



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

February 17, 2022

MR. JOHN R GREENEWALD
SUITE 1203
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request No.: 1490892-000
Subject: BALDWIN, HANSON WEIGHTMAN

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552

☐ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(2)

☒ (b)(3)

50 USC 3024 (i) (1)

☐ (b)(4)

☒ (b)(5)

☒ (b)(6)

☐ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☒ (b)(7)(C)

☐ (b)(7)(D)

☒ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (b)(8)

☐ (b)(9)

Section 552a

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (k)(1)

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☐ (k)(7)

64 pages were reviewed and 63 pages are being released.

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☒ Documents were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agencies [OGAs].
- ☒ This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. "Part 1" of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. "Part 2" includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. "Part 3" includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

This is the final release of information responsive to your FOIPA request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.

Inquiries regarding your Other Government Agency (OGA) referral(s), designated within the release as "Referral/Direct," may be directed to:

Attn: Eric Stein
Office of Information Programs and Services
A/GIS/IPS
U.S. Department of State
HST Room B266
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Records that may have been responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.

A record that may be responsive to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request has been transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). If you wish to review these records,

submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to NARA, Special Access and FOIA, 8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500, College Park, MD 20740-6001. Please reference the file numbers 100-HQ-370055-A, 100-HQ-79595-46, 100-HQ-181575 (3-45) 33X, 105-HQ-25196 Serial 14, and 100-HQ-370055-A.

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

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THE CASE OF THE U-2: STORY OF U.S. ESPIONAGE

MANY TOOLS

Aerial Surveys Play a Large Part

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The secret world of spies and espionage dominated diplomacy last week, and cast a long shadow over the summit meeting. The men who ordinarily lurk in the back alleys of international politics were suddenly headlined on the world's front pages when an American high-flying reconnaissance plane was downed over the heart of Russia.

The incident of the downed U-2 focused attention on the United States intelligence system and posed a number of questions.

Why was an American reconnaissance plane over the heart of Soviet Russia? What part does aerial reconnaissance play in the entire intelligence collection process?

The Lockheed U-2's flight was part of a global United States intelligence-gathering mechanism intended to penetrate the Iron Curtain of secrecy that shrouds the Soviet heartland and that has increased tremendously the military danger of surprise attack to the United States in the atomic age. The U-2 reconnaissance expeditions were justified by the President and by Secretary of State Herter as essential to preserve the free world against a nuclear Pearl Harbor.

Timing of Interest

The timing of the flight of the downed U-2 on May 1, shortly before the summit conference, was not discussed publicly by the President. But the date of the incident was May Day, a holiday important in Soviet chronology, and the United States had anticipated for some time a Soviet space or missile-launching attempt prior to the conference. It is probable, too, that the flight was made to check intelligence data collected by other means.

Aerial reconnaissance played a major role in intelligence in actual war, but has never before played so important a role in a so-called time of peace as it has since World War II. This new emphasis upon its importance is, in part, due to products of the technological revolution: strip-mapping and infra-red cameras that can take pictures of clear definition from fifteen miles or more in the air; tape recorders that record radio transmissions and radar pulses, along with times of transmission and frequencies, and planes, like the U-2, with extraordinary capabilities in altitude, range and speed.

Prior Incidents

There have been many prior incidents in which United States planes, operating along or near Soviet frontiers, were shot down or damaged. These flights, especially the U-2 program, have provided information of tremendous value to the United States intelligence community. The U-2 program, in fact, was probably second only to so-called communications intelligence (recording of enemy radio and other communications) in importance, but it formed only a part of the whole vast mechanism of intelligence collection.

What was the U-2 program? Who directed it? Who flew the planes? Where were the planes based? How successful has it been?

The U-2 was designed in considerable secrecy about six years ago by Clarence L. ("Kelly") Johnson, a vice president of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. After a prototype had proved its amazing capabilities, an unknown number was built. Under the "cover plan" developed, the planes actually did some air sampling of the upper atmosphere (for radioactive particles after a nuclear explosion), and made weather recordings.

Some of the planes were under the contractual control of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, flown by civilian pilots hired by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, and "managed" by special "weather" wings of the Air Force. Others are operated by the Air Force directly. The venture was thus a cooperative and joint one though probably no one in NASA knew of its secret aspects.

Guarded Secret

The actual air reconnaissance program over Russia was known to, and authorized by, President Eisenhower himself and the National Security Council. The Central Intelligence Agency was the directing agency and provided the funds. The U-2 program had been known to a few key Congressmen and to others at the top in Washington for years, but the secret was closely guarded. Whether top officials in Washington knew ahead of time of the May 1 flight is unknown, but no orders from Washington, which closely controlled the over-all program, were sent to halt such "overflights" of Russia.

The U-2's operated from many parts of the world, ranging from Alaska and the Aleu-

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 The Washington Daily News _____
 The Evening Star _____
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 New York Mirror _____
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 New York Post _____
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 The Worker _____
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 The Wall Street Journal _____
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tians to Germany, North Africa and Turkey. Some of these bases were used for weather observation purposes and air samplings. To conduct penetrations of the Soviet air space, a U-2 might leave its normal base and fly to an advanced base to fill fuel tanks and get closer to its objective. Thus the planes based in Japan may have conducted only weather and air-sampling missions; Okinawa was probably a base used for "overflights."

Known to Russians

The U-2 program has been probably the most successful reconnaissance plane—and one of the most successful intelligence operations—in history. In four years or more it had "overflowed" Russia many times. The Russians knew about some of these flights—in fact, Soviet aviation magazines mentioned the U-2 as long ago as 1958.

Most of these were probably "shallow" penetrations, up to 500 to 600 miles from the frontiers, but a considerable number were "deep," and some had involved long-range flights similar to the 3,600-mile south-north flight Pilot Powers was alleged to be engaged upon (from Peshawar, Pakistan, to Bodo, Norway) when his plane was downed. Prior to May 1, apparently between five and eight U-2's had been lost or crashed. Presumably these losses occurred outside Soviet borders. In any case, the Russians had never before recovered equipment or pilot.

Data procured by the planes have been of very great importance. Presumably Soviet missile launching sites near the Caspian and Aral Seas, Soviet nuclear detonations, Soviet airfields and other important military objectives have been photographed, and much data on ~~Soviet electronic methods and~~ capabilities recorded.

* Why was Pilot Powers' U-2 lost?

Only the Russians and Pilot Powers can answer this one. The Russians have maintained that the U-2 was downed by Soviet anti-aircraft rocket while flying near Sverdlovsk in the Urals at an altitude of about 65,000 feet or more. Later, a Soviet military paper quoted Powers as saying he thought his engine had failed. Both the President and Mr. Johnson have cast some doubt on the Soviet rocket claim, at least at the altitude claimed by Moscow. Some observers believe a mechanical or engine failure—loss of oxygen supply, or a "flame-out" of the jet engine—forced Powers to come down to lower altitudes where he would have been an easy target. There is no evidence, and no support in official circles, for the belief expressed by some that Powers' descent was deliberate—that he was a "double-agent," defector, or traitor.

Harvest of Evidence

On the other hand Powers himself was captured, with many instruments and much equipment. Large parts of the plane—probably enough for a Soviet copy to be made—were exhibited more or less intact in Moscow. The pilot did not, or could not, utilize the "self-destruct" mechanism which would have blown the plane to bits in the air, nor did he kill himself, although he carried with him ample means to do so.

The recovery of large parts of the U-2 (now acknowledged by Mr. Johnson from photographs shown him to look like his design), and of much equipment intact can be explained by the plane's very high glide ratio. If the pilot rode the plane down to lower altitudes and then jumped, the plane may have glided to a relatively slow crash.

Why the pilot survived only

he can answer. The unwritten code of an espionage agent is to kill himself rather than to reveal information to the enemy. But Powers was a pilot first, an agent second; and pilots do not have a "self-destruct" philosophy. Undoubtedly the CIA hoped that both Powers and his plane would be destroyed rather than fall into Russian hands. The extreme psychological and, if necessary, physical torture which the Communists know so well how to administer could probably break down any man.

* Have the Russians conducted aerial reconnaissance?

Yes, but nowhere near as much as we have done. The reasons are three. (1) The Russians do not face an "Iron Curtain"; aerial reconnaissance has less importance to them than to us. (2) They have no bases close enough to the continental United States. (3) They have no plane like the high-flying U-2. Soviet planes have flown over the borders of Alaska, Northern Canada, Japan, Western Germany. But their penetrations have usually been very shallow, and rarely if ever in areas where missile batteries or modern interceptors were stationed.

* What military deductions can be drawn from the U-2 program?

It would be a mistake to generalize too much on the basis of what is known. Neither the U-2 nor any other U. S. aircraft has "overflowed" all of Russia. Nevertheless, it would appear that Soviet radar and anti-aircraft defenses had, until recently, no answer to the high-altitude aircraft. In fact, there is still some doubt about Soviet anti-aircraft rocket capabilities. This apparent defensive weakness, coupled with the data acquired by the U-2 and by other means, explains in part some of the confidence of the United States about our military strength relative to that of the Soviet Union. We know, obviously, a great deal more about Russian defenses than the general public realizes.

Bomber Controversy

The U-2 episode bears squarely on the military controversy about the continued utility of the piloted bomber. Premier Khrushchev has dismissed the bomber as obsolete and has publicly pinned his reliance upon rockets. There is no doubt that the missile will ultimately take over a major share of the strategic bombardment function now largely shouldered by the Strategic Air Command.

But there is also no doubt that the U-2 incident would appear to strengthen, not reduce,

the importance of the piloted bomber for the next few years. Unarmed aircraft have penetrated by ones and twos deep into Russia, without utilizing radar-jamming or any of the other techniques which would assist actual bombing attacks. Even if the U-2 proves to have been knocked out of the skies at 65,000 feet by a Soviet rocket it is safe to conclude that the Soviet air defenses today could not possibly fend off a major assault by SAC.

Defense Problem

SAC would of course suffer losses, but the Soviet frontier is too large to be "airtight." Electronic counter-measures, saturation raids, low as well as high altitude attacks, the use of decoys and of air-to-ground missiles launched hundreds of miles from their target would certainly pose an insoluble problem for the Soviet air defense system. The old adage that "some bombers always get through" is still true today and SAC is still a major deterrent to nuclear war.

*

How about our intelligence organization—does it need strengthening?

The answer, of course, is yes; any organization is susceptible of improvement. A secret intelligence organization like the CIA has such immense power that it should be carefully,

though secretly, controlled by Congress. The suggestion that a Joint Congressional Committee should supervise the CIA has been shelved for this session of Congress but it has merit and should be restudied next January.

But the faults in connection with the U-2 case were not, to a major extent, intelligence faults.

Policy Difficulties

There may have been some problems owing to the multi-agency status of the project—the CIA, the Air Force and NASA. But the major problem appears to have been lack of coordination; the right hand of government did not seem to know what the left hand was doing. This is probably necessary to a large extent with secret intelligence, but some one at the top, probably the Operations Coordination Board, should have prevented the clumsy untruths which have hurt the credibility of the United States Government. Moreover, a policy anticipating exactly what did happen—the loss of a U-2 to the Russians—should have been formulated before the event, not hastily in moments of crisis.

*

What about the future? Will aerial reconnaissance be continued?

In some form or another, aerial reconnaissance is here to

NEED IS SEEN Secrecy of Russians Is a Factor

stay. The U-2 may not fly again over Soviet territory, though this is by no means certain. But aerial patrol "along" the frontiers of the free world will certainly continue; the penalties of surprise attack are too great to permit any United States Government to discontinue such aerial watch-keeping.

And in time reconnaissance satellites will complement piloted aircraft. Already Tiros I, a weather satellite, is taking photographs of cloud cover over the world, including the Soviet Union and China. The Samos and Midas projects are reconnaissance and early warning satellites which in future years may provide complete "coverage" of the Eurasian heartland.

Satellites Ahead

Today adequate reconnaissance by satellite is not yet fully feasible. The definition of the photographs taken from space is not equal as yet to those taken by a high-flying plane, and—more important—the transmission of the photographs by electronic impulses from satellite to earth now results in a great loss of clarity. But these are engineering problems which will be overcome. Aerial reconnaissance is here to stay.

*

What about our bases overseas?

The use of our allies' bases for the U-2 program has subjected them—particularly the smaller and weaker ones—to intense Soviet political and psychological pressure, which may increase if there is any evidence that these bases are used for the same purpose again. It is probable, however, that the purposes of the U-2 flights were not known to our allies. In any case, there are some bases under U. S. control—in Alaska, the Aleutians and Okinawa, for instance—which are not subject to such pressure.

There is no likelihood that the U-2 incident will lead to the loss of overseas rights by the United States, though it may lead to some curtailment of reconnaissance flights from those bases. But our allies are unlikely to cut off their noses to spite their faces. Continued U. S. strength abroad is to our allies' interest, even more than to the interest of the United States. We can, if necessary, fall back upon sea bases, or U. S. continental bases, but if we retire from Eurasia our friends are vulnerable to Communist pressures.

U. S. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLANE



Associated Press

The Lockheed U-2 is a unique, glider-like plane with very long, straight wings (a wingspan of 80 feet in contrast to a fuselage of 49 feet 7 inches). It is a light aircraft (with auxiliary tanks the weight is 17,270 pounds, with fuel). Its very low wing-loading and relatively high power, supplied by a Pratt & Whitney J 57 jet engine, give it remarkable performance characteristics. It can fly for long dis-

tances at a speed of about 500 miles an hour, at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. And it can glide, with power shut off, for scores of miles in a very gradual descent. The single-man plane is unarmed. But its cabin is crammed with cameras and instruments. For weather research purposes, the plane has carried instruments to measure cosmic rays, pressure, temperature and humidity, and

a camera for pictures of cloud cover. It has been equipped with "sniffers"—sticky filters to pick up evidence of nuclear fall-out. For aerial reconnaissance its instruments might include various electronic devices to pick up radio and radar signals. But its chief instrument for espionage would be high-resolution, long-range aerial cameras that can photograph ground features in fantastic detail.

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Post-Mortems on U-2

C. I. A. Is the Only Agency Relatively Untarnished by Show of Weaknesses

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Post-mortems on the U-2 were still being held this week, and a balanced judgment will have to await the substantiating footnotes of time.

But the Senate's recent investigation, as well as facts available from other sources, have disclosed a pattern of policy-fumbling and some weaknesses in planning. The Central Intelligence Agency has emerged relatively untarnished — though some questions affecting its reputation are still unanswered. But the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council and the White House are all involved in what appears to have been a lack of policy-coordination at the top levels of the Government.

The two principal victims of the incident, besides the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, were the reconnaissance plane program, since suspended by the President, and the credibility of the United States Government. The faith of the United States and world public opinion in the truthfulness of United States Government spokesmen — though partly restored by the later acceptance by the President of full responsibility for the U-2 program — have certainly been badly shaken by what are now admitted to have been outright falsehoods.

White's Statement Noted

The Senate committee's inquiry disclosed that perhaps the most flagrant and inexcusable instance of unnecessary official falsehood was the indignant public assertion by Lincoln White, official State Department spokesman, that there had never been any deliberate attempt "to violate Soviet airspace."

Mr. White, who knew nothing of the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, was permitted to make this statement at a time when the United States Embassy in Moscow already had reported "cocktail-circuit rumors" that an American U-2 pilot had been captured by the Russians.

An equally damaging fact ~~admitted~~ has been the apparent admission that there was no planning for the possible loss of a U-2 and pilot to the Russians. The Central Intelligence Agency was clearly charged with the top operational management of the program, and in this capacity undoubtedly prepared the original cover story, released by The National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

But, Allen W. Dulles, the C. I. A. director, has been careful to draw a line between intelligence, collection, analysis, and evaluation, and the formulation of policy. He has tried to avoid the danger inherent in every secret intelligence operation — of being drawn into the partisan development of policy.

But the U-2 incident obviously required, after May 1, a policy decision that apparently was never contemplated until afterward. Mr. Dulles seems to have had clear control over the management and operational phase of the U-2 program, but where management stopped and policy began was obviously a shadowy margin. And policy control seems to have been so diffused that no one really assumed it.

Yet one of the fundamental purposes of the National Security Council is to assist the President in forming coordinated national security policies. The National Security Act of 1947, which established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, provided that the council should "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security."

It also said the council should consider "policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security." The Central Intelligence Agency was charged with coordinating the intelligence activities of the Government and with advising the National Security Council in intelligence matters.

Later, an Operations Coordination Board was established under the National Security Council to monitor the implementation of policy decisions.

Buff

W. H. White

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b7E

The Washington Post and Times Herald _____
 The Washington Daily News _____
 The Evening Star _____
 New York Herald Tribune _____
 New York Journal-American _____
 New York Mirror _____
 New York Daily News _____
 New York Post _____
 The New York Times _____
 The Worker _____
 The New Leader _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 Date _____

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NOT RECORDED

46 JUN 14 1960

JUN 12 1960

50 JUN 15 1960 44

File
5-10-60
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Involved Many Agencies

The U-2 case clearly involved both intelligence policy and national security policy, with many agencies of the Government participating. Yet the National Security Council, established by law to consider just this type of problem, does not appear to have been used effectively in this instance.

The U-2 incident seems to justify the recent inquiry by a Senate subcommittee headed by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, into the National Security Council and the whole system of government policy-making.

There remains the question of whether the Central Intelligence Agency is properly placed and properly supervised. During the debate that resulted in the National Security Act of 1947, the placement of the C. I. A. under the State Department was considered and rejected.

The reasons were, and are, good. If the State Department operated the nation's leading secret intelligence organization, either diplomacy or the collection and evaluation of intelligence would suffer. The two have so many incompatibles that to mix them in the same organization might be disastrous, just as it would be to have the State Department run the Pentagon.

The C. I. A. is properly placed as an independent agency, responsible to the President and to the National Security Council. But the National Security Council may not be exercising, as fully as it should, its function of policy control. And any secret intelligence agency, because it is naturally incompatible with some of the ideals of democratic government, requires careful top supervision.

The C. I. A. has an executive watchdog in a board established in 1956, in the executive office of the President. This board, headed by Gen. John E. Hull, retired, has access to the C. I. A. and other intelligence agencies. Its members — particularly its chairman — make frequent, though intermittent, inspections. The committee reports to the President.

It is questionable, however, whether this board meets the need for objective and continuous supervision. A Joint Congressional Committee of leading members of both houses of Congress would probably provide more thorough and more detached evaluation.

Defense Movie On Reds Ready

By the Associated Press

The Defense Department has completed the filming of its official narrative on communism to replace several other training films formerly used by the armed forces, some of which have become involved in controversy.

Work on the script for the new film "Challenge of Ideas," intended to explain the ideological background of communism, was started more than a year ago under direction of the Pentagon's troop information and education experts, with civilian advisers.

Meanwhile, the services withdrew from use at least two films which had been produced by non-defense organizations and about which complaints have been made—"Operation Abolition" and "Communism on the March."

Production of "Challenge of Ideas" cost about \$20,000, a spokesman said. The Army has ordered 200 copies; the Navy and Marine Corps 184, and the Air Corps 275.

Co-operating in the preparation of the film were Edward R. Murrow, now chief of the United States Information Agency; Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times, Television-radio Commentator Lowell Thomas and Actors John Wayne and Helen Hayes.

The Defense spokesman said the civilians donated their services.

The new film is one of several planned for production. A second, based on youth organizations, is still in the script-writing stage.

Tolson ☒
Belmont ☒
Mohr ☐
Callahan ☐
Conrad ☒
DeLoach ☒
Evans ☐
Malone ☐
Rosen ☒
Sullivan ☒
Tavel ☐
Trotter ☐
Tele Room ☐
Ingram ☐
Gandy ☐

M. J. Felt

R. J. [unclear]

B. J. [unclear]

Defense Department film
"Challenge of Ideas"

File 5-45

The Washington Post and Times Herald _____
The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star ☒ FINAL
New York Herald Tribune _____
New York Journal-American _____
New York Mirror _____
New York Daily News _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Worker _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
Date 7-13-61

62-84819-A-
NOT RECORDED

REC- 54176 JUL 21 1961

JUL 3 1961

66 JUL 24 1961

Arms and the Atom-IV

Wm. J. Edgar Hoover

An Appraisal of How Budget Is Affected By Need for Varied Weapons Array

25694

Worth Reading
Worth Reading

Atomic Energy Commission

NY Times 5-17

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Boardman
- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Parsons
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tamm
- Mr. Trotter
- Mr. Nease
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Holloman
- Miss Gandy

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Many contradictions and compromises in United States and foreign defense policies are inescapable and inherent result of the technological revolution in warfare and of budgetary restrictions.

From time to time the now familiar generalization is reiterated—that billions could be saved if the Pentagon were reorganized, if all the services were merged into one, and so on.

This is a glib and easy assertion, but it misses the main point.

The huge expense of defense today is the result of developing and maintaining many different new weapons systems; each of them extremely costly, and of maintaining at the same time sizable numbers of men in uniform. Nuclear arms and conventional arms are harnessed in the same team.

Varied weapons systems provide versatility.

The more there are of them the more difficult the defense against them. And if a nation maintains a military capability ranging from the delivery of thermonuclear weapons upon an enemy's city to action by a squad of riflemen it has the inestimable advantage of freedom of strategic choice. It can decide how to react when its vital interests are threatened; it can utilize force graduated to the occasion; it can make the punishment fit the crime.

It can, of course, save money if it reduces its available weapons systems. In doing so it reduces its freedom of choice and its total military capabilities; it increases its calculated risk.

The United Kingdom

This is what the United Kingdom has done, because of economic necessity, in its new defense program. It has reduced numbers of men sharply and it has reduced its capability to react with conventional forces to enemy action. It has, in fact, by abandoning some of its overseas bases and commitments, frankly relinquished any intention of defending these interests.

Some of the reductions, of course, are logical and sound; they represent real savings. The elimination of the small British garrison in Bermuda is reasonable. Bermuda is under the shadow of the United States; we maintain bases there, and Washington would never allow any non-British power to seize the island.

The projected scrapping of the older British battleships is sound; these play but a marginal role in war today. The United States Navy could well save money by retirement of some of our older battleships and gradual reductions in the size of our reserve fleet.

But the main British savings will be made by sharp reductions in numbers of men and by emphasizing preparedness for nuclear war at the expense of a capability for conventional war.

This decision, dictated not by military prudence but by economic necessity, follows closely upon the abortive British and French attack on Egypt last fall. This attack might have had an entirely different ending had it been mounted six to eight weeks earlier when the climate of world opinion was different.

But Britain could not take conventional military action sooner; even at that time her conventional capabilities were so stripped down that it took weeks to mobilize ships, planes and reserves.

Britain in other words is nearly increasing her calculated risk and reducing her strategic flexibility. In her case this is a necessity, not a choice.

Compromises Necessary

In our case there is no such necessity. Any defense policy, of course, must represent compromises; the sky is not the limit. A choice between the Jupiter and the Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles—if both promise approximately equal performance characteristics—does not represent any appreciable increase in the nation's calculated risk.

The elimination of one or the other missile, or the merger of both into one system, may save some millions. But the elimination of the entire intermediate range ballistic missile weapons system would save billions—but at a very great and unjustifiable increase in our calculated risk.

But the pressure for big savings, plus the pressure of those who believe in an atomic strategy, is forcing us, toward far greater risks. If we concentrated our military capabilities solely on deliveries of nuclear weapons of all types, primarily by planes and missiles, we could

greatly reduce the Army, the Marines and the Navy, and save billions.

But this in turn would commit us to an inflexible strategy. If our vital interests were challenged we could answer only with atom bombs. And the utilization of nuclear weapons might bring on the very holocaust we were trying to avoid total and unlimited nuclear war.

Strategy Must Dominate

We must, in other words, be able to fight total war or limited war; we must be able to fight with or without nuclear weapons.

Our strategy, as Henry A. Kissinger has pointed out, must dominate and direct our technology; weapons must not dictate strategy. Any flexible strategy, a strategy that reduces calculable risks to acceptable proportions, must emphasize graduated forces, from rifle bullets to megaton weapons.

We have been trending more and more toward dependence upon nuclear force. Yet unless we retain an across-the-board capability we face the impossible dilemma that, according to Robert Endicott Osgood, our present policies tend to pose. In his new book, "Limited War—The Challenge to American Strategy," Mr. Osgood states and resolves the dilemma:

"America's capacity for total war is a prerequisite for the restriction of warfare, but unless the nation can also wage limited war successfully, Communist aggression may force the United States to choose between total war, non-resistance, or ineffective resistance. Such a three-pronged dilemma would be disastrous for America's military security and her diplomatic position the only rational course is to develop a strategy capable of limiting war, and fighting limited wars successfully."

INDEXED-66

162-82221-A-

NOT RECORDED

46 MAY 24 1957

MAY 17 1957

N. Y. TIMES

62 MAY 29 1957

Emb

The New Pact—II

More Than U. S. Defense Pledge Needed To Make Baghdad Alliance Effective

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The United States has committed itself to "full partnership" in the new Baghdad Pact. It has demonstrated, by the landing of armed forces in Lebanon, its interest in the Middle East and its determination to resist aggression. But this is not enough to breathe

**News
Analysis**

life into a moribund alliance, unless additional actions are taken. On paper, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, the Middle Eastern members of the new Baghdad Pact, have formidable military forces.

Turkey has about 400,000 to 500,000 men in her army, organized in about twenty-two divisions, supported by 200 to 300 jet aircraft. She has a Navy of about twelve submarines and about a dozen destroyers.

Iran's armed forces, including the gendarmerie, total about 140,000 to 150,000 men; there are ten divisions and about seven brigades.

Pakistan's army is almost 200,000 strong, plus more than 60,000 state and security troops, organized in about eight divisions, with cadres of three more. The Pakistani Army is supported by F-86 Sabrejet fighter planes supplied by the United States.

MIDDLE - EAST
SITUATION

CLIPPING FROM THE

N.Y. N.Y. TIMES

EDITION LATE CITY

DATED 1 AUG 1958

PAGE 3

FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL
MATTERS- LEBANON,
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC,
IRAQ

BUFILE:

EX-124

C. C. Moore
File 5-92

REC-16

[Redacted Box]

NOT RECORDED
167 AUG 12 1958

TOP CLIPPING

DATED 6-1-58

FROM United States

MARKED FILE AND INITIALED

67 AUG 13 1958

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member of the pact in the future, would add as many weaknesses as strengths.

Any government in Iraq that was not pro-Nasser would certainly be subject to the same subversion or "indirect aggression" that the United States is now pledged to oppose.

Economic Problems Are Great

The military weaknesses of the Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact are less important in any comprehensive assessment than the major economic problems of both Turkey and Pakistan, the unstable political situation in Pakistan, and the generally backward and feudalistic structure of society in all these countries.

The defense of these nations against "indirect aggression" depends for its success upon the creation of conditions of economic, political, and social stability within each country. Only on this foundation can a strong military system be erected, and only such conditions will insure these nations against the virus of communism or extreme nationalism, or against the kind of coup that upset the old regime in Iraq.

If the new Baghdad Pact is to have much meaning, the United States and Britain must provide major military aid to strengthen the Middle Eastern members against direct aggression, and major economic aid to strengthen them against indirect aggression.

Such aid must be provided on a far larger scale than the programs of the past, or the pact will remain of limited usefulness.

Pledge is Effective

Whether such positive action is taken or not, the implicit pledge of defense against aggression now given by the United States to the Baghdad Pact members does act in restraint of aggression, particularly against direct aggression.

But the danger is that unless the Middle Eastern members of the Pact are strengthened with Western aid, that unless the United States shows strong, immediate and tangible evidences of supporting the pact, Washington's pledge of defense may be tested, particularly by "indirect aggression."

Furthermore, the pledge may have to be honored, as it was in Lebanon, under conditions of emergency and at the eleventh hour.

No Atomic Weapons

All these nations are weak in the air. None have atomic weapons or missiles. Most of them lack modern tanks and the newest anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Communications conditions are difficult and the equipment inadequate.

Iran, which has the longest frontier with the Soviet Union, has virtually no radar warning system, and the radar installations in both Turkey and Pakistan are inadequate.

Iraq, the fourth Middle Eastern, and the only Arab, member of the original pact has just undergone a military coup that probably means her eventual elimination from the alliance.

There have been some suggestions that the new Iraqi Government was not anti-Western and would not commit the country to federation with President Gamal Abdel Nasser's United Arab Republic, formed by the Union of Egypt and Syria. Whether or not this is true, it is clear that Iraq, as a

REC-16

To Stabilize the Mideast

Recognition of Aspirations of Arab Peoples for Betterment Urged

The writer of the following letter, formerly a lecturer at Alexandria University, is Information Officer for the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

Prof. Hans Kohn in his letter published July 20 lives up to the old tradition of Arab-Jewish harmony that typified for many generations the relationship between these Semitic people. In recent years many people, particularly some Jews, have been led to view everything regarding the Arabs through the spectacles of Zionism.

The lesson that is being learned today is how to deal with the Arabs, their reawakening and their urge for unity. Those who refuse to recognize the Arabs advance three arguments: that the resources of the Arab world such as the Suez Canal or Arab oil might be denied Western countries; that the Arab nations are pro-Communist; the future of Israel.

As to the first, the Arabs want to increase their income from these resources in order to develop the many projects that are needed to increase their standard of living.

Administration of Suez

The Suez Canal agreement has satisfied both shareholders and the international community—for Egypt accepted and reaffirmed its obligation of freedom of passage according to the 1888 agreement and the Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, the canal administration has accorded American companies tenders to improve the facilities of the canal, which in time will increase Egypt's income from the canal.

The same applies to oil resources. The Arabs need a market for their oil, which is the Western market, particularly Europe. They need to augment their production and to modify the terms of contract as the requirements of international markets necessitate. Oil constitutes a major revenue to finance a capital investment needed for the many developmental projects. It is in

their interest to guarantee a constant flow of oil at fair prices.

The desire of the Arab to achieve a better life—as an individual and as a community—is a trend along a great religious tradition that radiated to the world from the Middle East. If anything, it is against the concentration of wealth by little cliques and the monopoly of power in the hands of a few autocratic rulers. It is a grass-roots movement for better shares in income, better schools and better hospitals for the masses.

Land Reform

If the Arab world is encouraged to meet this challenge, this would lay the foundation for real stability in the area, based on the satisfaction of the people, not a temporary one imposed by bases, defense treaties and meaningless doctrines. Land reform in Egypt could be pointed to as the one real act that brought the basis of stability and hope to millions of Egyptians and indeed to the masses throughout the Arab world. If it is democracy that the West is eager to aid, the marines are not the best medium.

The future of Israel, which some fear to discuss, lies squarely within the United Nations, which has the prime responsibility for the partition of Palestine and subsequent developments. The United Nations and the many resolutions regarding Palestine spell out in detail the rights and obligations of each side.

If all the powers would work toward living up to these resolutions, an atmosphere of calm and justice would prevail.

President Nasser and other responsible Arab leaders have testified to that effect on many occasions, particularly at the Bandung and Accra conferences. However, let no one, particularly the Jewish people, who know the meaning of lost homes and persecution, fail to ask themselves whether the Palestinian, like every one else, does not have every right to want to return to his home. The Jewish people in the West could by understanding of this dilemma of the Middle East bring more light and justice to that area.

Let me, in conclusion, pay a personal tribute to my former professor for his sympathetic treatment of the problem and for his courage.

TAHSEEN M. BASHEER

New York, July 26, 1958.

MIDDLE-EAST
SITUATION

CLIPPING FROM THE

N.Y. TIMES

EDITION LATE CITY

DATED 8/1/58

PAGE 20

FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL
MATTERS- UNITED ARAB
REPUBLIC

BUFILE:

Handwritten initials and signatures.

Handwritten signature.

EX-124

REC-16

[Redacted box]

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NOT RECORDED
167 AUG 12 1958

TOP CLIPPING

DATED 8-6-58
FROM Wash. Star
MARKED FILE AND INITIALED

67 AUG 13 1958

F B I

Date: 4/20/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

Via _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: UNSUB; Article Entitled
"Crank Calls Harass Families
of G.I.'s Serving in Vietnam"
by Hanson W. Baldwin, New York
Times, April 4, 1966ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-10-88 BY [REDACTED]
#288,611 9/17/80b6
b7Cb3
b7ERe Bureau telephone call by Inspector REX SCHRODER
to NY, 4/19/66 and NY telephone call to Bu, 4/20/66.Enclosed are original and one xerox copy of
captioned article.It is noted article attributes source of
information as "An incomplete Defense Department compilation".The following pertinent information appears in
the article:

"In the most recent reported incident, on
March 11, a bogus officer, dressed in a Marine Corps
uniform, visited the home of a Marine officer serving
in Vietnam and told his wife that her husband had been
seriously wounded. The wife detected the fraud and notified
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So far no arrest has
been made."

3-Bureau (Encls. 2)

2-New York (47-NY)

1-New York (100-156700)

1-New York

JJR:pml
(8)

REC-79

APR 21 1966

C.C. WICKS

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

Per _____

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-7954

REC'D
DDM INTELL DIV.
REC'D
DDM INTELL DIV.
APR 27 6 25 PM '66
APR 21 5 43 PM '66

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TO : DIRECTOR, DIA WASHINGTON
FROM : [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]
[illegible text]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]

4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]
6. [illegible]

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UACB by close of business April 21, NYO will proceed to make arrangements to interview HANSON W. BALDWIN at the office of the "New York Times" for specific information about the incident involving Bogus Officer dressed in an Marine Corps uniform.

Files of the NYO reflect HANSON W. BALDWIN is a Military Editor of the "New York Times", is listed in Who's Who in America, a graduate of the US Naval Academy and a very prominent newspaperman. He has contacts at the highest levels of government in Washington, D.C. *MU*

He was the subject of an investigation in case captioned "HANSON W. BALDWIN (NY Times of June 5, 1952) [redacted] NY file [redacted] BALDWIN was interviewed 1/6/53 as reflected in report of SA THOMAS J. BARRY, 1/7/53, at NY, regarding his source of classified material which appeared in his article in the "New York Times", June 5, 1952. He refused to divulge the source of his information.

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BALDWIN was also subject of case captioned "ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN THE NEW YORK TIMES OF JULY 26, 1962, [redacted] Bufile [redacted] NY file [redacted] This article contained data of a highly classified nature and it had only been discussed at top government circles in Washington at that time. President JOHN F. KENNEDY personally had ordered investigation concerning the source of BALDWIN'S information.

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When BALDWIN was approached by Bureau Agents, on the evening of 7/30/62, at Chapaqua, NY, he declined to consent to interview. He informed Agents he resented "this kind of approach" and said he would be available for interview at his office the following morning. No further effort was made to interview BALDWIN at that time.

Full details concerning this latter investigation is set forth in report of SA ROBERT C. BYRNES dated 8/18/62 at WFO, Bu file [redacted]

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b7E

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Crank Calls Harass Families of G.I.'s Serving in Vietnam

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

An incomplete Defense Department compilation showed yesterday that families of military personnel serving in Vietnam had received 100 threatening, abusive or crank telephone calls or communications in the last year.

A considerable number of the calls have been made to widows or dependents of men killed in Vietnam. The anonymous callers have used obscenity or abuse, or have gloated over the death of the servicemen involved.

In one case, in a call to a home where the widow of a captain killed in Vietnam had been staying, a man and a woman said in unison over the telephone:

"Slaughtered sheep sound like this."

The words were followed by a bleating noise.

False Injury Report

Many of the ghoulish calls have been much more specific. The caller has said he was glad the serviceman was killed, or has used profanity to express his pleasure.

Other communications have involved threats. One Navy wife in the Norfolk, Va., area was threatened with physical violence if she attended a homecoming celebration for the aircraft carrier Independence, which had served in Vietnamese waters.

In the most recent reported

incident, on March 11, a bogus officer, dressed in a Marine Corps uniform, visited the home of a Marine officer serving in Vietnam and told his wife that her husband had been seriously wounded. The wife detected the fraud and notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So far no arrest has been made.

Most to Army Families

According to the Defense Department, there appears to be no common pattern to the calls and letters. However, the servicemen themselves, particularly some of those who have served aboard carriers, believe that the calls are so widespread that organization is evident. They believe that the number is considerably larger than that reported by the dependents to the services and that Communists or left-wing sympathizers in the United States have in part been responsible.

Dependents of Army personnel have received the majority of the recorded telephone calls. Almost 50 have been reported, most of them to dependents of the First Cavalry (AirMobile) Division, and to the next of kin of paratroopers serving in Vietnam. Most of these calls have been made in the Third Army area in the vicinity of Fort Bragg, N.C., and Fort Benning, Ga.

The majority of the calls or communications to Navy and Marine personnel, which total at least 25, were made in the vicinity of the Naval Air Station, Lemoore, Calif., and in the

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state)

4 NEW YORK TIME

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/17/84 BY SP

Date: 4/4/66
Edition: LATE CITY
Author: HANSON W.
Editor: CLIFTON DAI
Title: UNSUBS; ARTI
LED "CRANK CALLS
FAMILIES OF GI'S
Character: VIET NAM
W. BALDWIN
Classification:
Submitting Office: NYO
☐ Being Investigated

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11-11-66

62-110385-20

Norfolk area. The relatively few recorded calls involving Air Force personnel — about 7 — were in scattered geographical areas.

In addition to the calls centrally compiled by the Defense Department, a great many additional calls, letters or communications have been reported in New York, Pennsylvania, the Middle West, California and elsewhere.

According to the Defense Department, the types of telephone calls have included "silence, hoarse breathing, obscenity, abuse or gloating over death of the servicemen involved."

"None of the calls," it says, "have been identified, either as

to name or association with a group."

Whenever such calls or communications are reported, the local military intelligence services, local police authorities and the F.B.I. have been informed, but so far the originators of the calls or the abusive communications have not been identified.

Legal action that can be taken varies widely with local laws. Apparently there is no Federal statute that applies, although Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, has introduced a bill that would make it a Federal offense to make threatening and abusive communications to members of

the armed forces and their families.

Vigorous local investigation of each such communication and the voluntary withholding by many public relations media of the home addresses of dependents of Vietnamese casualties has apparently resulted in some diminution of the communications.

The information programs by the services to inform dependents of what to do if such calls are received serves, the Defense Department says, to "reduce the impact of families — however, there is still shock, humiliation and anger."

Best Copy
Available

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: 4-19-66

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

*0 Harassment of Dependents of
Military Personnel in Vietnam*

Pages 7362-7363. Senator Smathers, (D) Florida, spoke concerning harassing telephone calls received by families of military personnel serving in Vietnam. He pointed out that "As have several other Senators, I have introduced a bill to cope with this serious problem, which could have significant impact on the morale and effectiveness of our fighting men. . . . I urge Congress to begin consideration of all of them as soon as possible so that a major gap in our Federal laws can be closed." Mr. Smathers included with his remarks an article from the New York Times of April 4, 1966, entitled "Crank Calls Harass Families of GI's Serving in Vietnam" written by Hanson W. Baldwin. This article stated "In the most recent reported incident, on March 11, a bogus officer, dressed in a Marine Corps uniform, visited the home of a Marine officer serving in Vietnam and told his wife that her husband had been seriously wounded. The wife detected the fraud and notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So far no arrest has been made." The article goes on to state "In addition to the calls centrally compiled by the Defense Department, a great many additional calls, letters, or communications have been reported Whenever such calls or communications are reported, the local military intelligence services, local police authorities and the FBI have been informed, but so far the originators of the calls or the abusive communications have not been identified."

Original filed in:

66-1731 2880

62-110385

NOT RECORDED

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for was reviewed and pertinent items were

marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

55 MAY 16 1966

F B I

Date: 4/21/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEWARK (43-1219) (C)

SUBJECT: ~~UNITED STATES GRAVE REGISTRY~~

POST OFFICE BOX 58,

MOORESTOWN, N.J.;

MISUSE OF NAME TO INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY

Re Milwaukee airtel to Bureau 4/14/66

Newark airtel to Pittsburgh and Philadelphia
4/19/66.

Referenced Milwaukee airtel reflects a resident of Madison, Wisconsin, on 3/30/66, received an application from the captioned agency.

Investigation in this matter reflects residents of Pa., and N.J., have received applications from the captioned agency.

This matter has been discussed with the appropriate AUSA at Pittsburgh, Pa., and at Camden, N.J., who concluded no violation exists relative to using of the name United States Grave Registry. AUSA ROBERT PAGE, Camden, N.J.,

- 3 - Bureau CC RACHNER 1016 94D 62-110383-201
1 - Milwaukee (Info.) (62-0) REC 5
1 - Pittsburgh (Info.)
1 - Philadelphia (Info.) EX-108
1 - Newark

AM:cg
(7)

11 APR 22 1966

Other assessment of dependents of military personnel in Vietnam

C. G. Wick

JUN 3 1966

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED

CONFIDENTIAL

b5

NK 43-1219

This matter is being handled by the Post Office Inspector's Office, Philadelphia, Pa.

It is suggested any additional information or inquiries relative to this matter be furnished the Post Office Inspector's Office.

F B I

Date: 5/6/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: *unsub* SAC, LOS ANGELES (47-9637) (C)

RE: *unsub* UNSUB; Article Entitled
unsub "Crank Calls Harass Families of
 G.I.'s Serving in Vietnam" by
 HANSON W. ~~BALDWIN~~, New York Times,
 4/4/66

UNSUB, aka *unsub*
 Captain *unsub* USMC
 IMPERSONATION *unsub*

Re Bureau airtel to Los Angeles, 5/4/66.

On Saturday, 3/12/66, at 1:55 p.m., Mrs. *unsub* California,
 telephonically advised that Mrs. *unsub* California, had
 received a telephone call from an individual on 3/12/66 who
 identified himself as Captain *unsub* United States
 Marine Corps.

According to Mrs. *unsub* Captain *unsub* informed
 Mrs. *unsub* that her son, *unsub* Serial
 No. *unsub*, who was allegedly stationed with the Marines
 in Vietnam, had been killed. Mrs. *unsub* said that Captain
unsub claimed to have personal effects of *unsub*
 and would bring them to Mrs. *unsub* at her residence at
 2:00 p.m., 3/12/66, and at this time Mrs. *unsub* was to give
 Captain *unsub* \$250.00 for transportation of the son's
 body back from Vietnam.

3 - Bureau
 1 - Los Angeles

JLC:elc

(4)

REC-13

62-110345 21

14 MAY 9 1966

57 MAY 20 1966

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

b6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

LA 47-9637

Prior to SA AMROL's contact with Mrs. [] on 3/12/66, AUSA ROBERT L. BROSIO was telephonically contacted and the above-mentioned facts were discussed with him. Mr. BROSIO authorized the arrest of the individual identifying himself as Captain [] in the event [] made an appearance at the [] residence, dressed in the uniform, or represented himself to be a member of the United States Marine Corps and acted as such, or attempted to obtain anything of value from Mrs. [] to wit: the \$250.00 for transportation of her son's body to the United States.

b6
b7C

SA ROGER N. AMROL remained at the [] residence but Captain [] did not appear at the residence nor did he make any subsequent contact by telephone. It should be noted that this matter was also furnished to the Los Angeles Police Department by Mrs. [] and prior to SA AMROL's arrival at the residence a black and white patrol car had been parked in front of the residence for approximately 20 to 30 minutes.

b6
b7C

Close contact was maintained with the [] family, but Captain [] did not recontact them at any other time. The [] family was unable to furnish any suspects in this matter and none were developed by the Los Angeles Police Department.

b6
b7C

This matter was closed administratively in the Los Angeles Office on 4/15/66 as no suspects were developed, nor were any similar complaints received. The results were furnished to ONI, San Diego, California, by letter dated 4/15/66.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. Rosen *R*

DATE: January 31, 1958

FROM : L. N. Conroy *LC*

SUBJECT: GLOBAL STRATEGY CONFERENCE
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI)
NAME CHECKS

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 Nease _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

This morning name checks were received in Name Check Section from ONI on a group of prominent individuals being considered for invitation to the annual Global Strategy Conference to be held at the Naval War College sometime in early 1958. Lieutenant Commander George S. Harrison, ONI, has advised that results of main security-type investigations only are desired in this matter. Subjects of the name checks are listed below:

Off. Sec. atpt (N.D.) 116-59080
2/11/58 Charles F. Adams, Jr., president, Raytheon Manufacturing Company, Waltham, Massachusetts
N.R. Reverend John C. Agnew, rector, Channing Memorial Unitarian Church, Newport, Rhode Island
Referred to 1/12/53 memo Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor, "New York Times," NYC
N.R. Eugene Smith Pulliam, managing editor, "Indianapolis News," Indianapolis, Indiana
N.R. Edwin Russell, editor, "Harrisburg Patriot," Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (*Phila. SAC contact - 94-48251*)
N.R. Robert Lee Sherrod, managing editor, "Saturday Evening Post," Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
N.R. Dr. Donald E. Swarts, Dean of Men and Director of Publications, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

The name check requests are being handled expeditiously and ONI will be furnished the results of a search of our files.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information

Request forms stamped as noted above and returned to ONI 1/31/58. 29. 62-5-891

RECORDED-29
INDEXED-29

24 FEB 4 1958

EX 105

1 - Records and Communications Division

hls
 MG:rap *R*
 (5)

60 FEB 7 1958

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 5, 1968

BY LIAISON

SECRET

Mrs. Mildred Stegall
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Stegall:

Name Checks

Reference is made to your name check request concerning some individuals scheduled to attend a White House affair on June 18, 1968.

The central files of the FBI reveal no pertinent derogatory information concerning the following individuals:

Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Crossland
Samuel Huntington
Mr. and Mrs. Louis B. Lundborg

Mr. and Mrs. G.W. Poormart
Mr. and Mrs. Robert Shaplen

The fingerprint files of the Identification Division of the FBI contain no arrest data identifiable with the above individuals based on background information submitted in connection with this name check request.

Attached is a memorandum concerning Mr. and Mrs. Hanson Baldwin.

A copy of this communication has not been sent to the Attorney General.

REC 8

ENCLOSURE

Sincerely yours,

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach-Enc. (sent direct)
- 1 - Mr. Gale - Enc. (sent direct)

Enclosure

NOTE: Information received from [REDACTED]

ENCLOSURE COPY AND COPY ENCL FILED IN

CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 172

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Delivered to Mildred Stegall

SUGGESTED GUEST LIST FOR DINNER HONORING
THE PRESIDENT OF VIETNAM

June 18, 1968

total 189
mch 19 68

Handwritten: Please have the following people checked in by 11:00 AM

The President and Mrs. Johnson

The President of Vietnam and Mrs. Thieu
Ambassador of Vietnam and Mrs. Bui Diem
official party of 10

Lynda Robb

Former President and Mrs. Eisenhower

The Vice President and Mrs. Humphrey

Secretary of State and Mrs. Rusk

Secretary of Defense and Mrs. Clifford

Hon. and Mrs. William Gaud - AID

Hon. and Mrs. Bunker - Amb. to South Vietnam

Hon. and Mrs. Ball - Amb. to the UN

Amb. and Mrs. Duke

Hon. and Mrs. Wm. Bundy - Asst. Secretary of State

STAFF

Hon. and Mrs. Walt Rostow

General and Mrs. Maxwell Taylor

Handwritten: Mrs. Willie Fay Taylor

MILITARY

General and Mrs. Earl G. Wheeler, Chairman; JCS

General and Mrs. William Westmoreland - we do not know if he will be here.

If not, would you want to invite Mrs. Westmoreland?

Handwritten: List as a hold

~~Cdr. and Mrs. Dorwin B. Wiles~~ Oxon Hill, Md. - the officer that was in charge of all the Navy SeaBee (construction battalion) teams in South Vietnam from late 1965 through late 1966 - he was intimately involved with the civic action programs during his tenure and was directly responsible for numerous school and road building projects, drilling wells for hamlets throughout the country.

Captain Harvey Barnum, Jr. - a Marine winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor
Handwritten: currently stationed in Wash. as aid to General West

GOVERNORS - from Gov. Daniels

Governor and Mrs. Rampton - D - Utah)) The two Governors who led the unsuccessful

~~Governor and Mrs. Connally - D - Texas~~ fight to get a Vietnam resolution

Handwritten: in Governor & Mrs. Rampton D - Hawaii passed at the Governor's Conference last Fall.

Governor and Mrs. Rhodes - R - Ohio - has stood strongly by the President on Vietnam. In a recent speech he said: I have never described myself as an expert on Vietnam. I am not an arm-chair general and I don't intend to get in that position. We have one commander in chief, one President; it's not a matter of having two or three and making a choice. I have no objection to anybody dissenting to our position, but I'm backing the effort of the administration, of the Pentagon, and the people that we pay to run the department of defense.

SENATE - from Mike Manatos

Senator and Mrs. Gale McGee

Senator and Mrs. Thomas Kuchel

Senator and Mrs. Daniel Inouye

Senator Richard Russell

Senator and Mrs. Robert Byrd

Senator and Mrs. Dirksen

Except for Dirksen, McGee and Kuchel, all others are members of Armed Services Committee. I suggest Dirksen by reason of his support of the President on Vietnam rather than the second ranking Republican on the Committee, who is Strom Thurmond.

Mr. Henry
Mendel Rosen

Mr. Henry
Mendel Rosen

Mr. Henry
Mendel Rosen

Mr. Henry
Mendel Rosen

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Mr. Henry
Mendel Rosen

Mr. Henry
Mendel Rosen

ARTS AND LETTERS - continued

Mr. Raymond Burr

Mr. Hugh O'Brian

All of the above have spent considerable time entertaining troops in Vietnam.

Mr. and Mrs. Steve Addiss Folk singers who have been in Vietnam many times

Mr. and Mrs. William Crofut -- both entertaining American and Vietnam troops, as well as visiting and entertaining the citizens of Vietnam. They have both become students of the country, its culture, language and hopes.

EDUCATORS - All of these men are experts on Vietnam - and all can pass a blood test.
Robert A. Scalapino - Professor of Political Science, University of Calif., Berkeley, California.

A. Doak Barnett - Professor of Government, Columbia University, New York

Samuel Huntington - Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

VETERANS ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. and Mrs. Joe Scerra - commander in chief of VFW - who personally, and with his organization, has done marvelous work in Vietnam.

Mr. and Mrs. William Galbraith, commander in chief, American Legion - same as above.

OTHERS

Hon. and Mrs. Paul Douglas, Chairman, Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam.

General and Mrs. Omar Bradley - distinguished retired Army general who has consistently supported President Johnson's military policy in Vietnam.

Hon. and Mrs. Robert S. McNamara

Dr. and Mrs. Howard Rusk - author of several studies on civilian casualties and medical facilities in Vietnam.

Hon. and Mrs. Dean Acheson

Hon. and Mrs. Eugene Locke - former Deputy Amb. to South Vietnam.

Mr. and Mrs. Leo Cherne - founder of American Friends of Vietnam.

Miss Genevieve Caulfield - a blind teacher of the blind who has worked for many years with the blind in Vietnam. - also a Presidential Medal winner.

Mr. and Mrs. Norman Chandler - Mr. Chandler owns the Los Angeles Times - Mrs. Chandler, almost singlehandedly, raised the money for the new cultural center in L.A. sent to get him on some mission by President

Mr. and Mrs. Stanley Dooner - Chairman, Dept of Television and Film - University of Texas - from Horace Busby - he is one of the nation's and University's best. His name comes up often in discussion of future plans for the Library.

Mr. and Mrs. John Burns - Austin, Texas

Mr. and Mrs. Donald C. Brewster, Adelphi, Maryland - Chief of Training for AID program - married to a Vietnam woman, fluent in Vietnamese - spent 5 years in Vietnam, 2 years as a teacher and 3 years with AID working in field operation programs. Taught in Vietnam schools - great rapport with the Vietnamese people.

Mr. and Mrs. Richard Scammon - was in V. N. to observe the elections in '67 - he is a wellknown public defender of the honesty of the elections.

RELIGION

Dr. and Mrs. J. William Morgan - University Methodist Church, Austin, Texas - attractive couple, He preaches great sermons on Vietnam - suggested by Ernest Goldstein. Rev. Morgan serves on the Arts and Humanities Council.

BUSINESS

Mr. and Mrs. David Rockefeller - President, Chase Manhattan Bank

Mr. and Mrs. Eugene Black - President, Asian Development Bank, designated by President Johnson to head a team of distinguished Americans to inaugurate U. S. participation in post-war development programs in Southeast Asia, especially in the Mekong Delta

BUSINESS - continued

Mr. and Mrs. David Lilienthal - President Johnson's designate for postwar reconstruction and development in Vietnam.

~~Mr. and Mrs. Robert F. Six - President, Continental Airlines 1/17/67 - last dinner~~

~~Mr. and Mrs. Juan Trippe, Chairman of the Board, Pan American Airlines 2/30/66 - last~~

~~Mr. (and wife?) Robert Goate, San Francisco - knows Thieu - has met him on dinner~~
two occasions in Vietnam. *Wagner, Vietnam, etc.*

Mr. and Mrs. Karl F. Landegger - President, Parsons & Wittemore Inc. - many bus. *5/17/65*

~~Mr. and Mrs. Walker Cislak, Detroit Edison Company. - have power project in~~
Thuduc, Vietnam *Aug. 22, 1967 - last dinner*

Mr. and Mrs. G. W. Poorman, President, Esso International - has oil company in *USA*
Vietnam. *never seen*

~~Mr. and Mrs. Ralph K. Davies, Chairman, American President Line, Inc., 601~~
California Street, S.F., Calif. *Great fund-raiser for Republic of Vietnam*

Mr. and Mrs. Louis B. Lundborg - Chairman, Bank of America *never seen*

USA

3/2/06 Billings, Mo. 10/5/65 - Reg
Barbara Ann Willington, nee

Wilhelmine Dany Taylor

Vietnam

Federal Bureau of Investigation Records Branch

, 19__

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
<input type="checkbox"/>	Service Unit - Room 6524
<input type="checkbox"/>	Forward to File Review
<input type="checkbox"/>	Attention _____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Return to _____
	Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Regular Request (Analytical Search)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Subversive References Only
<input type="checkbox"/>	Nonsubversive References Only
<input type="checkbox"/>	Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Restricted to Locality of _____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Buildup <input type="checkbox"/> Variations

Mr. & Mrs. **MAY 29 1968** *Committee*

Subject Chammond, Samuel
 Birthdate & Place _____
 Address 3120 CRESCENT RIM
DR., B DISE, TAPHO
 Localities _____
 R# 610 Date 5/29 Searcher Initials 340
 Prod. 5

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

	NR	
116-336038	Sam Hunt	(Passion Ben)
32-15013-1895	Samuel H.	
91-895-120	Samuel Hunt	
80-98 sub 429	S. H.	
61-1241-34-3641-P329	Samuel M.	

MAY 29 1968

RCM

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

, 19__

- ☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention _____
☐ Return to _____

Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

- ☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

- ☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

MAY 29 1968

Subject Crossland, Samuel Mrs

Birthdate & Place _____

Address 3130 Crescent RimDR. Boise, IDAHO

Localities _____

B. RD Date 5/29 Searcher Initials 340Prod. 2

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

1R 140-31430-14 P 7-24;1R Samuel Hunt Mrs91-895-120Sam Hunt Mrs1RSamuel M. Mrs1R

MAY 29 1968

RC

Vietnam

Federal Bureau of Investigation Records Branch

, 19__

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention _____
☐ Return to _____
 Supervisor _____ Room _____ Ext. _____

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

MAY 29 1968

Subject Sherrington, Samuel
 Birthdate & Place _____
 Address Campbell Univ.
Cambridge, Mass.
 Localities Education
 R. 12 Date 5/29 Searcher Initials 726
 Prod. 12

b3

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

b7E

62-110039-69408

Samuel Community Center Inc.

46-0-4406, 4425

Samuel P. (aka)

b3

b7E

MO-38747-318

Samuel Phillips (aka)

62-5-3273

MAY 29 1968

Vietnam
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

P.3.

, 19__

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
<input type="checkbox"/>	Service Unit - Room 6524
<input type="checkbox"/>	Forward to File Review
<input type="checkbox"/>	Attention _____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Return to _____
	Supervisor _____ Room _____ Ext. _____

Type of References Requested:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Regular Request (Analytical Search)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Subversive References Only
<input type="checkbox"/>	Nonsubversive References Only
<input type="checkbox"/>	Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Restricted to Locality of _____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Buildup
<input type="checkbox"/>	Variations

Mr. & Mrs. MAY 29 1968

Subject Lundberg, Louis B.
Birthdate & Place _____
Address Chicasso, Paul & Anna

Localities _____

R# 657 Date 5/29 Searcher Initials 726
Prod. _____

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

100-412082-5p 33, 35,
39, 43, 46, 65,
69, 73, 77;

MAY 29 1968

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

P3

, 19__

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention _____
☐ Return to _____
Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject Lundberg, Louis B. Mrs
Birthdate & Place _____
Address _____

Localities _____

R# _____ Date 5/29 Searcher Initials 726

Prod. _____

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

NR

Vietnam
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

D.3

, 19__

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention _____
☐ Return to _____
Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

MAY 29 1968

Subject Pearson, L.W.
Birthdate & Place _____
Address _____

Localities

R# 638 Date 5/29 Searcher Initials 726
Prod. _____

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

NR

Glen W.

99-1790-1 mp

MAY 29 1968

RCP

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

p3

, 19__

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
<input type="checkbox"/>	Service Unit - Room 6524
<input type="checkbox"/>	Forward to File Review
<input type="checkbox"/>	Attention _____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Return to _____
	Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Regular Request (Analytical Search)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Subversive References Only
<input type="checkbox"/>	Nonsubversive References Only
<input type="checkbox"/>	Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Restricted to Locality of _____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Buildup <input type="checkbox"/> Variations

Subject Poorman, H. W. Mrs.
Birthdate & Place _____
Address _____

Localities _____

R# _____ Date 5/29 Searcher Initials 726

Prod. _____

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

NR

Vietnam

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

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19

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527

☐ Service Unit - Room 6524

☐ Forward to File Review

☐ Attention

☒ Return to Murphy 4230

Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)

☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)

☐ Subversive References Only

☐ Nonsubversive References Only

☒ Main References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of

☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)

☐ Buildup

☐ Variations

Mr. & Mrs. MAY 29 1968

Subject Shaplen, Robert

Birthdate & Place NEW YORKER

Address expatriate in Vietnam
Redone upate

Localities

R# 100 Date 5/29 Searcher Initials 340

Prod. C

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

✓ 94-42783
✓ 94-42783-19 11-14-65
✓ 65-60527-26299 10-12-51
✓ [redacted]
✓ [redacted] b3
✓ [redacted] b7E

✓ Robert M.
✓ 100-362994-193
Bob
ST

✓ Robert MAY 29 1968
✓ 62-60527-26989

RC 70

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

, 19__

- ☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention _____
☐ Return to _____

Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

- ☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

- ☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

MAY 29 1968

Subject Shaplan, Robert Mrs.
 Birthdate & Place _____
 Address _____

Localities

By 611 Date 5/29 Searcher Initials 340
 Prod. 5

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

~~62-60527-26299~~ 5/29-51
~~62-60527-26989~~
Bob Mrs.
NR
Robert M. Mrs.
NR
Elaine Gilbert
SI
Elaine
~~111-362836-7~~
~~114-309-1~~
~~Gilbert, Elaine~~
~~145-1129-14~~

MAY 29 1968

R670

Re Leaked Information from Department

MISSILE RACE POSING NEW DANGER FOR WEST

INDEXED

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Boardman
- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Mason
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Parsons
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Mr. Winterrow
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Holloman
- Miss Gandy

By Hanson W. ~~Baldwin~~ in THE NEW YORK TIMES - Feb. 5/56

This article is merely a re-assessment of Senator Henry M. Jackson's speech in which he warned that the Soviet Union would probably test a 1,500-mile ballistic missile this year. Mr. Baldwin announces, in the wake of this speech, Defense Secretary Wilson's impending appointment of a kind of guided missile "czar".

Baldwin admits there is good evidence that Russia is testing an intermediate range ballistic missile good for at least 800 miles, against the 200-mile Redstone being tested in the U.S. He agrees that even this Russian missile could cause severe damage to U.S. allies and to U.S. air bases abroad and that the 1,500-mile missile would be catastrophic from both the military and political standpoints, particularly in view of the fact that many of our bases are located where local restrictions or large Communist minorities expose them to sabotage or attack.

Communism, therefore, could be expected to exploit such nuclear advantages by every political and psychological means at its disposal.

Handwritten notes in left margin:
... of ...
... of ...
... of ...

Handwritten notes at bottom left:
article
detected
...
...
...
21 MAR 1956

INDEXED - 19

EX - 108

62-98174-49
NOT RECORDED
17 FEB 28 1956

Handwritten signature/initials at bottom right.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 5, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: LEAKS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

My memorandum of 1-13-56 reflected that we would obtain for future reference magazine and newspaper articles concerning the Defense Department's guided missile program. This recommendation was made following a conference of Defense Department personnel, Bureau representatives and Department representatives, held at Secretary of Defense Wilson's office January 13, 1956, at which Secretary of Defense Wilson presented the problem of leaks of information concerning guided missiles from the Department of Defense and indicated he had learned a number of articles concerning the subject would appear in the press. No requests for action by the Bureau were made at the conference. One of the articles mentioned by Secretary of Defense Wilson was to be published in "Collier's" magazine, authored by Hanson W. Baldwin.

The current issue of "Collier's" (March 16, 1956) contains an article captioned "ICBM" by Hanson W. Baldwin. It is similar in content to prior articles concerning the intercontinental ballistic missile; it points out Russia and the U.S. are engaged in a race to develop this weapon; that the weapon would be a virtually unstoppable 16,000-mile-per-hour missile which could drop an H-warhead on a city 5,000 miles away. The article contains artist's conceptions of what such a missile would look like and its path of flight. It identifies the principal personnel engaged in missile research; namely, physicists Simon Ramo and Dean Wooldridge, Air Force Advisors; Thomas G. Lamphier, Jr., Vice President of CONVAIR; and Karel Jan Bossart and James R. Dempsey, CONVAIR engineers. It also identifies as head of the Air Force ballistics program Major General Bernard A. Schriever. The article points out that Trevor Gardner, former Assistant Secretary of Air Force, had resigned because he was dissatisfied with the Pentagon's policy on the ICBM.

The supplement to the "Sunday Star" entitled "This Week Magazine," dated March 4, 1956, contained an article entitled "The Race for the World Bomb" by Donald Robinson. It too is similar to prior articles concerning the ICBM. This article estimates each individual ICBM will cost between 4 million and 5 million dollars; points out that basic research is done in 3 ultrasecret laboratories

DET:ss

(4)

CC:

AHBelmont

WABranigan

DETodd

RECORDED-38
INDEXED-38

EX-103

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics at Wallops Island, Virginia; at Cleveland and at Moffett Field, California.

We do not know whether the articles contain classified information or not.

Walt Yeagley of the Department, who attended Secretary Wilson's conference, was advised telephonically that these articles had been published.

ACTION:

The articles should be filed for reference purposes. No further action is necessary at this time.

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ENCLOSURE

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March 4, 1956

This Week

The Sunday Star
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MAGAZINE



IT'S LOVE! Richard Eyer and Samantha. See Page 15

The Race For The "World Bomb" ... Page 8

MARCH 4, 1956

A Good Day To Start Again

By ROBB SAGENDORPH, Publisher, "The Old Farmer's Almanac"

To this working almanac-maker, the 24-hour turning of the earth on its axis which we call day, holds special fascination. For each day seems to carry with it a likeness to the wisdom which has appeared in this same day for hundreds of years.

Take March 4 as an example. I always think of it as a day of Beginnings. On this former Inauguration Day the Presidents used to take the oath of office; Abraham Lincoln did so in 1861, Theodore Roosevelt in 1905. Through the ages, the time has been meant for beginnings. First the Egyptians, then the Greeks and Romans, marked it as the New Year. It is the season when Mother Earth once more begins to bear. Creation stirs within us as inevitably as in the wild jungle fowl whose brood always hatches at the equinox, or the maple tree whose sap is said to pulsate skyward more vigorously with the waxing of this moon.

From our snug push-button cars and air-conditioned factories it is perhaps difficult for us to notice these first evidences of primeval creation. We shall probably even guffaw at the solemn pronouncements that spring is on the way and will be with us again this year on the 20th at pre-

cisely 10:21 a.m. Spring indeed! It is unlikely we shall even speak of spring when these pitiless March winds carry a man's new hat to mud and slush. Yet there seems to be a connection between this miserable weather and mankind's progress.

I say this because I believe that the weather, too, is part of God's great creative plan for the Universe, a plan with forces perhaps little understood but plain to all who would read them. Rugged March brings life itself peeping from primordial slime. Through last winter's rotting leaves the sharp spears of the crocus and daffodil come to mount anew their emblems of smiling beauty. Birds take wing from other lands to join us in the poetry of the season. Only to be alive in March is to be born again.

One final note: the calendar shows that Sunday, as the Lord's Day, was first legally established sixteen hundred and thirty-five years ago, by the Emperor Constantine. So this Sunday, March 4, 1956, is marked in my book of records as an extra-good day for beginnings. It is a day for the shedding of mean, despondent thinking; a day for the giving and receiving of love, Creation's one real meaning.

SPRING AGAIN: "Through the ages, the time has been meant for beginnings. . . It is the season when Mother Earth begins to bear."



This Week

United Newspapers
Magazine Corporation

THE SUNDAY MAGAZINE

420 Lexington Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

WILLIAM I. NICHOLS, Editor-in-Chief and Publisher
STEWART BEACH, Executive Editor

EUCLID M. COVINGTON, President • JOHN C. STERLING, Chairman of the Board

March 4, 1956

Cover by Don Omiltz

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Names and descriptions of all characters in fiction stories and semi-fiction articles in this magazine are wholly imaginary. Any name which happens to be the same as that of any person, living or dead, is entirely coincidental. The title "This Week" is registered in the U.S. Patent office.

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FOR A BETTER AMERICA

TW-34-5

Race For The "World Bomb"

The ICBM is a pilotless, super-destructive monster which can wipe out any city on the globe and cannot be intercepted. Who will have it first — the U.S. or Russia?

unds of security, an authentic report on the status of our top-secret ICBM project. "Atlas" has been its code name.

If present plans are adhered to, the ICBM will be between 75 and 100 feet long, approximately 15 feet in diameter, and will be powered by two huge rocket-jet engines. Experts say it will be capable of speeds of 12,000 to 15,000 miles an hour.

Payload: 200 A-Bombs

In this connection, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics reports that experimental NACA missiles have already flown at more than 7,000 miles an hour!

That is close to twice as fast as any speed ever before attained by a man-made object.

It is anticipated that the ICBM will have a range of 5,000 to 6,000 miles and will be able to achieve altitudes of over 246 miles. It will have an elaborate built-in guidance system, and current designs call for this system to be so accurate that the missile will be able to come down out of the ectosphere and hit within the confines of any given city.

The demolitionary power the ICBM will carry is hellish. Each will have inside it the explosive force of 200 A-bombs.

Is it any wonder that a veteran Pentagon strategist remarked to me, "The ICBM is as near to being the ultimate weapon as anyone now alive is ever likely to see"?

The weapon is so devastating that, it can be disclosed, the long-range war plans of the NATO powers have had to be completely revised. In fact, some of the shrewdest NATO thinkers are maintaining that the next world war can be settled by ICBM's within a half-hour after it starts.

Which leads us to the question: Where does the Soviet Union stand with the intercontinental ballistic missile? If it gets one first, the U.S. and the rest of the free world will be at the Communists' mercy.

Alarming though it sounds, I must report that the Russians have also been making big

strides with an ICBM. Air Secretary Quarles said, "You can assume that the Russians have been recording significant progress with the ICBM. We have every cause to be concerned."

The Russians started working on an ICBM in 1946, I was informed. Early that year, they carried off more than 200 German rocket experts to the U.S.S.R., locked them in a newly constructed laboratory at Moscow-Chimki, and ordered them to design a guided missile with a transatlantic range.

The program moved quickly. And for good reason. One of the German scientists, a genius at physics by the name of Helmut Grottrup, had previously done vast research along exactly the same lines for Hitler.

Actually the U.S. Army got to Grottrup first, but no one realized the German scientist's importance. Through a shocking slip-up, G-2 turned him loose and let the Russians grab him. We may yet pay heavily for that blunder.

America's Head Start

Year by year, the Russians have increased the tempo of their ICBM efforts. Not long ago, they even took their top plane designer, A. S. Yakovlev, creator of the famous Yak fighter-bomber, off all his other activities and assigned him exclusively to the ICBM.

Nevertheless, as of now, the U.S. seems to be out front in the crucial race.

Air Secretary Quarles, the most knowledgeable man in America on this subject, told me:

"On the basis of facts at my disposal, I feel confident that we are ahead of the Russians in the evolution of an intercontinental ballistic missile suitable for our purposes."

Luckily, the United States recognized the value of guided missiles even before the Russians did. Alone among the Allied powers, we produced guided missiles for combat purposes during World War II. This has never before been disclosed.

What's more, unlike the Russians, the U.S. Air Force didn't wait for the end of World War II to begin work on the intercontinental missile itself. Although it knew that this might well be a 50-year task, it set up a special committee of some of its most gifted officers to delve into the problem in January, 1945, while hostilities against Germany were still on.

"We knew how vital it was for us to get an ICBM before the Russians did," Brigadier General J. F. Phillips (Ret.), who served on that committee, declares.

It is true that all missile work for the Armed Forces languished between 1946 and 1950. That was the period when the United States was cutting back on most of its military defenses. However, after the outbreak of the Korean War, missile work picked up, and it has been in high gear ever since. Our expenditures for guided missiles have multiplied 25-fold since 1950. Today, the three services are spending more than \$1,000,000,000 a year on missiles. How much of this is going just for ICBM cannot, of course, be divulged. That is strictly classified — but it's a lot.

Insiders say that each individual ICBM will cost between \$4,000,000 and \$5,000,000.

By order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the ICBM now has priority over practically every other research and development project in the Armed Forces. The best brains in science, industry and the Air Force have been marshaled for it under the personal leadership of Air Secretary Quarles.

The basic research for the missile is being done in three ultra-secret NACA laboratories: at Wallops Island, Va.; in



"MR. MISSILE": He's General Putt

Cleveland; and at Moffet Field, Calif. Here, brand-new metallic materials are being evolved, engines that employ hitherto unheard-of principles of propulsion tried out, and missiles with fantastic, futuristic shapes tested.

Meanwhile, in the Pentagon and at the Air Research and Development Command in Baltimore, crack Air Force planners headed by Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, better known as "Mr. Missile," are busy determining immediate applications for the NACA's broad-scoped discoveries.

Development of the actual parts for the pilot model is being done by American industry, and nothing is being allowed to stand in the way of a fast job. A big Southern California aircraft company found that out.


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
YAKOVLEV: Out to win for Russia

Continued from preceding page

ICBM On Its Way: Hell At 15,000 Miles An Hour



CORPORAL, ready for action now, hits 5,000 mph



POWER PLANT: No. 1 jet engine will hurl ICBM 100 miles up, then drop off as No. 2 takes over. Twelve minutes after launching, missile is on its own for thousands of miles to target

the prime contract for producing the ICBM but didn't move speedily enough for the Air Force.

"Either you get better results or you lose the contract," the Air Force warned. The company didn't improve and the Air Force revoked its contract.

"The ICBM means too much to the security of the United States for us to take chances," it ruled.

The Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation of Los Angeles now has the over-all contract for producing the ICBM. The General Electric Corporation has responsibility for the electronic components, North American Aviation and Aerojet-General are working on the rocket engines, and the Convair Division of the General Dynamics Corporation is building the hull and tanks. These five companies hold in their hands the lives of all their fellow-countrymen. And their job is the toughest proposition American airmen, scientists and industrialists have ever had to tackle together.

Three Gargantuan problems have had to be met in developing the ICBM. The first is the question of propulsion. How do you fly a 250-ton vehicle for 6,000 non-stop miles at a speed of 15,000 miles an hour without one refueling? It sounds almost impossible, but real gains have been made toward this goal.

The system that has been worked out is this. Two mighty jet engines are being designed with a combined thrust of over 600,000 pounds, 30 times greater than the strongest airplane engine in the world today. One of these engines will fling the missile the first 100 miles or so up into the air. Then, its fuel exhausted, it will automatically drop off and lighten the load. The second engine will now take over. By the time it, too, has exhausted its fuel — 10 to 12 minutes after the launching — the ICBM will have built up such enormous momentum that it will be able to flash through the ectosphere right to the target with no further propulsive power, like a bullet from a gun.

Naturally, the most powerful fuel imaginable will be required to run the ICBM's two giant engines. Just what it will be is not yet decided. Best bet now appears to be liquid oxygen plus a new secret chemical.

Terrific Speed, Terrific Heat

Second of the three mammoth problems the ICBM designers have to face is heat. When the ICBM dives back into the earth's atmosphere at the end of its 15,000-mile-per-hour flight through space, the terrific speed at which it will be traveling is going to generate absolutely unbearable temperatures, above 10,000 degrees Fahrenheit. That is hotter than it is on the sun. It is so hot that any diamond exposed to it would immediately turn into a puff of vapor.

"Under such heat," NACA officials say, "the ICBM could just disappear."

The ICBM men think that they may have found an answer to this awful heat, though. They believe it may lie in an entirely new kind of material with which they have been experimenting. It is called "cermets," an alloy of metal and ceramics.

Just recently, a certain cermet was tested at more than 6,600 degrees. It survived.

The last of the three big problems in building the ICBM is even more rugged than the others. It involves a guidance system for the missile. The question here is:

"How do you launch a missile in the United States and expect it to find its way, with no man's help, for 6,000 miles through outer space to a little dot on the surface of the earth?"

Not the slightest margin for error can be tolerated. Air Secretary Quarles has stressed that in a 6,000-mile

flight a mere one-per-cent error (such as Hitler allowed his V-2's) could cause the ICBM to hit 60 miles away from Point Zero.

Making the situation still more difficult is that, in all likelihood, the ICBM will have to set practically its entire course during the first 200 miles of its flight. Once it gets up into the ectosphere, it probably won't be able to do any steering whatsoever. Its rudders won't have any "air" to lean against up there.

There have been days when the ICBM experts were in black despair over this guidance problem.

"We thought it was just beyond man's capacity to solve," one ICBM man told me.

It can now be reported, though, that the dark mood has passed. ICBM men are optimistic that they will soon have the matter licked.

Navigator: An Electronic Brain

The latest thinking provides for the ICBM to be a celestial-navigation missile. It will set itself on the correct ectospheric path by means of automatic tracking telescopes which will "shoot" the stars and transmit the data to an electronic "brain" capable of instantly figuring out the most intricate mathematical equations. This "brain" will determine the right course and see to it that the ICBM follows it.

Just lately whispers have been heard that the ICBM may also carry some singular infrared instruments to guide it down from the ectosphere; at the end of its flight, directly into the center of its target. These instruments are said to be so sensitive that they can distinguish between a city and the suburbs around it at an altitude of 100 miles. They do it through variations in heat.

Is there any possible defense against the ICBM, assuming that Communist Russia gets one, too?

Most authorities think not! They say it moves too incredibly fast for anyone ever to ward off its blow.

"Can you imagine intercepting it?" Harold E. Talbott, the former Secretary of the Air Force, dejectedly said. "Two of us might just as well stand at opposite ends of a dark hall and pitch needles at each other in the fond expectation that the needles might collide."

If we can't invent a way to intercept them, the only recourse the United States will have against a Russian ICBM is to try to knock out its launching sites.

We can use our own ICBM's to do this or the revolutionary atomic-powered planes which the Air Force has under development. These atomic planes will be able to fly for a week without refueling. They can be kept permanently aloft, ready for instant action in case of war.

"With their long cruisability," Secretary Quarles says, "they can utilize the air virtually as a parking strip."

Quarles believes, incidentally, that there will still be a big place for the manned plane in the Air Force even after it has the ICBM.

"The ICBM is just one way to blow up a city, not the only way," he declares. "In general a manned plane can do a better job than a missile. A live pilot can select an alternate target that preliminary intelligence didn't disclose. With a manned plane, human intelligence is merely six miles from the target, not six thousand."

That the ICBM can deal out atomic death faster than any other weapon, Secretary Quarles doesn't dispute, though. Like every conscientious Air Force officer, he hates the very thought of it. His one dream is that the horror incarnate in the ICBM may actually prove a boon by deterring any potential aggressor from starting a war which could set the ICBM's whizzing.

"Even the Russians must realize," he says, "that we only have one world to destroy."

—The End

Do Women Make Good Bosses?

With more lady executives than ever before, it's becoming a hot question. Here **THIS WEEK** reports the surprising answer

By **LESTER and IRENE DAVID**

There is a remarkable trend in business and industry these days, and chances are excellent you will come face to face with it sooner or later. That is, unless you have already. It's the spectacular rise of the lady boss.

Few persons realize how far she has advanced and in what impressive numbers. In its most recent tabulation, the U.S. Census Bureau reveals that the number of women executives has now passed the one million mark. This is a 150-per-cent jump in the past 15 years and all the more astonishing in view of the fact that the number of male bosses increased only 65 per cent in the same period.

Wait till you hear what's going on. The Women's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor reports that the ladies are invading virtually every type of higher-level job, even those considered sacred male preserves. There are more women bank officials than ever, more personnel and office managers, more sales executives

and more department-store supervisors. Women are now production managers in heavy industries, officials in chemical laboratories and even foremen of construction gangs.

That's not all. The National Association of Manufacturers, the Labor Department and practically all business spokesmen agree the invasion shows no signs of abating.

The conclusion, therefore, is clear: More and more women, as well as an increasing number of men, are acquiring—or may soon acquire—lady bosses. (If this prospect dismays you, just read on!)

How Are They Doing?

All this raises the natural and significant question: How are they doing? How are the girls getting along up there in the Executive Suite and behind those glass doors? In short, do women make good bosses or don't they?

The popular impression is frankly negative. Employment-agency heads admit they often hear the refrain: "I wouldn't work for a woman boss." Personnel chiefs report frequent requests for transfers to male executives. The Harvard Business School, following a broad survey, found "a whole body of preconceptions about women [in executive jobs] which might almost be called a mythology."

We dug into the situation. We studied mountains of reports, sounded out the women officials themselves, had long, confidential talks with their bosses, let their male colleagues unburden themselves and spoke to employees in shop, plant and office.

The verdict: women must work harder than men to get ahead, there is plenty of resentment against them and they generally are paid less. But in spite of all this, women bosses are doing fine, thank you.

— Continued on page 24

MISS VICE-PRESIDENT: "She had to be better than average to have got the job in the first place," one masculine expert points out





LAUNCHING: For 10 years researchers have struggled with terrific problems involved in intercontinental missile flight. Self-propelled rocket RV-A-10, shown here, is big recent step. But "ultimate weapon," (ICBM), will be "ballistic," motorless for nearly all its 5,000-mile trajectory.

The

BY DONALD ROBINSON

This could be the way Moscow dies.

A flash alerts the Pentagon: "Russians Attacking NATO Nations." At once, a code signal goes to a secret launching platform near the Canadian border, and a blue-clad U.S. Air Force officer pushes a button. Instantly, an intercontinental ballistic missile — the deadliest, most destructive weapon ever conceived by man — is sizzling into the sky.

Sputtering flames, the missile streaks up beyond the earth's atmosphere to the never-never land of empty space. Then, at four miles a second, 20 times the speed of sound, it hurtles toward Northwest Russia, 5,000 miles away. In just 20 minutes, it's there, smashing its hydrogen-bomb warhead into the heart of Moscow.

After that, there's nothing left of the Russian capital except bits of radioactive rubble and shreds of torn human flesh.

This also could be the way New York dies. And every other major city in the U.S.

It sounds like a science-fiction writer's nightmare, doesn't it? But it's frighteningly real. The United States has just such a missile under development today. So has the Soviet Union.

We expect to have our intercontinental ballistic missile in operation no later than 1965. We may have it as early as 1961, according to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson.

Another authority, Secretary of the Air Force Donald A. Quarles, who is himself a distinguished scientist, says, "The ICBM is now in the blueprint stage."

So much progress has been made in this direction that the Air Force has just put out a special order to all its 958,300 men, stating, "The era of the unmanned missile is very much at hand." A bestarded general in the Pentagon phrased it more bluntly: "Push-button warfare is here."

Nothing is more hush-hush today than the research and development job our government is doing in the field of guided missiles. It is more tightly guarded than the H-bomb itself. However, I can now give, within the



QUARLES: He says the U.S. is ahead



The U.S. and Russia are engaged in a race whose outcome may determine the course of history. The goal: development of the most frightful weapon conceived by man—a virtually unstoppable 16,000-mph intercontinental ballistic missile that can drop a hydrogen warhead on a city 5,000 miles away. At stake is not only the security of the free world, but our position as the world's leading technological and industrial power. On the next page begins the full, dramatic story of the ...

ICBM

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

As Military Editor of The New York Times, the author is one of America's best known and most respected military analysts. A 1924 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, he spent three years in the Navy aboard battleships and destroyers. In 1928 he joined the staff of the Baltimore Sun (of which his father, the late Oliver P. Baldwin, was managing editor) and a year later shifted to The New York Times. He became military and naval correspondent of The Times in 1937 and Military Editor in 1942, the same year he won a Pulitzer prize for his articles on the South Pacific war. Since World War II, he has toured Europe and Asia, witnessed three atom-bomb tests, covered peacetime maneuvers, and lectured at the National War College, Naval War College, Armed Forces Staff College, Air War College, and Command and General Staff College.



MAXWELL FREDERIC COPLAN

ICBM

Is the ICBM the ultimate weapon?

How destructive is it?

Is there any defense against it?

What will happen if Russia gets it first?

IT WILL not be long. In ten years—five years, perhaps only two or three—the historic count-down will start: “Ten—nine—eight—seven—six—five—four—three—two—one—” At zero a new era will open up on the earth—the era of push-button war. A giant rocket, 100 to 135 feet high, will lift slowly from its launching pad and, with voice of thunder, tongue of flame, disappear into the stratosphere. Some 20 to 30 minutes later and 5,000 miles away, the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile will plunge toward the earth.

Where will it come from?

It could be launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida, at the U.S. Air Force Missile Test Center, to splash harmlessly into the South Atlantic near Ascension Island. . . .

Or, the missile might be launched from a Russian desert to arch—in unseen ellipse—high above the uninhabited tundra of the north. . . .

It will make a difference—at most, the difference between peace and war; at least, the difference between added security for the West and possible Communist domination of more of the world.

Dubbed ICBM in our research laboratories and Pentagon offices, the intercontinental ballistic missile has been called “the ultimate weapon.” This giant ocean-spanning, mountain-leaping rocket—mated to a hydrogen warhead with a destructive capability of megatons (millions of tons of TNT)—is a supreme instrument of offense. It arches so high (600 to 800 miles above the earth), and moves so fast (12,000 to 16,000 miles an hour) that, once it has been launched, defense against it will be nearly, if not entirely, impossible. The German V-2, the small 200-mile range forerunner of the ICBM, bombarded London during World War II, and even the conventional explosives then used in the warhead caused thousands of casualties and blew whole buildings apart. The ICBM will—when developed—threaten every city on earth, not merely with damage but with destruction.

The implications are frightening—and sobering. In the early period of the coming ICBM era, before radar missile detection and possible antimissile defenses are developed, an enemy could probably devastate the United States with a surprise ballistic missile bombardment. Before we could even detect the attack—much less before we could launch a retaliatory attack. One or two missiles for each of our 50 biggest cities might cause 10,000,000 to 50,000,000 casualties, knock out perhaps a third of our industrial capacity, and turn parts of America into radioactive deserts.

But if we beat Russia in the race to develop the first practical ICBM, the weapon could be still another deterrent to nuclear war and to overt, large-scale armed aggression of any sort. Our capability of retaliation against aggressors would be considerably increased; the aggressors would have certain knowledge that they might have to pay a very high price indeed.

How is the race going?

No one—in Washington or Moscow—can answer that positively. “We just don’t know,” a high U.S. official says.

But many of our Intelligence officials and some of our scientists believe Russia leads today. The Communists are *not* ahead of us across the whole broad band of the missile spectrum. We don’t think Russia has anything to equal our Nike or Terrier anti-aircraft guided missiles, or the Army’s short-range surface-to-surface bombardment missile, the Corporal. We are “fat” with other good missiles—air-to-air and ship-to-shore.

But in the field of long-range bombardment missiles—in which the ICBM is the ultimate objective—the Russians seem to be off to a head start. There is unmistakable evidence that last year they tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile—a bombardment missile of unknown accuracy but with a range of at least 800 miles, far greater than that of anything we have yet

fired; a missile which is clearly a first cousin to the ICBM. Moreover, Senator Henry M. Jackson, chairman of the Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, warned in the Senate last month that “there is a danger” the Soviets may fire a 1,500-mile ballistic missile before the end of this year. Possession of even these two intermediate weapons would give Russia the means to bombard from her own territory most, if not all, of our allies in Europe and Asia—the means perhaps to blackmail them into throwing in their lot with the Soviet bloc, denying us their bases and isolating the United States.

The truth is that the Russians have emphasized the finished “hardware,” and they are getting it. We have emphasized research and “refinements,” and ultimately this approach may pay off. However, our policy has been questioned within the administration itself; last month Trevor Gardner, who has urged a bigger, faster missile program, resigned his post as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development as the culmination of his long disagreement with the Pentagon on that subject.

Policy disputes aside, there is little doubt that time is important. We are coming into the homestretch of the race. In a year or so—perhaps less—the first earth satellites will be launched into outer space, and Russia may put hers upstairs first. The earth-satellite program, despite the general scientific knowledge it will produce for all, is really a dress rehearsal for the ICBM so far as the launching phase of the program goes. It will supply, too, some data—much needed for calculating accurate ballistic trajectories—about nature’s unknowns in space. So the heat is on.

Last month Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson took cognizance of the need for speeding up our efforts by announcing that he shortly would name a special assistant to direct all our various ballistic-missile projects.


“We have always been under pressure,” a missile scientist working on the ICBM says—“only more so now. We cannot afford to believe in a twenty-year peace; we have to pace our development as if war were just around the corner.”

We must learn, then, whether we like it or not, to live with the ICBM, and hence we must understand not only what makes it tick and how it fits into our military armory, but what effect its development will have upon war and peace, strategy and society.

Let’s suppose, for a moment, that the worst happens and Moscow does win the race for the most powerful offensive weapon known to man. The Soviet advantage would be temporary—and brief. No matter who wins the race, the other power will not be far behind—six months, one year . . . three years. Moscow, then, would have a transitory advantage in offensive delivery capabilities, a temporary monopoly of long-range ballistic weapons. But this could not be an “absolute” advantage; the ICBM won’t cancel out all other offensive and all defensive systems, both active and passive. It won’t mean world domination for the Kremlin—unless Russia also develops a virtually airtight defense against all other nuclear-explosive delivery systems, well-nigh an impossibility.

But Russia with an ICBM would be like a bully (Continued on page 74)

Artist’s conception of how the ICBM may be fired: reinforced launching pit is camouflaged on surface to resemble a farm. To right of main pit are fueling room and control center; at left, the assembly room where hydrogen warhead is stored. Final shape of missile and number of stages it will have are secret; this concept contains two propulsion units and warhead





In class at Actors' Studio, Margaret Feury illustrates for fellow students a technique of projecting emotion on stage. Miss Feury has occasional stage and TV jobs, is considered one of the most promising actresses in the studio

Director Lee Strasberg oversees all studio classes, prods his students into intensely realistic performances with sharp, severe, illuminating criticism. "Acting is no mere imitation of life," he told them recently, "it is *living*"

PHOTOGRAPHED BY ED FEINGERSH



ICBM

continued from page 24

The trajectory of the ICBM: it reaches twice as high into space as proposed man-made satellite, and about six times higher than the V-2. It's called a ballistic missile because it is thrown into the air by its rocket motors, then continues in free flight like an artillery shell. Word "ballistic" comes from ballista, crossbow-type artillery used by ancient Romans to hurl stones

with a really big stick. Regardless of whether he used it, he would have the means to throw his weight around dangerously—and the other boys in the block might go out of their way to avoid offending him.

To the present Communist advantage of superior land power, then, the ICBM would add a temporary—though definite—qualitative superiority in the air offensive.

I don't agree with those prophets of doom who hold that a Russian monopoly of the ICBM—even though short-lived—would enable Moscow to accomplish her objective of absolute world power. It is true, and it is a frightening thought, that if Russia wins the ICBM race, some of the tough men in the Kremlin might (figuratively) push a button and destroy New York. But Moscow has the capability of destroying New York today—though with far more difficult and less certain methods. And Russia could not hope to escape heavy retaliatory damage, whether or not we had developed the ICBM, for the intercontinental ballistic missile will not automatically replace all other ground, ship and air-based weapons. Short- and intermediate-range missiles and piloted planes, some of them firing air-to-ground missiles like the Rascal, would still pack a powerful offensive punch. Some of these would get through, no matter how good the Russian defenses.

WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN if Russia wins the ICBM race is suggested by the events that followed her conquest of the atom; when she broke our atomic monopoly. Her diplomacy became bolder; the Reds were more willing to take a chance. They started a war in Korea, got tough in Indochina and off Formosa. Right now, they are getting tough in the Middle East.

In other words, the Soviet political and psychological offensive would be greatly strengthened. Many of the world's peoples are band-wagon jumpers; they want to be on the side they think will win. We can depend on Soviet propaganda to exploit to the full a Soviet victory in the ICBM race. The Russians would be certain to hammer on the theme that the Soviet Union had displaced the United States as the most advanced industrial and technological nation in the world. The resultant loss of face for the U.S. could be damaging for the cause of freedom.


Furthermore, just as Soviet diplomacy would be strengthened by the new weapon, so ours—if we didn't have it—would be correspondingly weakened. Without the power of full retaliation, it would take a bold President and a bold Secretary of State to stand completely firm against Communist aggression and Soviet demands if our military leaders advised them that Moscow could destroy 20 major U.S. cities and pulverize our industrial plant in half an hour!

So, in my opinion, while a Russian victory in the ICBM race wouldn't mean all-out nuclear war or Communist world domination, it would mean a very critical period, indeed, in which U.S. diplomacy—already behind the eight ball in many parts of the world—would be still further handicapped. The danger would be that during this period Russia might make very large political-economic-psychological gains which would prejudice our future global position. The danger would be that Russia might press her campaign for the world to a point where another small war—like Korea or Indochina—might start, with unknown ultimate consequences.

What is the story behind the development of this amazing missile which can change the course of history?

The arms race today and tomorrow is centered around carriers of nuclear weapons rather than the weapons themselves. The world already has a whole "family" of A-weapons; it has about maximized weapons of destruction. The race now goes to the side that first develops the most efficient carriers for nuclear weapons: planes, ships, submarines—and missiles.

If any one man deserves the title of "Father of the Ballistic Missile," he



JOHN BRYSON



The men behind the ICBM: top, physicists Simon Ramo (left) and Dean Wooldridge, advisers and technical directors for the Air Force program; bottom, Convair's team includes (from left) Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr., vice-president and management's top man on so-called "Atlas" project; Karel Jan (Charlie) Bossart, project engineer; and James R. Dempsey, director of missile project



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


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AMERICA'S BEVERAGE OF MODERATION





is Dr. Wernher von Braun, a dynamic young German-born scientist. During World War II, he headed the German scientific team at Peenemünde which developed the granddaddy of the ICBM—the V-2 rocket, used against London. He and many of his countrymen were recruited by the U.S. Army after the war and brought to the United States to help develop our missiles. Now American citizens, they are an important part of the Army's missile-development team at Redstone Arsenal, near Huntsville, Alabama.

To this group's pioneering research has been added a vast volume of basic and developmental work by U.S. scientists and engineers. As a result, the United States is already flying medium-range and long-range surface-to-surface bombardment missiles—all of them to date, however, operating in the earth's atmosphere and hence relatively easier to intercept than the space-flying ICBM. The U.S. Navy's Regulus, the Air Force's Matador—both of them small pilotless planes, with ranges of about 500 miles—are much improved versions of the German V-1 pilotless aircraft which bombarded London prior to the development of the V-2. Drone planes—really a form of guided missile—have flown coast to coast with their own self-contained navigation system.

The Snark—the first of this nation's intercontinental-range guided missiles—has been test-fired at Cape Canaveral on Florida's east coast, and Northrop Aircraft Company, its developer, is reported to be about to receive a production contract. The Snark is a pilotless plane, powered by a turbojet engine, and it flies at aircraft altitudes and speeds (under 50,000 feet, 500 to 600 miles an hour) for about 5,000 miles.

The Navaho, North American Aviation's contribution to the armory of intercontinental war, is still in the development stage. Powered either with a turbojet or with a ram-jet engine, it is designed to fly higher and faster (50,000 to 75,000 feet and 1,000 to 2,000 miles per hour) than the Snark.

But all these missiles are really pilotless bombers, not intercontinental artillery like the ICBM. In fact, the wingless ballistic missile differs from a conventional artillery shell only in that it has its own integral propulsion system and can be guided from the ground in at least the initial stages of its flight. The path of a long-range artillery shell is an arc looping high into the air, then curving downward toward the target. A long-range ballistic missile follows the same elliptical trajectory—but loops into outer space and covers a few thousand miles instead of a few thousand yards.

By contrast, the long-range-winged missiles now in use all follow so-called "cruise" or flat trajectories. Like piloted planes, they take off from runways, ramps, catapults or other launching rigs, climb to cruising altitude and level off. They are limited in speed, altitude and trajectory by the need of their engines for the oxygen in the atmosphere and by their dependence on their stubby wings for lift. These limitations mean that missiles like the Snark and Navaho can be intercepted—by fast piloted planes or by other missiles.

The ICBM—because it follows a ballistic trajectory outside the earth's atmosphere, because it flies so high and so fast—may become the world's first unstoppable weapon. Scientists envisage, in theory, a system of automatic tracking and intercepting missiles which might in time make possible a small "kill rate." But the time between launching and impact is so short, the technical difficulties so immense, that any such defensive system is a long way off. Furthermore, even when it is developed it can never be more than fractionally effective—and that just wouldn't be good enough. Only a few ICBMs would have to get through to knock out our own principal cities—and a good part of our war-making potential.

IMAGINE TRYING to hit an artillery shell in mid-flight with another artillery shell. This is—in minuscule—the problem of intercepting an ICBM. The expensive and extensive radar, interceptor and missile-defense system we are now so hastily and painfully erecting will be of little use against the ICBM. We cannot even track a giant rocket through its entire ballistic trajectory with our present early-warning and control radar—much less intercept it. The ICBM represents, for the immediate future at least, the ultimate triumph of the offensive in war.

Russia's probable lead in the ICBM race can be traced in part to the way in which the Soviets were able to capitalize on the preliminary work done by the Germans in World War II. While Von Braun and a number of his colleagues came over to the West, the Soviets seized the Peenemünde station itself and found a number of V-2 production lines more or less intact. Recruiting those scientists who had not already fled to the West, the Reds started up the production lines again, stockpiled V-2s and, as time went on, gradually improved the range, accuracy and performance of the missiles.

On the other hand, our immediate postwar effort in missile work was

ICBM continued

centered on basic research and preliminary development. We carried out a series of test-firings of V-2-type rockets and other research vehicles at the White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico, and awarded research contracts to a number of companies and universities. Not until the Korean war started did we attempt to turn basic knowledge into finished "hardware," and even then the emphasis was more on the pilotless-plane-type missile than the ballistic kind.

Then, more than two years ago, Assistant Air Secretary Trevor Gardner "built a fire" under the ICBM. Such a missile had been under consideration ever since World War II, with Convair doing research and design studies, part of the time at its own expense. But a missile is very different from an airplane, and rather "early on"—as the British put it—Convair encountered some of the same difficulties other aircraft companies have since met in attempting to adapt to missile work. The ICBM studies, therefore, were more or less inchoate until Gardner appointed a scientific committee in 1953 to study the project and make recommendations. This committee—and another later—not only found that an ICBM was feasible, but laid the groundwork for the present high-priority organization.

THAT ORGANIZATION is centered around a specially created Western Development Division of the Air Research and Development Command, with headquarters at Los Angeles. Here, Major General Bernard A. Schriever of the Air Force, with the aid of a sizable staff and of the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, is directing the development of the ICBM. (Dean Wooldridge and Simon Ramo are two brilliant young physicists who did some trail-blazing work in electronics, while with Hughes Aircraft, on the Falcon air-to-air guided missile and on various Air Force fire-control systems.) An advisory committee, including Brigadier General Charles A. Lindbergh and headed by the famous scientist Dr. John von Neumann, "kibitzes" and monitors progress.

Last year, the effort was broadened to a dual and competing approach. While Convair continues to develop its "Atlas" project, the Glenn L. Martin Company is attempting a different approach to the air-frame and configuration problem in a separate program. Companies working with Convair or Martin on propulsion matters include North American, Aerojet-General division of General Tire & Rubber Company, and Reaction Motors; while General Electric, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Sperry Rand, Bendix, AVCO, AC Spark Plug Division of General Motors, and American Bosch Arma Corporation are among firms assisting in solving guidance and other problems.

The United States has also entered—belatedly—the intermediate-range ballistic missile race. The Air Force has a project of its own under way, and the Army and Navy have begun a joint high-priority program centered at Redstone Arsenal under Major General John Bruce Medaris and Dr. von Braun; their missile will be for both ground and shipboard launching.

All these competing projects will exchange technical data; a great increase in funds is to be provided in the next fiscal year, starting July 1st, and in mid-1957—the year, incidentally, in which the U.S. hopes to launch some earth satellites into the upper atmosphere—the entire project will be reviewed. After considerable hesitancy and delay, the U.S. ballistic-missiles program at last appears to be in high administrative gear.

But the technical problems are still immense, especially as they apply to the ICBM. Imagine a giant rocket—a Gargantuan version of a Fourth of July skyrocket, more than 100 feet high, weighing more than 100 tons—hurled to an altitude 600 to 800 miles above the earth into a region of no air. Then envisage, if you can, the warhead or nose of this huge gadget slanting downward through the denser atmosphere—speeding at 15,000 miles an hour toward a target a couple of thousand miles away. How can you hit anything with such a long-range weapon? How do you even get this great mass to budge from the earth?

It can be done. One expert has said, "The missile can be built with the scientific knowledge now available, but basic research will enable us to do the job better. The work ahead is chiefly engineering."

There are three primary problems (and thousands of subsidiary ones) that collectively make up the problem of the ICBM. These are propulsion, guidance, and heat or re-entry.

"It is going to take much or most of the engine development of the country to get the ICBM upstairs," a scientist predicted in outlining the propulsion problem.

The world's fastest rocket today probably loafs along at 4,000 to 5,000 feet per

second. The Atlas (Convair's name for the ICBM), if it is to travel 3,000 miles, will have to be moving in its first stage at five to six times as fast—20 to 25 times the speed of sound.

The engines that will give the ICBM this "umph" are rocket engines. They spew hot gases out of an exhaust in the tail of the rocket. They differ from other jet engines in that they carry their own oxygen with them to permit combustion on chemicals and either liquid or solid. The V-2 used a combination of alcohol and liquid oxygen; the Army's Corporal guided missile—a battle weapon with a range of under 100 miles—uses an acid-aniline combination.

Liquid fuels—chemicals in all sorts of combinations—produce a higher impulse, a greater thrust, than solid fuels, and they can be "cut off" (combustion stopped) at a desired point in flight. But they are volatile, explosive and hard to handle, and the rocket engines that use them require a lot of "plumbing" in the form of piping. Solid propellants—powder in various forms—haven't yet equaled the "kick" of the liquid fuels, and cutoff control is more difficult. But they are simple, reliable, rugged and give promise of providing a somewhat slower but more even acceleration.

Another potential fuel of great promise for the future (but unlikely for the first models of the ICBM) is fissionable material. A very small nuclear pile to heat and expand some type of gas might ultimately prove to be the most efficient type of propulsion for an ICBM.

But the ICBM's first rocket engines are likely to be powered with liquid fuels, or perhaps with liquids and solid propellants in combination.

A single rocket motor big enough to lift a hydrogen warhead sufficiently high for a 5,000-mile range has not yet been built. On the other hand, engines now under development could be used in multiple to provide the total thrust needed. The earth-satellite program (which really serves—in its launching phase—as a sort of "dry run" for the ICBM) will depend upon a multistage rocket for launching. Two liquid-fuel rocket engines will be connected in tandem. The first "stage" will lift the entire device rapidly into the skies; when its fuel is exhausted, a servomechanism will detach it from the main body, and the second "stage" will take over. Finally, at the apogee (top) of the trajectory, some 200 or 300 miles above the earth, a solid-propellant engine will tilt the satellite on its side and give it a final "kick" up to 30,000 feet per second in a path parallel to the earth's orbit. Thus, the earth-satellite launching program will probably involve what is called a "three-stage" rocket—three rocket engines connected in tandem, one behind another—the power of all of them used successively to get the satellite to the required speed and altitude.

The advantage of the staged rocket for the ICBM is obvious; speed increases as bulk and weight decrease, until finally the warhead—on its own and with all its propulsion mechanism dropped behind it—follows a ballistic trajectory, like an artillery shell, to its target.

ROCKET MOTORS thus can be linked in tandem, or stages, to provide the boost needed to put the warhead upstairs. Each stage would function successively; as each used its fuel and was detached the rocket would become lighter and lighter and its speed greater and greater.

But rocket motors can also be linked in parallel—or radially, like the cylinders of a radial gasoline engine. This so-called "honeycomb mesh," or "six-shooter-revolver" configuration, could also be arranged so that one or more of the engines would be detached from the central cylinder and would drop off when it had done its job.

No one yet knows which configuration—tandem or parallel motors—offers more promise; both can and probably will be used. But the ultimate ICBM will almost certainly be—as experts see it now—a staged rocket, perhaps one and a half or two propelling stages with the warhead on top.

That brings us to the second major problem—guidance. Like the jabberwockian talk of Alice in Wonderland, there have been a lot of semantics used to define guided missiles. One might ask: When is a guided missile not a guided missile? The answer would be: the ICBM. It will be guided only for about the first 300 miles of its 5,000-mile flight.

Imagine a gun barrel about 300 miles long. This represents the "guided" part of the ICBM's trajectory—the burning time when the rocket motors are functioning and accelerating the warhead for its 4,700 miles of free flight. Up until the last rocket-motor stage falls off, some control, some guidance is possible; after that, no human effort is likely to modify the ICBM's trajectory.

The "guidance" of the ICBM simply endeavors to put the warhead on a proper course at a proper speed at a fixed predetermined point in space. This is done primarily in two ways. The course and speed required to reach a fixed and known target are precalculated (as they are prior to the firing of an artillery shell), the amount of

For Collier's own appraisal of the importance of the Soviet-U.S. race to develop the ICBM, please turn to Comment, page 98 of this issue

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


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ICBM *continued*



Left: Maj. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever heads the AF ballistic missile program. Right: Trevor Gardner, dissatisfied with Pentagon policy on ICBM, resigned as Assistant Air Secretary

fuel and acceleration needed is determined, and the servomechanisms which will automatically cut off the fuel supply at the right point are adjusted before firing. Similarly, control mechanisms which will tilt the rocket toward the correct great-circle course can be preadjusted. These mechanisms can take two forms. The German V-2 rocket used graphite control vanes which were set in the blast of the jet stream; the angle at which these vanes were set deflected the jet blast and tilted the rocket. The U.S. Viking rocket, on the other hand, changed the angle of the jet blast by tilting the entire rocket motor.

IN ADDITION to careful prefire calculations and adjustments (called "programed guidance"), some electronic control over the rocket during its climb into the blue-black emptiness of outer space is possible. The rocket is fitted with a so-called "transponder," or radar beacon, and its course during the 300 miles of guidance is tracked by ground radar. The data recorded is fed into computing machines, which immediately determine whether or not the rocket is on its predetermined course. If it is not, a new course is calculated by the machines, the correction flashed by electronic waves to the rocket, and servomechanisms deflect the jet stream and tilt the rocket, shut off, open or regulate the fuel flow. If the rocket promises to be a "wild" one (like one of our test V-2s which went the wrong way at White Sands Proving Ground and landed across the border in Mexico), a self-destructing mechanism can be activated.

This limited guidance for the ICBM may in time be supplemented. A system of so-called inertial guidance, or automatic self-navigation, now applicable to cruise-type missiles like the Navaho, can be tailored to the propulsion stages of the rocket, and—perhaps—to the warhead to keep it in the proper flying "attitude" during its free flight. A so-called "terminal guidance system," which would take over when the missile was approaching its target and would "attract" the missile to the target by light, heat or infrared, might also have some future application to the ICBM. But the difficulties would be enormous.

The ICBM as now envisaged, therefore, is subject in free flight to the whims and vagaries of nature. And some of these are irregular and variable—one reason why the ICBM will never be a "bomb-in-a-pickle-barrel" weapon, but essentially a weapon of limited accuracy for area bombardment.


There are three groups of errors which affect the guidance of an ICBM, and none of them is easily susceptible to correction.

The first of these categories might be called "errors due to nature." There is a constant and unpredictable fluctuation in the thickness of the ionospheric layers of the atmosphere which influences the propagation of radio waves through space, and hence the accuracy of any electronic guidance systems. There is, moreover, no way to predict variable changes in the direction and strength of gravitational forces, which could tend to pull an ICBM off course. And, finally, the earth's rotation—long considered a constant—has been found to change unpredictably and without uniformity; such a change could cause a missile properly launched to score a clean miss.

The second category of errors are instrument errors. These are more susceptible to human control, but will probably never be eliminated completely. Tiny errors at launching—and during the 300-mile gun-tube guidance phase—are multiplied geometrically by the long range to enormous errors on impact. An error in speed of one foot per second at the time of combustion cutoff could cause an error of one mile on impact.


The third category of errors are errors of mapping and surveying. To put it baldly, we don't know where true north is, or where, say, Sverdlovsk is. The ICBM follows a great-circle course from launching point to target. If it is to hit we have to know exactly where—on the earth's surface—the two points are. This is not as simple as it sounds; one of the great problems of missile warfare is the incorrect co-ordinates of many of the cities and points

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ICBM *continued*

on earth, particularly those in Russia. Many of the world's maps are in error, especially those that show the vast area of the Soviet Union east of the Urals.

If the co-ordinates given on your maps and charts are in error you will miss. This may be one reason, incidentally, why the Russians are hostile to President Eisenhower's mutual aerial inspection proposal. They know we don't know the exact location of cities and industries east of the Urals, and they know there is probably no good way for us to find out except by a great remapping job.

All these categories of errors—many of which appear unpredictable—mean that the ICBM will have to compensate for its inaccuracy by the frightful power and the extensive destructive effect of the explosive it carries—the hydrogen warhead. Just how "inaccurate" it will be no one now knows; the first ICBM obviously will be far less accurate than later models. An error of one per cent in 5,000 miles—a figure once discussed—could mean that the missile might fall 50 miles from the target. That, scientists and military men agree, is not good enough. Scientists seem to believe that ultimately they may be able to reduce the circular error at 5,000 miles' range to five to 10 miles—provided the target is where it is supposed to be.

Dwarfing the tremendous—though soluble—problems of propulsion and guidance, virtually all scientists agree, is the problem of heat generated by skin friction when the missile re-enters the earth's atmosphere. Meteors that constantly bombard the earth nearly all burn up and disintegrate long before they reach the surface; the tremendous heat generated by their passage through the earth's atmosphere destroys them. The ICBM will be, in effect, a meteor; it will be hurled into upper space, and then fall back at high speeds into the denser lower atmosphere. The denser lower air will slow it up—perhaps down to Mach 2 or 3—but also it will heat and perhaps burn it up. In fact, the skin friction caused by the passage through the atmosphere will be so enormous that until some way is found of absorbing, or draining off, or neutralizing this heat, no intact ICBM will reach the earth.

This is a problem for metallurgists, chemists, physicists and half a dozen other specialists with long names—like aerothermodynamicist. It is a giant problem—in fact, the major problem of the ICBM today. Re-entry temperatures might, for example, reach 6,000 degrees or more, and today most of our low-carbon alloy steels lose their strength at about 1,000 degrees.

THERE ARE several approaches to this problem—and they are all being tried. You can try to slow the missile up—with wings or spoilers or some similar devices—and thus reduce the temperatures. You can plunge right on through, reducing the duration of heating, though increasing the temperature. You can try ceramic "skins," or porous or sweating jackets, which exude moisture for liquid cooling. You can devise higher-temperature alloys. Or you can take a leaf from the lesson of the larger meteorites that sometimes reach the earth; you can increase the thickness of your missile's skin (and hence the bulk and weight) and provide a "heat sink." This is the so-called "brute force" or boiler-plate approach; it obviously takes longer for a thick metal skin to melt than a thin one. But the "brute-force" approach has its disadvantages; it increases the weight of the missile and thus greatly increases the problem of the propulsion engineer.

Today, there is no clear-cut answer in sight to the heat problem—though one will be found. But again, as in the guidance problem, the power of the weapon that the ICBM will carry—the thermonuclear explosive—reduces somewhat the importance of the re-entry factor. You don't have to design a missile that will remain intact all the way to earth. It can "miss" vertically as well as horizontally and still do tremendous damage.

Here, then, is what some military men have called "the ultimate weapon," "the absolute weapon"—"the weapon that will rule the earth." It will tower perhaps 100 to 135 feet above its launching pad. Its gross take-off weight—with fuel—may be between 100 and 120 tons. It will lift, slowly at first, virtually straight into the air, burning thousands of pounds of fuel in 60 seconds. It will slowly tilt toward its great-circle course. Probably under 100,000 feet its first stage will break away; the second stage will ignite and the smaller rocket will continue its climb toward the stars. At 300 miles—above the earth's thin envelope of air—the second stage will be detached and the great warhead, perhaps 30 feet long, four feet in diameter, will streak on alone toward outer space under the tremendous momentum given it. It will reach its apogee between 600 and 800 miles above the earth and will then start its elliptical fall—perhaps tail first (for there is no bite of thin air to straighten it out). It may "tumble," particularly as it gathers speed and reaches the upper atmosphere; it should nose down under the resistance of thicker air—but erratic gyrations are possible. Finally, glowing white and slowed down to Mach 2 or 3, it will burst like a violent meteor above some unsuspecting metropolis of man.

The ICBM will be an awesome weapon—with frightening capabilities. It is well named Atlas; truly it carries man and his future on its shoulders.

THE END



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ICBM

There can be too much secrecy

WHILE WE and the Soviet leaders have moved from one postwar conference to another, each of us has been building up his supply of weapons and perfecting new ones, in case of war. On the basis of recent assertions in Washington by responsible political leaders, and on the evidence adduced by Hanson W. Baldwin in this issue of Collier's, it has become at last abundantly clear that we and the Soviets are involved in a critical contest to develop the first intercontinental ballistic missile, otherwise known as the ICBM. This is not a "guided" missile in the sense that its automatic guidance apparatus carries it through its flight until the moment it finds and strikes its target. Although some form of "terminal" controls ultimately may be included in the weapon, although it is subject to guidance and correction during its first several hundred miles of flight, it is for most of the great arc of its trajectory very like a bullet. While, as pointed out by Mr. Baldwin, severe engineering problems still exist, the ICBM ultimately will be able to take off, achieve a velocity many times the speed of sound, and descend perhaps half an hour later on its target 5,000 miles away. There is no presently known method of stopping—or, as the military say, of interdicting—the missile once it has been launched.

Whether or not this is, indeed, "the ultimate weapon" or "the absolute weapon," as it has sometimes been described, is a matter the experts may debate. Meanwhile, no one can argue the appalling capacities of a hydrogen bomb encased in a 5,000-mile-range missile which cannot be stopped. It is dangerous nonsense to glibly over the relative power of a weapon when, at a minimum, it can bring under the threat of total devastation any city on earth.

Nor may we, in relation to our military requirements, be greatly concerned with Soviet intentions. These, as has been abundantly illustrated, are highly fluid as to tactics, rigid only as to ultimate aims. To understand Soviet political aims and the various techniques used in pursuing them is the primary concern of our State Department. It is the task of the Department of Defense to make certain that regardless of Soviet intentions our defense establishment is at all times equal to or better than Soviet armed strength. That is its mission in peacetime no less than in wartime.

Yet there is increasing evidence that in the critical field of the ICBM the Soviets may well be ahead. As Mr. Baldwin points out, no one (including, fortunately, the Russians) can be entirely certain that this is so. But other statements have not been reassuring. Senator Symington has said flatly that the Soviets are well ahead in the race. Senator Jackson of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy also has indicated this in his speech in which he voiced the possibility that the Soviets soon may fire a 1,500-mile missile, with all that this threat implies against our present allies and our bases in Europe, Africa and Asia. Many a leader in defense, in science, in politics has expressed the same opinion—that the Soviets are ahead of us.

Assuming that this is true, we should like to raise and examine the question—why? In a nation which has achieved one technological miracle after another, which rightly prides itself upon its enormous gifts of scientific brains and technological know-how, why is it that we should fall behind a nation which we have all too often, out of smugness or vanity or plain bad judgment, underestimated?

Is it because the Soviets have concentrated their main effort on producing the weapon with the clearest decisive advantages while we have scattered our effort over a variety of weapons, all excellent but none with the essential capability required?

Is it because, through dilatoriness or indecision or mistaken preoccupation with cost, we have proceeded on the ICBM program on a

"business as usual" basis, keeping the essential plants on a single-shift basis when nothing less than a round-the-clock program will suffice?

The facts are, at least, that the plants have *not* been working at or anywhere near capacity; that only now, when the race has been in progress for nearly three years, has anything resembling a crash program been set in motion. And the apparent fact is that, as a result, we have let the Soviets get off to a head start in a matter which is of life-and-death importance to all of us.

Another, highly relevant, fact is that the vast majority of Americans have been going about their daily lives completely unaware not only of the fact that we are trailing in the race, but even of the significance of the race itself. In plain logic, such a situation is intolerable in a democracy such as ours.

This is not to quarrel with the basic requirement of maintaining essential security on many aspects of our national defense. It is obvious that a vast amount of technical data on individual defense projects, and information related to their progress, must be protected by secrecy. We clearly cannot afford to leak to the Russians data that enable them to widen their lead in the race for the ICBM—this is accepted by all.

But neither is it possible—and the ICBM may provide the grimmest example of this—for this democracy to exist in circumstances where the people are sealed off from all inkling of the great, strategic considerations which govern their very lives. This is a cynical denial of both the common sense of the American people and of the validity of the principle of self-government. More than that, it is harshly impractical, and self-defeating.

It is impractical, for one reason, because regardless of all else the people are invested with the power to govern, and they will govern, for better or worse, depending precisely upon the quality of information upon which their decisions are based. Every penny of money spent by the military on any project is provided by the House of Representatives, which alone has the power to initiate appropriation measures, and which, to a man, must return to the voters every two years for license to stay in office.

Ultimately any program such as that of the ICBM is inevitably based on public support, for it is only the public which can provide, out of pocket or through its existing institutions, the money, education and training, and scientific research programs to do the job.

The security of the United States is the primary, but not exclusive, concern of our elected representatives and our appointed military leaders. The great outlines of our defense policies and a broad knowledge of our relative defensive posture should be known not merely by a small group of leaders, but by all citizens. In a democracy, in a free society based on the wisdom and judgment of all its members, the final great decisions must be made by the nation as a whole.

But those final decisions can be made only when people have sufficient information to exercise thoughtful and careful judgment. The risk is great, but less great than when these decisions are made in an absence of public knowledge, when the public has been deprived access to information which will enable it to make competent decisions on the gravest matters of life and death and the survival of all we believe in.

It is not enough to know after the fact. It is necessary that the public be made aware of the great alternatives confronting it. Only thus do we, as a free people, retain ultimate custody of our lives and our freedom. Certainly neither history nor any possible future casualties will forgive those in power who feared to put into the hands of Americans the knowledge they needed to help prepare for their survival, but instead told them too little and too late.



COLLIER'S

MARY GIBSON

"Watch it, Harry, you're beginning to act like yourself!"

Hoyt, a Cornell University ornithologist. Phloeo has pecked innumerable cages to sawdust and once, when Dr. Hoyt was careless, pecked him on the skull and knocked him cold. Phloeo has also lost her tail feathers, because of a dietary deficiency.

It is essential, of course, that Pfitz's young bird retain her tail feathers. Without them she would lose her value as a feathered guinea pig because, just as a man can't swing an ax without bracing his feet, a woodpecker can't peck without bracing its tail feathers. In order to preserve his bird's tail plumage Pfitz spends more time in the woods hunting ant-infested logs to bring home to the bird's six-by-six-by-eight-foot cage than most wives spend in the kitchen. But the natural diet he is feeding his bird seems to be producing results. When I saw the youngster her tail feathers were already over five inches long.

While they are waiting for the captive bird to mature and reveal to them the innermost secrets of her nature, Jorgensen and Pfitzenmeyer are also experimenting with some ideas of their own for frustrating the pileated woodpecker's pecking proclivities.

Their first scheme died stillborn. They learned that there was no record of woodpeckers ever having damaged a South American wallaba tree, which is about three times as hard as the domestic wood used in poles. Unfortunately, while they were happily preparing to experiment with wallaba poles, they received word that the Pileatus, down in Louisiana, was already chomping large chunks out of poles made of greenheart, another South American wood even harder than wallaba.

Jorgensen and Pfitz then decided to see if woodpeckers were color-conscious and could be repelled by a painted pole. They painted bands of red, white, green and yellow on some poles in a region where there was considerable pecking. In brilliant sunshine these poles looked to me like gigantic pieces of stick candy—and the birds seemed to find them enticing, too. The paint had hardly dried before the woodpeckers went to work on them, attack-

ing every color except red. Their failure to attack the red sections may not be too significant, however. Pileatus, like any intelligent axman, takes things easy during the summer months. Jorgensen and Pfitzenmeyer want to see red go through an entire year untouched before they will believe the answer lies in anything as simple as painting a pole red.

They are also planning to place wooden models of the kingbird on some poles. The kingbird is a pugnacious little eight-inch creature who has been known to vent his displeasure even on vultures and eagles, and most birds head for the hills when they see him coming. The question here is: Does Pileatus know a kingbird when he sees one and, if so, is he scared of him? "Unfortunately," Jorgensen says, "we haven't found much evidence that this pileated fool is afraid of anything."

ANOTHER PROJECT under consideration stems from an experiment conducted by Dr. H. W. Frings, of the university's department of zoology. He has recorded the fright cry of the starling, broadcast it over an amplifier in a town infested with starlings, and driven the pests from the area. Jorgensen and Pfitzenmeyer are intrigued with the idea of placing amplifiers, capable of projecting sound five miles, along a power line and letting them blare out the fright cry of the woodpecker once every hour. They'd also like to know just how to go about frightening a pileated woodpecker. And there are some people connected with the project who would like to know just how you go about placating any citizenry who might live within hearing distance of the amplifiers.

Meanwhile, as Pileatus continues to peck away, the utilities emit their own fright cry. A recent issue of Electrical World reported, in obvious anguish, "This bird has defeated every stratagem devised to date, is increasing in numbers, and broadening its hostilities... no pole is immune!" All because man, entering the second decade of the Age of the Atom, still can't figure out what makes a woodpecker peck. THE END

Collier's for March 16, 1956

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Radford Warns Against Overestimating Russia

By the Associated Press

Admiral Arthur W. Radford has linked a forecast of new reductions in the size of United States armed forces with advice against "hysterical" overestimates of Soviet military might.

These opinions of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff were made public yesterday by a Senate Armed Services subcommittee on air power more than a month after Admiral Radford's testimony June 21 and after screening by Pentagon censors.

Asked by Senator Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts, whether projected United States forces in the next four years would continue to deter a possible Communist attack, Admiral Radford said:

"I think there will be a change. We are moving with our atomic weapons capability toward more powerful deterrents with smaller forces.

"In other words, a very small force can have a very great de-

terrent power, and I think we have to explain that to our allies."

Admiral Radford said this shift in weapons and forces should be gradual "and I think it will be more and more apparent by 1960. . . . I think we will begin to move more rapidly as these new weapons come into being."

Senator Saltonstall also raised questions about estimates of Communist military strength by

the Central Intelligence Agency and by intelligence officers of the armed services.

"There is good reason to believe that we normally overestimate Communist capabilities in almost every respect," Admiral Radford replied.

"In general in the intelligence field they tend to err on the safe side."

During World War II, Admiral Radford said, he saw several military operations "delayed until we built up additional strength on account of some intelligence estimate," and he added:

"Actually when we carried out the operation we found the opposition to be less."

"I think we are in a dangerous position vis-a-vis the Communists in that respect today," he added, "because there has been an almost hysterical assumption of great capabilities on the part of the Communists, some of which, in my opinion, actually do not exist."

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MR. DEANIGAN

(ZHUKOV)

NEW YORK--SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER ZHUKOV SAID LARGE ARMIES ARE STILL NECESSARY IN MODERN WARFARE DESPITE THE ADVANCEMENT IN AIR POWER AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

AT THE SAME TIME ZHUKOV ATTACKED PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S AERIAL ARMS INSPECTION PLAN AS A SOURCE OF "MUTUAL SUSPICION" AND PROPOSED INSTEAD A SYSTEM OF LAND INSPECTION BY AN INTERNATIONAL BODY.

ZHUKOV EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS IN A LETTER TO THE NEW YORK TIMES' MILITARY EDITOR, HANSON W. BALDWIN. BALDWIN SUBMITTED SIX QUESTIONS TO THE SOVIET MARSHAL DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW LAST MONTH. THE TIMES SAID IT RECEIVED THE REPLIES TODAY.

"AIR POWER AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THEMSELVES CANNOT DECIDE THE OUTCOME OF AN ARMED STRUGGLE," ZHUKOV WROTE. "ALONG WITH ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS, IN SPITE OF THEIR TREMENDOUS DESTRUCTIVE POWER, LARGE ARMIES AND A TREMENDOUS QUANTITY OF ARMS INEVITABLY WILL BE DRAWN INTO MILITARY OPERATIONS."

IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, ZHUKOV DENIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION ANNOUNCED IT WOULD CUT ITS ARMED FORCES BY 1,840,000 BECAUSE IT FELT A NUCLEAR WAR CALLED FOR LESS MEN.

"THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT... WAS MOTIVATED NOT BY THE CONJECTURED NATURE OF MODERN WAR..." HE SAID. "IN THIS QUESTION WE WERE MOTIVATED FIRST OF ALL BY CONSIDERATION OF STRENGTHENING PEACE IN THE ENTIRE WORLD AND REDUCING TENSION IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, AS WELL AS BY CONSIDERATIONS OF DEVELOPING THE PEACEFUL ECONOMY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND RAISING THE WELL BEING OF THE PEOPLES OF THE U.S.S.R."

BALDWIN ASKED ZHUKOV WHY THE COMMUNISTS DID NOT AGREE TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S AIR AND GROUND INSPECTION PLAN FOR DISARMAMENT CONTROL.

ZHUKOV SAID THAT THE U.S. PLAN "AMOUNTS IN SUBSTANCE TO THE DEVELOPING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WHICH WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO MUTUAL SUSPICION AND STILL GREATER DISTRUST BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE U.S.A."

INSTEAD, ZHUKOV COUNTERED WITH A PLAN THE RUSSIANS ALREADY HAVE PROPOSED. IT CALLED FOR A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL LAND CONTROL OF ARMS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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(ZHUKOV)

NEW YORK--SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER MARSHAL ZHUKOV CHARGED THAT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S AERIAL ARMS INSPECTION PLAN WOULD BE A SOURCE OF "MUTUAL SUSPICION" AND AMOUNTED, IN EFFECT TO SPYING.

ZHUKOV PROPOSED INSTEAD THAT A GROUND INSPECTION SYSTEM OF POLICING ANY DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE.

ZHUKOV EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS IN A LETTER TO NEW YORK TIMES MILITARY EDITOR HANSON W. BALDWIN. BALDWIN SUBMITTED SIX QUESTIONS TO ZHUKOV LAST MONTH WHEN HE VISITED THE SOVIET UNION WITH U.S. AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. NATHAN TWining. THE REPLIES WERE RECEIVED YESTERDAY, THE TIMES SAID.

THE DEFENSE MINISTER ALSO TOLD BALDWIN THAT LARGE ARMIES ARE STILL NECESSARY IN MODERN WARFARE;

THAT "SOME CIRCLES" IN THE U.S. ARE EXAGGERATING SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH FOR THE PURPOSE OF "INCREASING APPROPRIATIONS" FOR MILITARY PURPOSES;

THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS BUILDING SO MANY SUBMARINES PURELY FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES;

THAT THE DEMOBILIZATION OF 1,840,000 SOVIET SERVICEMEN WAS FOR THE PURPOSES OF "STRENGTHENING PEACE" AND "REDUCING TENSIONS" AS WELL AS BOLSTERING THE SOVIET ECONOMY.

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO CARRY ON A SMALL WAR OR ANY OTHER TYPE OF WAR WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ZHUKOV WOULD ONLY SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION OPPOSES ALL WARS.

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