



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

December 28, 2021

MR. JOHN R. GREENEWALD JR.
SUITE 1203
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD
CASTAIC, CA 91384-4520

FOIPA Request No.: 1513385-000
Subject: CONSIDINE, ROBERT BERNARD

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed 50 pages of records were determined to be responsive to your subject and were previously processed and released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Please see the selected paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☒ In an effort to provide you with responsive records as expeditiously as possible, we are releasing documents from previous requests regarding your subject. We consider your request fulfilled. Since we relied on previous results, additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may request an additional search for records. Submit your request by mail to **Initial Processing Operations Unit, 200 Constitution Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, or by fax to (540) 868-4997**. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence.
- ☐ Please be advised that additional records responsive to your subject exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you must advise us that you want the additional records processed. Please submit your response within thirty (30) days by mail to **Initial Processing Operations Unit, 200 Constitution Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, or by fax to (540) 868-4997**. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence. **If we do not receive your decision within thirty (30) days of the date of this notification, your request will be closed.**
- ☐ One or more of the enclosed records were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession.

If this release of the previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may file a FOIPA request with NARA at the following address:

National Archives and Records Administration
Special Access and FOIA
8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500
College Park, MD 20740-6001

- ☐ Records potentially responsive to your request were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and they were not previously processed pursuant to the FOIA. You may file a request with NARA using the address above.

- ☐ One or more of the enclosed records were destroyed. Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) , Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.
- ☐ Records potentially responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) according to Title 44 United States Code Section 3301, Title 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Chapter 12 Sub-chapter B Part 1228, and 36 CFR 1229.10.
- ☒ Documents or information referred to other Government agencies were not included in this release.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **"Part 1"** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **"Part 2"** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **"Part 3"** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

Please be advised that if you are seeking a new search for records, you may wish to narrow the scope of your request based on material that you have already received, e.g., timeframe or locality. Additionally, be advised that "unusual circumstances" may apply. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B)(iii). These "unusual circumstances" will delay our ability to make a determination on your request within 20 days. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B). Additionally, the payment of pertinent fees may apply to your request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(A)(viii). The application of "unusual circumstances" is not a determination of how the FBI will respond to your substantive request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552


- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**



FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND
PRIVACY ACTS

SUBJECT: Considine, Robert



FEDERAL

INVESTIGATION

BUREAU OF

117-251-1

June 4, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

EX 65

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 ELW/jw/58
DATE 6-1-01 # 937277

TO : Atomic Energy Commission
Room 33, Public Health Building
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr.

b7C

FROM : John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: "Keep Your Fingers Crossed" - Article written
by Bob Considine, appearing in June issue
of True Magazine

Information has been received from the El Paso, Texas, Field Division of this Bureau to the effect that the Security Office at Los Alamos was concerned regarding the above mentioned article.

A review of this article reflects that Bob Considine was asked by the editors of True Magazine to write such an article. A preface to the article states: "He is qualified to divulge more information than has been made available to the average man." It is then pointed out that Considine was a correspondent at the Bikini Atoll test, and writer of the motion picture "The Beginning or the End." It is further pointed out that Considine had talked with such men as Professor J. Robert Oppenheimer, Major General Leslie R. Groves, Major General Thomas F. Farrell, Professor Einstein, Dr. Leo Szilard, and others, for his authority. This article answers such questions as "How big is the A-bomb?", "What does the stuff look like?", "What makes it explode?", and other questions regarding the interior make-up and the materials used in the bomb.

It is requested that the Atomic Energy Commission advise this Bureau if information contained in this article reveals any restricted data.

cwb

CWB:LL

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 6
★ JUN 5 1947 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Handwritten: 117-251-1, 65, 117, 2, 525

Handwritten signature

Handwritten initials WPK

Handwritten initials RPS

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: May 21, 1947

FROM: *jms* SAC, El PasoSUBJECT: PUBLISHED INFORMATION CONCERNING
THE ATOMIC BOMB
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

b7C

For the information of the Bureau, [redacted] investigator for the Los Alamos Security Office, advised Special Agent [redacted] that the Security Office was concerned in regard to an article which appeared in the June issue of TRUE magazine, which article was written by BOB CONSIDINE.

The article by CONSIDINE is entitled "Keep Your Fingers Crossed" and reflects that CONSIDINE was qualified to divulge more information concerning the Atomic Bomb than the average man inasmuch as he had talked with such men as Professor J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER, Major LESLIE R. GRAVES, and Major General THOMAS B. FARRELL, who had run the Atomic Bomb operations. This article reflects that CONSIDINE had also talked with other individuals who had been informed relative to the experiments in regard to the Atomic Bomb. This article further sets forth information concerning the size of the Atomic Bomb as well as the material used therein and stated that the amount of metal used to cause the explosion is quite small. A sketch is given of the bomb indicating that U235 is used therein and further reflects that the weight of the material used in the bomb has been described as weighing approximately two pounds. Additional information is given concerning the Atomic Bomb and various individuals located at the Los Alamos Security Office have expressed the opinion that the information contained in this article is extremely revealing in regard to the Atomic Bomb.

This information is being furnished to the Bureau for information purposes only.

TBW:jmw/cs
117-0

SE 35
117-251-1
FBI
34 MAY 24 1947

6/4/47

Sgt. A. F.

Alto

CWB

EX-5 *Good*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-1-01 BY 39063 ELL/gw/cg

937 779

61 R 27

January 3, 1952

RECORDED - 82
INDEXED - 32
EX - 87

117-251-4

Mr. [Redacted]

Dear Mr. [Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-1-01 BY 3963 [Redacted] / 35
#93777

Your letter of December 19, 1951, has
been received.

While I would like to be of service,
it is not possible for me to comply with your
request since information contained in FBI files
is confidential and available for official use
only.

For your information the FBI did not
make this material available to the individual
mentioned by you.

b7C

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

NOTE: Correspondent may be identical with an individual
listed in 100-4712-490 as having corresponded with the
America First Committee expressing a desire for membership
or to contribute financially to it. Espionage Supervisor
advises Gold confession never made available to Considine
by the Bureau. * I ADVISED THAT I HAD NO KNOWLEDGE THAT [Redacted]

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr

TEB:mas

COMM - FBI
JAN 3 1952
MAILED 13

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COMM - FBI
JAN 3 1952
MAILED 13

[Redacted]

RECEIVED
JAN 3 1952
MAILED 13

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM : T. Vincent Quinn, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division

SUBJECT: ~~X~~ "KEEP YOUR FINGERS CROSSED"
Article Written by Bob Considine,
Appearing in June Issue of True Magazine

DATE: November 17, 1947

Mr. Tolson.....
GOVERNMENT.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Glavin.....
November 17, 1933
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Rosen.....
FVQ:WFF:lr
Mr. Tracy.....
146-41-15
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Egan.....
Mr. Foxworth.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
Mr. Nease.....
November 17, 1933
Magazine

FVQ:JEF:lr

146-41-15

Reference is made to your memorandum of November 1, 1947, relating to an article in the June issue of True Magazine written by Bob Considine regarding the atomic bomb.

It is noted that the Atomic Energy Commission feels that only one of the three items revealed by Considine has never appeared in any way in other publications and that that item is not considered a significant disclosure.

In view of the Commission's attitude in this matter, it is felt that while there may have been a technical violation of a federal statute, prosecution would not be warranted.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-7-01 BY 39063 ELW/col/bs
#937779

INDEXED

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NOV 24 1947

117-251-3
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Dec. 19, 1951

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
J. P. A.
Washington D.C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-1-01 BY 39063 ELM/col/bb
937779

Mr. Edgar Hoover. Bob Considine

I have just finished reading Bob
Considine's serial re the A-bomb robbery
and was intrigued with his opinion of
the 100,000 word confession of Harvey
Gold. Can you arrange to send me a
copy of it, or can you tell me where
I can read a copy? Thank you so much
for your immediate attention.

b7C



82-117-251-4
JAN 17 1952
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TEX

TRUE COPY



Dec. 19, 1951

F.B.I.
Washington D C.

Mr. Edgar Hoover.

I have just finished reading Bob Considine's serial re the A-bomb robbery and was intrigued with his opinion of the 100,000 word confession of Harry Gold. Can you arrange to send me a copy of it, or can you tell me where I can secure a copy? Thank you so much for your immediate attention.



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-1-01 BY 39063ELW/cal/sh
#937979

nmfack 1-3-52
feb

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

November 4, 1947

DIRECTOR, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"KID" YOUR FINGERS CROSSED
Article written by Bob Connelidine,
Appearing in June Issue of True Magazine

6-1-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063E4/pa/bs
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
#937779

The Security Office of the Atomic Energy Commission Installation at Los Alamos, New Mexico, called to the attention of the El Paso Office of the Bureau an article appearing in the June issue of True Magazine written by Bob Connelidine. A review of this article reflected that Connelidine was asked by the Editors of True Magazine to write an article dealing with the atomic bomb.

The article was prefaced by the statement "He is qualified to divulge more information than has been made available to the average man." The article then pointed out that Connelidine was a correspondent at the Bikini test and was a writer for the motion picture "The Beginning or the End." It was further pointed out that Connelidine had talked with such men as Professor Oppenheimer, Major General Groves, Major General Farrell, Professor Einstein, Dr. Lee Duillard and others for his authority. This article answered such questions as "How big is the atomic bomb? What does the stuff look like? What makes it explode?" and other questions regarding the interior make-up and the materials used in the bomb.

The Atomic Energy Commission was requested to review this article for any possible disclosure of restricted data.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SENT FROM D.

TIME 6:00 PM

DATE 11-6-47

BY [Signature]

b1 FBI

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E.A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

It is requested that you advise as to whether or not information as above constitutes a violation of any Federal Statute.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND
PRIVACY ACTS**

SUBJECT: Considine, Robert



FEDERAL

INVESTIGATION

BUREAU OF

REDS PLOTTED A-THEFT 3 YRS. BEFORE TESTS

Soviet Hero Sent Here in 1938

This is the second in a series of 11 articles telling the step-by-step story of how Russia penetrated seemingly impenetrable security to steal America's atomic secrets in history's most fateful spy conspiracy. The author, noted writer-reporter-columnist Bob Considine, obtained the facts behind the facts during months of research and in talks with atomic and security officials in the United States and Britain.

BY BOB CONSIDINE

(World Copyright, 1951, by International News Service)

Russia picked up wind of our A-bomb efforts in 1942, nearly three years before the first one was tested. Its agents immediately were assigned to gain all information available, by any means at their command.

The success of their mission changed the course of history. Possession of the bomb secrets and, in a startlingly short time, of an A-bomb stockpile, emboldened the Kremlin to engage in unprecedented aggression which erupted—if did not wholly digest—more than half a billion subjects.

Made Illegal Entrance

The first known co-ordinator of the great A-bomb robbery in this country was Arthur Alexandroich Adams, battle-scarred veteran of the Russian revolution of 1905. He gained illegal entrance into this country from Canada in 1938 with the aid of Samuel Novick, president of the Electronics Corporation of America, according to a House un-American activities committee report.

Novick later received many war contracts and during that time sponsored left-wing broadcasters Johannes Steele and William S. Gailmor.

By 1942 Adams apparently was in charge of an extensive espionage apparatus. It involved a number of members of the Soviet consulates of San Francisco and New York. One of these, vice consul Peter Ivanov, attached at San Francisco and using as one of his operatives the notorious Steve Nelson, set up a particularly potent information-leaking cell in the University of California's radiation laboratories. Some of the lab's brighter young men became intimate associates of the spies.

Touched Chief Co-ordinator

The Adams apparatus eventually reached all the way out to touch Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, brilliant chief co-ordinator of all the scientific effort in connection with the bomb and now a principal adviser to the atomic energy commission.

In his restless youth Oppenheimer had toyed with the notion of joining the Communist party. His brother did. These facts were known to Gen. Leslie R. Groves when the over-all boss of Manhattan engineering district selected Oppenheimer as chief scientist of the project. It was, and remains, Groves' belief that Oppenheimer was thoroly loyal and

the best man for the enormous job. The next best, Groves has said, would have been an alien scientist who, when the job was done, would return to a Europe threatened with communism.

Oppenheimer promptly reported to Groves that he had been contacted by the apparatus. At first he would not name the contact, but later did with the understanding that the man would not be turned over to the FBI.

Adams himself was not often seen in the company of a scientist. One exception to that rule, however, was Prof. Clarence His-

key, who was assigned to atomic work in the fall of 1942 by Prof. Harold Urey, winner of the Nobel prize for chemistry in 1934 for his isolation of heavy hydrogen.

When MED security officers arranged for Hiskey to be put in the Army the scientist met with Adams in Chicago, then went to Cleveland to talk to John Hitchcock Chapin, a young chemical engineer employed in important metallurgical work at the University of Chicago's atomic effort. He asked Chapin to meet with Adams, Chapin later testified, and so that Chapin would recognize Adams he (Chapin) gave Hiskey a hotel key to give to the Russian spy. In time the men did meet and the spy passed the key back to Chapin, who got cold feet and clammed up.

Hiskey, who is now a member of the faculty of Brooklyn Poly, was given an opportunity to explain his role in the atomic conspiracy—at a later hearing by the House committee—but refused to answer pertinent questions "on the grounds that it may tend to degrade and incriminate me."

Adams Evades FBI

The FBI kept close tabs on Adams. One search of his room revealed information about Oak Ridge. J. Edgar Hoover's men watched Adams' American friends, too: Victoria Stone, jeweler in New York City; Julius Heiman, steel importer whose daughter worked for Tass, Russian news agency; Eric Bernay, former advertising manager of the New Masses and recorder of Hannes Kiefer's music, and others.

But Adams gave the FBI the slip in February, 1945, five months

before the test of the bomb. The man crossed the country, preached to within a few feet of the gangplank of a Russian ship at Portland, Ore., recognized that he would be seized if he attempted to board, turned, spent an afternoon in a Portland movie, sped back to New York (closely followed) and then disappeared. Somehow, he got back to Russia.

He must be credited as a master-mind in the great robbery. By the time he vanished his apparatus was working perfectly. It had Dr. Klaus Fuchs and Sgt. David Greenglass inside super-secret Los Alamos, where the bomb was nearing completion. It had Julius Rosenberg and his wife working in New York. It had Harry Gold, a wistful-looking little Philadelphia chemist, running priceless information from Fuchs and Greenglass to Soviet spies in New York.

In the meantime, while Adams or his superiors pieced together threads of information picked up at Berkeley, Chicago, New York and Cleveland, Russia was gaining a picture of the A-bomb effort which could only have been of great assistance to its team of nuclear physicists headed by Dr. Peter Kapitza.

In all probability most of the information that was stolen left the U. S. in diplomatic pouches strapped to the strong wrists of accredited Soviet diplomatic couriers. The traffic in this information was steady and constructive, and it must have appeared to the Kremlin that it would never end.

But a link in the strong chain snapped, and the link was not a spy or an unwitting accomplice. He was a bona fide Russian, a devoted Communist and Red army officer. His brush with the free air of liberty did strange things to him, and his defection from communism did much to frustrate the fantastic intrigue.

(TOMORROW: "Klarke" turns square, to the consternation of the Russian embassy in Washington.)

SUMMARY OF ARTICLE:

In summary this article recounts the conception of the atom bomb project. Specific mention is made of Doctors Enrico Fermi and Lise Meitner who figured so prominently in the original nuclear research to split the uranium atom. The article then takes up the origin and functions of the Manhattan Engineer District under General Leslie Groves, with specific emphasis on the security functions of the atom bomb project.

COMMENTS:

The article states that MED operated in a "realm of espionage and counter-espionage well above the reach of the FBI....." As you are aware, MED was solely responsible for security of the installations and security investigations of their own employees. The Bureau was responsible for security investigations involving contacts of those employees. The Bureau also was responsible for investigating the individuals once they were separated from the project.

The article stated that FBI Agents were not permitted near certain installations. As you are aware, considerable difficulty was encountered with MED when we attempted to discharge our various investigative responsibilities during the time that MED was in existence.

The article contains a statement that 750 Agents (500 of them FBI) worked on the A-bomb project. This is apparently a figment of the author's imagination. It also conflicts with the author's earlier statement that MED operated well above the reach of the FBI.

No new pertinent information appears in this article which does not appear in Bureau files.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

ATOM-SECRET- THEFT TOPPED ANY IN HISTORY

Not Even Axis Foe Had Daring

(This is the story—as it never has been possible to tell it before—of how Russia stole the secrets of the atomic bomb and of the shadowy men and women who successfully engineered the most astounding international theft of all time.)

(The author, famed writer-reporter-columnist Bob Considine, devoted months of research to gathering the facts. He talked with Scotland Yard men and atomic experts in England. He interviewed dozens of security officials, scientists and others in this country. He obtained access to information never before published. And he weaves it all into the fantastic, but true, story that begins herewith in the first of 11 articles.)

BY BOB CONSIDINE

(World Copyright, 1951, by International News Service)

During the tense and costly years when the United States, Britain and Canada were engaged in the creation of the atomic bomb, no known effort was made by any of the bomb's intended victims—Italy, Germany and Japan—to steal its devastating formula and beat the Allies to the punch.

The grimly guarded secrets of the bomb were stolen, however, by an ostensible ally—Russia—in the most daring, economical and sinister cloak-and-dagger conspiracy in history.

This and subsequent articles will attempt to place in proper perspective the men and women who participated in that spying coup and the methods by which these inconspicuous and often highly educated and otherwise moral spies achieved their shocking feat.

Prepare for A-War

They turned the world into two armed and fear-laced camps. They caused to be levied on nations still tottering from the costs of World War II the bankrupting burden of preparing for A-War I.

They are responsible, at least in part, for the heavy taxes which burden you, rising costs and public debts which will reach well into the 21st century.

Justice has landed heavily upon those who have been apprehended. But their deed is done and its excruciating success is measured by recurrent tests of the Soviet A-bomb.

For a time in the annals of science it seemed the destiny of the Axis to create the A-bomb. But political and racial persecution boomeranged in the faces of Mussolini and Hitler, providentially depriving them of the bomb.

Mussolini Foiled, Too

While teaching at the universities of Florence and Rome between 1934 and 1938, Dr. Enrico Fermi, now of the University of Chicago, came perilously close to discovering that the uranium atom could be split and potentially produce undreamed-of power. It is a popular tale in the realm of nuclear physics that an ill-placed bit of lead foil deprived Fermi of an even greater place in science than he now holds.

It can be reasoned, too, that the same bit of foil foiled Mussolini. For Fermi might well have been forced to divulge his discovery for the "good of the state." Fortunately, the distinguished Italian scientist fled Italy when it appeared he might be arrested for his anti-Fascist views. His work with the U. S. bomb was tremendous.

Late in 1938, Dr. Lise Meitner, working with the great German physicists Hahn and Strassman at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, made the startling observation that uranium bombarded by the submicroscopic emissions of radium was partly transmuted into two elements of approximately half the atomic weight of uranium—krypton and barium.

It was the most astonishing discovery of the age, for in one stroke it rendered obsolete every

(Continued on page 7, col. 1)

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Times-Herald 1 & 11

Wash. Post

Wash. News

Wash. Star

N.Y. Mirror

N. Y. Compass

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Soviet Atom-Secret Robbery Is History's Most Daring Plot

[Continued from first page]

book on physics written since the time of the early Greeks . . . whose men of wisdom first decreed that the atom was indivisible. Plainly, Dr. Meitner had broken atoms and sensed that she had opened the door to a world of explosive energy too overwhelming to comprehend adequately.

But, before Dr. Meitner had an opportunity to relay her earth-shaking findings to her superiors at the Nazi-dominated institute, she learned that Heinrich Himmler's exclusion act would force her to leave Germany because she was partly Jewish. She took the discovery out with her, starting the human chain reaction which reached fruition in the United States.

U. S. Feared Nazi Threat

The men she left behind her, one of whom (Otto Hahn) won the Nobel prize in chemistry for enlargements on her work, toiled only sporadically at the creation of A-bomb—tho for a time this country considered itself in a desperate race to beat Hitler to history's most devastating explosive.

By the time our evaluation teams were able to probe Germany's atomic energy program, before V-E day, they learned that German scientists were so skeptical about the possibility of an A-bomb that they had directed much of their study to the release

of atomic energy for industrial purposes.

To understand the enormity of the eventual robbery of the bomb secrets by agents of the U.S.S.R. one should first understand the tremendous wall of security we placed around our bomb-building activities.

To begin, the little group of scientists who knew an atomic bomb was possible would not even trust the U. S. mail to deliver the historic letter from Prof. Albert Einstein to President Roosevelt, the springboard of the \$2 billion Manhattan project which produced the bomb. The letter, instead,



Dr. Lise Meitner

Gen. Groves

was carried by hand by Alexander Sachs, and several tense months were lost while he waited to gain admission to Roosevelt's office.

Unique Security Force

After the Army entered the picture it set up, under Gen. Leslie R. Groves, a 250-man security force unique in our annals. That it was in time punctured, notably by Dr. Klaus Fuchs and Harry Gold—now serving 14 and 30-year prison sentences, respectively—does not detract from the cloak-and-dagger drama of its activities.

It protected and was the "keeper" of top scientists attached to the project (most of whom had code names). It operated in a realm of espionage and counter-espionage well above the reach of the FBI, whose agents it would not permit near certain installations. It censored or stopped mail of MED (Manhattan Engineering District) employees. It had men in Switzerland and Sweden not adverse to kidnaping German physicists who ventured there for lectures Or shooting them.

It built what amounted to a private insane asylum for a naval officer who became a psychiatric case after absorbing too much valuable information at Oak Ridge. It feared that if he were placed in a regular asylum he might talk. It maintained an agent as a bartender at the Lafonda hotel, Santa Fe, N. Mex., frequented by scientists and technicians attached to super-secret Los Alamos laboratory, where the bomb was assembled.

It instructed chief librarians in public libraries of large cities to

get the name and address of any person who sought information about nuclear energy or asked to see a Saturday Evening Post article written about 1940 by William L. Laurence of the New York Times envisioning an atomic bomb.

Workers Are Split Up

Under Groves' system of "compartmentalization" most of the scientists on the project were permitted to know what the man on the left or right was doing, but not the men beyond that. Some top scientists, including Fuchs, to his indignation, were barred from visiting installations aside from the one in which they worked.

Fuchs was specifically barred when he requested an assignment at or a visit to the Hanford (Wash.) plutonium plant. Harry S. Truman, when head of the powerful Senate war investigation committee, was not permitted to enter the Hanford plant and is said to have been told flippantly by a guard that the plant was making hubblegum.

Firemen who responded to a fire inside the gates at Oak Ridge were denied admission, because they lacked credentials. The building burnt to the ground. The mayor of Cambridge, Mass., was investigated because he said, at a dinner party where Dr. James Bryant Conant was a guest, that the United States was making a powerful new explosive in Tennessee and shipping it to the Pacific by way of San Francisco. (Turned out, after Conant reported him to Groves, that he had in mind RDX—a putty-like extra high explosive.)

Corporal Complained

One day at the Pentagon a corporal who worked at Oak Ridge demanded to see Groves. He was admitted and then blurted:

"I want to make a complaint against the Army's handling of Oak Ridge. I have enough scientific background to know we're attempting to make an atomic bomb, and..."

Groves nodded to an aide, invited the corporal to sit down and chatted with him for half an hour—just long enough to enable an aide to photostat all the papers in



Harry Gold

Dr. Klaus Fuchs

the briefcase the corporal left in the outer office. Groves was urged to send the corporal into a combat group, but he refused for fear that he might be captured.

On Aug. 21, 1944, nearly a year before the first atomic bomb in history was tested successfully at Alamogordo, N. Mex., Arthur Hale, the radio commentator, broke a story about it—written for him by a conscientious objector legman who knew a man at Illinois Tech whose roommate worked on the project and had spilled the beans. The conchy thought the broadcast might make Hitler quit.

The broadcast was heard by a G-2 officer, who immediately phoned Groves, who ordered that all associated with the program be brought before him. Hale was taken severely to task by Groves, and then ordered to return to the air as if nothing had happened. Groves did not wish Hale's many listeners to wonder why he had stopped broadcasting after mentioning something called an atomic bomb.

Stalled Dr. Joliot-Curie

In the fall of 1944 war bond officials invited Dr. Frederic Joliot-Curie, co-winner of the 1935 Nobel prize in chemistry for his work in the artificial production of radioactive substances, to fly to New York to speak at a sales rally.

MED's security office assigned Col. Tony Calvert to intercept him. Calvert moved in on him at the Dorchester hotel in London and stalled him—on the excuse that bad weather had grounded planes out of Prestwick—until he missed the speaking date. Part of the stalling process included placating the Frenchman with a suit and a camel-hair coat.

Joliot-Curie, a Communist sympathizer, had been the only top-notch atomic scientist who refused to stop publishing scientific papers during the war. MED blocked him because it felt he would certainly meet with friends in our own advanced atomic research program in the United States. And take back what he learned to Paris, and then Moscow.

A woman who telephoned Dr. Arthur H. Compton at the University of Chicago's Argonne Forest laboratory long before the first bomb was detonated, to tell him she had dreamed we made "an atomic bomb that destroyed Berlin," was immediately visited by Capt. Jim Murray, a MED man, who talked her out of writing her dream to the Chicago Tribune and other papers. Capt. Murray gave her his private phone number and extracted her promise that she would call only him if she had other dreams about some preposterous thing called an atomic bomb.

Many of the scientists attached to the Manhattan project were of draft age. MED could not get them exempted because it could not tell draft boards the reason. It would permit them to be drafted, go thru basic training, then have the Army reassign them to their old work. Many rebelled against the vast pay reductions.

Prof. Clarence Hiskey, working on the project, aroused the suspicions of MED's security unit. It was strictly against Gen. Groves' practice to allow the kind of A-bomb hearings or "tell-all" trials that followed in the wake of V-J day.

An aide discovered that Hiskey—now comfortably on the faculty of Brooklyn Poly—had an ROTC background. He was ~~permanently~~ called into service and

banished first to a quartermaster unit on the Canol project in the western Canadian wilds and later to a Pacific area by-passed by the war.

Another suspected scientist, after being drafted, was held over in training camp for five consecutive "basics." He became America's best-trained and least-used G.I. Nobel prize winner Niels Bohr (1935, for physics), the scientist who brought Lise Meitner's revelation to this country and later was spirited out of Nazi clutches in the bomb-bay of a R.A.F. "Mosquito," wrote a comprehensive paper on the still unrevealed bomb and gave it to his friend Supreme court Justice Felix Frankfurter. MED sternly demanded that Frankfurter surrender it, which he did, and returned it to him after the war.

In all, about 750 agents (500 of them FBI) worked in or on the environs of the A-bomb project, which employed 225,000 directly and another 600,000 indirectly. But were defeated by forces beyond their control or by forces too innocent-looking to arouse suspicion. It was (and remains) the costliest defeat in the history of the republic and of free men.

(TOMORROW: The beginning of Russia's great A-bomb robbery.)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: December 13, 1951

FROM : MR. BELMONT

SECRET

SUBJECT: ARTICLES APPEARING IN
WASHINGTON TIMES-HERALD
NEWSPAPER IN DECEMBER, 1951,
WRITTEN BY BOB CONSIDINE,
CONCERNING THEFT OF ATOMIC
SECRETS BY THE SOVIETS.
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PURPOSE

Classified by 3040 PWT/1mw

Declassify on: OADR 11/19/87

3042/PWT/KLK 9-8-87

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To advise that the fourth and fifth articles in this series appeared on December 12 and 13, 1951, respectively, and described what purported to be the "fantastic inside story" of how the Soviets obtained atomic secrets from Dr. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs through their Soviet courier, Harry Gold, and their New York Vice Consul, Anatoli A. Yakovlev.

DETAILS

The December 12 and 13, 1951, editions of the Times-Herald contained articles No. 4 and 5 of the series of 11 articles written by Bob Considine, which articles are described as the "fantastic inside story of how Russia stole America's A-bomb secrets."

The fourth of these articles entitled "Many of World's Woes Date From Fuchs-Gold Meeting," points out the alleged momentous significance to the USSR of the meeting in New York City early in 1944 between Dr. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, the British atomic scientist, and Harry Gold, who is described as the document-running courier for the Communist spy apparatus.

This article also contained a biographical sketch of Dr. Fuchs' background, including the information as to his Communist affiliations and connections in Germany and

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England. Mention is thereafter made that subsequent to Dr. Fuchs' return to England in 1942 from a Canadian internment camp Joseph Goebbels is reported to have furnished British Security via Switzerland with a dossier on Fuchs' Communist activities in Germany as a student; further, that this information was ignored by the British. It might be stated that the Bureau has not received any information that such dossier was ever turned over to the British Security but the fact of Fuchs' Communist affiliations in Germany was brought to the Bureau's attention through a captured German document received after the war.

A statement also appears at the conclusion of this article relative to the Roosevelt-Churchill agreement in Quebec whereby the Manhattan Engineer District and the FBI would accept accredited British scientists and technicians from England without further loyalty check. This statement as to the Bureau is, of course, untrue but it is believed factual insofar as MED is concerned.

Article No. 5 in this series entitled "~~Obscure Chemist Only Link Between Fuchs and Soviets~~," dramatically describes the various meetings in New York City of Dr. Fuchs and Gold, whom he knew only as ~~Raymond~~, wherein atomic information was passed to Gold, which data was thereafter turned over to Anatoli A. Yakovlev, Soviet Vice Consul in New York, whom Gold knew only as "John." This article concludes by quoting a statement attributed to Yakovlev to the effect that "the chain" between Dr. Fuchs and the Soviets "is cut in two places," meaning that Fuchs did not know the identity of Gold nor did Gold know the true identity of Yakovlev, which is a "good thing." The above statement is accurate [REDACTED]

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The essential facts herein represent no new information to the Bureau.

ACTION

None. This is for your information. The Dr. Goebbels item above is being brought to the attention of [REDACTED] with a request for their comments. (S)

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Many of World's Voes Date From Fuchs-Gold Meeting

"An hour of more momentous significance to the U.S.S.R. than Stalingrad or the defense of Moscow." Thus does Bob Considine, in the following article, describe the meeting of two insignificant men on a New York suburban street in 1944. This is the fourth of 11 articles telling how Russia stole the secrets that enabled her to make atomic bombs.

BY BOB CONSIDINE

[World Copyright, 1951, by International News Service]

Many of the world's foremost woes and fears date from an inconspicuous meeting of two humble-looking intellectuals on a seamy street in suburban Woodside, N.Y., one evening early in 1944.

From one direction strolled a roundish, flabby little Philadelphia chemist named Harry Gold. Under an arm he carried a green-bound book. If there was anything unusual about him it was the pair of gloves rolled tightly in his right hand, like a chubby baton.

Carried a Tennis Ball

From the opposite direction walked a pale wiry man in his late 30's, blinking solemnly behind his horn-rimmed glasses. His clothes were on the stiffly imaginativeless goods of wartime England, but on the street which he now trod—to the eventual despair of all free men—he melded into the air of shabby gentility. In his hand he carried, half-concealed, a tennis ball.

The symbols of recognition being unmistakable, both men paused.

"I'm Raymond," Harry Gold, a document-running courier for the Communist spy apparatus for the previous 10 years, whispered.

The other man, faintly aloof as he studied Gold, said clearly, "I am Dr. Klaus Fuchs." He walked on with Gold (whom he was to know only as "Raymond") at his side.

More Vital Than Stalingrad

It was an hour of more momentous significance to the U.S.S.R. than Stalingrad, or the defense of Moscow. From that hour and that meeting—the culmination of fantastic intrigue—the Kremlin could move firmly toward the creation of an atomic stockpile which emboldened it to make its stupendous post-war aggressions against the free world.

Fuchs, at that meeting, had behind him a life which will be studied for generations to come by psychologists, psychiatrists and criminologists—for his own subsequent confessions, six years later, appear too juvenile to shed serious light on the events which motivated one of history's top crimes.

He was raised in a pious atmosphere and happy family. His father, a well-liked extrovert, was a Lutheran pastor who became a Quaker. Klaus, the youngest child, was showered with attention. Behind the meekest demeanor, and in a sickly body, he developed a curious superiority complex. But no one denied, first at Leipzig university and later at Kiel, where his father was professor of religious science, that Klaus was not only bright but brave.

He joined a Communist youth organization and, in the early 1930's, agitated openly in behalf of Hitler's Nazi party. It was his first brush with intrigue on the grand scale. German Communists, it is generally forgotten, were strongly pro-Hitler on the ground that he and his party had

the best chance of overthrowing the Weimar republic—after which the Communists would take over from the Nazis as the parent party had seized Russia from the moderate Kerensky government.

Hitler, of course, out-intrigued the German Communist plot by burning the Reichstag and commencing his purge of the Reds on the ground that they were the arsonists.

Ordered to Leave Country

Fuchs ducked underground and became a cog in a Communist group dedicated to protecting key workers from the Reds' wrath. But after a time he was ordered to leave the country in order to complete his schooling—against the day when Germany would become a Communist country and scientific Reds would be needed.

In Britain he shone at Bristol university (doctorate of philosophy in mathematics and physics) and at Edinburgh university (doctorate of science). The Carnegie Foundation awarded him a research fellowship. When war broke out he was interned and sent to Canada, along with many other enemy aliens.

By 1942 he was back in England and had accepted a teaching post at the University of Glasgow. In June of that year he was assigned to secret atomic work, became naturalized, took the solemn security oath, and made immediate contact with a Communist espionage ring to deliver to it such information as he could acquire.

British Ignored Dossier

The hatred of the Nazis for this man was such that some time after his return to Britain Joseph Goebbels sent to British security officials, via Switzerland, a dossier on Fuchs' communist activities in Germany as a student. But the British ignored the information, along with other dossiers sent, on the ground that it was but part of a continuing Nazi effort to "split the allies."

Fuchs' contributing to the fund of Soviet knowledge could only have been meagre during his immediately subsequent two years of work in Britain's atomic research program.

But during that period a step of tremendous portent had been taken at Quebec by the President of the United States and Prime Minister Churchill. Fuchs and the U.S.S.R. were to be notable beneficiaries of that step.

British Scientists Accepted

Roosevelt and Churchill entered into a pact at Quebec whereby security officers of the Manhattan engineering district (the A-bomb clearing house) and the FBI would accept accredited British scientists and technicians—sent here from England to work—without further loyalty checks.

The British were to have full authority over their own. Of Fuchs, their security report had said, "he will never become a foreign agent."

Thus Fuchs was welcomed into a land and an operation which possessed all then known about processing and refining uranium-238, extracting uranium-235 (explosive) by the gaseous diffusion and other bizarre methods, the theories relating to the construction of an atomic bomb, and other information so advanced that in all probability it has still not been shared with our closest allies.


Tomorrow: Fuchs and Gold in operation.

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Obscure Chemist Only Link Between Fuchs and Soviet

This is the fifth article of an 11-article series telling the fantastic inside story of how Russia stole America's A-bomb secrets.

BY BOB CONSIDINE

It would be difficult to picture a more innocuous-looking man than Dr. Klaus Fuchs, the mortal enemy who was bowed into the United States in December 1943. He came as a trusted member of an otherwise devoted team of British physicists sent here, at the suggestion of Winston Churchill, to speed the day when the Western Allies could add a devastating A-bomb to their arsenal.

The quiet, pale, studious young man seemed too shy to make friends. His diffidence was written off by those who first met and trusted him as the markings of genius. As unexciting as he was, his presence here caused tremendous excitement in the Kremlin.

His spy contact in England, informed that Fuchs would be sent to the United States and would want to continue his spying amid the secret treasures here, set machinery into operation to retain the services of the master spy.

Russian Embassy Advised

That it was to be on a high level was apparent from the start. His arrival was quickly brought to the attention of the Russian embassy here. Harry Gold was given the courier's role in the sell-out by Anatoli A. Yakovlev, Soviet vice consul in New York. It was to Yakovlev (whom Gold knew as "John" and who made good his return to Russia in 1946) that the little Philadelphian delivered documents, plans, and verbal reports received from Fuchs.

When Fuchs and Gold first made contact at Woodside, N. Y., Fuchs was working at Columbia university developing the gaseous diffusion system of separating fissionable uranium atoms from non-fissionable. He was one of three visiting British scientists who had complete access to all phases of the important atomic work at the university.

In August, following the meeting at Woodside, Fuchs, by now having turned over to Gold all that was to be known about extraction processes and the chief extraction plant, Oak Ridge, Tenn., was providently assigned to work at supersecret Los Alamos.

He helped build the Alamo-gordo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki bombs, was made familiar with advanced research and development in the field of atomic weapons (not to reach the testing stage until October, 1951) and the heady early studies of the hydrogen bombs, still a bomb of the undiscernible future so far as its U. S. development is concerned.

He Fooled Everyone

Fuchs covered his tracks so well, and acted so much like a security conscious member of the generally devoted and loyal band of atomic scientists working on a massive project without the notice of the American people, that even Gold and the Russians sometimes had trouble keeping abreast of him.

Their first meeting lasted only long enough for Fuchs to inform the courier that at a meeting whose date they then set for the following month he would deliver to Gold "information relating to the application of nuclear fission to the production of a military weapon."

Gold was flabbergasted. Only then did he realize why he—who had run so many dirty little errands for the spy ring, including the theft of sugar-refining methods—had been chosen by "John" for this new work and told that he was to concentrate on Fuchs exclusively. This was to involve science on a level far beyond the educational reach of other couriers, and Gold had been selected because of his scientific background. He was exhilarated by the thought as he rode back to Philadelphia that night. It built him up in his own estimation, a task to which he had been almost psychopathically devoted for most of his life.

Gold was a bit chagrined when he met Yakovlev a week later and tensely handed him an account of the meeting with Fuchs and the promise of information about nuclear explosions. Yakovlev, aware of what the information would be, curtly told Gold to go about his job—and to exercise more caution with it than ever before.

They Traded Newspapers

Fuchs next emerged from his shadows in July, 1944, and met Gold near Borough hall in Brooklyn, N. Y. It was night. Each carried an afternoon New York newspaper, identical edition. Little was said, except they agreed on their next meeting's date and place. But as they walked along the street together they traded

the papers. Then they separated immediately.

This was a procedure they subsequently followed. Whether their meeting was to be a long or short one, Fuchs would never turn over written information until the moment before they separated. The reason for this was a simple one: if Fuchs were apprehended while with Gold, and it was discovered he was carrying secret papers, he could explain that as an accredited scientist he had every right to have them on his person.

And if Gold was caught with the papers, even shortly after accepting them, Fuchs would not be in the immediate vicinity.

On this particular night Gold walked quickly to the other side of Borough hall, after Fuchs departed, and handed to Yakovlev the paper Fuchs had given him. Folded within its pages was a thick package of atomic revelations, related in Fuchs' painfully small script.

Far-reaching Results

(Several scientists and security officers who were of great help to the writer in the preparation of this series believe that as a result of that one meeting Russia was perhaps able to construct an "Oak Ridge" of its own).

The next meeting of Fuchs and Gold took place at 96th street and Central Park west in New York City. There were no papers to pass. Fuchs and Gold walked easily along in the shadows of the trees which line the east side of the street, and that was the first time Gold heard the words "atomic bomb."

Fuchs gave him intimate particulars, verbally, about the progress of a joint American-British effort—often in the form of seminars—then being held at 90 Church street in New York City. Fuchs had been privy to such meetings.

Gold dutifully wrote out a long report and turned it over to Yakovlev. Gold never was one to question the workings of the apparatus in which he had become ensnared, but in delivering the report to Yakovlev he inquired—timidly—if there was some way in which he and Yakovlev might not have closer relations.

Chain Cut in 2 Places

Yakovlev shook his head. No, he explained, he would have to remain "John" to Gold, whom he called by name. Fuchs, in turn, must not know anything about Gold except the name "Raymond." Fuchs must not know how to contact Gold, even in the case of an emergency. Their meetings would have to be as they had been before, by arrangement. And, to complete the baffling scheme, Gold would never know how to contact "John" directly.

"The chain," Yakovlev smiled, "is thus cut in two places. It is a good thing."

(Tomorrow: Fuchs "disappears," causing alarm in the Russian spy system.)

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: December 17, 1951

FROM : H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE
WASHINGTON TIMES HERALD
NEWSPAPER IN DECEMBER, 1951,
WRITTEN BY BOB CONSIDINE
CONCERNING THEFT OF ATOMIC
SECRETS BY THE SOVIETS.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
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PURPOSE:

To analyze briefly the third and sixth articles in this series appearing on December 11 and 14, respectively, the former of which contains an inaccuracy concerning the connection of the Fuchs case and the defection of Igor Gouzenko in Canada.

DETAILS:

The third article entitled "~~Crack in Russia's~~ A-Spy Ring in Canada Bared Fuchs Clue" appeared on December 11. It is described as telling "the Canadian links in the tremendous conspiracy" of how "Russia stole America's atom bomb know-how." It refers to the defection of Gouzenko in Canada on September 5, 1945, and discussed in some detail the implication of Dr. Allan Nunn May in Soviet espionage in Canada.

In the article it is stated that the whole intrigue of Russia's efforts to steal the atomic bomb "began to unravel" in Canada, and that if it had not been for the defection of Gouzenko, "the path to the master criminal, Dr. Klaus Fuchs" might never have been made clear. It ends by stating that in February, 1946, after the sentence of Allan Nunn May, Scotland Yard "began a painstaking examination of Dr. May's voluminous notebooks.....One scrawled name, mentioned only once and by itself, was in one of the notebooks. The word was 'Fuchs.' From that scant clue spread one of the great manhunts in history."

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You will recall that the facts are that the names of Fuchs and his sister-in-law, ~~Kristel Heineman~~, appeared in the address book of ~~Israel Halperin~~, who was implicated in the Gouzenko affair but who is not mentioned in this article. Available information is that the British did not take any action on that information. Considerable information has previously appeared in the press concerning the relation between the Gouzenko affair and the Fuchs case, tending to show that the investigation in Canada resulted in the apprehension of Fuchs. This is the first time, however, that it has been alleged Fuchs' name appeared in the notebook of Allan Nunn May. ~~Actually, of course, the apprehension of Fuchs resulted from~~ [redacted] information. b1

(S)
The sixth article in this series entitled "Fuchs Gives Los Alamos Secrets to Messenger Gold" describes the efforts of Gold to recontact Fuchs after the latter was transferred to Los Alamos, his meeting with Fuchs in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and his plans for future meetings with Fuchs in Los Alamos. Except for minor inaccuracies, this article contains nothing worthy of note.

These articles appear to contain no significant information not already known to the Bureau.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

~~SECRET~~

Crack in Russia's A-Spy Ring In Canada Bared Fuchs Clue

BY BOB CONSIDINE

In this third article of his series telling the detailed story of how Russia stole America's atom bomb know-how, Bob Considine reports on the Canadian links in the tremendous conspiracy.

[World Copyright, 1951, by International News Service]

Canada was a full partner in the three-nation effort to produce from virtual nothingness an atom bomb of such terrifying power that its use would finish the Axis and bring an abrupt halt to World War II.

Thus it merited the attention of the Soviet Union, and its atom-bomb stealing apparatus, just as much as did the atomic operations in England and America. The important aspect of the penetration of Canada's curtain of security was that it was there—first of all—that the whole intrigue began to unravel.

Had His Own Code

The Soviet spying apparatus in Canada was under the direction of the Soviet military attache in Ottawa, Col. Zabotin, who in turn took his instructions from Moscow in a code that was not even known by other elements within the embassy, including the ambassador.

Zabotin, whose interesting code name was "Grant," escaped to Russia in advance of 17 assistants in December 1945 from New York. His work was done by that time, and done well. If there had never been a defection in his own staff, Zabotin's sinister accomplishments might never have been known—nor the path to the master criminal, Dr. Klaus Fuchs, made clear.

Sample of Uranium

It is still not known how many Canadian scientists Zabotin and his operatives were able to reach or taint. But one of his men, Lt. Angelov, obtained from Dr. Allan Nunn May small amounts of Uranium 238 and 235 and a written report on what May—a highly regarded and trusted scientist—knew about the bomb project.

Price of the sell-out: \$700 and two bottles of whisky. As in America, the Reds stole their multi-billion-dollar secrets at bargain rates.

Either May gave the nod to the Russians or they presumed he would continue to supply information to them after his return to London at the conclusion of his work in Canada. On July 28, 1945, the director of military intelligence in Moscow radioed this message to "Grant":

"Work out, and telegraph ar-

rangements for the meeting and the password of Alek (May) with our man in London."

Arrangements Rejected

On Aug. 22 of that year "Grant" replied:

"We have worked out the conditions of a meeting with Alek in London. Alek will work in King's college, Strand . . . Meetings Oct. 7, 17, 27 on the street in front of the British museum. The time, 11 o'clock in the evening. Identification sign:—A newspaper under the left arm. Password:—'Best Regards to Mikel.'"

The director had other ideas:

"The arrangements worked out for the meeting are not satisfactory. I am informing you of new ones.

"1. Place: In front of the British museum in London, on Great Russell street, at the opposite side on the street. Alek walks from Tottenham Court road, the contact man from the opposite side—Southampton Row.

Time Too Late

"2. Time: It would be more expedient to carry out the meeting at 20 o'clock . . . as 23 o'clock is too dark.

"3. Identification signs: Alek will have under his left arm the newspaper 'Times,' the contact man will have in his left hand the magazine, 'Picture Post.'

"4. The password: The contact man; 'What is the shortest way to the Strand?' Alek, 'Well, come along, I am going that way.' In the beginning of the business conversation Alek says: 'Best regards from Mikel.'"

But unknown to Zabotin, the director, May and the others in the conspiracy, a link in the chain had broken. He was Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in Zabotin's office who went under the code name of "Klark."

Decides to Break Away

The young former Red army lieutenant, comparing his former and then current life with the freedom he found in Canada, decided sometime during the summer of 1945 to break with the Soviets. For weeks he carefully and almost microscopically turned down the edges of secret papers he planned to take with him when he fled. At 8 o'clock on the night of Sept. 5 1945, he made his bold move, taking with him the papers he had earmarked.

He attempted to sell his story that night, and the documents, to an Ottawa newspaper but met with a chilly reception. Frightened, he returned to his

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A SPY EXPOSE IN CANADA LED TO FUCHS HUNT

[Continued from first page]

ment and spent the night with his wife and child—but left with his family for a friend's apartment in the same building early the next morning.

Two of Zabotin's men already were outside the building. Later four men from the spy's office broke down Gouzenko's door and ransacked the place. Gouzenko called for and got Canadian police protection. Under guard he was taken to police headquarters where he gave up his documents and told his story. The Russian embassy brought the strongest possible pressure to bear to have him placed in its custody as a thief.

Russians Flee Home

But Canada kept him. And bit by bit, as the documents underwent decoding, the fantastic first chapter of the apprehension of Russia's atom-bomb spies began to unfold. Zabotin and 17 other members of the Russian embassy quickly left for Moscow.

In sentencing Dr. May (who pleaded guilty) to 10 years in prison, the British judge said:

"Allan Nunn May, I have listened with some slight surprise to some of the things which your learned counsel has said he is entitled to put before me: The picture of you as a man of honor who had only done what you believed to be right.

"I do not take that view of you at all. How any man in your position could have the crass conceit, let alone the wickedness, to arrogate to himself the decision of a matter of this sort, when you yourself had given your written undertaking not to do it, and knew it was one of the country's most precious secrets, when you yourself had drawn and were drawing pay for years to keep your own bargain with your country—that you could have done this is a dreadful thing.

A Dishonorable Man

"I think that you acted not as an honorable but a dishonorable man. I think you acted with degradation. Whether money was the object of what you did, in fact you did get money for what you did. It is a very bad case indeed. The sentence upon you is one of 10 years' penal servitude."

That was February, 1946. Scotland Yard then began a painstaking examination of Dr. May's voluminous notebooks which he had filled during his years of work in the atomic project.

One scrawled name, mentioned only once and by itself, was in one of the notebooks.

The word was "Fuchs."

And from that scant clue spread one of the great hunts in history.

(Tomorrow:—The Strange case of Klaus Fuchs.)

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Fuchs Gives Los Alamos Secrets to Messenger Gold

(This is the sixth article of an eleven-part series telling of "the great A-bomb robbery" by Soviet Russia.)

BY BOB CONSIDINE

(Copyright, 1951, by International News Service)

Harry Gold, the inconspicuous spy, kissed his mother good-bye in their comfortable Philadelphia home one August afternoon in 1944 and when she pressed him as to where he was going—as the old lady often did—he winked suggestively.

She sighed, but not unhappily. Harry had a mysterious girl somewhere.

Soon, she supposed, he would bring her home and that would be fine with Mrs. Gold. For she had worried for a long time about these odd meetings that carried the elder of her two sons off so many nights, and saw him return so late that he could barely get a few hours sleep before reporting to his job as a research chemist.

Seeks Klaus Fuchs

Gold hurried to a train and an hour and a half later was in New York. His date was with no girl. It was with Dr. Klaus Fuchs, one of the more distinguished foreign physicists working behind the shrouds of America's atom bomb-building effort.

Gold did not emerge from the labyrinth of Penn station. He bought an evening paper (to hand later to Fuchs in return for the newspaper Fuchs would give him, enclosing priceless information) and stepped aboard a Brooklyn-bound local subway. Three or four times during that trip to Brooklyn he hopped off his car just as the doors were closing and stood on sparsely populated platforms, making a pretense of reading but—in truth—furtively scanning the faces of those about him. Then he would get back on a train . . . just as the doors were closing.

He had his orders from a superior he knew only as "John" but who was Anatoli Yakovlev, Soviet vice consul in New York. He must exercise the most extreme caution not to be followed to his meetings with Fuchs and he was told of the way in which he had frustrated and pierced the wall of security around the spy-

Fuchs Isn't There

The meeting place this time was near the Brooklyn Museum of Art. But to Gold's consternation, Fuchs did not appear.

Startled, Gold returned to Philadelphia and waited a tense week for their alternate meeting date. He returned to New York, waited with growing alarm for Fuchs at a corner on Central Park West, reading into each passing face the look of a government agent, then fled.

If Gold was agitated, "John" was doubly so when the Philadelphia reported Fuchs' disappearance. Yakovlev had withheld from Gold the New York address of the scientist. But now he gave it to him—128 West Seventy-seventh St.

Somewhat tremulously, Gold went to the house. When a janitor answered his ring, he told the man he was there to return a book he had borrowed from Fuchs. In the book, which he had just bought, Gold had painfully copied Fuchs' signature.

Didn't Say Where

"He left town," the janitor said. "Didn't say where he was going."

Yakovlev eventually dispatched Gold to Cambridge, Mass. and the home of Fuchs' sister and brother-in-law, Mrs. Elizabeth Heineman, completely innocent of the plot and of her brother's role, welcomed "Raymond" as a friend. Klaus, she said, had been transferred to some place in the Southwest. That was all she knew.

But she added that before her brother left on his mysterious mission he told her she could expect him to visit her during the Christmas holidays. Forlornly, Gold left his phone number in Philadelphia and asked Mrs. Heineman to have Fuchs call him when he returned. He made two other fruitless trips to Cambridge, at "John's" demand.

Yakovlev was furious with Gold for losing track of a man who had become, since his arrival in the United States as part of a British atomic team which U. S. authorities had agreed not to investigate, the most important spy in the entire Communist network throughout the world. Gold mewed pitifully for another chance to make good on this new spy-courier assignment.

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Home for Christmas

Gold's life was made miserable during the long fall and early winter. But at the turn of the year his phone in Philadelphia rang and a quiet, precise, clipped voice on the other end—calling long distance — asked, "Raymond?"

It was Fuchs.

As full of joy as discretion, Gold rushed to Cambridge to see the man whom he later (in a confession) called "noble" and a "genius." On a frigid afternoon, meeting with Fuchs, including in a bedroom of the Heineman house, Fuchs explained his disappearance. He had been assigned to Los Alamos, N. Mex., where the bomb itself was being fabricated.

To the amazed Gold, the spy revealed that the bomb—it was believed—could be made to explode by bringing together, inside the bomb casing, a number of "non-critical" masses of uranium-235 or plutonium, thus forming a critical mass that would explode with holocaustic might. This "trigger" device, he said, was called the "lens" and was so difficult to devise and perfect that it represented a sore bottleneck in the production of the first bomb.

At the moment they parted, as had been their custom, Fuchs handed Gold a fat envelope. And the most closely guarded secrets of the most secret laboratory on earth had started the trip to the Kremlin.

Gold, who did not know how to get in touch with "John," hit his nails in frenzy, waiting for their scheduled February meeting in New York City. He proudly handed over the envelope Fuchs had given him the previous month.

Yakovlev scanned it shrewdly and quickly, then returned it to his pocket for more careful reading. He demanded from Gold an account of their talks.

Gold painstakingly recreated

mention of Fuch's annoyance at having had to come all the way east to deliver the information, and his demand that thereafter Gold would have to travel to Santa Fe—with a meeting scheduled for the first Saturday in June, 1945, at 4 p.m. on the Castillo street bridge.

Then Gold mentioned the "lens" and Yakovlev reacted as if touched by a live wire. He whispered almost savagely that Gold must search his mind and remember everything Fuchs had said about the "lens."

Gold nervously told what he knew, but the Russian almost spit his derision. And when Gold left late that night for the dreary ride back to Philadelphia he felt that he had somehow let down his superior.

Had Sketch of Lens

What he did not know was that Yakovlev had come into possession

by way of Julius Rosenberg, who is now facing the electric chair, of an actual sketch of the sternly guarded "lens," including information about the type of explosives used to smash together the nuclear matter!

To build that "lens" the United States had spent millions, and had retained what is believed to have been a majority of the finest precision tool workers in the country. The Russians, as we will see later, got it for \$500—and at least \$50 of that sum was returned to the U. S. Treasury by the purchase of a war bond!

[Tomorrow: Gold meets Fuchs twice in Santa Fe.]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: December 18, 1951

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE
WASHINGTON TIMES HERALD
NEWSPAPER IN DECEMBER, 1951,
WRITTEN BY BOB CONSIDINE
CONCERNING THEFT OF ATOMIC
SECRETS BY THE SOVIETS.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
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Belmont ☐
Mohr ☐
Tele. Room ☐
Nease ☐
Gandy ☐

PURPOSE:

To analyze briefly the ninth article in this series which appeared December 17, 1951, and which contained a few inaccuracies.

DETAILS:

The ninth article entitled "Misstep by Chemist Gold Put G-Men on Spies' Trail," appeared on December 17, 1951. It begins with discussing the David Greenglass espionage activity and then reverts to Harry Gold, and the latter's last meeting with his superior Anatoli Yakovlev, which ended abruptly because of Gold's then current employment by Abraham Brothman who was considered to be under suspicion by the Russians. A few inaccuracies were noted in this article.

Mention is made that Gold was alarmed at the arrest and conviction of Dr. Allan Nunn May for Soviet espionage activity in Canada, but that he was relieved when the furor subsided because "he had no way of knowing that the word 'Fuchs' had appeared in Dr. May's seized notes." According to available information the only known connection between Fuchs and the Soviet espionage case in Canada was the fact that Fuchs' name appeared in the address book of Israel Halperin. There has been no information that his name appeared in May's notes. This inaccuracy was first mentioned in the sixth article in this series and was commented upon in my memorandum to you dated December 17, 1951.

The ninth article refers to Gold's appearance at the Earl Theater in New York, according to prearrangement on the night of December 26, 1946. It states that a huge man approached

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Gold, identified himself and then beckoned Gold to leave and took Gold to a pub at the corner of 42nd and Third Avenue where Yakovlev was waiting. The facts, as related by Gold, are that he was met at the Earl Theater by a Russian whom he has identified from photographs as Pavel Fedosimov, a Secretary at the Soviet Consulate in New York. Fedosimov inquired whether he had any information from "the Doctor," (meaning Fuchs) and upon being advised in the negative by Gold, he ordered Gold to meet Yakovlev at the mentioned bar.

The article points out that this last meeting with Yakovlev was terminated hurriedly by Yakovlev when Gold revealed that he was employed by Abraham Brothman. It is stated that when Elizabeth T. Bentley broke with Communism "she told the FBI of her relationship with Brothman and how Gold had succeeded her in this work." Actually, Bentley never knew Gold and had not furnished any information about Gold but had related that when she terminated her activities with Brothman, on behalf of Jacob Golos, Golos intended to replace her with someone else. This turned out to be Gold.

No significant information not already known to the Bureau was noted in this article.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

Misstep by Chemist Gold Put G-Men on Spies Trail

This is the ninth of 11 articles telling the story, as it never has been possible to tell it before, of how Russia stole America's A-bomb secrets, and the people it used in the fantastic cloak-and-dagger conspiracy.

BY BOB CONSIDINE

(World Copyright, 1951, by International News Service)

Sgt. David Greenglass, a former member of the Young Communist league who was assigned during the war to work in the world's most sacrosanct tool shop, the one in building E, Los Alamos, N. M., where the "trigger" of the A-bomb was engineered, was a thoro soul.

He was not too bright, but he was thoro. And his great idols in life were his brother-in-law and sister, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg—who now face the electric chair for passing along to Russia what the unhappily placed sergeant was able to glean at his historic work.

A month after the end of World War II Greenglass came back to New York and gave Julius and his sister enough information to enable them to transcribe notes, descriptions and drawings of the vastly improved "lens" of the Nagasaki bomb.

Laughed at Treason

The pleasure of the Rosenbergs made him feel very proud. And David joined in the laughter when Rosenberg confided to him that he had stolen a complete proximity fuse while on official business at the Emerson Radio corporation, and had turned it over to the Russians.

David, mustered out with an honorable discharge, went to work for Julius in a machine shop. He had all but forgotten the grave risk he had taken at Los Alamos by the time Dr. Allan Nunn May, the British scientist who had delivered uranium samples and much information to the Russians while working on the A-project in Canada, was apprehended, confessed, and was given 10 years in prison.

But Dr. May and his convicted associates soon faded out of the press. David Greenglass breathed easier. He was making pretty good money working for Julius. In fact, he still had some of the \$500 which Harry Gold had given to him, plus a \$50 U.S. war bond which Ruth had bought at the time they received the \$500.

Gold, in those early months after V-J day and the return of Dr. Fuchs to England, found himself ignored by the apparatus for which he had been working for more than a decade. Perhaps it was just as well, he reasoned. He had taken many chances.

In 1946 Gold was forced to look around for a new job. The Pennsylvania Sugar Co., where he had worked for 17 years as a chemist, except for two brief periods of

absence at college, closed the last in which, the gentle, middle-aged man worked and was well liked.

The job he accepted was one of the graver blunders of his life. He hooked on at \$100 a week with the Abraham Brothman associates, chemical research engineers who maintained a laboratory in Elmhurst, Queens. He was "chief chemist." Brothman was an old acquaintance.

Gold, too, noticed with alarm the arrest and conviction of Dr. May, but was relieved when the furore subsided. He had no way of knowing that the word "Fuchs" had appeared in Dr. May's seized notes. Fuchs was a closed incident in the life of Gold. And so, apparently, was "John"—the name by which he had known Soviet Vice Consul Yakovlev. He had not seen or heard from "John" for a long time.

Pre-Arranged Signal

Then, 10 months after his last previous meeting with "John," on which occasion Gold turned over the last information Fuchs was to give him, Gold received in the mail two tickets to a boxing match. It was a pre-arranged signal, telling Gold to appear (at 8 p.m. on the date stamped on the tickets) at the Earl movie theater near the Yankee stadium in New York City.

But the envelope had been addressed incorrectly and had taken too long to reach him. The date on the tickets had already passed. Gold waited tensely for several days, then received a phone call at his New York laboratory. The date was Dec. 26, 1946.

"Harry Gold?" the voice asked. "Yes."

"Have you been all right?" It was Yakovlev and by that question he was asking if Gold had suspected he was being followed.

"Yes."

"I'll meet you at the theater to-night at 8 o'clock."

Gold appeared, bought a ticket, and took a seat in the upstairs lounge. Presently a huge man approached him and quickly showed him a torn slip of paper which would be the recognition signal for "John's" aide.

Silently the man beckoned to Gold to leave, and took him to a pub at the corner of Forty-second and Third avenue. Yakovlev was waiting with a smile. He apologized for not having contacted Gold for ten months, inquired if he had heard from Fuchs, and got down to business. He was going to send Gold to Paris in March, 1947, to meet "a prominent physicist" and obtain information from him.

Gold was willing. He nodded, and said, "I think I can arrange for leave as soon as the pressure of work at Abe Brothman's has eased up a bit."

Yakovlev sat up as if struck by an electric charge.

"You fool!" he almost shouted. The Russian dipped in his pocket, slammed down several bills on the table, and charged out of the place. Gold, struggling into his coat, followed him, whining for an explanation.

"You've spoiled eleven years of work!" the Russian thundered, while Gold trotted at his side. "You should have remembered that I told you in 1945 that Brothman was being watched by the FBI."

Yakovlev left him worriedly for Russia, and worriedly and penitently Gold went back to work for Brothman. He should have remembered and been more careful, Gold conceded. He had served, briefly, as Brothman's courier in the early 1940's after Elizabeth Bentley—a higher-ranking member on the Communist courier roster—had complained to her boss and lover, Communist agent Jacob Golos, that Brothman was not delivering enough valuable material for the Russians.

When Miss Bentley broke with communism she told the FBI of her relationship with Brothman and how Gold had succeeded her in this work. Brothman was called before a grand jury in 1947. He told a smooth lie, then coached Gold to confirm it during his own testimony. Gold did so, and both went free.

But the FBI now had a picture of Gold and a brief dossier, as a result of that and a subsequent fruitless appearance before the jury. It was to prove one of the traps that caught him—and the historic track-down of Gold, and his confession, meant that the G-men could close in on the Greenglasses and Rosenbergs, the latter couple now standing in the shadow of the electric chair.

(TOMORROW: THE NET CLOSES.)

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Date: 12/17/1951

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

DATE: December 26, 1951

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE WASHINGTON
TIMES HERALD NEWSPAPER IN DECEMBER, 1951,
WRITTEN BY BOB CONSIDINE CONCERNING 'THEFT OF
ATOMIC SECRETS BY THE SOVIETS
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
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PURPOSE:

To analyze briefly the seventh and eighth articles in this series, which appeared December 15 and 16 respectively, and which contained nothing of significance.

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DETAILS:

The seventh article, entitled "Fuchs and Gold Gave Reds Complete Atom Data in 1949," appeared on December 15. It deals with Gold's trip to Santa Fe, New Mexico, to obtain atomic information from Fuchs, and it is substantially correct. However, it again makes the statement that the Nazis delivered to the British in 1942 a complete dossier on Fuchs' Communist activities, a dossier which the British ignored on the ground that it was part of Hitler's program to confuse the Allies. This same statement was made earlier, in the fourth article, which appeared on December 13, 1951, and which was commented upon in a memorandum to Mr. Ladd dated December 13, 1951. In the latter memo it was pointed out that this statement was being brought to the attention of [] with a request for their comments. This was done by memo dated December 18, 1951. b1

As Gold visited Fuchs in Santa Fe in 1945, the date in the title of this article would appear to be an error.

The eighth article, entitled "Spy Chieftain Ordered Gold to New Mexico," appeared on December 16, 1951, and dealt with Gold's contact with David Greenglass in Albuquerque after his first meeting with Fuchs in Santa Fe. It likewise was substantially correct.

No new information appears to be contained in these articles.

ACTION:

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None. This is for your information. You will be advised of [] comments about the alleged receipt from the Nazis of a dossier concerning Fuchs' Communist activities, when received. b1

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Fuchs and Gold Gave Reds Complete Atom Data in 1949

(This is the seventh article of an eleven-part series telling how Russia, in the most sinister cloak-and-dagger conspiracy in history, stole America's A-bomb secrets.)

BY BOB CONSIDINE

[International News Service Staff Correspondent]

[World, Copyright, 1951, by International News Service]

Harry Gold, the gentle-mannered atomic spy, used his hard-won vacation from the Pennsylvania Sugar company, of Philadelphia, for his trip to Santa Fe, N. Mex., in June, 1945, to pick up priceless atomic information from Dr. Klaus Fuchs.

It was inconvenient for him, and costly, too, for the Russians never gave him enough to pay his expenses as one of their top couriers in this country. Gold willingly paid the rest, usually about half. That had been the case since he formed his alliance with the Reds.

Gold never complained. Once, long before he was promoted to atomic spying, he told his mother in Philadelphia—after a sleepless day and night of work—that he was going to bed and “don’t wake me up even if God calls me.”

Aroused by Call

Two hours later, in response to a phone call, he was on a street car en route to Broad Street station in Philadelphia. He had been summoned by one of the five or six Communist intermediaries for whom he worked for years. He journeyed to New York, took a long subway ride to the remotest Bronx, walked for blocks in the rain, reported to his superior, was bawled out for not delivering more information, and was sent back to Philadelphia—arriving, wet to the skin and on the point of fainting from exhaustion, near dawn.

If there was any distress connected with the Santa Fe trip it was financial, chiefly. Gold was short of funds, as usual, for he was a notorious “soft touch” around the sugar company lab where he worked.

Partly because of this financial limitation, and his inborn sense of covering his tracks, he took an upper berth to Albuquerque, then took a bus from there to Santa Fe, arriving in the city Saturday June 2, 1945, barely half an hour before the meeting which had been planned nearly half a year before.

Picks Up Fatal Map

As he stepped off the bus, Harry Gold, who earnestly acting in the interests of the Communist intrigue, made the costliest decision of his life. Fearful even to ask a passer-by how he might get to Castillo street bridge he dropped into a museum and, in the manner of a carefree visitor, picked up a souvenir map of Santa Fe. That map was to be his doom, a long time later.

But there was no warning of that doom-to-be at that time. Fuchs appeared on the bridge exactly on time, driving a battered Chevrolet coupe. He waved to Gold, who hopped in.

Fuchs was full of information, written and verbal. A test of the A-bomb, he reported, had been scheduled for the following month but he told Gold it was his personal opinion that the bomb would not be ready until some time in 1946. Many difficulties still had to be worked out. Since their last meeting, however, work had progressed wondrously—and he had remained in the forefront of the pioneers probing realms of research hitherto unknown to man. All these secrets he imparted to Gold, who happily returned them to New York, and “John.”

Fuchs Describes Test

Fuchs and Gold had their final meeting on Sept. 19, 1945, at the door of a church on the outskirts of Santa Fe. Fuchs was late. He had had trouble getting rid of

several friends in the project. But he was jubilant.

He described to Gold the violence of the test of the first A-bomb at Alamogordo, which he had witnessed along with some of the most respected scientists in the world—Conant, Fermi, Tolman, Lawrence, Bohr, Wigner, Kistiakowski, Oppenheimer and others. He had miscalculated the efficiency of America's engineering and scientific personnel, he said, but was not unhappy about it. For he was in possession of all there was to know . . . and now Gold had it, written and verbal.

At the end of their long ride into the outskirts of Santa Fe, a cloud furrowed Fuchs' brow. Everything had gone well, he conceded, but there was a worry or two. The Americans, he said, were closing doors on him and other foreign physicists, now the war was won. He would soon return to England, he reported, and he hoped aloud that his father—a German Quaker-professor who was quite garrulous—would not go thru with his plan to meet them.

Fears Exposure

Fuchs was vaguely afraid that the father would expose him for what he had been in Germany as a student: A Communist agitator and organizer. (Fuchs did not know that the Nazis had delivered to the British in 1942 a complete dossier on his Communist activities, a dossier which the British ignored on the ground that it was part of Hitler's program to confuse the Allies.)

Anyway, Fuchs shrugged as his meeting with Gold ended, he would remain loyal to communism. He would continue to work on atomic matters and deliver whatever he learned. He asked Gold to arrange with his superiors to have a new courier (British) named to contact him.

The men agreed on a recognition system—as involved as the one by which they themselves had met and formed a union which changed the history of mankind.

Recognition by Books

This was it, according to Gold's subsequent testimony before he was given 30 years in prison:

“Beginning on the first Saturday of every month after it had been determined that Fuchs had returned to England, at a stop on the British subway called Paddington Crescent, possibly Teddington Crescent, 8 p.m., Fuchs was to be carrying five books bound with strings and supported by two fingers of one hand; he was to be carrying two books in the other hand.

“His contact, whoever that would be, was to be carrying a copy of a Bennett Cerf book, ‘Stop Me if You Have Heard This.’”

This was testimony which later justifiably enraged Mr. Cerf, a respected U. S. publisher, on several counts. One was that he naturally was an innocent party to such a scheme, and another was that Gold misnamed one of his best sellers: “Try and Stop Me.”

Russia Tests Bomb

Fuchs and Gold parted, master and messenger in a catastrophic plot which, when its evil fruits were laid before the eyes of President Truman, caused the Chief Executive to blanch in horror.

The public has never been told—nor will it be told—just how much information Fuchs gave away. That it was an enormous amount was seen vividly on Sept. 23, 1949, when President Truman announced that the Russians had successfully tested an A-bomb—an event which such authorities as Lt. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, who headed up the U. S. bomb effort, did not believe could take place until sometime in the 1960s, in then.

[Tomorrow: The man Harry Gold, his informant Sgt. David Greenglass, and the doomed Rosenberg.

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Glavin ✓
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Date: DEC 15 1950

ENCLOSURE

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SPY CHIEFTAIN ORDERED GOLD TO NEW MEXICO

Overruled Objections On Greenglass

(This is the eighth article of an eleven-part series describing the inner workings of the fantastic spy-conspiracy by which Russia stole America's atomic bomb secrets.)

BY BOB CONSIDINE

[World Copyright, 1951, by INS]

The web in which Harry Gold had been enmeshed for 10 years led him in May, 1945, to a meeting in a restaurant at 42nd and Third avenue, New York City—a meeting with his superior in the ultra-secret Soviet spying ring, vice consul Anatoli Yakovlev.

Yakovlev, whom the moon-faced little Philadelphia chemist knew only as "John," briskly reviewed Gold's forthcoming trip to Santa Fe to obtain more information about the A-bomb from Dr. Klaus Fuchs. The plan was as familiar to Gold as his own name.

Mission Was Twofold

Satisfied that all was understood, Yakovlev then told Gold that his mission to the southwest would be twofold. He must contact another member of the spy ring in Albuquerque.

For one of the few times in his life as a courier, Gold summoned gumption enough to object. He stated that he would see only Fuchs on the trip, and that it was dangerous to take on any additional task.

Yakovlev quietly put down his drink and his normally friendly face froze.

"That is an order!" he hissed. The hurt dog look returned quickly to Gold's eyes, and he nodded.

Yakovlev reached into his pocket and handed Gold a slip of onion-skin paper on which was typed:

GREENGLASS

209 NORTH HIGH ST.

ALBUQUERQUE, N. MEX.

"Recognition signal—"I come from Julius."

Gave Him Box Top

Then Yakovlev handed Gold an oddly-cut portion of the top of a Jell-o box.

"Greenglass will have the matching part," the Russian told Gold. He then gave Gold an envelope containing \$500, to give to Greenglass.

A short time later, his treacherous and dangerous meeting with Fuchs, which had been concluded in Santa Fe, Gold took a bus to Albuquerque. He arrived at the north High street address about 8:30 at night and was told that the Greenglasses were away and would return in the morning. For the next five hours Gold searched for a room, and finally found a sleeping place on a cot in the hall of a boarding house.

It was a trip that was costing him money and all of a hard-won vacation from his job, but he accepted this as part of his self-imposed mission "to help people." Besides, Yakovlev had asked him to do it, and Gold—as he confessed later—had a "horror of saying 'no.'"

He met the Greenglasses the

following morning and identified himself as "Dave from Pittsburgh," after he had matched his share of the Jell-o box top with the piece which Greenglass took from his wife's purse. From Greenglass, later that day, Gold received an envelope containing four handwritten pages and several sketches. He marked it "other" and wrote "doctor" on the thicker envelope he had received from Fuchs, and turned both of them over to his superior two weeks later at a prearranged meeting place on Main street, Flushing, N. Y.

Gold had glanced only briefly at the material given to him by Greenglass, and he was a bit surprised when "John" evidenced tremendous pleasure as his own eyes glanced over the drawings. Gold had not been very impressed with Greenglass. He had an inherent contempt for any member of the conspiracy who accepted money, though he recognized that money sometimes had to be forced on a man in order to make him more co-operative via threats of blackmail.

What chiefly annoyed Gold about Greenglass, however, was that the Army sergeant had the audacity to suggest that he, Greenglass, a machinist, could organize a considerable spying cell at Los Alamos. Gold, an exuberantly cautious man, was shocked to the

point of bawling out Greenglass . . . and all this he imparted to his superior.

But Vice Consul Yakovlev was not listening. He was jumping with excitement. For Greenglass had turned over to him, by way of Gold, additional and needed drawings and specifications of the fantastically complicated "trigger" of the A-bomb—the perfect complement to Fuchs' material on the best method of separating uranium 235 from non-explosive uranium 238.

More Luck For Fuchs

The accidental assignment of Greenglass to Los Alamos in 1944 was a stroke of luck which the Russian spying ring regarded as almost as great as one of the clauses of the Quebec agreement, which enabled Dr. Fuchs to enter this country's most secret atomic research program as a member of a team of British specialists without the embarrassment of a loyalty check.

The bulky, flabby-faced Greenglass had for many years been a protégé of Julius Rosenberg, beau and later husband of David's sister Ethel. The growing David became completely under the domination of the two and, in his fumbling way, regarded both as geniuses. Before and after his marriage to Ethel in 1939 Julius often brought gifts to David when he called . . . once a fine chemistry set. Whatever the nature of the gift he generally brought along some Communist literature for David to read.

David had no mind for the broader fields of education. He became an apprentice machinist and soon was drafted into the Army, where he listed that as his trade. In time Los Alamos needed hundreds of his classification. And his name popped up as one who would be sent.

He worked there for weeks without having the faintest notion of the potential fruit of his labors. Then late in November, 1944, his wife visited him, her expenses paid by the Rosenbergs. Julius was doing well as a civilian expert with the Army signal corps (from which he was to be fired the following year on charges that he was a Communist).

David's Wife "High Up"

Julius, David's wife said, was now "high up" in the transmission of secret information to Russia. He wanted David to know that he, David, was working on an atom bomb, and he felt it David's duty to deliver to him at once any information he had picked up. After all, said Ruth Greenglass, Russia was our ally.

David thought it out for a night, then told Ruth what he knew and she memorized it. It wasn't much, but Julius was delighted with it when Ruth returned the information to New York. David had revealed the approximate number of persons working at Los Alamos (including such known atomic scientists as J. Robert Oppenheimer and Niels Bohr) and given a description of the physical layout of the buildings and plants.

In January, 1945, David was

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given a brief furlough. He hurried to New York and turned over to Rosenberg a crude but efficient sketch of the so-called "lens" of the bomb that was then slowly nearing completion. It was the "trigger" that would touch off a weapon which has since caused an abrupt turn in the history of man and relations between the East and West.

Thus, six full months before the test of the first atom bomb at Alamogordo, the Russians learned

the infinitely difficult secret of how it would be detonated, a prospect into which U. S. taxpayers had unknowingly poured millions of dollars.

(TOMORROW: The Rosenbergs and Gold make mistakes.)

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Wash. Star
N.Y. Mirror
N. Y. Compass

Date: _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

FROM : MR. BELMONT

DATE: December 26, 1951

SUBJECT: ARTICLES APPEARING IN WASHINGTON
TIMES HERALD IN DECEMBER, 1951,
WRITTEN BY BOB CONSIDINE CONCERNING
THEFT OF ATOMIC SECRETS BY SOVIETS.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
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PURPOSE

To review the concluding article in this series. This last article does not set forth any information which is new concerning the Harry Gold case and merely points out how the investigation of Gold led to David Greenglass and from him to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

DETAILS

Bob Considine concluded his series of articles on "The Great A-Bomb Robbery" by Soviet Russia by describing how the FBI succeeded in tracking down Harry Gold. He described this as a "masterful job" by the FBI and repeated much of the same information which has been made public in connection with our work on this case. He then explained how the Bureau caught David Greenglass and from Greenglass was able to arrest and convict Julius Rosenberg.

Considine's article concluded with the statement that "The Russian spy ring in this country, although sorely dented, is not believed to be defunct. The scope of our work on atomic weapons and the hydrogen bomb is now so vast that perfect security is hardly possible." He also stated that Russia, through Fuchs, Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo, and Dr. Allan Nunn May, was able to obtain a "fair grasp of many of our innermost atomic secrets." He pointed out that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy believes that the information from the afore-mentioned persons speeded up the first test of the Soviet atom bomb by 18 months.

ACTION

None. The foregoing is for your information.

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Soviet A-Spy Ring, Dented, Believed Still Busy in U. S.

(This article concludes the story of "The Great A-Bomb Robbery" by Soviet Russia.)

BY BOB CONSIDINE

The FBI's masterful job in tracking down Harry Gold, from the most meager kind of description given to it by Dr. Klaus Fuchs in his British prison, ran into another blind alley when its agents called on Fuchs' sister and brother-in-law in Cambridge, Mass.

Mr. and Mrs. Kristel Heineman had been deeply shocked by the news that Klaus was, in truth, one of history's top spies: One whose work had more significance than that of perhaps all the operators in the annals of espionage.

The Heinemans, in the opinion of the FBI, did their best to help the baffling search for the man whom Fuchs knew only as "Raymond."

Remember a Visitor

They remembered that Klaus had a visitor at their Cambridge home in January 1945. (Fuchs was home from Los Alamos on a brief vacation at the time, and turned over vital information to Gold.)

Matter of fact, the same man had called twice earlier. They had liked him, they remembered, and the Heineman children adored him, for he brought them candy. The Heinemans understood that the visitor had two children (Gold was a bachelor) and, while they could not be sure, they thought his first name might have been James—with a last name that sounded as if it began with "David."

The FBI followed James Davidson, a New York City engineer who answered the physical description and who was absent from his job about the time Fuchs visited Cambridge in 1945 from Los Alamos. But when the Heinemans were shown Davidson's picture they shook their heads—yet Fuchs had picked the same picture out of a group of suspects and said, "I am pretty sure this is the man."

Look Into Chemists

FBI turned its attention to chemists. They queried every contact with whom Fuchs had come in contact, searched mountains of records, studied Santa Fe hotel registers, railroad, airline and bus records.

The search narrowed to 1,500 photographs and dossiers. Lights burned thru the night in the bureau's agencies. Then it narrowed to a handful. Then, more and more, the agents kept coming back to a photograph of a witness before a 1947 grand jury—an innocuous little man named Harry Gold.

He was working now in a heart research program at the Philadelphia General hospital and appeared neither surprised nor angry when the FBI called to ask for an interview. He set a time, appeared, and was co-operative but mum.

Would he allow motion pictures to be taken of him, to show to Fuchs? Certainly.

Would he permit the FBI to search his Philadelphia home? Certainly.

The search was made on the morning of May 22, 1950, just after Gold's father and younger brother—wholly ignorant of the business—had gone to work. Gold suggested that the two agents first search his bedroom, where, he said, he would most likely conceal evidence.

For a long time the search was fruitless. Then an agent, for reasons he still does not understand, looked behind a bookcase, reached down and pulled out a folder map of Santa Fe. He opened it and found an "X" marked on Castillo Street bridge—where Gold had met Fuchs in June, 1945.

The blood drained out of Gold's face. He had sworn to the agents he had never been west of the Mississippi.

"Mr. Gold, would you like to tell the whole truth?" an agent asked quietly.

"I Am the Man"

Gold hesitated a moment, then almost shouted, "I am the man to whom Klaus Fuchs gave his information."

(An hour later, FBI agents in England wired that Fuchs had identified the figure in the films as his American contact.)

Gold's confession, which this writer has seen, runs well over 100,000 words. It is the most fantastically thoro, erudite, self-pitying, self-abusing document I have ever read. He contemplated selling it several months ago and giving the money to the heart fund, but interested editors backed off when the Department of Justice would not permit him to be interviewed for the purposes of clarifying the passages of the soul-baring.

In short, Gold "did it" because he had been beaten up as a child by neighborhood anti-Semitic toughs and, as he grew, came to believe that Russian control of the world would end anti-Semitism. He never joined the Communist party because he disapproved of the "Bohemian" life of members he met.

Others Are Alerted

Gold said his philosophy was that "everybody should pass," a reference to his habit of staying up half the night, as a schoolboy, laboriously doing the lessons of schoolmates in different shadings of handwriting. When a Communist chemist named Black got him a job in the depression, Gold was

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Date: Dec 19, 1951

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so grateful that he willingly began supplying the Russian with whatever information he could find about chemical processes.

Julius Rosenberg and his wife Ethel knew, after the arrest of Fuchs, that it would be only a matter of time for them. They knew Gold would be next, and Gold would tell of Sgt. David Greenglass and, thru Greenglass, the Rosenbergs would be caught.

Rosenberg thrust \$5,000 on Greenglass and gave him complete instructions for his escape to Czechoslovakia, via Mexico, Sweden and Switzerland, with intricate recognition signals to boot. Greenglass stayed put in his cheap New York flat, was caught, turned United States evidence, and got 15 years. His wife was not tried.

The Rosenbergs, apprehended with packed bags, fought their case in court in a historic trial before Judge Irving R. Kaufman. The government's case was brilliantly handled by U. S. attorney (now judge) Irving Saypol, assisted by the present U. S. attorney Myles J. Lane and Asst. U. S.

attorneys James Kilsheimer and Roy Cohn.

The verdict: Guilty.

The sentence (requested by Saypol and arrived at only after both Saypol and Judge Kaufman had made separate visits to their synagogues, for divine guidance): death in the electric chair in Sing Sing.

Judge Kaufman condemned their act as "worse than murder."

The Rosenbergs have appealed, and the government is preparing its answer. If they are put to death they will be known, if not abhorred, in American history as the first persons ever condemned to death for treason by a non-military tribunal.

Ring Still Operates

The Russian spy ring in this country, altho sorely dented, is not believed to be defunct. The scope of our work on atomic weapons and the hydrogen bomb is now so vast that perfect security is hardly possible—altho as a result of the great atom-bomb robbery tremendous precautions are

now taken to guard secrets and screen workers.

It is likely that Russia has a fair grasp of many of our innermost atomic secrets. Fuchs gave away a priceless store of knowledge. What he did not know may since have been supplied by Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo, an associate of Fuchs' at Harley and earlier an associate of Dr. Allan Nunn May at Chalk River, Ontario.

Pontecorvo disappeared with his wife and three children behind the Iron Curtain in September 1950. He was, the 82d Congress' joint committee on atomic energy said, "a human storehouse of knowledge about the Anglo-American-Canadian atomic projects."

The committee believes that the defections of Fuchs, May, Gold, Greenglass and the Rosenbergs speeded up the first test of the Soviet atom bomb by 18 months. Others believe they speeded it by 10 years.

Whatever their contribution was, they sold your freedom—for peanuts and a clay-footed ideal. (World Copyright, 1951, by International News Service)

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Wash. News _____

Wash. Star _____

N.Y. Mirror _____

N. Y. Compass _____

Date: Dec 19, 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD *RL*

FROM : MR. BELMONT *EB*

SUBJECT: ARTICLES APPEARING IN WASHINGTON
TIMES HERALD IN DECEMBER, 1951,
WRITTEN BY BOB CONSIDINE CONCERNING
THEFT OF ATOMIC SECRETS BY SOVIETS.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
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DATE: December 19, 1951

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Gandy ☐

PURPOSE

To review the 10th article of this series. This article deals with the Fuchs-Gold case and describes how the case started by obtaining a coded MVD memorandum in East Germany which was by "FBI master cryptologists." Considine's source regarding the foregoing is not known but he is reasonably close to describing our source [redacted] Considine later in the article wrongly Fuchs in with Allan Nunn May through a notebook. Actually, Fuchs' name did appear in the Halperin notebook. Halperin was implicated in the Soviet espionage case in Canada but there is no tie-up in Halperin's espionage and Fuchs' espionage activities. The article also deals with the confession and sentencing of Fuchs and the events leading up to the FBI interview of Fuchs in London.

DETAILS

This 10th article by Considine is entitled "FBI Led in Cracking Open Soviet Ring of Atom Spies." It deals primarily with how the investigation of Fuchs began and deals with his confession and sentencing. It also speaks of the difficulty the FBI had in arranging to see Fuchs after his imprisonment. It sets forth that the FBI found Harry Gold on the basis of what Fuchs told us. There are several inaccuracies in this article which will be dealt with hereinafter.

MVD Coded Memorandum

Considine states, "The major share of the credit (for the breaking of the case) belongs to the FBI. The Bureau's work in the face of the remotest possible clues stands as an enduring monument to its public service. Scotland Yard played a vital role also, as did one Agent who cannot be named nor his affiliation indicated. That one Agent--astoundingly enough-- can be said to be 'close' to the inner workings of the Russian MVD. While in East Germany in 1948 he managed to obtain

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a coded MVD memorandum which made passing reference to a Communist agent well known in atomic research. It did not mention his name, the FBI learned later when its master cryptologists broke down the difficult code."

Comment: It is not known what Considine's source is for the foregoing. He is rather close to the true facts.

FBI Information
to the British

b1

Considine also states in his article that the FBI learned Russia was building an atomic bomb and because we knew of the Quebec agreement which enabled British atomic scientists to enter the United States without scrutiny we came to the conclusion that the guilty man must have been on the British team. He also states that the FBI was prodded to this conclusion and its earlier suspicions of Fuchs as the leak and "by what the FBI calls one mistake the brilliant scientist made during his years in this country." Considine says the Bureau will not reveal its informant and sent word to Britain in the Fall of 1949 that it had better inquire into Fuchs' activities.

Comment: The foregoing is basically accurate.

We did inform the British of our suspicions in September, 1949.

Allan Nunn May's Notebook

Again in this article Considine claims Scotland Yard had a clue to Fuchs' identity by the fact that one of Dr. Allan Nunn May's notebooks contained his name.

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Comment: In earlier articles Considine has made the same statement. Dr. Allan Nunn May was convicted of Soviet espionage on the basis of the disclosures made by Igor Gouzenko in Canada. There is no available information that his notebooks contained the name of Fuchs. It is believed that Considine is confused here as there has been previous newspaper publicity relative to a notebook which contained the name of Fuchs. This was actually Israel Halperin's notebook. It might be noted that Halperin claims to have heard of Fuchs while Fuchs was interned in Canada and our investigation never has disclosed any espionage tie-up between Fuchs and Halperin. Halperin was in a Soviet Military Intelligence network and Fuchs was in an MEB network.

FBI Interview of Fuchs

Considine deals with the confession and sentencing of Fuchs and then states "The FBI, which had supplied the British with vital tips leading to Fuchs' arrest, had difficulty arranging to see the prisoner. It was not until the following May that Agents [redacted] b7C were permitted to speak to Fuchs in the presence of a prison officer." He then explains about the meager facts which had been provided by Fuchs relative to the identity of Gold which did not include Gold's name or residence.

Comment: As you will recall, Fuchs was not able to provide data which would enable an easy identification of Harry Gold and he discarded an early photograph of Gold which was shown to him. It was on the basis of the data furnished by him, coupled with the information from [redacted] b1 [redacted] which led to our identification of Harry Gold. By the time Messrs. [redacted] b7C [redacted] we were reasonably certain that Gold was the man we were seeking. Fuchs identified Gold's photograph in England almost simultaneously with Gold's confession in Philadelphia.

ACTION

None. The above is for your information in the event we do receive comments from [redacted] (S) regarding Considine's remarks as to the original source. It is felt all we can do is tell the [redacted] b1 we do not know where Considine obtained his data. (S)

In view of the fact that inquiries regarding this article may be anticipated this memorandum is being routed to Mr. [redacted] for his information. b7C

✓ KLM

FBI Led in Cracking Open Soviet Ring of Atom Spies

This is the tenth of a series giving the detailed story of how Russia carried out history's most fateful international conspiracy and stole America's atomic secrets.

BY BOB CONSIDINE

The round-up of Dr. Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, Sgt. David Greenglass and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg — who combined with persons known and unknown to steal the multi-billion-dollar A-bomb secrets and thus drastically alter the course of history — is cloak and dagger drama at its ultimate.

The major share of the credit belongs to the FBI. The bureau's work in the face of the remotest possible clues stands as an enduring monument to its public service. Scotland Yard played a vital role also, as did at least one agent who cannot be named nor his affiliation indicated.

That one agent—astoundingly enough—can be said to be "close" to the inner workings of the dreaded Russian M.V.D. While in East Germany in 1948 he managed to obtain a coded M.V.D. memorandum which made passing reference to a Communist agent well known in atomic research. It did not mention his name, the FBI learned later when its master cryptologists broke down the difficult code.

Russ Explode Bomb

A bit earlier, as the cold war grew colder, British intelligence people inside Russia learned that Russian production of a prototype A-bomb was well along the way. Then in September, 1949, to the horror of the free world, Geiger counters and other radiation detecting devices rimming the Iron Curtain picked up the appalling evidence that the U.S. S.R. had successfully tested its bomb. The Soviet Union could thenceforth commence its stockpile and, with confidence, make bold aggressions against the democracies.

The horse, so to speak, had fled. But it did not lessen the determination to lock the barn door. For by that time we had greater A-bombs in the process of manufacture and the holocaustic H-bomb.

By determining how we were robbed the first time, and by catching and convicting the robbers, we might guard against a repetition.

Scotland Yard's chief clue as to the identity of a top spy in the atomic picture—looked better than it really was. The single word "Fuchs" had appeared in one of the many notebooks seized from the quarters of Dr. Allan Nunn May, the convicted atomic spy, in 1946. But there was no other reference to the name in May's notes. Other well-known and trusted names also had appeared in May's notes, for he was a man engulfed in the world of nuclear fission and his friendships were admittedly wide.

Deny German Visa

Nevertheless, the British denied Fuchs permission to travel to East Germany to visit his father, a famed Quaker and professor of religious science—after Fuchs returned from Los Alamos to become head of the theoretical division of Britain's top atomic energy project at Harwell.

In November 1947, Fuchs returned briefly to the United States to take part in the atomic energy commission's so-called declassification conference. This is a little known but shocking fact. The British perhaps at the suggestion of Scotland Yard, had left him off the team of experts assigned to aid the top brass in the AEC to decide which information could now be revealed, which must remain secret, and review the latest developments.

But three renowned American atomic scientists insisted that Fuchs be among the British physicists invited to attend!

So, one of history's master criminals arrived, took part in vital hearings, and later spent a short time at the University of Chicago's Argonne laboratories, a key research center.

Fuchs returned to England with a fresh store of advanced information, tho there were feeble cries later from U. S. scientists that he had not learned much that he did not already know. On

the first Saturday of the month following his return, he passed the information to the British courier who had taken the place of Harry Gold as Fuchs' contact man.

FBI Suspects Briton

Shortly after it was learned by the FBI that Russia was building the same type of devastating bomb whose secrets this country expected to possess exclusively for many years to come, J. Edgar Hoover's office—cognizant of the provision in the Quebec agreement which enabled British atomic scientists to enter the United States without scrutiny—came to the conclusion that the guilty man or men must have been on the British team.

The FBI was prodded to this conclusion, and its earliest suspicions of Fuchs as the "leak," by what it calls "one mistake" the brilliant scientist made during his years in this country. It will not reveal the mistake or its informant. Suffice it to say that the FBI sent word to Britain in the fall of 1949 that it had better inquire into Fuchs' activities.

The net was closing. And Fuchs, whom Rebecca West later called a "supreme egotist," was beginning to have his first doubts. But before Miss West could assay those doubts, Fuchs' Communist contact had. Fuchs began missing meetings with the contact. The contact's superior in the Soviet spy ring insisted that the courier force 100 pounds on Fuchs and demand that he—who had a contempt for money—accept it to prove his loyalty to the party and the intrigue.

Protests at First

Fuchs protested at first. But to demonstrate his faith he accepted the money, to his apparent disgust. He told the courier that while he was still of the opinion that a Marxist world would be a better world than the free one, he reserved to himself the right to criticize certain activities of the Communists.

Scotland Yard played Fuchs like a difficult fish. Three months before his arrest it arranged a tidy promotion for him at Harwell to allay any fears he might have, and obstruct any efforts the Russians might have of "liberating" him. His pay was raised from \$4,480 to \$5,040 a year.

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117-1114-7

Date: Dec 18, 1951

In January, 1950, Scotland Yard put the question to him. Fuchs stared blandly at them, the perfect picture of a scientist who found police crude and beneath him. William James Scardon, a security investigator at Harwell, put it quite bluntly. Fuchs shook his head and the little group of British officers were about to leave—for they had no real evidence against him—when Fuchs stopped them.

"I will make a statement," Fuchs said quietly.

In the subsequent interview that followed, and in several others, Fuchs proved a bewildering target to the direct-method police. At one point Scardon accused him directly of giving away A-bomb secrets.

Finally Gives In

Fuchs seemed surprised. "I do not think so," he said.

Many exasperating interviews later Fuchs told Scardon, "I will never be persuaded by you to talk." It was shortly before lunch time and Scardon suggested that he think it over during the repast. After the luncheon Fuchs' attitude changed. He agreed to answer questions because he now had a clear conscience.

His historic confession followed. It began with his "very happy childhood," his pride in the role he played with the Communist youth of Germany, his years of atomic work and betrayal, and his growing doubts about the perfection of communism.

Fuchs said he was prompted to do what he did because he believed that the Western Allies were deliberately allowing Germany and Russia to fight each other to death.

He added that he was a case of "controlled schizophrenia."

Report Kept Secret

"I used my Marxian philosophy," he explained, "to conceal my thoughts in two separate compartments. One side was the man I wanted to be. I could be free and easy and happy with other people without fear of disclosing myself because I knew the other compartment would step in if I reached the danger point . . . I succeeded in the other compartment in establishing myself completely independent of the surrounding forces of society."

His conscience was so clear, he said, that he could see no reason why he could not be retained at Harwell or be permitted to take a university job which would enable him to carry on his work in atomic energy.

To Prof. Michael Perrin, a fellow scientist, Fuchs gave a detailed report on the information he had given to the Russians. It is a report that has never been released, except in the broadest generalities, because of the fear that he used this device to tell the Soviet Union—by means of the report's publication—things

that either had slipped his mind or he had learned since his last contact with his courier.

In sentencing Fuchs on March 1, 1950, Lord Chief Justice Rayner Goddard intoned:

"You have betrayed the hospitality and protection given to you with the grossest treachery.

"Dare we now give shelter to political refugees who may be followers of this pernicious creed, who may well disguise themselves and bite the hand that feeds them?"

U. S. Harm Cited

"You might have imperiled the friendship between this country and the great American republic

with whom his majesty is allied. You have done irreparable harm both to this land and to the United States of America, and you did it as your statement shows clearly for the purpose of furthering your political creed."

The FBI, which had supplied the British with vital tips leading to Fuchs' arrest, had difficulty arranging to see the prisoner after he was taken to Brixton and given certain prison tasks which provide time for him to continue his scientific studies.

It was not until the following May that agents Hugh Clegg and Robert Lamphere were permitted to speak to Fuchs, in the presence of a prison officer. Clegg and Lamphere wanted information about Fuchs' American contacts.

Fuchs explained that while in the United States, he had had only one contact. He knew him only by the name "Raymond." He did not know where he lived or worked, judged him to be between 40 and 45, a chemist, and perhaps a first generation American.

From that meager story the FBI found Harry Gold!

(World Copyright, 1951, by International News Service)

[Tomorrow: The Roundup.]

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Date: Dec. 18, 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD

DATE: December 14, 1951

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: ARTICLES APPEARING IN WASHINGTON
TIMES HERALD NEWSPAPER IN DECEMBER,
1951, WRITTEN BY BOB CONSIDINE,
CONCERNING THE THEFT OF ATOMIC
SECRETS BY THE SOVIETS;
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
ESPIONAGE - R

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PURPOSE:

To summarize the second of a series of eleven articles written by Bob Considine, which are currently appearing in the Washington Times Herald newspaper and which relate to the theft of atomic secrets by the Soviets.

To inform of pertinent related data in our files.

BACKGROUND:

The Washington Times Herald newspaper is currently publishing a series of articles by Bob Considine concerning the theft of atomic bomb secrets by the Soviets.

These articles are being reviewed daily in the Domestic Intelligence Division.

A summary of the second article which appeared in the December 10, 1951, issue of the Washington Times Herald is set forth as follows:

SUMMARY OF ARTICLE:

The author relates that Arthur Alexandrovich Adams was the first-known coordinator of the A-bomb robbery and prior to Adams' escape from the United States he was apparently in charge of an extensive espionage apparatus which included Peter Ivanov of the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, Steve Nelson, Clarence Hiskey, John Hitchcock Chapin, Dr. Klaus Fuchs, Sergeant David Greenglass, Julius Rosenberg, and his wife, and Harry Gold.

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The author also relates that the Adams' apparatus eventually reached Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, who reported to General Leslie R. Groves that he had been contacted by the apparatus. At first, Oppenheimer refused to name his contact but he later did with the understanding that the contact would not be turned over to the FBI.

COMMENTS:

As you are aware, Arthur Adams was, without a doubt, a Soviet agent. However, it is extremely doubtful that he was in charge of the extensive espionage apparatus that the author attempts to portray. Adams was a member of the Soviet military intelligence apparatus headed by Pavel Mikhailov. Fuchs, Greenglass, Gold, and the Rosenbergs were working for an MGB apparatus.

With respect to the author's remarks concerning J. Robert Oppenheimer, MED advised the Bureau on August 26, 1943, that Oppenheimer had been approached about six months prior for information concerning the project. Oppenheimer refused to name the individual who approached him. On September 12, 1943, Oppenheimer again refused to name the individual who approached him, according to MED. On December 14, 1943, Oppenheimer advised MED that Professor Haakon Maurice Chevalier was the individual who had previously approached him and informed him that George Charles Eltenton desired information concerning the project for the Soviets. Our files do not reflect that these individuals were a part of Adams' apparatus. On September 5, 1946, Oppenheimer was interviewed by the Bureau and he furnished details concerning this incident. We have no information to the effect that Oppenheimer requested that the identity of his contact be withheld from the FBI at the time he furnished the information to MED.

No new pertinent information appears in this article of interest to the Bureau.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

REDS PLOTTED A-THEFT 3 YRS. BEFORE TESTS

Soviet Hero Sent Here in 1938

This is the second in a series of 11 articles telling the step-by-step story of how Russia penetrated seemingly impenetrable security to steal America's atomic secrets in history's most fateful spy conspiracy. The author, noted writer-reporter-columnist Bob Considine, obtained the facts behind the facts during months of research and in talks with atomic and security officials in the United States and Britain.

BY BOB CONSIDINE

(World Copyright, 1951, by International News Service)

Russia picked up wind of our A-bomb efforts in 1942, nearly three years before the first one was tested. Its agents immediately were assigned to gain all information available, by any means at their command.

The success of their mission changed the course of history. Possession of the bomb secrets and, in a startlingly short time, of an A-bomb stockpile, emboldened the Kremlin to engage in unprecedented aggression which gulped—if did not wholly digest—more than half a billion subjects.

Made Illegal Entrance

The first known co-ordinator of the great A-bomb robbery in this country was Arthur Alexandroich Adams, battle-scarred veteran of the Russian revolution of 1905. He gained illegal entrance into this country from Canada in 1938 with the aid of Samuel Novick, president of the Electronics Corporation of America, according to a House un-American activities committee report.

Novick later ~~acted~~ ^{acted} many war contracts and during that time sponsored left-wing broadcasters Johannes Steele and William S. Gailmor.

By 1942 Adams apparently was in charge of an extensive espionage apparatus. It involved a number of members of the Soviet consulates of San Francisco and New York. One of these, vice consul Peter Ivanov, attached at San Francisco and using as one of his operatives the notorious Steve Nelson, set up a particularly potent information-leaking cell in the University of California's radiation laboratories. Some of the lab's brighter young men became intimate associates of the spies.

Touched Chief Co-ordinator

The Adams apparatus eventually reached all the way out to touch Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, brilliant chief co-ordinator of all the scientific effort in connection with the bomb and now a principal adviser to the atomic energy commission.

In his restless youth Oppenheimer had toyed with the notion of joining the Communist party. His brother did. These facts were known to Gen. Leslie R. Groves when the over-all boss of Manhattan engineering district selected Oppenheimer as chief scientist of the project. It was, and remains, Groves' belief that Oppenheimer was thoroly loyal and the best man for the enormous job. The next best, Groves has said, would have been an alien scientist who, when the job was done, would return to a Europe threatened with communism.

Oppenheimer promptly reported to Groves that he had been contacted by the apparatus. At first he would not name the contact, but later did with the understanding that the man would not be turned over to the FBI.

Adams himself was not often seen in the company of a scientist. One exception to that rule, however, was Prof. Clarence H.

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SOVIET WORKED 3 YRS. TO STEAL A-BOMB SECRET

[Continued from first page]

key, who was assigned to atomic work in the fall of 1942 by Prof. Harold Urey, winner of the Nobel prize for chemistry in 1934 for his isolation of heavy hydrogen.

When MED security officers arranged for Hiskey to be put in the Army the scientist met with Adams in Chicago, then went to Cleveland to talk to John Hitchcock Chapin, a young chemical engineer employed in important metallurgical work at the University of Chicago's atomic effort. He asked Chapin to meet with Adams, Chapin later testified, and so that Chapin would recognize Adams he (Chapin) gave Hiskey a hotel key to give to the Russian spy. In time the men did meet and the spy passed the key back to Chapin, who got cold feet and clammed up.

Hiskey, who is now a member of the faculty of Brooklyn Poly, was given an opportunity to explain his role in the atomic conspiracy—at a later hearing by the House committee—but refused to answer pertinent questions "on the grounds that it may tend to degrade and incriminate me."

Adams Evades FBI

The FBI kept close tabs on Adams. One search of his room revealed information about Oak Ridge. J. Edgar Hoover's men watched Adams' American friends, too: Victoria Stone, jeweler in New York City; Julius Helman, steel importer whose daughter worked for Tass, Russian news agency; Eric Bernay, former advertising manager of the New Masses and recorder of Hanns Eisler's music, and others.

But Adams gave the FBI the slip in February, 1945, five months

before the test of the first A-bomb. The man crossed the country, approached to within a few feet of the gangplank of a Russian ship at Portland, Ore., recognized that he would be seized if he attempted to board, turned, spent an afternoon in a Portland movie, sped back to New York (closely followed) and then disappeared. Somehow, he got back to Russia.

He must be credited as a master-mind in the great robbery. By the time he vanished his apparatus was working perfectly. It had Dr. Klaus Fuchs and Sgt. David Greenglass inside super-secret Los Alamos, where the bomb was nearing completion. It had Julius Rosenberg and his wife working in New York. It had Harry Gold, a wistful-looking little Philadelphia chemist, running priceless information from Fuchs and Greenglass to Soviet spies in New York.

In the meantime, while Adams or his superiors pieced together threads of information picked up at Berkeley, Chicago, New York and Cleveland, Russia was gaining a picture of the A-bomb effort which could only have been of great assistance to its team of nuclear physicists headed by Dr. Peter Kapitza.

In all probability most of the information that was stolen left the U. S. in diplomatic pouches strapped to the strong wrists of accredited Soviet diplomatic couriers. The traffic in this information was steady and constructive, and it must have appeared to the Kremlin that it would never end.

But a link in the strong chain snapped, and the link was not a spy or an unwitting accomplice. He was a bona fide Russian, a devoted Communist and Red army officer. His brush with the free air of liberty did strange things to him, and his defection from communism did much to frustrate the fantastic intrigue.

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Date: _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: December 12, 1951

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: ARTICLES APPEARING IN WASHINGTON TIMES-HERALD NEWSPAPER IN DECEMBER, 1951, WRITTEN BY BOB CONSIDINE, CONCERNING THE THEFT OF ATOMIC SECRETS BY THE SOVIETS ATOMIC ENERGY ACT ESPIONAGE - R

PURPOSE:

To summarize the first of a series of eleven articles written by Bob Considine, which are currently appearing in the Washington Times-Herald newspaper and which relate to the theft of atomic secrets by the Soviets.

To inform of pertinent related data in our files.

BACKGROUND:

The Washington Times-Herald newspaper is currently publishing a series of articles by Bob Considine concerning the theft of atomic bomb secrets by the Soviets.

These articles are being reviewed daily in the Domestic Intelligence Division.

The first article, which appeared on December 9, 1951, is prefaced by the remarks that this is a story (in eleven installments) of how Russia stole the secrets of the atomic bomb. To secure the material for the story, the author states that he devoted months of research talking to Scotland Yard men, atomic experts in England, dozens of security officials, scientists, and others in this country.

A summary of the first article which appeared on December 9, 1951, is set forth, together with comments concerning pertinent related data in the Bureau files.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD *RL*

FROM : MR. BELMONT *EB*

SUBJECT: ARTICLES APPEARING IN WASHINGTON
TIMES HERALD IN DECEMBER, 1951,
WRITTEN BY BOB CONSIDINE CONCERNING
THEFT OF ATOMIC SECRETS BY SOVIETS.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
ESPIONAGE - R

DATE: December 19, 1951

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PURPOSE

To review the 10th article of this series. This article deals with the Fuchs-Gold case and describes how the case started by obtaining a coded MVD memorandum in East Germany which was broken by "FBI master cryptologists." Considine's source regarding the foregoing is not known but he is reasonably close to describing our source. Considine later in the article wrongly ties Fuchs in with Allan Nunn May through a notebook. Actually, Fuchs' name did appear in the Halperin notebook. Halperin was implicated in the Soviet espionage case in Canada but there is no tie-up in Halperin's espionage and Fuchs' espionage activities. The article also deals with the confession and sentencing of Fuchs and the events leading up to the FBI interview of Fuchs in London.

DETAILS

This 10th article by Considine is entitled "FBI Led in Cracking Open Soviet Ring of Atom Spies." It deals primarily with how the investigation of Fuchs began and deals with his confession and sentencing. It also speaks of the difficulty the FBI had in arranging to see Fuchs after his imprisonment. It sets forth that the FBI found Harry Gold on the basis of what Fuchs told us. There are several inaccuracies in this article which will be dealt with hereinafter.

MVD Coded Memorandum

Considine states, "The major share of the credit (for the breaking of the case) belongs to the FBI. The Bureau's work in the face of the remotest possible clues stands as an enduring monument to its public service. Scotland Yard played a vital role also, as did one Agent who cannot be named nor his affiliation indicated. That one Agent--astoundingly enough-- can be said to be 'close' to the inner workings of the Russian MVD. While in East Germany in 1948 he managed to obtain

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Comment: In earlier articles Considine has made the same statement. Dr. Allan Nunn May was convicted of Soviet espionage on the basis of the disclosures made by Igor Gouzenko in Canada. There is no available information that his notebooks contained the name of Fuchs. It is believed that Considine is confused here as there has been previous newspaper publicity relative to a notebook which contained the name of Fuchs. This was actually Israel Halperin's notebook. It might be noted that Halperin claims to have heard of Fuchs while Fuchs was interned in Canada and our investigation never has disclosed any espionage tie-up between Fuchs and Halperin. Halperin was in a Soviet Military Intelligence network and Fuchs was in an MEB network.

FBI Interview of Fuchs

Considine deals with the confession and sentencing of Fuchs and then states "The FBI, which had supplied the British with vital tips leading to Fuchs' arrest, had difficulty arranging to see the prisoner..... It was not until the following May that Agents Hugh Clegg and Robert Lamphere were permitted to speak to Fuchs in the presence of a prison officer." He then explains about the meager facts which had been provided by Fuchs relative to the identity of Gold which did not include Gold's name or residence.

Comment: As you will recall, Fuchs was not able to provide data which would enable an easy identification of Harry Gold and he discarded an early photograph of Gold which was shown to him. It was on the basis of the data furnished by him, coupled with the information from [redacted] which led to our identification of Harry Gold. By the time Messrs. Clegg and Lamphere went to England we were reasonably certain that Gold was the man we were seeking. Fuchs identified Gold's photograph in England almost simultaneously with Gold's confession in Philadelphia.

ACTION

(U) None. The above is for your information in the event we do receive comments from [redacted] regarding Considine's remarks as to the original source. It is felt all we can do is tell the [redacted] we do not know where Considine obtained his data.

In view of the fact that inquiries regarding this article may be anticipated this memorandum is being routed to Mr. Keay for his information.

~~SECRET~~

a coded MVD memorandum which made passing reference to a Communist agent well known in atomic research. It did not mention his name, the FBI learned later when its master cryptologists broke down the difficult code."

Comment: It is not known what Considine's source is for the foregoing. He is rather close to the true facts. [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

FBI Information
to the British

Considine also states in his article that the FBI learned Russia was building an atomic bomb and because we knew of the Quebec agreement which enabled British atomic scientists to enter the United States without scrutiny we came to the conclusion that the guilty man must have been on the British team. He also states that the FBI was prodded to this conclusion and its earlier suspicions of Fuchs as the leak and "by what the FBI calls one mistake the brilliant scientist made during his years in this country." Considine says the Bureau will not reveal its informant and sent word to Britain in the Fall of 1949 that it had better inquire into Fuchs' activities.

(U) Comment: The foregoing is basically accurate except that our [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We did inform the British of our suspicions in September, 1949.

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Allan Nunn May's Notebook

Again in this article Considine claims Scotland Yard had a clue to Fuchs' identity by the fact that one of Dr. Allan Nunn May's notebooks contained his name.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

November 4, 1947

DIRECTOR, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"KID" TUNE FINGER CROSSER
Article written by Bob Connelidne,
Appearing in June Issue of True Magazine
~~RECORDED~~ 117-251-2

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The Security Office of the Atomic Energy Commission Installation at Los Alamos, New Mexico, called to the attention of the El Paso Office of the Bureau an article appearing in the June issue of True Magazine written by Bob Connelidne. A review of this article reflected that Connelidne was asked by the Editors of True Magazine to write an article dealing with the atomic bomb.

The article was prefaced by the statement "He is qualified to divulge more information than has been made available to the average man." The article then pointed out that Connelidne was a correspondent at the Bikini test and was a writer for the motion picture "The Beginning or the End." It was further pointed out that Connelidne had talked with such men as Professor Oppenheimer, Major General Groves, Major General Farrell, Professor Einstein, Dr. Lee Duillard and others for his authority. This article answered such questions as "How big is the atomic bomb? What does the stuff look like? What makes it explode?" and other questions regarding the interior make-up and the materials used in the bomb.

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SENT FROM D. O.

TIME 6:00 AM 2

DATE 11-6-47

BY ~~RECORDED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

It is requested that you advise as to whether or not information as above constitutes a violation of any Federal Statute.

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