects, Plans and Policy
Branch, Intelligence Directorate,
JCS
COLONEL [REDACTED] USA, JCS
BRIGADIER GENERAL F. T. UNGER, USAF,
Director, Operations, JCS
BRIGADIER GENERAL EDWIN H. BURBA, USA,
Deputy Director of Operations, JCS
BRIGADIER GENERAL PAUL J. FONTANA, USMC,
Deputy Director Operations, JCS
COLONEL [REDACTED] USAF, Operations,
JCS
MAJOR GENERAL PAUL S. EMRICK, USAF,
Director, Plans and Policy, JCS
REAR ADMIRAL DRAPER L. KAUFFMAN, Deputy
Director, Plans and Policy, JCS
BRIGADIER GENERAL BENJAMIN O. TURNAGE,
USA, Plans and Policy, JCS
COLONEL [REDACTED] USA, Nuclear
Branch, Operations, Plans Division, JCS
CAPTAIN [REDACTED] USN, Special
Assistant to Director, DIA
COLONEL [REDACTED] USA, Executive
Officer, DIA
REAR ADMIRAL SAMUEL B. FRANKEL, USN,
Chief of Staff, DIA
COLONEL [REDACTED] USAF, Assistant
Executive, DIA
COLONEL [REDACTED] USA, Inspector
General DIA
COLONEL [REDACTED] Special Activities
Office, DIA
FIRST LIEUTENANT [REDACTED] USAF,
Intelligence (Security) Office,
Special Activities Office, DIA
[REDACTED] Special
Activities Office, DIA

b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
CAG:kmm

b3
b7E

MAJOR [REDACTED] USAF, Chief,
Briefing Branch, SAO, Support
Division, DIA

COLONEL [REDACTED] USAF, DIA
COLONEL [REDACTED] USAF,
DIA

LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED]
USAF, DIA

LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED]
USA, DIA

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] DIA
FRANK J. DENNY, Director, National
Indications Center, Department of
Defense

NILS A. LENNARTSON, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, (Public Affairs),
Department of Defense

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
CAG:mro

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED] ACSI, USA
REAR ADMIRAL VERNON L. LOWRANCE, USN, Director
of Naval Intelligence.
REAR ADMIRAL HAROLD G. BOWEN, JR., USN, Deputy
Director of Naval Intelligence.
CAPTAIN GORDON K. NICODEMUS, USN, Acting Assistant
Director of Naval Intelligence.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] ONI
COMMANDER [REDACTED] USN, ONI.
VICE ADMIRAL RUFUS E. ROSE, USN, Commandant,
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
ADMIRAL ARLEIGH BURKE, USN (retired), Former Chief
of Naval Operations
BRIGADIER GENERAL RICHARD D. CURTIN, Director,
Office of Space Systems, USAF
MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD M. MONTGOMERY, Assistant Vice
Chief of Staff, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL PRENTISS D. WYNNE, JR., Director,
Directorate of Warning and Threat Assessments,
USAF.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEAN C. STROTHER, Deputy Chief of
Staff, Operations, USAF
MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES B. WESTOVER, Assistant Deputy
Chief of Staff, Operations, USAF
MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM W. MOMYER, Director, Operational
Requirements, USAF
MAJOR GENERAL SAM W. AGEE, Director of Operations,
USAF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES FERGUSON, Deputy Chief of
Staff, Research and Technology, USAF
MAJOR GENERAL CECIL H. CHILDS, Assistant Deputy
Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, USAF
COLONEL [REDACTED] Office of Information, USAF
COLONEL [REDACTED] Chief Aerospace Force
Division, Air Force Intelligence Center, USAF
LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED] Office of ACSI,
USAF.
CAPTAIN [REDACTED] Office of Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, USAF
GENERAL FREDERIC H. SMITH, JR., USAF (retired), Former
Vice Chief of Staff, USAF
MAJOR [REDACTED] Evaluations Branch, Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF

b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
CAG:kmm

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED] USAF,
National Guard Bureau

b6
b7C

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GORDON A. BLAKE, Director,
NSA

LEONARD P. BIENVENU, Director of Security,
NSA

(U)

~~S-2~~

[REDACTED] Policy Staff, NSA

JOHN A. CONNELL, NSA Representative to
BNE

b3 P.L. 86-36 per NSA

[REDACTED] USN, NSA

Representative to BNE

WILLIAM R. MC CULLEN, Analyst, NSA

GEORGE W. BALL, Under Secretary of State,
United States Department of State

THOMAS L. HUGHES, Deputy Director, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, United States
Department of State

[REDACTED] Staff Assistant, Office of
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, United States Department of
State

[REDACTED] Special Assistant,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
United States Department of State

[REDACTED] Special Assistant to
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, United States Department of
State

b6
b7C

HENRY H. FOWLER, Under Secretary of the
Treasury, Department of Treasury

GEORGE B. PLEAT, Deputy to Director of
Intelligence, AEC

[REDACTED] Intelligence Specialist,
AEC

[REDACTED] Intelligence Specialist,
AEC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

August 18, 1962

b3
b7E

Title *ARTICLE BY HANSON W. DALDRUP IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962*

Character *ESPIONAGE - R*

Reference *Report dated and captioned as above*

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b6
b7C

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

August 16, 1962

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable W. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In my previous letters to you, the last being August 15, 1962, you were furnished pertinent details concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962. You were also advised that you would be furnished pertinent developments in this continuing investigation.

Rear Admiral Eugene B. Fluckey, President, United States Naval Board of Inspection and Survey, was interviewed on August 15, 1962. Admiral Fluckey advised that he has seen Baldwin every two or three months, the last occasion being on July 17, 1962. He has not heard Baldwin soliciting information of the type which appeared in the July 26, 1962, article. Admiral Fluckey, on the basis of prior conversations he has had with Baldwin, is of the opinion that Baldwin deals with members of the President's Cabinet and officials at the Pentagon. In addition, Admiral Fluckey believed that Baldwin has "White House connections." Admiral Fluckey noted that Baldwin, on July 17, had indicated he had been "on the Hill" on July 16.

REC'D-READING ROOM
AUG 16 2 16 PM '62
b3
b7E

REC-8

AUG 22 1962

DECLASSIFIED BY 1005
DATE 10/13/01
b6
b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY 1005
DATE 10/13/01

MAILED 2
AUG 16 1962
COMM-FBI

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- McGuire
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

JFW:djw
(8)

SENT DIRECTOR
9-12-62

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable E. Kenneth O'Donnell

Interviews were also conducted on August 15, 1962, with Mr. Nils A. Lennartson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Department of Defense, and with Mr. Edward A. McDermott, Director, Office of Emergency Planning, Executive Office of the President. No pertinent information was obtained.

Investigation in this matter is continuing, and you will be furnished pertinent developments. The above information has been furnished to the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since its contents pinpoints the location of "~~Top Secret~~" information in an article available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~

b6

b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: August 17, 1962

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Belmont

Mr. Evans

Mr. Sullivan

Mr. D. E. Moore

Mr. Wannall

Mr. Wacks

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
July 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

On 8-17-62 Liaison Agent [REDACTED] and I interviewed Mr. John A. McCone, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, concerning this matter. He had no specific information as to the source of the information in the article and the detailed results of the interview will be contained in the report being submitted by the Washington Field Office this weekend.

b6

b7C

Roswell Leavitt
 During the interview when Mr. McCone was questioned as to whether he suspected anyone as being the source of the material, he replied that he understood that our investigation had indicated that Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric might have been the source. I asked Mr. McCone where he had obtained this information and he indicated it was from a high level source and when again questioned, said that it was from the President. He requested, however, that the fact that the President had mentioned this to him not be recorded in any report we submitted in connection with this matter.

ACTION:

For information.

DEM:td (7)

b3
b7E

11 AUG 23 1962

EX-116

53 AUG 29 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

August 17, 1962

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In my previous letters to you, the last being August 16, 1962, you were furnished pertinent details concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962.

In connection therewith, there is enclosed a memorandum containing information obtained on August 15, 1962, from our coverage on Hanson W. Baldwin, as well as the results of an interview conducted with Rear Admiral William L. McCormick, Assistant Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, on August 16, 1962.

Baldwin's expressions of confidence, as well as concern that his source will not be compromised; his comments concerning the President; and his opinion of Orvil Dryfoos, publisher of "The New York Times," as of August 15, 1962, are included in the enclosed memorandum.

You will be furnished additional developments in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

J. EDGAR HOOVER

SEE NOTE, PAGE 2

SENT DIRECTOR
8-17-62

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

JFW:djw

(8)

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

b3
b7E

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/28/96 BY SP3 BJC/cur

RECEIVED
P T
READING ROOM

AUG 17 2 47 PM '62

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because information herein discloses the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan 1 - Wacks
1 - Wannall
1 - D E Moore

August 17, 1962

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN,
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962

Our coverage of Hanson W. Baldwin disclosed that during the evening of August 15, 1962, he was in contact with a person believed to be [redacted] Baldwin stated that "they went down to the Alumni House at Annapolis" to ascertain who had attended a meeting of the U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association of which Baldwin is a member. It is noted that on August 13, 1962, we interviewed Rear Admiral William F. Fitzgerald, Jr., Executive Director of the Association, Annapolis, Maryland, to ascertain the exact date when Baldwin was at a meeting of the Association in Washington, D. C., during the week of July 16, 1962, and if he indicated at the meeting whom he intended to contact in Washington, D. C.

b6
b7C

When [redacted] asked if Baldwin had warned any of his friends, he replied, "I didn't know they were going down there. I wouldn't warn them anyhow. That would be the worst thing to do. One of my friends wrote me from Washington and told me that - - he's an irrepressible anyway - - told me that he had literally, almost literally, been threatened with a lie detector test. It is a heck of a fine thing for an officer and gentleman." (In this regard it is noted that FBI Agents in conducting interviews in this case have made no mention of lie detector tests or polygraph examinations.) Baldwin also commented that this man was not "intimidated."

b6
b7C

In response to [redacted] comment that she hoped "your source is not easily intimidated," Baldwin said that he did not think so and he shared her hope but "that's the only thing I would worry about."

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

b3
b7E

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

THIS NOTE PAGE 3
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/27/96 BY SP3 BJS/CLM
9/23/96 SP3 BJS/CLM

b6
b7C

SP8 JF/CLM
3-21-89

~~TOP SECRET~~

Article by Hanson W. Baldwin
"The New York Times," July 26, 1962

[redacted] then asked what Baldwin thought of Mr. Kennedy's 'column play'" and when Baldwin asked what she meant she stated, "Oh, I mean I think that the way this is handled it's awful!" Baldwin said, "There is a good article in 'Look' magazine on Kennedy and the press" (apparently referring to the article in the August 28, 1962, issue of "Look" entitled "Kennedy vs the Press") "but it doesn't have some of the most important things in it. However, it has a lot of instances." [redacted] asked, "What is it? He doesn't like criticism?" Baldwin replied, "No, he doesn't like criticism, but this wasn't a critical article, dear. He goes off half-cocked. He uses the FBI and police power much too freely. It can be a dangerous thing and if it continues - - if it continues we're really going to have to go to town."

b6
b7C

[redacted] wondered if Scotty (James B.) Boston, head of the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times," was on Baldwin's side. Baldwin assured her that Boston was. Baldwin was then asked if "Orvil" (apparently Orvil Dryfoos, publisher of "The New York Times") was "scared." Baldwin stated, "No. I don't think he is scared. I think he was impressed. When the President sends you a special letter by special messenger, as I told him before the message arrived, this is only intended to represent kind of a form of pressure because Presidents don't do these things unless they expect to get some kind of results about it, and I told him about the President's sending General Taylor to see Mr. Luce to complain about an article in 'Fortune' magazine. Mr. Luce sent General Taylor back with a bee in his ear. But not Mr. Dryfoos. Mr. Dryfoos is another breed of cat." Baldwin also commented that he did not think Dryfoos was "a very strong man" but that Luce was "ruthless."

On August 16, 1962, Rear Admiral William M. McCormick, U.S. Navy, Assistant Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, advised that from January, 1961, to

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Article by Hanson W. Baldwin
"The New York Times," July 26, 1962

February 27, 1962, he served as Military Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric. Rear Admiral McCormick stated that during that period Baldwin had four or five appointments with Mr. Gilpatric. He advised that normally Mr. Gilpatric did not have a third person present during press interviews.

Additional interviews were conducted with officials of the Defense Intelligence Agency on August 16, 1962; however, no information pertinent to this investigation was obtained.

NOTE: Original being sent O'Donnell at White House; two Xerox copies made, one sent to Attorney General and other sent to Secretary of Defense. Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because the caption indicates the location of information so classified in a publication available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

SEE REVERSE
ST 62
12-11-1962
ADJ-10

August 15, 1962

BY COURIER SERVICE

Document declassified to ~~Secret~~
per [redacted] RS on 4/5/2010

b6
b7C

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In my previous letters to you, the last being August 14, 1962, you were furnished pertinent details concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962. You were also advised that you would be furnished pertinent developments in this continuing investigation.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

READING ROOM
81

b6
b7C

Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon advised on August 14, 1962, that on the evening of August 13, 1962, he had as guests at his home Mr. John A. McGone, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Mr. James P. Reston, head of the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times." Mr. Dillon advised that during the evening Reston brought up the subject of the investigation of the July 26 article, indicating that he thought this was an excessive use of the FBI. He stated this was not the right way to obtain information and intimated that some high official in the United States Government should have taken the matter up personally with Baldwin.

REC-15

Mr. Dillon advised that Reston stated he did not know why Baldwin would publish such an article and he did not know who may have furnished the information to Baldwin.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JFJ:djw

(8)

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SEE NOTE, PAGE 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENT DIRECTOR
8-15

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Donnell

the conversation Reston said that "they" had been preparing a "blast" because the FBI had been used, and he mentioned the fact that the FBI contacted a secretary of "The New York Times" at 7 p.m. in the evening (this probably is in reference to our interview with [redacted] details of which have been previously furnished you). Reston continued by stating that someone had called "The New York Times" and explained the importance of the subject matter involved in the news article and, thereafter, Reston felt better. b6 b7C

Mr. Dillon pointed out that he received the impression that someone in a high position in the Administration had talked to Reston, but he stated that Reston did not so comment. Mr. Dillon said, however, that Reston did say that he did not realize the importance of the information, although he knew when he read the article that it would be embarrassing. Reston indicated he now realized that the "complaint" was not merely a political tactic for bargaining or pressure purposes. Mr. Dillon advised that Reston stated that he had heard only three persons were in possession of the information and the phrases used in the article, and he thought Baldwin must have obtained the information from some friend who divulged it to him but did not make the proper "off-the-record injunctions" of those portions which should be protected. It appeared to Mr. Dillon that this subject was uppermost in Reston's mind.

(U) On August 14, 1962, Mr. Lowell R. Dailey, Assistant to Mr. Bruno W. Augenstein, Assistant Director of Defense, Research and Engineering (Intelligence and Reconnaissance), Department of Defense, made available for examination the document captioned, "Protection of Satellite Reconnaissance Vehicles." This document, dated July 13, 1962, is classified "~~TOP SECRET~~ - Special Handling Required." According to [redacted] Mr. Dailey, only four copies of this document were prepared.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable F. Kenneth O'Donnell

One copy was furnished to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on July 14, 1962, and returned the same date; one copy was furnished to Mr. Joseph V. Charyk, Under Secretary of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force, on July 16, 1962, which he still has in his possession; and one copy was furnished to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric on July 16, 1962, and returned on the same date. The fourth copy was retained as a file copy. On August 7, 1962, the copy previously in the possession of Mr. Gilpatric was furnished to CIA, which has retained possession.

A comparison of the above document with the last three paragraphs of the July 26, 1962, news article indicated that certain information in the document appeared in the article, although not in the continuity set forth in the document.

On August 14, 1962, officials of various United States Government agencies were interviewed; however, no information pertinent to this investigation was developed.

Investigation in this matter is continuing, and you will be furnished pertinent developments. The above information has been furnished to the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" since contents indicate the location of "~~Top Secret~~" information in a publication available to the public.

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. SULLIVAN

FROM : MR. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES" 7-26-62
ESPIONAGE - X1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
DATE: 8-16-621 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Wacks
1 - Mr. Branigan

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTJ/STG

3/27/96

SP3 BTJ/STG

ASAC Schmit of the New York Office called to report the following conversation between Hanson W. Baldwin and [redacted] which occurred during the late evening of 8-15-62:

343842

7/23/96

SP3 BTJ/STG

b6

b7C

Baldwin stated that the Alumni Association Publishers' Committee had a meeting in Washington at the Army and Navy Country Club. "They went down to the Alumni Club at Annapolis to find out who had been to the meeting and I am sure they questioned them. One of my friends from Washington wrote me and told me he had been literally threatened with a lie detector test. That's a heck of a thing for an officer and a gentleman." [redacted] replied "I hope your source was not intimidated." Baldwin stated "Oh no, this man wasn't intimidated. So do I; that's the only thing I would worry about."

b6

b7C

Baldwin then related he had told Dryfoos about the President sending General Taylor to see Mr. Luce and that Mr. Luce sent Taylor back with a bee in his ear. However, Dryfoos is another kind of a cat.

Baldwin referred to the "Look" magazine article and said that much was left out of it. He said Kennedy uses the FBI and police power too freely. He also said that this could be dangerous if it continues and that Scotty Reston was upset.

b3

b7E

Baldwin then remarked that Dryfoos is not scared but impressed. He said "When the President sends a letter by messenger, it is a form of pressure Presidents don't do unless they expect results."

REC-15

12 AUG 23 1962

A verbatim transcript of the conversation is being submitted by the New York Office by teletype, and H.G. will be advised.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

WAB:hrt

(6)

AUG 24 1962

SENT DIRECTOR
8-16-62

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 23 1962
TELETYPE *sh*

URGENT 8-23-62 12-34 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI [REDACTED] AND SAC WFO [REDACTED]

b3
b7E

-----1-----

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

SUBJECT HANSON W. BALDWIN

ESP-X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 *gjs*
9/23/96 SP3 BJS/ *gjs*
9/23/96 SP3 BJS/ *gjs*

b6
b7C

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED NO PERTINENT
INFORMATION CONCERNING BALDWIN THIS DATE/8-22-62/.

b3
b7E

END AND ACK

7
36 R

NY R 01 WA NH

TU

EX 100

REC- 50

12 AUG 24 1962

1144
TWO COPIES W/ *gjs*

5. *gjs*

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wamadal

REVERSE
MOORE
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

August 22, 1962

BY LIAISON

- 1 - Mr. Wacks

Document Downgraded to ~~Secret~~
per [redacted] RS b6
on 4/5/2010 b7C

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In my previous letters to you pertinent details were set forth concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962.

In connection therewith Captain Turner F. Caldwell, United States Navy, Assistant Director, Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, was interviewed on August 20, 1962. He advised that his only contact with Baldwin occurred in 1953 and he has not seen him since.

Captain Caldwell could furnish no information as to the source for Baldwin's information contained in the July 26 article; however, he stated that it was his personal opinion that Baldwin obtained his information from someone in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Captain Caldwell advised that it was his personal conviction that Maxwell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, furnished the information to Baldwin.

Captain Caldwell stated that the reason he believed that Mr. Gilpatric was Baldwin's source was that in 1961 an incident which occurred in 1961. Captain Caldwell said that in 1961 shortly after the present Administration took office he was assigned to a study group under Dr. Alain Enthoven of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to prepare a "Top Secret" document entitled "Strategic Forces Study." According to Captain Caldwell the paper was prepared for Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to present to the

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

JFW:dmd (8)

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENT DIRECTOR

8-22-62

Aug 27 2 43 PM '62
RECEIVED-READING ROOM
FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
Aug 21 3 30 PM '62
RECEIVED-READING ROOM
FBI
CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BJC/CLM
EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION
b3
b7E
b6
b7C
4/24/96

See note page 2

b3
b7E

Revised page 2 of letter
originally dated 8-21-62.
Redate first page to 8-22-62
JFW:dmd

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

President and when it was completed the document went to Mr. McNamara; to Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles J. Hitch; and to Mr. Gilpatric. Captain Caldwell stated that before the paper was given to the President a paraphrased, detailed draft of the study appeared in an article written by Baldwin. There was considerable consternation about this leak and Dr. Enthoven personally blamed Captain Caldwell for the unauthorized disclosure. Captain Caldwell stated he was incensed by this accusation and he conducted an inquiry on his own to attempt to ascertain Baldwin's source for this leak. According to Captain Caldwell the results of his inquiry convinced him that Mr. Gilpatric was Baldwin's source. Captain Caldwell pointed out that he had ascertained that Baldwin had been in Washington, D.C., and had seen Mr. Gilpatric shortly before the appearance of Baldwin's article on the matter.

Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), on August 20, 1962, advised that he has known Baldwin for many years but has had no recent contact with him. Mr. Nitze could furnish no information as to Baldwin's source for the information in the July 26 article.

You will be furnished additional developments in this matter. The above information has been furnished to the Attorney General and the Honorable Robert S. McNamara, The Secretary of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

Note: This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because information herein discloses the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~

F B I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-26-2017 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

Date: August 21, 1962

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962
ESP - X

Major General DALE O. SMITH, Special Assistant
for Arms Control, JCS, advised that he was slightly
acquainted with BALDWIN, but has not seen him for past
ten years. SMITH unable to furnish any suspects for
instant leak, but speculated that certain civilians
in the scientific community and at State Department
favored arms inspections and fragmentary leaks of infor-
mation to the Soviets might be helpful to their position
and eventually establish an inspection system.

WFO has a pending undeveloped lead to inter-
view [redacted]

Inquiries at CIA this date indicate that [redacted]
has communicated with CIA indicating his intention to
possibly attend a science committee meeting in Washington
next week. In the absence of a compelling reason and
UACB, no further efforts will be made to interview [redacted]

b3 per CIA

3 - Bureau

1 - New York [redacted]

1 - WFO

RCB/pcn

(5)

EX-108
(Info)(PERSONAL ATTENTION)(RM)

A I R T E L

b3
b7E

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

AUG 29 1962

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 8-23-62

This information will be
included in report.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTG/fat

3/29/96 SP3 BTJ/cmm

9-13-96 SP3 BTJ/fat

WHF

~~TOP SECRET~~

Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - D.E. Moore
1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

August 21, 1962

BY LIAISON

REC'D-READING ROOM
AUG 21 2 29 PM '62

b6
b7C

Document downgraded
to ~~Secret~~ per [redacted]
[redacted] RS on 4/5/2010

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. McNamara:

With reference to our investigation of the leak of classified data in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962, there is enclosed a copy of a memorandum dated August 18, 1962, which sets forth in detail the results of our investigation in this matter. The two sources not identified by name in the memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

The memorandum includes the results of interviews conducted from July 26, 1962, through August 18, 1962, and your attention is specifically called to the synopsis contained on pages one through nine. Of particular note are certain interviews in which Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, is mentioned. Lieutenant General David A. Burchinal, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Department of the Air Force, stated that on July 18, 1962, Baldwin advised him that Mr. Gilpatric had told Baldwin that [the successor to the B-52 bomber had been selected and it would not be the RS-70, but would involve a very "hush-hush" project.] According to General Burchinal, this information is highly classified and Baldwin is not entitled to have it (page 92). Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, advised that on July 19, 1962, he saw Baldwin, who implied that Mr. Gilpatric had informed him that General Maxwell Taylor was to be the new Chairman of the

b6
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

EX-100

19 AUG 24 1962

b3
b7E

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by SP8 JF/6
Declassify on: OADR
9/23/96 JF/6
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
JF/6

onrad
JeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JFW:br
(8)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable Robert S. McNamara

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Anderson said that this information had not been released to the public at that time (page 107). b7C per USMC

[] on August 9, 1962, advised that it was generally believed by responsible people in the military community that Mr. Gilpatric was the person who disclosed the information for the July 26 article to Baldwin (page 239). The results of our interviews with Mr. Gilpatric conducted on August 2 and 17, 1962, are contained on pages 69 through 80 of the memorandum.

With regard to Mr. Gilpatric, this Bureau in 1952 conducted an investigation relative to the compromise of two "Security Information - Secret" documents in articles in "Aviation Week" of July 21 and 29, 1952. During this investigation, Mr. Edward K. Moss, Assistant Administrator for Public Information, Defense Production Administration - National Production Authority, advised on September 29, 1952, that it was his personal belief that the "leak" came from the office of Mr. R. L. Gilpatric, the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Also during this investigation, Colonel Arno Luehman, Deputy Director of Public Information, Department of the Air Force, advised on October 1, 1952, that on an unrecalled day in July (1952) Mr. Gilpatric had made available for his reading a classified document. Later on the same day, Ben Lee, Military Editor of "Aviation Week" appeared at his office with a telegram which Lee claimed he had received from the offices of McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Incorporated, publishers of "Aviation Week," in New York City. After Lee read two or three excerpts from this telegram, it was apparent to Colonel Luehman that the information contained therein was substantially the same as he had read in Mr. Gilpatric's office earlier that morning.

On the following day, Mr. Lee again appeared in Colonel Luehman's office, requested an interview with Gilpatric and, after his interview with Mr. Gilpatric, displayed to Colonel Luehman a two-page onionskin paper which he stated Mr. Gilpatric gave him and Colonel Luehman noted that it bore the classification "Secret." After Lee left, Colonel Luehman

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable Robert S. McNamara

reported to Mr. Gilpatrick the fact that Lee had shown him the document bearing the classification "Secret" and stated Lee had claimed Mr. Gilpatrick had given it to him and Mr. Gilpatrick at that time emphatically denied to Colonel Lushman he had furnished any such document to Mr. Lee.

During the instant investigation, we have interviewed 238 individuals including many who were in contact with Mr. Baldwin during his visit to Washington from July 16 through July 19, 1962. Certain additional individuals who were not available for interview will be interviewed in the immediate future and you will be advised of the results of these interviews as soon as completed. Some officials at the White House and at various other departments who are not known to have been in contact with Baldwin have not been interviewed in connection with this investigation.

It was originally estimated that approximately 300 to 400 people had access to information which could have been the source of Baldwin's article. Our investigation has indicated that approximately 710 individuals are believed to have had access to this information. Inasmuch as our investigation has indicated that Baldwin deals on an extremely high level, we do not contemplate interviewing the various individuals at a lower level believed to have had access to this information.

It is noted that during the investigation, we were able to establish that while Baldwin was in Washington, D. C., he contacted 22 individuals currently on a high level in the Government as well as three recently retired high-level officials. According to the facts developed, Baldwin apparently has almost unlimited access to sources on a high echelon within the Government, either friends or acquaintances of many years. It appears that Government officials have talked to him quite freely. The very fact that Baldwin was able to contact in a period of

~~TOP SECRET~~
- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable Robert S. McNamara

Four days so many persons knowledgeable of highly classified data creates a presumption that information of value was imparted to him. Investigations of previous leak cases have indicated a like entree by other well-known reporters.

It is noted that the investigation indicates that Baldwin probably also gathered information during his July trip to Washington, D. C., which was used for his articles in "The New York Times" issues of July 28 and 29, 1963.

This situation to re again emphasizes the conviction that investigations are not the answer to the problem of leaks of classified information. Rather a general strengthening of procedures within the various agencies relating to the handling of classified information would appear to be the solution. Unless this is accomplished, there can be no assurance that other serious unauthorized disclosures of classified information will not occur.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

NOTE: This letter classified ~~TOP SECRET~~ since it indicates the location of information so classified in article available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b6
b7C

August 22, 1962

BY LIAISON

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - Wannall
1 - D.E. Moore
1 - Wacks

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In my previous letters to you, you were furnished pertinent details concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962.

In connection therewith, our coverage of Hanson W. Baldwin disclosed that on August 17, 1962, he was in contact with [redacted] Baldwin referred to "a very good article" in "Look" magazine on "Kennedy and the Press" pointing out that the article cited "some of these incidents that have occurred in the past." Baldwin said, "It doesn't cite them all and doesn't cite this recent one, of course." (Baldwin apparently referred to the article in the August 28, 1962, issue of "Look" entitled "Kennedy vs. the Press" by Fletcher Knebel.) [redacted] commented, "But if someone doesn't stand up to him -- Who does he think he is? I'd punch him in the nose."

Baldwin again referred, in a critical vein, to our interviews with the "secretary in Washington," apparently [redacted] employed at the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times," and with Rear Admiral William F. Fitzgerald, Jr., Executive Director of the U. S. Naval Academy Alumni Association. Baldwin indicated with respect to the latter interview that he thought it was "a tacit kind of intimidation." Baldwin also pointed out that the thing that makes me maddest is that they go into the Pentagon with officers who have sworn oaths of fidelity, loyalty and obedience

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

JPW:SMF
(C)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/28/96 BY SP3 BJS/clm
7/25/96 SP3 BJS/TRE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

and they threaten them with lie detector tests. This is incredible as compared with the kind of country which I was brought up in and this has happened not only in this case but in two previous cases." As was indicated in my communication of August 17, 1962, FBI Agents in conducting interviews in this case have made no mention of lie detector tests or polygraph examinations.

Baldwin commented that former President Dwight D. Eisenhower never "sent the FBI as such into the Pentagon" although he did become quite upset about leak cases. Baldwin was of the opinion that it was "peculiar to this Administration" and he thought that the explanation lies in the fact that "Kennedy" has some type of "a Boston-Irish inferiority complex." Baldwin also believed that "Kennedy" was "snubbed when he went to Harvard." As a further reason for investigations into unauthorized disclosures of classified information, Baldwin thought that "Bobby Kennedy" was close to the President and influenced the President in instituting such investigations. [redacted] commented that "these Kennedys" were "big on hopping right on the phone and going and doing something without thinking something really through." Baldwin in reply pointed out that that was "the trouble" and it was "the trouble with Cuba."

b6
b7C

The above information has been furnished to the Attorney General.

You will be furnished additional information developed in this case.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because information herein discloses the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - D. E. Moore
1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

b6
b7C

~~Document downgraded to~~

per [redacted] RS
on 4/5/2010

August 22, 1962

BY LIAISON

Aug 22 2 43 PM '62

FBI

RECORD-LEADING ROOM

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. McNamara:

With reference to our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962, Captain Turner F. Caldwell, Jr., United States Navy, Assistant Director, Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, was interviewed on August 20, 1962. He advised that his only contact with Baldwin occurred in 1953 and he has not seen him since.

Captain Caldwell could furnish no information as to the source for Baldwin's information contained in the July 26 article; however, he stated that it was his personal opinion that Baldwin obtained his information from someone in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Captain Caldwell advised that it was his personal conviction that Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, furnished the information to Baldwin.

Captain Caldwell stated that the reason he believed that Mr. Gilpatric was Baldwin's source was based on an incident which occurred in 1961. Captain Caldwell said that in 1961 shortly after the present Administration took office he was assigned to a study group under Dr. Alain Enthoven of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to prepare a "Top Secret" document entitled "Strategic Forces Study." According to Captain Caldwell the paper was prepared for you to present to the President and when it was completed the document went to you; to Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles J. Hitch; and to Mr. Gilpatric. Captain Caldwell

b3
b7E

JFW:VMS
(8)

SEE NOTE ON PAGE 2

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/clr
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
5/9/96/19-2396 SP3 BTJ/clr

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable Robert S. McNamara

stated that before the paper was given to the President a paraphrased, detailed draft of the study appeared in an article written by Baldwin. There was considerable consternation about this leak and Dr. Enthoven personally blamed Captain Caldwell for the unauthorized disclosure. Captain Caldwell stated he was incensed by this accusation and he conducted an inquiry on his own to attempt to ascertain Baldwin's source for this leak. According to Captain Caldwell the results of his inquiry convinced him that Mr. Gilpatric was Baldwin's source. Captain Caldwell pointed out that he had ascertained that Baldwin had been in Washington, D. C., and had seen Mr. Gilpatric shortly before the appearance of Baldwin's article on the matter.

Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), on August 20, 1962, advised that he has known Baldwin for many years but has had no recent contact with him. Mr. Nitze could furnish no information as to Baldwin's source for the information in the July 26 article.

You will be furnished additional developments in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE: This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" since it pinpoints the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

- 2 -
~~TOP SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 26 1962
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

URGENT 8-26-62 11-58 PM TDM

TO DIRECTOR FBI [REDACTED] AND SAC WFO [REDACTED]

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN., ESPIONAGE DASH X.

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED NO PERTINENT
ACTIVITY CONCERNING BALDWIN ON AUGUST TWENTY FIVE OR TWENTY SIX,
NINETEEN SIXTY TWO.

CORR BUREAU FILE NO IS [REDACTED]

END AND ACK

NY R 3 WA JS

53 AUG 29 1962

REC-34

18 AUG 27 1962

b3
b7E

TWO COPIES WFO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3.7.82 BY SP-10
3/28/96 4305 KLM
9-23-96 SP-8 JHE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 24 1962

TELETYPE *al*

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

gn

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *3-21-89* BY *SP8 BTJ/fat*
3-29-96 SP3 BTJ/lem
2-23-96 SP3 BTJ/lem

URGENT 8-24-62 1-18 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI [REDACTED] AND SAC WFO [REDACTED]

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

SUBJECT HANSON W. BALDWIN ESP-X

NEW YORK THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED

NO PERTINENT INFO THIS DATE CONCERNING BALDWIN.

END AND ACK

NY R 02 WA NH

TU

50 AUG 24 1962
TWO COPIES WFO

REC-34

11 AUG 27 1962

EX-107

b3
b7E

Am
A.F. JAMES

F B I

Date: August 24, 1962

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - XMajor General C. F. LEONARD, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
U. S. Army, interviewed on 8/24/62 with negative
results.ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-83 BY SP8BJ/626
3/29/86 SP3BJ/626
9/23/91 SP3BJ/6263 - Bureau
1 - WFO
HJM/pcn
(4)

EX 100

REC- 45

A I R T E L

10 AUG 27 1962

Approved: _____

Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

b3
b7Eb6
b7Cb3
b7E

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: August 22, 1962

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Tolson	✓
Belmont	✓
Mohr	
Callahan	
Conrad	
DeLoach	
Evans	
Malone	
Rosen	✓
Sullivan	✓
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Holmes	
Gandy	

The Attorney General casually mentioned in conversation last evening that Secretary McNamara of the Defense Department was planning to talk to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric about this case. The Attorney General wanted to make certain that McNamara had copies of all reports. I told him that information developed to date had been made available to McNamara but that the matter was still pending and additional reports would be furnished to both the Attorney General and McNamara, as well as the White House.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTJ/CLM
3/29/96 SP3 BTJ/CLM
9-23-96 SP3 BTJ/CLM

REC-10

EX-102

5 AUG 27 1962

b3
b7ECAE:amr
(8)

57 AUG 31 1962

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 8/17/62

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN
IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES"
JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - D. E. Moore
1 - Liaison
1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Mr. Belmont's memorandum to Mr. Sullivan 8/16/62 indicated that the Director had instructed we furnish the Secretary of Defense copies of reports we have sent so far in this case to the Attorney General and Mr. O'Donnell at the White House. Accordingly, on the afternoon of 8/16/62 Special Agent [redacted] delivered personally to Secretary of Defense McNamara a copy of each letter we had sent to the Attorney General in this case. These included the letters of July 27, 30, 31, and August 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, and 16. These contain the information sent to Mr. O'Donnell.

In presence of Liaison Agent Secretary McNamara perused several of the letters, particularly those of 8/2 and 8/3 pertaining to Roswell L. Gilpatric, and on finishing the reading of the letters nodded his head, obviously in disgust, and commented that it appears the only way to prevent such leaks is to have a third person present when Defense officials are talking to newspapermen. Mr. McNamara was advised that our investigation in this matter is continuing. He made inquiry as to whether or not it was felt our investigation would develop sufficient information whereby he could fire the individual who leaked the information to Baldwin. Mr. McNamara was advised, of course, that our investigative efforts were directed toward determining the identity of this individual.

ACTION:

REC-10

For your information.

b3
b7E

JFW:slj
(8)

SENT DIRECTOR
8-17-62

57 AUG 31 1962

F146

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-88 BY SP8 BTJ/STW

Date of Mail 8-18-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-88 BY SP8 EY/pt
3/29/96 SP3 BJS/cem
9-23-96 SP3 BJS/pt

Subject JUNE MAIL Hanson W. Baldwin

Removed By 65 AUG 31 1962

File Number

[Redacted Box]

b3
b7E

Permanent Serial Charge Out

F B I

Date: August 23, 1962

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Malone	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]
 FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]
 ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
 "THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962
 ESPIONAGE - X

b3
b7E

Colonel [REDACTED] Headquarters,
 Systems Command, USAF, Andrews AFB, advised he met
 BALDWIN at Maxwell AFB at cocktail party about 1954.
 Again saw him at air force base in Texas 1956. Has
 had no other contact with him and does not believe
 BALDWIN aware of his identity. [REDACTED] unable to
 furnish any possible contacts of BALDWIN or possible
 sources of leak.

b6
b7CALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8/STJ/STJ

3/29/96 SP3/STJ/STJ

9-23-96

SP3/STJ/STJ

3 - Bureau
 1 - WFO
 RCB/pcn
 (4)

REC-29

A I R T E L

10 AUG 27 1962

EX-116

50 AUG 31 1962

CC: Sullivan

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
 Special Agent in Charge

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

The Attorney General

August 22, 1962

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wacks

b6
b7C

ARTICLE BY HANSON M. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

CLASSIFIED BY *SP3 BTJ/K*
DECLASSIFY ON: *25X12*

In connection with our investigation in this matter, we interviewed Captain Turner F. Caldwell, Jr., United States Navy, Assistant Director, Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, on August 20, 1962. He advised that his only contact with Baldwin occurred in 1953 and he has not seen him since.

Captain Caldwell could furnish no information as to the source for Baldwin's information contained in the July 26 article; however, he stated that it was his personal opinion that Baldwin obtained his information from someone in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Captain Caldwell advised that his personal conviction that Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, furnished the information to Baldwin.

Captain Caldwell stated that the reason he believed that Mr. Gilpatric was Baldwin's source was based on a incident which occurred in 1961. Captain Caldwell said that in 1961 shortly after the present Administration took office he was assigned to a study group under Dr. Alain Enthoven of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to prepare a "Top Secret" document entitled "Strategic Forces Study." According to Captain Caldwell the paper was prepared for Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to present to the President and when it was completed the document went to Mr. McNamara; to Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles J. Nitch; and to Mr. Gilpatric. Captain Caldwell stated that before the paper was given to the President a paraphrased, detailed draft of the study appeared in an article written by Baldwin. There was considerable consternation about this leak and Dr. Enthoven personally blamed Captain Caldwell for the unauthorized disclosure. Captain Caldwell stated he was incensed by this accusation and he conducted an inquiry on his own to attempt to ascertain Baldwin's source for this leak. According to Captain Caldwell the results of his inquiry convinced him that

MAILED 10
AUG 22 1962
COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENT DIRECTOR
2-22-62

See note page 2

b3
b7E

REC'D-READING ROOM

AUG 27 2 43 PM '62

Document forwarded to *SECRET*
Per *4/5/2010*

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Mr. Gilpatric was Baldwin's source. Captain Caldwell pointed out that he had ascertained that Baldwin had been in Washington, D.C., and had seen Mr. Gilpatric shortly before the appearance of Baldwin's article on the matter.

Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), on August 20, 1962, advised that he has known Baldwin for many years but has had no recent contact with him. Mr. Nitze could furnish no information as to Baldwin's source for the information in the July 26 article.

You will be furnished additional developments in this matter.

Note: This letter is classified ~~"TOP SECRET"~~ since the caption pinpoints the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

DISTRIBUTION: AG
O'DONNELL
MCNAMARA

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wacks

August 20, 1962

BY LIAISON

Document downgraded
to Secret per [redacted] ps

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. McNamara:

With reference to our investigation of the leak of classified data in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962, there is enclosed a memorandum containing the results of our reinterview with Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, conducted on August 17, 1962.

Mr. Gilpatric in this reinterview was unable to furnish the source for the information in the above-mentioned article. Mr. Gilpatric also pointed out that he has not consciously furnished Baldwin with any sensitive data or classified material. Mr. Gilpatric did, however, advise that when Baldwin contacted him on July 17, 1962, the matter of the A3-70 airplane was mentioned.

You will be furnished additional developments in this matter.

Sincerely yours, [redacted]

REC-21

EX-108

Note: This letter is classified "Top Secret" because information herein discloses the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

JFW:dmd (8)

SENT DIRECTOR

7-20-62

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by SP3 BTJ/clw
Declassify on: OADR

MAILED TO
Sant to 2
AUG 20 1962
COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

b6
b7C

AUG 20 3 50 PM '62

REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

August 20, 1962

b6
b7C

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN,
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962

Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, who was first interviewed on August 2, 1962, was reinterviewed on August 17, 1962.

Mr. Gilpatric advised that the luncheon held on July 26, 1962, in New York City with the Board of Editors of "The New York Times" was for the purpose of having the editors of the newspaper obtain background data and decisions to aid them in their interpretation of the news. Mr. Gilpatric explained that his purpose in being at the luncheon was to convey to the Board a picture of the over-all defense policies of the Administration; to point out our objectives in terms of cutting down the impact of overseas expenditures on the balance of payments; and to indicate the effect of procurement in the United States on the domestic economy. Mr. Gilpatric also stated that at the luncheon he attempted to "do a bit of selling" of the Administration's defense policies. Mr. Gilpatric said that Balowin was present at the luncheon but did not have very much to say.

In the previous interview Mr. Gilpatric stated he had complained to Orvil E. Dryfoos, publisher of "The New York Times," that Baldwin was insensitive to security and had breached the limits of security on several occasions. Mr. Gilpatric also on August 2 stated that he had told Dryfoos that he cited the article of July 26, 1962, as an example and that he complained to Dryfoos about Baldwin's critical judgment of the Administration's defense policies without first discussing the matter prior to publication. On August 17, Mr. Gilpatric stated that he did not furnish Dryfoos with any specific instances other than the article of

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

JFW:agg
(10)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

~~TOP SECRET~~

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN,
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962

July 26 but he did have in mind a series of articles Baldwin wrote approximately a year ago which were critical of the organization of the Defense Intelligence Agency. According to Mr. Gilpatric the material in Baldwin's articles was still classified at the time of publication, although shortly thereafter they were the subject of public releases. Mr. Gilpatric also pointed out that in October, 1961, in a speech he made at Hot Springs, Virginia, he, with authorization, released for the first time classified information concerning our defense weapons, number of bombers and other data relating to our strategic weapons system. He stated his purpose was to acquaint the American public with the extent of our defenses and at the same time call to the attention of the Soviets how strong we were. Mr. Gilpatric pointed out that earlier in 1961 Baldwin had written an article which included practically the same material. This fact indicated to Mr. Gilpatric that Baldwin had access to classified information.

Mr. Gilpatric was of the opinion that Baldwin's best sources were located in the Pentagon. He pointed out that he has always felt that Baldwin's primary sources were in the Department of the Navy. He pointed out that he has arrived at this opinion because of Baldwin's U. S. Navy background and the fact that Baldwin's articles appeared to take a "Navy position" in any controversial issue. Mr. Gilpatric stated he did not know the names of any of Baldwin's sources; however, he mentioned that Wilfred J. McNeil, former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in 1959 and 1960, is a close friend of Baldwin's and used to be a Baldwin source in the Department of Defense. Mr. Gilpatric also stated that Baldwin's source for the July 26 article was "purely" military. Mr. Gilpatric said that he based this opinion on his knowledge that Baldwin's sources are primarily military whom he has built up over a period of 15 or 20 years in the military and naval establishments. He stated that he also believed that these agencies have the necessary motivation to circulate their points of view. Mr. Gilpatric did not, however, perceive a service interest motive in the July 26 article.

- 2 -
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN,
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962

With respect to Mr. Gilpatric's statement of July 26 that he meets members of the press alone, he explained that this custom applies only to old and trusted friends whom he has known for more than ten years. He cited as such friends Joseph Alsop, Walter Lippmann, Arthur Krock and Hanson W. Baldwin. He stated he never makes a record of interviews with members of the press and he did not make a memorandum of Baldwin's interview with him on July 17, 1962.

Mr. Gilpatric said that he has been concerned for some time about Baldwin's sources of information at the Pentagon, and he has been aware that they were extremely good sources. He pointed out, however, that he has never inquired of Baldwin concerning his sources and has never made any effort to identify them. Mr. Gilpatric stated that he continued to see Baldwin despite his concern and furnished the explanation that Baldwin is the senior Military Editor of a great newspaper and it is important that he give Baldwin an audience in order to permit him to express himself. Mr. Gilpatric also stated that it is part of his job to see Baldwin. He declared he has not consciously furnished Baldwin with any sensitive data or classified material.

Mr. Gilpatric stated that when the current investigation was initiated James B. Reston, head of the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times," had become upset and complained to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. It was Mr. Gilpatric's understanding that Mr. McNamara had contacted Reston. According to Mr. Gilpatric, subsequently the President mentioned to Mr. Gilpatric that he had sent his Naval Aide, Captain Fawcett T. Shepard, Jr., to deliver a letter to Dryfoos prepared by James R. Killian of the White House staff concerning the seriousness of the disclosures which appeared in the July 26 article and the possible adverse effects on the country's security.

With respect to Mr. Gilpatric's statement in his August 2 interview that he discussed the subject matter of the successor to the B-52 bomber with Baldwin in April or May, 1962, and that he had not touched on this point when Baldwin saw him

- 3 -
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN,
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962

(U) on July 17, Mr. Gilpatric on August 17 stated that Baldwin did ask him on July 17 what was to be done [about the RS-70 airplane and the problem of the successor to the B-52 bomber. ~~SECRET~~]. Mr. Gilpatric said that he told Baldwin a decision had not been made.

At the conclusion of the interview Mr. Gilpatric advised that although Baldwin is a journalist of great talent and ability, he possesses a certain pride, even arrogance, and decides what he will publish and what should be published. Mr. Gilpatric described Baldwin as being very brilliant and very knowledgeable but also opinionated and authoritative. Mr. Gilpatric stated, however, that Baldwin apparently has exercised restraint in the past since Baldwin told him he knew about the U-2 reconnaissance plane and the Cuban invasion plans long in advance of any publicity concerning them.

NOTE:

Original being sent O'Donnell at White House. Two Zerox copies made, one sent to Attorney General and the other to Secretary of Defense.

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because the caption indicates the location of information so classified in a publication available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wainwright
1 - Mr. Wacks

*copy furnished
to C. White
while home for
classroom 12/4/64
D.W.*

*Document downgraded
to Secret per*

[Redacted]

on 4/5/2010

AS August 21, 1962

BY LIAISON

DATE 8-20-62
BY [Signature]

RECEIVED-READING ROOM
JUL 20 1962

AUG 20 1962

b6
b7C

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

In my previous letters to you, the last being August 20, 1962, you were furnished pertinent details concerning our investigation of the leak of classified information in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962.

In connection therewith, there is enclosed a copy of a memorandum dated August 18, 1962, which sets forth in detail the results of our investigation in this matter. The two sources not identified by name in the memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

The memorandum includes the results of interviews conducted from July 26, 1962, through August 18, 1962, and your attention is specifically called to the synopsis contained on pages one through nine. Of particular note are certain interviews in which Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, is mentioned. Lieutenant General David A. Burchinal, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Department of the Air Force, stated that on July 18, 1962, Baldwin advised him that Mr. Gilpatric had told Baldwin that the successor to the B-52 bomber had been selected and it would not be the B-70, but would involve a very "hush-hush" project. According to General Burchinal, this information is highly classified and Baldwin is not entitled to have it (page 92). Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, advised that on July 19, 1962, he saw Baldwin who implied that Mr. Gilpatric had informed him that General Maxwell Taylor was to be the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Anderson said that this information had not been released to the public at that time (page 107).

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b7C per USMC

Jr W: dmd (8)

MAIL ROOM

SENT DIRECTOR
FOR APPROVAL
8-20-62

EX-103

TOP SECRET REC-21

SEE NOTE PAGE 10

19 AUG 27 1962

b3
b7E

CLASSIFIED BY SP3 BTJ/clm
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1/4
5/10/96

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

August 9, 1962, advised that it was generally believed by responsible people in the military community that Mr. Gilpatric was the person who disclosed the information for the July 26 article to Baldwin (page 239). The results of our interviews with Mr. Gilpatric conducted on August 2 and 17, 1962, are contained on pages 69 through 79 of the memorandum.

With regard to Mr. Gilpatric, this Bureau in 1952 conducted an investigation relative to the compromise of two "Security Information - Secret" documents in articles in "Aviation Week" of July 21 and 29, 1952. During this investigation, Mr. Edward K. Moss, Assistant Administrator for Public Information, Defense Production Administration - National Production Authority, advised on September 29, 1952, that it was his personal belief that the "leak" came from the office of Mr. R. L. Gilpatric, the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Also during this investigation, Colonel Arno Luehman, Deputy Director of Public Information, Department of the Air Force, advised on October 1, 1952, that on an unrecalled day in July (1952) Mr. Gilpatric had made available for his reading a classified document. Later on the same day, Don Lee, Military Editor of "Aviation Week," appeared at his office with a telegram which Lee claimed he had received from the offices of McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Incorporated, publishers of "Aviation Week," in New York City. After Lee read two or three excerpts from this telegram, it was apparent to Colonel Luehman that the information contained therein was substantially the same as he had read in Mr. Gilpatric's office earlier that morning.

On the following day, Mr. Lee again appeared in Colonel Luehman's office, requested an interview with Gilpatric and, after his interview with Mr. Gilpatric, displayed to Colonel Luehman a two-page onionskin paper which he stated Mr. Gilpatric gave him and Colonel Luehman noted that it bore the classification "Secret." After Lee left, Colonel Luehman reported to Mr. Gilpatric the fact that Lee had shown him the document bearing the classification "Secret" and stated Lee had claimed Mr. Gilpatric had given it to him and Mr. Gilpatric at that time emphatically denied to Colonel Luehman he had furnished any such document to Mr. Lee.

During the instant investigation, we have interviewed 238 individuals including many who were in contact with Mr. Baldwin during his visit to Washington from July 16 through July 19, 1962. Certain additional individuals who were not available

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

or interview will be interviewed in the immediate future and you will be advised of the results of these interviews as soon as completed. Some officials at the White House and at various other departments who are not known to have been in contact with Baldwin have not been interviewed in connection with this investigation.

It was originally estimated that approximately 300 to 400 people had access to information which could have been the source of Baldwin's article. Our investigation has indicated that approximately 710 individuals are believed to have had access to this information. Inasmuch as our investigation has indicated that Baldwin deals on an extremely high level, we do not contemplate interviewing the various individuals at a lower level believed to have had access to this information.

It is noted that during the investigation, we were able to establish that while Baldwin was in Washington, D.C., he contacted 22 individuals currently on a high level in the Government as well as three recently retired high-level officials. According to the facts developed, Baldwin apparently has almost unlimited access to sources on a high echelon within the Government, either friends or acquaintances of many years. It appears that Government officials have talked to him quite freely. The very fact that Baldwin was able to contact in a period of four days so many persons knowledgeable of highly classified data creates a presumption that information of value was imparted to him. Investigations of previous leak cases have indicated a like entree by other well-known reporters.

It is noted that the investigation indicates that Baldwin probably also gathered information during his July trip to Washington, D.C., which was used for his articles in "The New York Times" issues of July 28 and 29, 1962.

This situation to me again emphasizes the conviction that investigations are not the answer to the problem of leaks of classified information. Rather a general strengthening of procedures within the various agencies relating to the handling of classified information would appear to be the solution. Unless

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

if this is accomplished, there can be no assurance that other serious unauthorized disclosures of classified information will not occur.

The above information has been furnished to the Attorney General and the Honorable Robert S. McNamara, The Secretary of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

Note: This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because information herein discloses the location of information so classified in an article available to the public.

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 25 1962

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 MTF/fab

URGENT 8-25-62 1-26 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR RXXX FBI [REDACTED]

ANS SAC WFO [REDACTED]

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

-----1-----

SUBJECT HANSON W. BALDWIN

ESP-X

NEW YORK THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK RREPORTED
NO PERTINENT INFO CONCERNING BALDWIN THIS DATE.

END AND ACK

REC-14

NY R 01 WA NH

AUG 31 1962

TWO COPIES WFO

12 AUG 27 1962

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

b3
b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 28 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTJ/fat

URGENT 8-28-62 12-08 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FBI [REDACTED] AND SAC WFO [REDACTED]

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN ESP-X

-----1-----

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED NO PERTINENT
ACTIVITY THIS DATE.

END AND ACK

NY R 1 WA HFL

TWO COPIES WFO.

b3
b7E

REC-9

16 AUG 28 1962

EX-108

50 AUG 31 1962

5-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 30 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTJ/pat

URGENT 8-30-62 1-31 AM CAS

TO DIRECTOR FIB [REDACTED] AND SAC WFO [REDACTED]

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

HANSON W. BALDWIN ESP- X

---6---
b3
b7E

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED NO PERTINENT
INFORMATION XXXX INFORMATION CONCERNING BALDWIN THIS DATE.

END AND ACK

REC- 16

EX 105

11 AUG 30 1962

NY R 6 WA JS

TWO COPIES WFO

56 SEP 5 1962

1962

Warrant & Writ

F B I

Date: August 28, 1962

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

WFO has appointment to interview DR. GLENN T. SEABORG, AEC, 8/29 next. Contacts at Pentagon indicate Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] will not return until 9/4 next. In absence of indication [REDACTED] in possession of pertinent information to this investigation, he will not be interviewed, UACB. Closing report will be submitted immediately following SEABORG interview.

3 - Bureau
1 - New York [REDACTED] (PERSONAL ATTENTION) (Info) (RM)
1 - WFO
RCB/pcn
(5)

REC- 36

12 AUG 30 1962

A I R T E L

Approved: M. W. Johnson Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

b3
b7Eb6
b7Cb3
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-21-88 BY SP8/25/88

3/27/96

9/23/96

5/13/00

F226 F146

5/13/00

NAT SEC

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 06-10-2010

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM : SAC, WFO [REDACTED] c. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: August 29, 1962 b3
b7E

Document downgraded to
~~Secret~~ per [REDACTED] /RS
on 4/5/2010 WPM

b6
b7C

Enclosed for the Bureau are 7 copies of a report reflecting results of interviews with individuals not previously available. One copy is being furnished New York for completion of its file.

WFO previously set out leads to interview Dr. GEORGE KISTIAKOWSKI, who was a member of the Hyland Panel, a consultant group which functioned briefly in June 1962 to consider certain aspects of the material eventually published in [NIE 11-8-62.] KISTIAKOWSKI has not been available for interview and, as previously indicated to the Bureau, no further efforts to interview him are being made, in the absence of a substantial reason.

Also, a lead was previously set out for WFO to interview Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] of the Department of Army. [REDACTED] was one of several Army officers whose names were included in a group which performed grafting work on [NIE 11-8-62.] No information has been received that he and BALDWIN have had any contact. Inasmuch as [REDACTED] will not be available for interview until after September 4, 1962, and in order to avoid delay in submission of this report, he will not be interviewed, UACB.

b6
b7C

The confidential source referred to herein is
NY 3698-S*.

This report is classified "~~Top Secret~~" in order to protect [the "~~Top Secret~~" classification of National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-62, which document and attendant documents similarly classified] presented the basis for interviews in this investigation [REDACTED]

This completes the investigation of [REDACTED] WFO.

Bureau (Enc 7)
1 - New York [REDACTED] (Enc 1) (PERSONAL ATTENTION) (RM)
1 - WFO
RCB/pcn
(4)

b3
b7E

54 SEP 10 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.


WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

August 30, 1962

b3

b7E

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 06-10-2010



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Document downgraded
to ~~Secret~~ per
on 4/5/2010

RS b6
b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3 BT/elm
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1-88
4/26/92 Record let 7-31-96

COPIES DESTROYED

101 JUN 19 1970

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3

b7E

ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
RGB/pcn

SYNOPSIS

Captain TURNER F. CALDWELL, Jr., Office of Chief of Naval Operations, met BALDWIN in 1953 and has had no further contact with him. Stated he had no information regarding instant leak of information, but personally felt that it came from ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC. Basis of opinion was incident in 1961 when sensitive information published in BALDWIN column. CALDWELL learned at that time that BALDWIN had been in Washington and seen GILPATRIC just prior to publication of article. Assistant Secretary of Defense PAUL H. NITZE interviewed and indicated he had no recent contact with BALDWIN. Colonel [REDACTED] Air Force, met BALDWIN in 1954 and again in 1956. He could furnish no pertinent information regarding instant leak. Major General DALE O. SMITH, Special Assistant for Arms Control, Department of Defense, could furnish no information regarding instant leak. Dr. GLENN T. SEABORG, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, advised he was not acquainted with BALDWIN and had never been contacted by him. Major General C. F. LEONARD, Jr., interviewed with negative results. Information from confidential informant set out regarding comments of BALDWIN on investigation.

b6
b7C

- C -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CEG:dim

b3
b7E

**Captain TURNER F. CALDWELL, Jr., USN
Assistant Director, Strategic Plans Division,
Office of Chief of Naval Operations**

Captain CALDWELL advised on August 20, 1962, he had just returned from leave; that he was aware of the leak to HANSON BALDWIN but had not had any opportunity to read the column of July 26, 1962. After perusal of the news article in the Agent's presence, Captain CALDWELL advised his only contact with BALDWIN occurred in 1953 when CALDWELL was Executive Officer on the aircraft carrier "FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT" and this ship took part in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization fleet exercise known as "Main Brace." BALDWIN as a member of the press was among a group of reporters who were covering this naval maneuver. He said he had not had any contact with BALDWIN since that occasion.

Captain CALDWELL said he had no information as to how instant leak occurred but in response to questions voiced the personal opinion the leak possibly occurred within the area of the office of the Secretary of Defense. When pressed for his feelings in this regard, Captain CALDWELL said his personal conviction was the leak probably came from ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

(U) Captain CALDWELL said his reason for such personal belief dated back to an event which occurred in 1961. He related that shortly after the new administration took office he was assigned to a study group under Doctor ALAIN ENTHOVEN to prepare a "Top Secret" study known as "Strategic Forces Study." CALDWELL related this paper upon completion went to Mr. MC NAMARA, Secretary of Defense, for presentation to the President. He said the matter was very closely held and he knew other copies went to Mr. HITCH, Assistant Secretary of Defense - Comptroller, and a copy also was directed to Mr. GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense. CALDWELL said even before the study was in the hands of the President, a paraphrased, detailed draft of the study appeared in HANSON BALDWIN's column. Captain CALDWELL said there was considerable consternation about this leak and Doctor ENTHOVEN personally blamed Captain CALDWELL for the leak. Captain CALDWELL said he was incensed over this false accusation so he conducted some inquiry on his own to try to pin-point the leak. Captain CALDWELL said the results of his inquiry

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

convinced him that Mr. GILPATRIC was BALDWIN's source; also, he had learned BALDWIN had been in town and had seen Mr. GILPATRIC immediately prior to the publication of BALDWIN's column on this matter.

Captain CALDWELL said with regard to instant leak he could not see any military service "pitch"; instead, he felt more in favor of the possibility it could be a "controlled" leak for some reason unknown to Captain CALDWELL.

(U) Captain CALDWELL said in the Strategic Plans Division there are only about six persons knowledgeable of the [NIE] [REDACTED] material. Captain CALDWELL said in accordance with Secretary MC NAMARA's directive, immediately after the HANSON BALDWIN article appeared in the newspaper, a survey was conducted among personnel in the Strategic Plans Division and it was (U) disclosed that none of the personnel having access to the [NIE] [REDACTED] data had seen BALDWIN immediately prior to the July 26, 1962, newspaper column.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CEG:dim

b3
b7E

Mr. PAUL H. NITZE
Assistant Secretary of Defense
For International Security Affairs (ISA)

Mr. NITZE advised on August 20, 1962, he has known HANSON BALDWIN for a number of years but has not had any contact with BALDWIN since Mr. NITZE took office as Assistant Secretary of Defense. He said some months ago BALDWIN wrote an article concerning Mr. NITZE's presentation of a defense policy matter before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Paris. The BALDWIN article was completely at variance with the facts in that Mr. NITZE's presentation took a policy position in alignment with military and Joint Chiefs of Staff thinking in this matter, as contrary to the stand advocated by State and other civilian agencies. He said BALDWIN claimed in this article that NITZE had presented a position not in accordance with the military feeling. Mr. NITZE said BALDWIN was completely wrong in his column and never took any steps to correct this erroneous article. He stated he was considerably put out about the matter and since that time BALDWIN has made no effort to see him.

(U) Concerning the BALDWIN article of July 26, 1962, Mr. NITZE stated it was his feeling the leak had occurred from someone who had a good knowledge of the [NIE] material but ~~SECRET~~ Mr. NITZE stated he had no suggestion or information as to where the leak may have occurred or who might have been involved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RCB:ctw)

b3
b7E

COLONEL RAYMOND T. SLEEPER
HEADQUARTERS, SYSTEMS COMMAND
U. S. AIR FORCE, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE

Colonel SLEEPER was interviewed on August 23, 1962. He advised that he had first met HANSON BALDWIN in about 1954 when he was stationed at Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Alabama. BALDWIN had appeared before an air symposium at Maxwell and SLEEPER met him at a cocktail party subsequent to the appearance of BALDWIN before the symposium. This was merely a social meeting and SLEEPER spent no substantial period of time with BALDWIN.

Sometime during 1956, BALDWIN arrived at Carswell Air Force Base, Forth Worth, Texas, where SLEEPER was assigned as a pilot of a B-36. SLEEPER was assigned to carry BALDWIN as a passenger in an exhibition flight which continued for approximately 20 to 30 minutes. SLEEPER explained certain operational capabilities of the B-36 during this flight. He noted that the B-36 was a controversial plane at that time and BALDWIN was merely familiarizing himself with information available to the general public. SLEEPER has not seen BALDWIN or been in contact with him since that time.

(U) Colonel SLEEPER stated that he had the opportunity to read the [NIE 11-8-62] report but that he had not discussed its contents with BALDWIN or any other individual. He was not familiar with any individuals with whom BALDWIN was in contact nor could he furnish any suggestions as to the source of the leak of information. [32] [5]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RCB:ctw/dim)

b3
b7E

**MAJOR GENERAL DALE O. SMITH
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR ARMS CONTROL
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Major General Smith was interviewed on August 21, 1962. He advised that several years ago he met HANSON BALDWIN but that he had never developed this acquaintance. He has not seen BALDWIN for at least ten years. He knows of no specific individuals with whom BALDWIN is acquainted but is of the opinion that BALDWIN contacts only those officials on the highest level in the Government. He could furnish no suspects as to the source of instant leak.

SMITH stated that although he was not aware of any individual who was in contact with BALDWIN, he did feel that there were certain persons or elements in the Government who held views towards arms control which would be benefited by fragmentary leaks of information such as that appearing in the July 26, 1962, article by BALDWIN. The philosophy of these individuals, none of whom SMITH would specifically identify, would permit the Soviets to realize that the United States has sufficient information regarding the Soviet military potential and that nothing additional would be gained by free inspection. This position was absolutely opposed by the JCS and all of the military. SMITH stated that the individuals holding the above philosophy were in the scientific community and various sections of the Department of State.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RCB:ctw)

b3
b7E

DR. GLENN T. SEABORG
CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

(U) Dr. SEABORG was interviewed on August 29, 1962. He advised he was familiar with the content of [NIE 11-8-62] [REDACTED] inasmuch as he attended a briefing conducted at the National Security Council on July 9 and 10, 1962, regarding the content of this document. Dr. SEABORG stated he had not discussed the content of this document with any individuals whatsoever. He stated he was not personally acquainted with HANSON BALDWIN nor had he ever had any contact with him. BALDWIN, to his knowledge, has never contacted his office since Dr. SEABORG assumed his present position.

Dr. SEABORG stated that he was unable to furnish any information regarding the source of this leak of information. Although he was not aware of the identity of any contacts of BALDWIN employed in the Government, Dr. SEABORG stated that he assumed prominent Government officials, such as, ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC, Department of Defense, and JOHN MC CONE, Director, CIA, who had been in Government service for many years, might possibly have been acquainted with BALDWIN. However, Dr. SEABORG stated that he had no personal knowledge that either of these individuals were contacts of BALDWIN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
(RCB:ctw)

b3
b7E

MAJOR GENERAL C. F. LEONARD, JR.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,
INTELLIGENCE, U. S. ARMY

Major General LEONARD was interviewed on August 24, 1962. He is not acquainted with BALDWIN and had no information as to the source of the leak of information.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]
RCB:dim

A confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past learned that on the evening of August 15, 1962, HANSON W. BALDWIN was in contact with a person believed to be [REDACTED] BALDWIN stated that "They went down to the Alumni House at Annapolis" to ascertain who had attended a meeting of the U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association of which BALDWIN is a member.

[REDACTED] inquired whether BALDWIN had warned any of his friends. He replied, "I didn't know they were going down there. I wouldn't warn them anyhow. That would be the worst thing to do. One of my friends wrote me from Washington and told me that - - he's an irrepressible anyway - - told me that he had literally, almost literally, been threatened with a lie detector test. It is a heck of a fine thing for an officer and gentleman." BALDWIN also commented that this man was not "intimidated."

b6
b7C

In response to [REDACTED] comment that she hoped "your source is not easily intimidated," BALDWIN stated that he did not think so and he shared her hope but, "that's the only thing I would worry about."

[REDACTED] then inquired what BALDWIN thought of "Mr. KENNEDY's 'column play'" and when BALDWIN asked what she meant she stated, "Oh, I mean I think that the way this is handled it's awful!" BALDWIN said, "There is a good article in 'Look' magazine on KENNEDY and the press but it doesn't have some of the most important things in it. However, it has a lot of instances." BALDWIN's daughter asked, "What is it? He doesn't like criticism?" BALDWIN replied, "No, he doesn't like criticism, but this wasn't a critical article, dear. He goes off half-cocked. He uses the FBI and police power much too freely. It can be a dangerous thing and if it continues - - if it continues we're really going to have to go to town."

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] inquired whether SCOTTY (JAMES B.) RESTON, head of the Washington, D.C., office of "The New York Times" was on BALDWIN's side. BALDWIN assured her that RESTON was. BALDWIN was then asked if "ORVIL" (apparently ORVIL DRYFOOS, publisher of "The New York Times") was "scared." BALDWIN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[REDACTED]

replied "No. I don't think he is scared. I think he was impressed. When the President sends you a special letter by a special messenger, as I told him before the message arrived, this is only intended to represent kind of a form of pressure because Presidents don't do these things unless they expect to get some kind of results about it, and I told him about the President's sending General TAYLOR to see Mr. LUCE to complain about an article in 'Fortune' magazine. Mr. LUCE sent General TAYLOR back with a bee in his ear. But not Mr. DRYFOOS. Mr. DRYFOOS is another breed of cat." BALDWIN also commented that he did not think DRYFOOS was "a very strong man" but that LUCE was "ruthless."

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 29 1962

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Malone _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 JY/F

3/30/96 SP3 BJS/96

URGENT 8-29-62 12-25 AM CAS 9/23/96 SP3 BJS/96

TO DIRECTOR FBI [REDACTED] AND SAC WFO [REDACTED]

FROM SAC NEW YORK [REDACTED]

---2---

SUBJECT.. HANSON W. BALDWIN ESP-X

b3
b7E

NY THREE SIX NINE EIGHT DASH S ASTERISK REPORTED NO PERTINENT
ACTIVITY CONCERNING BALDWIN THIS DATE.

END AND ACK

NY R 2 WA HFL

REC-16

COPIES DESTROYED

11 AUG 31 1962

101 JUN 19 1970

5-14x TWO COPIES WFO
53 SEP 6 1962
WFO

5-00

Beimont 1 - D. E. Mo
Evans 1 - Wannall
Sullivan 1 - Wachs

August 31, 1962

Director, FBI
Leak of Classified Information in

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X

Reference is made to our letter dated August 21, 1962, enclosing a memorandum dated August 18, 1962, which set forth the results of our investigation in this matter.

There is enclosed a memorandum dated August 30, 1962, setting forth the results of six additional interviews. The source not identified by name in the enclosed memorandum has furnished reliable information in the past. Your attention is specifically called to the interview of Captain Turner F. Caldwell, Jr., United States Navy, appearing on pages 1 and 2. Captain Caldwell is of the personal opinion that Deputy Secretary of Defense Rosamell L. Gilpatrick furnished the information for the July 26 article to Baldwin.

We do not contemplate conducting any additional interviews in this matter in the absence of a specific request.

b3
b7E

Enclosure

ARJ:smf:shw shw
(9)

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because information herein discloses the location of information classified in an article available to the public. The enclosure is classified "~~Top Secret~~" for same reason. (S)

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAILED 2

AUG 31 1962

COMM-FBI

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

222

~~TOP SECRET~~

August 31, 1962

BY LIAISON

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - D.E. Moore
1 - Wannall
1 - Wacks

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

Reference is made to our letter dated August 21, 1962, enclosing a memorandum dated August 18, 1962, which set forth the results of our investigation of the leak of classified data in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962.

There is enclosed a memorandum dated August 30, 1962, setting forth the results of six additional interviews. The source not identified by name in the enclosed memorandum has furnished reliable information in the past. Your attention is specifically called to the interview of Captain Turner F. Caldwell, Jr., United States Navy, appearing on pages 1 and 2. Captain Caldwell is of the personal opinion that Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric furnished the information for the July 26 article to Baldwin.

We do not contemplate conducting any additional interviews in this matter.

This information has been furnished to the Attorney General and the Honorable Robert S. McNamara, The Secretary of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

25 SEP 4 1962

NOTE: This letter is classified "Top Secret" because information herein discloses the location of information so classified in an article available to the public. The enclosure is classified "Top Secret" for the same reason.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/30/96 BY SP3BJ/cw
9/25/96 SP3 BT5/96

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
Loach

Enclosure

ARJ:smf

(8)

SEP 6 1962

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - D.E. Moore
- 1 - Wannall
- 1 - Wacks

August 31, 1962

BY LIAISON

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. McNamara:

Reference is made to our letter dated August 23, 1962, enclosing a memorandum dated August 13, 1962, which set forth the results of our investigation of the leak of classified data in the article by Hanson W. Baldwin in "The New York Times" issue of July 26, 1962.

There is enclosed a memorandum dated August 30, 1962, setting forth the results of six additional interviews. The source not identified by name in the enclosed memorandum has furnished reliable information in the past. Your attention is specifically called to the interview of Captain Turner F. Caldwell, Jr., United States Navy, appearing on pages 1 and 2. Captain Caldwell is of the personal opinion that Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric furnished the information for the July 26 article to Baldwin.

We do not contemplate conducting any additional interviews in this matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/30/96 BY SP3 BT/cun
9/23/96 SP3 BT/JHA

REC-4

Sincerely yours,

b3
b7E

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

Enclosure

AEJ:smf:slj

(3)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

NOTE:

This letter is classified "~~Top Secret~~" because information herein discloses the location of information so classified in an article available to the public. The enclosure is classified "~~Top Secret~~" for the same reason.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Date of Mail 8-28-62.

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTJ/et
3/30/96 SP3 BJS/cmm
9/23/96 SP3 BJS/peL

Subject JUNE MAIL Hanson W. Baldwin

Removed By 65 SEP 6 1962

File Number

[Redacted Box]

b3
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 06-10-2010 BY [REDACTED]

F B I

Date: 8/30/62

b6
b7C

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED] (RUC)
SUBJECT: HANSON W. BALDWIN
ESP - X

b3
b7E

ReWFOairtel to Director dated 8/28/62, in which
WFO indicated it would submit a closing report following
interview of Dr. GLENN T. SEABORG.

No investigation is pending in this case at NY.

In the absence of any request from the Bureau or
WFO for investigation at NY, this case is RUC'd to WFO.

- ③ - Bureau [REDACTED] (RM)
2 - Washington Field [REDACTED] (RM)
1 - New York [REDACTED]

REC- 51

b3
b7E

WDD:dmg
(8)

SEP 11 1962

FIVE

EX-108

12 AUG 31 1962

12 AUG 31 1962
12 AUG 31 1962
12 AUG 31 1962

Approved: [Signature] Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

Date of Mail 8-30-62.

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8 BTJ/6
3/30/96 SP3 BTJ/cir
9/23/96 SP3 BTJ/gel

Subject JUNE MAIL Hanson W. B. Baldwin-10

6 SEP 13 1962

Removed By _____

File Number

[Redacted Box]

b3
b7E

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: September 13, 1962

FROM : D. J. BRENNAN, JR.

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN,
 "NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962,
 ESPIONAGE - X

An article by Hanson W. Baldwin, July 26, 1962, in the "New York Times" carried classified information. The Bureau conducted investigation to determine source of information. Our investigation indicated that the leak may have come from Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

b3 10 USC 424
 b6

The President has been greatly concerned about this leak and subsequent to the article appearing in the "New York Times" sent a personal letter to Orvil Dryfoos, publisher of the "New York Times" concerning this leak.

per DIA

[redacted] to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), confidentially advised that Dryfoos has an appointment with the President on the evening of September 13, 1962, apparently to discuss this matter. [redacted] stated that apparently the Bureau's investigation into this matter had alarmed the "New York Times" and that it was possible that in the future the "New York Times" would attempt to ascertain whether such articles include classified information.

In this connection, he stated that James B. Reston, head of the Washington, D. C., office of the "New York Times," had called Defense on the morning of September 13, 1962, and asked whether Defense had any office which could take a look at articles before they are published to determine whether the article contains classified information. He was assured by Defense that they would gladly review any article submitted to them.

ACTION:

For information.

b3
 b7E

BAW:hke
 (8) SEP 21 1962
 1-Mr. Belmont
 1-Mr. Sullivan
 1-Mr. DeLoach
 1-Mr. Wannall
 1-Mr. Wacks
 1-Liaison
 1-Mr. Wells

12 SEP 18 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-21-89 BY SP-5 RBL/ST

3/30/96 SP-3 RBL/ST

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan *WC3 10/2/62*

DATE: 9/4/62

FROM : W. R. Wannall *WRW*SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN,
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
ESPIONAGE - X1 - Mr. Tolson 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. J.P. Mohr 1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Miss Holmes
1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Lenihan 1 - Mr. Wacks

Mohr	
Callahan	
Conrad	
DeLoach	
Evans	
Malone	
Rosen	
Sullivan	
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Holmes	
Gandy	

*Document downgraded to Secret
per [redacted] RS on 4/5/2010*b6
b7C

On page 20 of the Summary of Bureau Operations of Interest prepared for the Director's use in his contemplated meeting with the President, it is stated that Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric is considered suspect in captioned matter.

The following are what point out Gilpatric as a possible source for Baldwin's article:

1. Lieutenant General David A. Burchinal, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Department of the Air Force on 8/1/62 stated that when he saw Baldwin on 7/18/62 Baldwin told him that he had recently seen Gilpatric; that Gilpatric was one of his closest friends; and that Gilpatric had told him that the successor to the B-52 bomber had been selected; that it would not be the RS-70; but would involve a very "hush-hush" project. General Burchinal stated he was shocked to learn this, since such information was highly classified and Baldwin was not entitled to have it.

2. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, on 8/7/62 advised that when he saw Baldwin on 7/19/62 Baldwin implied that Gilpatric had informed him that General Maxwell Taylor would receive the appointment as new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Anderson said that this information had not been released to the public at that time.

b7C per USMC

3. [redacted]

[redacted] on 8/9/62 advised that it was pretty well known that Gilpatric was the person responsible for the information in Baldwin's 7/26 article. [redacted] more specific, [redacted] stated

JFW:br

REC-1

OCT 8 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~b3
b7E

54 OCT 12 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISEALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISECLASSIFIED BY 5032 BIL/CLN
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1/2/96

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

Re: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN,
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962

b3
b7E

that it was generally believed by responsible people in the military community that Gilpatric was the person who disclosed the information to Baldwin.

4. Vice Admiral John Sylvester, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), Department of the Navy, on 8/9 advised that it was his opinion and the opinion of other high-ranking officials in the Navy that Baldwin's source was a civilian employee of the Department of Defense in a very high-placed position such as the Secretary, Deputy Secretary or one of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

5. General George H. Decker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, on 8/10 stated he felt that Baldwin's source was probably a highly-placed civilian official of the Department of Defense with at least the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense or higher.

6. Major General Jerry D. Page, Deputy Director of Plans, Department of the Army, advised on 8/3 that it was his guess that a civilian in the office of the Secretary of Defense was probably responsible for the leak which may have been deliberate or controlled.

7. Captain Turner F. Caldwell, Jr., Assistant Director, Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, on 8/20 said that it was his personal conviction that the captioned leak came from Gilpatric. Caldwell based his opinion on the fact that in 1961 he had made independent inquiries into another leak which appeared in a Baldwin column and he had convinced himself that Gilpatric then was Baldwin's source.

8. Gilpatric when interviewed on 8/2 stated he had never at any time furnished Baldwin any classified information and had not discussed the matter of what was to be [the successor

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN,
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

(U) to the B-52 bomber with Baldwin when he saw him on 7/17/62. When reinterviewed, however, on 8/17/62 Gilpatric admitted that the successor to the B-52 had been brought up during his conference with Baldwin on 7/17.

In addition to the above, it is noted that in 1952 we conducted an investigation relative to the compromise of two "Security Information - Secret" documents in articles in "Aviation Week" of July 21 and 29, 1952. During this investigation, Mr. Edward K. Moss, Assistant Administrator for Public Information, Defense Production Administration - National Production Authority, advised on September 29, 1952, that it was his personal belief that the "leak" came from the office of Mr. R. L. Gilpatric, the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Also during this investigation, Colonel Arne Luehman, Deputy Director of Public Information, Department of the Air Force, advised on 10/1/52 that on an unrecalled day in July (1952) Mr. Gilpatric had made available for his reading a classified document. Later on the same day, Ben Lee, Military Editor of "Aviation Week," appeared at his office with a telegram which Lee claimed he had received from the offices of McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Incorporated, publishers of "Aviation Week," in New York City. After Lee read two or three excerpts from this telegram, it was apparent to Colonel Luehman that the information contained therein was substantially the same as he had read in Mr. Gilpatric's office earlier that morning.

On the following day, Mr. Lee again appeared in Colonel Luehman's office, requested an interview with Gilpatric and, after his interview with Mr. Gilpatric, displayed to Colonel Luehman a two-page onionskin paper which he stated Mr. Gilpatric gave him and Colonel Luehman noted that it bore the classification "Secret." After Lee left, Colonel Luehman reported to Mr. Gilpatric the fact that Lee had shown him the document bearing the classification "Secret" and stated Lee

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

Re: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN,

"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3
b7E

had claimed Mr. Gilpatric had given it to him and Mr. Gilpatric at that time emphatically denied to Colonel Luehman he had furnished any such document to Mr. Lee.

ACTION:

For your information.

over

JD

Q

W&S

✓

[Signature]

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 9-29-64

FROM : W. S. Tavel

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN
 "THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962
 ESPIONAGE - X

Bufile

b3
 b7E

The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Branch, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1113 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-21-89 BY SP-8 BTJ/624
 3/30/96

WLB:snw
 (2)

10/22/64
 no need to retain
 in Special file room

W. J. Jones

REC 45

OCT 8 1964

b3
 b7E

79 OCT 14 1964

XEROX

OCT 8 1964

66-17404-
 RECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

CC TO: [redacted]
REQ. REC'D: [redacted]
JUL 12 1965
ANS. BY: [redacted]

SECRET

NAME CHECK

February 26, 1965

CC TO: [redacted]
REQ. REC'D: [redacted]
JUN 14 1965
ANS. BY: [redacted]

HANSON W. BALDWIN
Born: March 22, 1903
Baltimore, Maryland

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

In reply to your request for the results of any investigation conducted by this Bureau, the following information is set forth.

Hanson W. Baldwin has never been the subject of a full-scale investigation conducted by this Bureau. Articles by Baldwin appearing in "The New York Times" issues of June 5, 1952, and August 23, 1952, contain classified information. At the specific request of the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, Baldwin was interviewed on January 6, 1953, regarding the unauthorized disclosures of classified information in the June 5, 1952, and August 23, 1952, issues of the newspaper. Baldwin at that time was ask to divulge the source for the information in the articles, but he refused to do so stating that as a good newspaperman he would be unable to divulge his source.

The Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, in February, 1953, advised that in view of the refusal of Baldwin to disclose the source in addition to the wide dissemination of the information involved, further investigation was not warranted in these matters.

According to the Atomic Energy Commission, Baldwin's article of October 10, 1955, appearing in "The New York Times," contained classified data. The Atomic Energy Commission, subsequently, advised that information disclosed by Baldwin was not contained in any specific document but had appeared in numerous documents issued by the Atomic Energy Commission or the Defense Department which had been disseminated to hundreds of persons. In February, 1956, as a result of this information, the Internal Security Division, United States Department of Justice advised that in its opinion there was insufficient evidence to establish a violation of the (S)(M)

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This reply is result of check of FBI investigative files. To check arrest records, request must be submitted to FBI Identification Division.

Original & 1 - Army
Requst received 2-16-65

JSP:gpt
(4)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

MAR 3 1965

DECLASSIFIED BY SP8/BJ/ab
ON 3-21-89
O GA 7-31-96
CLASSIFIED BY SP3/BJ/TS
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
33843 3-31-99

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 13-10-91 BY SP3/BJ/TS
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
33843 3-31-99

Declassified per DOE Refr data
7/31/96, 60267NUS/SCA/DE/19-1
7/14/99

Hanson W. Baldwin

~~SECRET~~

espionage statutes. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Articles by Baldwin appeared on July 26, 1962, in "The New York Times" which include information of a highly classified nature. ~~(S)~~ (U) [] 100-79595; [] ~~(S)~~ (U)

b3
b7E

NOTE:

See memorandum Rosen to Belmont, 2-26-65, captioned Hanson W. Baldwin, Name Check Matter, JSP/NCB.

Memorandum classified ~~confidential~~ since it sets forth information so classified in communication from AEC. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~SECRET~~

Feb, 1965

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention _____
☐ Return to _____

Supervisor Room Ext.

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☒ Main Ref References Only

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

FFR 18 1985

Subject Robert W. Broun
 Birthdate & Place _____
 Address _____

Localities

R# 581 Date 5/12 Searcher Initials 7.1
Prod. 7V

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL.

b3

-b7E

[illegible]

7/27/12

40, 100-7-1545-44 7/1/55
40, 7/1/55
50, 7/1/55

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8
C/131

3/30/96

FEB 23 1965

9/23/46 SP3 B15/92

110

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Document downgraded
to Secret per [redacted] RS

on 4/5/2010 DATE: February 26, 1965

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: HANSON W. BALDWIN
NAME CHECK MATTER

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Malley
- 1 - Mr. Scatterday
- 1 - Mr. Peelman

SEE REVERSE
SIDE Mohr
CLASS DeLoach
ACTION Casper
Conrad
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

Peelman
Schmuck

The Name Check Section is in receipt of name check concerning Hanson W. Baldwin from Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), Department of the Army. The purpose of the name check as indicated on the form is to "attend National Strategy Seminar." ACSI desires only results of our investigations.

Our files show Baldwin was born 3/22/03, Baltimore, Maryland. He graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1924 and resigned from the Navy in 1927. Since 1929 he has been employed as a reporter and editor with the "New York Times," having held the position of military editor of the "New York Times" since 1942. He is a Pulitzer Prize recipient and has written a number of books dealing with military strategy.

Baldwin has never been the subject of a full-scale Bureau investigation; however, he has been the subject of four prior inquiries based on articles he wrote in the "New York Times" (issues of 6/5/52, 8/23/52, 10/10/55 and 7/26/62) which contained classified information. In connection with articles of 6/5/52 and 8/23/52 at the specific request of the Criminal Division of the Department, Baldwin was interviewed on 1/6/53 to determine if he was willing to divulge the source of his information. Baldwin advised that as a good newspaperman he would be unable to divulge his sources. The Department subsequently advised that in view of this refusal by Baldwin and since prior inquiries had shown that the security information involved had been widely disseminated, further investigation was not warranted and there was no way to determine whether Baldwin had committed a violation of Federal espionage laws.

Concerning Baldwin's article of 10/10/55, this related to data regarding antiaircraft guided missiles which the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) reported was secret-restricted data. AEC subsequently advised that information disclosed by Baldwin was not contained in a specific document but had appeared in numerous documents issued by AEC or the Defense Department which had been disseminated to hundreds of persons. As a result in February, 1956, the Internal Security Division of the Department advised that in its opinion there was insufficient evidence to establish a violation of the espionage statutes and that further investigation did not appear warranted. No actual investigation was undertaken by the Bureau in this matter.

JSP:ncb
(6)

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTINUED - OVER

NAME CHECK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 11-6

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: Hanson W. Baldwin

(U) The 7/26/62 issue of the "New York Times" contained articles under byline by Baldwin [setting forth information regarding Russian missile installations. These articles contained highly classified (S) information.] The Attorney General requested an investigation of this apparent leak. Our investigation, which included interviews of numerous highly-placed Government officials, pointed to Roswell L. Gilpatric, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, as the source of the leak. Results of this investigation due to its highly sensitive nature was furnished only to the White House, the Attorney General and personally to the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. No prosecutive action was initiated by the Department resulting from this investigation.

Baldwin is not known to have any specific subversive connections. However, he has been critical of the FBI on several occasions. For instance, in 1947 he wrote an article in the "New York Times" that while the FBI was rightly praised as a splendid criminal investigating agency, it did not deserve its "over-publicized" title as a counter-espionage agency. In 1948 Baldwin alluded to alleged friction between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Bureau following the transfer of intelligence responsibilities in Latin America. During 1947 in our investigation of the Alger Hiss case, Hiss wrote a letter to an official at Stanford University in which he referred to Baldwin as "my friend."

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) If approved, the Name Check Section ^{will} furnish a memorandum to ACSI and advise them that Baldwin has never been the subject of a full-scale investigation; however, he has been the subject of inquiries based upon articles appearing in the "New York Times." ACSI will be advised of the opinion of the Department as well as the observations of AEC. Regarding the 7/26/62 article, ACSI will be advised only that an article appearing in the "New York Times" under Baldwin's byline contained information of a highly classified nature.

[Handwritten signature]

(2) ACSI not be furnished with results of the 1962 investigation and that they not be referred to the office of the Secretary of Defense in view of the highly sensitive nature of the information involved in this investigation and the parties interviewed.

*CMS
Spr*

sk

Rosen V.

-2-

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

*memo sent
ACSI - 3-1-65
JAC*

~~TOP SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 08-10-2010

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 5, 1968

BY LIAISON

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
DECLASSIFICATION
ACTION

Mrs. Mildred Stegall
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Document downgraded

to ~~Secret~~ per [redacted]
[redacted] AS on 4/5/2010

b6
b7C

Dear Mrs. Stegall:

Reference is made to your name check
request concerning some individuals scheduled to attend a
White House affair on June 18, 1968.

The central files of the FBI reveal no pertinent
derogatory information concerning the following individuals:

[redacted]

The fingerprint files of the Identification
Division of the FBI contain no arrest data identifiable with the
above individuals based on background information submitted
in connection with this name check request.

b6
b7C

Attached is a memorandum concerning
Mr. and Mrs. Hanson Baldwin.

A copy of this communication has not been sent
to the Attorney General.

b3
b7E

Sincerely yours,

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach-Enc. (sent direct)
- 1 - Mr. Gale - Enc. (sent direct)

Enclosure

NOTE: Information [redacted] which is not to be
disseminated outside the FBI, indicated that on January 24, 1968, Robert
Shaplen, reporter with the "New Yorker," applied for a visa to enter North
Vietnam, at which time he used as a reference one Wilfred Burchett, an
individual who has been identified as an Australian communist journalist.

380

54 JUN 17 1968

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

SEE REVERSE
ADD. DISSEMINATION

Delivered to Mildred Stegall

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

3-13-89
Classified by SP8/ty/bch
Declassify on: OADR

CLASSIFIED BY SP8/ty/bch
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1)
ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-5-31183

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

June 5, 1968

MR. AND MRS. HANSON BALDWIN

Hanson Weightman Baldwin, who was born on March 22, 1903, at Baltimore, Maryland, has been the subject of inquiries conducted by the FBI in 1952, 1955 and 1962 concerning articles written by him which contained classified information. Mr. Baldwin refused to disclose the sources of the information appearing in the articles.

Our files contain no additional pertinent information concerning Mr. Baldwin.

The central files of the FBI contain no pertinent information concerning Mrs. Baldwin.

The fingerprint files of the Identification Division of the FBI contain no arrest data identifiable with captioned individuals based upon background information submitted in connection with this name check request.

NOTE: Per request of Mrs. Mildred Stegall, White House Staff.

LSL:emt (7)

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

JUN 10 1968 XEROX

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

b3
b7E

(1-22-60)

Vietnam
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 06-10-2010 BY [redacted]

, 19__

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527

b6

☐ Service Unit - Room 6524

b7C

☐ Forward to File Review

☐ Attention _____

☐ Return to _____

Supervisor

Room

Ext.

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)

☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)

☐ Subversive References Only

☐ Nonsubversive References Only

☒ Main *S* References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____

☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)

☐ Buildup

DATE 3-21-89 *503 B5/COM*

M. A. M.
Subject

Birthdate & Place

Address *Military Affairs Expert*

Footnote by Bureau

Localities

R. *(65)* Date *5/21*

Searcher

Initials *(11)*

Prod.

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

NA
101-5-350-1221

H. HILSON

b3

101-79595

b7E

101-10-330-135

64-175-330-1

62-87712-15

HILSON W.

64-7-52

157-755-405

3-4-52

12-5-891

MAY 29 1968

SEARCH SLIP

Subj: Baldwin, Hansen

Supervisor _____ Room _____

R# 652 Date 5-29 Searcher Initial 3411

Prod. _____

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

HANSEN H. W. / Hansen (AKA)
100-7595-46 5-2-54
46 5-1-55
50 11-22-60

H. W.
[Redacted Box]

b3
b7E

353842
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 4/26/96 BY SP3 BTJ/clm

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Records Branch

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 06-10-2010 BY [REDACTED]

, 19__

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527 b6
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524 b7C
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention _____
☐ Return to _____

Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup _____ Variations

3/30/96 MAY 29 1968

Subject Hanson, Mrs.

Birthdate & Place _____

Address Military Affairs reportfor the NY Times

Localities _____

R# 182 Date 5/59 Searcher Initials 340Prod. 182

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

	112
	HANSON Mrs.
	[REDACTED]
	HANSON Mrs. b3
	57 b7E
	HANSON Mrs. Hanson Mrs.
	[REDACTED]
	HANSON Mrs. (copy)
	[REDACTED]
	100-205870-9640
	100-264664-1
	100-156645-1
	100-14-204-1
	101-925187
	100-4526-35
	100-30464-5

MAY 29 1968

- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Notis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

The Attorney General

October 28, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Pursuant to an oral request of [redacted] Staff Member of the SSC, on October 24, 1975, and with the concurrence of [redacted] Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, enclosed is the original of a memorandum to effect delivery of copies of eight FBI documents to the SSC responsive to the request of [redacted]

b6
b7C

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the aforementioned memorandum.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

b6
b7C

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: [redacted]

Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

① - [redacted] (Baldwin)

b3
b7E

JTP:lbh
(10)

ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

NOV 23 1975

NOTE:

On 10/24/75 Donald E. Moore, formerly Inspector, Intelligence Division, testified, together with FBIHQ officials, before the SSC. Mr. Moore, in his testimony, mentioned his recollection of an incident in about 1962 when an electronic surveillance was conducted by the FBI on a newsman. No details

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

62 DEC 4 1975

DUPLICATE YELLOW

ORIGINAL FILED IN

1083

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-89 BY SP8BJ/len
288611

159387/len
4/23/96
SP3 BJ/len

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

were mentioned in public testimony. [redacted] of the SSC
requested that the SSC be furnished for its use FDI documents
relating to that surveillance. Being furnished herewith
in response to that request are [redacted]
[redacted] of Bureau file [redacted] regarding Hanson W. Baldwin.

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

62-116395

October 28, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the testimony on
October 24, 1975, before the SSC, of Mr. Donald E. Moore,
formerly Inspector, Intelligence Division, FBI Headquarters.
In his testimony, Mr. Moore mentioned recollection of an
electronic surveillance of a newsmen by the FBI in about
1962. [redacted] Staff Member of the SSC,
requested from the FBI records pertaining to the
initiation of that surveillance.

b6
b7C

This memorandum effects delivery to the SSC
of eight FBI communications, all dated in 1962, which
are responsive to the oral request of [redacted]

1 - The Attorney General

① - [redacted] (Baldwin)

b3
b7E

JPT:lhb
(9)

~~TOP SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED
ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-83 BY SP3 BJS/CLM

ENCLOSURE

61166j