



U.S. Department of Justice

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
Washington, D.C. 20535

January 4, 2024

MR. JOHN R. GREENEWALD JR.  
SUITE 1203  
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD  
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request No.: 1342754-001  
Subject: 066-HQ-19012

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The FBI has completed its search for records subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that are responsive to your request. The enclosed 843 pages of records were determined to be responsive to your subject and were previously processed and released. Please see the selected paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☐ In an effort to provide you with responsive records as expeditiously as possible, we are releasing documents from previous requests regarding your subject. We consider your request fulfilled. Since we relied on previous results, additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may request an additional search for records. Submit your request by mail to **Initial Processing Operations Unit; Record/Information Dissemination Section; Information Management Division; Federal Bureau of Investigation; 200 Constitution Drive; Winchester, VA 22602**. You may also email your response to [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). Please include the FOIPA Request Number listed above in your correspondence.
- ☐ Please be advised that additional records responsive to your subject exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you must advise us that you want the additional records processed. Please submit your response within thirty (30) days to **Initial Processing Operations Unit; Record/Information Dissemination Section; Information Management Division; Federal Bureau of Investigation; 200 Constitution Drive; Winchester, VA 22602**. You may also email your response to [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). Please include the FOIPA Request Number listed above in your correspondence. **If we do not receive your decision within thirty (30) days of the date of this notification, your request will be closed.**
- ☐ One or more of the enclosed records were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession.

If this release of the previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may file a FOIPA request with NARA at the following address:

National Archives and Records Administration  
Special Access and FOIA  
8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500  
College Park, MD 20740-6001

- ☐ Records potentially responsive to your request were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and they were not previously processed pursuant to the FOIA. You may file a request with NARA using the address above.
- ☐ One or more of the enclosed records were destroyed. Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.
- ☐ Records potentially responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) according to Title 44 United States Code Section 3301, Title 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Chapter 12 Sub-chapter B Part 1228, and 36 CFR 1229.10.
- ☒ Documents or information referred to other Government agencies were not included in this release.

Inquiries regarding OGA referrals may be directed to the following agencies at:

Office of Information Policy (OIP)  
U.S. Department of Justice  
6<sup>th</sup> Floor  
441 G Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20530

Federal Emergency Management Agency  
FOIA Officer  
Disclosure Branch  
500 C Street, S.W.  
Mail Stop 3172  
Washington, D.C. 20472-3172

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **"Part 1"** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **"Part 2"** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **"Part 3"** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Additional information about the FOIPA can be found at [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia). Should you have questions regarding your request, please feel free to contact [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). Please reference the FOIPA Request number listed above in all correspondence concerning your request.

Please be advised that if you are seeking a new search for records, you may wish to narrow the scope of your request based on material that you have already received, e.g., timeframe or locality. Additionally, be advised that "unusual circumstances" may apply. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B)(iii). These "unusual circumstances" will delay our ability to make a determination on your request within 20 days. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B). Additionally, the payment of pertinent fees may apply to your request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(A)(viii). The application of "unusual circumstances" is not a determination of how the FBI will respond to your substantive request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of this response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.



You may seek dispute resolution services by emailing the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison at [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). The subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. G. Seidel". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "M" and a stylized "S" at the end.

Michael G. Seidel  
Section Chief  
Record/Information Dissemination Section  
Information Management Division

Enclosures

## FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

### Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

### Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Confidential Informant Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of confidential informant records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F) [5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F)] and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552a (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records would reveal confidential informant identities and information, expose law enforcement techniques, and endanger the life or physical safety of individuals. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

### Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches and Standard Search Policy.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems, such as the Central Records System (CRS), or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. The CRS is an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. The standard search policy is a search for main entity records in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include a search for reference entity records, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files.
  - a. *Main Entity Records* – created for individuals or non-individuals who are the subjects or the focus of an investigation
  - b. *Reference Entity Records*- created for individuals or non-individuals who are associated with a case but are not known subjects or the focus of an investigation
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Foreseeable Harm Standard.** As amended in 2016, the Freedom of Information Act provides that a federal agency may withhold responsive records only if: (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the nine exemptions that FOIA enumerates, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law (5 United States Code, Section 552(a)(8)(A)(i)). The FBI considers this foreseeable harm standard in the processing of its requests.
- (iv) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative "FBI file." An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at [www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks](http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks). Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at [www.edo.cjis.gov](http://www.edo.cjis.gov). For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.

## **EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS**

### **SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552**

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

### **SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a**

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault

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The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are  
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released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: December 13, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

66-17381-2026 Minnich

A memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated December 10, 1957, set forth the results of a meeting of the Interagency Planning Group (IPG) on December 9, 1957, at the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). As indicated in referenced memorandum, Phase III of the 1958 exercise is the Seat of Government phase. It was indicated at the above meeting that this would take place during the period August 4, 5 and 6, 1958, or September 8, 9 and 10, 1958, (the latter alternate dates not yet being established). This phase of the exercise will require a small group from each agency having responsibility and authority for emergency plans and operations to convene at the ODM relocation site (HIGHPOINT) to examine validity, feasibility and consistency of operational measures.

SE-22 66-19012-1

On the morning of December 13, 1957, the office of Mr. John F. Grady, Testing Officer, ODM, who presided over the IPG meeting on December 9, 1957, advised that the alternate September dates mentioned at the meeting had now been approved.

RECORDED-45

ACTION:

For information.

JMF:bjt  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

57 JAN 8 1958

53 MAY 22 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 22, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

Tolson  
Nichols  
Boardman  
Belmont  
Mohr  
Parsons  
Rosen  
Tamm  
Trotter  
Nease  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section attended a meeting of the Interagency Planning Group at the Office of Defense Mobilization on January 22, 1958. Mr. John Grady, Chairman of the group, advised that the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) presented a paper to the Cabinet at its meeting on Friday, January 17, 1958, and that the Cabinet approved the paper. The details of this are now being printed and will be distributed to the agencies on Monday, January 27, 1958. Mr. Grady advised that the Cabinet approved the suggested dates for the three phases of Operation Alert 1958 which are as follows:

Phase I - Attack Phase This will be held on May 6 and 7, 1958. This phase is for the State and local Civil Defense organizations.

Phase II - Federal Action Phase This will be held on July 14 through 18. The first two days will test the relocation sites at a field and regional level. On July 16-18 the Departmental relocation sites will be in operation and in communication with regional and field offices.

Phase III - Evaluation Phase This will be held on September 15, 16, and 17. The participation will be a small group, from each agency, having responsibility and authority for emergency plans and operations. This group will convene at the ODM relocation site along with selected regional representatives. The purpose of this last phase is to examine the validity, feasibility and consistency of operational measures and the adequacy of policies and essential programing guidance.

The details will be studied upon receipt and you will be advised of the results of this study.

Mr. Grady advised that considerable work is necessary to put Phase I, which is State and local Civil Defense organizations participation, into workable form. He advised that the interested agencies who are members of the Interagency Planning Group are invited to attend a two-day working session, January 28 and 29, at the ODM relocation site which is located at HIGHPOINT. Transportation and lodging will be furnished by ODM and each member will pay for his own meals.

OHB:bjt (5)

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Liaison Section

RECORDED - 40

EX-110

50 MAY 23 1958

18 JAN 27 1958

1 - Mr. Bartlett



Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont  
RE: OPERATION ALERT 1958

COMMENTS:

It is not believed that the Bureau would profit by sending a representative to this two-day meeting inasmuch as it will have to do with State and local Civil Defense emergency actions. At the conclusion of the meeting, Liaison can determine the results of the conference.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, Liaison will advise ODM that the FBI will not participate in the proposed two-day conference which is scheduled for January 28 and 29 at HIGHPOINT.

ASH  
9/18/58

ASH

gmm

gms

✓

OK  
✓

1-24-58

John Grady, ODM  
notified. ASH

Via Courier

**Date:** February 5, 1958

**To:** Office of Defense Mobilization  
Executive Office Building  
17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest  
Washington 25, D. C.

**Attention:** Mr. Joseph Stonesifer

**From:** John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

**Subject:** ~~PRINT-OUT DATA FOR OPERATION ALERT 1958~~

Reference is made to the telephone call from Mr. Joseph Stonesifer of the Office of Defense Mobilization to Mr. John F. Gallagher of the FBI Laboratory on January 29, 1958. It was requested that the following Office of Defense Mobilization categories of National Damage Assessment Center print-out data be furnished the Bureau's relocation site for Operation Alert 1958:

- Category 31** National Government, Headquarters  
(a) National Summary by Branch of Government  
(b) National Summary by Department  
(c) Name Print-Out by Department
- Category 32** National Government, Field  
(a) National Summary by Bureau  
(b) Name Point Print-Out by Bureau
- Category 37** Aggregate Population  
(a) By Metropolitan Area and County  
(b) National Summary
- Category 32** Deployed Population  
(a) By Metropolitan Area and County  
(b) National Summary

REC-18 66-17-12-3  
11 FEB 6 1958

Attack data such as ground zeroes, size and type of explosions and upper-wind data are also requested as necessary and damage assessment work at the Bureau's relocation site.

NOTE: Mr. Joseph Stonesifer, Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), National Damage Assessment Center (NDAC) called SA John F. Gallagher for the print-out data and attack data included in this let. were fully requested at that time. Print-out data is that obtained from the electronic computer at NDAC.

MAIL ROOM

10 1958

JFG:np (6)

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: February 4, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SYNOPSIS:

Letter dated 1/27/58 from Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) transmitted initial guidance Program Memorandum (PM) X-14 for Operation Alert 1958 (O/A 58). Letter notes particular emphasis will be on local and state participation with federal participation in the field and at Washington level on solving of substantive problems concerning use of available resources. Letter does not require acknowledgment. PM sets forth purpose, objectives, and situation of exercise and fact it will be in three phases: Phase 1, Attack Phase, May 6 and 7, 1958, with participation by state and local civil defense organizations "including field personnel of federal agencies, as appropriate." Phase 2, Federal Action Phase, July 14-18, inclusive, with participation by federal agencies, field, and Seat of Government (SOG). Field relocation sites to be activated on July 14 and 15 and activities conducted independently of SOG with SOG sites activated on July 16 to continue operations with field sites through July 18. Phase 3, Evaluation Phase, September 15, 16, and 17 with small group from each agency convening at ODM site for critique. Additional instructions will be developed by ODM. Observations are: Planning and phasing of O/A 58 is directed towards resource agencies to fully comply and test our emergency programs under an attack or imminent attack situation, we would have to prepare assumed situations and relocate during Phase 1, (5/6,7/58) thereby being only federal agency or Bureau so doing. We would still have to relocate during Phase 2, (July 14-18) to handle communications and requests from other relocated agencies. Past three years we have tested our emergency planning under attack situations; we have educated Departments of Justice and State as to necessity for immediate authority to place our

Enclosures 1, sent 2-6-58

JTM/mje (11)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman  
 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Mr. Trotter  
 1 - Mr. Tamm  
 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier)  
 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention: Mr. McGuire)  
 1 - Mr. Rosen  
 1 - Mr. Parsons  
 1 - Section Tickler  
 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC- 69

FEB 25 1958

55 FEB 28 1958

Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

programs into action; we have trained employees and developed techniques to a degree of perfection that continued similar testing during O/A 58 would not incur benefits to Bureau nor would it comply with ODM objectives, i.e., resources and training employees. It appears desirable to initiate our planning along resource, bomb damage lines with assumed situations revolving around movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies from contaminated areas into decontaminated areas and involving problems such as bomb damage and fallout analysis, emergency payroll procedures, number of personnel surviving initial attack, and where located, and whether they can be moved to personnel-depleted field offices, status of field office space, availability of automotive, firearms, and office equipment, and where located, and movement of equipment into depleted areas; these are but a few of the problems we would face after an attack which have never been tested. This would involve more personnel from Administrative and Laboratory Divisions, fewer over-all personnel, with Domestic Intelligence Division personnel responsible for over-all direction and success of operation. Savings of salaries and per diem should be realized while still meeting ODM's intent. Full compliance with Phase 2 would require our field offices to relocate on July 14 and 15, operating independently of SOG and remain at sites July 16 through 18. ODM planning does not recognize our responsibilities and the fact previous exercises have proven a two-day period sufficient to test our responsibilities, communications, and planning; anything over being a waste of time. It is felt that on receipt of additional instructions or if more propitious time presents itself, we should obtain ODM approval to relocate field offices on July 16, and 17 so entire Bureau participation, Seat of Government and field offices will be confined to July 16-18, inclusive. Incipient stage of ODM planning makes premature any observations re Phase 3 and consideration of other factors such as bomb damage reports and field office participation in Phase 1. Field offices should be informed by SAC letter of dates of Phases 1 and 2.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) SOG division heads particularly divisions participating in past exercises should not grant annual leave to employees whose service should be required for O/A 58 or plan any activities which would conflict with dates of Phase 2, July 14-18, inclusive.

(2) Training and Inspection Division should not schedule any sessions at Quantico during Phase 2 period and members of

Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

field office chain of command including SACS and ASACS should not be scheduled for conferences or in-service training.

(3) Upon receipt of additional ODM instructions or if more propitious time presents itself, Liaison will seek approval from ODM for Bureau field offices to relocate on July 16 and 17, 1958, with entire Bureau participation confined to July 16-18, inclusive.

(4) Defense Plans Desk, Liaison Section, will initiate planning along the lines of a resource, bomb damage type exercise revolving around movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies from contaminated areas into decontaminated areas and involving problems such as bomb damage and fallout analysts, emergency payroll procedures, number of personnel surviving initial attack, where located, and whether they can be moved to personnel-depleted field offices, status of field office space, availability of automotive, firearms and office equipment, and where located, and movement of equipment into depleted areas, which problems will utilize Administrative and Laboratory Division personnel with the over-all exercise under the direction and responsibility of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

(5) If recommendation number 4 is approved, Administrative and Laboratory Divisions immediately designate representatives to confer with Supervisor Minnich, Defense Plans Desk, Liaison Section, re their participation in the exercise.

(6) Attached SAC letter be sent.

Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

DETAILS:

Letter dated 1/27/58 from Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) enclosed Program Memorandum X-14, Operation Alert 1958 (O/A 58) which contains initial guidance for forthcoming exercise with additional instructions to be issued as required. According to letter, particular emphasis will be on local and state participation with federal participation in the field and at Washington level on the solving of substantive problems concerning the use of available resources. Letter poses no problems or questions and is not being acknowledged.

Program Memorandum X-14 sets forth purpose of exercise is to examine readiness at local, state, and national levels to meet a direct nuclear attack on the U.S.; objectives are to improve national readiness by local, state, and national governments to determine what preparedness measures if taken pre-attack would make post-attack job more manageable and to train personnel in habits of thinking needed to cope with emergency conditions, and the situation will be a direct nuclear attack on the U.S. with tactical warning only.

O/A 58 will be in three phases, i.e., Phase 1, Attack Phase: May 6 and 7, with participation by state and local civil defense organizations and supporting personnel "including field personnel of federal agencies, as appropriate;" activity includes public participation, damage reporting and assessment, and local and state survival and recovery actions. Phase 2, Federal Action Phase: July 14-18, inclusive, with participation by federal agencies (field, region and departmental); indicated activity is activation of relocation sites at field and region levels on July 14 and at Departmental and agency headquarters July 16 with field activities on July 14 and 15 conducted independently and Departmental sites in operation and communication with field sites on July 16, 17, and 18. Phase 3, Evaluation Phase: September 15, 16, 17, will require a small group from each agency having responsibility and authority for emergency plans and operations to convene at ODM relocation site along with selected regional representatives to examine operational measures and policies. Guidelines, assumptions, and administrative instructions for the exercise will be developed.

The exercise is to be conducted within the scope of Mobilization plans (presumably plans C and D minus now in



Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

existence) and federal guidance (central programming) presumably to be furnished in future.

OBSERVATIONS:

Interpretation of Program Memorandum X-14 (PM X-14) coupled with occurrences at past Inter-Agency Planning Group (IPG) meetings re O/A 58 denotes planning and phasing of the exercise is primarily directed towards situations within resource agencies. Phase 1 is the attack phase with major participation by local and state civil defense organizations, and Phase 2, the federal phase a D plus type phase with survival and resource situations indicated. To fully comply with this type phasing and in order to test our emergency programs under an attack or imminent attack situation, we would have to prepare our own assumed situations and relocate during Phase 1 thereby being the only federal agency or bureau so doing. Relocation during Phase 1 would not relieve us of the responsibility to again relocate during Phase 2 in order to handle communications and requests from other agencies in a relocated status.

For past three years our planning and participation in alert exercises has been based on assumed situations designed to test our emergency planning under an imminent attack situation. We have educated the Department of Justice and State as to the necessity for immediate authority to place into execution our "Detcom" and "Prodip" programs; we have successfully and thoroughly trained employees and developed our techniques to a degree of perfection that continued similar testing of our emergency planning during O/A 58 would not incur benefits to the Bureau nor would it comply with ODM's objectives, i.e., resources and affording different employees the opportunity of performing under simulated emergency conditions.

In order to test a different phase of our planning and to afford training to employees other than those with Domestic Intelligence Division responsibilities, it appears desirable to initiate our planning along the lines of a resource, bomb damage type operation. The Bureau's resources are personnel, equipment, and supplies, and we feel we can plan assumed situations revolving around movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies from contaminated areas into decontaminated areas involving problems such as bomb damage and fallout analysis, emergency payroll procedures, number of personnel surviving initial attack, and where located, and whether they can be moved to personnel-depleted field offices, status of field office space, availability of automotive, firearms, and office equipment, and where located, and movement of equipment into depleted areas; these are but a few of the problems we would face after an attack which have never been tested. The majority of personnel excluding communications personnel utilized in an exercise of this type would be

Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

Administrative and Laboratory Divisions' personnel with Domestic Intelligence Division personnel responsible for the over-all direction and success of the operation.

A resource-attack damage type operation would require fewer personnel and result in a savings of salary and per diem cost of the exercise while still fully cooperating with ODM intent.

Regarding the extent of our participation in O/A 58, full compliance with Phase 2 planning would require our field offices to relocate on July 14 and 15 to operate independently of the Bureau on these dates and then remaining at the sites through July 16, 17, and 18, 1958, to continue joint efforts with the Bureau's relocation site. This would require our field offices to remain in a relocated status for a five-day period whereas in O/A 57, they only remained in a relocated status for two days. ODM planning of this Phase fails to recognize our responsibilities but is directed primarily towards the responsibilities of the large resource agencies such as Agriculture and Interior. Further, previous exercises have proven that a two-day period is sufficient to fully test our responsibilities, communications, and planning with anything in excess of a two-day period being as far as we are concerned a waste of time. It is felt that upon receipt of additional guidelines re this Phase or if a more propitious time presents itself, we should through liaison obtain ODM approval for our field offices to relocate on July 16 and 17 so that Bureau participation in O/A 58 both field and Seat of Government (SOG) will be confined to July 16, 17, and 18.

Since ODM planning is in an incipient stage, observations re Phase 3 and consideration of other factors such as bomb damage reports and field office participation in Phase 1 would at this time be premature pending receipt of additional information from ODM.

We should advise field offices by SAC letter of dates for O/A 58 so as to permit SACs to plan leave schedules, speeches, etc.

All divisions at SOG should be cognizant of the dates for Phase 2 of O/A 58 for scheduling of annual leave and other activities. In particular, Training and Inspection Division should not schedule any sessions at Quantico during the period July 16-18, inclusive, and members of field office

Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

Chain of Command including SACs and ASACs should not be scheduled for conferences or in-service training.

Additionally, if the planning of a resource, bomb damage type operation is acceptable, the Laboratory and Administrative Divisions should immediately designate representatives to confer with the Supervisor of the Defense Plans Desk, Liaison Section, re their participation in the exercise.

*am*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : Mr. R. R. Rogers

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

DATE: February 26, 1958

Tolson ☒

Nichols ☒

Boardman ☒

Belmont ☒

Mohr ☒

Parsons ☒

Rosen ☒

Tamm ☒

Trotter ☒

Nease ☒

Tele. Room ☒

Holloman ☒

Gandy ☒

Reference is made to your memorandum to Mr. Boardman dated February 12, 1958, in the above-captioned matter. Referenced memorandum reported the receipt at the Bureau of copies of an Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) draft captioned "Standards for the National Non-military Defense Exercise--Operation Alert 1958 (Attack Phase)." The proposed draft related that a sealed envelope will be used to place appropriate information in the hands of local civil defense directors and appropriate Federal agency representatives to be opened at a specific time. It was indicated that this envelope may contain "sabotage incidents." Liaison was instructed to determine from ODM the type of "sabotage incidents" which would be included in this sealed envelope and whether the sealed envelopes will be made available to the Bureau.

On February 25, 1958, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section discussed instant matter with Mr. John Grady of ODM and Mr. Arnie Leathers, Federal Civil Defense Administration. Mr. Bartlett was advised that the Bureau would receive sealed envelopes for use in the exercise; however, at the present time it is not planned to use any "sabotage incidents" in the operation. Mr. Bartlett was further advised that if, at a later date, it was decided to use this type of information, it would be in the form of a situation that has already taken place such as the water supply of a certain city being knocked out. Liaison was assured that the envelope would not contain any sabotage problems to be handled by the Bureau during the operation.

ACTION:

For information.

OHB:bjt  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. A. H. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. J. T. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. O. H. Bartlett

REC-19

66-19012-10

MAR 3 1958

EX-128

55 MAR 4 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R.R. ROACH

FROM : MR. H. BARTLETT

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT-1958

DATE: March 11, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On March 10, 1958, I attended a meeting of the Interagency Planning Group at the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). The Chairman of this Group is Mr. John Grady of ODM. The discussion revolved around the attack phase of Operation Alert-1958, which is to be held on May 6 and 7.

Enclosed is a draft of program memorandum X14 and X1. The Group literally tore this draft apart and Mr. Grady advised that he would have the paper rewritten so that it could be more clearly understood. In view of this, there is no need to have this paper analyzed and it is attached for information purposes. Upon receipt of the new draft it will be completely analyzed and you will be advised of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

## Enclosure

OHB: jlk

(4)

- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett

Draft Detached  
 + returned Bufiles  
 Desk - Jm  
 3-12-58  
 Jm

REC- 50

EX. - 126

66-19012-11

18 MAR 12 1958

1486  
 55 MAR 14 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *4-7-58*

DATE: March 28, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *asko*SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958 - ATTACK PHASE  
MAY 6 AND 7, 1958SYNOPSIS:

Document containing standards for Operation Alert 1958, Attack Phase (O/A 58 A.P.) May 6 and 7, 1958, issued jointly by Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) - Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) received. Basic standards outlined therein and annexes A through K covering (A) Policy Assumptions, (B) Warning, (C) Communications, (D) Radiological Defense, (E) Health and Medical Care, (F) Welfare, (G) Transportation, (H) Exercise Reporting, (I) Emergency Information, (J) Resources and Requirements, and (K) manpower instructions are attached. Basic standards are that A.P. will be held 5/6 and 7/58 with "CHECKERBOARD," a simulated air raid warning, on 5/6/58 at unannounced time and resuming at 9 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, 5/7/58. "CHECKERBOARD" will be announced over FCDA National Warning System (NAWAS). Sealed envelopes covering attack data will be disseminated to State and local civil defense organizations and appropriate Federal agencies for opening at specified time. It is indicated "sabotage incidents" may be included in sealed envelopes but on 2/25/58 FCDA - ODM assured us no plans existed to include "sabotage incidents" but if included, they will be situations already occurred and envelopes will not contain any problems to be handled by Bureau. We will receive the envelopes before A.P. begins. Actual or simulated Conelrad drill proposed but we will not participate due to interference with our daily operations and compromise of our established field office code words which are to be used in an actual emergency. Federal agency participation in A.P. is voluntary and limited to liaison with State or local governments and analyzing and reporting from "in-place" effects of attack on operations. Believed advisable for field offices upon request to furnish mature, experienced agent to State and local civil defense organizations in liaison capacity to

Enclosures

*Reut 4-1-58*

JTM:nje (9)

ENCLOSURE

\*Control of electromagnetic radiation whereby stations discontinue broadcasts to minimize use of radio signals by enemy.

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier)

1 - Mr. Nease (Attention: Mr. McGuire)

1 - Mr. Parsons (Attention: Mr. Gallagher)

1 - Mr. Bartlett

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Winnich

REC-35

6 APR 7 1958

65 APR 17 1958

6484

memo reach to  
Belmont 4-11-58  
c 101/96k/101

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*Gauthier*  
*Rosen*  
*Wiley*

*Winnich*  
*LIAISON*



Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958 - ATTACK PHASE  
MAY 6 AND 7, 1958

explain our responsibilities and jurisdiction without becoming involved in local planning. The analyzing and reporting statement in document is not clear and we will obtain clarification from ODM through liaison. Annex A, "Policy Assumptions," indicates the Federal actions and policies are for use during all phases of O/A 58 while annexes B through K are for use during A.P. only. It appears with slight revisions annexes B through K will be used for Federal Phase 7/14 through 18/58 and pertinent Seat of Government divisions should review applicable annexes in connection with their planning for Federal Phase. Proposed SAC letter includes basic standards and instructions to the field re public participation drills, handling of the receipt of "CHECKERBOARD" over FCDA - NAWAS, the sealed envelopes, proposed Conelrad drill, liaison with State and local civil defense organizations, press inquiries, reports to outside agencies, and communications with the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) Attached SAC letter go forth.
- (2) Liaison determine from ODM the intent and extent of the instructions to analyze and report from "in-place" locations the effects of the attack on operations, also the statement "as appropriate Federal field agencies should prepare reports on effects of attack on their own situation."



Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958 - ATTACK PHASE  
MAY 6 AND 7, 1958

(3) Annexes pertinent to responsibilities of Seat of Government divisions be reviewed and considered by these divisions in connection with their planning for participation in Federal Phase of O/A 58 as follows: Laboratory Division review annex D - Radiological Defense; Administrative Division review annexes E - Health and Medical Care, F - Welfare, G - Transportation, J - Resources and Requirements, and K - Manpower; Records and Communications Division review B - Warning, C - Communications, and I - Emergency Information.

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

Left side: *[Signature]*  
Center: *[Signature]* *[Signature]* *[Signature]*  
Bottom center: *[Signature]*

Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958 - ATTACK PHASE  
MAY 6 AND 7, 1958

DETAILS:

Two copies "Standards for Operation Alert 1958, Attack Phase, May 6 and 7, 1958" dated 3/1/58 issued jointly by FCDA - ODM received Liaison Section via mail 3/25/58 (copy attached).

Pages 1 through 6 encompass the basic standards for the A.P. and attached are annexes A through K covering (A) Policy Assumptions, (B) Warning, (C) Communications, (D) Radiological Defense, (E) Health and Medical Care, (F) Welfare, (G) Transportation, (H) Exercise Reporting, (I) Emergency Information, (J) Resources and Requirements, and (K) Manpower.

Basic Standards for Attack Phase

The A.P. will be held 5/6 and 7/58 for a twelve-hour period each day beginning with "CHECKERBOARD," a simulated air raid warning on 5/6/58 and resuming at 9:00 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, 5/7/58. Time of "CHECKERBOARD" will remain unknown until announced over the FCDA - NAWAS the morning of May 6. It will assume that on 5/6/58 a direct attack was launched on the United States preceded by a minimum of two and a maximum of four hours warning. The attack pattern has been developed and the technique of sealed envelopes will be used to place attack, ground zero, size of weapon, type of burst, and yield of weapon information into the hands of State and local civil defense directors and appropriate Federal agency representatives for opening at the time specified. "Chemical, biological, and sabotage incidents may be contained in the sealed envelope attack data." A Canadian national test exercise will be held May 3, 4, and 9, 1958, and there will be some interplay such as liaison and exchange of attack information by State and local civil defense with their Canadian counterparts.

During the attack phase, State and local emphasis will be given to many factors one of which is "public participation drills" with FCDA - NAWAS disseminating "CHECKERBOARD" (simulated air raid warning) over NAWAS to initiate the A.P. with public dissemination of "CHECKERBOARD" and supplemental warning information to be made through State and local warning systems as directed by State and local authorities.

Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958 - ATTACK PHASE  
MAY 6 AND 7, 1958

If an FCDA proposal is accepted, Conelrad\* will be in effect for thirty minutes beginning with "CHECKERBOARD" and further simulated for duration of attack. In the event an actual Conelrad drill is not ordered, Conelrad is to be simulated for the full attack period.

Federal agency participation "as appropriate" is stated as "A. serving as liaison with or as part of State and local governments depending on the State and local plans; and B. Analyzing and reporting from 'in-place' locations the effects of the attack on their operations."

#### Observations Re Basic Standards

Field offices should be instructed to participate in evacuation tests or curb drills only to the extent permitted by the normal operation of the office.

Regarding possibility of "sabotage incidents" being included in the sealed envelopes to be disseminated by FCDA, Memorandum Roach to Belmont, 2/26/58, advised that on 2/25/58 FCDA and ODM representatives advised the Bureau would receive the sealed envelopes; that no plan exists to use "sabotage incidents" but if later decision is made to include "sabotage incidents," they will be in the form of a situation already occurred, such as water supply of a city knocked out. FCDA - ODM also assured the envelopes would not contain any sabotage problems to be handled by the Bureau.

An actual Conelrad drill which is doubtful, or a simulated Conelrad drill should not be instituted or engaged in by our field offices with respect to our CW network or two-way radio cars as to do so would jeopardize our daily operations and cancel out the Conelrad code word to be utilized by each field office during an actual emergency.

In the past, field offices have been authorized to assign mature, experienced Bureau Agents to attend local civil defense briefings on alert exercises or to act in a liaison capacity for purposes of explaining the Bureau's jurisdiction and responsibilities, with instructions to refrain from becoming involved in any local planning activities. Participation by Federal agencies in the A.P. is voluntary; however, it certainly appears desirable to have the field offices, in the absence of any condition which would make it undesirable, and upon request

\*Control of electromagnetic radiation whereby stations discontinue broadcasts to minimize use of radio signals by enemy.

Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958 - ATTACK PHASE  
MAY 6 AND 7, 1958

by State or local civil defense, to designate a mature, experienced Agent to attend any pre-exercise briefings or to act in a liaison capacity at the headquarters only, of State or local civil defense organizations for purposes of explaining the Bureau's jurisdiction and responsibilities without becoming involved in local planning.

The basic standards plus instructions to the field concerning the extent of their participation in the A.P. should be set forth in ahSAC letter.

The statement regarding analyzing and reporting from "in-place" locations the effects of the attack on operations in connection with Federal agency participation is not further clarified in the document. It probably pertains to effects on resources but we should through liaison determine the extent of this requirement and whether we will be required to report on assumed damage to our field offices, our equipment, and casualties to our personnel.

Observations Re Annexes A through K

Annex A, "Policy Assumptions," indicates the Federal actions and policies are for use during all phases of O/A 58 whereas annexes B through K are indicated to be for use during the A.P. only. It appears, however, that with some slight revision the contents of these annexes will probably become applicable to the Federal Phase July 14 through 18, 1958. The Laboratory, Administrative, and Records and Communications Divisions should review the annexes pertinent to their responsibilities and consider them in connection with their planning for participation in the Federal Phase of O/A 58.

It is noted that annex H, "Exercise Reporting," again refers to "as appropriate Federal field agencies should prepare reports on effects of attack on their own situation." This will also require clarification through liaison with ODM.

*JSW*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ah*

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *RR*

SUBJECT: 0 BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958 *Santhrin*

DATE: April 4, 1958

Tolson ☒

Nichols ☒

Boardman ☒

Belmont ☒

Mohr ☒

Parsons ☒

Rosen ☒

Tamm ☒

Trotter ☒

Nease ☒

Tele. Room ☒

Holloman ☒

Gandy ☒

On April 2, 1958, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section attended a meeting of the Interagency Planning Group (IPG) at the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). The chairman of this Group is Mr. John Grady of ODM. Mr. Grady announced that the second phase of Operation Alert 1958, in which the Federal agencies will participate, will close at 4:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on July 18, 1958, rather than 5:30 p.m. of the same date. Mr. Grady said that this change would assist Federal employees in returning to Washington from relocation sites. *Loose*  
*Minnich*

Mr. Grady announced also that target data which have been prepared by the Target Selection Committee are now being printed and will be delivered to the agencies on either April 8 or 9, 1958.

Mr. Grady announced that relocation guide lines will be furnished to the Federal agencies on or about April 11, and that the standards for Federal participation in Phase II of Operation Alert 1958 (Federal relocation) should be in the agencies' hands by May 1, 1958. *Grady*

ACTION:

For information. The above-mentioned papers will be reviewed at the Bureau upon their receipt and you will be advised of the items of Bureau interest. *d*

*OH*  
OHB:bjt  
(6)

- Ans*
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
  - 1 - Mr. Parsons
  - 1 - Mr. Minnich
  - 1 - Liaison Section
  - 1 - Mr. Bartlett

REC-23

66-19012-14  
12 APR 9 1958

EX. - 135

62 APR 11 1958 *436*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

#77Civ999    
Classified by    
Declassify on: OADR 8/26/87  
*only pages 3, 4, 5 and 6 reviewed  
for classification*

4/8/58  
SAC LETTER NO. 58-25

(E) BUPLANS - <sup>0</sup>OPERATION ALERT-1958 - ATTACK PHASE,, MAY 6 AND 7,  
1958 -- Re SAC Letter 58-10 (B) Buplans Operation Alert 1958.

Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) and Office  
of Defense Mobilization (ODM) have issued jointly basic standards  
for the Attack Phase of Operation Alert 1958 and pertinent portions  
thereof are as follows:

The Attack Phase (A.P.) of Operation Alert 1958 (O/A  
58) will be held May 6 and 7, 1958, for a twelve-hour period each  
day beginning with "CHECKERBOARD," a simulated air raid warning

4/8/58  
SAC LETTER NO. 58-25

- 3 -

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-2733

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102 APR 17 1958

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

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67 APR 17 1958

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

on 5/6/58, and resuming at 9:00 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, 5/7/58. The time of "CHECKERBOARD" will remain unknown until announced over the FCDA National Warning System (NAWAS) the morning of May 6, 1958. The assumptions for the A.P. will be that on 5/6/58 a direct attack was launched on the United States preceded by a minimum of two and a maximum of four hours' warning. The attack pattern has been developed by FCDA - ODM and the technique of sealed envelopes will be used to place attack, ground zero, size of weapon, type of burst, and yield of weapon information into the hands of State and local civil defense directors and appropriate Federal agency representatives for opening at the time specified. FCDA - ODM instructions are that "Chemical, biological, and sabotage incidents may be contained in the sealed envelopes." (C) (U)

A Canadian national test exercise will be held 5/3, 4, and 9/58 and there will be some interplay such as liaison and exchange of attack information by State and local civil defense with their Canadian counterparts. (C) (U)

During the A.P., State and local emphasis will be given to many factors, one of which is "public participation drills" with FCDA - NAWAS disseminating "CHECKERBOARD" over NAWAS to initiate the A.P., with public dissemination of "CHECKERBOARD" and with supplemental warning information to be made through State and local warning systems as directed by State and local authorities. (C) (U)

If an FCDA proposal is accepted, Conelrad will be in effect for thirty minutes, beginning with "CHECKERBOARD" and further simulated for duration of attack. In the event an actual Conelrad drill is not ordered, Conelrad is to be simulated for the full attack period. (C) (U)

Federal agency participation is on a voluntary basis "as appropriate" and is stated as "serving as liaison with or as part of State and local governments depending on the State and local plans and analyzing and reporting from 'in-place' locations the effects of the attack on their operations." (C) (U)

All field offices encompassing areas participating in the A.P. of O/A 58 are to be guided by the following instructions: (C) (U)

#### Public Participation Drills (C) (U)

If local civil defense is planning an evacuation test or curb drill as part of the A.P. of O/A 58 in the area wherein your office is located, you should participate only to the extent permitted by the normal operation of your office. (C) (U)

4/8/58

SAC LETTER NO. 58-25

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FCDA - NAWAS (S) (U)

Field offices tied into FCDA - NAWAS upon receipt of "CHECKERBOARD" should accept the simulated air raid warning as a test message and should not make further dissemination of the warning information outside the confines of their offices. The test message should not be relayed to the Bureau or other field offices and no action need be taken in connection with its receipt. (S) (U)

Sealed Envelopes Containing Attack Data (S) (U)

The sealed envelopes containing attack data will be made available to the Bureau by FCDA - ODM and no effort should be made to obtain the information from State or local defense organizations at the time the envelopes are opened. Regarding the possibility of "sabotage incidents" being included in the sealed envelopes, FCDA - ODM have advised no plans exist to use "sabotage incidents" but if a decision is made to do so, incidents will be in the form of situations already occurred and will not require simulated or assumed handling by the FBI. (S) (U)

Conelrad Drill or Simulated Conelrad Drill (S) (U)

You should not participate in any real or any simulated Conelrad drill. (S) (U)

Liaison with State and Local Civil Defense Organizations (S) (U)

In the absence of any condition which would make it undesirable and upon request by the State or local civil defense organization, you may designate a mature, experienced agent to attend any pre-exercise briefing or to act in a liaison capacity, at the headquarters only, of the civil defense agency so requesting. Any agent so designated should only advise the State or local civil defense authorities of the Bureau's jurisdiction and responsibilities in the event of a national emergency. The designated agent should be reminded he is not to discuss any of the Bureau's confidential programs. However, if the need arises, he may point out the FBI is fully cognizant of any problems which might be presented in the event of an enemy attack or other grave emergency; that the FBI has provided for its own defense planning; that all FBI personnel will be utilized to meet our responsibilities, and that all information pertaining to the FBI's defense planning is on a need-to-know basis. The agent should not become involved in any local planning activities. (S) (U)

4/8/58  
SAC LETTER NO. 58-25

- 3 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Press Inquiries ~~(C)~~ (U)

Any inquiries from the press or other public information media as to your participation in the A.P. of O/A 58 may be answered with a statement to the effect that your office is participating in conformance with the basic standards prescribed by FCDA - ODM. ~~(C)~~ (U)

Reports to Outside Agencies ~~(C)~~ (U)

You are not to prepare or submit reports regarding assumed effects of the attack upon your operations to FCDA - ODM or any other agency. In the event such a request is received, you should advise that all required reports are being handled by the Bureau. In the absence of unusual circumstances, it will not be necessary for you to advise the Bureau of any such request. ~~(C)~~ (U)

Communications with the Bureau ~~(C)~~ (U)

You will be expected to be aware of all facets of State and local defense planning and to be alert to any printed matter or press releases by State or local civil defense organizations which may touch upon the Bureau's responsibilities and jurisdiction. However, unless the planning or printed matter conflicts with the Bureau's responsibilities, jurisdiction, or defense planning, you are not to transmit to or communicate with the Bureau concerning same. ~~(C)~~ (U)

Since you should not receive assumed problems from State or local civil defense authorities or from the Bureau during the A.P., it is not foreseen that communication with the Bureau regarding the A.P. will be necessary. However, in the event you deem it advisable to communicate with the Bureau regarding the A.P., all communications should be captioned "Buplans - Attack Phase, May 6 and 7, 1958," and you should prefix and end all such communications with "Exercise Opal 58." ~~(C)~~ (U)

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 11, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT - 1958  
ATTACK PHASE  
MAY 6 and 7, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Reference is made to your memorandum to Mr. Boardman dated March 28, 1958, in the above-captioned matter. In connection with the "Standards for Operation Alert - 1958," which have been reviewed at the Bureau, two questions were raised concerning the Bureau's reporting in connection with the attack phase. Liaison was requested to determine from Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) clarification on necessity for FBI reporting to ODM on the following two items mentioned in the "Standards:" (1) The intent and extent of the instructions to analyze and report from "in-place" locations the effects of the attack on operations, and (2) "as appropriate, Federal field agencies should prepare reports on the effects of attack on their own situation."

On April 9, 1958, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section discussed instant problems set forth above with Mr. John Grady, ODM. Mr. Grady advised that the FBI will not be required to submit reports in either situation.

Apart from the above, Mr. Grady advised Mr. Bartlett that the Federal phase of Operation Alert scheduled for July, 1958, will commence with a "D+14" situation. Even though it will not affect the Bureau in its own planning, Mr. Grady said that with the exercise beginning 14 days after attack it can be assumed that the emergency and resource agencies, which will be set up as a result of war conditions, will be in operation.

ACTION:

For information.

OHB: jlk/bjt

(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett

REC-79

66-19012-15

EX-126

APR 15 1958

50 APR 17 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ahb*

DATE: March 27, 1958

FROM : Mr. E. R. Roach *ER*  
*Prop/ans*

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

On March 25, 1958, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section attended a meeting of the Interagency Planning Group at the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). Mr. John Grady, ODM, is chairman of this group. Mr. Grady advised that the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) standards for Operation Alert 1958 should be delivered to the agencies within the next few days. He further advised that the Target Selection Committee for the 1958 test has made ~~the~~ report and this report has been cleared by the Director of ODM. Mr. Grady advised that the agencies will be advised of the target selections prior to the actual test. Mr. Grady advised that various other items of interest to the agencies which would be used in the test are in various stages of preparation and that the following list represents the items and proposed dates of completion:

1. Target selection approval ..... 3/18/58
2. Fallout map prepared ..... 4/1/58
3. 1st computation completed ..... 4/4/58
4. Printing and binding first set ..... 4/11/58
5. All computation completed ..... 4/18/58
6. Printing and binding second set ..... 4/25/58
7. Damage Assessment Training Conference,  
Washington, D. C. .... 4/28-29/58
8. Damage Assessment Training Conference,  
San Francisco, California ..... 5/1-2/58
9. Test run of National Damage Assessment  
Center alternate facilities on West Coast 5/5 & 7/58
10. 1st drafts including condensed tables on  
damage analysis ..... 5/16-30/58
11. Final drafts & reproduction of analysis  
completed ..... 6/15-27/58

Mr. Grady advised that the next meeting of the Interagency Planning Group will be held on Wednesday, April 2, 1958. You will be advised of any action taken at this meeting.

ACTION:For information *EX-128*OHB:bjt *ly*

(5)

1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. Winnich *4486*  
1 - Liaison Section  
1 - Mr. Bartlett

58 APR 24 1958

REC-77

66-19012-16

10 APR 17 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. J. Parsons *DJP*

DATE: April 29, 1958

FROM : B. J. White *B. J. White*SUBJECT: OPERATIONS ALERT - 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mason      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Winterrowd | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

On April 24 and 25, 1958, Special Agent William R. Heilman attended a training conference on damage assessment held by the National Damage Assessment Center (NDAC) Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) at their relocation site. Approximately one hundred persons from all branches of the Government attended this conference.

The conference was intended to give basic training for hand assessment of damage resulting from a nuclear attack on United States. Hand damage assessment is carried out by plotting ground zero on a map and applying calculated probabilities for structural damage, thermal effects, personnel casualties and immediate area fallout (large particles which drop almost immediately called "throwout" as distinguished from widespread fallout) for the particular size and type of weapon detonated. This is the type of assessment carried out by Laboratory personnel during the previous operation alerts, with the exception of personnel casualty estimates. Last year these personnel casualty estimates were based on data from printouts obtained from the Univac Electronic Computer prepared by NDAC several days after the initial attack phase after accumulating data from the mock attack.

The one and a half million dollar Univac was obtained by ODM to electronically handle the multitude of damage assessment data for national resources and essentially yields the same results as hand assessment, except on a larger scale and on some seventy resources such as agricultural potentialities, port and rail facilities, finance, etc.

WRH/ch  
(4) *WRH*

REC-69

53 MAY 7 1958

66-19012-271  
MAY 5 1958

PERS. FILES

Memo White to Parsons  
Re: OPERATIONS ALERT, 1958

Overall nation wide fallout plots resulting from a large scale attack still have to be hand prepared by using upper wind fallout forecasts obtainable from sixty-six weather stations throughout United States. For the purpose of Operations Alert, 1958, the fallout forecast for May 4, 1958, will be used as standard for ensuing problems and operations. A copy of this fallout map, prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Agency, will be distributed to Federal agencies on May 8, 1958. In contrast to the two atomic bombs actually dropped on Japan, where fifteen to twenty per cent of the casualties were attributed to radiation from fallout, it is believed that with the newer, larger weapons, fifty per cent of the total casualties will be from radiation due to fallout.

The NDAC now feels that the new nuclear weapons have created new target systems and cities with high population densities, once considered as high priority targets, are no longer thought of as such and are referred to as "soft targets." SAC bases, missile launching sites and other war waging facilities are now considered by NDAC as prime or "hard" targets.

Although no relocation site can be guaranteed to be beyond the shadow of a fallout pattern resulting from a large scale attack, each of our relocation sites was selected on the basis of climatological wind data to minimize fallout problems and at the same time taking into consideration near by military and like potential targets.

NDAC furnished a series of thirty-two acetate templates to be used on one to five hundred thousand scale maps for evaluating blast damage, personnel casualties and immediate area fallout radiation intensities. These templates have been prepared as a result of Univac studies and set forth various rings of per cent probabilities for the three categories as applied to several different sizes and types of weapons.



Memo White to Parsons  
Re: OPERATIONS ALERT, 1958

It was interesting to note that the FBI Laboratory appeared to be well ahead of most Government agencies in planning, training, providing personnel protection devices and hand damage assessment procedures.

Action: For information only

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *5/6/58*

DATE: May 6, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*SUBJECT: DUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
ANALYSIS TASK GROUPS  
(CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT)

|                                     |                |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Tolson     |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Boardman   |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Belmont    |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Mason      |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Mohr       |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Parsons    |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Rosen      |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Tamm       |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Nease      |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Winterrowd |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Tele. Room     |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Holloman   |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Mr. Gandy      |

Form letter dated 4/25/58 from Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) advises a primary objective of Operation Alert 1958 (O/A 58) is to deal with substantive problems and task groups are being established to analyze estimated damage in certain principal areas as listed on an attachment to ODM letter. Letter states "Those task groups on which representation from your agency is requested are indicated by an asterisk," and if representation is desired on other task groups, ODM should be advised. The task group indicated by an asterisk on an attachment to ODM letter is "Continuity of Government" and the agency team captain for this group is "Bureau of the Budget."

On 5/5/58 the office of John Grady, ODM, advised Supervisor Bartlett, Liaison Section, that they thought FBI might be interested in participating in task group on Continuity of Government but that participation is not required.

OBSERVATIONS:

We continually refrain from participating in committees or task groups of this nature and particularly since O/A 58 is primarily a resource exercise of basic interest to resource-type agencies, we should decline ODM's invitation to participate. We, of course, through liaison receive the results of these studies, and the applicable portions are utilized in connection with our defense planning.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached letter to ODM go forth.

Enclosure *sent 5-7-58*

JTM:mje (6)

REC-95

EX-117

MAY 1958

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

50 MAY 12 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: May 2, 1958

FROM : MR. O. H. BARTLETT

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

At the request of Mr. Henry F. Hurley, who heads the Office of Continuity of Government at the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), I attended a meeting at ODM on May 2, 1958, together with other relocation officers from the Federal agencies and departments. Mr. Hurley said that ODM, with the approval of the National Security Council, is now looking into the problem of fallout protection for relocation sites in an attempt to determine how much money is necessary to make the relocation sites usable immediately after attack and during the period when dangerous fallout would be most prevalent.

Mr. Hurley advised that ODM will send a memorandum to the agencies and departments within the next few days asking two questions; first, the number of employees of the particular agency who will be needed at the relocation site during the first three to four weeks following attack to handle essential noninterrupted functions; second, a statement concerning the general functions of those persons to be relocated during this same period. According to Mr. Hurley, the answer to this questionnaire should be returned to ODM not later than June 27, 1958. The answers from all agencies and departments will then be turned over to Public Buildings Services of General Services Administration in order to arrive at estimated cost to the Federal Government to make relocation sites safe and usable during the pertinent period after attack. GSA will then include this figure in its 1960 budget request which will go to Congress. The plan is to have the money appropriated in a lump sum to GSA rather than have individual agencies submit separate budget requirements for this particular work. Mr. Ed Cox, Relocation Officer, ODM, pointed out that the 45 Federal agencies and departments who will relocate will use 92 sites to carry out headquarters functions. Forty per cent of these sites are Federally owned. The immediate problem at hand deals only with headquarters functions and not field relocation sites.

ACTION:

Upon receipt of the ODM questionnaire, an appropriate answer will be prepared and transmitted to ODM prior to June 27, 1958.

OHB:jlk (4) jlk  
 1 - Mr. Minnich  
 1 - Liaison Section  
 1 - Mr. Bartlett

60 MAY 12 1958

EX-117

REC-95

10 MAY 8 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nease

DATE: May 6, 1958

FROM : L. E. Wherry, Jr.

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS AT  
RELOCATION SITE JULY 14 AND 15, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ODM Program Memorandum X-14, Annex No. 2 (Communications Annex) dated April 15, 1958, states "All communications facilities to be utilized during Phase Two, Operation Alert, 1958, should be staffed on an 8-hour basis no later than 8:30 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, July 14, 1958, and on a 24-hour basis no later than 8:30 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, July 16, 1958."

To afford the coverage at our relocation site requested by ODM on July 14 and 15, 1958, a skeleton staff of communications employees can (1) go to the Academy on Sunday evening, July 13, and remain over night at the Academy throughout the exercise, or (2) travel to and from Quantico on July 14 and to Quantico July 15, staying over night at Quantico July 15, 16 and 17. The primary reason for operating the communications equipment on July 14 and 15 is to assure that the equipment is working properly when the full activities start on July 16 when the remainder of the communications personnel needed will arrive with other evacuees from the Bureau.

I am opposed to (1) since it will needlessly increase the per diem costs attributable to the exercise. I am opposed to an 8-hour operation as set forth in (2) because it will require, and for no apparent good reason, that our communications section personnel put in an 11-hour day on July 14 and a 9½ day on July 15. It takes 1 hour to drive between Quantico and the SOG, ½ hour to prepare for a communications test after arrival at Quantico and ½ hour to secure equipment and communications material after operations. We expect to be extremely busy with official exercise traffic on July 16 and 17, and our personnel may be required to work long hours on these first two days of the full exercise activities. *is*

1 - Mr. Boardman  
 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Mr. Minnich  
 1 - Mr. Sloan

*sent direct*

LEW:nma  
 (6)

REC-62

10 MAY 12 1958

EX-117

50 MAY 14 1958

*memo Roach to Belmont*  
*5-9-58*  
*ITM: puf.*

*66-19012-28*  
*[Signature]*

Mr. Nease

May 6, 1958

ODM did not object to our operating the communications equipment at our relocation site for less than 8 hours per day before the main exercise activities last year.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Liaison Section advise ODM and Justice Department that our relocation site communications facilities will be manned from 9:30 a.m. to 3 p.m. EST, July 14 and from 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. EST, July 15, next.

R

Jim

ant

Hear

for all  
gr

gr

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach *R*

DATE: April 15, 1958

FROM : Mr. O. H. Bartlett *OHB*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On April 15, 1958, I attended a meeting of the Interagency Planning Group (IPG) at the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). Very few items of Bureau interest were discussed at this meeting.

Mr. John Grady of ODM, Chairman of the Group, did mention that the fallout maps are now being printed and that they will be distributed to the agencies by May 1. These are the maps that will go to the field in sealed envelopes in those agencies where the field offices are participating in Phase I of Operation Alert. For uniformity, Mr. Grady mentioned that the sealed envelopes which are to be used in the test are not to be opened before the first attack, within a given State.

Mr. Grady introduced to the Group Mr. Robert Bowman who is on loan from Commerce to ODM for a few months. Mr. Bowman is doing the staff work on reports and evaluation for Phase II of Operation Alert. Mr. Grady mentioned that the next two meetings of the IPG will take place on April 29 and May 13, 1958.

ACTION:

For information.

OHB:bjt *bjt*  
(4)

- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett

REC-36

EX-117

66-19012-30

MAY 18 1958

F-101  
53 MAY 14 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ah*

DATE: May 9, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *RR*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS AT  
RELOCATION SITE JULY 14 AND 15, 1958

|            |                                     |
|------------|-------------------------------------|
| Tolson     | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Nichols    | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Boardman   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Belmont    | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Mohr       | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Parsons    | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Rosen      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Tamm       | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Trotter    | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Nease      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Tele. Room | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Holloman   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Gandy      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

Memorandum Wherry to Nease May 6, 1958, contains approved recommendation for Liaison to seek approval from Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) to man our relocation site communications facilities from 9:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, July 14 and from 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time July 15, 1958. Also, that if the hours are approved, the Department of Justice be so advised.

On May 9, 1958, John Grady, ODM, advised Supervisors Bartlett and Minnich, Liaison Section, that ODM granted approval for the hours stated. Grady said he recognized the FBI would have little or no traffic on the dates in question.

On May 9, 1958, Mr. Frank of the Communications Section, advised Supervisor Minnich that he had notified Joe B. Nelson, who is in charge of relocation site communications facilities for the Department, of ODM's approval of the hours in question.

ACTION:

None. These hours will be shown in our over-all brief for participation in Operation Alert 1958.

JTM:pwf *pwf*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention Mr. McGuire and Mr. Wherry)
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-85

EX - 123

66-19012-33  
MAY 16 1958

68 MAY 21 1958

LIAISON

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 16, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
INTERAGENCY PLANNING GROUP MEETING 5/13/58

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

On 5/13/58 Supervisor Minnich, Liaison Section, attended an Interagency Planning Group (IPG) meeting at Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM).

Meeting was presided over by John Grady, ODM, and principal discussion concerned evaluation and reporting for Phase II of Operation Alert 1958. A rough draft questionnaire consisting of four pages of questions was made available for discussion. ODM proposed that no reports be submitted during Phase II, July 14-18, 1958; however, that questions as contained in the questionnaire be answered by all agencies and submitted to ODM no later than August 11, 1958. The majority of the questions pertain to resources and the questionnaire was thoroughly torn apart by IPG representatives to such an extent that Grady indicated no further consideration be given to the questions contained in the rough draft as a complete and thorough revision would be made of the proposed questions.

Grady advised the group that ODM is behind in the release of annexes containing additional instructions for participation in Phase II of the exercise and that all annexes would not be in the hands of participants until May 31, 1958, or shortly thereafter.

Grady scheduled the next meeting of the IPG for Monday, May 19, 1958, 12:30 p.m. in Room 226 of the Widner Building.

JTM:mje (7) ACTION: None. You will be kept advised.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention: Mr. McGuire)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-56

66-19012-35

12 MAY 20 1958

66 MAY 21 1958



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *Ho* 5-13-58

DATE: May 7, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *ASB* *8/1*SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
ACTIVATION OF RELOCATION SITE

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Winterrowd | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Operation Alert 1958 (O/A 58) exercise will occur between 7/14-18/58, inclusive. Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) in "Annex number 4, Relocation Operation Guides". for O/A 58 instructs that relocation sites (R/S) at the national level are to be manned by communications personnel by 8:30 a.m., Eastern Standard Time (EST), 7/14/58, and fully activated with sufficient staff to begin operations at 8:30 a.m. EST, 7/16/58, with the exercise ending at 4:00 p.m., EST, 7/18/58.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Communications Section of the Records and Communications Division is submitting a separate memorandum regarding manning of our R/S by communications personnel commencing 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/14/58.

Regarding sufficient staffing by 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/16/58, to begin operations, it would appear desirable to send one Agent Supervisor each from Divisions 3\* and 5\* to our R/S the evening of 7/15/58 so as to prepare to commence handling exercise inquiries at 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/16/58. Further, sufficient and appropriate Laboratory personnel should be dispatched to our R/S on 7/14/58 as are necessary to insure proper functioning of our communications equipment. This leaves the remainder of the officials, agent and clerical personnel to be dispatched to our site either during the evening on 7/15/58 or to leave Washington, D. C., no later than 7:00 a.m., EST, 7/16/58. This would be 8:00 a.m., Daylight Saving Time, which is one hour prior to commencement of our normal work-day of 9:00 a.m., DST. Travel time by bus to our R/S from Washington, D. C., is approximately one hour. To send the additional personnel to our R/S the evening of 7/15/58 would incur additional per diem and the preparation and serving of an evening meal on 7/15/58 and breakfast on 7/16/58 before the exercise

JTM:mje (10)

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. McGuire

1 - Mr. Mohr

1 - Mr. Parsons

1 - Mr. Tamm

1 - Mr. Bartlett

1 - Mr. [unclear] Section

1 - Mr. Minnich

\* Administrative Division

\*\* Domestic Intelligence Division

Attention: Mr. Wherry

Attention: Mr. Gauthier

Attention: Mr. Sloan

Attention: Mr. Sloan

Attention: Mr. Sloan

Attention: Mr. Sloan

Attention: Mr. Sloan

REC

MAY 20 1958

53 MAY 25 1958

Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
ACTIVATION OF RELOCATION SITE

starts. Since this is a resource-type exercise not involving an attack phase, we do not contemplate testing of our notification and check off procedures; therefore, it is felt we should dispatch remainder of our personnel at 7:00 a.m., EST, 7/16/58.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That sufficient and appropriate Laboratory personnel be dispatched to our relocation site on 7/14/58 to insure the adequate functioning of our communications.

(2) That one Agent Supervisor each from Divisions 3 and 5 be sent to our R/S the evening of 7/15/58 to prepare for handling of exercise inquiries by 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/16/58.

(3) That remainder of officials, agent and clerical personnel participating in the exercise depart Washington, D. C., at 7:00 a.m., EST, 7/16/58.

*Seems OK. Present as  
part of overall plan when  
ready to bring to  
Director's attention*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: May 19, 1958

FROM : MR. W. T. WHALEY *WTD*SUBJECT: *Duplicate*  
OPERATION ALERT - 1958  
LIAISON - OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION (ODM)

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Reference your memorandum to Liaison Agents May 7, 1958, advising that the Federal action phase of Operation Alert - 1958 is scheduled for July 14-18, 1958.

Today, the writer discussed this year's alert with Mr. William Elliott, Security Chief, Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) and Elliott advised that as of today he did not know how involved his office would be in this year's alert. He stated that the plans were continually changing at ODM and although he would have a staff at ODM's relocation site (High Point), he did not know how many there would be. However, he stated that he definitely wanted a Bureau representative present and that our representative could come to the site whenever he deemed it advisable. Elliott was advised that the writer or another member of the Liaison Section would be present at High Point during this operation.

At the conclusion of the talk, Elliott stated that he would keep the writer advised as to developments in this matter.

ACTION:

Informative.

WTW:jlkgk  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Bartlett
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Whaley

*Waley advised he would depart for ODM site on 7-16-58. This seems OK - 5-19-58 jmw*

53 MAY 21 1958

REC-62

EX-102

MAY 20 1958

LIAISON

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: May 20, 1958

FROM : G. A. DAY

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. Charles Brewer, OSD Assistant for Administrative Management, advised that the OSD plans are not final as yet, but it appears that participation in the 1958 relocation exercise by OSD will be greatly reduced from that of previous years. He indicated that present plans call for a relatively small delegation of about 40 (compared with several hundred previously) who will relocate to Fort Ritchie, Maryland. He stated that the writer was included in the permanent list of persons who will accompany OSD to their relocation site in the event of an actual emergency as well as during any relocation exercises. Brewer stated that this arrangement will make it possible for the writer to visit the relocation site this year or not, as FBI may decide, without in any way jeopardizing the liaison relationship which has been established.

Mr. George Gould, Director of Security Services, OSD, with whom the writer has shared space at the OSD relocation site during 1956 and 1957, advised that he does not now plan to participate in the exercise this year and that OSD representation will be so small that it will not be necessary for him to send anyone but a Clerk, who can answer any physical security questions which may arise.

ACTION:

In view of the very limited participation by OSD in the 1958 exercise and inasmuch as permanent arrangements have been established which will permit the writer to visit the site at any time, it is recommended that unless there is some material change in the OSD plans, the writer not plan to relocate at Fort Ritchie during the exercise this year.

GAD:hke  
 (5)

1-Mr. Minnich  
 1-Mr. D. J. Sullivan  
 1-Mr. Day  
 1-Liaison Section

REC-93

EX. - 123

66-19012-39  
10 MAY 21 1958

58 MAY 23 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 15, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958 (PARTICIPATION)

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman 2/4/58 advised that Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) guide lines for Federal Action Phase (FAP) of Operation Alert 1958 (O/A 58) to occur July 14-18, 1958, inclusive, instructs that field relocation sites (R/Ss) are to be activated on July 14 and 15, 1958, and activities conducted independently of Seat of Government (SOG) with SOG site activated on July 16, 1958, to continue operations with field sites through July 18, 1958. Recommendation approved by Director for Liaison, at propitious time, to seek approval, from ODM for our field offices to relocate on July 16-17, 1958, with entire Bureau participation confined to July 16-18, 1958, inclusive.

On 5/13/58 John Grady, Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) advised Supervisor Minnich, Defense Plans Desk, Liaison Section, that the dates of our participation as set forth above were approved by ODM. Additionally, Grady advised that in recognition of the resource-survival type character of the exercise and the fact our field offices to handle the intra-FBI test problems would have to have available inventory cards and other records maintained at headquarters city, ODM was also approving our field offices to assume a relocated status at headquarters city and not at nearby resident agencies.

ACTION:

None. The extent of our participation as approved by ODM will be included in our over-all brief for participation in Operation Alert 1958 and field offices will be appropriately advised as to the extent of their participation by SAC letter.

JTM:mje (8)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier)
- 1 - Mr. McGuire (Attention: Mr. Wherry)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Tamm (Attention: Mr. Sloan)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

FLY  
57 MAY 23 1958

EX-135

REC-93

MAY 22 1958

Tolson  
 Boardman  
 Belmont  
 Mohr  
 Parsons  
 Rosen  
 Tamm  
 Trotter  
 Nease  
 Tele. Room  
 Holloman  
 Gandy

66-19012-40

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach *RR*

DATE: May 21, 1958

FROM : Mr. O. H. Bartlett

SUBJECT: *Duplan*  
OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
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| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Reference is made to your memorandum to me dated May 12, 1958, in the above-captioned matter. Six questions were set out in this memorandum. On May 19, 1958, I discussed these matters with Mr. John Grady at the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) who furnished the following answers to the questions in the enclosed, referenced memorandum:

- (1) There is no Cabinet meeting planned during the period of July 14-18, 1958.
- (2) There will be no "enlarged" meeting of top Government officials prior to, during or immediately after the Federal Action Phase of Operation Alert 1958. Such a meeting is planned for September, 1958.
- (3) There will be no ODM Inspector assigned to the FBI relocation site and it is not planned that one will visit during the test.
- (4) There are no plans in existence for an Interagency Communication System Inspector to visit the FBI relocation site during the test.
- (5) Details have not been worked out for participation by the President and the White House staff during the Federal Action Phase of the exercise. Undoubtedly there will be relocation on the part of some White House staff members; however, it is not known at this time if the President will personally participate at the White House relocation site.
- (6) The matter of Cabinet members relocating during the test will be discussed in the near future at a Cabinet meeting. There is no firm decision at this time; however, it is felt that some Cabinet members will undoubtedly visit their sites during the test.

Enclosure

OHB:bjt (4) *W*

1 - Mr. Minnich

1 - Mr. Bartlett

REC-67

EX-101

10 MAY 21 1958

58 MAY 23 1958

ENCLOSURE

EX-101

100-19012-41

Memorandum Mr. Bartlett to Mr. Roach  
RE: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

ACTION:

For the information of the Defense Plans Desk.  
You will be advised as soon as some decision is reached  
concerning a firm White House plan for relocating in addition  
to Cabinet members' participation during the test.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. O. H. Bartlett

DATE: May 12, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

You are aware of our plans for participation in the Federal Action Phase of Operation Alert 1958, July 14-18, 1958, and in connection therewith, you are requested to determine from the appropriate agency, as soon as such information might become available, answers to questions as follows:

1. The time and date of any cabinet meeting during the period July 14-18, 1958.
2. Will there be an "enlarged" meeting of top Government officials planned prior to, during, or immediately after Federal Action Phase of Operation Alert 1958?
3. Will an Office of Defense Mobilization inspector be at or visit the relocation site? If so, who?
4. Who will be the interagency Communication System inspector who will undoubtedly visit our relocation site during the exercise?
5. What are the plans of the President and White House staff for participation in the Federal Action Phase?
6. Are cabinet members relocating?

As soon as you ascertain the answers to the foregoing questions, you should make the results known to the Defense Plans Desk.

JTM:pwj (4)  
1 - Mr. Bartlett  
1 - Liaison Section  
1 - Mr. Minnich

ENCLOSURE

REC-67 66-19012-41

EX-101

10 MAY 21 1958

LIAISON

Memo Bartlett to Roach  
5-21-58 OAB/tjt



~~SECRET~~

2 - Ori & 1

1 - Mr. Bartlett  
1 - Mr. Boardman 1 - Section  
1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Minnich  
1 - Mr. Bland

(Rewrite of same letter  
5/20/58  
Re: same subject, JTM:mje)

Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

May 21, 1958

b6  
b7C

Director, FBI

**DEFENSE PLANS / EVALUATION AND REPORTS  
OPERATION ALERT 1958, PHASE II**

On May 19, 1958, the Office of Defense Mobilization made available a rough draft of "Program Memorandum X-14, Annex Number 6" containing approximately thirty-five questions to be answered by agencies participating in Operation Alert 1958. The pages to the questionnaire are unnumbered; however, under "7. Internal Security" there are stated two questions which call for comment by this Bureau. These questions are "A. Were arrangements adequate for security of non-military facilities? If not, what should be done?" and "B. Were arrangements adequate for control of persons dangerous to Internal Security? If not, what should be done?"

Question A is ambiguous and its meaning should be clarified. Presumably, it pertains to physical "security of non-military facilities" which is not within the FBI's responsibilities.

Regarding question B, it is also extremely ambiguous. Does it mean control of the persons after apprehension or does it pertain to our security programs for prompt apprehension? While in the latter case we would definitely answer "Yes" in compliance with the question, it is believed the question should be clarified or eliminated.

Regarding these questions, it is noted Operation Alert 1958 is primarily a resource-survival type exercise with this Bureau's participation planned along these lines. Consequently, it does not appear that questions raised concerning "internal security" are applicable.

Office of Defense Mobilization has requested that any revisions or objections to the questions be furnished it by the close of business Wednesday, May 21, 1958.

The foregoing observations are being made available to the Department's consideration in replying to the questions raised by Office of Defense Mobilization.

JTM:mje (9) (Cover memo Belmont to Boardman 5/20/58  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958 - EVALUATION  
AND REPORTS - PHASE II  
JTM:mje/jyl)

Classified

"Secret" as refers to Emergency Defense Programs which are so classified by Department.

~~SECRET~~

MAILED 9  
MAY 21 1958  
COMM-FBI

RECD READING ROOM  
MAY 21 9 14 AM '58

Tolson  
Nichols  
Boardman  
Belmont  
Mohr  
Parsons  
Rosen  
Tamm  
Trotter  
Nease  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

8 MAY 23 1958  
MAIL ROOM

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ah*

DATE: May 21, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *RR*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
INTERAGENCY PLANNING GROUP (IPG)  
MEETING MAY 19, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
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| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
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| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

On May 19, 1958, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section attended an IPG meeting at the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM).

Mr. John Grady, ODM, presided at the meeting and the members of the Group were handed a revised draft of program memorandum X-14 together with a revised questionnaire prepared by ODM. These revised drafts were prepared after the discussion at the May 13, 1958, meeting of this Group which was reported in my memorandum to you dated May 16, 1958. Mr. Grady stated that the agencies could present any objections or suggested revisions to ODM on these papers by the close of business Wednesday, May 21, 1958. These drafts are in the hands of the Defense Plans Desk Supervisor and are being analyzed. You will be advised of the results of this analysis.

Mr. Grady reported that representatives of those agencies in the resources field will meet at the ODM relocation site, HIGHPOINT, for a work session from June 2, through June 6, 1958. The Bureau will not participate in this session in view of the fact that the discussions will pertain solely to resources which are outside of the Bureau's field of endeavor.

Mr. Grady reported that an "Exercise Federal Register" will be prepared and furnished to the Federal agencies prior to the Federal Action Phase. This Register will publish the necessary documents to support the action program during this test.

ACTION:

For information. The next meeting of the IPG will be held on Tuesday, May 27, 1958, and you will be advised of the results.

OHB:bjt (8) *bjt*

- 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention: Mr. McGuire)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett

REC-85

EX-123

10 MAY 22 1958

58 MAY 23 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 16, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
ATTACK PHASE, MAY 6-7, 1958

Tolson  
Nichols  
Boardman  
Belmont  
Mohr  
Parsons  
Rosen  
Tamm  
Trotter  
Nease  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

The Attack Phase of Operation Alert 1958 occurred May 6-7, 1958, and information concerning this phase was gleaned from news releases as follows: The simulated attack was preceded by warnings from one hour and forty-five minutes to four hours and forty-five minutes and the simulated attack resulted in 291 H-bomb and missile hits on continental and territorial targets. No general public participation was required in the D. C. area however some Federal employees and schools did participate. The President spent approximately seven minutes in the White House bomb shelter as part of the exercise. Improvements in mass evacuation procedures were accredited with "saving" approximately twenty-five million persons who would have been considered casualties in last year's drill.

Civil defense officials termed the exercise a success and pointed out lack of adequate fallout shelters was the biggest flaw in the present civil defense program. It is estimated the area covered by fallout was in the neighborhood of two million square miles. Allegedly the White House has assigned "the highest priority" to a program for development of adequate fallout shelters.

Reportedly Moscow radio commented by saying the exercise was designed to "fan up a war psychosis" in the United States and despite "all efforts of the warmongers, most of the Americans remained perfectly indifferent to the scare exercise."

Additionally, on May 9, 1958, John Grady, Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) incidental to another matter advised Supervisors Minnich and Bartlett, Liaison Section, that he considered participation in the Attack Phase as adequate remarking that ODM was under "considerable pressure from above" to play down publicity on the Attack Phase. He commented he believed this was accomplished. However, he did not further explain his remarks or give the basis for them.

JTM:mje (8)

EX-101 REG-62

66-19012-441  
20 MAY 22 1958

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier)
- 1 - Mr. McGuire (Attention: Mr. Wherry)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

58 MAY 26 1958

Memo Roach to Belmont  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
ATTACK PHASE, MAY 6-7, 1958

On 5/13/58 in connection with an Interagency Planning Group meeting at ODM attended by Supervisor Minnich the FCDA representative described the Attack Phase as an extremely pleasing exercise and that there was increased activity by all Federal agencies with State and local civil defense directors commenting upon a more cooperative attitude by Federal representatives. He also stated that FCDA is sold on the phasing of an operation alert exercise and would like to carry the phasing one more step by separating the attack procedures and bomb damage analysis procedures into two separate phases. He commented the exercise was played on a "low key" with not more than 70 people per shift handling over-all operations connected with the exercise at FCDA headquarters. He said Michigan and Indiana were the only two states which did not play the exercise; however, all three territories did. He commented that the procedure of using sealed envelopes to place attack damage into the hands of participants prior to the simulated attack would have to be re-evaluated as FCDA received many indications that the sealed envelopes were opened prior to the scheduled time. He noted that FCDA is of the opinion the country will become more and more dependent upon hand analysis of bomb damage since communications theoretically suffered severely during the Attack Phase.

The Post Office Department and Health, Education, and Welfare representatives were critical of the instructions issued by FCDA with respect to damage analysis pointing out that the instructions were most confusing and the use of the FCDA standards and templates bore no resemblance to the actual maps.

The Laboratory is analyzing the results of the simulated bomb damage and fallout as it affects the Seat of Government, field offices, relocation sites, and resident agencies. Upon completion of this analysis, a memorandum will be submitted.

\*Federal Civil Defense Administration

ACTION:

None. Informative.

JR  
7/18

Jm  
WSP  
✓

gmo  
Lha

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH *R*

DATE: May 21, 1958

FROM : *4* MR. B. A. WELLS *W*SUBJECT: *Dap/aus*  
OPERATION ALERT - 1958  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Mr. C. R. Wilson, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), advised that ONI was not participating on a large scale in Operation Alert-1958. A token force only will relocate from ONI.

Mr. David Belisle, National Security Agency (NSA), advised that NSA is not participating in the relocation phase of Operation Alert - 1958. General Samford, Director, NSA, may visit relocation headquarters sometime during operation alert.

ACTION:

For information.

BAW:jlh *jk*  
(4)

- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Wells

REC-93

66-19012-46

20 MAY 23 1958

EX-101

58 MAY 26 1958

*Filer**L. J. Jones*

## 4 Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH *RR*

DATE: May 21, 1958

FROM : MR. W. T. WHALEY *WTV*SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT - 1958  
LIAISON - U. S. AIR FORCE

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On May 20, 1958, the writer discussed this year's operation alert with Lieutenant Colonel David L. Roberts, Plans and Policy Division, Office of Special Investigations (OSI). Colonel Roberts was advised that in the event of emergency SA Paul Fields would maintain liaison with the Air Force. Colonel Roberts stated that as we know the Air Force relocation site was at [redacted] and that he would place Agent Fields' name on the Air Force relocation list.

Colonel Roberts also stated that as in the past the Air Force was not participating in this year's operation. He said the only Air Force involvement would be on a local level where Air Force bases would assist local Government agencies in their operations in the alert. Colonel Roberts said no one in Washington would relocate to [redacted]

b3  
b7E

ACTION:

Informative.

WTV:jlkgk *WTV*  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Fields
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Whaley

*Jefferson*  
*original* is

REC-85

66-19012-47

14 MAY 23 1958

101

*F. J. R.*

58 MAY 26 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

4 TO : Mr. R. R. Roach *RR*  
 FROM : Mr. M. W. Kuhrtz  
 SUBJECT: *Duplan*  
OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

DATE: May 22, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

In connection with the captioned matter, I contacted Mr. Howard Trees, State Department, relative to State's plans in participating in Operation Alert as well as State's desires concerning the presence of a Bureau Liaison Representative at their relocation site. Mr. Trees advised me on May 20, 1958, that State's plans for the Operation Alert exercise are still not completely "firmed up"; however, it has been established that State's activity this year will be limited to foreign economic aid matters and will not include the operational aspects associated with political and diplomatic activity with an all-out attack. As a matter of fact, the Economic Division of State is responsible for this year's activity at the relocation site rather than the Security and Consular Department which had the responsibility of last year's Operation Alert with Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor in charge. Mr. Trees stated that as far as he was concerned, there would be no objection on the part of State to having an FBI Liaison Representative present; however, on the basis of present planning, he saw no need for such participation by the Bureau and suggested that at the moment we not consider having a representative present with State at its relocation site. Mr. Trees advised that State's planning for this operation would be more firmly established in the middle of June and suggested that further contact be made with him at that time.

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the above, it is suggested that the Bureau not consider having a Liaison Representative with State for Operation Alert. Contact will be continued with Mr. Trees in order to report the developments of State's planning for this operation as they progress.

MWK:bjt (4) *lyt*  
 1 - Mr. Minnich  
 1 - Liaison Section  
 1 - Mr. Kuhrtz

REC- 69

66-19012-48  
MAY 26 1958

58 MAY 27 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. G. A. Day *Handwritten initials*

DATE: May 19, 1958

FROM :

*R. R. Roach*  
*Dup/aut*

SUBJECT:

OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
7/14 - 18/58

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| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

You are aware of our plans for participation in the Federal Action Phase (FAP) of Operation Alert 1958, 7/14-18/58, and in connection therewith, you are requested to determine from the appropriate sources as soon as such information might become available, answers to questions as follows:

1. Will there be a National Security Council meeting with regard to or during the FAP?
2. Will there be an IIC meeting with regard to or during the FAP?

As soon as you ascertain the answers to the foregoing questions, you should make the results known to the Defense Plans Desk.

- 1 - Mr. G.A. Day
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. J.T. Minnich

*Handwritten signature*  
JTM:jul

(4)

1. This is possible, but not probable. The President will decide, as he has in the past, at the last moment. FBI will not be affected unless the subject of the NSC meeting is within IIC purview.
2. No, unless the Director decides to call one.

46-19812-49  
MAY 26 1958

58 JUN 2 1958

EX-10.

REC-24

*Handwritten signature*



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: May 20, 1958

FROM : MR. D. J. SULLIVAN

SUBJECT:

OPERATION ALERT - 1958

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF  
STAFF, INTELLIGENCE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On May 19, 1958, Lieutenant Colonel Tom Guidera, Executive Officer, Office of Director of Plans, Programs and Security, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACSI), Department of the Army, advised that ACSI, according to present plans, was to participate in Operation Alert - 1958 only to a very limited degree. He stated that according to current thinking, ACSI would be represented at Fort Ritchie, Maryland, by only three or four individuals and at the official Army relocation site, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, by approximately 10 individuals. According to Guidera, no operational tests were contemplated and the exercise as far as ACSI was concerned would be primarily a communications test.

Guidera stated that ACSI's permanent plan provided for a Bureau Liaison representative to accompany ACSI to Fort Bragg; however, in view of the limited participation of ACSI in the current test, he was of the opinion that it would be a waste of time for an agent to relocate with ACSI during 1958.

ACTION:

In view of the limited participation of ACSI in Operation Alert - 1958, it is recommended that, unless there is a material change in ACSI's plans, no Liaison Representative relocate to Fort Bragg with ACSI during this year's exercise.

DJS:jlkgk  
(4)

- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

66-19012-50  
20 MAY 27 1958

REC-24

EX-101

58 JUN 2 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *LM*

DATE: May 28, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *ahb*SUBJECT: *O* OPERATION ALERT-1958 - EVALUATION  
AND REPORTS - PHASE II

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman 5-20-58 set forth two questions under caption: "7. 'Internal Security,' A. Were arrangements adequate for security of nonmilitary facilities? If not, what should be done?" and "B. Were arrangements adequate for control of persons dangerous to internal security? If not, what should be done?"; which questions were contained in a rough draft of Annex Number 6, issued by Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) pertaining to evaluation and reporting in connection with Operation Alert 1958 (O/A 58). We observed that the questions were ambiguous and should either be clarified or eliminated and by letter dated 5-21-58 to the Internal Security Division of the Department we furnished our observations re ambiguity of the questions.

On 5-27-58 Supervisor Bartlett, at Interagency Planning Group, meeting, received an amended rough draft of Annex Number 6, a review of which reveals the questions now read: "7. Internal Security," A. Were arrangements adequate for physical security of nonmilitary facilities? If not, what should be done?" and "B. Were personnel security arrangements adequate? If not, what should be done?"

OBSERVATIONS:

Interpretation of the questions as now worded indicates they have no pertinence to FBI responsibilities. It is not felt that we should furnish further observations to the Department for additional clarification of the questions. We anticipate answering these questions subsequent to and on the basis of our participation in O/A 58 as not being applicable to the FBI.

ACTION:

None. Informative.

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Bland (Attention: Mr. Rushing)
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:nck (7)

REC-93 66-19012-51

15 MAY 29 1958

EX-123

58 JUN 2 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*

DATE: May 21, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *RR*SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

b3 per CIA

On May 19, 1958, [ ] Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), invited Agent Papich to accompany CIA personnel to that Agency's relocation site, in connection with the captioned exercise. [ ] stated that if the Liaison Agent accepts the invitation, he would join CIA personnel on July 16, 1958.

ACTION:

If you approve, Agent Papich will accompany CIA personnel to that Agency's relocation site and will remain there for a period which would be of a logical and practical duration, consistent with over-all Bureau interests.

SJP:bjt *bjt*  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

REC-4

EX-101

JUN 2 1958

58 JUN 4 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont *JB*

DATE: May 27, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *RR*SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT - 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14 - 18, 1958LIAISON ASSIGNMENTS

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

As you know, the Federal Action Phase of Operation Alert - 1958 is scheduled for the week of July 14 - 18, 1958. We have arranged, with the approval of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) to be operational only during July 16, 17, and up to 4 pm on the 18th, at our relocation site. From the best information we have been able to obtain to date few of the intelligence agencies intend to do more than give token participation to the action phase of the test this year. Although our Liaison Agents are listed as a part of the essential personnel to evacuate with these agencies in time of actual emergency, there appears at this time to be little need for us to send out liaison men with the agencies which are relocating for this Operation Alert unless they intend to operate on a scale comparable to that of the Bureau.

In view of these circumstances, it would appear that unless it would be helpful to the Bureau to have our Agents relocate with the agencies this year and unless there is some indication of a direct request that we do so, it is believed it would be inadvisable for us to send these men out with the various agencies that are relocating merely for the sake of having our Liaison Agents with the agencies should there be some possible need for them. It is proposed that we keep in close touch with the appropriate agencies and unless some reason develops making it to the Bureau's advantage to relocate with them we will not do so. We will, of course, keep in tact our permanent arrangements whereby Liaison Agents will evacuate in time of actual emergency with the critical agencies.

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the fact that it would be a waste of manpower, time, and money to send our Liaison Agents out with agencies where no real need exists, it is recommended that this not be done and that we send Agents upon receipt of invitations only to those places where it will serve a definite benefit to the Bureau.

1-Mr. Belmont  
1-Mr. Minnich  
1-Mr. Roach  
1-Section

RRR:mās:mad  
(5) *FLS*

58 JUN 4 1958

REC-4

EX-101

JUN 2 1958

*66-19012-53*  
*JB*  
*RR*  
*FLS*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 2, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

On May 29, 1958, Edward Morgan, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), confidentially advised Agent Papich that all indications point toward light participation on the part of INS in the captioned exercise. It is Morgan's understanding that INS will become involved in a minimum of test problems and the present plan is to send a small skeleton staff to the relocation site.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:bjt  
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

REC-79

66-19012-55

10 JUN 3 1958

EX - 123

58 JUN 4 1958

## 4 Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: May 13, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: BUPLANS / RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT  
AND NON-INTERRUPTABLE FUNCTIONS

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Memorandum Bartlett to Roach 5-8-58 advises a memorandum would be forthcoming from Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) which would ask two questions:

- (1) Number of employees needed at relocation site (R/S) during first three to four weeks following attack to handle essential non-interruptable functions?
- (2) A statement concerning general functions of those employees.

The answers to these questions will be turned over to Public Buildings Service of General Services Administration (GSA), in order to arrive at estimated cost to make R/S safe and usable. GSA plans to include the cost figure in its 1960 budget request so as to have the money appropriated in a lump sum to GSA rather than have individual agencies submit separate budget requirements for any work required. Questions only pertain to headquarters sites not field sites.

ODM memorandum 5-8-58 (attached) requests answers to questions along lines set out in reference memorandum be forwarded ODM by 6-27-58 and suggests Mr. Murray Fine, ODM, be contacted for assistance. On 5-12-58 Fine telephonically advised Supervisor Minnich that at some date subsequent to receiving the answers to the questions, GSA would probably inspect relocation sites of all agencies to determine appropriate cost of affording radioactive protection based on personnel involved and functions to be performed. ODM requests reply to bear minimum classification of "confidential."

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached letter to ODM be sent.

Enclosures

JTM:po (7)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (Attention Mr. Gallagher)
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-4

20 JUN 3 1958

58 JUN 9 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: 6-4-58

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - "POLICY GUIDANCE  
AND DIRECTION FOR PHASE II  
OPERATION ALERT 1958"

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On 6-2-58 Liaison Section received via mail from Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) five copies of a document entitled "Policy Guidance and Direction for Phase II Operation Alert 1958." The document is classified "~~secret~~" and the copies are numbered 534 to 538 inclusive. Purpose of the document is to provide policy guidance and direction to field and headquarters personnel of Federal agencies for use in Phase II - Federal Action Phase of Operation Alert 1958.

The document consists of six sections as follows.

1. OPAL (Operation Alert 1958) Organization of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, which section makes operational assignments of functions to permanent departments and agencies and to OPAL agencies. A brief paragraph is contained on page six pertaining to the Department as well as the Bureau, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Bureau of Prisons. Among the functions which are recognized as affecting the Bureau are "...makes required investigations ...enforces laws relating to all subversive activities, including espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and investigations pertinent thereto...." Additionally, this section describes official assignments for OPAL agencies and denotes a contemplated eleven emergency OPAL agencies will be established.

2. Operating Arrangements and Procedures to be Used by the OPAL Organizations During the Federal Action Phase. This merely sets forth organizational procedures to be used by the emergency agencies.

JTM:pwj (9)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier)
- 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention Mr. McGuire) (with attachment)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (with attachment)
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

58 JUN 9 1958

EX-101

REC-85

65-19012-57

JUN 6 1958

Memorandum A. H. Belmont to Mr. L. V. Boardman  
Re: DEFENSE PLANS - "POLICY GUIDANCE  
AND DIRECTION FOR PHASE II  
OPERATION ALERT 1958"

3. Policy Guidance. These factors have already been considered in our plan.

4. Initial Presidential Actions (~~Secret~~). This section sets forth brief synopses and code words of Executive Orders, proclamations, directives, and documents of actions triggered by or to be triggered by the President from Phase I, May 6-7, 1958, through Phase II, July 14-18, 1958, all of which will be used as necessary in connection with our participation in Phase II.

5. The Office of OPAL Resources and Operations. Set forth in this section are the initial actions at appropriate time beginning D-Day (May 6) taken by the Office of OPAL Resources and Operations. These actions will be considered and utilized as necessary with regard to our planning.

6. Initial Actions by Other Federal Agencies. Set forth in this section are brief synopses of exercise documents which will be issued pertaining to telecommunications, food, housing and community facilities, industrial production, manpower, minerals and metals, power and fuels, transportation, health, economic stabilization, and economic warfare (~~secret~~).

Copies number 535 and 536 were personally delivered to Inspector Gauthier, Administrative Division, for review and information.

Exercise documents which are synopsized in referenced document, upon receipt, will be given to Inspector Gauthier for review and analysis as to their possible effect upon the administrative functions of the FBI.

Copy number 537 is attached to Mr. Parsons' tickler copy for his review and information.

Copy number 538 is attached to Mr. Nease's tickler copy for his review and information.

Copy number 534 is being retained by Buplans Desk, Liaison Section.

ACTION:

None, informative.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ah*

DATE: June 11, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *R*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On June 10, 1958, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section attended a meeting of the Interagency Planning Group at the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). Mr. John Grady, ODM, acted as chairman of this Group. Mr. Grady mentioned that ODM Director Gordon Gray briefed the Cabinet at their meeting on Friday, June 6, 1958, concerning the plans for Operation Alert 1958. Mr. Grady mentioned that the Cabinet paper has not been distributed to the agencies as yet but that he understands from the Assistant Cabinet Secretary there was an indication that the head of each agency participating in the exercise may be urged to visit the relocation site sometime during the test; that an assistant to the agency head should be in charge at the relocation site during the test and that it was rumored the President had indicated to the Cabinet that all key officials in the participating agencies should "clear their calendars during the period of July 14-18." Mr. Grady said he did not know and there has been no indication of what the President meant by this remark. However, it appears that this remark may pertain to those officials at the relocation sites who will be busily engaged in handling problems. James J. Canavan, Defense Plans Coordinator, Department of Justice, advised Liaison Agent Bartlett that he would obtain the results of the Cabinet meeting and make them known to the Bureau.

OBSERVATION:

Activities at our site will, of course, be under the direction and control of at least one or more of the Assistant Directors. Concerning the level of agency participation, we will, of course, follow this matter and analyze the Cabinet paper upon receipt.

ACTION:None. Informative. *✓*

REC-95

*esth*  
 OHB:bjt (5) *esth*  
 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Liaison Section  
 1 - Mr. Minnich  
 1 - Mr. Bartlett

66-19012-60

10 JUN 17 1958

58 JUN 18 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *JPB*

DATE: June 16, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*SUBJECT: RUPLANS - PHASE II, FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
OPERATION ALERT 1958 (TOP LEVEL PARTICIPATION)

Tolson ☒  
 Nichols ☒  
 Boardman ☒  
 Belmont ☒  
 Mohr ☒  
 Parsons ☒  
 Rosen ☒  
 Tamm ☒  
 Trotter ☒  
 Nease ☒  
 Tele. Room ☒  
 Holloman ☒  
 Gandy ☒

Memorandum Roach to Belmont 6-11-58 advised Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) Director Gordon Gray briefed the Cabinet on 6-6-58 concerning Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL '58). Since there was some conversation at an Interagency Planning Group meeting on 6-10-58 as to what was said at the Cabinet meeting regarding "Top Level" participation, James J. Canavan, Defense Plans Coordinator, Department of Justice, was to obtain results of the Cabinet meeting and make them known to the Bureau.

On 6-13-58, Canavan personally delivered to Supervisor Minnich, Defense Plans Desk, excerpts of minutes of the Cabinet meeting, according to which the President requested (1) all key officials of Departments and agencies are to be aware of and participate as fully as possible in OPAL '58, (2) calendars during July 16-18 are to be clear of all but compelling engagements and out-of-town commitments are to be held to a minimum, and (3) deputy and undersecretaries should be fully prepared to participate in relocation phase of exercise with "Department heads personal relocation optional but encouraged (depending upon their other business) even if for only part of the time." Also, the President stressed his conviction these exercises are highly worthwhile and there has been a great advance since 1953 in mental attitudes as well as physical capability of Government to act in an emergency.

OBSERVATIONS:

Canavan confidentially advised on basis of the above he is of the opinion the Attorney General will not visit the Departmental site. However, he has no definite word to this effect and he will keep the Defense Plans Desk advised. Regarding the second point above, concerning calendars to be kept clear, Canavan was of the opinion this statement refers to "Top Level" personnel who will physically be at agency relocation sites. Activities at our site will, of course, be under the direction and control of at least one or more of the Assistant Directors.

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Nease
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-91

EX-102

12 JUN 19 1958

JTM:nck (9)

63 JUN 24 1958

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman

RE: BUPLANS - PHASE II, FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
OPERATION ALERT 1958 ("TOP LEVEL" PARTICIPATION)

As to participation by key agencies with which we normally do business, the following has been ascertained: (1) Department of Justice - instructed their units since exercise is principally a resource-survival type, the role of the Department will be limited; (2) Immigration and Naturalization Service - light participation, minimum of test problems, small skeleton staff at relocation site; (3) Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army - limited participation, represented at Fort Ritchie, Maryland, by only three or four and the official Army relocation site, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, by approximately ten individuals, no operational tests contemplated, primarily a communications exercise; (4) Office of Special Investigations (Air Force) - not participating, no one relocating to [redacted]; (5) Office of Secretary of Defense - participation greatly reduced from previous years, very limited, small delegation of about forty to Fort Ritchie, as compared to several hundred in previous years; (6) Atomic Energy Commission - relocation site now in basement of Atomic Energy Commission headquarters, [redacted] and it will be activated with full initial cadre; (7) [redacted] participation not as extensive as last year; (8) Office of Naval Intelligence - not participating on large scale, only nominal force to relocation site; (9) National Security Agency - not participating, General Samford, director, National Security Agency, may visit relocation site; (10) State Department - "not firmed up" but participation will probably be limited to foreign economic aid matters with Economic Division of State responsible for planning rather than Security and Consular Divisions; and (11) White House - degree of participation not known at this time.

In light of the foregoing and unless other indications are determined prior to July 16, 1958, it does not appear to be necessary for the Director or Mr. Tolson to relocate to our site the morning of July 16, 1958. However, the Director and Mr. Tolson may desire to visit our site during the period of our participation, 8:30 A.M., EST, July 16, to 4 P.M., EST, July 18, 1958.

ACTION:

None. Informative.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *6/20/58*

DATE: June 18, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
7/14-18/58  
(EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER)

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

On 6/18/58 Liaison Section received from Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), via mail, five copies (numbered 551 through 555 inclusive) of an Emergency Federal Register (EFR). This EFR is for use during the Federal Action Phase of Operation Alert 1958, and it contains documents published in their entirety consisting of six Proclamations, fifteen Executive Orders, and four Messages to Congress.

OBSERVATIONS:

The documents published in the EFR should be reviewed and analyzed with respect to any possible effect upon our administrative or investigative functions, and particularly for our use and information in connection with our participation in the Federal Action Phase.

Copies numbered 554 and 555 were personally delivered to Inspector Gauthier, Administrative Division.

Copy number 553 is enclosed with Mr. Nease's copy of this memo.

Copy number 552 is enclosed with Mr. Parsons's copy of this memo.

Copy number 551 is being retained by the Defense Plans Desk, Liaison Section, for review and analysis of all documents with Internal Security aspects. Analysis prepared as a result of this review will be submitted by subsequent memorandum.

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier) (With enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention Mr. McGuire) (With enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:jyl (8)

EX-101 REG-74

66-19012-65  
JUN 23 1958

58 JUN 24 1958

Belmont to Boardman  
Re: BUPLANS -- OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
7/14 - 18/58  
(EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER)

RECOMMENDATION:

That Administrative Division, Communications Section of  
Records and Communications Division, and Laboratory Division  
review and analyze all documents pertinent to the responsibilities  
of their respective divisions and furnish a copy of the analysis  
to the Defense Plans Desk.

*R* *sm* *fm*  
*2nd*  
*203*  
*ghy*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 30, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: DEFENSE-PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE - PHASE II  
REQUEST FROM OFFICE OF DEFENSE  
MOBILIZATION FOR NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

At 3:30 p.m., 6/27/58, in accordance with a previous telephonic request, Mr. Robert A. Bowman, in the office of Mr. Grady, Plans and Readiness, Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), was furnished figures concerning the number of Bureau personnel participating in Phase II. The figure 92 participants at national level, as given to Mr. Bowman, is based on 25 at Quantico, 14 at Midland Radio Station, 6 at Soweego, and 47 from the Seat of Government. The figure of 212 for our field office participants is based on an average of 4 per field office, consisting of the SAC or ASAC, one radio operator, one stenographer, and one clerk.

Mr. Bowman advised these figures were needed merely to determine the approximate number of Federal employees who would participate in Phase II.

ACTION:

None. Informative.

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:jyl  
(5)

REC-90

66-19012-74

3 JUN 30 1958

EX-117

58 JUL 2 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 17, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL '58)  
PHASE II, FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson        |   |
| Mr. Boardman      |   |
| Mr. Belmont       | ✓ |
| Mr. Mohr          |   |
| Mr. Nease         |   |
| Mr. Parsons       |   |
| Mr. Rosen         |   |
| Mr. Tamm          |   |
| Mr. Trotter       |   |
| Mr. W.C. Sullivan |   |
| Tele. Room        |   |
| Mr. Holloman      |   |
| Miss Gandy        |   |

Attached is the plan covering the extent of our participation in Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL '58). The plan encompasses (1) over-all Government plan, (2) over-all FBI plan, (3) physical facilities at Quantico, (4) personnel participating in the exercise and their assignments, (5) communications and courier service, (6) field office participation, and (7) test exercise problems.

All participating divisions have been afforded the opportunity of submitting suggestions for the exercise and the test problems have been devised and coordinated through the cooperative efforts of the participating divisions.

Recapitulation of the Bureau plan for Phase II of OPAL '58 follows:

Dates:

Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) instructions call for participation by all Federal agencies from 7/14-18/58 with agency field installations going to their relocation sites (R/S) on 7/14 and 15 to operate independently of Seat of Government (SOG) but continuing at their R/Ss 7/16-18/58 on which dates SOG's R/Ss are to be in operation. FBI, SOG, and field participation as approved by ODM is limited to 7/16-18/58.

Place:

Bureau relocation site Quantico, Virginia.

Enclosure

JTM:mje (10)

|                  |                  |
|------------------|------------------|
| 1 - Mr. Tolson   | 1 - Mr. Trotter  |
| 1 - Mr. Boardman | 1 - Mr. Holloman |
| 1 - Mr. Belmont  | 1 - Mr. Edwards  |
| 1 - Mr. Mohr     | 1 - Mr. Roach    |
| 1 - Mr. Nease    | 1 - Mr. Sloan    |
| 1 - Mr. Parsons  | 1 - Mr. Medler   |
| 1 - Mr. Rosen    | 1 - Mr. Wherry   |
| 1 - Mr. Tamm     | 1 - Mr. Minnich  |

REC-8

EX-117

JUL 17 1958

LIAISON

70 JUL 2 1958

(ENCLOSURE)

REC-8

EX-117

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL '58)  
PHASE II, FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

Time: Commencing 7:00 a.m., EST, 7/16/58, all Bureau officials and personnel participating will leave Washington, D. C., at this time via Bureau bus or personally owned automobile. Our site is to be manned and operational by 8:30 a.m., EST. Due to resource-survival type exercise, our notification and check-off procedures of all key evacuees will not be tested. The Director, the Department, and ODM will be telephonically notified at the time our site becomes operational on 7/16/58. The exercise terminates at 4:00 p.m., EST, 7/18/58.

Personnel: Total 47 - (15 officials and supervisors and 32 clerical employees, 22 of whom are female.)  
7 from the Administrative Division: Assistant Director Mohr, 3 Agent Supervisors, 1 Supervisory Supply Officer and 2 secretaries.  
28 from the Records and Communications Division: 1 Agent Supervisor; 27 clerical employees, 22 of whom are necessary for adequate manning of communications facilities.  
6 from Domestic Intelligence Division: Assistant Director Belmont, 3 Agent Supervisors, and 2 secretaries.  
6 from the Laboratory Division: Assistant Director Parsons, 4 Agent Supervisors necessary for maintenance of cryptographic and communications equipment, and 1 secretary.

In addition to the above, five Liaison Agents will accompany key agencies, including the White House, to their relocation sites.

Last year (Operation Alert 1957) we initially utilized 69 Bureau officials and clerical employees and released some of these after two and a half days of a seven-day test period. Since our participation is limited and condensed into a three-day period this year, we do not anticipate release of any employees the first two days 7/16-17/58; however, a few Records and Communications employees may be released the morning of 7/18/58.

Shifts - Two twelve-hour shifts for officials and Agents. Eight-hour shifts for clerical personnel where possible.



Memorandum Belmont to Boardman.  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL '58)  
PHASE II, FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

Meals - Served in dining room.

Sleeping - Female employees on third floor  
and male employees on second  
floor.

Security: Twenty-four hour guard duty by Quantico Agent  
personnel.

Communications:

Telephones - (23 lines)

(IN INTEREST OF ECONOMY  
RADIO WILL BE UTILIZED  
TO ITS FULLEST EXTENT)

- 10 - regular commercial lines.
  - 1 - through Triangle, Virginia.
  - 9 - through Fredericksburg, Virginia.
- 12 - special lines.
  - 1 - direct to Bureau switchboard, Justice Building.
  - 2 - direct to Interagency Communications Center, HIGHPOINT, ODM relocation site and Interagency Communications Center.
  - 6 - microwave telephone circuits to HIGHPOINT.
  - 1 -
  - 1 - extension off of U.S. Marine Corps switchboard, Quantico.
  - 1 - Red Line Network private system providing direct communications between White House R/S and R/Ss of seven agencies. Interagency calls may be made subject to "cut-off" if the President desires to use the line.
  - 1 - mobile telephone - in Director's car operated through switchboard at HIGHPOINT. Local Washington, D.C., coverage and limited highway coverage provided. A log of operations and directory is in the car.

b3  
b7E

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL '58)  
PHASE II, FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

Teletypes - (9)

- 3 - to Richmond.
- 1 - radio-teletype to Midland radio station.
- 1 - to Justice R/S (maintained at Department expense).
- 2 - to HIGHPOINT, 1 of which is microwave.

- 
- 1 - private line teletype on Red Line Network. Inasmuch as Washington Field Office will not occupy its R/S at Shepherdstown, West Virginia, the teletype machine there will not be tested during the exercise. However, it is tested semiannually by Washington Field Office and will be tested in June, 1958.

Radio - Main radio stations at Sowege and Midland and a 50-watt two-way FM (voice) radio unit equipment for operation on three channels at Quantico.

Field Office Participation: 53 field offices will assume a relocated status at headquarters city continuously from 8:00 a.m., EST, 7/16/58, to 12:00 midnight, EST, 7/17/58. All 53 field offices will receive intra-FBI test problems and 18 will be given actual availability checks. (ODM has approved our field offices not manning actual relocation sites due to the resource-survival type exercise.)

Test Problems:

40 - (280 field office contacts). Problems involve some of the essential personnel, equipment and survival functions we would meet in a period subsequent to an attack after having fulfilled our immediate emergency security responsibilities. Problems primarily relate to personnel, health and welfare, office supplies and equipment, vouchers, office space, emergency payroll matters, and radioactive detection meters. Also included are actual availability checks

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL '58)  
PHASE II, FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

of Agents in headquarters city of 18 field offices. The problems are based on assumed situations collated with effects of the attack pattern on May 6, 1958, as analyzed by the Laboratory.

Reports of Test:

A daily report will be submitted for the Director's information and summary reports will be submitted to the Director and Attorney General on 7/18/58. ODM does not require any reports during the course of the exercise except for a daily communications report to be submitted by teletype to HIGHPOINT.

Department of Justice Participation:

The Department to date has not completed its planning. It is indicated as "perhaps token manning" of its R/S. Degree of Departmental and level of Departmental participation will be made known to the Director as soon as the Department plans are completed.

OVER-ALL SUMMARY OF OTHER DETAILS IN PLAN

Phase I of OPAL '58 was the Attack Phase which occurred on May 6 and 7 under an assumption that a direct attack was launched on the United States preceded by a minimum of two and a maximum of four hours' warning. Participation by Federal agencies was not mandatory. The Director approved nonparticipation by the FBI. However, the Laboratory did prepare and analyze bomb damage and fallout charts from the standpoint of damage incurred by FBI installations and estimated casualties to our personnel.

Phase III, the Evaluation Phase of OPAL '58, is to take place on 9/15, 16, 17/58 when a small group from each agency having responsibility and authority for emergency plans and operations will be convened at HIGHPOINT for the purpose of examining the

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman  
Re: .OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL '58)  
PHASE II, FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

validity, feasibility, and consistency of operational measures and the adequacy of policies and central programming guidance. Phase III is not covered in the plan.

ODM PLANNING - PHASE II

ODM planning is primarily directed toward survival and resources with assumption and directives directed toward resource agencies. According to ODM, (1) no bomb damage assessment training will be conducted during Phase II; (2) no civil defense shelter or curb drills should be held; (3) most news releases were concentrated in Phase I and NEWSPPOINT, ODM emergency news release center, will not be activated but information developed during Phase II will be released through ODM headquarters, Washington, D. C. (We will not have a designated public information officer at our site but will refer any inquiries to Mr. Nease's office for referral to the Department.); and (4) air transportation service and motor transport and mail service will be provided. (We will not use as SAC Sloan will have an airplane available for the Director's use and we utilize our own courier service.)

FBI PLANNING - PHASE II

We will have eight employees of the Communications Section manning our R/S communications facilities on 7/14-15/58 and appropriate Laboratory personnel will be at the site on these dates to insure proper and adequate functioning of communications equipment. One Agent Supervisor each from the Administrative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions will go to our site the evening of 7/15/58 to effectuate its readiness to be completely operable by 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/16/58.

We have at our site dividing panels for purposes of converting large classrooms into many individual offices. The panels were made at considerable expense. However, due to fewer personnel participating in the exercise this year, the short period of the exercise, the difficulty of erecting the panels, and as an economy measure, we do not contemplate erecting them this year.

ACTION:

The Director will be kept apprised of daily developments at the Bureau's relocation site during the course of our participation in Phase II of OPAL '58.

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 58-37  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6  
b7C

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 19, 1958

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) ~~BUPLANS~~ ~~OPERATION ALERT 1958~~ (OPAL '58) - PHASE II,  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE ~~RE~~ SAC LETTERS 58-10 (B) AND 58-25 (E) --

PHASE II - FEDERAL ACTION PHASE OPAL '58 (U)

Phase II will commence on July 14, 1958, as a "D+14" situation; i.e., on the assumption it is fourteen days after the attack phase which occurred on May 6 and 7, 1958. (U)

Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) anticipates Federal participation in this Phase at field, regional, and departmental levels. At the national level, relocation sites (R/Ss) are to be staffed by communications personnel on an eight-hour basis no later than 8:30 a.m., Eastern Standard Time (EST), July 14, 1958, and fully activated and staffed on a twenty-four-hour basis no later than 8:30 a.m., EST, July 16, 1958, returning to a pre-exercise status no later than 4:00 p.m., EST, July 18, 1958. All Seat of Government R/Ss are to become exercise operational no later than 8:30 a.m., EST, July 16, 1958. At the field level, agency R/Ss are to be in operation no later than 8:30 a.m., EST, July 14, 1958, remaining in operation until 4:00 p.m., EST, July 18, 1958. (U)

ODM planning and instructions for this Phase are primarily aimed toward survival and resources with assumptions and objectives directed toward resource agencies. Consequently, resource-type agencies will more actively engage in this type exercise than will agencies with intelligence-security-type responsibilities. (U)

The foregoing is for your information and regarding FBI participation in Phase II, all field offices, excluding legal attaches, are to be guided by the following: (U)

FBI PARTICIPATION - PHASE II OPAL '58

Classified by [REDACTED]

Dates of Seat of Government Participation

Declassify on: OADR

8/23/83

The Bureau relocation site (R/S) will be fully activated on a twenty-four-hour basis no later than 8:30 a.m., EST, July 16, 1958, and will be in continuous operation until 4:00 p.m., EST, July 18, 1958. The period 8:30 a.m., EST, July 16, 1958, until 12:00 midnight, July 17, 1958, will be directed toward initiating and completing all intra-FBI test problems. (U)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT RECORDED  
102 JUN 24 1958

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY ROUTING  
SLIP (S) OF  
DATE 7/13/84

50 JUN 25 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. 11-1

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Scope and Dates of Participation by Field Offices ~~TS~~ (U)

All field offices will participate in OPAL '58 and each SAC or ASAC will be responsible for the over-all and successful participation of his office in the exercise. Either the SAC or ASAC must be immediately available in headquarters city at all times during the period of the exercise with the exception of the development of a kidnaping, bank robbery, a major apprehension, or other major case which requires the presence of the SAC or ASAC at the scene. The SAC, ASAC or other necessary members of the field chain of command should not accept speaking engagements or participate in police schools or other conferences during the period of the exercise. ~~TS~~ (U)

Field offices are not to activate or man actual R/Ss but are to assume a relocated status at the headquarters city space continuously from 8:00 a.m., EST, July 16, 1958, to 12:00 midnight, EST, July 17, 1958, for purposes of intra-FBI testing. There must be a member of the chain of command on duty at the field office at all times during this period as intra-FBI test problems may be directed to field offices at any time on these dates. Although intra-FBI testing will be completed during the period of time indicated, exercise play by field or regional offices of other Federal Government agencies will commence at 8:30 a.m., EST, July 14, 1958, to continue until 4:00 p.m., EST, July 18, 1958, and either the SAC or ASAC must be available to handle any inquiries which might originate during this period of time from field installations of such agencies. ~~TS~~ (U)

Bomb Damage Assessment ~~TS~~ (U)

All bomb damage assessment occurred subsequent to and as a result of Phase I - Attack Phase, May 6 and 7, 1958. Consequently, field offices are not to become involved in or furnish the Bureau any damage assessment information emanating from outside sources. The FBI Laboratory has analyzed the effects of the mock attack on May 6, 1958, with respect to damage incurred by Bureau installations and casualties to Bureau personnel. The Laboratory analysis is enclosed herewith and each SAC, ASAC, and member of the field chain of command should carefully analyze and study the effects of the attack as intra-FBI test problems in part will be based on this analysis. ~~TS~~ (U)

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SAC LETTER NO. 58-37

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Civil Defense Drills (U)

Since Phase II is assumed to occur fourteen days after an attack, no civil defense shelter or curb drills should be held. However, since state and local civil defense authorities retain the capability of independent action outside the scope of ODM-Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) instructions, it is conceivable that sporadic public participation drills could be held. In the event such a drill is held in the area wherein your office is located, you should participate only to the extent permitted by the normal operation of your office (U)

Public Information (U)

In the event you receive press inquiries concerning your participation in Phase II of OPAL '58, you will state only that your office is participating in the exercise. If the public information representatives desire additional information, they should be referred to the Bureau (U)

Liaison With Civil Defense Organizations (U)

You may, upon request and within the conditions set forth in SAC Letter 58-25 (E), designate a mature Special Agent to act in a liaison capacity at the headquarters only of the requesting civil defense agency. (U)

Each SAC should be fully apprised of local developments insofar as Phase II of OPAL '58 is concerned. Those SACs responsible for liaison with ODM Regional Mobilization Committees and with FCDA regional offices should keep the Bureau and interested field offices immediately advised of any developments pertaining to FBI planning or FBI participation in Phase II. Communications in this regard should be captioned "Buplans - Phase II, Federal Action Phase, OPAL '58," and you should prefix and end all such communications with "Exercise OPAL '58." (U)

Evaluation and Reports (U)

According to ODM, no reports are required to be filed by field installations during Phase II; however, a report in questionnaire form to be filed by all "agencies" is required by ODM on or before August 11, 1958. The format of this questionnaire has not been determined as yet; however, indications are that an estimate of costs or total personnel participating in Phase II will not be included (U)

6/19/58

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In the event a request for a report is received from any agency, you should advise that all required reports are being handled by the Bureau. You should advise the Bureau of any such request. (S) (U)

The Bureau does not contemplate requesting reports regarding your participation in Phase II. You should, however, make your own evaluation of the type and nature of the actions required by you in connection with resources and survival. Any valuable results gleaned from such an evaluation, if of value to the over-all defense plans of the FBI, should be furnished to the Bureau; otherwise, if of value only to your office defense plans, you should incorporate the information therein. (S) (U)

For your information, Phase III of OPAL '58 is the evaluation Phase and it will take place on September 15, 16, and 17, 1958, when a small group from each agency will be convened at the "secret" R/S of ODM to examine the adequacy of over-all defense planning. In the event of FBI participation in Phase III, it may be necessary to solicit certain information from you regarding Phase I, the Attack Phase, and Phase II of OPAL '58. (S) (U)

Intra-FBI Test Problems (S) (U)

All field offices will receive a minimum of four test problems which will emanate from the Bureau's R/S sometime between 8:30 a.m., EST, July 16, 1958, and 12:00 midnight, EST, July 17, 1958. The problems, where possible, have been coordinated with the effects upon FBI installations or to FBI personnel of the mock attack on May 6, 1958. The problems are based on many assumptions, the primary ones being that: (1) fourteen days have elapsed since a widespread nuclear attack on the United States and its possessions, (2) the FBI has accomplished its basic emergency security responsibilities, and (3) to meet the increased responsibilities under conditions of survival of the nation, we must know the state of our resources, that is, personnel, space, equipment, and the ability of FBI field offices to adequately function under survival circumstances. Responses to test problems are to be carefully and thoroughly considered in keeping with the seriousness of the assumptions and the catastrophic effects of the mock attack. (S) (U)

Certain problems will be received by all field offices while others will be sent to selected offices. To assist you in dispatching prompt and adequate replies, you should have immediately available information as follows: (S) (U)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- A. Total personnel your office broken down by position categories; i.e., Agents, special employees, investigative clerks, stenographers, typists, et cetera.
- B. SAC Letter 56-25 (F), "Buplans, Payroll Voucher, and Accounting Procedures," as well as personnel familiar with these procedures.
- C. Inventory records pertaining to office machines, firearms, and ammunition. (S) (U)
- D. Square footage of office space at headquarters city and all resident agencies.
- E. Total number National Academy graduates in good standing in your area.
- F. Total number clerical applicants on eligibility list.
- G. Number of Special Agent applicants under investigation.
- H. Location of nearest FCDA medical stockpile.
- I. Number of former Special Agents in good standing known to be residing your area.

In the handling of all test problems you should adhere to instructions as follows: (S) (U)

- 1. Each reply should be prefixed and ended with "Exercise OPAL '58."
- 2. Each reply, immediately after the prefix "Exercise OPAL '58," should contain the words "Test Problem" and the number of the test problem shown on the incoming message from the Bureau's R/S. (S) (U)
- 3. All problems which refer to "previous advice of damage your area" have reference to the damage analysis chart enclosed herewith and the chart is to be utilized in responding to such problems.

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SAC LETTER NO. 58-37

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4. Certain problems so as to prevent overload of cryptographic and communications facilities under test conditions contain a provision limiting replies to a specified number of words. The limitation applies only to the body of your reply and you are not to exceed the specified limitation.
5. Under no circumstances are you to make or cause to be made contacts, telephonically or personally, with sources or individuals outside the employ of the FBI. You should not construe or interpret any test problem to require such contacts and all replies, where necessary, should clearly denote that you simulated or assumed contact with other persons. (S) (U)
6. No test problem should be interpreted in such a fashion as to cause belief or speculation by employees of your office that, in the event of an emergency, particular employees would be transferred or required to perform duties of the nature set out in some of the problems.
7. Adherence to specific time limits set forth in the problems is necessary; however, do not submit status messages in the event your reply is delayed in excess of the time limit. Instead embody your explanation for exceeding the time limit in your reply to the problem.

[Availability] (S) (U)

In the event you are requested to conduct an availability check of your Agent personnel, you are reminded that such a check does not include Special Agents on approved annual leave. Under normal conditions, the manual provisions regarding Agents' availability apply. However, under the conditions of a national emergency, which will be realistically assumed by the Bureau during OPAL '58, the normal procedures do not apply. (S) (U)

It is expected that all Agents will be available during a national emergency, actual or assumed. The manner of assuring their availability during such periods is an administrative procedure which should be handled by you. (S) (U)

6/19/58

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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[Night Differential and Compensatory Leave] (S) (U)

Some night work or other overtime will unquestionably be necessary during the course of OPAL '58. Special Agents performing such work are compensated under premium compensation procedures. As to non-Agent personnel occupying positions under the Classification Act, Bureau policy is not to order overtime work but to allow them to claim compensatory leave for any necessary overtime they volunteer to perform. Such employees should be so advised beforehand, and if any of them are unwilling to put in overtime voluntarily and claim compensatory leave, they should not be given overtime assignments during course of the exercise. Earned compensatory leave must be taken by close of pay period following the period in which the leave was earned. (S) (U)

As to Wage Board employees, their administrative workweek cannot exceed forty hours per week without prior Bureau authority. If they work over forty hours a week they must be paid at overtime rates for such work. Accordingly, you should govern their assignments to keep within the forty-hour administrative workweek. (S) (U)

Regarding night differential, Bureau policy is to pay night differential at the rate of ten per cent of the base pay for any regularly scheduled night duty falling between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. This does not include any irregular occasional night work which might be included in voluntary overtime which an employee puts in. Consequently, only those clerical employees who perform night duty on a regularly scheduled tour of duty for an individual office, division, section, unit, or other group, will be eligible to receive night differential pay. This will be handled in the regular way on the Time and Attendance Registers and Cards. "Regularly scheduled" tour of duty means that the tour must be scheduled in advance to continue for at least two consecutive workweeks. Night work need not be scheduled for each day of the workweek, but it must be scheduled on at least one day of each of the two or more workweeks. (S) (U)

[COMMUNICATIONS] (S) (U)

[A. General] (S) (U)

Text of all test exercise messages, written or oral, should begin and end with the phrase "Exercise OPAL '58," which (S) (U)

6/19/58

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

will be part of the encoded text of encoded messages. Encode all messages in response to coded messages from the Bureau's relocation site. Have communications personnel review all instructions in this letter pertaining to communications. (C) (U)

[B. Security] (C) (U)

Exercise messages, written or oral, should not refer to the geographical location of the Bureau's relocation site in plain language. (C)

[C. Telephone] (C) (U)

Telephone calls on all exercise matters should be made to the Bureau's relocation site by calling Fredericksburg, Virginia, Essex 3-8561. If this number is busy, call Fredericksburg, Virginia, LD 20. Telephone operators at the Bureau's relocation site will answer your calls by saying "Essex 3-8561" or "LD 20." (C) (U)

[D. Teletype] (C) (U)

Teletype calls on exercise matters should be made to the Bureau's relocation site by calling the relocation site TWX teletype numbers on the Richmond, Virginia, exchange, RH 280, RH 441, and RH 466. Teletype calls will be placed, received, and acknowledged at the Bureau's relocation site by these numbers. Use regular teletype headings and procedures. Do not use "relocation site," "relocation headquarters," or similar terminology in the headings or plain language texts of teletype messages. (C) (U)

[E. Radio] (C) (U)

In order to reduce the over-all cost of the exercise, CW radio will be used for most exercise problems. Emergency monitoring and traffic procedures set forth in Radio Operators' Manual, Part I, Section 6, pages 5 through 10, will be observed by all field office radio stations except San Juan from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., EST, July 16 and 17, 1958, in lieu of normal radio schedules. The San Juan Station will provide radio coverage July 16 and 17 from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., EST. Field office stations will discontinue normal radio contact schedules at 7:30 a.m., EST, July 16 and resume normal schedules at 10:00 p.m., EST, July 17, 1958. (C) (U)

6/19/58

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The address symbol for the Bureau's relocation site and the Washington Field Office in radiograms will be "XY" and "FF" respectively. Since the Washington Field Office has no CW radio station, teletype or coding units, the communications exchanged with the Washington Field Office will be processed by the Bureau's Seat of Government Communications Section. The Washington Field Office must provide messenger service between the Washington Field Office and the Seat of Government communications center from 8:30 a.m., EST, July 16 to 12:00 midnight, EST, July 17, 1958, to deliver and receive exercise messages. (S) (U)

Do not use the Bureau's CONELRAD procedures and call signs or authentication charts if a CONELRAD test is announced. (S) (U)

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures

6/19/58  
SAC LETTER NO. 58-37

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

2 - dupl.  
1 - Boardman  
1 - Belmont  
1 - Casper  
1 - Callahan  
1 - Conrad  
1 - DeLoach  
1 - Mohr  
1 - Parsons  
1 - Rosen  
1 - Sullivan  
1 - Tamm  
1 - Trotter  
1 - Tele. Room  
1 - Holloman  
1 - Gandy  
1 - [REDACTED] Section  
1 - [REDACTED] SON

b6  
b7C

Date: June 27, 1958

To: Director  
Office of Defense Mobilization  
Executive Office Building  
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Merrill J. Collett, Chairman  
Operational Capability Task Force

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: ~~PRE-PHASE II QUESTIONNAIRE ON FEDERAL~~  
~~RELOCATION SITE FACILITIES~~

In accordance with the request contained in Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) communication dated June 18, 1958, there are enclosed herewith 54 reports in triplicate regarding relocation site facilities of Federal Bureau of Investigation field offices and the Seat of Government. These reports are classified "~~secret~~" as they contain the location of our relocation sites which are so classified.

JTM:jlh (8)

Enclosures (103)

NOTE: This letter is being classified "~~secret~~" inasmuch as enclosures transmitted by same are so classified.

Cover memo Belmont to Boardman dated 6-26-58, captioned "Buplans-Operation Alert 1958, Federal Action Phase, July 14-18, 1958 (Pre-Phase II Questionnaire on Federal Relocation Site Facilities)" JTM:hke

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE  
REC-65

MAIL ROOM ☐

58 JUL 2 1958

REC-65

~~SECRET~~

JUL 1 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 20, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, 7/14-18/58  
PRE-PHASE II QUESTIONNAIRE ON  
FEDERAL RELOCATION SITE FACILITIES

Wilson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Form letter dated 6/18/58 from chairman, Operational Capability Task Force (OCTF), Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), enclosing five copies of a Pre-Phase II questionnaire on Federal Relocation Site Facilities received Liaison Section 6/19/58. Questionnaire lists eight questions relating to our Seat of Government relocation site and relocation sites of our field offices. Questions cover a wide range including: number of employees designated to use sites; number necessary at sites to perform essential functions; food stored at sites; protection from radioactive fallout; equipment and personnel trained to measure residual radiation; medical services available vicinity of site; sources of fuel, power, and water at sites; communications facilities and whereabouts of members of Chain of Command for each site on "D Day," May 6, 1958, the date of the mock attack which occurred during Phase I, the Attack Phase of Operation Alert 1958. Cover letter requests distribution of questionnaire to our field offices for answering and direct return to OCTF with deadline of 6/30/58. Questionnaire is to be utilized during Phase III of Operation Alert 1958, the Evaluation Phase at HIGHPOINT, ODM relocation site on 9/15, 16, and 17/58.

OBSERVATIONS:

Our defense planning is centralized. We have complete copies of the defense plans of each field office. Certain questions require technical study by the Laboratory and on this basis we are capable of compiling answers for our field offices at the Seat of Government and Defense Plans Desk will prepare same. This was previously pointed out to the chairman of OCTF by Liaison Agent Bartlett on 6/17/58 and he expressed surprise and pleasure at the extent of our defense planning, and he readily acceded to the questions being answered by the Seat of Government for all our field offices. Answering of these questions is not optional but is required by ODM.

Enclosure.

REC-18

66-19012-79

JTM:mje (9)

1 - Mr. Boardman; 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. [Name])  
 1 - Mr. Nease; 1 - Mr. Parsons  
 1 - Mr. Bartlett; 1 - Liaison Section

58 JUL 7 1958

Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, 7/14-18/58  
(PRE-PHASE II QUESTIONNAIRE ON  
FEDERAL RELOCATION SITE FACILITIES)

ACTION:

All questions will be appropriately answered and the answers will be transmitted to ODM to arrive prior to ODM deadline date of 6/30/58.

Jim  
R  
Bm  
✓  
JWD  
JWB  
Jhy  
Jad



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *LB*

DATE: June 24, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT - 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, 7/14-18/58  
(Emergency Federal Register)

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

My memorandum of 6/18/58 advised of receipt from Office of *Al. C. Sullivan* Defense Mobilization (ODM) of copies of Emergency Federal Register to be used during the Federal action phase of Operation Alert (OPAL) - 1958. You were advised that the documents published therein would be reviewed and analyzed with respect to any possible effect on Bureau functions in connection with our participation in Federal action phase of OPAL - 1958. *Rushing*

These documents were prepared by ODM for use in OPAL - 1958 only and are not approved permanent planning documents. A review thereof reveals four documents with internal security aspects; however, none has a direct bearing on our operations in the internal security field.

1) Executive Order (EO) OPAL 58-3 Providing Temporary National Security Measures. This EO recognizes that an unprovoked armed attack has been launched against the United States by foreign military forces resulting in widespread chaos and destruction in many parts of the country and paralysis of many local governments. It provides for the performance of essential civil functions of state and local governments by the Federal Government when requested by a state to do so or when a state government is unwilling or unable to perform such functions. It further provides that the Secretary of Defense or his designee prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he may determine from which individuals may be excluded and with respect to which the right of any person to enter, remain in or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of Defense may impose. It provides for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus during the period this EO is in effect or during a 60-day period that begins on the date of the issuance of the order, whichever is shorter, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus to be effective throughout the continental United States and its possessions. An EO along similar lines was utilized in OPAL - 1957.

- 55 JUL 7 1958
- 1 - Mr. Nease
  - 1 - Mr. Boardman
  - 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier)
  - 1 - Mr. Parsons
  - 1 - Mr. Belmont
  - 1 - Mr. Minnich
  - 1 - Mr. Whitson
  - 1 - Mr. Rushing

TDR/pjm (9)

REC-18

EX-117

66-19012-80

10 JUL 21 1958

*5. NR*

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman  
Re: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT - 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, 7/14-18/58

As a matter of information, our Emergency Detention Program, which also calls for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, is not encompassed in the above proclamation.

2) Proclamation OPAL 58-3, Control of Persons Entering or Leaving the United States by the President of the United States of America. This proclamation confers upon the Attorney General authority to prescribe by regulations documentary requirements for persons entering or leaving the United States; authorizes the Secretary of State to invalidate, reinstate, modify or otherwise amend existing passports or visas; authorizes the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury to close any existing port of entry and to designate any new port of entry within the United States as they may deem advisable in the interests of national security, and authorizes the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury to designate the type of freight or passenger which may enter or leave any specified port of entry.

3) Proclamation OPAL 58-4 Proclaiming that the National Defense Requires Immediate Actions for Military Purpose with Respect to Communications, Plant Security and Vessel Security. This proclamation provides for interception of wire or radio communications of any foreign government by representatives of the military department or the Department of Justice. It also gives the Secretary of Defense authorization to bar from access to any defense facility individuals concerning whom there is reasonable ground to believe may engage in subversive activity. It also provides for screening of radio operators on any vessel by the Secretary of Defense.

4) EO OPAL 58-5 Establishing the Office of Censorship and Prescribing its Functions and Duties. This document provides for censorship of all communications crossing the borders of the United States or any of its territories or possessions, including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and all communications between the continental United States and any of its territories and possessions, including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

ACTION:

None. Submitted for information. ✓

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *10/12/58*

DATE: June 24, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
7/14-18/58  
(PRE-PHASE II QUESTIONNAIRE ON  
FEDERAL RELOCATION SITE FACILITIES)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

W. C. Sullivan

Memo Belmont to Boardman 6/20/58 advised of receipt of form letter from Chairman, Operational Capability Task Force (OCTF), Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), enclosing five copies of a Pre-Phase II questionnaire on Federal relocation site facilities. The questionnaire lists eight questions relating to our Seat of Government relocation site and relocation sites of our field offices. It was pointed out we would answer this questionnaire for all our field offices and transmit the answers in triplicate to ODM prior to ODM deadline of 6/30/58.

Review of the questions and our defense plans denotes answers to some of the questions will be standard for all field offices, and where they will vary they are subject to being handled by merely inserting a descriptive adjective into a sentence or paragraph.

the yellow of

Enclosed herewith is a plastiplate of a proposed form to be used and filled out in triplicate on each of our field offices for transmittal to ODM.

RECOMMENDATION:

That enclosed form be approved for utilization in answering questions contained in the questionnaire and triplicates of the form, after execution, be forwarded to ODM.

(ENCLOSURE)  
 REC-18 EX-117

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:jyl (6)

REC-18

EX-117

JUL 21 1958

55 JUL 7 1958

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FIELD OFFICE**

**Relocation Site:**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.

- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.

- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

MAIL ROOM ☐

ENCLOSURE

JUN 24 3 28 PM '58

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
W. C. Sullivan

SEE NOTE P3

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). An adequate number of meters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicians for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.
- (C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)                      on D day.  
                         at D + 14.  
                         at D + 30.  
                         at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

*Cover Memo BELMONT To BOARDMAN 6-24-58 JTM:JYL*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *8/2/58*

DATE: June 26, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT *ABW*

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
7/14-18/58  
(PRE-PHASE II QUESTIONNAIRE ON  
FEDERAL RELOCATION SITE FACILITIES)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman, 6/20/58, advised of receipt of questionnaire from Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) listing eight questions relating to our Seat of Government relocation site and the relocation sites of our field offices. Questions were to be appropriately answered and forwarded to ODM by 6/30/58.

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman, 6/24/58, enclosed Plastiplaten of form to be utilized in answering questions. Use of the form and, after execution in triplicate, forwarding of the answers to ODM was approved by the Director (memorandum and yellow of Plastiplate form attached).

The form in triplicate has been filled out for each of our 53 field offices as follows:

- (1) The name and address of each field office and name and location of the field office relocation site were inserted on page one.
- (2) An appropriate descriptive adjective was inserted in answer to 4(A) and numerals were inserted in respective spaces in answer to 4(B). Also, a description of the medical service available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site was inserted in 5, all of which are on page 2.
- (3) Appropriate descriptive adjectives were inserted in 6(A) and additional comments re Communications Facilities were added to 7, both on page 3.

ODM did not require restatement of the questions contained in the questionnaire, a copy of which is attached. The form was not utilized in answering these questions regarding our relocation site at Quantico and the enclosure pertaining to this site is

Enclosures

JTM:hke (6)

1-Mr. Boardman

1-Mr. Belmont

1-Mr. Bartlett

1-Mr. Minnich

1-Liaison Section

REC-18

EX-117

66-19012-83

10 JUL 24 1958





55 JUL 7 1958

Memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman  
RE: BUPLANS -- OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
7/14-18/58  
(PRE-PHASE II QUESTIONNAIRE ON  
FEDERAL RELOCATION SITE FACILITIES)

an original as the answers differ from the answers regarding our field offices. All answers are considered responsive to the questions and they are based on the defense plans of the respective field office, with the exception of answers deemed standard to our over-all defense plans. The answers to 4(A), (B), and (C) and 6(A) were coordinated with the Laboratory and in part are based on the Laboratory's damage analysis of the effects of the mock attack on May 6, 1958 (Phase I of Operation Alert 1958).

**RECOMMENDATION:**

Attached letter with enclosures be sent to ODM.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT *W*

DATE: July 1, 1958

FROM : MR. MOHR *W*

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
ANNEX NO. 8  
(RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS ANNEX)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Re memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, dated 6/30/58, concerning captioned subject matter.

Annex No. 8 is disseminated by the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) and sets forth the Resources and Requirements Program to be carried out by the Regional Offices (8 Regions in the United States) of the Office of Opal Resources and Operation (OORO) during Operation Alert 1958. The Program calls for representatives of various agencies to participate with OORO Regional Headquarters prior to 7/14/58 for the purpose of determining the post-attack resources requirements of the nation to carry on essential civilian and military survival activities.

This Program basically involves evaluation of State and local activities and the effect of resources shortages thereon. A list of representative items in the following major survival program areas has been selected for use under the Resources and Requirements Program for Operation Alert 1958:

1. Health and medical supplies and equipment.
2. Food.
3. Wearing apparel.
4. Emergency housing and lodging.
5. Engineering and construction equipment and supplies.

A review of Annex No. 8 indicates no action to be taken by the Bureau at this time. The Bureau in the past has advised ODM that our defense planning in connection with Operation Alert 1958 is centralized and that all information in connection with Operation Alert 1958 will be handled by FBI Headquarters in Washington prior to Operation Alert 1958 and at its relocation site during Operation Alert exercises on 7/18/58. *66-19012-85*

The Resources and Requirements Program outlined in Annex No. 8 is an attempt by the Federal Government to ascertain the

EX-117

*LJG:mjb mjb*  
 (3)

1 - Mr. Minnich, Defense Plans Desk

55 JUL 7 1958

*W*  
*3/1/58*

Memo from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont  
July 1, 1958  
Re: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

resources of local and State Government which can be directed toward survival purposes. These resources will be under the control of the Federal Government, administered by OORO. It appears that the needs of key critical agencies of the Federal Government will be given high priority by OORO.

During an extended national emergency, the resources needs of the FBI will be brought to the attention of OORO Headquarters to insure high priority of handling. The Bureau at this time is unable to recommend any stockpiling of supplies for our use during a national emergency. Assumed test problems which may be issued by OORO during Operation Alert 1958 will be evaluated and appropriate decision made at that time.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

None. For information only.

## Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *JPB*

DATE: July 2, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *MB*

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
ATTACHMENTS NUMBER 2 AND 3 TO ANNEX NO. 8  
PART 1 (RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS ANNEX)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont ☒  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Memo 6/30/58 advised of the receipt of Annex No. 8, Resources and Requirements Annex, and forwarded a copy of Annex No. 8 to the Administrative Division for review.

On 7/2/58 Liaison Section received, via mail, 25 copies of attachments number 2 and 3 to Annex No. 8, Part 1. Annex No. 8 described the Resources and Requirements Program and attachment number 2 contains conversion factors for making initial civilian requirements projections and attachment number 3 pertains to resources and requirements reports to be prepared by regional offices of the office of OPAL Resources and Operations during Phase II.

These attachments appear to have no bearing upon our participation in Operation Alert 1958; however, a copy of the attachment is enclosed with Mr. Mohr's copy of this memorandum for the information of the Administrative Division.

ACTION:

None. Informative.

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier) (with enclosure)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:jul (6)

REC-41

EX-117

JUL 8 1958

68 JUL 9 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT *Belmont*

DATE: July 3, 1958

FROM : MR. MOHR *Mohr*

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
7/14-18/58  
(EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER NO. 2)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Re memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated 6/26/58 concerning captioned subject.

Emergency Federal Register No. 2 (EFR) deals with Executive Order OPAL 58-2 (Edward), which establishes the Office of OPAL Resources and Operations (OORO). The Administrator of OORO delegates authority as follows:

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (page 99)

This Directive provides for physical security protection measures to be taken by Federal agencies in connection with Government stockpile locations, all buildings under his management control including relocation sites, and industrial facilities essential to the war effort.

Bureau planning provides for the physical security of all space occupied by the FBI both on national and field levels. During a national emergency, armed Security Patrols and Special Agents are to be assigned to our operations on a 24-hour basis, 7 days a week. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1 (page 101)

This Directive provides for the delegation of priorities and allocation authority, and policy on its use. It sets up:

1. The Administrator of the OPAL Energy and Minerals Agency with respect to the production, processing and distribution of solid fuels, petroleum and gas, etc.

*mjb*  
 LUG:mjb *mjb*  
 (3)

1 - Mr. Minnich *Minnich*

66 JUL 9 1958

REC-47

250 JUL 8 1958

EX-117

Memo Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 2

2. The Administrator of the OPAL Food Agency.
3. The Administrator of the OPAL Transport Agency for purposes of national defense.
4. The Administrator of the OPAL Communications Agency with respect to the utilization of wire and radio facilities and services.
5. The Administrator of the OPAL Industrial Production Agency.

The priority and allocation authorities delegated to these agencies are designed to maintain operations of essential services to meet the survival needs of the Armed Services and key critical civilian agencies during a national emergency. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 2 (page 116)

This Directive delegates to OPAL agencies authority to requisition or condemn private property or its use. Requisitioning authority shall be limited to that exercised by the Federal Government and shall be used only when necessary for military operations and their support, or survival of the population of the country.

The Bureau's interest concerns the requisitioning and condemning of private property which may be critically needed during an extended national emergency. Private property under the control of the Federal Government, however, should not work to the disadvantage of the FBI. Close liaison with OORO should make available to us resources that have become scarce and difficult to obtain. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4 (page 118)

This Directive delegates to certain Federal and OPAL agencies emergency contracting authority. The Directive further provides for the redelegation to other agencies of the Government emergency contracting authority for all types and kinds of things and services necessary to facilitate the national defense of the country. Advertising, competitive bidding, and bid, payment,

Memo Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 2

performance or other bonds or other forms of security need not be required.

During an extended national emergency the provision of this Directive will no doubt work to the advantage of the Bureau. The acquisition of essential equipment, supplies, and services which may be available at local sources in the field can be expedited. During a real emergency the Bureau will take appropriate steps to obtain from OORO authority to operate under the provision of this Directive. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 6 (page 121)

This Directive provides that OPAL Industrial Production Agency immediately establish and maintain a central inventory record of idle Government-owned production equipment and machine tools. The classes of production equipment and machine tools currently in short supply are types not in use by the Bureau's Exhibits Section and Mechanical Section. The provision of this Directive has no apparent effect on the operation of this Bureau in a real emergency or during Operation Alert 1958.

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 12 (page 126)

This Directive provides that all Federal agencies with a supply of personnel, materials, facilities, or services in excess of their requirements shall make such items available for civil defense purposes. All agencies shall be responsible for promptly notifying the OPAL Regional Executive of the OORO as to the quantity, location, and time of availability of any excess items.

The Bureau has gone on record with the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) in the past concerning the fact that at no time prior to or subsequent to a real national emergency would the FBI have personnel, material, or facilities in excess of actual needs to fulfill its responsibility to meet the maximum war effort. Any simulated requests which may be forthcoming from OORO Regional Executives during Operation Alert 1958 designed to obtain information from the field offices concerning data provided for in this Directive, will be handled directly with OORO from the Bureau's relocation site on the basis that no excess personnel, material, facilities, or services exist.

Memo Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 2

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5 (page 127)

This Directive provides for the Director of OORO to seize any plant engaged in urgent production when such plant has failed or is likely to fail to produce material and services within a reasonable time at a reasonable expense.

No FBI interest involved, nor is there any action during Operation Alert 1958 indicated.

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 8 (page 129)

This Directive vests authority with the General Services Administration (GSA) to release any quantity of strategic and critical materials from any stockpile location upon order from the OPAL Regional Executives of OORO.

It appears that this authority would work to the advantage of the Bureau during an extended national emergency. For example, the stockpile of ammunition would be of critical concern to us. Under the provisions of this Directive the Bureau would be in a position to have requisitions for ammunition handled on a high priority basis with GSA. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT MEMORANDUM NO. 1 (page 130)

This memorandum provides for aerial reconnaissance in support of the National Damage Assessment Program. It provides that the Department of Defense determine as promptly as possible through aerial reconnaissance the degree of damage to facilities on a priority list as developed by the National Damage Assessment Center.

The Bureau's interest in this matter is being handled by the FBI Laboratory.

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 15 (page 131)

This Directive determines ~~with~~ damage assessment surveys and reports to be made by certain OPAL and Federal agencies concerning the resources condition of the following facilities:

Memo Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 2

Manufacturing  
AEC  
Hospital and welfare  
Government buildings  
Post Office  
Veterans Administration  
Communications  
Energy and minerals  
Food  
Production capabilities  
Housing  
Manpower  
Finance  
Transportation

The immediate interest to the Bureau is that of reporting to GSA any shortage in building space which may occur during a national emergency, and reporting to the OPAL Transport Agency our needs for automotive equipment. These controls appear to be unobjectionable and should work to the advantage of the Bureau in a national emergency. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

RESOURCES DIRECTIVE NO. 13 (page 133)

This Directive provides that the Department of Agriculture shall direct the activities of Federal and other Governmental authorities in the suppression of fires in rural areas.

No FBI interest is evident in connection with the authority provided for in this Directive. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

HEALTH DIRECTIVE NO. 1 (page 134)

This Directive provides for OORO to mobilize and use the nation's health resources for the duration of the national emergency. Health manpower, health resources, health services, allocation of health services, and health standards shall be controlled to insure the maintenance of the health of the uninjured population, upon whose ability to work at their prescribed tasks our survival as a free people rests. The Department of Defense will be responsible for providing health services to the members of the Armed Forces. The Director for Health will be



Memo Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont.  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 2

responsible for providing health services to the nonmilitary population of the nation.

The Bureau's interest revolves around the fact that we will have to depend upon the Director for Health, OORO, for health resources that are immediately available during operations in the field. It will be necessary that we maintain close liaison with OORO to insure that health services will be deployed and allocated to us in areas of need as the situation demands. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

HOUSING DIRECTIVE NO. 1 (page 136)

This is a Directive providing for the activation of a plan for billeting of refugees. The Administrator of OPAL Housing Agency is directed to institute immediately the plan of action to guide and advise local Civil Defense Housing Authorities for the billeting of refugees or evacuees.

Of immediate concern to the Bureau is the need to maintain a close liaison with the OPAL Housing Agency in order that the needs of Bureau personnel in the field be given some priority of consideration. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 16 (page 137)

This Directive provides that the OPAL Energy and Minerals Agency shall assume full responsibility for the operations of the Defense Minerals Exploration Agency and modify its programs as appropriate.

No FBI interest is involved and no administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 10 (page 138)

This Directive provides that OPAL Energy and Minerals Agency immediately initiate a stockpile program to assure the continued production of necessary solid fuels.

No FBI interest is involved and no administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

Memo Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 2

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 14 (page 139)

This Directive provides authority to the Postmaster General to assist OORO in instituting and directing Federal activities at the regional level concerned with:

1. Registering persons and families.
2. Receiving and answering welfare inquiries.
3. Reuniting families in disaster areas.

The Bureau has in the past advised ODM and the Department of Justice that our emergency planning specifically instructs our employees, both in the field and at the Seat of Government, the manner in which they are to keep their immediate superiors advised concerning their whereabouts during a national emergency when a general evacuation of the population has been brought about. Our planning further provides that employees will be instructed concerning assignments to FBI field operations nearest to their evacuation point. The reuniting of families of FBI employees has also been carefully considered and every aid will be extended to employees by the Bureau to reassemble next of kin as soon as possible under conditions existing at the time.

The Bureau feels that our planning is as desirable as that which would be undertaken by the Post Office Department, both in the registration of our employees for assignment to work with other agencies and also in reuniting them with their families, many of whom may be widely scattered in survival camps or sites. The Bureau is not participating in the provisions of this Directive. The Defense Plans Desk, Domestic Intelligence Division, is familiar with this matter, and in the event of a simulated request from OORO during Operation Alert 1958 Domestic Intelligence Division will handle accordingly.

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 11 (page 140)

This Directive provides antitrust immunity to voluntary agreements.

This is a matter which comes under the purview of the Bureau's Investigative Division, and any test inquiry concerning this matter during Operation Alert 1958 will be handled by Domestic Intelligence Division.

Memo Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 2

RESOURCE DIRECTIVE NO. 3 (page 141)

This Directive provides for the restoration, repair, expansion, or construction of essential facilities through loans, loan guarantees, and the obligation or direct expenditure of Government funds.

No FBI interest is evident. No administrative action during Operation Alert is indicated.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information only.

F B I

Date: 7/2/58

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CINCINNATI (66-2175-0)

SUBJECT: BUPLANS *ORIGINAL AGENT 1958*  
OPAL, 1958

Re SAC Letter #58-37, dated 6/19/58, entitled 'Buplans. Reference is made to pages 4 and 5, entitled 'Intra FBI Test Problems. Specific attention is called to page 5, letter I, "Number of Former Agents In Good Standing Known To Be Residing Your Area."

In view of possibility of test problem in connection with the above, there is set forth a list of known former Special Agents within the Cincinnati area. It is not known whether all of the individuals listed are in good status with the Bureau at this time and this office is not requesting the Bureau to check their files on these people to ascertain their status since it is felt by the Cincinnati Office that a check of the same would create quite a file problem at SOG. Therefore UACB it will be presumed by the Cincinnati Office that these people are in good standing and could be called on in the event of a National emergency to assist the Bureau in whatever endeavor the Bureau so desired their assistance.

3 - Bureau  
1 - Cincinnati

AJM:MEH  
(4)

REC-646-19012-92

10 JUL 7 1958

LINSON

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

55 JUL 14 1958

PERS. FILED

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

CI 66-2175-0

ADAMS, C. T.  
ADAMS, JOSEPH P.  
ALLEY, WADE H.  
ALLOWAY, R. BROOKE  
BARKSDALE, T. H.  
BELL, JAMES F.  
BRIDWELL, CHARLES C.  
BRUMM, OLIVER C.  
CARBUITT, JOHN B.  
CALHOUN, JAMES R.  
CHAMBERS, RALPH W.  
COOK, DONALD D.  
CRANSTON, KENNETH  
CROW, FRED W. JR.  
CUNNINGHAM, R. P., JR.  
DALY, EDWARD F.  
DAVIS, JAMES A.  
DEVINE, SAM L.  
DOMBROSKY, EDWARD W.  
DONOVAN, WELDON F.  
EARHART, WARREN S.  
EVANS, DONALD O.  
FARLEY, JOHN J.  
FITCH, LOUIS H.  
FRY, CHARLES E.  
GHUNDISH, RICHARD C.  
HARRIS, HOWARD D.  
HECKERMAN, ARTHUR R.  
HEILKER, JOHN H.  
HILS, CLEM  
HINDS, ROBERT N.

HOEFLING, JAMES K.  
HOFFMAN, EDWARD V?  
HOFHEIMER, HARRY  
HOLLAND, ROBERT H.  
HORR, WILLIAM H.  
HUGHES, EDWARD L.  
HUNSINGER, GEORGE M.  
IMBS, JOHN F.  
ISAACS, SIDNEY  
JACK, ROBERT G.  
JENKINS, JAMES S.  
KENT, RAYMOND C.  
KREIGER, GEORGE A.  
KUNKE, ARLEY A.  
LANGE, FREDERICK J.  
LOHR, WILLIAM J.  
LUTZ, FREDERICK B.  
LYNN, BRUCE G.  
MASON, GEORGE E.  
MENDELSON, STANLEY H.  
MERWIN, EARL N.  
MC SHURLEY, MARK M.  
MOORE, BURT D.  
MOORHEAD, JOHN SCOTT  
MOWREY, MARSHALL, JR.  
OBENSHAIN, L. A.  
OSBORNE, E. VERNON  
OSTENDARP, HERBERT R.  
OSTOLHOFF, A. E.  
PFISTER, ROBERT F.  
POTTS, JACK D.  
RATCLIFF, JOHN D.

- 2 -

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

CI 66-2175-0

RATTERMAN, F. L.  
REIF, JULIUS W.  
RIFFLE, PAUL E.  
RIGGS, RICHARD W.  
RONAN, JOSEPH F.  
RYAN, JOHN D.  
SAXTON, RICHARD C.  
SCHMID, WILLIAM J.  
SCHWER, GEORGE A.  
SHADE, WILLIAM H.

SHEEKETSKI, JOSEPH E.  
SHEEHY, WILLIAM J.  
SPROUL, DON E.  
STANFORD, CARL E.  
STEMPLE, JACK L.  
SWEARINGEN, C. JR.  
TISDALE, ARTHUR G.  
WEAVER, ROBERT C.  
WOOD, PEIRCE

MASON

- 3 -

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: July 8, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
 FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, 7/14-18/58  
 (EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER,  
 VOLUME 23, NO. 2, SUPPLEMENT 1)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

My memorandum of 7/2/58 recorded receipt of copies of Emergency Federal Register #2, Supplement 1. This document was prepared for use in the Federal action phase of Operation Alert 1958. My memorandum pointed out that Domestic Intelligence Division would review documents contained therein for internal security aspects and would submit the results in a subsequent memorandum.

This document has been reviewed. It consists primarily of organizational directives of the Office of OPAL Resources and Operations; resources directives dealing with such things as delegation of priorities and allocation authority; health directives, manpower and stabilization directives. Nothing contained therein has any bearing on our operations in the internal security field.

ACTION:

None. Submitted for information.

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Mr. Rushing

TDR/pjm.  
 (5)

REC-86

66-19012-93

JUL 9 1958

58 JUL 11 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *LB*

DATE: July 8, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
(ANNEX NUMBER 8 - PART II)

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Memorandum 6/30/58 advised of the receipt of Annex Number 8, Resources and Requirements Annex, and forwarded a copy of it to the Administrative Division for review.

On 7/3/58 Liaison Section received via mail copies of Part II to Annex Number 8. The contents of Part II of Annex Number 8 have no pertinency to our participation in the exercise.

ACTION:

None. Informative.

*mje*  
JTM:mje (6)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier) (with enclosure)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

EX-124

REC-55

66-14012-95

TO: MR. BOARDMAN

55 JUL 15 1958



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Boardman ← *LB*

DATE: July 3, 1958

FROM : Mr. Belmont *MB*

SUBJECT: BUPLANS-OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE 7/14-18/58  
(EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER  
VOLUME 23, NO. THREE)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On 7-2-58 Liaison Section received via mail copies of the Emergency Federal Register (EFR), Volume 23, No. 3, for use during the Federal Action Phase of Operation Alert 1958. This EFR contains documents pertinent to the Commerce Department, Defense Air Transportation Administration, Interior Department, Maritime Administration, Public Roads Bureau, and to the emergency agencies which would be set up in connection with exercises as follows:

Commercial Fisheries Administration, Communications Agency, Electric Power Administration, Energy and Minerals Agency, Food Agency, Industrial Production Agency, Petroleum and Gas Administration, Stabilization Agency, Solid Fuels Administration, Transport Agency.

OBSERVATIONS:

The documents in this volume of the EFR should be reviewed and analyzed with respect to any possible effect upon our administrative or investigative functions and particularly for our use and information in connection with our participation in the Federal Action Phase. The Domestic Intelligence Division will review all documents for any internal security aspects, and an analysis prepared as a result of this review will be submitted in a subsequent memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Administrative Division, Laboratory Division, and Communications Section of the Records and Communications Division review and analyze all documents pertinent to the responsibilities of their respective divisions and furnish a copy of the analysis to the Defense Plans Desk.

JTM:pal  
 (8)

- 1- Mr. Boardman
- 1- Mr. Belmont
- 1- Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier (with enclosure))
- 1- Mr. Nease (Attention Mr. McGuire (with enclosure))
- 1- Mr. Parsons (with enclosure)
- 1- Section Tickle
- 1- Mr. Minnich

REC-41

EX 105

66-19012-97

10 JUL 10 1958

51 JUL 25 1958

LIAISON

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT *HB*

DATE: July 8, 1958

FROM : MR. MOHR *HR*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE 7/14-18/58  
(EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER NO. 3)

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| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Re memorandum Belmont to Boardman 7/3/58 concerning captioned subject matter.

Emergency Federal Register No. 3 (EFR) deals with Executive Order OPAL 58-2 (Edward), which establishes the Office of OPAL resources and Operation (OORO). The following Resource Directives and Orders specifically outline the authority of OPAL agencies:

OPAL COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (page 173 - 187)

There are 15 Directives dealing with telecommunications, establishing authority concerning:

1. Control of intrastate communications.
2. Control over maritime radio service.
3. Control over aeronautical service.
4. Review of certain actions of the Federal Communications Commission.
5. Closure of amateur radio stations.
6. Priorities of public correspondence.
7. Priorities of resumption of private line services.
8. Wartime expansion of FCC monitoring.
9. Frequency assignments.
10. Restrict exclusive use of overseas cable and radio channels.
11. Territorial and trusteeship areas.

*ah*

REC-3

66-19012-98

EX-117

JUL 11 1958

G:mjb *mjb*  
(3)55 JUL 17 1958 *Winnich, Defense Plans Desk*

Memo Mohr to Belmont, 7/8/58  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 3

12. U. S. extraterritorial areas.
13. Closure of stations in International Broadcast Service.
14. Actions involving FCC's changes in rules and regulations.
15. Control in U. S. theaters of operation.

The Laboratory and Records and Communications Divisions are evaluating these Directives dealing with the overall interest of the Bureau during an extended national emergency and also during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL FOOD AGENCY (page 188 - 304)

There are 10 of these Orders dealing with food resources:

- Order No. 1 (page 188)  
Regulations governing filing of and actions on petitions for relief from hardship and other adjustments and exceptions and appeals.
- Order No. 2 (page 193)  
Food inventory freeze.
- Order No. 3 (page 203)  
Anti-hoarding of food.
- Order No. 4 (page 209)  
Basic rules for restrictions on distribution and use of food.
- Order No. 5 (page 218)  
Basic rules for food priorities.
- Order No. 6 (page 234)  
Requisitioning food and supporting items.
- Order No. 7 (page 263)  
Basic rules for set-aside requirements for food processors and distributors.
- Order No. 8 (page 272)  
Distribution and use of fertilizer.
- Order No. 9 (page 279)  
Prohibition of the transfer of farm machinery and equipment.

Memo Mohr to Belmont, 7/8/58  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 3

Order No. 10 (page 293)

Restriction on the transfer of repair parts for farm machinery and equipment.

Interior OPAL Order No. 1 (page 301)

Setting forth the organization of the OPAL Commercial Fisheries Administration, having functions and powers relating to fishery commodities or products.

OPAL Food Agency orders are designed to affect substantial segments of food trade and industry, and such orders are considered appropriate to the national defense. Every segment of the population is affected by these orders in order that the Federal Government can effectively control the distribution of food in the civilian market at such a degree as to minimize hardship. These are the type of controls that have been enforced during World War II. It is felt that these orders will not work a particular hardship on the Bureau's operation. Close liaison with OORO will necessarily have to be maintained during an extended national emergency in order that the needs of Bureau personnel to carry out their duties can be considered at all times. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

OPAL HOUSING AGENCY (page 305 - 317)

This is a Directive to suspend all nonessential programs and activities, and advising of the transfer of all records, property, personnel, and funds of the present constituent agencies, units, divisions, branches, staffs, and programs of the Housing and Home Finance Agency. The OPAL Housing Agency shall effect the following during a national emergency:

1. Make federally owned or controlled housing and related resources available for refugee lodging.
2. Delegate control of registration and utilization of existing housing.
3. Delegate the requisitioning, commandeering, or condemning of private property or its use.
4. Establish a housing loan program designed to provide adequate funds to obtain essential housing objectives.

Memo Mohr to Belmont, 7/8/58  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 3

The extent of the Government's interest and control of housing facilities is limited to providing housing accommodations to refugees in the area of such housing. The Directives make it mandatory for all Federal agencies to report to the OPAL Housing Agency all Federally owned or controlled housing accommodations under their jurisdiction. No FBI interest is involved and no administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

OPAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AGENCY (page 318 - 347)

The duties of this agency are to furnish continuity in the mobilization activities of the nation's industrial capacity and to exercise certain functions formerly handled by the Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce. The provisions of this Directive have no immediate effect on the operations of the Bureau in a real emergency or during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL MANPOWER AGENCY (page 348 - 354)

This Agency provides emergency management of manpower during an extended national emergency. The Agency has authority to establish through State employment security agencies, activities as follows:

1. Establishment of area labor-management committees.
2. Emergency operation of employment security systems.
3. Employment stabilization and priority referral.
4. Compliance with manpower decisions.
5. Worker incentives.
6. Appeals procedures.
7. Mobilization lists of essential activities and critical occupations.

This is a plan whereby the Federal Government will marshal and channel the nation's manpower to the maximum war effort. The successes of the Federal Government in this operation will be directly beneficial to the Bureau in connection with manpower problems occurring throughout the nation during an

Memo Mohr to Belmont, 7/8/58  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 3

extended national emergency. The controls will eliminate competition in the field of manpower resources, both for industry and for industry and for Government operations. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

OPAL ENERGY AND MINERALS AGENCY (page 355 - 360)

This agency establishes wartime control and distribution of energy and mineral resources of the nation during an extended national emergency. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

OPAL ELECTRIC POWER ADMINISTRATION (page 361 - 369)

This agency establishes wartime control over fuel resources of the nation during a national emergency. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

OPAL PETROLEUM AND GAS ADMINISTRATION (page 370 - 381)

This agency establishes wartime control over petroleum and gas resources of the nation during an extended national emergency. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

OPAL TRANSPORT AGENCY (page 382 - 407)

This agency establishes wartime controls over all railroads, water carriers, motor carriers, air carriers, ocean shipping, port operators and storage operators. This agency promulgates highway traffic regulations, activates the civil reserve air fleet and the national emergency defense airlift, activates air priorities system, requisitions ocean-going merchant vessels and other water craft, and ship warrants procedure. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (page 408 - 411)

HEW is responsible to issue press releases regarding self-care, sanitation safeguards and other health measures; also to issue emergency measures for release of biological products. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

Memo Mohr to Belmont, 7/8/58  
Re: Emergency Federal Register No. 3

OPAL STABILIZATION AGENCY (page 412 - 414)

This agency establishes wartime control over prices, wage rates, salaries, and rents during an extended national emergency. These controls are similar to those exercised by the Federal Government during World War II. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information only.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: July 10, 1958

FROM : MR. MOHR

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE 7/14-18/58  
(EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER NO. 3, SUPP. 1)

|            |       |
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| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Re memo Belmont to Boardman dated 7/8/58 concerning captioned subject matter.

Emergency Federal Register (EFR) No. 3, Supplement 1, deals with OPAL Economic Warfare Agency and this agency's power over the economy of the nation after the Department of Defense has made known the identity of attacking nations and also after the Department of State determines the aggressor and over-run nations. The OPAL Economic Warfare Agency (OEWA) has the authority to regulate foreign assets, imposing import and export control. Further authority of the OEWA delegates to the Secretary of Commerce authority to maintain a watch list of persons located in the U.S. whose commercial or financial transactions may be inimical to U.S. interests.

The Domestic Intelligence Division is in the process of reviewing the authority of the Commerce Department in this matter for possible effects any action taken by the Commerce Department during a national emergency may have on internal security aspects of the Bureau's jurisdiction. No administrative action during Operation Alert 1958 is indicated.

## RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information only.

*LJB:mjb*  
LJB:mjb

(3)

1 - Mr. Minnich, Defense Plans Desk

REC-3

EX-117

JUL 11 1958

55 JUL 17 1958



ST  
esa Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *LB*

DATE: July 8, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*SUBJECT: BUPLANS OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, 7/14-18/58  
(EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER  
VOLUME 23, #3, SUPPLEMENT 1)

|               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| Tolson        | _____ |
| Boardman      | _____ |
| Belmont       | _____ |
| Mohr          | _____ |
| Nease         | _____ |
| Parsons       | _____ |
| Rosen         | _____ |
| Tamm          | _____ |
| Trotter       | _____ |
| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

My memorandum of 7/8/58 recorded receipt of copies of Emergency Federal Register, Volume 23, No. 3, Supplement 1. You were advised that the Domestic Intelligence Division would review this supplement for any internal security aspects and that results thereof would be submitted in subsequent memorandum. This document deals primarily with instructions issued by the Director of OPAL Economic Warfare Agency and deals largely with foreign assets control regulations, the delegation of authority to administer foreign assets control regulations, and imposition of import controls. It deals to some extent with export controls and interested agencies involved in such instructions include State Department, Treasury Department, and Commerce Department. No documents contained therein have a bearing on our operations in the internal security field.

ACTION:

None. Submitted for information.

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Mr. Rushing

TDR/pjm  
(5)

REC-55

66-19012-100  
JUL 11 1958

55 JUL 17 1958

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *JLB*

DATE: July 8, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *ph*

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
PHASE II, FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
7/14-18/58 (TOP LEVEL PARTICIPATION  
AND CHAIN OF COMMAND AT DEPARTMENT  
OF JUSTICE RELOCATION SITE)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*W. C. Sullivan*

On 7/8/58 James Canavan, Defense Plans Coordinator, Department of Justice, telephonically advised Supervisor Minnich, Defense Plans Desk, that he had received indications from Harold H. Healy, Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, which makes him feel "pretty positive" that the Attorney General will not visit Justice relocation site 7/16-18/58. Additionally, according to Canavan, Deputy Attorney General Walsh does not plan to visit Justice relocation site and in fact he "may be on leave."

Canavan advised Justice is not staffing its site very deep, maybe a total of 25 employees, excluding communications personnel, will participate at the site during the period 7/16-18/58. Canavan said ranking officials at the site on the dates indicated should be as follows:

7/14 & 15/58 - James Canavan, in the capacity of executive officer, will be at the site due to activation of communications on these dates.

7/16/58 - Perry W. Morton, Assistant Attorney General, Lands Division.

7/17/58 - J. Walter Yeagley, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, which Division has responsibility for Justice defense plans.

7/18/58 - James Canavan

## ACTION:

None. You will be kept advised of any indication of a change in the foregoing Justice plans.

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention: Mr. McGuire)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (Attention: Mr. Gauthier)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:nck (8)

REC-64 66-19012-102

21-117

8 3 51 24 25

JUL 14 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: July 8, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE 7/14-18/58  
(ANNEXES TO D+14 SITUATION SUMMARY  
FOR PHASE II)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On July 3, 1958, Liaison Section received via mail from Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM)-five copies numbered 561 through 565, inclusive, of "Annexes to D+14 Situation Summary for Phase II" which copies are classified ~~secret~~. This summary provides detailed information to support the situation summary and it reports the situation as of D+14. The summary goes into lengthy detail regarding continuity of Government, population and the medical burden, effects of the attack on food and agricultural production, housing, survival items, manpower, fuels, transportation, power, industrial production, and stabilization and finance.

OBSERVATIONS:

The summary is informative in nature and requires no action by us. There are attached to Mr. Mohr's, Mr. Nease's, and Mr. Parsons' copies of this memorandum copies 561, 562, and 563; respectively, of the summary. The remaining two copies are being retained by the Defense Plans Desk.

ACTION:

None. Informative.

JTM:mje (8)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier) (with one enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (Attention: Mr. McGuire) (with one enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention: Mr. McGuire) (with one enclosure)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

JUL 9 3 51 PM '58 REC-64

66-19012-103

JUL 14 1958

LIAISON

JUL 21 1958

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *7-11-58*

DATE: July 11, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, JULY 14-18,  
1958, (PHASE II, QUESTIONNAIRE  
TO FIELD DIVISIONS)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
 W. C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_

SAC Auerbach, Chicago Division, telephonically contacted Mr. Roach, Liaison Section, at 11:07 a.m. 7/10/58. Auerbach advised he had received from regional office of Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM) a questionnaire disseminated by an Operational Capability Task Force (OCTF). The questionnaire is to be answered by 7-15-58 and Auerbach understands these questionnaires are also being disseminated by regional offices of ODCM in the New England States area. Roach advised Auerbach we were aware of the questionnaires and had received approval from OCTF group at ODCM to handle the questionnaires at the Seat of Government. Auerbach was advised to ignore the questionnaire.

## OBSERVATIONS:

SAC Letter 58-37 (6/19/58) instructs field that in the event a request for a report is received from any agency re Operation Alert 1958, the agency is to be advised all reports are being handled by the Bureau and the field is to advise the Bureau of any such request.

We are now in the process of handling the questionnaire referred to by Auerbach. OCTF advised questionnaires would not be sent to Field Divisions. Apparently the OCTF is unable to control dissemination of the questionnaires through regional offices of ODCM; therefore, on basis of Auerbach's statement, we may logically anticipate receiving inquiries from other Field Divisions re this questionnaire. So as to economize and forestall inquiries from Field Divisions re this questionnaire, it appears desirable to issue appropriate instructions to all Field Divisions.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached radiogram be dispatched to all Field Divisions.

Enclosure

RRR:pwj (8)

- 7-11-58 ✓ *jm*
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
  - 1 - Mr. Belmont
  - 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier)
  - 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention: Mr. McGuire)
  - 1 - Mr. Parsons
  - 1 - Liaison Section
  - 1 - Mr. Winick

REC-52

10 JUL 15 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: July 10, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: BUPLANS OPERATION ALERT 1958

FEDERAL ACTION PHASE

7/14-18/58 (EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER)

VOLUME 23, NUMBER 3, SUPPLEMENT II)

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| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman 7/3/58 advised of the receipt, via mail, of the Emergency Federal Register (EFR), Volume 23, Number 3, for use during the Federal Action Phase of Operation Alert 1958. Memorandum Belmont to Boardman 7/8/58 advised of the receipt of Supplement I to this volume of the EFR. The memoranda recommended the EFR and Supplement I be reviewed and analyzed by the Administrative Division, Laboratory Division, and Communications Section of the Records and Communications Division, and the analysis be furnished to the Defense Plans Desk.

On 7/10/58 Liaison Section received, via mail, copies of EFR, Volume 23, Number 3, Supplement II, a copy of which is enclosed with Mr. Mohr's copy of this memorandum. This EFR supplement contains documents promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Federal Reserve System, and Treasury Department. The documents have no internal security aspects and appear to be only of interest in connection with administrative functions.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Administrative Division review and analyze all documents set forth in Supplement II to Volume 23, Number 3, of the EFR and furnish a copy of the analysis to the Defense Plans Desk.

- 1 - Mr. Boardman  
 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier)(with enclosure)  
 1 - Liaison Section  
 1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:jyl (6)

55 JUL 28 1958

copy made in  
 Belmont Unit  
 R2

REC-86

66-19012-106

JUL 16 1958

LIAISON

2 - O'G & I  
 ① - W. Low  
 1 - Mr. Boardman  
 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Mr. Mohr  
 1 - Liaison Section  
 1 - Mr. Minnich

ST  
 eta

VIA LIAISON

Date: July 14, 1958

To: Honorable Leo A. Hoegh  
 Director  
 Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization  
 2000 Florida Avenue, Northwest  
 Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Merrill J. Collett, Chairman  
 Operational Capability Task Group

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
 PHASE II QUESTIONNAIRE ON AUTHORITY  
 AND COMMAND CAPABILITY (FBI  
 FIELD DIVISIONS)

JUL 14 1 50 PM '58  
 REC'D-READING ROOM  
 FBI

In accordance with the contents of Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM), communication dated July 1, 1958, regarding "Questionnaire on Authority and Command Capability," information requested in referenced communication concerning FBI field divisions is set forth herein.

In view of the nature of FBI responsibilities and the centralized defense planning of this Bureau, it is desired that the information set forth be considered equally applicable to all 53 FBI field divisions. Additionally, since FBI communication dated June 27, 1958, forwarded reports in triplicate on each field division, which reports contained the address of the permanent division site and the location and address of the division relocation site, this information is not being restated herein.

BY COURIER SVC

per J. Boardman

49 JUL 15

COMM - FBI

Organization and Personnel

1. Acting within the scope of ODCM instructions for Phase I, the Attack Phase, FBI field division relocation sites were not activated. However, had the sites been activated the employee who would have been in command at the site following the May 6 attack would have been one included in a pre-established chain of command which is provided for in the defense plan of each field division.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

JTM:mje (8)

21 JUL 1958

MAIL ROOM ☐

(Cover memo Belmont to Boardman 7/11/58  
 Re: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
 FEDERAL ACTION PHASE 7/14/58  
 (ANNEX NUMBER 7, EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL  
 CAPABILITY IN AN EMERGENCY) JUL 16 1958

JTM:mje

(Note on third page)

**Honorable Leo A. Hoegh**

**Attention: Merrill J. Collett, Chairman  
Operational Capability Task Group**

**2. Yes**

**3. Under centralized planning and phasing such instructions are an integral part of the defense plans maintained in each field division.**

- 4. (a) Same as number three above.  
(b) Yes  
(c) None**

**5. None, all FBI personnel and equipment will be urgently needed to handle security work and meet essential wartime functions in a period of emergency. FBI defense planning provides for recruitment of needed personnel exclusive of arrangements with State or local governments.**

- 6. (a) Yes  
(b) Yes  
(c) Yes**

**Federal - State Relationships**

**7. (a) Not applicable.  
(b) This is not a foreseeable situation in view of FBI liaison with State - local governments and the nature of FBI responsibilities.**

**(c) By Presidential directives matters concerning sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities are the primary responsibility of the FBI. The intensive effort which would be required to meet FBI obligations under these directives would preclude rendering assistance to any state in civil defense efforts unless the nature of the assistance requested pertained to matters within FBI responsibilities.**

- (d) Same as (b) above.  
(e) Not applicable**

**8. (a) and (b) Not applicable in view of answers stated to question number seven.**

**Records**

**9. None, within the scope of planning possibilities which have recognizable limitations such as funds, availability, security and space of suitable relocation sites.**

Honorable Leo A. Hoegh

Attention: Merrill J. Collett, Chairman  
Operational Capability Task Group

Communications

10. Information regarding communication facilities at FBI field division relocation sites was furnished to ODCM in answer to question number seven on the Pre-Phase II questionnaire. This information was furnished by FBI communication dated June 27, 1958, referred to in the second paragraph of this letter.

11. The capabilities of communications at FBI field division relocation sites were denoted in answer to question 8(b) on the Pre-Phase II questionnaire mentioned in number ten above. As to communications capabilities with the agencies stated under 11 (a) through (e), these capabilities would depend on the status of the communications facilities of the listed agencies at D-Day, D+14, D+30, and D+90. The status of the communications capabilities of the listed agencies is unknown to the FBI.

12. Yes

Total Evaluation

13. Operational capability of the FBI field offices to meet an attack is considered excellent due to the high degree of readiness incorporated into FBI defense planning. The provisions included in the defense plans of each FBI field division regarding relocation, emergency communications, emergency authority, and Federal - state relations are considered adequate.

Enclosure

NOTE: Enclosure is copy of questionnaire dated 7/1/58 captioned "OPAL 1958 - PHASE II, OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY TASK FORCE, Questionnaire on Authority and Command Capability," which is being transmitted since letter does not restate questions contained therein.



5+ *usa* Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Boardman *gh*

DATE: July 2, 1958

FROM : Mr. Belmont *MB*SUBJECT: BUPLANS-OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE 7/14-18/58  
(EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER  
VOLUME 23 NO. TWO, (SUPPLEMENT ONE)

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman 6-26-58 advised of the receipt of copies of Emergency Federal Register, No. two (EFR). Memorandum recommended Administrative Division, Laboratory Division, Investigative Division, and Communications Section of Records and Communications Division review and analyze all documents pertinent to the responsibilities of their respective Divisions and furnish a copy of the analysis to the Defense Plans Desk.

On 7-2-58 Liaison Section received copies of Supplement No. one to EFR No. two, copies of which are enclosed with Mr. Mohr's, Mr. Nease's and Mr. Parsons's copy of this memorandum. The documents published in this supplement should also be reviewed and analyzed as to any possible effect upon our administrative and investigative functions and particularly for our use and information in connection with our participation in the Federal Action Phase.

The Domestic Intelligence Division will review all documents for internal security aspects and will submit the results in a subsequent memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Administrative Division, Laboratory Division, and Communications Section of Records and Communications Division review and analyze all documents pertinent to the responsibilities of their respective Divisions and furnish a copy of the analysis to the Defense Plans Desk. *ad*

JTM:sal

(8)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier (with enclosure))
- 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention Mr. McGuire (with enclosure))
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (with enclosure)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-9

10 JUL 17 1958

EX-102

F68  
51 JUL 25 1958

LIAISON

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ST  
TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *Mr@*

DATE: July 9, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, JULY 14-18, 1958  
(PARTICIPATING OFFICIALS AT OUR  
RELOCATION SITE 7/16-18/58)

|                |       |
|----------------|-------|
| Tolson         | _____ |
| Boardman       | _____ |
| Belmont        | _____ |
| Mohr           | _____ |
| Parsons        | _____ |
| Rosen          | _____ |
| Tamm           | _____ |
| Trotter        | _____ |
| Clayton        | _____ |
| Tele. Room     | _____ |
| Holloman       | _____ |
| Gandy          | _____ |
| W. C. Sullivan | _____ |

Since completion of our over-all plan for FBI participation in Operation Alert 1958 (O/A 58), we have received a considerable number of additional annexes from Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization regarding the nature and scope of the exercise. These annexes point up the basic concepts of the exercise along resource-survival lines. In consideration of the stress being placed upon resources and survival and since the majority of our intra-FBI problems are planned around our administrative functions, it appears proper to reappraise our planning regarding participating officials at our relocation site on 7/16-18/58. Assistant Directors Belmont, Mohr, and Parsons are now scheduled to be at our site during the period of our participation. However, since the Domestic Intelligence Division responsibility is primarily one of coordination and submission of reports which will primarily be based on our administrative functions, the scheduling of three assistant directors out of a total of 47 participating employees may be excessive. Therefore, unless it is the Director's desire that Mr. Belmont should be at our site 7/16-18/58, he will not go. In this regard and in compliance with the Director's desire, in the event Mr. Belmont does not go to the site Mr. Roach, who is now scheduled to go, acting in Mr. Belmont's absence, will assume all responsibility for coordination, submission of appropriate reports, and for our successful participation in the exercise. Mr. Mohr will be the Bureau official in charge of our site.

RECOMMENDATION:

If it is the Director's desire that Mr. Belmont not go to our site 7/16-18/58, Mr. Roach will assume all responsibility now delegated to Mr. Belmont in our planning for O/A 58 and Mr. Mohr will be the official in charge of our site.

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier)

1 - Mr. Nease (Attention: Mr. McGuire)

1 - Mr. Parsons

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:pwf (8)

REC-9

JUL 17 1958

EX-102

66-19012-409 OK

JUL 21 1958

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *for*

DATE: July 14, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *RR*

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

W. C. Sullivan

On July 14, 1958, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section talked to Mr. H. R. McPhee of the White House concerning White House participation in Operation Alert 1958.

Mr. McPhee advised that definitely the President is not participating in the test; that there may be some White House participation; however, this is not definitely established at this time. Mr. McPhee volunteered that he discussed Operation Alert on July 14 with General Goodpaster, the President's staff secretary. Mr. McPhee said that he would advise Mr. Bartlett as soon as a definite decision was made concerning this matter.

## ACTION:

For information.

*mje*  
OHB:mje (5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
  - 1 - Mr. Minnich
  - 1 - Liaison Section
  - 1 - Mr. Bartlett
- RR* *AB* *W.C.*

55 *RCF* JUL 21 1958

EX-102

66-19012-110  
JUL 17 1958

*Sub*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BOARDMAN *JB 7/16/58*

DATE: 7/14/58

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| Tolson        |  |
| Boardman      |  |
| Belmont       |  |
| Mohr          |  |
| Nease         |  |
| Parsons       |  |
| Rosen         |  |
| Tamm          |  |
| Trotter       |  |
| W.C. Sullivan |  |
| Tele. Room    |  |
| Holloman      |  |
| Gandy         |  |

At 4:30 p.m., 7/14/58, Ed Cox, Relocation officer of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM), called liaison supervisor Bartlett from High Point, which is the relocation site of ODCM. He furnished the following message, which he stated was being given to all government agencies:

"Between now and 8:30 a.m., 7/16/58, the strategic alert cadre of departments and agencies reported in response to ODM letter of May 9 will very likely be directed to proceed immediately to their relocation sites."

Mr. Bartlett sought further information from Mr. Cox. Cox said this would come out as an order from the White House. Bartlett asked him if this would apply to the personnel who would be relocated in an actual emergency, or whether it applied only to those employees who are already scheduled to report to the relocation site on 7/16 for purposes of Operation Alert 1958. Mr. Cox said this would apply solely to the personnel presently scheduled for Operation Alert 1958. Mr. Cox had no further information as to the reason for this message.

Mr. Bartlett checked with Mr. McPhee at the White House as to his knowledge of this message. McPhee did not have any knowledge concerning the message, but stated that it may well be tied into the meeting presently going on between the President and his staff, and the bipartisan leaders of Congress, relative to the Near East situation, which developed from the Iraq revolt.

At the present time, the way this matter rests, should an instruction be received to proceed immediately to the relocation site, rather than waiting until Wednesday morning, 7/16, such instruction will apply only to the 47 people who are going to the relocation site on Wednesday morning, 7/16. It is entirely possible that ODCM is utilizing this method to throw a spark into Operation Alert 1958 and galvanize those agencies into action which have been lagging on this exercise.

## ACTION:

Mr. Bartlett is seeking further information from ODM and the White House and will advise as soon as further information is available.

AHB:CSH (7)

EX-102

(see addendum, page 2)

cc Mr. Boardman, Mr. Belmont, Mr. Roach, Mr. Minnich, Mr. Bartlett, Night Supervisor

51 JUL 25 1958

10 JUL 17 1958

LIAISON

Mr. Boardman

**ADDENDUM:**

At 5:15 p.m. Mr. Bartlett again talked to Mr. Cox, ODCM, who stated that this plan had been afoot prior to the recent development in the Near East. This lends credence to our speculation that this is merely a technique to develop interest on the part of agencies and departments who are going to participate in Operation Alert 1958.

:As a precaution we are advising the 47 persons scheduled to participate that they should bring their bags tomorrow and be prepared in the event they go to the relocation site earlier than planned.

*[Handwritten mark]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

54  
wa Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 15, 1958

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson        | ✓ |
| Mr. Boardman      | ✓ |
| Mr. Belmont       | ✓ |
| Mr. Nease         | ✓ |
| Mr. Parsons       | ✓ |
| Mr. Tamm          | ✓ |
| Mr. Trotter       | ✓ |
| Mr. W.C. Sullivan | ✓ |
| Tele. Room        | ✓ |
| Mr. Holloman      | ✓ |
| Miss Gandy        | ✓ |

This is the initial report on Operation Alert 1958 following a message from the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization received at the Bureau by me at 11:32 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time today (July 15, 1958). All times hereafter are being listed as Eastern Standard Time to conform with the time being used by the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM) throughout the operation.

Operation Alert 1958 was not scheduled to start until 8:30 a.m. EST, July 16, 1958. However, by memorandum dated July 15, 1958, from Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary, the FBI and other agencies were requested to immediately proceed to their relocation sites immediately upon receipt of the alert call. The Bureau complied with this request and went into operation as indicated below:

Alert received-----10:32 a.m.

Personnel scheduled to depart by bus departed-----11:06 a.m.  
(Those scheduled to leave by car departed  
shortly prior to or shortly thereafter)

Bus arrived at relocation site-----11:57 a.m.

Bureau relocation site became fully operational-----11:50 a.m.

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization  
(Highpoint) notified that FBI operational  
at 11:50 a.m.-----12:05 p.m. *al*

Justice relocation site notified FBI operational  
at 11:50 a.m.-----12:29 p.m.  
(Mr. Canavan, Justice representative, not  
reached until time indicated)

- 1 - Mr. Nease  
1 - Mr. Holloman  
1 - Mr. Boardman  
1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. Mohr  
1 - Mr. Parsons  
1 - Mr. Roach  
1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-9

JUL 17 1958

RRR/mad/pjm  
(15) JUL 25 1958

66-19012-112  
LIAISON

Memorandum to The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

From the above, it will be noted that the persons scheduled for this exercise were promptly notified and dispatched to the relocation site. (Six persons who had worked night shifts at Bureau headquarters the night before arrived at the Bureau's relocation site later in the afternoon to take up night duties.) From the above time table, it will be noted that, from the alert notice (10:32 a.m.) until we were fully operational (11:50 a.m.), all persons concerned were notified and had arrived at the relocation site in one hour and 22 minutes. This was done despite the fact that the alert was received at the Bureau when many of the employees were at lunch.

Of the five Liaison supervisors scheduled to go with their agencies, only three of the five and those assigned to ODCM, Justice and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) went to the agencies. [redacted] b3

[redacted] is not sending out its main force until tomorrow and the White House has not made a decision as of this time. In view of the international crisis in the Middle East, we plan to have our Liaison Agents at the relocation sites of other agencies only if it is required to keep our relocation arrangement intact with those agencies or if our Agents can be of great value to the Bureau in our operations at our relocation site. (Previous memorandum was submitted on this matter.) b7E

#### BUREAU PROBLEMS:

We set up in advance of the alert 40 field problems to be run as originally scheduled on July 16 and 17, 1958. In view of the so-called surprise alert, it became necessary for us to contact our field offices via radio to stand by to start receiving Bureau problems effective today (July 15, 1958). This alerting was accomplished by an all field division radio contact with the exception of those offices (2) which it was necessary to contact by teletype. (Jacksonville was not installed since suitable space will not be available until September. Little Rock just moved and station is being reinstalled.) Scheduled problems to the field were dispatched to all field offices as scheduled and are presently continuing. Our scheduled problems will continue through the balance of today, tomorrow (July 16, 1958) and as many as is necessary on July 17, 1958, to keep our scheduled program.

#### COMMUNICATIONS:

In setting up our problems (40) covering 53 field offices, we have stressed the use of radio both for economy reasons and in order to give the radio network a good severe workout. The communications

Memorandum to The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

system at the relocation site is performing effectively at this time. We have encountered no difficulties so far.

ACTIVITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES:

Liaison Agent Whaley advised that activities at Highpoint, the relocation site of ODCM, are being stepped up and that Deputy Director John Patterson arrived at 2:48 p.m. to take over active supervision while Director Hoegh is scheduled to arrive later today, July 15, 1958.

b6 per DOE  
b7C per DOE

Liaison Supervisor [ ] at AEC site states that there is little or no activity there at the present time. He advised that the main cadre was not scheduled to arrive until tomorrow (July 16, 1958).

Liaison Supervisor Daunt at the Justice relocation site advised at the time of calling, 2:30 p.m., that up to that time only Mr. James Canavan, an assistant to Walter Yeagley, was the highest ranking person in authority. It was expected, however, that Yeagley would arrive later on in the afternoon. (An earlier memorandum reflected that Deputy Attorney General Walsh may visit Justice site on the afternoon of July 16, 1958.)

OUTSIDE PROBLEMS:

As of 4:00 p.m. today, the Bureau received 15 problems from ODCM which requested replies by July 16 and 17. We replied to all questions posed today. Some of the problems raised are similar to questions asked in Prephase II and Phase II questionnaires received from the Operational Capability Task Group and answers to which have already been forwarded to this Group in Washington. We are answering these problems along similar lines. For example, one problem requests the number of FBI initial cadre and relocation staff that could be made available for other than our own needs. We will reply none as the intensive effort required to meet FBI operations precludes rendering assistance to other agencies, local or state governments. Other problems are: What trained medical service, equipment and operations are available at your relocation site? We will reply U.S. Marine Corps Hospital. Additionally, a supply of first aid kits and personnel trained in first aid are at the site. Also in the event



Memorandum to the Director  
RE: OPERATION ALERT 1958

of a real emergency 12 registered graduate nurses and facilities of our health service could be immediately dispatched to the site. How many communications and policy personnel excluding the officer in charge are in the alert cadre? (Those persons coming to the site today) Our answers to this question is 46 which excludes one person who is considered to be the officer in charge. We broke this figure down as requested between clerical, communications and policy personnel. Have you notified the censorship agency to your watch list needs? We replied to ODCM that we had given the censorship agency the watch list information they desired and advised the censorship group as requested that we would submit approximately 150 names 50% of which could be released to British and Canadian censorship agencies. (This is the same type of reply we gave last year). In the event that all Washington fingerprint files are destroyed in an attack what alternate files exist? If none what are your plans for dealing with this contingency? We replied by stating the FBI acts as a central depository of fingerprints furnished by law enforcement agencies and in the event records are destroyed such records will be regrouped from individual duplicate records maintained by law enforcement agencies and state fingerprint Bureaus throughout the country, further the FBI has microfilmed and stored at relocation site certain essential fingerprint records to be used under emergency conditions.

DIFFICULTIES:

Frankly, we have not run into any difficulties as yet. It is interesting to note that [redacted] through which the Bureau reaches Highpoint on the microwave system, was hit by lightning in the past day or two. [redacted] did not know about this until they were informed of it) This did not, however, interfere with our transmission as we were able to get to Highpoint by other facilities as the Bureau technicians were able to "patch" into commercial facilities which completed our microwave circuit.

b3  
b7E

ACTION:

None. The Director will be advised by further memorandum of developments tomorrow, 7/16/58.

R

✓ JLM  
7/15/58

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 16, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

|                   |       |
|-------------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson        | _____ |
| Mr. Boardman      | _____ |
| Mr. Belmont       | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr          | _____ |
| Mr. Parsons       | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen         | _____ |
| Mr. Tamm          | _____ |
| Mr. Trotter       | _____ |
| Mr. W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room        | _____ |
| Mr. Holloman      | _____ |
| Miss Gandy        | _____ |

This report covers our activities at the relocation site since the initial report submitted on the afternoon of July 15, 1958, up until noon (1:00 P.M., Washington time), today, July 16, 1958.

SCHEDULED BUREAU PROBLEMS

As of noon, today, all Bureau problems scheduled in advance to be completed by noon, July 16, 1958, have been completed. In addition, we have gone ahead and initiated problems in advance of our scheduled program. This has been done despite the fact that we have received a heavy flow of outside problems from the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM), as well as miscellaneous traffic which has kept our communications extremely busy. It is possible that, if we continue to run ahead of our schedule, we may be able to release our radio operators in the field ahead of the 10:00 P.M., July 17, 1958, termination time, as well as some personnel from our relocation site. We are watching this very carefully and we will release such personnel as is possible if conditions will permit.

The problems we are running with the field include primarily those dealing with Bureau resources, personnel, equipment, vouchers and payroll matters. For example, our first problem to the field simulated placing all offices on a 24-hour schedule and taking other appropriate emergency steps, as well as surveying available personnel after the simulated bomb damage. Other problems required the field to handle emergency preparation of vouchers under Treasury Department instructions that territorial disbursing by offices could be done. Other problems requested information from the field concerning destroyed equipment and the possibility of local procurement. Problems were directed to the field concerning automotive requirements under local civil defense emergency conditions. Other problems concerning

- 1 - Mr. Nease
- 1 - Mr. Holloman
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Roach
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-55

EX-138

66-19012-115  
3 JUL 18 1958RRR/pjm  
(9)

51 JUL 25 1958

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

office space and emergency supplies from General Services Administration offices were presented to the field with instructions to advise their ability to carry on Bureau responsibilities under the simulated emergency. Other problems pertaining to personnel, both Agent and clerical, were given to the field with a request that they respond to Bureau inquiries on conditions pertaining to such personnel as soon as possible. In addition to these simulated problems which have been completed, we will, of course, contact nine field offices this evening to run actual availability checks. The results of these checks will be reported in my memorandum tomorrow, July 17, 1958.

#### OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

As of noon, today, we had received 19 outside problems. All of these have been received from the director of the Office of Opal Resources and Operation (OORO), ODCM, with the exception of two inquiries received by our New York and Boston Offices from the Operational Capability Task Group. We have replied to all of these inquiries promptly so that the Bureau will not be charged with any delay in reporting, notwithstanding the fact that some of the questions and problems raised would not require answers until the close of business today, July 16, or tomorrow, July 17. Examples of the problems received in the last 24 hours are as follows:

- 1) By messages on July 15, 1958, the New York and Boston Offices received inquiries from the chairman of the regional Operational Capability Task Group (OCTG) concerning certain questions regarding adequacy of relocation site, food stored at the site or under agency control, and related matters. The New York and Boston Offices were advised that we had previously on a headquarters level answered these inquiries on behalf of all our field offices and that this was done with the authority of ODCM. Boston and New York were advised to instruct the regional representative of OCTG to please channel additional requests in this matter directly to OCTG for referral to Bureau headquarters.

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

2) By teletype of July 15, the director of OORO (ODCM) sent the following message to the Justice relocation site and Justice in turn referred it to the Bureau: "Considering warning time and attack effects on FBI field offices, report capability to take enemy aliens and possible subversives into custody." In response, we replied to Justice relocation site that, in view of the ~~top secret~~ nature of programs concerning which OORO has inquired, no reply was being made by the FBI direct. However, for the Department's consideration in connection with any reply it desired to make, we supplied the following information. Due to the surprise nature and the severity of the attack on May 6, 1958, and the heavy resultant damage to centers of population throughout the country, the persons referred to by OORO suffered heavy casualties and dispersal. Numbers of those who were not casualties have been taken into custody and continued efforts are being made to locate and apprehend others who may be at large. This situation stresses absolute necessity of instituting these emergency programs in advance of a possible attack in order for them to be fully effective. Justice was told that OORO was being advised that appropriate information had been given to Justice for furnishing any reply necessary to OORO. OORO was told that a reply would not be forthcoming from the FBI and that Justice had all necessary data.

3) On July 15, a message was received from OORO inquiring concerning internal emergency action documents considered to be "self-triggering" delegations of authority, including those given to field units, and if this agency has developed action papers to implement presidential emergency orders; if this agency has secure storage facilities at our relocation site, and if copies of presidential action papers have been prepositioned. OORO emphasized the fact that the message related to real papers and not to exercise documents. We sent a reply on July 15 by teletype stating that the responsibility for implementing presidential emergency action papers with respect to programs involving the FBI in an emergency rests with the Attorney General and that the FBI has detailed plans for compliance with instructions of the Attorney General at all levels of operation; that secure storage facilities are available at the FBI relocation site; that one copy of the presidential emergency action papers has been received by the FBI which is included in head of agency personal kit at FBI headquarters, and that we have requested an additional copy for our relocation site which has not been received to date.

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

4) By teletype of July 15 from OORO, it inquired "If this had been a real warning, has your agency advised alert cadre personnel concerning actions to be taken by their dependents? If not, what are your recommendations?" We replied by teletype on the same date that Bureau cadre personnel were fully instructed concerning action for dependents.

5) By teletype dated July 15 from OORO, inquiry was made as to what radio backup equipment exists at the FBI's relocation site to handle emergency relocation communications. We replied by teletype on the same date that the FBI emergency relocation communications consist of CW radio circuits to all field offices with radio-teletype to key points and that we were equipped with microwave radio facilities to relocation sites of critical agencies through microwave network.

6) On July 15, we received a teletype from OORO relating to radiological decontamination measures that could be taken at the Bureau's relocation site and what equipment and personnel would be available. We advised OORO on July 15 that, if necessary, we could take any one or all of the following decontamination measures: (1) hosing down of immediate locale; (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination; (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment; (4) filtering of all incoming air into the building. Further, a Federal Government owned and controlled water supply system is utilized, including an installed infiltration device to provide water free from radionuclides.

#### PERSONNEL

Personnel at the relocation site have been kept very busy. We have carefully surveyed the volume of operations with a view toward cutting personnel if possible. As of noon, today, all persons assigned to the site were actively engaged in handling our intra-Bureau responsibilities, as well as those with outside agencies. We are still operating with the original 47 alert group. We are receiving a heavy flow of messages, particularly over the interagency communications system, which originate at ODCM headquarters at Highpoint. This traffic is composed of messages and problems directed to us by ODCM, and informational traffic which requires only review but no action. As previously mentioned, if it is

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

possible to release personnel at the completion of the handling of the scheduled Bureau problems, we will do so. We will watch developments very closely and you will be kept informed of developments.

#### ACTIVITIES AT OTHER AGENCIES

We now have Liaison Agents at three relocation sites, i.e., ODCM, Justice and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Agent Whaley at ODCM advised that he had been informed by ODCM official that the FBI was among the first to relocate upon receiving the alert message on the morning of July 15. According to the latest figures available, 71 departments and agencies received the alerting message. (They were requested, pursuant to White House instructions, to relocate immediately on the morning of July 15 rather than waiting until the morning of July 16.) Of this group, only 37 were able to activate their relocation sites by 10:00 A.M., July 16, although 47 of the group had communications staffs at their sites. Agent Whaley was also advised that the FBI and the Bureau of the Budget were handling problems presented by ODCM faster than any other agencies. ODCM representative commented that it was expected that the Bureau of the Budget would handle the problems faster than any other agency as it was relocated at Highpoint where the problems originated. He expressed amazement at the speed with which the Bureau was handling the problems given to it by ODCM. Agent Whaley further advised that Director Hoegh of ODCM is now planning to visit Highpoint at 2:00 P.M., today. It was rumored that the Vice President may go to Highpoint but this has now been discounted and it is quite positive that he will not appear. Neither does the ODCM staff expect a visit from the President this year.

Agent [ ] at AEC stated that none of the top AEC officials are scheduled to be at the relocation site today but some of them may attend a briefing to be held tomorrow, July 17, at the relocation site. Agent [ ] related that AEC at Albuquerque had reported on a practice problem in the Albuquerque AEC area to the effect that the FBI had extended excellent cooperation in handling

b6 per DOE  
b7C per DOE  
b7E per DOE

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

b7E per DOE

[REDACTED] The message from the AEC relocation site at Albuquerque made no request of any type of the Bureau but merely stated that the FBI handled this simulated problem in an excellent manner.

Liaison Agent Daunt advised that things are very quiet at the Justice relocation site. Deputy Attorney General Walsh, who is to visit ODCM site at Highpoint today, is scheduled to go to the Justice site tomorrow. Deputy Attorney General Walsh is accompanied by Assistant Attorney General (AAG) in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel Malcolm R. Wilkey. According to James Cannavan, Justice employee at the site, AAG Wilkey is very unhappy with Justice's relocation site and is visiting other sites to compare them with what Justice has. AAG Harry M. Morton of the Lands Division is at the Justice site and is acting in charge, scheduled to return to Washington today, leaving Acting AAG Yeagley in charge. Luther Huston is reportedly en route to the Justice site for a visit. Immigration and Naturalization Service is represented by two men, General Edwin Howard and one Allen Cothrell. Agent Daunt advised that the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department has representatives actively assigned at the ODCM site at Highpoint.

#### COMMUNICATIONS

From the time we activated our site at 11:50 A.M., EST, July 15, until 11:00 A.M., EST, today, a total of approximately 24 hours, our communications set-up has received a total of 112 coded radiograms and has sent a total of 276 coded radiograms, for a grand total of 388 radiograms handled. During the same period, 48 incoming teletypes were received (only four of which were at Bureau cost) and 36 (20 at cost to Bureau) were sent for a total of 84 teletypes handled.

As an example of how much code work has been done, our Code Room has encoded and decoded 12,141 code groups during this period. For a better comparison picture, the Code Room, consisting of ten employees, handled in 24 hours more than we normally handle in a 24-hour period at the Seat of Government with four to six more employees. (This pertains strictly to AFSAM 7 code work and does not take into consideration the fact that Code Room employees at the

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

Seat of Government have additional time-consuming duties of an administrative nature, manual cipher pad working, etc.) The communications personnel have put in long hours, have turned out a large volume of work, and are performing at peak efficiency. As the above figures will reflect, we are continuing to emphasize the use of our radio network to exchange messages with the field.

#### DIFFICULTIES

We have experienced no difficulties thus far in our Operation Alert work. Communications equipment is holding up extremely well to date. There have been no breakdowns of our equipment. We have been running with a minimum of backlog and traffic is flowing evenly in and out of the relocation site communications center. The lack of difficulties encountered at the relocation site can to a good measure be attributed to the prior arrangements made of facilities at our relocation site by SAC Sloan and his staff, as well as the other planning and arrangements made by participating divisions at the Seat of Government prior to the starting of this exercise.

#### ACTION:

A subsequent report will be submitted on July 17, 1958.

*R*

*JPM*  
7/16



~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C

The Attorney General

54  
iso  
Director, FBI

cc - Mr. Belmont  
cc - Mr. Nease  
cc - Mr. Holloman  
cc - Mr. Mohr  
cc - Mr. Parsons  
cc - Mr. Roach  
cc - Mr. Minnich


July 21, 1958

OPERATION ALERT 1958

I am setting forth for your information a brief summary of the FBI's participation in Operation Alert 1958.

At 10:32 a.m. EST, July 15, 1958, an alert call was received from a representative of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM) advising that, pursuant to authority from the White House, the FBI should immediately proceed to its relocation site to take part in Phase II of the alert exercise. The FBI became operational at 11:50 a.m. EST and within an hour and 25 minutes from receipt of the alert call had our full relocation cadre at the site and in operation. Appropriate notification was given to Department of Justice relocation site and to ODCM. In addition to the 47 persons who proceeded to our relocation site, three Bureau liaison representatives went to the relocation sites of the Department of Justice, ODCM and the Atomic Energy Commission.

We had prepared in advance of the Alert 40 field office problems to be conducted during the course of the Operation. In view of the resources and survival type exercise planned by ODCM, our field problems basically pertained to the Bureau's responsibilities in the fields of resources, man power and survival. In addition to the intra-FBI problems conducted, we received 28 problems posed by the President, ODCM and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Those received from the President dealt primarily with questions of a personnel nature while those from ODCM related to communications, adequacy of facilities at the relocation site, availability of essential records and care for the families of dependents of the Alert cadre in a real emergency. One problem directed by ODCM to the Justice relocation site, which was referred to us for comment, related to the highly classified emergency detention program. The Justice relocation site was advised that, in view of the highly classified nature of this program, the FBI was making no reply to ODCM and deferred to Justice representatives the matter of any comment on this program, it being our observation that any such program to be successful and effective must be instituted as far as possible in advance of an actual attack.



Tolson  
Boardman  
Belmont  
Mohr  
Nease  
Parsons  
Rosen  
Tamm  
Trotter  
Clayton  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

JUL 25 1958  
RRR:mek:jdd  
(11)

NOTE: See memo from Mr. D. Belmont to Director, re same, 7-18-58, RRR:pjm.

~~SECRET~~

EX-138

MAIL ROOM

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW, PAGE 2.

~~SECRET~~

**The Attorney General**

**The problems from CIA dealt with questions of staff assignments in relation to committee work.**

**We disposed of all of the outside problems promptly.**

**You may be interested to know that as part of our preparedness test during this exercise we required, on a surprise basis, more than one third of our field offices to contact all agents on duty status in headquarters cities and to report to us the time required to accomplish this. All offices were able to contact all agents in a surprisingly short time, none over an hour and most under 30 minutes.**

**Our liaison agents again accompanied some critical agencies to their relocation sites and were able to contribute materially to the success of the operation from the standpoint both of the agency involved and the Bureau. The Director of ODCM, Mr. Leo A. Hoegh, commented that he felt the presence of a Bureau representative at the ODCM relocation headquarters was a very important both during a test and in an actual emergency.**

**Under conditions which would exist following an actual emergency, as envisioned in Operation Alert 1958, telephone and teletype communications facilities would undoubtedly be badly disrupted. Keeping this in mind, we placed a heavy load on our emergency radio communications network and found it to be highly effective in such an operation. During the test, however, our telephone, teletype and microwave systems were thoroughly tested and produced excellent results.**

**I wish to advise you that this Bureau approached and carried out Operation Alert 1958 with full seriousness of purpose not only in the planning stages but also during the entire exercise. We again carefully examined our procedures, planning and organization to insure that we will be in a position in an actual emergency to carry out our responsibilities to the fullest extent.**

**cc - Mr. Lawrence E. Walsh  
Deputy Attorney General**

**NOTE ON YELLOW: Letter classified ~~secret~~ in view of the reference to the emergency detention program, the component parts of which are so classified by the Department.**

~~SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *MB 7/14/58*

DATE: July 8, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *MB*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958.  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE 7/14-18/58  
(EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER  
VOLUME 23, NUMBER 3, SUPPLEMENT 1)

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman 7/3/58 advised of the receipt via mail of the Emergency Federal Register (EFR), Volume 23, Number 3, for use during the Federal Action Phase of Operation Alert 1958. Memorandum recommended that the Administrative Division, Laboratory Division, and Communications Section of the Records and Communications Division review and analyze all documents pertinent to the responsibilities of their respective divisions and furnish a copy of the analysis to the Defense Plans Desk.

On 7/3/58 Liaison Section received via mail five copies of the EFR, Volume 23, Number 3, Supplement 1; copies are numbered 561 through 565, inclusive; 561, 562, and 563, respectively, are attached to copies of this memorandum for Mr. Mohr, Mr. Nease, and Mr. Parsons.

The Domestic Intelligence Division in connection with its review of EFR, Volume 23, Number 3, will also review Supplement 1 for any internal security aspects and an analysis prepared as a result of this review will be submitted in a subsequent memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Administrative Division, Laboratory Division, and Communications Section of the Records and Communications Division review and analyze all documents set forth in Supplement 1 to Volume 23, Number 3 of the EFR which are pertinent to the responsibilities of their respective divisions and furnish a copy of the analysis to the Defense Plans Desk.

EX-124 DEC 11 66-19012-120

JUL 21 1958

JTM:mje. (8)

1 - Mr. Boardman; 1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier)

1 - Mr. Parsons

1 - Mr. Nease (Attention: Mr. McGuire)

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Minnich

(with enclosure)

(with enclosure)

(with enclosure)

51 JUL 25 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nease

**DATE: July 9, 1958**

FROM *L. E.* L. E. Wherry, Jr.

SUBJECT: BUPLANS  
FBI - JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS - OPAL 58

Communications Supervisor A. C. Frank contacted Mr. Harrison Merkel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Communications Chief, on July 8, relative to communications facilities available between the FBI and the Department of Justice during Opal 58 exercises. Mr. Merkel advised that they would order the activation of the Justice - FBI private line teletype circuit on Monday, July 14, next, and would immediately after activation of the circuit make a test call to our relocation teletype room. We will have people in our Communications Section at Quantico on Monday, July 14, and will exchange test messages with the Department for practice purposes only.

DEPARTMENT'S

In previous years at the ~~Department's~~ request, we have tested the use of CW radio facilities between the Bureau's main SOG radio site and the Department's relocation site at Martinsburg, West Virginia. We have made little use of radio communications facilities between these 2 points primarily because they are emergency circuits only and would be used to back up existing circuits connecting both the Bureau and the Department over ICS teletype and telephone facilities. So that the testing of the radio facilities will not conflict with our other operations during the alert period, July 16 and 17, we arranged to conduct a short test by CW radio on the morning of July 15, next. The Justice station will use radio call sign FIG1 and the FBI station will use the radio call sign FIG3. The Bureau will transmit on one of its regularly assigned radio frequencies, 5060KCS, and the INS station will transmit on 4617.5KCS. This will merely be a test to ascertain transmission conditions between these 2 locations, and no traffic of any nature will be exchanged. Further, we will discourage the use of these radio facilities by the Department during the alert since we have the direct line teletype facilities available for exchanging of ordinary exercise messages.

166-19012-

**RECOMMENDATION:**

**Submitted for information purposes only.**

- 1 - Mr. Boardman  
1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. Parsons  
1 - Mr. Minnich  
1 - Mr. Sloan

NOT RECORDED

176 22 1058

JUN 17 1962

100-730871

~~JUL 21 1968~~

74 19 1 35643

## RECEIVED

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

**ORIGINAL FILED IN**

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *1/1/58*

DATE: July 8, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT *1/1/58*

|               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| Tolson        | _____ |
| Boardman      | _____ |
| Belmont       | _____ |
| Mohr          | _____ |
| Parsons       | _____ |
| Rosen         | _____ |
| Tamm          | _____ |
| Trotter       | _____ |
| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

Memorandum from Mr. White to Mr. Parsons of 6/9/58 set forth an analysis of the effect on the Bureau of the assumed attack on the United States which occurred during the first phase of Operation Alert 1958. The Laboratory's conclusions and damage assessment have been reviewed with a view toward determining what effect this assumed attack would have on our ability to discharge our responsibilities in the internal security field with respect to the Emergency Detention Program and the program for taking into custody enemy diplomatic personnel. In connection therewith, the following observations are made:

Emergency Detention Program (EDP)

At the time of the assumed attack, we had approximately 13,000 subjects included in the Security Index (SI). The Laboratory estimated that 38 field offices, plus the Seat of Government headquarters facilities, were completely destroyed with the records, files and equipment contained therein having no salvage value. Residing within these 38 field office territories, we had listed 10,520 individuals for apprehension.

Two field offices received moderate blast damage which resulted in cessation of all functions with a possibility existing that some files and equipment could be salvaged. Radiation intensity of fall-out prohibited performance of any functions outside of shelter in excess of two weeks after the attack. 1120 individuals residing in this territory were scheduled for apprehension.

Five field offices received light blast damage with the function of the offices not seriously impeded but deterioration threatened. Considerable damage resulted from fire. No significant radiation hazards exist. Within these five field office territories resided 410 SI subjects.

Only eight offices escaped blast or bomb damage and residing within these seven offices' territories there were 915 SI subjects.

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Mr. Whitson
- 1 - Mr. Rushing

REC-42

EX-124

66-19012-121  
10 JUL 23 1958

TDR/LW/pjm

(6)

51 F66  
III 25 1052

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

As can be seen from the foregoing, it is apparent that conditions were such in 38 of our field office territories as to make it almost, if not completely, impossible to apprehend immediately an appreciable number of the more than 10,000 SI subjects residing therein. In this connection, it is noted that between the first alert of an impending attack and the first strike on the United States, there was a time lapse of less than two hours. Even had we received instructions for institution of this program simultaneous with the alert, little could have been accomplished in the short intervening period between the alert and the actual attack. Further, Federal Civil Defense Administration has indicated that evacuation was attempted in 35 cities, identities unspecified, with a total number of 13,300,000 being successfully evacuated. Included therein were undoubtedly many SI subjects. Under the theoretical conditions existing following the mock attack, as analyzed by the Laboratory, it appears that immediate and successful implementation of the EDP could have occurred in only the eight cities not affected by bomb damage, with operations in an additional seven cities, hit by light and medium bomb damage but affected with radiation, held up pending lifting of radiation fall-out to such an extent as to permit operations outside shelter.

Operations to effect the apprehension and detention of SI subjects would be initiated from relocation sites following the initial attack. Such operations would include the screening of refugees from bombed cities, particularly those cities in which evacuation was attempted, and would encompass fugitive-type investigations as undoubtedly a great number of the SI subjects would have become displaced persons. Investigative aids that could be utilized in efforts to locate and apprehend such subjects include photos and complete descriptions which we maintain on SI cards, fingerprint records maintained at the Bureau's relocation site on vast majority of SI subjects, and in many cases handwriting specimens. Before the job could be considered completed, of course, all SI subjects must be accounted for and undoubtedly many would have become casualties as a result of the attack.

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Program for Internment of Enemy Diplomatic Personnel (Prodip)

With respect to our program for assisting State Department in the taking into protective custody of enemy diplomatic personnel, it is noted that the majority of such personnel would have been located in Washington, D. C., and New York City, both heavily damaged from bomb blasts with our installations destroyed in these two cities. Our success with respect to this program would have been highly problematical because of undoubted chaotic conditions that would have existed in these cities.

\* Under the Office of Defense Mobilization assumptions, however, evacuation orders to the various cities, including Washington, D. C., and New York City, would have been sent out 23 minutes after the first notification of the detection of approaching unidentified groups of aircraft. Any order for general evacuation would make immeasurably difficult, if not impossible, the task of rounding up enemy diplomatic personnel. From a practical standpoint, it is doubted that FBI and State Department personnel could gain access to enemy diplomatic establishments and institute even a preliminary search of the premises before the evacuation of the two cities would be under way. The completion of the Bureau's responsibilities for taking into protective custody enemy official personnel and turning them over to the Department of State would have to wait until such persons could be screened from the crowds of refugees which had left the cities in question. This screening would have to be attempted as soon as practicable since the enemy would be holding the survivors among our diplomatic and official personnel in the enemy country to be exchanged for theirs in our country. It is impossible to estimate what percentage of these enemy people would have been taken into protective custody by D+14 days.

CONCLUSION:

It is obvious from the above that under the conditions existing following the mock attack we would experience great difficulty in the prompt and completely successful accomplishment of our EDP and of

\* NOW OFFICE OF DEFENSE AND CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Prodip. This fact has been recognized by us since Operation Alert 1955 and we have repeatedly pointed out to the Department that it is apparent that the EDP will be most effective if it can be initiated as far in advance of an actual attack as intelligence data received makes possible. Likewise, a search of diplomatic premises for clandestine nuclear weapons, in order to have a chance of success, should be instituted far enough in advance to prevent detonation of such weapons which, it must be assumed, would be coordinated with the attack.

ACTION:

None. Submitted for information.

WPK  
JH  
JH  
JH  
V.



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nease *gm*

DATE: July 8, 1958

FROM *LEW* L. E. Wherry, Jr.

SUBJECT: PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ENTER  
CODING UNIT AT BUREAU'S EMERGENCY  
RELOCATION SITE DURING  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

|            |  |
|------------|--|
| Tolson     |  |
| Nichols    |  |
| Boardman   |  |
| Belmont    |  |
| Mohr       |  |
| Parsons    |  |
| Rosen      |  |
| Tamm       |  |
| Trotter    |  |
| Nease      |  |
| Tele. Room |  |
| Holloman   |  |
| Gandy      |  |

National Security Agency Manual KAG 8B/TSEC, Cryptographic Operations, Civil Agencies, page 52, item 4105. Authorized Entrance List, states, "A list of all personnel authorized to enter shall be posted inside the cryptocenter. The list should include all persons employed in the cryptocenter and all other persons whose duties may require their being admitted. Persons seeking entry shall be challenged and identified, and only those whose names appear on the authorized list shall be admitted unless specifically authorized by the agency head. Under no conditions will unauthorized persons be permitted to enter the cryptocenter merely because they are known to cryptocenter personnel."

Enclosed is a list of all personnel, including code clerks, who are authorized to enter the cryptocenter at the emergency relocation site during Operation Alert 1958.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That if the list is approved one of Mr. Sloan's copies be posted in the crypto unit at the relocation site.

## Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 2 - Mr. Sloan
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (Attention Downing)

LEW:nma

(8)

EX-124

REC-42

15 JUL 23 1958

55 AUG 5 1958

ENCLOSURE  
REC-42

EX-124

Mr. Nease

July 8, 1958

The following academy personnel, Bureau officials, SOG Supervisors, and employees will be permitted access to the relocation cryptocenter, rooms 210 and 212, during Operation Alert 1958.

Officials

The Director  
Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Parsons  
Mr. Holloman  
Mr. Edwards  
Mr. Sloan  
Mr. Nease

Supervisors

G. L. Davy  
C. F. Downing  
A. C. Frank  
L. J. Gauthier  
B. L. Huelskamp  
J. M. Matter  
O. G. Medler  
R. L. Millen  
J. T. Minnich  
R. R. Roach  
C. Q. Smith  
L. E. Wherry, Jr.

Academy Personnel

Luther C. Blake  
Dan A. Brant  
John A. Chase  
John R. Harrison  
John A. Hawn, Jr.  
Bruce C. Hodge  
Glen Eugene Ing  
Harold K. Light  
Ronald L. Maley  
Wallace H. Mann, Jr.  
Barney C. Olson  
Kenneth Shaffer  
Charles J. Shepherd  
James H. Thompson  
Hilland D. Thorpe  
George A. Zeiss, III

66-19012-122

ENCLOSURE

Code Clerks

Miss Casey W. Arnette  
Miss Caroline C. Atkins  
Miss Marilyn Jo Cast  
Miss Yvonne Hillman  
    Harold W. Lawson  
    Rodney L. Leffler  
Mrs. Mary A. Powell  
Miss Jane F. Rokisky  
Miss Barbara A. Campbell  
    Chauncey D. Seefeldt  
Miss Joann Thomas  
Miss Loretta E. Tobin

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ST  
esa TO MR. BOARDMAN *ABH 7/15/58*

DATE: 7/15/58

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. Bob Bowman of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM) called me at 11:32 a.m., 7/15, stating he was calling at the direction of the head of ODCM. He referred to the attached memorandum, dated 7/15, from General Goodpaster of the White House, and instructed that the envelope attached to General Goodpaster's letter be opened and the instructions contained therein followed.

The instructions, which are also signed by General Goodpaster, state that the President has approved that the group of employees to handle Operation Alert 1958 are to proceed immediately to the relocation site and send a message to High Point confirming arrival; further, that important messages may be received at the relocation site, requiring immediate attention.

Instructions were immediately issued that the 47 employees designated to go to our relocation site should be notified and depart at once. It is noted that these employees were engaged in official duties, as we were not attempting to hold them on any stand-by basis. For example, Mr. Roach was attending the IAC meeting out of the building. Despite this, the employees were notified and assembled, and the Bureau bus departed for the relocation site at 12:06 p.m.

The appropriate notification to ODCM and Justice Department, as well as the Bureau, will be made from Quantico upon arrival, and the exercise will proceed. Mr. Roach will keep the Bureau advised.

Enclosure  
 AHB:CSH (7)

cc Mr. Boardman, Mr. Belmont,  
 Mr. Nease, Mr. Minnich,  
 Mr. Roach, Mr. J.P. Mohr

EX-124

REC-42

66-19012-126

JUL 22 1958

ENCLOSURE

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EX-124

55 JUL 28 1958

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esa

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

*Handwritten initials/signature*

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson        | ✓ |
| Mr. Boardman      | ✓ |
| Mr. Belmont       | ✓ |
| Mr. Mohr          | ✓ |
| Mr. Nease         | ✓ |
| Mr. Parsons       | ✓ |
| Mr. Rosen         | ✓ |
| Mr. Tamm          | ✓ |
| Mr. Trotter       | ✓ |
| Mr. W.C. Sullivan | ✓ |
| Tele. Room        | ✓ |
| Mr. Holloman      | ✓ |
| Miss Gandy        | ✓ |

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1958

✓

OPERATION ALERT 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL  
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Incident to Operation Alert 1958, you are requested immediately to transmit this envelope; unopened; to the designated Officer in Charge of your Department's Alert Cadre.

Attention is invited to the notation on the envelope, i.e., it is "TO BE OPENED ONLY UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE AND CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION."

*A. J. Goodpaster*  
A. J. Goodpaster  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Staff Secretary

EX-124

ENCLOSURE

REC-42

66-19012-126

10 JUL 22 1958

*al*  
ENCLOSURE  
REC-42  
EX-124

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

*Handwritten signature*  
~~EXP. PROC.~~  
JUL 15 1958

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1958

OPERATION ALERT 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICERS IN CHARGE  
OF THE DEPARTMENTAL AND AGENCY  
ALERT CADRES

By this memorandum you are notified that the President has approved the following procedures regarding the immediate manning of agency relocation sites at this stage in Operation Alert 1958:

- (a) The Officer in Charge of your agency's Alert Cadre, together with the additional membership of the cadre as reported in your agency's response to Director Gordon Gray's letter of May ninth (with such changes for this exercise as were agreed upon between your agency and ODCM by telephone yesterday) are to proceed immediately to your agency's relocation site.
- (b) Each Officer in Charge is to notify the other officials concerned.
- (c) The several of you are to proceed forthwith to the relocation site, by the means specified in your cadre Alert plans, and without detour or intermediate stops.
- (d) Each Officer in Charge is to send a message to the attention of the Operational Capability Task Group at High Point confirming his arrival.
- (e) Upon the cadre's arrival, each Officer in Charge may expect to receive important messages requiring his immediate attention; action should be taken on them promptly and without any contact with Washington.

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

66-19012-126

ENCLOSURE

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

- 2. -

The approved purpose of this exercise is to test, compare and evaluate the speed and capability of each agency's Alert cadre.

By direction of the President

*A. J. Goodpaster*  
*jam*

A. J. Goodpaster  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Staff Secretary

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *LB* *7-18-58*

DATE: July 15, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ah*

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, July 14-18, 1958  
(Department of Justice Participation)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

At 10:45 a.m. today, Miss Cecil Kilmer, secretary to James Canavan, Defense Plans Coordinator, Department of Justice, telephonically advised Supervisor Minnich, Defense Plans Desk, that Canavan, who is at Justice relocation site, had telephonically advised her that Deputy Attorney General Walsh had canceled his vacation plans and Mr. Walsh will visit Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization relocation site the A.M. of 7-16-58 and the Justice relocation site during the P.M., 7-16-58. Miss Kilmer could furnish no additional information regarding this change in plans.

## ACTION:

None. Informative. ✓

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:nck (5)

EX-124

REC-42

66-19012-127

13 JUL 22 1958

55 AUG 5 1958

11 AUG 1958



5+  
esa

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

JPB

July 16, 1958

|                   |       |
|-------------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson        | _____ |
| Mr. Boardman      | _____ |
| Mr. Belmont       | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr          | _____ |
| Mr. Nease         | _____ |
| Mr. Parsons       | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen         | _____ |
| Mr. Tamm          | _____ |
| Mr. Trotter       | _____ |
| Mr. W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room        | _____ |
| Mr. Holloman      | _____ |
| Miss Gandy        | _____ |

MEMORANDUM FOR The Associate Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Robert Gray, Secretary to the Cabinet

SUBJECT: Your participation in OPERATION ALERT, 1958

At the Cabinet meeting of June 6, 1958, the President asked:

- i) all key officials of Departments and Agencies be aware of and participate as fully as possible in Operation Alert, 1958,
- ii) calendars during July 16-18 should be kept clear of all but compelling engagements, and out-of-town commitments be held to a minimum,
- iii) Deputy and Under Secretaries be fully prepared to participate in the relocation phase of the Exercise, with Department Heads' personal relocation optional but encouraged (depending upon their other business) even if for only part of the time."

The President has today directed me to request that you personally be at your relocation site during Thursday and Friday, July 17 and 18.

For the purposes of this Exercise, it is now assumed that you are the senior official of your agency able to function, and that, therefore, you are the Acting Head of your agency.

If you will require air transportation to your relocation site, it is suggested that you immediately call code 1257, extension 273 or 274.

66 JUL 30 1958

EX-124

REG-42

ENCLOSURE

REG-42

EX-124

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

66-19012-129

15 JUL 23 1958

LIAISON

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

- 2 -

As you arrive at your site, highly important messages will be coming in which, for the success of the Exercise, will require not only the proper functioning of your relocation staff, but your own attention as well. The responses to these messages are to be made using exclusively the files, facilities and personnel at your site, without reference to Washington.

You should be aware of the likelihood of other special Exercise requirements arising during Thursday and Friday which will involve you directly.

The objective of asking your personal participation is to test the readiness and capability of high officers of the Executive Branch to perform their assigned governmental emergency functions at their relocation sites.

At the suggestion of Director Hoegh, your attention is called to the two attachments.

1 Destroyed  
(Annex # 3  
to P.M. X 14  
no value)  
Jm - 7-17-58

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION FOR FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
OF OPERATION ALERT 1958, PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT AND  
CABINET ON JULY 7, 1958, BY GOVERNOR LEO A. HOEGH,  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF DEFENSE AND CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION.**

**1. Mr. President, OPAL 1958 is being conducted in three phases:**

**PHASE I on May 6 and 7 required State and Local action;**

**PHASE II, July 14-18 inclusive, requires Regional, Field  
and National action; and**

**PHASE III, September 17, 18, and 19, involves evaluation  
and critique.**

**PHASE I is the attack phase which began with the assumption that  
international tension had built up rapidly during the week preceding  
May 6, but that there was no period of strategic warning.**

**There were 282 nuclear weapons, with the weight of 642 megatons.  
This compares with 175 weapons and 373 megatons in the attack  
during OPAL 1957.**

**During PHASE I, the following action took place:**

**(A) Upon receiving warning of impending attack, we were able  
to simultaneously notify 200 critical points throughout the nation  
through our National Warning System (NAWAS). It took us two  
minutes and 57 seconds to do so -- including acknowledgment.  
The time for the States to disseminate the warning to Local  
communities averaged 7 minutes, the same varying from three  
to thirty minutes. The time for the Local Governments to dis-  
seminate the warning to the public ranged from "instantaneous"  
to "considerable delay."**

**(B) Participation -- 46 States (Indiana and Michigan were unable  
to do so at the time), 5 Territories, the District of Columbia and  
approximately 3500 Local Communities participated in the operation.  
Public participation was greater than in any previous alert.**

66-19012-129

(C) The State and Local Governments, coordinated by Civil Defense staffs, took the following action:

- (1) Disseminated attack warning
- (2) Directed action to save lives -- to prevent damage -- and to maintain control
- (3) Made estimates of casualties -- of survival requirements -- and of surviving resources
- (4) They made full use of their own resources -- the Local Government making demands upon the States and the States upon the Federal Government for deficiencies.

PHASE II. Between PHASE I and PHASE II -- May 8 to July 14, analyses of the effects of the attack were made.

On July 14, we assume the time is D plus 14. Actions of the Regions, the Field Offices and the National Government will be based upon the following reports:

- (A) Reports from the States
- (B) Reports from Special Task Forces, which are based on national damage assessment data
- (C) Estimates made by each Federal Field Agency

Prior to July 14, all these reports will be evaluated and final estimates prepared. Therefore, Departments and Agencies will have before them damage analyses when the exercise starts on July 14. They will be able to deal with the problems from the outset. D plus 14 is realistic as it would take the Federal Government about fourteen days to determine the effects of the attack.

The situation in PHASE II: The facts show that the attack was heavy but not decisive. The situation at D plus 14, as a result of the attack, is as follows:

- (A) By D plus 14 radioactive fallout has decayed to the point that there is no significant radiation problem in 70 percent of the nation.
- (B) At D plus 14 there are 20,000,000 sick and injured and 36,000,000 killed.
- (C) As to Continuity of Government -- Control and Operations:
  - (1) 42 State Capitals were hit or threatened by heavy fallout. 21 of them had been relocated -- therefore, 27 were in operation. More State Governments were relocated this year than in any previous exercise.
  - (2) With reference to Federal operational capability, we find that at D plus 14 -- 35 of the 90 relocation sites in the Nation Arc were in operation. Of the 934 Federal Field Offices, 21 percent are operational, while 50 percent of the Field Relocation Sites are operational. Command control is therefore seriously impaired at the Federal level. It requires that the entire Federal relocation sites need careful review.
- (D) Continuing with the situation as of D plus 14, we find the following as to resources:
  - (1) Medical care is inadequate because of lack of hospitals and medical personnel and medicine.
  - (2) Clothing and housing are adequate.
  - (3) Fuel -- coal and natural gas are adequate -- petroleum is inadequate.
  - (4) Transportation is inadequate with reference to national railroad capabilities.

- (5) Communications -- 25 percent of national capability exists. There is a definite need for radio back-up.
- (6) Power -- 1/3 of the electrical generating capability is available at D plus 14. By D plus 90, 60 percent is available.
- (7) Food --- we have a 10-month supply based upon 200 calories per person per day. There will, however, be a shortage due to lack of transportation and pin-down because of fallout. It will require better distribution.

On July 14 and 15 the Regional and Field Offices will be cut off from National Headquarters and will be required to take actions without Federal guidance until July 16. Regional Offices will take the following action:

- (A) Determine resources available in the Regions to meet State requirements.
- (B) Prepare a plan of action.
- (C) Report shortages and overages.
- (D) Request from National Headquarters the resources needed for the States and people within the Regions.

July 16, 17, and 18 -- the National Headquarters and all Federal Departments and Agencies will operate from relocation sites. The Regional data is submitted to the National Headquarters and the following actions will be taken:

- (A) Evaluate the data.
- (B) Make final determination of the situation.
- (C) Prepare resources status.
- (D) Balance civilian claims in terms of DOD and AEC.

- (E) Prepare plans and take action to meet the situation. Not only will the actions be in connection with D plus 14, but also D plus 30 and D plus 90 will be required.

By this exercise we expect to accomplish the following objectives:

- (A) Thorough analysis of the effects of the attack.
- (B) An examination of how the nation would meet the attack situation.
- (C) An evaluation of our plans and our readiness.
- (D) Determination of steps which, if taken pre-attack would make post-attack job more manageable.
- (E) Recommendations to improve our over-all non-military defense readiness.

Mr. President, to accomplish these objectives, we will need the continued excellent cooperation and support of all Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: 7/18/58

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: BUPLANS

*Operation Alert 1958*

|               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| Tolson        | _____ |
| Boardman      | _____ |
| Belmont       | _____ |
| Mohr          | _____ |
| Nease         | _____ |
| Parsons       | _____ |
| Rosen         | _____ |
| Tamm          | _____ |
| Trotter       | _____ |
| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

Walt Yeagley of the Department called at 2:50 p.m. He said he had received a call from the Deputy AG, who wanted to be advised of the condition of the Security Index. Yeagley told him it was in A-1 condition.

The Deputy AG asked him some questions about the AG's portfolio, which indicated to Yeagley that the Deputy AG is acquainting himself with the Department's plans for an emergency.

A memorandum dated 7/18/58, Roach to Belmont, reflected activities at the Justice Department relocation site, and indicated that apparently this was Walsh's first acquaintance with the defense planning; that he took notes and asked questions, and questioned Yeagley as to why he had not been informed in more detail as to the Justice operations and procedures. It would appear that Mr. Walsh is now acquainting himself with these procedures.

AHB:CSH. (4)

EX. -124

REC-42

66-19012-131

17 JUL 22 1958

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MAILED



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 17, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

BULPLANS

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

|                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| Mr. Tolson        |  |
| Mr. Boardman      |  |
| Mr. Nichols       |  |
| Mr. Mohr          |  |
| Mr. Parsons       |  |
| Mr. Belmont       |  |
| Mr. Tamm          |  |
| Mr. Trotter       |  |
| Mr. W.C. Sullivan |  |
| Tele. Room        |  |
| Mr. Holloman      |  |
| Miss Gandy        |  |

This report covers the Bureau's activities at the relocation site from noon, July 16, to noon, July 17, Eastern Standard Time.

SCHEDULED BUREAU PROBLEMS

Of the 40 scheduled problems, we have, as of noon, today, completed 22. All others have been initiated with the field and we anticipate replies forthcoming to conclude all Bureau problems scheduled by early this afternoon, with the exception of availability checks to be run tonight. The field has responded very effectively in carrying out its responsibilities under the scheduled problems. It has approached the matter in a very enthusiastic manner and in many cases has responded within the minimum allowable time set by the Bureau. The reaction we have received from the field gives the indication that the field divisions contacted on specific problems would be able to carry on emergency operations under the conditions that have been assumed. Examples of problems are as follows.

1) A problem was dispatched to the Los Angeles and Philadelphia Offices requiring them to simulate ascertaining availability of National Academy (NA) graduates\*for immediate probationary appointments for an indefinite duration as Special Agents. Replies, promptly received, indicated that out of 64 NA graduates in the Philadelphia area 14 were assumed available and out of 88 NA graduates in the Los Angeles area 59 were considered available. The problem, which required an assumption by the SAC, is a good sampling of the trained manpower resources available in an emergency.

2) A problem was dispatched to the Atlanta and Albuquerque Offices concerning actual preparation of five vouchers covering reimbursable expenses incurred during the previous month by Special Agent personnel and to simulate other arrangements.

- 1 - Mr. Nease
- 1 - Mr. Holloman
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Roach
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

EXH 124

\* in good standing

EX-124

REC-28

66-19012-136

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(9) pjm

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Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

The problem required simulated copies of vouchers be forwarded to the Bureau by July 22, 1958. Both offices replied well within the minimum time allowed and indicated they were forwarding vouchers to the Bureau on July 16, considerably in advance of the July 22 deadline. Replies indicated these offices were able to satisfactorily handle auditing problems.

On the evening of July 16, nine field offices were contacted and requested to conduct actual availability checks. All offices made the checks and contacted Agents on duty status in headquarters city in what is considered satisfactory time. There is set forth the time required by each office.

|                  |            |            |
|------------------|------------|------------|
| San Diego        | 32 Agents  | 5 minutes  |
| Dallas           | 24 Agents  | 7 minutes  |
| Omaha            | 13 Agents  | 9 minutes  |
| Kansas City      | 34 Agents  | 10 minutes |
| Little Rock      | 18 Agents  | 15 minutes |
| Albuquerque      | 21 Agents  | 19 minutes |
| San Francisco    | 147 Agents | 28 minutes |
| Washington Field | 363 Agents | 33 minutes |
| Chicago          | 264 Agents | 38 minutes |

OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

From noon, yesterday, July 16, until noon, today, July 17, we received eight additional outside problems, for a total from the inception of Operation Alert of 27. All problems received today were from the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM) relocation site and the President of the United States. It is speculated that these are the so-called policy question problems that were to be directed to the official second in charge of departments and agencies under the program that was posed yesterday by the White House Cabinet secretary that the Associate Director proceed to the Bureau's relocation site and take charge of operations. We have checked with the Bureau's Liaison Agent at Highpoint and he confirmed the fact that ODCM was holding up this last batch of problems to be sent to the relocation sites this morning so that they would be on hand when the

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

deputy heads of the various agencies arrived at the sites. We are, of course, proceeding in the handling of these questions as we have those in the past. They follow generally the pattern and relate to matters we have already handled concerning personnel, security of sites, public information disclosure and related matters. Examples are:

- 1) By teletype of July 17 from the President, all agencies were asked to advise if steps had been taken to clarify and simplify the emergency duties of personnel at the site. We replied by teletype that emergency duties of our staff are streamlined and simplified consistent with required duty responsibilities of the FBI and that all alert cadre are cognizant and thoroughly familiar with their duties.
- 2) By teletype from the President on July 17, all relocation sites received an inquiry to the effect that "Have stand-by instructions on domestic information been issued to your agency, to whom do you look for such instructions, or are you the judge of your own public information policy?" We replied by return teletype that all installations of the FBI have stand-by instructions established through predetermined policy formulated by the Attorney General. All inquiries and releases are made by the Director of Information, Department of Justice, unless the exigency of the situation dictates on-the-spot action.
- 3) We received by teletype directed to all Government agencies from the President the following inquiry: "What is your estimate of the psychological impact on your relocation staff of the Operation Alert 1958 attack and of the separation of your staff members from their families? What motivation or compulsion did you use to induce your agency's civil service personnel to undertake hazardous but essential duties in an emergency situation?" We replied to this by stating that psychological impact on the Bureau's staff was absolute minimum; that, because of the staff's assurance of sound planning and maximum safety and security for their dependents, morale and esprit de corps is high; further, that the employees' high sense of patriotism and devotion to duty

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

had been achieved through firmly established careful personnel selection and their continued indoctrination; that our actual experience in OPAL 1958 demonstrated that our employees instinctively subordinate personal considerations to the grave responsibilities at hand.

4) A teletype received from the director of the Office of Opal Resources and Operation (OORO) today inquired of our agency's policies and capabilities with respect to actions which we would take (a) concerning protection of the relocation site from panic-stricken civilians; (b) if the governor of the state in which our site is located requests our assistance in survival operations which will substantially delay our implementation of approved essential functions; (c) if state or local officials attempt, with a threat of force, to pre-empt our facilities, equipment and personnel, and (d) if the governor of the state in which our site is located, acting under his martial law, issued orders to us contrary to our preattack assignment. We responded by return teletype to this inquiry by stating (a) the security of the Bureau's site is adequate due to location and in the best interests of the country admittance to the site would be denied to members of the local community under the situation stated; (b) extensive efforts required to meet obligations under presidential directives would preclude rendering assistance unless matters pertain to FBI responsibility; (c) situation assumed is not foreseeable due to FBI liaison with state governments and nature of FBI responsibilities. The (d) part of the question was commented on by stating it was not applicable and OORO was referred to the answer in part (c). We gave the above replies which had been previously supplied to OORO in another questionnaire form, these replies having been previously approved.

#### PERSONNEL

On the morning of July 17, two typists from the communications group were released and returned to Washington. This was done in view of the decrease in traffic in the Code Room and the adoption on a trial basis of a procedure in the handling of incoming code messages

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

whereby the typing operation from the raw material appearing on the code machine tapes was eliminated. We are following the procedure on the bulk of code traffic of merely pasting the clear text machine tapes on the necessary forms rather than having it placed there by retyping the message on the form. This trail basis procedure gives us the clear text of the encoded messages faster although it does not supply us with a duplicate copy of the message which is needed in some instances. The problem of producing duplicates of needed messages needs study. If we continue to run ahead of schedule on our problems with the field, it is quite possible that additional personnel will be released during the day, both in the field (radio operators) and at the relocation site. This is being watched very carefully and we will release personnel consistent with essential needs. Our personnel count as of noon, today, is 45, excluding the two Liaison Agents who remain at the relocation sites of their agencies, i.e., ODCM and Justice. Agent Fitzgerald at Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was released yesterday afternoon due to inactivity at the site.

#### ACTIVITIES AT OTHER AGENCIES

Activities, as reported by our Liaison Agents, continue to be slow at other agencies. Director Leo A. Hoegh, ODCM, took over active direction at Highpoint yesterday afternoon. He has made a staff announcement that the exercise would continue until the previously announced time of 4:00 P.M., Friday, July 18. Hoegh indicated to the staff representatives that he intended to visit the relocation sites of the Department of Defense and other agencies in the area. He gave no indication that he would be visiting our site and it is not anticipated that he will. As previously mentioned, the Bureau received several outside problems from ODCM this morning but it is not expected that we will have a heavy flow of traffic from Highpoint during the day. Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Walsh spent the night at Highpoint and proceeded to the Justice relocation site at 8:45 A.M. today.

Agent Daunt reported from the Justice site that the DAG arrived at 10:00 A.M. and was going into a briefing with other Justice representatives at 11:00 A.M. Subsequent to this briefing, the group,

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

including DAG Walsh, Assistant Attorneys General Wilkey, Andretta and Anderson, and the Justice Reservist Cannon, were to make a tour of the Justice site and are scheduled to return to Washington after lunch. There is no indication that DAG Walsh will stop at Quantico en route to Washington.

Agent Fitzgerald at the AEC site reported yesterday afternoon that there had been a briefing of AEC officials and, much to the surprise of the group at the site, Commissioners Willard F. Libby and John S. Graham appeared. The extent of AEC participation was to analyze the theoretical bomb drop on the United States and the damage that it caused, together with the number of cities (200) which were destroyed. In view of the inactivity at the site subsequent to this meeting Agent Fitzgerald was instructed to return to Washington subject to returning if any matters develop of interest to the Bureau.

#### COMMUNICATIONS

From noon, yesterday, until noon, today, July 17, a period of 24 hours, our communications system received 183 and transmitted 90 coded radiograms, for a grand total of 273 radiograms handled. During the same period, there were 31 incoming and 12 outgoing teletypes handled, for a total of 43. There were 15,916 code groups processed during the day. As can be noted from the above figures, an analysis of the communications load today shows it's running approximately the same as it did yesterday. There was, however, an increase of approximately 3,000 code groups handled. Our personnel and equipment have functioned extremely well. We did, however, during the peak period yesterday afternoon experience a backlog in the decoding of radiograms and other messages for approximately one or two hours. This was overcome to a great extent by the process of eliminating typing operation on a experimental basis, previously mentioned. We are studying this speed-up procedure and will make recommendations at the conclusion of the operation. The flow of traffic from ODCM and from our own field installations is expected to drop sharply during the day. Appropriate checks will be made to see how many personnel can be released.



Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

### DIFFICULTIES

We have experienced no difficulties with our equipment or operations at the relocation site to date. During the early morning hours (12:50 A.M. to 3:50 A.M.) yesterday, a piece of equipment referred to as the python encoding circuit belonging to ODCM, although not becoming inoperative, did malfunction and cause some delay in communications that ODCM was directing to us. This was immediately reported by our communications people and the trouble was located and repaired. This malfunctioning of equipment did not impair our operations in any way.

### REPORTS TO ODCM

During the period covered by this report, we sent two required reports to ODCM at Highpoint, one being a daily communications report in which we reported no difficulties so far as Bureau equipment was concerned and that our communications facilities were functioning satisfactorily during the reporting period. The other report required was in response to a sealed envelope received at our site on the morning of July 16 which required answer by the close of business on July 17. The sealed envelope opened at the relocation site contained a questionnaire from ODCM identical to the questions which we previously answered, pertaining to our field divisions, by letter dated July 14, 1958, to ODCM. At that time, we were aware of the fact that we would receive a questionnaire at Quantico and, generally, the type of questions that would be asked. There were 13 questions in all, some with many parts, many of which were repetitions of those we had previously answered concerning field installations and those answered on a pre-Phase II questionnaire. A previous memorandum prepared at the Bureau on July 11 set forth the answers we would give to the questionnaire if received at Quantico in line with the questions which had to do with facilities available at our relocation site, police protection, access to site by public, questions regarding state martial law, and preparedness of personnel. Rather than to wait until the deadline date of July 17, we sent a teletype to Operational Capability Task Group office at ODCM at 4:32 P.M., July 16, which answered all the questionnaire inquiries.

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

ACTION:

According to the planned schedule, the Bureau field will cease Operation Alert status at midnight, July 17 (field radio operators will discontinue at 10:00 P.M., tonight). We will have completed all of our intra-Bureau problems and expect to have also handled any problems directed to us by outside agencies up to that time. The over-all exercise officially terminates at 4:00 P.M., July 18. Inasmuch as the over-all report on this Operation, covering the period from 11:50 A.M., July 15, to noon, July 18, will be prepared tomorrow, unless advised to the contrary no daily report will be submitted. Anything which may occur subsequent to that time of real significance will, of course, be called to the Director's attention. Our over-all summary, prepared for the Director's information, will contain our observations of the Operation and appropriate recommendations. We will also attach a brief summary of our participation in Operation Alert in letter form for transmittal to the Attorney General.

*R*

*J. P. M.*  
*7/17*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF FALSE MESSAGE FROM HIGHPOINT  
OFFICE OF DEFENSE AND CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION  
RELOCATION CENTER, JULY 18, 1958

DATE: July 18, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

At the request of Major General Robert A. Schow, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, SA D. J. Sullivan, Liaison Section, on the night of July 18, 1958, had a conference with Brigadier General Richard Collins, Director of Plans, Policy and Security; Colonel Robert A. Hall, Acting Chief, Security Division; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI); Lieutenant General J. D. O'Connell, Chief, Signal Corps and Colonel George P. Sampson, Chief, Army Communication Service Division, Signal Corps.

General O'Connell furnished the enclosed memorandum concerning a false message which had been transmitted over the Government network, a wire circuit, from HIGHPOINT, the relocation site of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM). This false message read as follows: "This is an AP bulletin. U. S. has declared war on Russia." and had been transmitted by one Thomas Gattis, an employee of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT & T).

114 HANDLEY BLVD, WINCHESTER, VA

When the existence of the false message was discovered, Gattis had been interviewed by the Security Officer of ODCM and it was determined that Gattis, a 19 or 20-year-old individual, had thought the circuit closed and had been indulging in a bit of "horseplay." General O'Connell stated that Gattis had been turned over to the Signal Corps Security Officer at HIGHPOINT and while he was not being detained as such, he was not being allowed to go home. General O'Connell desired to know as soon as possible whether the Bureau would investigate this matter and possibly resolve whether Gattis' action might have been foreign inspired by putting him on a polygraph. General O'Connell explained that the transmittal of the message was known to the Naval Aide of the President and the Signal Corps expected questions from the President's office as to what action was being taken.

General O'Connell was advised that while this did not look as though it was a matter for the Bureau to investigate, a determination would be obtained from the Bureau and he would be advised as soon as possible. It was firmly pointed out to General O'Connell that under no circumstances should the Signal Corps, ODCM or any other element of the Army hold or restrain Gattis in any way for the Bureau.

Enclosure  
DJS:bjt (6)  
1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. Nease  
1 - Mr. Minnich

102  
ENCLOSURE

REC-88

REC-89

66-19012-137  
JUL 28 1958

LAIS

55 AUG 5 1958

02

OPERATION ALERT - 1958  
SUB PLANS

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont  
RE: TRANSMITTAL OF FALSE MESSAGE FROM HIGHPOINT  
ODCM RELOCATION CENTER, JULY 18, 1958

Bureau files contain no information identifiable with Gattis. According to General O'Connell, he thought Gattis was a local boy from Winchester, Virginia, or vicinity and was presently living at 114 Handley Boulevard in Winchester. He has been a permanent employee of AT & T, stationed in HIGHPOINT for approximately one year. This does not look as though it is a matter for the Bureau to investigate or comes within the Bureau's jurisdiction. Gattis is an industrial employee and no doubt was investigated by or at the instigation of the Army prior to being given a clearance for work at HIGHPOINT by ODCM. As pointed out above, ODCM Security, according to General O'Connell, had been more or less satisfied that there was nothing malicious in Gattis' actions.

ACTION:

If you approve, ACSI and General O'Connell will be advised via Liaison that this does not appear to be a matter coming within the investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau and if the Army or ODCM desires to investigate Gattis or put him on the polygraph, it is a matter for them to decide.

✕

R

OK  
h

done  
7/18  
R

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont *ABW*

DATE: July 22, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *RR**BULLANS*SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
LIAISON - OFFICE OF THE  
DEFENSE CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION  
(ODCM), HIGHPOINT

|               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| Tolson        | _____ |
| Boardman      | _____ |
| Belmont       | _____ |
| Mohr          | _____ |
| Nease         | _____ |
| Parsons       | _____ |
| Rosen         | _____ |
| Tamm          | _____ |
| Trotter       | _____ |
| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

Supervisor W. T. Whaley of the Liaison Section arrived at Highpoint, the ODCM relocation center, at 1:48 p.m., July 15, 1958, and remained at the site during the entire operation. Whaley returned to Washington at 5:13 p.m., July 18, 1958. No major problems occurred during this operation affecting the Bureau. The Liaison Agent was in contact with the Director of ODCM, Leo Hoegh, the Deputy Director, John Patterson, and all other high officials at the site. Mr. Hoegh commented to Mr. Whaley that the FBI had done an excellent job in cooperating on the alert and that he was very happy to have an FBI representative at Highpoint during the exercise.

Approximately seven hundred people were due to take part in the exercise, but only about four hundred actually participated. The Liaison representative did not notice any major delinquencies during the test and the operation appeared to run smoothly. Mr. Hoegh, in an address to all the participants, advised that the operation was considered by ODCM to have been highly successful and it was definitely felt that this country was prepared to meet any emergency.

*114 HANLEY BLVD. WINCHESTER, VA.*

During the last day of the exercise, one Thomas Gattis, an employee of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company which was attached to Highpoint, inadvertently sent a false message over the Government network which stated in effect that the U. S. has declared war on Russia. Gattis was immediately interviewed by security officers of ODCM and stated that he had thought the circuit was closed and had only been indulging in a bit of "horseplay." Security officers at ODCM, although annoyed, felt that there was nothing malicious in Gattis' action, but hoped to have him fired from his position for the "horseplay."

## ACTION:

55 AUG 5 1958

Informative.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Roach
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Mr. Whaley
- 1 - Liaison Section

WTW:bdw

REC-89

EX-102

JUL 28 1958

LIAISON

July 21, 1958

REC-91

66-19012-139

Colonel Ward B. Cleaves  
President  
Cleaves Food Service Corporation  
8405 Ramsey Avenue  
Silver Spring, Maryland

Dear Colonel Cleaves:

I want to personally commend  
you for the delicious food so tastefully  
served during the recent exercises at  
Quantico.

Your manager at Quantico, Mr. Thomas C.  
May, spent long hours closely supervising  
food service during this operation.

Would you kindly convey to him and  
his staff my personal thanks for their  
outstanding effort during this exercise.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

COMM-FBI

MAILED 20

8  
HLS:chb  
(3)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☒

JUL 21 3 46 PM '58  
REC'D-READING ROOM  
FBI

5 AUG 5 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT *APR*

DATE: 7/18/58

FROM : *H. L. SLOAN**BUPLANS*SUBJECT: FOOD SERVICE  
RELOCATION SITE  
OPERATION ALERT, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

As in past years, the Cleaves Food Service catered the meals served at the relocation site during OPAL 1958. The employees of this corporation provided excellent food and service which contributed greatly to the high morale among employees at the relocation site.

Thomas C. May, manager of Cleaves Food Service at the relocation site, spent long hours personally supervising this catering operation.

ACTION:

If approved, the enclosed letter of appreciation be sent to Ward B. Cleaves, President, Cleaves Food Service Corporation, so that he may personally convey the Director's thanks to Mr. May and his staff.

Enclosure

HLS:chb  
(6)

REG-91 66-19012-139  
EX-108  
10 JUL 21 1958  
CRIMINAL  
HARRISON

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont *apb*

DATE: 7-18-58

FROM : *51* Mr. Roach *3*SUBJECT: *BUPLANS*OPERATION ALERT 1958  
July 15 - 18, 1958

|               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| Tolson        | _____ |
| Boardman      | _____ |
| Belmont       | _____ |
| Mohr          | _____ |
| Nease         | _____ |
| Parsons       | _____ |
| Rosen         | _____ |
| Tamm          | _____ |
| Trotter       | _____ |
| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

Shortly after 12:00 Noon 7-18-58 a message was transmitted from ODCM site over the circuit in plain text. The message printed on our perforator tape but did not print a hard copy message since they had not advised they were going to transmit in plain text when the machine was actually set on cipher. The message received on tape read:

"THIS IS A BULLETIN FROM THE AP. . . THE U S  
HAS JUST DECLARE WAR ON THE RUSSIAN."

Immediately subsequent to this occurrence ODCM transmitted a message to all agencies requesting agencies to disregard transmission alleged as bulletin from AP as it was a false transmission. This message received at 12:49 P. M. EST.

At 1:24 P. M. EST, message to all agencies from Director of Security and Inspection, ODCM, again instructed a disregard concerning the message and cautioned that the transmission was false and any information concerning same is highly classified and not to be released or discussed. We were required to acknowledge receipt of this message by telephone to ODCM and this was done at 1:40 P. M. EST.

Liaison Agent Whaley at High Point, ODCM site, subsequently advised that ODCM had determined the identity of the communications employee who had transmitted the message and they were at that time grilling the employee as to his reasons or purpose in so doing.

Perforator tape has been destroyed.

JTM:MAH *part*

1 - Mr. Roach *Jim*  
1 - Mr. Minnich *A* *Jefferson* *ch*

EX-108

REC-91

66-19012-140

JUL 28 1958

-- F68-  
55 AUG 5 1958



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *John*

DATE: July 16, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *Belmont*SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

|               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| Tolson        | _____ |
| Boardman      | _____ |
| Belmont       | _____ |
| Mohr          | _____ |
| Nease         | _____ |
| Parsons       | _____ |
| Rosen         | _____ |
| Tamm          | _____ |
| Trotter       | _____ |
| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

By White House memorandum dated July 16, 1958, Mr. Robert Gray, Secretary to the Cabinet, advised the Associate Director of the FBI that the President has directed Mr. Gray to request the Associate Director of the FBI to personally be at the FBI relocation site during Thursday and Friday, July 17 and 18, 1958.

On the afternoon of July 16, 1958, I instructed Liaison Representative O. H. Bartlett to call on Mr. Gray at the White House and point out to him that the FBI already has two Assistant Directors and several Inspectors at our relocation site with all the necessary personnel and facilities and that we are taking full part in the exercise; that the FBI is making every effort to extend its coverage to gather intelligence of importance to the White House bearing on the current international situation and that the above were being pointed out to determine if it was absolutely essential that Mr. Tolson proceed to the relocation site during the next two days.

Mr. Bartlett advised me that he talked to Mr. Gray at the White House at 5:35 p.m., July 16, and pointed out the above facts after making reference to Mr. Gray's memorandum of instant date. Mr. Gray asked Mr. Bartlett two questions: First, is the Associate Director of the FBI familiar with the policies affecting Operation Alert and the physical facilities of the relocation site? Mr. Bartlett advised Mr. Gray that Mr. Tolson was completely familiar with the policies affecting relocation; that Mr. Tolson has personally participated in several previous exercises and that he is completely familiar with the physical plant which houses our relocation operations. Second, is the senior Assistant Director now at the relocation site in a position to act as the head of the FBI for exercise purposes during the next two days and can he answer matters of policy without referring them to headquarters? Mr. Bartlett advised Mr. Gray that Assistant Director John P. Mohr, who will be at the

cc - Mr. Boardman  
cc - Mr. Belmont  
cc - Mr. Mohr (with enclosures)  
cc - Mr. Roach  
cc - Mr. Bartlett  
cc - Liaison Section

OHB:jdd

55 AUG 5 1958

REC-6

JUL 28 1958

66-19012-141

PRR, FILED

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman  
RE: Operation Alert 1958

relocation site until the end of the test, can answer matters of policy and, for test purposes, is acting as the head of the agency. Mr. Gray then advised that he is completely satisfied that the Bureau is doing everything necessary to participate in the operation and that it will not be necessary for Mr. Tolson to go to the relocation site.

Mr. Roach has been advised of the memorandum from the White House together with the action above reported. He has been instructed to inform Mr. Mohr so that they will be in a position to handle the test problems that will arise and can represent the Bureau if a conference is called later in the test. The White House memorandum, together with its enclosures, has been forwarded to the relocation site together with a copy of this memorandum.

ACTION:

For information.

*ash*

*R*

*W*

*W*

*V*

51

OPERATION ALERT 1958

BuPLANS

July 16, 1958

2H  
APR

|                   |       |
|-------------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson        | _____ |
| Mr. Boardman      | _____ |
| Mr. Belmont       | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr          | _____ |
| Mr. Nease         | _____ |
| Mr. Parsons       | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen         | _____ |
| Mr. Tamm          | _____ |
| Mr. Trotter       | _____ |
| Mr. W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room        | _____ |
| Mr. Holloman      | _____ |
| Miss Gandy        | _____ |

ROAC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

gile

It is suggested that Mr. Bartlett contact Mr. Gray or his assistant concerning the attached and explain that we have two Assistant Directors and several Inspectors at our Relocation Site with all the necessary personnel and facilities and we are taking full part in Operation Alert; that the FBI is making every effort to extend its coverage to gather intelligence of importance to the White House bearing on the current international situation and, frankly, we question the advisability of Mr. Tolson leaving Washington at this particular time.

at

V.

CT:DSS

Memo Belmont to Boardman, 7-16-58  
OAG file  
EC-8

REC-6

66-19012-142

EX 105

JUL 28 1958

55 AUG 1 1958

11/27/58

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF DEFENSE AND CIVILIAN  
MOBILIZATION  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson        | ✓ |
| Mr. Belmont       | ✓ |
| Mr. Mohr          | ✓ |
| Mr. Nease         | ✓ |
| Mr. Parsons       | ✓ |
| Mr. Rosen         | ✓ |
| Mr. Tamm          | ✓ |
| Mr. Trotter       | ✓ |
| Mr. W.C. Sullivan | ✓ |
| Tele. Room        | ✓ |
| Mr. Holloman      | ✓ |
| Miss Gandy        | ✓ |

JUL 23 1958

*copy  
51*  
BUPLANS

OPERATION ALERT 1958

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Your letter of July 17, 1958, regarding the Evaluation Phase of Operation Alert 1958 was received. I regret that you will be unable to serve as Chairman of the Seminar Committee on Domestic Security.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

*al*  
*Leo A. Hoegh*

Leo A. Hoegh

REC-55

106-19012-143

4 JUL 30 1958

EX-101

*W ach. Reply  
to Bufile  
7-17-58  
mll (4)*

*528*  
55 AUG 5 1958

~~EXP. PROC.~~ See  
JUL 24 1958



# The CLEAVES FOOD SERVICE CORPORATION

Industrial Restaurant Operators

8405 RAMSEY AVENUE • SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND  
TELEPHONE JUNIPER 9-7477

WARD B. CLEAVES  
PRESIDENT

JOHN J. COLEMAN  
VICE PRESIDENT  
MARTIN C. TOWNE  
VICE PRESIDENT

*Handwritten signatures and initials in the top right corner.*

*Handwritten in a circle:* BUPLANS

*Handwritten:* OPERATION ALERT 1958

July 24, 1958

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
United States Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

We all deeply appreciate the wonderful commendation that you sent me on July 21, 1958, and I most certainly will convey your thanks to Tom May and the food service staff at the Academy.

Again thank you for being so very kind and thoughtful to take time out from your very busy schedule to write me as you did.

Sincerely yours,

THE CLEAVES FOOD SERVICE CORPORATION

*Handwritten signature of Ward B. Cleaves*  
Ward B. Cleaves  
President

*Vertical stamp:* EX-101  
*Vertical stamp:* JUL 28 1958

WBC:gl

REC-55

*Handwritten:* 66-19012-144

EX-101

55 AUG 5 1958

*Handwritten number:* 27

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: 7/24/58

FROM : B. J. White *BJW*SUBJECT: DATA FOR OPERATION ALERT  
1957 AND 1958

|            |                                     |
|------------|-------------------------------------|
| Tolson     | _____                               |
| Nichols    | _____                               |
| Boardman   | _____                               |
| Belmont    | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Mohr       | _____                               |
| Parsons    | _____                               |
| Rosen      | _____                               |
| Tamm       | _____                               |
| Trotter    | _____                               |
| Nease      | _____                               |
| Tele. Room | _____                               |
| Holloman   | _____                               |
| Gandy      | _____                               |

The data relative to Operation Alert 1957, which was maintained in the Physics and Chemistry Section of the Laboratory until the completion of Operation Alert 1958, has been destroyed.

The data relative to Operation Alert 1958 will be packaged and maintained in the Physics and Chemistry Section of the Laboratory for one year. This material will be destroyed following Operation Alert 1959. *if there has to be one.*

## ACTION:

For information only.

1-Mr. Minnich, Room 7635

JFG:FCP (5)

NOT RECORDED  
126 JUL 28 1958

~~16 JUL 25 1958~~

~~LEASON~~

55 AUG 5 1958

ORIGINAL FILED IN

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. SIZOO

DATE: 7/29/58

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: PANEL ON DOMESTIC SECURITY.  
(Final stages of Operation Alert 1958)

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

You will recall that the Director was invited to chair a panel on domestic security, during the 3-day conference in connection with the final stages of Operation Alert 1958, which invitation the Director declined. It now appears that Deputy AG Walsh will accept this invitation.

As previously stated, we should be sure we do not do any spade work for the Department in this matter and if a request is received from Mr. Walsh we should refer him to Mr. Yeagley, as the Internal Security Division has the necessary information.

We should, however, keep in touch with this situation so that if the Director is invited to attend a portion of this conference, or the briefing to be given the President, he will know the score and will be prepared with the necessary material to represent the Bureau.

AHB:CSH (4)

cc Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Sizoo  
Mr. Roach

REC-60

EX-135

66-19012-146

AUG 1 1958

55 AUG 6 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *abm 7-31-58*

DATE: July 24, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *RRo*  
*BUPLANKS*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
EVALUATION PHASE  
SEPTEMBER 17, 18 and 19, 1958  
(REQUEST RECEIVED BY DEPUTY ATTORNEY  
GENERAL WALSH TO BE CHAIRMAN OF SEMINAR  
ON DOMESTIC SECURITY)

|               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| Tolson        | _____ |
| Boardman      | _____ |
| Belmont       | _____ |
| Mohr          | _____ |
| Nease         | _____ |
| Parsons       | _____ |
| Rosen         | _____ |
| Tamm          | _____ |
| Trotter       | _____ |
| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

At 11:55 a.m., today, James Cannavan, defense plans coordinator for the Department of Justice, telephonically contacted Supervisor Minnich, Defense Plans Desk, and confidentially advised as follows.

Cannavan understands that Deputy Attorney General Walsh today received a personal invitation from Governor Leo Hoegh, Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM) to chairman a seminar on domestic security which will be held at HIGHPOINT (relocation site of ODCM) during the evaluation phase of Operation Alert 1958 on September 17, 18 and 19, 1958. Cannavan said he received the indication that Deputy Attorney General Walsh is inclined to accept the invitation feeling that by doing so he will be able to control the seminar and keep it from wandering into the fields of martial law and the detention program. Cannavan had no further information regarding this invitation.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Director, by letter from Governor Hoegh, was previously extended an invitation to chairman the seminar on domestic security and by letter dated July 17, 1958, to Hoegh, the Director declined the invitation pointing out that the broad field of domestic security would more properly be within the area of the National Security Council or the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

ACTION:

None-informative.

EX-128

66-19012-147

18 AUG 4 1958

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

*1 cc made 7-25-58 GAW/Sm*  
*FW*  
 55 AUG 11 1958



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Room 5744 725, 1958

TO:

*PH*  
*PK*  
*Q. J.*  
Director

☒ Mr. Belmont *Q. J.*

☒ Mr. Nease

☒ Mr. Mohr

☒ Mr. Rosen

☒ Mr. Tamm

☒ Mr. Trotter

☒ Mr. Parsons

☒ Mr. Clayton

☒ Mr. Holloman

☒ Miss Gandy

☒ Personnel Files Section

☒ Records Section

☒ Mrs. Skillman

☒ Mrs. Brown  
*Q. J.*

See Me

For appropriate action

Send File

Note and Return

Clyde Tolson

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 7-30-58

FROM :

H. L. Edwards *HLE**PLANS*

SUBJECT:

OPERATION ALERT 1958

(July 15-18-1958)

Evaluation of Results

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL 58) was based on conditions W. C. Sullivan existing 14 days after a nuclear attack. FBI suffered destruction of 38 field offices, SOG headquarters, and 107 resident agencies. Employees' deaths and injuries were extensive. Test problems were directed to the field covering administrative situations such as personnel availability, employee replacement and recruiting, space, supplies, office equipment, automobiles, first-aid material, emergency medical treatment, welfare and housing of employees and their families, and payroll and voucher matters. The replies received indicated a serious realistic consideration and an excellent degree of flexibility and adaptability to strange and adverse conditions in order to maintain operations at maximum level.

There is attached a detailed memorandum covering these particular situations and the information received from the field as to their proposed actions. In summary, while operations were naturally affected, there was an excellent ability to improvise and to shift to meet changing conditions. Through local sources or from other government facilities or even from employees' families, replacements or substitutions of material and skills as well as equipment could be had on some basis or another. Probably the biggest single difficulty would be the personnel question. As regards securing eligibles for Special Agent positions, a good source would be National Academy graduates. These could be secured, according to the field. National Academy graduates, while not familiar with Bureau procedures, would at least have a background of investigative experience. Clerical positions apparently could be filled by using former employees, members of employees' families, or part-time employment of such individuals as high school students.

REC-3  
ENCLOSURE  
Through local contacts and through use of employees skills in first aid and emergency treatment, it was indicated the offices could take care of their emergency health problems. Space could be obtained on one basis or another on an acceptable level. Minimum housing needs could be handled. Shifts of employees and equipment or

LLD:jma/mle

(5)

Enclosures

1 - L. J. Gauthier

1 - Mr. Belmont (Attention: J. T. Minnich)

1 - H. L. Edwards

REC-3

EX-108

66-19012-148

10 AUG 4 1958

60 AUG 12 1958

*Handwritten signatures and stamps*  
 2020

Memo H. L. Edwards to Mr. Mohr  
RE: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
(July 15-18-1958)  
Evaluation of Results

supplies between field offices could be managed. Payroll and voucher matters were generally well handled considering this was the first time the field had ever done so.

From an overall viewpoint, the response received from the field offices was most gratifying and indicated that they are on their toes and that in an emergency which required them to do so, they could survive on an operational basis by the use of ingenuity and taking full advantage of all local or interoffice possibilities. The field should be commended for their excellent showing and they should be given, very briefly, the benefit of the questions which result from analysis of this exercise. Their comments should be solicited as to possible solutions and after analysis at SOG, the information gained should be made available to them for the benefit of all offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached SAC letter commending the field and furnishing them information as to the general results of this exercise and soliciting their opinions for future use be approved.

*BT*

*John*  
7/30

*V. Perone*  
8/1

*John*

*R*

*Q*

*X*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 7-30-58

FROM : H. L. Edwards *Hopewell*SUBJECT: EVALUATION OF RESULTS OF  
OPERATION ALERT 1958  
(July 15-18, 1958)

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

This exercise was predicated upon the conditions existing 14 days after a nuclear attack which had resulted not only in extensive blast damage but in large areas subject to intense radioactive fallout. The effect upon the FBI was that 38 field offices, Seat of Government headquarters facilities and 107 resident agencies were destroyed. Several hundred employees had been killed and an even larger number injured. Only one relocation site had suffered blast damage although 11 sites were in fallout areas where operations were temporarily restricted.

Thirty-five test problems were prepared relating to such matters as casualties to personnel, employee availability, employee replacement, recruiting, space, supplies, office equipment, automotive equipment, first-aid material, emergency medical treatment, welfare and housing of families of employees, payroll matters and voucher matters. Field office replies indicated a serious, logical consideration, giving full weight to local conditions. The replies received have been analyzed in relation to administrative functions of the nature set forth above. These are very real problems which would be essential to continuity of FBI operations in the case of such a disaster. The replies indicate an ability on the part of the field to rapidly adjust to difficult conditions and to successfully operate. It is possible that our centralized administrative functions will either be at an absolute minimum or will not exist at all. SACs will need to do the best they can in any way that they are able. The general conclusions reached are discussed below under appropriate headings:

PERSONNEL

The field responded very quickly with a personnel inventory broken down by agents stenographers and various categories of clerical employees and, making allowance for loss from death or injury (either temporary or permanent), indicated an ability to adjust and to maintain themselves in an operational status. Offices suffering light casualties indicated availability of employees for transfer to other offices which had been badly depleted, and were able to state transportation means

1 - H. L. Edwards  
1 - L. J. Gauthier  
1 - J. T. Minnich

LLD:mle  
(5) *LJD*

REC-3  
EX-101

66-19012-148

AUG 4 1958

*Handwritten signatures and initials*

available. Estimates of manpower loss in clerical categories due to military service calls of reserve, National Guard and Selective Service were substantial, indicating the necessity for the Bureau to have an aggressive policy to secure deferment of trained employees. One problem assumed the recruiting of FBI employees for use in Civil Defense activities and the replies received indicated no problem, either due to refusal of employees to accept recruitment or appropriate local authorities being advised FBI employees would not be released.

### RECRUITING AND REPLACEMENT

Assuming personnel loss from death or injury and other causes, questions as to possibility of replacement as well as recruiting of new employees were posed. The replies received indicated that while the situation would not be completely favorable, clerical employees could be had from such sources as part-time employment of 16-year-old high school students, children of FBI employees and similar sources. The lowering of minimum age to 16 years and using part-time employees appear to be extremely fertile sources.

Realizing that communications would be imperative, and assuming either destruction or only partial operation of land-line communications such as telephone and teletype, and that our own radio facilities would be our best chance, the field was asked to advise as to possibility of securing radio personnel on a temporary appointment basis pending investigation. The replies received indicated that this could be done. Since employees so recruited would not have been investigated and given complete clearance, the question of their access to highly ~~confidential~~ coding equipment and codes exists. This would probably have to be resolved by using them for the technical maintenance and operation aspects of the radio work, with coding and decoding being done by fully cleared non-technical employees. Such employees exist in each field office and it should be insured that an adequate number continue to be available.

The replies received on Special Agent recruitment indicated that the best immediate source would consist of National Academy graduates in good standing. These would supply us with personnel whose backgrounds and abilities are known and while they would, of course, not be trained in Bureau procedures, they would be trained in law enforcement principles and investigative techniques. Approval of such appointments should be controlled from headquarters if at all possible to do so, but in case of absolute emergency involving serious shortages, inability of the office

to secure transfers from other divisions and destruction of communications or centralized administrative control, field offices would have to take emergency action to make such appointments according to their best judgment. This emphasizes the desirability and necessity of the various field offices maintaining contact with and knowledge of former Special Agents and National Academy graduates to insure that this potential reservoir is maintained at maximum level.

In all recruiting activities and in resisting recruiting activities by other agencies including the military services, it is assumed that due to the nature of the work and the tremendous increase in volume of that work which the FBI would be called on to do we would have as high a priority as anyone for retaining or obtaining employees.

#### EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

Problems were directed to the field assuming that other offices were badly in need of arms and ammunition. The replies received indicated a logical assessment and further showed that a good quantity and variety of both arms and ammunition could be made available by expeditious means of transportation. A sound assessment was made by the field in this regard.

The problem was also posed of the requirement in offices of such ordinary supplies as typing paper, carbon paper and typewriter ribbons. Information received indicated the ability of the field to cover these routine but basic needs from local sources with no particular difficulty.

As regards automotive equipment and assuming either damage or radioactive condition, the field advised that they would be able to meet minimum operating needs and even indicated ability to secure additional vehicles through local Civil Defense control sources. It must be assumed that under such conditions transportation would be at a minimum and that the sale, transfer or even use of automotive equipment together with the necessary fuel, lubricants and repair parts would be subject to rigid Government controls. Again, this would be a place where the critically essential nature of FBI operations would require a high priority and the field would have to be alert for establishment of any such controls and maintain close and efficient liaison with appropriate local authorities to insure our needs are met.

Under the assumption that basic office machines such as typewriters had been damaged, the field indicated an excellent flexibility not only as regards securing repair but obtaining replacement or additional such equipment from such sources as private industry, resident agencies, other Federal agencies or the personal machines of employees.

Under disaster conditions, one pertinent aspect would be such things as ~~confidential~~ manuals which might be in resident agencies or in unusable headquarters facilities, credentials and weapons of injured or dead employees. Replies indicated an instant appreciation of this condition and that the field would be able to take immediate affirmative steps to either secure these items or insure their destruction to prevent unauthorized use.

### SPACE

This could well be one of the most critical aspects due to destruction of present space and relocation sites, or their unavailability for use due to radioactive contamination. In answer to questions along this line, the field indicated ability to shift rapidly to other space which, while not fully adequate, permitted maintenance of necessary operations. There was also indication of logical, sound decision in establishing new resident agencies to cover areas formerly covered from other spaces, under conditions where the agents would not be able to operate from their homes, so essential coverage would be maintained.

Assuming unavailability, from destruction or other reasons, of normal garage storage space, replies from the field indicated a very practical and adequate action involving either employees maintaining the equipment at their residences, securing additional usable space or parking in the open under conditions of maximum security. The analyses received from the field as to their space possibilities under the destruction and damage conditions stated for the problem indicated an ability to maintain essential operations either in the remainder of their usable space or in other space which could be secured.

### HEALTH AND MEDICAL MATTERS

Under any disaster conditions such as those assumed for this exercise, an imperative demand would be to secure treatment for injured employees and to take care of their needs. It can be assumed that due to depletion of their own ranks by death or injury, professional medical and nursing services would be difficult to obtain and this difficulty would be further confronted by the tremendous increase in demand on an emergency basis for the services of available professional people. Information received in response to questions as to means and facilities for obtaining such care for our employees indicated an excellent situation in the field. A high percentage of our employees are qualified in first aid. They could give services within their ability and under orders of a physician could even do such things as administer hypodermic injections and other medications. One office reported that the wives or next of kin of several of the employees had been graduate nurses and that their

services would be immediately available. Several employees were reported to have had past experience which would be extremely valuable, such as one Special Agent who had been in the Navy Medical Corps for three years. Our position in this regard appears very good.

Offices were tested as to their availability to secure first-aid equipment and medications not only for their own use but for the use of other offices. The response indicated a very favorable situation and a very realistic appraisal and proposals for action which would offer maximum possibilities. There was also indicated an ability to secure assistance from local Civil Defense medical stockpiles (assuming that these were not either contaminated or depleted). The assumption was also made that it was necessary to transfer agents from one field office to another field office where epidemic typhoid fever conditions existed. The field indicated excellent possibilities in being able to secure typhoid inoculations from appropriate sources either Government or private and to expedite the movement of the agents to the infected area suitably protected against the disease.

#### EMERGENCY HOUSING

In response to questions, the field indicated an ability to provide suitable emergency housing facilities for families of agents where such was necessary due to bomb damage and also to obtain bachelor or barrack type quarters suitable for agents transferred into a field division in response to requests for assistance. It is realized that housing of any nature due to destruction, contamination and also large population shifts would be critical. It is believed, however, that through contacts and knowledge of available space and through doubling up and other means, we could handle our problems in this regard. This, particularly as regards the families of agent and other personnel, would be a vital factor in the continuity and efficiency of our operations in order to insure complete availability of the services of our agent and clerical personnel without the burden of worry over this aspect.

#### INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY

With a view to determining manpower needs based on case load and investigative priority (which could change rapidly both as to volume and nature), questions were directed to field offices as to their most essential pending investigative responsibilities and their manpower situation and work load. Replies indicated that due to increase in espionage, sabotage and security complaints and investigations it would undoubtedly be necessary, at least on a temporary basis, to shift our investigative manpower to use it to the maximum advantage. This, of course, is impossible to predict but the field should maintain current assessments of their situation in this regard both as to investigative load and priority grouping of investigative responsibilities under conditions which would be assumed to exist under disaster emergencies.



## PAYROLL MATTERS

On the assumption that centralized payroll functions would not be possible each field office was given the problem of preparing a payroll covering ten agents and ten clerks to be presented to their local Treasury Department Disbursing Officer for settlement. The results consisting of the actual payrolls themselves have been received and are now being analyzed individually in detail by the Payroll Unit of Statistical Section. Aside from minor errors in arithmetic, the deficiencies detected appear to consist principally of errors in preparing the forms themselves, use of incorrect forms, and either misapplication or misinterpretation of existing instructions. As soon as this audit of these returns has been completed appropriate advice will be furnished the field, calling these deficiencies to their attention and giving them assistance and guidance in avoiding them in the future. Considering that this is the first time that this has ever been done by the field offices, the results are surprisingly good.

## VOUCHER MATTERS

From a review of Vouchers and Schedule of Payments prepared by the field in relation to this exercise, it appears that existing instructions are adequate and can be executed by the field in an efficient manner. Errors detected were basically matters of form. This likewise resulted very well.

## CONCLUSION

The field did an excellent job on this exercise. Their handling of these problems and their solutions indicated a down-to-earth, realistic and most logical assessment of the condition and their possibilities. They should be commended for this. In addition, although this entire operation was most successful we should re-emphasize to them the necessity for a complete realization of the extreme conditions that might exist as regards their present personnel, replacement employees, new employees, space, supplies and office equipment, automotive equipment, communications, welfare and health assistance, maximum use of people and facilities and that they should at all times be considering possibilities to develop new means of carrying on the work of the Bureau under all possible conditions and explore new avenues beyond those presently included in their official Buplans.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached SAC Letter commending the field on their successful carrying out of this exercise and reiterating their responsibilities and informing them of the results of analysis of their solution of the test problems be approved.

*gjm* ✓  
*7/22*

8/5/58

SAC LETTER NO. 58-46

(B) OPERATION ALERT 1958 -- The results of the problems posed to the field during the course of this exercise concerning matters such as personnel, space, supplies, equipment, emergency medical treatment, welfare and housing, and payroll and voucher matters have been analyzed.

I want to commend you and your staff for the very effective action that was taken in connection with these problems. They were handled in an enthusiastic, intelligent, and realistic manner which indicated an excellent ability to adjust rapidly, to improvise, and to take advantage of all possibilities. The results indicate that the field will be able to carry on its essential operations under disaster conditions, and were indeed most gratifying.

The matters relating to such things as space, supplies, equipment, welfare and housing, could be solved, according to the information received, on local levels in one fashion or another to permit operations to continue. The biggest problems appear to be replacement of employees lost by death or injury and recruiting of additional employees.

A good potential source for Special Agents appears to be National Academy graduates. This would provide individuals whose backgrounds and abilities are known.

Clerical employees apparently could be secured from such sources as existing lists of eligibles, families and friends of employees, part-time employment of high school and college students, and similar sources. In technical fields such as radio communications, it was indicated that technically qualified individuals could be obtained for emergency appointment. Pending suitable investigation and clearance, the question exists of their access to highly ~~confidential~~ codes and coding equipment. This could be resolved by having them perform the technical aspects of operation and maintenance with the code work being

done by nontechnical employees who have been approved for such work.

This entire exercise indicates the need for field offices to be constantly alert to ways and means by which personnel problems in such disaster conditions could be overcome and sources for emergency appointment. In order to have the benefit of the observations of the field in regard to the matters set forth above and to related problems, each field office is requested to forward to the Bureau not later than September 1, 1958, any comments it may have in this regard, the possibilities that exist in its division, suggestions and recommendations as to solutions to these problems. These will be correlated and the results then disseminated for the benefit and guidance of all field offices. These replies should be forwarded marked Attention: Administrative Division.

66-19012 -  
NOT RECORDED

76 AUG 15 1958

59 AUG 19 1958

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-04-2769

4  
(ST)

00-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

3:20PM August 7, 1958

Miss MARGO WALCAIVICH  
telephoned locally and identified  
herself as an employee of the Office  
of Defense and Civilian Mobilization.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

She stated that that agency is  
making a study for the National  
Security Council in which it is assumed there was an  
enemy attack at midnight on May 14, 1958. She stated  
that in connection with this study, it is necessary to  
ascertain where key government officials were at that  
time. She asked where the Director was at that time.  
Arrangements were made for her to speak to Mr.  
Belmont.

Mr. Belmont has advised he is checking to see if this  
is a legitimate call. Mr. Belmont stated he would  
advise the Director of the call.

It is noted that the Director was at the Bureau on  
May 14 and 15, 1958.

jwd

DO  
Mr. Belmont  
8-7-58  
1075

REC-41

EX-117

12 AUG 12 1958

55 AUG 18 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. J. A. Sizoo

DATE: August 7, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On the afternoon of August 7 the Director's Office and Mr. Tolson's Office received calls from Margo Walcaivich (code 113, extension 2016) of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM). She advised that she was doing a study for the National Security Council for the purpose of ascertaining the extent to which top officials in the Government would have been affected on the assumption that a surprise attack occurred at midnight the night of May 14th, 1958. This is the same assumption on which Operation Alert, 1958, was based.

A check with ODCM reflected that this is a legitimate request based on a study being made by that organization. After checking, I called Miss Walcaivich and advised that both the Director and Mr. Tolson were in Washington at that time.

cc - Mr. Belmont  
 cc - Mr. Roach  
 cc - Mr. Minnich

REC-41  
 EX-117

66-19012-150  
 12 AUG 12 1958

AHB:jdd

68(4)

55 AUG 18 1958

REC-66 66-19012-151

August 6, 1958



EX-108

Honorable William P. Rogers  
The Attorney General  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I certainly am pleased to have your notes of August 1 concerning the assistance that representatives of this Bureau were privileged to render in connection with Operation Alert 1958.

It was good of you to write as you did, and since I know Special Agents Edward R. Fleming, Jr., John T. Minnich and Jerome J. Daunt will be most appreciative of your thoughtfulness, I am apprising them of your kindness. All of us are glad that we could contribute to the Department's important role in the Alert and to the over-all success of the exercise.



Sincerely,

*Edgar*

REC'D-READING ROOM  
FBI  
AUG 6 11 55 AM '58

- 1 - Pittsburgh - Enclosure  
1 - SA John T. Minnich - Enclosure  
1 - SA Jerome J. Daunt - Enclosure  
1 - Personnel file of SA Edward R. Fleming, Jr. - Enclosure  
1 - Personnel file of SA John T. Minnich - Enclosure  
1 - Personnel file of SA Jerome J. Daunt - Enclosure

NOTE: SA Fleming EOD 6-22-42, clerk, 7-8-46 SA, assigned Pittsburgh, GS-13. SA Minnich EOD 8-5-40 clerk, 6-21-43, SA, assigned Domestic Intelligence, GS-14. SA Daunt EOD 4-28-47, assigned Domestic Intelligence GS-14.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐



Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D.C.

August 1 1958

Mr. Tolson ☒  
Mr. Belmont ☒  
Mr. Mohr ☒  
Mr. Nease ☒  
Mr. Parsons ☒  
Mr. Rosen ☒  
Mr. Tamm ☒  
Mr. Trotter ☒  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan ☒  
Tele. Room ☒  
Mr. Holloman ☒  
Miss Gandy ☒

Edward R. Fleming, Jr. - Special Agent - Pittsburgh  
Resident Agent at Martinsburg, W. Va., since 9-6-55  
EOD: 6-22-42 as a clerk Grade GS-13, \$10,130  
7-8-46 as a Special Agent

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

BOPLANS

In reviewing the report of this Department's participation in Operation Alert 1958 I noted the splendid assistance which our staff at the relocation site received from Special Agent Edward Fleming who is assigned there as Resident Agent for your Bureau.

His knowledge of the area has been extremely valuable to us during this and previous exercises. I therefore take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the many kindnesses which Special Agent Fleming has extended to our staff.

Sincerely,

*William P. Rogers*  
Attorney General


William P. Rogers

*me only  
ack 8/6/58  
CBP*

EX-108

REC-66 66-19012-151  
2 auto to REM 9-14  
8/5/58 TO AUG 13 1958

~~EXP. PROC. JCC~~  
AUG 4 1958



Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D.C.

August 1 1958

John T. Minnich - Special Agent - Domestic Intelligence  
Division

EOD: 8-5-40 as a clerk      Grade GS-14, \$11,355  
6-21-43 as a Special Agent

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Nease  
Mr. Parsons  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tamm  
Mr. Trotter  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Holloman  
Miss Gandy

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

O  
BUPLANS

In reviewing the report of this  
Department's participation in Operation Alert 1958  
I noted the fine cooperation which our Planning  
Staff received from Special Agent John Minnich in  
making preparation for the test exercise.

I therefore take this opportunity to  
express my commendation both to you and Special  
Agent Minnich for the creditable manner in which he  
performs his duties.

Sincerely,

William P. Rogers

Attorney General

William P. Rogers

EX-108 REC-66 66-19012-152  
2 auto tit 8-14  
10 AUG 13 1958  
KEM  
8/15/58

EXP. PROC. JCC  
AUG 4 1958

57 AUG 26 1958  
only  
8/8/58  
CBP  
66 AUG 21 1958





Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D.C.

August 1 1958

*V. Berge*  
*att*  
Mr. Tolson ☒  
Mr. Belmont ☒  
Mr. Mohr ☒  
Mr. Nease ☒  
Mr. Parsons ☒  
Mr. Rosen ☒  
Mr. Tamm ☒  
Mr. Trotter ☒  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan ☒  
Tele. Room ☒  
Mr. Holloman ☒  
Miss Gandy ☒

*51*  
Jerome J. Daunt - Special Agent Supervisor - Domestic  
Intelligence Division  
EOD: 4-28-47      Grade GS-14, \$11,355

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

*BUPLANS*

In reviewing the report of this  
Department's participation in Operation Alert 1958  
I noted the splendid assistance which our Staff at  
the relocation site received from Special Agent  
Jerome J. Daunt who was assigned there as Liaison  
Representative for your Bureau. Special Agent Daunt's  
contribution was extremely valuable and had substan-  
tial effect on the successful outcome of the exercise.

Sincerely,

*William P. Rogers*  
Attorney General

William P. Rogers

*FLY*  
57 AUG 26 1958

REC-66

EX-108

66-19013-153

*authentic*  
*16M*  
*8/15/58*

AUG 13 1958

8-14

~~EXP. PROC.~~

AUG 4 1958

*17/5*  
~~66 AUG 21 1958~~

*only 6*  
*8/15/58*  
*C.B.F.*

*4/5*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: July 15, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
JULY 15 - 18, 1958

|                   |       |
|-------------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson        | _____ |
| Mr. Belmont       | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr          | _____ |
| Mr. Nease         | _____ |
| Mr. Parsons       | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen         | _____ |
| Mr. Tamm          | _____ |
| Mr. Trotter       | _____ |
| Mr. W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room        | _____ |
| Mr. Holloman      | _____ |
| Miss Gandy        | _____ |

This is a condensed summary reflecting the Bureau's operations at its relocation site covering the period from the starting of the operation on the morning of July 15 and ending at 4:00 p.m., on July 18, 1958, together with observations and recommendations and a brief resume' to the Attorney General. There is attached a detailed memorandum covering the same subject matter.

PARTICIPATION PRIOR TO JULY 14 - 18. PHASE II

Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL 58) began May 6, 1958, by a simulated mock nuclear attack on the U.S. Phase I, May 6-7, 1958, was principally for state and local practice. Federal agencies were not required and Bureau did not participate in this phase. Our Laboratory did, however, based upon information from Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, (ODCM) analyze the effect of the total attack and it was found that 38 field offices plus Seat of Government were destroyed as well as 107 Resident Agencies. Due to the strategic location of our relocation sites only 1 suffered blast damage although 11 were in fall-out areas which restricted our operations for two or more weeks. Laboratory findings were used as basis for planning our test problems to the field. Phase II of OPAL 58 theoretically began 14 days after the May 6 attack.

RELOCATION -- JULY 15, 1958

By order from White House through ODCM Federal Government agencies relocated one-half day early starting at approximately 10:32 a.m., Eastern Standard Time (EST), July 15. (All Alert Operation on Standard time). We received Alert and were operational at Quantico at 11:50 a.m., and had a full operating group within one hour and 25 minutes. We relocated 47 persons plus 3 Liaison Agents with other agencies.

Enclosure

REC-8

66-19012-154

23 AUG 25 1958

Mr. Nease 1-Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Holloman 1-Mr. Parsons  
Mr. Boardman 1-Mr. Roach  
Mr. Belmont 1-Mr. Minnich

RRR:mad (9) 59

66 SEP 3 1958

Memorandum to the Director

The speed with which the Bureau relocated received very favorable comments from ODCM.

#### BUREAU SCHEDULED PROBLEMS

We scheduled 40 intra-Bureau test problems which were designed to test our field offices in handling problems relating to personnel, material resources, survival, emergency recruitment and related problems. We also conducted 18 actual field availability checks. The test problems to the field were substantial and thought-provoking. They were realistic and practical. They keynoted resourcefulness, ingenuity, and self-reliance. Great emphasis was placed on the cold fact that the normal supply of "people and things" was no longer possible thus placing a premium on doing the job with resources at hand and learning the practical meaning of improvising where necessary. The field responded to these problems in a highly satisfactory manner. The availability checks we ran were all handled in a time considered to be satisfactory, the time elements running from 2 to 51 minutes. This represented one-third of our offices checked for a total of 2,288 Agents then on duty status at headquarters cities.

#### OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

We received 28 problems from ODCM, the President and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). They dealt with such matters as field communications, facilities at relocation site, essential agency records (the question of duplicating our fingerprint records was raised by ODCM--observations and recommendations set forth) personnel matters and staff assignment questions. A question on our emergency detention program was raised and we advised Justice that we would not respond to ODCM's inquiry due to the highly ~~secret~~ nature of programs but stressed to Justice again if such programs are to be successful they must be implemented as far as possible in advance of an attack. These problems were handled promptly and we were commended by ODCM for the speed of our replies.

Memorandum to the Director

COMMUNICATIONS

Again our communications system proved to be the lifeline between the field and Seat of Government operations in an emergency. Our equipment and personnel performed with a high degree of efficiency. The traffic handled this year was comparable to that of the past year being extremely heavy for such a short period of time. Methods of streamlining certain communications procedures may be advisable to enhance efficiency, possible outback on personnel and speed up operations during peak periods. Possible improvement in microwave circuit being checked. Recommendations set forth.

LIAISON

This year 3 Liaison Agents went out with their agenotes, ODCM, Justice and AEC. These are valuable assignments and it helps us greatly at our relocation site to handle intra-agency problems, know what is going on, cut red tape and get the job at hand done. Two of the Agents were released during the course of the exercise due to inactivity of the sites. Leo A. Hoegh, Director, ODCM, was appreciative of the assignment of a Bureau Agent to that site stating that during any exercise or during an actual emergency he wants an FBI representative on the spot.

COSTS

ODCM did not request an estimate cost figure this year as was done after last year's Alert and, therefore, we did not incur communications expense by having our field offices submit these figures. We kept our cost down this year by the fact that we used almost exclusively our radio system in handling our problems. We did not have Agents in the field on per diem or incur travel costs. Fewer personnel participated this year than last and by streamlining procedures we were able to release personnel at Quantico and in the field (radio operators) prior to the completion of the exercise.

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

Quite frankly, we did not encounter any difficulties so far as our operations at Quantico or in the field were concerned.

*Memorandum to the Director*

*Our equipment and personnel performed exceptionally well. Some minor communications facilities breakdowns were noted on ODCM owned and operated equipment but this did not interfere with our operations.*

*PERSONNEL*

*47 employees reported to Quantico from Washington on July 15, 1958. On July 17, 1958, we released 6 persons and on the morning of July 18, 13 more. During the day we released such personnel as could be spared to carry on our wind-up operations. Employees conducted themselves in a business-like manner, were very enthusiastic about their assignment and showed that they were dedicated and well suited to serve under trying conditions. They put in long hours of work and did a very efficient job--recommendations being submitted.*

*REPORTS TO ODCM*

*Other than daily communications reports to ODCM we submitted only one required report which was the answer to a questionnaire sent by ODCM to Quantico to be answered during the course of the operation. We submitted all of our reports with appropriate replies very promptly.*

*OBSERVATIONS*

*Although we experienced no difficulties during the operation, we had an opportunity to check our activities very closely and make certain observations. From the field standpoint as to related problems of personnel, material, et cetera, we found that the major job to be done on the field level is to get our offices back into operation at the earliest possible moment to carry on essential Bureau business. We are faced with the cold fact that the normal supply of "people and things" will no longer be available thus we must get the work done with the resources at hand. Our offices must have resourcefulness, ingenuity and self-reliance. Our SAC's must be able to maintain in an emergency essential operations with existing personnel and equipment. The results of the alert test showed that all SAC's felt that they could maintain such operations with the simulated*

Memorandum to the Director

staffs they would have under such severe damage as was sustained in this practice alert. Further these tests again show that we must be completely flexible in our planning if we are to be successful in carrying out our responsibilities. With reference to emergency recruitment of personnel in our future plans we must give consideration to desirability of streamlining emergency applicant processing and other planning. With reference to communications and other emergency procedures which we are following at our Quantico relocation site it is possible that some may be subject to further streamlining to improve efficiency, cut back on personnel where possible, change some administrative handling of traffic material and having our microwave radio system free of any relay points [redacted] and possible temporary outdoor housing of some of our microwave equipment. With reference to the matter of reconstructing fingerprint files, it is observed that our present position calls for the reconstructing of these files from those fingerprints on record in state and other establishments throughout the country and that we estimate that this would be one way of accomplishing this if all of our records were demolished. This is something that we should probably look into to determine if our position is still good and if such a procedure is still adequate. Recommendations set forth. We will analyze all of these observations to see if we can in any way improve upon our present procedures. Appropriate recommendations will be submitted on each.

b3

Recommendations on pages 6 and 7.

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

RECOMMENDATIONS

1) a) With reference to field operations, based on the above observations, the Administrative Division will study all matters of field operations under simulated, as well as real, emergency, conditions and will submit appropriate recommendations for approval, following which an SAC letter will be sent to the field for its information and future guidance.

*Being handled  
separately. CRD/wh*

b) At the time this SAC letter is prepared, the field should be complimented on the splendid accounting it gave of itself during OPAL 58.

*Being handled  
separately. CRD/wh*

2) a) With reference to the possible streamlining of procedures in our communications work and management at the relocation site, the Records and Communications Division will study our present procedures to see if it's possible to effect streamlining measures which would improve efficiency and possibly reduce some personnel requirements during these tests and during actual emergencies at the site.

*Being handled  
by J. L. Henry  
BHH*

b) A study with appropriate recommendations will also be made concerning the physical housing of our communications facilities in the Academy building at the relocation site.

*Being handled  
Adm. Division  
BHH*

Memorandum for The Director  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958

3) The Administrative and Laboratory Divisions will further study the problem of erecting more suitable temporary housing for our operating equipment at our microwave station.

*Being handled  
separately  
C.B./lhw*

4) It is recommended that the Identification Division reanalyze the matter of reconstructing our fingerprint files should they become destroyed in a national emergency.

*Under consideration  
6.2.3.  
8-8-58*

5) In view of the excellent attitude displayed by all employees engaged in OPAL 58 and their willingness to serve long hours, it is recommended that letters of commendation be sent to those clerical employees who participated in the exercise.

*Letters of commendation, to all clerical  
employees - 7/23/58  
lhw*

6) The staff at Quantico, both before and during the entire exercise, rendered excellent assistance and it is recommended that a letter be sent to the SAC expressing appreciation to the personnel.

*Done 7/23/58  
lhw.*

7) It is recommended that the attached summary memorandum dated July 21, 1958, be sent to the Attorney General, with a copy for Deputy Attorney General Walsh.

*Done  
R*

*R*

*7-1*

*OK  
K*



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM  
July 15 - 18, 1958

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson        | ✓ |
| Mr. Belmont       | ✓ |
| Mr. Mohr          | ✓ |
| Mr. Nease         |   |
| Mr. Parsons       |   |
| Mr. Rosen         | ✓ |
| Mr. Tamm          | ✓ |
| Mr. Trotter       |   |
| Mr. W.C. Sullivan |   |
| Tele. Room        |   |
| Mr. Holloman      |   |
| Miss Gandy        |   |

This is a summary memorandum covering the Bureau's activities at the relocation site starting on the morning of July 15 and ending at 4:00 P.M., July 18, 1958. All times used are being listed as Eastern Standard Time to conform with the time being used by the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization throughout the operation.

Brief mention is also made of the Bureau's participation prior to the present exercise.

PARTICIPATION PRIOR TO JULY 14-18, PHASE II

Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL 58) began on May 6, 1958, by the launching of a mock nuclear attack on the United States and its possessions preceded by a minimum of two hours' and a maximum of 'four hours' warning, which caused widespread damage. During Phase I of OPAL 58, May 6 and 7, 1958, state and local emphasis was placed on matters dealing with survival and resources. Participation in Phase I by Federal agencies was not mandatory and, in view of the survival-resource character of the exercise, the Director approved nonparticipation by the FBI.

Based on bomb strike information furnished by the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM), our Laboratory did, however, analyze the effect of the attack on FBI installations which revealed that, theoretically, 38 field offices plus Seat of Government facilities were destroyed in addition to 107 Resident Agencies that were destroyed. Because of the strategic location of our relocation sites, only one suffered blast damage although eleven sites were in fall-out areas of sufficient density to restrict operations for two

## Enclosures

- 1 - Mr. Nease
- 1 - Mr. Holloman
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Roach
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

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EX-108

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ENCLOSURE

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EX-108

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FBI

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weeks or more. The Laboratory's findings were distributed to the field and served as a realistic basis for the planning and for the handling of our test problems during Phase II of OPAL 58. Phase II theoretically began 14 days after the attack of May 6, 1958. Our operations during Phase II are summarized below.

RELOCATION -- JULY 15, 1958

Federal agency relocation under Phase II of OPAL 58 was not scheduled to start until 8:30 A.M., July 16, 1958. However, by memorandum dated July 15, 1958, from Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, White House staff secretary, the FBI and other agencies were requested to immediately proceed to the relocation sites upon receipt of an alert call. The FBI received the alert call at 10:32 A.M. and became operational at its relocation site at 11:50 A.M. It had a full alert cadre at the site within one hour and 25 minutes from receipt of the alert call. This was done despite the fact that the alert was received during the lunch hour and when traffic conditions were congested at the Seat of Government and in the Washington area.

In addition to the alert cadre of 47 persons, three Liaison Agents accompanied three other agencies to their relocation sites.

The speed with which the Bureau effected its evacuation and placed its site in full operation was commented on by an ODCM official by stating that the FBI was one of the first to relocate upon receiving the alert call on the morning of July 15. Prior to the arrival of the alert cadre at the Bureau's relocation site, the Special Agent in Charge at Quantico and his staff had set up our operating quarters and had in readiness all available equipment and supplies. As soon as the Bureau's site was operational, representatives of ODCM and Department of Justice relocation sites were appropriately notified.

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### SCHEDULED BUREAU PROBLEMS

We set up in advance of the alert 40 problems to be run with our field offices. These problems dealt primarily with Bureau resources, personnel, equipment, vouchers and payroll matters, as well as 18 actual field availability checks, as noted in the following analysis.

#### Manpower Resource Problems

Nine test problems involving manpower resources were conducted, designed to cover every geographical area in the country. The Bureau's requirements, covering Agents, clerks and technicians, were surveyed with all field offices to make certain that our personnel inventory from surviving personnel was such that essential responsibilities could be carried out. The replies received from the field were realistic since the bomb damage in the various areas was keyed to the assumed bomb damage and fall-out patterns submitted by ODCM. The most telling results of these types of problems were that, with our impaired staffs throughout the country, we were able to function even with large losses. The field showed great initiative in perfecting local arrangements under the most adverse conditions.

#### Recruitment of FBI Personnel

Seven test problems were used to cover samplings on a nationwide and territorial survey of resources availability. The Special Agents in Charge (SACs) were authorized to offer temporary appointments to completely processed applicants. The results indicated that such sources as former Agents who had offered services and National Academy (NA) graduates in good standing are good potential sources in a dire emergency. The problems further demonstrated the desirability of the field maintaining close continuous contact with Agent applicant sources at all times.

#### Fiscal Matters

Two test problems were used involving 55 communications to the field. One problem tested the field's ability to prepare and handle field payroll schedules with the nearest Disbursing Office of the

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Treasury Department without benefit of supervision from the Seat of Government. Another problem dealt with the ability of two field offices to schedule travel expense vouchers for payments directly through the local Disbursing Office of the Treasury Department, again without headquarters aid.

Medical and Health Matters

Six problems were used pertaining to services of office employees trained in first aid or otherwise qualified as medical aides under emergency conditions, thereby enabling certain injured employees to work. The replies to these problems were especially encouraging, mainly because of the Bureau's first aid training program which over the years has provided the field divisions with a substantial number of employees trained to render such assistance. Additional problems covered such matters as (1) arranging typhoid inoculations for employees under transfer and (2) procuring medical supplies for shipment to offices in critical need.

Office Supplies and Equipment

Four problems were used requiring field offices to immediately ship firearms and ammunition from one division to another. Such matters as procurement of and payment for necessary supplies locally, obtaining of typewriters and other office equipment, and locating and recovering Government property were also covered.

Welfare and Housing

Two problems were used concerning the welfare and housing of our employees. These dealt with critical needs of families of personnel under transfer where housing facilities were badly damaged, as well as arranging accommodations for presently assigned employees who were bombed out of their existing quarters.

Space Matters

We ran problems requesting the 53 field divisions, on a deadline basis, to submit inventories of their headquarters and Resident Agency space, showing percentage operable, location, and, where existing facilities were inadequate, the steps to be taken to secure needed space.

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### Automotive Equipment

Two problems were used involving the extent of damage to our automotive equipment and to estimate needs to enable the Bureau to redistribute automobiles from nondepleted field offices. Problems relating to storage and protection of automotive equipment and procuring additional equipment from outside sources were also posed to the field and the field responded very satisfactorily and showed ability to handle such problems.

### FIELD AVAILABILITY CHECKS

We conducted availability checks in 18 offices involving 2,288 Agents. This represents over one-third of the Bureau's Agent manpower. All offices contacted their Agents within the hour. The shortest time for a small office to conduct the availability check was seven minutes (Savannah - 16 Agents); the shortest time for a medium office was 13 minutes (Boston - 60 Agents); the shortest time for a large office was 51 minutes (New York - 979 Agents). These checks show that the SACs have been able to properly organize their offices and set up appropriate procedures for reaching Agents in a very short time in emergency conditions. This, of course, would be absolutely essential in a real emergency.

### OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

During the course of the exercise, we received 28 problems from outside agencies, 17 originating from the director of the Office of Opal Resources and Operation (OORO), an operating office within ODCM. Four originated from the President and one each from the Interagency Communications System (ICS) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Problems originating from ODCM related primarily to (1) availability and adequacy of field communications; (2) adequacy of facilities at our relocation site, including decontamination, equipment and availability of medical supplies and facilities; (3) availability of essential agency records at the site; (4) number of relocation cadre, distinguished between clerical, communications and policy personnel, and whether the number assigned was sufficient to handle emergency agency functions; and (5) details regarding agency planning with regard to care of dependents in a real emergency.

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The problems originating from the President dealt primarily with questions of a personnel nature; for example, an estimate was requested of the psychological impact on the relocation staff from the OPAL 58 attack and subsequent separation from their dependents. It was also requested that a report be submitted on what motivation or compulsion we would use to induce our personnel to undertake hazardous but essential duties in an emergency situation. Inquiry was also made and a report requested as to whether duties assigned to cadre personnel were clear and fully understood by the personnel.

The two problems from ICS and CIA dealt only with questions of staff assignment for specific responsibilities for the exercise. A special deadline was set for the handling of the majority of the problems and they were all handled well within the deadline. In fact, an ODCM official complimented us not only on the manner in which the problems were handled but on the speed with which they were handled at our site and replies made to the originator. Attachment A to this memorandum sets forth a concise summary of each of the 28 problems, reflecting the problems posed and the replies given by the Bureau.

#### COMMUNICATIONS

This alert exercise again brought into sharp focus the fact that communications at Quantico are the life line of any emergency operation conducted from the Bureau's relocation site. We found communications equipment and personnel to be highly effective during this exercise.

For dual reasons of economy and to thoroughly test our radio network, we worked the majority of our problems utilizing the radio network as the medium of communication. Recognizing the fact that Bureau radio messages can be monitored by those outside our network, it was necessary during this exercise as in normal practice to code all radio messages, thus throwing a very heavy burden on our coding personnel. While there was a backlog during some of the peak periods of contact with the offices, the resultant delay was usually temporary and promptly cleared.

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Teletype, telephone and microwave systems were also tested and found to operate effectively. Utilizing all of these methods of communication, we could have, with a larger staff, handled a much greater volume if necessary.

SUMMARY OF MESSAGES SENT AND RECEIVED  
FROM JULY 15 THROUGH 4:00 P.M., JULY 18, 1958

|           | <u>Incoming</u> | <u>Outgoing</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Telephone | 53              | 28              | 81*          |
| Teletype  | 143             | 55              | 198**        |
| Radio     | 335             | 430             | 765***       |
| TOTALS    | 531             | 513             | 1,044        |

\* Only 27 of these calls were charged to the FBI (\$25.60).

\*\* Only 33 of these were over commercial facilities (\$37.60).

\*\*\* Compared to 522 in 1957.

(The thorough test afforded our coding unit is reflected by the fact that the messages required handling\*41,064 code groups as compared to\*47,704 code groups handled during the exercise in 1957. Our decoding operations were speeded up considerably this year by the use of new code machine devices which eliminated manual operation of the decoding machines.)\* New Method of computing code groups.)

We had no difficulty reaching our field offices and very limited trouble in reaching other Government relocation sites. This was an improvement over last year. However, we did experience some mechanical breakdowns of ODCM equipment through which we reach ODCM and other agencies which are on the Government communications network. All of these difficulties were reported promptly by our communications people and repaired by ODCM without impairing our operations.

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With reference to Bureau traffic handled at our relocation site, possible cutting down of personnel on future tests, and improvements in the operations of our coding unit, related messenger service and logging centers, we found that perhaps some improvement could be made, transmission time speeded up, and efficiency improved. We are making studies of these matters and recommendations will be made where appropriate.

#### LIAISON.

Three Liaison Agents accompanied agencies to their relocation sites at the start of the exercise (ODCM, Justice and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)). Immediately upon arrival at the sites, these Agents checked in by telephone to the Bureau's relocation site and during the exercise they kept in close contact with us and we had no difficulty in reaching them. The Agents were able to keep us advised of over-all Government planning, as well as activities at their individual agencies. In several instances, we utilized the liaison representative to clarify requests, which was of considerable assistance to our operations at Quantico. We received much information and cut red tape which greatly assisted in smooth operations with other agencies. For example, during the test, the Director received a request from Mr. Leo A. Hoegh, director of ODCM, requesting that Mr. Hoover head up the so-called security seminar. The request from Mr. Hoegh left many unanswered questions. With a Liaison Agent on the spot, at ODCM, we were able to check this matter firsthand with ODCM officials at their site and obtain sufficient information which justified the Director to decline the invitation extended by Mr. Hoegh.

We continually scrutinized the necessity of our Agents remaining at the relocation sites of the other agencies and it was possible for us to release two Liaison Agents during the course of the exercise.

The value of having our liaison representatives relocate with their agencies is indisputable. By continuing this procedure during Operations Alert, we have further established a pattern whereby our



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Agents will be able to serve us in this capacity in a real emergency. On the morning of July 18, in talking to Liaison Agent Whaley, Director Hoegh, ODCM, advised that in practices and in real emergencies he wants an FBI Agent at the ODCM relocation site. He stated he felt it is very useful and can be helpful both to the FBI and to ODCM. He stated that he was appreciative of the fact that the Director had seen fit to assign a man at his relocation site.

COST

The cost of OPAL 58 has been considerably less than last year. Prior to the exercise, it was pointed out that an estimate of cost figure is not required by ODCM this year and, therefore, we would not be put to the expense of compiling such a figure. However, we kept the cost low this year by the extensive use of our radio network in lieu of costly teletype and telephone messages. We eliminated field per diem and travel costs since we obtained from ODCM permission to have our field divisions assume relocation status but actually remain at headquarters city. Fewer personnel were used this year (47 this year compared to 69 last year) due to streamlining procedures and keeping ahead of our planned schedule of problems presented to the field. We were able also to release our radio operators ahead of the scheduled cut-off time.

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

During the course of the exercise, no difficulties were encountered in connection with the problems handled by us or with our communications equipment at the relocation site or in the field. However, the following communications network difficulties with outside facilities were encountered:

- 1) On July 16, from 12:50 A.M. to 3:50 A.M., the crypto-teletype circuit to ODCM did not function correctly although it was not inoperative. The malfunctioning of this equipment was brought to the attention of ODCM Communications Operations Center and it was repaired.

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2) Two microwave telephone circuits to ODCM were inoperative for approximately 20 minutes during the early morning of July 17 and our coded transmissions to ODCM via the crypto-teletype circuit could not be received at ODCM during this period.

These instances of failures in the communications system owned, operated and maintained by ODCM were brought to its attention and it effected repairs. These outages did not affect our over-all operations and, if this were to happen during a real emergency, we could use other emergency channels.

PERSONNEL

47 employees reported to the Bureau's relocation site from Washington on July 15, 1958. (We had 69 people last year.) By the evening of July 17, we had released six persons and by noon, July 18, an additional 13 employees had been released. The remaining personnel (28) stayed until the conclusion of the exercise, 4:00 P.M., July 18.

Judging from the manner in which all problems and operations at the Bureau's site were handled by both clerical and Agent personnel, we can assume with assurance that in a real emergency such personnel would function with peak efficiency under the most adverse conditions. During the exercise, all of our people evidenced a businesslike approach to the work and displayed an exemplary attitude. They displayed their willingness to put aside personal considerations and completely dedicate themselves to the assumed grave responsibilities at hand. In spite of our prescheduled arrival at Quantico, the SAC and his staff had the building and equipment in complete readiness and we were able to commence the operation immediately upon arrival. The care which the Quantico staff had taken in setting up for the physical needs of the exercise was quite evident. As usual, the Quantico firearms staff provided building security on a 24-hour basis and furnished other services.

Attachment B sets forth a complete list of personnel used during OPAL 58, including the Quantico staff and Liaison Agents who relocated with their agencies.

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### REPORTS TO ODCM

Excluding daily communications reports, we were only required to submit one report to ODCM during the course of the exercise. This particular report responded to questions in a questionnaire contained in a sealed envelope opened at our site on the morning of July 16. These questions were identical to ones contained in a questionnaire/answered by us on our field divisions to ODCM on July 14, 1958. The questions pertained in the main to relocation site facilities and our capabilities regarding certain situations which may arise incidental to a real emergency of the type assumed for OPAL 58. We answered all questions along the lines previously approved in answering our questionnaire regarding field divisions. No new problems were raised and we replied to the ODCM questionnaire promptly.

### OBSERVATIONS

OPAL 58 was the first emergency test where the setting was 14 days after the theoretical bombing, thus emphasizing such factors as taking inventory of personnel and material resources with a view to assessing the damage, seeing what our salvageable manpower and equipment were, and determining what would be needed to get the "house" back in operable order for carrying on essential Bureau business. It also gave the field more of an opportunity to take various actions rather than operate on complete simulations. As in the past, it also gave us an opportunity to critically analyze and, where possible, streamline our operations at our Quantico relocation site.

### Field Analysis

The test problems given the field were substantial and thought provoking. They were realistic and practical. They were designed to make the field think and required the SACs to exhibit ingenuity and resourcefulness in salvaging all the personnel and equipment they could, retain for themselves only what they absolutely needed, and make available whatever they could spare to other offices which fared worse. The tests brought out and emphasized the cold fact that the

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normal supply of "people and things" was no longer possible, thus placing a premium on doing the job with resources at hand and learning the practical meaning of improvising where needed. The results of OPAL 58 administrative tests with the field furnished gratifying proof that the Director's emphasis over the years on speed, results, initiative and imagination to find ways to get the job done will pay real dividends in an actual emergency. We noted that the field responded to the problems posed with seriousness of purpose and realism typical of our Bureau training and practice. Initiative was quite in evidence and, in fact, in many cases they had already anticipated some aspects of a situation and were able to respond with practical solutions in a minimum of time. Based on damage figures computed by the Laboratory, which damage in some localities was extremely severe, every SAC responded he could maintain essential operations with existing personnel and equipment although five SACs indicated their space was inadequate but they were taking immediate steps to secure needed space.

It was again noted that proper planning for the welfare, security and safety of dependents of evacuated personnel has proven to be essential in order to insure maximum productivity and esprit de corps of the employees at the relocation site. We were called on by ODCM during the alert to evaluate this phase of our planning. OPAL 58 also gave an excellent opportunity to test our potential personnel recruitment resources, demonstrating the feasibility of the Bureau's established plans for relying on such sources as NA graduates in good standing, Special Agents who would be desirable for use, and eligible applicants in the security, radio and communications fields. In our future plans, we will give consideration also to the desirability of streamlining emergency applicant processing without, of course, sacrificing the absolutely essential requirements of suitability, loyalty and other factors that we have steadfastly maintained. We can also consider the possibility of having a reservoir-type of assignment in the Bureau where we can place employees initially pending completion of our investigation.

The one cardinal principle that the alert test brought into sharp focus is that we must maintain a complete flexibility in our planning rather than putting all our eggs in one basket and relying

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on fast emergency devices. For example, the bombing this year illustrated when the damage was charted that movement of personnel and equipment north and south would be very difficult and hazardous in view of the fall-out factor which is governed by prevailing winds at the time and, thus, we would have to concentrate on deployment of personnel and equipment from east to west or west to east. In future bombings, however, the reverse might be true due to the conditions existing at the time. Therefore, we must remain completely flexible in our operations.

It was found from certain problems given to the field covering field radio stations, emergency radio transmissions, as well as the use of radiological equipment, that the readiness of the field to handle this phase of the Bureau's essential work is very good. The response from the field offices demonstrates a surprisingly sound working knowledge and real appreciation of the technical problems with which they are confronted, as well as from the dangers inherent in fall-out in the use of detection equipment to protect our personnel.

During the course of the exercise, we received at the Seat of Government a Cabinet paper from the director of ODCM, Mr. Hoegh. Many items were listed as having been discussed at a Cabinet meeting on July 7, 1958. One item of interest is a reference to Federal operational capability, in regard to which a statement was made to the effect that alert planning requires that the entire Federal relocation site problem be carefully reviewed. This statement is made based on the damage analysis and effects of the mock attack, which occurred theoretically on May 6, 1958. So far as the Bureau is concerned, it can be observed that, based on the damage from this mock attack, we found that, from a geographical and physical facilities standpoint, only one of our 54 relocation sites suffered from blast damage and only eleven were in sufficient fall-out to affect our operation immediately after the attack. In view of this, there appears to be no basis, as far as we are concerned, to review our relocation site locations. We did this in 1956 and the above shows the effectiveness of our review.

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During this test, ODCM posed a question to us (Problems #3 and #21 in Attachment A) as to, in the event all Washington fingerprint files were destroyed, in an attack, what alternate files exist and, if none, what our plans were for dealing with this contingency. We responded by stating that the FBI acts as a central repository of fingerprint cards furnished by law enforcement agencies. In the event FBI fingerprint records are destroyed, such records will be regrouped from individual duplicate records maintained by law enforcement agencies and state fingerprint bureaus throughout the country; further, that we have microfilm and, stored at the relocation site, certain essential fingerprint records to be used under emergency conditions. In response to this answer, ODCM inquired what length of time it would take to regroup individual duplicate fingerprint records from the sources we indicated. ODCM was told that, within 90 days, considerable progress in regrouping would have been made and the speed of regrouping thereafter would depend on unknown factors relating to the ability of law enforcement agencies to maintain essential operation; that it was felt that in about 180 days substantial regrouping would have been completed, and that progress thereafter would depend on manpower and funds available and other similar factors existing. The matter of reconstructing our identification records appears to be of concern to ODCM and we may desire to re-examine our position in this matter so that we are sure that our planning for such a possible contingency is good or that it may be improved upon.

Analysis of Operations at Bureau Relocation Site

This year at Quantico, as in the past, we have noted certain procedures and facilities that will be subject to examination for the purpose of streamlining and making more efficient. This year we noted that temporary backlogs in decoding work could be speeded up by eliminating a typing procedure while the messages are being converted from code to plain text. We further noted that operations in our communications work may be streamlined and speeded up if certain logging procedures could be changed without impairing the necessary message control factor. Additional air conditioning equipment in the code rooms is something that we must seriously consider. This appears

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to be necessary in view of the necessary additional equipment in these rooms. Soundproofing of the space and modernizing the lighting to improve effectiveness and efficiency, as well as removing additional heat sources, will be considered. The ceilings in the teletype and telephone switchboard rooms could be improved upon if certain soundproofing were installed.

Microwave facilities equipment is housed in a temporary-type metal structure at the relocation site. In observing this equipment operating 24 hours per day with high outside temperatures, it is concluded that the high temperature sustained by this critical equipment will ultimately result in short-timed equipment life and possible failure at a critical time. In order to reduce heat and insure maximum efficiency of equipment, an air conditioned rehousing of a small temporary nature appears to be in order. Also, with reference to the present interagency communication microwave system, this system, which is one link in the critical agency's circuit, must pass through a facility [redacted] From past experience and during the present alert, we have found that it would be to our advantage that this circuit not pass through the [redacted] control segment and, therefore, as soon as possible we will look into the possibility of having our operations separated from [redacted] as soon as commercial AT&T facilities are ready.

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ATTACHMENT A

OUTSIDE PROBLEMS


ENCLOSURE 66-19012-155



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. J. P. Mohr

DATE: July 18, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
July 15-18, 1958  
Outside Problems

In addition to our intra-Bureau problems, we received from various agencies many problems requiring replies. All problems were handled expeditiously. The following summarizes briefly the nature of problems received and our replies thereto. All times are Eastern Standard Time (EST).

JULY 15, 1958Problem #1

At 1:39 P.M., we received a teletype from the Office of Opal Resources and Operation (OORO) requesting a report as to whether we had a field communications system, if such system was working under OPAL 58 attack, and if it was useful for agency business and civil defense purposes. OORO requested a reply by noon, July 16. We replied by teletype, transmitted at 9:15 P.M., that we did have a field communications system, that under OPAL 58 attack such system was operational in all except two offices, and that the system was useful for agency business but not available for civil defense purposes due to responsibilities of this agency. Problem completed.

Problem #2

At 1:38 P.M., OORO by teletype requested advice as to whether the working, sleeping and mess facilities at our relocation site were sufficient to take care of individuals other than our own personnel. If so, how many others. A reply was requested by noon, July 16. We replied by teletype, transmitted at 10:12 P.M., advising that FBI facilities were adequate only for its own employees. Problem completed.

1 - Mr. Nease  
1 - Mr. Holloman  
1 - Mr. Boardman  
1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. Mohr  
1 - Mr. Parsons  
1 - Mr. Roach  
1 - Mr. Minnich  
1 - Mr. Rushing

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Problem #3

OORO teletype received at 1:36 P.M. posed the question "In the event that all Washington fingerprint files were destroyed in an attack, what alternate files exist? If none, what are your plans for dealing with this contingency?" A reply was requested by 6:00 P.M., July 17, 1958. Our teletype, transmitted at 9:39 P.M., pointed out that the FBI acts as a central repository of fingerprint cards furnished by law enforcement agencies. In the event FBI fingerprint records are destroyed, such records would be regrouped from individual duplicate records maintained by law enforcement and state fingerprint bureaus throughout the country. We further pointed out that the FBI has microfilmed and stored at relocation site certain essential fingerprint records for use under emergency conditions. Problem completed.

Problem #4

OORO teletype received at 1:37 P.M. requested advice as to what radiological decontamination measures could be taken at our relocation site with available equipment and personnel. A reply was requested by noon, July 16. We replied by teletype transmitted at 9:09 P.M. that, with available equipment and personnel, the following decontamination measures could be taken: (1) hosing down of immediate locale; (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination; (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment, and (4) filtering of all incoming air into the building. In addition, we pointed out that a Federal Government owned and controlled water supply system is utilized, including an installed filtration device to provide water free from radionuclides. Problem completed.

Problem #5

OORO teletype received at 1:37 P.M. requested advice as to whether agency alert cadre assignment had been reflected in official approved job description for classified civil servants. A reply was requested by noon, July 16. Our teletype, transmitted at 7:31 P.M., advised that FBI job descriptions do not specifically reflect cadre assignments for security reasons but sufficient general reference has been incorporated therein and grade levels do include evaluation of such duties. Problem completed.

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Problem #6

OORO teletype received at 1:37 P.M. requested advice as to whether all essential agency records are currently available at the relocation site. A reply was requested by noon, July 16. Our teletype, transmitted at 11:21 P.M., advised that all essential records are available at our site within the scope of planning possibilities which have recognizable limitations, such as funds and space at relocation site. Problem completed.

Problem #7

OORO teletype received at 1:16 P.M. asked "In the light of current delegations and your ability or inability to function prior to D plus 90, how many of your (1) cadre, (2) relocation staff, could be made available for other than your own needs, i.e., for state and local civil defense purposes?" A reply was requested by noon, July 16. Our teletype, transmitted at 7:41 P.M., advised that by presidential directives matters concerning sabotage, espionage and subversive activities are the primary responsibility of the FBI and that intensive effort required to meet FBI obligations under these directives would preclude rendering assistance to any state and civil defense efforts unless the nature of assistance requested pertained to matters within FBI responsibilities. Problem completed.

Problem #8

OORO teletype received at 1:15 P.M. requested advice as to how many and what kinds of persons were at the site when the alert cadre arrived. A reply was requested by noon, July 16. Our teletype, transmitted at 11:21 P.M., advised that the initial cadre at the site upon arrival totalled 15, consisting of eight communications personnel at the site, six communications personnel at Midland, Virginia, and one at Sowego radio station, considered as part of site. Problem completed.

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Problem #9

OORO teletype received at 1:18 P.M. requested advice as to what radio backup exists as an alternate for the agency's emergency relocation communications. A reply was requested by noon, July 16. Our teletype, transmitted at 10:17 P.M., advised that radio backup for FBI emergency relocation communications consists of CW radio circuits to all field offices with radio-teletype to key points; also, microwave radio facilities to relocation sites of critical agencies through the microwave network. Problem completed.

Problem #10

OORO teletype received at 1:37 P.M. queried "To fulfill the functions assigned to your agency at your site, would you need more people than are assigned there or are likely to get there after an attack? If so, what arrangements have you made with state and local governments?" A reply was requested by noon, July 16. We advised by teletype, transmitted at 10:51 P.M., that in case of attack sufficient personnel scheduled for relocation site to take care of agency functions. Problem completed.

Problem #11

OORO teletype received at 1:59 P.M. requested advice as to whether alert cadre personnel had been advised concerning actions to be taken by their dependents in the event of the real attack. A reply was requested by 6:00 P.M., July 17. Our teletype, transmitted at 11:08 P.M., advised that FBI cadre personnel had been fully instructed concerning action for dependents in the event of an emergency. Problem completed.

Problem #12

OORO teletype received at 1:56 P.M. asked what trained medical services, equipment and supplies are available on or in the vicinity of the relocation site. A reply was requested by noon, July 16. Our teletype, transmitted at 11:01 P.M., advised that complete medical supplies and hospital facilities are available in the immediate

Memorandum for Mr. Mohr  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
Outside Problems

vicinity of our relocation site with professional services available, including doctors, medical specialists, technicians and nurses, with the relocation site itself further equipped and stocked with a First Aid Room.

Problem #13

OORO teletype received at 1:56 P.M. requested advice as to the number of individuals besides the officer in charge in the alert cadre, distinguished between clerical, communications and policy personnel. A reply was requested by noon, July 16. Our teletype, transmitted at 11:03 P.M., advised that the cadre at FBI relocation site totalled 46, including 21 communications employees, 11 administrative clerks and 14 policy officers. Problem completed.

Problem #14

OORO teletype received at 1:56 P.M. requested a report as to (1) what internal emergency action documents have been developed to implement presidential emergency action papers assigned to our agency; (2) whether secure storage facilities exist at our relocation site, and (3) whether copies of presidential emergency action papers have been pre-positioned. With respect to the latter question, the teletype pointed out that this message related to the finally approved presidential emergency action documents and not to exercise documents. A reply was requested by noon, July 16. Our teletype, transmitted at 10:49 P.M., pointed out that (1) responsibility for implementing presidential emergency action papers with respect to programs involving the FBI in an emergency rests with the Attorney General and that the FBI has detailed plans for compliance with instructions of the Attorney General at all levels of operation; (2) secure storage facilities are available at FBI relocation site, and (3) the one copy of presidential emergency action papers received to date by the FBI is included in "head of agency personal kit" at FBI headquarters in accordance with Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM) prior instructions. We added that FBI letter of June 16, 1958, to the director of ODCM requested one additional copy of each presidential emergency action paper for pre-positioning at our relocation site and that this additional set of these documents had not been received to date. Problem completed.

Memorandum for Mr. Mohr  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
Outside Problems

Problem #15

OORO teletype received at 1:58 P.M. requested to be advised as to whether the FBI censorship watch list had been furnished National Censorship. A reply was requested by noon, July 16. We transmitted a teletype to National Censorship at 8:43 P.M. advising it that 150 names would be the initial FBI contribution to the censorship watch list. Our teletype transmitted at 9:12 P.M. advised OORO that the National Censorship Agency had been advised as to the number on the censorship watch list. Problem completed.

Problem #16

At 3:51 P.M., we received a copy of a teletype from OORO addressed to Justice relocation site. It asked of Justice "Considering warning time and attack effects on FBI field offices, report capability to take enemy aliens and possible subversives into custody." A reply was requested by 6:00 P.M., July 17. Subsequently, we received a teletype from Justice referring to the above message and requesting that we reply direct to OORO with a copy to Justice answering the question raised by OORO. Our teletype of July 16 to Justice advised that, in view of the ~~top secret~~ nature of programs concerning which OORO had inquired, no reply was being made by the FBI direct to that agency. However, for the Department's consideration in connection with any reply it might desire to make, we advised that, due to the surprise nature and the severity of the attack on May 6, 1958, and the resultant heavy damage to centers of population throughout the country, the persons referred to by OORO suffered heavy casualties and dispersal. Many of those who were not casualties were taken into custody and continued efforts were being made to locate and apprehend others who might be at large. We pointed out that this situation stresses absolute necessity of instituting these emergency programs in advance of a possible attack in order for them to be fully effective. Problem completed.

Problems #17 and #18

New York teletype received at 1:44 P.M. and Boston radiogram received at 2:46 P.M. reported receipt of identical messages from Lester Brown, Operational Capability Task Group (OCTG), OORO, asking

Memorandum for Mr. Mohr  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
Outside Problems

certain questions about adequacy of relocation sites with regard to housing, food and equipment permanently stored at such sites. Brown's message was ignored by both offices and referred to the Bureau. Our teletype, transmitted at 9:30 P.M., to Boston and New York instructed Boston to advise Brown that facilities at the relocation sites are adequate for any number of employees up to 100% who would reach the sites under attack conditions and to further advise Brown that, with previous OCTG approval, all questions pertaining to FBI field divisions will be handled by the Bureau directly with OCTG and if he had any additional questions they should be channelled through that agency. Problems completed.

Problem #19

A teletype from the President of the United States received at 8:00 PM. requested to be advised as to whether our alert cadre included a communications "inspector general" with the proper message center training and if he has developed clear internal standards of priority for communications. Our teletype, transmitted at 12:00 midnight, advised that our cadre did include a communications and crypto security inspector general with appropriate message center training and that clear internal standards of priority for communications have been developed consistent in every respect with Interagency Communications System (ICS) standards. Problem completed.

JULY 16, 1958

Problem #20

Mrs. Gem Milde from the office of the security officer, ICS, called on the morning of July 16 requesting the identity of the FBI security officer familiar with the ICS "project." We returned Mrs. Milde's call at 11:55 A.M. advising that Section Chief Churchill Downing was the Bureau's security officer fully familiar with the ICS "project." The ICS "project" undoubtedly refers to the ICS communications network. Problem completed.

Memorandum for Mr. Mohr  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
Outside Problems

Problem #21

Problem #3 reflects receipt of a query from OORO as to what we would do should our fingerprint records in Washington be destroyed. In reply, we pointed out that such records would be regrouped from individual duplicate records maintained by law enforcement and state fingerprint bureaus throughout the country. OORO teletype received at 1:02 P.M. requested advice as to how long it would take to regroup individual duplicate fingerprint records under OPAL 58 conditions in view of the magnitude of the attack, widespread physical damage, loss of communications capability, fall-out damage, and preoccupation of state and local law enforcement officers. We replied by teletype, transmitted at 5:30 P.M., that by D plus 90 considerable progress in regrouping could be made and the speed of regrouping thereafter would depend on unknown factors relating to the ability of law enforcement agencies to maintain essential operations. We felt that by D plus 180 substantial regrouping could be completed. Progress thereafter would be dependent on manpower and funds available. Problem completed.

Problem #22

San Juan radiogram received at 4:30 P.M. reported receipt of an identical inquiry from Lester Brown, OCTG, as received by Boston and New York (refer to Problems #17 and #18). San Juan advised it was taking no action on the request from Brown, requesting the Bureau to handle. The problem is considered handled by instructions given Boston to pass on to Brown with regard to handling such questions through appropriate channels. Problem completed.

Problem #23

JULY 17, 1958

OORO teletype received at 9:35 A.M. inquired of our agency's policies and capabilities with respect to actions which the agency would take (1) concerning protection of the relocation site from panic-stricken civilians; (2) if the governor of the state in which our site is located requests our assistance in survival operations which will substantially delay our implementation of approved essential functions; (3) if state or local officials attempt, with a threat of force, to pre-empt our facilities, equipment and personnel; and (d) if the



Memorandum for Mr. Mohr  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
Outside Problems

governor of the state in which our site is located, acting under his martial law, issued orders to us contrary to our preattack assignment. A reply was requested by 6:00 P.M., July 17. Our teletype, transmitted at 11:33 A.M., advised that (1) the security of the Bureau's site is adequate due to location and, in the best interests of the country, admittance to the site would be denied to members of the local community under the situation stated; (2) extensive efforts required to meet obligations under presidential directives would preclude rendering assistance unless matters pertain to FBI responsibility; (3) situation assumed is not foreseeable due to FBI liaison with state governments and nature of FBI responsibilities. Part (d) of the inquiry was commented on by stating it was not applicable and OORO was referred to the answer in part (c). We gave the above replies which had been previously supplied to OORO in another questionnaire form, these replies having been previously approved. Problem completed.

Problem #24

A teletype from the President, received at 8:34 A.M., asked what has been done to clarify and simplify emergency duties of each person on the staff at the relocation site. A reply was requested by 6:00 P.M., July 17. Our teletype, transmitted at 2:12 P.M., advised that emergency duties of staff personnel at the site are streamlined and simplified consistent with required duties and responsibilities of the FBI. All members of the alert cadre are cognizant and thoroughly familiar with their duties. Problem completed.

Problem #25

A teletype from the President, received at 8:34 A.M., requested advice as to whether stand-by instructions on domestic information had been issued to this agency, to whom do we look for such instructions, or are we the judge of our own public information policy. A reply was requested by 6:00 P.M., July 17. Our teletype, transmitted at 2:09 P.M., advised that all installations of the FBI have stand-by instructions established through predetermined policy formulated by the Attorney General. All inquiries and releases are made by the Director of Public Information, Department of Justice, unless the exigency of the situation dictates on-the-spot action. Problem completed.

Memorandum for Mr. Mohr  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
Outside Problems

Problem #26

A teletype from the President, received at 9:04 A.M., requested a report by 6:00 P.M., July 17, as to our estimate of psychological impact on the relocation staff of the OPAL 1958 attack and separation of staff members from their families. In addition, a report was requested on what motivation or compulsion would we use to induce our personnel to undertake hazardous but essential duties in an emergency situation. Our reply, transmitted by teletype at 2:03 P.M., reported psychological impact of OPAL 1958 on relocation staff at an absolute minimum; separation of dependents has minimum effect because of staff assurance that sound planning to provide safety and security of dependents gives feeling of confidence for welfare. Firmly established personnel selection and continued indoctrination policies have developed high sense of patriotism and duty resulting in complete dedication to grave responsibilities at hand. No other motivation or compulsion deemed necessary. Problem completed.

Problem #27

Problem #11 reflected receipt of a teletype from OORO requesting advice as to whether alert cadre personnel had been advised concerning actions to be taken by their dependents in the event of a real attack. We replied to that question by stating that cadre personnel had been fully instructed concerning actions for dependents in the event of an emergency. OORO teletype, received at 10:08 A.M., requested specifics as to precise instructions or advice which dependents of alert cadre personnel have been given. We replied by teletype at 1:51 P.M., pointing out that such personnel had been furnished ~~confidential~~ telephone numbers and addresses of FBI Emergency Message Center enabling either direct communication with or relaying of messages to evacuee employees; that they had been furnished extensive lists of available housing accommodations near the relocation site and also furnished names and contact points for stand-by evacuees and other responsible employees, geographically distributed, who have been assigned responsibility for attending to needs of dependents; further, that dependents have been briefed thoroughly on applicable civil defense instructions, requested to be guided by them in evacuations, and instructed to use civil defense facilities where necessary for reuniting children and parents who might become separated. Problem completed.

Memorandum for Mr. Mohr  
Re: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
Outside Problems

Problem #28

Harold Ford of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) called and requested the name of the Bureau representative on the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) for exercise OPAL 1958. He was advised that Section Chief Ralph R. Roach is the FBI's representative on this Committee for this exercise. This was confirmed by teletype to CIA. Problem completed.

ATTACHMENT B  
PERSONNEL

ENCLOSURE

66-19012-155

QUANTICO

OPERATION ALERT 1958

PERSONNEL

Administrative Division

John P. Mohr - Assistant Director  
H. Lynn Edwards - Inspector  
Leo J. Gauthier - Inspector  
Charles Q. Smith - Special Agent  
✓ Alfred M. Newman - Supply Officer  
✓ Marguerite A. Hansen - Secretary  
✓ Dorothy M. Weber - Secretary  
  
✓ Clyde Carey - Chauffeur  
✓ Thomas Moten - Chauffeur

Records and Communications Division

Records Branch

✓ O. George Medler - Special Agent  
✓ V. Fay Richardson  
✓ R. Starit Murphy  
✓ John R. Schemmel  
✓ Kenneth Elkins

Communications Section

✓ Louis E. Wherry, Jr. - Section Chief  
✓ Alvin C. Frank - Assistant Section Chief

Switchboard Unit

✓ Bessie C. Sadler - Supervisor  
✓ Callie Lee McCoy  
✓ Catherine M. Levecque  
✓ Charles R. Hewitt

Teletype Unit

✓ Nancy A. Mooney - Supervisor  
✓ Clyde E. Strickland  
✓ Jean Hope Marshall  
✓ Donna L. Ingwersen  
✓ Deanna J. Murray

Code Room

✓ Mary A. Powell - Supervisor  
✓ Caroline C. Atkins  
✓ Yvonne Hillman  
✓ Harold W. Lawson  
✓ H. Joann Thomas  
✓ Casey W. Arnette  
✓ Jane F. Rokisky  
✓ Marilyn J. Cast  
\* ✓ Loretta E. Tobin  
\* ✓ Barbara A. Campbell  
\*\* ✓ Rodney L. Leffler  
\*\* ✓ Chauncey D. Seefeldt

Domestic Intelligence Division

Ralph R. Roach - Section Chief  
John T. Minnich - Special Agent  
Theron D. Rushing - Special Agent  
Bernard L. Huelkamp - Special Agent  
✓ Martha A. Dale - Secretary  
✓ Peggy J. Micer - Secretary

Liaison Agents at Sites of Other Agencies

Jerome J. Daunt - Justice Department  
Joseph M. Fitzgerald - Atomic Energy Commission  
Wesley T. Whaley - Office of Defense and Civilian  
Mobilization

\* On loan from Records Branch  
\*\* On loan from Laboratory Division

Liaison Employee Other Than Those Participating At Quantico

A Joy A. Eastham - Clerk

Mrs. Eastham, in addition to her duties in the Special Memorandum Unit of the Liaison Section, voluntarily performed numerous assignments in connection with the planning phase of Operation Alert 1958, during the weeks preceding the commencement of Phase II of the Operation. She performed her assignments with efficiency and on her own initiative solved many of the involved clerical-type duties associated with the preparation of the Operation.

Laboratory Division

Donald J. Parsons - Assistant Director  
X Mary E. Keough - Secretary

Cryptanalysis-Translation Section

Churchill F. Downing - Chief

As indicated above (page 2) Rodney L. Leffler and Chauncey D. Seefeldt, Cryptanalyst and Cryptanalyst's Aide, respectively, were assigned to the Code Room to assist in handling the large volume of traffic during the Alert.

Electronics Section

Richard L. Millen - Chief  
Gordon L. Davy - Special Agent  
John M. Matter - Special Agent

Laboratory Division Employees Other Than Those Participating At Quantico

John F. Gallagher - Special Agent  
William R. Heilman - Special Agent

SAs Gallagher and Heilman contributed materially to the success of the Alert through their analysis of the blast effects of the approximately 300 simulated nuclear bombs dropped on the United States and its territories during the Attack Phase. They assessed damage, calculated radioactive fallout and reduced the information to a summary chart which was distributed to the field to be used as the basis for our

operations. The excellent job they did contributed materially to the success of the Operation.

FBI Academy

Henry L. Sloan - Special Agent in Charge  
Harold K. Light - Assistant Special Agent in Charge

Dan A. Brant - Special Agent  
John A. Chase - Special Agent  
John R. Harrison - Special Agent  
Bruce C. Hodge - Special Agent  
Glenn Eugene Ing - Special Agent  
Ronald L. Maley - Special Agent  
Charles J. Shepherd - Special Agent  
James H. Thompson - Special Agent  
Hillard D. Thorpe - Special Agent  
George A. Zeiss III - Special Agent  
Hayes Beckwith, Jr. - Maintenance Employee  
Luther C. Blake - Clerk  
C. H. Bridgewater, Jr. - Clerk Stenographer  
William G. Harrell - Maintenance Employee  
John A. Hawn, Jr. - Radio Technician  
Charles P. Jones, Jr. - Maintenance Employee  
William F. Kyle - Maintenance Employee  
Wallace H. Mann, Jr. - Chief Clerk  
Barney C. Olson - Clerk  
Kenneth Shaffer - Clerk  
John F. Snellings - Maintenance Employee  
J. Leroy Sullivan - Maintenance Employee  
Joseph P. Varnick - Gunsmith

Employees of the Cleaves Food Service Corporation are covered by a separate memorandum.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 22, 1958

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT - 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Phase III of Operation Alert - 1958, known as the "evaluation phase," will take place on September 17, 18, and 19 at the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM) relocation site at Highpoint. This is the final phase of the exercise and on the final day, September 19, there will be a Presidential briefing.

On 8-22-58 Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section conferred with Mr. John Grady, ODCM. Mr. Grady advised that the plans for Phase III are taking shape in that the seminar group chairmen had been selected and they are now in the process of selecting the groups to work with them. At the present time there is no indication that the Bureau will be asked to participate in any of the seminar groups. The Director was asked to be chairman of the Domestic Security seminar group, which was declined. Mr. Grady advised that even though the President may be out of Washington on vacation on September 19, he believes that the President's interest in the subject matter will bring him back for the briefing and that a Cabinet meeting will be called at the same time to be held at Highpoint. This Cabinet meeting will be enlarged to include the heads of all Government agencies, including the FBI. The invitations will be forthcoming from the Cabinet secretary.

ACTION:

Liaison will follow with the Cabinet secretary at the White House concerning developments regarding this matter. Necessary material will be prepared for Director's use if an invitation received.

OHB:119

1 - Belmont  
 Liaison Section  
 Minnich  
 Bartlett

(5)

REC-6

66-19012-156

AUG 27 1958

EX-135

55 SEP 2 1958

LIAISON

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT - 1958

DATE: August 28, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_

Belmont \_\_\_\_\_

Mohr \_\_\_\_\_

Nease \_\_\_\_\_

Parsons \_\_\_\_\_

Rosen \_\_\_\_\_

Tamm \_\_\_\_\_

Trotter \_\_\_\_\_

W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_

Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_

Holloman \_\_\_\_\_

Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated August 22, 1958, in the above-captioned matter. Reference memorandum dealt with Phase III of Operation Alert 1958 known as the "Evaluation Phase," which is scheduled to take place on September 17, 18 and 19, 1958. The final day is set aside for a Presidential briefing.

On August 27, 1958, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section conferred with Mr. Robert Gray, Cabinet Secretary, at the White House. Mr. Gray was asked if the vacation plans of the President will alter the Presidential briefing scheduled for September 19, 1958, at HIGHPOINT, the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM) relocation site. Mr. Gray said that this briefing would be postponed due to the fact that the President will be away from Washington at that time. You will recall that this briefing was to be in the form of an enlarged Cabinet meeting and that the heads of all Government agencies are to be invited. This would include an invitation from the White House to the Director.

On August 28, 1958, Mr. Bartlett got in touch with the office of Mr. John Grady at ODCM. Mr. Grady is out of town; however, his secretary said that they have received no change of dates as the result of the President's being out of Washington.

ACTION:

For information. Liaison will follow this matter and you will be advised.

OHB:pwj (5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett

EX-135

57 SEP 9<sup>59</sup> 1958

REC-10 66-19012-157

8/28

23 SEP 2 1958

LIAISON

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: September 5, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

|            |  |
|------------|--|
| Tolson     |  |
| Boardman   |  |
| Belmont    |  |
| Mohr       |  |
| Nease      |  |
| Parsons    |  |
| Rosen      |  |
| Tamm       |  |
| Trotter    |  |
| Clayton    |  |
| Tele. Room |  |
| Holloman   |  |
| Gandy      |  |

Reference is made to my memoranda to you dated August 22 and 28, 1958, in the above-captioned matter. These memoranda dealt with Phase III of Operation Alert 1958, known as the Evaluation Phase which has been scheduled to take place on September 17, 18, 19, 1958. The final day was set aside for a Presidential briefing.

On September 4, 1958, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section discussed plans for the Evaluation Phase with Mr. John Grady, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Mr. Grady advised that the plans are going ahead for this phase on the scheduled dates of September 17-19, 1958. He advised that with the President out of Washington on his vacation, there is a possibility that the entire 3-day session may be pushed back to a later date so that the President can participate in the enlarged Cabinet meeting which would meet with him on the final day of the session. Mr. Grady said that the agencies will be advised as soon as a firm commitment is made by the White House.

Mr. Bartlett then checked with Mrs. Helen Colle, secretary to Mr. Thomas E. Stephens, Presidential Appointment Secretary. Mrs. Colle advised that the President does not plan to return to the Washington area from Newport on September 19, 1958, the day scheduled for the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) Presidential briefing. Mr. Bartlett also checked with the office of Mr. Robert Gray, Cabinet Secretary, to ascertain if that office had further information concerning this subject. Mr. Bartlett was advised that Mr. Gray is in Europe for three and a half weeks and that there is no Cabinet meeting scheduled for the month of September.

Concerning the two-day seminar sessions to be held on September 17 and 18, Mr. Grady advised that he knows of no plans for FBI participation. He stated that the heads of Government agencies would be invited to participate in the Presidential briefing. The proposed place for this briefing is the Office of Defense site at "Raven Rock" rather than HIGHPOINT, the OCDM relocation site.

This matter will be followed by Liaison with both OCDM and the White House inasmuch as it is expected that an invitation will be forthcoming for the Director to attend the enlarged Cabinet meeting.

OHB:bjt  
(5)

- 57 SEP 11 1958  
EX-102
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
  - 1 - Mr. Minnich
  - 1 - Mr. Bartlett
  - 1 - Liaison Section

REC-54

66-19012-158  
23 SEP 8 1958

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont  
RE: OPERATION ALERT 1958

whenever it is held. The necessary briefing material will be prepared for the Director if this proposed invitation develops into a firm commitment.

ACTION:

For information. Liaison will follow.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: September 10, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. B. Roach *Rs*SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S BRIEFING OF CABINET  
REGARDING COMMUNISM AND ESPIONAGEO OPERATION ALERT 1958

MINNICH

|            |   |
|------------|---|
| Tolson     | ✓ |
| Boardman   | ✓ |
| Belmont    | ✓ |
| Mohr       | ✓ |
| Nease      | ✓ |
| Parsons    | ✓ |
| Rosen      | ✓ |
| Tamm       | ✓ |
| Trotter    | ✓ |
| Clayton    | ✓ |
| Tele. Room | ✓ |
| Holloman   | ✓ |
| Gandy      | ✓ |

W. C. Sullivan

On September 9, 1958, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section called on Mr. Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Cabinet at the White House. (Mr. Robert Gray, Cabinet Secretary, is in Europe.) Mr. Bartlett asked Mr. Patterson if any plans had been finalized for the proposed meeting in October of the Cabinet at which time the Director will brief the Cabinet regarding communism and espionage. Mr. Patterson advised that the agenda for the October Cabinet meetings have not been finalized; however, he believes that the Director's briefing will be set up for the October 17 meeting. This meeting will be held at the White House. Mr. Patterson advised that the Bureau will be notified as soon as a firm agenda is set for the particular Cabinet meeting when the Director is to appear.

Mr. Bartlett then asked Mr. Patterson what decision has been made concerning the Presidential briefing which was scheduled for September 19, the final day of a three-day session on the "Evaluation Phase" of Operation Alert 1958. Mr. Patterson advised that he understands that the first two days of the "Evaluation Phase," September 17 and 18, will be held according to schedule and that the final day, September 19, will be postponed until after the President returns to Washington from his vacation. According to Mr. Patterson, this Operation Alert briefing will probably take place at the October 10 Cabinet meeting. He further added that it has not been decided if this will be a regular Cabinet session or an enlarged Cabinet session which would include the heads of the Government agencies. The latter would result in an invitation to the Director to attend this October 10 meeting, whereas the former would not. Again Mr. Patterson said that the agencies would be notified as soon as possible if an enlarged meeting is to take place and at that time the specific date would be set.

ACTION:

NOT RECORDED

148 SEP 15 1958

For information. Liaison will continue to follow these matters.

ONB:bjt  
(7) SEP 17 1958

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Holloman
- 1 - Mr. Minnich - detached & sent to [unclear]
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett

*I don't think we should continue to make specific inquiries about these meetings*

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: 9/16/58

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958  
PHASE III - EVALUATION PHASE  
9/17-18/58

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Memo Roach to Belmont 9/5/58 pointed out concerning the two-day Seminar sessions to be held at HIGHPOINT, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) relocation site on 9/17-18/58, that there were no plans for FBI participation.

Memo Roach to Belmont 9/15/58 pointed out the Cabinet meeting had definitely been postponed from 9/19/58 to 10/10/58.

On 9/16/58 James Cannavan, Defense Plans Coordinator, Department of Justice, telephonically advised Supervisor Minnich, Defense Plans Desk, that the Department has not issued an invitation nor does it intend to issue an invitation to the Bureau to participate in the Seminar on Domestic Security to be held during the Evaluation Phase. Cannavan advised as a matter of fact, present indications are that Deputy Attorney General Walsh will not chairman this Seminar due to the pressure of other business. The Seminar will probably be chairmanned by J. W. Yeagley, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division. Cannavan also advised, in connection with other Seminars being held during this phase, that if invitations to participate in the Seminars have not been received as of this date, none should be forthcoming.

OBSERVATIONS:

The foregoing definitely indicates that Bureau participation will not be required in the Evaluation Phase, 9/17-18/58; however, there is a very good likelihood that the Director will be invited to attend the Cabinet meeting on October 10, 1958, at which time results of the Evaluation Phase will be presented to the President, Cabinet and heads of agencies.

ACTION:

None. For information.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Holloman
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

EX-102  
66-19012-159  
SEP 18 1958

55 SEP 22 1958 (6)

Mr. L. V. Boardman

July 7, 1958

A. H. Belmont

**DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION  
ALERT 1958 (OPAL' 58)**

**FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, JULY 14-18, 1958  
(ACTIVITIES AT RELOCATION SITE)**

In order for the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) to fulfill its coordinating responsibility during Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL' 58), keep the Director advised of all developments during the course of the exercise, facilitate the preparation of required reports, and to insure that sufficient information will always be readily available to prepare any necessary briefs for the Director's use during the course of the exercise, it is desirable that all incoming messages be routed through the DID. All messages initially received in the DID will be logged and followed closely where any action is involved.

During the time that the Director is at the relocation site, the original of all pertinent communications will be furnished to him immediately upon receipt, in which event a copy of the message should be routed through DID for immediate information and each such message will be logged and thereafter routed to the appropriate division responsible for handling.

Incoming and outgoing radiograms, teletypes, and telephone calls originated by, received by, or initiated by participating personnel at the relocation site will generally require written messages or memoranda. A copy of all such messages or memoranda should be designated for DID so that we may be fully apprised of the status of any problems involved. Also, all outgoing messages to field offices or other Government agencies should be routed through DID prior to dispatching to the Communications Section for transmittal. Similarly, DID should be kept currently advised of all special problems which in any way pertain to or would have an effect upon our successful participation in the exercise.

Each division and administrative office participating in the exercise will be responsible for procedures or responsibilities resulting therefrom for which it would normally be responsible in a Seat of Government operation.

JTM:pmf (44)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

1 - Mr. Boardman  
6 - Mr. Belmont  
10 - Mr. Nease

2 - Mr. Tamm  
6 - Mr. Mohr  
6 - Mr. Parsons

2 - Mr. Holloman  
1 - Mr. Roach  
6 - Mr. Minnich

59  
23 1958

MAIL ROOM ☐

66 19012

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman  
Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION  
ALERT 1958 (OPAL' 58)  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, JULY 14-19, 1958  
(ACTIVITIES AT RELOCATION SITE)

Participating personnel scheduled to go to the relocation site on 7-16-58 should report to work that morning prepared to spend 7-16, 17, and until 5:00 p.m., DST, 7-18-58 at the relocation site. All meals at the site will be served in the dining room beginning with lunch on 7-16-58. Ample towels, soap, and bedding are available at the site. Laundry and dry cleaning service, if needed, will be available. All participants should take with them sufficient clothes or other personal necessities to see them through the period of the exercise. Normal business attire will not be required of clerical employees and female employees may wear such informal attire as anklets and loafers instead of high-heeled shoes etc. Shorts will not be permitted. Each division head has the responsibility for impressing upon all participating personnel the seriousness of the exercise, pointing out that frivolity will not be permitted. All Special Agent personnel will be scheduled to work twelve-hour shifts and clerical personnel, insofar as possible, will be scheduled on an eight-hour shift basis. Those employees reporting to the site on the morning of July 18 who are scheduled to work a night shift will be permitted to spend the period from the time of reporting to the Academy until time to report to work resting in their assigned bedrooms or recreation room. Division heads will have the responsibility of furnishing a sign-in register for their participating employees and each employee will be required to sign the divisional register daily. The division head will be responsible for seeing that the time and attendance clerk for each division at the Seat of Government is kept advised as required. Additionally, on arrival at the site each employee will sign in on an appropriate register and at departure will sign out on the same register.

In the event it becomes necessary for the family or dependents of an employee to contact the employee while at the site, such contact is to be made through the acting division head at the Seat of Government who will in turn contact the employee at the site and arrange for the employee to contact his or her family. Under no circumstances should the members of the employee's family visit the site during the exercise nor should the employee's family be advised of the identity or location of the site, which information is classified "~~Secret~~." There is, of course, no objection to employees informing their adult dependents they are participating in OPAL' 58 at the Bureau's relocation site.



Memorandum Belmont to Boardman  
Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION  
ALERT 1958 (OPAL' 58)  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, JULY 14-18, 1958  
(ACTIVITIES AT RELOCATION SITE)

Each division head will be responsible for insuring that operations for which he is responsible during the test period are adequately covered at all times. In keeping therewith, meals will be served over a two-hour period including the midnight shift. Employees will be permitted to claim \$5.60 per diem daily. Sleeping accommodations will be available for all individuals participating and specific room assignments have been made. Each employee should be thoroughly familiar with his or her duties at the site keeping in mind that this is a test of the FBI's readiness to carry out our essential functions under emergency conditions and that in the event of a real emergency the FBI has tremendous responsibilities for the internal security of the country.

Each division head participating in the exercise has been furnished with a copy of the over-all brief setting forth all basic information necessary for the successful participation of the respective division in the operation. Each division head should see that all participating personnel are appropriately briefed in accordance with the information contained therein.

Since OPAL' 58 is a resource-survival type exercise and the Federal Action Phase in which the FBI is participating is the second Phase considered to be occurring fourteen days after the Attack Phase, curb and shelter drills for nonparticipating personnel are not scheduled and should not take place. Therefore, employees not going to the Bureau's relocation site are not affected by the exercise and should pursue their normal duties during the week July 14-18, 1958.

ACTION:

1. Each official receiving a copy of this memorandum should appropriately advise the personnel under his supervision relative to their participation in OPAL' 58.
2. All incoming communications should be routed through DID immediately upon receipt and all outgoing communications, prior to their dispatch, should be cleared through DID offices at the site.

*Jim* *am* *LH*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ah*

DATE: September 23, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *Rs*SUBJECT: *DEFENSE PLANS* ~~OPERATIONAL~~  
CAPABILITY OF FEDERAL, STATE  
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT -  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

*BUPLANS*

On September 22, 1958, Liaison Section received via mail from Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) one copy, numbered 141, of a document captioned "Operational Capability of Federal, State and Local Government - OPAL 1958." This document contains the findings and recommendations relative to the readiness capability of the Government on May 6 (after a simulated mock nuclear attack) as arrived at by an operational capability task group. The basic document consists of fifteen pages of findings and recommendations and attached thereto are annexes as follows: Annex Number 1, consisting of two pages listing the membership of the task group; Annex Number 2, consisting of seventeen pages pertaining to operational capability of the Federal Government, headquarters, regional and field offices; Annex Number 3, consisting of fifteen pages regarding operational capability of State and Local Government at D+14; Annex Number 4, consists of one page re present Government's communications system of several agencies listed by ownership of operating facilities; Annex Number 5, consisting of eight pages re operational capability of OPAL emergency agencies; Annex Number 6, consisting of three pages re military assistance to civil authorities.

The findings and recommendations of the task group are detailed and require great study and analysis as to their possible effect, if adopted, upon our defense planning.

A review of the basic document and annexes denotes on page 1 of Annex Number 2 re headquarters relocation sites, it is stated that headquarters of the Air Force, Treasury and Justice were denied operational capability until D+30 (thirty days after the mock attack). Interestingly, on page 3 of this annex is the statement with regard to field office relocation sites that Justice, covering FBI and United States Attorneys

JTM:pwj (1)

EX-135

REC-9666-19012-162

SEP 26 1958

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Nease (attention Mr. Wherry)
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (attention Mr. Gauthier)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (attention Mr. Millen and Mr. Gallagher)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

55 OCT 1 1958

Memorandum Roach to Mr. Belmont  
Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATIONAL  
CAPABILITY OF FEDERAL, STATE  
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT -  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

had a capability of 71.4% at D+14, 78.5% at D+30 and 92.8% by D+90. It is noted that field relocation sites of the Treasury Department in comparison showed operational capabilities of 30.5% at D+14, 41.6% at D+30 and 47.2% by D+90. In fact the capability of Justice including our field relocation sites, percentage wise, is higher than the other agencies shown.

OBSERVATIONS:

Since the findings and recommendations of the task group cover a wide field including communications facilities, sites, monitoring equipment and personnel, headquarters services, command authorities, trained personnel, organizational arrangements, etc., the document is being retained by the Defense Plans Desk for study analysis and preparation of individual memoranda by subject matter pertaining to the contents of the document.

ACTION:

Defense Plans Desk will study and analyze the document in accordance with the foregoing observations.

*Jmr*  
*gpd* *g*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: September 30, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
PRESENTATION OF EVALUATION OF NATIONAL READINESS  
TO THE PRESIDENT, CABINET AND HEADS OF AGENCIES  
 10-10-58

Tolson ☒  
 Boardman ☒  
 Belmont ☒  
 Mohr ☒  
 Nease ☒  
 Parsons ☒  
 Rosen ☒  
 Tamm ☒  
 Trotter ☒  
 Clayton ☒  
 Tele. Room ☒  
 Holloman ☒  
 Gandy ☒

W. C. Sullivan

Pursuant to a request from Mr. Tolson, page eleven of the Director's brief concerning captioned meeting has been redrafted.

The attached page eleven now includes the estimated out-of-pocket cost for Operation Alert 1957 which totaled \$4,588.25. This figure does not include the salaries of participating personnel.

ACTION:

That attached original of page eleven be inserted in the Director's brief and that the copies be revised accordingly.

## Enclosure

BLH:pwf (9)

- 1 - Mr. Holloman (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Minnich (with enclosure)
- 1 - Liaison Section (with enclosure)
- 1 - Yellow (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Huelskamp

WILL BE DONE  
 AFTER DIRECTOR SEE.

ENCLOSURE

Det + filed in serial 166  
 Cons 10/14/58 T.K.

REC-14

EX-132

66-19012-163  
 OCT 1 195861 OCT 3<sup>59</sup> 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *Arthur*

DATE: October 7, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *R*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS-EVALUATION REPORT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958  
(DOMESTIC SECURITY SEMINAR REPORT)

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

On 10-7-58, Buplans Desk, Liaison Section, received in the mail from the Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, a ten-page copy of a report which was probably prepared by J. Walter Yeagley, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, on the results of the Domestic Security Seminar held on September 17-18, 1958. This report was received via routing slip and it does not request any action by us.

A review of the report which is being retained by the Buplans Desk denotes it is word for word, practically identical with the Domestic Security Seminar report contained in the document, "Report of Round Table Discussion and Seminar Groups Reports" which was received from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) on 10-3-58. The contents of this document were noted in a memorandum Roach to Belmont dated 10-6-58. As was pointed out in this memorandum, no action is required by us concerning the reports contained in the document until such time as OCDM adopts the findings and recommendations and issues them in directive form.

ACTION:

None. Informative.

*sal*  
JTM:sal (4)  
1-Mr. Belmont  
1-Liaison Section  
1-Mr. Minnich

EX-128

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U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

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OCT 10 1958

REC-10

OCT 8 1958

61 OCT 10 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *Abm 10-8-58*

DATE: October 7, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *R*

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
 PRESENTATION OF EVALUATION OF NATIONAL  
 READINESS TO THE PRESIDENT, CABINET  
 AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES  
 OCTOBER 9, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
 W. C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_

At 4:15 p.m., 10-7-58, J. Walter Yeagley, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division of the Department, telephonically contacted Supervisor Minnich, Defense Plans Desk, Liaison Section, and advised that the Attorney General is on the West Coast in connection with a speaking commitment and he will not attend the enlarged Cabinet meeting at 9:00 a.m., 10-9-58. Yeagley advised Deputy Attorney General Walsh will attend in the Attorney General's place and Yeagley wanted to know if the Bureau had any thing for Walsh in connection with the Evaluation Phase of Operation Alert 1958. Yeagley was advised that we had nothing.

ACTION:

None, informative.

JTM:pwf (4)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

53 OCT 14 1958

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 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
 FBI  
 DIVISION OF INVESTIGATION

EX 105

REC-86

OCT 9 1958

66-19012-165

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *wh*

DATE: September 26, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *RR*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
PRESENTATION OF EVALUATION OF NATIONAL READINESS  
TO THE PRESIDENT, CABINET AND HEADS OF AGENCIES  
10-10-58

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

Material pertaining to the phases of Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL'58) has been prepared for the Director's possible need in the event questions are raised or he is asked for his comments while in attendance at the enlarged Cabinet meeting on October 10, 1958, regarding the above captioned matter.

The enlarged Cabinet meeting on 10-10-58 in connection with an evaluation of national readiness will primarily be an Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) affair, and it will probably primarily consist of Governor Leo A. Hoegh, Director, OCDM, and the chairman of each of seven seminar groups reporting to the President, Cabinet, and heads of Agencies as the audience. We have no indication that the views of the Director will be sought or that he will be asked for his comments concerning OPAL'58. It should be noted that a time and place for this meeting has not as yet been determined, but as soon as it is made known, same will be furnished to the Director.

The material prepared pertains primarily to the attack phase and the Federal action phase of OPAL'58 and our participation therein.

It should be noted that to date a definite invitation has not been extended to the Director requesting his presence at the meeting; however, the Director has attended meetings of this nature in past years, and any indication that an invitation will or will not be extended, will be immediately brought to the Director's attention.

ACTION:

That the original of the attached material be available for the Director for his possible use in connection with attendance at the enlarged Cabinet Meeting.

Enclosure

JTM:sal(8)

1-Mr. Holloman (with enclosure)  
1-Mr. Belmont (with enclosure)  
1-Mr. Mohr (with enclosure)  
1-Mr. Parsons (with enclosure)  
1-Mr. Tamm (with enclosure)

1-Liaison Section (with enclosure)  
1-Yellow (with enclosure)

61 OCT 17 1958

LIAISON

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: October 6, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958 PRESENTATION  
OF EVALUATION OF NATIONAL READINESS TO THE  
PRESIDENT, CABINET AND HEADS OF AGENCIES  
OCTOBER 10, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
W. C. Sullivan

On September 29, 1958, the Liaison Section received by mail Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) document which contains information regarding the program of the enlarged Cabinet meeting on October 10, 1958. According to the document, at the meeting Governor Leo A. Hoegh, Director, OCDM, will make a preliminary statement citing observations, conclusions and recommendations from all or several of the seven seminar group reports. Also, reference will be made to the problem of making provisions for the families of relocated personnel. This is frequently referred to as the "family care" program. Our planning does contain "family care" provisions which provide key evacuees at the Seat of Government and in the field with a relocation site telephone number to be used by adult dependents for relay of messages and reuniting of families. Also, mature, male employees are designated to render all possible assistance to families of relocated personnel.

In addition to the foregoing, on October 3, 1958, Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division of the Department, advised Supervisor Minnich that at a meeting in Governor Hoegh's office on October 1, 1958, it was decided that neither Deputy Attorney General Walsh nor Yeagley would report on the findings and recommendations of the Domestic Security Seminar. Nor would Kenneth Downs, Assistant Director, OCDM, report on the findings and recommendations of the seminar on Information. According to Yeagley, Lewis E. Berry, Assistant Director, OCDM, and Chairman of the Seminar on Operational Readiness, will give an approximate 12-minute report on the findings and recommendations of the Operational Readiness Seminar. Berry has also been given the assignment of including in his report pertinent information from the reports on the Domestic Security Seminar and the Information Seminar. Yeagley said he furnished Berry a 3-page report of the Domestic Security Seminar results and Berry is to use any portion he desires. However, Yeagley anticipates Berry will not spend more than two or three minutes on the Domestic Security findings and recommendations. Yeagley made a copy of the report which he furnished to Berry available and it points out two fields were considered: (1) physical security and (2) law and order.

61 OCT 16 1958

REC-95

66-19012-16

Enclosure

JTM:bjt (9)

EX-128

- 1 - Mr. Holloman (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Huelskamp
- 1 - Yellow (with enclosure)

10 OCT 14 1958 Section (with enclosure)  
1 - Mr. Minnich (with enclosure)



Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958 PRESENTATION  
OF EVALUATION OF NATIONAL READINESS TO THE  
PRESIDENT, CABINET AND HEADS OF AGENCIES  
OCTOBER 10, 1958

The report relates the physical security of the majority of vital Government facilities was found to be adequate for purposes of Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL '58); however, OPAL '58 offered no realistic test of the adequacy of the measures planned. Also, the need for a means of protecting certain vital facilities from sabotage should be explored and, if appropriate, plans developed to provide such protection. The report concluded it would be impossible in an actual emergency to provide a sufficient number of guards to protect every vital facility. Regarding law and order, the report states OPAL '58 did not provide an appropriate medium for testing the ability at local level to maintain law and order under an actual attack. Further, this problem is one that should initially be worked out at state and local level with emphasis on law enforcement as primarily a local responsibility with Federal assumption of authority exercised only as a last resort. The report points out continuity of the courts is a most important factor and, according to the Department of Defense, full consideration of the problem of maintaining law and order will be had as a result of a pending joint study by OCDM and the Department of Defense. The report makes 5 recommendations which are summarized and set forth on pages 1b and 1c, attached hereto, which are for inclusion in the material previously prepared for the Director's use and information. The report does not mention the FBI and it does not relate to matters within FBI responsibilities.

*\*see encl. behind file  
200-167-1000-1000 11/19/58*  
Regarding reports to be given by other seminar group chairmen at the enlarged Cabinet meeting on October 10, 1958, a 41-page document, classified ~~secret~~, entitled "Report of Round Table Discussion and Seminar Group Reports" was received from OCDM on October 3, 1958. The document contains either a summary or the complete report, plus recommendations, of each of the seven seminar groups and significant portions of these reports will be utilized by the chairmen reporting at the Cabinet meeting. The information in this document touches upon practically the entire field of defense planning such as damage assessment, relocation sites, prepositioning of documents, communications, operational capabilities of state and local government, resources, financial and economic stabilization, information, alert exercise recommendations for 1959, 1960 and 1961, and domestic security as referred to above. The document does not mention the FBI or FBI responsibilities. As the document stands, it has no effect upon the FBI until OCDM adopts the findings and recommendations and issues them in directive form. All OCDM directives are studied and applicable provisions are incorporated into FBI defense planning. This document does not, in any way, denote what portions of any particular report will be mentioned at the Cabinet meeting.

Pages 1, 1a, 1b, 1c and 2 of the brief prepared for the Director concerning the captioned meeting now encompass the foregoing information. The table of contents has been revised accordingly.

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont

RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958 PRESENTATION  
OF EVALUATION OF NATIONAL READINESS TO THE  
PRESIDENT, CABINET AND HEADS OF AGENCIES  
OCTOBER 10, 1958

ACTION:

That attached original pages 1, 1a, 1b, 1c and 2 and the  
Table of Contents be inserted in the Director's brief and copies  
be revised accordingly.

*Jim*  
*John*  
*V.*  
*Q*  
*Do as*  
*H. Done*  
WILL Be done  
AFTER Director  
Sees - *Jim*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *W.B.*DATE: October 8, 1958 *W.B.*FROM : R. R. Roach *R.R.*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
PRESENTATION OF EVALUATION OF NATIONAL  
READINESS TO THE PRESIDENT, CABINET  
AND HEADS OF AGENCIES - OCTOBER 9, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

W. C. Sullivan

On October 8, 1958, the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General forwarded a three-page Cabinet paper dated October 6, 1958, regarding recommendations growing out of Operation Alert 1958. The document is for the Director's information in connection with the Cabinet meeting tomorrow morning, October 9, 1958.

The first page of the document points out the recommendations selected for Cabinet consideration were previously distributed by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) to all participating agencies.

Page 2 of the document sets forth eight recommendations which will be offered for the concurrence of the Cabinet. These recommendations have been studied and they are parallel to the recommendations contained in a 41-page document entitled "Report of Round Table Discussion and Seminar Group Reports," previously received. Recommendations touch upon the entire field of defense planning and as they now stand have no effect upon the FBI until adopted and issued by OCDM in directive form. This information is set out on page 1c of the material prepared for the Director's use.

Page 3 sets forth ten items which are to be noted by the President and Cabinet as actions to be taken by appropriate agencies and by OCDM. Again, these actions touch upon practically all phases of defense planning and as they now stand have no pertinency to the FBI until issued in directive form. One action, "J," pertaining to physical protection against sabotage of key Government facilities and of vital non-Government facilities, is a finding abstracted from a report by the seminar group on domestic security. This report is set forth in detail on pages 1a, 1b, and 1c of the material prepared for the Director's use.

Inasmuch as the material prepared for the Director's use, as it now stands, covers the items mentioned in the document forwarded by the Department, the material is not being amended.

## ACTION:

None. For information. *W.B.*

1 - Mr. Holloman  
1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. Mohr  
1 - Mr. Parsons

1 - Liaison Section  
1 - Mr. Minnich  
1 - yellow

JTM:nck (8)

REC-66

\* prepared by Yeagley for Dep. A.G. *W.B.*

66-19012-168

OCT 15 1958

LIAISON

Tolson  
Mr. Belmont  
10/10/58  
96H/elm

October 10, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON  
MR. BELMONT

Yesterday I attended the enlarged meeting of the Cabinet which was for the purpose of a briefing with recommendations growing out of Operation Alert, 1958. Governor Leo Hoegh, Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), opened the meeting with a brief statement and following him, individual briefings were given by Dr. Raymond Saulnier, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors on the subject of Financial and Economic Stabilization; Mr. J. R. Price, Assistant Director, OCDM, on the subject of Resources and Requirements; Mr. Lewis E. Berry, Assistant Director, OCDM, on Operational Readiness and Domestic Security; Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, on the subject of Organization and Assignments; and Lieutenant General C. R. Huebner (Retired), Civil Defense Director, New York State, on Training.

Following the briefing, the President asked some general questions and then called upon members of the Cabinet as to whether they had any questions. There were a number of questions propounded by the members of the Cabinet, but only one affected the FBI and that was the one raised by the Postmaster General. It seems that during the briefing there was reference to developing a centralized communications service which would not only be used during the alerts but which possibly could be utilized during peacetime. It had been pointed out that one of the major problems was the matter of communications and a number of agencies had excellent and satisfactory communications which might be absorbed into a central service. The Postmaster General stated he was concerned about this particular comment because the Post Office Department has a large and very effective communications service and he also knew the FBI did and that certainly so far as the Post Office Department was concerned, he would not want the messages that are now going out over their communications service to be sent over any central operation in view of the character of some of the information being sent out by that Department and he assumed the same applied to the FBI. I concurred in his observation.

JEH:EDM (6)

Tolson  
Belmont  
Mohr  
Nease  
Parsons  
Rosen  
Tamm  
Trotter  
W.C. Sullivan  
Tele. Room  
Holloman

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|-----------|-------------|
| SENT FROM | D. O.       |
| TIME      | 3:55 PM     |
| DATE      | OCT 10 1958 |

TO OCT 15 1958

Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, Mr. Belmont

October 10, 1958

The recommendations which appear in Cabinet Paper 58-87, page two, were generally discussed, and the results seemed to be somewhat hazy as to exactly what was to be done other than that some of these matters were to be implemented and some were to be given further study.

Very truly yours,

/s/ JEH

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1241712-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 46

Page 34 ~ b3;  
Page 35 ~ b3;  
Page 36 ~ b3;  
Page 37 ~ b3;  
Page 41 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 42 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 43 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 44 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 45 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 46 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 47 ~ Duplicate;  
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(Rev. 12-2-57)

FROM  
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
TO  
Official indicated below by check mark

Mr. Tolson ☒ b6  
Mr. Belmont ☒ b7C  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Attorney General .....  
Director, Public Information .....  
Deputy Attorney General .....  
Solicitor General .....  
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust .....  
Assistant Attorney General, Civil .....  
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights .....  
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal .....  
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security .....  
Assistant Attorney General, Lands .....  
Assistant Attorney General, Tax .....  
Assistant Attorney General, Legal Counsel .....  
Assistant Attorney General, Alien Property .....  
Administrative Assistant Attorney General .....  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation .....  
Director, Bureau of Prisons .....  
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization ....  
Pardon Attorney .....  
Parole Board .....  
Board of Immigration Appeals .....  
Librarian .....  
Records .....

MEMORANDUM

10/8/58

Mr. Hoover:

For your information in  
connection with the Cabinet  
meeting tomorrow morning,  
to which I understand you have  
been invited.

NN  
HHH

Attachment:

CP-58-87 - ~~SECRET~~

XXXXXX

REC-66 66-19012 170

OCT 10 1958

EXP. PROC.

OCT 8 1958

ENCLOSURE  
REC-66  
OCT 24 1958



PRESENTATION OF EVALUATION OF NATIONAL READINESS  
TO THE PRESIDENT, CABINET AND HEADS OF AGENCIES

DATE: OCTOBER 9, 1958

TIME: 9:00 A.M.

PLACE: CABINET ROOM  
WHITE HOUSE

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## EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT A - Summary of twenty-eight outside problems received during the Federal Action Phase

EXHIBIT B - Letter dated August 1, 1958, from the Attorney General regarding FBI participation

I. PURPOSE

Through the offices of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) at an enlarged Cabinet meeting on October 10, 1958, there will be presented to the President, Cabinet and heads of agencies an evaluation of National readiness as determined by the results of Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL '58) which were studied by seven seminar groups during the Evaluation Phase of OPAL '58 on September 17 and 18, 1958.

A. Participants

This will primarily be an OCDM affair with the principal participants consisting of Governor Leo A. Hoegh, Director, OCDM, and the chairman of each seminar group, excluding Judge Lawrence E. Walsh, Deputy Attorney General, Chairman, Domestic Security Seminar, and Kenneth Downs, Assistant Director, OCDM, Chairman, Information Seminar. The President, Cabinet and heads of agencies will be the audience. The seminar groups, chairman and executive secretary of each, which participated in the Evaluation Phase at HIGHPOINT, OCDM relocation site on September 17 and 18, 1958, are:

| <u>GROUP</u>                                  | <u>Chairman</u>  | <u>Executive Secretary</u>   |
|---|--|--|
| 4. (Planning) 1. Organization and Assignments | Mr. William Finan<br>Assistant Director<br>Bureau of the Budget                    | Mr. Merrill Collett<br>OCDM  |
| 3. ✓ 2. <sup>x5</sup> Operational Readiness   | Mr. Lewis E. Berry<br>Assistant Director<br>OCDM                                   | Mr. John O'Neill<br>OCDM   |
| 2. ✓ 3. Resources and Requirements            | Mr. J. R. Price<br>Assistant Director<br>OCDM<br>Mr. James King<br>Acting Chairman | Mr. Frank Aaronson<br>OCDM   |
| 1. ✓ 4. Financial and Economic Stabilization  | Dr. Raymond Saulnier,<br>Chairman, Council<br>of Economic Advisors                 | Mr. Edward Phelps<br>OCDM  |
| 5. Domestic Security                          | Judge Lawrence E. Walsh, Deputy Attorney General                                   | Mr. J. W. Yeagley<br>Justice (Acting Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division) |

## 6. Information

Mr. Kenneth Downs  
Assistant Director  
OCDM

Mr. Paul Wagner  
OCDM

Mr. Paul Wagner  
Acting Chairman

## 7. Training

Lieutenant General  
~~G. R. Huebner~~  
(Retired)  
Civil Defense  
Director, New York  
State

Mr. W. H. Ziehl  
Bureau of the  
Budget

B. Program

On the basis of available information, at the enlarged Cabinet meeting, Governor Hoegh will make a preliminary statement citing observations, conclusions and recommendations from all or several of the seminar group reports. Also, 5 of the group chairmen will orally present what they consider to be the most significant portions of their reports. Neither Judge Lawrence E. Walsh, Deputy Attorney General, nor J. Walter Yeagley, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Internal Security Division of the Department, will present the report on the Domestic Security Seminar. Lewis E. Berry, Assistant Director, OCDM, and Chairman of the seminar on Operational Readiness, has the assignment of including in his report pertinent information from the reports on Domestic Security and Information Seminars. Yeagley furnished Berry a 3-page report on the Domestic Security Seminar results and Berry is to use any portion he desires. Berry's report is to be given in approximately 12 minutes and, according to Yeagley, Berry will not spend more than 2 or 3 minutes on the Domestic Security findings and recommendations. Yeagley made a copy of the report which he furnished to Berry available and it points out 2 fields were considered: (1) physical security and (2) law and order.

The findings and conclusions of the Domestic Security Seminar group regarding physical security are that the physical security of the majority of vital Government facilities was found to be adequate for the purposes of OPAL '58. However, the exercise offered no actual realistic tests of the adequacy of the measures planned. Also, the need for means of protecting vital highway, transportation and communications facilities from sabotage should be explored and, if appropriate, plans should be developed to provide such protection.

It is concluded that it would be impossible in an actual emergency to provide a sufficient number of guards to protect every vital Government and industrial facility.

Regarding law and order, the report states OPAL '58 did not provide an appropriate medium for testing the ability at the local level to maintain law and order under an actual attack. Further, that this problem is one that should initially be worked out at the state and local level with emphasis on law enforcement as primarily a local responsibility with Federal assumption of authority exercised only as a last resort.

The report states the continuity of the courts is a most important factor in maintaining law and order and additional steps to insure that this is accomplished should be vigorously pursued.

The report states that according to the Department of Defense, full consideration of the problem of maintaining law and order will be had as a result of a pending joint study by OCDM and the Department of Defense.

Recommendations of the Domestic Security seminar group are summarized as:

- (1) Agency heads responsible for vital Government facilities should complete plans immediately for availability in an emergency of a sufficient number of guards to properly protect such facilities.
- (2) OCDM should take immediate steps to implement further the provisions of Executive Order 10421 relating to the assignment of responsibilities for the security cognizance of vital facilities. (Executive Order 10421, dated December 31, 1952, provides for the development by Federal agencies of programs and measures for the physical security of facilities within the cognizance of such agencies. The order shall not be deemed to confer on any Federal agency investigative functions exercised by any Federal agency represented in the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) or to alter or modify any function of the IIC.)

- (3) OCDM should provide for immediate institution of studies concerning the need for providing protection for transportation and communication facilities.
- (4) OCDM should institute measures designed to insure that maintenance of law and order during an emergency will be accomplished at state and local level with Federal planning complementary thereto.
- (5) Arrangements must be made to insure that appropriate action is taken, both state and Federal, to provide for the continuity of civil courts during an emergency.

The report does not mention the FBI and it does not relate to matters within FBI responsibilities.

Regarding reports to be given by the other seminar group chairmen at the enlarged Cabinet meeting on October 10, 1958, a 41-page document classified ~~secret~~ entitled "Report of Round Table Discussion and Seminar Group Reports" has been received. This document contains either a summary or the complete report plus recommendations of each seminar group and significant portions of these reports will be utilized by the chairmen reporting at the Cabinet meeting. The information in this document touches upon practically the entire field of defense planning such as damage assessment, relocation sites, prepositioning of documents, communications, operational capabilities of state and local government, resources, financial and economic stabilization, information, alert exercise recommendations for 1959, 1960 and 1961, and domestic security as referred to above. The document does not mention the FBI or FBI responsibilities. As the document stands, it has no effect upon the FBI until OCDM adopts the findings and recommendations and issues them in directive form. All OCDM directives are studied and applicable provisions are incorporated into FBI defense planning. This document does not, in any way, denote what portions of any particular report will be mentioned at the Cabinet meeting.

At the Cabinet presentation, reference will be made to the problem of making provisions for the families of relocated personnel. This is frequently

referred to as the "family care" program. FBI defense planning does contain "family care" provisions which provide our key evacuees at the Seat of Government and in the field with a telephone number of the relocation site which may be used by their adult dependents for the relay of messages and reuniting of the families in the event of separation. Also, mature, male employees, Special Agents if available, are designated to render all possible assistance to families of relocated personnel. The designated employee, where possible, resides in the same geographic location as the key evacuee.

## II. OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL '58)

### A. Purpose

The purpose of OPAL '58 was to examine the readiness of the nation at local, state and regional levels to meet a direct nuclear attack on the United States and to provide for training of Governmental personnel, auxiliaries and the general public. OPAL '58 was planned and occurred in three phases as follows:

### B. Phase I - The Attack Phase (AP) May 6 and 7, 1958

The AP occurred on May 6 and 7, 1958, and was based on assumptions that international tension increased rapidly during the week preceding May 6, 1958; that world conditions had deteriorated; that the nation had been informed of the seriousness of the situation and that there was no period of strategic warning. On May 6, 1958, "Checkerboard," a simulated air raid warning, occurred and it was assumed a direct attack was launched on the United States preceded by warnings from one hour and forty-five minutes to four hours and forty-five minutes. The attack pattern had been developed and the attack resulted in 282 mock nuclear detonations having an explosive force equivalent to 642 million tons of TNT blasting preselected targets.

During the AP, State and local emphasis was placed on many factors, most of them dealing with survival and resources. Also, it was assumed that many Federal orders were issued dealing with food, communications, housing, health, transportation, manpower, and power and fuels.

Participation in the AP by Federal agencies was not mandatory and in view of the survival-resource character of the exercise the Director approved non-participation by the FBI.

No general public participation was required in the Washington, D. C., area. However, some Federal employees and schools did participate. The President spent approximately seven minutes in the White House bomb shelter as part of the exercise.

Civil Defense officials termed the exercise a success pointing out lack of fall-out shelters was the biggest flaw in the Civil Defense Program and allegedly the White House has assigned the highest "priority" to a program for development of adequate fall-out shelters.

1. FBI Participation and Effect  
of Attack upon FBI Personnel  
and Installations

The Seat of Government (SOG) did not participate in the AP; however, the field offices were instructed to participate in public drills to the extent permitted by the normal operation of the office. Also, field offices, upon request, were to designate a Special Agent to act in a liaison capacity at the headquarters only of State and local Civil Defense. Field offices were not required to advise of the extent of participation under these instructions.

The locations of the mock blasts were analyzed by the Laboratory Division in order to determine the effect upon FBI personnel and installations with results as follows:

Thirty-eight field offices plus SOG headquarters facilities were completely destroyed. Additionally, 107 Resident Agencies were destroyed. Interestingly, because of the strategic location of our relocation sites, only one (Portland Office



site) site suffered blast damage although eleven relocation sites were in fall-out areas of sufficient density to restrict operations for two weeks or more.

Based on the Laboratory's calculations, from this mock attack 649 FBI employees were killed and the injured totaled 2,808.

2. Summary and Conclusions of the  
Extent of the Physical Effects  
Upon the Country D+14  
(Fourteen Days After the Attack)

The mock attack caused death or injury to about one third of the United States population; about four per cent total land area, primarily cities, was subjected to massive fire and only one third of the United States land area was virtually unaffected and remained safe for work and travel during the first two days with about one third more becoming available after the attack. The impact upon the National Government indicated the administrative capability of the Federal Government was seriously though not completely curtailed by lack of fall-out protection at relocation sites and undamaged regular facilities.

The remaining potential of Survival and Recovery consisted of three fourths of the population considered alive and well with about one tenth of the survivors expected to become radiation casualties D+90 (ninety days after the attack). The Medical Burden at D+90 was expected to include about nine per cent of the preattack population, most all of whom with normal care would be expected to live. However, due to the short supply of medical help and facilities, it was doubtful that many of the group of potential surviving injured, other than those able to get by with self help or unskilled family care, could be expected to survive. Food and Clothing was expected to be adequate for survival with problems in some local areas. Housing was expected to be tight with excessive overcrowding in some areas. Manpower suffered about a forty per cent reduction which could be partially offset by using other parts of the surviving population

and increasing the hours of work. Fuels became seriously limited with only one quarter of preattack petroleum refining capability considered available at D+14 and by D+7 months it was not expected to raise above one half. Aircraft was considered seriously restricted by loss of aircraft and limited fuel supply. Railroad capacity was considered at one fourth of preattack capacity. Highways and Inland Waterways were considered about one half of preattack capability. Ports suffered so seriously that surviving ocean-going tonnage would require over-the-beach loading and unloading. It was anticipated that surviving port capability by the end of the year would be back to two thirds or three fourths of the preattack level. Skilled Personnel Communications Capability was considered deteriorated to such a point that control operations would be handicapped. Electric Power was considered down to one third preattack level and by D+90 expected to be back to more than one half of the preattack capability. Finance was very seriously disrupted and expected to require local resourcefulness to prevent economic breakdown due to lack of general accepted medium of exchange. Finally, Agricultural Production prospects were comparatively bright while Industrial Production prospects were gloomy.

C. Phase II - Federal Action Phase (FAP)  
July 14-18, 1958

The FAP commenced on 7/14/58 and extended through 7/18/58 as a D+14 situation; i.e., planning was on the assumption it was 14 days after the AP on 5/6-7/58.

1. FBI Participation in FAP

Dates - 7/15-18/58 SOG

7/15-17/58 FIELD

Personnel Relocated - 47

Intra FBI Test Problems - 40

Problems Pertained To: Manpower Resources  
 Recruitment of Personnel  
 Fiscal Matters  
 Medical and Health Matters  
 Office Supplies and  
 Equipment  
 Space Matters  
 Automotive Equipment  
 Field Availability Checks

*Test Problems Originating With Outside Agencies - 28*  
*Liaison Agents to Other Agency Sites - 3*

*Difficulties - Minor in OCDD Communications Equipment*

**None in Overall Operation**

### Reports to OCDM - 1 During Exercise

OCDM planning was primarily directed toward survival and resources, with assumptions and objectives directed toward resource agencies such as Commerce, Labor and Interior. Since FBI planning involved an intra-FBI testing of our primary resources, that is personnel and equipment, and since we are not a resource type Bureau, with the Director's approval, we obtained. OCDM permission for FBI participation, field and Seat of Government to be confined to 8:30 a.m., Eastern Standard Time (EST) 7/16/58 to 4:00 p.m., EST 7/18/58. It was also approved for our field offices to not man relocation sites or assume a relocated status in nearby Resident Agencies, but they remained at their headquarters city in an assumed relocated status.

2. FBI Relocation, July 15, 1958

Over-all Federal agency relocation was not scheduled to start until 8:30 a.m. 7/16/58; however, a communication from the White House on 7/15/58 instructed the FBI and other agencies to proceed to relocation sites upon receipt of an alert call. The FBI received the alert call at 10:32 a.m. 7/15/58 and became operational at its relocation site at 11:50 a.m. A full alert cadre was at the site within one hour and twenty-five minutes from receipt of the alert call, despite the fact the call was received during the lunch hour and when traffic conditions were congested at SOG and in the Washington area. An OCDM official commented the FBI was one of the first to relocate upon receiving the alert call.

### 3. Scheduled Intra-FBI Test Problems

During previous alert exercises we had thoroughly tested our emergency planning under an attack situation and we were successful in focusing the thinking of the Department of Justice and State upon the necessity for immediate authority to place our emergency security programs into action. We had trained our employees and developed techniques to a

degree of perfection that continued similar testing would not have incurred any benefits to the FBI; therefore, our planning for the FAP encompassed test problems involving some of the essential personnel, equipment and survival functions the FBI would have to meet in a period subsequent to an attack, after having fulfilled our immediate emergency security responsibilities. The problems related primarily to personnel, health and welfare, office supplies and equipment; vouchers, office space and payroll matters. Also, problems were devised to test the ability of employees to handle the radioactivity detection meters and the dosimeters, which instruments test the accumulation of radioactivity to which an individual has been exposed. The availability of Special Agent personnel in headquarters city of selected field offices was checked. As a corollary to running the problems, we thoroughly tested our emergency communications facilities. There follows a resume and analysis of the intra-FBI test problems:

#### A. Manpower Resources Problems

Nine test problems involving manpower resources designed to cover every geographical area in the country were run. The replies received from the field were realistic, since the bomb damage in the various areas was keyed to the assumed bomb damage and fall-out patterns submitted by OCDM. The personnel inventory of surviving personnel was such that essential responsibilities could be carried out even with impaired staffs throughout the country. The field showed extreme initiative in perfecting local arrangements under the most adverse conditions.

#### B. Recruitment of FBI Personnel

Seven test problems were utilized as samples to cover a nation wide and territorial survey concerning sources of additional personnel. The results indicated that such sources as former Agents who had offered services and National Academy graduates in good standing are good potential sources in a dire emergency. It was also revealed that close continuous contact with Agent applicant sources by the field is desirable at all times.

#### C. Fiscal Matters

Two test problems involving 55 communications to the field tested the field's ability to prepare and handle field payroll schedules with the nearest disbursing office of the Treasury Department without benefit of supervision from SOG and to schedule travel expense vouchers for payments directly through the local disbursing office of the Treasury Department.

#### D. Medical and Health Matters

Six problems pertaining to services of office employees trained in first aid or otherwise qualified as medical aides elicited encouraging replies from the field, because of the FBI's first aid training program which, over the years, has provided the field divisions with a substantial number of employees trained to render such assistance.

#### E. Office Supplies and Equipment

Four problems required field offices to immediately simulate shipping firearms and ammunition from one office to another. Such matters as procurement of and payment for necessary supplies locally, obtaining of typewriters and other office equipment and locating and recovering Government property were also covered.

#### F. Welfare and Housing

Two problems were utilized concerning the welfare and housing of FBI employees. These dealt with the critical needs of families of personnel who transferred to areas where housing facilities were badly damaged and the arranging for accommodations for presently assigned employees who were bombed out of their existing quarters.

#### G. Space Matters

Problems were run requesting the 53 field offices on a deadline basis to submit inventories of their headquarters and Resident Agency space, showing percentage operable, location, and where existing facilities were inadequate, the steps to be taken to secure needed space.

## H. Automotive Equipment

Two problems involving the extent of damage to our automotive equipment and to estimate needs to enable the FBI to redistribute automobiles from non-depleted field offices were run. Also, problems relating to storage and protection of automotive equipment and procuring additional equipment from outside sources denoted the field's ability to respond in a satisfactory manner.

## I. Field Availability Checks

Availability checks of Special Agent personnel in 18 field offices involving 2,288 Agents representing over one third of the FBI's Agent manpower were conducted. All offices contacted Agent personnel within the hour, the shortest time for a small office being seven minutes for sixteen Agents, for a medium office thirteen minutes for sixty Agents and for a large office fifty-one minutes for 979 Agents. The availability of Agent personnel is, of course, absolutely essential in a real emergency.

### 4. Test Problems Originating With Outside Agencies

Twenty-eight problems were received from outside agencies, 17 originated with the Director of the Office of OPAL Resources and Operation an operating office within OCDM. Four originated with the President and one each with the Interagency Communications System and the Central Intelligence Agency. Problems originating with OCDM basically pertained to (1) availability and adequacy of field communications (2) adequacy of facilities at the FBI relocation site, including decontaminating equipment and the availability of medical supplies and facilities (3) availability of essential agency records at the site (4) number of relocation cadre, distinguishing between clerical, communications and policy personnel and whether the number assigned was sufficient to handle emergency functions and (5) details regarding agency planning with regard to care of dependents in a real emergency.

The problems originating with the President were basically of a personnel nature, for example, appraisal was requested of the psychological impact on the relocation staff as a result of the mock attack and subsequent separation from their dependents. Also requested was a report as to what motivation or compulsion would be used to induce personnel to undertake hazardous, but essential, duties in an emergency situation. Inquiry was made as to whether duties assigned to cadre personnel were clear and fully understood.

The two problems received from Interagency Communications System and Central Intelligence Agency dealt with questions of staff assignment for specific responsibilities for the exercise.

Interestingly, a special deadline was set for the handling of the majority of the problems and they were all handled well within the deadline. In fact, an OCDM official complimented the FBI not only on the manner in which the problems were handled but on the speed with which they were handled at the site and replies made to the originator (Exhibit A sets forth a concise summary of each of the 28 problems showing the problems posed and the reply thereto).

#### 5. Communications

The exercise again drove home the fact that communications at the FBI site are the lifeline of any emergency operation and the FBI equipment and personnel were highly effective during the exercise.

For economy and to thoroughly test the FBI radio network, radio was fully utilized in handling intra-FBI problems. Since all radio traffic must be coded, a very heavy burden was thrown upon Coding Unit personnel. Although a backlog developed during some of the peak periods, the resultant delay was usually temporary and promptly cleared. Decoding operations were speeded up considerably by the use of new coding machine devices which eliminated manual operation and considering a new method of computing, 41,064 code groups were handled which exceeded the count of previous years with no increase of personnel.

## 6. Liaison Matters

Three Liaison Agents accompanied other Agencies to their relocation sites at the start of the exercise. This was a reduction over previous alert exercises and is attributable to decreased participation by intelligence-type agencies in a resource-survival type exercise.

The Liaison Agents were of considerable assistance in clarifying requests and cutting red tape which assured smooth operations with other agencies. Director Hoegh, OCDM, advised the FBI Liaison Agent that in practice and real emergencies, he wants an FBI Agent at the OCDM site. He was of the opinion it is very useful and helpful to both FBI and OCDM and he was appreciative that the Director had seen fit to assign a man to the OCDM site.

## 7. Cost to FBI

Prior to participation in the exercise, it was pointed out that an estimate of cost figure was not required by OCDM and one would not be compiled. However, the cost is believed to have been considerably less than last year due to extensive use of the radio network, the elimination of field per diem, and travel costs by assuming a relocated status at headquarters city; fewer Seat of Government (SOG) personnel utilized (47 this year as compared to 59 last year) and due to streamlining procedures radio operators were released ahead of the scheduled cut-off time. The estimated out-of-pocket cost of OPAL 57 to the FBI totaled \$4,588.25. Salaries of participating personnel were not included.

## 8. Difficulties Encountered

The FBI encountered no real overall operational difficulties as such. However, a few minor difficulties occurred in the communications system owned, operated, and maintained by OCDM. The difficulties were immediately brought to OCDM's attention, it effected repairs, and overall operations were not affected.

## 9. Personnel

Forty-seven employees reported to the relocation site on July 15, 1958, and on July 17, six employees were released, with thirteen more released on July 18. It was noted employees conducted themselves in a businesslike manner, were very enthusiastic



about their assignment; and showed they were dedicated and well-suited to serving under trying conditions. They put in long hours of hard work and did a very efficient job.

#### 10. Reports to OCDM

During our participation in FAP, excluding daily communication reports to OCDM, only one required report was submitted which was in the nature of answers to a questionnaire sent by OCDM to the site to be answered during the course of the exercise. Previous to the exercise, we responded to two questionnaires concerning our field and SOG facilities and subsequent to the exercise we answered certain questions contained in an evaluation-type questionnaire.

#### 11. Overall Observations

We experienced no difficulties during the exercise and we had an opportunity to check our activities very closely and make certain observations relative to a survival-type operation. From the field standpoint concerning problems of personnel, material, equipment, et cetera, it was determined that the major job to be accomplished on the field level is to get the offices back into operation at the earliest possible moment to carry on essential FBI business. It brought to point, the fact that the normal supply of "people and things" will no longer be available and work must be done with the resources at hand. It was determined the field must have resourcefulness, ingenuity, and self-reliance and the Special Agents in Charge must be able to maintain, in an emergency, essential operations with existing personnel and equipment. The results of the exercise denoted that all Special Agents in Charge felt they could maintain such operations with a staff such as remained under severe damage as was sustained in this practice exercise. The exercise again highlighted that FBI planning must be completely flexible to be successful in carrying out FBI responsibilities. Regarding emergency recruitment of personnel, in future planning, consideration will be given to the desirability of streamlining emergency applicant processes and other planning. Regarding communications and other emergency procedures being followed at the relocation site, it is possible some are subject to further streamlining to improve efficiency, cutback on personnel where possible, change the administrative handling of traffic material and have the microwave radio

system free of any relay points [redacted]

b3

[redacted] Concerning the reconstruction of fingerprint files, the FBI's present position of reconstructing has been examined and determined to be sound. The test permitted the opportunity of seriously considering the adding of a survival-type phase to our Defense Planning and the field was requested to submit observations along these lines, the results of which are currently being examined in order to determine the structure of such a phase.

It should be noted that a summary of our participation in the FAP was furnished to the Attorney General and therein he was advised that the FBI approached and carried out OPAL'58 with full seriousness of purpose not only in the planning stages but during the entire exercise; also, that the FBI again carefully examined procedures, planning, and organization, to insure that the FBI would be in a position, in an actual emergency, to carry out its responsibilities to the fullest extent.

In addition to the foregoing statements interlaced herein, denoting favorable comment received concerning FBI participation in the exercise, by letter dated August 1, 1958, the Attorney General commended the Director and other FBI personnel concerning FBI participation.

(Exhibit B - Copy of letter dated August 1, 1958, received from the Attorney General.

“NOISEAR” ®

BOORUM & PEASE “NOISEAR” ®

BO

A

EXHIBIT A

SUMMARY OF TWENTY-EIGHT OUTSIDE PROBLEMS  
RECEIVED DURING FAP

Problem #1

A report was requested as to whether the FBI had a field communications system; if it was working under OPAL 1958 attack conditions; and if it was useful for Agency business and Civil Defense purposes.

Reply The FBI does have a field communications system under OPAL 1958 attack conditions. It was operational in all except two offices; it was useful for FBI business but not available for Civil Defense purposes, due to responsibilities of the FBI.

Problem #2

Report requested as to whether the working space and necessary facilities at the FBI relocation site were sufficient to take care of individuals other than FBI personnel and if so, how many others.

Reply The FBI facilities were adequate only for FBI employees.

Problem #3

Questions posed: "In the event Washington fingerprint files were destroyed in an attack, what alternate files exist? If none, what are the plans for dealing with this contingency?"

Reply It was pointed out the FBI acts as a central repository for fingerprint cards furnished by law enforcement agencies. In the event of destruction of such records, they would be regrouped from individual duplicate records maintained by law enforcement and State fingerprint Bureaus throughout the country. Also, the FBI has microfilmed and stored at the relocation site certain essential fingerprint records for use under emergency conditions.

Problem #4

What radioactivity decontamination measures could be taken at the relocation site with essential equipment and personnel?

Reply The following decontamination measures could be taken:  
(1) Hosing down of immediate locale. (2) Showering and washing for

EXHIBIT A

personnel decontamination. (3) Scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment. (4) Filtering of all incoming air into the building. Additionally, a Federal Government owned and controlled water system is utilized including an FBI installed filtration device to provide water free from radionuclides.

Problem #5

Request made as to whether Agency Alert Cadre Assignment had been reflected in official approved job description for classified Civil Servants.

Reply FBI job descriptions do not specifically reflect Cadre Assignments for security reasons, but sufficient general reference has been incorporated therein and grade levels do include evaluation of such duties.

Problem #6

Information requested as to whether all essential Agency records are currently available at the relocation site.

Reply All essential records are available at the FBI site within the scope of planning possibilities which have recognizable limitations, such as funds and space at relocation site.

Problem #7

Asked, "In the light of current delegations and your ability or inability to function prior to D+90, how many of your (1) Cadre, (2) relocation staff could be made available for other than your own needs, i. e. for State and local Civil Defense purposes.

Reply By Presidential Directives, matters concerning sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities are the primary responsibilities of the FBI and the intensive effort required to meet FBI obligations under the directives would preclude rendering assistance to any State and Civil Defense efforts unless the nature of assistance requested pertained to immediate FBI responsibilities.

Problem #8

Requested advice as to how many, and what kind of persons were at the site when the Alert Cadre arrived.

Reply That the initial count at the site upon arrival was a total of fifteen, consisting of eight communications personnel at the site, six communications personnel at Midland, Virginia, and one at Sowege Radio Station, considered as part of the site.

Problem #9

What radio back-up exists as an alternate for the emergency relocation communications?

Reply Back-up for FBI emergency relocation communications consists of CW radio circuits to all field offices with radio teletype to key points; also, microwave radio facilities to relocation sites of critical agencies through the microwave network.

Problem #10

"To fulfill the functions assigned to your Agency at your site, would you need more people than are assigned and who are likely to go there after an attack? If so, what arrangements have you made with State and local Governments?"

Reply In case of attack, sufficient personnel scheduled for relocation site to take care of FBI functions.

Problem #11

Have Alert Cadre personnel been advised concerning actions to be taken by dependents in the event of a real attack?

Reply FBI cadre personnel have been fully instructed concerning action by dependents in the event of an emergency.

Problem #12

What trained medical services, equipment, and supplies are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site?

Reply Complete medical supplies and hospital facilities are available in the immediate vicinity of the FBI site with professional services available including doctors, medical specialists, technicians, and nurses, with the site itself equipped and stocked with a First-Aid room.

Problem #13

Requested the number of individuals besides the officer in charge in the alert cadre, distinguishing between clerical, communications, and policy personnel.

Reply Cadre personnel at FBI site totaled 46, including 21

communications employees, 11 administrative clerks, and 14 policy officials.

Problem #14

Requested, (1) What internal emergency action documents have been developed to implement Presidential emergency action papers assigned to FBI? (2) Whether secure storage facilities exist at the relocation site and (3) whether copies of Presidential emergency action papers have been pre-positioned.

Reply It was pointed out that (1) responsibility for implementing Presidential emergency action papers with respect to programs involving the FBI in emergencies rests with the Attorney General, and the FBI has detailed plans for compliance with instructions of the Attorney General in all levels of operation. (2) secure storage facilities are available at FBI relocation site and (3) the one copy of Presidential emergency action papers received to date by FBI were included in "Head of Agency Personal Kit" at FBI headquarters in accordance with OCDM instructions. Further, that FBI letter of June 16, 1958, to the Director of OCDM requested one additional copy of each Presidential emergency action document for pre-positioning at the FBI site, and the additional set of documents has not been received to date.

Problem #15

Has the FBI Censorship Watch List been furnished National censorship?

Reply 150 names would be the initial FBI contribution to the Censorship Watch List and the National Censorship Agency has been advised re the Watch List.

Problem #16

Communication addressed to Department of Justice relocation site received at FBI relocation site asked of Justice, "Considering warning time and attack effects on FBI field offices, report capability to take aliens and possible subversives into custody." Subsequently a communication was received from Justice referring to the foregoing and requesting that FBI reply direct to OCDM with a copy to Justice.

Reply Communication directed to Justice advised that in view of the ~~top secrecy~~ of programs, no reply was being made by the FBI direct. However, for Justice's consideration in connection with any reply it might desire to make, they were advised that due to the surprise nature and speed of the attack on May 6, 1958, and the resultant heavy damage to the centers of population throughout

Inquiry received which was a follow-up to Problem #3 concerning fingerprint records, which inquiry requested advice as to how long it would take to regroup individual duplicate fingerprint records under the mock attack conditions in view of the magnitude

### Problem #21

Reply Section Chief Churchill Downing is the Bureau's security officer fully familiar with the ICS "Project" which refers to the ICS communications network.

Requested the identity of the FBI security officer familiar with the ICS "Project."

### Problem #20

Reply Our cadre did include a communications and crypto security "Inspector General" with appropriate message center training and that clear internal standards of priority for communications have been developed consistent in every respect with Interagency Communications System/Standards.

Inquiry was made as to whether our alert cadre included a communications "Inspector General" with proper message center training and if he had developed internal standards of priority for communications.

### Problem #19

Reply Boston and New York were requested to reply that facilities at the sites were adequate for any number of employees up to 100 per cent who would reach the site under attack conditions and that with previous OCDM approval all questions pertaining to FBI field divisions were being handled by the Bureau directly with OCDM and any additional questions should be channeled through that Agency.

The New York and Boston field offices received requests concerning the adequacy of relocation sites with regard to housing, food, and equipment permanently stored at such sites.

### Problems #17 and #18

the country, the persons referred to suffered heavy casualties and dispersal. Many of those who were not casualties were taken into custody and continued efforts were being made to locate and apprehend others who might be at large. Further, it was pointed out that this situation stressed the absolute necessity of instituting these emergency programs in advance of a possible attack in order for them to be fully effective.



of the attack, widespread physical damage, loss of communications capability, fallout damage, and preoccupation of State and local law enforcement officers.

Reply That by D/90 considerable progress in regrouping could be made and the speed of regrouping thereafter would depend on unknown factors relating to the ability of law enforcement agencies to maintain essential operations. Further, that by D/180 extensive regrouping could be completed and progress thereafter would be dependent on man power and funds available.

Problem #22

Inquiry received by the San Juan field office identical with that received by the New York and Boston field offices set forth under Problems #17 and #18.

Reply The problem was considered handled by the instructions the Boston office was to pass on in connection with Problems 17 and 18, which information was going to the same individual who had directed the inquiry to the San Juan office.

Problem #23

Request as to FBI policies and capabilities with respect to actions which the FBI would take (1) concerning protection of the relocation site from panic stricken civilians, (2) if the Governor of the State in which the FBI site is located requested assistance in survival operations which would substantially delay implementation of approved essential functions, (3) if the State or local officials attempted with the threat of force to pre-empt FBI facilities, equipment, and personnel and, (4) if the Governor of the State in which the FBI site is located attempted to use his martial law and issued orders contrary to FBI pre-attack assignment.

Reply (1) The security of the FBI site is adequate due to location, and in the best interests of the country admittance to the site would be denied to members of the local community under the situation stated; (2) extensive efforts required to meet obligations under Presidential directives would preclude rendering assistance unless matters pertained to FBI responsibilities; (3) the situation assumed is unforeseeable due to FBI liaison with State governments and nature of FBI responsibilities; (4) this inquiry was considered not applicable and the originator of the question was referred to a reply which the FBI previously furnished in another questionnaire.

Problem #24

Inquiry as to what had been done to classify and simplify

emergency duties of each person on the staff at the relocation site.

Reply Emergency duties of staff personnel at the site were streamlined and simplified and all members of the alert cadre are cognizant and thoroughly familiar with their duties.

Problem #25

Inquiry as to whether standby instructions on domestic information had been issued to the FBI; to whom does the FBI look for such instructions, or is the FBI the judge of its own public information policy?

Reply All installations of the FBI have standby instructions established through pre-determined policies formulated by the Attorney General. All inquiries and releases are made by the Director of Public Information, Department of Justice, unless the exigency of the situation dictates on-the-spot action.

Problem #26

Requested the FBI estimate of psychological impact on the relocation staff of the mock attack and effect of separation of staff members from their families. Also, a report was requested on what motivation or compulsion would be used to induce FBI personnel to undertake hazardous but essential duties in an emergency situation.

Reply The psychological impact of the mock attack on the FBI relocation staff was at an absolute minimum. Separation of dependents had minimum affect because of staff assurance that sound planning to provide safety and security of dependents gave a feeling of confidence for their welfare. Further, that firmly established personnel selection and continued indoctrination policies had developed high sense of patriotism and duty resulting in a complete dedication to grave responsibilities at hand, and no other motivation or compulsion was deemed necessary.

Problem #27

Requested information as to whether alert cadre personnel had been advised concerning action to be taken by their dependents in the event of a real attack. A reply was dispatched advising that cadre personnel had been fully instructed concerning actions for dependents in the event of emergency, and a subsequent inquiry was received as to what specific previous instructions or advice for dependents of alert cadre personnel had been given.

Reply It was pointed out that such personnel had been furnished

~~confidential~~ telephone numbers and addresses of FBI emergency centers enabling either direct communication with, or relaying of messages to evacuees; that they had been furnished extensive lists of available housing accommodations near the relocation site and also furnished names and contact points for standby evacuees and other responsible employees geographically distributed who had been assigned responsibility for attending to needs of dependents. Further, that the dependents had been briefed thoroughly on applicable Civil Defense instructions and requested to be guided by them in every case, and instructed to use Civil Defense facilities where necessary for reuniting children and parents who might become separated.

Problem #28

Requested the name of the Bureau representative on the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee for Exercise OPAL 1958.

Reply Section Chief, Ralph R. Roach, was the FBI representative on this Committee for the Exercise.



TRUE COPY

EXHIBIT B

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 1, 1958

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

In reviewing the report of this Department's participation in Operation Alert 1958 I noted the fine cooperation which our Planning Staff received from Special Agent John Minnich in making preparation for the test exercise.

I therefore take this opportunity to express my commendation both to you and Special Agent Minnich for the creditable manner in which he performs his duties.

Sincerely,

Attorney General

TRUE COPY

EXHIBIT B

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*

DATE: October 8, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *R.R.*SUBJECT: BUPLANS OPERATION ALERT 1958  
JULY 15-18, 1958  
(RECOMMENDATIONS)

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Memorandum Belmont to the Director dated 7-18-58  
re Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL '58) contained recommendations as  
follows:

- (1) a. "With reference to field operations based on the above observations the Administrative Division will study all matters of field operations under simulated, as well as real emergency conditions, and will submit appropriate recommendations for approval, following which an SAC Letter will be sent to the field for its information and future guidance."

*Measures being prepared re this matter by J. P. [unclear]*

ACTION : All field offices submitted their observations and suggestions regarding their participation in the exercise. Their letters have been analyzed and a conference between Buplans supervisor and Administrative Division representatives is to be held in the immediate future regarding adoption of measures on the fields' views. You will be kept advised of the progress in this matter.

- (2) a. "With reference to the possible streamlining of procedures in our communications work and management at our relocation site, the Records and Communications Division will study their present procedures to see if it is possible to affect streamlining results which would improve efficiency and possibly reduce some personnel requirements during these tests and during actual emergencies at the site."

JTM:sai (9)

1-Mr. Belmont  
1-Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier)  
1-Mr. Nease (Attention Mr. Wherry)  
1-Mr. Parsons (Attention Mr. Millen)  
1-Mr. Trotter  
1-Mr. Tamm (Attention Mr. Sloan)  
1-Liaison Section  
1-Mr. Minnich

EX-102

REC-93

OCT 22 1958

61 OCT 23 1958

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
Re: BUPLANS OPERATION ALERT 1958.  
JULY 15-18, 1958  
(RECOMMENDATIONS)

ACTION: Wherry to Nease memorandum 9-29-58 recommended streamlining procedures i.e., stripping of messages on communications form and utilizing Thermo Fax machine for copies be adopted. (2)a. is considered as handled with the exception of some minor changes in logging procedures in and out of messages which is an internal administrative procedure being accomplished by the Communications Section of Records and Communications Division.

- (2) b. "A study with appropriate recommendations will also be made concerning the physical housing of our communications facilities in the Academy building at the relocation site."

*Work being performed 10/20-58*

ACTION: To improve those facilities, sound-proofing material has been received at Quantico and will be installed in the immediate future. The ceilings in the communications rooms have been opened up for insulation of the air ducts, which work will be performed by the Marine Corps. Drapery material is on hand at Quantico and will be made up by the Marine Corps. Fluorescent lights have been installed in the rooms. Ordering of air conditioning equipment, venetian blinds, and rugs is under consideration by the Administrative Division and it may be possible to order these items in February or March, 1959.

*Estimate obtained by Miller - no action because of expense*

"The Administrative and Laboratory Divisions will further study the problem of acquiring more suitable temporary housing for our operating equipment at our microwave station."

ACTION: Memorandum Millen to Parsons 9-16-58 advises that inquiries were made and discussed by SAC Sloan with a Marine Corps Maintenance Officer who indicated that a rough cost estimate will be made and sent to Sloan for Bureau consideration.

- (4) "It is recommended that the Identification Division re-analyze the matter of reconstructing our fingerprint files should they become destroyed in a national emergency."

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
Re: BUPLANS OPERATION ALERT 1958  
JULY 15-18, 1958  
(RECOMMENDATIONS)

ACTION: Memorandum R. E. Moore to Trotter 8-15-58 set forth background re reconstructing Identification files and suggested that while our system is sound, a select representative number of State Identification Bureaus and Police Departments be contacted to see if any problems would be encountered which are not now foreseen. Mr. Belmont noted, "Think we can stand our ground as is.", and Mr. Clayton for Mr. Tolson noted, "I agree." This matter is considered completed by Mr. Trotter.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Administrative, Training and Inspection, Laboratory, and Records and Communications Divisions submit a memorandum upon completion of the items pertinent to their Divisions. Also those Divisions, excluding the Administrative Division, if items pertinent to them are not completed within 30 days from the date of this memorandum, should submit a status memorandum designating a copy for the Buplans Desk.

*Jim*  
*John*  
*[Signature]*



From  
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL ~~WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS~~  
Internal Security Division

To

Official indicated by check mark

|   |                          |
|---|--------------------------|
| The Attorney General .....                                    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| The Solicitor General .....                                   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Deputy Attorney General .....                                 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Assistant Attorney General [Antitrust] ....                   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Assistant Attorney General [Civil] .....                      | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Assistant Attorney General [Lands] .....                      | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Assistant Attorney General [Tax] .....                        | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Assistant Attorney General [Criminal] .....                   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Assistant Attorney General<br>[Office of Legal Counsel] ..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Director, FBI .....   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Director of Prisons .....                                     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Commissioner, Immigration and<br>Naturalization .....         | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Pardon Attorney .....   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Administrative Assistant Atty. Gen. ....                      | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Deputy Administrative Asst. Atty. Gen. ....                   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| The Executive Assistant to the Atty. Gen. ....                | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Director of Public Information .....                          | <input type="checkbox"/> |

MEMORANDUM

*Mr. John Edgar Hoover*  
*F.B.I.*

*Rec'd in mail*  
*10-7-58*  
*for [unclear]*

*griffith*  
*[unclear]*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *WBS*

FROM : R. R. Roach *R*

SUBJECT: BUPLANS -- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FILES  
RECORDS BRANCH

DATE: October 29, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Memorandum from C. F. Downing to R. T. Harbo dated 7-18-52 contained approved recommendation for retention of certain files pertaining to defense plans. *J. Waitart*

Subsequent to submission of referenced memorandum, the following Buplans files have been added to those maintained in the ~~Confidential~~ File Room of the Records Branch:

66-19009 - Operation Alert 1957  
66-19012 - Operation Alert 1958  
66-19016 - Presidential Emergency Action Documents, Pre-positioning Program  
66-19017 - Defense Plans - Mobilization Plan C  
66-19018 - Defense Plans - Mobilization Plan D-minus

The foregoing files all contain information ranging from ~~confidential~~ to ~~top secret~~ and pertain not only to the Bureau's defense planning but to Government-wide defense planning, including that of the White House. It is, therefore, considered necessary and desirable that these files continue to be maintained in the ~~Confidential~~ File Room.

RECOMMENDATION:

That retention of the files set forth herein in the ~~Confidential~~ File Room be approved.

1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. Nease (Attention: Mr. Waitart)  
1 - Liaison Section  
1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:nck

66-19012  
NOT RECORDED  
145 NOV 4 1958

12 NOV 3 1958

33 NOV 6

*Retained in File Room*  
*Spec. File Room*  
*6-8-67*  
*Removed from Special File Room per memo 7-30-73 from O. Connell to Marshall*  
*Handled 8-3-73*  
*alt*

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-17404-35

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ABW 10/30*

DATE: October 30, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *RR*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
RECORD OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT  
AND CABINET AT ENLARGED CABINET MEETING  
ON OCTOBER 9, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

W. C. Sullivan

Memorandum Roach to Belmont dated 10-8-58 advised of the receipt of a three-page Cabinet paper dated 10-6-58 which contained eight recommendations to be offered for the concurrence of the Cabinet and ten items to be noted by the President and Cabinet as actions to be taken by appropriate agencies and by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) at the enlarged Cabinet meeting held on 10-9-58.

Memorandum for Heads of Agencies, dated 10-25-58, from the White House, enclosed a three-page Cabinet paper setting forth the action taken on the items presented at the enlarged Cabinet meeting on 10-9-58. The items presented are identical with those which were set forth in the three-page Cabinet paper dated 10-6-58 and these items, together with the action taken, have been consolidated into one document, which is attached hereto.

A review of the eight recommendations presented denotes that two of the recommendations were approved with no qualifications, five were approved with certain qualifications and additional instructions, and one was deferred pending additional information. The ten items set forth in the Cabinet paper dated 10-6-58 were noted by the President and the Cabinet.

Concerning the eight recommendations and ten items, generally they touch upon the entire field of defense planning, but as they now stand no action is required by the FBI. The recommendations and items which might require consideration by the FBI are:

REC-12 66-19012-173

(1) Recommendation A - To improve operational readiness of field installations.

(2) Recommendation C - To establish OCDM regional operational sites manned by OCDM staff and appropriate representatives from other departments and agencies, construction to start no later than January, 1960.

NOV 12 1958

(3) Recommendation G - That the present Federal Relocation Act be reviewed for the purpose of assisting in a final determination

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Belmont (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (with enclosure)
- 1 - Liaison (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Minnich (with enclosure)

JTH:nck (6) Enclosure

EX-117-4  
WH-117-4  
EX-117-3

Memorandum Roach to Belmont

RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958, RECORD  
OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT AND CABINET  
AT ENLARGED CABINET MEETING ON OCTOBER 9, 1958

on the optimum number of sites and on giving selected sites greater protection.

- (4) Recommendation H - That the various, separate Federal civilian agency communications systems be studied to ascertain the extent to which they can be unified in order best to serve over-all emergency needs.
- (5) Action C - An accelerated program will be undertaken for training Government personnel at all levels in the operation of communications systems, message procedures, and techniques in order to achieve maximum use of communications facilities.
- (6) Action G - With respect to radiological monitoring, OCDM will accelerate existing programs of equipment supply, coordinated operations, and personnel training.
- (7) Action J - Increased attention will be given to the physical protection against sabotage of key Government facilities and of vital non-Government facilities (e.g. communications); the director of OCDM will examine this matter with the Department of Justice and other agencies concerned.

Our planning concerning these matters is current according to existing OCDM instructions. If and when OCDM issues directives concerning these matters, they will be analyzed as to effect upon, or action to be taken by, the FBI. Action J, of course, resulted from the seminar group on domestic security, which was to have been chairmanned by Deputy Attorney General Walsh but which was actually chairmanned by Acting Assistant Attorney General Yeagley. The report prepared by this group for use during the enlarged Cabinet meeting on 10-9-58 was reviewed in connection with material prepared for the Director's use at the meeting and it was determined the contents had no effect upon, or made no demands of the FBI.

Three additional matters were discussed pertaining to the shelter program, agency responsibilities and operations at regional sites, and a study of mail delivery. These additional matters have no immediate effect upon the FBI or our defense planning.

The cover memorandum transmitting the 10-25-58 Cabinet paper denotes that a revised version of the Cabinet paper dated 10-6-58 will be prepared, based on the President's decisions, and recirculated.

ACTION:

None. For information.

*Jim* *[Signature]* *V.* *+*

RECOMMENDATIONS GROWING OUT OF OPERATION ALERT 1958,  
PRESENTED AT ENLARGED CABINET MEETING ON OCTOBER 9, 1958,  
AND ACTION TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT IN CONNECTION THERETO

- A. That efforts to improve the operational readiness of the field establishment of the Federal government should be given greater emphasis and priority.

Approved.

- B. A reaffirmation of the decision to consolidate the key regional boundaries, and to move ahead with the specified implementation of Cabinet Paper CP - 58-79 (approved April 25, 1958; RA - 58-103, Item 3).

Approved by the President, with the understanding that special accommodation may have to be made in certain cases, but with the admonition that what may seem "administratively impossible" can be done if there is sufficient determination.

- C. That well-protected regional operational sites, manned by OCDM staff and appropriate representatives from other departments and agencies be established for OCDM regions. Construction is to start no later than January 1960.

Action was deferred pending a presentation which the Director of OCDM is to prepare which will set forth the designs, the locations (preferably on government-owned land), the full costs and all other pertinent data on the eight proposed regional sites. Final action will be taken only in the light of this presentation, and following the usual budgetary review.

- D. That federal mobilization guidance to state and local officials be prepared in such a way that this material can be issued on an unclassified basis.

Action approved subject to attaining the proper balance between the candidness helpful for optimum preparation and the security necessary in the public interest.

- E. That the Director of OCDM, working with the interested agencies, prepare for Cabinet consideration by February 1,

64-19012-173  
ENCLOSURE

1959, a proposal which will ensure, insofar as possible, that the President will have a post-attack capability to communicate with the surviving population.

Action approved.

- F. That the extent and timing of establishment of "emergency agencies" be reviewed; that the "built-in" readiness of the existing departments and agencies be examined with a view to strengthening such readiness; that the Director of OCDM, working with the Bureau of the Budget and the appropriate agencies, report on this matter to the Cabinet by March 1, 1959.

The President agreed that as a matter of policy, initial reliance in a situation of sudden emergency will have to be placed on the built-in readiness of existing departments and agencies with emergency agencies to be established later, as conditions would warrant or require. This statement of policy is to govern future organizational planning. The Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, in consultation with the Bureau of the Budget and the interested agencies will prepare for early Cabinet consideration suggested guidelines which should govern the timing of the functioning of the emergency agencies.

- G. That the present Federal Relocation Act be reviewed for the purpose of assisting in a final determination (1) on the optimum number of sites and (2) on giving selected sites greater protection; that a special study of this matter be undertaken by the Director of OCDM and the interested agencies for consideration by the Cabinet by December 1, 1958.

Action approved with the understanding that the findings presented will be subjected to the usual budgetary review before final approval.

- H. That the various, separate Federal civilian agency communications systems be studied to ascertain the extent to which they can be unified in order best to serve over-all emergency needs; that the Director of OCDM, working with the interested agencies, prepare for Cabinet consideration by January 1, 1959, an interim Report which would propose a statement of national policy and which would propose methods for implementation of this policy.

Action approved, it being understood that the serious questions which this study will raise will be given the most careful consideration.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE CABINET WERE TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING  
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND BY THE  
OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

- A. Capability will be expanded at all levels for immediate on the spot evaluation of damage information essential for early survival decisions. Provision will be made for fully-equipped and permanently-manned regional damage assessment centers, with machine capability.
- B. The nuclear detonation detection (NUDET) system, in addition to other sources, will be used to provide basic bomb strike data for damage assessment. Improvement of this system by the use of electronic detection equipment will be sought by OCDM working with the Department of Defense.
- C. An accelerated program will be undertaken for training government personnel at all levels in the operation of communications systems and in message procedures and techniques, in order to achieve maximum use of communications facilities.
- D. The "Survival Items Surveys," covering production capabilities and inventories at all levels, will be completed promptly so that information will be available both at the national headquarters and the regional relocation sites for use in emergency situations and for developing pre-attack, remedial programs.
- E. The Director of OCDM will take the lead in reviewing with the interested agencies the existing methods of estimating post-attack resource requirements, in order to assure rapid consolidation of regional needs.
- F. The Director of OCDM, working with the interested agencies, will develop a schedule of priorities or urgencies which will serve national objectives and be a guide for the assignment of resource allocation at all levels.
- G. With respect to radiological monitoring, the Director of OCDM will accelerate existing programs of equipment supply, coordinated operations and personnel training.
- H. The Special Committee on Financial Policies for Post-attack Operations will complete its deliberations to the point

where decisions can be made and communicated to Federal, state and local agencies concerning:

1. solvency and liquidity of financial institutions
2. moratoria on debts
3. indemnification of losses
4. use of bank deposits and availability of new bank credits
5. check clearance and use of cash or script

- I. The Special Committee on Financial Policies for Post-attack Operations will be requested promptly to clarify agency responsibility for post-attack control and supervision of the banking system (including the Federal Reserve Banks) and for preparedness plans regarding this system.
- J. Increased attention will be given to the physical protection against sabotage of key government facilities and of vital non-government facilities (e.g. communications); the Director of OCDM will examine this matter with the Department of Justice and the other agencies concerned.

The actions referred to above were noted.

ADDITIONAL POINTS RAISED AT THE ENLARGED CABINET MEETING ON OCTOBER 9, 1958, AND ACTION TAKEN IN CONNECTION THEREWITH

1. Pursuant to a point raised by the Secretary of State, the Director of OCDM will present to the Cabinet by March 1, 1959, a report on the implementation of the announced shelter program and on the measures taken or contemplated to persuade the individual citizen to take the necessary protective measures in advance.
2. The Director of OCDM, in consultation with the affected agencies, will give special attention to clarifying the pattern of OCDM and agency responsibilities and operations at the regional sites.
3. The Postmaster General will inform the President of the studies and findings of which he is cognizant concerning operation of such governmental services as mail delivery and similar matters in Germany during the final months before her surrender in 1945.



OFFICE OF DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson ☒  
Mr. Belmont ☒  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*Wanted Road 7, Belmont  
10-30-58  
JTAH:ck*

*Handwritten signatures and initials:*  
- A large signature, possibly "Lynch".  
- A signature, possibly "Holloman".  
- A signature, possibly "Gandy".  
- A signature, possibly "Trotter".

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*Gile*

✓

*Rosen*  
*McGuire*  
*(LAST)*

**EXP. PROC.**

NOV 4 1958

*Judge*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ABW*

DATE: November 7, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *ABW*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS ~~OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY~~  
OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL 1958)

|                |       |
|----------------|-------|
| Tolson         | _____ |
| Boardman       | _____ |
| Belmont        | _____ |
| Mohr           | _____ |
| Nease          | _____ |
| Parsons        | _____ |
| Rosen          | _____ |
| Tamm           | _____ |
| Trotter        | _____ |
| Clayton        | _____ |
| Tele. Room     | _____ |
| Holloman       | _____ |
| Gandy          | _____ |
| W. C. Sullivan | _____ |

SYNOPSIS:

Reference my memorandum 9-23-58 concerning receipt of Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) document captioned "Operational Capability of Federal, State and Local Government - OPAL 1958." Information in document concerning communications and damage assessment currently under review by Records and Communications and Laboratory Divisions. Remaining pertinent items in document reviewed herein.

Based on Operation Alert 1958, OCDM states that medical facilities at sites appear inadequate; 60% of field sites after attack would be without power, fuel, water, and sewage disposal facilities; sites for the most part would not have food; the arrival of evacuees at sites would be "an awkward uncertainty at best"; and apparently Government agencies have no emergency policies regarding Federal-state relationships.

Observations

Regarding our Quantico facilities, our site has available medical facilities which appear adequate, an auxiliary emergency water purification system which will remove radioactive particles, emergency motor generators to furnish necessary power, and a three-week food supply for 300 people with supplementary arrangements. During past exercises, we evacuated from Washington, D. C., to Quantico in approximately one hour and in spite of emergency handicaps, our site would be operable as it is manned continuously.

OCDM's remark concerning a lack of emergency policies concerning Federal-state relationships arises from an OPAL 1958 problem and a pre-attack questionnaire. In this problem and questionnaire, OCDM questioned agencies' policies concerning protection of site from outsiders and pre-emption of facilities and personnel and/or requests for assistance by outside authorities.

REC-13 66-19012-174

EX-103

NOV 12 1958

With approval, we answered that in the best interest of the country, admittance to our site would be denied to outsiders, pre-emption of our facilities and manpower was not foreseeable due to the nature of our responsibilities and our liaison with outside agencies, and our responsibilities would preclude our assistance concerning outside requests.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Buplans Desk
- 1 - Mr. Huelskamp

BLH:nck (5)

Enclosure sent 11-16-58

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL 1958)

In order that the field will be aware that OCDM has raised these questions, and to emphasize and remind the field of proper action to be taken, the attached SAC Letter should be sent to the field, even though it repeats some information previously furnished.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached SAC Letter be approved and forwarded to all field offices.

BA  
Jm

Jm

Q

H

V.

GH  
J

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL 1958)

DETAILS:

Reference Roach to Belmont memorandum 9-23-58 which advised that OCDM had furnished a document captioned "Operational Capability of Federal, State and Local Government - OPAL 1958." Portions of this document concerning communications and damage assessment are currently under review by the Laboratory and the Records and Communications Divisions. The remaining part of the document has been reviewed by the Defense Plans Desk with pertinent excerpts and observations as follows:

1. Facilities (Relocation Sites)

(a) Medical Services

"Agency reports place in bold relief the absence of doctors or medical services at relocation sites...and the uniform pre-attack optimism concerning availability of community medical facilities. As examples: 'there are 30 M.D.'s in the community' and 'our plan provides for use of community medical facilities.'"

(b) Community Facilities

"This same bland assumption that the local community would make Federal relocation sites and relocatees their first responsibility carried over into power, fuel, water, and sewage disposal facilities. As a result, we estimate these facilities to have been unavailable at 60% of the field relocation sites as a result of the attack and resulting fallout."

(c) Food

"...in the field, none of the civilian relocation sites were reliably supported with food stocks, and in the headquarters are roughly 70% of the civilian agencies reported either the complete absence of food or food storage limited to a period under one week."

Observations

(a) The "pre-attack optimism" refers to an OCDM pre-attack questionnaire which, among other things, asked what medical facilities were available to the agency and field relocation sites. We answered this questionnaire for our field offices by furnishing the nearest medical service as shown by a national medical and health directory

66-19012-174

- 3 ENCLOSURE

Memorandum Roach to Belmont

RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL 1958)

maintained by the Bureau's Health Service. In view of OCDM's expressed interest in these services, undoubtedly a follow-up questionnaire will be directed to all agencies in the future in order that OCDM might check on the progress in acquiring medical services. It is noted that the FBI Academy at Quantico has an existing arrangement for doctors and hospital services which would also be available to our key evacuees in any emergency. This arrangement appears to be satisfactory. Regarding the field office sites, it appears desirable to instruct the field by SAC Letter to ascertain, through public or ~~confidential~~ sources only, information regarding medical facilities near their sites which would be available in an emergency. Pertinent information obtained should be incorporated in the field office defense plans.

(b) Our Quantico site has an auxiliary emergency water purification system which will remove radioactive particles from our water supply. The site also has emergency motor generators to furnish necessary power in the event our normal power service is interrupted. Regarding our field office relocation sites, it appears desirable that each field office should determine, through public or ~~confidential~~ sources, the sources, and auxiliary sources if any, of utility services at its relocation site including the name of the individual or department responsible for restoring interrupted services. Pertinent information obtained should be incorporated in the field office defense plans as a separate caption under relocation site information.

(c) The contract caterer at Quantico maintains sufficient food at the FBI Academy to supply 300 people for 3 weeks. He has also made arrangements with the Marine Corps and wholesale food suppliers in the Quantico area for additional supplies. Regarding our field office sites, we have not engaged in stockpiling of foodstuffs; however, many of the field sites are located at universities which might possibly have food supplies for the use of field office evacuees. It appears desirable to instruct the field offices to obtain from public sources the names and addresses of potential food suppliers in the vicinity of the field office site. These lists of food suppliers should be made an appendix of the respective field office defense plans and only the fact that such information has been obtained should appear in each field office's defense plans proper.

## 2. Command ("Chain of Command" and Evacuees)

### (a) Command Authority

OCDM stated that in view of distance, travel between headquarters and the relocation site, and assumed attack damage, OCDM

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL 1958)

was "unable to share agency optimism as to relocation site arrivals of command personnel. It believed, rather, that the presence of Federal civilian command would have constituted an awkward uncertainty at best."

(b) Personnel

OCDM also believed that there would have been inadequate staffing at relocation sites. Further, since evacuees in many instances had been informed orally of their responsibilities, the possibility exists that under attack conditions, many evacuees may not recall instructions and/or be unable to locate the sites.

Observations

(a) During the past Operation Alerts it has taken Bureau evacuees approximately one hour to arrive at our Quantico site. Of course, in an emergency there would be handicaps. However, since our Quantico site is manned continuously with a responsible official in charge, it is operational and delays in arrival would be minimized to some extent. Regarding arrivals at the field office sites, it is noted that several field offices' "chain of command" includes a Senior Resident Agent assigned in the vicinity of the respective field office site. This appears to be a desirable practice and should be brought to the field's attention for consideration in connection with future changes in their "chain of command."

(b) In addition, each field office should be instructed to take the necessary measures to insure that field office evacuees are aware of their responsibilities.

3. Federal-State Relationships

"In general, this broad field proved to be a quagmire of uncertainties.... It was interesting to note that both the Department of the Army and the Department of Justice indicated that no additional pre-attack instructions are considered necessary in this area." (Note: The tone of this latter remark was one of disapproval, rather than approval, by OCDM.)

"Also, as indicated by agency replies to questionnaires, Federal authorities in the headquarters arc and in the field had no policies or instructions dealing with situations such as the following: (a) their facilities required police protection"; (e.g., a significant portion of the local community has become panic stricken and threatens to enter your site) "(b) state or local authorities attempted to pre-empt

Memorandum Roach to Belmont

RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL 1958)

use of facilities, stores, or personnel; or (c) the Governor of a State requested assistance which would substantially delay conduct of emergency assignments or, acting under state martial law, issued instructions to Federal officials contrary to their pre-attack assignments."

Observations

During the July, 1958, exercise, we received a problem from OCDM and a pre-attack questionnaire which contained questions similar to (a), (b), and (c) above. Our answers were as follows: (a) The security of the Bureau's site is adequate due to location and, in the best interest of the country, admittance to the site would be denied to members of the local community under the situation stated; (b) the situation assumed is not foreseeable due to the FBI's liaison with state governments and the nature of FBI responsibilities; and (c) in view of the FBI's obligations under Presidential directives, this Bureau would be precluded from rendering assistance unless the matters pertained to FBI responsibility. These replies had been previously approved and furnished to OCDM.

Since specific emergency situations concerning Federal-state relationships can only be anticipated, it appears desirable to instruct the field in general terms regarding FBI responsibilities and these relationships in an emergency. All offices should be reminded that in an emergency and unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, the Bureau's emergency responsibilities are to take precedence over other activities and unrelated outside requests. Further, essential equipment, facilities, supplies, and manpower must be protected and must not be pre-empted by others or diverted to other uses to the detriment of FBI emergency programs or responsibilities.

Handwritten signature and initials, likely of the author or reviewer, located at the bottom left of the page.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: 11-6-58

FROM : R. L. Millen

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
OF FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

|               |       |
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| Tolson        | _____ |
| Belmont       | _____ |
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| Nease         | _____ |
| Parsons       | _____ |
| Rosen         | _____ |
| Tamm          | _____ |
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| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

Reference is made to Mr. Roach's memorandum to Mr. Belmont dated 10-23-58 requesting that the Laboratory and the Records and Communications Division submit analyses and recommendations, if any, concerning Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) findings and recommendations included in OCDM document entitled, "Operational Capability of Federal, State and Local Government - OPAL 1958." The recommendations included in the OCDM paper attached to referenced memorandum were analyzed in the Laboratory. It was noted that the recommendations were rather vague, general and nonspecific in nature and require no comment to OCDM at this time. The following general comments are set forth for information and future guidance should specific proposals be made at a later date.

Recommendation Number 1, that emergency communications be subject to centralized coordination, is dangerous. This is part and parcel of a long-standing program of the former Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Defense Mobilization (now merged into OCDM) to build a communications empire to serve all Government agencies. This could only be detrimental to the Bureau's best interests since the Bureau would have no control over priority, security, etc., and our traffic would be competing with traffic from all other Government agencies. This would undoubtedly result in delays, misroutings, breaches of security, etc. Furthermore, it could be expected that any such central communications system would want to use our CW radio network to handle traffic for other agencies.

The OCDM paper alleges that the commercial telephone system is inadequate but does not go into any detail concerning how a centralized Government system would remedy the deficiency. It is interesting to note that some 30 million dollars was allotted to provide the present Interagency Communications System the only function of which is to provide communications between Government agencies in the small relocation area around Washington. Considering this fact, it taxes the imagination to conceive of the money that would be spent in trying to set up any centralized communications system on a nationwide basis. Any specific proposals by OCDM in this regard should be scrutinized very closely before any commitments are made.

66-17385  
55 NOV 19 1958  
1 - Mr. Minnich  
1 - Mr. Wherry

AJP:ctw

EX-102

REC-76

66-19012-175

NOV 17 1958

Memorandum to Mr. Parsons from R. L. Millen

DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
OF FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958  
66-17385

Recommendation Number 3 states that the various existing emergency communications systems should be reinforced with back-up facilities. This position is sound in principle and, as you know, the Bureau has limited radio back up of its land-line ~~radio~~ communications. However, it is pointed out that sufficient radio frequencies for back up of all these systems simply would not be available and, therefore, implementation of this recommendation does not appear to be practical.

The remaining recommendations appear to be innocuous as far as the Bureau is concerned. However, since they deal primarily with land-line communications and operating personnel, the Records and Communications Division may wish to comment further concerning these recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the Domestic Intelligence Division for information and guidance.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nease

DATE: 11-10-58

FROM : L. E. Wherry, Jr.

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
OF FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

Tolson ☒  
Boardman ☒  
Belmont ☒  
Mohr ☒  
Nease ☒  
Parsons ☒  
Rosen ☒  
Tamm ☒  
Trotter ☒  
W.C. Sullivan ☒  
Tele. Room ☒  
Holloman ☒  
Gandy ☒

Reference Mr. Roach's memorandum of 10-23-58 to Mr. Belmont recommending that the Laboratory Division and the Records and Communications Division submit analyses and recommendations, if any, concerning office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) findings and recommendations in OCDM document captioned "Operational Capability of Federal, State and Local Government - OPAL 1958." The excerpts from reference OCDM document, attachment to Mr. Roach's memorandum, have been reviewed, studied and analyzed in the Communications Section. Following are the comments of the Communications Section concerning the excerpts from reference OCDM document.

The Communications Section concurs with the comments of the Laboratory Division concerning, "Recommendation Number 1, that emergency communications be subject to centralized coordination." Interagency communications systems and procedures for the exchange of communications between the relocated Seat of Government Headquarters of the various government agencies requires centralized coordination; however, subjecting intra-FBI communications to outside control would prevent our having absolute control of our own internal communications and result in message delays, possible breaches of security and general lack of control over how and when our messages would be transmitted. In fact, it could result in OCDM attempting to absorb, take over or use for other agencies our CW Radio Network which is our communications lifeline in an emergency situation where landline facilities are disrupted or obliterated. Any government-wide communication system established should be used only as a back-up for our CW Radio Network and for the commercial facilities we use; and, in the event there is no mail service to and from a particular area, for sending communications we would normally send by mail. It is pointed

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Mr. Nease
- 1 - Mr. Parsons, Attention Mr. Millen

LEW:ml  
(6)EX-101  
REC-93

66-19012-176

10 NOV 17 1958

55 NOV 20 1958

Memorandum to Mr. Nease

11-10-58

Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
OF FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958


out that the combined message volume capacity of our CW Radio Network, plus intra-FBI TWX teletype (toll), telegraph and telephone communications and our encoding and decoding capacity would accommodate only a small portion of the intra-FBI communications normally handled by mail.

Recommendation Number 5 is, "An intensive program of training communicators should be initiated by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in order to free civil government from an unrealistic dependence on military communicators in time of emergency. This training should cover two broad areas: (a) upgrading a sufficient number of stenographic and clerical personnel to competence as teletype, telephone, and radio operators, and (b) orientation of professional program staff in the techniques of message preparation, with emphasis on brevity and clarity." This recommendation appears to be aimed (1) at OCDM's Interagency Communications System (ICS) message relay center, HIGHPOINT, which operation has depended largely upon personnel actually assigned to the Signal Corps; and (2) to civil agencies which have had to request that military communications personnel be assigned to their relocation sites during test exercises because they have an insufficient number of their own personnel adequately trained in the ICS message handling methods, procedures and systems. We have continued to have our communications personnel trained in the ODM-ICS schools, have never experienced any difficulties in the handling of interagency communications, and have declined any outside help.

The remaining recommendations in reference OCDM document require no comment other than those made by the Laboratory Division. In this connection, it is pointed out that we are in no position to comment on recommendations concerning planning details of a centralized government-wide communications system in which we wish to take no active part.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be forwarded to the Domestic Intelligence Division for information and guidance.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons *J*

DATE: 11/20/58

FROM : B. J. White *B. J. White*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS  
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY  
OF FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL  
GOVERNMENT; OPERATION ALERT 1958

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| Tolson        | _____ |
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| Parsons       | _____ |
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| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

Memorandum dated 10/23/58, from Roach to Belmont, with Annex No. 2 report of Operational Capability Task Group, has been reviewed in the FBI Laboratory.

You will recall that all field office relocation sites were studied with reference to possible fallout contamination should prime targets as listed in the Department of Defense Key Facilities Chart be subjected to nuclear blasts. As a consequence of this study, the relocation sites of 14 offices were moved to more favorable sites.

Fallout patterns resulting from surface detonations of nuclear warheads are dependent upon the point of detonation, bomb size and existing wind conditions (surface and aloft) at the time of detonation. The winds at the time of actual detonation can only be known a few days prior to the detonation. However, winds were obtained from the Weather Bureau's climatological data which reflected the prevailing direction and speed of winds at many different locations throughout the country. Prevailing winds and prime targets were the elements considered in the evaluation of relocation site locations.

During the 1958 Operational Alert, the mock attack was so severe that approximately 70 per cent of this country's surface was blanketed by a mock fallout which would restrict operations for at least two days following the attack. The coastal areas were almost saturated with fallout from this assumed attack.

During the last Operational Alert, it was noted that from such a saturation type attack, 38 field offices were destroyed, plus the facilities at the Seat of Government. One hundred seven resident agencies were destroyed. Only one relocation site suffered blast damage and eleven relocation sites had serious fallout problems. The headquarters' relocation site was not afflicted by blast effects or fallout.

1-Mr. Minnich

1958

JFG:FCP (5)

REC-13

66-19012-179

NOV 28 1958

55 DEC 2

133

Memorandum to Mr. Parsons

No appreciable improvement could be realized from a re-evaluation of relocation sites, using the same norms as in the past. Improvements could be realized but these would entail costly and apparently impractical expenditures. Accessible underground bomb-proof, well stocked facilities are the only sure way of realizing a higher operational efficiency under a saturation type attack with nuclear warheads.

Equipment for monitoring the fallout hazard and dosimeters for measuring radiation doses are available in every field office. Trained personnel is available in every office who understands the equipment and the significance of the readings. The FBI Laboratory is following new developments in the instrumental field of radiation detection and measurement. Training is continuing on radiation hazards.

ACTION:

For information only.

*JWS*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *ABM*

DATE: November 26, 1958

FROM : R. R. ROACH *R*SUBJECT: BUPIANS OPERATION ALERT 1958  
JULY-15-18, 1958  
(RECOMMENDATIONS)

|               |       |
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| Tolson        | _____ |
| Belmont       | _____ |
| Mohr          | _____ |
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| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
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| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

Memorandum Belmont to the Director dated 7-18-58 re Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL '58) based on results of our participation in the exercise contained four recommendations, and Roach to Belmont memorandum 10-8-58 advised recommendations 2a and 4, regarding communications procedures and reconstruction of Identification Division files were considered handled.

Recommendations 1, 2b, and 3 and action taken to date are:

- (1) "With reference to field operations based on the above observations the Administrative Division will study all matters of field operations under simulated, as well as real emergency conditions, and will submit appropriate recommendations for approval, following which an SAC letter will be sent to the field for its information and future guidance."

ACTION: Memorandum Roach to Belmont 11-24-58 set forth analysis of field office suggestions and recommended an SAC letter be sent. This matter is considered handled.

- (2) b. "A study with appropriate recommendations will also be made concerning the physical housing of our communications facilities in the Academy building at the relocation site."

ACTION: Some of the work has been completed. The Administrative Division has advised it may be possible to order air conditioning equipment, venetian blinds, and rugs in February or March, 1959. A tickler will be set for 3-1-59 to follow this with the Administrative Division.

- (3) "The Administrative and Laboratory Divisions will further study the problem of acquiring more suitable temporary housing for our operating equipment at our microwave station."

53 DEC 15 1958

JTM:sal (8)

1-Mr. Belmont

1-Mr. Mohr

1-Mr. Nease

1-Mr. Parsons

(Attention Mr. Guathier)

(Attention Mr. Wherry)

(Attention Mr. Millen)

DEC 11 1958

1-Mr. Tamm (Attention Mr. Sloan)

1-Liaison Section

1-Mr. Minnich

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
Re: BUPLANS OPERATION ALERT 1958  
JULY 15-18, 1958  
(RECOMMENDATIONS)

ACTION: Memorandum Millen to Parsons 10-16-58 advised survey of this item had been completed. It was noted that the equipment protection which would be provided by this enclosure and the resultant increased security from equipment failure are well recognized. However, the critical need to conserve funds at this time would appear to preclude proceeding with the project and no recommendation to seek approval was made by the Laboratory. A recommendation was made that no further action be taken at this time relative to rehousing the microwave equipment at Quantico. A tickler will be set for 3-1-59 to follow this matter with the Laboratory Division.

ACTION:

None. Informative.

Jim  
Jef  
Q



2- original and duplicate  
12- copies below  
1-yellow  
1-Mr. Belmont  
1-Mr. Mohr  
1-Mr. Nease  
1-Liaison  
1-Mr. Minnich

b6  
b7c

SAC, Atlanta

December 17, 1958

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

**BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958**  
**(OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE**  
**MOBILIZATION STOCKPILES)**

Re SAC Letter 58-46 (B).

Many field offices, in response to referenced SAC Letter, have suggested that they be furnished a list of the various stockpiles maintained by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), including the location, services, facilities, and equipment available.

Within fifteen days from receipt of this letter, recipients are to contact the regional OCDM offices in their area and ascertain information as follows:

- (1) Location of OCDM-maintained stockpiles in the region.
- (2) Services, facilities, and equipment available at the stockpile.
- (3) Authority necessary and procedure to be followed to obtain any required items under emergency conditions.

DEC 15 2 53 PM '58  
REC'D-READING ROOM  
FBI

Subsequent to the receipt of the foregoing information it should be immediately furnished by letter to the Bureau with copies to the offices located within the OCDM regional boundary with instructions to these offices that the information should be included in the office defense plans.

2 - Baltimore  
2 - Boston  
2 - Dallas  
2 - Denver  
2 - Detroit  
2 - San Francisco

MAILED 19  
DEC 17 1958  
COMM-FBI

Cover memo Roach to Belmont, dated 11-24-58  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958,  
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED  
BY THE FIELD. 66-19012-181

REC-93

10 DEC 18 1958

JTM:nc (20)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

61 DEC 19 1958

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*ple*  
(E) ~~BUPLANS~~ ~~OPERATION ALERT 1958~~ SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD ~~Re~~ SAC Letter 58-46 (B).  
(U)

The suggestions and recommendations submitted in response to referenced SAC Letter have been analyzed. Many field offices suggested the maintenance of various lists ranging from lists of former Bureau employees as potential employees in the event of an emergency to lists of employees possessing various skills. Also suggested was the pre-positioning of various forms at resident agencies and the maintenance of a "relocation kit" to include items not in everyday use but which might be desirable in the event of an emergency. The Bureau has given these suggestions careful consideration and concludes that the administrative burden attendant to the maintenance of lists, forms, and a "relocation kit" is not warranted.

12/23/58

SAC LETTER NO. 58-81

- 2 -

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-2815

Classified by SP8 BTJ/dal  
Declassify on: OADR 8/30/83

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

166-19012-  
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102 JAN 7 1959

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52 JAN 8 1959

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kit" would probably become so involved and expanded that the effort would not justify the anticipated results. Therefore, suggestions along these lines have been rejected. (S) (U)

Regarding the furnishing of a listing of various stockpiles maintained by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) throughout the country, a letter has gone forth to the field offices maintaining liaison with regional OCDM offices to ascertain complete information regarding stockpiles maintained and to furnish this information to all field offices within the respective regions. You should, upon receipt of this information, include it in your office plans (S) (U)

You are to immediately comply with instructions regarding communications as follows (S) (U)

(1) All employees currently designated to serve as emergency relief radio operators are to be afforded by the senior radioman in your office a code sending and receiving test at the GS-5 radio operator level as set forth in the Radio Operators Manual, Part I, Section 7.A., and the results furnished to the Bureau within thirty days.

(2) Emergency relief operators in your office who are unable to meet the GS-5 radio qualifications are to be afforded sufficient instruction and practice under the supervision of the senior radio employee to bring the relief operator's ability up to GS-5 level. (S) (U)

(3) Each emergency relief operator qualified at the GS-5 level should be afforded a minimum of two hours' practice each sixty days and should be afforded the GS-5 radio operator's test once each six months. The results of these tests should be forwarded to the Bureau, attention Communications Section, and an appropriate notation included in your office plans.

Many additional suggestions and recommendations were received which are considered essential to effective planning and will be incorporated into the Bureau's over-all defense planning. Instructions incorporating these suggestions will be forthcoming in the near future and you should not include in your office plans any of the suggestions made by you until such instructions are received. (S) (U)

The efforts of all field offices to devise good, concise, workable plans are commendable and should be continued. (S) (U)

12/23/58  
SAC LETTER NO. 58-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~52 JAN 8 1959~~

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Director, FBI

DATE: 12/31/58

FROM: SAC, San Francisco (100-27336)

SUBJECT: BUPLANS--OPERATION ALERT 1958  
(OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE MOBILIZATION  
STOCKPILES)

Re Bulet 12/17/58.

Bulet set forth that many field offices in response to SAC Let 58-46 (B) had requested they be furnished a list of various stockpiles maintained by Office of Civil Defense Mobilization (OCDM), including the location, services, facilities, and equipment available.

PHILIP D. BATSON (NA), Regional Director, Region 7, OCDM, Santa Rosa, Calif. is presently in Washington, D. C. and will not return to his Headquarters until after the Christmas holidays. JESSE H. MCLENDON, Law Enforcement Liaison Officer, in charge of Health and Welfare Section, OCDM, Region 7, is on annual leave until January 5, 1959.

In the absence of these two officials at OCDM, Region 7, the following data was received by SA MERLE R. ADAMS from THOMAS R. HUFF, Director of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defense, Region 7. Mr. HUFF advised on 12/23/58 that there had been some misunderstanding concerning the type of stockpile maintained by OCDM and regarding the proper utilization of the stockpile. He referred to the inventory records of Region 7 and pointed out that the stockpile contains no foodstuff whatever. The stockpile is broken down into two categories (1) Engineering and (2) Medical.

2 Bureau  
1 San Diego  
1 Los Angeles  
1 Portland  
1 Seattle  
1 Phoenix  
1 Salt Lake City  
1 Butte  
1 Anchorage  
1 Honolulu  
1 San Francisco  
AJT/ig  
(12)

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66-19012-182

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LIAISON

61 JAN 7 1958

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SF 100-27336

Under the Engineering category is an inventory list broken down into the following items as an example: 6,000 battery leads, 10,000 bolts and nuts, 1,000 feet 3/4 inch pipe, 500 couplings, 10 generators, and miscellaneous tools. Mr. HUFF stated the quantity of these items is continuously being changed and shifted from warehouse to warehouse and that much of the equipment listed above is for the primary purpose of purification of water and to set up new water systems in the event of an emergency.

Under the Medical category there is listed the following items as an example: 10,000 buckle splints, 500 feet webbing, 10,000 bandages  $\frac{1}{2}$ " , 10,000 sodium chloride tablets, 50 bolts field dressing, 10 quarts blood plasma, miscellaneous items such as adhesive tape, blood receptacles, forceps, needles, patient effects bag, heating pads, 39,000 blankets, plastic sheets, water pumping units and 50 medical field cases. Mr. HUFF explained that these items are all in packaged units, as hospital equipment. Although they have 39,000 blankets they have no cots. The materials are for OCDM pre-positioned hospital units only and are intended primarily to be set up as units. At the present time these units are only designated for State use in an emergency.

Mr. HUFF further explained that it was his understanding that on the Federal level the Federal Agencies were expected to care for their own needs, in an emergency there would be little or no control and survival would be on an individual basis for the first 10 days. The next 10 days OCDM would try to administer and supplement aid to the needs of the various States. No materials would be released until a decision is made by OCDM and State authorities working in a committee to determine where the need is the greatest.

Mr. HUFF stated he recently visited the warehouse at San Jose, Calif. and although the warehouse is set up to store medical units, at the present time there is very little equipment in storage, although this situation will be remedied as time goes on.

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In regard to the authority necessary and procedure to be followed to obtain any required items under emergency conditions, Mr. HUFF was of the opinion that the Regional Director of OCDM would be the proper authority to contact.

Set forth below is the location of OCDM maintained warehouses in Region 7 which covers the following FBI field offices: San Diego, Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, Butte, Anchorage, Honolulu and San Francisco. Also set forth is the current warehouse manager and his office telephone number:

| <u>NAME OF WAREHOUSE<br/>AND LOCATION</u>  | <u>TYPE OF<br/>WAREHOUSE</u> | <u>NAME OF FACILITY<br/>MANAGER</u>              | <u>OFFICE<br/>NUMBER</u>                                   |
|--|------------------------------|--|--|
| Yakima Warehouse<br>1011 South 3rd St.<br>Yakima, Washington   | Medical                      | M. A. COLLISON                                   | Glencourt<br>2-6703  |
| Mira Loma Ware-<br>house Bldg. #931<br>Mira Loma Air Force<br>Station, Mira Loma,<br>Calif.          | Medical &<br>Engineering     | HOWARD A.<br>STEBBINS                            | Overland<br>5-5211<br>Ext..90                              |
| San Jose Warehouse<br>124 Keyes St.<br>San Jose, Calif.  | Medical                      | CARL AKIN  | Cypress<br>4-8817  |
| Stockton Naval<br>Supply<br>Annex of Oakland Naval<br>Supply Depot<br>Stockton, Calif.               | Medical                      | Captain G. M.<br>DRISCOLL                        | Howard<br>6-6031   |
| Sharpe General<br>Depot<br>Lathrop, Calif.<br>and<br>Quarter Master Supply<br>Section, Tracy, Calif. | Medical<br>"                 | Col. WALTER A.<br>HUNTSBERRY<br><br>L. W. SUTTON | Call<br>Information<br><br>Terminal<br>5-1180<br>Ext..6340 |

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SF 100-27336

|   |                       |  |                                  |
|---|-----------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| Santa Rosa Engineering Stockpile<br>U. S. Naval Air Station<br>Santa Rosa, Calif.         | Engineering           | ALLAN O. CORNISH                                     | Liberty<br>2-1680                |
| Velox Naval Supply Depot<br>Spokane, Washington   | Medical               | Lt. Com. LINDIG                                      | Walnut<br>6281<br>Ext..215       |
| McMinnville Engineering Stockpile<br>McMinnville Municipal Airport<br>McMinnville, Oregon | Engineering           | IVAN L. PEARSON<br>(Chief of McMinnville Fire Dept.) | McMinnville<br>2051              |
| Mt. Rainier Ordnance Depot<br>Tacoma, Washington  | Medical & Engineering | Col. C. F. BUCK, JR.                                 | Lakewood<br>3611                 |
| Clearfield Naval Supply Depot<br>Clearfield, Utah   | Medical               | Lt. Comm. C. R. HARVEY                               | Clearfield<br>5-1661<br>Ext..241 |
| Diamond Head Tunnel<br>Diamond Head Crater<br>Honolulu, Hawaii                            | Medical               | RICHARD K. YEE                                       | 77-3215                          |

The San Francisco Office believes that the information contained herein is inconclusive and doesn't meet the request outlined in Bulet but it is the only information obtainable in the absence of PHILIP D. BATSON, Director, Region 7, and his deputy.

The San Francisco Office will vigorously pursue this matter further and upon the return of BATSON or his deputy obtain additional and current information if available.

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SF 100-27336

Upon receipt of this additional information  
the Bureau and interested offices will be so advised.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 12/30/58

FROM : SAC, DALLAS (66-715E)

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
(OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE  
MOBILIZATION STOCKPILES)

Re Bureau letter to Atlanta dated 12/17/58.

On 12/19/58, Mr. LESLIE HOLLAND, Deputy Regional Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), Brackenridge Hall, Denton, Texas, advised that the OCDM regional office covers the states of New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas and Louisiana. There are two OCDM-maintained stockpiles in this region, the correct addresses and personnel responsible for the two facilities being Mr. L. S. WOOD, General Supply Officer, OCDM Warehouse "A", P. O. Box 5216, Drew Station, Lake Charles, Louisiana, and Mr. WILLIAM C. DICKSON, General Supply Officer, OCDM Warehouse, Camp Swift, P. O. Box 196, Bastrop, Texas. The OCDM warehouse at Lake Charles, Louisiana, where the stockpile is located, only maintains medical supplies there. This stockpile has all items necessary for equipping a hospital, such as operating room, laboratory, X-ray, sterilizing room and pharmaceutical supplies. In addition the stockpile at Lake Charles contains civil defense emergency units, each unit containing about 350 boxes and crates with 293 different items of equipment and more than 8,000 individual pieces. To display this unit in its entirety, it requires at least 15,000 square feet of space. These emergency hospital units are to be dispersed to various sections of the region where needed in the event of stress or emergency situations. Each unit is designed to provide a 200 bed emergency hospital. Each unit contains beds, mattresses, surgical instruments and equipment, laboratory and X-ray facilities, pharmaceutical supplies and sterilizing room equipment.

The OCDM stockpile at Bastrop, Texas, also maintains several civil defense emergency hospital units as described above as well as medical supplies enumerated heretofore. In

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
- 1 - Albuquerque (RM)
- 1 - El Paso (RM)
- 1 - Houston (RM)
- 1 - San Antonio (RM)
- 1 - New Orleans (RM)
- 1 - Little Rock (RM)
- 1 - Oklahoma City (RM)
- 1 - Dallas

WHB:jh  
(10)

61 JAN 7 1958

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LILSON

DL 66-715E

addition to the medical supplies, this stockpile maintains two complete blood banks plus engineering units such as pipes, pumps and other equipment which are to be utilized in fighting fires or for an emergency water supply.

The two stockpiles mentioned have on hand 120-125 civil defense emergency hospital units which are to be used in this region. At present 23 have been allocated to Louisiana, 12 to Oklahoma, 5 to Arkansas, 4 to New Mexico and the remainder to Texas. Mr. HOLLAND stated that their records did not reflect how many units were in each of the stockpiles at present as these units are received and transferred frequently. The removal of these units to the points where needed is referred to as the "pre-position" program of the OCDM.

There is no established procedure to be followed to obtain any required items under emergency conditions. The telephone, teletype or letters would suffice in obtaining any of the above equipment, according to Mr. HOLLAND, by making the demand to Mr. WELCOME W. WILSON, Regional Director, OCDM, Denton, Texas. The regional directors are authorized to release 50% of the equipment in these stockpiles upon request if there is justification that they are needed. Upon making demand, the necessary equipment will be released immediately.

The Bureau has advised that all offices receiving this letter located within this OCDM regional boundary should include these instructions in the office defense plans.

SF - 64

OFFICE MEMORANDUM \* UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: December 31, 1958  
FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (66-1812)  
RE: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
(OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE  
MOBILIZATION STOCKPILES)

Reference Bureau letter to Atlanta December 17, 1958.

Mr. JOSEPH W. MOODY, Supply Officer, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Thomasville, Georgia, on December 29, 1958, advised that the regional office at Thomasville covers Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. In addition to these states it also covers Canal Zone, Puerto Rica, and the Virgin Islands. Mr. MOODY advised that this region maintains stockpiles as follows:

Medical Stockpiles

Anniston Ordnance Depot, Bymun, Alabama

This stockpile maintains medical and survival items such as drugs, dressings, and emergency hospital equipment. This depot also maintains equipment for moving and handing the above supplies.

Rockwood, Tennessee

This stockpile maintains medical and survival items such as drugs, dressings, and emergency hospital equipment. It also maintains engineering items such as pumps, pipelines, water filters and generators.

- ② - Bureau (RM)
- 2 - Birmingham
- 2 - Charlotte
- 2 - Jacksonville
- 2 - Knoxville
- 2 - Memphis
- 2 - Miami
- 2 - Mobile
- 2 - New Orleans
- 2 - San Juan
- 2 - Savannah
- 2 - Atlanta

RAM:hld

(24)

61 JAN 9 1958

1 cc Det Dir  
1-7-59  
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66-19012-184  
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LIPSON

JAN 5 1959

AT 66-1812

Atlanta General Depot, Forest Park, Georgia

This depot maintains medical items only such as drugs, dressings, and emergency hospital supplies.

Engineering Stockpiles

Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization,  
Thomasville, Georgia

This agency stockpiles pumps, pipeline, water purification units and generators.

Veterans Administration Hospital, Dublin, Georgia

This agency stockpiles pumps, pipeline, water purification units and generators.

Mr. MOODY advised that under emergency conditions supplies from the above stockpiles will be issued on the authority of Mr. THOMAS H. GOODMAN, Regional Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Thomasville, Georgia. Requests for supplies should be made directly to him at the Regional Office, OCDM, Thomasville, Georgia, telephone CANal 6-1761.

The Bureau has instructed that the above information be included in the Defense Plans of offices receiving this communication.

2-Orig and 1  
1-Yellow  
1-Liaison  
1-Mr. Minnich

SAC, Denver (66-1059 E)

January 8, 1959

REC-91

Director, FBI 66-19012-185

PERSONAL ATTENTION

BUPLANS  
OPERATION ALERT 1958  
OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE  
MOBILIZATION STOCK PILES


Re Denver letter dated 12-31-58.

The offices receiving copies of this letter should not contact State Civil Defense agencies regarding their stock piles as suggested by referenced Denver letter. State stock piles are considered to be for the needs of the respective states and local governments and in a time of an emergency the needs of the Bureau will be supplied by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), emergency agencies established by OCDM or private suppliers.

1 - Kansas City  
1 - Minneapolis  
1 - Omaha

JTM:sal (8)  
sal

NOTE: Referenced Denver letter set forth information concerning Denver's contact with regional OCDM, at which time it was suggested to the Denver office that State Civil Defense agencies be contacted regarding their stock piles. This is not considered feasible or desirable.



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DEPT OF JUSTICE  
FBI

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM

JAN 14 1959

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: Dec. 31, 1958

FROM : SAC, DENVER (66-1059 E)

SUBJECT:

BUPLANS

OPERATION ALERT 1958

OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE  
MOBILIZATION STOCK PILES

Rebulet to Atlanta 12/17/58, cc to Denver, and  
SAC Letter 58-46 (B).

For the information of offices receiving copies of this letter, referenced Bulet requested the location of Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) maintained stock piles in the region, the services, facilities and equipment available at the stock pile and the authority necessary and procedure to be followed to obtain any required items under emergency conditions be ascertained from OCDM Regional Offices.

On 12/30/58, Mr. DAVID HARRISON, Deputy for Operations OCDM Region 6, Denver, Colorado, advised stock piles in Region 6 are located at Hampton, Iowa, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and at the Sioux Ordnance Depot, Sidney, Nebraska. The stock pile at Hampton, Iowa contains medical and engineering supplies. The medical supplies consist of 200 bed emergency hospital units developed to help fill anticipated gap in hospital facilities in the event of a nuclear attack. These units can be transported in a van of 1600 cubic feet capacity and they require about 15,000 square feet of space when set up. In addition to the hospital units the medical stock pile consists of burn dressings, blood-recipient sets, blood derivatives, plasma expanders, gas masks, atropine, vaccines and antitoxins, paper blankets, litters, radiological dosimeters and radiological survey meters.

The engineering stock pile at Hampton, Iowa, consists of 8" pipe and couplings, water pumps, generators, chlorinators, water purifiers, and battery chargers.

- ② Bureau  
2 - Kansas City  
2 - Minneapolis  
2 - Omaha  
1 - Denver  
LRH:ekw (9)

REC-91

JAN 2 1959

JAN 5 1959

EXP. PROC.

A

1-7-59  
letter to  
Denver  
cc's to

g.m. Dale  
1-8-59

66-19012-185  
JAN 2 1959  
HARRISON

DN 66-1059E

The stock pile at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, consists of engineering supplies similar to those at Hampton, Iowa.

The stock pile at Sidney, Nebraska, consists of medical supplies similar to those at Hampton, Iowa.

Mr. HARRISON stated in addition to the above medical supplies, substantial quantities of vaccines and antibiotics are stock piled in the storage facilities of the manufacturers. These supplies will be distributed through OCDM Regional Offices in time of emergency.

The stock piled supplies are under the direct control of the OCDM Regional Director who will release them to the various state Civil Defense Directors on the basis of need. Mr. HARRISON said that states are to exhaust their supplies they have stock piled locally before they submit requests to OCDM for additional supplies. Some of the stock piled items are continually being released to state Civil Defense Units who can provide safe permanent local storage facilities and who will accept responsibility for adequate maintenance and protection. Offices located in Region 6 should obtain required items under emergency conditions by requesting them from their respective State Civil Defense Units.

Referenced Bulet instructed that each office receiving this information should include it in their office defense plans.

Since most State Civil Defense Agencies will have their own stock piles, it is suggested that each office contact their respective State Civil Defense Director to determine the location and availability of their stock piling.

2-Orig and 1  
1-Yellow 1-Minnich  
1-Mr. Belmont  
1-Mr. Bartlett  
1-Mr. Parsons (Attn Conrad)  
1-Liaison

January 7, 1959

SAC, Detroit (66-2276-E)

REC-91

Director, FBI 66-19012-186

PERSONAL ATTENTION

BUPLANS-OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION  
STOCKPILES  
REGION IV


Re Detroit letter dated 1-2-59.

Unless instructed to do so by the Bureau,  
you are to take no action concerning Dr. Moore's  
advice re equipment available under the "Chemical Program"  
as set forth on page five of relet.

- 1 - Chicago
- 1 - Indianapolis
- 1 - Kansas City
- 1 - Milwaukee
- 1 - Springfield
- 1 - St. Louis

JTM:sal (14)

NOTE: Enclosure to Cover Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
dated: 1-6-59 captioned: "BUPLANS-OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE  
MOBILIZATION STOCKPILES, REGION IV-DETROIT DIVISION" JTM:sal



Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

JAN 14 1959  
MAIL ROOM ☐



## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: January 2, 1959

FROM : SAC, Detroit (66-2276-E)

SUBJECT: BUPLANS OPERATION ALERT 1958  
(OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE  
MOBILIZATION STOCKPILES)

12/17/58. Re SAC Letter 58-46 (B) and Bureau letter to Atlanta,

The following information was obtained at Battle Creek, Michigan, on December 22, 1958, from Deputy Director of Region IV, OCDM, PAUL McDONALD and his staff:

Region IV, OCDM, includes at present the following states: Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Wisconsin. In this region OCDM has the following stockpiles or warehouses containing OCDM materials generally categorized as Engineering, Radiological, and Medical:

MICHIGAN

OCDM/GSA Warehouse  
Corner of Hanover and Dobbins Streets  
Marshall, Michigan  
Phone: STORY 17251  
Manager: Mr. A.E. KLAAS

ILLINOIS

OCDM/GSA Warehouse  
Naval Industrial Reserve Shipyard  
Seneca, Illinois  
Phone: 7-6195  
Manager: Mr. C.E. HANSEN, SR.

- ② - Bureau (RM)  
2 - Chicago (RM)  
2 - Indianapolis (RM)  
2 - Kansas City (RM)  
2 - Milwaukee (RM)  
2 - Springfield (RM)  
2 - St. Louis (RM)  
2 - Detroit

CFC/mac  
(16)

EX-102

1 cc det 3/27  
1-6-59  
let to Detroit  
1-7-59  
DM. Sal

REC-91

SR.1

66-19012-186

JAN 5 1959

A. EXP. PROC.

DE 66-2276-E

OCDM/GSA Warehouse  
Crab Orchard Wild Life Refuge  
Area #7  
Building 1-1  
P.O. Box 67  
Carterville, Illinois  
Phone: Ordille, Illinois WY 22141  
Manager: Mr. POLLOCK

Commanding Officer  
Decatur Signal Depot  
Decatur, Illinois

Commanding Officer  
Granite City Engineer Depot  
Granite City, Illinois

MISSOURI

OCDM/GSA Warehouse  
1615 Pythian Street  
P.O. Box 325  
Springfield, Missouri  
Phone: 4-9123  
Manager: Mr. PAUL C. BRAY

OCDM/GSA Warehouse  
c/o Ozark Terminal, Inc.  
P.O. Box 147  
Neosho, Missouri  
Phone: Glendale 1-2336  
Manager: Mr. SAM P. MAYCOCK

INDIANA

Building 72, Dutch Lane Road  
Jeffersonville, Indiana  
Phone: Butler 3-3511 Extension 3214  
Manager: not indicated

c/o Liberty Coach Building  
West Dewey and Spencer Street  
Bremen, Indiana  
Phone: Liberty 6-7241  
Manager: Mr. THOMAS H. JOHNSON

DE 66-2276-E

WISCONSIN

No stockpiles or warehouses are located in this state.

WHAT IS AVAILABLE AT THE ABOVE STOCKPILES:

Except for services by a limited number of radiological technicians in the repair of radiological instruments at the warehouses at Marshall, Michigan, and Cartersville, Illinois, there are no services available, as such, at the stockpiles.

The contents of the stockpiles vary from time to time as to amount but generally contain the categories Engineering, Radiological and Medical.

ENGINEERING

These are water supply units for communities, to supplement existing water plants in emergency. Each unit consists roughly of 10 miles of 8" pipe and accessories, electric pumps, generators, chlorinators, and storage tanks. These are located in the following warehouses:

- 1 - Carterville, Ill.
- 1 - Marshall, Mich.
- 4 - Seneca, Ill.
- 1 - Springfield, Mo.

RADIOLOGICAL

These materials are in the form of instruments (Survey meters, and Dosimeters) used to detect radioactive material, and chargers and testers necessary to service those instruments. They are stated to be located at all stockpiles except the ones at Granite City and Decatur, Illinois, which are small stockpiles devoted to medical equipment.

MEDICAL

These materials embrace all types of medicines (except narcotics) and equipment needed to supply and maintain unit hospitals. OCDM's planning contemplates 200 bed hospital units to supplement existing hospital facilities. All of the stockpiles in Region IV have medical material in varying amounts.

OBTAINING MATERIALS FROM STOCKPILES UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS:

The materials in the stockpiles with the exception noted below are the property of OCDM and are available only through the National Operational Headquarters of OCDM (Battle Creek, Michigan) or through OCDM Region IV or its duly authorized representatives, except as explained hereafter. The purpose of the stockpiles is stated to be to meet community needs, and not the needs of particular organizations or agencies (such as Federal agencies as such) and requisition and distribution is to be handled through state and local Civil Defense organizations.

According to Mr. BEN C. KILLIAN, Director of Operations, Region IV, OCDM, it is contemplated that Federal Agencies, such as the FBI, will avail themselves of the opportunity to acquire adequate supplies of radiological instruments in advance of any emergency so that there would be no occasion to have recourse to stockpiles in emergency to handle their needs, excepting of course unforeseen developments. He stated that minimal requirements based upon the number of employees at any given installation have been worked out and are available, as are application forms for securing same from Region IV. He further stated that necessary training programs in the operation of the instruments are available through Region IV known as Radiological Monitor Instructors, course. He stated that generally these courses, occupying about a weeks time, not necessarily on consecutive days and generally arranged to meet the requirements of the agency, are designed to train a nucleus of instructors within the particular division of the agency involved.

DE 66-2276-E

According to Doctor GEORGE MOORE, U.S. Public Health Service Physician assigned to Region IV, OCDM, as Regional Medical Officer, medical supplies are available only through qualified physicians. He pointed out that as of January 1, 1959, all medical supplies in the stockpiles will become the property of the U.S. Public Health Service and will be administered by that agency acting through the State Health Commissioners under the State Civil Defense organizations in the states in Region IV. He recommended that each FBI field office affected should perfect liaison with the U.S. Public Health representatives in their district so that in the event of emergency the requirements of those offices can be readily made known to and obtained through those representatives.

Doctor MOORE further advised that he strongly advises that FBI field offices in the Region also consider requesting for investigative personnel an adequate supply of equipment under the Chemical Program. This includes general purpose masks, detection kits for testing food, air, and water, atropine syrettes for counteracting effects of exposure to certain "nerve gases". He also advocated the obtaining of Civil Defense First Aid Kits containing disaster items for use in Bureau cars.

Doctor MOORE pointed out that 32,000 of the general purpose masks are being released by OCDM to state Civil Defense agencies in the immediate future. He indicated that requirements of FBI and other Federal agencies would be available in the future from Region IV upon application. He stated that present planning contemplates that these requirements will be met in advance of emergency in the case of Federal agencies generally, so that dependency upon stockpiles by those agencies will be obviated.

As further and more specific information regarding items of particular interest becomes available, it will be furnished to interested offices.

The above information should be included in the office defense plans of offices receiving copies of this letter.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
 ATT.: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FROM : SAC, KNOXVILLE (66-798)

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958 -  
 SUGGESTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS  
 SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD

DATE: 1/7/59

Re SAC Letter 58-81, Sec. E, dated 12/23/58.

The Knoxville Division, in addition to its Radio Technician Operator, GS-10, has a Radio Communications Officer, GS-7. UACB, tests to be afforded emergency relief radio operators at GS-5 level not being given.

2 - Bureau / det. Comm. Sect.  
 1 - Knoxville

1/12/59  
 af

GCG:at  
 (3)

*No reply made  
 re letter  
 - 4/5/59*

*W Henry*

*A*

REC-51

66-17012-187

10 JAN 12 1959

55 JAN 14 1959

*W Henry*  
*LIATSON*

COMM. SECT.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/7/59

ATTENTION: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FROM : SAC, HOUSTON (66-735)

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958,  
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD

Re: SAC Letter 58-81, Section E.

In accordance with Bureau instructions SA F. PATRICK CARR, emergency relief radio operator for the Houston Division, was given code sending and receiving tests at GS-5 radio operator level as set forth in Radio Operator's Manual, Part I, Section 7.A, with the following results:

Receiving: Letters - 20 WPM - 100% accuracy  
Numbers - 12 WPM - 100% accuracy

Sending: Letters - Handkey - 18 WPM - 98% accuracy  
Numbers - Handkey - 12 WPM - 99% accuracy

The above test taken by Agent CARR was given under the supervision of RTO JAMES H. VINES.

Other provisions set forth in referenced SAC letter will be complied with.

2 - Bureau (RM)  
1 - Houston  
HOH/mec  
(3)

1 - Dir. Comm. Sect.  
1/12/59  
set

REC-91

66-19012-188

JAN 12 1959

EX-102

FCP  
55 JAN 14 1959

W. J. [unclear]  
COMM. SECT.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *W. C. Sullivan*

DATE: November 24, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach *R*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD

|                |       |
|----------------|-------|
| Tolson         | _____ |
| Boardman       | _____ |
| Belmont        | _____ |
| Mohr           | _____ |
| Nease          | _____ |
| Parsons        | _____ |
| Rosen          | _____ |
| Tamm           | _____ |
| Trotter        | _____ |
| Clayton        | _____ |
| Tele. Room     | _____ |
| Holloman       | _____ |
| Gandy          | _____ |
| W. C. Sullivan | _____ |

SAC Letter 58-46 (B) requested the field to submit suggestions and recommendations concerning problems utilized in our participation in Operation Alert 1958. Field replies have been analyzed and matters for consideration cover eight primary areas: (1) Special Agent and Clerical Sources - Generally, the field concluded excellent potential sources for Special Agent appointments would be present male clerical employees, former Bureau male employees, National Academy graduates in good standing, employees of professional-type business firms, individuals recommended by reputable organizations, etc., with similar sources for potential clerical appointments. Various lists of one type or another were advocated; however, this is not considered desirable due to tremendous administrative burden. (2) General Personnel Appointment Matters - Suggestions indicated that if the field is unable to communicate with the Bureau it would be necessary for the field to be familiar with the mechanics of placing new employees on the rolls, and this involves two main points; that is, the records of the agency must reflect the individual as an employee and the employee must be paid. The field can accomplish this; however, it might be necessary to appoint employees subject to later investigation and physical examination. (3) Payroll Matters - Suggestions were that the field be permitted to maintain supplies of certain forms in resident agencies. It has been determined Treasury Department will accept typed forms in an emergency. Therefore, in view of expense, pre-positioning of forms not considered desirable. (4) Voucher Matters - Suggestions were received similar to payroll matters and not considered desirable for same reasons, plus fact some forms are now actually at designated resident agencies. (5) Medical and First Aid Supplies - Field suggested maintenance of small stockpiles at resident agencies. Not considered desirable due to maintenance expense and deterioration. (6) Emergency Transportation Matters - In view of heavy burden which would be placed on transportation facilities during an emergency, it was suggested field offices be aware of aviation skill of employees plus availability of privately owned planes or helicopters. Suggestion has merit provided no official or unofficial contacts are made and no lists maintained as such. (7) Communications - Suggestions were numerous and resultant observations are: (a) desirable for field to be aware of potential sources for recruitment of electronic technicians and potential radio operators; (b) that designated emergency relief radio

- 1 - Mr. Belmont  
1 - Mr. Mohr  
1 - Mr. Nease  
1 - Liaison Section  
1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:nch (6) Enclosures

66-19012-189  
10 JAN 14 1959

COMM. SEC. DIV.

REC-95

JAN 22 1959 EX-135  
66-12-16-58



Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD

operators be afforded code sending and receiving tests at GS-5 level and results furnished the Bureau; (c) that relief operators unable to meet GS-5 radio qualifications be afforded sufficient practice to bring ability up to GS-5 level; (d) that it is desirable, and where possible, to have a minimum of three CW radio operators available to each office; (e) each relief operator qualified at GS-5 level be afforded minimum of two hours practice each sixty days and afforded GS-5 radio operating tests once each six months; (f) each Special Agent designated as a relief radio operator, while attending in Service, be held over two days for additional radio instruction; and (g) each office consider communication means available between headquarters city and resident agencies. (8) Civil Defense Matters - Field suggested alternate sites for resident agencies, alternate site in addition to official relocation site for headquarters city, and maintenance of "relocation kit," consisting of items not in everyday use. Suggestions not believed practicable nor worthy of adoption. Field suggested listing of various stockpiles maintained throughout the country by Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), which information can and should be obtained by the field offices having liaison with OCDM regional offices.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

As noted, suggestions concerning payroll matters; voucher matters; medical and first aid supplies; and alternate sites for resident agencies, alternate site in addition to official relocation site for headquarters city, and maintenance of "relocation kit," consisting of items not in everyday use, are not deemed worthy of adoption. Concerning those field suggestions worthwhile and feasible, the following actions are recommended:

(1) If you approve, we will include in a survival phase of our defense planning: (a) the logical sources of Special Agent and clerical employees as set out herein, emphasizing that no lists should be maintained in regard thereto. (b) instructions that as long as communication with the Bureau is possible all necessary supervision will be furnished, but if emergency conditions prevail there will be delegated to the field, as circumstances require, the authority to take necessary personnel action. Further, concerning physical examinations and investigation, if at all possible they be accomplished either in whole or in part; however, it might be necessary to appoint employees subject to later physical examination and investigation. (c) that in an emergency, if regular forms are not available, the Treasury Department will accept and honor a payroll prepared on typed forms until regular forms can be obtained. Also, that the regular biweekly listing which accompanies each

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD

group of pay checks contains adequate information for emergency preparation of an office payroll. (d) that consideration should be given to the potential of office personnel in connection with the use of privately owned aircraft. (e) that all field offices are to be aware of potential sources for the recruitment of electronic technicians and potential radio operators and that each office should be aware of the means of communication available between the headquarters city and each resident agency, particularly the availability of police radio and teletype systems and civil defense communication systems to pass information between resident agencies and headquarters city. However, no contacts are to be made outside of the Bureau concerning these communications.

(2) Concerning the two-day holdover for the radio operator's training of Special Agents who are designated as relief radio operators and who are attending In-Service, this matter will be the subject of a separate memorandum prepared by the Communications Section, Records and Communications Division, which memorandum will be submitted to the Executives' Conference for consideration.

(3) Instructions go forth to the field by attached SAC Letter advising that all employees currently designated to serve as emergency relief radio operators are to be afforded by the senior radioman in each office a code sending and receiving test on the GS-5 radio operator level as set forth in the Radio Operator's Manual and the results furnished the Bureau. Also, that emergency relief operators in each office who are unable to meet the GS-5 radio qualifications be afforded sufficient instruction and practice under the supervision of the senior radio employee in each office to bring the relief radio operator's ability up

Memorandum Roach to Belmont

RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD

to the GS-5 level, and that each emergency relief radio operator qualified at GS-5 level be afforded the GS-5 radio operator test once each six months.

(4) Attached letter be sent to field offices maintaining liaison with regional offices of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) instructing them to ascertain complete information regarding stockpiles maintained in the respective regions and to furnish the information to field offices within the regions.

W. B. Roach  
J. B. Roach

A

J. B. Roach

W. B. Roach

J. B. Roach  
12/15

V. K. Roach  
12/15

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD

DETAILS:

SAC Letter 58-46 (B) requested the field to submit suggestions and recommendations concerning problems utilized in connection with our participation in Operation Alert 1958. Basically, these problems revolved around the Bureau's operating capability and ability to survive subsequent to a devastating nuclear attack.

Field offices have responded with suggestions, comments, and some recommendations, which have been analyzed and categorized by the Defense Plans Desk of the Domestic Intelligence Division, the Communications Section of the Records and Communications Division, and the Administrative Division. Generally, the field concurred with inferences based on problem responses that on their level they are capable of handling space, general supplies, equipment, employee welfare, and housing. Matters mentioned by the field offices for consideration patterned out into eight primary areas as follows:

(1) Special Agent and Clerical Sources

It was generally concluded by the field offices that excellent potential sources for Special Agent appointments would be (a) present male clerical employees, (b) former Bureau male employees, (c) National Academy graduates in good standing, (d) members of law enforcement agencies personally known to the field office, (e) employees of law, accounting, and other professional-type business firms, (f) senior students at law and accounting schools, (g) executives and other employees of industrial plants who have had previous FBI investigation at the request of other agencies, and (h) individuals recommended by such reputable organizations as bar associations and American Legion chapters. Further, it was generally concluded that identical or similar sources would have great potential for clerical appointments.

The field generally advocated keeping lists of one type or another as to these sources; however, this is neither feasible nor desirable as it would involve a tremendous administrative burden, both in the field and at the Bureau. The list would never be completely current and the availability of individuals on such lists during an emergency is questionable.

(2) General Personnel Appointment Matters

Results of the survey indicate that it might not be possible for field offices to communicate with the Bureau and it would be

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD

necessary for them to operate as best they could until communications could be re-established. Therefore, it would be necessary for the field to be familiar with the mechanics of placing an individual on the rolls, to know the grade which the employee would have at the time of entry on duty, and investigation that would be required under the circumstances, including physical examination and necessary forms.

It is noted that the proposed Executive Order to Adjust the Federal Civilian Personnel System for Operation in a National Emergency contains, in Section VII, provision for a broad delegation of authority to Government departments and agencies to take any action necessary relative to civilian personnel which operations of the agency might require during the emergency. This would, accordingly, require a delegation from the Attorney General to the Bureau. The Executive Order itself would not become effective except under emergency conditions and the Attorney General would not have this authority until that time. Therefore, he would be in no position to delegate it now and could only delegate the authority at such time as it became available to him. We could then secure it, but should insure that his delegation to the Director includes authority for the Director to redelegate within the FBI if conditions warrant.

The question as to placing an individual on the rolls resolves basically to two main points: (1) the records of the agency reflecting the person as an employee and (2) getting the employee paid. All field offices, in connection with appointments made at the present time, have and use all of the necessary forms for appointment with the exception of the Bureau's appointment letter to the employee. This letter could be typed in the field if necessary. Under emergency conditions, the execution of these forms and reflection in the records of the office that the individual is an employee would be sufficient. Regarding payroll, the inclusion of the employee on the FBI payroll, together with the regular payroll certification, would be sufficient for Treasury Department to pay the individual, which is all the Treasury Department needs at the present time. Under emergency conditions, it would be up to the field offices to make suitable arrangements at local levels with the Treasury Department. A listing is furnished to the field biweekly containing sufficient information for preparing emergency payrolls.

Concerning investigation and physical examination, if at all possible they should be accomplished either in whole or in part, but under emergency conditions it might be necessary to appoint employees subject to later investigation and physical examination.

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD

(3) Payroll Matters

Suggestions were received that field offices be permitted to maintain a sixty-day emergency supply of payroll forms in several resident agencies in case the reserve supply in field offices or relocation sites could not be used. This is considered undesirable as it would involve a great many forms scattered in many places throughout the country. Also, it involves a certain amount of expense and it is understood that in an emergency the Treasury Department will accept typed forms until supplies of the regular forms can be obtained.

(4) Voucher Matters

Suggestions were received concerning voucher forms similar to those pertaining to payroll matters and dissemination of voucher forms is not desirable for the same reason. There are, at present, certain emergency voucher form supplies in the field offices and designated resident agencies.

(5) Medical and First Aid Supplies

It was suggested that the field be permitted to maintain small stockpiles of medical supplies and first aid material at resident agencies on the theory that if the supplies now maintained in headquarters city or at designated resident agencies were not available they might be able to get them from one of the other resident agencies. This is not considered desirable as it would involve considerable expense and a constant problem of care and maintenance growing out of the question of deterioration of certain first aid supplies.

(6) Emergency Transportation Matters

The field pointed out that in the event of an emergency, roads, highways, and railroads, due to destruction or damage or the movement of military personnel or the evacuation of civilian population, would likely be unavailable for general use. Consequently, a heavy burden would be placed on existing travel facilities. It was suggested by various field offices that a survey be made of employees for aviation skill (some Agents and clerks are not only qualified pilots but in some cases own their own plane) and that field offices maintain an awareness of available outside facilities for air travel, such as privately owned planes or helicopters. This suggestion appears to have merit provided no official or unofficial contacts are made concerning availability of private transport means outside of the Bureau and that no lists are maintained as such.

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD.

(7) Communications

Observations, comments, and suggestions concerning communications were received pertaining to replacement and recruitment of radio personnel; increasing the number of technically qualified radio personnel; the retraining and testing of Special Agents and Special Employees who are former radio operators; the relocation of CW radio, auxiliary generators, and coding equipment; communications between resident agencies and field offices; and the use of automatic keying and receiving equipment in field offices.

In consideration of these matters, the Communications Section observes that (a) it is desirable for all field offices to be aware of potential sources for the recruitment of electronic technicians and potential radio operators; (b) that all employees currently designated to serve as emergency relief radio operators be afforded by the senior radio man in each office a code sending and receiving test at the GS-5 radio operator level as set forth in the Radio Operator's Manual and the results furnished the Bureau; (c) that emergency relief operators in each office who are unable to meet the GS-5 radio qualifications be afforded sufficient instruction and practice under the supervision of the senior radio employee in each office to bring the relief radio operator's ability up to the GS-5 level; (d) that it is desirable, and where possible, to have a minimum of three CW radio operators available to each office, the number consisting of a combination of one regularly assigned radio operator and two relief operators, or two regularly assigned operators and one relief operator; (e) each emergency relief operator qualified at the GS-5 level be afforded a minimum of two hours' practice each sixty days and be afforded the GS-5 radio operating tests once each six months; (f) that each Special Agent designated as a relief radio operator, while attending In-Service, be held over for two additional days and given additional instructions, being permitted to operate on the air from Seat of Government station; and (g) that each office consider means of communication available between the headquarters city and each resident agency, particularly the availability of police radio and teletype systems and civil defense communication systems to pass information between resident agencies and headquarters city.

Pertaining to the automatic keying and receiving equipment in field offices, its use depends upon so many factors that no consideration should be given to furnishing such equipment at this time.

(8) Civil Defense Matters

Various field offices were of the opinion it would be good if in addition to official relocation sites, alternate sites be

Memorandum Roach to Belmont  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
SUBMITTED BY THE FIELD

considered for resident agencies. Also, that alternate relocation sites for headquarters city, in addition to the official relocation site, be unofficially determined as to availability. Neither of these suggestions appears to have merit as Resident Agents should, of course, make their way to the relocation site of the field office so that their services may be fully utilized and directed and existing instructions require that all field offices constantly keep in mind the fact that their official relocation site may become untenable requiring their movement to another area.

The field suggested that the Bureau furnish a listing of the various stockpiles maintained by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), including the location of the supplies and services, facilities, and equipment available. This matter can more easily be resolved in the field by the field offices which maintain liaison with regional offices of OCDM.

The field suggested that each office maintain a "relocation kit" consisting of items not in everyday use which might be necessary or desirable for operation in an emergency. This suggestion has some merit but the administrative mechanics attendant to a "relocation kit" would probably become so involved and expanded that they would constitute a major problem and in the final analysis would probably not be worth the effort to maintain.



66-19012-190  
**CHANGED TO**  
66-19021-39

JUL 7 <sup>59</sup> 1959

*[Signature]*

*ms*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

Mr. F. A. Frohose

FROM :

J. T. Winnich

SUBJECT:

BUFIANS -  
 OPERATION ALERT 1958  
 JULY 15-18, 1958  
 (RECOMMENDATIONS)

Memorandum Belmont to the Director dated 7-18-58 regarding Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL 158), based on results of our participation in the exercise, contained four recommendations, and Roach to Belmont memorandum 11-26-58 advised all recommendations were handled with the exception of the following:

(2)b. "A study with appropriate recommendations will also be made concerning the physical housing of our communications facilities in the Academy building at the relocation site."

**ACTION:** The only action to be accomplished in connection with this recommendation was to order air conditioning equipment, and install Venetian blinds and rugs. On 7-21-59, Mr. Newman of the Administrative Division advised that the air conditioning units have been obtained and will be installed. The Venetian blinds are available and are being installed and the rugs have been placed on order. A tickler will be set for 9-1-59 to insure that this work has been accomplished.

"The Administrative and Laboratory Divisions will further study the problem of acquiring more suitable temporary housing for our operating equipment at our microwave station."

**ACTION:** Memorandum Wilten to Parsons 7-14-59 recommended that Mr. Sloan at Quantico ascertain that the same conditions presently exist with regard to cost and construction as previously reported, and if cost and construction are approximately the same as previously reported, authority to proceed with the project be granted. Memorandum Sloan to Tamm 7-17-59 advised that approximately \$100 should be added to the estimated cost (\$2,396.29) of construction of the Microwave Building. On 7-21-59 Mr. Baker of the Laboratory advised that he believed the recommendation to proceed with this construction had been approved and he will keep the Defense Plans Desk advised of progress. An appropriate tickler is being set for 9-1-59 to insure that this project is completed.

ACTION: For information.

REC-23

66-19012-191

JUL 21 1959

1 - Liaison Section  
1 - Mr. Winnich

JTW:ack (3)

JUL 19 1959

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: July 21, 1959

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. F. A. Frohbose

DATE: September 2, 1959

FROM : J. T. Minnich

SUBJECT: BUPLANS -  
OPERATION ALERT 1958  
JULY 15-18, 1958  
(RECOMMENDATIONS)

|               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| Tolson        | _____ |
| Belmont       | _____ |
| DeLoach       | _____ |
| McGuire       | _____ |
| Mohr          | _____ |
| Parsons       | _____ |
| Rosen         | _____ |
| Tamm          | _____ |
| Trotter       | _____ |
| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

Memorandum Belmont to the Director dated 7-18-58 regarding Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL '58), based on results of our participation in the exercise, contained four recommendations and Minnich to Frohbose memorandum dated 7-21-59 advised all recommendations were handled with the exception of the following:

- (2)b. "A study with appropriate recommendations will also be made concerning the physical housing of our communications facilities in the Academy building at the relocation site."

ACTION: The installation of the air conditioning equipment, venetian blinds, and rugs has been accomplished and this recommendation is now considered handled.

- (3) "The Administrative and Laboratory Divisions will further study the problem of acquiring more suitable temporary housing for our operating equipment at our microwave station."

ACTION: On 9-1-59 Mr. Baker of the Laboratory advised that the construction work in connection with this project was temporarily delayed until completion of our participation in the Operation Alert exercise of 8/24-26/59. He said that the Marine Corps will be doing the construction work as a spare-time project and it is not believed that should be pushed too rapidly. He advised that completion of this project would probably be accomplished by the end of October, 1959. An appropriate tickler is being set for 11-1-59 to insure that this project is completed.

ACTION:

For information.

JTM:sal (3)

- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-5

10 SEP 2 1959

55 SEP 8 1959

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. F. A. Frohbose

DATE: November 3, 1959

FROM : J. T. Minnich

SUBJECT: BUPLANS  
OPERATION ALERT 1958  
JULY 15-18, 1958  
(RECOMMENDATIONS)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Memorandum Belmont to the Director dated 7-18-58 regarding Operation Alert 1958, based on results of our participation in the exercise, contained four recommendations, and Minnich to Frohbose memorandum dated 9-2-59 advised all recommendations were handled with the exception of the following:

(3) "The Administrative and Laboratory Divisions will further study the problem of arranging more suitable temporary housing for our operating equipment at our microwave station."

ACTION:

On 11-3-59 Mr. Baker of the Laboratory advised that construction work in connection with the project is in progress and he anticipates completion of the work in approximately one month. An appropriate tickler is being set for 12-9-59 to insure that this project is completed.

ACTION:

For information.

JTM:sal (3)

1 - Liaison Section  
 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-99  
 EX 104

66-19012-194  
12 NOV 10 1959

55 NOV 17 1959 R/18a

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *as Br*

DATE: December 18, 1959

FROM : F. A. Frohbose

*(1)* SUBJECT: BUPLANS  
OPERATION ALERT 1958  
JULY 15-18, 1958  
(RECOMMENDATIONS)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Memorandum Belmont to the Director dated 7-18-58 regarding Operation Alert 1958 based on results of our participation in the exercise contained four recommendations, and Minnich to Frohbose memorandum dated 9-2-59 advised all recommendations handled with the exception of the following:

- (3) "The Administrative and Laboratory Divisions will further study the problem of arranging more suitable temporary housing for our operating equipment at our microwave station."

ACTION:

On 12-14-59 Mr. Baker of the Laboratory advised that the construction work has been completed. All recommendations in referenced memorandum Belmont to the Director are considered as handled.

*sal*  
 JTM:sal (4)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Liaison  
 1 - Mr. Minnich

EX-101

REC-15

66-17012-195  
10 DEC 21 1959

55 DEC 23 1959

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
Attention: Communications Section

DATE: 10/19/61

FROM : SAC, OKLAHOMA CITY (66-1256)

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - CW RADIO  
RELIEF OPERATORS

Re SAC Letter No. 58-81, Section E.

This is to advise that SA HARVEY B. MURPHY, listed as CW Radio Relief Operator in this office, was afforded GS 5 Radio Operators Test and made the following grades:

Sending -  
86 at 16 GPM, Letters  
96 at 10 GPM, Numbers

Receiving -  
85 at 20 GPM, Letters  
100 at 12 GPM, Numbers

Appropriate notations are being included in the office Buplans.

P  
② - Bureau (RM) 1 det  
1 - Oklahoma City comm  
Sut  
ap

HBM:dc  
(3)

66-19012

NOT RECORDED

9 OCT 23 1961

H.M. Anderson  
LIAISON  
COMM. SEC.

57 OCT 26 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 8/7/62

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-27336)

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

ATTN: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Re SAC Letter 58-81, dated December 23, 1958.

In accordance with instructions in referenced SAC Letter, the employees of the San Francisco Office who are designated as emergency relief operators have been afforded, by EMT STANLEY R. HARVEY, JR., of this office, code sending and receiving tests at the GS-5 level and the typing test. The results of these tests are as follows:

| Relief Operator       | Date Tested | Code Sending Tests |        | Code Receiving Tests |        | Typing        |
|-----------------------|-------------|--------------------|--------|----------------------|--------|---------------|
|                       |             | Letter             | Digit  | Letter               | Digit  |               |
|                       |             | 16 GPM             | 10 GPM | 20 GPM               | 12 GPM |               |
|                       |             | Grade              | Grade  | Grade                | Grade  | 45 wpm        |
| SE VERNON L. KIPPING  | 8/7/62      | 95%                | 96%    | 94%                  | 97%    | 98% <i>an</i> |
| SA DWAYNE L. ESKRIDGE | 8/7/62      | 94%                | 97%    | 95%                  | 96%    | 97%           |

REC-51

66-19012-196

RECORDED  
4 AUG 8 1962

EX-108

CCs:  
3 - Bureau 1 cc detached Communications Section  
1 - San Francisco  
BHC:pp  
(4)

53 AUG 16 1962

*H. M. Anderson*  
*LIAISON*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 10-6-64

FROM : W. S. Tavel *WST*SUBJECT: BUPLANS  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

Bufile 66- 19012

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Casper     | _____ |
| Callahan   | _____ |
| Conrad     | _____ |
| DeLoach    | _____ |
| Evans      | _____ |
| Gale       | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Sullivan   | _____ |
| Tavel      | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holmes     | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Branch, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1113 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

*WB:snw*  
 (2) *W*
*Retain in  
Spec. File room  
WST  
6-8-67*
*Maintain  
in Special  
File Room  
WST  
6-8-67*
*66-19012*  
 NOT RECORDED

FEB 9 1965

 85 FEB 9 1965  
*AYO*

OCT 1 15 08 PM '64

*W*



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : D. J. Brennan, Jr. *WPD*

DATE: February 2, 1968

FROM : W. P. Dix *WPD*

SUBJECT: DESTRUCTION OF FILES

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Attached Office of Emergency Planning memorandum authorizes the destruction of test and exercise materials related to emergency planning. Copies of this material which have been retained in the Buplans Unit are being destroyed.

Copies of this material in Bufiles should be considered for destruction. Examples of items which can be destroyed are as follows:

- 66-19012 - enclosure to serial 4
- 66-19012 - enclosure to serial 6
- 66-19012 - enclosure to serial 9
- 66-19012 - enclosure to serial 12
- 66-19012 - attachment to enclosure to serial 23
- 66-19012 - attachment to enclosure to serial 64

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 8-3-82 BY SP4 EKA/EL

## ACTION:

That this be referred to the Files and Communications Division, attention Mr. Waikart, for determination as to feasibility of purging such material from Bufiles.

Enclosure  
1-Mr. Waikart (Enclosure)  
1-Liaison  
1-Mr. Dix  
WPD:slh  
(4)

XEROX

FEB 21 1968

57 FEB 27 1968

6 FEB 20 1968

*Selected for  
handling in  
Consolidation*

*Consolidation*

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-3286-

Operation ALERT 1958

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING  
Washington, D. C. 20504

IEPC Memorandum No. 55  
December 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTERAGENCY  
EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Disposition of Test and Exercise Materials

To assist you in carrying out the provisions of the Federal Records Act of 1950, and your agency's record disposal program, requiring the retirement and disposal of non-current records, and more specifically, test and exercise materials, we provide the following guidance:

1. All Operation Alert documents and other test and exercise materials (these were developed or dated prior to June 1962) may be destroyed;
2. All SPADE FORK, REX-66, and REX-I material may be retired or destroyed;
3. All STAGE II Test material, except the Test Aid Kit, may be retired or destroyed;
4. Until further notice, one copy of CIVLOG-65 material should be retained by original addressees.

Destruction of classified test and exercise material should be accomplished in accordance with existing agency security regulations.

*G. B. Hotchkiss, Jr.*  
G. B. Hotchkiss, Jr.  
Executive Secretary, IEPC

1  
XEROX

FEB 21 1968  
*alt*

ENCLOSURE

66-19012-197

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Marshall

FROM : P. F. O'Connell

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1958

BUFILE: 66-17404-35

DATE: JUL 30 1973

*TG Smith*

The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Section, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1116 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

JEB:ncf  
(2)

*5 - White*

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

8/1/73

RHH:glw

It is recommended that this file be returned to regular file sequence.

*Removed from Special  
File Room 8-3-73  
(notation 66-19012-1)*

*66-19012*  
**NOT RECORDED**

**AUG 3 1973**

*4-1*

79 AUG 3 1973

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *LB*

DATE: June 12, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, JULY 14-18,  
1958, (INSTRUCTIONS TO FIELD)

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Our planning has progressed to the stage which permits instructions to our field offices re extent of their participation in Federal Action Phase, July 14-18, 1958, of Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL' 58).

Proposed SAC Letter sets forth: (1) Brief resume of Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) planning and participation by other agencies. (2) All field offices, excluding legal attaches, will participate in OPAL' 58 with each SAC or ASAC responsible for successful participation and each SAC or ASAC must be immediately available unless their presence at the scene of a major occurrence is required. (3) Field offices are to assume a relocated status at headquarters city space continuously from 8:00 a.m., Eastern Standard Time (EST), 7-15-58, to 12:00 midnight, EST, 7-17-58, for purposes of intra-FBI testing during which period a member of the chain of command must be on duty. (4) No bomb damage assessment is to occur during the Phase as FBI Laboratory has analyzed results of mock attack on 5-6-58 with regard to Bureau installations and personnel and damage analysis chart, attached, is to be studied by SAC, ASAC, and members of chain of command as it will be utilized in test problems. (5) No Civil Defense shelter or curb drills will be held. (6) Press inquiries are to be answered by stating only that the office is participating in the exercise. (7) Special Agents, within certain limitations, may be designated in a liaison capacity at headquarters only of requesting civil defense agency. (8) ODM is not requesting any reports during exercise but each office shall evaluate and advise Bureau if of interest to our over-all planning or include in office defense plans. (9) All offices will receive minimum of four intra-FBI test

Enclosures (2)

JTM:pwj (8) X-102

- 1 - Mr. Boardman (with enclosures) RE021
- 1 - Mr. Belmont (with enclosures)
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier) (with enclosures)
- 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention Mr. McGuire and Mr. Wherry) (with enclosures)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (with enclosures)
- 1 - Liaison Section (with enclosures)
- 1 - Mr. Minnich (with enclosures)

JUN 23 1958

58 JUN 24 1958

Memorandum A. H. Belmont to Mr. L. V. Boardman  
Re: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, JULY 14-18,  
1958, (INSTRUCTIONS TO FIELD)

problems which will emanate from our relocation site between 8:30 a.m., EST, 7-16-58, and 12:00 midnight, EST, 7-17-58, and responses thereto are to be carefully and thoroughly considered in keeping with seriousness of the assumptions and catastrophic effects of the mock attack. (10) Information necessary and instructions re handling the problems is set forth. (11) Responsibility for availability of agent personnel during period of an assumed or actual emergency outlined. (12) Instructions re payment of night differential and granting of compensatory leave shown. (13) Activation and use of communications facilities delineated.

RECOMMENDATION:

That enclosed SAC Letter with Bomb Damage Analysis Chart. attached, be approved.

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*  
JAB Rgm Jm V JG  
Jhy  
ox  
2

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

4 TO : MR. TAMM

DATE: June 11, 1958

FROM : J. H. L. SLOAN

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS-OPERATION ALERT - 1958  
JULY 14-18, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

The below-listed individual will act as relief for Cleaves Food Service steward [redacted] during Operation Alert, 1958. Cleaves Food Service is the caterer providing the food at the FBI Academy.

Name [redacted]  
 Born [redacted]  
 Height 5' 11"  
 Weight 165 pounds  
 Hair Brown  
 Eyes Blue  
 Mother's Name [redacted]  
 Current Address [redacted]  
 Former [redacted]  
 Employment [redacted]

ACTION:

An indices check be made on the above-named individual and the results of same be forwarded to SAC, [redacted]

1 - Mr. John T. Minnich

JAC:chb  
(4)

REC-52

JUN 23 1958

58 JUN 27 1958

-102

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

4 TO : Mr. Tamm *TH*

DATE: 6/16/58

FROM : H. B. Fletcher *o. Duplan*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT - 1958  
July 14 - 18, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman *b6*  
 Gandy *b7C*

An indices check was requested on [redacted] *Will*  
 [redacted] act as relief for Cleaves Food Service steward [redacted] *b7E*  
 during Operation Alert, 1958. Cleaves Food Service is the  
 caterer providing the food at [redacted] *SHAN*  
*JAC*

*via*  
 Review of Bureau files reflects no derogatory  
 information concerning [redacted]

ACTION:

None . . . informative

1 - Mr. John T. Minnich  
 1 - SAC Sloan, [redacted]

*B*  
b7E

*DM:mcc*  
 (4)

REC- 52

66-19012-69

JUN 23 1958

EX-102

LIAISON

58 JUN 27 1958

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Records BranchJune 1358  
1957☐ Name Check Unit - Room 6523☐ Service Unit - Room 6524☐ Forward to File Review☐ Attention ☐☒ Return to ☐

Supervisor

Room

Ext.

b6

b7C

## Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)☐ Subversive References Only☐ Nonsubversive References Only☐ Main \_\_\_\_\_ References Only

## Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of \_\_\_\_\_☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)☐ Buildup ☐ Variations☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty FormSubject ☐Birthdate & Place ☐Address ☐

b6

b7C

Localities \_\_\_\_\_

R# \_\_\_\_\_

Date

6-13

Searcher

Initials

JM

b6

b7C

NUMEROUS REFERENCE

4-22a

SEARCH SLIP

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Subj:

Supervisor

[Redacted]

Room

5248

R#

Date 6-13

Searcher

Initial

DM

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

[Redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

DM

Whitaker

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *11/20/58*

FROM : A. H. Belmont *11/20/58*

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE - July 14-18, 1958  
SCHEDULING OF SAC, MEMPHIS, TO ADDRESS  
GROUP ON July 16, 1958

DATE: June 18, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman ☒  
Belmont ☒  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

FBI participation in Federal Action Phase, Operation Alert 1958, limited to 7/16-18/58 with field offices assuming relocated status at headquarters city from 8:00 A.M., Eastern Standard Time (EST), 7/16/58, to 12:00 midnight, EST, 7/17/58, for purposes of intra-FBI testing. We have always required SAC or ASAC to be available unless major occurrence requires their presence at scene. Also, we instruct SAC, ASAC, and members of field chain of command not to accept speeches, schedule police schools, or similar activities during this period.

Memorandum Jones to Nease 6/16/58 advises SAC, Memphis, scheduled to address annual seminar of International Association of Auto Theft Investigators on 7/16/58. Director originally invited and SAC was designated because of Director's inability to accept. SACs have addressed other annual gatherings of this group throughout the Nation since 1955. ASAC, Memphis, is not scheduled for leave or speeches during period 7/14-18/58.

OBSERVATIONS:

We do have test problems which may be received at Memphis Office on 7/16/58 during SAC's absence; however, problems permit from two to four hours' time to answer and ASAC or member of Memphis chain of command could, if necessary, obtain advice and counsel of SAC prior to answering. Since SAC was designated by Bureau to address this group and by letter dated 6/6/58 he advised the group that he will appear before them, it is felt no change should be made at this date. It would appear advisable, however, to remind SAC, Memphis, that he must assure the immediate availability of the ASAC and the presence at his office of a member of his chain of command during his absence; also, that he will be personally responsible for the adequacy and promptness of responses emanating from his office in connection with

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
  - 1 - Mr. Mohr
  - 1 - Mr. Nease  
(Attention: Mr. Jones)
  - 1 - Mr. Parsons
  - 1 - Mr. Belmont
  - 1 - Liaison Section
  - 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 58 JUL 1 1958  
JTM:nck (8) Enclosure

REC- 84  
EX-102

66-19012-71  
15 JUN 27 1958

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman  
RE: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE - July 14-18, 1958  
SCHEDULING OF SAC, MEMPHIS, TO ADDRESS  
GROUP ON July 16, 1958

any intra-FBI test problems or inquiries from other Government agencies received during his absence.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached letter be sent to Memphis.

*jm*  
*RE* *jm* *jm* *jm* ✓  
*jm*



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 6/19/58

FROM : Q. Tamm

SUBJECT: CANCELLATION OF IN-SERVICE TRAINING  
SCHOOLS IN JUNE AND JULY, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
W. S. 2b7E

The Director has asked for more details concerning the cancellation of In-Service training schools in June and July, 1958, stating that he did not understand why dates [ ] could not have been rearranged so as to take care of these schools or at least part of them.

The Defense Secretaries' Conference is scheduled for 6/19-22/58. By memorandum 2/25/58, SAC H. L. Sloan advised of these dates and recommended that the In-Service class of 6/9/58, be returned to Washington on the morning of 6/17/58, and that the In-Service class scheduled to begin 6/16/58, be canceled. This action would permit setting up the building for the conferees and would free the entire firearms staff so that they would be available for duty during that period. The Director approved these recommendations. The same action was taken in 1957 with reference to this conference. This is the only class which has been canceled for June, 1958.

By memorandum Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 2/4/58, advice was furnished that Operation Alert 1958 would cover 7/14-18/58, inclusive, with relocation sites to be partially activated on July 14 and 15 and completely activated July 16, 17, and 18. July 14 is a Monday. In this memorandum, it was recommended that the Training and Inspection Division not schedule any sessions [ ] during this period and this, together with other recommendations contained in the memorandum, was approved by the Director. No In-Service classes were scheduled to begin 7/7 and 7/14/58. Classes are scheduled to begin 7/21 and 7/28/58.

The July 7 class, if it were scheduled, would normally be [ ] July 7 to 17, returning to Washington the morning of the 18th, which are the dates covered by Operation Alert 1958. The In-Service Class convening 7/14/58, if scheduled, would normally report [ ] not later than Wednesday night, 7/16/58. In-Service classes normally run a little over 40 in attendance.

Forty to fifty Seat of Government personnel, both male and female, are normally housed [ ] during the Operation Alert fully activated exercises. There are set up and utilized by the personnel assigned to the handling of Operation Alert. It takes at least two workdays for the maintenance personnel [ ] to prepare for an Operation Alert, carrying out their regular duties in addition. It takes at least one workday to restore the premises following the completely activated phase of Operation Alert.

In 1957, the same Operation Alert exercises covered the period 7/12/57, (Friday) through the following Friday 7/19/57, completely activated 7/12/57 to 7/17/57.

1 - Mr. Mohr  
EHD:ekd

NOT RECORDED  
JUN 25 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Tolson  
Re: CANCELLATION OF IN-SERVICE TRAINING  
SCHOOLS IN JUNE AND JULY, 1958

By reason of these exercises, no In-Service class was scheduled for 7/8/57, because it would have normally been [redacted] during the period 7/12 through 7/18/57. The class beginning 7/1/57, returned to Washington on the morning of 7/10/57 (Wednesday), two days early, to permit maintenance employees to set up the partitions in [redacted] and otherwise prepare the [redacted] premises for occupation by Operation Alert personnel. The class beginning 7/15 was held until Friday night in Washington, 7/19, three days late in its departure [redacted] In 1957, as indicated, only one class was not scheduled because of Operation Alert and it was practical to hold other classes because [redacted] facilities were available for all but two or three of the usual days. b7E

This Division and the Administrative Division deemed it not feasible to schedule the In-Service classes which would have started on 7/7 and 7/14, since the facilities [redacted] would not be available for such classes, not only during the week of 7/14-18/58, when Operation Alert is to be activated, but also during two or three days of the preceding week and one day of the following week due to necessary preparation and restoration of the premises. b7E

On 6/18/58, it was learned it had just been decided that setting up partitions [redacted] with reference to Operation Alert would not be required this year. This will make it possible to now schedule an In-Service class for 7/14/58, since it can depart [redacted] Friday night, 7/18/58, only two days later than normal departure for [redacted] and only minor schedule changes will be necessary. Since the scheduled class for 6/16/58, was canceled after it had been scheduled, the scheduling of the class on 7/14/58, will be very helpful in carrying out the In-Service program for the calendar year 1958 since it will restore the one class. b7E

#### RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that an In-Service class be scheduled for 7/14/58, since only minor schedule changes will be required as indicated above.

*Class being set up.*

*OK, all of the [redacted] just  
silly reasoning by [redacted] & [redacted]  
of things as if "normal" [redacted]  
it is the [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]  
down completely. A little effort  
& ingenuity could [redacted] [redacted]  
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]*

2-original & duplicate  
1-yellow  
7-tickler

SAC, Memphis

June 19, 1958

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION


BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, July 14-18, 1958

Regarding your scheduled appearance before the annual seminar of the International Association of Auto Theft Investigators on July 16, 1958, you are reminded this date is within the scope (July 14-18, 1958) of Federal Action Phase of Operation Alert 1958. Therefore, in your absence you must assure the immediate availability of your ASAC and the presence at your office of a member of your chain of command. You are not to absent yourself any longer than necessary and your immediate availability to a telephone if possible is desired. Intra-FBI test problems and inquiries from other Government agencies may be received during your absence and you will be held personally responsible for the adequacy and promptness of replies emanating from your office.

JTM:nck (10)

Cover memo Belmont to Boardman dated 6-18-58, RE: BUPLANS--OPERATION ALERT 1958, FEDERAL ACTION PHASE - July 14-18, 1958, SCHEDULING OF SAC, MEMPHIS, TO ADDRESS GROUP ON July 16, 1958. JTM:nck

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



REC-84

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
FBI  
JUN 19 3 03 PM '58

MAIL ROOM

58 JUL 1 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT *JB*

DATE: June 23, 1958

FROM : MR. MOHR *JB*

4  
SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
7/14-18/58  
\*(EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Re memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated 6-18-58 re captioned subject.

This is to advise that the documents published in the Emergency Federal Register have been reviewed and analyzed by the Administrative Division with respect to any possible effect on our administrative functions, and particularly for our use and information in connection with our participation in the Federal Action Phase

b7E

It appears doubtful that any Presidential emergency action document signed by the President during Operation Alert 1958 will actually involve exercise participation on a field level. However, indications are that in some instances the Bureau at its relocation site may have to communicate with other key critical agency sites concerning specific aspects of certain documents.

Attached is information relating to Presidential emergency documents that concern the responsibilities of the Administrative Division during Operation Alert 1958.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached information be referred to the Buplans Desk, Domestic Intelligence Division, for review and comment.

LJG:mjb

(3)

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Minnich (Enclosure)

1 - Mr. Gauthier (Enclosures)

REC-8

EX-117

66-19012-76  
10 JUL 14 1958

LIAISON

3/1/58

ENCL. BEHIND FILE

ENCLOSURE

REC-8

70 JUL 2 1958 EX-117

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. J. Parsons

DATE: June 30, 1958

FROM : B. J. White

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
7/14-18/58  
(EMERGENCY FEDERAL REGISTER NO. 2)

|               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| Tolson        | _____ |
| Boardman      | _____ |
| Belmont       | _____ |
| Mohr          | _____ |
| Nease         | _____ |
| Parsons       | _____ |
| Rosen         | _____ |
| Tamm          | _____ |
| Trotter       | _____ |
| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Holloman      | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

Re memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman June 26, 1958. Resource Directive No. 15 of the Emergency Federal Register No. 2 entitled "Damage Assessment Surveys and Reports" requires expeditious reports relative to damage assessments of fourteen different categories. The specific agencies and departments responsible for these reports are set forth in this directive.

No damage report is requested of the FBI in this directive and no action is necessary unless an agency during the course of its survey requests specific information of the FBI. For example, the General Services Administration may require data relative to FBI facility damage to supplement their report required on federal building damage.

## ACTION:

None. For information only.

1 - Mr. Minnich

JFG:np.  
(5)

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

JUL 5 1958

EX-117

REC-18

66-19012-84

JUL 11 1958

55 JUL 7 1958

2 - Orig & 1  
1 - Follow  
1 - Liaison Sect.  
1 - Mr. Minnich

SAC, Savannah (1-277)

June 26, 1958

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI

REC-28

EX-117

~~66-19012-88~~  
~~66-19012-89~~  
DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
RETRAINING SESSION  
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ASSOCIATES OF GEORGIA  
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA  
7/16-17/58

ReBulet to Atlanta April 23, 1958, and your letter of June 18, 1958.

You, rather than your ASAC, are authorized to attend the daytime sessions of the retraining program. This change is being made on the basis of the statements in your referenced letter, as to the presence of your ASAC or a member of your chain of command at your office during the course of the Federal Action Phase of Operation Alert 1958 and the fact you will be immediately available. You are reminded you are not to absent yourself any longer than necessary, and your immediate availability to a telephone, if possible, is desired. Intra-FBI test problems and inquiries may be received during your absence, and you will be held personally responsible for the adequacy and promptness of replies emanating from your office.

1 - Atlanta - for information

JTM:jyl  
(6)

Enclosure to cover memo  
Cover memo Belmont to Boardman  
6/25/58 JTM:jyl

Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

RETRAINING SESSION

FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ASSOCIATES OF GEORGIA  
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

7/16-17/58

JTM:jyl

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 18, 1958

FROM : SAC, Savannah (1-277)

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
 RETRAINING SESSION  
 FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ASSOCIATES OF GEORGIA  
 SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, JULY 16-17, 1958

Reference is made to Bureau memo to the Atlanta Division dated 4/23/58, pointing out that the Special Agents in Charge of the Atlanta and Savannah Divisions should not attend the retraining session of the National Academy Associates, Savannah, Ga., 7/16-17/58.

It is respectfully requested the Bureau reconsider permitting the SAC of the Savannah Division to attend this retraining session since the meeting will be held in the DeSoto Hotel, Savannah, Ga., which is just across the street from the Savannah Office. ASAC WILLIAM B. WELTE, Jr., as well as field approved Supervisor ALBERT E. HOGAN, both members of the chain of command, will be in the office, and the SAC could return to the office in a matter of five minutes. I would be immediately available at all times during the course of the alert.

From the standpoint of relations with the NA Associates, it is felt that definitely a Special Agent in Charge should be in attendance at the business sessions. Considering the close proximity of the meeting and the relations involved, it is again respectfully requested that the SAC of the Savannah Division be permitted to attend the daytime sessions of the retraining program.

Bureau  
 Savannah

REC-28

CWB:FM

JUN 50

2 15 JUN 1958

66-19012-88

7-3  
15 JUN 20 1958

(3)

RECEIVED - INH

Memo submitted to Director

6/25/58

JTM:gm

Set to Savannah

6/25/58

JTM:gm

EXP. PROC.

JUN 20 1958

UNRECORDED

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *8/8/58*

DATE: June 25, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
RETRAINING SESSION  
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ASSOCIATES OF GEORGIA  
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA  
7/16-17/58

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Memo Roach to Belmont 4/22/58 advised retraining session of FBI National Academy Associates of Georgia being held in conjunction with National Academy Associates regularly scheduled summer meeting 7/16-17/58 at Savannah, Georgia. By letter dated 4/16/58, SAC, Atlanta was of the opinion it would be desirable for him to attend. Bureau letter 5/23/58 to Atlanta, copy to Savannah, advised importance of Federal Phase, 7/14-18/58, of Operation Alert 1958 precluded authorizing SACs to attend, but that ASACs Atlanta and Savannah should represent the offices.

Savannah letter 6/18/58 requests reconsideration, as from the standpoint of relations with National Academy Associates, SAC, Savannah is of the opinion he should attend business sessions. The letter advises the meeting will be held in a hotel across the street from Savannah office, and ASAC and member of chain of command will be in the office, with SAC able to return to office in five minutes. SAC would be immediately available at all times during Operation Alert 1958. SAC, Savannah requests permission to attend daytime sessions of retraining program.

OBSERVATIONS:

We do have problems scheduled which may be received at Savannah office during SAC's absence; however, problems permit two to four hours time to answer, and ASAC or member of chain of command could, if necessary, obtain advice and

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Boardman (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Tamm (with enclosure)
- 1 - Liaison Section (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Minnich (with enclosure)

JTM:jyl (6)

REC-28

EX-117

66-19012-89

13 JUL 3 1958

1 AUGUST 1958  
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 94-234656-17

55 JUL 9 1958



Memo Belmont to Boardman  
Re: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
RETRAINING SESSION  
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ASSOCIATES OF GEORGIA  
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA  
7/16-17/58

counsel of SAC prior to answering. Since meeting is in such close proximity to Savannah Field Office, SAC will be immediately available, and since SAC feels greater benefit would accrue to Bureau by his presence, it is deemed desirable to authorize his attendance. However, he should be reminded of his personal responsibility for participation of his office in Operation Alert 1958.

RECOMMENDATION:

That enclosed letter be sent to Savannah.

*[Handwritten signatures and initials: JWB, JWB, JWB, JWB, JWB]*

1-124

CODE

July 9, 1958

RADIOGRAM

DEFERRED

REC-55

66-19012-94

TO: SAC LOS ANGELES

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT ONE NINE FIVE EIGHT. REUR RADIOGRAM  
JULY EIGHT, LAST, AND SAC LETTER FIVE EIGHT DASH THREE SEVEN.  
RADIO COVERAGE SHOULD BE PROVIDED EIGHT A.M. TO TEN P.M. EST  
JULY ONE SIX AND EIGHT A.M. TO TEN P.M. JULY SEVENTEEN, NEXT.

LEW

LEW:nma  
(3)

NR. 120130  
ENC. 0130-0146 BY 97  
CK. 0144-0150 BY 76  
APPROVED BY [Signature]  
TYPED BY [Signature]  
FILED BY [Signature]

RADIO

JUL 9 - 1958  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

CODE  
MAIL ROOM ☐

55 JUL 15 1958

## DECODED COPY

*Mr. Minnich*

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

☒ Radio☐ Teletype

DEFERRED 7-8-58

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAC LOS ANGELES 081616

*pk*

BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL 58). RE SAC LET 58 - 37  
 PAGE 8 SECTION E, RADIO. DOES EMERGENCY OPERATION SCHEDULE  
 MEAN ROUND THE CLOCK OPERATION JULY 16 AND 17 OR SHOULD  
 COVERAGE BE PROVIDED ONLY FROM 8:00 AM EST TO 10:00 PM JULY 16  
 AND 8:00 AM EST TO 10:00 PM EST JULY 17?

RECEIVED: 4:12 PM RADIO

5:15 PM CODING UNIT CWA

cc: Mr. Minnich

*Parsons to  
 SAC Los Angeles  
 7-9-58  
 LEW*

*ah*

-124  
REC-55

66-19012-94

JUL 10 1958

2 - Original and 1  
yellow  
1 - Liaison Section  
1 - Mr. Minnich

SAC, Cincinnati

July 9, 1958

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI

66-19012-96

BUPLANS

OPERATION ALERT 1958

Re SAC Letter 58-37 and your letter 7-1-58.

Interpretation of points 1 and 2 in your letter is correct.


The scheduling of your ASAC and yourself to cover your office during the pertinent period is a matter within your discretion. However, SAC Letter 58-37 does permit the scheduling of a member of your chain of command.

The scheduling of your stenographers on a voluntary rotating basis from 8:00 a.m. 7-16-58 until 12 midnight 7-17-58 is also within your discretion. However, you may wish to consider merely having a stenographer on call from midnight 7-16-58 to 8:00 a.m. 7-17-58 inasmuch as intra-FBI test problems requiring the services of a stenographer will probably not be received during this period.

NOTE:

Cincinnati letter interprets two points in SAC Letter 58-37 as requiring either the SAC or ASAC to be available during period 7-14-58 through 7-18-58 and a member of the chain of command at the office during the period 7-16 and 7-17-58. Interpretation is correct. Letter also sets forth the schedule which will be followed by the SAC and ASAC during the period July 14-18, 1958, and the fact that stenographers will work on a rotating basis from 8:00 a.m. 7-16 until 12 midnight 7-17-58.

JTM:pwf (5)



JUL 10 1958

FBI - 702.105  
REC'D RE. 702.105

JUL 15 1958

MAIL ROOM

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 7/1/58

FROM : SAC, Cincinnati

SUBJECT: BUPLANS,  
OPERATION ALERT, 1958

Re SAC Letter 58-37.

Attention is invited to Page 2, Paragraph 2.

My interpretation is:

1. Since other Government agencies will be holding exercises between 8:30 a.m. EST, 7/14/58, through 4:00 p.m. EST, 7/18/58, either the SAC or ASAC must be available ..... meaning that during normal work hours one should be in the office but outside of these hours one must be reachable at home or elsewhere on an immediate basis.

2. The intra-FBI testing will be in the period commencing 8:00 a.m., 7/16/58, and ending 12 midnight, 7/17/58, at which time the field office must be under the immediate, on-the-scene supervision of a member of the chain of command.

Is my interpretation correct for point 1 and point 2?

UACB, both the SAC and ASAC will work the regular day shift commencing Monday, 7/14/58, however, the ASAC will come in at 4:00 p.m., 7/16/58, and work until 8:00 a.m., 7/17/58, and the SAC will handle the day shift (8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.), 7/17/58. The ASAC will be on duty from 8:00 p.m., 7/17/58, until 8:00 a.m., 7/18/58, and on the following regular work day resume his standard work shift.

We feel this is necessary under the peculiar conditions existing in this office at the present time and we prefer to follow this arrangement unless the Bureau has objections.

We intend to have stenographers on a rotating basis on duty from 8:00 a.m. 7/16/58 until 12 midnight 7/17/58 on a voluntary basis, UACB.

2 - Bureau  
2 - Cincinnati

EDM:pat  
(4)

EX 105

24 JUL 7 1958

EXP. PROC.  
JUL 7 1958  
ah

Letter to Cincinnati  
7-9-58  
JTM:pat  
7-7-58  
JTM

my [signature]  
JUL 7 1958

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nease *YK*  
 FROM : L. E. Wherry, Jr.

DATE: July 8, 1958

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - COMMUNICATIONS  
 USE OF FORMER COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
 PERSONNEL AT THE SOG DURING OPERATION  
ALERT 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

You will recall that we have recently given refresher training in communications operations to a number of Bureau employees in other divisions and sections who were formerly assigned to the Communications Section. This was done to prepare these employees to assist us in processing communications at the SOG during Operation Alert 1958 when a large percentage of our SOG communications employees will be working at the Bureau's emergency relocation site.

We will require the services of the following former Communications Section employees at the SOG during the test exercise as follows:

| Employee              | Division | Communications Assignment                             |
|-----------------------|----------|---|
| Maud S. Barclay       | 4        | Coding Unit, July 16<br>thru 18, 9 a.m. - 5:30 p.m.   |
| Naomi R. Blakemore    | 4        | Teletype Unit, July 16<br>thru 18, 9 a.m. - 5:30 p.m. |
| Patricia A. Chandler  | 4        | Coding Unit, July 16<br>thru 18, 2:30 p.m. - 11 p.m.  |
| Dorothy L. Enfinger   | 4        | Teletype Unit, July 16<br>thru 18, 9 a.m. - 5:30 p.m. |
| Macie Van Slyke       | 4        | Coding Unit, July 16<br>thru 18, 9 a.m. - 5:30 p.m.   |
| Robert F. Wyrick, Jr. | 4        | Teletype Unit, July 16<br>thru 18, 9 a.m. - 5:30 p.m. |

- 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention Mr. Walkert)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

166-19012-  
 NOT RECORDED  
 176 JUL 21 1958

JUL 18 1958

LIAISON

LEW:nma

51 JUL 25 1958

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-17380-14-199

Mr. Nease

July 8, 1958

| <u>Employee</u>   | <u>Division</u> | <u>Communications Assignment</u>                     |
|-------------------|-----------------|--|
| Lola Legore       | 5               | Coding Unit, July 16<br>thru 18, 2:30 p.m. - 11 p.m. |
| Miriam Gravette   | 6               | Coding Unit, July 16 thru<br>18, 2:30 p.m. - 11 p.m. |
| Lewis P. Ryan     | 3               | Coding Unit - on call                                |
| Robert L. Gleason | 7               | Coding Unit - on call                                |
| Bonnez Carson     | 7               | Coding Unit - on call                                |

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memo be approved and the carbon copies  
forwarded to the officials concerned.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: July 16, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, JULY 14-18, 1958  
(D / 14 SITUATION SUMMARY FOR PHASE II)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman 7-11-58 advised of receipt of "D / 14 Situation Summary for Phase II," a review of which denotes information which may be of interest as follows:

Summary and Conclusions

**MAGNITUDE OF THE ATTACK AND THE EXTENT OF PHYSICAL EFFECTS** indicates the mock attack on 5-6-58 was heavy, amounting to 638 megatons of TNT. It caused death or injury to about one third of the U. S. population; about four per cent total land area, primarily cities, was subjected to massive fire and only one third of the U. S. land area was virtually unaffected and remained safe for work or travel during the first two days; about one third since (fourteen days after attack) became available. **IMPACT ON NATIONAL GOVERNMENT** indicates the administrative capability of the Federal Government was seriously, though not completely curtailed by lack of fall-out protection at relocation sites and undamaged regular facilities.

The remaining potential of **SURVIVAL** and **RECOVERY** is indicated as three fourths of the population considered alive and well with about one tenth of the survivors expected to become radiation casualties D / 90 (ninety days after attack). The **MEDICAL BURDEN** at D / 90 is expected to include about nine per cent of the pre-attack population, most all of whom would, with normal care, be expected to live. However, due to the short supply of medical help and facilities, it is doubtful that many from the group of potentially surviving injured, other than those who can get by with self help or unskilled family care, can be expected to survive. **FOOD AND CLOTHING** is expected to be adequate for survival with problems in some local areas.

JTM:pwj/sal (8)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier)
- 1 - Mr. Nease (Attention Mr. McGuire)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-42

EX-124

66-19012-128

17 JUL 23 1958

51 JUL 25 1958



Memorandum Belmont to Boardman

Re: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, JULY 14-18, 1958

(D / 14 SITUATION SUMMARY FOR PHASE II)

HOUSING will be tight with serious overcrowding in some areas. MANPOWER suffered about forty per cent reduction which can be partially offset by using other parts of surviving population and increasing hours of work. FUELS are seriously limited, only one quarter of pre-attack petroleum refining capacity considered currently available and by D / seven months it is not expected to rise above one half. AIR TRANSPORTATION seriously restricted by loss of aircraft and limited fuel supply. RAILROAD CAPACITY considered one fourth of pre-attack capacity. HIGHWAYS AND INLAND WATERWAYS CAPACITY is considered about one half of pre-attack capacity. Surviving transportation capacity by the end of the year should be back to two thirds or three fourths of pre-attack level. PORTS have suffered so seriously that surviving ocean-going tonnage will require over-the-beach loading and unloading. SKILLED PERSONNEL COMMUNICATIONS CAPACITY considered deteriorated to such a point that control operations will be handicapped. ELECTRIC POWER considered down to one third of pre-attack level and by D / 90 expected to be back to more than one half of the pre-attack capacity. FINANCE very seriously disrupted and will require local resourcefulness to prevent economic breakdown due to lack of generally accepted medium of exchange. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION prospects are comparatively bright while INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION prospects are gloomy.

ACTION:

None, informative.

V.

*Jim* *R* *Wra*  
*9/2*  
*8/6*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
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## Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

5x  
esa

TO : Mr. Belmont *Ans. 7/12*

FROM : Mr. Roach *20*

SUBJECT: *0* OPERATION ALERT 1958  
July 15 - 18, 1958

DATE: 7-18-58

Tolson ☒

Boardman ☒

Belmont ☒

Mohr ☒

Nease ☒

Parsons ☒

Rosen ☒

Tamm ☒

Trotter ☒

W.C. Sullivan ☒

Tele. Room ☒

Holloman ☒

Gandy ☒

(Concluding Report  
12:00 Noon to 4:00 P. M. (EST)  
July 18, 1958)

*H. L. Edwards*

All activities at our site were covered in daily reports or the summary report to the Director which included all happenings up to 12:00 Noon (EST) 7-18-58.

From 12:00 Noon to 4:00 P. M. (EST) deactivation time of our site, we received no outside problems nor did we initiate any problems. No activities of significance occurred which would require action.

At 12:00 Noon we had a total of 28 employees out of the original cadre of 47 at the site. As we tapered off activities we released personnel and at 4:00 P. M. deactivation time, only a total of 13 were left for closing down purposes.

JTM:MAH *John*

1 - Mr. Roach  
1 - Mr. Minnich

*John*

*al*

EX-124  
REC-42

66-19012-133

JUL 28 1958

LIAISON

55 AUG 5 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AM*

DATE: July 22, 1958

FROM : *ss* R. R. Roach *R*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958 *Minnich*

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Clayton    | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

All Operation Alert 1958 exercise material, documents, messages, and related items are being catalogued, placed into folders and will be retained by the Buplans Desk for one year. This material, excluding the over-all plan for our participation in the exercises, will be destroyed subsequent to Operation Alert 1959. The over-all plan is of value in connection with planning all future exercises and will be permanently retained together with the plans from Operations Alert 1955, 1956 and 1957.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM:jyl  
(4) *JX*

EX - 124

REC-42

66-19012-135

10 JUL 23 1958

51 JUL 25 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: February 21, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Document dated 2-15-58 "Standards for Operation Alert 1958, Attack Phase" and "Annex A" received from Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) via mail by Liaison Section 2-20-58 (copy attached). Form cover letter of transmittal dated 2-15-58 to "All State Civil Defense Directors" advises the document is an advance copy of the Basic Standards for Operation Alert 1958 (O/A 1958), Attack Phase, for preliminary planning purposes and these "Standards" will be reissued as a complete document with all annexes in the near future.

The document has been reviewed and it is not at all dissimilar from the Interagency Planning Group draft analyzed by memorandum Belmont to Boardman dated 2-12-58 with approved recommendation by the Director for Liaison to determine from Office of Defense Mobilization the type "sabotage incidents" which will be placed in sealed envelopes disseminated to state and local Civil Defense directors and whether envelopes will be made available to us.

Since document is an advance copy lacking Annexes B - J, additional planning for our participation in O/A 1958 will not proceed on the basis of the attached document but will be held in abeyance pending receipt of the complete document with all annexes.

ACTION:

None. Informative

JTM:ncj (9)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (with enclosure)  
Attention: Mr. Gauthier
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (with enclosure)  
Attention: Mr. Gallagher
- 1 - Mr. Nease (with enclosure)  
Attention: Mr. McGuire
- 1 - Liaison Section (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Minnich (with enclosure)

Enclosure

EX-116

66-19012-7

10 FEB 25 1958

55 FEB 28 1958 4486



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *as for*

DATE: May 16, 1958

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *R*

SUBJECT:

*Duplanc*  
OPERATION ALERT - 1958 -  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

On May 13, 1958, Captain John A. Waters, Director of Security, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), advised that in connection with the captioned exercise AEC will activate its Emergency Relocation Center (ERC) on July 16, 1958, at which time the full initial cadre will go to the center. Waters said that the location of the ERC is [redacted] and that this information is confidential. Waters added that at the beginning of the Federal action phase of operation alert the center will be manned by selected personnel of the initial cadre.

b7E per DOE

It should be noted that the Bureau's Liaison Representative with AEC is a member of the initial cadre which includes the top people of all divisions of AEC. A copy of the AEC initial cadre furnished by Waters is attached. As in the past, AEC expects the Bureau Liaison Representative to relocate with the full initial cadre on July 16, 1958. Accordingly, this will be done in order to protect the Bureau's interest and the Bureau's Liaison Representative will remain with the initial cadre at [redacted] as long as it appears necessary. [redacted] is where normal liaison is conducted and therefore agent will also carry on regular work.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure *9/2/58 destroyed*JMF:jlh *15-22-58*

(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

REC-31

66-19012-34

MAY 19 1958

ENCLOSURE

MAY 22 1958

LIAISON

CONFIDENTIAL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
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66-19012-

Belmont / Boardman 2/4/58

(B) BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958 -- Operation Alert 1958 now scheduled in three phases only two of which are pertinent to field operations. (X)

Phase 1 is an "Attack Phase" to take place on May 6 and 7, 1958, with participation by state and local civil defense organizations and supporting personnel. Participation in this Phase by some Federal personnel may be required and is anticipated; however, in the absence of specific Bureau instructions, field offices should not participate in this Phase, and requests from local or state civil defense organizations for field office participation in this Phase should be immediately transmitted to the Bureau for consideration and approval. (X)

Phase 2, "Federal Action Phase," is to occur July 14 to July 18, inclusive, and according to present information, this Phase will require Seat of Government and field participation for either the entire period or a portion thereof. In preparing your 1958 leave schedule or other activities in advance, you should make certain that sufficient communications personnel, Chain of Command, and personnel having essential emergency functions will be available to carry out the responsibilities of your office during the course of Phase 2 and, if necessary, during Phase 1. (X)

The foregoing plans are in an incipient stage and additional instructions will be forthcoming. (X)

2/11/58

SAC LETTER NO. 58-10

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

Classified by SP8 BJS/SCC

Declassify on: CADR8/3/83

NOT RECORDED  
199 FEB 20 1958

64 FEB 21 1958

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 22, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
RETRAINING SESSIONFBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ASSOCIATES OF GEORGIA  
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, JULY 16-17, 1958

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
| Parsons    | _____ |
| Rosen      | _____ |
| Tamm       | _____ |
| Trotter    | _____ |
| Nease      | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holloman   | _____ |
| Gandy      | _____ |

Atlanta letter 4-16-58 advises 1958 retraining session of FBI National Academy Associates of Georgia is being held in conjunction with National Academy Associates regularly scheduled summer meeting of July 16-17, 1958, which dates are fixed in the by-laws of the association. These dates conflict with date of Federal Phase of Operation Alert 1958, July 14 through 18, 1958, inclusive. SAC Atlanta feels it desirable to attend but will not do so unless so instructed.

OBSERVATIONS:

We have always required presence of SAC at field office during alert exercise except in the presence of an unforeseen emergency. However, we have in the past authorized absence of the ASAC from a field office as long as the SAC will be present during the exercise. Training and Inspection Division feels it is desirable for a representative of the Atlanta field office to attend the retraining session but not to the detriment of the successful conduct of Operation Alert 1958. It appears ASAC of Atlanta could attend retraining session without undue effect upon the alert exercise. The same applies to the ASAC of the Savannah office.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached letter be sent to Atlanta, cc. Savannah, authorizing ASACs both offices to attend retraining session provided SACs and/or a member of the chain of command will be at the field office during course of Operation Alert 1958.

Enclosure

JTM:pwj (5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Tamm (attention Mr. Rogers)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC- 95

10 APR 29 1958

70 MAY 7 1958

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7/24/58 37472 (C/44)

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 4/16/58

FROM : SAC, Atlanta (80-861) Attn. Training & Inspection DivisionSUBJECT: RETRAINING SESSION  
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ASSOCIATES OF GEORGIA  
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, JULY 16-17, 1958.

*Baptists - operation alert - 1958*

Re Savannah let 4/10/58 which outlined the program for the 1958 retraining session of the FBI National Academy Associates of Georgia.

It is noted that the dates of this retraining session will be July 16 and 17, 1958, and that these dates are fixed in the by-laws of the NA Associates of Georgia. These particular dates conflict with the "Federal Action Phase" of Operation Alert 1958, which will occur July 14 to July 18, 1958, inclusive.

Since the retraining session is being held in conjunction with the National Academy Associates' regularly scheduled summer meeting, the dates of which are fixed in the by-laws, it would appear that unless the Bureau will specifically authorize me to be absent from my headquarters during the Operation Alert I will not be able to attend or participate in the retraining session at Savannah. I feel that it would be desirable for me to attend this session since a great many of the NA Associates of Georgia come from the Atlanta Division, and if the Bureau will permit me to do so I would appreciate advice in this matter. UACB, however, I will not plan to attend.

NRJ:CM

- 2 - Bureau
- 1 - Savannah (1-277)
- 1 - Atlanta (80-861)

10 APR 20 1958

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REC'D - 212 LICE

NOT RECORDED

141, MAR. 1 1958

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- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Tamm (att. Mr. Roger)
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

SAC, Atlanta (80-861)

April 23, 1958

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI

66-19012 - V

DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
RETRAINING SESSION  
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ASSOCIATES OF GEORGIA  
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, JULY 16-17, 1958


Re Atlanta letter 4-16-58.

The importance of successful participation in the Federal Phase of Operation Alert 1958, precludes authorizing your attendance at the retraining session. However, provided you or a member of your chain of command is available at your field office July 14 through 18, 1958, the dates of Operation Alert 1958, you are authorized to designate your Assistant Special Agent in Charge to represent your field office at the retraining session.

For the information of Savannah, re Atlanta letter advises that due to the conflict in dates between the retraining session and Operation Alert 1958 the Special Agent in Charge of Atlanta does not plan to attend. The foregoing instructions apply to your office and you may designate your Assistant Special Agent in Charge to attend the retraining session.

2 - Savannah (1-277)

JTM:pwf (9)



(Cover memo Reach to Mr. Belmont dated 4-22-58 JTM:pwf)  
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
RETRAINING SESSION  
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ASSOCIATES OF GEORGIA  
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, JULY 16-17, 1958)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
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Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

70 MAY 7 1958

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APR 23 10 47 AM '58

## 4 Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *5-2-58*

DATE: April 30, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: *Baylane - [initials]*  
BUREAU PLANS  
OPERATION ALERT 1958  
ATTACK PHASE

|            |       |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson     | _____ |
| Nichols    | _____ |
| Boardman   | _____ |
| Belmont    | _____ |
| Mohr       | _____ |
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Memorandum Belmont to Boardman 4-11-58 advises of the receipt of seven copies of Attack Pattern for Operation Alert 1958, and recommendation was approved that the documents be referred to the Laboratory for analysis of Attack Pattern information with respect to blast damage which would be incurred by Bureau installations.

Six copies of Attack Pattern for Operation Alert 1958, revised as of 4-21-58, received in the mail, Liaison Section, 4-28-58, and five copies were personally delivered to Supervisor Gallagher of the Laboratory. Mr. Gallagher understands the revised Attack Pattern replaces the previous Attack Pattern forwarded to him by memorandum 4-11-58.

ACTION:

None. Informative.

JTM:pwf (3) *[initials]*

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr (Attention Mr. Gauthier)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (Attention Mr. Gallagher)
- 1 - Mr. O. H. Bartlett
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-69

66-19072-22

TO MAIL 5/1/58

68  
50 MAY 7 1958



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: May 9, 1958

FROM : I. W. Conrad

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT  
1958 (July 14 thru July 18)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
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Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

PERSONNEL:

In connection with the above-entitled operation, it is suggested that the following personnel go to  for purposes of the test. It is contemplated that there will be rotation of personnel during the test and possibly some reduction of assigned personnel during the latter part of the test.

b7E

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>Duties</u>   |
|--|---|
| Assistant Director D. J. Parsons<br>(Alternate - I. W. Conrad) | Will supervise over-all operation of Laboratory personnel and problems. He will also be responsible for coordination of Laboratory matters with problems involving other divisions. |
| G. L. Davy<br>(Alternate - B. L. Sutton)                       | Primarily responsible for maintenance and readiness of radio communications facilities including CW radio station, microwave, and voice FM equipment.                               |
| J. M. Matter<br>(Alternate - R. F. Pfafman)                    | Primarily responsible for maintenance and readiness of wire communications equipment.   |
| C. F. Downing<br>(Alternate - I. W. Newpher)                   | Primarily responsible for maintenance and readiness of cryptographic equipment.   |
| M. E. Keough<br>(Alternate - K. M. Barron)                     | Primarily responsible for stenographic and clerical duties involved in handling of Laboratory problems.   |
| R. L. Millen<br>(Alternate - A. J. Baker)                      | Primarily responsible for maintenance and continuing readiness of communications facilities and related problems.   |
| 1 - Mr. Minnich  |   |

IWC:KMB

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PERS. FILES

67 MAY 16 1958

EX-117

Memo Conrad to Parsons  
Re: Defense Plans - Operation Alert 1958

The above is the minimum personnel considered sufficient to properly supervise operations under Laboratory control. In the event there is any time available between Operation Alert problems, Laboratory personnel will have sufficient current work with them to remain fully occupied.

It is felt that the above personnel will also be able to take care of any additional matters which the Office of Defense Mobilization observer may suggest.

The above personnel will also have available information on technical equipment and radio frequencies in use throughout the field, in order to assist the Administrative Division in any necessary move of technical equipment from one field division to another.

PROBLEMS:

Problem 1 - Selected offices will be requested to set up radioactivity detection meters and report simulated readings to [ ] to simulate keeping Bureau headquarters aware of such conditions in the field. Agent Millen will be responsible for supervision and carrying out of this problem. b7E

Problem 2 - Selected field offices will be requested to equip representative personnel with the dosimeter equipment which is available in the field in order to provide a test of the function of this equipment in protecting personnel who may have to work in radioactive areas. Reports on the use of this equipment will be made to Bureau headquarters by the field offices. Agent Millen will be responsible for supervision and carrying out of this problem.

Problem 3 - Selected field offices will be instructed to operate their radio stations (CW and/or FM) on emergency power for a period of 15 minutes and to report completion of such test to Bureau headquarters. Agent Davy will be responsible for the supervision and carrying out of this problem.

Problem 4 - The [ ] Office has radio facilities permanently installed at its relocation site. Accordingly, it is contemplated that Honolulu will be instructed to establish contact from the relocation site using the emergency radio equipment for that purpose. This equipment is installed and ready to go and no excessive effort will be required for this exercise. Agent Davy will be responsible for the supervision and carrying out of this problem. b7E

ACTION: Above should be referred to Domestic Intelligence Division for coordination and incorporation in over-all Bureau plans.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nease

DATE: May 13, 1958

FROM: L. E. Wherry, Jr.

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL  
FOR OPERATION ALERT 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

The Communications Section of the Records and Communications Division will utilize the following Bureau employees in Communications activities during Operation Alert 1958:

Monday - July 14, 1958.

Front Office - L. E. Wherry, Jr.

Coding Unit - Mrs. Mary A. Powell  
 Miss Casey W. Arnette  
 Miss Jane F. Rokisky

Switchboard - Miss Catherine M. Levecque  
 Unit Mr. Charles R. Hewitt

Teletype Unit- Miss Jean Hope Marshall  
 Miss Donna L. Ingwersen

Tuesday - July 15, 1958

Front Office - L. E. Wherry, Jr.

Coding Unit - Mrs. Mary A. Powell  
 Miss Caroline C. Atkins  
 Miss Yvonne Hillman

Switchboard - Miss Bessie Sadler  
 Unit Miss Callie Lee McCoy

Teletype Unit- Miss Nancy A. Mooney  
 Mr. Clyde Strickland

The 8 employees listed under July 15 will remain over night at the relosite and throughout the test exercise.

- 1 - Mr. Sloan  
 1 - Mr. Minnich  
 1 - Mr. Parsons (Attention Mr. Downing)  
 1 - Mr. Waikert

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53 MAY 20 1958

LEW:nma

(9)

EX-101

10 MAY 15 1958

LIAISON

Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, July 16 through 18, 1958.

The following 15 employees will come down by bus on July 16 and remain throughout the alert or until they can be released to return to the SOG.

Front Office - Mr. Alvin C. Frank

Coding Unit - Mr. Harold W. Lawson  
Miss Joann Thomas  
Miss Casey W. Arnette  
Miss Jane F. Rokisky  
Miss Marilyn Jo Cast

Miss Loretta E. Tobin  
Miss Rose Mary Yost  
(Typists from Records Branch)

Mr. Rodney L. Leffter  
Mr. Chauncey D. Seefeldt  
(Crypto clerks being loaned by Cryptanalysis-  
Translation Section of Laboratory).

Switchboard Unit - Miss Catherine M. Levecque  
Mr. Charles R. Hewitt

Teletype Unit - Miss Jean Hope Marshall  
Miss Donna L. Ingwersen  
Miss Deanna J. Murray

RECOMMENDATION:

None.. For information purposes..



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Nease

FROM : E. Wherry, Jr.

DATE: May 14, 1958

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - COMMUNICATIONS  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

\*RETRAINING OF FORMER COMMUNICATIONS SECTION PERSONNEL

Tolson  
Nichols  
Boardman  
Belmont  
Mohr  
Parsons  
Rosen  
Tamm  
Trotter  
Nease  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

You will recall that in past years during the Operation Alert exercises it has been necessary for us to utilize at the SOG the services of a number of former Communications Section personnel who have been assigned to other duties. This year during the test exercises we are operating our Communications units at the SOG with less personnel than previously and accordingly must rely heavily on former Communications Section employees now assigned elsewhere in the Bureau.

In order that these employees will be proficient in their former duties, we will afford them at least one day of retraining on the suggested dates shown alongside their names.

The following is a list of former Communications Section personnel, the dates we can retrain them, the Communications Unit to which they were formerly assigned and the work shift to which they will be assigned during the Alert. The asterisks indicate those who will be on call from their regular assignments for day shift communications assignment on short notice. We will not request the services of the on-call employees unless absolutely necessary.

| <u>Employee</u> | <u>Training date</u> | <u>Unit Assignment</u> | <u>Shift Assignment</u> |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
|-----------------|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|

Administrative Div.

|               |        |             |   |
|---------------|--------|-------------|---|
| Lewis P. Ryan | 6-2-58 | Coding Unit | * |
|---------------|--------|-------------|---|

Records & Communications Division

| <u>Records Branch</u> |        |             |              |
|-----------------------|--------|-------------|--------------|
| Maud S. Barclay       | 6-3-58 | Coding Unit | 9 - 5:30     |
| Patricia A. Chandler  | 6-4-58 | Coding Unit | 2:30 - 11:00 |

- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Nease (Atten. Walkart - Atten. Wick)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

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12 MAY 21 1958

ACF:LEW:nma

(8)

67 MAY 26 1958

EX-102

PERS. FILES

Mr. Nease

May 14, 1958

|                     |         |               |          |
|---------------------|---------|---------------|----------|
| Macie M. Van Slyke  | 6-11-58 | Coding Unit   | 9 - 5:30 |
| Georgia W. Bishel   | 6-2-58  | Teletype Unit | *        |
| Naomi R. Blakemore  | 6-3-58  | Teletype Unit | 9 - 5:30 |
| Dorothy L. Enfinger | 6-4-58  | Teletype Unit | 9 - 5:30 |
| Sophie K. Kenny     | 6-5-58  | Teletype Unit | *        |
| Robert F. Wyrick    | 6-6-58  | Teletype Unit | 9 - 5:30 |

Mr. Nease's Office

|                     |        |             |          |
|---------------------|--------|-------------|----------|
| Edna Arlene Rairigh | 6-2-58 | Switchboard | 9 - 5:30 |
|---------------------|--------|-------------|----------|

Domestic Intelligence Division

|                |        |             |              |
|----------------|--------|-------------|--------------|
| Lola G. LeGore | 6-6-58 | Coding Unit | 2:30 - 11:00 |
| Joan C. Keller | 6-3-58 | Switchboard | 9 - 5:30     |

Investigative Division

|                    |        |             |              |
|--------------------|--------|-------------|--------------|
| Marian M. Gravette | 6-9-58 | Coding Unit | 2:30 - 11:00 |
|--------------------|--------|-------------|--------------|

Laboratory Division

|                   |         |             |   |
|-------------------|---------|-------------|---|
| Bonnez G. Corson  | 6-10-58 | Coding Unit | * |
| Robert L. Gleason | 6-5-58  | Coding Unit | * |

Suggested retraining dates may be changed by contacting the Communications Section, extension 538. Attendance of these employees to scheduled retraining should be confirmed by routing slip, attention Communications Section, no later than 5/29/58. Hours of shift assignment relate only to assignment to duties during Operation Alert July 14 through July 18. All pre-exercise retraining will be performed on the 9:00 - 5:30 shift unless other arrangements are made individually subsequent to distribution of this memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

That copies of this memorandum be forwarded to the Divisions concerned for appropriate action.

*gm*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 6, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958  
FEDERAL ACTION PHASE - JULY 14-18, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

FBI participation in Federal Action Phase, Operation Alert 1958, limited to 7/16-18/58 with field offices assuming a relocated status at headquarters city from 8:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time (EST), 7/16/58, to 12:00 midnight EST, 7/17/58, for purposes of intra-FBI testing. We have always required SAC or ASAC to be available unless major occurrence requires their presence at scene. Also, we instruct SAC, ASAC, and members of field chain of command not to accept speeches, schedule police schools, or similar activities during this period.

[ ] Office radiogram 6/5/58 advised SAC received invitation to talk to Joint Annual Convention of Department of American Legion and American Legion Auxiliaries on 7/17/58 at 10:30 A.M. (3:30 P.M. EST Washington, D.C.). SAC, [ ] traditionally talks to this group. ASAC will be out of territory on home leave at Bluefield, West Virginia, 6/11 to 7/23/58. SAC would be in touch with Office only 10 minutes away and relief supervisor (not a member of chain of command) will be in charge of the Office. Crime Records approves of talk from group standpoint.

OBSERVATIONS:

We do have test problems scheduled which may be received at [ ] Office during SAC's absence; however, problems permit from 2 to 4 hours' time to answer and a member of [ ] chain of command could, if necessary, obtain advice and counsel of SAC prior to answering. The nature of the group indicates benefit would accrue to the Bureau by permitting SAC to give the talk, provided he assures presence of a member of the chain of command in his absence and does not absent himself any longer than necessary. Also, that he will be personally responsible for the adequacy and promptness of responses emanating from his Office in connection with any intra-FBI test problems or inquiries from other Government agencies received during his absence.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached radiogram be sent to [ ]

JUN 9 1958

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - Mr. Nease

1 - Mr. Mohr

1 - Mr. Gauthier

1 - Mr. Parsons

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Minnich

Enclosure

JTM:nck (7)

PERS. FILES

1-original  
1-yellow  
1-Mr. Boardman  
1-Mr. Nease  
1-Mr. Mohr (Attn: Mr. Gauthier)  
1-Mr. Parsons  
1-Mr. Belmont  
1-Liaison Section  
1-Mr. Minnich

6-6-58

CODE

4  
RADIOGRAM

DEFERRED

EX-138 REC-1  
TO SAC

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

1958  
BUPLANS, OPERATION ALERT FIFTY EIGHT, FEDERAL ACTION PHASE, JULY  
FOURTEEN DASH EIGHTEEN, FIFTY EIGHT. REURAD JUNE FIVE LAST.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO ADDRESS LEGION GROUP TEN THIRTY A.M. JULY  
SEVENTEEN PROVIDED YOU ASSURE PRESENCE AT OFFICE OF MEMBER YOUR  
CHAIN OF COMMAND AND DO NOT ABSENT YOURSELF ANY LONGER THAN  
NECESSARY. INTRA FBI TEST PROBLEMS AND INQUIRIES FROM OTHER  
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES MAY BE RECEIVED DURING YOUR ABSENCE AND YOU  
WILL BE HELD PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ADEQUACY AND PROMPTNESS  
OF REPLIES.

✓  
Cover memo Belmont to Boardman  
6-6-58, JTM:nck RE: BUPLANS -  
OPERATION ALERT 1958, FEDERAL  
ACTION PHASE - JULY 14-18, 1958

RADIO

JUN 6 - 1958

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

58 JUN 11 1958

sent via  
code

ROOM 2

7<sup>14</sup> PM Per NS



*to*  
**DECODED COPY**

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease *[initials]*  
Parsons *[initials]*  
Rosen *[initials]*  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

☒ **Radio**☐ **Teletype**

DEFERRED

6-5-58

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAC  

050458

b7E

ATTN CRIME RECORDS SECTION. AMERICAN LEGION, DEPARTMENT OF   REQUEST FOR TALK. INVITATION TO TALK TO JOINT ANNUAL CONVENTION OF DEPARTMENT OF   AMERICAN LEGION AND AMERICAN LEGION AUXILIARY ON JULY 17 AT 10:30 AM RECEIVED. SAC, FBI   TRADITIONALLY TALKS TO THIS GROUP. THIS IS SECOND LAST DAY OF ALERT AND ASAC WILL BE OUT OF THE TERRITORY. TIME MENTIONED WOULD BE 4:30 PM WASHINGTON TIME AND I WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH   OFFICE AND ONLY 10 MINUTES AWAY. RELIEF SUPERVISOR ROBERT E. THORNTON WOULD BE IN CHARGE OF OFFICE. RECOMMEND I BE PERMITTED TO MAKE THIS TALK. PLEASE ADVISE.

b7E

RECEIVED:

2:55 AM RADIO

3:08 AM CODING UNIT

ECD

cc: Mr. Nease

*MMU* 1 cclet 2w  
6-6-58  
*[initials]*

*[Signature]*  
No objection in  
Crime Records from  
standpoint of type  
of group, etc.  
that

Mr. Nease

*Memorandum  
to Boardman  
Referring to  
b-6-58  
JTM wjb*

REC-1

66-17018

JUN 9 1958

*1 cclet 2w  
to Boardman  
standpoint.  
mll  
(4)*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. PARSONS

DATE: June 9, 1958

FROM : B. J. WHITE

SUBJECT: BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT  
OPERATION ALERT 1958 (OPAL '58)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

You will recall during the first phase of Operation Alert-1958, the U. S. and its possessions were subjected to a mock nuclear attack. During the attack, 282 mock nuclear detonations having an explosive force equivalent to 642 million tons of TNT, blasted preselected targets.

A list of the locations of these blasts was made available by the Office of Defense Mobilization and has been analyzed by the Laboratory in order to determine the effect on the Bureau of this assumed attack. The vast majority of these blasts were surface detonations and, thus, extensive areas of intense radioactive fallout resulted. It has been approximated that 67% of this country's surface was blanketed by fallout of sufficient intensity to restrict most operations for two days following the attack.

Thirty-eight field offices plus Seat of Government headquarters facilities were completely destroyed. In addition, 107 resident agencies were destroyed. It is interesting to note that because of the strategic location of our relocation sites, only one relocation site suffered blast damage although 11 relocation sites were in fallout areas of sufficient density to restrict operations for two weeks or more.

Based on the Laboratory's calculations from this mock attack, 649 Bureau employees were killed and the injured totaled 2308. Attached is a summary prepared by the Laboratory reflecting the calculated damage inflicted on each field division as a result of the mock attack. This information is being distributed to the field by SAC Letter to serve as a basis for the second phase of OPAL '58 which will begin July 14, 1958.

ACTION: For information only.

Enclosure

- 1- Mr. Belmont
- 1- Mr. Tamm
- 1- Mr. Mohr
- 1- Mr. Minnich
- 1- Mr. Roach
- 1- Mr. Edwards

REC-8

66-19012-66  
13 JUN 18 19582-ENCLOSURE  
58 JUN 20 1958  
WRH/ DJP/mek (10)

## LEGEND

NUMBER OF BOMBS: The number of bombs detonated in the field office territory. If the detonation is on the border of two field divisions, this bomb will be reflected in each of the divisions.

BLAST DAMAGE: Headquarters City and Relocation Site (RS) blast damage effects resulting from the blast wave are listed as:

D - This means that the installation was demolished or damaged beyond repair. Records, files, and equipment have no salvage value.

M - Moderate blast damage. This means cessation of function. Restored with considerable effort. Reconstruction less costly than new construction. May be possible to salvage some files and equipment.

L - Light blast damage. The function of the installation is not seriously impeded but deterioration is threatened. There is considerable damage from fire.

O - No damage from blast or fires.

RADIATION HAZARDS: The radiation hazards are tabulated as those existing at D / 14 i.e. 14 days after the initial attack. The various radiation hazards are described by the symbols:

NS - No significant radiation hazards

A - Radiation intensity of fallout permits only limited operations in the area

B - Radiation intensity of fallout prohibits performance of any functions outside of shelter

CASUALTIES IN DIVISION: The number of injured and dead were estimated in the FBI Laboratory as a result of technical analyses which took into account the location, size, and type of detonation, as well as radioactive fallout. These figures refer to a

66-19012-61  
ENCLOSURE

deployed population resulting from a 2 to 4 hour warning. Accordingly, for the purpose of this exercise each field division should consider these figures to represent confirmed total casualties; however, the actual distribution of the respective total in any given field division is left to the discretion of the SAC, based on assumed local conditions.

RESIDENT AGENCIES NON-FUNCTIONAL AT D / 14: A resident agency may be non-functional fourteen days following the attack (D/14) if the installation was demolished by a blast (D) or if the installation was in a fallout area of such intensity that no Bureau function could be performed on D / 14 (F).

FIELD OPERATING FROM: This column lists the city which will be considered the assumed location of the Division's Headquarters on D/14. RS is the abbreviation for relocation site.

## Field Office

Resident Agencies non-  
functional "D/ 14"  
(14 days after the  
attack)Field Operating  
From

Number of Bombs  
Headquarters City  
Blast Damage  
Headquarters City  
Radiation Hazard  
D / 14  
Relocation Site  
Blast Damage  
Relocation Site  
Radiation Hazard  
D / 14  
Casualties in  
Division Injured  
Casualties in  
Division Dead

Albany

11 L NS

9 2

Burlington, Vt. D  
Rutland, Vt. D  
Watertown, N.Y. D

Albany

b7E

Albuquerque

7 D B

14 3

Los Alamos D  
Santa Fe D  
Alamogordo F

RS

Anchorage

3 D B

5 1

Fairbanks D  
Juneau F

RS

Atlanta

4 D B

22 4

RS

Baltimore

11 D B

55 9

Annapolis D  
Aberdeen D  
Dover, Del. D  
Wilmington, Del. D  
Hyattsville F  
Silver Spring F

RS

Birmingham

5 0 B

10 2

Huntsville D

RS

Boston

13 D A

60 11

Bangor, Me. D  
Concord, N.H. D  
Ft. Fairfield, Me. D  
Springfield, Mass. D  
Portsmouth, N.H. D  
Salem, Mass. D  
Portland, Me. D  
Worcester, Mass. D  
Lawrence, Mass. F  
Brockton, Mass. F  
Framingham, Mass. F  
Hyannis, Mass. F  
Nashua, N.H. F  
Providence, R.I. F

RS

66-19012-61

ENCLOSURE

|              |   |   |    |
|--------------|---|---|----|
| Buffalo      | 5 | M | A  |
| Butte        | 7 | 0 | NS |
| Charlotte    | 6 | D | B  |
| Chicago      | 3 | M | B  |
| Cincinnati   | 9 | D | B  |
| Cleveland    | 6 | D | B  |
| Dallas       | 8 | L | NS |
| Denver       | 6 | D | B  |
| Detroit      | 8 | D | B  |
| El Paso      | 2 | 0 | NS |
| Honolulu     | 1 | D | B  |
| Houston      | 9 | L | NS |
| Indianapolis | 6 | 0 | NS |
| Jacksonville | 5 | D | A  |

|    |    |                  |   |                      |
|----|----|------------------|---|----------------------|
| 8  | 4  | Jamestown, N.Y.  | D | Niagara Falls        |
|    |    | Rochester, N.Y.  | F |                      |
| 5  | 0  | Boise, Idaho     | F | Butte <sup>b7E</sup> |
|    |    | Coeur d'Alene    | F |                      |
|    |    | Great Falls      | F |                      |
| 32 | 8  | Durham, N.C.     | D | RS                   |
|    |    | Greensboro, N.C. | D |                      |
|    |    | Winston-Salem    | D |                      |
| 94 | 20 | Rockford, Ill.   | D | RS                   |
| 19 | 16 | Columbus, Ohio   | D | Chillicothe, Ohio    |
|    |    | Dayton           | D |                      |
|    |    | Hamilton         | F |                      |
|    |    | Springfield      | F |                      |
|    |    | Steubenville     | F |                      |
|    |    | Zanesville       | F |                      |
| 41 | 8  | Akron, Ohio      | D | RS                   |
|    |    | Canton           | D |                      |
|    |    | Toledo           | D |                      |
|    |    | Youngstown       | D |                      |
| 10 | 2  |                  |   | Dallas               |
| 24 | 5  | Grand Junction   | D | RS                   |
|    |    | Pueblo, Colo.    | D |                      |
|    |    | Cheyenne, Wyo.   | D |                      |
| 49 | 12 | Flint, Mich.     | D | RS                   |
|    |    | Grand Rapids     | D |                      |
|    |    | Lansing          | D |                      |
|    |    | Monroe           | F |                      |
|    |    | Port Huron       | F |                      |
| 0  | 0  |                  |   | El Paso              |
| 4  | 1  |                  |   | RS                   |
| 6  | 1  | Beaumont, Tex.   | D | RS                   |
| 3  | 1  | Ft. Wayne, Ind.  | D | Indianapolis         |
|    |    | Gary             | D |                      |
|    |    | Hammond          | F |                      |
| 9  | 3  | Pensacola        | D | RS                   |

|             |    |   |    |
|-------------|----|---|----|
| Kansas City | 10 | D | B  |
| Knoxville   | 4  | D | A  |
| Little Rock | 4  | D | A  |
| Los Angeles | 1  | D | B  |
| Louisville  | 5  | D | B  |
| Memphis     | 5  | D | A  |
| Miami       | 5  | D | B  |
| Milwaukee   | 6  | D | A  |
| Minneapolis | 10 | L | HS |
| Mobile      | 2  | O | A  |

|    |    |                     |   |          |
|----|----|---------------------|---|----------|
| 24 | 6  | Jefferson City, Mo. | D | RS       |
|    |    | Salina, Kan.        | D |          |
|    |    | St. Joseph, Mo.     | D |          |
|    |    | Springfield, Mo.    | D |          |
|    |    | Topeka, Kan.        | D |          |
|    |    | Hutchinson, Kan.    | F |          |
| 16 | 4  | Chattanooga, Tenn.  | D | RS       |
|    |    | Kingsport           | D |          |
|    |    | Oak Ridge           | D |          |
| 12 | 4  | Blytheville, Ark.   | D | RS       |
|    |    | Fort Smith, Ark.    | D |          |
| 85 | 17 | Burbank, Cal.       | F | RS       |
|    |    | Inglewood           | F |          |
|    |    | Lancaster           | F |          |
|    |    | Pasadena            | F |          |
|    |    | Whittier            | F |          |
|    |    | Santa Monica        | F |          |
| 27 | 5  | Covington, Ky.      | D | RS       |
|    |    | Frankfort           | D |          |
|    |    | Paducah             | D |          |
|    |    | Hopkinsville        | F |          |
|    |    | Lexington           | F |          |
|    |    | Owensboro           | F |          |
|    |    | Paintsville         | F |          |
| 16 | 3  | Greenville, Miss.   | D | RS       |
|    |    | Nashville, Tenn.    | D |          |
|    |    | Greenwood, Miss.    | F |          |
|    |    | Columbus, Miss.     | F |          |
| 38 | 7  | Orlando             | D | Lakeland |
|    |    | Tampa               | D |          |
| 16 | 4  | Kenosha, Wis.       | D | RS       |
|    |    | Green Bay           | D |          |
| 13 | 1  | Bismarck, N.D.      | D | RS       |
|    |    | Fargo, N.D.         | D |          |
|    |    | Stour Falls, S.D.   | D |          |
|    |    | Rapid City, S.D.    | F |          |
| 2  | 0  | Union Springs       | F | RS       |

|               |    |   |    |  |     |     |                    |   |                     |
|---------------|----|---|----|--|-----|-----|--------------------|---|---------------------|
| Newark        | 5  | 0 | A  |  | 35  | 4   | Camden             | D | Atlantic City       |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Paterson           | F |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Red Bank           | F |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Trenton            | F |                     |
| New Haven     | 4  | 0 | A  |  | 13  | 2   | Bridgeport         | D | RS                  |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Hartford           | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | New Britain        | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | New London         | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Waterbury          | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Stamford           | F |                     |
| New Orleans   | 8  | D | B  |  | 27  | 6   | Baton Rouge, La.   | D | RS                  |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Gulfport, Miss.    | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Jackson, Miss.     | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Lake Charles, La.  | D |                     |
| New York      | 3  | D | A  |  | 421 | 170 | White Plains       | F | RS                  |
| Norfolk       | 1  | D | B  |  | 8   | 2   |                    |   | RS                  |
| Oklahoma City | 4  | D | A  |  | 15  | 2   | Tulsa              | D | RS                  |
| Omaha         | 12 | D | B  |  | 30  | 20  | Cedar Rapids       | D | RS                  |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Davenport          | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Des Moines         | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Dubuque            | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Lincoln            | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Sioux City         | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Waterloo           | D |                     |
| Philadelphia  | 4  | D | A  |  | 44  | 15  | York, Pa.          | D | RS                  |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Scranton           | F |                     |
| Phoenix       | 3  | D | B  |  | 18  | 3   |                    |   | RS                  |
| Pittsburgh    | 8  | D | A  |  | 40  | 7   | Charleston, W. Va. | D | Martinsburg, W. Va. |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Erie, Pa.          | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Huntington, W. Va. | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Johnstown, Pa.     | D |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Beaver             | F |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | New Castle         | F |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Wheeling, W. Va.   | F |                     |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Washington, Pa.    | F |                     |
| Portland      | 5  | D | B  |  | 30  | 15  | Salem              | D | Eugene              |
| Richmond      | 2  | 0 | NS |  | 8   | 1   | Alexandria         | D | Richmond            |
|               |    |   |    |  |     |     | Roanoke            | D |                     |



|                  |    |   |    |
|------------------|----|---|----|
| St. Louis        | 2  | D | B  |
| Salt Lake City   | 7  | D | B  |
| San Antonio      | 6  | D | B  |
| San Diego        | 1  | D | B  |
| San Francisco    | 2  | D | B  |
| San Juan         | 4  | D | NS |
| Savannah         | 9  | L | NS |
| Seattle          | 10 | D | B  |
| Springfield      | 9  | D | B  |
| Washington Field | 4  | D | B  |
| Washington - SOG | 4  | D | B  |

|      |     |                  |   |            |     |
|------|-----|------------------|---|------------|-----|
| 32   | 6   |                  |   | Farmington | b7E |
| 19   | 4   | Provo            | D | RS         |     |
|      |     | Reno             | D |            |     |
| 13   | 3   | Waco             | F | RS         |     |
| 14   | 5   |                  |   | RS         |     |
| 109  | 32  | Berkeley         | D | RS         |     |
|      |     | Hayward          | D |            |     |
|      |     | Oakland          | D |            |     |
|      |     | Richmond         | D |            |     |
|      |     | Sacramento       | D |            |     |
|      |     | San Mateo        | D |            |     |
|      |     | San Rafael       | D |            |     |
|      |     | Martinez         | F |            |     |
|      |     | Vallejo          | F |            |     |
| 7    | 1   | Ponce            | D | RS         |     |
|      |     | Rio Piedras      | D |            |     |
| 6    | 1   | Brunswick        | D | Savannah   |     |
|      |     | Charleston, S.C. | D |            |     |
|      |     | Columbia, S.C.   | D |            |     |
| 36   | 7   | Bremerton        | D | RS         |     |
|      |     | Spokane          | D |            |     |
|      |     | Tacoma           | F |            |     |
|      |     | Everett          | F |            |     |
|      |     | Vancouver        | F |            |     |
| 19   | 5   | Decatur          | D | RS         |     |
|      |     | Peoria           | D |            |     |
|      |     | Rock Island      | D |            |     |
|      |     | Belleuille       | F |            |     |
|      |     | Centralia        | F |            |     |
|      |     | Edwardsville     | F |            |     |
| 120  | 28  |                  |   | RS         |     |
| 1016 | 146 |                  |   | RS         |     |

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 11, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1958DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PLANNINGJustice Department Planning

Memorandum 6/4/58 from Internal Security Division of Department to all divisions and bureaus sets forth status of planning on Departmental level, excluding FBI and Bureau of Prisons, for Operation Alert 1958 (OPAL '58).

Memorandum denotes: (1) Since exercise is principally a resource-survival type exercise, role of the Department will be limited; (2) All units having essential wartime functions are expected to participate on 7/16-18/58 (These are the inclusive dates of our participation); (3) Participation by members of Executive Reserve will be limited to inviting those members not present at Department's relocation site last year to attend a briefing (Executive Reserve is composed of businessmen and attorneys considered capable of stepping into the Departmental Chain of Command in event of an emergency) and (4) United States Attorneys in the field have been advised activation of their relocation sites will not be required. However, United States Attorneys who represent the Department on Office of Defense Mobilization Regional Committees (RCs) are to participate either personally or through alternates in activities of the RCs at the RCs relocation sites during the week of July 14.

Memorandum requests that Acting Relocation Officer James J. Canavan be advised not later than 6/12/58 as to identity of participants at Department's relocation site. We will have a Liaison Agent at the Department's site commencing 7/16/58 and Canavan has been so advised.

ACTION:

None. Informative. You will be kept advised of any additional pertinent Departmental planning.

Enclosure

JTM:mje (7)

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Gauthier) (with enclosure)

1 - Mr. Parsons (with enclosure)

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Minnich

REC-91

JUN 19 1958

58 JUN 23 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*McLoughlin*  
*DeLoach*

X ENCLOSURE  
 REC-91

*Handwritten signature*

*Handwritten signature*

100-17012-63

*Handwritten signature*

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Washington, D. C.

June 4, 1958

MEMORANDUM TO HEADS OF ALL DIVISIONS AND BUREAUS OF  
THE DEPARTMENT HAVING ESSENTIAL WARTIME FUNCTIONS

FROM: J. Walter Yeagley  
Acting Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: Operation Alert 1958

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of the status of planning on a departmental level for Operation Alert 1958 in accordance with directives thus far received from the Office of Defense Mobilization. It is being issued at this time in order that you may make plans for the participation of your office in the exercise. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Prisons will have additional plans for manning their own relocation sites.

Time and Scope of Exercise

Operation Alert 1958 is divided into three phases. The first was the attack phase which took place on May 6 and 7 and involved principally State and local civil defense organizations. Under the assumed attack pattern a total of 282 nuclear weapons were dropped upon the United States and its possessions. The principal objective of this phase was the evaluation by State and local governments of their capabilities to cope with the attack situation on the basis of their own resources and a determination of the kinds of Federal assistance needed.

The Federal action phase will commence on July 14 and for the first two days field and regional activities will be conducted independently. Relocation sites at the national level will be staffed by communications personnel during this period and will be fully activated commencing at 8:30 a.m. E.S.T. July 16. Each department and agency is required to have a sufficient staff at their headquarters sites to begin operations at that time. A normal workday schedule will be observed, namely, 8:30 a.m. E.S.T. to 5:30 p.m. E.S.T. (although the city is on Daylight Saving Time all time references to Operation Alert are to be in Standard Time according to ODM), with communications operations and a duty officer watch maintained on a twenty-four hour basis. The exercise will close at 4:00 p.m. E.S.T. on July 18.

It has been assumed that the time period in which the Federal exercise will begin is 14 days after the attack. The exercise will be conducted to bring into play three major areas of operations:

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Mr. Tolson   |  |
| Mr. Boardman |  |
| Mr. Belmont  |  |
| Mr. Mohr     |  |
| Mr. Nease    |  |
| Mr. Parsons  |  |
| Mr. Rosen    |  |
| Mr. Tamm     |  |
| Mr. Trotter  |  |
| Mr. Clayton  |  |
| Tele. Room   |  |
| Mr. Holloman |  |
| Miss Gandy   |  |

66-19012-63  
ENCLOSURE

(1) the continuity of government, (2) the evaluation of Emergency Programs, Plans and Actions, (3) determining the relative urgency of demands on surviving resources or services and the capability of meeting such demands. To emphasize and aid in dealing with substantive problems arising from the attack phase task groups are being established by ODM to analyze estimated damage to the principal resource groups, as well as some general areas such as stabilization, foreign affairs and continuity of government. The exercise period will, therefore, be utilized to review the capability to perform essential functions, review and evaluate emergency programs, plans and actions and play the substantive problems that arise as a result of the task groups analyses. These areas will be considered in the time sequence of the immediate post attack period, D plus 14 and a projection of 30 and 90 days following the attack.

The evaluation phase will be held at the ODM relocation site on September 15, 16 and 17. Participation will be limited to a small group from each agency, having responsibility and authority for emergency plans and operation, along with selected regional representatives.

#### Participation

Since this year's test is principally a resource-survival type exercise the role of this Department will be somewhat limited. However, all units having essential wartime functions will be expected to participate in the exercise on July 16, 17 and 18. While it is not possible to forecast the degree to which the substantive problems generated during the exercise will require action by this Department some representation from all such units should be provided at the relocation site on these three days.

It is presently planned to hold a briefing session on Thursday, July 17, for those new officials in the chain of authority who have not previously visited the relocation site in order to familiarize them with its operation as well as our emergency programs. Additional information regarding the schedule for July 17th will be furnished to these officials at a later date.

It is requested that each component of the Department which will participate in Operation Alert at the Departmental relocation site determine which of its personnel will participate and the period of time of participation of each. In order that appropriate arrangements can be made at the site and the necessary hotel reservations obtained, each participating component of the Department is requested to notify the Acting Relocation Officer, James J. Canavan, Room 3537, no later than June 12 as to the identity of participants and the duration of the stay of each at the site. Personnel of the various divisions having assignments to the site operating staff (such as communications operators, security officers or staff communications and duty officers) need not be included. Each participating office of the Department will be responsible upon receipt of this memorandum for notifying its essential personnel of all pertinent information concerning Operation Alert 1958. Additional instructions will be furnished as received from ODM.

### Executive Reserve

Participation by the members of the Executive Reserve will be limited to inviting those members who were not present at the site during last year's exercise to attend the briefing for new officials in the chain of authority referred to above.

### Field Participation

The United States Attorneys have been advised that activation of their relocation sites will not be required during this year's test. It was recommended to them, however, that they cooperate to the greatest extent practicable in the circumstances in the event State and local civil defense organizations or Federal Government field units should call upon them to simulate some type of action or supply certain information in connection with the exercise play.

The United States Attorneys who represent the Department on the ODM Regional Committees have been instructed to participate either personally or through their alternates in the activities of the Regional Committees at the latter's relocation sites during the week of July 14.

## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 14, 1958

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT, 1958

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SAC Johnson, Atlanta Office, telephonically advised 7-11-58, that he had received a Phase 2 questionnaire from the ODCM regional office and the questionnaire bore the notation that it was not to be opened until 7-14-58 and teletype replies were to be submitted prior to the close of business 7-15-58 to the regional office of ODCM. Johnson said that Knoxville had also received a similar questionnaire. Johnson stated that inasmuch as Bureau instructions were that all questionnaires would be answered by Bureau headquarters, he had called F. M. Baker, regional director, ODCM, in Thomasville, Georgia, and told Baker that answers to questionnaires were being handled by FBI headquarters. Baker, however, advised him that while this was true with regard to most Phase 2 questionnaires, ODCM desired replies from the field with regard to the questionnaire received by Atlanta and Baker volunteered that he had sent similar questionnaires to all southeastern FBI offices. Baker said that the questionnaire which Johnson had received was based on ODCM program memorandum X-14 dated June 16, 1958.

Johnson said that in view of Baker's statement, he wanted to let the Bureau know of receipt of the questionnaire and also the fact that the questionnaire had been sent to all southeastern FBI offices. I told Johnson that he would be advised as to what action to take with regard to the questionnaire.

Subsequent to Johnson's call a radiogram was sent to all offices advising of the fact that local ODCM offices were sending questionnaires regarding Phase 2 of Operation Alert and that such questionnaires should be ignored, that Bureau is handling all questionnaires for field.

## ACTION:

For record purposes.

DEM:mn

cc -

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Roach

Mr. Minnich

(4)

EXHIBIT 2-10104

F-4

63 JUL 17 1958

EX-124

REC-8

66-19012-104

JUL 15 1958

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

54  
100 TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 18, 1958

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: MARTIAL LAW  
OPAL 583  
Operation Alert 1958

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| Tolson         |  |
| Boardman       |  |
| Belmont        |  |
| Mohr           |  |
| Nease          |  |
| Parsons        |  |
| Rosen          |  |
| Tamm           |  |
| Trotter        |  |
| Clayton        |  |
| Tele. Room     |  |
| Holloman       |  |
| Gandy          |  |
| W. C. Sullivan |  |

During the visit of Deputy Attorney General Walsh and Assistant Attorney General Wilkey to the Justice relocation site on 7-17-58, most of their time was spent on the question of martial law. An exercise request was received from the President's relocation site to draw up an Executive Order establishing military law in a specific area. After much discussion by Walsh, Wilkey and Yeagley, the attached copy of a reply (obtained by our Liaison representative) was prepared by Wilkey and sent to the President. Our Liaison representative also listened to much of this discussion.

The Justice reply to the President deliberately excludes mention of the words "martial law." This was based on the Attorney General's desire that no test paper on martial law be prepared for the exercise because the Attorney General feared a leak by Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM) that a martial law paper was prepared and tested during OPAL 58. The Justice reply, drawn up in the form of an Executive Order, "ducks" the issue by referring back to documents drawn up earlier in OPAL 58 which are similar to martial law papers used in test exercises of 1956 and 1957. These provided the Secretary of Defense with certain powers in exclusion areas established by him and placed under military control. In addition, it provides ODCM with powers to act in areas where local government is incapable or unwilling.

Wilkey indicated, during these discussions, that the Attorney General was opposed to martial law which would place ODCM in control using the military as a police force. The term "carpet baggers" was used in describing ODCM in this role.

This was Walsh's first acquaintance with defense planning. During the briefing on 7-17-58, he took notes and asked several questions concerning Justice defense procedures.

Enclosure

- ENCLOSURE  
EX-124  
REC-42
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
  - 1 - Mr. Rushing
  - 1 - Mr. Minnich
  - 1 - Liaison Section
  - 1 - Mr. Daunt

EX-124

REC-42

JUL 22 1958

51 JUL 25 1958

Memorandum Roach to Mr. Belmont  
Re: MARTIAL LAW  
OPAL 58

On one occasion, when James Canavan of the Department, indicated that their procedures would need revision, Walsh spoke up and asked when this would be done suggesting a short deadline. Walsh questioned Yeagley as to why he had not been informed in more detail as to the Justice operations and procedures. Yeagley told him that a copy of all this material had been sent to his office and perhaps it had not been sent into him and would he, Walsh, want Yeagley to look into it. Walsh stated that he would take care of the matter personally. He was asked to be kept advised personally of all matters that might develop during the remainder of the test.

ACTION:

For your information.

*from*  
*gmw*  
*Q*

✓



From: Justice, Senior Officer in Charge

TO : President United States Info  
Crystal, Crown, and Cactus

Excercise OPAL 58

Your Zulu 31. Absence of information respecting operative facts on which decision would be based precludes drafting of precise document. Any document which President issues should provide that it shall be in force only until Congress reconvenes and has opportunity to validate it. If facts justify, following is submitted for consideration.

"Whereas there has been an unprecedented disaster.

"Whereas Congress has not yet been able to reconvene to consider matters arising from this disaster.

"Whereas the Opal 58 Executive Orders referred to herein have heretofore been issued

"Whereas, under section 3 of Opal Frederick (Executive Order Opal 58-3) the Secretary of Defense has been authorized to prescribe military areas and to use Federal Troops and other federal agencies therein and to accept assistance of State and local agencies therein

"Whereas certain State governments in such military areas are now unable to perform essential civil functions and emergency functions called for by this unprecedented disaster

"Now therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, I direct that until the further direction of the President the Commanding Officer of Military District No. Blank shall perform and excercise the following powers, duties, and functions within the said Military District.

"Section 1. All powers, duties, and functions vested in the Director

66-19012-130  
ENCLOSURE

of Opal Resources and Operations by section 102, section 202 paragraph 1, and section 205 paragraph a of Opal Edward (Executive Order Opal 58-2)

"Section 2. All powers, duties and functions vested in the Secretary of Defense under section 3 and section 4 paragraph (b) of Opal Frederick (Executive Order Opal 58-3)

"Section 3. All powers, duties, and functions which will enable the Federal Government to perform or direct performances of the functions referred to in section 2 of Opal Frederick (Executive Order Opal 58-3).

"Section 4. This Order shall be in effect until revoked by the President or until legislation pertaining thereto is enacted by Congress, whichever shall first occur." Exercise Opal 58

Rec. In mail  
3-25-58


b6  
b7C

# STANDARDS FOR OPERATION ALERT 1958


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**"Attack Phase"**  
**May 6, 7, 1958**


## Control



## Dispersal



## Protection



66-19012-13

March 1, 1958

STANDARDS FOR OPERATION ALERT 1958

ATTACK PHASE

The "Standards" contained herein are issued jointly by the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

Instructions for the FEDERAL ACTION PHASE and the EVALUATION PHASE will be issued subsequently to the regional and national levels, as required.

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March 1, 1958

## STANDARDS FOR OPERATION ALERT 1958

### ATTACK PHASE

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

A. Operation Alert 1958 will be conducted in three separate phases:

- (1) ATTACK PHASE (emphasis at the State and local level)  
To be held May 6 and 7, 1958, for a 12-hour period each day. The Phase will begin with CHECKERBOARD, the simulated air raid warning, on May 6 and resume at 9 a.m. e.s.t. May 7. The time of CHECKERBOARD will remain unknown until announced over the National Warning System (NAWAS) the morning of the 6th.
- (2) FEDERAL ACTION PHASE (emphasis at the Federal level, both regional and national)  
To be held July 14 through July 18. Hours to be prescribed in subsequent instructions.
- (3) EVALUATION PHASE (emphasis at the national level)  
To be held mid-September.

B. The standards contained herein are directed to the Attack Phase of the exercise which places emphasis on activities at the State and local levels. They are designed as a blueprint from which all participating agencies can make plans to carry out their mission, in concert with all other agencies. The importance of this phase of the exercise cannot be overemphasized as it provides a basis for the succeeding phases.

#### 2. PURPOSE

The purpose of "Operation Alert 1958" is to examine the readiness of the Nation at local, State, and national levels to meet a direct nuclear attack on the United States, and to provide for training of governmental personnel, auxiliaries, and the general public.

#### 3. OBJECTIVES

Objectives of the exercise are to improve national readiness by:

- A. Local and State government evaluation of (1) their capabilities to cope with the attack situation; (2) overall deficiencies or excesses of resources in relation to their

needs; (3) the kind of Federal assistance needed and how such assistance would be utilized.

- B. The Federal Government's evaluation of its capability to meet demands arising from the attack.
- C. Determination of what additional preattack preparedness measures would make the postattack job more manageable.
- D. Training of local, State, and Federal government personnel and of auxiliaries in their emergency functions.
- E. Increasing public knowledge and training in survival techniques.

#### 4. ASSUMED SITUATION

##### A. Immediate Preattack Situation

It is assumed that international tension has increased rapidly during the week preceding May 6, 1958, and that world conditions have deteriorated. The Nation has been informed of the seriousness of the situation. There was no period of strategic warning.

##### B. Attack Situation

It is assumed that on May 6, 1958, a direct attack was launched on the United States, preceded by a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 4 hours of warning. The attack pattern has been developed and recommended by a committee composed of representatives of the State Directors Association, ODM, DOD, and FCDA. The technique of sealed envelopes will be used to place appropriate information as to time of attack, ground zero, size of weapon, type of burst, yield of weapon, and other pertinent information in the hands of State and local civil defense directors and appropriate Federal agency representatives for opening at the time specified on the envelope. Weapons might be delivered by any or all the means described in Section II of FCDA Advisory Bulletin No.204. Chemical, biological, and sabotage incidents may be contained in the sealed envelope attack data.

##### C. Policy Assumptions

Federal policy assumptions to meet the situation are found in Annex A.

#### 5. CANADIAN COORDINATION

The Canadian national test exercise this year will be held May 3 through May 4 and on May 9. Border areas are encouraged to arrange limited duplicate play, exchange of liaison, or the ex-

change of a summary of the attack situation with their Canadian counterparts. The attack pattern and data used in the Canadian exercise will be introduced as a part of the total situation in the Attack Phase of the U. S. exercise, as if the attacks had occurred on the same day. Likewise, attack data developed in the U. S. Attack Phase will be furnished for consideration in the Canadian exercise. Communications circuits will be activated between the U. S. and Canadian national levels as necessary to transmit and receive this information.

6. PARTICIPATION AND ACTIVITIES

A. Attack Phase (May 6-7)

(1) Emphasis in the Attack Phase will be given to:

- a. Participation on the basis of target and support area organization, to the maximum extent possible.
- b. The maximum use and testing of the Operational Survival Plans and/or other local and State plans.
- c. Maximum play of the operational intelligence function to insure collection, evaluation, and dissemination of correct information for operational decisions on the use of resources and forces.
- d. Consideration of nine resource areas: food, communications, transportation, manpower, health and medical supplies and equipment, light, power and fuel, wearing apparel, construction supplies and equipment, emergency housing and lodging.
- e. Operational limitations due to radioactive fallout and the development of actions that should be taken as rapidly as the decay of radioactivity will permit.
- f. Public participation drills.

(2) Federal agency participation, as appropriate in the Attack Phase, will include:

- a. Serving as liaison with, or as a part of, State and local governments, depending on the State and local plans; and
- b. Analyzing and reporting from "in place" locations the effects of the attack on their operations.

(3) Actions on May 6, 1958

- a. Warning procedures will be exercised. See Annex B.



- b. Public action signals should be activated or simulated as desired by States and local authorities.
- c. Local and State survival actions as permitted by the situation should be taken or simulated, including radiological monitoring and analysis.
- d. "Flash" reports, attack data reports, and reports on the fallout situation should be transmitted. Damage assessment analysis should be conducted at State and local levels to develop the resources and requirements data prescribed. See Annexes D and H.

(4) Actions on May 7, 1958

- a. Each level should forward an estimate of the situation as of D plus ONE, consolidating the information received from the lower levels. See Annex H.
- b. States and localities should continue with the exercise play, including the analysis of damage and the determination of resource requirements, and furnish other reports prescribed. See Annexes D and E.

(5) Actions after May 7, 1958

The Attack Phase May 6-7 will develop the attack situation. Local and State authorities are urged to continue the staff exercise to develop data required for the Federal Action Phase. See Annexes G and J.

B. Federal Action Phase (July 14-18)

This phase of the exercise will be played with Federal relocation sites activated at the Regional and National level. The first two days will be devoted to independent action at the Regional level, developing the Regional estimate of the situation, and resources and requirements data based on the information previously accumulated. State directors are invited to participate in the Federal Action Phase at the FCDA Regional Emergency Operations Centers.

C. Evaluation Phase (mid-September)

A small group from each Federal agency having responsibility and authority for emergency plans and operations, together with selected key Regional representatives, will be convened at the ODM relocation site to evaluate the measures taken during the first two phases and the adequacy of current policies and program guidance.

## 7. PLAY OF COMMUNICATIONS

- A. During the first day (May 6) there will be no interruptions of communications because of assumed attack effects. On the second day, communications breakdown resulting from assumed attack damage and radioactive fallout, together with time required to restore service, will be simulated. Communications services simulated as inoperative due to damage or fallout will not be used. Alternate methods, if available, may be used. In the event both primary and alternate systems are not available, no messages will be transmitted. There will be no actual breaking of communications circuits during this phase.
- B. For the Attack Phase only, FCDA will assume responsibility for payment of communications message handling services, such as TWX, Western Union, and telephone, required to assure prompt dissemination of attack data and damage reports from its regional headquarters to other Federal agencies at the regional level. No new communications services or facilities which would necessitate expenditure of FCDA funds will be established for this phase of the exercise. Where other Federal agency personnel are physically located within FCDA Regional Headquarters, temporary PBX telephone extension service will be provided by FCDA.
- C. Certain communications expenses incurred by States and political subdivisions in connection with Operation Alert 1958 are eligible for Federal contributions. In this connection, FCDA Manual M25-1, Chapter 7 (revised January 1957,) should be consulted to determine approvable items and procedures for submitting project applications.

## 8. PROPOSED CONELRAD DRILL

If the proposal of FCDA that a nationwide CONELRAD drill be conducted is accepted, CONELRAD will be in effect for 30 minutes beginning with CHECKERBOARD and further simulated for the duration of the attack. For exercise purposes it will be assumed that CONELRAD restrictions are lifted at the time CHECKERBOARD is terminated. If an actual CONELRAD drill is to be conducted, directives issued by the Federal Communications Commission will be supplemented by programing guidance from FCDA. In the event an actual CONELRAD drill is not ordered, CONELRAD should be simulated for the full attack period.

## 9. WEATHER CONDITIONS

Actual weather conditions of the day will be used, exclusive of winds. The winds for the exercise will be preselected, coded into a "UF" report, and transmitted over normal communications channels the morning of May 2, plainly labeled "FOR OPAL 1958." (See FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 188, revised

February 1958, for definition of "UF" Coded Reports and Procedures.) This report then becomes the official wind data for the exercise. For training purposes, States and localities should consider preparing fallout patterns daily during the period May 1 through May 5.

10. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Damage assessment, using hand assessment methods, is required during the attack phase of the exercise. FCDA Technical Manual 8-1, "Civil Defense Urban Analysis," July 1953, provides general guidance on assessment methods. FCDA Technical Bulletin 8-1 "Blast Damage from Nuclear Weapons of Larger Sizes," February 1955, furnishes damage ring information.

March 1, 1958

OPERATION ALERT 1958

ANNEX A

Attached for use during all phases of Operation Alert is Annex A, "Policy Assumptions." These materials indicate Federal actions and policies for Operation Alert and answer the often expressed need of State and local authorities for further Federal Government mobilization guidance.

It is recognized that although it might be possible to take certain Federal actions soon after an attack, the implementation of orders could vary considerably in time, from rapid action in less affected areas to a lag in implementation in areas which had suffered direct attack or heavy fallout. The attached materials are for application in the Attack Phase to the maximum extent you determine to be feasible in your play of the exercise consistent with the attack situation in which you find yourself.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
Office of Defense Mobilization  
Washington 25, D.C.

ANNEX A

For exercise purposes in Operation Alert 1958, it will be assumed that direct nuclear attacks have been made on the United States, its Territories and Possessions.

POLICY ASSUMPTIONS

1. In order to meet this situation, principal efforts should be directed to assure national survival by:
  - A. Maintaining direction and authority through the operations of local, State, and Federal governments.
  - B. Supporting military operations.
  - C. Assuring survival of the remaining population.
  - D. Controlling the allocation and distribution of resources to meet requirements.
2. The Federal Government, to the extent of its capabilities, will initiate whatever actions are essential for national security and survival.
3. For the purpose of the exercise, the following are assumed:
  - A. National and civil defense emergencies were proclaimed.
  - B. The President is using all available means of communication to advise the people of the situation and calling upon them to follow instructions of appropriate authorities and to rally to meet the needs of national survival.
  - C. Congress has reassembled.
  - D. Primary reliance continues to be placed on States and their local governments for the conduct of civil functions; however, when requested by a State or when a State government is unable to perform essential civil functions, the Federal Government will perform or direct performance of such functions.
  - E. Military assistance, as may be made available by Federal military commanders, will be provided for civil defense purposes.
  - F. National Guard and other reserve units and military reservists having an immediate assignment have been ordered to active

Federal duty. Other elements of the National Guard will remain available to the States until needed for other purposes.

- G. The Secretary of Defense may designate areas for specific military purposes.
- H. Funds are available to Federal agencies for emergency operations.
- I. Economic policies are being announced to support restoration and functioning of the banking and credit systems. In keeping with these national policies, immediate local or State measures must be taken to restore or continue banking and credit operations in areas without physical damage or heavy fallout and to support and stabilize surviving local or State economies.
- J. A Federal order is being issued imposing immediate ceilings on prices, wage rates, salaries, and rents. Its purpose is to give the force of Federal policy and law to local efforts directed at maintaining the appropriate preattack status quo wherever local or State economies can be kept functioning. Immediate interim local and State action will have to be taken to supplement and support the Federal action. Ceilings are the highest prices, wage rates, salaries, and rents which were in effect on May 1, 1958.
- K. The Federal Government has authorized State and local authorities to ration or otherwise distribute inventories of consumers goods in a method consistent with the local situation to conserve resources until national reevaluation and action is possible.
- L. Federal controls will be imposed on production, food, housing, manpower, transportation, fuel, power, and communications.
- M. Federal requisitioning has been authorized to acquire property for immediately essential national programs.
- N. Federal executive departments and agencies will operate from relocated headquarters and field establishments.
- O. Personnel, materials, and facilities of the Federal departments and agencies, except those required for continuity of their own emergency programs, and of States and their local governments are available for civil defense purposes.
- P. Control of resources will be established by Federal field offices under the direction of regional executives operating out of the Executive Office of the President with Presidential authority.
- Q. Censorship has been imposed upon international communications and plans for voluntary censorship by domestic information media implemented.

R. National emergency agencies are being established for censorship, domestic information, and resources management, including subordinate agencies dealing with stabilization, telecommunications, transportation, energy and minerals, food, housing, manpower, and production. As rapidly as possible, these agencies will advise or consult with State authorities to the maximum extent, and, as the agencies become operative and it is feasible, they will gradually absorb those interim local or State operations which should be a part of national systems. The activities of these national emergency agencies are indicated in Appendix I to this annex.

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
Office of Defense Mobilization  
Washington 25, D. C.**

**February 5, 1958**

**OPERATION ALERT 1958**

**APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A**

**Additional Federal guidance on Production, Food,  
Communications, Housing, Health, Transportation,  
Manpower and Power and Fuels is provided herein.**



1. PRODUCTION

Initially, emphasis and priority must be given to the continuation and resumption of production in surviving facilities that can produce new supplies of critically needed survival items and services.

Those resources which are necessary to permit resumption and maintenance of emergency levels of operation of essential services (electric power, transportation and communications) shall be made available wherever possible for these purposes.

2. FOOD

a. FOOD INVENTORY FREEZE ORDER

The Emergency Food Agency has issued a Food Inventory Freeze Order. This order prohibits sales and uses at all levels except at the retail level. Not included in the Food Inventory Freeze are:

- (1) Sales or delivery to approved government agencies.
- (2) Use or processing by a processor for the preparation of any product for delivery to an agency approved in a. above.
- (3) Use or processing of food by a processor for the preparation of such end products as are regularly prepared by such processor in the usual course of average monthly rate of production in the same monthly period in the preceding two years.
- (4) Perishable commodities such as milk, fresh fruits and vegetables, fresh meats and poultry which would spoil if not used in the immediate future.

Authority to approve government agencies authorized to receive food in a. above has been delegated to EFA personnel at regional, state and county levels. Authority to provide for selective release of commodities or to modify the inventory freeze controls issued by the national level has been delegated to EFA personnel at regional and state levels, such authority being restricted to the geographic area of such regional or state representative when cut off from higher authority.

b. ANTI-HOARDING FOOD ORDER

The Emergency Food Agency has issued an Anti-Hoarding Food Order. This order was issued in accordance with the pro-

visions of Section 102 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and makes it unlawful for anyone to accumulate food (as defined in Executive Order 10480) in excess of the reasonable demands for business, personal or human consumption.

c. FOOD REQUISITIONING ORDER

The Emergency Food Agency has issued a Food Requisitioning Order. This order authorizes delegated personnel of the EFA at the national, regional and state levels to requisition food (as defined in Executive Order 10480) at all levels from the farm to the consumer. Authority to requisition food has been delegated to EFA personnel at the county level when cut off from higher authority.

d. BASIC DISTRIBUTION AND USE ORDER

The Emergency Food Agency has issued a Basic Distribution and Use Order. The order provides for establishing distribution and use controls of food (as defined in Executive Order 10480) at all levels of distribution and use except retail. Authority to exercise this power has been delegated to regional and state EFA personnel. Powers delegated to regional and state level includes authority to determine food commodities in critical short supply; to take necessary action to control food inventories; to determine non-essential uses of food and to prohibit such uses; and to channel distribution to specified uses or areas.

e. BASIC SET-ASIDE FOOD ORDER

The Emergency Food Agency has issued a Basic Set-Aside Food Order. The order requires food processors and distributors (through the wholesale level) to hold or reserve a designated quantity or proportion of their current or future production or inventory of processed foods for Government Agency procurement.

Authority to specify the processed food commodities to be set-aside, together with the quantity or proportion to be set-aside, and the designation of the Government Agency authorized to receive the food set-aside under the order, has been delegated to personnel of EFA at the regional and state levels.

f. FOOD PRIORITIES ORDER

The Emergency Food Agency has issued a Food Priorities Order. This order authorizes preferred status in acquiring food (as defined in Executive Order 10480) when the buyer (government agency or private person) receives a rating certificate from an authorized EFA official. Rated contracts or purchase orders must be accepted and filled ahead of non-rated contracts.

Authority to issue Priority Rating Certificates has been delegated to personnel of EFA at regional, state and county level.

g. PROCUREMENT

The Emergency Food Agency has authorized the exercise of the powers of the Commodity Credit Corporation to purchase food for resale or for distribution to other government agencies to meet urgent postattack food requirements. Authority to exercise these powers has been delegated to EFA personnel at the regional, state and county level and will be exercised with respect to all food except at retail.

h. SUPPLY ACTIONS

The Emergency Food Agency is taking all possible steps consistent with fallout conditions and other factors to move needed supplies of food from surplus areas to areas of deficit. Supplies are being procured or requisitioned from commercial sources or taken from Commodity Credit Corporation inventories depending upon most ready availability and suitability.

3. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Mobilization planning in the field of telecommunications is designed to assist in maintaining the flow of national telecommunications in the course of a national emergency. Plans have been developed for three distinct areas: domestic telecommunications, international telecommunications, and utilization of the radio frequency spectrum.

In domestic telecommunications, planned actions are intended to assure that those messages and calls required for survival and defense activities in an emergency will get through to their destinations without undue delay. In the international field, specific commercial international radio and cable channels have been allocated to satisfy stated emergency Government requirements, while reserving sufficient international communication capability to serve public needs.

In order to make such planning effective in an emergency period, suitable controls at the national, and to a degree, the individual area are essential. In order to provide national control, a National Telecommunication Agency will assume the responsibility for maintaining the flow of national telecommunications under the wartime powers of the President in the telecommunication field.

This will entail a number of pre-planned programs and procedures that, in order to be of greatest value in an emergency, must

be largely automatic in their application.

The purpose of this paper is to make general information available on some of these national programs and procedures that will assist in working out similar procedures in the cities and states that will be compatible.

#### NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES

A. Procedures system for urgent telephone calls and telegrams that should be completed or delivered in order to further the war effort. (See Attachment 1).

As outlined in Attachment 1 the procedures set forth are designed to permit rapid communication in an emergency. The FCC will be directed to administer this program on a mandatory basis, which is available today on a voluntary basis.

B. Priority System for the resumption of Intercity Private Line Service. (See Attachment 2).

This system is designed to operate automatically as it has been set up in a system of certifications made in advance for the purpose of restoring private line service in a national emergency. As outlined in Attachment 2, this system would be administered in an emergency by the FCC.

C. Procedures for claiming telecommunication and related resources under a situation in which the U.S. is attacked. (See Attachment 3)

As outlined in Attachment 3, there are basic procedures set forth under which, in an emergency, the various elements of telecommunications might be claimed. This attachment is still in the formative state and subject to revision as it becomes perfected by virtue of coordinating the procedures with those of other resource areas.

#### 4. HOUSING

The Emergency Housing Agency will provide technical guidance for State and local civil defense organizations to assist them in (a) assessing the absorptive capacity of support areas; (b) determining feasibility of using damaged housing for emergency lodging; (c) arranging for referral or billeting of displaced persons; (d) developing plans for payment of compensation to owners of property furnishing emergency lodging; (e) planning for the utilization, control and management of existing residential and emergency housing; and (f) acting as local claimants for trailers,

demountable housing, building materials, equipment, etc. needed to meet unfilled critical needs.

The Emergency Housing Agency will provide temporary emergency housing in support of areas subjected to enemy attack through the repair of damaged structures, emergency conversion of non-residential structures, the procurement of temporary shelters such as tents, trailers and demountable housing, and the construction of temporary barracks. The Emergency Housing Agency will also provide community facilities in such areas through emergency repair or restoration of such facilities or the installation of additional facilities for which the agency normally has legal responsibility, such as water and sewerage.

## 5. HEALTH RESOURCES

Initially, State and local governments must depend for health resources on those locally and immediately available. When national controls become possible, health resources will be allocated on an equitable basis according to need and between civilian and military requirements. It must be recognized that neither human nor material resources will be adequate, postattack, to provide health services of the quality or in the quantity to which the American people have become accustomed. Priorities for medical care will be established. Only self-help will be available to segments of the population which become isolated from organized sources of professional health service, by blast damage and the immobilizing effect of radiological fallout. (See Annex E)

## 6. TRANSPORTATION

Prior to the simulated attack, field agents of the Department of Commerce and the Interstate Commerce Commission are charged with responsibilities for performing certain designated functions relating to transportation, storage and port facilities in a civil defense emergency. Appropriate delegations have been made to the field which are designed to permit field agents to operate independently if contact with headquarters is not possible. In the initial post-attack period, field agents will exercise authority as necessary to meet the transportation needs of claimants. They will be the focal point of contact with State and regional officials on matters pertaining to transportation, storage and port facilities.

Certain orders, plans and programs designed to become effective upon the declaration of a national civil defense emergency have been adopted and disseminated to the field.

Upon the establishment of an emergency transportation agency at the national level, controls will be assumed over such intercity

and off-shore transportation both public and private, storage and port facilities, which in the opinion of the head of the emergency transportation agency it is practicable and desirable to control.

7. MANPOWER

Initially manpower agencies will be governed by decisions of local government in making distribution of available manpower and in determining manpower requirements for survival purposes. As rapidly as possible Federal controls will be established and manpower will be allocated in accordance with programs determined by the Federal Government to be essential. Manpower agencies will be guided by such policy as may be established preattack or postattack by the Office of Defense Mobilization. The Department of Labor, the Selective Service Systems and other agencies concerned with manpower will issue such additional instructions and regulations as may be necessary in furtherance of this policy.

8. ELECTRIC POWER AND FUELS

Prior to the attack, standby field organizations were formed by the Department of the Interior to perform certain Federal functions with respect to electric power, petroleum and gas, and solid fuels in a civil defense emergency. Designed to operate independently if contact with the Department's national relocation center is impossible, these organizations were activated automatically upon occurrence of the civil defense emergency. They are staffed with predesignated personnel from these industries and regular employees of the Department.

Certain officials of these field organizations, in each geographical area, have been given substantially all of the authority delegated to the Secretary of the Interior for priorities, allocations, and requisitioning in their respective fields. In the initial post-attack period, they will exercise authority as necessary to comply as fully as possible with civil defense, military, and Atomic Energy Commission requests for products within their purview.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

June 27, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Precedence Systems for Communications Essential  
to the National Defense and Security over  
Facilities of U.S. Domestic and International  
Telephone and Telegraph Carriers.

Precedence systems for the transmission of vital communications essential to the national defense, security and safety, under specified emergency conditions, are in the process of being established through the cooperative efforts of the Federal Communications Commission and the privately-owned communications companies. These precedence systems designed for use on both telephone and telegraph facilities are being made available on a national basis in order that vital information may be transmitted throughout the country without delay during periods of extreme stress when congestion occurs on communication channels.

It is estimated that these precedence systems will be available for use by each branch of the Federal Government as well as by other essential users of public correspondence services by about July 1, 1955.

It is not practicable to provide any rules to govern the level within agencies at which the use of the precedence systems should be authorized. This is because of the varying nature, size and location of the various entities of the Federal Government family.

It is therefore suggested that the heads of each Government department or agency use their best judgment in making such authorizations, bearing in mind that the precedences should be used only when necessary to expedite the transmission of vital communications under the specified emergency conditions, probably at the expense of routine transmissions.

## Precedence Systems

You will probably find that the telephone and telegraph companies have contacted your organization and have supplied information relative to the details of applying the precedences.

A copy of each of the procedures (telephone and telegraph) as agreed upon by the Federal Communications Commission and the telephone and telegraph carriers is attached for your information.

/s/ Harold M. Botkin  
Assistant Director for  
Telecommunications

Attachments



PRECEDENCE SYSTEM FOR PUBLIC CORRESPONDENCE MESSAGE TELEPHONE AND T.W.X.  
SERVICES ESSENTIAL TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY

Pursuant to a request from the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Communications Commission has prepared the following as its recommended plan for a system of communication precedences for public correspondence message telephone and T.W.X. services to be provided by all domestic and international telephone common carriers.

I. Gradations of Precedence to be Provided, and Precedence Indicators therefore:

| A. Group Order<br>of Precedence | Types of Telephone and T.W.X.<br>Calls to which Applicable |
|---------------------------------|--|
|---------------------------------|--|

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| Group 1 |  |
|---------|--|

|                      |                        |
|----------------------|------------------------|
| Precedence Indicator | "Priority 1 Emergency" |
|----------------------|------------------------|

The precedence indicator "Priority 1 Emergency" shall be used only for calls which directly concern the matters described herein.

- (1) Immediate dangers due to the presence of the enemy.
- (2) Intelligence reports on matters leading to enemy attack requiring immediate action.
- (3) Urgent calls to or from the United States Armed Forces and their Allies.
- (4) Proclamations of Civil Defense Emergency.

Calls in this group shall be given precedence over all other calls.

Group 2

Precedence "Priority 2 Emergency"  
Indicator

The precedence indicator "Priority 2 Emergency" shall be used only for calls which require immediate completion for the national defense and security, the successful conduct of war, or to safeguard life and property, other than those set forth in Group 1 above, and such indicator may be used for calls concerning the matters listed herein.

- (1) Initial reports of damage due to enemy action.
- (2) Civil defense activities immediately subsequent to and resulting from enemy attack.
- (3) Calls that require immediate completion to or from the United States Armed Forces and their Allies.
- (4) Natural disaster of extreme seriousness and widespread damage.

Calls in this group shall be given precedence over all other calls, except those in Group 1.

Group Order  
of Precedence

Types of Telephone and  
T.W.X. Calls to which  
Applicable

Group 3

Precedence "Priority 3 Emergency"  
Indicator

The precedence indicator "Priority 3 Emergency" shall be used only for calls which require prompt completion for national defense and security, the successful conduct of war or to safeguard life or property, which do not merit Group 1 or Group 2 precedence, and such indicator may be used for calls concerning the matters listed herein.

- (1) Civil defense or the public health and safety.
- (2) Important governmental functions.
- (3) Supply and movement of food.
- (4) Maintenance of essential public services.

- (5) Production or procurement of essential materials and supplies.
- (6) Calls that require rapid completion to or from the United States Armed Forces and their Allies.

Calls in this group shall be given precedence over all other calls, except those in Groups 1 and 2.

- B. Calls of the types listed in each group herein above shall have no precedence over other calls within the same group. Where necessary to obtain a circuit for the immediate completion of a telephone call having Priority 1 Emergency precedence, any telephone conversation in progress other than one having priority shall be interrupted. Upon specific request of the calling party, a conversation in progress at the called telephone station shall be interrupted to complete calls having Priority 1, Priority 2 and Priority 3 Emergency precedence.

## II. Persons Authorized to Use the Precedence System.

The precedence system shall be available for use by the President of the United States, the Vice President, Cabinet Officers, members of the United States Congress, Federal, State and Municipal Governmental Departments and Agencies, essential war industries, and services such as communications, transportation, power, public utilities, press associations, news media, health and sanitation services, the American Red Cross Organization, and such other individuals and organizations as may be designated.

The effectiveness of the system will depend upon whole-hearted cooperation on the part of persons authorized to employ it. Users should familiarize themselves with the purposes to be served by the use of each precedence group and the types of calls which may be assigned the respective precedences. It must always be remembered that the entire system will operate successfully only if the use of the precedence indicators is limited strictly

to the intended purposes. Each authorized user, therefore, should consider whether each call requires any special precedence and exercise care not to request a higher precedence than the circumstances require.

PRECEDENCE SYSTEM FOR PUBLIC CORRESPONDENCE TELEGRAPH  
MESSAGES ESSENTIAL TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY

Pursuant to a request from the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Communications Commission has prepared the following as its recommended plan for a system of communication precedences for public correspondence telegraph messages to be provided by all domestic and international wireline telegraph, cable and radiotelegraph common carriers.

I. Classes of Service for Which Transmission Precedence Shall Be Provided:

- (1) Full rate domestic messages.
- (2) Full rate international, including outbound, inbound and transiting messages.
- (3) Full rate messages between shore and ship.

II. Gradations of Precedence to be Provided, and Precedence Indicators therefore:

| A. Group Order<br>of Precedence   |             | Types of Messages to which<br>Applicable  |
|---|-------------|---|
| Group   | 1           |   |
| Precedence Indicator  | "Emergency" | (1) Immediate dangers due to the presence of the enemy, including Civil and Military Air Defense Warning. |
| The precedence indicator "Emergency" shall be used <u>only</u> for messages which directly concern the matters listed herein. |             | (2) Intelligence reports on matters leading to enemy attack requiring immediate action.                   |
|   |             | (3) Urgent messages to or from the United States Armed Forces and their Allies.                           |
|   |             | (4) Proclamations of Civil Defense Emergency.   |

Messages in this group shall be transmitted ahead of all other messages.

Group 2

Precedence "Immediate"  
Indicator

The precedence indicator "Immediate" shall be used only for messages which require immediate completion for national defense and security, the successful conduct of war, or to safeguard life or property, other than those set forth in Group 1 above, and such indicator may be used for messages concerning the matters listed herein.

- (1) Initial reports of damage due to enemy action.
- (2) Civil defense activities immediately subsequent to and resulting from enemy attack.
- (3) Messages that require immediate completion to or from the United States Armed Forces and their Allies.
- (4) Natural disaster of extreme seriousness and widespread damage.

Messages in this group shall be transmitted ahead of all other messages, except those in Group 1.

Group Order  
of Precedence

Types of Messages to  
which Applicable

Group 3

Precedence "Rapid"  
Indicator

The precedence indicator "Rapid" shall be used only for messages which require prompt completion for national defense and security, the successful conduct of war or to safeguard life or property, which do not merit Group 1 or Group 2 precedence, and such indicator may be used for messages concerning the matters listed herein.

- (1) Civil defense or the public health and safety.
- (2) Important governmental functions.
- (3) Supply and movement of food.
- (4) Maintenance of essential public services.

- (5) Production or procurement of essential materials and supplies.
- (6) Messages that require rapid transmission to or from the United States Armed Forces and their Allies.

Messages in this group shall be transmitted ahead of all other messages, except those in Groups 1 and 2.

- B. Messages in Groups 1 and 2 interrupt all messages of lower priority in transmission, that is, messages in Group 1 interrupt messages in Group 2 and lower groups, but messages in Group 3 and lower groups do not interrupt other messages in transmission. Messages of the types listed in each group shall have no precedence over other messages in the same group, but messages within the same group shall be transmitted in time order.
- C. The precedence indicators "Emergency", "Immediate", and "Rapid" shall be written in full by the authorized sender as the first word in the address on messages at the time of filing. Such indicators shall be transmitted without abbreviation.

### III. Persons Authorized to Use the Precedence System.

The precedence system shall be available for use by the President of the United States, the Vice President, Cabinet Officers, members of the United States Congress, Federal, State and Municipal Governmental Departments and Agencies, essential war industries, and services such as communications, transportation, power, public utilities, press associations, news media, health and sanitation services, the American Red Cross Organization, and such other individuals and organizations as may be designated.

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The effectiveness of the system will depend upon wholehearted cooperation on the part of the persons authorized to employ it. Users should familiarize themselves with the purposes to be served by the use of each precedence group and the types of messages which may be assigned the respective precedences. It must always be remembered that the entire

system will operate successfully only if the use of the precedence indicators is limited strictly to the intended purposes. Each authorized user, therefore, should consider whether each message requires any special precedence and exercise care not to request a higher precedence than the circumstances require.



August 22, 1957

PROCEDURES FOR CLAIMING TELECOMMUNICATION AND RELATED RESOURCES UNDER  
A SITUATION IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS ATTACKED

Introduction

1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this document is to set forth the procedures under which the benefits of mobilization planning may be realized and to furnish guidance to those Government and private entities which have requirements for telecommunication resources vital to the national interest in a situation under which the United States has been attacked in force, and to those Government agencies or other entities charged with meeting such requirements.

Effort has been made to avoid incompatibility between these procedures and emergency responsibilities of Government agencies.

In the application of these procedures, unforeseen conditions of attack could necessitate changes better designed to meet a particular exigency.

A situation under which the United States is involved in a war overseas, but is not attacked, is not dealt with in this document.

2. TELECOMMUNICATION AUTHORITY

Executive Order 10705 dated April 17, 1957 delegates to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization the President's authority under Section 305 (a) and Section 606 (a), (c) and (d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The authority contained in these Sections may be performed under the following conditions.

305(a) and 606(a):                      Only during the continuance of a war  
in which the United States is engaged.

606(c) and 606(d):                      Only upon proclamation by the President  
that there exists a state of war in-  
volving the United States.

Upon the creation of an emergency communication agency, it is assumed that the authority of the Director, ODM will have been delegated to the Administrator of the emergency agency unless it has been physically impossible to do so by limitations of time and space, in which case actions appearing herein will be taken under the authority residing in the Director, ODM.

### 3. RESOURCES AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CONTINUING OPERATION OF NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION

The various elements comprising national telecommunications, and the resources necessary to the operation thereof, include the following:

1. Radio Frequencies.
2. International Telecommunication Services (Radio and Cable).
3. Domestic Telecommunication Services.
4. Telecommunication Equipment, Materials, Manpower, Transportation, Power and Fuels.

#### PROCEDURES

##### 1. RADIO FREQUENCIES

A. The use of radio frequencies between 10 kc/s and 100,000 Mc/s will, during an emergency, be governed by procedures which will be implemented within the framework of the following conditions:

- 1) All outstanding authorizations by the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) to Government radio stations will remain in effect unless ordered otherwise by the emergency communications agency.
- 2) Rules and Regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) pertaining to the use of radio frequencies will remain in effect unless ordered otherwise by the emergency communication agency.
- 3) The emergency communication agency will:
  - a) Publish and distribute, insofar as it is practicable, policies, standards, instructions, procedures, and information on frequency usage for the guidance of all concerned.
  - b) Receive requests for assignment of frequencies, review such requests, accomplish necessary additional coordination, consider all pertinent views and comments on proposed uses of frequencies, and grant or deny, as appropriate, the assignment of such frequencies.
  - c) Adjudicate conflicting requests.

B. The following procedures will be employed in presenting requests for new or additional assignments of radio frequencies, and requests for modifications of outstanding licenses or authorizations which would involve a change in the use of radio frequencies:

## Areas of the Continental United States, Its Territories and Possessions

### Government Agencies

U. S. Federal Government agencies, including the Military Services in instances not provided for otherwise, having need for new or additional assignments of radio frequencies, and for modification of outstanding authorizations which would involve a change in the use of radio frequencies, will present such requirements with nominated frequencies and a statement of coordination accomplished to the emergency communication agency. Necessary coordination should be accomplished with other users of radio insofar as practicable.

### Non-Government Entities

Non-Government entities having need for new or modified licenses will continue as heretofore to present applications to the Federal Communications Commission.

### Department of Defense

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (CSigO, DNC, DAFC) will keep the emergency communication agency suitably informed of military uses of radio frequencies under delegated or broad assignment authority.

### United States Theaters of Operation

All requests for the assignment and use of radio frequencies within U.S. Theaters of Operations will be presented under procedures prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such procedures will include coordination with the emergency communication agency in order to avoid harmful interference to communications which are outside of the Theaters of Operation.

### Exterritorial Areas

#### Department of State

The Department of State will coordinate with the emergency communication agency before authorizing the use or change of use of frequencies in extritorial areas, such as Tangier in order to avoid harmful interference elsewhere.

#### Department of the Interior

The Department of the Interior will coordinate with the emergency communication agency before authorizing the use or change of use of frequencies in American Samoa and Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in order to avoid harmful interference elsewhere.

## Department of Defense

The use or change of use of frequencies in the Panama Canal Zone will be coordinated with the emergency communication agency in order to avoid harmful interference elsewhere.

### 2. INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE (RADIO AND CABLE)

Requirements for telecommunication channels between the United States, its Territories and Possessions and overseas or foreign points which are intended for satisfaction by employment of other than Government-owned facilities shall be presented in peace-time to the Office of Defense Mobilization, or to the emergency communication agency after its creation in an emergency, by the responsible Government agency for coordination and inclusion in national mobilization plans as follows:

#### General Procedure

U.S. Federal Government agencies having need for the communication facilities which fall into the above category for use in the event of an emergency shall present such requirements with a request that the requirements be provided for and suitably earmarked within the national mobilization plans embracing such circuitry.

#### Department of Defense

The Department of Defense will assume the responsibility for reviewing and coordinating the method of satisfying and funding for all military requirements for channels such as heretofore outlined, including military requirements for overseas bases, NATO, SEATO and other foreign countries. The Department of Defense will approve all such requirements prior to transmittal.

#### Department of State

The Department of State will assume the responsibility of receiving, reviewing for completeness and appropriateness, including funding, any requirements other than military falling within the aforementioned categories and emanating from foreign countries. The Department of State will approve all such requirements prior to transmittal.

#### Office of Defense Mobilization

The Office of Defense Mobilization will assume the responsibility for coordinating, and integrating when practicable within national mobilization plans, requirements under the foregoing categories which are presented to it, making use of the knowledge, information and advice of the Federal Communications Commission in the process of satisfying requirements which have been presented, with due regard for the facilities which must remain under the control of the commercial companies and those which must be generally available to the public and the Government in the degree considered necessary.

### 3. DOMESTIC TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE

The principle which has been followed in establishing a procedure for the utilization of the nation's domestic telephone and telegraph services is that the common carrier (Bell System, Independents, Western Union) is the only entity physically capable of satisfying demands for nationwide service. Consequently, demands for domestic telecommunication service should always be made initially to the common carrier that normally provides the service.

Based upon this principle, the Government, in cooperation with industry, has completed programs for the priority use of the nation's telephone and telegraph systems and for the priority resumption of intercity private line service when interrupted. These programs have been promulgated, are in voluntary use throughout the nation today, and their application will be mandatory in a situation under which the country is attacked. A copy of each precedence system is attached.

#### Telephone Calls and Telegraph Messages

The Precedence Systems for Public Correspondence telephone calls, TWX and telegraph messages essential to the national defense and security have been made available on a national basis in order that vital information may be transmitted throughout the country without delay during periods of extreme stress.

The degree of priority to be accorded such public correspondence is furnished to the supplier of service in accordance with the user's interpretation of the degree of urgency. The user will be responsible in any post emergency review, for the priorities which he has invoked.

#### Resumption of Private Line Service

The Priority System for the Resumption of Intercity Private Line Service provides for a procedure in which certification of a private line within a priority category is made by the user to the common carrier furnishing the service. Certifications, in order to be effective, must be made in advance and should be maintained in a currently corrected status. These certifications will form the basis upon which a determination may be made to govern the degree of priority under which service is to be restored.

#### New or Additional Telephone or Private Line Service

Requests for new or additional telecommunication service, including private line TWX and telephone service should be submitted direct to the common carrier which normally furnishes the service .

Demands which impinge upon the carrier's ability to furnish essential service, because they would place a strain upon existing manpower, available equipment and other resources needed and consumed in the course of furnishing essential service, will be referred to the emergency

communication agency for decision with a certified outline of necessity which will describe the applicant's proposed use of the service requested.

4. TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, MANPOWER, TRANSPORTATION, POWER AND FUELS

General

In an emergency situation the widest and most flexible use should be made of existing resources (such as trained manpower, inventories of equipment, on-the-shelf materials and other stocks on hand) in order to assist prompt restoration of domestic and international telecommunication service.

Pending the availability of detailed emergency control regulations governing the production and distribution of equipment, and the provision of manpower, transportation, power, fuels and materials:

a) Each communications common carrier will utilize all of these resources under its control in order to provide the necessary service. When public demands for service conflict with the priority demands specified under the Priority Systems referred to in the preceding Section 3, the priority demands for service will be met first as a minimum objective. This latter service is referred to as the BASIC PRIORITY SERVICE in succeeding sub-paragraphs.

b) Having provided basic priority service (or better) on its own system, each common carrier will make available to other common carriers that portion of its surplus residual of those resources which may be needed by the latter to provide basic priority service.

c) If, after exhausting all resources and having obtained all available assistance from other carriers, a carrier is still unable to provide the necessary service, the procedures set forth below will be followed.

Equipment and Materials

If existing authority is unable under suitable priority arrangements to satisfy the requirements of communications common carriers, the facts are to be referred by the authority denying the requirement to the emergency communication agency.

Manpower, Transportation, Power and Fuels Needed for Telecommunications

All requirements will be submitted to the local office responsible for dispensing the commodity needed, and the operating element will inform the emergency communication agency of the action taken.

Should the local agency or authority be unable to satisfy the requirement, the operating element will communicate with the emergency communication agency, advising them of the degree of urgency associated

with the requirement, and the fact that it cannot be met locally.

(Variations of procedures for the aforementioned resources will be amplified or adjusted as detailed procedures are made available from the various resource areas.)

#### Attachments

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

PRIORITY SYSTEM FOR THE RESUMPTION OF INTERCITY PRIVATE LINE SERVICE

1. The precedence system set forth in this document provides for safeguards to assist in the prompt resumption of private line service essential to the national defense and security of the country when such services may have been interrupted.
2. As used herein, the term "private line service" means intercity service provided by U. S. common carriers engaged in domestic and/or international wire, radio and cable communications for the intercity communications purposes of customers, over integrated communications pathways, including facilities, local channels which are integral components of intercity private line services and station equipments, between specified locations for a continuous period or for regularly recurring periods at stated hours. The term "resumption" means the recommencement of private line services by patching, rerouting, substitution of component parts, or otherwise as determined by the common carrier involved.
3. When interrupted, private line service shall be resumed by the common carriers in the following order of priority, insofar as practicable:

PRIORITY I

The Priority I classification shall be afforded only to those private line services which are used to transmit and/or receive communications which are vital to the nation under the following categories:

- a. Immediate dangers due to the presence of the enemy, including civil and military air defense warning.
- b. Intelligence reports on matter leading to enemy attack requiring immediate action.
- c. "Flash," "Emergency" and "Operational Immediate" communications to or from the United States Armed Forces.
- d. Urgent communications of or in support of the U. S. Armed Forces and their Allies, and/or with U. S. diplomatic missions abroad.
- e. Proclamations of Civil Defense Emergency.



Private line service within this classification shall receive precedence of resumption over all other private line service, applying the principles described in paragraph 4.

#### PRIORITY II

The Priority II classification shall be afforded only to those private line services which are used to transmit and/or receive communications which are vital to the nation under the following categories:

- a. Initial reports of damage due to enemy action.
- b. Civil defense activities immediately subsequent to and resulting from enemy action.
- c. "Priority" communications to or from the United States Armed Forces.
- d. High precedence U. S. Government communications with foreign Governments and U. S. Diplomatic missions abroad.
- e. Natural disaster of extreme seriousness.

Private line service within this classification shall receive precedence of resumption over all other private line service except those listed under Priority I, applying the principles described in paragraph 4.

#### PRIORITY III

The Priority III classification shall be afforded only to those private line services which are used to transmit and/or receive communications which are vital to the nation under the following categories:

- a. Civil defense or the public health and safety.
- b. Important governmental functions.
- c. Maintenance of essential public services.
- d. Communications concerning production, procurement and distribution of food, essential materials and supplies which require rapid completion of transmission.
- e. Communications to or from United States Armed Forces which require rapid completion of transmission.
- f. Official U. S. Government communications with foreign Governments and U. S. diplomatic missions abroad which require rapid completion of transmission.

Private line service within this classification shall receive precedence of resumption over all other private line service except those listed under Priorities I and II, applying the principles described in paragraph 4.

4. The order of listing of lettered items under each priority classification does not indicate or imply differences in priority treatment within a given classification. When necessary, in order to resume a service having a given priority classification, services having lower priority classifications will be interrupted in the reverse order of priority starting with non-priority services. It is recognized that, as a practical matter, in providing for the resumption of a priority service or services operating within a multiple circuit type of facility (such as a carrier band, cable or multiplex system), lower priority or non-priority services on parallel channels within the band or system may enjoy resumption as well. Reactivation of such lower priority or non-priority services resulting therefrom shall not, however, interfere with the expeditious resumption of priority service. It is further recognized that operational circuits are needed by common carriers during the process of circuit reactivation and for maintenance purposes. Such circuits have precedence in resumption over all other circuits and are exempt from interruption for the purpose of resuming priority service.

5. The priorities outlined herein are available for the private line services of Federal, state and municipal governmental agencies, essential industries and services and such other private line customers as can meet the criteria set forth in paragraph 3 above.

6. Foreign governments desiring to obtain priority of resumption for their private line services which terminate in the United States should submit requests therefor to the U. S. Department of State.

7. It will be the responsibility of private line customers to determine which, if any, of their private line services are sufficiently critical to qualify for priority under the terms of Priority Classifications I, II or III set forth in paragraph 3, and to certify to the common carriers the priority classifications to be accorded the services so determined. Private line services which are in operation on the date hereof should be certified by customers within 120 days. Services placed in operation subsequent to the issuance of this system should be certified within 120 days of the initial service date.

8. Each customer, in requesting priority of resumption under this system, will assume an obligation thereafter to make periodic appraisals of the criticality of the private line service involved and also to make appraisals at the time of any change in the nature or use of the service, and to notify the common carrier promptly of any appropriate reclassifications. The effectiveness of this system will depend upon

the whole-hearted cooperation on the part of the customers authorized to employ it. Customers should therefore familiarize themselves with the purposes to be served by the system and the importance of services which may be assigned the respective priorities. It must always be remembered that the system will operate successfully only if its use is limited strictly to the intended purpose. Before submitting each certification, each customer should consider carefully whether the service involved requires any priority of resumption and exercise care not to certify a higher priority than the circumstances require.

9. Common carriers will accord resumption priorities to private line services of agencies of Federal, State or municipal governments only upon receipt of written certification by the head of such an agency or his designee. Similarly, common carriers will accord resumption priorities to private companies or organizations only upon receipt of written certification by a principal officer of the company or organization.

10. In the application of the foregoing principles, the fact is recognized that it may be necessary to supplement the foregoing with overriding decisions made at the national level. These decisions would take into account the advance certifications for priority of resumption outlined herein.

March 1, 1958

OPERATION ALERT 1958

WARNING - ANNEX B

1. BASIS FOR WARNING

Actions by FCDA Warning Centers will be based on the exercise tactical situation as presented to the FCDA National, Eastern, Central, and Western Warning Centers by the North American Air Defense Command.

2. EXERCISE TERMINOLOGY FOR WARNING

FCDA Advisory Bulletin 159 (revised) dated May 1, 1957, defines warning terminology used for exercises.

3. WARNING PROCEDURES

- A. The FCDA National Warning Center will declare and disseminate "CHECKERBOARD" (simulated AIR RAID WARNING) over the National Warning System (NAWAS) to initiate the attack phase of the exercise.
- B. Immediately following "CHECKERBOARD," FCDA Warning Centers will disseminate supplementary warning information including time to "Reference Cities" and track information regarding FAKERS (simulated enemy aircraft) as outlined in the FCDA publication "National Warning System (NAWAS) - Explanation of Operating Procedures for Warning Points." This document, dated March 1957, has been furnished to all warning points.
- C. The exercise tactical situation will provide a minimum of 2 hours and a maximum of 4 hours warning between the declaration of "CHECKERBOARD" and the time of bomb detonation.
- D. FCDA Warning Centers will continue to disseminate supplementary warning information periodically until "CHECKERBOARD" is terminated by announcement over NAWAS by the National Center. (NOTE: Termination of "CHECKERBOARD" means that Attack by FAKER aircraft or missile is no longer probable. It does not mean that the exercise is terminated.)
- E. Dissemination of "CHECKERBOARD" and supplemental warning information through State and local warning systems will be as directed by State and local authorities.

4. FLASH REPORTS OF HITS OVER NAWAS

Flash reports of hits received by FCDA Warning Centers from State Warning Points will be relayed to Lowpoint immediately

over the control circuit of NAWAS. Duplication of previously reported hits will be avoided if possible. Warning Centers will also furnish hit reports to the appropriate NORAD Headquarters as requested.

5. NUDET REPORTS

Reports of nuclear detonations (NUDET) may be received at Warning Centers from NORAD sources. Warning Centers will relay such reports to Lowpoint immediately over the Control Circuit of NAWAS, avoiding duplication of previously reported hits.

6. CONELRAD

No announcement pertaining to CONELRAD will be made over NAWAS. For exercise purposes, it will be assumed that CONELRAD is implemented at the time "CHECKERBOARD" is declared and that the CONELRAD Operating procedures are discontinued at the time "CHECKERBOARD" is terminated.

7. TERRITORIES AND POSSESSIONS

The implementation of simulated warnings for the Territories and possessions comes under the jurisdiction of appropriate military commands, who will take action consistent with their simulated exercise warning procedures.

March 1, 1958

OPERATION ALERT 1958

COMMUNICATIONS - ANNEX C

1. OBJECTIVES

The primary objectives of communications play in the exercise will be to test the communications capabilities at all levels of government and provide active participation and training of personnel in exchange of vital information essential to emergency operations.

2. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

- A. FCDA National Headquarters will activate its National Communications System #1 (NACOM) as required for the Attack Phase. The NACOM System interconnects FCDA National Headquarters at Battle Creek with the Classified Location, the seven FCDA Regional Offices, and State civil defense offices. NACOM #1 will be activated at 8 a.m. e.s.t. (1300Z) on the first day (May 6). Communications facilities will be provided between the U.S. and Canadian national levels as required.
- B. Communications between FCDA Emergency Operations Centers and the national relocation sites of other Federal agencies will be as follows:
  - (1) Relay of messages to and from other agencies through Lowpoint.
  - (2) If necessary to insure continuity of operations, TWX, Western Union, and telephone communications may be utilized between Lowpoint and other Federal agencies. In this connection, long-distance telephone calls should be held to a minimum at all levels.
- C. Radio backup through the use of amateur personnel and equipment should be utilized at all levels. Such amateur participation should be within the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) plans, approved and pending. Amateur participation will be encouraged through the United States Civil Defense Amateur Radio Alliance (USCDARA) and the American Radio Relay League (ARRL), for both the Attack and Federal Action Phases.
- D. Every effort is being made to provide crypto service for use on NACOM #1. It is expected, however, that all transmissions will be unclassified.
- E. Communications between the Territories and possessions and the FCDA Regional Offices will be arranged by the Regions,

through the use of the Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS), military, or such other governmental channels as are now in being.

- F. Arrangements for communications between State Control Centers and the lower levels of government will be made by State and local authorities. Such plans must be coordinated with FCDA Regional Administrators if Federal financial assistance is required to cover the cost.
- G. FCDA will accept messages for transmission over FCDA communications circuits for other agency personnel without charge. It is mandatory that the message procedures outlined in FCDA Manual of Operations, M18-1, Part IV, Chapter 2, are adhered to; otherwise messages will not be acceptable for transmission.
- H. Representatives of other agencies assigned to and stationed within FCDA Regional Offices will be provided communications service to their agencies' national relocation headquarters, over FCDA circuits, if no other service is available to them.
- I. Procedures authorized for use on NACOM #1 are contained in FCDA Manual M18-1, Part IV, Chapter 2. A full description of the System is contained in Chapter 3.

### 3. COMMUNICATIONS PRIORITIES

The priorities for use of communications in the public service (telephone and telegraph) may be simulated, but no actual requests for priorities should be made to the serving companies. FCDA Technical Bulletins TB4-3, dated September 1955, entitled "National Communications Priorities," and TB4-5, dated May 1957, entitled "Priority Procedures for the Resumption of Intercity Private Line Communication Services," outline the priority systems and their usage.

### 4. SIMULATED BREAKDOWNS

See Basic Standards, Page 5, Section 7. A.

### 5. COMMUNICATIONS EXPENSES

See Basic Standards, Page 5, Section 7. B. and C.

### 6. CONELRAD

See Basic Standards, Page 5, Section 8.

March 1, 1958

OPERATION ALERT 1958

RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE - ANNEX D

1. GENERAL

This annex sets forth the basic information and guidance necessary in the play of the exercise to insure a reasonably realistic test of radiological defense plans at Federal, State, and local levels.

A. The exercise will be directed toward:

- (1) The testing of radiological defense organizational structures and operations plans at all levels of governmental responsibility, including liaison among the several levels.
- (2) The evaluation of the present state of readiness, including the resources available for radiological defense; i.e., qualified personnel for monitoring and analysis groups, instrumentation, communications, et cetera.
- (3) A more accurate estimation of the requirements for a fully implemented, adequate nationwide radiological defense system.
- (4) The acquisition of experience and information relative to the effects of fallout radiation as the limiting factor of operational activities in all areas of civil defense.
- (5) The training of radiological defense personnel.

- B. Seventy-five percent of the warehoused radiological defense equipment is placed under the control of the FCDA Regions. Regions will make a preexercise allocation of the stockpile items under their control to the States within the Region on the basis of population, using current FCDA stockpile status reports of inventories. The stockpile items allocated to the States will be considered as a part of State resources in the play of the exercise.
- C. No operational activities should be considered exempt from radiation hazard, except for the provision that communications service will be available the entire 12 hours of play on May 6.
- D. The basic preattack assumption is that fallout may occur at any location in the United States.



- E. Operations will be based on the weather conditions for the day, although a special UF coded forecast, for exercise purposes only, will be transmitted the morning of May 2. This special report will be used to prepare the fallout forecast patterns.

## 2. CONSTRUCTION OF THE FALLOUT PATTERN

- A. Appendix 1 of this annex provides tabular data for decay rates (Table I), integrated dose values (Table II), and wind/distance factors (Table III). Appendix 1 also contains charts of fallout patterns for the various sized weapons, scaled for an indicated wind speed of 10 miles per hour as a sample. The tabular data in Table III have been scaled to 5 different wind speeds for use if other than a 10-mile speed is required. If the wind speed happens to be 10 miles per hour, the chart provided in the appendix can be used. If not, it will be necessary to construct a pattern from the tabular wind/distance data provided in Table III. The tabular data also provide the information for locating the isochrones.
- B. After the location of ground zero, yield and type of burst become known, and after the special UF exercise forecast has been received the fallout pattern best fitted to the situation should be selected, or prepared from the data provided in the appendix. The 40,000 ft. vector from the special UF forecast will be used for the kiloton weapons; the 60,000 vector for 1 to 5 megaton weapons; and the 80,000 ft. vector for weapons greater than 5 megatons. To develop operational capability in applying the UF forecasts, participants are referred to FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 188, revised January 24, 1958.
- C. Ground zero on the pattern is represented by an X. This X should be placed over the ground zero point and the axis of the pattern aligned to the direction of the appropriate wind vector. As an example, the UF forecast reads:

10503      20604      40805      60906      80605

For kiloton sized weapons 40805 would apply. The 4 indicates 40,000 ft., 08 is the direction in tens of degrees clockwise from north, and 05 is the distance in tens of miles the fallout will travel in 3 hours.

## 3. USING THE PATTERN

- A. Local operations should use the simulated values for fallout as shown on the pattern for carrying out their missions. The dose rate values on the contours are based on H plus 1 hour, and can be used for the first hour after the detonation. The dose rate contours beyond the first hour, or zone 1, must be reduced by the decay rate shown in Table I of appendix 1.

- B. The arrival time of fallout is indicated on the patterns by dashed lines (isochrones) beginning with H plus 1 hour. The areas between the dashed lines are labeled zone 1, 2, et cetera. In this exercise all fallout which affects a zone is assumed to be on the ground by the end of each hour indicated by the downwind isochrones for each zone.
- C. To determine the dose rate for a zone, use Table I. For each contour line there is a column with the dose rates for each succeeding hour after burst. The value of each contour line in zone 10 at the time fallout arrives is shown in the horizontal column for zone 10. The value of the contour lines of the other zones at any time after the burst can be determined by reading horizontally across the table opposite the time. In determining the dose rate at a location that does not coincide with the contours on the pattern, a linear interpolation between contours, though not accurate, is permissible for the purposes of the exercise.
- D. The effects of overlapping patterns will be evaluated at the National and Regional FCDA Headquarters. Where patterns overlap, the highest single fallout value should be used as the basis for estimating the radiation hazard at State and local levels. In determining the highest single value, the computed level of radiation at the arrival time of fallout should be used. To account for spatial variation, the UF data will be refined at the regional and national levels by streamlined analysis techniques.

#### 4. REPORTING PROCEDURES

- A. Reports describing the fallout patterns should be transmitted in narrative form using fixed geographical locations such as cities, topographic features, et cetera. If preferred, the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) or other coordinate system may be used, provided prior arrangements are made with the addressee.
- B. The local level will have the greatest need for detailed radiological information. This would normally be supplied by monitors reporting from the local services. The needs of State, regional, and national offices will not require all this information. A summary should be relayed to the State offices from county or area headquarters. Here the summary process should be repeated and the results transmitted to the next higher level.
- C. The State should alert all cities in its jurisdiction of attacks within the State and also of attack on neighboring States which will produce a radiation hazard to cities within its jurisdiction. The regional headquarters will summarize the regional situation to alert each State of a radiation hazard from neighboring States. The national headquarters will summarize the national situation to keep the regions informed of any radiation hazard to them from neighboring regions and Canada.

- D. For the play of the exercise, simulated monitored readings at 6 p.m. e.s.t. (2300Z) on May 6 and 12 noon e.s.t. (1700Z) on May 7, should be reported and transmitted from the local level as soon as possible.

(1) First Report - May 6

The first report is requested within a few hours after the attack and should not reflect the simulated dose rates existing at this time. All that is necessary is information as to the presence or absence of fallout, its time of arrival, and if it is serious or not. A reading of 15r/hr or greater at the time of arrival will be reported as serious fallout. (See section 3. C. above.)

(a) Local to State Subdivision

Example: If fallout arrives at Abletown at 5 p.m. and the dose rate is 20r/hr, at Bakerville the dose rate is 10r/hr at an arrival time of 3 p.m., and Dumas has not received fallout at 6 p.m., the first report would read:

Abletown fallout 5 p.m. serious, Bakerville fallout 3 p.m., Dumas 6 p.m. no fallout.

(b) State Subdivision to State and State to Region

The county, area, or State radiological defense office will report the general location of fallout areas, indicating the serious fallout areas. An example of a report should read:

Fallout covers the portion of the State south and east of a line through Twin Forks and Goshen. Serious fallout is within an area bounded by Canfield, Dallas, Red Bluff, and Star City, and the area within a radius of 30 miles of Metropolis.

(c) Region to National Headquarters

The report from the regional level to the national level should show a summary of State reports.

(2) Second Report - May 7

The second report will be made giving the dose rate at 12 noon e.s.t. (1700Z). Under conditions of the exercise deposition of fallout will have ceased by this time, and the dose rates reported should be computed from Table I. Linear interpolations between contour lines may be used.

(a) Local to State Subdivision

This report will specify the dose rate and the corresponding geographical location.

(b) State Subdivision to State and State to Region

These reports will consist of contour lines developed from the lower echelons. The positions of the following four dose-rate contours should be reported: 0.25r/hr, 2.5r/hr, 25r/hr, and 75r/hr. Towns, major landmarks, U.S. highways, railroads, or coordinate systems may be used to identify points on the contours. A minimum number of such points should be used in representing the contours.

(c) Regional to National Headquarters

The regional report will consist of contours representing dose rates of 2.5r/hr and 75r/hr.

5. COMPUTATION OF RADIATION EXPOSURE--Table II

- A. Table II in the appendix shows the dose accumulated at any point in the dose rate pattern from a given time to H plus 50 years. Accumulation of the dose begins at the time fallout arrives, or the person arrives in the area, no earlier.
- B. To compute the integrated dose for a given period, read horizontally across the table from the H plus time that fallout was deposited or entry began, to the column under the contour line value shown on the pattern. This figure is the accumulated dose from this time through H plus 50 years.
- (1) The value for the integrated dose from the end of the period under consideration to H plus 50 years is found in the same manner. This value must be subtracted from the integrated dose from the beginning of the period.
- (2) For example, the integrated dose from H plus 4 hours through H plus 2 weeks at the 100r contour is computed as follows:

| <u>Period</u>                                     | <u>Dose</u> |
|---|-------------|
| H plus 4 hours through H plus 50 years            | 341r        |
| H plus 2 weeks through H plus 50 years (subtract) | <u>119r</u> |
| H plus 4 hours through H plus 2 weeks             | 222r        |

The values in this table are for unsheltered exposure. Refuge on the ground floor of a normal home would decrease the exposure to about one-half the value indicated in

Table II, and refuge in the basement of a normal home would decrease the exposure to about one-tenth the table values.

## 6. CRITERIA FOR EMERGENCY RADIATION EXPOSURES

The values given in this section should be used for purposes of this exercise only. Recommendations regarding emergency exposure criteria currently being prepared by FCDA may differ from those presented here.

### A. Exposure of Civil Defense Workers under Emergency Conditions

Emergency exposures will be accepted without regard to preattack radiation exposure history. Exposure criteria will be based on exposure from external sources because accurate evaluation of previous exposures or exposure from internal sources is virtually impossible during the emergency.

### B. Exposure Criteria for workers is presented in two classes:

- (1) Class I--Individuals who may take a full dose in a very short period with a reasonable assurance of not receiving any substantial additional dose. This assumes the individual will be moved to a place relatively free of radiation. The number of persons in this class should be held to a minimum, and they should only be used for critical emergency operations where failure to act could result in serious harm to large numbers of persons.

|                                       |      |
|---------------------------------------|------|
| Maximum exposure in any 1 day         | 100r |
| Maximum exposure in any 1 week        | 150r |
| Total exposure over 1 month or longer | 200r |

A whole-body exposure of 100r in a single day, 150r in 1 week, evenly distributed, or 200r evenly distributed over 1 month, could temporarily incapacitate a small percentage of the workers. During emergency field operations every effort should be made to keep exposures to 50 percent or less of the values listed. Field losses of personnel will not be seriously increased by allowing workers to accept such values, but there could be an increase in delayed deleterious effects. The long-range delayed effects of a 1-month exposure of 200r may be greater than for a single 1-week dose of 150r.

- (2) Class II--Individuals whose dose may be distributed over extended periods, and who will be called on for repeated services.

|  |      |
|--|------|
| Maximum exposure in any 1 day          | 25r  |
| Maximum exposure in any 1 week         | 100r |
| Total exposure over 2 months or longer | 200r |

The daily or weekly exposure of these levels are not expected to result in any immediate incapacitation of the workers. The full exposure of 200r in 2 months will have the same result as in Class I. The above figures for the larger weekly and monthly exposures assume some degree of radiation recovery for fractionated doses.

#### C. Radiation Conditions Determining Evacuation

- (1) The general populace will be inexperienced in self-protection and will generally be exposed under conditions impossible to evaluate well. Exposures of larger segments of the population to doses of 200-300r would probably be disastrous from a genetic viewpoint.
- (2) Where the exposures of people can be accurately evaluated, they may be treated as Class II workers. Where possible, a safety factor of two or more should be applied.
- (3) Under conditions of poor or uncertain evaluation of exposure of the population, doses should be kept to a total of 75r in any period of 6 months or less. Under the worst conditions, considering only immediate survival, the total exposure should not exceed 200r in any 1 month. In such cases it is extremely important to avoid significant exposures in the future.
- (4) If practical, persons should be evacuated from contaminated areas when the situation indicates that they would receive a dose in excess of 75r by remaining. Radiation effects must be weighed in comparison with other risks, such as starvation, freezing, disease, and so forth, when considering an evacuation. Movement capability and availability of relatively uncontaminated reception centers should influence this decision.

#### D. Returning Evacuees to a Contaminated Area

Previous dose should be the guiding factor in determining further exposure after reinhabiting an area. A return to exposure conditions exceeding 0.3r/wk should be regarded as still emergency conditions. The absolute total limits for a lifetime dose should be 200r for poorly evaluated persons and 300r for accurately evaluated exposures.

### 7. RADIOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS

For determination of equipment requirements see Annex J, Appendix 1, Attachment 1.

ANNEX D

APPENDIX - I

|           |  |
|-----------|--|
| Table I   | Decay Rates  |
| Table II  | Integrated Dose  |
| Table III | Wind/Distance and Isochrone<br>Factors                           |
| Charts    | One for each sized weapon,<br>scaled to 10 m.p.h. wind<br>speeds |

TABLE I  
DECAY RATES

| Time       | Zone | Dose Rate Contour Values |        |         |         |          |          |
|------------|------|--------------------------|--------|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| H+1 hour   | 1    | 10r/hr                   | 30r/hr | 100r/hr | 300r/hr | 1000r/hr | 3000r/hr |
| H+2 hours  | 2    | 4.4 "                    | 13.2 " | 43.5 "  | 132 "   | 435 "    | 1320 "   |
| H+3 hours  | 3    | 2.7 "                    | 8.0 "  | 26.8 "  | 79.8 "  | 268 "    | 798 "    |
| H+4 hours  | 4    | 1.9 "                    | 5.6 "  | 18.9 "  | 56.3 "  | 189 "    | 563 "    |
| H+5 hours  | 5    | 1.4 "                    | 4.3 "  | 14.4 "  | 43.0 "  | 144 "    | 430 "    |
| H+6 hours  | 6    | 1.2 "                    | 3.5 "  | 11.6 "  | 34.6 "  | 116 "    | 346 "    |
| H+7 hours  | 7    | .97 "                    | 2.9 "  | 9.6 "   | 28.9 "  | 96.2 "   | 289 "    |
| H+8 hours  | 8    | .82 "                    | 2.5 "  | 8.2 "   | 24.7 "  | 82.0 "   | 247 "    |
| H+9 hours  | 9    | .71 "                    | 2.1 "  | 7.1 "   | 21.3 "  | 71.0 "   | 213 "    |
| H+10 hours | 10   | .63 "                    | 1.9 "  | 6.3 "   | 18.8 "  | 62.8 "   | 188 "    |
| H+15 hours | 15   | .39 "                    | 1.2 "  | 3.9 "   | 11.5 "  | 38.7 "   | 115 "    |
| H+20 hours | 20   | .27 "                    | .82 "  | 2.7 "   | 8.1 "   | 27.1 "   | 81.3 "   |
| H+21 hours | 21   | .26 "                    | .77 "  | 2.6 "   | 7.7 "   | 25.9 "   | 77.3 "   |
| H+22 hours | 22   | .24 "                    | .73 "  | 2.4 "   | 7.3 "   | 24.3 "   | 73.0 "   |
| H+23 hours | 23   | .23 "                    | .69 "  | 2.3 "   | 6.9 "   | 23.1 "   | 69.4 "   |
| H+1 day    | 24   | .22 "                    | .66 "  | 2.2 "   | 6.6 "   | 22.0 "   | 65.8 "   |
| H+2 days   |      | .10 "                    | .29 "  | 1.0 "   | 2.9 "   | 9.6 "    | 28.9 "   |
| H+1 week   |      | .02 "                    | .06 "  | .2 "    | .6 "    | 2.1 "    | 6.4 "    |
| H+2 weeks  |      | .01 "                    | .03 "  | .09 "   | .3 "    | .93 "    | 2.8 "    |
| H+1 month  |      | .004 "                   | .01 "  | .04 "   | .12 "   | .38 "    | 1.14 "   |
| H+6 months |      | --                       | .001 " | .004 "  | .01 "   | .04 "    | .12 "    |
| H+1 year   |      | --                       | --     | .002 "  | .006 "  | .02 "    | .06 "    |
| H+5 years  |      | --                       | --     | --      | --      | .003 "   | .009 "   |
| H+10 years |      | --                       | --     | --      | --      | --       | .004 "   |



TABLE II  
INTEGRATED DOSE TABLE TO H+50 YEARS  
Dose Rate Contour Values

| Time Dose Begins | 10r/hr | 30r/hr | 100r/hr | 300r/hr | 1000r/hr | 3000r/hr |
|------------------|--------|--------|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| H+1 hour         | 47 r   | 141 r  | 470 r   | 1410 r  | 4630r    | 13890r   |
| H+2 hours        | 39.9r  | 120 r  | 399 r   | 1196 r  | 3985r    | 11955r   |
| H+3 hours        | 36.5r  | 109 r  | 365 r   | 1094 r  | 3645r    | 10935r   |
| H+4 hours        | 34.1r  | 102 r  | 341 r   | 1023 r  | 3410r    | 10230r   |
| H+5 hours        | 32.6r  | 97.7r  | 326 r   | 977 r   | 3255r    | 9765r    |
| H+6 hours        | 31.2r  | 93.5r  | 312 r   | 935 r   | 3115r    | 9345r    |
| H+7 hours        | 30.3r  | 90.8r  | 303 r   | 908 r   | 3025r    | 9075r    |
| H+8 hours        | 29.3r  | 87.9r  | 293 r   | 879 r   | 2930r    | 8790r    |
| H+9 hours        | 28.5r  | 85.5r  | 285 r   | 855 r   | 2850r    | 8550r    |
| H+10 hours       | 27.9r  | 83.6r  | 279 r   | 836 r   | 2785r    | 8355r    |
| H+15 hours       | 25.4r  | 76.2r  | 254 r   | 762 r   | 2540r    | 7620r    |
| H+20 hours       | 23.8r  | 71.4r  | 238 r   | 714 r   | 2380r    | 7140r    |
| H+21 hours       | 23.5r  | 70.5r  | 235 r   | 705 r   | 2350r    | 7050r    |
| H+22 hours       | 23.2r  | 69.8r  | 232 r   | 698 r   | 2325r    | 6980r    |
| H+23 hours       | 23.0r  | 69.0r  | 230 r   | 690 r   | 2300r    | 6900r    |
| H+1 day          | 22.8r  | 68.4r  | 228 r   | 684 r   | 2280r    | 6840r    |
| H+2 days         | 19.4r  | 58.1r  | 194 r   | 581 r   | 1935r    | 5805r    |
| H+1 week         | 14.5r  | 42.8r  | 143 r   | 428 r   | 1425r    | 4275r    |
| H+2 weeks        | 11.9r  | 35.7r  | 119 r   | 357 r   | 1190r    | 3570r    |
| H+1 month        | 9.7r   | 29.1r  | 97.0r   | 291 r   | 970r     | 2910r    |
| H+6 months       | 5.7r   | 17.0r  | 56.5r   | 170 r   | 565r     | 1695r    |
| H+1 year         | 4.4r   | 13.4r  | 44.5r   | 134 r   | 445r     | 1335r    |
| H+5 years        | 2.2r   | 6.6r   | 22.0r   | 66.0r   | 220r     | 660 r    |
| H+10 years       | 1.5r   | 4.4r   | 14.5r   | 43.5r   | 145r     | 435 r    |

TABLE III  
WIND/DISTANCE AND ISOCHRONE FACTORS  
TABULAR DIMENSIONS OF DOSE RATE CONTOURS  
20 MEGATON YIELD

10 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 8--03

| <u>Contour</u> | <u>Upwind GZ</u> | <u>Crosswind GZ</u> | <u>Downwind GZ</u> | <u>Maximum Width</u> |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 10r/hr         | 55 mile          | 59 mile             | 1450 mile          | 380 mile             |
| 100r/hr        | 24               | 27                  | 530                | 205                  |
| 1000r/hr       | 7.3              | 9.3                 | 194                | 83                   |
| 3000r/hr       | 1.2              | 2.9                 | 110                | 36                   |

20 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 8--06

|          |         |         |           |          |
|----------|---------|---------|-----------|----------|
| 10r/hr   | 51 mile | 59 mile | 2900 mile | 190 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 21      | 27      | 1060      | 102      |
| 1000r/hr | 5       | 9.3     | 388       | 42       |
| 3000r/hr | 1       | 2.9     | 220       | 18       |

30 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 8--09

|          |         |         |           |     |
|----------|---------|---------|-----------|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 47 mile | 59 mile | 4350 mile | 127 |
| 100r/hr  | 19      | 27      | 1590      | 68  |
| 1000r/hr | 3.3     | 9.3     | 582       | 28  |
| 3000r/hr | 0.9     | 2.9     | 330       | 12  |

40 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 8--12

|          |         |         |           |         |
|----------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|
| 10r/hr   | 43 mile | 59 mile | 5800 mile | 95 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 16      | 27      | 2120      | 51      |
| 1000r/hr | 2.3     | 9.3     | 776       | 21      |
| 3000r/hr | 0.8     | 2.9     | 440       | 9       |

50 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 8--15

|          |         |         |           |         |
|----------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|
| 10r/hr   | 39 mile | 59 mile | 7250 mile | 76 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 13.5    | 27      | 2650      | 41      |
| 1000r/hr | 1.3     | 9.3     | 970       | 17      |
| 3000r/hr | 0.7     | 2.9     | 550       | 7       |

ISOCHRONE DISTANCE DOWNWIND OF GROUND ZERO

|            | <u>H+1 isoch.</u> | <u>H+2 isoch.</u> | <u>H+3 isoch.</u> | <u>H+4 isoch.</u> |      |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------|
| 10 mile/hr | 40 mile           | 50 mile           | 60 mile           | 70 mile           | etc. |
| 20         | 50                | 70                | 90                | 110               | etc. |
| 30         | 60                | 90                | 120               | 150               | etc. |
| 40         | 70                | 110               | 150               | 190               | etc. |
| 50         | 80                | 130               | 180               | 230               | etc. |

TABLE III  
WIND/DISTANCE AND ISOCHRONE FACTORS  
TABULAR DIMENSIONS OF DOSE RATE CONTOURS  
10 MEGATON YIELD

10 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 8--03

| <u>Contour</u> | <u>Upwind GZ</u> | <u>Crosswind GZ</u> | <u>Downwind GZ</u> | <u>Maximum Width</u> |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 10r/hr         | 37 mile          | 40 mile             | 936 mile           | 242 mile             |
| 100r/hr        | 16               | 18                  | 336                | 125                  |
| 1000r/hr       | 4.8              | 6                   | 121                | 51                   |
| 3000r/hr       | 0.7              | 1.8                 | 70                 | 22                   |

20 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 8--06

|          |         |         |           |          |
|----------|---------|---------|-----------|----------|
| 10r/hr   | 34 mile | 40 mile | 1872 mile | 121 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 14      | 18      | 672       | 62       |
| 1000r/hr | 3       | 6       | 242       | 25       |
| 3000r/hr | 0.6     | 1.8     | 140       | 11       |

30 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 8--09

|          |         |         |           |         |
|----------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|
| 10r/hr   | 31 mile | 40 mile | 2808 mile | 80 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 12      | 18      | 1008      | 41      |
| 1000r/hr | 2.6     | 6       | 363       | 17      |
| 3000r/hr | 0.5     | 1.8     | 210       | 7.3     |

40 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 8--12

|          |         |         |           |         |
|----------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|
| 10r/hr   | 28 mile | 40 mile | 3744 mile | 60 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 10      | 18      | 1344      | 31      |
| 1000r/hr | 2       | 6       | 484       | 13      |
| 3000r/hr | 0.5     | 1.8     | 280       | 5.5     |

50 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 8--15

|          |         |         |           |         |
|----------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|
| 10 r/hr  | 35 mile | 40 mile | 4580 mile | 48 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 8       | 18      | 1680      | 25      |
| 1000r/hr | 1.0     | 6       | 605       | 10      |
| 3000r/hr | 0.5     | 1.8     | 350       | 4.4     |

ISOCHRONE DISTANCE DOWNWIND OF GROUND ZERO

|            | <u>h+1 isoch.</u> | <u>h+2 isoch.</u> | <u>h+3 isoch.</u> | <u>h+4 isoch.</u> |      |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------|
| 10 mile/hr | 30 mile           | 40 mile           | 50 mile           | 60 mile           | etc. |
| 20         | 40                | 60                | 80                | 100               | etc. |
| 30         | 50                | 80                | 110               | 140               | etc. |
| 40         | 60                | 100               | 140               | 180               | etc. |
| 50         | 70                | 120               | 170               | 220               | etc. |

TABLE III  
WIND/DISTANCE AND ISOCHRONE FACTORS  
TABULAR DIMENSIONS OF DOSE RATE CONTOURS

5 MEGATON YIELD

10 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--03

| <u>Contour</u> | <u>Upwind GZ</u> | <u>Crosswind GZ</u> | <u>Downwind GZ</u> | <u>Maximum Width</u> |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 10r/hr         | 24.8 mile        | 27 mile             | 590 mile           | 150 mile             |
| 100r/hr        | 10.5             | 12                  | 215                | 78                   |
| 1000r/hr       | 2.7              | 3.8                 | 78                 | 31                   |
| 3000r/hr       | 0.6              | 1.1                 | 44                 | 13.5                 |

20 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--06

|          |      |     |      |     |
|----------|------|-----|------|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 22.6 | 27  | 1180 | 75  |
| 100r/hr  | 9    | 12  | 430  | 39  |
| 1000r/hr | 1.6  | 3.8 | 156  | 16  |
| 3000r/hr | 0.5  | 1.1 | 88   | 6.7 |

30 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--09

|          |      |     |      |     |
|----------|------|-----|------|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 20.4 | 27  | 1770 | 50  |
| 100r/hr  | 7.5  | 12  | 645  | 26  |
| 1000r/hr | 0.8  | 3.8 | 234  | 10  |
| 3000r/hr | 0.4  | 1.1 | 132  | 4.5 |

40 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--12

|          |      |     |      |     |
|----------|------|-----|------|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 18.2 | 27  | 2360 | 38  |
| 100r/hr  | 6    | 12  | 860  | 19  |
| 1000r/hr | 0.8  | 3.8 | 312  | 8   |
| 3000r/hr | 0.4  | 1.1 | 176  | 3.3 |

50 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--15

|          |     |     |      |     |
|----------|-----|-----|------|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 16  | 27  | 2950 | 30  |
| 100r/hr  | 4.5 | 12  | 1075 | 16  |
| 1000r/hr | 0.8 | 3.8 | 390  | 6.2 |
| 3000r/hr | 0.3 | 1.1 | 220  | 2.7 |

ISOCHRONE DISTANCE DOWNWIND OF GROUND ZERO

|            | <u>h+1 isoch.</u> | <u>h+2 isoch.</u> | <u>h+3 isoch.</u> | <u>h+4 isoch.</u> |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| 10 mile/hr | 30 mile           | 40 mile           | 50 mile           | 60 mile etc.      |
| 20 mile/hr | 40                | 60                | 80                | 100 etc.          |
| 30 mile/hr | 50                | 80                | 110               | 140 etc.          |
| 40 mile/hr | 60                | 100               | 140               | 180 etc.          |
| 50 mile/hr | 70                | 120               | 170               | 220 etc.          |

TABLE III  
WIND/DISTANCE AND ISOCHRONE FACTORS  
TABULAR DIMENSIONS OF DOSE RATE CONTOURS  
2 MEGATON YIELD

10 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--03

| <u>Contour</u> | <u>Upwind GZ</u> | <u>Crosswind GZ</u> | <u>Downwind GZ</u> | <u>Maximum Width</u> |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 10r/hr         | 14.7 mile        | 16.2 mile           | 330 mile           | 81 mile              |
| 100r/hr        | 6                | 7                   | 118                | 41                   |
| 1000r/hr       | 1.5              | 2.2                 | 43                 | 16.3                 |
| 3000r/hr       | 0.6              | 0.6                 | 24                 | 7                    |

20 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--06

|          |         |         |          |         |
|----------|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| 10r/hr   | 13 mile | 16 mile | 660 mile | 40 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 5       | 7       | 236      | 20      |
| 1000r/hr | 0.8     | 2.2     | 86       | 8       |
| 3000r/hr | 0.5     | 0.6     | 48       | 3.5     |

30 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--09

|          |           |         |          |         |
|----------|-----------|---------|----------|---------|
| 10r/hr   | 11.5 mile | 16 mile | 990 mile | 27 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 4         | 7       | 354      | 14      |
| 1000r/hr | 0.7       | 2.2     | 129      | 5.5     |
| 3000r/hr | 0.4       | 0.6     | 72       | 2.3     |

40 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--12

|          |         |         |           |         |
|----------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|
| 10r/hr   | 10 mile | 16 mile | 1220 mile | 20 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 3       | 7       | 472       | 10      |
| 1000r/hr | 0.6     | 2.2     | 172       | 4       |
| 3000r/hr | 0.4     | 0.6     | 96        | 1.8     |

50 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--15

|          |          |         |           |         |
|----------|----------|---------|-----------|---------|
| 10r/hr   | 8.5 mile | 16 mile | 1650 mile | 16 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 2        | 7       | 590       | 8       |
| 1000r/hr | 0.5      | 2.2     | 215       | 3.3     |
| 3000r/hr | 0.3      | 0.6     | 120       | 1.4     |

ISOCHRONE DISTANCE DOWNWIND OF GROUND ZERO

|            | <u>h+1 isoch.</u> | <u>h+2 isoch.</u> | <u>h+3 isoch.</u> | <u>h+4 isoch.</u> |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| 10 mile/hr | 30 mile           | 40 mile           | 50 mile           | 60 mile etc.      |
| 20         | 40                | 60                | 80                | 100 etc.          |
| 30         | 50                | 80                | 110               | 140 etc.          |
| 40         | 60                | 100               | 140               | 180 etc.          |
| 50         | 70                | 120               | 170               | 220 etc.          |

TABLE III  
WIND/DISTANCE AND ISOCHRONE FACTORS

TABULAR DIMENSIONS OF DOSE RATE CONTOURS

1 MEGATON YIELD

10 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--03

| <u>Contour</u> | <u>Upwind GZ</u> | <u>Crosswind GZ</u> | <u>Downwind GZ</u> | <u>Maximum Width</u> |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 10r/hr         | 10 mile          | 11 mile             | 211 mile           | 51 mile              |
| 100r/hr        | 4                | 4.7                 | 76                 | 26                   |
| 1000r/hr       | 0.9              | 1.4                 | 27                 | 10                   |
| 3000r/hr       | 0.4              | 0.4                 | 15                 | 4.3                  |

20 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--06

|          |          |           |          |         |
|----------|----------|-----------|----------|---------|
| 10r/hr   | 8.8 mile | 11.0 mile | 422 mile | 25 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 3.3      | 4.7       | 152      | 13      |
| 1000r/hr | 0.8      | 1.4       | 54       | 5       |
| 3000r/hr | 0.4      | 0.4       | 30       | 2.1     |

30 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--09

|          |          |           |          |         |
|----------|----------|-----------|----------|---------|
| 10r/hr   | 7.7 mile | 11.0 mile | 634 mile | 17 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 2.6      | 4.7       | 228      | 8.5     |
| 1000r/hr | 0.7      | 1.4       | 80       | 3.4     |
| 3000r/hr | 0.4      | 0.4       | 45       | 1.4     |

40 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--12

|          |          |           |          |         |
|----------|----------|-----------|----------|---------|
| 10r/hr   | 6.6 mile | 11.0 mile | 844 mile | 13 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 1.9      | 4.7       | 304      | 7       |
| 1000r/hr | 0.6      | 1.4       | 108      | 2.5     |
| 3000r/hr | 0.3      | 0.4       | 60       | 1.1     |

50 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 6--15

|          |          |           |           |           |
|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 10r/hr   | 5.5 mile | 11.0 mile | 1055 mile | 10.1 mile |
| 100r/hr  | 1.2      | 4.7       | 380       | 5.1       |
| 1000r/hr | 0.4      | 1.4       | 135       | 2         |
| 3000r/hr | 0.3      | 0.4       | 75        | 0.9       |

ISOCHRONE DISTANCE DOWNWIND OF GROUND ZERO

|            | <u>h+1 isoch.</u> | <u>h+2 isoch.</u> | <u>h+3 isoch.</u> | <u>h+4 isoch.</u> |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| 10 mile/hr | 30 mile           | 40 mile           | 50 mile           | 60 mile etc.      |
| 20         | 40                | 60                | 80                | 100 etc.          |
| 30         | 50                | 80                | 110               | 140 etc.          |
| 40         | 60                | 100               | 140               | 180 etc.          |
| 50         | 70                | 120               | 170               | 220 etc.          |

TABLE III  
WIND/DISTANCE AND ISOCHRONE FACTORS  
TABULAR DIMENSIONS OF DOSE RATE CONTOURS  
100 KILOTON YIELD

10 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--03

| <u>Contour</u> | <u>Upwind GZ</u> | <u>Crosswind GZ</u> | <u>Downwind GZ</u> | <u>Maximum Width</u> |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 10r/hr         | 2.8 mile         | 3.2 mile            | 45 mile            | 11 mile              |
| 100r/hr        | 1.0              | 1.2                 | 17                 | 5                    |
| 1000r/hr       | 0.13             | 0.3                 | 6                  | 2                    |
| 3000r/hr       | 0.10             | 0.1                 | 3.3                | 0.9                  |

20 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--06

|          |      |     |     |     |
|----------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 2.4  | 3.2 | 90  | 5.5 |
| 100r/hr  | 0.7  | 1.2 | 34  | 4   |
| 1000r/hr | 0.1  | 0.3 | 12  | 1   |
| 3000r/hr | 0.05 | 0.1 | 6.9 | 0.5 |

30 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--09

|          |      |     |     |     |
|----------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 2.0  | 3.2 | 135 | 3.7 |
| 100r/hr  | 0.4  | 1.2 | 51  | 3   |
| 1000r/hr | 0.1  | 0.3 | 18  | 0.7 |
| 3000r/hr | 0.05 | 0.1 | 10  | 0.3 |

40 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--12

|          |      |     |     |      |
|----------|------|-----|-----|------|
| 10r/hr   | 1.6  | 3.2 | 180 | 3    |
| 100r/hr  | 0.2  | 1.2 | 68  | 2    |
| 1000r/hr | 0.1  | 0.3 | 24  | 0.5  |
| 3000r/hr | 0.05 | 0.1 | 13  | 0.25 |

50 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--15

|          |      |     |     |     |
|----------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 1.2  | 3.2 | 225 | 2   |
| 100r/hr  | 0.2  | 1.2 | 85  | 1   |
| 1000r/hr | 0.1  | 0.3 | 30  | 0.4 |
| 3000r/hr | 0.05 | 0.1 | 17  | 0.2 |

ISOCHRONE DISTANCE DOWNWIND OF GROUND ZERO

|            | <u>h+1 isoch.</u> | <u>h+2 isoch.</u> | <u>h+3 isoch.</u> | <u>h+4 isoch.</u> |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| 10 mile/hr | 20 mile           | 30 mile           | 40 mile           | 50 mile etc.      |
| 20         | 30                | 50                | 70                | 90 etc.           |
| 30         | 40                | 70                | 100               | 130 etc.          |
| 40         | 50                | 90                | 130               | 170 etc.          |
| 50         | 60                | 110               | 160               | 210 etc.          |

TABLE III  
WIND/DISTANCE AND ISOCHRONE FACTORS  
TABULAR DIMENSIONS OF DOSE RATE CONTOURS  
50 KILOTON YIELD

10 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--03

| <u>Contour</u> | <u>Upwind GZ</u> | <u>Crosswind GZ</u> | <u>Downwind GZ</u> | <u>Maximum Width</u> |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 10 r/hr        | 2.2 mile         | 2.6 mile            | 40 mile            | 9.5 mile             |
| 100 r/hr       | 0.8              | 1.0                 | 14                 | 4.2                  |
| 1000r/hr       | 0.12             | 0.24                | 4                  | 1.5                  |
| 3000r/hr       | 0.08             | 0.1                 | 1.5                | 0.7                  |

20 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--06

|          |      |      |    |     |
|----------|------|------|----|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 1.9  | 2.6  | 80 | 4.3 |
| 100r/hr  | 0.56 | 1.0  | 28 | 2.1 |
| 1000r/hr | 0.08 | 0.24 | 8  | 0.8 |
| 3000r/hr | 0.04 | 0.1  | 3  | 0.4 |

30 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--09

|          |      |      |     |      |
|----------|------|------|-----|------|
| 10r/hr   | 1.6  | 2.6  | 120 | 3.2  |
| 100r/hr  | 0.34 | 1.0  | 42  | 1.4  |
| 1000r/hr | 0.08 | 0.24 | 12  | 0.5  |
| 3000r/hr | 0.04 | 0.1  | 4.5 | 0.23 |

40 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--12

|          |      |      |     |     |
|----------|------|------|-----|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 1.2  | 2.6  | 160 | 2.2 |
| 100r/hr  | 0.12 | 1.0  | 56  | 1.2 |
| 1000r/hr | 0.08 | 0.24 | 16  | 0.4 |
| 3000r/hr | 0.04 | 0.1  | 6   | 0.2 |

50 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--15

|          |      |      |     |      |
|----------|------|------|-----|------|
| 10r/hr   | 0.8  | 2.6  | 200 | 1.9  |
| 100r/hr  | 0.12 | 1.0  | 70  | 0.84 |
| 1000r/hr | 0.08 | 0.2  | 20  | 0.3  |
| 3000r/hr | 0.04 | 0.04 | 7.5 | 0.14 |

ISOCHRONE DISTANCE DOWNWIND OF GROUND ZERO

|            | <u>h+1 isoch.</u> | <u>h+2 isoch.</u> | <u>h+3 isoch.</u> | <u>h+4 isoch.</u> |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| 10 mile/hr | 20 mile           | 30 mile           | 40 mile           | 50 mile etc.      |
| 20         | 30                | 50                | 70                | 90 etc.           |
| 30         | 40                | 70                | 100               | 130 etc.          |
| 40         | 50                | 90                | 130               | 170 etc.          |
| 50         | 60                | 110               | 160               | 210 etc.          |



TABLE III  
WIND/DISTANCE AND ISOCHRONE FACTORS  
TABULAR DIMENSIONS OF DOSE RATE CONTOURS  
20 KILOTON YIELD

10 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--03

| <u>Contour</u> | <u>Upwind GZ</u> | <u>Crosswind GZ</u> | <u>Downwind GZ</u> | <u>Maximum Width</u> |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 10r/hr         | 1.1 mile         | 1.4 mile            | 33 mile            | 7.6 mile             |
| 100r/hr        | 0.5              | 0.7                 | 7.7                | 2.7                  |
| 1000r/hr       | 0.1              | 0.2                 | 1.8                | 1.0                  |
| 3000r/hr       | 0.05             | 0.1                 | 0.7                | 0.5                  |

20 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--06

|          |      |     |      |      |
|----------|------|-----|------|------|
| 10r/hr   | 0.9  | 1.4 | 66   | 3.8  |
| 100r/hr  | 0.3  | 0.7 | 15.4 | 1.4  |
| 1000r/hr | 0.04 | 0.2 | 3.6  | 0.5  |
| 3000r/hr | 0.02 | 0.1 | 1.4  | 0.25 |

30 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--09

|          |      |     |     |     |
|----------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 0.6  | 1.4 | 99  | 2.5 |
| 100r/hr  | 0.16 | 0.7 | 23  | 0.9 |
| 1000r/hr | 0.04 | 0.2 | 5.4 | 0.3 |
| 3000r/hr | 0.02 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 0.2 |

40 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--12

|          |      |     |     |      |
|----------|------|-----|-----|------|
| 10r/hr   | 0.3  | 1.4 | 132 | 1.9  |
| 100r/hr  | 0.1  | 0.7 | 31  | 0.7  |
| 1000r/hr | 0.04 | 0.2 | 7   | 0.25 |
| 3000r/hr | 0.02 | 0.1 | 3   | 0.13 |

50 MILE PER HOUR EFFECTIVE WIND, UF DESIGNATOR 4--15

|          |      |     |      |     |
|----------|------|-----|------|-----|
| 10r/hr   | 0.2  | 1.4 | 165  | 1.5 |
| 100r/hr  | 0.06 | 0.7 | 38.5 | 0.5 |
| 1000r/hr | 0.04 | 0.2 | 8.0  | 0.2 |
| 3000r/hr | 0.02 | 0.1 | 3.5  | 0.1 |

ISOCHRONE DISTANCE DOWNWIND OF GROUND ZERO

|            | <u>h+1 isoch.</u> | <u>h+2 isoch.</u> | <u>h+3 isoch.</u> | <u>h+4 isoch.</u> |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| 10 mile/hr | 20 mile           | 30 mile           | 40 mile           | 50 mile etc.      |
| 20         | 30                | 50                | 70                | 90 etc.           |
| 30         | 40                | 70                | 100               | 130 etc.          |
| 40         | 50                | 90                | 130               | 170 etc.          |
| 50         | 60                | 110               | 160               | 210 etc.          |


FALLOUT PATTERN FOR 20 MEGATON YIELD

10 MPH EFFECTIVE WIND

UF DESIGNATOR 8--03

ANNEX D

TOTAL DOWNWIND EXTENT 1450 MILES




FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

FALLOUT PATTERN FOR 10 MEGATON YIELD

10 MPH EFFECTIVE WIND

UF DESIGNATOR 8--03




FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

FALLOUT PATTERN FOR 5 MEGATON YIELD

10 MPH EFFECTIVE WIND


UF DESIGNATOR 6--03



FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

FALLOUT PATTERN FOR 2 MEGATON YIELD


10 MPH EFFECTIVE WIND  
UF DESIGNATOR 6--03



FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

FALLOUT PATTERN FOR 1 MEGATON YIELD  
10 MPH EFFECTIVE WIND  
UF DESIGNATOR 6-03

D-23



0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

SCALE  
 Statute Miles


FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY  
 OPERATION ALERT 1958

FALLOUT PATTERN FOR 100 KILOTON YIELD

10 MPH EFFECTIVE WIND

UF DESIGNATOR 4--03

D-24



SCALE  
Statute miles

FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY  
OPERATION ALERT 1958

FALLOUT PATTERN FOR 50 KILOTON YIELD


10 MPH EFFECTIVE WIND

UF DESIGNATOR 4--03

h+1 isochrone 20 miles downwind ground zero

TOTAL DOWNWIND EXTENT 40 MILES

D-25



SCALE  
Statute Miles

FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY  
OPERATION ALERT 1958



FALLOUT PATTERN FOR 20 KILOTON YIELD


10 MPH EFFECTIVE WIND

UF DESIGNATOR 4--03

h+1 isochrone 20 miles downwind groundzero

TOTAL DOWNWIND EXTENT 33 MILES

D-26



SCALE  
Statute miles

FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY  
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HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE - ANNEX E

1. GENERAL

- A. This Annex gives exercise guidance on evaluation and use of medical resources; standards for medical care; responsibilities under the Emergency Blood Program; and exercise play involving public health and sanitation, chemical warfare defense, and biological warfare defense.

2. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

- A. It is improbable that casualties in areas of total severe blast and thermal destruction and in some areas of high intensity fallout will receive medical attention within time that would be life saving.
- B. The mass displacement of people which will result from the nuclear attack, conditions of crowding and unsatisfactory sanitation, and reduced calorie intake and seasonal effects, will increase the incidence of communicable disease. The 2½ percent peacetime incidence of sickness and injury will be trebled during the first nine months and doubled during the last 3 months of the first postattack year.
- C. The disruption of power supplies and the contamination of surface water supplies will seriously compound the sanitation problem in reception areas and those areas around and beyond the fringe of blast areas.

3. HEALTH AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

A. FCDA Medical Stockpiles

The FCDA stockpiles of health and medical supplies and equipment located within each region are 100 percent under the control of the Regional Administrators, with the exception of general reserve stocks at Somerville, New Jersey; Neosho, Missouri; and Clearfield, Utah, and the bulk stock stores in manufacturers inventories. These general stores remain under national control.

Regions will make a pre-exercise allocation of the stockpile items under their control to the States within their regions on the basis of target area population, using the current FCDA stockpile status reports of inventories. The stockpile items allocated to the States will be considered as a part of the State resources in the play of the exercise.

B. Narcotic Supplies

Procedures for acquisition of narcotics in an emergency as given in FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 205, December 10, 1956, should be observed during the exercise. Federal stockpiles in classified locations will be under control of FCDA National Headquarters.

C. Prepositioned Civil Defense Emergency Hospitals

All FCDA prepositioned hospitals within the States will be considered a local resource. However, their operation will only be simulated; they will not be physically moved or used. It is urged that the exercise situation be used to evaluate the soundness of plans pertaining to locations and operations of the units.

D. Civil Defense Emergency Training Hospitals

All CDEH training units now on loan to States should be utilized to the maximum either for training, demonstration, or exhibit during the exercise.

E. Selected Medical Survival Items

Guidance on the determination of requirements for selected survival items is contained in Annex J, Appendix 1, Attachment 1.

4. MEDICAL CARE OPERATIONS

A. Existing hospitals should be urged to test their disaster plans by token evacuation or by simulated action, with appropriate staff participation.

B. Under an attack with modern weapons, and because of medical production vulnerability, minimum stockpiles, and small medical inventories, the recommended priority for medical care is:

- (1) Maintenance of health of non-casualties.
- (2) First aid and medical-surgical attention to the minimal (walking wounded) casualties to return them to the work force as soon as possible.
- (3) Care of children and of women of child-bearing age.
- (4) Care of nonambulatory casualties that reach medical channels.

5. EMERGENCY BLOOD PROGRAM

The American National Red Cross is designated as the blood collecting agency for the defense needs of the National blood Program in accordance with existing agreements between the American National Red Cross, and the Department of Defense, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration respectively, and in cooperation with other member institutions of the Joint Blood Council. ANRC representatives will be assigned to Lowpoint and FCDA Regional Control Centers during the exercise. They will operate through established FCDA channels of communications. A realistic evaluation of whole blood requirements will be made by participating State and local operational echelons. This appraisal will span the first and second 24-hour postattack periods only and will include only those requirements that could realistically be utilized within operating medical care facilities (see table below.) These evaluations will be sent through established communications channels to FCDA National Headquarters (Lowpoint) by the end of the Attack Phase.

WHOLE BLOOD -- Units per 1000 casualties<sup>1</sup>

reaching medical channels and surviving 24 hours<sup>2</sup>

| 8-10 HOURS |                       | 10-72 HOURS |                       | TOTAL FOR<br>72 HOURS |                       |
|------------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Units      | Units per<br>Casualty | Units       | Units per<br>Casualty | Units                 | Units per<br>Casualty |
| 75         | 0.075                 | 600         | 0.60                  | 675                   | 0.675                 |

<sup>1</sup>Includes casualties only from blast, thermal, and initial radiation effects.

<sup>2</sup>Allowance is made for those casualties surviving initially but whose injuries prove fatal within 24 hours.

6. PUBLIC HEALTH AND SANITATION

No specific standards are included for public health and sanitation inasmuch as the emergency operational requirements are basically an intensification and broadening of normal peacetime responsibilities. As in the case of medical care, highest priority must be given to the maintenance of health of the non-casualty survivors.

7. CHEMICAL WARFARE DEFENSE

Problems may involve the marking and policing of contaminated areas; decontamination of contaminated areas; and actual testing of samples of contaminated food and water in public health laboratories.

8. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFENSE

Problems involving biological warfare defense may involve both overt and covert attack situations requiring the handling of samples, for the purpose of evaluating present capabilities, the utilization of State and local public health and agriculture laboratory facilities, and those in universities and commerce, to the extent such activity can be arranged or simulated.

OPERATION ALERT 1958

WELFARE - ANNEX F

1. PURPOSE

This annex sets forth basic information and guidance necessary in the play of welfare problems in the exercise to assure a maximum of realism and uniformity, assess operating capabilities, and obtain proper manageability and coordination at Administrative and operating levels. States and localities should give full recognition to prevailing circumstances, conditions, and resources within their jurisdictions and should operate in accordance with their existing operational plans and procedures.

2. OBJECTIVES

- A. To test State and local reception and care capabilities as to adequacy of present plans, organization, programs, and methods to provide for the basic needs of the surviving population under attack conditions.
- B. To assess postattack welfare needs in terms of shortages and overages in selected survival items on State and local levels.
- C. To provide training in emergency reception and care functions and in the operational concepts required to cope with emergency situations.

3. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

The assumption of widespread damage from enemy attack creates secondary assumptions which must be considered in the welfare play of the exercise.

- A. Losses in existing supplies through attack and the disruption of national production will limit supplies of welfare resources, requiring rationing of stocks on hand. See Annex J.
- B. Logistical welfare support will be denied to certain areas for prescribed periods of radiological hazard.
- C. Existing Federal, State, and local programs of welfare, social security, and other benefits will be disrupted and not immediately available as resources.

- D. Residual radiation will be of sufficient intensity in some localities to deny them as reception areas and/or to require the use of basements of homes or other available "refuge."
- E. The incidence of sickness and injury will be increased many fold over normal times. This will require close coordination with the Health and Medical Services to provide interservice assistance in caring for survivors.

#### 4. ACTIVITIES

##### A. GENERAL

It is the responsibility of government in a civil defense emergency to provide the necessities of life to the homeless and others who are in need, to reunite families and reestablish family life, and to take such rehabilitative measures as are required to enable the surviving population to become adjusted and to make a maximum contribution to the war and recovery efforts.

It is recognized that during the immediate survival period when people are pinned down in the basements of homes or other "refuge" facilities they will generally have to be self-sufficient. As soon as possible provision will have to be made for supplying basic needs for survival. These include (1) billeting in private residences, (2) the operation of mass shelters and/or congregate lodgings, (3) the provision of emergency feeding and clothing, (4) registration and information, (5) financial assistance, (6) care of special groups, (7) morale services, and (8) referrals for civil defense or other emergency employment.

##### B. RADIOLOGICAL

The hazards of radiological fallout pose major problems in the planning and execution of reception and care services, particularly in the immediate survival period. See Annex D for radiological criteria.

##### C. SELECTED SURVIVAL ITEMS

For exercise purposes, the play of welfare resources, including the determination of assistance required over and above resources available, and/or the determination of excess resources, should be restricted to wearing apparel, food, and emergency housing and lodging. For additional information and guidance see Annex J, Appendix I.

March 1, 1958

## OPERATION ALERT 1958

### TRANSPORTATION - ANNEX G

#### 1. GENERAL

The objectives of Phase One of the exercise with respect to transportation are to determine the effectiveness of current emergency transportation plans, assess transportation capabilities in the immediate postattack period, and to identify the actions necessary to improve postattack transportation capacity to serve immediate survival requirements.

#### 2. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

In the immediate postattack period, widespread devastation and the implications of fallout will make it necessary to rely heavily on State and local initiative to meet transportation problems in these isolated areas pending the time it is possible to reconnect and eventually reconstitute national transportation capability. Maximum utilization of remaining local transportation capability to serve civilian survival requirements is a responsibility of State and local governments.

National preattack plans and arrangements have been made with respect to surviving intercity capabilities, including military plans for transportation services under military control. Plans for emergency actions in these areas have been developed in coordination with the Office of Defense Mobilization. These plans include utilization of equipment and facilities owned or operated by the military and national control of certain rail, air, highway, and water transportation equipment and services. During the brief period of the State and local phase of OPAL 58, these actions will be assumed. They will not require actual State and local implementation, but will require State and local cooperation and recognition.

#### 3. OPERATIONS

Subject to the above-cited policies and plans, the direction of local transportation activities will be assumed by State and local governments upon receipt of tactical warning. Transportation activities in local areas will be in accordance with the transportation annex to State and local survival plans. If such annex has not been prepared, for the purpose of OPAL 58, local area operations will be guided by the draft manual entitled "Civil Defense Transportation Organizations and Operation Procedures" dated September 30, 1957.

State and local transportation operations should generally be directed toward:



- A. Acquiring control of local transportation equipment and directing use of that equipment to serve the highest priority transportation requirements--movement of people and supplies, et cetera, as determined by State and local governments. Traffic control and priority systems will need to be implemented to insure that the categories of need are met in the order of their relative urgencies by such measures as rerouting around damaged points, uses of alternate kinds of equipment, and other devices to insure maximum utilization of remaining transportation capability.
- B. Projection of traffic requirements--chiefly involved here is speedy evaluation of the local transportation situation; the remaining transportation capability; the relation of that capability to the projection of transportation demands arising from postattack action programs to bring the local situation under control; and the development of plans and estimates of supplies, materials, manpower, fuel, power, et cetera, required to meet projected postattack transportation requirements. (See Annex J.)
- C. Dealing with the physical effects of attack on local transportation capability--the bridges that are destroyed, the roads that are blocked, the need for reconstitution or establishment of new interconnecting shipping or collection points, supplies needed to operate and salvage damaged equipment. In other words, the transportation logistics and the actions needed to strengthen and improve transportation capacity to meet immediate postattack needs.

#### 4. REPORTS

##### A. Estimate of the Situation Report

A report providing an estimate of the transportation situation as of D plus 2 containing the following information for all modes of transportation should be prepared by each local governmental unit. The State should summarize these reports, supplementing them as required and forward to reach the appropriate FCDA Regional Office by May 31, 1958.

- (1) Condition of facilities; i.e., roadnet, trackage, bridges, tunnels, classification yards, ports and harbors, et cetera.
- (2) Percentage of equipment available by types.
- (3) Estimate of normal service capability remaining following attack.
- (4) Transportation manpower availability.
- (5) Alternate transport facilities available to replace those lost.

March 1, 1958

OPERATION ALERT 1958

\* EXERCISE REPORTING - ANNEX H

1. PREPARATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTS -- GENERAL

Prepared by:

Local Government

\*\* State Government

\*\* FCDA Regional Headquarters

\*\* Lowpoint

Sent to:

State Emergency  
Operation Center

Associated FCDA  
Regional Headquarters

Lowpoint plus other  
Regional Federal  
Agencies

Classified Location,  
other Federal Agencies,  
and to Regional Head-  
quarters where appro-  
priate

\*\* Consolidates and summarizes reports.  
Greenwich "Z" time should be used in  
these reports.

2. ATTACK PHASE, May 6, 1958

A. Warning Period

Times at which States and cities are alerted following the simulated warning will be reported by FCDA attack warning officer to Lowpoint. State Emergency Operations Centers do not forward this information.

Flash Reports of Pre-attack Actions

(1) As soon as possible after warning is received, Flash Reports containing brief statements regarding actions taken, should be prepared and reported.

(2) Local reports are required for the following circumstances:

(a) Decision to evacuate (time.)

\* Limited to attack data and overall situation estimates. For other reports, see Section 4, this Annex.

- (b) Decision not to evacuate (time).
- (c) Evacuation interrupted (time and percent accomplished).
- (d) Evacuation completed (time).
- (e) Take cover (time).

- (3) Regions will consolidate Flash Reports and disseminate to Federal agencies at Regional level. Lowpoint will consolidate all Flash Reports and disseminate to Classified Location and Federal agencies at the National level.

B. Attack Period - May 6, 1958

Flash Reports of Attack

These reports are immediate reports, giving an estimate of Ground Zero location, such as "CHICAGO HIT 1512Z VICINITY LOOP" or "KANSAS CITY HIT 1531Z VICINITY STOCK YARDS."

Attack Data Reports

These reports are supplemental to the Flash Reports, and are sent as soon as additional confirmed information becomes available. They should include:

- (1) Name of city.
- (2) Time of attack.
- (3) Type of burst (air-surface-water).
- (4) Ground Zero (UTM coordinates are preferred; but latitude and longitude acceptable).
- (5) Approximate size of weapon and radius of blast damage.

Revised attack data reports should be forwarded as soon as more precise information becomes available.

C. May 7, 1958

Periodic "Estimate of the Situation" Reports

These reports will summarize the following elements:

- (1) Estimated dead.
- (2) Estimated displaced.
- (3) Estimated injured.

(4) Availability of resources - general deficiencies or excesses.

(5) Major actions taken.

✓ As appropriate, Federal field agencies should prepare reports on the effects of attack on their own situation. These should be transmitted through channels to FCDA regional offices.

Time Schedule

|  |                         |
|--|-------------------------|
| (1) Local to State                     | 9 a.m., e.s.t. (1400Z)  |
| (2) State to Region                    | 12 noon, e.s.t. (1700Z) |
| (3) Region to Lowpoint                 | 3 p.m., e.s.t. (2000Z)  |
| (4) Lowpoint to Classified<br>Location | 6 p.m., e.s.t. (2300Z)  |

3. REQUESTS FOR RESOURCES

Requests for resources will not be transmitted during the Attack Phase of the exercise. Local and State governments are urged to continue to develop resources and requirements data beyond the Attack Phase. These data should be forwarded to FCDA regional offices by May 31, 1958, for use in the Federal Action Phase. See Annex J.

4. OTHER REPORTS

Radiological - Annex D.

Health and Medical Care - Annex E.

Transportation - Annex G.

Resources and Requirements - Annex J.

March 1, 1958

## OPERATION ALERT 1958

### EMERGENCY INFORMATION - ANNEX I

#### 1. GENERAL

The Emergency Information mission of government at all levels is the dissemination of official information and instructions to the people immediately prior to, during, and after attack(s).

Apart from survival instructions, the civilian population must be kept informed of the general situation, what is being done for those in greatest need, and for the survival of the nation.

Cooperation of all information media is essential to the fulfillment of this mission.

#### 2. OBJECTIVES

The exercise objectives are:

- A. To advance the training of information staffs for emergency operations and to simulate public release of survival information.
- B. To estimate in the attack areas what press, radio, and television facilities are available after the attack.
- C. To determine the extent of denial, by fallout, of postattack use of surviving radio and TV transmitters.
- D. To evaluate the available supplementary communications channels, including short wave radio, upon which emergency information could be disseminated until landlines or power sources were restored.
- E. To summarize the deficiencies of personnel and communications facilities in terms of emergency information in order to recommend remedial steps.

#### 3. EMERGENCY INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

- A. Operation Alert 1958 is a nationwide training exercise, which this year assumes even greater significance because of the simultaneous development of Operations Plans in States, Territories, and target areas. This year's training exercise is phased so as to involve the various elements of local, State, and Federal government agencies in intensified evaluation of their respective areas of responsibility in accordance with the assumed attack pattern and realistic fallout assumptions.

- B. CONELRAD radio stations are urged to carry out their training exercises for personnel, whether there is a CONELRAD drill or it is merely simulated. (See Basic Standards, Page 5, Section 8.)
- C. Wire service bureaus; national radio and television networks and daily newspapers, and local broadcast and television stations should be invited to participate in emergency information training, apart from any public information activity which they will undertake for their regular news collection and distribution.
- D. Public information officers of the American National Red Cross will be invited to assign staff representatives to Federal Civil Defense Regional Headquarters for training purposes. State information directors may establish similar arrangements, subject to appropriate contact with State or local Chapter Red Cross Directors.

4. INFORMATION RELEASES ON OPAL 1958

- A. Information Officers should discourage media efforts to inject undue realism into attack simulation, especially in radio, TV, or CONELRAD scripts.
- B. Emphasis should be placed upon positive aspects of the exercise rather than the release of gross casualty totals which cannot be expected to present an accurate picture.
- C. Public participation events, where they demonstrate a logical relationship to the Operational Survival Plans, should be subjected to carefully planned press coverage as a means of explaining the purpose of Operational Survival Planning.
- D. Public Information releases of the general nature of the training exercise and significant local public participation will be handled for media in the usual manner, with as much advance planning with media editors as possible, to insure a full understanding and a clear presentation of the purpose of Operation Alert 1958.

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OPERATION ALERT 1958

ANNEX J

RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS

1. GENERAL

This annex sets forth guidance and standards for determining the adequacy of supplies of things that will be needed to carry out the survival activities. It outlines the procedures and formula for compiling resources and requirements data, including deficiencies and surpluses, and reporting such data through channels.

It is recognized that many localities will not be able to develop completely within the prescribed period the resources and requirements studies described herein. For the most part, the requested reports will have to be prepared on the basis of resources data readily available at State and local levels. Where possible, the time between now and the exercise period should be used to compile additional data required.

2. ACTIVITIES DURING ATTACK PHASE

As soon as conditions permit, supplies of essential survival goods and services will be taken under immediate emergency control by local authorities and distributed on an austerity basis. In the event available supplies are inadequate to meet pressing survival needs, local authorities will determine priorities of use on the basis of local conditions and categories of the population which can make the greatest contribution to survival and recovery of the community.

3. ACTIVITIES AFTER ATTACK PHASE

Information generated during the attack phase, and further developed after May 7, should be forwarded by the States to the respective FCDA Regional Offices no later than May 31. These data will then be summarized at Regional and Federal levels to identify and measure the size of total national deficiencies of resources essential for human survival. This will provide the basis in the final evaluation phase for assessing the consequences and considering actions that might have been taken to make up supply deficiencies that are disclosed during the operation.

The following guidelines are provided to assure uniform treatment and development of data on survival resources at local and

State levels, and thus provide a statistical basis for regional and national evaluation of the situation during succeeding phases.

- A. Estimates of requirements and surviving available supplies should be projected from your attack situation for a D plus 30 period and a D plus 90 period. The 30 day projection should reflect the most urgent specific needs in minimum amounts. A separate projection for D plus 90 should reflect the longer term requirements. Reporting guidance for resources and requirements is outlined in the attachments to this Annex.
- B. Resources and requirements estimates should be based on the needs of the surviving population of the reporting government unit (town, city, or county, and as summarized and supplemented by the State,) and of any displaced people from other areas who will require refuge and care in the reporting government unit during the first 30 days and the first 90 days.
- C. The reports as of D plus 30 and of D plus 90 should take into consideration:
  - (1) All essential supplies within the boundaries of the reporting government unit which are estimated as still being available for use;
  - (2) Estimates of supplies in areas interdicted by radioactive fallout as such supplies become available and safe for use during the first 30 days and the first 90 days.

#### 4. FURTHER GUIDANCE

More specific procedures and guidelines for the various resources and requirements areas are attached as appendices as follows:

##### Appendix I

##### Civilian Requirements

|              |                               |
|--------------|-------------------------------|
| Attachment 1 | Health and Medical            |
| Attachment 2 | Food                          |
| Attachment 3 | Wearing Apparel               |
| Attachment 4 | Light, Power and Fuels        |
| Attachment 5 | Emergency Housing and Lodging |
| Attachment 6 | Engineering and Construction  |

##### Appendix II

##### Distribution Controls



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OPERATION ALERT 1958

ANNEX J - APPENDIX I

CIVILIAN REQUIREMENTS

1. GENERAL

The objective of this appendix is to standardize the determination of civilian resource requirements by establishing selected items, standard terms, units of measure, and format for reflecting the computations.

The estimates of resources and their utilization should be restricted to the following survival categories:

1. Health and Medical Supplies and Equipment
2. Food
3. Wearing Apparel
4. Light, Power and Fuels
5. Emergency Housing and Lodging
6. Engineering and Construction Equipment and Supplies

Resource data with respect to these categories should be developed prior to the exercise for assessment during the attack phase, in view of the short time prescribed for the performance of the exercise.

2. ESTABLISHMENT OF STANDARDS FOR SURVIVAL CATEGORIES

Units of measure, guidance and standards for determining requirements and supply estimates for each item are included in the category attachments to this appendix of the Annex.

Each local government unit participating in Operation Alert 1958 should, based on estimates of the size and condition of the surviving population and other pertinent factors within its boundaries, develop and report resources and requirements information (to be summarized and supplemented by the State) as follows:

1. Determine the minimum quantities of specified resources needed to preserve and maintain the life of the surviving civilian population during the first 30 days and also the first 90 days after D-day. Conversion factors for this purpose are set forth in the attachments; for example -- iodine tablets, 1000 fifty tablet bottles per 1000 survivors.
2. Estimate supplies available for use for survival purposes. The attachments provide guidance on the kinds of inventories and probable sources of supply

to be reported for the purposes of this exercise.

3. Determine deficiencies or surpluses in the estimated supplies needed to meet survival requirements during the first 30 days and the first 90 days after D-day.
4. Report supply deficiencies or surpluses to the next higher echelon.
5. That part of the estimated surviving population in areas denied by radioactive fallout who can be expected to survive and who can be reached within the first 30 days and the first 90 days will be considered in estimating survival requirements.
6. Supplies in denied areas which can be salvaged and decontaminated for human use during the first 30 days and the first 90 days after D-day will be included in estimating available supplies.

### 3. STANDARD FORMAT

It is requested that a standard format be used for reporting requirements and supply data in each of the indicated categories. The specific conversion factors and guidance indicated in each of the category attachments will be used to insure uniformity in reporting.

The standard format for reporting Resources and Requirements data for each item is as follows:

#### Column

- (1. Name of Item
- (2. Standard unit of measure for the item
- (3. Standard conversion factor for D plus 30 days
- (4. Standard conversion factor for D plus 90 days
- (5. Gross requirements for D plus 30 days (gross requirements are computed by using appropriate conversion factors, Col. 3, in conjunction with estimated casualties, estimated non-casualties or work to be done, etc.)
- (6. Gross requirements for D plus 90 days (use same computation methods used in Col. 5.)
- (7. Available Supply (of Item - Col. 1) for D plus 30
- (8. Available Supply (of Item - Col. 1) for D plus 90

(9. \*Overages and shortages D plus 30 days

(10. \*Overages and shortages D plus 90 days

\*Overages and Shortages. Indicate average by plus (+) sign preceding figure, and shortage by minus ( - ) sign preceding figure.

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OPERATION ALERT 1958

ANNEX J - APPENDIX I

ATTACHMENT 1 - Health and Medical Supplies and Equipment

The list of selected survival items and radiological instruments shown herein are those which should be considered in deficiency reporting from local to State and Region, and which should be used subsequently in developing data for later phases of the exercise. In the interests of manageability, this list of items has been selected as representative of the types of items essential for survival and is not intended to cover the total list of essential survival items.

Total requirements for each listed item should be estimated from population and casualty data by use of the conversion factors shown. These factors are intended for use in this exercise only.

Total resources available should be determined by totaling the supplies of the items available for use during the 30 day and 90 day periods following D-day. Due allowance should be made for the non-availability of such remaining supplies as are interdicted by fallout. Supply sources should include FCDA stockpile material as allocated by the national and regional offices of FCDA; other Federal stockpiles as may be made available; State and local civil defense stockpiles; producer and manufacturer inventories; wholesaler inventories; retail trade inventories; hospital, nursing home and other institutional inventories; and private inventories in the possession of professional medical personnel. See Annex E, Section 3.A., FCDA Medical Stockpiles.

Anticipated deficits or surpluses during the 30 day or 90 day periods should be determined from the differences between estimated requirements and estimated available supplies.

| SELECTED SURVIVAL<br>ITEMS  | UNIT OF<br>MEASURE                 | REQUIREMENTS CONVERSION<br>FACTORS     |                                |  |                                |
|---|------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
|   |                                    | D plus 30 days                         |                                | D plus 90 days                         |                                |
|   |                                    | Per<br>1000<br>Surviving<br>Casualties | Per<br>1000 Non-<br>Casualties | Per<br>1000<br>Surviving<br>Casualties | Per<br>1000 Non-<br>Casualties |
| 1. Penicillin, for all forms  | 1 million<br>USP Units             | 1632                                   | 150                            | 1913                                   | 450                            |
| 2. Broad Spectrum Anti-<br>biotics (tetracycline,<br>chloramphenicol, chlor-<br>tetracycline, oxtetra-<br>cycline), all forms | Gram                               | 3015                                   | 133                            | 3534                                   | 400                            |
| 3. Morphine and substitutes<br>(including all opium<br>derivatives and synthetic<br>narcotics)                                | 1/4 grain<br>dose or<br>equivalent | 4393                                   | 140                            | 5150                                   | 419                            |
| 4. Blood Derivatives<br>(plasma, 500 cc. or<br>albumin, 25 Gr.)   | Bottle                             | 461                                    | 0.08                           | 540                                    | 0.23                           |
| 5. Plasma Volume Expanders,<br>500 cc. (dextran or PVP)   | Bottle                             | 1267                                   | 0.22                           | 1485                                   | 0.65                           |
| 6. Blood Collecting Bottles   | Bottle                             | 1877                                   | 3.3                            | 2200                                   | 10                             |
| 7. Tetanus Antitoxin,<br>(prophylactic or therapeutic)  | Antitoxic unit                     | 8,540,000                              | 3800                           | 10,000,000                             | 10,000                         |
| 8. Tetanus Toxoid, (alum<br>precipitated)   | cc.                                | 0                                      | 1500                           | 0                                      | 1500                           |
| 9. Smallpox Vaccine (1 dose)  | Tube                               | 80                                     | 80                             | 1000                                   | 1000                           |
| 10. Pads, Gauze, all sizes  | Each                               | 5,800,000                              | 1400                           | 6,800,000                              | 4100                           |
| 11. Needles, Hypodermic, all<br>sizes (reusable)  | Each                               | 1305                                   | 43                             | 1530                                   | 130                            |
| 12. Syringes, Hypodermic,<br>all sizes, (reusable)  | Each                               | 235                                    | 6                              | 275                                    | 19                             |

| SELECTED SURVIVAL<br>ITEMS                 | UNIT OF<br>MEASURE | REQUIREMENTS CONVERSION<br>FACTORS     |                                |  |                                |
|--|--------------------|--|--------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
|  |                    | D plus 30 days                         |                                | D plus 90 days                         |                                |
|  |                    | Per<br>1000<br>Surviving<br>Casualties | Per<br>1000 Non-<br>Casualties | Per<br>1000<br>Surviving<br>Casualties | Per<br>1000 Non-<br>Casualties |
| 13. Digitalis and Derivatives<br>all forms | USP Unit           | 333                                    | 333                            | 1000                                   | 1000                           |
| 14. Insulin, all types                     | USP Unit           | 10,000                                 | 10,000                         | 30,000                                 | 30,000                         |

| RADIOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS  | UNIT OF<br>MEASURE | CONVERSION FACTORS                                   |   |
|---|--------------------|--|---|
|   |                    | D plus 30 days<br>per 1000 pre-<br>attack population | D plus 90 days,<br>per 1000 pre-<br>attack population |
| 1. Survey meter, Geiger counter,<br>probe type, beta-gamma, dis-<br>criminating, 0-50 mr./hr. (CD<br>V-700) | each               | 2  | 2   |
| 2. Survey meter, gamma only,<br>0-50 mr./hr. (CD V-710)   | each               | 10   | 10  |
| 3. Survey meter, beta-gamma<br>discriminating, 0-500 mr./<br>hr. (CD V-720)                                 | each               | 2  | 2   |
| 4. Dosimeter, self-reading,<br>gamma only, 0-20 r. (CD<br>V-730)  | each               | 43   | 43  |
| 5. Dosimeter, self-reading,<br>gamma only, 0-100 r.<br>(CD V-740)   | each               | 43   | 43  |
| 6. Dosimeter charger, portable,<br>battery operated (CD V-750)  | each               | 10   | 10  |

## Page of

**Dated:** \_\_\_\_\_

30 Days

90 Days

No. Dead \_\_\_\_\_

### HEALTH AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

No. Injured \_\_\_\_\_

Region, State or Area Reporting \_\_\_\_\_

No. Noncasualties                     

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OPERATION ALERT 1958

ANNEX J - APPENDIX I

ATTACHMENT 2 - FOOD

During the initial period following attack, food is one of the most critical resources needed for human survival. It is important, therefore, that immediate action is taken to determine requirements and available supplies of food to provide dietary needs of the surviving population.

Following is a brief discussion together with standards and guidelines for:

1. Determining requirements of food to feed the surviving population;
2. Estimating surviving food supplies that will be available for this purpose;
3. Determining surplus food supplies that can be released for use in other areas and;
4. Determining deficits in available supplies that must be made up from surplus food stocks of other areas.

A. Food Requirements

The essentiality of food for survival cannot be determined in specific amounts of particular items of food. No single item with the exception of milk for small children, can be classed as essential by itself. At the outset, caloric content rather than variety of food is the essential factor. Thereafter a satisfactory daily diet should include at least one item from the six main food classes listed below.

Within this general framework almost unlimited substitution, in accordance with available supplies, is acceptable nutritionally. To the extent, however, that certain segments of the population require special foods or diets they should be accommodated wherever available supplies permit. For example, if milk supplies are limited, preference should be given to children under two years of age, pregnant and nursing women. Special food preparations where possible should be reserved for people such as diabetics who require special diets.



The six main food classes are:

1. Meat group - protein foods
  - a. beef, veal, pork, mutton and lamb.
  - b. poultry, eggs, fish
  - c. dry beans and peas
2. Milk group - all forms.
  - a. fresh
  - b. dried, non-fat, cheese
  - c. evaporated
3. Flour and cereals
4. Fruit and Vegetable group
  - a. dried and concentrated
  - b. fruits, fresh, canned and frozen
  - c. vegetables, fresh, canned and frozen
  - d. potatoes, white and sweet
5. Food Fats and Oils group
  - a. butter and margarine
  - b. lard, shortening, salad and cooking oils, salad dressing, etc.
6. Sugar and Sweets group
  - a. sugar, all types
  - b. sirup, molasses, honey and fruit spreads, etc.

Requirements should be estimated in terms of the man-days of food required to feed the surviving population at 2200 calories per day. Two estimates will be made (1) for the first 30 days following the attack, and (2) for the first 90 days following the attack. This is accomplished by simply multiplying the number of persons that require feeding (in the reporting area--town, city, or county summarized and supplemented by the State) by 30 and 90 to determine total man days of food that will be needed for the respective periods. In projecting food requirements persons evacuated from other areas and who will reside in the reporting area should be included in man-day food requirements. These calculations should take into consideration the estimated time certain of the population would be pinned down by fallout and are thus inaccessible. For these people requirements should be estimated from the time when supplies can be provided to them until the end of the 30 and 90 day periods.

## B. Food Supplies

Food supplies include stocks of food in the following inventory categories which have not been destroyed and are accessible and which can be provided for use by the surviving population during the periods of D plus 30 days and D plus 90 days respectively.

1. Home food supplies
2. Retail grocers and restaurants.
3. Schools and public institutions.
4. Wholesalers
5. Refrigerated warehouses
6. Dry storage warehouses
7. Frozen food locker plants
8. Food processors
9. Food assembly points (Public stockyards, auction markets, egg assembly points, milk collecting points, etc.)
10. Food stocks on farms (except stocks in farm homes)
11. Food in transit but within the area (railroad cars, trucks, etc)

Inventories of food in available home supplies are estimated as follows on the basis of the pre-attack population.

| <u>Type of Home</u> | <u>Assumed Per-Person Food Supply</u><br>(number of days) |
|---------------------|---|
| Urban-Apartment     | 4   |
| Urban-House         | 7   |
| Suburban House      | 10  |
| Rural Nonfarm House | 15  |
| Farm House          | 25  |

(The above standards are for use in OPAL - 58 only)

Food supplies available in other inventory categories are estimated in terms of pounds of consumable food in the main food classes and categories listed in Section A (Food Requirements).

Baked goods in bakeries are estimated as one-man day of food supply per capita of the pre-attack population. Flour and other raw materials in bakeries on D-Day should be reported as food processor inventories.

In addition to available food inventories, food supplies include food that can be produced and made available for human use during the D-Day plus 30 and D-Day plus 90 day periods. This will include consumable food that can be processed from raw food supplies on hand in the area as well as consumable foods that can be produced and supplied directly by farms in the reporting area. This should include consumable meat equivalent of livestock in the area except dairy cows and breeding stock.

Food available from inventories and from new production expressed in pounds is converted to man-days of food at a daily diet level of 2200 calories by use of the ratios listed in the attached reporting format.

Estimates should include stocks of consumable food that will become available as radiation levels decline. Estimates will also include supplies that can be obtained from farm production and food processing facilities that will be able to resume operations.

Much of the supply information called for can be obtained from U. S. Department of Agriculture staffs in the reporting area. This applies particularly to the County and State Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Committees.

#### C. Food Surpluses and Deficits

Food surpluses and deficits are determined by comparing man-days of food required with available man-days of food supplies.

The attached summary and reporting format illustrates the process to be followed and the data to be furnished for each of the D plus 30 day and D plus 90 day periods.

RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS DATA

FOOD

| Major Food Categories<br>and Items                                   | Man Day<br>Conversion<br>Factors |
|--|----------------------------------|
| 1. Meat group-protein<br>foods                                       |                                  |
| a. beef, veal, pork,<br>mutton and lamb                              | .51                              |
| b. Processed meat<br>products  | .51                              |
| c. poultry, eggs, fish   | .30                              |
| d. dry beans and peas  | .73                              |
| 2. Milk group - all forms  |                                  |
| a. fresh   | .14                              |
| b. dried, non-fat, cheese  | .77                              |
| c. evaporated  | .28                              |
| 3. Flour and cereals   | .77                              |
| 4. Fruit and Vegetable group   |                                  |
| a. dried and concentrated  | .45                              |
| b. fruits, fresh, canned<br>and frozen                               | .11                              |
| c. vegetables, fresh, canned<br>and frozen                           | .06                              |
| d. potatoes, white and sweet   | .14                              |
| 5. Food Fats and Oils group  |                                  |
| a. butter and margarine  | 1.48                             |
| b. lard, shortening, salad and<br>cooking oils, salad dressing, etc. | 1.84                             |
| 6. Sugar and Sweets group  |                                  |
| a. sugar, all types  | .79                              |
| b. sirup, molasses, honey and<br>fruit spreads, etc.                 | .43                              |

RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS DATA - OPERATION ALERT 1958

Page      of     

Dated:           

Total Survivors D day                     

Food (Annex J Appendix I Att. 2)

Region, State or Area Reporting                                     

| Major Food Categories<br>and Items | Available in<br>Inventories<br>on D-Day<br>(lbs) | Food Supply Available<br>D Plus 30 Day<br>Period<br>(lbs) | Food Supply Available<br>D Plus 90 Day<br>Period<br>(lbs) | Man-Day<br>Conversion<br>Factors | Man-Days of Food<br>Available for<br>D/30 Day<br>Period | Man-Days of Food<br>Available for<br>D/90 Day<br>Period |
|------------------------------------|--|---|---|----------------------------------|---|---|
|------------------------------------|--|---|---|----------------------------------|---|---|

RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS DATA - OPERATION ALERT 1958

Page \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_

Dated: \_\_\_\_\_

FOOD - SUMMARY (last page of report)

Man-day food supplies available in home inventories

(Use home food supply standards shown in Section B) \_\_\_\_\_

Man-day food supplies in bakeries (use 1 man-day

per capita of the preattack population) \_\_\_\_\_

Total Man-days of Food Supply \_\_\_\_\_ 30 days 90 days

Man-day Food Requirements:

(No. of Survivors times 30

or 90 according to proper column) \_\_\_\_\_

Food Supply Surplus or Deficit:

(Total Food Supply minus man-day food requirements

for 30 days or 90 days according to proper column) \_\_\_\_\_

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ANNEX J - APPENDIX I

Attachment 3 - Wearing Apparel

The survival items covered under the category of wearing apparel reflects austerity requirements to insure maintenance of minimum health, safety, and morale. The per capita requirements indicated by conversion factors are in addition to clothing people would be wearing.

In the immediate postattack period and for a minimum period of 90 days following an attack, it may be assumed that very little if any clothing will be available from new production. Therefore, requirements for clothing must be satisfied from existing stocks in manufacturer and wholesale inventories and in distribution outlets, department stores, dry goods stores, and private homes in reception areas.

Requirements for the purpose of this exercise will be reported on the following category of items:

1. Gloves - all types, including mittens.
2. Shoes - footwear of all types, including rubber waterproof boots and overshoes.
3. Head covering - headwear of all types, including cloth, waterproof, knit headscarves.
4. Outerwear - (in following units) -- Men and Boys: a suit, or work coat with 1 pr. pants, 3 shirts, and an overcoat.  
Women and Girls: a suit, or jacket with 1 pr. slacks or jeans, a dress or a skirt with blouse, and 3 blouses or sweaters.  
Infants: a sleep-play suit or a knit outer garment, and a coat and legging set.
5. Rain coats - waterproof outer garments of all types, including mackinaws.
6. Socks, stockings - all types.

The main considerations should be warmth and occupational requirements, without an attempt to satisfy personal taste. Generally, clothing needs will be generated by the need for protection against exposure from the elements and from radiological contamination, occupational changes, displacements of populations, restoration of productivity, etc.

Requirements should be developed in accordance with conversion factors listed herein, which should be applied on a per capita basis. Variations in these factors may be necessary to meet special situations (e.g., cold weather) in certain areas.

These factors should not be used in connection with the issuance or distribution of clothing to individuals and families. They are designed specifically for use in determining requirements, where stockpiles and existing commercial inventories are being depleted as a result of clothing issued for replacement purposes due to wear, contamination, supplemental issues, etc., to safeguard health and to maintain morale.

Some items would, of course, not be required for every individual. The conversion factor for gloves, for example, is based primarily on the needs of workers performing physical labor. For certain other items, such as overshoes and outerwear, conversion factors are based in part on the need for protecting the clothing of individuals whose activities require them to spend some time in areas where radioactive dust from fallout is present.

|                                    | <u>Unit of Measure</u> | <u>Conversion Factors</u> |                  |
|------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|
|                                    |                        | <u>D plus 30</u>          | <u>D plus 90</u> |
| 1. Gloves                          | doz/pr                 | 0.05                      | 0.09             |
| 2. Shoes                           | doz/pr                 | 0.06                      | 0.07             |
| 3. Head covering                   | dozen                  | 0.05                      | 0.06             |
| 4. Outerwear                       | doz/unit               | 0.06                      | 0.07             |
| 5. Rain coats                      | dozen                  | 0.05                      | 0.06             |
| 6. Socks, stockings -<br>all types | doz/pr                 | 0.16                      | 0.17             |



RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS DATA - OPERATION ALERT 1958

Page \_\_\_ of \_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

WEARING APPAREL

Region, State or Area Reporting \_\_\_\_\_

No. Dead \_\_\_\_\_  
 No. Injured \_\_\_\_\_  
 No. Noncasualties \_\_\_\_\_

30 Days

90 Days

| Identity<br>of Item | Standard Unit<br>of Measure | Standard Conversion Factors |             | Gross Requirements |             | Available Supply |      | Overages and Shortages |      |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------|------|------------------------|------|
|                     |                             | 1st 30 days                 | 1st 90 days | 1st 30 days        | 1st 90 days | D/30             | D/90 | D/30                   | D/90 |

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ANNEX J - APPENDIX 1

Attachment 4 - Light, Power and Fuels

1. Basic Considerations Related to Light and Electric Power

Due, for the most part, to heavy damage to transmission and distribution lines and substations in bombed cities, sufficient electric power will not be immediately available in the majority of the fringe areas and reception centers. Most acute need for power in such areas will be for refrigeration, mass feeding centers, and the operation of hospitals, community water systems, and controls on existing heating systems which, without electric power, would be inoperable. Small portable generators available at time of attack could meet only a fraction of these needs.

During the time required to construct transmission and distribution facilities to serve reception areas, and to restore segments of damaged systems where necessary to get power to such areas, there will be great need for battery-powered flashlights and lamps and non-electric lighting equipment, including such items as candles and gasoline and kerosene lamps and lanterns. Need for items of these kinds will continue in these areas even after the minimum lighting envisaged in the initial power installations is available. Adequate supplies of such items in contiguous support areas also would be desirable, since there is probability of breaks in power service due to upset of normal system operation.

In the immediate postattack period, efforts of the electric utilities will be concentrated on emergency-type construction of transmission and distribution lines and where necessary the installation of movable generators - of the "packaged" variety - if such units are available. Materials, tools, and equipment to do this job must be provided. Stocks of such items normally carried by utilities, although adequate for restorations in natural disaster, would not be equal to the excessive demands of the postattack situation. New supply will be needed.

2. Basic Considerations Related to Fuels

Of all the fuels, motor fuels are the most universally used throughout the Nation, regardless of season. Therefore, even though movement of the mass of civilian passenger automobiles will be strictly limited following evacuation of cities, the availability of motor fuels for uses essential to human survival will be of widespread and urgent concern in the immediate postattack period. Among such uses will be the operations of trucks, diesel locomotives, water transport, aircraft, tractors and other farm equipment needed for

food production, and a host of engines required for water supply, sanitary disposal systems, and hospitals.

The civilian requirements for fuels in the postattack period will be much smaller than preattack requirements, since millions of fuel consuming units - particularly residences, commercial buildings, electric power generating plants, and factories - will have disappeared in the bombing. Priority will be given to the supplying of fuel for human survival, including transportation, electric power, and food production essential to both. Refinery yields will be adjusted to fit the pattern of needs for particular petroleum products at the season of the attack. Nevertheless, due mainly to transportation difficulties, severe, localized shortages of one fuel or another from time to time during several months following the attack should be anticipated. These will call for endurance by affected communities, maximum conservation of motor fuels, perhaps a return to relatively primitive methods of cooking and heating, and ingenuity on the part of the fuel industries and government to alleviate the shortages.

### 3. Conversion Factors

#### a. ELECTRICITY FOR LIGHT AND POWER

The following factors reflect an austerity basis for applying or converting light, power, and fuel use into gross and net requirements. These factors will apply only for the purposes of this exercise. The units of measure will be determined by applying the consumption allowances indicated for each category of fuel.

0.48 Kilowatt per capita per day, for consumption for basic survival purposes, or

1.0 Kilowatt per capita per day for consumption and industrial production when industrial production capabilities have been established.

The computations for electric power should indicate, at the local and State levels, the requirements for need and assistance. This calculation should not reflect surplus-deficit balances. The reconciliation of requirements and assets to determine deficits will be made at the FCDA Regional level in coordination with the Department of Interior area directors.

#### b. FUEL

The following factors reflect the austere use of fuel products. They are indicated as guides for the application of those fuels as to use.

| <u>COAL*</u><br>(per capita, per day) | <u>Unit of Measure</u> | <u>Conversion Factor</u> |                  |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|
|                                       |                        | <u>D plus 30</u>         | <u>D plus 90</u> |
| Cooking                               | lbs.                   | 1.5                      | 1.5              |
| Space and water heating               | lbs.                   | 3                        | 3                |

GASOLINE AND/OR DIESEL FUEL  
(per unit, per day)

|                                 |       |      |      |
|---------------------------------|-------|------|------|
| Passenger Cars                  | gals. | .5   | .7   |
| Busses                          | gals. | 20.0 | 25.0 |
| Trucks, Light (under 1 ton)     | gals. | 4.0  | 4.0  |
| Trucks, Heavy (over 1 ton)      | gals. | 20.0 | 40.0 |
| Farm Equipment                  | gals. | 15.0 | 15.0 |
| Other (Pumps, generators, etc.) | gals. | 2.0  | 3.0  |

KEROSENE  
(per unit, per day)

|                         |       |     |     |
|-------------------------|-------|-----|-----|
| Stoves or heating units | gals. | 1.0 | 1.0 |
|-------------------------|-------|-----|-----|

|   |       |    |    |
|---|-------|----|----|
| <u>LUBRICANTS</u><br>(per vehicle, per day) | gals. | 0. | .4 |
|---|-------|----|----|

LIQUIFIED PETROLEUM GAS\*  
(per capita per day)

|                     |      |    |    |
|---------------------|------|----|----|
| Cooking and heating | lbs. | .2 | .2 |
|---------------------|------|----|----|

C. General Limitations Regarding Use of Factors

The above factors do not provide gasoline for vehicles in process of evacuation during the alert period. It is assumed that such requirements will be provided from gasoline already in the tanks of the vehicles and in sufficient quantities to allow transportation to the reception centers.

The use of fuels as expressed by the foregoing conversion factors is not to be construed as representative of any planned rationing systems.

\*To be computed only for areas where this fuel is in common use.

The use of fuels as prescribed will be limited to those civil defense activities essential to survival. Since the computation of gasoline and diesel oil requirements is indicated on a per-vehicle basis, obviously all such surviving vehicles will not be authorized for civil defense operations. Hence, the basic allowances will allow flexibility of use for a lesser number as necessary and as directed.

It will be recognized that many other uses for fuel will be required, such as railroads, generating plants, water and power systems, sea going vessels, etc. However, due to the wide diversification of these types and uses, these needs should not be considered as a part of this exercise.

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No. Survivors

30 days

90 days

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

LIGHT, POWER AND FUEL

Region, State or Area Reporting \_\_\_\_\_

| Identity<br>of Item | Standard Unit<br>of Measure | Standard Conversion Factors |             | Gross Requirements |             | Available Supply |      | Overages & Shortages |      |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------|------|----------------------|------|
|                     |                             | 1st 30 days                 | 1st 90 days | 1st 30 days        | 1st 90 days | D/30             | D/90 | D/30                 | D/90 |

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OPERATION ALERT 1958

ANNEX J - APPENDIX I

ATTACHMENT 5 - EMERGENCY HOUSING AND LODGING

The large number of evacuees and displaced persons requiring housing and lodging as a result of dwellings destroyed, severely damaged, or otherwise denied, will require maximum utilization of all available space in existing residential structures, (dwellings, hotels, motels, house trailers, garages, etc.) including suitable non-residential structures and other usable space in structures and other facilities under construction. Military facilities suitable for lodging, where in excess of military demand, may be made available for civilian use.

There will be a necessity for increasing the supply of housing resources on a temporary basis in order to furnish housing for the balance of the displaced persons existing after maximum utilization of all suitable space indicated above. Temporary housing would include such items as tents, trailers, prefab houses, and emergency barrack type structures. In later periods, utilization of suitable dwelling space in damaged residential and congregate space in non-residential structures will be made through emergency repairs to make structures habitable. Necessary construction will be geared to relief, not recovery. (See Attachment 6, Section 3, to this Appendix.)

Total assignable space available, and indicated overages or shortages in space capacities are evident only after full utilization of all existing housing resources. Such data should be computed by using the conversion factors given below. These factors reflect space in terms of numbers of persons requiring housing or who can be given emergency lodging in existing housing and other usable facilities.

| <u>Item</u>      | <u>Conversion Factor</u> |
|------------------|--------------------------|
| Dwelling Room    | 2 person per room        |
| or               | or                       |
| Congregate space | 1 person per 40 sq. ft.  |

Deficits evident after full utilization of all suitable space in existing housing resources should be reflected by using the following conversion factors:

| Item                             | Unit of Measure | Conversion Factor<br>(per 10M displaced<br>persons requiring housing) |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|---|
| Tents                            | each            | 894   |
| or                               |                 | or  |
| Prefab Houses                    | each            | 834   |
| or                               |                 | or  |
| Emergency Barrack<br>type houses | each            | 625   |
| or                               |                 |   |
| Trailers                         | each            | 2085  |

Each of the above conversion factors will independently provide emergency housing for 10,000 persons. Each of the four types of emergency housing should be considered in estimating total requirements. The attached standard format should be used on each operational level for reporting purposes.

Requirements for materials to provide for repair or construction of emergency housing should be reported in accordance with instructions in Attachment 6, Section 3, of this Appendix.



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RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS DATA - OPERATIONS ALERT 1958

Date:                     

EMERGENCY HOUSING AND LODGING

Region, State or Area Reporting                                     

Consistent with conversion factors,  
                     available undamaged dwellings will house                      people  
                     repairable damaged dwellings will house                      "  
                     Sq Ft usable congregate space available to housing                      "  
Total capabilities above will house and lodge                      "  
Total number of survivors, including evacuees based on above                      "  
Housing and lodging Overages (+) or Shortages (-) for                      "

| Identity<br>of Item | Standard Unit<br>of Measure | Standard Conversion Factor |             | Gross Requirements |             | Available Supply |      | Overages & Short |      |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------|------|------------------|------|
|                     |                             | 1st 30 days                | 1st 90 days | 1st 30 days        | 1st 90 days | D/30             | D/90 | D/30             | D/90 |

March 1, 1958

OPERATION ALERT 1958

ANNEX J - APPENDIX I

ATTACHMENT 6 - ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

In all emergency construction, maximum conservation of materials will be practiced. In temporary, emergency-type installations, normal standards of construction will be sacrificed, where necessary because of shortages of material, to any extent consistent with minimum tolerable limits of safety to the public.

When decay of radioactive fallout permits, salvage of usable materials and equipment in areas fringing bombed cities will be undertaken. Materials in undamaged areas, not required where they are, will be used to provide material for areas of need. Construction will be confined to relief and not for restoration. Primary consideration will be given to water supply and sanitation.

For the purpose of this exercise, FCDA emergency stocks of engineering equipment and supplies located in each Region are 100 percent under the control of the Regional Administrator. Regions will make a pre-exercise allocation of the stockpile items under their control to the States within their Region on the basis of target area population, using the current FCDA stockpile status report of inventories. The stockpile items allocated to the States will be considered as a part of the State resources in the play of the exercise.

1. WATER

Should the normal source of water supply be reduced, cut off, or made unsafe for human consumption and use, full utilization must be made of all available auxiliary water supplies while awaiting completion of temporary repairs. Portable power generating and pumping units, lightweight pipe, and water purification and chlorinating units, must be placed in service wherever required. Individual use of chemicals for water purification purposes should be practiced as required.

Available inter-connections between the water systems of adjacent municipalities should be used to the extent possible. If inter-connections are small and do not provide sufficient gravity flow, auxiliary pumping plants should be put into operation to increase the flow.

The requirement for water, other than for decontamination and fire-fighting activities, should be established on the basis of:

- 1 gal. per day per person (non-casualties)
- 5 gal. per day per person (casualties)

Water supply system will be used as the unit of measure of reporting deficits of water requirements. The system described below, which will furnish 7,700 gallons of water per minute, will supply needs for 110,000 people. Requirements for smaller numbers of people will be adjusted accordingly.

Following is a representative list of items comprising such a water supply system:

A. Steel Pipe and Fittings, (for 10 mile range of operation)

8" pipe - 10 miles (2,640 lengths, 20 ft. ea.).  
8" couplings - 2,775 (including 5,610 bolt and nut sets).  
8" rubber gaskets - 2,875.  
8" pipe caps - 30.  
8" x 8" x 8" tees - 15.  
8" x 8" x 4" reducing tees - 90.  
4" couplings - 90 (including 200 bolt and nut sets).  
4" rubber gaskets - 90.  
8" gate valves - 15.  
4" gate valves - 90.  
1,500 g.p.m. engine-driven pumps - 5 (including 1 suction strainer, 2 lengths rubber suction hose, and 1 length rubber discharge hose per pump).  
Metal protective coating and/or lubricant - 4 drums, 100 lb. ea.  
Tool boxes with tools - 15.  
Double socket speed wrenches - 20.

B. Water Purification and Storage Units:

100 g.p.m. water purifiers - 2.  
100 g.p.m. engine-driven pumps - 2.  
3,000 gal. rubber-coated nylon water storage tanks - 4.

C. Water Chlorinators:

Mobile water chlorinators - 1 (capacity - 200 to 300 lb. chlorine per 24 hours).

D. Generators and Power Cable:

40 kw. generators - 2 (including 4 lengths single conductor #2, A.W.G. 600 v. rubber-covered cable, 100 ft. ea. per generator).  
30 kw. generators - 2 (including 4 lengths single conductor #4, A.W.G. 600 v. rubber-covered cable, 100 ft. ea. per generator).  
15 kw. generators - 2 (including 4 lengths, single conductor #8 A.W.G. 600 v. rubber-covered cable, 100 ft. ea. per generator).  
5 kw. generators - 2 (including 3 lengths, single conductor #8, A.W.G. 600 v. rubber-covered cable, 100 ft. ea. per generator).

E. Battery Chargers:

18-cell, trickle type - 3.

2. SANITATION

Resources and requirements for items for sanitation should be reported on the following basis:

Heavy Equipment:

|            |     |                     |
|------------|-----|---------------------|
| Bulldozers | ea. | 1 per 5 m survivors |
|------------|-----|---------------------|

Protective Items:

|  |     |                     |
|--|-----|---------------------|
| Low-range Survey Meter<br>(Geiger Counter) | ea. | 2 per 5 m survivors |
|--|-----|---------------------|

Water Supply Material:

Disinfection Chemicals

|                                      |                                    |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| High-test hypochlorites<br>(70%) HDH | 80 lbs. HDH per million gals water |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|

|  |                                      |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| Iodine Tablets,<br>50 tablets per bottle | bottle 1 m bottles per 1 m survivors |
|--|--------------------------------------|

Insect and Rodent Control:

Insecticides

|   |      |                                |
|---|------|--------------------------------|
| DDT Technical grade,<br>powder and emulsifiable<br>concentrates | lbs. | 250 lbs. per 25 m<br>survivors |
|---|------|--------------------------------|

Rodenticides

|  |      |                                |
|--|------|--------------------------------|
| Anti-coagulant type,<br>5/10, commercial grade | lbs. | 200 lbs. per 25 m<br>survivors |
|--|------|--------------------------------|

Equipment

|  |     |                     |
|--|-----|---------------------|
| Hand dusters, plunger<br>type, 3-5 lbs. cap. | ea. | 1 per 1 m survivors |
|--|-----|---------------------|

|   |     |                      |
|---|-----|----------------------|
| Hand sprayers, compression<br>type, 3-5 gal. cap. | ea. | 1 per 15 m survivors |
|---|-----|----------------------|

3. EMERGENCY HOUSING

In determining requirements for construction of emergency barrack type houses, the following materials and equipment, based on each

10,000 persons to be housed, should be applied. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive. It contains selected items to be used for exercise purposes only.

A. Construction Supplies

| Item   | Unit of Measure          | Conversion Factor<br>(per 10m unhoused<br>persons) |
|--|--------------------------|--|
| Lumber   | Thousand Board Feet      | 10,500   |
| Flooring   | Thousand Board Feet      | 2,040  |
| Doors  | Each                     | 3,600  |
| Windows  | Each                     | 7,200  |
| Wall Board   | Thousand sq. ft.         | 3,360  |
| Roofing  | Squares                  | 15,600   |
| Asphalt Insulating<br>Boards                       | Thousand sq. ft.         | 1,470  |
| Rough Hardware - Nails,<br>Screws, Fasteners, etc. | Tons                     | 660  |
| Building paper                                     | Rolls (100 sq. ft. roll) | 3,000  |
| Cement   | Bags                     | 36,000   |

B. Engineering Equipment

|                                  |                |        |
|----------------------------------|----------------|--------|
| Gasoline or Diesel<br>Generators | 50 KW units    | 8      |
| Pumps                            | 100 GPM units  | 2      |
| Tanks, Elevated                  | 5000 gal. cap. | 5      |
| Pipe, 6 in. or less              | Feet           | 12,000 |
| Electric Wire                    | Feet           | 12,000 |

C. Flexible Vinyl Film and Adhesive (Per 10,000 people)

100 rolls flexible vinyl film (350 lin. yd. per roll).  
100 cases adhesive (12 qt. per case, including brushes).

RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS DATA - OPERATION ALERT 1958

Page \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_

ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Region, State or Area Reporting \_\_\_\_\_

| Identity<br>of Item | Standard Unit<br>of Measure | Available Supply |      | Overages and Shortages |      |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|------|------------------------|------|
|                     |                             | D/30             | D/90 | D/30                   | D/90 |

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ANNEX J - APPENDIX II

Emergency Economic Operations and Distribution Controls

1. GENERAL

- A. The purpose of this appendix is to set forth the standards by which distribution controls should be implemented, after an attack, by areas or the State, as appropriate, when the country must sustain itself from current inventory. Current inventory consists of consumer goods in warehouses, dealers' yards, stores, loaded trucks, and railroad cars, and all other concentrated sources of goods that do not need further processing to make them usable to meet emergency needs. These controls should be instituted as soon as possible in undamaged areas to insure availability of essential support to attacked areas when such support becomes possible in the immediate postattack period.

These standards will also provide guidance as to State and local emergency stabilization actions that should be instituted as appropriate in undamaged or relatively undamaged areas, pending the development of national economic stabilization operations.

- B. All distribution and economic control operations should be carried out in accordance with ODM-FCDA "Guidelines for State and Local Emergency Economic Operations," as revised. (Pending receipt of this document, the issuance of May 1957 should be used.)

2. STANDARDS

A. Distribution Control and Rationing

For the immediate postattack period and particularly during the period when the Nation must sustain itself largely from inventory, the major resource controls and rationing objectives in undamaged areas will be to:

- (1) Conserve all essential civilian resources on a full-austerity basis until a national evaluation is possible.
- (2) Insure the meeting of essential emergency operational needs.
- (3) Provide for minimum sustaining needs of the civilian population, including civilian institutions providing essential civilian services.
- (4) Prevent hoarding and insure maximum equity in availability of civilian goods and services.

Resource controls and rationing actions by State and local governments are outlined in detail in ODM-FCDA "Guidelines for State and Local Emergency Economic Operations," as revised. (See I. B. above.) Actions taken thereunder will be consistent with national stabilization objectives.

**B. Monetary and Credit Matters**

Local or State measures in keeping with known or proclaimed national policies should be taken to maintain the banking and credit structure in undamaged areas, and to support and stabilize surviving local or State economies.

For the purpose of Operation Alert 1958 it will be assumed that, as a national policy, the Nation will underwrite the solvency and liquidity of its monetary and credit system, even though a considerable portion of the national net worth may have been destroyed.

As a result of this action, the implementation of Federal standby and other emergency measures, aimed at the goal of local stability and the maintenance and functioning of monetary and credit systems, even though on a substantially restricted basis, will be assumed. State and local governments should, as the situation permits, consult and cooperate with financial authorities, including local or area representatives of the Federal Reserve Board, Department of the Treasury, Federal Home Loan Bank, and similar agencies which have been successful in relocating their function. State and local officials should advise such agencies and financial institutions of projected actions that will require fiscal support, and lend assistance in the establishment of a coordinated pattern of area monetary and credit controls appropriate to the particular postattack situation. The objective of all such actions is to keep a monetary and credit system functioning in some form, even though its operations are necessarily restricted.

**C. Price Controls**

In connection with price controls, FCDA acts as interim administrative agent for the ODM and the Economic Stabilization Agency. At the national level, the continuing job is complex and must be developed and implemented in balance with many other economic factors. For immediate purposes, however, the particular concern in this exercise is with freezing and maintaining prices and wage rates, salaries and rents at the levels prevailing on May 1, 1958, on the assumption these local economies will be functioning and transactions will be taking place.

As soon as possible after attack, the Office of Defense Mobilization will issue a general Freeze Order, covering prices, wage rates, salaries, and rents. Such national freeze actions should



be assumed if a community or area is without outside communication capability. Authority to administer this order as it pertains to prices, on an interim basis, will be delegated to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator. The Federal Civil Defense Administrator will immediately provide for State and local administration in accordance with these instructions.

The price-wage-rent freeze issuance has the following four main objectives:

- (1) Provide maximum assurances of market-place stability while efforts are under way to guarantee continuing functioning of economy.
- (2) Provide at least an interim basis of payment for foods and services which are requisitioned or allocated by the government.
- (3) Discourage hoarding, scare buying, and other harmful economic distortions that result in inequities and price squeezes.
- (4) Encourage resumption, insofar as practicable, of essential services and production.

Price control actions authorized to State and local civil defense officials are outlined in detail in ODM-FCDA "Guidelines for State and Local Emergency Economic Operations, as revised." (See 1. B. above.) Actions taken thereunder will be consistent with national stabilization objectives.

March 1, 1958

## OPERATION ALERT 1958

### MANPOWER - ANNEX K

#### 1. GENERAL

- A. During the immediate postattack period, local governments are responsible for providing for the best use of available manpower and for determining manpower requirements for survival purposes. At such time as national controls can be established, the Office of Defense Mobilization will be responsible for decisions as to civilian manpower requirements and utilization of manpower for postattack production and for adjudication of any conflicts between civilian and military claimants for civilian manpower.
- B. Under assignment by FCDA, the Department of Labor will mobilize manpower for civil defense purposes through the U.S. Employment Service and the State and local employment offices, the agencies of government through which the control and allocation of manpower will be exercised during the emergency.
- C. The objectives of "Operation Alert 1958" with respect to manpower are the testing of existing manpower plans and organization to determine their adequacy; to determine the amounts and kinds of assistance State and local levels will need and which can be provided; and to train personnel at all levels to implement existing plans.
- D. Manpower offices should provide for cooperation with military installations in their area in carrying out essential military missions. This means full coordination in meeting highest priority civilian and military needs, especially in priority use of civilian manpower to repair joint-use facilities such as power, sanitation, and roads; and in planning to avoid transportation conflicts in mass movement of troops and civilian government forces.
- E. It may be necessary, in the absence of higher authority, to invoke such manpower controls as are permitted by existing State laws and emergency powers and included in survival plans. Extraordinary State and Federal authority that the postattack situation may require can be proclaimed in such cases by broadcast if landline communications to isolated areas are destroyed.

#### 2. OPERATIONS

During the immediate postattack period State and local governments should take the following actions as circumstances permit:

- A. Prepare preliminary estimates of the situation in terms of capacity for action, and manpower availability and mobility in areas of survival.

- B. Activate auxiliaries and implement emergency operational procedures according to plan. Make preparations for activating and publicizing the locations of emergency registration stations, listing the kinds of workers and skills required.
- C. Make preparations to allocate manpower when directed by higher authority.
- D. Initiate arrangements for reporting so that a flow of pertinent data to higher authority is available; (1) for decision as to the best possible manpower plan of action for the largest possible area, (2) to insure meeting the highest priority civilian manpower needs in the area in accordance with the plan, and (3) for damage assessment activities as related to manpower.
- E. Prepare to implement, as soon as conditions permit, plans and methods for reimbursement of assigned workers, and for compensation for workers injured or out of work as a result of the attack.

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(OPAL ' 58)  
PHASE II - FEDERAL ACTION PHASE  
JULY 14-18, 1958

66-19012-75

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*I. OVER-ALL GOVERNMENT PLAN*

### OVER-ALL GOVERNMENT PLAN

Operation Alert 1958 hereafter referred to as OPAL '58 is being conducted in three separate phases.

#### PHASE I. ATTACK PHASE

This Phase occurred on May 6 and 7, 1958, and was based on assumptions that international tensions increased rapidly during the week preceding May 6, 1958; that world conditions had deteriorated; that the nation had been informed of the seriousness of the situation, and that there was no period of strategic warning. On 5/6/58 it was assumed a direct attack was launched on the United States preceded by a minimum of two and a maximum of four hours' warning. The attack pattern had been developed and sealed envelopes were placed in the hands of state and local civil defense directors and appropriate Federal agency representatives for opening at the specified time. During Phase I state and local emphasis was placed on many factors most of them dealing with survival and resources. Also, it was assumed that many Federal orders were issued dealing with food, communications, housing, health, transportation, manpower, and power and fuels.

Participation in Phase I by Federal agencies was not mandatory and in view of the survival-resource character of the exercise, the Director approved nonparticipation by the FBI. The Laboratory, however, did prepare and analyze bomb damage and fallout charts from the standpoint of assumed damage incurred by FBI INSTALLATIONS. This information was studied and considered in connection with planning for FBI participation in Phase II. The FBI was not required to submit reports of any nature regarding Phase I.

#### PHASE II -- FEDERAL ACTION PHASE

This Phase will commence on July 14, 1958, and extend through July 18, 1958, as a "D+14" situation; i.e., planning is to be on the assumption it is fourteen days after the Attack Phase which occurred on May 6 and 7, 1958.

*This Phase anticipates Federal participation at field, regional, and departmental levels. At the national level relocation sites are to be staffed by communications personnel on an eight hour basis no later than 8:30 a.m., Eastern Standard Time (EST), 7/14/58, and a twenty-four hour basis no later than 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/16/58, returning to a pre-exercise status no earlier than 4:00 p.m., EST, 7/18/58. The Seat of Government (S.O.G.) relocation site (R/S) is to be fully activated with sufficient staff to begin operations at 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/16/58. At the field level relocation sites are to be in operation at 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/14/58 and remain in operation until 4:00 p.m., EST, 7/18/58. The hours of duty suggested by Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) are 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., EST, 7/14-17/58, inclusive, and 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., EST, on 7/18/58. A Duty Officer Watch is to be maintained during off-duty periods.*

*ODM planning for OPAL '58 is primarily directed toward survival and resources with assumptions and objectives directed towards resource agencies such as Commerce, Labor, and Interior. Since our planning involves an intra-FBI testing of our primary resources, that is personnel and equipment, and since we are not a resource-type Bureau, with the Director's approval we obtained ODM permission for our participation in Phase II to be as follows:*

*Bureau R/S communications facilities will be manned and operable from 9:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., EST, 7/14/58 from 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., EST, 7/15/58 and continuously manned from 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/16/58 to 4:00 p.m., EST, 7/18/58.*

*Field offices will not man relocation sites or assume a relocated status in nearby resident agencies but will remain at their headquarters city in an assumed relocated status from 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/16/58 through 12:00 midnight, EST, 7/17/58.*

*Since this is a resource-type exercise not involving an attack phase, we are not testing our S.O.G. notification and check-off procedures. Other than Communications and Laboratory personnel and one supervisor each from the Administrative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions already at our R/S, the remainder of the officials and clerical personnel participating in the exercise will depart for our R/S from*

the Bureau by Bureau bus or personally owned automobile at 7:00 a.m., EST, 7/16/58.

Entire FBI participation, field and Seat of Government, will be confined to 8:30 a.m. EST, 7/16/58 to 4:00 p.m., EST, 7/18/58 with 7/16 and 17/58 being the days on which we will test our emergency communications equipment and initiate our intra-FBI test problems. On 7/18/58 we will be analyzing the results of the first two days of our activities and handling any problems received from outside agencies.

#### BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

All bomb damage assessment occurred subsequent to and as a result of the Attack Phase, May 6 and 7, 1958, as a result no training for attack damage reporting or analyzing will be conducted during Phase II.

#### CIVIL DEFENSE DRILLS

Since Phase II is assumed to occur fourteen days after an attack, no civil defense shelter or curb drills should be held.

#### PUBLIC INFORMATION

According to ODM most news releases concerning OPAL '58 were concentrated in Phase I (the Attack Phase) and because of the nature of Phase II, it is expected the volume of news releases will be substantially below that of last year. Therefore, anticipated volume will not warrant coverage by media of "NEWSPOINT," (the ODM emergency release center) and "NEWSPOINT" will not be activated. Instead, exercise information developed in Phase II will be provided to the working press through the facilities of ODM in Washington, D. C. Information officers as appropriate of Executive departments and agencies having essential emergency functions are to participate.

Bureau policy during past exercises has been to avoid any publicity relative to Bureau activities during the course of an alert exercise. We plan to follow the same program this year. However, in past exercises we have designated a public information officer, a representative of the

Records and Communications Division, to be at our site and in the event inquiries were directed to our site, the inquiries were to be directed to the Department of Justice. Since ODM is handling press inquiries from Washington, D. C., since our R/S is classified ~~"Secret"~~ and since any press inquiries would originate with ODM in Washington, D. C., it is not considered necessary to have at our site a designated public information officer. Any press inquiries received will be directed to Mr. Nease's office for relay to the Department of Justice as we have done in the past.

#### AIR TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

The Department of Defense will provide an emergency air transportation service for the Executive departments and agencies of the Government during OPAL '58. The air transportation service will be used for transporting key officials of the Executive departments and those documents essential for day-to-day operations that cannot be transmitted by other means. The airports at Martinsburg, West Virginia, and Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia, will be serviced under this program. The frequency and time of flights will be established by the joint air transportation service group as dictated by conditions and requirements existing at that time. Requests for air transport service are to be directed to HIGHPOINT (ODM relocation site), extensions 273 or 274.

Helicopter service under conditions as specified above will be available from Fort Ritchie, Maryland; Martinsburg, West Virginia; Hagerstown, Maryland; HIGHPOINT; Warrenton, Virginia; and the Quantico, Virginia, Marine Corps Base.

SAC Sloan has arranged for an airplane at Quantico; therefore, we do not plan to utilize the above transportation service.

#### MOTOR TRANSPORT AND MAIL SERVICE

The General Services Administration will provide scheduled motor transport service for official mail and passengers during OPAL '58 on July 16 and 17, 1958. The service will operate over U.S. highway 11 between Lexington, Virginia, and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, serving designated

intermediate points enroute. Passengers and mail will be picked up and discharged at the main post office in each of the following cities along the route: Chambersburg, Pennsylvania; Hagerstown, Maryland; Martinsburg, West Virginia and Winchester, Strasburg, Harrisonburg, Staunton, and Lexington, Virginia. Agencies participating in this service must supply shuttle service from their R/S to the post office at the designated mail messenger stop point.

We have not participated in this service in past exercises inasmuch as we supply such courier service or transportation as is necessary for our personnel or documents which must be disseminated.

POLICY, ASSUMPTIONS, PROCLAMATIONS, ORDERS AND CONTROLS  
AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY AGENCIES

For OPAL '58 it will be assumed that direct nuclear attacks have been made on the United States, its territories and possessions.

In order to meet this situation, efforts are to be directed to assure national survival by: maintaining direction and authority through operations of local, state, and Federal Governments; supporting military operations; assuring survival of remaining population and controlling allocation and distribution of resources to meet requirements.

The Federal Government will initiate actions essential for national security and survival.

The following are assumed: (1) national and civil defense emergencies were proclaimed; (2) the President is using all means to advise of the situation and calling upon the people to follow instructions and rally to meet the needs of national survival; (3) Congress has reassembled; (4) when a state government is unable to perform essential civil functions, the Federal Government will perform or direct performance of such functions; (5) military assistance as available will be provided for civil defense purposes; (6) national guard, other reserve units and military reservists having immediate assignments have been ordered to active Federal duty; (7) the Secretary of Defense may designate areas for specific military purposes; (8) funds are available to Federal agencies for

emergency operations; (9) economic policies are being announced to support restoration and functioning of banking and credit systems; (10) a Federal order is being issued imposing immediate ceilings on prices, wage rates, salaries, and rents; (11) the Federal Government has authorized State and local authorities to ration or otherwise distribute inventories of consumers' goods; (12) Federal controls will be imposed on production, food, housing, manpower, transportation, fuel, power and communications; (13) Federal requisitioning has been authorized to acquire property for essential national programs; (14) Federal Executive departments and agencies will operate from relocated headquarters and field establishments; (15) personnel, materials and facilities of the Federal departments and agencies except those required for continuity of their own emergency programs and of states and their local governments are available for civil defense purposes; (16) control of resources will be established by Federal field offices, and (17) censorship has been imposed upon international communications and plans for voluntary censorship by domestic information media implemented.

National emergency agencies are being established for censorship, domestic information, and resources management including subordinate agencies dealing with stabilization, tele-communications, transportation, energy and minerals, food, housing, manpower, and production.

#### EVALUATION AND REPORTS

ODM has not reached a definite determination as to whether inspectors or monitors will be utilized to visit relocation sites of participating agencies.

According to ODM instructions, no reports excluding communications reports are required to be filed during the play of Phase II; however, ODM will require a report in questionnaire form to be filed by all "agencies" with ODM on or before August 11, 1958. To date we have not received the questionnaire and the handling of this report will be accomplished by separate memorandum subsequent to the exercise.

A daily communications report is requested of all agencies. This report should cover the twenty-four hour period from 7:01 p.m. to 7:01 p.m., EST for the period 7/16-17/58 and



should be transmitted by teletypewriter to reach the Communications Operations Center at ODM by 10:00 p.m., EST, 7/17/58.

The communications report will consist of two parts: Part I is a daily diary of activities including such items as time of circuit "outages," traffic backlogs, and difficulties in operating procedures as pertaining to Interagency Communications System facilities. Part II is to be an appraisal of the over-all communications situation of all communications facilities and services at all levels of agency activities.

#### PHASE III -- EVALUATION PHASE

This phase is to ~~take~~ place on 9/15, 16, and 17/58 when a small group from each agency having responsibility and authority for emergency plans and operations will be convened at HIGHPOINT along with selected regional representatives. The purpose of this Phase is to examine the validity, feasibility, and consistency of operational measures and the adequacy of policies and central programming guidance.

The desirability and extent of FBI participation in this phase is not considered in this brief but will be the subject of a separate memorandum subsequent to our participation in Phase II.

*II. OVER-ALL FBI PLAN*

### OVER-ALL FBI PLAN

FBI participation in OPAL '58, Phase II, Federal Action Phase, will differ considerably from previous alert exercises. During alert exercises the past three years, we thoroughly tested our emergency planning under attack situations. Our efforts were successful in focusing the thinking of the Departments of Justice and State upon the necessity for immediate authority to place our emergency security programs into action. We trained employees and developed techniques to a degree of perfection that continued similar testing during OPAL '58 would not have incurred any benefits to the FBI nor would it have complied with ODM objectives for OPAL '58 of resources and training of employees. Therefore, our plan this year encompasses test problems involving some of the essential personnel, equipment, and survival functions the Bureau would have to meet in a period subsequent to an attack after having fulfilled our immediate emergency security responsibilities. The problems relate primarily to personnel, health and welfare, office supplies and equipment, vouchers, office space, and payroll matters. Additionally, the problems will thoroughly test our emergency communications facilities. Problems have also been devised to test the ability of employees to handle the radioactivity detection meters and the dosimeters which instruments test the accumulation of radioactivity to which an individual has been exposed. We will also conduct actual availability checks of agents in headquarters cities of selected field offices.

The problems are based on assumed situations collated with the effects of the attack pattern on May 6-7, 1958, and many of them will include specific instructions requiring field offices to actually perform certain emergency functions within the confines of headquarters city space.

Since entire FBI participation will take place from 7/16 through 7/18/58, the first two days of the exercise will be directed primarily towards handling of our intra-FBI test problems. Friday, July 18, will be devoted to analyzing the results of our intra-FBI testing and the continued handling of such problems as are presented to us by other agencies.

### PERSONNEL AND DUTY HOURS

ODM directives leave to the discretion of each agency the number of individuals who should participate in the exercise. ODM requires activation of our communications facilities on 7/14-15/58, two days prior to full FBI participation. Therefore, we will have eight employees of the Communications Section manning our R/S communications facilities on these dates. Appropriate Laboratory personnel will be at the R/S on 7/14-15/58 to insure the proper and adequate functioning of the communications equipment. One Agent Supervisor each from Administrative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions will go to the site the evening of 7/15/58 to effectuate its readiness to be completely operable by 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/16/58. The remainder of the Bureau officials and clerical employees will depart Washington, D.C., by Bureau bus or personally owned automobile at 7:00 a.m., EST, 7/16/58. Over-all a total of 47 Seat of Government employees will participate in the exercise at the relocation site from 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/16/58 to 4:00 p.m., EST, 7/18/58. Since our participation is limited and condensed into a three-day period, we do not anticipate being able to release any employees during the course of the exercise. (See section IV for detailed personnel assignments.)

ODM recommends that operations beginning at 8:30 a.m., EST, 7/16/58, through 4:00 p.m., 7/18/58, be continuous and that the normal workday for 7/16-17/58 should be 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., EST, and that the hours of operation should be 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., EST, on 7/18/58. Normal duty hours for Agent personnel at the site will be 8:30 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., EST, 7/16/58; 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., EST, 7/17/58; and 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., EST, 7/18/58.

Every effort will be made to schedule clerical employees on an eight hour shift basis to cover the night and midnight to 8:00 a.m., EST periods. During the play of the exercise we will use a skeleton staff to man the communications equipment and for supervisory purposes during the midnight hours.

In addition to Bureau personnel at our relocation site, certain Bureau liaison representatives with key Government agencies will be required to go to the relocation site of the key agency. Due to the resource-survival type exercise

being conducted this year, we will have fewer liaison representatives relocating with key agencies than we have had in past exercises. For detailed liaison assignments, see section IV pages 39-40.

#### NOTIFICATION AND CHECKOFF PROCEDURES

Phase II does not encompass an attack situation; the bulk of participating personnel will depart Washington, D. C., 7:00 a.m., EST, 7/16/58 which is prior to the start of the normal Bureau workday at 9:00 a.m., DST. Therefore, we will be unable to and do not plan to test our notification and checkoff procedures.

#### NON-FBI EMPLOYEES AT RELOCATION SITE

It is not anticipated that we will have any non-FBI employees visiting the Academy during this period unless ODM decides to utilize an inspector or monitor from another agency in which event a separate memorandum will be submitted regarding the handling of such a situation. Additionally, it may be necessary for the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company or the Interagency Communications System to send servicemen to the building during the course of the exercise. A list of individuals who have been granted previous clearance to enter the Academy and make repairs on communications equipment is maintained at Quantico and only these individuals will be permitted access.

#### BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND FALLOUT DATA

This will not be handled at our site as in past years since it was accomplished by the Laboratory subsequent to the Attack Phase.

#### EVALUATION AND REPORTING

ODM does not require submission of reports during the course of the exercise with the exception of a communications report which will be submitted as required and indicated on page 6 of section I of this document.

### COMPENSATORY LEAVE AND OVERTIME PAY

According to the Administrative Division the Civil Service Commission has stated that provisions of the overtime pay law and regulations will clearly apply to all agencies participating in OPAL '58. Therefore, Bureau policies will apply as follows:

#### 1. OVERTIME

- a. Wage Board Employees (maintenance and certain skilled employees-we have a few at Quantico)

In accordance with Bureau policy unless unusual circumstances exist and prior Bureau authority is received, the work week of Wage Board employees is not to exceed forty hours. Should such an employee work more than eight hours on any day, his working days within the administrative work week must be adjusted to compensate for same. Wage board employees under the law are not entitled to compensatory leave; therefore, if any overtime is ordered, it must be compensated for at time and a half overtime pay.

- b. Classification Act Employees (general schedule (GS) employees)

According to the Administrative Division, it is advisable for each division head to reach a clear cut understanding and decision with clerical employees prior to OPAL '58 before having them go to the relocation site. In the event any of them evidence unwillingness to put in voluntary overtime and claim compensatory leave in lieu of overtime pay, replacements to the group should be obtained for such employees. The overtime pay law and regulations provide that employees in grade GS-9 and below have the option of claiming either compensatory leave or overtime pay at overtime rates if they are ordered to work any overtime. In conformance with Bureau policy, we will not order Classification Act non-Agent employees to work any overtime but will permit them to claim compensatory leave for any necessary overtime which they volunteer to perform. If necessary and desirable, we could adjust the administrative work week of these employees in an emergency to have them perform on an irregular schedule but we would have to insure that they did not work more than forty hours in the administrative work week.

## 2. COMPENSATORY LEAVE

Bureau policy is to grant compensatory leave to any clerical employee who volunteers to perform any necessary overtime work. However, the compensatory leave must be taken by the close of the pay period following the period in which the leave was earned unless an exception to defer it is approved by Mr. Tolson's office.

## 3. NIGHT DIFFERENTIAL

Bureau policy is to pay night differential at the rate of ten per cent of base pay for any regularly scheduled night duty falling between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. This does not include any irregular occasional night work which might be included in voluntary overtime which an employee puts in. Therefore, only those clerical employees who perform night duty on a regularly scheduled tour of duty for an individual office, division, section, unit, or other group will be eligible to receive night differential pay. In the event it is so necessary to schedule a clerical employee, it will be handled in the regular way on the Time and Attendance Registers and Cards. "Regularly scheduled" tour of duty means that the tour must be scheduled in advance to continue for at least two consecutive work weeks. Night work need not be scheduled for each day of the work week but it must be scheduled on at least one day of each of the two or more work weeks.

III. PHYSICAL FACILITIES AT QUANTICO



## PHYSICAL FACILITIES AT QUANTICO

### 1. ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES AT ACADEMY BUILDING.

SAC Sloan will be in charge of the Academy building. He will be assisted by the firearms instructors and the building staff. SAC Sloan has advised that the Academy building will be in readiness for Operation Alert 1958 upon arrival of the Seat of Government personnel.

### 2. SECURITY PROCEDURES.

#### (a) Guard Force.

The firearms instructors will be used as guards and will operate on a 24-hour basis. Four armed instructors will be on duty daily from 8:00 a.m. (EST) to 8:00 p.m.; three armed instructors will be on duty daily from 8:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight and two armed instructors will be on duty daily from 12:00 midnight to 8:00 a.m. It will be the responsibility of the guard force: (1) to challenge all persons entering the building at the main entrance, it being pointed out all doors to the Academy will be locked at all times with the exception of the main entrance, and the main entrance will be locked between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m.; (2) one man will be stationed in the basement corridor during the hours 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.; (3) one man will be stationed on the first floor in the entrance foyer from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.; (4) during the hours 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. one man will be stationed at the main entrance to the building and a second man will patrol the basement, first and second floors.

#### (b) Bureau Personnel.

On arrival all Bureau employees will be required to identify themselves and record their name, date and time of arrival on an official Bureau register. They will also record the date and time of departure.

#### (c) Visitors Calling At The Academy.

All visitors must enter through the main entrance to the building where they will be challenged by a

member of the guard force. Those having official business dealing with Academy operations as such will be referred to SAC Sloan who will be located in the Chief Clerk's Office. All visitors arriving in connection with Operation Alert 1958 will be seated in the lobby of the Academy building and a messenger dispatched to the person whom they have requested to see. This will not apply to the Attorney General should he decide to visit the Academy during the period in question.

### 3. OFFICE SPACE AND EQUIPMENT.

#### (a) Office Space.

The Director will use the office of the SAC. Three classrooms on the first floor will be used as office space. Dividing panels for purposes of converting the large classrooms into many individual offices are available at the Academy. These panels were made at considerable expense and in past exercises due to the length of the exercise and number of participating personnel we have erected the panels. We have fewer personnel participating in the exercise this year and our period of participation, 2 3/4 days, is the shortest it has ever been. The panels are quite difficult to erect, are made of a material which does not withstand constant handling and they are not needed this year for our successful participation in the exercise; therefore, as an economy measure we do not contemplate erecting the panels. See attached charts for specific space assignments beginning page 19.

#### (b) Office Equipment.

Desks and tables, chairs and office supplies and equipment with the exception of file cabinets, will be available for all personnel. All personnel will leave their pending work and work boxes on the top of their desks or tables. 24-hour guard service, the fact that some employees will be working the night shift, plus the fact that all doors to the Academy will be locked after 6:00 p.m. preclude the necessity for having file cabinets for night storage of work.

### 4. SLEEPING ACCOMMODATIONS:

The Director will use the bedroom located next to the SAC's office. Mr. Tolson will use bedroom 206. Sleeping

accommodations for other Bureau officials and personnel will be assigned as shown on pages 17 and 18. Female participants will be assigned sleeping accommodations on the third floor, which floor will be for their exclusive use, and male participants will be assigned sleeping accommodations on the second floor.

#### 5. COMMUNICATIONS

The telephone handsets will be installed in all office space and all communications rooms will be in readiness prior to the arrival of Seat of Government personnel.

#### 6. OTHER EQUIPMENT

##### (a) First Aid.

Ample supply available in first aid room located in the basement.

##### (b) Gas Masks.

A sufficient number of gas masks to care for all personnel participating in this exercise are available at Quantico.

##### (c) Radiac Testing Devices.

These devices together with dosimeters are available in the emergency cabinet in the gun vault at Quantico. These devices are used for testing the presence of radioactive materials and the extent to which an individual has been exposed to radioactive particles. Firearms instructors are qualified to operate these devices.

#### 7. PER DIEM.

All agent and clerical personnel remaining over night are entitled to \$5.60 per diem daily less \$1.12 per night for lodging furnished by the Government.

#### 8. MEALS

(a) Meals will be served as follows: Breakfast- 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.; Lunch - 12:00 noon to 2:00 p.m.;

Dinner - 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.; for night shift-11:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m., as needed. Employees may enter the dining room at their convenience during these hours.

(b) The cost of meals varies with whether employee is entitled to claim per diem. For employees entitled to per diem the cost of meals will be as follows: Breakfast - \$1.10; Lunch and dinner - \$1.60 each. For employees not on per diem the cost will be \$1.00 per each of the three meals. This is consistent with the present schedule for meals at Quantico.

(c) Employees will pay for their meals when they leave the relocation site. Menus will be submitted separately.

#### 9. TRAINING CLASSES

Mr. Tamm has advised that training classes in the Academy building will have been terminated sufficiently in advance of the exercise to permit the Quantico staff to prepare the building for the relocation exercise.

#### 10. DIRECTOR'S SWITCHBOARD

A telephone switchboard similar to that now in use in the Director's office will be available for all calls for the Director. This system will be installed in Classroom No. 1. A buzzer system for the convenience of the Director is available from the Director's desk to the desks of Director's office personnel who will be in Classroom #1 in an actual emergency.

#### 11. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SPACE

In the event the Attorney General visits the Academy, office space will be in readiness for him in the counselor's room located on the first floor at the north end of the building. This space will also be available for use by Mr. Tolson.

*SLEEPING ACCOMMODATIONS  
(MALE)*

*Director  
Mr. Tolson*

*SAG's Bedroom  
Room 206*

*202*

*Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Parsons*

*203*

*Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Huelskamp  
Mr. Minnich  
Mr. R. R. Roach*

*204*

*Mr. H. L. Edwards  
Mr. L. J. Gauthier  
Mr. A. M. Newman  
Mr. C. Q. Smith*

*205*

*Mr. G. L. Davy  
Mr. J. M. Matter  
Mr. R. L. Millen  
Mr. C. F. Downing*

*207*

*Mr. K. Elkins  
Mr. A. C. Frank  
Mr. O. G. Medler, Jr.  
Mr. L. E. Wherry, Jr.*

*208*

*Mr. R. L. Leffter  
Mr. J. R. Schemmel  
Mr. C. D. Seefeldt  
Mr. M. G. Anthony*

*209*

*Mr. C. R. Hewitt  
Mr. H. W. Lawson  
Mr. R. S. Murphy  
Mr. C. Strickland*

*First Aid Room*

*Mr. Crawford*

*SLEEPING ACCOMMODATIONS  
(FEMALE)*

308

*Miss C. M. Levecque  
Miss Callie L. McCoy  
Miss Bessie Sadler  
Miss Rosemary Yost*

309

*Miss Casey W. Arnette  
Miss Caroline C. Atkins  
Miss M. Dale  
Miss Yvonne Hillman*

310

*Miss V. Fay Richardson  
Miss Loretta E. Tobin*

311

*Miss Mary A. Powell  
Miss Jane F. Rokisky  
Miss Joann Thomas  
Miss Marilyn Jo Cast*

312

*Miss Mary E. Keough  
Miss Lorena H. Lewis  
Miss D. Weber  
Miss Marguerite Hansen*

313

*Miss Jean H. Marshall  
Miss Nancy A. Mooney  
Miss Deanna J. Murray  
Miss Donna L. Ingwersen*

*Female employees will use the stairway at the north end of the building in proceeding to and from their sleeping accommodations on the third floor.*

**IV. PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN THE EXERCISE  
AND THEIR ASSIGNMENTS**

*PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN THE EXERCISE AND THEIR ASSIGNMENTS*

|  | <u>Officials<br/>and Agents</u> | <u>Clerical</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| <i>Director's Office</i>                       | 0                               | 0               | 0            |
| <i>Mr. Tolson's Office</i>                     | 0                               | 0               | 0            |
| <i>Mr. Nease's Office</i>                      | 0                               | 0               | 0            |
| <i>Mr. Boardman's Office</i>                   | 0                               | 0               | 0            |
| <i>Identification Division</i>                 | 0                               | 0               | 0            |
| <i>Training and Inspection Division</i>        | 0                               | 0               | 0            |
| <i>Administrative Division</i>                 | 5                               | 2               | 7            |
| <i>Records and Communications<br/>Division</i> | 1                               | 27              | 28           |
| <i>Domestic Intelligence Division</i>          | 4                               | 2               | 6            |
| <i>Investigative Division</i>                  | 0                               | 0               | 0            |
| <i>Laboratory Division</i>                     | <u>5</u>                        | <u>1</u>        | <u>6</u>     |
| <i>Total</i>                                   | 15                              | *32             | 47           |

*\*22 of the clerical employees are female*



## DETAILED ASSIGNMENTS OF PERSONNEL

### IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

No one from this Division will participate in the test exercise.

### TRAINING AND INSPECTION DIVISION

No one from Seat of Government will represent this Division. SAC Sloan and staff at Quantico will be in charge of the security and operations of the Academy Building during the exercise and will have previously prepared the building for the relocation test.

### ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

#### Assistant Director Mohr

Will be responsible for the proper supervision of all the assigned functions of this Division. He will be present 24 hours a day and his responsibilities will include the coordinating and successful handling of all Administrative Division exercise problems. He will keep Assistant Director Belmont advised of all developments and see that results of the test problems are made known to Mr. Belmont in sufficient time for inclusion into the daily report for the Director.

#### Inspector H. L. Edwards - Number 1 Man

He will be present on a 24-hour basis throughout the period of the test to serve as Number 1 Man to and handle duties designated by Assistant Director Mohr. He will be assigned to the day shift and will be available according to need thereafter.

#### Inspector L. J. Gauthier

He is the defense plans coordinator for the Administrative Division. He will be present on a 24-hour basis assigned to the day shift to be available thereafter as the need arises and he will assist the Number 1 Man in the over-all operation and coordination of the problems and work dealing with the Administrative Division.

Supervisor C. Q. Smith

He will be present on a 24-hour basis throughout the period of the test. He will handle designated exercise problems and will be the night and midnight supervisor in charge.

Supervisor A. M. Newman

He will be present on a 24-hour basis throughout the period of the test. He will handle designated test problems and collate field office replies to inventory problems with actual inventories of the responding field offices.

Miss Dorothy Weber

Will perform secretarial duties for Mr. Mohr and assist in secretarial duties for personnel representing the Administrative Division.

Miss Marguerite A. Hansen

Will handle secretarial duties for the Number 1 Man and other personnel of the Administrative Division.

RECORDS AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

Communications Section

Will relocate four switchboard operators, five teletype operators and twelve Code Room employees as well as Section Chief Louis E. Wherry and Assistant Section Chief Alvin C. Frank.

Switchboard Unit - Telephone Operators

Miss Bessie Sadler (Supervisor)  
Miss Callie Lee McCoy  
Miss Catherine M. Levecque  
Mr. Charles R. Hewitt

Teletype Unit

Miss Nancy A. Mooney (Supervisor)  
Mr. Clyde Strickland  
Miss Jean Hope Marshall  
Miss Donna L. Ingwersen  
Miss Deanna J. Murray

Code Room - Code Clerks

Mrs. Mary A. Powell (Supervisor)  
Miss Caroline C. Atkins  
Miss Yvonne Hillman  
Mr. Harold W. Lawson  
Miss Joann Thomas  
Miss Casey W. Arnette  
Miss Jane F. Rokisky  
Miss Marilyn Jo Cast  
Miss Loretta E. Tobin ) Typists on loan from  
Miss Rosemary Yost ) Records Branch  
Mr. Rodney L. Leffter ) Crypto Clerks on loan  
Mr. Chauncey D. Seefeldt ) from Cryptanalysis  
Translation Section of  
Laboratory

Records Branch

Supervisor O. G. Medler

Will be responsible for all problems involving the Records Branch including messenger service. Additionally, he will be responsible for all administrative problems relative to Communications Section personnel.

Miss V. Fay Richardson

Will handle classifying, searching, and filing matters.

Messrs. R. Stairit Murphy, John R. Schemmel,  
Kenneth Elkins

Will assist as required in filing operations and will be the messengers during the entire course of the exercise.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Assistant Director Belmont

Will be responsible for the over-all planning and adequacy of arrangements for FBI participation in the exercise. He will direct, guide, and coordinate all activities at the relocation site and see to the prompt and proper preparation of a daily report for the Director, and summary reports for the Director and Attorney General immediately prior to conclusion of the Bureau's participation in the exercise.

Section Chief R. R. Roach

He will be present on a 24-hour basis during the period of the test to serve as Number 1 Man to and handle duties designated by Assistant Director Belmont. Additionally, he will be responsible for the over-all operations of Liaison personnel at the relocation site or at relocation sites of other key Government agencies.

Supervisor J. T. Minnich

Will be present on a 24-hour basis during the period of the test. He is responsible for all preplanning and coordination of the FBI's defense plans program. He will insure compliance with, where required, all Office of Defense Mobilization instructions and directives. He will perform other designated duties.

Supervisor B. L. Huelskamp

Will log incoming and outgoing communications and assist Mr. Minnich in the maintenance of such folders as may be necessary, in connection with the handling of intra-FBI test problems or problems received from outside agencies. He will be available for such night duty as may be required.



Miss Lorena Lewis


Will perform secretarial duties for Mr. Belmont and assist in secretarial duties for other Domestic Intelligence Division personnel.

Miss Martha Dale

Will perform stenographic and clerical duties for all Domestic Intelligence Division personnel.

In addition to Domestic Intelligence Division personnel at the Bureau relocation site, Liaison men will accompany other Government agencies to their relocation sites, with exceptions as noted, as follows:

| <u>Agency</u>  | <u>Relocation Site<br/>of Agency</u>  | <u>Liaison<br/>Agent</u> | <u>Date Agent at<br/>Agency Site</u> |
|--|---|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Atomic Energy<br>Commission  |   | J. M.<br>Fitzgerald      | July 16, 1958<br>b3                  |
| Assistant Chief of<br>Staff, Intelligence<br>G-2                             |   | D. J.<br>Sullivan        | *not<br>accompanying                 |
| Central Intelligence<br>Agency   |   | S. J. Papich             | July 16, 1958                        |
| Department of<br>Justice and<br>Immigration and<br>Naturalization<br>Service |   | J. J. Daunt              | July 16, 1958                        |
| Office of Defense<br>Mobilization  | HIGHPOINT,<br>Bluemont, Va.   | W. T. Whaley             | July 16, 1958                        |
| State Department   |  | M. W. Kuhrtz             | *not<br>accompanying<br>b3           |
| White House  |   | O. H.<br>Bartlett        | July 16, 1958                        |
| Department of<br>Defense   |   | G. A. Day                | *not<br>accompanying                 |

| <u>Agency</u>                       | <u>Relocation Site<br/>of Agency</u>  | <u>Liaison<br/>Agent</u> | <u>Date Agent at<br/>Agency Site</u> |
|-------------------------------------|---|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| National Security<br>Agency         |  | B. A. Wells              | *not<br>accompanying                 |
| Office of Special<br>Investigations |   | P. H. Fields             | *not<br>accompanying                 |
| Office of Naval<br>Intelligence     |   | W. F. Woods              | *not<br>accompanying                 |

b3

\*Liaison agents are not accompanying these agencies due to the resource-survival type exercise being conducted which occasions limited participation by designated agencies. These Liaison Agents have been assured by the respective agencies that "invitations" to accompany them to relocation sites during an actual emergency remain outstanding and the presence of FBI Liaison Agents under such a situation is needed and desired.

#### INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

No one from this Division will participate in the test exercise.

#### LABORATORY DIVISION

##### Assistant Director Parsons

Will supervise over-all operation of Laboratory personnel and problems. He will also be responsible for coordination of Laboratory matters with problems involving other divisions.

##### Supervisor G. L. Davy

He will be primarily responsible for maintenance and readiness of radio communications facilities, including CW (code) and voice FM equipment.

Supervisor J. M. Matter

He will be primarily responsible for maintenance and readiness of wire communications equipment.

Section Chief C. F. Downing

He will be primarily responsible for maintenance and readiness of cryptographic equipment.

Section Chief R. L. Millen

Will be primarily responsible for maintenance and continuing readiness of communications facilities and related problems.

Miss M. E. Keough

Will be primarily responsible for stenographic and clerical duties involved in the handling of Laboratory problems.

V. COMMUNICATIONS  
AND  
COURIER SERVICE



In Using Communications Facilities at Quantico, ODM  
Has Advised IT IS A VIOLATION OF SECURITY REGULATIONS  
TO DO ANY OF THE FOLLOWING in Plain Text Messages:

1. ASSOCIATE THE NAME OF AN AGENCY WITH ITS CODE WORD.
2. ASSOCIATE THE NAME OF AN AGENCY WITH THE GEOGRAPHIC  
LOCATION OF ITS RELOCATION SITE.
3. ASSOCIATE THE NAME OF AN AGENCY WITH THE AGENCY'S  
RELOCATION SITE COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER.
4. ASSOCIATE AN AGENCY'S CODE WORD WITH THE AGENCY'S  
RELOCATION SITE COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER.
5. ASSOCIATE AN AGENCY'S CODE WORD WITH THE GEOGRAPHIC  
LOCATION OF ITS RELOCATION SITE.
6. REFER TO LOCAL WEATHER, PAST, PRESENT OR FORECAST.
7. SEND OUTSIDE THE RELOCATION SITE THE SAME IDENTICALLY  
WORDED MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT (ORALLY OR IN WRITING)  
THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY SENT OUTSIDE IN ENCODED FORM, OR  
VICE VERSA.

## COMMUNICATIONS

### Telephone Facilities

The following telephone facilities have been provided at the FBI relocation site:

1. A two-position manual switchboard to which are connected: Sixty telephone extensions - terminated in telephone jacks all located in rooms now allocated to office space.

The following trunk lines connect the switchboard with outside telephone facilities:

- A. One local trunk - Triangle, Virginia, exchange - telephone number Trojan 5-8235.
- B. One extension off Marine Corps switchboard - (extension 7770). For all calls to Marine Corps installations on the base - dial 7770 when making calls from any other extensions on Marine Corps system.
- C. Five incoming trunks from Fredericksburg, Virginia, exchange - telephone numbers Essex 3-8561 through Essex 3-8565.
- D. Four outgoing long-distance trunks to Fredericksburg, Virginia, exchange - Fredericksburg LD trunks 20 through 23.
- E. One private line circuit to the Bureau's main switchboard in the Justice Building.
- F. Two private line circuits to HIGHPOINT (maintained at Office of Defense Mobilization expense). HIGHPOINT is Office of Defense Mobilization relocation site and interagency communications center.
- G. Six microwave telephone circuits to HIGHPOINT.

H. One microwave telephone circuit to   
relocation site.

b3

2. The Red Line telephone network connects the President at the White House relocation site with the Directors or Heads of the following agencies at their relocation sites: FBI, Office of Defense Mobilization, Atomic Energy Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense. This private telephone system will permit the President to talk to heads of the above agencies, or these agency heads to the President. This private line system can be used by agency heads to contact each other; however, the President reserves the right to terminate the connection if he desires to use the circuit. There is a possibility that a crypto device known as a KY-1 may be installed and operational on the red line telephone prior to OPAL '58. The KY-1 device will allow use of the red line telephone circuit for ~~secret~~ conversations.

With the exception of the red line telephone system, all telephone calls made to or placed from the Academy will be received by or placed by FBI telephone switchboard operators.

### 3. Mobile Telephone

The Director's car is equipped with a mobile telephone operated through the switchboard at HIGHPOINT. Local Washington, D. C., coverage is possible, however, the system is not complete to permit highway coverage. An operator's manual containing pertinent numbers is in the Director's car. The telephone number assigned to this car is 27428. Anyone desirous of contacting the Director's car from a telephone on the Government code would dial code 1257 and ask for the mobile operator. If it is necessary to use commercial telephone, dial Washington, D. C., Republic 7-5725, which is the telephone number of the communications center at HIGHPOINT. The mobile telephone number of the Attorney General's car is 27437.

### Teletype Facilities

The following teletype facilities are available:

1. Three TWX (toll) teletype circuits through the Richmond Virginia, teletype exchange designated as Richmond 280, Richmond 441 and Richmond 486. These circuits are equipped for automatic 60 words per minute tape sending and receiving. These circuits are to be used for sending and receiving traffic to or from any continental field office or other Government agency not connected by private line or Interagency Communications System.

2. One Bureau owned radio-teletype circuit to the Midland Radio Station. Maintained on full-time basis ready for immediate use.

3. One private line teletype circuit to Department of Justice relocation site (maintained at Department expense).

4. One private line teletype circuit to HIGHPOINT (simultaneous automatic 60 word per minute sending and receiving).

5. One microwave teletype circuit to [redacted] relocation site (simultaneous automatic send-receive).

b3

6. One microwave teletype circuit to HIGHPOINT (simultaneous 60 word per minute automatic sending and receiving).

All teletype circuits are immediately operable with exception of the microwave circuits to HIGHPOINT and [redacted] and the Quantico-Midland radio-teletype circuit, which are activated by Bureau Laboratory Engineers; and, the FBI-Justice leased teletype circuit which is activated by Justice Department.

b3

### Radio Facilities

The following Bureau-operated radio facilities are available at the Bureau relocation site:

1. The main Bureau radio transmitting and receiving stations are located approximately 18 (Sowego) and 29 (Midland) miles, respectively, west of the Academy. These stations are staffed 24 hours per day, seven days per week and provide Bureau controlled communications by: manually keyed telegraphy to and from all Bureau field offices in the Eastern United States and automatic radio-teletype to San Juan, and automatic radio-teletype to San Diego where traffic is relayed by radio-teletype to both Anchorage and Honolulu. All radio traffic to or from offices in the Western United States is relayed via manually keyed telegraphy by the San Diego West Coast relay station.

2. A 50-watt 2-way FM radio unit, equipped for operation on three channels, is provided at the Academy. One channel is used for contacting radio equipped cars assigned to Quantico, one to contact the Washington Field Office 250-watt FM radio station and one to contact the radio stations at Midland and Sowego.

3. A Bureau owned microwave radio station located near the Academy building provides two telephone and one teletype circuits to HIGHPOINT; one telephone and one teletype circuit to [ ] relocation site.

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#### Cryptographic Materials and Equipment

The following cryptographic materials and equipment make it possible to communicate in a secure manner with all Bureau installations, the Department of Justice and other agencies having AFSAM-7 equipment:

1. AFSAM-7 coding machines (six Bureau owned - four furnished by Office of Defense Mobilization) complete with rotors, and associated key lists and manuals are stored at the Academy. Each field office and foreign liaison office has been instructed to set aside one specific enciphering and one specific deciphering code pad for emergency use with the Bureau at its relocation site. Additionally, various other cryptographic items are set aside, including code books, standard emergency telephone code (domestic), modified emergency telephone code (for use by personnel on foreign assignment) and two copies of each personal code furnished to Special Agents on foreign assignment.

2. A supply of special AFSAM-7 key lists for use between the Department of Justice relocation site and the Bureau relocation site as well as AFSAM-7 key lists provided by the Interagency Communications System for use between the Bureau and other identically equipped relocated agencies are maintained at the Bureau relocation site.

3. There is also a back-up system of one-time code pads for interagency communications.

4. One "on-line" teletype crypto device, called a TSEC/HW19 One-Time Tape Device, is installed in the code room of the Academy connected by a private line to identical equipment in the crypto section at HIGHPOINT. This equipment allows simultaneous transmission of a plain text teletype message tape and a one-time cipher tape. Messages pass over the line in cipher and appear on receiving terminus machine in plain text. This circuit is for regular encrypted message traffic between FBI relocation site and the agencies or agency heads physically relocated at HIGHPOINT.

5. One "on-line" teletype crypto device using crypto rotors and referred to as the "Red Line Teletype" is installed in the code room of the Academy. This device allows reception or transmission, but not both at the same time, of messages automatically encoded by the device, or in plain text of unclassified material, between the White House relocation site and the relocation sites of the FBI, Office of Defense Mobilization, Atomic Energy Commission, CIA, State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense. Agency heads of any two of these agencies may also use this private line system, subject to the connection being terminated without notice if the President desires to use the circuit.

6. An "on-line" receive only crypto device called the "Fox" Broadcast Machine connecting the Bureau relocation site with HIGHPOINT is installed in the code room and permits reception of messages of interest to all critical Government agency relocation sites.

#### FACSIMILE TRANSCIVER

A facsimile transceiver machine is installed in the basement of the Academy Building for the sole purpose

of transmitting and receiving diagrams, maps, photographs and illustrations between key agencies.

The equipment is calibrated for operation between the key agencies and the system is not compatible with other equipment operated commercially without prior arrangements in advance for satisfactory circuits (telephone lines) and equipment compatible with Interagency Communications System equipment. Transmissions are relayed through the central communications center at HIGHPOINT (ODM relocation site) and the equipment may be utilized for transmission to or receipt of transmissions from other facsimile holders in the ICS System.

#### Communications Precedences Used on ICS Facilities

Each message transmitted over the ICS network must be assigned one of the following precedences listed in order of their urgency:

|                            |     |
|----------------------------|-----|
| Flash-----                 | 20  |
| Emergency-----             | 30  |
| Operational Immediate----- | 30  |
| Priority-----              | 150 |
| Routine-----               | 150 |
| Deferred-----              | 150 |

The above numbers indicate the suggested maximum number of code groups or words to be used with each precedence classification.

Proper application of these precedences is extremely important and must be assigned according to the urgency of the message as defined in Interagency Communication System Manual for Staff Personnel (ICS 104) pages 6-8 through 6-9. A copy of this manual will be available to each divisional front office at the Bureau's relocation site.

#### Courier Service

The Records and Communications Division will operate a courier service with armed Special Agents in addition to the driver between Washington and the Bureau relocation site as follows:

COURIER SERVICE  
(Records Branch)

Courier service will be the responsibility of the Records Branch and the scheduled courier runs as set forth herein will be adhered to unless the dictates of the exercise require otherwise.

Each courier run is to be accompanied by an armed Special Agent guard.

DST (Daylight Saving Time)      EST (Eastern Standard Time)

Wednesday - July 16, 1958

| <u>Armed Guard</u> | <u>Leave<br/>Bureau</u>     | <u>Approximate<br/>Time Arrival<br/>Relocation<br/>Site</u> | <u>Leave<br/>Relocation<br/>Site</u> | <u>Approximate<br/>Time Arrival<br/>At Bureau</u> |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| SA Bowers          | 1:30 pm DST<br>12:30 pm EST | 2:30 pm DST<br>1:30 pm EST                                  | 3:00 pm DST<br>2:00 pm EST           | 4:00 pm DST<br>3:00 pm EST                        |
| SA McGray          | 3:30 pm DST<br>2:30 pm EST  | 4:30 pm DST<br>3:30 pm EST                                  | 5:00 pm DST<br>4:00 pm EST           | 6:00 pm DST<br>5:00 pm EST                        |
| SA Stapleton       | 6:30 pm DST<br>5:30 pm EST  | 7:30 pm DST<br>6:30 pm EST                                  | 8:00 pm DST<br>7:00 pm EST           | 9:00 pm DST<br>8:00 pm EST                        |

Thursday - July 17, 1958

|              |                             |                              | Noon                       |                               |
|--------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| SA Malmfeldt | 10:30 am DST<br>9:30 am EST | 11:30 am DST<br>10:30 am EST | 12:00 DST<br>11:00 am EST  | 1:00 pm DST<br>12:00 noon EST |
| SA Hoxie     | 1:30 pm DST<br>12:30 pm EST | 2:30 pm DST<br>1:30 pm EST   | 3:00 pm DST<br>2:00 pm EST | 4:00 pm DST<br>3:00 pm EST    |
| SA Haaser    | 3:30 pm DST<br>2:30 pm EST  | 4:30 pm DST<br>3:30 pm EST   | 5:00 pm DST<br>4:00 pm EST | 6:00 pm DST<br>5:00 pm EST    |
| SA Goll      | 6:30 pm DST<br>5:30 pm EST  | 7:30 pm DST<br>6:30 pm EST   | 8:00 pm DST<br>7:00 pm EST | 9:00 pm DST<br>8:00 pm EST    |



Friday @ July 18, 1958

|             |              |              |                |                |
|-------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|
| SA Brady    | 10:30 am DST | 11:30 am DST | 12:00 noon DST | 1:00 pm DST    |
|             | 9:30 am EST  | 10:30 am EST | 11:00 am EST   | 12:00 noon EST |
| SA Marshall | 1:30 pm DST  | 2:30 pm DST  | 3:00 pm DST    | 4:00 pm DST    |
|             | 12:30 pm EST | 1:30 pm EST  | 2:00 pm EST    | 3:00 pm EST    |

In the event files are to be moved from the Bureau to the relocation site for use of personnel participating in the exercise, they will be properly logged out of the Bureau and into the relocation site. "Loose mail" delivered between the Bureau and the relocation site will be transported in sealed envelopes and hand delivered directly to the interested official.

If it becomes necessary to provide special messenger service between the Bureau relocation site, the Justice Department relocation site and other Government agencies participating in the exercise, SAC Sloan will have a car and driver on a "stand-by" at our site. One of the firearms instructors will be utilized as a guard.

*VI. FIELD OFFICE PARTICIPATION*

### FIELD OFFICE PARTICIPATION.

All FBI field offices will participate in OPAL' 58.

All field offices will be instructed to assume a relocated status at their headquarters city space continuously from 8 A.M., EST, 7-16-58 to 12 Midnight, EST, 7-17-58, for purposes of intra-FBI testing. Field offices are being advised all intra-FBI testing will be completed by 12 Midnight, EST, 7-17-58. However, exercise play by field or regional offices of other Government agencies will continue until 4 P.M., EST, 7-18-58, and either the SAC or ASAC must be available to handle any inquiries which might originate from other Government agencies. ODM has approved our field offices assuming a relocated status at their headquarters city so as to have available records, necessary and required, for a resource-type exercise, and ODM has also approved our field office participation being limited to 7-16/17-58 as stated above.

Each SAC and ASAC will be instructed that they will be responsible for the over-all participation of their office in the exercise and that either the SAC or ASAC must be immediately available in headquarters city at all times during the period of the exercise with the exception of the development of a kidnaping, bank robbery, a major apprehension or other major case which would require the presence of the SAC or ASAC at the scene. Further, that the SAC, ASAC or other necessary members of the field chain of command should not accept speaking engagements or participate in police schools or other conferences during the period of the exercise. Also, that there must be a member of the chain of command on duty at the field office during the two days the office is in an assumed relocated status as intra-FBI problems may be directed to field offices any time during that period. In addition to members of the chain of command being available, field offices will be advised that the nature of the problems will require the availability of personnel having a knowledge of inventory records, equipment and emergency payroll matters.

Every effort will be made to use CW (code) radio for transmission of messages to field offices, thus reducing the over-all cost of the exercise as much as possible.

ODM has indicated that reports will not be required during the period of the exercise; however, it has not definitely determined the type of report which will be required subsequent to the exercise. However, there is no indication that it contemplates requiring submission of estimated cost or number of personnel participating in the exercise. Therefore, field offices, as of date of submission of this document, will not be required to submit any reports to the Bureau.

*VII. TEST EXERCISE PROBLEMS*

### INTRA-FBI TEST PROBLEMS

This section contains 40 intra-FBI test problems involving 280 field office contacts including actual availability checks of SAs in headquarters city of 18 field offices.

The problems dealing with resources, personnel, equipment, vouchers and payroll matters are to be initiated and supervised by Administrative Division personnel. The problems pertaining to communications and radioactive fall-out equipment are to be initiated and supervised by Laboratory Division personnel. Domestic Intelligence Division will initiate and supervise the problem regarding reporting activation of the FBI relocation site to the Director and the Department of Justice and ODM relocation sites which will be personally handled by Mr. Belmont, and the problems involving the actual availability check to be conducted of 18 field offices.

The first and last paragraphs of each problem contain a space after the word "Supervisor." This space is for administrative control, and the name of the supervisor responsible for initiating the problem and preparing a memorandum of the results thereof is to be inserted in the space by the official of the respective division responsible for the problem. Additionally, as a control factor so as to prevent overload on cryptographic and communications equipment and to regulate replies from field offices, the first paragraph of each problem going to a field office or field offices contains time factors showing the times between which the message is to be sent and the date on which the message is to be sent. The time and date factors should be adhered to where possible or else corresponding adjustments should be made on subsequent problems.

#### NOTE:

The Jacksonville Field Office does not have a CW (code) radio station so that all messages to Jacksonville are to be sent via coded or plain-text teletypes. If the message was previously sent to other field offices via radiogram (all radiograms are coded), then the message must go to Jacksonville via coded teletype.

All messages to the Washington Field Office will be sent via the Bureau's communication section. They will be sent from the radio station to the Bureau where they will be picked up by special messenger from the Washington Field Office, and Washington Field Office replies will be handled conversely.

A master index of each problem by consecutive number showing the times between which the problem is to be sent, the date on which sent, the time and date it was actually sent and the official responsible for the problem is set out hereafter:

| Problem Number | Times Between Which Problem Is To Be Sent | Date Problem Is To Be Sent | Time & Date Actually Sent | Responsible Official |
|----------------|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| 1.             | Immediately upon arrival at site          | 7-16-58                    |                           | Belmont              |
| 2.             | 8:30 - 8:45 a.m.                          | 7-16-58                    |                           | Mohr                 |
| 3.             | 8:30 - 8:45 a.m.                          | 7-16-58                    |                           | Mohr                 |
| 4.             | 9:00 - 9:15 a.m.                          | 7-16-58                    |                           | Mohr                 |
| 5.             | 9:15 - 9:30 a.m.                          | 7-16-58                    |                           | Mohr                 |
| 6.             | 9:15 - 9:30 a.m.                          | 7-16-58                    |                           | Mohr                 |
| 7.             | 1:00 - 1:15 p.m.                          | 7-16-58                    |                           | Mohr                 |

| <i>Problem<br/>Number</i> | <i>Times Between<br/>Which Problem<br/>Is To Be Sent</i> | <i>Date Problem<br/>Is To Be Sent</i> | <i>Problem Time &amp; Date<br/>Actually Sent</i> | <i>Responsible<br/>Official</i> |
|---------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 8.                        | 1:30 - 1:45 p.m.   | 7-16-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 9.                        | 1:30 - 1:45 p.m.   | 7-16-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 10.                       | 4:00 - 4:15 p.m.   | 7-16-58                               |  | Parsons                         |
| 11.                       | 5:00 - 5:15 p.m.   | 7-16-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 12.                       | 5:30 - 5:45 p.m.   | 7-16-58                               |  | Parsons                         |
| 13.                       | 6:30 - 6:45 p.m.   | 7-16-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 14.                       | 7:00 - 7:15 p.m.   | 7-16-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 15.                       | 7:30 p.m.  | 7-16-58                               | (Availability<br>Checks)                         | Belmont                         |
| 16.                       | 8:30 - 8:45 a.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |



| <i>Problem<br/>Number</i> | <i>Times Between<br/>Which Problem<br/>Is To Be Sent</i> | <i>Date Problem<br/>Is To Be Sent</i> | <i>Time &amp; Date<br/>Actually Sent</i> | <i>Responsible<br/>Official</i> |
|---------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 17.                       | 8:30 - 8:45 a.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 18.                       | 8:30 - 8:45 a.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 19.                       | 8:45 - 9:00 a.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 20.                       | 8:45 - 9:00 a.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 21.                       | 9:00 - 9:15 a.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 22.                       | 9:30 - 9:45 a.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 23.                       | 1:00 - 1:15 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |

| <i>Problem<br/>Number</i> | <i>Times Between<br/>Which Problem<br/>Is To Be Sent</i> | <i>Date Problem<br/>Is To Be Sent</i> | <i>Time &amp; Date<br/>Actually Sent</i> | <i>Responsible<br/>Official</i> |
|---------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 24.                       | 1:00 - 1:15 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 25.                       | 1:15 - 1:30 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 26.                       | 1:30 - 1:45 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 27.                       | 5:00 - 5:15 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 28.                       | 5:00 - 5:15 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 29.                       | 5:15 - 5:30 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 30.                       | 5:30 - 5:45 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 31.                       | 5:30 - 5:45 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |

| <i>Problem<br/>Number</i> | <i>Times Between<br/>Which Problem<br/>Is To Be Sent</i> | <i>Date Problem<br/>Is To Be Sent</i> | <i>Time &amp; Date<br/>Actually Sent</i> | <i>Responsible<br/>Official</i> |
|---------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 32.                       | 5:45 - 6:00 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Parsons                         |
| 33.                       | 5:45 - 6:00 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Parsons                         |
| 34.                       | 6:00 - 6:15 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 35.                       | 6:00 - 6:15 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 36.                       | 6:30 - 6:45 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 37.                       | 6:45 - 7:00 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 38.                       | 7:00 - 7:15 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 39.                       | 7:00 - 7:15 p.m.   | 7-17-58                               |  | Mohr                            |
| 40.                       | 7:30 p.m.  | 7-17-58 (Availability<br>Checks)      |  | Belmont                         |

TEST PROBLEM NUMBER 1

Immediately upon arrival at the relocation site, Mr. Belmont will place a call to the Director advising him we are operational and then the Department of Justice relocation site and advise the highest person in authority at that location of the exact time at which the FBI site became operational. Immediately following completion of these calls, Mr. Belmont will place a call to the communications center at HIGHPOINT and advise the official in charge of that location of the exact time the FBI site became operational.

NOTE:

ODM instructions are that relocation sites are to be operational by 8:30 A.M., EST, 7-16-58.

|                       |                |       |
|-----------------------|----------------|-------|
| Director              | Time Called    | EST   |
|                       | Person Advised | _____ |
| Department of Justice | Time Called    | EST   |
|                       | Person Advised | _____ |
| HIGHPOINT (ODM)       | Time Called    | EST   |
|                       | Person Advised | _____ |

TEST PROBLEM NO. 2

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 8:30 a.m. and 8:45 a.m. on 7-16-58.

Immediately after arrival at the Bureau relocation site a communication will be dispatched to all field offices. This will simulate instructing the field to continue employees on twelve-hour duty status, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week until further notice. The field is being instructed to reply within four hours, furnishing inventory of surviving employees who are able to carry on essential operations and to give employee needs. The following message will be sent by radiogram to all field divisions except Jacksonville\*, including territorial divisions:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 2. UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE SIMULATE CONTINUING OFFICE ON TWENTY-FOUR HOUR, SEVEN DAY BASIS, ALL PERSONNEL SCHEDULED ON TWELVE-HOUR SHIFTS (EIGHT TO EIGHT SHIFTS). ALL ANNUAL LEAVE STILL SUSPENDED; AGENTS ARMED ON DUTY; STATUTORY OVERTIME RATES FOR NON-AGENTS. BASED ON DEAD AND INJURED FIGURES SUPPLIED TO YOU, SURAD IMMEDIATELY FIFTY WORDS OR LESS INVENTORY ON SURVIVING EMPLOYEES YOUR ENTIRE TERRITORY GIVING LOCATIONS AND BREAKDOWN BY AGENTS, INVESTIGATIVE CLERKS, SPECIAL EMPLOYEES, STENOGRAPHERS, RADIO PERSONNEL AND ALL OTHERS; SHOW NUMBER ABLE TO WORK; NUMBER CURRENTLY DISABLED YOU ESTIMATE CAN RESUME DUTY IN TEN DAYS; WHETHER YOU CAN MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS

WITH EXISTING PERSONNEL BEARING IN MIND BUREAU'S OVER-ALL  
CASUALTIES. IF NOT, SPECIFY MINIMUM NEEDS. EXERCISE  
OPAL 58"

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare memorandum  
from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed  
and summarizing results.

\*Send to Jacksonville by teletype.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 3

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 8:30 a.m. and 8:45 a.m. on 7-16-58.

This problem simulates the preparation of vouchers for travel expenses on Standard Form 1012 and the scheduling for payment on Standard Form 1166. The problem assumes that the Treasury Department has instructed its territorial disbursing offices to handle payment of 1012 vouchers directly with Federal field agencies submitting schedules for payment. The problem will simulate the action which would be taken (SAC Letter No. 56-25, dated 5-1-56) under actual conditions, and the following radiogram will be sent to Albuquerque and Atlanta divisions:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 3. ACTUALLY PREPARE FIVE VOUCHERS ON STANDARD FORM 1012 COVERING REIMBURSABLE EXPENSES INCURRED DURING PREVIOUS MONTH BY AGENT PERSONNEL. ACTUALLY PREPARE VOUCHER AND SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS, STANDARD FORM 1166, AND SIMULATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH NEAREST DISBURSING OFFICE OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT FOR PAYMENT. VOUCHERS TO BE PROPERLY AUDITED, AND ALL COPIES FORWARDED BUREAU VIA MAIL BY 7-22-58, ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, BUPLANS DESK. SURADIOGRAM WITHIN FOUR HOURS TIME REQUIRED TO PROCESS VOUCHERS AND SIMULATE CONTACT WITH DISBURSING OFFICE. DO NOT CONTACT DISBURSING OFFICE. EXERCISE OPAL 58"

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 4

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 9:00 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. on 7-16-58.

The Albany and Butte field offices have suffered serious depletion of personnel. The area in which the field offices are located has received bomb damages, but is not contaminated. These offices have also suffered losses in personnel. The purpose of this problem is to determine whether these offices have recovered or accounted for all badges and credentials from agent personnel and whether all ~~confidential~~ manuals have been accounted for or destroyed. The following message will be sent by radiogram to the following two field offices: Albany and Butte.

"EXERCISE OPAL '58. TEST PROBLEM 4.

BASED ON PREVIOUS ADVICE RE DAMAGES TO AREA,  
SURAD IN THIRTY WORDS OR LESS IN FOUR HOURS  
WHETHER ALL BADGES AND CREDENTIALS OF AGENT  
PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR. ALSO ADVISE  
WHETHER ALL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MANUALS HAVE BEEN  
ACCOUNTED FOR THROUGH KNOWN DESTRUCTION OR  
ARE OTHERWISE IN SAFE CUSTODY. ADVISE STEPS  
BEING TAKEN TO LOCATE MISSING BADGES, CRE-  
DENTIALS OR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MANUALS TO PREVENT  
FALLING INTO IMPROPER HANDS AND RESULTING  
WRONGFUL USE. EXERCISE OPAL '58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.



TEST PROBLEM NO. 5

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 9:15 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. on 7-16-58.

This problem assumes that in certain field office areas practically all office machines have been lost during attack phase. It is assumed that office machines are not available from other field offices and it will be necessary to obtain this type equipment from commercial sources. This problem will simulate the action which would be taken under actual conditions and the following radiogram will be sent to Buffalo and Cincinnati field offices:

"EXERCISE OPAL '58. TEST PROBLEM 5. BASED ON PREVIOUS DAMAGE INFORMATION GIVEN YOU, SURAD NOT TO EXCEED THIRTY WORDS WITHIN THREE HOURS FOLLOWING CONCERNING TYPEWRITERS AND DICTAPHONES: NUMBER DAMAGED MACHINES REPAIRABLE LOCALLY AND STEPS TAKEN TO HANDLE; ALSO, SPECIFIC STEPS TAKEN TO FILL REMAINING NEEDS BY LOCAL PROCUREMENT; SPECIFY NEEDS FOR REMAINING ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS. EXERCISE OPAL '58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 6

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 9:15 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. on 7-16-58.

In the immediate postattack period, widespread devastation and the implications of fallout will make it necessary to rely heavily on State and local initiative to meet transportation problems. The direction of local transportation activities will be assumed by State and local governments upon receipt of tactical warning. This problem assumes that many of the automobiles have been knocked out and local civil defense authorities have commandeered all automotive equipment. This message will be sent by radiogram to Detroit and Kansas City field offices.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 6. BASED ON PREVIOUS DAMAGE INFORMATION GIVEN YOU, SURAD NOT TO EXCEED THIRTY WORDS WITHIN FOUR HOURS NUMBER OF OPERABLE AUTOMOBILES, NUMBER LOCALLY RESTORABLE TO OPERABLE CONDITION AND ESTIMATE MINIMUM ADDITIONAL NEEDS FOR ESSENTIAL OPERATING PURPOSES. ASSUME CIVIL DEFENSE AUTHORITIES HAVE COMMANDEERED ALL OTHER AUTOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT. ADVISE RESULTS OF SIMULATED CONTACT WITH CDA TO MEET ESSENTIAL REMAINING NEEDS. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 7

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 1:00 p.m. and 1:15 p.m. on 7-16-58.

After arrival at the Bureau relocation site a communication will be dispatched to all field offices to determine extent of damage suffered to office facilities and steps taken to secure needed space. It is assumed for the purposes of this problem that the United States has received serious damage on a nation-wide basis from a nuclear attack and the purpose of this problem is to determine the extent of the damages incurred by individual field offices and their capacity to continue operation. The field will be instructed to reply to this message within 4 hours setting forth requested information. The following message will be sent by radiogram to all field divisions except Jacksonville\*, including territorial divisions.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 7. BASED ON PREVIOUS ADVICE RE DAMAGE YOUR AREA, SURAD IN FORTY WORDS OR LESS WITHIN FOUR HOURS INVENTORY OF OFFICE SPACE YOUR HEADQUARTERS AND RESIDENT AGENCIES SHOWING PERCENTAGE OPERABLE, WHERE LOCATED, AND WHERE EXISTING FACILITIES INADEQUATE, STEPS BEING TAKEN TO SECURE NEEDED SPACE. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

\* Send to Jacksonville by teletype.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 8

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m. on 7-16-58.

This problem assumes that in certain field office areas local procurement of office supplies from GSA is impossible. The field is being instructed to simulate contacting local sources to obtain certain supplies and to simulate payment for same. This problem will simulate the action which would be taken under actual conditions and the following radiogram will be sent to Milwaukee and Norfolk field offices.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 8. ASSUME NEEDED OFFICE SUPPLIES NOT AVAILABLE FROM LOCAL GSA REGION. SIMULATE AUTHORITY GRANTED TO PURCHASE LOCALLY IN THE OPEN MARKET TWENTY REAMS TYPING PAPER, TEN BOXES CARBON PAPER, FIFTY TYPEWRITER RIBBONS. SIMULATE UTILIZING IMPREST FUND UP TO FIFTY DOLLARS IF CASH PAYMENT REQUIRED. OTHERWISE USE FIELD PURCHASE FORM IF PRACTICAL. SURAD NOT OVER TWENTY WORDS WITHIN THREE HOURS ACTION TAKEN. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 9

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m. on 7/16/58.

This problem simulates instructions from the Bureau to the field to contact all National Academy graduates in their territory to determine their availability to accept immediate temporary appointment as Agents. The situation assumes that recruitment of Agent personnel is critical and SACs are being instructed to furnish the Bureau the number of National Academy graduates who might accept immediate temporary appointments as Special Agents. This message will be sent by radiogram to the following three field offices: Houston, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 9. RECRUITMENT.

UNLESS REASON TO CONTRARY EXISTS, SIMULATE CONTACTING THROUGH APPROPRIATE SUPERIORS ALL NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATES IN GOOD STANDING WITHIN YOUR TERRITORY TO ASCERTAIN AVAILABILITY FOR IMMEDIATE PROBATIONARY APPOINTMENTS INDEFINITE DURATION AS SPECIAL AGENTS. ASSIGNMENT WHEREVER SERVICES NEEDED. SURAD BUREAU WITHIN SIX HOURS TOTAL GRADUATES YOUR AREA AND NUMBER ASSUMED AVAILABLE AS INDICATED. EXERCISE OPAL 58"

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 10  
(LAB)

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 4:00 p.m. and 4:15 p.m. on 7-16-58.

This problem assumes that the Honolulu Office is unable to operate radio facilities from headquarters city. Since the Honolulu Office has radio facilities permanently installed at its relocation site, Honolulu will be instructed to establish contact from the relocation site using the emergency radio equipment for that purpose. This equipment is installed and ready to go and no excessive effort will be required for this exercise. The following message will be sent by radiogram to the Honolulu Office:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 10. ASSUME YOUR  
CW RADIO FACILITIES HEADQUARTERS CITY INOPERATIVE.  
ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH SAN DIEGO AT 0200 GMT USING  
EMERGENCY RADIO EQUIPMENT AT YOUR RELOCATION SITE  
AND REPORT RESULTS. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum for the Director advising that the above problem has been completed and setting forth the results thereof.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 11

Supervisor\_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 5:00 p.m. and 5:15 p.m. on 7/16/58.

Certain field offices have suffered serious depletion of personnel. Need for additional personnel of all clerical categories is critical. This problem simulates instructions from the Bureau to four field offices suffering light damages and casualties to advise Bureau what personnel can be spared for immediate assignment to other offices more seriously affected. SACs will have two hours to furnish the Bureau the number and positions of clerical employees who can be transferred. This message will be sent by radiogram to the following four field offices: Mobile, Richmond, San Antonio and Savannah.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 11. IN VIEW  
OF LIGHT CASUALTIES YOUR CLERICAL FORCE, SURAD WITHIN  
TWO HOURS SIMULATED IDENTITIES OF THREE CLERICAL  
PERSONNEL YOUR DIVISION IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR  
EMERGENCY TRANSFER TO DEPLETED DIVISIONS GIVING  
EARLIEST DEPARTURE DATE AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION  
AVAILABLE. ADVISE POSITIONS EACH CAN FILL. EXERCISE  
OPAL 58"

Supervisor\_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 12  
(LAB)

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between  
5:30 p.m. and 5:45 p.m. on 7-16-58.

This problem assumes that certain field offices have reason to believe that their areas are possibly contaminated by radioactivity. The purpose of the problem is to furnish Bureau headquarters with information concerning the degree of radioactivity at the field's relocation site. The following radiogram will be sent to the following field offices: Birmingham and Boston.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 12. ASSUME YOUR AREA  
MAY BE CONTAMINATED BY RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT. YOUR OFFICE  
INSTRUCTED TO CHECK AND USE RADTEK SURVEY METERS. SURADIOGRAM  
TO BUREAU RELOCATION SITE ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED. ALSO SEND  
SIMULATED READING WITH LOCATION WHERE READING MADE. EXERCISE  
OPAL 58"

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum for  
the Director advising that the above problem has been completed and  
setting forth the results thereof.



TEST PROBLEM NO. 13

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 6:30 p.m. and 6:45 p.m. on 7/16/58.

This problem simulates instructions from the Bureau to the field to process clerical applicant eligibility lists and to determine availability of suitable applicants to accept temporary appointments. The situation assumes that recruitment for local needs is critical and the Bureau is authorizing SACs to make temporary clerical appointments from eligibility lists. The field offices under this situation will have to notify the Bureau the positions of three applicants offered temporary appointments and the number that is needed (assume ten per cent clerical force incapacitated) to fill local requirements, plus the number available for assignment elsewhere. This message will be sent by radiogram to the following three field offices: New York City, San Francisco, and Oklahoma City.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 13. RECRUITMENT - ASSUME TEN PER CENT CLERICAL FORCE DEPLETED. SIMULATE PROCEDURES TO CONTACT SUITABLE CLERICAL APPLICANTS ON ELIGIBILITY LIST. SIMULATE OFFERING TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS YOUR DIVISION AS NEEDED AND ASSUME WILLINGNESS OF OTHERS TO ACCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS IN OTHER DIVISIONS. SURAD BUREAU WITHIN FOUR HOURS ACTUAL TOTAL NUMBER ON LIST, POSITIONS OF THREE APPLICANTS ASSUMED ACCEPTING APPOINTMENT YOUR DIVISION, NUMBER ADDITIONAL NEEDED YOUR DIVISION, AND NUMBER ASSUMED AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT ELSEWHERE. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 14

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 7:00 p.m. and 7:15 p.m. on 7-16-58.

The Dallas and Indianapolis field offices have suffered serious depletion of personnel. The area in which the field offices are located has received bomb damages, but is not contaminated. There is an urgent need for additional clerical personnel. For purposes of this problem, it will be assumed that the minimum age requirement for clerical employees is to be lowered from 17 years to 16 years and the existing prohibition against employment of students as part-time clerical employees is lifted. Authority is being granted the SACs of these offices to recruit qualified students for part-time clerical employment of not less than four hours per day and the SACs are being instructed to advise the Bureau of two positions to be filled by recruiting part-time clerks and estimated availability of applicants. This message will be sent by radiogram to the following two field offices: Dallas and Indianapolis.

"EXERCISE OPAL '58. TEST PROBLEM 14. ASSUME THAT EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY MINIMUM AGE REQUIREMENT FOR CLERICAL EMPLOYEES IS SIXTEEN YEARS. AUTHORITY HEREBY GRANTED TO SIMULATE RECRUITING QUALIFIED STUDENTS FOR PART-TIME CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT OF NOT LESS THAN FOUR HOURS PER DAY YOUR OFFICE. WITHIN THREE HOURS SURAD TWO POSITIONS TO BE FILLED AND ESTIMATED NUMBER APPLICANTS AVAILABLE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. EXERCISE OPAL '58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 15

The following telephone message will be directed to each office listed below at the time indicated:

"EXERCISE OPAL '58. TEST PROBLEM 15. YOU ARE TO IMMEDIATELY CONDUCT AN ACTUAL AVAILABILITY CHECK OF ALL AGENTS IN DUTY STATUS AT HEADQUARTERS CITY AND IMMEDIATELY UPON COMPLETION REPORT TO THE BUREAU RELOCATION SITE BY TELEPHONE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:

"ONE. TIME YOU RECEIVED THIS MESSAGE FROM BUREAU RELOCATION SITE.

"TWO. NUMBER OF AGENTS IN DUTY STATUS AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS CITY AND TIME REQUIRED TO CONTACT FIFTY PERCENT OF THEM.

"THREE. TIME REQUIRED TO CONTACT ALL AGENTS IN DUTY STATUS AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS CITY.

"FOUR. NUMBER OF AGENTS IN DUTY STATUS REQUIRING MORE THAN ONE CALL TO CONTACT BECAUSE AGENTS PHONE WAS NOT ANSWERED.

"FIVE. TIME FIRST ATTEMPT TO CONTACT BUREAU RELOCATION SITE WAS MADE. EXERCISE OPAL '58."

Below is a list of field offices, the times contacts will be made instituting the availability checks. Upon completion of the checks the supervisor instituting the contact will have the responsibility of preparing an appropriate memorandum for the Director's information.

July 16 - Wednesday

| <i>Time</i>    | <i>Office</i>    | <i>Supervisor</i> |
|----------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 7:30 p.m. EST  | Washington Field |                   |
| 8:30 p.m. EST  | Chicago          |                   |
| 9:30 p.m. EST  | Dallas           |                   |
| 9:30 p.m. EST  | Kansas City      |                   |
| 9:30 p.m. EST  | Little Rock      |                   |
| 9:30 p.m. EST  | Omaha            |                   |
| 10:30 p.m. EST | Albuquerque      |                   |
| 10:30 p.m. EST | San Diego        |                   |
| 10:30 p.m. EST | San Francisco    |                   |

NOTE: Times are scheduled so that it will be 8:30 p.m., local time at the receiving field office.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 16

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 8:30 A.M. and 8:45 A.M. on 7/17/58.

This problem simulates operational matters in the preparation and handling of payrolls between SAC's and the nearest disbursing office of the Treasury Department. SAC's will handle this matter as instructed in SAC Letter No. 56-25, dated 5/1/56, and supplemental sheets of instructions dated 6/18/57. The problem assumes that the Treasury Department in Washington has delegated authority to its territorial disbursing offices to handle the field payroll schedules of Federal agencies. For purpose of this test problem, five Agents and five clerical employees assigned to each office will be involved.

This problem will simulate the action which would be taken under actual conditions, and the following radiogram will be sent to all field divisions except \* Jacksonville, including Territorial divisions:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 16. ACTUALLY PREPARE PAYROLL SCHEDULE COVERING FIVE AGENTS AND FIVE CLERKS (THREE HAVING CSC RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS AND TWO HAVING SOCIAL SECURITY DEDUCTIONS). USE EMPLOYEES HAVING EMPLOYEE NUMBERS WITH LOWEST NUMERICAL VALUE. BASE PAYROLL ON ACTUAL TIME AND ATTENDANCE CARDS OF EMPLOYEES AND IDENTIFY THE PAY PERIOD BY NUMBER. SIMULATE ARRANGEMENT WITH NEAREST REGIONAL DISBURSING OFFICE OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT TO FORWARD SCHEDULE TO THAT OFFICE FOR PAYMENT. ACTUALLY PREPARE REQUIRED DOCUMENTS DESIGNATING TWO SPECIAL AGENTS TO ACT AS CERTIFYING OFFICERS AND TWO RESPONSIBLE EMPLOYEES TO ACT AS RECEIVING OFFICERS. SURADIOGRAM WITHIN FOUR HOURS TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE EXERCISE AND FORWARD PAYROLL SCHEDULE AND OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS VIA MAIL TO BUREAU ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, BUPLANS DESK, BY 7/22/58. EXERCISE OPAL 58"

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

\* Send to Jacksonville by teletype.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 17

Supervisor\_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 8:30 A.M. and 8:45 A.M. on 7/17/58.

This problem simulates a situation in which clerks who are assigned to field offices and are members of the Ready Reserve (includes National Guard) may expect to receive instructions from the local commanding officers of their respective Reserve units to report promptly for mobilization assignment in the Armed Forces; also Selective Service inductions being accelerated. This problem assumes existence of a national emergency caused by hostile action against the United States by another nation. The Bureau is requiring two field offices to advise the number of clerks in each affected category and number anticipated would be lost through call to active duty in each of next three weeks. This problem will be sent by radiogram to the Baltimore and Chicago field offices.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 17. ASSUME READY RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD WILL BE MOBILIZED ON SELECTIVE SPECIALTY BASIS, ALSO SELECTIVE SERVICE INDUCTIONS ACCELERATED. SURAD WITHIN TWO HOURS ACTUAL NUMBER CLERKS IN EACH AFFECTED GROUP AND ESTIMATED LOSSES THROUGH CALL TO ACTIVE DUTY WITHIN EACH OF NEXT THREE WEEKS. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor\_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 18

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 8:30 A.M. and 8:45 A.M. on 7/17/58.

This problem assumes resident agency is to be established in city formerly worked from another resident agency. No office space is available. The problem will simulate action to be taken to secure adequate space for Resident Agents' use, since they are either single or do not have their families with them. This message will be sent by radiogram to the Newark and Pittsburgh field offices:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 18. ASSUME RESIDENT AGENCY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN CITY FORMERLY COVERED BY ANOTHER RESIDENT AGENCY. NO OFFICE SPACE AVAILABLE. ALL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE SINGLE OR DO NOT HAVE FAMILIES WITH THEM. SIMULATE SECURING SPACE FROM WHICH RESIDENT AGENTS CAN OPERATE. SURAD WITHIN FOUR HOURS ACTUAL CITY AND BUILDING TO BE UTILIZED. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 19

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 8:45 A.M. and 9:00 A.M. on 7/17/58.

This problem assumes there is no available garage space at the relocated headquarters city. Office is to simulate the action to be taken to provide storage and protection of automotive equipment in its division. This message will be sent by radiogram to the following two field offices: Knoxville and Little Rock.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 19. ASSUME GARAGE SPACE NOT AVAILABLE AT RELOCATED HEADQUARTERS CITY. SIMULATE STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO PROVIDE STORAGE AND PROTECTION OF YOUR AUTOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT. SURAD NOT TO EXCEED TWENTYFIVE WORDS WITHIN FOUR HOURS SIMULATED ACTION TAKEN. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.



TEST PROBLEM NO. 20

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 8:45 A.M. and 9:00 A.M. on 7/17/58.

During immediate postattack period local governments are responsible for providing for the best use of available manpower and for determining manpower requirements for survival purposes. After national controls can be established, the Office of Defense Mobilization will be responsible for decisions as to civilian manpower requirements and utilization of manpower for postattack production. During the emergency, U. S. Employment Service and State and local employment offices will be responsible for recruiting manpower for civil defense purposes.

It is assumed that Federal employees in depleted areas are being recruited by civil defense authorities. This message will be sent by radiogram to the Charlotte and Louisville field offices:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 20. ASSUME FEDERAL EMPLOYEES YOUR AREA BEING RECRUITED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PURPOSES AND YOUR EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. BUREAU'S POSITION IS THAT ALL FBI EMPLOYEES NECESSARY TO FULFILL FBI RESPONSIBILITIES. SURAD WITHIN THREE HOURS IN NOT MORE THAN TWENTY WORDS STEPS BEING TAKEN TO INSURE YOUR EMPLOYEES NOT RECRUITED. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 21

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 9:00 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. on 7/17/58.

This problem assumes that in several field offices a number of employees in each field office are able to continue work although they have been injured in various degrees and require attention such as dressings to be changed and hypodermics to be administered under doctors' orders. Also assumes no nurses available through recruitment or otherwise for this purpose. This problem would simulate the action which would be taken under actual conditions to perform these duties by employees with previous medical training, prior military service as medical aides or corpsmen or specialized training in self-administered hypodermic injections. This message will be sent by radiogram to the following two field offices: San Diego and Seattle.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 21. BASED ON PREVIOUS ADVICE OF DAMAGE YOUR AREA SIMULATE NEED FOR SERVICES YOUR OFFICE TO CHANGE DRESSINGS AND ADMINISTER HYPODERMICS UNDER DOCTORS' ORDERS TO ENABLE SOME OF YOUR INJURED PERSONNEL TO CONTINUE FUNCTIONING. ALSO ASSUME NO NURSES AVAILABLE THROUGH RECRUITING OR OTHERWISE. WITHIN THREE HOURS SURAD NOT TO EXCEED THIRTY WORDS. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AVAILABLE YOUR OFFICE TO PERFORM SUCH SERVICES, QUALIFYING EXPERIENCE AND ADEQUACY. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 22

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 9:30 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. on 7/17/58.

This problem assumes that one field office area has been seriously depleted and has suffered heavy damage to available water supplies and sewer systems with the result that a heavy incidence of typhoid fever has resulted in the area. It is necessary that ten agents be transferred from another field office into this field office in order to handle the existing work load. It will be necessary that these agents being transferred receive typhoid inoculations prior to such transfer. The following radiogram will be sent to Washington Field office:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 22. ASSUME URGENT NEED EXISTS FOR SERVICES OF TEN AGENTS IN BALTIMORE OFFICE BUT THAT TYPHOID EPIDEMIC CONDITIONS ARE PREVALENT IN THAT OFFICE AREA. PRIOR TO TRANSFER OF TEN AGENTS FROM YOUR OFFICE TO BALTIMORE OFFICE, IMMEDIATELY INSTITUTE STEPS FOR THEM TO SECURE TYPHOID INOCULATIONS. SURAD NOT TO EXCEED THIRTY WORDS WITHIN TWO HOURS SIMULATED STEPS TAKEN TO SECURE SUCH INOCULATIONS AND ADVISE WHEN INOCULATIONS WILL BE RECEIVED AND EARLIEST DATE AGENTS CAN REPORT ON TRANSFER. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 23

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 1:00 P.M. and 1:15 P.M. on July 17, 1958.

This problem simulates instructions from the Bureau to the field to process pending Agent investigations and to determine availability of suitable applicants to accept immediate temporary appointments. The situation assumes that recruitment for Agent personnel is critical and Bureau is authorizing SACs to make temporary Agent appointments from pending investigations. The field offices under this situation will have three hours to notify the Bureau number of Agent applicants offered temporary appointments and the number it is anticipated will be appointed during the next twenty-four hours. The following message will be sent by radiogram to all field divisions except Jacksonville\*, including Territorial divisions:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 23. RECRUITMENT -  
SIMULATE PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY  
ALL SUITABLE AGENT APPLICANTS NOW UNDER INVESTIGATION.  
WHERE INVESTIGATION COMPLETED AND SATISFACTORY,  
SIMULATE OFFERING PROBATIONARY APPOINTMENTS FOR  
ENTRY ON DUTY AND OATH YOUR OFFICE SUBJECT TO LATER  
TRAINING ORDERS AND ASSIGNMENT. SURAD NOT TO EXCEED  
TWENTY WORDS WITHIN THREE HOURS ACTUAL NUMBERS SA  
APPLICANTS UNDER INVESTIGATION, THOSE IMMEDIATELY  
AVAILABLE, THOSE BEING APPOINTED, AND ESTIMATED  
ADDITIONAL NUMBER APPOINTEES. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

\*Sent to Jacksonville by teletype.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 24

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 1:00 p.m. and 1:15 p.m. on 7-17-58.

This problem assumes that certain field office areas have suffered the loss of the majority or all of their first aid equipment. With this critical shortage existing, the offices being contacted are requested to secure available first aid supplies in their areas which are not otherwise available through Federal Civil Defense Administration stockpile. The supplies are to be secured from any possible source so that they may be sent by the securing offices to those field offices having little or no first aid supplies. The problem simulates action which would be taken under actual conditions by offices with possible available supplies to secure such supplies and send them to offices badly needing them. The following radiogram will be sent to Salt Lake City and Springfield field offices:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 24. ASSUME CRITICAL NEED EXISTS FOR FIRST AID MATERIAL DENVER AND CHICAGO OFFICES AND AUTHORITY GRANTED TO PROCURE SUPPLIES FROM ANY SOURCE AVAILABLE SINCE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION STOCKPILE DEPLETED. BASED ON SOURCES OTHER THAN ACTUAL CONTACT SURAD BUREAU WITHIN FOUR HOURS FOUR NAMES OF ACTUAL POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS YOUR AREA, ASSUMED QUANTITY AVAILABLE, DATE AND METHOD OF SHIPMENT TO OFFICES HAVING NEED. EXERCISE OPAL 58"

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 25

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 1:15 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. on 7-17-58.

This problem assumes that in certain field office areas a number of employees suffered burn injuries and all office first aid supplies including burn ointment have been destroyed. This problem will simulate the action which would be taken under actual conditions by such an office to secure supplies of badly needed burn compound for immediate use by nurses or employees trained in first aid. The following radiogram will be sent to Denver and Miami field offices:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 25. BASED ON PREVIOUS ADVICE OF DAMAGE YOUR AREA ASSUMES NUMBER OF YOUR EMPLOYEES SUFFERED BURN INJURIES AND ALL AVAILABLE FIRST AID SUPPLIES INCLUDING BURN OINTMENT DESTROYED. SIMULATE CONTACT WITH APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS IN CHARGE OF FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION STOCKPILE PROGRAM YOUR AREA AND SECURE TWO POUNDS OF BURN OINTMENT. SURAD WITHIN THREE HOURS LOCATION OF STOCKPILE, AND RESULTS OF YOUR SIMULATED CONTACT. EXERCISE OPAL 58"

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 26

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m. on 7-17-58.

This problem assumes that in the Buffalo field office forty per cent of firearms equipment has been destroyed. Field offices outside attack area are being instructed to advise Bureau amount of firearms and ammunition that can be spared and shipped to depleted office. This problem will simulate the action which would be taken under actual conditions and the following radiogram will be sent to the Cleveland and Minneapolis field offices:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 26. SIMULATE INVENTORYING AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION AND NUMBER OF MACHINE GUNS, RIFLES, REVOLVERS, GAS GUNS THAT CAN BE SPARED FOR SHIPMENT TO DEPLETED OFFICES. SURAD NOT TO EXCEED THIRTY WORDS WITHIN FOUR HOURS APPROXIMATE AMMUNITION AND ACTUAL FIREARMS AVAILABLE FOR BUFFALO OFFICE, ALSO DATE TO BE SHIPPED AND MODE TRANSPORTATION. EXERCISE OPAL 58"

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 27

Supervisor will initiate message between 5:00 p.m. and 5:15 p.m. on 7-17-58.

This problem simulates instructions from the Bureau to the field to contact select former Special Agents presently residing within their field office territory who have volunteered their services to the Bureau during present emergency. It is assumed that the SAC knows of such former Agents in his area and their status, and the SAC is being instructed to advise the Bureau of the total number of such former Special Agents residing in his area, their simulated identities, and the number recommended for immediate temporary appointments as Special Agents. This message will be sent by radiogram to the following two field divisions: Memphis and New Haven.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 27. RECRUIT-

MENT - SUBAD WITHIN FOUR HOURS TOTAL NUMBER FORMER SPECIAL AGENTS KNOWN TO BE RESIDING IN YOUR AREA WHO HAVE OFFERED SERVICES TO BUREAU DURING EMERGENCY AND NUMBER AVAILABLE AND RECOMMENDED FOR IMMEDIATE TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT.

SIMULATE IDENTITIES SUCH FORMER AGENTS. BUREAU WILL ADVISE RE: APPOINTMENT, GRADE AND SALARY. EXERCISE OPAL 58"

Supervisor will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing the results thereof.



TEST PROBLEM NO. 28

Supervisor\_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 5:00 p.m. and 5:15 p.m. on 7-17-58.

For the purposes of this problem it is assumed the United States has received serious damage on a nation-wide basis from a nuclear attack resulting in substantial depletion of personnel and loss of certain facilities in three field divisions. Bureau desires to know types of most pressing investigative responsibilities facing certain depleted offices as result of damage suffered. Results of problem will permit Bureau to evaluate personnel and equipment needs in affected divisions. The following radiogram will be sent to the New Orleans, Portland, and Saint Louis offices:

"EXERCISE OPAL '58. TEST PROBLEM 28. BASED ON PREVIOUS ADVICE RE DAMAGE YOUR AREA, TO ENABLE BUREAU TO REDISTRIBUTE INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MOST URGENT NEEDS, SURAD NOT OVER THIRTY WORDS WITHIN FOUR HOURS FIVE MOST ESSENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES YOUR DIVISION, PLUS ESTIMATED AGENT MAN DAYS TO HANDLE. EXERCISE OPAL '58."

Supervisor\_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 29

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 5:15 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. on 7-17-58.

Certain field offices have suffered depletion of personnel. Need critical for personnel having communications and radio repair experience. This problem simulates instructions from Bureau to field authorizing direct hiring without Bureau approval on a temporary per diem basis of personnel having communications and radio repair experience. This message will be sent by radiogram to the following field offices: Omaha and Phoenix.

"EXERCISE OPAL '58. TEST PROBLEM 29. SIMULATE INITIATING INVESTIGATIONS OF FAVORABLY RECOMMENDED APPLICANTS QUALIFIED IN COMMUNICATIONS AND RADIO REPAIR. WHERE INDICES NEGATIVE AND TECHNICAL TESTS SATISFACTORY AUTHORITY HEREBY GRANTED TO IMMEDIATELY OFFER TEMPORARY PER DIEM APPOINTMENTS FOR YOUR NEEDS, APPOINTEE TO BE CLOSELY SUPERVISED PENDING COMPLETE INVESTIGATION. SURAD WITHIN ONE HOUR ACTUAL NUMBER PENDING RADIO APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS. ALSO ASSUMED NUMBER APPOINTEES UNDER INSTANT AUTHORITY, WITH GRADES AND SALARIES OF EACH. EXERCISE OPAL '58"

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 30

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 5:30 P.M. and 5:45 P.M. on July 17, 1958.

This problem assumes that two field office areas have suffered extensive damage with resulting loss of many housing facilities. An urgent need exists for sending twenty additional agents into each office. Inquiry is necessary with both offices to ascertain what possible housing facilities are available to handle the transferring agents and also possibly to handle members of their immediate families. This message will be sent by radiogram to the El Paso and San Diego field offices:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 30.

BASED ON DAMAGE INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED YOU, HOUSING FACILITIES ARE BADLY DAMAGED YOUR AREA BUT IMMEDIATE NEED EXISTS FOR TRANSFERRING TWENTY AGENTS YOUR OFFICE TO HANDLE INCREASED WORK LOAD. SIMULATE CONTACTS TO ASCERTAIN WHAT HOUSING FACILITIES, TEMPORARY OR OTHERWISE, WOULD EXIST TO HANDLE NEEDS OF TRANSFERRED AGENTS. SURAD IN THIRTY OR LESS WORDS WITHIN FOUR HOURS WHETHER HOUSING WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR MEMBERS OF TRANSFERRED AGENTS' IMMEDIATE FAMILIES. SPECIFICALLY ADVISE IF MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY SHOULD ACCOMPANY AGENTS ON TRANSFER. EXERCISE OPAL 58"

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 31

Supervisor will initiate message between 5:30 P.M. and 5:45 P.M. on July 17, 1958.

For the purposes of this problem it is assumed that two field divisions have received serious damage from a nuclear attack causing severe damage to housing facilities and numerous injuries to civilian personnel. The purpose of this problem is to determine whether there is suitable housing for the families of agents assigned to these divisions and whether all members of agents' families have been accounted for and whether there are any major problems confronting these agents which might preclude their full attention to duty. The following message will be sent by radiogram to Anchorage and San Juan field offices.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 31.

BASED ON PREVIOUS DAMAGE INFORMATION GIVEN YOU, SUBAD  
WITHIN FOUR HOURS IN THIRTY WORDS OR LESS WHETHER  
ALL MEMBERS OF AGENTS' FAMILIES ASSIGNED TO YOUR  
DIVISION HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR AND WHETHER THEY  
ARE SUITABLY HOUSED. ALSO ADVISE WHETHER ANY  
MAJOR FAMILY PROBLEMS EXIST WHICH MIGHT PRECLUDE  
AGENTS' FULL ATTENTION TO DUTY AND STEPS BEING  
TAKEN TO RESOLVE SUCH. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 32  
(LAB)

Supervisor\_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 5:45 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on 7-17-58.

This problem assumes that certain field office areas have encountered a loss of electrical power which requires them to operate their CW radio station on emergency power for a period of 15 minutes. The following message will be sent by radiogram to the following field offices: Albuquerque and Knoxville

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 32. ASSUME POWER SOURCE FOR YOUR CW RADIO STATION HAS BEEN CUT OFF. OPERATE YOUR CW STATION ON EMERGENCY POWER FOR PERIOD OF FIFTEEN MINUTES AND SURADIOGRAM RE COMPLETION OF TEST TO BUREAU RELOCATION SITE. OPERATION OPAL 58."

Supervisor\_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum for the Director advising that the above problem has been completed and setting forth the results thereof.

NOTE: In connection with requesting various offices to operate their emergency generators during exercise OPAL 58, there are certain offices where building restrictions and placement of the generators dictate that we not make test runs in times other than emergency. These offices which should not be requested to make test emergency generator runs are as follows: Albany, Boston, Cleveland, El Paso, New Haven, New York, Norfolk, Philadelphia, Portland, St. Louis, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, and Seattle.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 33  
(LAB)

Supervisor\_\_\_\_\_will initiate message between  
5:45 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on 7-17-58.

This problem assumes that certain field offices have assigned personnel to perform duties in areas contaminated by radioactive fallout. The purpose of the problem is to familiarize the field office with the use of dosimeter equipment which is available to the field offices and to simulate a test of the functioning of this equipment in protecting personnel working in radioactive areas. The following message will be sent by radiogram to the following field offices: San Juan and Cincinnati.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 33. ASSUME YOUR  
PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO WORK IN RADIOACTIVE AREA. CHECK YOUR  
DOSIMETERS AND SIMULATE USE IN AREA. SURADIOGRAM SIMULATED  
READINGS TO BUREAU RELOCATION SITE. FURNISH TIME PERIOD OF  
SIMULATED EXPOSURE OF TWO AGENTS AND DOSIMETER READINGS IN  
ROENTGENS OF SIMULATED RADIATION DOSE. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor\_\_\_\_\_will prepare a memorandum for  
the Director advising that the above problem has been completed and  
setting forth the results thereof.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 34

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 6:00 p.m. and 6:15 p.m. on 7-17-58.

The Atlanta and Birmingham field offices have suffered serious depletion of personnel. The area in which the field offices are located has received bomb damages, but is not contaminated. There is an urgent need for additional clerical personnel. For purposes of this problem, it will be assumed that the minimum age requirement for clerical employees is to be lowered from 17 years to 16 years and the existing prohibition against employment of students as part-time clerical employees is lifted. Authority is being granted the SACs of these offices to recruit qualified students for part-time clerical employment of not less than four hours per day and the SACs are being instructed to advise the Bureau of two positions to be filled by recruiting part-time clerks and estimated availability of applicants. This message will be sent by radiogram to the following two field offices: Atlanta and Birmingham.

"EXERCISE OPAL '58. TEST PROBLEM 34. ASSUME THAT EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY MINIMUM AGE REQUIREMENT FOR CLERICAL EMPLOYEES IS SIXTEEN YEARS. AUTHORITY HEREBY GRANTED TO SIMULATE RECRUITING QUALIFIED STUDENTS FOR PART-TIME CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT OF NOT LESS THAN FOUR HOURS PER DAY YOUR OFFICE. WITHIN THREE HOURS SURAD TWO POSITIONS TO BE FILLED AND ESTIMATED NUMBER APPLICANTS AVAILABLE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. EXERCISE OPAL '58.

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 35

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 6:00 P.M. and 6:15 P.M. on 7/17/58.

This problem simulates a situation in which clerks who are assigned to field offices and are members of the Ready Reserve (includes National Guard) may expect to receive instructions from the local commanding officers of their respective Reserve units to report promptly for mobilization assignment in the Armed Forces; also Selective Service inductions being accelerated. This problem assumes existence of a national emergency caused by hostile action against the United States by another nation. The Bureau is requiring two field offices to advise the number of clerks in each affected category and number anticipated would be lost through call to active duty in each of next three weeks. This problem will be sent by radiogram to the Cleveland and Detroit field offices.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 35. ASSUME READY RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD WILL BE MOBILIZED ON SELECTIVE SPECIALTY BASIS, ALSO SELECTIVE SERVICE INDUCTIONS ACCELERATED. SURAD WITHIN TWO HOURS ACTUAL NUMBER CLERKS IN EACH AFFECTED GROUP AND ESTIMATED LOSSES THROUGH CALL TO ACTIVE DUTY WITHIN EACH OF NEXT THREE WEEKS. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.



TEST PROBLEM NO. 36

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 6:30 P.M. and 6:45 P.M. on 7/17/58.

During immediate postattack period local governments are responsible for providing for the best use of available manpower and for determining manpower requirements for survival purposes. After national controls can be established, the Office of Defense Mobilization will be responsible for decisions as to civilian manpower requirements and utilization of manpower for postattack production. During the emergency, U. S. Employment Service and State and local employment offices will be responsible for recruiting manpower for civil defense purposes.

It is assumed that Federal employees in depleted areas are being recruited by civil defense authorities. This message will be sent by radiogram to the Buffalo and Butte field offices:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 36. ASSUME FEDERAL EMPLOYEES YOUR AREA BEING RECRUITED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PURPOSES AND YOUR EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. BUREAU'S POSITION IS THAT ALL FBI EMPLOYEES NECESSARY TO FULFILL FBI RESPONSIBILITIES. SURAD WITHIN THREE HOURS IN NOT MORE THAN TWENTY WORDS STEPS BEING TAKEN TO INSURE YOUR EMPLOYEES NOT RECRUITED. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 37

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 6:45 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. on 7/17/58.

This problem assumes that in several field offices a number of employees in each field office are able to continue work although they have been injured in various degrees and require attention such as dressings to be changed and hypodermics to be administered under doctors' orders. Also assumes no nurses available through recruitment or otherwise for this purpose. This problem would simulate the action which would be taken under actual conditions to perform these duties by employees with previous medical training, prior military service as medical aides or corpsmen or specialized training in self-administered hypodermic injections. This message will be sent by radiogram to the following two field offices: San Francisco and Dallas.

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 37. BASED ON PREVIOUS ADVICE OF DAMAGE YOUR AREA SIMULATE NEED FOR SERVICES YOUR OFFICE TO CHANGE DRESSINGS AND ADMINISTER HYPODERMICS UNDER DOCTORS' ORDERS TO ENABLE SOME OF YOUR INJURED PERSONNEL TO CONTINUE FUNCTIONING. ALSO ASSUME NO NURSES AVAILABLE THROUGH RECRUITING OR OTHERWISE. WITHIN THREE HOURS SURAD NOT TO EXCEED THIRTY WORDS NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AVAILABLE YOUR OFFICE TO PERFORM SUCH SERVICES, QUALIFYING EXPERIENCE AND ADEQUACY. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 38

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 7:00 p.m. and 7:15 p.m. on 7/17/58.

This problem assumes that one field office area has been seriously depleted and has suffered heavy damage to available water supplies and sewer systems with the results that a heavy incidence of typhoid fever has resulted in the area. It is necessary that ten agents be transferred from another field office into this field office in order to handle the existing work load. It will be necessary that these agents being transferred receive typhoid inoculations prior to such transfer. The following radiogram will be sent to New York City:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 38. ASSUME URGENT NEED EXISTS FOR SERVICES OF TEN AGENTS IN BALTIMORE OFFICE BUT THAT TYPHOID EPIDEMIC CONDITIONS ARE PREVALENT IN THAT OFFICE AREA. PRIOR TO TRANSFER OF TEN AGENTS FROM YOUR OFFICE TO BALTIMORE OFFICE, IMMEDIATELY INSTITUTE STEPS FOR THEM TO SECURE TYPHOID INOCULATIONS. SURAD NOT TO EXCEED THIRTY WORDS WITHIN TWO HOURS SIMULATED STEPS TAKEN TO SECURE SUCH INOCULATIONS AND ADVISE WHEN INOCULATIONS WILL BE RECEIVED AND EARLIEST DATE AGENTS CAN REPORT ON TRANSFER. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 39

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will initiate message between 7:00 P.M. and 7:15 P.M. on 7-17-58.

This problem assumes resident agency is to be established in city formerly worked from another resident agency. No office space is available. The problem will simulate action to be taken to secure adequate space for Resident Agents' use, since they are either single or do not have their families with them. This message will be sent by radiogram to the Los Angeles and Portland field offices:

"EXERCISE OPAL 58. TEST PROBLEM 39. ASSUME  
RESIDENT AGENCY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN CITY  
FORMERLY COVERED BY ANOTHER RESIDENT AGENCY.  
NO OFFICE SPACE AVAILABLE. ALL RESIDENT AGENTS  
ARE SINGLE OR DO NOT HAVE FAMILIES WITH THEM.  
SIMULATE SECURING SPACE FROM WHICH RESIDENT AGENTS CAN  
OPERATE. SURAD WITHIN FOUR HOURS ACTUAL CITY AND  
BUILDING TO BE UTILIZED. EXERCISE OPAL 58."

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Belmont advising above problem completed and summarizing results.

TEST PROBLEM NO. 40

The following telephone message will be directed to each office listed below at the time indicated:

"EXERCISE OPAL '58. TEST PROBLEM 40. YOU ARE TO IMMEDIATELY CONDUCT AN ACTUAL AVAILABILITY CHECK OF ALL AGENTS IN DUTY STATUS AT HEADQUARTERS CITY AND IMMEDIATELY UPON COMPLETION REPORT TO THE BUREAU RELOCATION SITE BY TELEPHONE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:

"ONE. TIME YOU RECEIVED THIS MESSAGE FROM BUREAU RELOCATION SITE.

"TWO. NUMBER OF AGENTS IN DUTY STATUS AT HEADQUARTERS CITY AND TIME REQUIRED TO CONTACT FIFTY PERCENT OF THEM.

"THREE. TIME REQUIRED TO CONTACT ALL AGENTS IN DUTY STATUS AT HEADQUARTERS CITY.

"FOUR. NUMBER OF AGENTS IN DUTY STATUS REQUIRING MORE THAN ONE CALL TO CONTACT BECAUSE AGENTS PHONE WAS NOT ANSWERED.

"FIVE. TIME FIRST ATTEMPT TO CONTACT BUREAU RELOCATION SITE WAS MADE. EXERCISE OPAL '58."

Below is a list of field offices, the times contacts will be made instituting the availability checks. Upon completion of the checks the supervisor instituting the contact will have the responsibility of preparing an appropriate memorandum for the Director's information.

July 17 - Thursday

| <i>Time</i>   | <i>Office</i> | <i>Supervisor</i> |
|---------------|---------------|-------------------|
| 7:30 p.m. EST | Boston        |                   |
| 7:30 p.m. EST | Buffalo       |                   |
| 7:30 p.m. EST | Cleveland     |                   |
| 7:30 p.m. EST | New York      |                   |
| 8:30 p.m. EST | Cincinnati    |                   |
| 8:30 p.m. EST | Detroit       |                   |
| 8:30 p.m. EST | Richmond      |                   |
| 8:30 p.m. EST | Savannah      |                   |
| 8:30 p.m. EST | Springfield   |                   |

NOTE: Times are scheduled so that it will be 8:30 p.m., local time at the receiving field office.

EXECUTIVE  
ORDERS

66-13013-76

OPAL AGNES

ACTION NO. 17

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-10

This is an Executive Order providing authority for the protection of savings and loan institutions during a national war emergency and the restoration of normal savings and loan operation. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board is to control the operations of all savings and loan associations in the United States, whether they are insured by a Federal agency or not.

FBI INTEREST:

There are 6,691 savings and loan associations and related bank type institutions in the United States, of which 2,876 are not insured by a Federal agency and therefore not within the Bureau's jurisdiction as to bank robberies, embezzlements, etc., at this time. This Executive Order in effect during a national war emergency would not materially affect the Bureau's work, although it would add to the number of savings and loan institutions within our jurisdiction (memorandum from Mr. Evans to Mr. Rosen dated May 22, 1958, re: Internal Security Programs to be Implemented in Event of a War-Related Emergency).

This document would slightly affect the functions of the FBI in a national emergency in that it would possibly increase investigative case load. No specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.



OPAL BARBARA

ACTION NO. 18

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-11

This is an Executive Order establishing the Federal Emergency Financial System authorizing the heads of Executive agencies to establish emergency procedures to carry on essential functions of government during a national war emergency. It authorizes the Bureau of the Budget to transfer balances of funds existing in some agencies to other agencies, based on the essential nature of the activities and programs carried on by the agencies. This action further authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to establish and maintain in readiness an emergency financial recording system for the compilation and reporting on the financial condition and operations of the government.

FBI INTEREST:

Departments and agencies participating in the exercise will assume that Congress has enacted the attached proposed emergency financial act prior to the attack. This assumption is being made in view of the fact that such legislation has been prepared and is in clearance. Congress will not presume to have passed any other such legislation prior to the attack.

It will be assumed that all funds under the emergency financial system available to the departments and agencies on July 1, 1958, i.e., the beginning of fiscal year 1959, will remain available to finance any essential functions during the existence of the emergency. To the extent that finance requirements through the exercise exceed the funds available to the department on July 1, 1958, it will be necessary that the additional funds be allocated to the department or agency by the Bureau of the Budget in accordance with the provisions of the plan. Emergency agencies will likewise assume that sufficient funds have been allocated to carry out the functions through the period of the exercise.

Departments and agencies will not be required to report to the Bureau of the Budget on their operations under this system this year. However, no restriction is placed on any internal agency exercise play of this system in which they may wish to engage.

This Executive Order basically covers what we are already prepared to do during a national war emergency. The Bureau's emergency accounting procedures are not affected, and these procedures follow along with this Executive Order. No specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL CAROLINE

ACTION NO. 19

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-12

This is an Executive Order authorizing additional departments and agencies of the Executive Branch to classify information and material pursuant to Executive Order No. 10501 of November 5, 1953. The Order would in effect extend the authority to classify documents to all departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.

FBI INTEREST:

Inasmuch as this action has been prepared for use in an emergency situation, we do not believe that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC) should object. In addition, the classification program is under continuing review within the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) and is a responsibility of ICIS rather than IIC. (Memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, May 13, 1958, re: Internal Security Programs to be Implemented in the Event of a War-Related Emergency).

This is a matter being handled by the Domestic Intelligence Division.

OPAL DAISY

ACTION NO. 20

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-13

This is an Executive Order adjusting the Federal Civilian Personnel System for operation in a national war emergency, and other related matters.

FBI INTEREST:

PART ONE: DELEGATIONS

SECTION I--Delegating to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) responsibility for civilian manpower and personnel administration in the Executive branch.

The Bureau has a vital interest in this section, since it appears to convey full power and authority to the CSC regarding personnel policies and regulations in case of a national war emergency, without any indication that the Bureau would be excepted from the control of the CSC. The section authorizes the CSC to establish for the Executive branch such manpower and personnel policies and regulations as may be required for the most effective utilization of the Government's civilian manpower and to take such steps as may be necessary to assure compliance with such policies and regulations. CSC is delegated responsibility for:

- a. Administering within the Executive branch of the Government manpower policies or controls issued by a Federal agency having general jurisdiction over the manpower resources of the whole country, including the issuance of regulations implementing such policies and controls.
- b. Representing the Executive branch of the Government in its capacity as an employer before the manpower authority of the country.
- c. Coordinating and controlling civilian recruiting activities of all Federal agencies in the Executive branch in order to prevent undesirable recruitment practices and to increase the effectiveness of the total recruitment effort during the present national emergency.

d. Directing the reassignment or transfer of, or otherwise redistributing, Federal civilian employees, including the movement of employees from one agency or location to another agency or location in order to meet the most urgent needs of the Executive branch during the present national emergency, and prescribing regulations governing such redistribution.

Unless the FBI obtains an exception to the provisions of Section I, we will be seriously hampered in carrying out our responsibilities, since we would be under the control of the CSC in connection with the recruiting, transfer, assignment or re-assignment of personnel. We would have no assurance of retaining our trained people, since CSC would have the authority under Section I as it now stands to transfer or reassign any of our employees if they saw fit.

Section I as presently written would adversely affect the operations of the Bureau and, while it is of no significance insofar as Operation Alert 1958 is concerned, it is felt that we should eventually make our objection known to the Department to insure that our authority to operate independently of CSC during a war emergency is protected.

SECTION II--Delegating authority to the Civil Service Commission to promulgate, revise, or suspend Civil Service Rules and to act quickly on rules and regulations.

The FBI has no interest in this section and it would not adversely affect the operations of the Bureau.

SECTION III--Delegating authority to the Civil Service Commission and heads of agencies to make exceptions to citizenship requirements in Federal employment.

This section would be of interest to the Bureau, since it permits the hiring of noncitizens in the Executive branch of the Government when such would be in the interest of the emergency effort. This might facilitate filling some Bureau positions such as translators for difficult languages, and the like. This section would not adversely affect the operations of the Bureau, and it is not necessary to request any revision of the section through the Department.

SECTION IV--Amending Executive Order 10450 to delegate authority to the Civil Service Commission to suspend the written inquiry phase of security investigations under disaster conditions.

This section would not adversely affect the operation of the FBI and it will not be necessary to request any revision of the section through the Department.

SECTION V--Delegating authority to the Civil Service Commission to suspend investigations under the Veterans' Preference Act.

Investigations under the Veterans' Preference Act are those undertaken by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) when a veteran appeals adverse action his agency takes against him. The investigator contacts the FBI Office involved and requests certain information and copies of documents. Sometimes the request can be handled by the SAC, but usually it requires SOG intercession in the form of preparing copies of pertinent documents from the personnel file together with explanatory summary memoranda stating our position. The investigator also requests affidavits from personnel involved and the SOG arranges to secure these, reviews them for accuracy and pertinency, and finally submits them. All of this is a substantial job at the SOG and the elimination of it by suspension of all such investigations would be very helpful. Of course, the proposed Order does not provide for the suspension, it simply gives CSC the authority to suspend.

This section would not adversely affect the operations of the FBI and no contact with the Department will be necessary regarding it.

SECTION VI--Delegating authority to the Civil Service Commission to suspend the mandatory age and optional retirement provisions of the Retirement Act.

This gives CSC authority to suspend the provisions of the Retirement Act (1) requiring retirement at age 70 and (2) permitting retirement by an employee who meets the minimum retirement requirements. In the case of a clerk these requirements are age 60, and 30 years of service. In the case of a Special Agent they are age 50, and 20 years' investigative service.

Exercise by the CSC of its authority in this regard would help us maintain our staff, which would be particularly important in the Special Agent category because the vast majority of our clerks are much further away from meeting retirement eligibility.

This section would permit the Bureau to employ certain individuals who would not be eligible for employment under present circumstances due to age or physical deficiencies. This might assist in filling some vacancies within the Bureau during emergency conditions. This section does not adversely affect the Bureau's operations and it will not be necessary to contact the Department regarding it.

SECTION VII--Delegating to agency heads special authority to act in disasters.

This section authorizes the heads of Federal departments, agencies, or independent establishments in the Executive branch of the Government to take any action relating to civilian personnel administration, including action relating to compensation or other appropriate payments to employees, necessary to the effective functioning of such Governmental organizations during a period of disaster in connection with a national emergency. This section further provides that actions taken under the section shall be consistent as far as possible with merit system principles and practices of civilian personnel administration in the Federal service. Actions under this section are to be terminated as soon as conditions permit and in no event shall such actions continue beyond six months after the termination of hostilities. Records are to be kept of actions taken under this special authority.

This section, as can be seen from the above, delegates broad and sweeping power to the heads of departments and in our case to the Attorney General. In case of a national emergency we would no doubt want to obtain from the Attorney General a delegation of authority to act on certain matters in order that our operations would not be curtailed or hampered by having to constantly obtain authority from the department to act in matters being handled by the FBI. It would appear that such a delegation of authority to the Bureau could not be obtained until after the Attorney General had obtained such authority for himself by invoking the provisions of this section.

PART TWO: DIRECT ACTIONS

SECTION VIII--Suspending statutory manpower ceilings and staffing ratios.

This section would not adversely affect the operations of the Bureau, and it will not be necessary to contact the Department regarding it.

SECTION IX--Suspending the eight-hour law as to laborers and mechanics on public work essential to the national defense.

This section would not adversely affect the operations of the Bureau, and it will not be necessary to contact the Department regarding it.

SECTION X--Suspending the dual employment and dual compensation restrictions.

This section provides for the employment of retirees from the military service, by the Federal Government at full pay while at the same time they would receive full retirement benefit payments. It makes no provision for the similar treatment of civilian retirees. It would appear to be in the interest of the Bureau to suggest that the section be broadened to include civilian as well as military retirees. By so doing, the Bureau would be able to employ retired Special Agents or clerical employees at full pay and full retirement benefits in case of a national emergency.

The section as presently written would not adversely affect the operations of the Bureau but it would be more advantageous to the Bureau if it included civilian retirees. Therefore, we may desire to call this to the attention of the Department at the appropriate time.

SECTION XI--Suspending statutory limitations on rates of additional pay for service outside the continental United States.

This section does not adversely affect the operations of the FBI and it is not necessary to contact the Department regarding it.

SECTION XII--Suspending the statutory limitations on the placing of positions in grades 16, 17, and 18 of the General Schedule of the Classification Act of 1949, as amended.

This section does not adversely affect the operations of the FBI and it is not necessary to contact the Department regarding it.

SECTION XIII--Providing benefits identical to those provided by the Missing Persons Act for civilian officers and employees of the United States not now covered by the Act.

This section would, among other things, provide for the dependents of a missing civilian employee of the Federal Government to receive allowances out of the pay of the employee missing, because of direct attack, for a temporary period until the status of the missing employee is determined. This section would not adversely affect the operations of the Bureau. However, in all probability, our investigative responsibilities would be substantially increased due to false claims being made under the extension of the Missing Persons Act. Furthermore, the provisions of this section would have to be considered in connection with budgetary matters, since the salaries of missing employees would have to be set aside while at the same time additional employees would have to be hired in their places to carry on the



Bureau's work. It is not possible, of course, to determine at this time to what extent the Bureau's budget would be affected.

No contact with the Department is necessary regarding this section at this time.

SECTION XIV--Placing employees on administrative leave in a disaster.

This provision would maintain employees on the rolls in an administrative leave status while they had been relieved or prevented from reporting for duty because of disaster conditions.

This provision is good for employee morale and from an employee viewpoint is the only fair thing to do. From the employer viewpoint, it would cause work because it would require the keeping of records as to the identity of employees relieved or prevented from reporting for duty so that they could continue on the rolls in a pay status. In a national emergency we would probably not be fussy; we would keep everybody on the rolls until we received information of their death or separation for some other reason. Eventually each employee's status in this regard would have to be determined, a large but inevitable task.

This section does not adversely affect the operations of the FBI and it is not necessary to contact the Department regarding it.

SECTION XV--Providing payment for loss of annual leave over the maximum in national emergencies.

This proposal has two aspects. One is that employees should be granted annual leave to the maximum extent possible under conditions of the emergency so as to help employees maintain their morale, well-being, and productivity, and so as to keep to a minimum the amount of annual leave in excess of their ceilings. The other aspect is what to do about annual leave which would otherwise be lost because it exceeds the ceilings. This aspect contemplates that such leave would be paid for in cash, apparently at the end of each leave year.

This section does not adversely affect the operations of the FBI and it is not necessary to contact the Department regarding it.

SECTION XVI--Lengthening the work week for Federal employees.

This provision would establish a 48-hour week except where the head of department or agency finds this administratively

impracticable. CSC would have authority to establish a work week exceeding 48 hours if in the interest of the emergency effort.

Provision for a 48-hour week, presumably an 8 hour-a-day, 6-day week appears to be satisfactory particularly when coupled with CSC discretion to allow a longer work week in certain cases. It might very well be that we would want a longer work week.

This section does not adversely affect the operations of the FBI and it is not necessary to contact the Department regarding it. It should be noted, however, that in connection with a lengthened work week the overtime pay is on a graduated scale with employees in the higher grades receiving less proportionately than those in the lower grades.

SECTION XVII--Suspending procedural requirements in disciplinary actions in a disaster situation.

All procedural requirements in disciplinary actions would be suspended except a written notice to the employee of the action and the reasons for it.

The provision would depart from our present procedure only where veterans would be involved. It would presumably eliminate the requirement that the notice be 30 days in advance. It would also eliminate the necessity of writing the agent concerning the agency's final decision of his right to appeal.

This section does not adversely affect the operations of the FBI and it is not necessary to contact the Department regarding it.

SECTION XVIII--Curtailing appeals under Federal civilian personnel systems during periods of disaster.

This would suspend legal requirements for consideration or reconsideration of "pending personnel system appeals" and for the receipt of new appeals.

This is construed to refer to personnel appeals systems operating within individual agencies. Our volume of such matters is not large and the suspension would not matter much. From an administrative viewpoint, anything we can eliminate along this line is helpful, however, because it eliminates time-consuming paper work and time-consuming interviews and inquiries.

This section does not adversely affect the operations of the FBI and it is not necessary to contact the Department regarding it.

SECTION XIX--Deferring adjudication of claims to retirement fund deposits, suspending voluntary contributions to the fund, and permitting deductions from annuity payments.

No interest to the FBI.

SECTION XX--Suspending annual medical check-ups of disability annuitants.

No interest to the FBI.

SECTION XXI--Suspending the requirement for a valuation of the Civil Service retirement fund.

No interest to the FBI.

### PART THREE: SELECTIVE SERVICE DEFERMENTS

SECTION XXII--Controlling Government requests for the Selective Service deferment of Federal employees.

This section provides for the accomplishment of two main objectives:

(A). Occupational deferments would be based on the critical nature of an employee's civilian services.

(B). All deferment matters would be handled by the agencies direct with the Selective Service System through agency committees subject to the supervision of the CSC Review Committee. That would also allow the agency to deny release to employees desiring to leave the military service, such denial being subject to the employee's right to appeal to the Review Committee. The proposed system would be as satisfactory a measure as anything could be short of authorizing us to secure a blanket deferment of all of our employees. We were not able to secure blanket deferments during World War II and it is highly unlikely that such could be obtained in case of a national emergency. Therefore, to have an employee deferred it would be necessary for the Bureau to show that he occupies a key position and that his services are essential in connection with the emergency effort. We should have no difficulty under the provisions of this section in securing deferment for our Special Agents and technically trained personnel. No doubt we would want to request the Department to let us have our own agency committee and, furthermore, we should have readily available supporting documentation with regard to our key positions. The necessary action is being taken at this time to prepare such documentation regarding our key positions so that it will be readily available if and when needed. We should call these matters to the attention of the Department at the proper time.

## REMARKS

1. In view of the fact that Sections I and VII provide full power and authority to the Civil Service Commission regarding FBI personnel policies and regulations, it is felt the Bureau should consider making the above-mentioned observations known to the Department in order that consideration can be given to reviewing these sections contained in the Presidential emergency action document (Daisy) with a view to revising the language to insure that our authority to operate independently of the Civil Service Commission is protected in a real war emergency.

2. In view of the fact that Section X provides for the suspension of dual employment and dual compensation restrictions for retirees of the military service during a war emergency, it is felt that the Bureau's observations should be presented to the Department, pointing out the advantages to the Government if this particular section were revised to include civilian employees as well as military employees. The proposed change in language would permit the Bureau to employ much-needed personnel during an emergency who have previous investigative and administrative experience in the FBI, without having them forfeit their retirement benefits.

No specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL DAVID

ACTION NO. 4

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-1

This is an Executive Order suspending publication of the Federal Register and establishing an alternate system for filing and publishing Executive agency documents. The Order authorizes the President in the event of an emergency to suspend the publication of the Federal Register. This document contains executive orders, rules and regulations issued by various Government agencies in connection with their activities and operations. In the event that it is necessary for the President to suspend the publication of the Federal Register, agencies which originated the documents shall distribute them by the best means available. This distribution, in addition to distribution to the press, radio and similar means of general communications under this proposal shall send the text of such documents to all regional offices of the General Services Administration within the range of communication. Those agencies originating documents for distribution shall preserve the original documents to be filed with the Federal Register Division when the President determines that it is practical to do so after the emergency.

FBI INTEREST:

It appears that the suspension of the publication of the Federal Register will have little effect upon the Bureau, inasmuch as we seldom use the Federal Register to publish information relating to our activity. In the past six years the Bureau has never originated any document that was published in the Federal Register. Therefore the suspension of the publication of the Federal Register would have little effect on the Bureau, and in the event it was necessary for the Bureau to publish something in the Federal Register it would be necessary to follow the instructions as set forth above. This document has little effect on the functions of the FBI in a national emergency and no specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL EDWARD

ACTION NO. 5

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-2

This is an Executive Order establishing Office of Opal Resources and Operations (OORO), the Director of which will administer during a national war emergency all the functions vested in the Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization. The Director of OORO is responsible for all civil defense activities and for the direction, control, and coordination of the mobilization, allocation, and use of the nation's resources, and the stabilization and restoration of the national economy; and to establish emergency agencies which are to be activated at a time to be determined by the Director of OORO.

FBI INTEREST:

The Director of OORO has extraordinary powers for the protection of the people and property and for the full effective mobilization of the nation's resources and for the conduct of national affairs. With respect to coordination, direction and control of civilian manpower and resources of the Government during a national emergency, the Director of OORO is limited to the extent necessary to fulfill essential requirements of the military and civilian services to successfully prosecute the war effort.

This Executive Order does not adversely affect the functions of the FBI in a limited national war emergency. However, during an extended war emergency when national resources and manpower requirements become depleted and services hard to obtain, the requirements of the Bureau undoubtedly will have to be clearly and forcefully defined with OORO on a high priority basis.

No specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL FLORENCE

ACTION NO. 22

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-14

This is an Executive Order declaring the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service to be a military service and prescribing regulations therefor.

FBI INTEREST:

This document in no way affects the functions of the FBI in a national emergency, and no specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL FREDERICK

ACTION NO. 6

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-3

This is an Executive Order providing temporary national security measures. It contains, among other provisions:

(SECT. 2). Authorizing Director of Office of Opal Resources and Operations (OORO) to discharge all functions of local governments when the latter are unable or unwilling to perform essential civil functions;

(SECT. 3). Authorizing the Secretary of Defense to prescribe military areas which shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary may impose;

(SECT. 4). Temporarily suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as to persons who may be apprehended or detained under this Executive Order.

FBI INTEREST:

Suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under this Executive Order does not apply to cases coming under the primary investigative jurisdiction of the FBI. It appears that this document in no way affects the functions of the FBI in a national emergency, and no specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.



OPAL HAROLD

ACTION NO. 28

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-16

This is an Executive Order amending the Selective Service regulations to provide administrative procedure for requesting men to be inducted into the Armed Forces. It authorizes the Secretary of Defense to place with the Director of Selective Service calls for specific numbers of individuals required for induction into the Armed Forces. The document outlines how the Director of Selective Service will place such orders with the State Director of Selective Service, as well as procedures to be followed by the local boards in calling individuals to be inducted into the Armed Forces. The local boards are to fill such calls from registrants who are classified 1-A and 1-A-0. The local boards will be required to mail a "Certificate of Acceptability" at least 21 days before the fixed date of induction. This document further lists the order of services of registrant.

FBI INTEREST:

No specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958. The document in its present form appears to be of interest to the Bureau only in an informative way, revealing how the Department of Defense would increase its manpower requirements during a real national emergency. It does not appear that this Executive Order will affect the Bureau during a real national war emergency.

OPAL IRVING

ACTION NO. 27

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-15

This is an Executive Order amending the Selective Service Regulations regarding deferment of registrants because of extreme hardships to dependents. In the event of an emergency it would provide deferment for registrants by reason of extreme hardship to dependents, such as a sole surviving son of a family of which one or more sons or daughters were killed in action or died in line of duty or died as a result of injuries or disease incurred during such service.

FBI INTEREST:

The effect of this change in the Selective Service Regulations which exempts individuals from military service because of hardships is a matter in which the Bureau is not directly interested except in connection with its recruiting program. A person who is classified in this category and otherwise qualifies will be a desirable employee for the Bureau during an emergency period.

This document has little effect on the investigative and administrative operations of the Bureau during a national emergency, and no specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL JAMES

ACTION NO. 8

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-4

Executive Order for control of weather reports and coordination of civil meteorological facilities. The Secretary of Commerce shall exercise control and jurisdiction over issuance of weather reports, coordinate meteorological facilities, and shall not disclose information considered by Secretary of Defense to be of value to the enemy.

FBI INTEREST:

This document in no way affects the functions of the FBI in a national emergency, and no specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL NATHAN

ACTION NO. 10

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-5

This is an Executive Order providing for the Office of Censorship and prescribing its functions and duties.

FBI INTEREST:

Internal security aspect to be handled by Domestic Intelligence Division.

OPAL STEPHEN .

ACTION NO. 13

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-6

This is an Executive Order for the control of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone. In time of war in which the United States is engaged, or when in the opinion of the President war is imminent, the officer of the Army commanding United States troops stationed in the Canal Zone shall control operations and government of the Canal Zone.

FBI INTEREST:

This document in no way affects the functions of the FBI in a national emergency and no specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL THOMAS

ACTION NO. 14

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-7

This is an Executive Order directing the Coast Guard to operate as a service in the Navy.

FBI INTEREST:

This document in no way affects the functions of the FBI in a national emergency and no specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL VINCENT

ACTION NO. 15

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-8

This is an Executive Order to assist in the control of vessels in territorial waters of the United States and the Canal Zone. Section 4 of title II of the act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 217, 220), as amended (50 U.S.C. 191), provides: "The President may employ such departments, agencies, officers, or instrumentalities of the United States as he may deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this title."

FBI INTEREST:

This document in no way affects the functions of the FBI in a national emergency and no specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL WALTER

ACTION NO. 16

EXECUTIVE ORDER OPAL 58-9

This is an Executive Order providing authority for the protection of banking institutions during the national war emergency and the restoration of normal banking operations.

FBI INTEREST:

The FBI has jurisdiction over irregularities on the part of bank employees and robberies of all banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The FBI has no jurisdiction over state-chartered banks not insured by FDIC. In the event of an unlimited national emergency it would appear that all banks in the United States would be within our jurisdiction as to embezzlement, bank robberies, etc., as they would be operating under an agency of the Federal Government. As of 12-31-57 there were 14,130 banks in the United States, of which 726 were not insured by FDIC and are not under the Bureau's jurisdiction at this time. This document in effect during a national war emergency would not materially affect the Bureau's work, although it would add to the number of banking institutions within our jurisdiction (memorandum from Mr. Evans to Mr. Rosen dated May 23, 1958, re: Internal Security Programs to be Implemented in the Event of a War-Related Emergency).

This document would slightly affect the functions of the FBI in a national emergency in that it would possibly increase investigative case load. No specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.



PROCLAMATIONS

OPAL ALBERT

ACTION NO. 1

PROCLAMATION OPAL 58-1

Presidential Proclamation proclaiming the existence of an unlimited national emergency and a civil-defense emergency. This Proclamation provides for the marshalling of every resource of this country and its people to defend this country and its people and to defeat the enemy.

FBI INTEREST:

In a real national war emergency, the FBI will function in accordance with its current Buplans. In connection with Operation Alert 1958, the Bureau will be operating at that time under the assumption that an unlimited national emergency exists.

OPAL BERNARD

ACTION NO. 2

PROCLAMATION OPAL 58-2

Presidential Proclamation that an act of war against the United States has been committed.

FBI INTEREST:

In a real national war emergency, the FBI will function in accordance with its current Buplans. In connection with Operation Alert 1958, the Bureau will be operating at that time under the assumption that an unlimited national emergency exists.

OPAL GEORGE

ACTION NO. 7

PROCLAMATION OPAL 58-3

This is a proclamation authorizing the control of entry into and departure from the United States of all persons, both citizens and aliens.

FBI INTEREST:

Internal security aspect handled by Domestic Intelligence Division.

OPAL KATHLEEN

ACTION NO. 30

PROCLAMATION OPAL 58-6

This is a proclamation establishing the Cristobal and the Gulf of Panama maritime control areas and prescribing regulations for the control thereof.

FBI INTEREST:

This document in no way affects the functions of the FBI in a national emergency and no specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL MALCOLM

ACTION NO. 9

PROCLAMATION OPAL 58-4

This is a proclamation that the national defense requires immediate actions for military purpose with respect to communications, plant security, and vessel security.

FBI INTEREST:

Internal security aspects to be handled by Domestic Intelligence Division.

OPAL OLIVER

ACTION NO. 11

PROCLAMATION OPAL 58-5

This document is a proclamation by the President which states that the national defense requires the immediate increase in the Armed Forces by extending active duty of the members of the Armed Forces until six months after termination of war or emergency. It requires all males between the ages of 18 and 46 to register and perform military service. It authorizes the use of the Armed Forces outside the United States and territorial possessions. Any member of the Reserve may be called to active duty including the Standby Reservist unless he has been determined unavailable by the Director of the Selective Service System.

FBI INTEREST:

This proclamation will have a tremendous effect on the increase of our investigative responsibility, as it would be broadened in proportion to the number of individuals who will be required to register under the Selective Service Act. As of June 13, 1958, we were handling monthly approximately 1,500 Selective Service cases. In the event of an emergency and this proclamation was issued, the Bureau would be handling about 4,500 cases monthly. At the present time under the Selective Service Act of 1948, on and after August 20, 1922, all male employees upon reaching the age of 18 are required to register for the draft. At the present time we have 1,805 male clerical employees and 65 Agents in the age group 18 to 26. In the age group 27 to 45, we have 664 male clerical employees and 5,203 Agents. However, under the present induction the Local Boards are calling registrants for induction between the ages of 22 and 23. The effect of Presidential Action No. 11 would undoubtedly reduce the number of our male clerical employees by calling them into the Armed Forces, except those employees in key clerical positions whose deferment we would request. The Interagency Advisory Committee on Essential Activities and Critical Occupations (Committee), Department of Labor, Washington, D. C., has considered the position Special Agent a critical occupation and also the positions of cryptanalyst and electronics personnel. It is understood that this Committee will look with favor upon our request to classify as a critical occupation other key clerical personnel. At the present time, the Local Boards

are classifying our employees who are members of the Standby Reserve to determine whether they are available or nonavailable for order to active duty. In each case where an employee is classified available, the Bureau communicates with his Local Board to have them change the classification to nonavailable. This has been done in all cases up to the present time. Further, we have an agreement with the various branches of the Armed Forces whereby they will not call into active duty our Agents who are members of the Reserves. In the event of an emergency the Bureau can request the Armed Forces, if it so desires, to extend the agreement to key clerical employees who are members of the Reserves. Whether or not the Department of Defense will agree to this is a matter to be decided. At the present time we have 70 Agents who are members of the Ready Reserves, 521 Agents who are members of the Standby Reserves, and 101 Agents who are in the Retirement Reserves. The number of Agents in the Ready Reserves is decreasing daily.

No specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958. However, due to the fact that this document in its present form will affect the functions of the FBI in a real national emergency, it is recommended that consideration be given to informing the Department of Justice in writing concerning the Bureau's overall observation, with a view to revising the document in such a manner that it will prove less objectionable to our operation during a real national emergency and will provide maximum efficiency of operation under practical working conditions.



## C O N T E N T S

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MESSAGES

OPAL GERTRUDE

ACTION NO. 23

MESSAGE

This is a Presidential message to the Congress requesting the declaration of a state of war.

FBI INTEREST:

In a real national war emergency, the FBI will function in accordance with its current Buplans. In connection with Operation Alert 1958, the Bureau will be operating at that time under the assumption that an unlimited national emergency exists.

OPAL MILLY

ACTION NO. 33

MESSAGE

Message from the President requesting enactment of proposed bill to extend the benefits of the Missing Persons Act to all civilian officers and employees of the United States.

FBI INTEREST:

This action would, among other things, provide for the dependents of a missing civilian employee of the Federal Government to receive allowances out of the pay of the employee missing, because of direct attack, for a temporary period until the status of the missing employee is determined. This action would not adversely affect the operations of the Bureau. However, in all probability, our investigative responsibilities would be substantially increased due to false claims being made under the extension of the Missing Persons Act. Furthermore, the provisions of this action would have to be considered in connection with budgetary matters since the salaries of missing employees would have to be set aside while at the same time additional employees would have to be hired in their place to carry on the Bureau's work. It is not possible, of course, to determine at this time to what extent the Bureau's budget would be affected. No contact with the Department is necessary regarding this matter and no specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958.

OPAL NANCY

ACTION NO. 34

MESSAGE

This is a message from the President requesting enactment of proposed bill to give the President broad emergency powers to cope with civilian personnel problems in the Executive Branch.

FBI INTEREST:

This message requests broad powers for the President to cope with personnel problems in the Executive Branch during a national war emergency. In the absence of specific language dealing with each aspect of these powers, no evaluation can be made concerning the effect this legislation, if enacted by the Congress, would have upon the Bureau's operations.

OPAL ROBERT

ACTION NO. 32

MESSAGE

This is a document from the President requesting enactment of proposed legislation to authorize Executive actions concerning augmentation of the Armed Forces. The document requests legislation for authority to order 1,000,000 of the Reserve to active duty. Another proposed bill is designed to extend in a national emergency the appointments, enlistments, and periods of obligated service of members of the Armed Forces. It proposes legislation to authorize the induction into the Armed Forces of male persons between the ages of 18 and 46 during a national emergency so declared, plus six months thereafter. There is also a proposed bill to suspend the limitation, in time of war, of the number of members and units of the Armed Forces that can be sent outside of the territorial possessions of the United States.

FBI INTEREST:

The proposed bills are of interest to the Bureau in that they affect our investigative and administrative operations. It is noted that none of the bills proposed provide blanket exemptions for certain individuals or agencies engaged in critical civilian work. It should be pointed out that during World Wars I and II it was considered undesirable to have legislation enacted to exempt personnel of the FBI.

The comments made with respect to Opal Oliver, Action No. 11, apply to this exercise document. No specific action on the part of the FBI is indicated during Operation Alert 1958. However, due to the fact that this document in its present form will affect the functions of the FBI in a real national emergency, it is recommended that consideration be given to informing the Department of Justice in writing concerning the Bureau's over-all observation, with a view to revising the document in such a manner that it will prove less objectionable to our operation during a real national emergency and will provide maximum efficiency of operation under practical working conditions.

~~SECRET~~

U. S. Marine Corps Hospital and Dispensary, 77  
U. S. Marine Corps Base, 77

5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the  
location site as follows:

(c) The following decontamination measures could be taken  
with available equipment and personnel: (1) washing  
down of contaminated areas, (2) showering and washing for  
personnel decontamination, (3) scrubbing with water and  
detergent to decontaminate equipment, and (4) filtering  
of all incoming air into the building.

(c) Five Red-Sea survival courses (0-50 r/nr). Ten basic-  
course (0-50 r and 0-100 r) and two nuclear danger  
courses. An adequate number of copies have been  
classified to utilize and maintain this equipment.  
All Special Agents have been instructed relative to  
radiological defense. Availability of trained  
radiologists and physicians for special monitoring  
problems is insured and incorporated into the day-  
to-day operational procedures and defense plans of  
this Bureau.

6. (a) Good protection from radiological fallout.  
3. Samples for daily tests and portables for daily data.

7. (a) 335. Approximately 2 per cent.  
(c) 700.  
(b) On the basis of 1 (V) and 1 (D). See.  
2. No.  
3. Samples for daily tests and portables for daily data.

Location Site: FBI LABORATORY DIVISION  
U. S. MARINE CORPS BASE  
CANTON, MISSISSIPPI

NOV 2 1958

RECEIVED NOV 2 1958  
U. S. MARINE CORPS BASE  
CANTON, MISSISSIPPI

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In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at headquarters of this Bureau and in each official automobile. Also, certain categories of employees are trained in first aid and depending upon the requirements of this Bureau, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI after entering on duty, are offered first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training. Additionally, the Health Service of this Bureau, staffed by twelve registered graduate nurses and consisting of physical facilities such as sterilizers, refrigerators, treatment chairs, hot plates, and medications such as eye washes, nose and throat sprays, aspirin, and similar routine medications not requiring a medical prescription could be immediately dispatched to the relocation site in the event of an emergency.

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Additionally, site has an emergency diesel power plant and an emergency supply of diesel fuel.

(B) Partially Operable as of Day.  
 Operable at D+14.  
 Operable at D+30.  
 Operable at D+60.

(C) Refer to answer 6 (A) and 6 (B) above.

7. Communications facilities at the site are as follows:

Ten regular commercial and twelve special telephone lines, nine TWX's, main radio stations at Romego and Midland, Virginia, which are connected with the site through other communications facilities, and one portable transmitter machine.

8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

- 2 -

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
ALBANY FIELD OFFICE  
502 FEDERAL BUILDING  
ALBANY, NEW YORK

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: **OTESAGA HOTEL**  
**COOPERSTOWN, NEW YORK**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

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ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) **Good** protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Six~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

**Mary Imogene Dassetts Hospital  
Cooperstown, New York**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

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6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) 

|                    |            |
|--------------------|------------|
| Inoperable         | on D day.  |
| Partially Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable           | at D + 30. |
| Operable           | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are four telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE  
916 PARK AVENUE, SOUTHWEST  
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: **CHEMIST BUILDING  
NEW MEXICO INSTITUTE OF MINING  
AND TECHNOLOGY  
SOCORRO, NEW MEXICO**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

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ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) **Good** protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) **Two** Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). **Six** Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

**Dr. Vivian B. Franklin**  
**Socorro, New Mexico**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

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6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| Operable | on D day.  |
| Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable | at D + 30. |
| Operable | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are six telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
ANCHORAGE FIELD OFFICE  
FEDERAL BUILDING  
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: **ALASKA AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION  
PALMER, ALASKA**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B).

66-19012-77

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ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

**Valley Presbyterian Hospital  
Palmer, Alaska**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Partially operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are two telephone trunk lines and a CW radio telegraph (simplex) available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE  
ROOM 533  
805 PEACHTREE STREET  
ATLANTA 8, GEORGIA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~BERKELEY SCHOOLS~~  
MOUNT BERRY  
ROWE, GEORGIA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

~~SECRET~~

(YELLOW FILE COPY)

ENCLOSURE

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Two~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~Floyd Hospital, West 7th Street, Rome, Georgia~~  
~~McCall Hospital, 310 South Broad Street, Rome, Georgia~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

- ~~SECRET~~
6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Partially operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Six~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
**Dr. Samuel L. Bare, 70 West Main Street, Westminster, Maryland**  
**Emergency Hospital, West 4th Street, Frederick, Maryland**  
**Frederick Memorial Hospital, Park Place, Frederick, Maryland**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

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6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.

(B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.

(C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.

7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are three telephone lines available.

8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
BIRMINGHAM FIELD OFFICE  
330 AMERICAN GULF BUILDING  
BIRMINGHAM 3, ALABAMA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~PRIMARY SCHOOL~~  
CULLMAN, ALABAMA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

**Cullman Hospital, 300-4th Avenue, East Cullman, Alabama**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.



- ~~SECRET~~
6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| Operable | on D day.  |
| Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable | at D + 30. |
| Operable | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are two telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
BUFFALO FIELD OFFICE  
400 U.S. COURT HOUSE BUILDING  
BUFFALO 2, NEW YORK

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: HOTEL VICTORIA PEACOCK  
HAFFIELD, NEW YORK

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77  
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~~SECRET~~  
ENCLOSURE

- ~~SECRET~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

Dr. Guy Granger, Cayville, New York  
Dr. Harold Canton, Cayville, New York

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |                    |            |
|--------------------|------------|
| Inoperable         | on D day.  |
| Partially Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable           | at D + 30. |
| Operable           | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are two telephons trunk lines and one pay telephone station available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

- 3 -  
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
BOSTON FIELD OFFICE  
670 ATLANTIC AVENUE  
BOSTON 10, MASSACHUSETTS

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~DEERFIELD ACADEMY~~  
~~DEERFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS~~

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

~~SECRET~~  
ENCLOSURE

(YELLOW FILE COPY)

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Two Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

Dr. Alfred S. Johnson, Jr., Dorchester, Massachusetts

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Partially operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
Best Copy Available

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
D/772 FIELD OFFICE  
400 BIRMINGHAM BUILDING  
D/772, JONAH

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: CITY HALL  
5555 LORAIN, JONAH

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.

(B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.

(C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.

(D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). 66-19012-77

~~SECRET~~  
(YELLOW FILE COPY)

ENCLOSURE



- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Good Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Good Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
St. Joseph Hospital, Deer Lodge, Montana

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Best Copy Available

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
CHARLOTTE FIELD OFFICE  
1700 JEFFERSON BUILDING  
CHARLOTTE 9, NORTH CAROLINA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: CAMDEN DUEL IS  
DAVIDSON CONSOLID  
DAVIDSON, NORTH CAROLINA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77-48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(YELLOW FILE COPY)

ENCLOSURE

- ~~SECRET~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Good~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~One~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~Dr. William H. Koeller, Escondido, North Carolina~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Partially Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are three telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE  
212 WEST MONROE STREET  
CHICAGO 6, ILLINOIS

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY~~  
~~DE KALB, ILLINOIS~~

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

YELLOW FILE COPY

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Ten~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.

5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
**De Kalb Public Hospital, 719 South 1st Street, De Kalb, Illinois**  
**St. Mary's Hospital, 145 Park Avenue, De Kalb, Illinois**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training. Additionally, the Health Service of this office staffed by one registered graduate nurse and consisting of physical facilities such as sterilizers, refrigerators, treatment chairs, hot plates, and medications such as eye washes, nose and throat sprays, aspirin, and similar routine medications not requiring a medical prescription would be immediately dispatched to the relocation site in the event of an emergency.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Partially operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are twenty trunk lines and a switch board with six to eight trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
CINCINNATI FIELD OFFICE  
225 U.S. POST OFFICE AND COURT HOUSE BUILDING  
CINCINNATI 2, OHIO

APR 27 1958

Relocation Site: SAINT PAUL'S EVANGELICAL AND REFORMED CHURCH  
SUNDAY SCHOOL WING  
707 NORTH OHIO STREET  
SIDNEY, OHIO

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

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ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

Wilson Memorial Hospital, 915 West Michigan Street, Sidney, Ohio

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Inoperable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
CLEVELAND FIELD OFFICE  
800 STANDARD BUILDING  
CLEVELAND 19, OHIO

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: **THURSTON AIR POST #191**  
**AMERICAN LEGION**  
**FREMONT, OHIO**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee. 66-19012-77
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

YELLOW FILE COPY

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

Community Hospital, 319 Birchard Avenue, Fremont, Ohio  
Memorial Hospital, Taft Avenue, Fremont, Ohio

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Partially operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
DALLAS FIELD OFFICE  
12TH FLOOR, 1114 COMMERCE STREET  
DALLAS 2, TEXAS

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: **ELEMENTARY SCHOOL  
TEXAS STATE ORPHANS HOME  
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee. 66-19012-77
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

YELLOW FILE COPY ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

Corsicana Hospital, 200 South 12th Street, Corsicana, Texas  
Navarro Clinic Hospital, 401 West Collins Street, Corsicana, Texas

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or, sooner if warranted.
- (B) Inoperable on D day.  
Partially operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
DENVER FIELD OFFICE  
284 NEW CUSTOM HOUSE  
DENVER 9, COLORADO

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: STUDENT UNION BUILDING  
COLORADO A AND M COLLEGE  
FORT COLLINS, COLORADO

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

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ENCLOSURE

66-19012-77

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Excellent protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
Larimer County Hospital, Hospital Road, Fort Collins, Colorado.  
Student Health Service Hospital, Colorado A & M College, Fort Collins, Colorado.  
  
In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

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- ~~SECRET~~
6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| Operable | on D day.  |
| Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable | at D + 30. |
| Operable | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there is one colophone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
DETROIT FIELD OFFICE  
919 FEDERAL BUILDING  
DETROIT 26, MICHIGAN

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: UNDERGRADUATE LIBRARY  
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

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ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Ten Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
St. Joseph's Mercy Hospital, 326 North Ingalls Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan - University Hospital, 1313 East Ann Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan - Student Hospital, University of Michigan, 207 Fletcher Avenue, Ann Arbor, Michigan.  
In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

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6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Partially operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there are three telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
EL PASO, FIELD OFFICE  
202 U.S. COURT HOUSE BUILDING  
EL PASO, TEXAS

APR 27 1956

Relocation Site: GYMNASIUM  
VAN HORN HIGH SCHOOL  
VAN HORN, TEXAS

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B) <sup>Yes</sup>

66-19012-77

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ENCLOSURE



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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~One~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

Doctor Joseph H. Cannon Jr., Van Horn, Texas

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| Operable | on D day.  |
| Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable | at D + 30. |
| Operable | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
HONOLULU FIELD OFFICE  
206 DILLINGHAM BUILDING  
HONOLULU 13, HAWAII

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: BIRNHEIMER TUNNEL  
DIAMOND HEAD CRATER  
OAHU, HAWAII

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee. 66-19012-77
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

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~~SECRET~~

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) Escalation protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~The~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~The~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Cough Shore Hospital, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Partially operable on D day.  
Partially operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there are four telephono transmitters and a CW radio telegraph (Staples) available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FIELD OFFICE  
HOUSTON  
800 FEDERAL BUILDING  
HOUSTON 8, TEXAS

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: TEXAS A AND M COLLEGE  
COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). 66-19012-77

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~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

- ~~SECRET~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~Agriculture and Mechanical College Hospital,  
College Station, Texas~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

- ~~SECRET~~
6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| Operable | on D day.  |
| Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable | at D + 30. |
| Operable | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.



~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
INDIANAPOLIS FIELD OFFICE  
507 FEDERAL BUILDING  
INDIANAPOLIS 4, INDIANA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: 202 SOUTH BOWLING  
INDIANA UNIVERSITY  
BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B).

66-19012-77

YELLOW FILE COPY ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~Bloomington Hospital, 600 South Rogers Street,  
Bloomington, Indiana~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.

(B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.

(C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.

7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there is one telephone trunk line available.

8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
 JACKSONVILLE FIELD OFFICE  
 414 U.S. COURT HOUSE AND POST OFFICE BUILDING  
 JACKSONVILLE 3, FLORIDA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: MAIN ADMINISTRATION BUILDING  
 SILVER SPRING  
 SILVER SPRING, FLORIDA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

YELLOW FILE COPY

~~SECRET~~66-19012-77  
ENCLOSURE

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Good Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Good Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Monroe Memorial Hospital, 1310 South Orange Avenue,  
Orlando, Florida

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| Operable | on D day.  |
| Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable | at D + 30. |
| Operable | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there are five telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
 KANSAS CITY FIELD OFFICE  
 707 U.S. COURT HOUSE BUILDING  
 KANSAS CITY 8, MISSOURI

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: CONCEPTION COLLEGE AND SEMINARY  
 CONCEPTION JUNCTION, MISSOURI

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

YELLOW FILE COPY

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Good~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Good~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
St. Francis Hospital, Old East First Street,  
Marysville, Missouri

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.



~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| Operable | on D day.  |
| Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable | at D + 30. |
| Operable | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there are two telephone trunks in use available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

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Best Copy Available

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
MILWAUKEE FIELD OFFICE  
735 U. S. POST OFFICE CUSTOMS AND COURT HOUSE BUILDING  
MILWAUKEE 2, WISCONSIN**

JUL 27 1958

**Relocation Site: NORTHWESTERN COLLEGE  
WATERTOWN, WISCONSIN**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

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ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.
- (B) Good Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Good Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.
- (C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~Upperoon Clinic Hospital, McCullis Pike, Athens, Tennessee~~  
~~Forest Hospital, Good Washington Street, Athens, Tennessee~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Partially operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, where to one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
LITTLE ROCK FIELD OFFICE  
445 FEDERAL BUILDING  
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: QUACUMBA BAPTIST COLLEGE  
ARCADELPHIA, ARKANSAS

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). 66-19012-77

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ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

**Memorial Hospital, 1500 Pine Street, Arkadelphia, Arkansas.**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) ~~Partially operable~~ on D day.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 14.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 30.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are two telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
100 ANGELES FIELD OFFICE  
1340 WEST CITY STREET  
LOS ANGELES 17, CALIFORNIA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~VILLALBA INTERMEDIATE COLLOID~~  
CMT, CALIFORNIA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

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ENCLOSURE



- ~~SECRET~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.
  - (B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Two~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.
  - (C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

**Forster Memorial Hospital,  
2800 Loma Vista Road, Ventura, California**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training. Additionally, the Health Service of this office staffed by one registered graduate nurse and consisting of physical facilities such as sterilizers, refrigerators, treatment chairs, hot plates, and medications such as eye medicine, nose and throat sprays, aspirin, and similar routine medications not requiring a medical prescription could be immediately dispatched to the relocation site in the event of an emergency.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are two telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

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Best Copy Available

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
LOUISVILLE FIELD OFFICE  
912 LADD BUILDING  
LOUISVILLE 2, KENTUCKY

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: **MAMMOTH CAVE NATIONAL PARK**  
**MAMMOTH CAVE, KENTUCKY**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

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~~SECRET~~ 66-19012-77  
ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Decontamination~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Too~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~One~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
~~Clinic Hospital, 515 West Washington Street, Glasgow, Kentucky.~~  
~~F. J. Campson Community Hospital, North Jackson Highway,~~  
~~Glasgow, Kentucky.~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are two telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
MEMPHIS FIELD OFFICE  
1104 STERICK BUILDING  
MEMPHIS 3, TENNESSEE

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: FBI RESIDENT AGENCY  
307 POST OFFICE BUILDING  
CLARKSDALE, MISSISSIPPI

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Cord~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~The~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Site~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~Clarksdale Hospital, 419 Pecan Street, Clarksdale, Mississippi.~~  
~~Cochran County Hospital, 7th Street, Clarksdale, Mississippi.~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) ~~Partially operable~~ on D day.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 14.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 30.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
MIAMI FIELD OFFICE  
3025 DISCARDE BOULEVARD  
MIAMI 22, FLORIDA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: BOCA RATON HOTEL AND CLUB  
BOCA RATON, FLORIDA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77      ENCLOSURE  
~~SECRET~~  
YELLOW FILE COPY

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Also Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

Dr. William G. O'Donnell and Dr. Willard Kachla, Boca Raton, Florida.

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Inoperable on D day.  
Partially operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are five telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

Best Copy Available

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
MILWAUKEE FIELD OFFICE  
705 U. S. 1012 WEST GORDON AND COURT HOUSE BUILDING  
MILWAUKEE 2, WISCONSIN

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: UNIVERSITY COLLEGE  
GATERSBURG, MISSISSIPPI

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~One~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

**St. Mary's Hospital  
1801 Main Street  
Watertown, Wisconsin**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| Operable | on D day.  |
| Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable | at D + 30. |
| Operable | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are eight telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
MINNEAPOLIS FIELD OFFICE  
412 LEROY BUILDING  
MINNEAPOLIS 2, MINNESOTA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY  
COLLEGEVILLE, MINNESOTA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77 ENCLOSURE  
YELLOW FILE COPY

- ~~SECRET~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~The~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~the~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows: ~~St. Cloud Hospital,~~  
1406 6 Avenue North,  
~~St. Cloud, Minnesota~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.



~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are three telephone trunk lines and a CW radio telegraph (teletype) available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOURTH FIELD OFFICE

533 FEDERAL BUILDING

LOUIS 10, ALABAMA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~CHICKENHEAD, ALABAMA~~

~~CHICKENHEAD, ALABAMA~~

1. (A)

The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.

(B)

Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.

(C)

No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered designated upon arrival of the first employee.

(D)

On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

ENCLOSURE

YELLOW FILE COPY

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). One Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows: Dr. John P. McCrory,  
Citronelle, Alabama

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.

(B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.

(C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.

7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there is one telephone trunk line available.

8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
~~SECRET~~ FIELD OFFICE  
U. S. POST OFFICE AND COURT HOUSE BUILDING  
FLOOR 2, NEW JERSEY

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~LOREISTOWN NATIONAL HISTORIC PARK~~  
~~LOREISTOWN, NEW JERSEY~~

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77  
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ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
 (B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Ten~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
 (C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

**All County Hospital, 95 Mount Kemble Avenue, Morristown, New Jersey**  
**Morristown Memorial Hospital,**  
**100 Madison Avenue, Morristown, New Jersey**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training. Additionally, the Health Service of this office staffed by one registered graduate nurse and consisting of physical facilities such as sterilizers, refrigerators, treatment chairs, hot plates, and medications such as eye washes, nose and throat sprays, aspirin, and similar routine medications not requiring a medical prescription would be immediately dispatched to the relocation site in the event of an emergency.

- ~~SECRET~~
6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |                    |            |
|--------------------|------------|
| Inoperable         | on D day.  |
| Inoperable         | at D + 14. |
| Partially operable | at D + 30. |
| Operable           | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
NEW HAVEN FIELD OFFICE  
510 THE COVER COMPANY BUILDING  
NEW HAVEN 10, CONNECTICUT

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: LOGISTICS COLONEL  
LANEVILLE, CONNECTICUT

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

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- ~~SECRET~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Good~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Good~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows: ~~Establimco School Infirmary,~~  
~~Lebanonville, Connecticut~~

~~Dr. John A. Atchley,~~  
~~Lebanonville, Connecticut~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) ~~Partially operable~~ on D day.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 14.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 30.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. ~~Additionally there is one telephone trunk line available.~~
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
 NEW ORLEANS FIELD OFFICE  
 1000 MASCHKE ST. NEW ORLEANS  
 NEW ORLEANS 18, LOUISIANA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI JUNIOR COLLEGE~~  
~~OSAGE, MISSISSIPPI~~

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77  
~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Good~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Good~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows: ~~Dr. Benton D. Everett,~~  
~~Quincy, Illinois~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) ~~Operable~~ on D day.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 14.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 30.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are five telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE  
201 EAST 69TH STREET  
NEW YORK 21, NEW YORK

JUN 27 1954

Relocation Site: BENNETT JUNIOR COLLEGE FOR GIRLS  
MILLBROOK, NEW YORK

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

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66-19012-77  
~~SECRET~~  
ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~For~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
**Dr. William W. Bennett, Hillbrook, New York.**  
**St. Francis Hospital, Hillcrest Park,**  
**North Road, Poughkeepsie, New York**  
In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training. ~~Additionally, the Health Service of this office staffed by two registered graduate nurses and consisting of physical facilities such as sterilizers, refrigerators, treatment chairs, hot plates, and medications such as eye washes, nose and throat sprays, aspirin, and similar routine medications not requiring a medical prescription would be immediately dispatched to the relocation site in the event of an emergency.~~

~~SECRET~~

- ~~SECRET~~
6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) ~~Partially operable~~ on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. ~~Additionally there is one telephone trunk line available.~~
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.



~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
HONOLULU FIELD OFFICE  
414 U.S. POST OFFICE AND COURT HOUSE BUILDING  
HONOLULU 10, HAWAII

JUL 27 1950

Relocation Site: **SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY COURTHOUSE**  
**COLUMBIA MD, VIRGINIA**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and <sup>Yes</sup> **68-19012-77**

~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE  
(YELLOW FILE COPY)

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Six~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

Dr. William F. Dougherty, Jr.  
Courtland, Virginia

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Partially operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are two telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
OKLAHOMA CITY FIELD OFFICE  
940 FIRST NATIONAL BUILDING  
OKLAHOMA CITY 2, OKLAHOMA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: SCOTTISH RITE TEMPLE  
GUTHRIE, OKLAHOMA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above; and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B) 66-19012-77

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

(YELLOW FILE COPY)

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) **Good** protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) **Two** Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). **Six** Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
**Benedictine Heights Hospital**  
**200 East Varner Avenue**  
**Guthrie, Oklahoma**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.

(B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.

(C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.

7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are four telephone trunk lines available.

8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
OMAHA FIELD OFFICE  
1010 FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING  
OMAHA 2, NEBRASKA

APR 27 1958

Relocation Site: FBI RESIDENT AGENCY  
205 U.S. POST OFFICE BUILDING  
OMAHA ISLAND, NEBRASKA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

(YELLOW FILE COPY)

- ~~SECRET~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) **Good** protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) **Two** Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). **Old** Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

**Grand Island Lutheran Hospital**  
**102 North Locust Street, Grand Island, Nebraska**  
**St. Francis Hospital**  
**1310 West Charles Street, Grand Island, Nebraska**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.



~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
~~PHILADELPHIA~~ FIELD OFFICE  
~~500 WILMINGTON BUILDING~~  
~~PHILADELPHIA 7, PENNSYLVANIA~~

JUN 27 1953

Relocation Site: ~~BYGOING COLLEGE~~  
~~WILMINGTON, PENNSYLVANIA~~

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

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ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Good Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Ten Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
**Divine Providence Hospital, 1100 Crampton Boulevard, Wilkesport, Pennsylvania**  
**Wilkesport Hospital, 777 Rural Avenue, Wilkesport, Pennsylvania**  
In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training. Additionally, the Health Corvettes of this office staffed by one registered graduate nurse and consisting of physical facilities such as sterilizers, refrigerators, treatment chairs, hot plates, and medications such as eye washes, nose and throat sprays, aspirin, and similar routine medications not requiring a medical prescription would be immediately dispatched to the relocation site in the event of an emergency.

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6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) ~~Partially operable~~ on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. ~~Additionally there are five telephone trunk lines available.~~
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
~~RELOCATED~~ FIELD OFFICE  
102 U. S. COURT HOUSE BUILDING  
TUCSON, ARIZONA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~RELOCATED~~ ~~RELOCATED~~ BUILDING  
~~RELOCATED~~, ARIZONA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes. 77

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~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE

- ~~SECRET~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) ~~Cool~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~One~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
~~Prescott Community Hospital,~~  
~~500 South Larina Street, Prescott, Arizona~~  
~~Navajo County Hospital,~~  
~~Willow Creek Road, Prescott, Arizona~~  
In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

- ~~SECRET~~
6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally a telephone trunk line can be installed after a two hour notice.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
PITTSBURGH FIELD OFFICE  
450 UNION TRUST BUILDING  
PITTSBURGH 19, PENNSYLVANIA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: FAIRMONT STATE COLLEGE  
FAIRMONT, WEST VIRGINIA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-

77-100  
ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
Fairmont Emergency Hospital,  
401 Guffey Street, Fairmont, West Virginia  
Fairmont General Hospital,  
Locust Avenue, Fairmont, West Virginia  
In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Inoperable on D day.  
Partially operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are four telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
PORTLAND FIELD OFFICE  
403 U. S. COURT HOUSE BUILDING  
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: CHEMAWA INDIAN SCHOOL  
CHEMAWA, OREGON

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

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ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~See~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~See~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~Coleman General Hospital~~  
~~2561 East Center Street, Salem, Oregon~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) ~~Inoperable~~ on D day.  
~~Partially operable~~ at D + 14.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 30.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are three telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
RICHMOND FIELD OFFICE  
501 SOUTHERN STATES BUILDING  
RICHMOND 17, VIRGINIA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: **BUILDING NUMBER 1**  
**ROCKINGHAM COUNTY FAIRGROUNDS**  
**HARRISONBURG, VIRGINIA**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77  
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ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

Rockingham Memorial Hospital, 738 South Mason Street,  
Harrisonburg, Virginia

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |                    |            |
|--------------------|------------|
| Inoperable         | on D day.  |
| Partially operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable           | at D + 30. |
| Operable           | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there are two telephone trunk lines which can be terminated in instruments on short notice.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
ST. LOUIS FIELD OFFICE  
419 U.S. COURT HOUSE AND CUSTOM HOUSE BUILDING  
ST. LOUIS 1, MISSOURI

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: **HIDDEN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL  
MEXICO, MISSOURI**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

YELLOW FILE COPY

ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) Two Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~One~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
Doctor Simeon G. Adams, R. D. Number 1, Mexico, Missouri

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

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6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |            |            |
|------------|------------|
| Inoperable | on D day.  |
| Inoperable | at D + 14. |
| Operable   | at D + 30. |
| Operable   | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there are two telephone trunk lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SALT LAKE CITY FIELD OFFICE  
301 CONTINENTAL BANK BUILDING  
SALT LAKE CITY 1, UTAH

JUN 27 1966

Relocation Site: INTERMOUNTAIN SCHOOL  
BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

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66-19012-77  
ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) Good protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). Six Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
**Ogden Memorial Hospital, 40 North First East Street,  
Brigham City, Utah**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| Operable | on D day.  |
| Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable | at D + 30. |
| Operable | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SAN ANTONIO FIELD OFFICE  
478 FEDERAL BUILDING  
SAN ANTONIO 6, TEXAS

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~SECRET~~ ~~INDUSTRIAL~~  
LEONVILLE, TEXAS

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B) Yes

190-12-77-44  
ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~One~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
~~Old Peterson Memorial Hospital, 710 Water Street, Kerrville, Texas.~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SAN DIEGO FIELD OFFICE  
710 SAN DIEGO STREET AND SAVANNAH DRIVE BUILDING  
SAN DIEGO 2, CALIFORNIA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: BUILDING 10101  
CALIF PENITENTIARY  
SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B) <sup>Yes</sup>.

66-19012-77

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

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- ~~SECRET~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~One~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~U. S. Naval Hospital, Camp Pendleton, California.~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

- ~~SECRET~~
6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B)
- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| Operable | on D day.  |
| Operable | at D + 14. |
| Operable | at D + 30. |
| Operable | at D + 90. |
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there is one telephone trunk line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE  
433 FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, CIVIC CENTER  
SAN FRANCISCO 3, CALIFORNIA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: DEL MONTE PROPERTIES COMPANY  
MONTENIZO, CALIFORNIA

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77 14

ENCLOSURE

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~~SECRET~~

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. Not within space designated for occupation.
  3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
  4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Two~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
  5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~Monterey Hospital, 575 Cortnell Street, Monterey, California.~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are one telephone trunk line and a CW radio telegraph (stoploc) available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SAN JUAN FIELD OFFICE  
CASA DE LAS FAMILIAS  
SAN JUAN 02, PUERTO RICO

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~RENTAL BUILDING~~  
~~NEAR DARRACHT~~  
CAYEY, PUERTO RICO

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Good~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~See~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~Clinica Port, 20 Asuncion Street, Cayey, Puerto Rico.~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) ~~Operable~~ on D day.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 14.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 30.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally there are one telephone trunk line and a CW radio telegraph available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SAVANNAH FIELD OFFICE  
300 DRAYTON STREET  
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: **PHYSICAL EDUCATION BUILDING  
GEORGIA TEACHERS COLLEGE  
STATESBORO, GEORGIA**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~The~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Site~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

**Bulloch County Hospital, East Grady Street, Statesboro, Georgia**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) ~~Partially operable~~ on D day.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 14.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 30.  
~~Operable~~ at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. ~~Additionally, there is one telephone trunk line available.~~
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
Best Copy Available

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SEATTLE FIELD OFFICE  
1015 SECOND AVENUE  
SEATTLE 4, WASHINGTON

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: ~~SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT~~  
~~SEATTLE, WASHINGTON~~

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

66-19012-77

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~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~The~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~See~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
**St. Elizabeth Hospital, 110 South 9th Avenue, Takoma, Washington**  
**Takoma Valley Memorial Hospital, 2311 Platon Drive, Takoma, Washington**

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

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6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there are three telephone lines available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SPRINGFIELD FIELD OFFICE  
421 SOUTH SEVEN STREET, HERNDON BUILDING  
SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: **ILLINOIS COLLEGE**  
**JACKSONVILLE, ILLINOIS**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

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ENCLOSURE

2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Two~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~One~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:  
~~Carver's Hospital, 401 East State Street, Jacksonville,~~  
~~Memorial Area Hospital, West Central Street, Jacksonville,~~  
~~Memorial~~  
In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there are telephone trunk lines and instruments available on short notice.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
503 OLD POST OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JUN 27 1958

Relocation Site: **SHEPHERD STATE COLLEGE  
SHEPHERDSTOWN, WEST VIRGINIA**

1. (A) The number of employees designated to use the relocation site during the first 24 to 48 hours will vary due to the nature of FBI responsibilities which require Special Agents to be in various areas of the field office territory and depending upon the circumstances of evacuation and activation of the site. If activation of the relocation site is ordered as a result of increased international tensions and not under threat of immediate attack or actual attack conditions, the site will be manned only by a sufficient number of employees necessary to prepare the site for transfer of essential operations from headquarters city. The number of employees designated for the relocation site will also vary under attack warning or actual attack conditions consistent with the time of the attack; that is, whether it occurs during the normal work day or during nonwork hours. A card indices breakdown of key employees by squad and geographical location is maintained, and the number of employees designated to proceed to the site is within the discretion of the Special Agent in Charge of the office, consistent with the location of the personnel and current responsibilities of the office. All employees designated under such conditions have, through conferences, been informed of the location of the site. Additionally, emergency instructions for all employees are prepared and retained in a stand-by status for immediate issuance. The number of employees designated, depending upon attack and evacuation circumstances, is within a varying range of ten to one hundred per cent.
- (B) Initially, all those designated within the circumstances of 1(A) above, and subsequently, all those surviving an attack and capable of reaching the site.
- (C) No, physical facilities of site permit immediate occupation, and site would be considered activated upon arrival of the first employee.
- (D) On the basis of 1(A) and 1(B). Yes.

YELLOW FILE COPY

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ENCLOSURE

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2. Not within space designated for occupation.
3. Since site is classified secret and it was arranged for on a high level, it is not considered advisable to seek this information from other individuals at site or to have an official cause such a survey to be made. Defense planning by this office provides for consideration as to immediate sources of supply for foodstuffs.
4. (A) ~~Good~~ protection from radioactive fallout.  
(B) ~~Four~~ Rad-Tek survey meters (0-50 r/hr). ~~Ten~~ Dosimeters (0-20 r and 0-100 r). An adequate number of employees have been qualified to utilize and maintain this equipment. All Special Agents have been instructed relative to radiological defense. Availability of trained radiologists and physicists for special monitoring problems is insured and incorporated into the day-to-day operational procedures and defense plans of this office.  
(C) The following decontamination measures could be taken with available equipment and personnel: (1) hosing down of immediate locale, (2) showering and washing for personnel decontamination, and (3) scrubbing with water and detergent to decontaminate equipment.
5. Medical services are available at or in the vicinity of the relocation site as follows:

~~City Hospital, Burke Street and Maple Avenue, Martinsburg,~~  
~~West Virginia~~  
~~King Daughters' Hospital, 200 East King Street, Martinsburg,~~  
~~West Virginia~~

In addition, a supply of first aid kits containing the usual first aid items are available at the headquarters city, in each resident agency, and in each official automobile assigned to this office. Also, certain categories of employees assigned to this office are trained in first aid and depending upon the complement of this office, the percentage so trained will vary between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. All Special Agents of the FBI, after entering on duty, are afforded first aid training in conjunction with their Special Agent training.

~~SECRET~~

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6. (A) Site has permanent sources of fuel, power, and water. Field office has emergency gasoline-powered generator which would be immediately dispatched to site upon receipt of attack warning or sooner if warranted.
- (B) Operable on D day.  
Operable at D + 14.  
Operable at D + 30.  
Operable at D + 90.
- (C) Refer to answer 6(A) and 6(B) above.
7. FBI defense planning provides for the immediate removal to the relocation site of the existing CW radio telegraph facilities. Additionally, there are one telephone trunk line and one teletype line available.
8. All members of the "chain of command" were either immediately available, or, in conjunction with day-to-day FBI responsibilities, their whereabouts was known enabling immediate contact with them.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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