U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

November 18, 2024

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD
SUITE 1203
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request No.: 1437927-001
Subject: DENTON, JEREMIAH ANDREW, JR.

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The FBI has completed its review of records subject to the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) that are responsive to your request. The enclosed documents were reviewed under the FOIPA, Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552		Section 552a
☐ (b)(1)	☐ (b)(7)(A)	☐ (d)(5)
☐ (b)(2)	☐ (b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
☑ (b)(3)	☑ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
50 U.S.C.§3024(i)(1)	☑ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
	☑ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☐ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
☑ (b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)

270 pages were reviewed and 259 pages are being released.

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request, as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

Based on the information you provided, we conducted a main entity record search of the Central Records System (CRS) per our standard search policy. For more information about records searches and the standard search policy, see the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum General Information Section.

This is the second interim release of information responsive to your FOIPA request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.

Records that may be responsive to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request have been transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). If you wish to review these records, submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to NARA, Special Access and FOIA, 8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500, College Park, MD 20740-6001. Please reference the following file numbers: 62-HQ-107350-Serial 988; 100-HQ-457899 and 105-HQ-49241-Serial 1617.

Records that may have been responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.

For your information, a search of the indices to our Central Records System reflected there were additional records potentially responsive to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request. We have attempted to obtain this material so it could be reviewed to determine whether it was responsive to your request. We were advised that the potentially responsive records were not in their expected location and could not be located after a reasonable search. Following a reasonable waiting period, another attempt was made to obtain this material. This search for the missing records also met with unsuccessful results.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **"Part 1"** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **"Part 2"** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **"Part 3"** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Additional information about the FOIPA can be found at www.fbi.gov/foia. Should you have questions regarding your request, please feel free to contact foipaquestions@fbi.gov. Please reference the FOIPA Request number listed above in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." If possible, please provide a copy of your original request and this response letter with your appeal.

You may seek dispute resolution services by emailing the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison at foipaquestions@fbi.gov. The subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,

Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

(i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.

(ii) **Intelligence Records**. To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

(i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.

(ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

(iii) **Requests for Confidential Informant Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of confidential informant records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F) [5 U.S.C.§ § 552 (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F)] and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C.§ 552a (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records would reveal confidential informant identities and information, expose law enforcement techniques, and endanger the life or physical safety of individuals. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

(i) **Record Searches and Standard Search Policy.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems, such as the Central Records System (CRS), or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. The CRS is an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. The standard search policy is a search for main entity records in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include a search for reference entity records or administrative records of previous FOIPA requests.

a. *Main Entity Records* – created for individuals or non-individuals who are the subjects or the focus of an investigation
b. *Reference Entity Records*- created for individuals or non-individuals who are associated with a case but are not known subjects or the focus of an investigation

(ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.

(iii) **Foreseeable Harm Standard.** As amended in 2016, the Freedom of Information Act provides that a federal agency may withhold responsive records only if: (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the nine exemptions that FOIA enumerates, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law (5 United States Code, Section 552(a)(8)(A)(i)). The FBI considers this foreseeable harm standard in the processing of its requests.

(iv) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative "FBI file." An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;

(k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

(k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum

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Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Se
Training
Off. of Cong
& Public Affs. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

To : Mr.

Date 11/6/81

From : J. D. McKenzi

Subject : INVITEES TO FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATION 12/11/81

F.B.I.N.A. Graduation

In connection with the graduation exercises on 12/11/81, it is suggested that invitations be extended to the following:

Key Members of Congress
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (Tennessee) - Senate Majority Leader
Senator Robert C. Byrd (West Virginia) - Senate Minority Leader
Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Massachusetts) - Speaker of the House
Congressman Robert H. Michel - House Minority Leader
Congressman Jim Wright (Texas) - House Majority Leader

Senate Judiciary Committee
Strom Thurmond (South Carolina) - Chairman
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Delaware) - Ranking Minority Member

Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism
Jeremiah Denton (Alabama) - Chairman
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Delaware) - Ranking Minority Member

Senate Appropriations Committee
Mark O. Hatfield (Oregon) - Chairman
William Proxmire (Wisconsin) - Ranking Minority Member

Senate Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (Connecticut) - Chairman
Ernest F. Hollings (South Carolina) - Ranking Minority Member

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Memorandum J. D. McKenzie to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
12/11/81

House Judiciary Committee
Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (New Jersey) - Chairman
Robert McClory (Illinois) - Ranking Minority Member

House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
Don Edwards (California) - Chairman
Henry J. Hyde (Illinois) - Ranking Minority Member

House Appropriations Committee
Jamie L. Whitten (Mississippi) - Chairman
Silvio O. Conte (Massachusetts) - Ranking Minority Member

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Barry Goldwater (Arizona) - Chairman
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (New York) - Vice Chairman

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Edward P. Boland (Massachusetts) - Chairman
J. Kenneth Robinson (Virginia) - Ranking Minority Member

Others

Colonel [redacted]
Chief of Air Force Office of Security Police/AFIGAC
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico 87117

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[redacted]
Executive Director
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.
Eleven Firstfield Road
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760

Mr. Hugh A. Groves (Secretary/Treasurer of NA Associates)
Deputy Chief
United States Park Police
1100 Ohio Drive, S.W.
Washington, D. C. 20242

Honorable William E. Hall
Director
United States Marshals Service
One Tyson's Corner Center
McLean, Virginia 22102

Memorandum J. D. McKenzie to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
12/11/81

Mr. Parker T. Hill
Chief
United States Park Police
1100 Ohio Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C. 20242

President Frank L. Hereford, Jr.
Pavilion 8 East Lawn
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia 22903

Mr. Maurice Turner
Chief of Police
Metropolitan Police Department
Washington, D. C. 20001

Honorable H. Stuart Knight
Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20223

[redacted]
Sheriff of Sumter County (Retired)

[redacted]

[redacted]
Executive Director
National Sheriffs' Association
Suite 320
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

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[redacted]

Memorandum J. D. McKenzie to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
12/11/81

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Colonel [redacted]
Chief, Law Enforcement Division
Human Resources Development Directorate Office
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

Lt. General Richard E. Carey
Commanding General
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134

Honorable Tim Murphy (Guest Lecturer)
Superior Court of the District of Columbia
Fifth and E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20001

Mr. James M. Powell
Chief of Police
U.S. Capitol Police
331 First Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20510

Mr. Harvey E. Pryor
Chief
U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dean [redacted]
Division of Continuing Education
Post Office Box 3697
University Station
Charlottesville, Virginia 22903

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Lieutenant Colonel [redacted]
Director
Law Enforcement Branch
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380

[redacted]

Memorandum J. D. McKenzie to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
12/11/81

Brigadier General Thomas J. Flynn
Deputy Commander, Intelligence
Headquarters, USAINSCOM
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Virginia 22212

Major General Albert Stubblebine
Commander
Headquarters, USAINSCOM
IAOPS-PTR-T
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Virginia 22212

Major General Paul M. Timmerberg
Commander, U.S. Army
Criminal Investigation Command
5611 Columbia Pike
Falls Church, Virginia 22041

His Excellency Peter M. Towe
Embassy of Canada
1746 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

His Excellency Dr. Ashraf A. Ghorbal
Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt
2310 Decatur Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

His Excellency Sir Nicholas Henderson
Embassy of Great Britain
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

His Excellency Yong Shik Kim
Embassy of the Republic of Korea
2320 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

His Excellency Sir Nicholas Fancourt Parkinson
Embassy of Australia
1601 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Memorandum J. D. McKenzie to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graudation
12/11/81

His Excellency Dr. Jan Hendrik Lubbers
Embassy of the Netherlands
4200 Linnean Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

His Excellency Prok Amaranand
Embassy of Thailand
2300 Kalorama Road, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

RECOMMENDATION:

That upon approval, this memorandum be returned to the Training Division so invitations can be prepared.

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm
Exec. AD-Inv
Exec. AD-LE

Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____

Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Ser
Training

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Memorandum

Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. M[illegible]
Tech[illegible]
Tra[illegible]
Off. [illegible]
& Pub[illegible]
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

To : Mr. Otto

Date 5/18/83

From : J. D. McKenzie

Subject : INVITEES TO FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATION 6/24/83

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In connection with the graduation exercises on 6/24/83, it is suggested that invitations be extended to the following:

Key Members of Congress
- Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (Tennessee) - Senate Majority Leader
- Senator Robert C. Byrd (West Virginia) - Senate Minority Leader
- Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Massachusetts) - Speaker of the House
- Congressman Robert H. Michel (Illinois) - House Minority Leader
- Congressman James C. Wright, Jr. (Texas) - House Majority Leader

Senate Judiciary Committee
- Strom Thurmond (South Carolina) - Chairman
- Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Delaware) - Ranking Minority Member

Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism
- Jeremiah Denton (Alabama) - Chairman
- Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Delaware) - Ranking Minority Member

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Senate Appropriations Committee
- Mark O. Hatfield (Oregon) - Chairman
- William Proxmire (Wisconsin) - Ranking Minority Member

Senate Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies
- Paul Laxalt (Nevada) - Chairman
- Ernest F. Hollings (South Carolina) - Ranking Minority Member

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House Judiciary Committee
- Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (New Jersey) - Chairman
- Hamilton Fish, Jr. (New York) - Ranking Minority Member

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(Attn: Legal Liaison and Congressional Affairs)

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FRONT OFFICE
TRAINING DIVISION

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EXEC. A. D.
FBI

Memorandum J. D. McKenzie to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
3/25/83

House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
Don Edwards (California) - Chairman
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Wisconsin) - Ranking Minority Member

House Appropriations Committee
Jamie L. Whitten (Mississippi) - Chairman
Silvio O. Conte (Massachusetts) - Ranking Minority Member

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Barry Goldwater (Arizona) - Chairman
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (New York) - Vice Chairman

House Select Committee on Narcotics, Abuse and Control
Charles B. Rangel (New York) - Chairman
Benjamin A. Gilman (New York) - Ranking Minority Member

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Edward P. Boland (Massachusetts) - Chairman
J. Kenneth Robinson (Virginia) - Ranking Minority Member

Others

Mr. L. Cary Bittick
Executive Director
National Sheriffs' Association
Suite 320, 1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

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The Traffic Institute
Northwestern University
555 Clark Street
P.O. Box 1409
Evanston, Illinois 60204

Mr. Norman Darwick
Executive Director
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.
13 Firstfield Road
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760

[redacted] (Sec/Treasurer, NA Associates)
740 Hillgrove Avenue
Western Springs, Illinois 60558

Memorandum J. D. McKenzie to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
6/24/83

Honorable William E. Hall
Director
United States Marshals Service
One Tyson's Corner Center
McLean, Virginia 22102

President Frank L. Hereford, Jr.
Pavilion 8 East Lawn
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia 22903

Mr. Lynn Herring
Chief
United States Park Police
1100 Ohio Drive, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20442

[redacted] Immediate-Past President, NA Associates)

[redacted]

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Lieutenant Colonel [redacted]
Director
Law Enforcement Branch
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20380

[redacted]

The Traffic Institute
Northwestern University
555 Clark Street
P.O. Box 1409
Evanston, Illinois 60204

Honorable Tim Murphy (Guest Lecturer)
Superior Court of the District of Columbia
Fifth and E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

Mr. James M. Powell
Chief of Police
U.S. Capitol Police
331 First Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20510

Memorandum J. D. McKenzie to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
6/24/83

Mr. Harvey E. Pryor
Chief
U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division
Washington, D.C. 20500

[redacted]
Chief of Police (Retired)

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Dean [redacted]
Division of Continuing Education
Post Office Box 3697
University Station
Charlottesville, Virginia 22903

Brigadier General William C. Kell
Director of Officer Personnel Management
United States Army
Military Personnel Center
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22332

Brigadier General P. Neal Scheidel
Chief of Air Force Office of Security Police/AFIGAC
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico 87117

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Honorable John R. Simpson
Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D.C. 20223

Major General Albert Stubblebine
Commander
Headquarters, USAINSCOM
IAOPS-TNG-T
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Virginia 22212

Memorandum J. D. McKenzie to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
6/24/83

Major General Paul M. Timmerberg
Commander, U.S. Army
Criminal Investigation Command
5611 Columbia Pike
Falls Church, Virginia 22041

Mr. Maurice T. Turner, Jr.
Chief of Police
Metropolitan Police Department
Washington, D.C. 20001

Major General David M. Twomey
Commanding General
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134

His Excellency Sir Robert Cotton
Embassy of Australia
1601 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

His Excellency Reginald Wood
Embassy of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas
Suite 685
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

His Excellency Allan E. Gotlieb
Embassy of Canada
1746 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

His Excellency Dr. Ashraf A. Ghorbal
Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt
2310 Decatur Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

His Excellency Sir Oliver Wright, G.C.M.G. G.C.V.O.
British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

His Excellency Peter Hermes
Embassy of Federal Republic of Germany
4645 Reservoir Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

Memorandum J. D. McKenzie to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
6/24/83

His Excellency Abdallah Bouhabib
Embassy of Lebanon
2560 28th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

His Excellency Knut Hedemann
Royal Norwegian Embassy
2720 34th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

b6
b7C

Representative
Coordination Council for North American Affairs
5161 River Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20014

RECOMMENDATION:

That upon approval, this memorandum be returned to the Training Division so invitations can be prepared.

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Training [redacted]

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Memorandum

Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Insp. ___
Intell. ___
Lab. ___
Legal Coun. ___
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Rec. Mgmt. ___
T[redacted] ___
Tele[redacted] ___
Director's Sec'y ___

To : Mr. C[redacted]

Date 11/7/86

From : J. W. Greenleaf

b6
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Subject : INVITEES TO FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATION 12/12/86

In connection with the graduation exercises on 12/12/86, it is suggested that invitations be extended to the following:

Key Members of Congress
Senator Robert Dole (Kansas) - Senate Majority Leader
Senator Robert C. Byrd (West Virginia) - Senate Minority Leader
~~Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Massachusetts) - Speaker of the House~~
Congressman Robert H. Michel (Illinois) - House Minority Leader
Congressman James C. Wright, Jr. (Texas) - House Majority Leader

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Se[redacted]te Judiciary Committee
Strom Thurmond (South Carolina) - Chairman
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Delaware) - Ranking Min[redacted]

DE-100 [redacted]

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Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism
Jeremiah Denton (Alabama) - Chairman
Patrick Leahy (Vermont) - Ranking Minority Member

6 JAN 26 1987

Senate Appropriations Committee
Mark O. Hatfield (Oregon) - Chairman
John C. Stennis (Mississippi) - Ranking Minority Member

Senate Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Paul Laxalt (Nevada) - Chairman
Ernest F. Hollings (South Carolina) - Ranking Minority Member

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. Baker
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted] QT

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(10)

7 JAN 0 1987

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum J. W. Greenleaf to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
12/12/86

House Judiciary Committee
Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (New Jersey) - Chairman
Hamilton Fish, Jr. (New York) - Ranking Minority Member

House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
Don Edwards (California) - Chairman
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Wisconsin) - Ranking Minority Member

House Appropriations Committee
James L. Whitten (Mississippi) - Chairman
Silvio O. Conte (Massachusetts) - Ranking Minority Member

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
David Durenberger (Minnesota) - Chairman
Patrick Leahy (Vermont) - Vice Chairman

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Lee H. Hamilton (Indiana) - Chairman
Bob Stump (Arizona) - Ranking Minority Member

DC

Others

Mr. Richard A. Amiott
Chief of Police
Mentor Police Department
Mentor, Ohio 44060

[redacted] Immediate-Past President, NA Associates)

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Mr. James J. Carvino
Chief of Police
U. S. Capitol Police
331 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D. C. 20510

Memorandum J. W. Greenleaf to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
12/12/86

Major General Eugene R. Cromartie
Commander
Criminal Investigation Command
United States Army
Nassif Building
5611 Columbia Pike
Falls Church, Virginia 22041

Mr. George P. Graves (Sec/Treasurer, NA Associates)
Chief of Police
Downers Grove Police Department
Civic Center
Downers Grove, Illinois 60515

Mr. Lynn Herring
Chief
United States Park Police
1100 Ohio Drive, S.W.
Washington, D. C. 20242

DC

Brigadier General Charles A. Hines
Director of Officer Personnel Management
Military Personnel Center
Department of the Army
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22332

Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] b6 b7C
Head
Provost Marshal's Section, MPH-50
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380

President Robert M. O'Neil
Madison Hall, Main Floor
Carrs Hill
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia 22901

Memorandum J. W. Greenleaf to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
12/12/86

Acting Dean [redacted]
Division of Continuing Education
[redacted]
Charlottesville, Virginia 22903

b6
b7C
b7D

Commissioner [redacted]
[redacted]

Honorable John R. Simpson
Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20223

DC

Major General Harry E. Soyster
Commander
U. S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Virginia 22212

Mr. Maurice T. Turner, Jr.
Chief of Police
Metropolitan Police Department
300 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20001

Lieutenant General Frank E. Petersen
Commanding General
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134

Mr. Jerald R. Vaughn
Executive Director
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.
13 Firstfield Road
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760

Mr. Frederick H. Walzel
Chief
U. S. Secret Service Uniformed Division
Suite 300
1310 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20531

Memorandum J. W. Greenleaf to Mr. Otto
Re: Invitees to FBINA Graduation
12/12/86

His Excellency Allan E. Gotlieb
Embassy of Canada
1746 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

His Excellency Sir Antony Acland
British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

His Excellency Richard H. Fein
Embassy of the Netherlands
4200 Linnean Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

His Excellency Kyung-Won Kim
Embassy of Korea
2370 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

His Excellency Arsa Sarasin
Embassy of Thailand
2300 Kalorama Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

DC

RECOMMENDATION:

That upon approval, this memorandum be returned to the Training Division so invitations can be prepared.

[illegible]	Adm. Servs.	Laboratory
	Crim. Inv.	Legal Coun.
Director		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec AD-Adm.	Ident.	Rec. Mgnt.
Exec AD-Inv.	Inspection	Tech. Ser
Exec AD-LES	Off.	Train

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Exec. AD-Adm. ___
Exec. AD-Inv. ___
Exec. AD-LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Off. of Cong. & Public Aff. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 12, 1982

Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, D.C. 20535

Miscellaneous

b6
b7C

RE: [redacted] FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

It has been over a month since I forwarded a request for assistance on behalf of [redacted] to your agency. To this date, no reply has been received.

I realize that your office receives a great many inquiries, but any effort to expedite a reply for the above mentioned constituent would be greatly appreciated.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senator
(Alabama)

JAD/kar

Please reply to:

One Court Square
Suite 116
Montgomery, Alabama 36104

b6
b7C

[redacted]

ACK ORALLY. 10/22/82

V-29 DE-69 62-0-91892

28 OCT 20 1982

10 OCT 28 1982

No Response Necessary

b6
b7C

Off. of C[redacted] Aff.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

STROM THURMOND, S.C., CHAIRMAN
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
PAUL LAXALT, NEV.
ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH
ROBERT DOLE, KANS.
ALAN K. SIMPSON, WYO.
JOHN P. EAST, N.C.
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA
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HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO
DENNIS DeCONCINI, ARIZ.
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VT.
MAX BAUCUS, MONT.
HOWELL HEFLIN, ALA.

VINTON DeVANE LIDE, CHIEF COUNSEL
QUENTIN CROMMELIN, JR., STAFF DIRECTOR

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
JEREMIAH DENTON, ALA., CHAIRMAN
ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH
JOHN P. EAST, N.C.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VT.

JOEL S. LISKER, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

February 9, 1982

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Congressional & Public
Affairs
9th and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

0 MISCELLANEOUS

Attention: [redacted]

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is a letter received from [redacted] of San Diego, California concerning an alleged terrorist enclave, the Rancho Bernardo, run by Navy Commander [redacted]

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b7C

I am forwarding this letter to you for your use and investigation, if necessary.

Please send me a report concerning the allegations in the letter.

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senate

JD:pjf

Enclosure

V-30
DE-51

91209

3 MAR 11 1982

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[redacted]

January 21, 1982

Senator Jeremiah Denton
Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

b6
b7C

Sir:

I suppose you have heard about ~~the Rancho Bernardo terrorist enclave~~, the Soviet-style equipment there, and ~~the Soviet agent and terrorist, Navy Commander~~ [redacted] If so, I doubt there will be much of interest to you in this letter.

Rancho Bernardo is in the north of the City of San Diego, just south of Escondido. It is about 120 miles south of Santa Monica, the residence of [redacted] who used to advocate Communist enclaves.

The ~~equipment to be found there is Soviet~~-style unconventional warfare equipment. This equipment could also be used for secret communications and espionage. I think the equipment is in widespread use throughout the U.S. and has been used by Soviet agents for a half century.

The argument for the existence of such equipment, without the use of electronic detection equipment, is somewhat rambling and complex. People who are considered schizophrenic often report hearing and seeing things other people do not claim to experience. Schizophrenia, like cancer, is a disease which has been extensively investigated. Although great steps toward understanding it are frequently claimed, no cure has yet

(over)

been found and treatment for the disease changes much like changes in fashion.

Let us simply try to imagine a way in which people with modern equipment can make a person hear a sound or see a picture. To make a person hear a sound, perhaps simply a very narrow sonar beam would do. One could, of course implant a radio in a person, but that would be banal and perhaps easy to detect. If one used two sonar beams, each carrying only half of the sound signal, and caused them to mix (intersect) only in the person's head, perhaps no one else could perceive the resultant combined sound. It is perhaps possible that microwaves could be similarly used to create a sound within a person.

If one could cause a person to hear a sound by means of narrow-beam radiation, could one perhaps pick up faint sounds from a person, that is, "mind-read" a person? Perhaps when we think we produce slight sub-vocal sounds. Perhaps a sonar beam (or other very narrow beam) can pick up the sound in its path. One could therefore possibly transmit a very narrow beam through a person and pick up the slight sounds that he might produce while thinking with a receiver in line with the transmitter. An implanted microphone, though banal, might also work.

If a very narrow beam of radiation, perhaps millimeter waves, is perceived by the retina as light, one could simply project images into someone's retina much like projecting a movie

(next page)

onto a screen.

If schizophrenic symptoms are frequently or mainly produced by technological equipment, one would have to wonder about psychiatrists, who often treat schizophrenics. Since psychiatrists are M.D.'s, one would also have to wonder about all M.D.'s. It is possible that the usual Soviet genocide has been in progress in the U.S. for years and that we have not bothered to notice.

It would seem that most of the diseases of modern medicine could have their symptoms produced by very narrow beam radiation. Pain, for instance, can easily be caused by electricity. Can pain also be caused by very narrow beams of electromagnetic energy? If so, with modern detection equipment, a pain could be caused to occur on a specific small spot on a person, or perhaps within a person. A person might also be caused to itch in a specific area or to sweat. Excess energy from a beam might cause growths on or inside a person.

One should consider the literature on ESP, particularly starting with that of Dr. J.B. Rhine. It is obviously a fraud. What is the purpose of the fraud? Is it to conceal widespread use of secret equipment?

If such equipment exists, the probable uses of it by a Soviet conspiracy are obvious. Aside from discrediting people who might have inadvertantly learned of Soviet activity, one might, by using the equipment to subliminally suggest behavior to a person, cause a person

more elaborately, a pilot might might be suggested into doing a wrong procedure. Obviously one might cause an automobile accident with such equipment. There was also a recent small plane crash into Mt. Woodson, which is just east of Rancho Bernardo.

Incidentally, the [redacted] last summer had house guests from South Africa. A Navy ensign has just been sentenced to two years hard labor in San Diego for sending material to the South African embassey.

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b7C

Very truly yours,

[redacted]

to do things that might aid a conspiracy. One might simply suggest a person do normal, habitual routines, which in a certain sequence might be of benefit to a conspiracy.

The equipment could obviously be used to secretly transfer information and orders within a conspiracy. One could also brainwash a person with the equipment, perhaps even transmitting "dreams" made in the Soviet Union to a person.

I think there is a great deal of such equipment in Rancho Bernardo and that it is actually an enclave. In Hayden's theory of enclaves, people would commit criminal operations from within the security of the enclave. I suspect people within this enclave had a great deal to do with the SLA and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. I don't know what they are up to now. I have suspicions in regard to Commander [redacted] and the Hinckley attack on Reagan. The neigborhood in which I and the [redacted] live should be monitored for the use of the equipment described above. b6 b7C

With the recent airplane crashs one should of course consider how the above-described equipment could cause an airplane to crash. Presumably narrow-beam radiation could make a plane's radar, etc, useless or misleading or simply cause equipment to malfunction. Also, at low altitudes, the pilot of an airplane might be dazed or made unconscious by narrow beam radiation. Somewhat

(next page)

1 - [redacted] b6 b7C
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - Congressional Affairs Unit
1 - [redacted]

MISCELLANEOUS

March 11, 1982

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Denton:

In your letter of February 9, 1982, based on a letter you received from [redacted] of San Diego, California, you requested our comments on allegations by [redacted] concerning the "Rancho Bernardo terrorist enclave" and the "Soviet agent and terrorist, Navy Commander [redacted]

The files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters contain no information identifiable with the "Rancho Bernardo terrorist enclave" or the "Soviet agent and terrorist, Navy Commander [redacted] b6 b7C

The information provided by [redacted] in his letter to you does not set out the basis for an investigation by the FBI. We are furnishing our San Diego office a copy of [redacted] letter for their information.

Sincerely yours,

(retype because of February 5 date.)

[redacted]

Charles P. Monroe
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

MAILED 14
MAR 11 1982
[redacted]

Enclosures (2)

1 - San Diego Office

Exec AD Adm.
Exec AD Inv.
Exec AD LES
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Insp.
Intell.
Lab.
Legal Coun.
Off. Cong. & Public Affs.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y
[redacted] (8)

V-30
DE-51
V-30

b6 b7C

9/2/0

NOTE SEE PAGE TWO

68 APR 13 1982

MAIL ROOM

NOTE: This response is based on a letter from Senator Jeremiah Denton to the FBI concerning allegations by a [redacted] of San Diego, California. In a five-page hand-printed letter [redacted] alleges that the "Rancho Bernardo terrorist enclave" and the "Soviet agent and terrorist, Navy Commander [redacted] are involved in "beam radiation" operations against various United States interests. For example [redacted] writes "one could also brainwash a person with the equipment, perhaps even transmitting "dreams" made in the Soviet Union to a person." FBIHQ indices negative on [redacted] Our letter is to be routed through Congressional Affairs Unit. One copy of [redacted] letter, Senator Denton's letter and FBIHQ letter to Senator Denton furnished to San Diego as information.

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1 - [redacted]
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1 -

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March 20, 1981

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Senate Judiciary Committee

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of March 10, 1981, requesting a list of laws or administrative measures which may create an impediment to the work of the FBI. I look forward to assisting the Subcommittee in this area and intend to identify the major problems that we face in this regard.

Be assured that I will provide you with this information as soon as possible.

b6
b7C

Sincerely,

[redacted]

William H. Webster

William H. Webster
Director

APPROVED:
Director
Exec. AD-Inv.
Exec. AD-Adm.
Exec. AD-LES
Adm. Serv.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.

1 - Honorable John P. East
Member, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
United States Senate

1 - Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs
U.S. Department of Justice

[redacted] (6)

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b7C

V-56

b3
b7E

DE 62-99828-727

64 APR 20 1981

[redacted]

MAIL ROOM

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b7C

1 - [redacted] - Enclosures (14)
1 - [redacted] - Enclosures (14)
1 - [redacted] Enclosures (14)
1 - [redacted] - Enclosures (14)
1 - [redacted] Enclosures (14)
1 - [redacted] Enclosures (14)
1 - [redacted] Enclosures (14)

April 21, 1981

1 - [redacted] Enclosures (14)
2 - [redacted] - Enclosures (14)
1 - [redacted] Enclosures (14)
1 - [redacted] Enclosures (14)
1 - [redacted] Enclosures (14)
1 - [redacted] Enclosures (14)

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Senate Judiciary Committee

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is in response to your letter of March 10, 1981, requesting a list of laws and administrative measures which may create an impediment to the work of the FBI. The enclosed list is not intended to be exhaustive. It does identify measures that either impair the ability of the FBI to carry out its mission or reduce the benefits to society rendered by federal law enforcement. Because many of these matters have been of longstanding concern, I have attached an appendix of supporting documents and statements which I hope you and your staff will find helpful. I look forward to personally discussing with you any of these problems which your Subcommittee may identify for further legislative attention.

DE-6 62-99828-734

Sincerely yours,

William H. Webster
Director

JUN 1 1981

APPROVED: Adm. Serv. ____ Legal Coun. ____
Crim. Inv. ____ Plan. & Insp. ____
Director ____ Rec. Mgnt. ____
Exec. AD-Inv. ____ Ident. ____ Tech. Servs. ____
Exec. AD-Ad ____ Intell. ____ Training ____
Exec. AD-LE ____ Laboratory ____ Public Affs. Off: ____

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Enclosures - 14

7 - ENCLOSURE

Note: Attached to this copy is a transcript of the Director's dialogue with Senator Sam Nunn. Note page 7 with regard to bail reform issue

[redacted] (14)

* Director signed original 4/23/81

hand delivered by liaison 4/23/81

JUL 13 1981

[redacted]

November 13, 1981

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Reference is made to your letter dated October 22, 1981, requesting the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to provide responses to additional questions regarding the disposition of twenty thousand cubic feet of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Personnel Security Investigative files of the period 1928-1959.

Responses to your inquiries, which were prepared by the Records Management Division, are enclosed.

I hope the enclosed information will assist in resolving your concerns in this matter. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely yours,

William H. Webster

William H. Webster
Director

Enclosures (7)

NOTE: Based on [redacted] memorandum 10/29/81, requesting that Records Management Division prepare written responses to questions submitted by Senator Denton regarding disposition of Civil S[redacted]ce Commission Personnel Security Investigative files for the yea[redacted]928-1959. This matter has been coordinated by the Records Managem[redacted] Division with the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs.

8 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. [redacted] Laboratory [redacted]

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Exec AD Inv. 1 -
Exec AD Adm. 1 -
Exec AD LES 1 -
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. 1 -
Crim. Inv. 1 -
Ident. 1 -
Intell. 1 -
Laboratory 1 -
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. O
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

[redacted] (9)


MAIL ROOM ☐

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NOV 28 1981

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FBI/DOJ


62-99829-754

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. 1 FROM THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
GOVERNMENT FILES

Question No. 1:

Do the individual files, which are the subject of this hearing, have any present utility in the E.O. 10450 personnel security program or any other security/loyalty program presently authorized?

FBI RESPONSE:

The utility of the Civil Service files which are the subject of the hearing cannot be determined without a detailed review.

Robert P. Finzel
Assistant Director
Records Management Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. 2 FROM THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
GOVERNMENT FILES

Question No. 2:

Do the FBI files duplicate the files in question? Do the FBI files duplicate the portions of the files in question which pertain to the loyalty of the individual or to whether or not the individual constitutes a national security risk?

FBI RESPONSE:

Response to question number 1 is applicable. It would be necessary to examine the material contained in the files which are the subject of the hearing and compare that material with corresponding material that might be contained in FBI files as a result of a referral from the Civil Service Commission.

Robert P. Finzel
Assistant Director
Records Management Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. 3 FROM THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
GOVERNMENT FILES

Question No. 3:

What would be the number or percent of files that you would recommend be examined in order to ascertain whether these files have historical, national security, or other value sufficient to warrant retention?

FBI RESPONSE:

It is believed that an examination of five percent of the files in question would be reasonable and sufficient to determine national security relevance and identify if retention is warranted for other reasons. The FBI defers to National Archives and Records Service regarding appraisal and retention of the Civil Service Commission files to determine if these files warrant retention because of historical significance.

Robert P. Finzel
Assistant Director
Records Management Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. 4 FROM THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
GOVERNMENT FILES

Question No. 4:

What would be the number or percent of the files which you would recommend be examined in order to substantiate or verify the claim that the portions of the files which have loyalty or national security value are duplicated by FBI files? What would be a sufficient sample to accomplish this?

FBI RESPONSE:

It is believed that an examination of a random sampling of five percent (1,000 cubic feet) of these files would be sufficient to verify any duplication of information contained therein.

Robert P. Finzel
Assistant Director
Records Management Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. 5 FROM THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
GOVERNMENT FILES

Question No. 5:

What would be the position of the FBI with regard to a proposal that the individual files and its index be turned over to the FBI for its use in its national security/loyalty investigations?

FBI RESPONSE:

No appreciable benefit would be realized by the FBI taking possession of the Civil Service Commission files and index, inasmuch as information contained in these records is presently available through the Office of Personnel Management. Additionally, the following other considerations mitigate against FBI taking possession of the files and index:

a. There is no space available at FBI Headquarters to accommodate the storage of these records.

b. FBI acceptance of these records would be an extremely expensive undertaking, inasmuch as all these records would have to be integrated into the FBI's Central Records System in order to make them compatible with the FBI unique numbering and filing scheme.

c. Additional FBI personnel would be required to maintain and process these records.

d. Acceptance of these records would place additional personnel and financial burdens on the FBI relative to processing Freedom of Information and Privacy Act requests, expungements, civil litigation, civil discovery, etc.

Robert P. Finzel
Assistant Director
Records Management Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. 6 FROM THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
GOVERNMENT FILES

Question No. 6:

What would be the position of the FBI with regard to a proposal that the organizational files and its index be turned over to the FBI for its use in its national security/loyalty investigations?

FBI RESPONSE:

Before offering a response to this question, it would first be necessary to examine the organizational files to ascertain whether their content is duplicated in FBI files.

Robert P. Finzel
Assistant Director
Records Management Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. 7 FROM THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
GOVERNMENT FILES

Question No. 7:

Have the individual files or the organizational files ever been offered to the FBI for its use as an alternative to disposal? If so, when was the offer made, by whom was it made, and what was the FBI's response to said offer?

FBI RESPONSE:

The files in question have never been offered to the FBI.

Robert P. Finzel
Assistant Director
Records Management Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Exec AD Adm.
Exec AD Inv.
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United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

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February 12, 1982

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Judge Webster:

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee at the FBI Oversight hearing on February 4, 1982. I also want to commend your staff for their testimony and fine cooperation at the Executive Session on February 11, 1982. I appreciate the Bureau's assistance in this undertaking.

I am enclosing additional questions which I request be answered and returned to the Subcommittee within twenty days. As you will note, many of the questions were asked at the hearings but I want to give the Bureau the opportunity to answer them in a more complete and detailed manner than is practical or possible, given the constraints of a hearing.

I also request that the questions be answered for the record for the open hearing held on February 4. If any portion of an answer is classified and can not be declassified, please give the unclassified portion of the answer for the record of the public hearing and put the classified portion in the record of the closed hearing.

I look forward to working with you and the members of your staff in our mutual effort to maintain, and, where possible, enhance the Bureau's performance.

With warm regards,

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senate
(Alabama)

JD:pjf

Enclosure

62-99826-788

ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ
FEB 19 1982
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1. At a closed hearing before the Intelligence Committee last November, Judge Webster referred to [redacted] activities with the PLO in Lebanon last summer. There are now public reports of her presence. b6 b7C

   Can you tell us more about her activities there?

2. Is there any indication at this time as to how or where persons alleged to be involved in the Brinks robbery obtained their weapons or other equipment.

3. How do FALN operations acquire their sophistication?

4. What indications are there that persons involved in the Brinks robbery were previously involved in similar armed robberies earlier, as reported in the press?

5. How would you describe the level of sophistication of the terrorism of the FALN or of other Puerto Rican terrorist groups?

6. To what extent is the FBI aware of "false-flag" intelligence collection by hostile foreign intelligence services through private U.S. organizations (e.g., news services, lobby groups, thinktanks, etc.)?

7. Director Webster, on Tuesday, December 29, 1981, at a year-end session, stated that despite the Brink's case, "the Weather Underground is not a viable organization. There is no evidence that such an organization is functioning."

   When did the Weather Underground cease functioning? How does the FBI know this?

   What has become of its members?

   Does the FBI monitor the activities of the former members? In what ways and by what techniques?

   Given the fact that its members are underground, how does the Bureau know that it is no longer a functioning organization? Has it been infiltrated by the FBI?

8. Director Webster has been quoted in an Associated Press release, based on a year end press conference on December 29, 1981, as having stated that:

   "It is premature to call the Brinks case a terrorist incident. It involved a number of former radicals with a history of violence but that amount of money is attractive for any purpose - either terrorist or criminal."

I assume the FBI is familiar with the contents of Carlos Marighella's Mini-Manual for Urban Guerrillas, published in 1969. In that document the author advised underground guerrillas to expropriate funds from banks and similar institutions in order to sustain their revolutionary activities. Do you think that it is likely that this was the underlying motivation in this case?

How soon after notification did the FBI arrive on the scene of the robbery? How was the fact of the robbery communicated?

Have the weapons used in the robbery been traced to their original owners?

Please comment in detail.

9. On October 25, [redacted] of the FBI's New York Field Office stated that the office was investigating possible links between the coalition of domestic violent groups and foreign terrorist groups, including the Irish Republican Army. He stated that he did not think there was any doubt that those involved in the Brinks robbery on October 20, were connected to the Puerto Rican terrorist group, the Fuergas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN) among other groups. Does this continue to be the Bureau's view? b6 b7C

10. What indications does the FBI have showing FALN connections with the Brinks robbery at Nyack or with any or all of the groups or individuals involved in that incident?

11. On Tuesday, December 29, 1981, Director Webster stated that Puerto Rico is economically vulnerable and thus provides an excellent opportunity for recruitment by hostile intelligence agencies. He further stated the number of incidents in Puerto Rico suggests various types of support.

Does the FBI have indications or evidence that Cuba or any other Soviet proxy or surrogate is involved with or supports, in any way, Puerto Rican terrorist groups?

If so, what are the indications?

What type of support does the number of incidents suggest?

What steps is the FBI taking to counter and interdict potential Cuban involvement with Puerto Rican terrorist groups?

12. It has been stated by Director Webster that the FBI has developed information about an organization not well known to it in the past, namely, the May 19th organization.

Please tell us what information the FBI has concerning this group.

When and in what way did the FBI first become aware of this group?

In what manner and by what techniques does the FBI presently monitor the activities of May 19th and its members?

Please answer the same questions with regard to the Republic of New Africa, the Black Liberation Army and the Symbionese Liberation Army.

13. Director Webster stated that 16 of the 43 terrorist events last year had to do with Puerto Rican groups.

Please describe the activities of FALN and of other Puerto Rican groups in Puerto Rico and in the continental United States.

14. Are there any indications that Cuba or its DGI is in any way connected with or supporting the FALN or any of its members?

By what methods and techniques does the FBI monitor the activities of the FALN and/or its members?

15. Are there any indications that the Provisional IRA (PIRA) or any of its front groups in the United States are in any way connected with the FALN or other Puerto Rican terrorist groups?

Are the PIRA fronts presently under investigation by the FBI?

If so, please describe any activity by the PIRA or its front groups in the United States and Puerto Rico.

16. Is there any indication, suspicion or evidence (real or otherwise) that the Soviets, the KGB or Eastern Bloc countries or their intelligence services support, train, equip or have contact in any other way with terrorist groups or individuals in the United States or Puerto Rico?

If so, please describe the indications, suspicion or evidence that gives rise to the conclusion and describe the nature and extent of said activities or contacts with domestic terrorist groups or individuals.

17. Provide an assessment of the extent to which KGB and proxy services, such as those in Poland, East Germany and Cuba, operate in the U.S. and Puerto Rico.

18. Considering the Soviet Bloc diplomatic community, in your view, what percentage or how many such persons have intelligence assignments?

    How many illegals should be added to this number?

19. Given the large KGB presence - what indicators exist that the Hill, specifically members of Congress and their staffs, might be targeted by espionage agents?

    How does the Bureau monitor this activity? In what way?

    Are briefings provided to Congressional staffs in order to alert them to the problem and inform them as to the proper way to deal with it?

20. Given the increase of staffing of hostile services operating in the U.S. and the Bureau staff limitations, how effective do you believe the Bureau can be in properly monitoring and, when necessary, countering such a threat?

    What is the ratio of FBI personnel operating in this area relative to the agents of the hostile services they are targeted against?

21. I note that last year, under the Levi Guidelines, the FBI had 10 groups and 47 individuals under investigation; what are the numbers this year?

    Please provide the names of the groups and a characterization of each of the individuals currently under investigation.

22. At the hearing on February 4, 1982, Director Webster stated that the FBI would have the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation into the May 19th group under the Levi Guidelines based on the rhetoric in their publication, the individuals involved, and their capability to do violence.

    Since certain rhetoric is one threshold element in precipitating an FBI investigation, does the FBI have a department or individuals who monitor and read the books, newsletters, magazines, newspapers, etc. put out by suspected terrorist, violent or subversive groups in order to pinpoint groups such as May 19th?

If so, what procedures are followed, i.e. is all the literature read or a random sampling?

If not, is this not a capability which would greatly enhance the Bureau's ability to monitor such groups?

Would the FBI require additional manpower and resources to perform this task? How many and how much?

23. How have the Levi Guidelines impacted on the FBI's ability to anticipate and interdict terrorist and violent activity by domestic groups?

24. Has the Bureau engrafted upon its Domestic Security Guidelines (i.e. Levi Guidelines) a separate set of internal guidelines or interpretations which further limit the Bureau's ability to monitor Domestic groups which have the capacity to engage in violent activity? Does the Bureau have the capacity to monitor groups which, are not in and of themselves violent, but which do support domestic terrorist groups either financially or by means of propaganda?

25. Are there any indications, suspicions or evidence that illicit narcotic revenues are used to finance terrorist or subversive activities in the United States?

If so, please describe in detail.

Are there any indications that Cuba is involved in any way with the illicit narcotics traffic in the United States?

If so, please describe in detail.

26. Is the Bureau cognizant of any systematic military training or special terrorist training which is being given to Palestinians residing in the U.S. as permanent resident aliens, or U.S. citizens? Specifically, have such persons traveled to Lebanon by way of 3rd countries in order to receive training and thereafter returned to their communities in the U.S.?

27. It is my understanding that the FBI undertook an analysis of the reasons for the sudden increase to 43 incidents in 1981, after a four-year decline from the peak of 100 in 1977.

Has that analysis been completed? If not, when will it be completed?

Is there any reason why the Subcommittee can not be furnished a copy of the analysis (once it is completed)? Would you please ensure that this is done.

28. In the past, pursuant to Executive Order 10450, the FBI maintained extensive files on individuals which chronicled their involvement in subversion, terrorist and extremist activities and organizations. These files were maintained in order to be able to perform security checks in the event such individuals applied for employment with the Federal Government.

From the testimony received at a hearing which I chaired on the proposed destruction of such files maintained by the former Civil Service Commission (now the Office of Personnel Management), it appears that such files are no longer maintained by the FBI.

What effect does this have on the Bureau's ability to participate in employee background investigations?

What is the status of the federal employment security program and of the FBI's role in it?

Is there presently a program in operation which enables the Federal Government to perform effective security checks on prospective employees?

29. Please characterize the nature and degree of coordination by the FBI with other agencies in order to be responsive to terrorist activities.

Please list the other agencies that the FBI coordinates with in this effort.

Have there been any improvements in the last year in coordination among the various agencies and the FBI? Are there additional improvements needed? What are they?

30. How does the FBI plan to coordinate its intelligence and investigative activities with the

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31. In an interview which Judge Webster gave on Sunday, January 3, 1982, on ABC Television, he stated that the major thrust today in Soviet and Soviet Bloc countries is technology transfer. Would you describe the problem in more specific terms, as you see it.

How does the Bureau balance its Foreign Counter Intelligence (FCI) interests with its criminal enforcement responsibilities in this area, for example, in some instances the Bureau presumably permits the technology to be exported illegally in order to preserve its FCI investigation. Please explain.

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32. At last year's authorization hearing, it was stated by the FBI representative that "there are a number of areas where we believe our ability to do our job can be enhanced if there were some fine tuning effected regarding certain statutes." Senator East requested that the Subcommittee receive a catalog of the areas, statutes and impediments referred to but it has not been received. b6 b7C

It is the Subcommittee's understanding that the Department has held the report, and we would appreciate any information you might furnish on the reason for the delay.

33. Concerns about the quality of forensic science technical capabilities have been raised by proficiency tests conducted by the Forensic Science Foundation. Are FBI-offered courses designed to develop competency among State and local personnel? If the FBI courses are only introductory in nature, what basis do we have for measuring whether they are beneficial in improving State and local capabilities?

34. How has the Bureau restructured its activities to reflect the Department of Justice's new emphasis on controlling violent crime?

Has this restructuring affected the staff years available for other Bureau priorities? (Organized crime, white collar crime, and foreign counterintelligence were the top three priorities.)

35. How will Bureau activities be changed by its new responsibilities concerning drug enforcement? Will there be a shift in resources and priorities or will more resources be requested?

36. How does the Bureau coordinate its training at Quantico with that of other Federal facilities such as the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia?

37. What academic research projects are FBI Academy-based instructors currently doing in the area of terrorism?

Please provide a list of current projects and of those reports that have been completed on the subject of terrorism.

38. Would you please describe the Government's Antiterrorism Program and your agency's role within that program? Also, what is your understanding of the specific roles, if any, of the National Security Council and the Department of State?

Resources — many Int/t NCO Case Auth

Senator Biden

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39. Does the Bureau have a program to assess the risk or vulnerability of potential U.S. terrorist targets? How does the Bureau forecast the number of terrorist incidents anticipated during the fiscal year?

40. How does the FBI develop and update contingency plans to assure an effective and timely response to violent criminal acts of terrorism, given that the methods and targets of terrorist groups are constantly changing?

41. The Working Group on Terrorism, composed of representatives of agencies with an interest in antiterrorism, meets as necessary to carry out its assigned responsibilities, which include information exchange, resolution of jurisdictional issues, and the coordination of the general antiterrorism activities of the various agencies. How would you evaluate the usefulness of this group in the U.S. Government's Antiterrorism Program, and have there been any changes concerning this group in the past year?

42. At last year's authorization hearing, it was stated that the Tax Reform Act and the Financial Privacy Act have impeded the Bureau's ability to perform its investigative responsibilities by cutting off access to financial information.

    Do those impediments still exist?

    What steps, if any, have been taken by the Administration or the Congress to rectify the situation?

    What steps should be taken in order to rectify the situation and to provide the Bureau with the investigative tools which it needs?

43. For years, the FBI has provided all-expense paid forensic science training, as well as other types of training, such as the National Academy, for State and local law enforcement. That means the Federal Government has footed the bill for instruction, lodging and transportation of persons to Quantico. Although we must recognize that concerns over government budgets are not limited to the Federal level, is it not reasonable to expect State and local governments to share some of the direct training costs - travel expenses, for instance?

    Is it not feasible to implement a post-testing procedure after the course, possibly in conjunction with a group such as the Forensic Science Foundation, so that we could have some assurance as to the impact of the FBI training effort?

44. Under the proposed Federal Tort Claims Act the liability of the United States for the Acts of its agents would include tort claims arising under the Constitution. The Senate version of the Act, S.1775, provides that the United States shall have available all defenses available to the employee, including "good faith" defense, whereas, the House version, H.R.24, does not include this provision. Do you consider it important that in such tort cases the United States be explicitedly granted the use of the "good faith" plea?

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

June 8, 1982

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Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism
Senate Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Denton

As a follow up to the hearings of February 4 and February 11, I am enclosing our answers to questions submitted in your letter dated February 12, 1982.

By agreement with Subcommittee Counsel, [redacted] certain questions and answers were consolidated for the purpose of completeness and continuity in our responses, and are numbered accordingly. Please note that the answers to questions 2, 4 and 8c should not be disseminated outside the Subcommittee because these responses relate to evidentiary material in pending investigations and trials. Additionally, classified material is being sent under separate cover and will be hand delivered to the Subcommittee.

I trust these responses will be of assistance to the Subcommittee.

To Full Committee

Hand Delivered to Subcommittee by [redacted]

Sincerely yours,

ICC 4251
7/14/82

William H. Webster
Director

ENCLOSURE

JUL 15 1982

These responses have been prepared, reviewed and approved by the respective Divisions before submission to CAU for preparation of the final letter to Senator Denton.

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Question 3 & 5:

How do Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN) operations acquire their sophistication?

How would you describe the level of sophistication of the terrorism of the FALN or of other Puerto Rican terrorist groups?

Answer:

FALN terrorist activities have primarily involved bombing incidents, as have the terrorist activities of other Puerto Rican proindependent violence-prone terrorist groups. The sophistication and expertise involved in these bombing incidents have been consistent the past several years and could have been acquired through past military training or even public source material. A trend has, however, been noted towards guerrilla type activity in Puerto Rico since late 1979, with the ambush attack on a United States military bus where two were killed and several wounded by automatic weapons.

Question 7:

Director Webster, on Tuesday, December 29, 1981, at a year-end session, stated that despite the Brink's case, "the Weather Underground is not a viable organization. There is no evidence that such an organization is functioning."

a. When did the Weather Underground Organization (WUO) cease functioning? How does the FBI know this?

b. What has become of its members?

c. Does the FBI monitor the activities of the former members? In what ways and by what techniques?

d. Given the fact that its members are underground, how does the Bureau know that it is no longer a functioning organization? Has it been infiltrated by the FBI?

Answer:

In 1976, internal dissension split the WUO with the heavily feminist "Revolutionary Committee" (RC) faction breaking away from what they referred to as the "Central Committee" (CC). After 1977, nothing was heard from the WUO either under its own name or under the RC or CC names. Nothing, however, was developed to show that the WUO ceased to exist. Indeed, the fact that some of its leading members, including [redacted] who was a fugitive, did not surface, tended to support the notion that the WUO as an entity, may have continued to exist. During the late 1970's, a large number of the membership, many of whom were probably a part of the CC, surfaced; however, none divulged information about the group's status. The FBI closed its domestic security case on the WUO when its continuation could not be justified because, from all information available, it could not be substantiated that the group was involved in criminal activities. b6 b7C

In 1979, the UFAP warrants for those WUO members sought on Chicago warrants were dropped, thereby bringing to an end investigations to locate these individuals. [redacted] and [redacted] became fugitives in late 1979 as a result of a UFAP warrant being issued following the discovery of a "bomb factory" in their Hoboken, New Jersey, safehouse. Silas Bissell became a fugitive in 1970, when he jumped bond in a bombing case in Seattle, Washington. He remains a fugitive. Marilyn Jean Buck became a fugitive when she escaped from a Federal prison in 1977. She remains a fugitive and a subject in the Brinks investigation. None of the other members of the b6 b7C

WUO have been subjects of FBI investigation since the 1979 Chicago UFAP warrants were dropped. Consequently, the exact whereabouts or activities of these people has not been monitored by the FBI. In some instances, the FBI has encountered some former WUO members while conducting other investigations. Even though active investigation has not existed in the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC) or the May 19th Communist Organization (until after the Brinks incident) these groups and some individual members have come to FBI attention but have not been the subjects of individual domestic security investigations. It is also believed that some of WUO members remain in an underground status.

Even though the FBI cannot state categorically that the WUO has ceased to exist, it is a known fact that the WUO as an organization has not claimed credit for any criminal activities since 1977. The only thing that is known at this time is that the WUO has not publicly claimed credit for anything in five years. In 1977, two undercover FBI Agents penetrated a cell of people associated with the WUO in California and eventually caused the arrest of five people including two WUO fugitives in November, 1977. No other infiltrations of the WUO by agents or informants have been made since that time.

Questions 9 and 10:

On October 25, [redacted] of the FBI's New York Field Office stated that the office was investigating possible links between the coalition of domestic violent groups and foreign terrorist groups, including the Irish Republican Army. He stated that he did not think there was any doubt that those involved in the Brinks robbery on October 20, were connected to the Puerto Rican terrorist group, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion National (FALN) among other groups. Does this continue to be the Bureau's view? b6 b7C

What indications does the FBI have showing FALN connections with the Brinks robbery at Nyack or with any or all of the groups or individuals involved in that incident?

Answer:

Former WUO members have participated in several rallies and have attended functions in support of FALN which were sponsored by the FALN surface support group, the Movement of National Liberation (MLN). No further information has been developed, however, to reflect that the FALN was aware of the October 20, 1981, Brinks robbery prior to that date or that the FALN was in any way involved in any of the other armored truck robberies in the New York area that the Brinks perpetrators are suspected of committing. Since the Brinks incident, the MLN has expressed support of people involved and the FALN in their communique recovered on March 1, 1982, expressed support for these people.

Question 12:

It has been stated by Director Webster that the FBI has developed information about an organization not well known to it in the past, namely, the May 19th Organization.

a. Please tell us what information the FBI has concerning this group.

b. When and in what way did the FBI first become aware of this group?

c. In what manner and by what techniques does the FBI presently monitor the activities of May 19th and its members?

d. Please answer the same questions with regard to the Republic of New Africa, the Black Liberation Army and the Symbionese Liberation Army.

Answer:

The FBI was aware of the major reorganization effort of the Weather Underground Organization in 1978 and of the formation of the entity known as the May 19th Communist Organization or May 19th Communist Committee. The Chicago Field Office, who in 1978 was the office of origin within the FBI for the investigation for the Weather Underground Organization, advised during 1978 that the May 19th Communist Organization was the East Coast faction of the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC). The Prairie Fire Organizing Committee was the surface support group for the Weather Underground Organization, which was headquartered in San Francisco, California, and sometime during 1976, a split occurred within that organization with the East Coast faction splintering off and forming itself as the May 19th Communist Organization or Communist Committee, headquartered in New York. Police intelligence sources advised the FBI that members of the PFOC and the May 19th Organization were interchangeable as late as December, 1978 and, therefore, the New York FBI Office recommended that the May 19th not be opened as a separate Domestic Security investigation at that time as the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee was already being investigated. The Weather Underground Organization investigation was closed by the office of origin, Chicago, and the Department of Justice was so advised by memorandum dated July 15, 1979. The investigation was closed due to the inactivity of the Weather Underground Organization since 1977. The Prairie Fire Organizing Committee investigation was closed by the office of origin, San Francisco, and the Department of Justice was so advised

by memorandum dated June 5, 1979. This case, like the one WUO, was closed because of a lack of information indicating group was involved in criminal activity therefore its continuation could not be justified. The May 19th Communist Organization was dominated by feminists and reportedly supported various violent groups such as the WUO, the Black Liberation Army, and the Republic of New Africa, among others. Based on the possible involvement of the May 19th Communist Organization in the Brinks case, a limited Domestic Security investigation was initiated on October 29, 1981. The New York FBI Office is currently the office of origin in this matter.

The FBI is currently investigating the May 19th Organization under the Domestic Security Guidelines for limited investigation. The investigation is in its preliminary stages.

Limited investigation was authorized on May 19th, October 30, 1981, with an expiration date extended to July 28, 1982.

May 19th is the East Coast branch and an off-shoot of the PFOC, which was the surface support group of the "old" WUO. May 19th has stated its support for numerous causes, including the John Brown Anti-Klan Committee (JBAKC), and the New African Freedom Fighters (NAFF), as well as strong support for the African Women's Movement.

[redacted] arrested as a result of NYROB, was (and still may be) a member of May 19th. At this time, she is the only direct connection between May 19th and the NYROB incident. The only other link (indirect) is the May 19th support of the NAFF. Members of this group, according to the Black Liberation Army (BLA) communication, dated November 5, 1981, about the Brinks Robbery, made up part of the NYROB "gang." b6 b7C

Regarding May 19th's cooperation with the FALN, the following is noted. May 19th members have demonstrated numerous times since 1978 in direct support of the FALN. Chicago reported source information in May, 1981, which outlined cooperation between members of the FALN and members of May 19th.

To date, membership, leadership, and financing of the group known as May 19th is largely unknown. This limited Domestic Security investigation continues with anticipation, that it will be converted to a full Domestic Security investigation in the near future. The FBI will intensify efforts to identify current May 19th leadership, members, financing, planned activities, and whether this organization presents a viable domestic terrorist threat.

The Republic of New Africa (RNA) was founded in Detroit, Michigan, in March, 1968, as the Black Government Conference (BGC) which was sponsored by the Malcolm X Society (MXS). The purpose of the conference was to establish a national black movement to be known as the RNA. The stated purpose of the RNA was to separate the States of Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina from the United States and establish an "African republic." During the period 1968 to 1972, RNA recruited approximately 430 members nationwide. The group known as the Black Legion (BL) was organized in 1974 along military lines and its mission was to defend RNA citizens and to support national RNA objectives.

The following can be considered significant RNA activities from the standpoint of violence:

March, 1969: RNA and police engaged in a shootout in Detroit, Michigan. One officer was killed.

August, 1971: 11 RNA members engaged in a shootout with police and FBI Agents in Jackson, Mississippi. One officer was killed and two were wounded, including one FBI Agent.

July, 1972: Secret Service and FBI Agents arrested two RNA members in possession of weapons at the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida.

October, 1972: RNA presented their case of United States terrorism against them to the United Nations. In December of 1972, the United Nations passed a resolution that the United States halt prosecution of the RNA 11 and that United Nations observers be sent to Mississippi to observe the election of RNA officers.

Following the two shootouts with police, RNA activity declined. It was considered a loosely structured entity which from 1973 to 1976 demonstrated an inability to attract national financial or popular support. Detroit FBI Office, which was office of origin for this investigation, discontinued its investigation on July 9, 1976, because RNA activities, characterized as being violations of State or Federal law were found to be spontaneous and had not been preplanned or agreed upon by RNA leadership. Those violations dealt primarily with firearms and RNA members were not charged with any violation of Federal statutes relative to the Domestic Security investigation.

The preliminary investigation of the RNA is currently closed. The current office of origin (Jackson) has reported that there is insufficient cause to conduct a Domestic Security investigation of the RNA at this time and that there is no indication of any direct connection between the RNA, as an organization and the NYROB investigation. However, it is possible that RNA members may have been involved as individuals. It is currently believed that the national membership of the RNA is approximately 300 based on a review of documents seized at the time of the arrest of RNA member Cynthia Boston, on October 27, 1981, at Gallman, Mississippi.

The BLA came into being in approximately February, 1971, when the Black Panther Party (BPP) split into the Newton faction and the Cleaver faction (CF). Eldridge Clever, leader of the BLA, called for the overthrow of the United States Government by creating a climate of terror. The more militant members of the BPP joined the CF, headquartered in New York City. The BLA was the underground militant arm of the BPP - CF. It was a loose-knit organization whose members, numbering approximately 100, were grouped into autonomous cells of 6 to 12 members in major cities. Approximately 30 to 40 of these members possessed criminal records.

Members of the BLA have murdered and wounded police officers and were involved in many bank robberies, bombings, and prison escapes. Some incarcerated members who attempted to escape from prisons, were aided and supported by other BLA members.

Closing of the BLA investigation was recommended by the then office of origin, New York, because individual members had been arrested and convicted for a wide array of violations; all but two of the hardcore leaders were incarcerated and/or awaiting trial; and its parent organization, the BPP-CF was defunct. The Department of Justice concurred with this recommendation on March 18, 1977.

A limited Domestic Security investigation was initiated on the BLA on October 30, 1981, based on possible BLA involvement in the Brinks incident. Although the investigation is in its preliminary stages, information received from New York, reveals that there is little indication at this time that the organization, as an entity, is currently active except as a political voice. However, former or perhaps current members may be involved in criminal activity including NYROB as individuals.

THE SYMBIONESE LIBERATION ARMY (SLA)

The FBI Domestic Security investigation of the SLA was closed by the office of origin, San Francisco, on December 10, 1976, at the conclusion of the investigation surrounding the Patricia Campbell Hearst kidnapping investigation. No further Domestic Security investigation has been conducted on the SLA to date.

Question 13:

Director Webster stated that 16 of the 42 terrorist events last year had to do with Puerto Rican groups.

Please describe the activities of FALN and of other Puerto Rican groups in Puerto Rico and in the continental United States.

Answer:

It is believed that proindependent violence-prone Puerto Rican terrorist groups will continue to be the most frequent perpetrators of terrorist incidents in the United States, as they have been for the past five years. During this five year period of 1977- 1981, they were responsible for 128 of 303 total claimed terrorist incidents in the United States. These 128 incidents were directed primarily against United States Government installations, public buildings and utilities.

Between October 26, 1974 and November 24, 1979, the FALN perpetrated 120 bombing-type incidents in the continental United States and Puerto Rico, resulting in five deaths, 80 injuries and three million dollars in property damage. On March 15, 1980, members of the FALN invaded the Illinois State Campaign Headquarters of President Jimmy Carter in Chicago and Republican Presidential candidate George Bush in New York. From April 4, 1980, when 11 members of the FALN were arrested until March 1, 1982, the FALN claimed credit for no terrorist incidents. On March 1, 1982, the FALN claimed credit for placing four bombs in New York City.

During 1981, six different Puerto Rican groups, other than the FALN, claimed responsibility for the 16 claimed terrorist incidents perpetrated by Puerto Rican terrorist organizations.

Question 15:

Are there any indications that the Provisional IRA (PIRA) or any of its front groups in the United States are in any way connected with the FALN or other Puerto Rican terrorist groups?

Answer:

There is no information that has been developed by the FBI that would indicate a possible connection between the PIRA and the Puerto Rican terrorist groups.

Question 21:

I note that last year, under the Levi Guidelines, the FBI had 10 groups and 47 individuals under investigation; what are the numbers this year?

Answer:

As of May 15, 1982, the FBI had a total of 43 investigations under the Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic Security. Of this number of investigations, there were 23 organizations and 20 individuals. Of the 23 organizations there were only three under full investigation. They were the Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation, Communist Workers Party, and the Movement of National Liberation. The following is a succinct characterization of each of these three groups:

The Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN) is a clandestine terrorist organization dedicated to the liberation of Puerto Rico through the use of violent actions including bombings, incendiary attacks, kidnappings and threats. The group has financed its action through armed robberies of money, materials and vehicles. The FALN has claimed responsibility for 120 bombing-type incidents (actual bombings, attempted bombings, incendiary device attacks, and bomb threats) since October 26, 1974. These incidents have resulted in over 3½ million dollars in damages and five deaths and 80 injuries. The group has forcibly taken control of two Presidential campaign offices and a National Guard Armory, binding employees and robbing the facilities. "Bomb factories" run by the FALN were discovered in Chicago and New York City on November 3, 1976, and July 12, 1978, respectively. Eleven members of the FALN were arrested in Evanston, Illinois, on April 4, 1980, in the possession of two stolen vans, two stolen cars, one falsely registered van, one stolen 14 foot truck, 13 firearms including automatic weapons, false identifications, and various disguises. One of these arrestees was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment in Federal custody for a fatal FALN bombing in New York City. The other ten were ultimately sentenced to terms of 55 through 90 years in Federal custody for Sedition to thwart the authority of the United States Government and violation of the Hobbs Act. Between April 4, 1980, and March 1, 1982, the FALN claimed credit for no incidents. On March 1, 1982, four bombings in New York City were claimed by the FALN.

The Communist Workers Party (CWP) previously known as the Workers Viewpoint Organization is headquartered in New York City. The CWP is guided by the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse Tung, and bases its revolutionary vanguard party in the working class. The CWP advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by any means possible, including violence, and further advocates the arming of the working class to achieve that end. Support for the organization which eventually became the CWP began in grass roots level activity in the Durham, North Carolina area in the fall of 1976. By the summer of 1979, the organization had embraced armed confrontation as a means to achieve their goal. Such a confrontation in November, 1979, in Greensboro, North Carolina resulted in the death of five members of the CWP. In January, 1980, CWP was excluded from a scheduled march on February 2, 1980, in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Civil Rights Movement in Greensboro, North Carolina because of their refusal to participate in an unarmed march. Members of the CWP continue to maintain arms in their places of residence in support of their professed willingness to kill in order to bring about the revolution they envision.

The Movement of National Liberation (MLN) is a Puerto Rican independence oriented organization centered in Chicago, Illinois, which believes that armed struggle is necessary in order for Puerto Rico to be liberated. The organization openly supports various clandestine terrorist groups presently functioning in Puerto Rico and in the continental United States. Included among these groups is the FALN.

In addition to the domestic groups being investigated by the FBI, there are a large number of international terrorist groups investigated by the FBI under the Attorney General Guidelines for Foreign Counterintelligence. The exact number is not listed here because it is classified.

Question 22:

At the hearing on February 4, 1982, Director Webster stated that the FBI would have the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation into the May 19th group under the Levi Guidelines based on the rhetoric in their publication, the individuals involved, and their capability to do violence.

Since certain rhetoric is one threshold element in precipitating an FBI investigation, does the FBI have a department or individuals who monitor and read the books, newsletters, magazines, newspapers, etc. put out by suspected terrorist, violent or subversive groups in order to pinpoint groups such as May 19th?

If so, what procedures are followed, i.e. is all the literature read or a random sampling?

If not, is this not a capability which would greatly enhance the Bureau's ability to monitor such groups?

Would the FBI require additional manpower and resources to perform this task? How many and how much?

Answer:

The FBI does not have a program whereby we monitor and read publications of suspected terrorist, violent or subversive groups. We do not monitor the activities of groups unless their activities meet the standards for investigation established by the Attorney General Guidelines for Foreign Counterintelligence or Domestic Security or are in violation of Federal statutes. If the FBI is investigating the activities of a specific group, we would, as part of our inquiry, examine publications of that group.

It is difficult to say whether this "capability would greatly enhance the Bureau's ability to monitor such groups" or what additional manpower or resources would be required to perform the task. We presently have the matter under review to determine whether any change in our current practice is warranted.

Questions 23 & 24:

How have the Levi Guidelines impacted on the FBI's ability to anticipate and interdict terrorist and violent activity by domestic groups?

Has the Bureau engrafted upon its Domestic Security Guidelines (i.e., Levi Guidelines) a separate set of internal guidelines or interpretations which further limit the Bureau's ability to monitor domestic groups which have the capacity to engage in violent activity? Does the Bureau have the capacity to monitor groups which are not in and of themselves violent, but which do support domestic terrorist groups either financially or by means of propaganda?

Answer:

The Domestic Security Guidelines have established an investigative criteria for groups and individuals which essentially involves criminal activity in furtherance of the four basic criteria for investigations which are set forth in the Guidelines. In other words, these investigations are based on allegations indicating groups or individuals are engaged in activities which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and violation of Federal law for those purposes spelled out in the Guidelines.

It is difficult to measure the effect of the Domestic Security Guidelines on our operations, but we believe they have served us reasonably well. They provided a clear statement of policy for the Bureau at a time when our authority in these matters was the subject of critical debate in Congress and elsewhere. Although the number of investigative matters has been reduced, we have had significant accomplishments in this area. And there have been no successful suits against an FBI Agent for activities that occurred after the Guidelines were adopted.

Still accurate?

The procedures established by the Domestic Security Guidelines are, of course, still being tested. Some problem areas have been identified and are currently being reviewed to determine whether modifications in the Guidelines are necessary. Among our more significant concerns are those dealing with the use of informants, especially our ability to infiltrate target organizations during preliminary inquiries. We have also experienced difficulty in maintaining coverage of organizations whose activities temporarily fall outside the Guidelines. If the investigation is closed, than all informants reporting on that organization must be redirected or closed. When the organization

becomes active again, it becomes a costly and time-consuming process to redevelop effective informant coverage.

The FBI has not enacted any internal guidelines more restrictive than the Attorney General Guidelines for the purpose of limiting its ability to investigate domestic groups. However, the FBI has imposed more demanding standards for investigations of individuals than required by the Attorney General Guidelines in order to ensure that the FBI's investigative resources are utilized in the most productive manner.

As a result, the FBI initiates domestic security investigations only on individuals when they are in a policy making position in an organization which is the subject of a full investigation, or have engaged in activities which indicate that they are likely to use force or violence in violation of Federal law.

The best example of the type of groups referred to in the last part of this question is the Movement of National Liberation (MLN). Although they have committed no acts of violence, they directly support both monetarily and with public statements the FALN, and because of the supportive role of the MLN, this group is under investigation within the scope of the Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic Security.

Question 25:

Are there any indications, suspicions or evidence that illicit narcotic revenues are used to finance terrorist or subversive activities in the United States?

Answer:

As a result of FBI investigations, individual members of terrorist groups, such as the anti-Castro Omega 7, have been arrested for trafficking in narcotics. The FBI has not developed evidence to substantiate the inference that the monies gained from this illicit drug trafficking were being used to fund terrorist activities in the United States.

In the recent past, information has been received by the FBI that other terrorist groups have been involved in drug trafficking, but the Bureau has not been able to substantiate the allegations.

Question 27:

It is my understanding that the FBI undertook an analysis of the reasons for the sudden increase to 42 incidents in 1981, after a four-year decline from the peak of 110 in 1977.

Has the analysis been completed? If not, when will it be completed?

Is there any reason why the Subcommittee can not be furnished a copy of the analysis (once it is completed)? Would you please ensure that this is done.

Answer:

The FBI has recently completed a summary of claimed terrorist incidents in the United States in 1981. This summary also includes statistical analysis of terrorist incidents in the United States during the last five years. A copy of this report is attached.

ANALYSIS OF CLAIMED TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE U.S. 1981

This Report Was Prepared By:

Terrorist Research And Analytical Center
Terrorism Section
Criminal Investigative Division

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SECTION A

A PICTORIAL ANALYSIS OF CLAIMED TERRORIST INCIDENTS, 1981

CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF CLAIMED TERRORIST INCIDENTS, U.S., 1981


DATE	LOCATION	TYPE OF INCIDENT	GROUP CLAIMING CREDIT
1-8-81	Ponce, PR	Firebombing	People's Revolutionary Commandos (CRP)
1-8-81	Rio Piedras, PR	Firebombing	People's Revolutionary Commandos (CRP)
1-8-81	Santurce, PR	Firebombing	People's Revolutionary Commandos (CRP)
1-12-81	San Juan, PR	Bombing	Borinquen People's Army - Macheteros (EPB-Macheteros)
1-23-81	New York, NY	Bombing	Croatian Freedom Fighters (CFF)
1-26-81	San Francisco, CA	Bombing	Jewish Defense League (JDL)
2-2-81	Los Angeles, CA	Attempted Bombing	October 3
2-9-81	Eugene, OR	Assault	Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade (RCYB)
2-22-81	Hollywood, CA	Bombing/Extortion	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
3-15-81	San Juan, PR	Attempted Bombing	Armed Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP)
4-21-81	Santurce, PR	Armed Robbery	Borinquen People's Army - Macheteros (EPB-Macheteros)
4-27-81	Washington, DC	Firebombing	Iranian Patriotic Army (IPA)
5-16-81	New York, NY	Bombing	Puerto Rican Armed Resistance (PRAR)
5-16-81	New York, NY	Attempted Bombing	Puerto Rican Armed Resistance (PRAR)
5-17-81	New York, NY	Attempted Bombing	Puerto Rican Armed Resistance (PRAR)
5-18-81	New York, NY	Attempted Bombing	Puerto Rican Armed Resistance (PRAR)
5-18-81	New York, NY	Attempted Bombing	Puerto Rican Armed Resistance (PRAR)
6-25-81	Torrance, CA	Firebombing	Jewish Defenders (JD)
6-26-81	Los Angeles, CA	Bombing	June 9 Organization
7-30-81	New York, NY	Takeover	Libyan Students in the U.S.
8-7-81	Washington, DC	Takeover	People's Mujaheddin Organization of Iran (PMOI)
8-20-81	Washington, DC	Arson	Black Brigade (BB)
8-20-81	Los Angeles, CA	Bombing	June 9 Organization
8-27-81	Carolina, PR	Bombing	Star Group (GE)
8-31-81	New York, NY	Takeover	Jewish Defense League (JDL)
9-3-81	New York, NY	Attempted Firebombing	Jewish Defense League (JDL)
9-4-81	New York, NY	Firebombing	Jewish Defense League (JDL)
9-9-81	Washington, DC	Takeover	Concerned Sierra Leone Nationals (CSLN)
9-11-81	Miami, FL	Bombing	Omega 7
9-11-81	Miami, FL	Bombing	Omega 7
9-12-81	New York, NY	Bombing	Omega 7
9-22-81	Schenectady, NY	Bombing	Communist Workers Party (CWP)
9-24-81	Miami, FL	Attempted Bombing	Omega 7
10-10-81	Hollywood, CA	Bombing	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
10-25-81	New York, NY	Firebombing	Jewish Defense League (JDL)
11-11-81	Santurce, PR	Bombing	Borinquen People's Army - Macheteros (EPB-Macheteros)
11-14-81	Glen Cove, NY	Shooting	Jewish Defense League (JDL)
11-20-81	Los Angeles, CA	Bombing	Justice Commandos of Armenian Genocide (JCAG)
11-27-81	Ft. Buchanan, PR	Shooting	National Liberation Movement (MNL)
11-27-81	San Juan, PR	Bombing	Borinquen People's Army - Macheteros (EPB-Macheteros)
11-27-81	Santurce, PR	Bombing	Borinquen People's Army - Macheteros (EPB-Macheteros)
12-24-81	New York, NY	Attempted Bombing	Jewish Defense League (JDL)

1981 CLAIMED TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY GROUP, NUMBER AND TYPE OF INCIDENT

TERRORIST GROUP	TYPE OF INCIDENT: ACTUAL BOMBINGS	ATTEMPTED BOMBINGS	ACTUAL FIREBOMBINGS	ATTEMPTED FIREBOMBINGS	ARMED ROBBERIES	SHOOTINGS	TAKEOVERS	ARSON	ASSAULTS	TOTAL INCIDENTS	PERSONS INJURED	PERSONS KILLED
ARMENIAN GROUPS												
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia	2									2		
June 9 Organization	2									2		
Justice Commandos of Armenian Genocide	1									1		
October 3		1								1		
CROATIAN GROUPS												
Croatian Freedom Fighters	1									1		
CUBAN GROUPS												
Omega 7	3	1								4		
IRANIAN GROUPS												
Iranian Patriotic Army			1							1		
People's Mujaheddin Organization of Iran							1			1	3	
JEWISH GROUPS												
Jewish Defenders			1							1		
Jewish Defense League	1	1	2	1		1	1			7		
LIBYAN GROUPS												
Libyan Groups in United States							1			1		
PUERTO RICAN GROUPS												
Armed Forces of Popular Resistance		1								1		
Borinquen People's Army - Macheteros	4				1					5		
STAR GROUP	1									1		
National Liberation Movement						1				1	1	
People's Revolutionary Commandos			3							3		
Puerto Rican Armed Resistance	1	4								5		1
OTHER DOMESTIC GROUPS												
Communist Workers Party	1									1		
Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade									1	1		
OTHER GROUPS												
Black Brigade								1		1		
Concerned Sierra Leone Nationals							1			1		
TOTAL	17	8	7	1	1	2	4	1	1	42	4	1


U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

CLAIMED TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE U.S.
Calendar Year 1981




TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS - 42

TOTAL NUMBER OF INJURED OR KILLED - 5


TERRORIST ATTACKS BY TARGET 1981
NUMBER OF ATTACKS
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Residences
0
Commercial Establishments
5
Vehicles
2
Public Safety Establishments (Law Enforcement etc)
0
Government Buildings & Property
1
Persons
1
Public Utilities
4
Transportation Facilities
3
Postal Facilities
3
Military
2
Diplomatic & International
15
Press & Media
2
Recreation or Entertainment
3
Educational
1
Other
0

CLAIMED TERRORIST INCIDENTS - 1981



Eugene, Oregon
REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST YOUTH BRIGADE
1 assault, Feb. 9, 1981

Schenectady, New York
COMMUNIST WORKERS PARTY
1 bombing, Sept. 22, 1981

Glen Cove, New York
JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE
1 shooting, Nov. 14, 1981

San Francisco, California
JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE
1 bombing, Jan 26, 1981

Los Angeles, California
OPERATION 3 (OCTOBER 3) (Armenian)
1 attempted bombing, Feb. 2, 1981

JUNE 9 ORGANIZATION (Armenian)
1 bombing, June 26, 1981
1 bombing, Aug. 20, 1981

JUSTICE COMMANDOS OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
1 bombing, Nov. 20, 1981

Hollywood, California
ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA
1 bombing/extortion, Feb. 22, 1981
1 bombing, Oct. 10, 1981

Torrance, California
JEWISH DEFENDERS
1 firebombing, June 25, 1981

Miami, Florida
OMEGA 7 (Cuban)
2 bombings, Sept. 11, 1981
1 attempted bombing, Sept. 24, 1981

New York
PUERTO RICAN ARMED RESISTANCE
1 bombing, May 16, 1981
2 attempted bombings, May 16 and 17, 1981
JF Kennedy Airport
2 attempted bombings, May 18, 1981

CROATION FREEDOM FIGHTERS
1 bombing, Jan. 23, 1981

LIBYAN STUDENTS IN THE U.S.
1 takeover, July 30, 1981

JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE
1 takeover, Aug. 31, 1981
1 attempted firebombing, Sept. 3, 1981
1 car firebombing, Sept. 4, 1981
1 firebombing, Oct. 25, 1981
1 attempted bombing, Dec. 24, 1981

OMEGA 7 (Cuban)
1 bombing, Sept. 12, 1981

Washington, D.C.
CONCERNED SIERRA LEONE NATIONALS
1 takeover, Sept. 9, 1981

BLACK BRIGADE
1 arson, Aug. 20, 1981

PEOPLE'S MUJAHEDDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN
1 takeover, Aug. 7, 1981

IRANIAN PATRIOTIC ARMY
1 firebombing, Apr. 27, 1981

Puerto Rico
BORINQUEN PEOPLE'S ARMY - MACHETEROS
San Juan, PR
1 bombing, Jan. 12, 1981
Santurce, PR
1 armed robbery, Apr. 21, 1981
1 bombing, Nov. 11, 1981
San Juan and Santurce, PR
2 bombings, Nov. 27, 1981

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDOS
3 firebombings, Jan. 8, 1981
Santurce, Rio Piedras, Ponce, PR

ARMED FORCES OF POPULAR RESISTANCE
1 attempted bombing, Mar. 15, 1981
San Juan, PR

STAR GROUP
1 bombing, Aug. 27, 1981
Carolina, PR

NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT
1 shooting, Nov. 27, 1981
Fort Buchanan, PR

TOTAL CLAIMED TERRORIST INCIDENTS FOR 1981
42

SECTION B

SUMMARIES OF CLAIMED TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY GROUPS

ARMENIAN GROUPS

ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA (ASALA)
AKA ARMENIAN UNDERGROUND FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA,
GROUP 28 MAY, AND AVENGERS OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of two incidents.

The goals of the ASALA are: retaliation against Turks for the alleged massacre of one and one-half million Armenians in 1915; the liberation of historical Armenian lands from Turkey; and reunification with Soviet Armenia as a socialist democratic state. These goals are to be reached by means of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary violence.

On February 22, 1981, at approximately 9:30 p.m., two bombs detonated at the Carpeteria Store located at 1122 North Vine Street, Hollywood, California, causing minimal damage. The executives of the store had previously received an extortion letter from the ASALA, demanding a $150,000 "contribution."

Investigation is continuing. No suspects have been developed.

In October, 1981, a bomb exploded at the Hollywood Palladium, 6215 Sunset Boulevard, Hollywood, California, during a banquet sponsored by the Armenian National Committee to Aid Homeless Armenians. No injures and minimal damage resulted. The device was similar in construction to previous bombing in Los Angeles, which have been claimed by the Armenians. The bombing was later claimed by communique from the ASALA.

No suspects have been developed and investigation is continuing.

JUNE 9 ORGANIZATION

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of two incidents.

The June 9 Organization is an offshoot of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). It derives its name from the killing of a Turkish diplomat in Geneva, Switzerland on June 9, 1981.

On June 26, 1981, an explosive device was detonated in front of the double door entrance of the Swiss Bank Corporation, Suite 1220, 800 West 6th Street, Los Angeles, California. The explosion was low order and caused little damage and no injuries. An unknown male caller informed "Associated Press," Los Angeles, that credit was claimed by the June 9 Organization, an Armenian terrorist group.

No suspects have been developed. Investigation is continuing.

On August 20, 1981, at approximately 5:00 a.m., an explosive device went off in front of the Swiss Precision Instrument Company, 875 North Virgil, Los Angeles, California. The device was low yield and it burned rather than detonated. It caused little damage and no injuries.

"Associated Press," Los Angeles, received a call from an unknown male claiming credit for the bombing in the name of the June 9 Organization. He stated the purpose of the bombing was to protest the imprisonment of Armenian nationalists by Swiss authorties.

No suspects have been developed and investigation is continuing.

JUSTICE COMMANDOS OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE (JCAG)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

The JCAG is an Armenian terrorist group dedicated to avenge the alleged death of one and one-half million Armenians killed by the Turkish government in 1915. Since 1973, the JCAG have committed terrorist acts against Turkish individuals and establishments throughout the world.

On November 20, 1981, at approximately 7:10 p.m., an explosive device detonated at the Turkish Consulate, 8730 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, California. Investigation indicated the device was placed in a hallway outside the Consulate door. The explosion made a small crater in the floor and blew down the door, and the door directly across the hallway. The ceiling in the hallway and offices in the immediate area received moderate damage. Claim for the bombing was received by the "Associated Press," Los Angeles, at approximately 8:20 p.m., November 20, 1981. In a telephone call, an unknown person, who was possibly female stated, "I have an announcement to make and I don't want to be interrupted; this is the JCAG, and we just blew up the Turkish Consulate in Los Angeles." The caller ended by stating "this is only a warning; if he comes to Los Angeles he'll be blown up" (possibly referring to the Turkish Ambassador).

No suspects have been developed and investigation is continuing.

OCTOBER 3

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

The October 3 Organization is an operational unit of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). It uses the name October 3 because two young Armenians were arrested on that date by Swiss authorities after a bomb they were fabricating exploded.

On February 2, 1981, a bomb was discovered attached to the wall adjacent to the front door of the Swiss Consulate, Los Angeles. It was rendered safe by the Los Angeles Police Department. The Los Angeles Office of the "Associated Press" received a call claiming credit for this attempted bombing in the name of the "Operation Number Three" group. This group is believed to be the October 3 group and is part of the ASALA.

Investigation is continuing. No suspects have been developed.

CROATIAN GROUPS

CROATIAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS (CFF)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

The CFF is also known as the Croatian National Resistance (CNR), an international anti-Yugoslav organization committed to the establishment of an independent state of Croatia.

On January 23, 1981, at 12:48 p.m., a bomb detonated at the New York Supreme Court building in New York City. At 9:45 a.m., "United Press International," New York, received a phone call claiming responsibility for the bombing in the name of the CFF.

Investigation is continuing. No suspects have been developed.

CUBAN GROUPS

OMEGA 7

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of four incidents.

Omega 7 is a pseudonym for the Cuban Nationalist Movement (CNM), a fanatical, anti-Castro Cuban exile group which was founded in 1960 to keep alive the spirit of the continuing fight of Cuban exiles against the incumbent communist government of Cuba. This group has, for some twenty years, committed numerous terrorist acts, including murder and political assassination, under the guise of fighting communism.

On September 11, 1981, at 10:13 p.m., an explosion occurred at the Mexican Consulate, Brickell Avenue, Miami Florida. The explosion completely demolished the Consulate suite and caused extensive damage to the entire fourth floor of the office building. There were no injuries. Omega 7 claimed credit for this bombing in a telephone call to radio station WQBA, Miami, Florida.

Two suspects have been developed and investigation is continuing.

On September 11, 1981, at approximately 1:55 p.m., an explosion occurred at the "Replica" magazine office, 30th Avenue and 7th Street, N.W., Miami, Florida. The explosive device was coupled with a propane tank device and the resultant fire destroyed the office and equipment. There were no injuries. Omega 7 leaflets were found at the scene.

Two suspects have been developed and investigation is continuing.

On September 12, 1981, at 1:40 a.m., a bomb exploded at the Mexican Consulate, 10 East 41st Street, New York City, New York. There were no injuries and the blast caused minor damage to the Consulate and the surrounding building. Omega 7 took credit for this bombing in a communique.

One suspect has been developed and investigation is continuing.

On September 24, 1981, at 4:00 p.m., the owner/publisher of the magazine "Replica," Mr. Max Lesnick, was checking the roof of his building at 30th Avenue and 7th Street, N.W., Miami, Florida, when he discovered an unexploded bomb over the front doorway area. He had a friend disarm the bomb which was marked with Omega 7 stickers.

No suspects have been developed and investigation is continuing.

IRANIAN GROUPS

PEOPLE'S MUJAHEDDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN (PMOI)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident during which three persons were injured.

The PMOI is an Islamic fundamentalist organization with Marxist tendencies. Since the era of the Shah, this organization has conducted guerrilla warfare and participated to a considerable extent in the Islamic Revolution of 1978/1979. Since the fall of the Shah, they have become increasingly anti-Khomeini and against the so-called dictatorship of the Mullahs. They have participated in the occupation of several Iranian installations throughout the world.

On August 7, 1981, at 8:50 a.m., 24 individuals (members of the PMOI) forcibly entered the Iranian Interest Section and held seven hostages for approximately one hour. The Washington Metropolitan Police Department responded and terminated the situation through negotiation. As the Metropolitan Police Department officers were departing the scene with the suspects, one shot was fired by one of the seven employees of the Iranian Interest Section who had been held hostage. The shooting resulted in the wounding of one member of the PMOI. In the ensuing confusion, another PMOI member's leg was broken. The alleged shooter also received injuries during the confusion.

As a result of this incident, 24 PMOI members were arrested. Besides the shooter, six PMOI members were also subsequently arrested on charges of assault.

The 24 individuals arrested have been convicted on charges of entering a diplomatic establishment to cause damage.

Seven more are awaiting trial on this matter.

IRANIAN PATRIOTIC ARMY (IPA)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

The IPA is a group of anti-Khomeini Iranians located in the Washington, D.C., area.

On April 27, 1981, at 2:30 a.m., a firebomb was thrown through the window of an Iranian-American merchant in Washington, D.C. In a telephone call received by CBS-Washington, responsibility was claimed by the IPA.

No suspects have been developed and investigation is continuing.

JEWISH GROUPS

JEWISH DEFENDERS (JD)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

The JD is a group which protests the alleged mistreatment of Jews worldwide.

On June 25, 1981, at 5:30 a.m., an incendiary device was thrown at the window of the Center for Historical Review in Torrance, California. "Associated Press," "United Press International" and "City News Service" had been notified by an anonymous caller between 5:07 and 5:13 a.m., that the incident would take place and were again contacted at approximately 5:30 a.m., when credit was claimed for the firebombing in the name of the JD. The incident resulted in no injuries and approximately $200 damage.

No suspects have been developed.

JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE/AMERICAN REVENGE COMMITTEE (JDL)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of seven incidents.

The JDL was organized in September of 1968, by Rabbi Meir D. Kahane, who proclaimed that violence is necessary to accomplish the objectives of the JDL. Headquartered in New York City, the JDL is composed primarily of young Jewish-American extremists who consider themselves to be protectors of "Jewish rights" and supporters of the State of Israel. Chapters of the JDL are located in several of the larger metropolitan areas of the United States. Many JDL members have been trained in self-defense and the use of firearms. By means of its terrorist activity, the JDL has attempted to publicize the poor treatment received by Jews in the Soviet Union and in Arab nations.

On January 26, 1981, at approximately 12:30 a.m., an explosive device detonated outside the Bank Melli Iran. The Union Bank, across the street, suffered damage to 42 windows and the Bank Melli Iran also suffered property damage. In a phone call to "United Press International," San Francisco, the JDL claimed responsibility for the bombing. KCBS radio, San Francisco, also received a phone call claiming responsibility in the name of the American Revenge Committee.

No suspects have been developed. Investigation is continuing.

On August 31, 1981, at 5:50 p.m., the United States State Department telephonically advised that at approximately 4:15 p.m., on August 31, 1981, the Austrian Consulate in New York was occupied by 15 individuals who identified themselves as members of the JDL.

These individuals entered the premises, locked and barricaded the door, and demanded to speak to the Consul General. When the Consul appeared, they demanded that the Austrian government not deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

After approximately 15 minutes, these individuals left the building and there were no injuries or property damage reported nor were any arrests made.

No suspects or arrests. Case closed October 5, 1981.

JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE/AMERICAN REVENGE COMMITTEE (JDL)

On September 3, 1981, two soda bottles, filled with flammable liquid and attached to M-80 firecrackers, were found under cars parked near the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. One car belonged to the Soviet Mission, the other to the Romanian Mission. Neither device detonated. Credit for this action was claimed by the JDL by an unidentified male caller to the "New York Post" newspaper.

No suspects have been developed.

On September 4, 1981, according to police, an incendiary device exploded beneath a vehicle registered to Adeyemi Bariyu, Minister, Nigerian Mission to the United Nations. Mr. Bariyu's vehicle was parked on 2nd Avenue at 68th Street. As described by bomb squad, the incendiary device consisted of an M-80 firecracker attached to a bottle of gasoline. The device caused relatively minor damage to the vehicle, a flattened left rear tire and a scorched rear quarter panel.

At approximately 1:30 a.m., an unidentified male telephoned "United Press International" and the "New York Post" stating that the Thunder of Zion militant faction of the JDL had just blown up a Soviet automobile. The caller demanded the Soviets release Maria Tiemkin and Anatoly Sharansky. In conclusion, the caller stated, "Russian blood will flow in New York street."

One subject, Mark Levey, was arrested September 8, 1981, for this bombing.

On October 25, 1981, at 5:00 a.m., a Molotov cocktail caused a fire at the Egyptian Government Tourist Office, 630 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York. Evidence recovered at the scene consisted of an unbroken bottle, one-quarter full of gasoline, and a broken bottle believed to be a Molotov cocktail, which started the fire. The tourist office was heavily damaged by the fire.

At 4:30 a.m., an anonymous caller to "Associated Press," New York, claimed credit for the bombing in the name of the JDL.

No suspects have been developed.

On November 14, 1981, sometime between 6:00 and 10:00 p.m., 12 shots were fired at the Soviet residence of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, Glen Cove, New York. No injuries occurred and all shots impacted in and around two floor-to-ceiling doors on the side of the Soviet residence. The doors are situated approximately seventy-five yards from a public road which passes the Soviet estate. At 10:00 a.m., November 15, 1981, an unknown male telephoned "United Press International" news and claimed credit for the shooting on behalf of the JDL.

As a result of subsequent investigation, two individuals were arrested and accused of this shooting. There is no apparent connection between these individuals and the JDL. Federal prosecution was declined in favor of local charges because the evidence indicated the residence was chosen at random and not because it was a Soviet establishment.

On December 24, 1981, at 6:40 p.m., the "New York Daily News" received a call claiming credit in the name of the JDL for the bombing of Soviet Mission in New York City. Because no bombing had taken place, a search was conducted by the New York City Police Department and a pipe bomb was located under a 1980 Toyota belonging to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

No suspects have been developed.

LIBYAN GROUPS

LIBYAN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (LSUS)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

The LSUS is a small militant group of Libyan students in the United States who oppose the regime of Muammar Qadafi in Libya.

On July 30, 1981, approximately 40 Libyan students took over the Libyan Mission to the United Nations in New York City. Libyan Mission personnel were ordered to leave by the protestors and no hostages were taken. The protestors who indentified themselves as members of the LSUS were demonstrating against the current government of Libya. After approximately three and one-half hours, New York City Police broke through the door to the Libyan Mission and arrested the demonstrators.

PUERTO RICAN GROUPS

ARMED FORCES OF POPULAR RESISTANCE (FARP)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

The FARP is a Puerto Rican based terrorist group dedicated to an independent Puerto Rico. The FARP has claimed numerous terrorist incidents on the Island of Puerto Rico.

On March 15, 1981, at 6:45 p.m., in the basement of the Condado Convention Center in San Juan, Puerto Rico, a bomb was placed in the trunk of a stolen car. The bomb failed to detonate but did cause the vehicle to catch fire. Ex-Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was due to deliver a speech in the Convention Center at 7:45 p.m., as a guest speaker for the World University. A three page communique was received by "United Press International," San Juan, in which the Puerto Rican terrorist group, FARP, claimed responsibility. On the same date, a second communique was received by "United Press International," San Juan, claiming responsibility for "all the revolutionary organizations operating in Puerto Rico."

Eight suspects have been developed and investigation is continuing.

BORINQUEN PEOPLE'S ARMY-MACHETEROS (EPB-MACHETEROS)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of five incidents.

The "EPB" Puerto Rican Popular Army "Macheteros" is a pro-independence terrorist group operating both in Puerto Rico and in the Continental United States.

On January 12, 1981, during the morning hours, a series of explosions occurred at the Puerto Rican Air National Guard Base, which adjoins San Juan International Airport. Eight A-7 jet aircraft were destroyed and two others were damaged. In addition, a pick-up truck and trailer and an F-104 display aircraft were also destroyed. In a communique found at the scene, the Puerto Rican terrorist group, EPB-Macheteros claimed responsibility for the bombing attack. A video tape, received and televised by a San Juan news commentator, showed the Macheteros constructing the explosive devices used in the attack.

Eighteen suspects have been developed and investigation is continuing.

On April 21, 1981, a Wells Fargo armored truck was robbed by armed persons. In a communique received by "El Mundo" newspaper on May 7, 1981, the Macheteros claimed responsibility for this armed robbery which netted the Macheteros $348,000.

Three suspects were developed.

On November 11, 1981, at approximately 12:20 a.m., an explosive device detonated at the Puerto Rican Electric Power Authority Substation, located at Calle Wilson Corner of Las Hermanas, Condado Sector, Santurce, Puerto Rico. The explosion damaged the radiators of the substation refrigeration system.

On Saturday, November 14, 1981, "United Press International," San Juan, received a communique in the morning mail from the EPB-Macheteros which claimed credit for this bombing.

No suspects have been developed.

On November 27, 1981, two explosions occurred which caused extensive damage to two PREPA substations in the San Juan metropolitan area. Large portions of the Condado and Miramar section of the city were blacked out and were without electrical power for an extended period of time. The Wilson Street, Condado, substation was almost completely destroyed by the explosion and resulting fire. Damage to the Taft Street, Santurce, facility was less severe. Total damage was estimated at over 10 million dollars.

On that same date, a call was received at the "San Juan Star" newspaper from an unknown male who claimed credit for the action for the "Macheteros."

On Saturday afternoon, November 28, 1981, a one page communique from the EPB-PRTP-Matcheteros was left near "United Press International" office in Santurce. In the communique, the EPB-Macheteros claimed responsibility for the Friday, November 27, 1981, attacks on the PREPA substations.

No suspects have been developed.

STAR GROUP (GE)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

GE is an armed clandestine movement within the rank of the Electrical Industry and Irrigation Workers Union (UTIER).

On August 27, 1981, at approximately 10:28 p.m., two explosions occurred at the Autoridad Energia Electrica (Puerto Rican Electric and Power Authority) Substation, Carolina, Puerto Rico. Responding Police of Puerto Rico Bomb Squad personnel discovered two additional unexploded bombs at the scene. These devices apparently failed to detonate due to damage to critical components caused by the first two explosions.

Damage to the substation was estimated at approximately $20,000. No suspects were identified and no injuries or fatalities resulted.

Shortly after the explosions occurred, news agencies in San Juan were advised telephonically that the bombings were perpetrated by the GE.

No suspects have been developed.

NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident during which one person was injured.

The MLN is a Puerto Rican independence group which advocates the use of violence to achieve independence for Puerto Rico. The MLN openly supports various Puerto Rican terrorist groups in Puerto Rico and the Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN) in the continental United States.

FBI investigation has determined that the MLN maintains very close ties to the FALN. It has also been determined that many of the MLN members are relatives of known FALN terrorists.

On November 27, 1981, at approximately 2:45 a.m., at least eight shots were fired at the main gate of the United States Army Post, Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, by unknown suspects. One military policeman on duty at the gate was wounded in the left arm.

Approximately nine hours after the shooting incident, an anonymous caller telephoned the "United Press International" office in San Juan and claimed credit for the shooting in the name of MLN.

No suspects have been developed.

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY COMMANDOS (CRP)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of three incidents.

The CRP is a clandestine terrorist group which has claimed responsibility for eight bombings in the San Juan area since October 11, 1977. The CRP has published communiques claiming responsibility for these bombings and has stated in this communique, "We fraternally salute all revolutionary and clandestine organizations that emerge in these historic moments, and we hope that soon we will unite all efforts for the creation of a powerful revolutionary army of the people."

On January 8, 1981, three incendiary devices ignited.

At 9:20 a.m., the first of three incendiary devices ignited at the Rio Piedras branch of the United States Post Office in Santurce, Puerto Rico. On January 9, 1981, CRP claimed responsibility by communique for the three incendiary attacks that occurred on this date. These communiques were received by "United Press International," San Juan, and "Associated Press," San Juan.

No suspects have been developed.

At 9:25 a.m., the second of three incendiary devices ignited at the Rio Piedras branch of the United States Post Office in Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico. On January 9, 1981, CRP claimed responsibility by communique for three incendiary attacks. These communiques were received by "United Press International," San Juan, and "Associated Press," San Juan.

No suspects have been developed.

At 9:45 a.m., the third of three incendiary devices ignited at the United Post Office branch in Ponce, Puerto Rico. On January 9, 1981, CRP claimed responsibility by communique for the three incendiary attacks that occurred on this date. These communiques were received by "United Press International," San Juan, and "Associated Press," San Juan.

No suspects have been developed.

PUERTO RICAN ARMED RESISTANCE (PRA[illegible])

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of five incidents, including one person killed.

The PRAR is a little known terrorist group which claimed responsibility for the following incidents:

On May 16, 1981, at 9:40 a.m., a pipe bomb exploded in the men's room in the east concourse of John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFKIA) in New York City. One individual was critically wounded from the explosion and later died; no other injuries resulted. Approximately 15 minutes prior to the explosion, an unknown caller phoned JFKIA and stated that several bombs had been planted in the airport terminal by the PRAR. Later the same day, New York City Police, acting on an anonymous phone call, recovered two written communiques from a garbage can on a New York City street. In these communiques the PRAR claimed responsibility for the bombing.

No suspects have been developed.

On May 16, 1981, the second of three bombs was found in JFKIA in New York. Responsibility for these three bombings was claimed in a phone call and a communique by the PRAR.

No suspects have been developed.

On May 17, 1981, the third of three bombs was found in the women's room of JFKIA in New York City. Responsibility for these three bombings was claimed by the PRAR via a phone call and a communique.

No suspects have been developed.

On May 18, 1981, a mail room employee discovered a suspicious package at the United States Mission to the United Nations in New York, which subsequently turned out to be a bomb. Responsibility for this attempted bombing was claimed by the PRAR.

On May 18, 1981, the acting General Consul of the Honduras Consulate in New York City discovered an explosive device in a special delivery package he had just received. Responsibility for this attempted bombing was claimed by the PRAR.

No suspects have been developed.

OTHER GROUPS

BLACK BRIGADE (BB)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

It probably evolved as the result of the revolution of Liberia which changed the power base from the immigrant population to the indigenous population.

On August 20, 1981, at 1:40 a.m., the United States State Department telephonically advised that the Liberian Chancery, 5201 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., had been set afire. A letter was found attached to the front door stating a group calling themselves the "BB" had set the fire in protest.

No suspects have been developed.

CONCERNED SIERRA LEONE NATIONALS (CSLN)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

This is a group of dissident Sierra Leone Nationals who demanded that the incumbent President of Sierra Leone resign.

On September 9, 1981, eleven members of the CSLN appeared at the Chancery of Sierra Leone, physically and verbally accosted the Charge D'Affaires and Chancery personnel, and demanded that a telegram be sent to the President of Sierra Leone instructing him to resign. FBI Washington Field Office, United States Secret Service Uniformed Division, and the Metropolitan Police Department responded to the scene and all eleven were arrested.

Eleven subjects were arrested and charged.

OTHER DOMESTIC GROUPS

COMMUNIST WORKERS PARTY (CWP)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

The CWP, aka Workers Viewpoint Organization (WVO), envisions itself as the political party of the United States multi-national working class. Its members come from all backgrounds and nationalities. Their immediate goal is to overthrow the United States Government by violence and the establishment of a socialist system - the dictatorship of the proletariat. Their ultimate aim is communism.

On September 22, 1981, at about 1:15 a.m., a powerful bomb exploded in front of the offices of the Eastern Rugby Union of America. The Union offices are located at 406 State Street, Schenectady, New York. The bomb was placed in the corridor on the second floor and damage was estimated at $40,000. There were no injuries reported and no known witnesses. The explosion was preceded by a telephone warning to a radio station in Schenectady. An employee at the radio station said he received a call from an anonymous female at 1:00 a.m. The call was not taped but he reports the caller said "a bomb will go off in Schenectady regarding the rugby match." He neglected to notify the police.

Later that morning about 9:00 a.m., a telephone call was received by another local radio station and credit was claimed for the bombing by the Black Liberation Army (BLA).

Although this was claimed by a supposed member of the BLA, information obtained through investigation suggests that members of the CWP were probably responsible for this bombing.

REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST YOUTH BRIGADE (RCYB)

This group has claimed responsibility for a total of one incident.

The RCYB forms a part of the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) which believes in the use of force and violence to overthrow the United States Government.

On February 9, 1981, at 3:00 p.m., Victor Tomseth, a former hostage in Iran, was addressing an audience when he was assaulted by two individuals. A male and a female approached the stage and ignited a yellow ribbon soaked in a flammable liquid and threw it at the former hostage. Upon their arrest the two individuals claimed to be members of the RCYB.

Both subjects convicted on charges of second degree arson.

SECTION C

SUSPECTED TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN 1981

SUSPECTED TERRORIST INCIDENTS

The following incidents were not claimed by any terrorist group but because of the type of target or the method of attack, they are suspected to be terrorist acts:

1. An explosive device detonated at the Anaheim Convention Center, Anaheim, California, on June 3, 1981. The explosion caused about $2,000 worth of damage but no deaths or injuries. The Convention Center was the proposed site for a performance of the Turkish Folk Ballet on June 5, 1981. The Ballet group was to perform at a number of locations around Anaheim and it was known that a large group of Armenians planned to protest the performances. Armenian terrorists are suspected in this incident.

2. On August 27, 1981, pipe bombs detonated at three commerical establishments in the Detroit, Michigan area; the Belgrade Bakery, 24057 Van Dyke, Centerline, Michigan; Kalandee World Travel, 19741 Van Dyke, Detroit, Michigan; and the Nitra Travel Agency, 11657 Jos Compau, Hamtramck, Michigan. All were slightly damaged by pipe bombs. These establishments are all owned by Yugoslav Americans and Detroit police advised their street sources indicated that disgruntled Albanians were responsibile for the attacks.

It is noted that Croatian terrorists have cooperated with Albanians in demonstrations and protests over the difficulties which Yugoslavia is having with its Kosovo region. Croatian terrorists have, in the past, used pipe bombs and it is possible that they assisted the Albanians in this activity. There were no claims by any group, organization, or person for these bombs and investigation is continuing.

3. On October 24, 1981, a pipe bomb exploded at the American European Market, 11916 Jos Campau, Hamtramck, Michigan. There was only minor damage and no injuries or deaths occurred. This incident was similar to the three pipe bombs on August 27, 1981, in that the market is owned by a Yugoslav American, it is in the same area and a pipe bomb was used. Disgruntled Albanians and Croatian terrorists are also suspected in this bombing.

4. On October 20, 1981, at approximately 3:55 p.m., a Brinks armored car making a currency pickup at Nanuet National Bank, Nanuet, New York, was robbed by four unknown persons armed with shotguns and automatic weapons. In the robbery one Brinks guard was killed and two were wounded. The suspects fled with $1,589,000 in currency. After leaving the scene in a red van, the subjects fled to a nearby shopping center, abandoned the van and entered a U-Haul vehicle at the entrance to the New York State Thruway. When the police

attempted to question the occupants of the U-Haul, a gun fight ensued, two police officers were killed, and an unknown number of suspects escaped on foot. A yellow Honda, leaving the scene at a high rate of speed, was pursued by officers. As a result of the shootout at the U-Haul and the crash of the Honda, police arrested [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] All these individuals were known as members and associates of radical and subversive groups of the sixties and eary seventies. When search warrants were executed at their residences, police found extensive false identification, weapons, ammunition, explosives, paramilitary training manuals, and radical and subversive literature and publications. There was also evidence of a network of safehouses and a coalition of members from the Black Liberation Army, Republic of New Africa, and the May 19 Communist Organization banded together to perform criminal activity.

Five previous robberies or attempted robberies have since been associated with the group responsibile for the October 20, 1981, robbery by modus operandi.

A. On February 20, 1980, an attempt was made to rob an IBI armored truck making a delivery to a Korvettes Department store, Scarsdale, New York, by three Negro males with handguns and shotguns. Getaway van rented by white female with legitimate citizen's identification.

B. On February 25, 1980, an armored car was robbed of $52,000 by two Negro males with shotguns and handguns at Bronx, New York, during which a guard was killed. Getaway van rented by white male using identification of legitimate citizen.

C. On April 22, 1980, at Inwood, Long Island, New York, a Purolator truck was robbed of $529,000 by five Negro males with automatic rifles, shotguns and 9mm handguns. Escape made in van rented by white female with identification of legitimate citizen.

D. On March 23, 1981, an attempt was made to rob a Purolator truck in Danbury, Connecticut. The driver was wounded. Four Negro males made their getaway in a van rented by a white male with legitimate citizen's identification.

E. On June 2, 1981, Brinks truck at Bronx, New York, was robbed by three Negro males with shotguns, automatic rifles and 9mm handguns. They opened fire, killing one guard

and wounding another. The getaway car (station wagon) was rented by white male with legitimate citizen's identification. There was a $292,000 loss.

These incidents are significant with regard to terrorism because of the individuals involved and the ideologies of the groups they represent. However, so far it appears that they were involved in criminal activity only for their own profit and not necessarily for political or subversive reasons. Investigation into the nature of these incidents and the groups and individuals involved is continuing.

SECTION D

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF FBI COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM IN 1981

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF FBI COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM, 1981

Ten of the eleven members of the Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN) who were arrested on April 4, 1980, by the Evanston, Illinois Police were indicted and convicted on a variety of Federal charges. They were sentenced to terms ranging from 50 to 90 years in prison. The eleventh member, Haydee Torres, was extradited to New York, tried and convicted for a murder in the August, 1977, Mobil Oil bombing. She was sentenced to life in prison.

Another key member of the FALN, Oscar Lopez Rivera, was sentenced to a total of 55 years in prison for his conviction on Seditious Conspiracy, Hobbs Act, Federal firearms and Federal vehicle theft charges.

Five of seven members of the Croatian National Resistance (CNR), arrested in New York in December of 1980, were convicted on Federal charges. Charges against one were dropped and one was acquitted. These seven were arrested after technical and source information, combined with evidence obtained with search warrants, revealed that they were involved in a bombing and assassination plot. They were sentenced to terms ranging from 20 to 35 years in prison.

Additionally, as the result of a RICO-Terrorism investigation, ten other members of the CNR were arrested and indicted on a variety of Federal charges. Nine of those arrested were apprehended by the FBI in various cities throughout the United States and one was arrested by Canadian authorities in Ontario. The ten were accused of at least two murders and several murder, arson and bombing conspiracies. The targets of these actions were representatives of the Yugoslav government, or individuals of Croatian origin who refused to make extortion payments, or who publicly opposed the use of violence to win independence for Croatia. The ten are awaiting further judicial action.

In an operation directed at the activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the United States, three men, George Harrison, Thomas Falvey, and Patrick Mullin, were arrested and a large quantity of arms and ammunition destined for Northern Ireland was seized. These arrests were a significant accomplishment in reducing the flow of arms to Northern Ireland.

FBI assistance to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) resulted in the identification, arrest, and deportation of four other IRA activists who were in the United States illegally.

Eugene Tafoya, an ex-member of the United States Army Special Forces, was arrested and convicted of third degree assault and conspiracy to commit third degree assault for his attack on Faisal Abdula Zagallai on October 14, 1980. This case was significant because Zagallai, a Libyan student, is an outspoken critic of Colonel Mu'ammar Qadhafi and it was believed that Tafoya may have been working for the Libyan government. It was investigated by the FBI as an FCI-Terrorism case and assistance was rendered to the local police. Tafoya was sentenced to two years in jail and investigation into the possibility of his connection to the Libyan government is continuing.

As a result of the investigation of the assassination of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, Horace Anthony Butler was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to first degree murder and for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Ali Abdul Mani was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to first degree murder. Tyrone A. Frazier, a Postal Service employee, pled guilty to Federal bribery charges. David Belfield, the alleged gunman, remains a fugitive.

In addition, there have been at least 13 convictions against members of the Islamic Guerrillas in America for weapons and related charges through the course of this investigation.

Naser Rahimi Almaneih, an anti-Khomeini Iranian, was sentenced to serve 50 years for the bombing of a Berkley high school convention of pro-Khomeini Iranian students on August 20, 1980.

Iranian students, Hamid Jiuseppe Arjomand, Keyvan Sabery, and Ramin Karimpour, were arrested at Burlington, Vermont, and charged with violation of Title 26, U.S. Code Sections 5861 and 5871, receipt and possession of unauthorized weapons. These individuals attempted to purchase an M-16 automatic rifle and a submachine gun from an undercover FBI Agent. All three later pled guilty.

Twenty four members of the People's Mujaheddin Organization of Iran (PMOI) were arrested for the takeover of the Iranian Interest Section of the Algerian Embassy. They later pled guilty to a charge of entering a diplomatic establishment to cause damage and were sentenced to one year in prison-suspended, probation and 25 hours community service.

Akbar Maleki Nauchedehi, an employee of the Iranian Interest Section, was arrested for shooting one of the members of the PMOI after the takeover of the Iranian Interest Section.

Accomplishments of FBI Counterterrorism Program, 1981

Eleven members of the Concerned Sierra Leone Nationals (CSLN) were arrested and charged with violation of the Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials after they took over the Chancery of Sierra Leone in Washington, D.C. The United States Attorney is considering future action against these individuals.

Michael Eugene Perdue and nine others were arrested and charged with violations of neutrality, gun control, and munitions control statutes because of their involvement in a plot to attack the Carribbean Island of Dominica. Perdue and his associates had chartered a boat and loaded it with explosives, small arms and ammunition. Apparently, their plan was to sail the boat to Dominica, and with the aid of local insurgents, invade the Island and overthrow the Government. Arrested with Perdue were Michael Stanley Morris, Wolfgang Walter Droege, Robert William Prichard, Jr., William Burnett Waldrop, Jr., Christopher Billy Anderson, Joe Daniel Hawkins, George Taylor Malvaney, Stephen Don Black, and Larry Lloyd Jacklin. All participants, except one who was acquitted, either pled guilty or were convicted and are serving a three year sentence.

Alpha 66 members, Maximo Fernandez, Florenzio Fernandez, Ramiro Rodriguez Fuentes, Eduardo Herrera, Jose Luis Escobar Martinez, Jorge Acevedo Avilo, and Elioberto Pulido Musterio were arrested by the FBI at Knights Key, Florida, while in the possession of numerous weapons and explosive devices. They planned to travel to Cuba by ship to conduct sabotage and assassinations. Recovered at the arrest were explosives, one 55mm anti-tank rifle, seven 38 caliber revolvers, one colt AR-15 semi-automatic rifle, and two Heckler and Koch semi-automatic rifles.

Six of the seven pled guilty to a ten count indictment charging them with being aliens illegally and unlawfully in the United States and knowingly receiving, possessing, and transporting firearms. Charges against the seventh defendant, Eduardo Herrera, are still pending, due to motions to suppress some of the evidence against him.

A Cuban Nationalist Movement (CNM) member, Jose Tenreiro, was convicted of perjury on March 6, 1981, and was sentenced to two years in the custody of the Attorney General.

Armando Santana, a prominent member of the CNM in New Jersey, was arrested for passport violations and local charges after a search warrant was executed at his residence and an illegal passport, weapons, and drugs were found.

Accomplishments of FBI Counterterrorism Program, 1981

Mark Levey was arrested by the FBI in Los Angeles and charged with the bombing of a Nigerian vehicle in New York. The bombing had been claimed by the Thunder of Zion Faction of the Jewish Defense League, and Levey is a suspect in a number of similar incidents.

Michael Albert Hawkins was arrested in Albany, New York on weapons violations charges for his activity on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

FBI assistance contributed to the conviction of Mohammed Shabata on a charge of second degree murder for the killing of a fellow Libyan student, Nabil Mansour, at Weber State College in Ogden, Utah.

As a result of the investigation of the 42 claimed terrorist incidents in 1981, suspects have been developed in seven of the incidents. Arrests have been made in four of the incidents and convictions have been obtained in two incidents.

In 29 of the incidents, no suspects have been developed but they are still under investigation by either Federal or state authorities.


SECTION E

TRENDS IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE U.S., 1977 - 1981

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Trends in Terrorist Activity in the U.S. 1977 - 1981

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS




CLAIMED TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY REGION 1981



CA-9
FL-3
NY-15
PR-11
WDC-4

Comparison of Claimed Terrorist Incidents By Region 1977-1981



Question 28:

In the past, pursuant to Executive Order 10450, the FBI maintained extensive files on individuals which chronicled their involvement in subversion, terrorist and extremist activities and organizations. These files were maintained in order to be able to perform security checks in the event such individuals applied for employment with the Federal Government.

From the testimony received at a hearing which I chaired on the proposed destruction of such files maintained by the former Civil Service Commission (now the Office of Personnel Management), it appears that such files are no longer maintained by the FBI.

What effect does this have on the Bureau's ability to participate in employee background investigations?

What is the status of the Federal Employment Security Program and of the FBI's role in it?

Is there presently a program in operation which enables the Federal Government to perform effective security checks on prospective employees?

Answer:

No FBI Headquarters files related to subversive, terrorist or extremist activities by individuals or organizations have been destroyed. The information appearing in these files documenting such activities is readily retrievable and is disseminated to other Government agencies pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order (EO) 10450.

The provisions of EO 10450, as amended, became effective on April 27, 1953, and serves as the basic authority under which most personnel investigations are conducted at the present time involving applicants and employees in the Executive Branch.

EO 10450, in its preamble, states that the interests of the national security require all persons privileged to be employed by the Government shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States.

Section 2 requires the agency head to maintain an effective program to insure employment or retention of applicants and employees is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.

Section 8 lists the factors for developing information which is of investigative and, by inference, adjudicative interest.

Section 13 states: "The Attorney General is requested to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish and maintain an appropriate employee security program."

Chapter 732 of the Federal Personnel Manual instructs that before an agency issues a letter of charges under EO 10450, the Department of Justice shall be consulted to assure that the rights of the employees are fully considered.

Available information indicates that difficulties of proof imposed by the courts in loyalty and security cases are considered almost insurmountable and as a result no removal or other adverse actions have been taken on these grounds for several years and the adjudicative basis has shifted from loyalty and security to suitability. Thus, favorable determinations are said to be based on EO 10450 while unfavorable decisions almost always rely on the suitability provisions of Civil Service Regulations.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FBI

The responsibilites of the FBI under EO 10450, as spelled out in that Order, include the following:

1. Name check
2. Fingerprint check
3. Dissemination of loyalty and suitability information
4. Investigative

Name Check and Fingerprint Check

Section 3 (a) provides that the appointment of each civilian employee shall be made subject to investigation but in no event shall the investigation include less than a national agency check, including a check of the fingerprint files of the FBI.

Although the scope of a national agency check is not specified in EO 10450, Chapter 736 of the Federal Personnel Manual defines a national agency check as including a check of the fingerprint files, Identification Division, FBI, and of the investigative files of the FBI.

Since the passage of Public Law 298 in 1952, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), now the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), has been charged with the major responsibility for conducting full field investigations. Information developed through the national agency check is used by OPM and the agencies receiving results of the complete background investigation in making employment and security adjudications.

Dissemination Responsibility of the FBI

Section 5 of EO 10450 provides:

> Whenever there is developed by any department or agency information indicating that the retention in employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, such information shall be forwarded to the head of the employing department or agency or his representatives...

If the FBI receives information coming within the provisions of this section, the FBI has the responsibility to disseminate it whether it be of a suitability or loyalty nature. Chapter 736 of the Federal Personnel Manual contains language similar to that in Section 5. The conditions for the type of information involved are set forth in Section 8 of the Order.

Investigative Role of the FBI Under EO 10450

Section 8 (d) reads as follows:

> There shall be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation all investigations being conducted by any other agencies which develop information indicating that an individual may have been subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information relating to any of the matters described in subdivisions (2) through (8) of subsection (a) of this section. In cases so referred to it, the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make a full field investigation.

Since 1953, 43,901 cases in the Security of Government Employees category have been opened at FBI Headquarters.

STUDIES OF PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM

There have been numerous studies, restudies, and discussions of EO 10450 and a Federal Personnel Security Program throughout the years.

A landmark study was made by the Commission on Government Security (Wright Commission) under authority of Public Law 84-304. Its report dated June 21, 1957, made sweeping recommendations for change, however, these recommendations were never adopted.

In 1965, a Presidential study group headed by John W. Macey, Jr., then Chairman of the CSC, made extensive recommendations, which resulted in modifications in ~~the~~ Personnel Security Program for Federal Employees.

During 1971-1972, extensive hearings were held by the Subcommittee on Loyalty-Security of the House Committee on Internal Security. Its findings and recommendations were published in a report dated January, 1973, entitled "The Federal Civilian Employee Loyalty Program." No action has been taken on this report.

In 1974, the FBI was represented on the Department of Justice task force formed to discuss developments in administering EO 10450 including problems arising as a result of court decisions, proposals by the CSC in the suitability area, recent legislation (both enacted and proposed), the demise of the Attorney General's list, and changes needed in EO 10450. This task force, which also included representatives from the CSC, Department of Defense, Department of State, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Department of Treasury, met on several occasions in 1974. No final recommendations were made by this task force.

The General Accounting Office has released its report of December 2, 1974, on "Personnel Investigations: Inconsistent Standards and Procedures." It was sent by the General Accounting Office to the Chairman, Internal Security Committee; Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, Post Office and Civil Service, and Government Operations. Briefly, the General Accounting Office recommended with certain exceptions, personnel security investigations should be consolidated into two agencies - Department of Defense, and the CSC; and a central body be established to adjudicate all cases involving positions in the civilian service.

In 1979, the General Accounting Office conducted a study and issued a report, number FPCD-79-79, captioned "Costs of Federal Personnel Security Investigations Could and Should Be Cut."

During 1980, the FBI participated in a study with representatives of the Treasury Department, the Department of Defense, OPM and the U.S. Postal Service concerning the Federal Personnel Security Investigations Program. A draft study on the implementation of General Accounting Office recommendations for modifications in the conduct of Federal personnel security investigations were made and set forth in a preliminary report in June of 1980.

Question 29

Please characterize the nature and degree of coordination by the FBI with other agencies in order to be responsive to terrorist activities.

Please list the other agencies that the FBI coordinates within this effort.

Have there been any improvements in the last year in coordination among the various agencies and the FBI? Are there additional improvements needed? What are they?

Answer:

The FBI in its role as the United States Government's "lead agency" to combat terrorism in the United States has constant, continuous and excellent cooperation with the other Federal agencies involved in the effort to counter terrorist activity.

As you are aware the FBI's jurisdiction and purview concerning terrorism is within the continential United States, Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Because many of the terrorist groups active in the United States are international in scope, it is imperative that the FBI work very closely with other Government entities such as United States Department of State (USDS) [redacted] National Security Agency (NSA), and the various military intelligence organizations that collect intelligence on the international scene.

The government agencies with which the FBI coordinates its effort to prevent or react to terrorist activities are Department of Justice, USDS, United States Secret Service, United States Immigration Service, United States Customs, United States Coast Guard, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, [redacted] the various military intelligence organizations and numerous state and local agencies involved in investigating terrorist acts. b3 b7E

Because of the continuous contact with the other agencies, the coordination between the FBI and the other agencies is excellent. Any minor concerns that arise in the cooperative effort are quickly and efficiently removed by liaison and discussion.

Question 30:

How does the FBI plan to coordinate its intelligence and investigative activities with the [redacted] new responsibilities for investigating international groups within the United States? b3 b7E

Answer:

While it is true that Executive Order 12333 removes the prohibition of Executive Order 12036 against [redacted] and other agencies undertaking activities which would influence an organization or its members in the United States through undisclosed participation, this expanded technique is not viewed as a new responsibility of the [redacted] but rather an enhanced authority. It should be noted that this ability of [redacted] is limited to organizations composed primarily of persons who are not U. S. persons and which are reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power. b3 b7E

Should a group of interest to the [redacted] meet this rather narrow criteria, the authority to influence the organization has two other prerequisites: (1) it must be done in accordance with procedures approved by the Attorney General, and (2) coordinated with the FBI.

The various intelligence agency procedures are currently under review but they will continue to spell out the standards for approval of such activities. The agreements between the FBI and [redacted] require the [redacted] to present its proposals in advance to the FBI with the caveat that if agreement cannot be reached with regard to the proposal, the activity may not be undertaken until the issue is resolved. b3 b7E

The FBI intends to continue to exercise its responsibility to coordinate the foreign intelligence collection and counterintelligence activities of other intelligence agencies within the United States in accordance with the above.

QUESTION 32:

At last year's authorization hearing, it was stated by the FBI representative that "there are a number of areas where we believe our ability to do our job can be enhanced if there were some fine tuning effected regarding certain statutes." Senator East requested that the Subcommittee receive a catalog of the areas, statutes and impediments referred to but it has not been received.

It is the Subcommittee's understanding that the Department has held the report, and we would appreciate any information you might furnish on the reason for the delay.

ANSWER:

The report referred to in your question was a letter dated April 21, 1981 to Senator Denton from Director Webster identifying certain major legislative issues that impact heavily on FBI operations. This letter was not delivered to the Subcommittee by the Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, following a review and determination that the catalog of legislative needs should not be released in that the new Administration had not yet reviewed and prepared legislative views on several of these items.

To secure a copy of the referenced letter, I suggest that the request be made to the Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice.

Question 33:

Concerns about the quality of forensic science technical capabilities have been raised by proficiency tests conducted by the Forensic Science Foundation. Are FBI-offered courses designed to develop competency among State and local personnel? If the FBI courses are only introductory in nature, what basis do we have for measuring whether they are beneficial in improving State and local capabilities?

Answer:

Courses offered at the FBI Academy in the forensic science area are designed to enhance existent skills. These courses provide for appropriate scholastic and practical tests toward the end of the courses in order to measure achievement within the academic setting. Grades given to students reflect the level of achievement obtained as a result of course attendance and participation. Each course is targeted at a particular population with an indicated level of existent skills and are designed toward increasing the level of skills while in the academic environment. Tests, of course, are directed toward the increased level of skills. These courses extend from those basic in nature through graduate level, accredited courses in subjects of very complicated technology.

Since competency is measured by successful application of acquired academic skills, the FBI has no actual field competency measurement program. However, a measure of developed competency in the local laboratories is documented by over 2,000 student course applications presently on file from agencies who have personnel working in their departments who have previously attended forensic courses offered at the FBI Academy.

Question 34:

How has the Bureau restructured its activities to reflect the Department of Justice's new emphasis on controlling violent crime?

Answer:

The FBI's commitment to the fight against violent crime may be viewed in terms of our current investigative and training efforts rather than a organizational restructuring.

For example on January 21, 1982, Attorney General William French Smith delegated to the FBI concurrent jurisdiction with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) relative to investigation of violations under the Controlled Substances Act, Title 21, U.S. Code.

Pursuant to the Attorney General's directive, the FBI and DEA will place strong emphasis on major distributors and organizations involved in the manufacturing, importing, distributing and financing of illicit controlled substances. This will entail a substantial effort on our part to combat what the Attorney General has identified as the number one crime problem in the United States.

The FBI's Organized Crime Section currently handles our narcotics investigative responsibilities and has played a significant role in the overall Federal effort to control organized criminal activity that impacts heavily on American society.

The Organized Crime Section, in general, targets, as its highest nationwide priority, the La Cosa Nosta (LCN). The LCN remains a powerful network of inter-related "family" groups which continually use violence and corruption to backstop its lucrative and wide-ranging criminal enterprises. All of the Organized Crime Section's various programs, in targeting the LCN, address the violent aspects of the LCN, at least indirectly, through investigative efforts directed at obtaining successful prosecutions of its leaders, members, and associates which are aimed at weakening its criminal structure and neutralizing its influence in our society.

More particularly, though, in addressing this issue of violent crime, among the programs managed by the Organized Crime Program, are several which focus in a more direct way on combating violent crime in our society. These programs include: Gangland Murders, relative to the LCN, and Non-Traditional Organized Crime. The latter program includes investigations directed against, outlaw motorcycle gangs, prison-spawned gangs and other ethnic, racial or regional organized crime groups.

The FBI is also stepping up efforts to enforce the provisions of the Fugitive Felon Act that provides authority for the FBI to locate and apprehend dangerous criminals who flee from the state and local authorities to avoid presecution. Emphasis is placed on individuals charged locally with a violent or serious crime such as murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and major narcotic violations.

We currently aggressively solicit unlawful flight cases involving violent or major offenders from state and local authorities. The effectiveness of this effort is shown by recent data indicating that, at the current rate of new unlawful flight cases being opened, the volume of new matters will increase from approximately 2,700 in FY 1981 to approximately 4,000 during FY 1982.

The FBI has assumed investigative responsibility to locate and apprehend approximately 10% of the Drug Enforcement Administrative fugitive workload. All of the fugitive cases referred to the FBI from DEA are Class 1 and Class II violators believed to be in the United States. The FBI now has approximately 300 pending DEA fugitive cases; DEA offers between 10 and 20 new cases to the FBI each month.

Traditional FBI investigative programs involving bank robberies, extortions, kidnappings, aircraft hijackings, threats against national leaders continue to be vital objectives in our Personal Crimes Program. Our efforts in these areas provide a major contribution in reducing the impact of these types of crimes nationally.

The Training Division has outlined a five-year plan to deliver programs of training and investigative support to state and local law enforcement agencies using the manpower, resoucres, and structure currently in place. The plan involves a nationwide assessment of training needs to be completed by June, 1983; an increase in emphasis on the theme of violent crime in all aspects of FBI education and training; equipping Bureau speakers and field police instructors with violent crime training packages; providing additional consultation and support such as crime analysis and criminal personality profile construction in major cases under the police cooperation classification; and identifying programs, activities and persons accomplishing decreases in violent crime and affording them high visibility and national recognition by conducting national conferences, seminars and symposiums eventually leading to a nationwide coordinated philosophy and approach to control violent crime in the United States.

35. How will Bureau activities be changed by its new responsibilities concerning drug enforcement? Will there be a shift in resources and priorities or will more resources be requested?

The FBI has significantly increased its workload in narcotics-related investigations during the last year. Now, with our newly designated responsibilities, it appears that many of our other investigative priorities, which require a significant amount of resources, will be investigated if resources permit or placed on a "back burner" for an extended period of time until sufficient resources are available.

The Bureau is presently conducting an in-depth survey addressing the impact of concurrent jurisdiction of narcotics violations on our personnel and resources presently committed to other investigative activities. The objective of this research is to identify lower priority investigative programs that are presently utilizing resources that could be more appropriately concentrated on narcotics investigations.

We are also reviewing and evaluating needs for resources other than for investigative personnel which are made more critical by our new role in narcotics investigations. Such areas include voice privacy equipment for our FM radios, automation of our field office operations, expansion of automated investigative information systems to increase our investigative effectiveness, increase in equipment to support Title III electronic surveillances, and the increase of informant coverage and undercover operations.

Question 36:

How does the Bureau coordinate its training at Quantico with that of other Federal facilities such as the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia?

Answer:

FBI Academy training programs are specifically designed to address the documented training and developmental needs of the FBI and local, county and state personnel. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) was established in 1970 to serve as an interagency training facility for Federal police officers and criminal investigators. Unless unusual circumstances are present, all requests for FBI Academy training by other Federal agencies are referred to FLETC. Due primarily to economic factors, exceptions have been allowed for the use of the FBI Academy facilities to host such activities as the Annual Attorney General Seminars and the 1981 Inspector Generals Seminar sponsored by the Office of Management and Budget. Although the clientele of both facilities differ, a close working relationship has developed in which respective administrative and training staffs have exchanged visits as well as state-of-the-art instructional materials and methods in such areas as criminal investigation, interviewing, and economic and financial crime matters. Continued liaison and cooperation between both facilities is maintained through FBI representation on the Center Interagency Working Group, as well as periodic contact with both the Director of FLETC, A. F. Brandstatter, and Department of Justice representative, Mr. Jack Conyers.

Question 37:

What academic research projects are FBI Academy-based instructors currently doing in the area of terrorism?

Answer:

The Special Operations and Research Unit at the FBI Academy is conducting five ongoing research projects on terrorism. They are:

1. The Terrorist Organizational Profile: A Psychological Role Model -- an examination of the social roles, group dynamics, and structural-functional aspects of modern terrorist groups.

2. Improvised Explosive Devices, Incendiary and Explosive, Used by Modern Terrorist Groups -- an analysis of such devices as used by various terrorist groups in their operations.

3. Specific Terrorist Incident Survey and Critique -- an examination of terrorist incidents to identify tactics and subsequent training requirements which determine the level of sophistication of terrorist groups.

4. Weapons Research on Arms used by Terrorist Groups -- each terrorist incident is examined to identify the weapons used and an evaluation of the suitability of the weapon selection for the mission.

5. Continuing liaison with other counterterrorist forces to identify their tactics in specific encounters -- this includes an examination of their training and cross training with such groups, discussions of selection, motivation, and retention problems.

Question 38:

Would you please describe the Government's Antiterrorism Program and your agency's role within that program? Also, what is your understanding of the specific roles, if any, of the National Security Council and the Department of State?

Answer:

The United States Government's Antiterrorism Program has the dual function of preventing terrorist incidents and responding quickly, efficiently and professionally to those incidents which do occur. The Department of State has been designated as the governmental agency responsible for terrorist incidents outside the United States and the FBI has the primary investigative responsibility with respect to the incidents and activities of terrorists in the United States.

The procedures for handling terrorist incidents is explained in "National Security Decision Directive Number 30", entitled "Managing Terrorism Incidents."

Due to the fact this is a classified document, the contents are not being restated here.

Question 39:

Does the Bureau have a program to assess the risk or vulnerability of potential United States terrorist targets? How does the Bureau forecast the number of terrorist incidents anticipated during the fiscal year?

Answer:

The FBI does not have a formalized program specifically tasked to survey potential terrorist targets in the United States and assess the risk or vulnerability of the potential target. What it does have is contingency plans in each of its field offices that are prepared to react to an incident in its territory. In the preparation of such contingency plans potential targets would be located and a certain amount of specifics would be recorded concerning the potential targets.

The only prediction of terrorist incidents that is done by the FBI at this time is for budget purposes. These figures are arrived at by comparing the numbers of incidents in the last few years, the number of groups active, their propensity for activity and then making a projection based on these comparisons.

Question 40:

How does the FBI develop and update contingency plans to assure an effective and timely response to violent criminal acts of terrorism, given that the methods and targets of terrorist groups are constantly changing?

Answer:

Each field division of the FBI is responsible for the preparation of contingency plans for their territory. The preparation of these plans include the survey of potential terrorist targets and the particular problems that can be expected to be experienced if an incident should occur. The plans would also take into consideration the variety of techniques used by terrorists and how each should be responded to.

In addition to the contingency plans prepared by each field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters (FBIHQ) has a prepared contingency plan that would be put into effect if a terrorist incident occurs in the United States.

These plans, both in the field and at FBIHQ, are continuously being revised to ensure that they are accurate, appropriate and timely.

Question 41:

The Working Group on Terrorism, composed of representatives of agencies with an interest in antiterrorism, meets as necessary to carry out its assigned responsibilities, which include information exchange, resolution of jurisdictional issues, and the coordination of the general antiterrorism activities of the various agencies. How would you evaluate the usefulness of this group in the United States Government's Antiterrorism Program, and have there been any changes concerning this group in the past year?

Answer:

The Working Group on Terrorism was a useful entity in that it allowed representatives of the various government agencies to meet on a regular basis to coordinate the efforts of the United States Government to combat terrorism by ensuring that all agencies represented were cognizant of the most current information and potential danger from terrorists.

This group is no longer functional and its responsibilities have been assumed by the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism which is chaired by Ambassador Sayre of the United States Department of State.

Question 42:

At last year's authorizaton hearing, it was stated that the Tax Reform Act and the Financial Privacy Act have impeded the Bureau's ability to perform its investigative responsibilities by cutting off access to financial information.

Do these impediments still exist?

What steps, if any, have been taken by the Administration or the Congress to rectify the situation?

What steps should be taken in order to rectify the situation and to provide the Bureau with the investigative tools which it needs?

Answer:

Unfortunately these impediments are still in place. With regard to the Tax Reform Act, the Administration has sought and obtained hearings before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Oversight of the Internal Revenue Service and the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight. S.1891, a comprehensive bill seeking to amend the Tax Reform Act of 1978 and carrying the full endorsement of the Administration, was introduced in November, 1981, by Senators Roth, Nunn, Rudman, and Chiles. This measure would provide the FBI with the necessary investigative access to IRS-held information while still protecting the confidentiality of information filed by individual taxpayers.

With regard to the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, no legislative steps have been taken to amend this law. The FBI continues to experience difficulties in obtaining access to necessary financial information, particularly in foreign counterintelligence investigations.

Question 43:

For years, the FBI has provided all-expense paid forensic science training, as well as other types of training, such as the National Academy, for State and local law enforcement. That means the Federal Government has footed the bill for instruction, lodging and transportation of persons to Quantico, Although we must recognize that concerns over government budgets are not limited to the Federal level, is it not reasonable to expect State and local governments to share some of the direct training costs - travel expenses, for instance?

Is it not feasible to implement a post-testing procedure after the course, possibly in conjunction with a group such as the Forensic Science Foundation, so that we could have some assurance as to the impact of the FBI training effort?

Answer:

The FBI has historically provided cost-free training as a cooperative law enforcement effort since the 1930's. A change in this policy could have a deleterious effect on the FBI's effectiveness since for the past 45 years we have relied on the cooperation, manpower and resources of local law enforcement agencies to aid us in carrying out our Federal investigative mission. Specifically, in the area of forensic science it should be noted that in the spirit of cooperative exchange, many state and local laboratories presently provide free-of-charge examinations of FBI evidence and on-the-scene technical services in FBI cases.

Should the cost-free training policy be changed, many state and local jurisdictions as well as individual police officers would be unable to afford any portion of the costs of training provided by the FBI. This would immediately impact on the larger metropolitan departments in large eastern and midwestern cities which are suffering a declining tax base and a shrinking budget, as well as the small rural law enforcement agencies which have no funds available for training. It should be noted that due to the present economic conditions, New York City police officers are prohibited from receiving any external training in which a fee is levied against the city. Similarly, California laws prohibit travel funds to be expended for out-of-state training. A program in which the Bureau would charge for its training would result in an unequal distribution of training and place, for example, West Coast jurisdictions at a distinct disadvantage in utilizing Quantico-based training resources.

The matter of establishing post-testing procedures after the completion of courses is a responsibility of the individual local laboratory. Many local laboratories on a voluntary basis are presently utilizing systems of proficiency testing as well as a variety of in-house and peer reviews. These systems address the issue of competency of personnel and should remain outside the purview or direction of the FBI.

No survey has been conducted in an attempt to measure the impact of the FBI forensic training effort. However, those who can best evaluate the training product are those directors of local laboratories who have personnel under their supervision who have received forensic training at the FBI Academy and are presently applying their acquired academic skills at the laboratory bench. These laboratory directors have on file over 2,000 applications for similar training for other employees in their laboratories.

Question: 44

Under the proposed Federal Tort Claims Act the liability of the United States for the Acts of its agents would include tort claims arising under the Constitution. The Senate version of the Act, S.1775, provides that the United States shall have available all defenses available to the employee, including "good faith" defense, whereas, the House version, H.R.24, does not include this provision. Do you consider it important that in such tort cases the United States be explicitedly granted the use of the "good faith" plea?

Answer:

Yes. The qualified immunity or good faith defense goes to the merits of a claim by testing the action of an FBI Agent against a standard of reasonableness and good faith. If the defense were not available a recovery would result whenever a technical violation is shown, even though the act was due to the honest mistake of an Agent. This would obviously result in an increased cost to the Government inasmuch as more judgments would have to be paid. There is also a hidden cost in that allowing for recovery for any technical violation would likely encourage the filing of a greater number of frivolous and/or harrassing lawsuits.

Deletion of the immunity defense could also lead to a perception on the part of the public that Government agents are increasingly violating the rights of citizens. This would be due to the increased number of successful constitutional claims which would result if the Government were not able to claim the good faith defense now available to an individual official sued in his personal capacity.

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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

August [illegible], 1982

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Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed are the FBI's answers to the Subcommittee's questions numbered 1 through 8, and 15 and 16 requested in your June 14, 1982 letter to complete the Subcommittee's hearing record on the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines.

Questions numbered 9 through 14 have required an extensive review of materials by our staff and the final response will be forthcoming. There have been approximately 521 domestic security investigation case files opened since 1977, which required review.

Question number 17 requests the FBI to provide the Subcommittee with our specific proposal for modification to the Levi Guidelines. As I indicated in my testimony on June 24, 1982, these recommendations have been forwarded to the Department of Justice and will be available to the Subcommittee upon approval by the Department of Justice.

I trust these responses will be of assistance to the Subcommittee.

Sincerely yours,

To File:
Hand Delivered to Subcommittee by CAS on 8/30/82

85

William H. Webster
Director

Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
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Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM

Enclosure

[redacted] (13)

SEE NOTE ON PAGE 2.

SEP 10 1982

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Honorable Jeremiah Denton

NOTE: These responses have been coordinated by Inspector [redacted] and the Criminal Investigative Division. Several contacts have been made with the Committee staff since the June 24, 1982 testimony to apprise them the status of these responses. These responses will be included in the permanent record of the Committee hearings concerning the Attorney General Domestic Security Guidelines.

b6
b7C

In response to question 3, by agreement with Subcommittee Counsel [redacted] a characterization and identification of groups under full investigation are being provided to the Committee.

APPROVED:
Director
Exec. AD-Adm.
Exec. AD-Inv.
Exec. AD-LES
Adm. Serv
Crim. In
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training

Characterization and identification of groups under preliminary or limited investigation are not being disclosed. The number of preliminary and limited investigations are being provided pursuant to Subcommittee request.

The Director 6/16/82

[redacted] b6 b7C

PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS TO THE HEARING ON JUNE 24, 1982, REGARDING THE DOMESTIC SECURITY GUIDELINES

PURPOSE: To inform you of a request by the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism for the FBI to answer questions pertaining to FBI policy, practices and proposed changes to the domestic security guidelines, and to recommend that we provide a response to designated questions prior to the hearing.

DETAILS: By letter (attached) dated June 14, 1982, Senator Denton, Chairman, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, requested that the FBI prepare written responses to 17 questions (attached) prior to your testimony before the Subcommittee on June 24, 1982.

Some of the questions, particularly questions 11 thru 14, require an extensive reply and a thorough review of materials pertaining to our domestic security investigations. b6 b7C Question 17 calls for the FBI to provide our specific proposal regarding modifications to the Levi Guidelines. After consultation with Inspector [redacted] and Terrorism Section Chief Stan Klein, Criminal Investigative Division, CAU recommends that we send a partial response including answers to questions 1 thru 10, and 15 and 16, and advise the Subcommittee that preparation of answers for the remaining questions is underway, but because of the need to review and research information, the remaining questions will be delivered to the Subcommittee as soon as possible following the scheduled hearing.

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That CID prepare written responses to questions 1 thru 10, and 15 and 16 by COB June 21, 1982, and deliver the fully approved responses to CAU for transmittal and delivery to the Subcommittee.

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2. That Division 6 prepare written responses to the remaining questions and deliver fully approved responses to CAU by COB July 2, 1982 for transmittal and delivery to the Subcommittee.

3. That CAU advise Subcommittee Counsel regarding our planned response.

Question 1 & 2:

What is the current statutory authority for domestic security investigations?

Please describe how the statutory authorities have changed over the last ten years.

Answer:

The basic authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct domestic security investigations is drawn from Section 533 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Under that statute, the Attorney General may appoint officials "(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States; (2) to assist in the protection of the President; and (3) to conduct such investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General." There are other statutes, such as the Congressional Assassination, Kidnaping and Assault Act, that give the Bureau special responsibilities to investigate particular crimes. In addition, there are Executive orders and Presidential statements or directives which place investigatory responsibilities upon the Bureau to gather information bearing on our Nation's security.

There has been no change in the statutory authority for domestic security investigations in the past ten years.

Question 3:

Without identifying them by name, how many domestic security investigations are open today (by groups and individuals)? Please characterize each of the groups.

(a) How many preliminary domestic security investigations are open today (by groups and individuals)?

(b) How many limited investigations are open today (by groups and individuals)?

(c) How many full domestic security investigations are open today (by groups and individuals)?

Answer:

As of August 20, 1982, there are a total of thirty-eight domestic security investigations being conducted by the FBI. These consist of full investigations on eight organizations and ten individuals; limited investigations on seven organizations; and preliminary investigations on seven organizations and six individuals.

The following are succinct characterizations of each of the eight groups under full investigation:

The Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN) is a clandestine terrorist organization dedicated to the liberation of Puerto Rico through the use of violent actions including bombings, incendiary attacks, kidnappings and threats. The group has financed its action through armed robberies of money, materials and vehicles. The FALN has claimed responsibility for 120 bombing-type incidents (actual bombings, attempted bombings, incendiary device attacks, and bomb threats) since October 26, 1974. These incidents have resulted in over 3½ million dollars in damages, five deaths, and 80 injuries. The group has forcibly taken control of two Presidential campaign offices and a National Guard Armory, binding employees and robbing the facilities. "Bomb factories" run by the FALN were discovered in Chicago and New York City on November 3, 1976, and July 12, 1978, respectively. Eleven members of the FALN were arrested in Evanston, Illinois, on April 4, 1980, in the possession of two stolen vans, two stolen cars, one falsely registered van, one stolen 14 foot truck, 13 firearms including automatic weapons, false identifications, and various disguises. One of these arrestees was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment in Federal custody for a fatal FALN bombing in New York City. The other ten were ultimately sentenced to terms of 55 through 90 years in Federal custody for Sedition to thwart the authority of the United States Government and violation of the Hobbs Act. Between April 4, 1980, and March 1, 1982, the FALN claimed credit for no incidents. On March 1, 1982, four bombings in New York City were claimed by the FALN.

The Communist Workers Party (CWP) previously known as the Workers Viewpoint Organization is headquartered in New York City. The CWP is guided by the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse Tung, and bases its revolutionary vanguard party in the working class. The CWP advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by any means possible, including violence, and further advocates the arming of the working class to achieve that end. Support for the organization which eventually became the CWP began in grass roots level activity in the Durham, North Carolina area in the fall of 1976. By the summer of 1979, the organization had embraced armed confrontation as a means to achieve their goal. Such a confrontation in November, 1979, in Greensboro, North Carolina resulted in the death of five members of the CWP. In January, 1980, CWP was excluded from a scheduled march on February 2, 1980, in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Civil Rights Movement in Greensboro, North Carolina because of their refusal to participate in an unarmed march. Members of the CWP continue to maintain arms in their places of residence in support of their professed willingness to kill in order to bring about the revolution they envision.

The Movement of National Liberation (MLN) is a Puerto Rican independence oriented organization centered in Chicago, Illinois, which believes that armed struggle is necessary in order for Puerto Rico to be liberated. The organization openly supports various clandestine terrorist groups presently functioning in Puerto Rico and in the continental United States. Included among these groups is the FALN.

Comites Obreros Revolucionarios (COR) first proclaimed its existence in Puerto Rico in 1971. From its inception, the self avowed objective of the group has been to obtain independence for Puerto Rico through armed revolution. Through words and deeds, COR has repeatedly advocated "producing a (social and political) crisis in Puerto Rico in order to "hasten independence through the use of arms." COR has supported its activities through robberies, thefts, and burglaries which they refer to as "expropriations."

It has been reported by several sources of known reliability that COR is the command organization for all radical Puerto Rican organizations including: FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional), FARP (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Popular), OVRP (Organization de Voluntarios por la Revolucion Puertorriquena) and the EPB-Macheteros. These organizations either jointly or individually, have been involved in most major acts of terrorism in support of Puerto Rican independence occurring during the past decade. While COR's command capacity over the other organizations has not been factually established, its very name, Revolutionary Workers Committees (note its pluralness) and the close connection of known COR members with the other terrorist groups, adds credence to this belief.

The Jewish Defense League (JDL), organized in September of 1968, by Rabbi Meir D. Kahane, is headquartered in New York City, New York, and is composed primarily of young Jewish-American extremists who consider themselves to be protectors of "Jewish rights" and supporters of the state of Israel. The JDL has chapters in several of the larger metroplitan areas of the United States. Many JDL members have been trained in self-defense and the use of firearms. JDL members have engaged in bombings and numerous violent demonstrations throughout the United States in an attempt to publicize the poor treatment received by Jews in the Soviet Union and in Arab nations. Rabbi Kahane, former International Director of the JDL, has publicly proclaimed that violence is necessary to accomplish the objective of JDL.

The May 19th Communist Organization (M19) was formed when the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC) split into coastal factions in 1976. The East Coast faction declared themselves to be M19 (May 19th is the birthday of Ho Chi Minh and Malcom X). M19 is dominated by feminists and reportedly supports various violent groups such as the Weather Underground, Black Liberation Army, and Republic of New Africa.

Investigation of the Arizona Chapter of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan is based on information received that this group may be involved in a conspiracy to murder a Federal informant and may have already murdered another individual they believe was an informant. According to the source, this group is made up of extremely dangerous individuals who may be involved in other illegal and violent activity. Investigation is continuing to determine the nature and activity of this group.

The Armed Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP) is a Puerto Rican based terrorist group dedicated to an independent Puerto Rico. In the past, the FARP has claimed numerous terrorist incidents on the island of Puerto Rico. In June of 1982, this organization claimed credit through a communique for placing two high order explosive devices on the seventh floor of Condominium Marbella West, Isla Verde, Carolina, Puerto Rico. The communique stated the bombing was done in retaliation for the forceable eviction by the Police of Puerto Rico (POPR) of over 100 families from a tract of land belonging to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. During the eviction one police officer was killed and several injured. No squatters were injured. POPR arrested six heavily armed individuals later linked to the Puerto Rican Independence Movement.

Question 4:

Under the current Guidelines, please specify the criteria under which preliminary, limited, and full domestic security investigations are initiated, with reference to the criminal standard?

Answer:

A preliminary investigation may be undertaken on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual or a group may be engaged in activities which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve the violation of Federal law for one or more of the purposes enumerated in the Domestic Security Guidelines. These investigations are conducted to determine whether there is a factual basis for opening a full investigation.

The threshold for a limited investigation is the same as the standard for a preliminary investigation. It may be authorized by a Special Agent-in-Charge or FBI Headquarters when the techniques available in a preliminary investigation are inadequate to determine if there is a factual basis for a full investigation.

A full domestic security investigation may be authorized on the basis of specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or group is or may be engaged in activities which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve the violation of Federal law. (Emphasis added.) Attorney General Levi testified shortly before promulgation of the Guidelines that the standard was intended to be the equivalent of "reasonable suspicion," which is substantially less than the grounds needed for arrest. It should also be understood that the "criminal standard" does not require a showing that a crime is "about" to be committed or that persons are "planning or preparing" to engage in crime. It is sufficient if there is reason to suspect that the individual or group is engaged in activities that "will involve" force or violence in violation of Federal law now or in the future. The Guidelines refer to the "immediacy of the threat" as a factor to be considered in each case. But an individual or organization can be investigated for anticipated criminal activity if it is determined that the danger to society is so serious that it outweighs the remoteness of the threat.

Question 5:

Is advocacy of violence alone or a rhetoric of violence alone in public speeches or publicly available documents ever sufficient to initiate a preliminary domestic security investigation?

Answer:

On February 14, 1982, Director Webster appeared before your committee and stated the following concerning this question:

"I do not say there is a categorical 'no' to that. To me, words uttered by people who, because of known criminally violent activity in the past, have the present capability of carrying out violence, form a clear basis for an inquiry.

I think our society would say, that one cannot have a perpetual investigation of anyone who publishes a violent tract. If a point is reached where one is unable to substantiate it at some lower level, we either close the investigation, or we go back to receiving information when and as it comes to us.

What has bothered people in the past about intelligence gathering, as distinguished from criminal investigations, has been this idea that we will go into every organization just in case they might be saying something we do not like. We do not do that. We have rather limited resources. We quickly run out of people. The whole FBI is one-third the size of the police force of New York City.

I want to assure you that we do not use this as an excuse not to investigate organizations which are advocating violence in our society.

Now, penetration and infiltration is a law enforcement technique we have to use from time to time, and I urge its use in appropriate places - Title III wiretaps, the use of informants, the use of undercover operatives are all necessary. But in our society we have to agree what the solid basis for that type of activity should be.

I suggest that we are ultimately looking for criminal conduct. If we have a lead-in because someone is urging criminal conduct, we are entitled to make at least a threshold inquiry to see what it is.

Now, there is a lot of difference between that and saying, 'Good, let us go penetrate that organization, let us find someone and send them in, and have them become members and spend the next three years saying whether they really mean it or not'. It is a common sense approach."

Question 6:

Can the FBI read, clip, or research publicly available documents of a group or individual prior to the initiation of a preliminary investigation?

Answer:

There is nothing in the Guidelines or federal law which prohibits the FBI from reading, clipping or researching publicly available documents of a group or individual prior to the initiation of a preliminary inquiry, provided that it does so consistent with the provisions of the Privacy Act. As you know, that Act prohibits the FBI from maintaining a record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless such information is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

Question 7:

What analytical resources of the FBI are being devoted to domestic security matters in terms of (a) budget allocations, (b) man years, and how much of these resources are devoted to reading, clipping, or researching and analyzing domestic security threats and problems?

Answer:

The Domestic Terrorism Budget for 1982 allocated nine workyears and $273,000 of budget authority for the Terrorist Research and Analytical Center (TRAC). Among the responsibilities of the TRAC are research and analysis in support of ongoing domestic security investigations.

We do not devote research and analytical resources to clipping and reading activities. During our ongoing domestic security investigations, those FBI personnel responsible for these investigations clip and read pertinent information which comes to their attention.

Question 8:

How does the FBI become aware of violent rhetoric or advocacy by groups or individuals? Is it through allegations by third parties, FBI research, other law enforcement agencies, or other sources?

Answer:

The FBI becomes aware of violent rhetoric or advocacy by groups or individuals in a variety of ways, several of which were enumerated in your question. It may also come to our attention through our own review of publicly available materials.

Question 15:

Have FBI agents or other investigative personnel been the subject of civil or criminal legal action for activities conducted under the Levi Guidelines?

Answer:

No FBI agents or other investigative personnel have been the subject of civil or criminal legal action for activities conducted under the Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic Security.

Question 16:

How many FBI personnel have had administrative action taken against them for violations of the Guidelines?

Answer:

There have been no FBI personnel who have had administrative action taken against them for violations of the Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic Security.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

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June 14, 1982

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Judge Webster:

In preparation for the hearings on the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines, I submit herewith 17 questions for response.

It is essential that the responses be furnished to the Subcommittee no later than close of business June 22, 1982.

Your continued cooperation is appreciated, and I look forward to your testimony on June 24, 1982.

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senate

JD:pf

Enclosure

Questions on the Levi Guidelines for the FBI:

1. What is the current statutory authority for Domestic Security Investigations (DSI)?

2. Please describe how the statutory authorities have changed over the last 10 years.

3. Without identifying them by name, how many DSI's are open today (by groups and individuals)? Please characterize each of the groups.

   (a) How many preliminary DSI's are open today (by groups and individuals)?

   (b) How many limited investigations are open today (by groups and individuals)?

   (c) How many full DSI's are open today (by groups and individuals)?

4. Under the current Guidelines, please specify the criteria under which preliminary, limited, and full DSI's are initiated, with reference to the criminal standard?

5. Is advocacy of violence alone or a rhetoric of violence alone in public speeches or publicly available documents ever sufficient to initiate a preliminary DSI?

6. Can the FBI read, clip, or research publicly available documents of a group or individual prior to the initiation of a preliminary investigation?

7. What analytical resources of the FBI are being devoted to domestic security matters in terms of (a) budget allocations, (b) man years, and how much of these resources are devoted to reading, clipping, or researching and analyzing domestic security threats and problems?

8. How does the FBI become aware of violent rhetoric or advocacy by groups or individuals? Is it through allegations by third parties, FBI research, other law enforcement agencies, or other sources?

9. How many DSI's under the Guidelines have been opened in the last five years on the basis of advocacy of violence alone?

10. How many DSI's have been opened in the last five years without some indications of current or imminent criminal activity on the part of the subject?

11. Provide a summary of DSI's in the last five years and the criteria for opening them (for preliminary, limited, and full DSI's).

12. How many DSI's (preliminary, limited, and full) have been terminated by FBI Headquarters in the last five years? (Provide a summary of the reasons for each termination.)

13. How many DSI's (preliminary, limited, and full) have been terminated by DOJ in the last five years? (Provide a summary of the reasons for each termination.)

14. How many full DSI's have been terminated by DOJ in annual reviews in the past five years? (Provide a summary of the reasons for each termination.)

15. Have FBI agents or other investigative personnel been the subject of civil or criminal legal action for activities conducted under the Levi Guidelines?

16. How many FBI personnel have had administrative action taken against them for violations of the Guidelines?

17. What specific proposals does the FBI have with respect to modifying the Levi Guidelines?

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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

April 1, 1983

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman
Subcommittee on Security and
Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your written request of March 23, 1983 for a copy of my instructions to FBI field offices regarding the new Attorney General's Guidelines on Domestic Security Investigations has been received. As I indicated to you in my testimony last Friday, I am willing to furnish you this communication.

It is my understanding that the document you requested was furnished to your staff shortly after the March 25, 1983 hearing. I hope it will be of assistance to you and your Subcommittee.

Sincerely yours,

William H. Webster
Director

NOTE: During testimony on the new domestic security guidelines on 3/25/83, the Director informed Senator Denton that a copy of the 3/17/83 airtel to the field explaining the revisions to the Attorney General's Guidelines on Domestic Security Investigations would be supplied to the Subcommittee. A copy was furnished to [redacted] Subcommittee Counsel, on 3/28/83. At her request, a copy was also furnished to [redacted] Counsel to the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.

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Room 7240, TL-245

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1 - Mr. O'Malley
(Attn: [redacted])
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March 31, 1983

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Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Dear Senator Denton:

Your letter of March 21, 1983, requesting an FBI report on Soviet involvement in the peace/nuclear freeze movement in the United States has been received. It is my understanding that a representative of your staff has already been furnished a copy of this report by a representative of my Congressional Affairs Section. I hope the material will be of assistance to the Subcommittee.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

William H. Webster
Director

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Honorable Jeremiah Denton

NOTE: By letter March 21, 1983 Senator Denton requested a copy of a report prepared by the Intelligence Division on Soviet involvement in the peace/nuclear freeze movement in the United States. A copy of this report had previously been requested by Chairman Boland of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and had been released to him. Pursuant to the approval of Deputy Assistant Director Parker, Intelligence Division, a copy of the report was furnished to Subcommittee Counsel [redacted] on 3/25/83.

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APPROVED:

Director
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JOEL S. LISKER, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

March 21, 1983

Honorable William H. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Attention: [redacted]

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Dear Judge Webster:

I hereby request that the FBI furnish me with their latest report, study or analysis, including both classified and unclassified versions, on Soviet involvement in the peace, nuclear freeze movement in the United States.

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton

Jeremiah Denton
U.S.S.

JD:mf

62-99878-866X

United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

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JOEL S. LISKER, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

26 January 1984

Honorable William H. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20535

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Attn: [redacted] SENATE Judiciary Committee

Dear Judge Webster:

On Wednesday, March 14, 1984, at 9:30 a.m. in 562 Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism will conduct a public hearing on oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Thereafter, on Tuesday, March 20, 1984, in S407 in the Capitol, a closed hearing on oversight will be held.

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As previously discussed with your office, the Subcommitte[redacted] requests that you make yourself available to testify on March 14th. In addition, on March 20th it is requested that Oliver Revell, Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigative Division and Edward J. O'Malley, Assistant Director of the Intelligence Division be available to testify at the closed hearing.

The Subcommittee is interested in an assessment of the Bureau's accomplishments for 1983, and an assessment of the Bureau's needs for 1984. Naturally there will be major emphasis on domestic and international terrorism and other matters relating to national security.

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It is also requested that at least fifty copies of written statements be submitted to the Subcommittee not less than 72 hours prior to the hearing dates. I want to emphasize that this is an important element of preparation for the hearing. [redacted] will be available to assist in preparing for these hearings.

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1 MAY 18 1984

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senate
(Alabama)

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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

April 19, 1984

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The FBI embarked on an ambitious automation project in 1978. The project was designed to address the investigative and administrative needs of the FBI field divisions and resident agencies that could be supported by automation. Following an automation feasibility study, the Richmond Division, one of the smaller FBI field divisions, was selected as a test site to institute automated support of field office functions. The system to support these field office functions is known as the Field Office Information Management System (FOIMS). After its successful implementation in the Richmond Division and a break-in period of approximately two years during which particular enhancements were made to the system, FOIMS was extended to support the FBI's largest field office, the New Y[redacted] Division. During the developmental and testing period, the future plans for FOIMS became more detailed and were refined. Through the analysis and planning phases, it was determined that the field offices should be supported by regional computer support centers (RCSCs). In the FBI's budget submissions and other planning documents submitted to the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget, [redacted] the plans to build up to six RCSCs. The original FOIMS implementation plan scheduled completion of one region per year for six years concluding in Fiscal Year 1987. Budget delays already have resulted in a cumulative delay of two years.

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MAIL ROOM ☐

APPROVED:
Director
Exec. AD-Adm.
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Original sent to Kevin Berry AAG, DOJ on 4-19-84

DUPLICATE YELLOW

FBI/DOJ

Honorable Jeremiah Denton

I have been concerned about the delays in extending automation to support the field division functions. I view it as absolutely essential that automation be more fully employed in the gathering, storing, analyzing, and retrieving of data associated with FBI investigations. The challenges facing the FBI in this technologically advancing "information era" can best be met with broader and more enhanced automation support. In view of the substantial budget allocated to this project in 1984 and a significant budget request for 1985, I requested my staff develop and present to me alternatives to the then existing implementation plan.

Several alternatives were developed over a six-month period. These alternatives were carefully analyzed and included the use of computer modeling. Through these efforts, an alternative has been identified which will extend automated support to all 59 field divisions and approximately 25 percent of the resident agencies by December, 1985. Under the original implementation scheduled, automated support would not reach all field divisions until Fiscal Year 1989. The accelerated schedule provides for implementing selected automated applications in all field divisions, i.e., automated index, case management, and automated time and attendance. This implementation schedule provides the best return on investment for the FBI and does not involve any increase in expenditure over funds already budgeted.

The accelerated implementation of FOIMS provides the basis for us to eliminate indexing redundancy which is estimated to be at the 65 percent level. This occurs because separate index records are created in each office that conducts the investigations related to a given case. It will also allow for the implementation of the Universal Case File Number, i.e., a single file number assigned to an investigation regardless of which office is supporting the investigation. With the placement of computer terminals in all field divisions, several administrative functions will be immediately supported. In addition, each of these terminals will, in a stand-alone fashion, be a microcomputer. This means that each field division will have local computing power for its use on a discretionary basis. I am convinced the single most important benefit to accrue from this accelerated implementation of FOIMS is the increase in computer literacy among the employees of the FBI.

Honorable Jeremiah Denton

I am pleased to advise you of these strategic changes in the FBI's automation program. In addition, I am confident this approach will prepare the FBI for the future enhanced capabilities of FOIMS and will integrate the organization rapidly into the information era.

Sincerely yours,

William H. Webster
Director

1 - Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

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1 - [redacted] - Enc.
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1 - Mr. Baker - Enc.
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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

April 10, 1984

Senate Committee on Judiciary

Honorable ~~Jeremiah~~ Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated April 3, 1984, wherein you submitted questions in connection with the Subcommittee hearings held on March 14 and 20, 1984.

A further response from Judge Webster will be forthcoming in the near future.

Sincerely,

William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

MAILED 9
APR 11 1984
FBI

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~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

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Director's Sec'y

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April 10, 1984

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated April 4, 1984, requesting background information on [redacted] and a copy of an FBI Laboratory report.

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A further response from Judge Webster will be forthcoming in the near future.

Sincerely,

William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

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June 1, 1984

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated May 10, 1984, requesting comments on what is being done to improve airport security at points of embarkation and deplaning for people traveling to and from the Olympic Games.

A further response from Director Webster will be forthcoming in the near future.

Sincerely,

~~DE-45~~

William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

MAILED 13
JUN 4 1984
FBI

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Director
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Room 7240, TL-2

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Director's Sec'y

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MAIL ROOM

May 9, 1985

Senate Committee on Judiciary

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated May 6, 1985 requesting that the FBI provide a complete report to the Subcommittee on the Zhang-Xin case.

A further response from Director Webster will be forthcoming in the near future.

Sincerely,

DE-172 [illegible] 120

William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

1 - ENCLOSURE

MAILED 9
MAY 11 1985
FBI

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1 - Mr. Baker-Enclosure
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FBI/DOJ

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

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JOEL S. LISKER, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

6 May 1985

Honorable William H. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Judge Webster:

It has come to my attention that a former official in the People's Republic of China's textile industry died allegedly by hanging himself in the PRC Consulate in New York City, on December 12, 1984. Shortly before his death, Mr. Zhang-Xin, forty-nine years old, had contacted the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and had been given forms to be filled out by individuals seeking permanent resident status. Thereafter, PRC officials reported that he was dead by suicide.

According to the information I have received, Mr. Zhang-Xin took the forms from INS and apparently told some of his co-workers of his decision. Thereafter, someone from the consulate called the FBI to tell them that Mr. Zhang-Xin had changed his mind and wanted the FBI to come to the Consulate to hear his recantation. A short time later, they called the FBI to report that Mr. Zhang-Xin had been found dead on the roof of the Consulate.

It is my understanding that a preliminary examination of the body showed Mr. Zhang-Xin had received an injury to the head, but the Medical Examiner's report is still not complete, almost five months after the death.

It is requested that the FBI provide a complete report to me or representatives of my staff on the Zhang-Xin case before May 20, 1985. It is my understanding that the FBI has closed its investigation in this matter.

62-99226-1025

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senator

JD:pj

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

July 9, 1985

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman
Subcommittee on Security
and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 26, 1985 requesting information about the alleged operation of a mercenary camp in Adger, Alabama.

A further response from Director Webster will be forthcoming in the near future.

Sincerely,

DE-65 V-262 5 2-97 [redacted] -1025

William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

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MAILED 9
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FBI/DOJ

November 27, 1985

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman
Subcommittee on Security and
Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Recently [redacted] Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee, contacted the Congressional Affairs Office and requested a copy of the National Crime Information Center audit report for the state of Alabama. Pursuant to his request, I am enclosing a copy of the report. If I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

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Sincerely yours,

William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

Enclosure

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2 DEC 3 1985

NOTE: Copies of the five previous NCIC audit reports were forwarded to Chairman EDWARDS by DIRECTOR'S letter dated November 13, 1985.

SA [redacted]
Room 7240, TL-245

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FBI/DOJ

January 3, 1986

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated December 19, 1985 requesting the FBI to interview Paul Wong and provide a briefing to [redacted]

A further response from Director Webster will be forthcoming in the near future.

Sincerely,

V-31

DE-3 62-91,24 1047

William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

MAILED 8
JAN 03 1986
FBI

1 - Mr. Baker - Enclosures (2)
1 - [redacted] Enclosures (2) (detached)
3 - [redacted] - Enclosures (6) (detached)
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Director's Sec'y

1 ENCLOSURE

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APR 17 1986
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FBI/DOJ

United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510

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JOEL S. LISKER, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

19 December 1985

Honorable William Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Judge Webster:

Enclosed please find a letter and attachments from [redacted] of the New Testament Church in New York City. I would ask that you examine the material that [redacted] enclosed with his letter and interview him to ascertain what occurred at the Taiwan National Day Parade. Once the interview has been conducted please provide a briefing to [redacted] Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism.

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Thank you for assistance in to this matter.

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senator

JD:cj
Enclosure

ENCLOSURE 62-9921-1047

[redacted] Pls. Refer to FBI for interview b6 b7C

紐約教會
CHURCH OF NEW YORK

P. O. BOX 21040 WOODHAVEN, N.Y. 11421 TEL. 718-847-3740

November 25, 1985

The Honorable Jeremiah A. Denton
United States Senate
Senate Hart Building #516
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Denton:

Re: Assault Induced by Taiwan Government on [redacted]

I am [redacted] of the New Testament Church in New York City.

During the Taiwan National Day Parade held in New York City Chinatown on [redacted] made a silent and peaceful protest against Taiwan Government's premeditated persecution of the New Testament Church. We were assaulted and [redacted] Had not the police detective come in time to stop them, we would have been killed on the street. This case is now on file with the 5th Police Precinct in New York City. b6 b7C

[redacted] Until now, no one from the Taiwan Government has taken any responsibility for their act of violence.

New Testament Church is a worldwide Church. For years, she has been suffering from religious persecution of the Taiwan Government (see attachments). Now, such premeditated persecution has extended to the United States, intervening with the basic freedom of speech and beliefs. The assault on [redacted] demonstrated again that the Taiwan Government does not respect human rights nor do they regard the rule of law in this country. b6 b7C

We hope that you would arise to see that justice is done. I would appreciate meeting you at your convenience, and seeing this matter being brought to Congress' attention.

Yours sincerely,

[redacted]

Enc: Attachments

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

May 6, 1986

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman
Subcommittee on Security and
Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated May 1, 1986 requesting responses to additional questions to the Committee's hearing held on April 30, 1986.

A further response from Director Webster will be forthcoming in the near future.

Sincerely,

William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

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MAILED 5
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FBI

1 - Mr. Baker - Enclosure
1 - [redacted] - Enclosure (dated)
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Room 7240, TL-245

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Director's Sec'y

MAIL ROO [redacted]

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FBI/DOJ

United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510

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JOEL S. LISKER, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

1 May 1986

Honorable William Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Judge Webster:

On behalf of my colleagues on the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, I want to thank you for your excellent testimony at yesterday's hearing. I appreciate your knowledgable and candid responses to our questions.

As I mentioned at the conclusion of the hearing, I am submitting additional questions from Senators Leahy, Simon and myself. Please provide the Subcommittee with responses to these questions within 30 days.

I appreciate your assistance in this matter and again thank you for your testimony.

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senator

JD:lj

62-116395-1062

July 2, 1986

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23, 1986 requesting responses to some additional questions for the record regarding the FBI Oversight Hearing held on April 30, 1986.

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A further response from Director Webster will be forthcoming in the near future.

Sincerely,

William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

MAILED 15
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Room 7240, TL-245

1 - Mr. Baker - Enclosure
1 - [redacted] - Enclosure
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1 - [redacted] Enclosure
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1 - ENCLOSURE

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FBI/DOJ

United States Senate

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23 June 1986

Honorable William Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Judge Webster:

In reference to the FBI Oversight Hearing of 30 April 1986, attached are additional questions submitted by Senator Orrin Hatch. Please provide the Subcommittee with responses to these questions as soon as possible.

I appreciate your assistance.

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senator

JD:wj
Enclosure

62-99825-1078

QUESTIONS FOR JUDGE WEBSTER

1. I COMMEND YOU, JUDGE WEBSTER, ON YOUR IMPRESSIVE SUCCESS IN HOLDING DOWN THE NUMBER OF DOMESTIC TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE VERY LOW NUMBER OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING 1985, I AM CURIOUS AS TO YOUR DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM. IN OTHER WORDS, HOW DO YOU DEFINE TERRORISM, AS IT IS OR MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT IN THE UNITED STATES, AND DOES THAT DEFINITION AFFECT IN ANY WAY THE NUMBERS OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS THAT THE BUREAU HAS REPORTED DURING THE PAST YEAR?

2. I HAVE NOTICED THAT OVER THE LAST HALF-DOZEN YEARS OR SO, THE FBI FIGURES ON THE USE OF BOMBS OR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES VARY CONSIDERABLY FROM THE FIGURES PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS. THE FBI FIGURES SEEM TO BE MUCH LOWER THAN THOSE OF THE ATF. WHAT IS YOUR EXPLANATION FOR THIS? HOW DOES THIS RELATE TO YOUR ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC TERRORIST INCIDENTS? AND HOW DO YOU DISTINGUISH, FOR EXAMPLE, BETWEEN AN ORDINARY CRIMINAL BOMBING AND AN EXTRAORDINARY TERRORIST BOMBING?

3. I HAVE BEEN CONCERNED FOR SOME TIME, AS YOU MAY KNOW, ABOUT THE POTENTIAL--OR THE ACTUAL--DANGER, POSED BY CENTRAL AMERICAN TERRORISTS WHO HAVE PENETRATED OUR BORDERS AND HAVE ENTERED THE UNITED STATES ILLEGALLY. GIVEN THE COLOSSAL NUMBER OF ILLEGAL ALIENS WHO CROSS OUR SOUTHERN BORDERS (LAST YEAR 1.3 MILLION WERE APPREHENDED--A 40% INCREASE OVER 1984), THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY SOME ILLEGAL ALIENS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST GROUPS OR POTENTIAL ACCOMPLICES OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. IN A SINGLE WEEK IN JANUARY, 1986, A TOTAL OF 15,023 ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS WERE APPREHENDED BY THE U.S. BORDER PATROL. THESE NUMBERS INCLUDED ALIENS FROM ARGENTINA, BOLIVA, EL SALVADOR, BRAZIL, COLUMBIA, GUATEMALA, VENEZUELA, HONDURAS, COSTA RICA, CHILE, PERU, THE PHILLIPINES, INDIA, YUGOSLAVIA, BELIZE, ECUADOR, JORDAN, AND NICARAGUA. THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST INFILTRATION, I WOULD THINK, IS ENORMOUS. WHAT ARE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS AND WHAT CAN YOU TELL US?

4. THE FBI HAS DONE A FINE JOB, MR. DIRECTOR, IN ALERTING US TO THE DANGERS OF NARCO-TERRORISM, A COMPARATIVELY NEW PHENOMENON AND A PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS ONE. IT IS DANGEROUS BECAUSE IT COMBINES DRUG CRIMINALITY WITH TERROR-VIOLENCE AND HAS STRONG LINKS WITH TERRORIST GUERRILLAS IN BOTH CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA. MOREOVER, OUR DIPLOMATS IN LATIN AMERICA HAVE COME UNDER THREAT BY NARCO-TERRORISTS AS WELL AS BY THE MORE TRADITIONAL (IF ONE CAN SAY THAT) TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE LINKAGES WITH GOVERNMENTS HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES, SUCH AS CUBA AND NICARAGUA, ARE MANY AND SEEM TO BE GROWING. I WONDER, JUDGE WEBSTER, IF YOU CAN TELL US WHAT KIND OF THREAT IS POSED TO THE UNITED STATES DIRECTLY BY THE NARCO-TERRORISTS AND TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THIS NEW PHENOMENON INCREASED THE FLOW OF DRUGS INTO THIS COUNTRY? ALSO, IF YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHAT THE CONGRESS CAN DO TO HELP INHIBIT THIS DRUG FLOW, THEY WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

5. ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE SEEM TO HAVE CONTINUALLY IN COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS THAT OF A SMOOTH AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION. DO SIMILAR PROBLEMS EXIST ON THE DOMESTIC LEVEL? WOULD YOU FAVOR, IN ANY WAY, CREATION OF A UNIFIED OR UNIFORM INTER-AGENCY COUNTER-TERRORIST COORDINATION? AGAIN, IS THERE ANYTHING THE CONGRESS CAN DO TO HELP MAKE THIS COORDINATION MORE EFFECTIVE? I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS.

6. What effect upon your counter-terrorism programs and activities, in general, will the reduction of your budget by $52.5 million have, and what future difficulties may arise from the reduction in funds that have not troubled the Agency so far?

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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September 5, 1986

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Senate Judiciary Committee

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated August 21, 1986 on behalf of [redacted] in which you requested that the FBI review [redacted] proposal on the "Anti-Terrorist Photo Acquisition and Comparison System" as well as his ideas concerning a "Watcher Organization." b6 b7C

A further response from Director Webster will be forthcoming in the near future.

Sincerely,

William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional and Public Affairs

V-27

DE-244 62-99828-1077

APPROVED:

Director
Exec. AD-Adm.
Exec. AD-Inv.
Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.

Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Off. of Cong. & Public Af

1 [redacted] (detached)
1 Enclosure (detached)
3 Enclosure (detached)
1 [redacted]

Exec AD Adm.
Exec AD Inv.
Exec AD LES
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Insp.
Intell.
Lab.
Legal Coun.
Off. Cong. & Public Affs.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
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Director's Sec'y

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM

Room [redacted]

NOV 6 1986

b6 b7C

FBI/DOJ

United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510

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JOEL S. LISKER, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

21 August 1986

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Congressional and Public Affairs
9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Enclosed please find a letter and materials from [redacted] of Dearborn, Michigan. [redacted] has proposed an "Anti-Terrorist Photo Acquisition and Comparison System" based on his knowledge of laser disk technology. Please address this suggestion, as well as his ideas concerning a "Watcher Organization". b6 b7C

Once you have reviewed this material please send your response to the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 198 Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., 20510, at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senator

JD:dj
Enclosure

62-99828-1071

ENCLOSURE

LADDIS SYSTEMS
Division of
LADDIS CORPORATION

P.O. Box 2008
Dearborn, Michigan 48123
Phone (313) 525-9251

April 24, 1986

Mr. Ron Lemay
Russell Senate Building
Room 198
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Lemay,

We at LADDIS Systems feel that the answer to most problems is innovation with enough invention to fill in the blank spaces.

We propose that funding be provided to innovate the Anti-Terrorist Photo Acquisition and Comparison System. We propose that we use a Frame Grabber Image processor system such as used in Automatic Inspection systems. This system would be interfaced with our Self-contained Laser Disk Machine which would provide the mass storage needed to make this system feasible. The flexibility of the system is paramount and it should accept Video Still and slow motion, fast motion, Video, and Video with one or two audio channels and compressed digital data. Our system design concept allows for all of these and more that may be discovered, during development. Very new Laser disk media developments make this system feasible and we can start full scale design and development within 30 days of receipt of appropriate funding.

This type of contract will be very hard to estimate since it requires two distinctly separate developments:

1. Photo Acquisition and Comparison System
2. Both of these systems are a combination of innovation and invention. The Photo Acquisition system will use available hardware with modifications and software that will require some modification or replacement. All of this will be determined after building and testing the first prototype system.

The Laser Disk Cataloging System will use state of the art hardware and media, but will require development of the Laser Disk Operating System which is a proprietary concept.

All of the above can be accomplished at a very fast pace since we use the most advanced Top Down Design methods that will allow the design of both hardware retrofit and software design to be accomplished in record time. We have proprietary computerized tools to accomplish these goals.

The third part of this total system is the organization of a modern professional Watcher organization as described in the enclosed paper. This is as important as having the hardware and software, for once one spots the targeted person one must follow him undetected to determine where the rest of the organization is and who they are. It is my feeling that watching is a specialty that must be done by highly trained personnel who will do it for a life's work and not for a temporary time. Watchers should have no arrest powers, just watch and report activities. They are not armed and never get close to their quarry or go to court where they will become known. We will rid ourselves of a great many spies and terrorists if this organization is put together in the proper manner. The utmost secrecy must be followed. There must be no advertising of its existence or location of its buildings or how it operates. These steps are necessary if its effectiveness is to be kept high.

I hope we can be of help to the administration and the nation in their efforts to stop terrorist activity against United States citizens in the free world. I am enclosing abbreviated resumes of the principals in LADDIS Corporation. We are a small business and have been an integral part of the evolution of computer systems for the passed two decades.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Enclosure

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Division of
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ANTI-TERRORIST PHOTO ACQUISITION AND COMPARISON SYSTEM

IMAGE PROCESSING

In order to adapt a personal computer to an imaging application, specialized hardware and software are required. Besides a frame grabber based on a microcomputer bus (see box, "Frame grabbers: the key to personal-computer-based vision"), an image sensor such as a CCD camera is necessary. The computer's data-handling ability is enhanced by a coprocessor system providing a high-speed hardware processor, additional RAM, and a dual-port architecture with its own data bus to speed up operations.

The system memory must be large enough to contain a number of elements. These include at least one video image; the microcomputer's operation system; utilities such as interpreters, assemblers, and linkers; application software; and scratchpad space for running programs and storing intermediate results at run time. AT least 256 Kbytes of RAM is recommended.

COPROCESSOR NEEDED

To process the stored image, a high-speed coprocessor is needed for real-time processing of video data. However, a personal-computer processor can perform simple operations at about half the speed of a typical coprocessor. For more complex arithmetic operations, the floating-point processor can be installed.

The coprocessor should be tied to a special data bus that provides a separate path to the video processor apart from the microcomputer bus. This link permits a higher data bandwidth, and because it can be dedicated to handling only video data, it is insensitive to activity on the microcomputer bus.

To make the system function properly, general imaging software -- which may be available as subroutine-level packages from the frame-grabber manufacturer--operates the frame grabber and performs general processing of the image data (such as additions, subtractions, and convolutions). In addition, applications software must be present to perform the image testing and provide any conditional operations necessary to control the process.

THE SYSTEM'S COMPONENTS

The system chosen is Structured around the IBM PC, it includes a dual-port coprocessor board, a 256 x 256-pixel frame-grabber board, an analog and digital I/O board (see Fig. 1.), subroutines to operate the frame grabber, and custom application software.

SYNCHRONIZED SIGNAL

To ensure that the image generation in the video camera is perfectly synchronized with the image acquisition on the frame grabber, a sync signal is derived from the frame grabber's on-board sync circuitry. The camera is thus locked to the frame

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grabber.

At this point, a digitized image of the target persons face sample exists. The orientation of the face is known. Furthermore, since the trigger has initiated the frame acquisition as soon as the sample entered the region of interest, the digitized image is known to contain the entire face. Now the application software is free to perform its analysis of the image.

Depending on which part of the software is being run, the image is subjected to either a high-speed acceptance test (performed at about 12 samples/s) or a slower quality-control test that is performed at about 6 samples/s. The pen face is evaluated as either a match or no match.

HARDWARE STRUCTURE

The structure of the computer system used to operate this acquisition system is shown in Fig. 2. The PC bus is the foundation of the computer system, to which a CPU, the system memory, and mass-storage device (hard disk) are attached.

Also attached to the PC bus are key peripherals. Foremost among these is a high-speed (30-frame/s), high-resolution video-acquisition device (fame grabber), which acquires a 256 x 256-pixel image with 6-bit gray-scale resolution (64 levels). The dual-port frame grabber digitizes the video image so it can be processed as data.

The digitized image is stored in 64 Kbytes of on-board RAM from which it is mapped into the PC's memory space, thus making it accessible to the unit's processor. The image is also supplied to a video output port that can be used to access a separate data bus.

Linked to the PC bus and the frame grabber, a coprocessor provides a high-speed dedicated microprocessor that permits real-time video data processing independent of the PC bus's activity. The coprocessor communicates with the frame grabber on a separate bus using the frame grabber's video output port...

Lastly, a single-board analog and digital I/O system attached to the PC bus permits the application software to direct the monitoring and controlling of the process and test procedure.

SOFTWARE PACKAGES

Operation of the acquisition system is supervised by software that controls the hardware and interprets the digitized video image in the system. Three software packages are used to judge whether the digitized image is acceptable.

A standard subroutine package controls the frame grabber. It also performs arithmetic operations on frame-buffer data such as merging and subtracting frames, histogramming, and convolutions.

The frame grabber subroutine package is complemented by a menu-driven imaging-system package that performs more sophisticated functions such as image and pattern recognition and by custom application frame acquisition, and to send alarm to watchers or security personnel. Pieces of each of these three

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software packages are linked to form a single executable image at run time.

ACCEPTANCE TESTING

If the quantity of white pixels falls within a tolerance value of the standard, an alarm is sounded. If the value falls outside this tolerance envelope, the facial match is rejected.

QUALITY-CONTROL TESTING

The quality-control test is some-what more sophisticated and has many variations, depending on the characteristics of the face being sampled. Overall dimensions and shape are tested routinely. Color matching and checking for color uniformity are possible.

All of the operations in the quality-control test compare the digitized sample with the digitized image of a known good photograph. As a first step, the exact location of the face in the image must be determined. A proprietary technique can determine orientation by looking at only three points on the image.

Once the sample orientation is known, standard image-processing techniques are employed to locate edges, check shape, and verify color. The techniques include frame summing or subtracting, convolutions employing dual-Gaussian or sombrero filtering, and gray-scale comparison of pixel values for matching color intensity or uniformity.

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FRAME GRABBERS: THE KEY TO PERSONAL-COMPUTER-BASED VISION

The frame grabber is a dedicated, high-speed A/D converter for video images. It acquires a video image signal from a camera, video cassette recorder, or video disk, and changes a composite video input signal (RS-170 - or CCIRR-compatible) into digital values that represent the video image or frame. This data represents the intensity level for each individual pixel of the image can then be processed by special imaging software.

The frame grabber (see diagram Fig.3.) takes in a video signal, strips the sync signal from it, and converts it into 61,440 pixels of data, organized as an array of 2440 lines with 256 pixels in each line. Each pixel (data point) is a 6-bit digital value, representing the gray-scale intensity of an individual pixel.

EIGHT INPUT LOOK-UP TABLES

The system provides a choice of eight input look-up tables, which permit each data value to be converted to some other value. Input look-up tables can be used to perform thresholding or dynamic range expansion or compression. In addition, each 6-bit value is assigned an 8-bit value.

A frame-buffer memory is also provided, It consists of a 64-Kbyte block of RAM mapped into the microcomputer's memory space, which can store one complete digitized frame.

The system also supplies a choice of four output look-up tables that assign colors to the gray-scale data values. The system permits 64 colors with 64 different intensity levels. Video output circuitry consists of four D/A converter used as a variable reference to control color intensity.

The sync signal can be supplied either from the video input connected to the system or from an on-board generator. If the signal is externally supplied, a phase-locked-loop circuit on the board tracks variations in the sync frequency. However, when the signal is supplied by the on-board generator, a separate connection is provided so external devices can be genlocked and thus be synchronized to the frame-grabber.

Other functions are controlled by an on-board microprocessor, which handles much of the internal timing and greatly simplifies programming.

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


Fig. 1. Analog and digital I/O boards let personal-computer-based systems monitor and control the processing and testing procedure.

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


Fig. 2. The PC bus is the foundation of the personal computer. It also provides access for the acquisition system peripherals.

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


Fig. 3. The key elements permitting the use of personal computers to perform visual tasks are IBM PC-compatible frame-grabber boards, which converts an analog signal from the video camera into a digital code.

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SELF CONTAINED LASER DISK MACHINE

This laser disk system is conceived to be a self contained disk of multiple coding modes. This means that; the control computer runs a standard operating system from ROM or computer disk. A custom floppy disk or plugable ROM is not carried along with the laser applications disk. All variable routines are stored as digital data in video tracks.

This is accomplished by using unique disk organization technique, resembling a tree structure with digital data menus. Leaves of the tree are mixed mode strings of records.

Modes allowed are:

- .Video Still
- .Video Slow motion
- .Video Fast motion
- .Video with or without one or two audio channels
- .Compressed audio only - stereo or bi-lingual or up to 1 second per track. (frame)
- .Compressed digital data or program code overlay from 2.5 to 18 kilobytes per track (frame) plus others.

Using different computer configurations a simple simulator can be made using the above features.

To properly route and control individual records each record has a control header of so many digital bytes, supplied to the control computer. The laser disk drive has its own digital control information header and Manchester codes.

Applications include Teaching devices, Books, Cable TV Library, Library in Space, Video Games, Aids to the Handicapped, Laser Disk Media Books, Simulators, Real Time Process Controllers.

Technology either available or in development stages for most of the hardware required. It may have to be modified or improved on for use in the System.

The main unique feature of this system is the method of handling, storing and retrieving of data. This constitutes a new media of communications.

New advances in the development of read/write laser disk media make the above applications possible.

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LIST OF POTENTIAL USES

1. Intelligent Fire Control

.Systems in (3) Dimensions - Height, width, and depth

.Target identification

2. Security Systems - Including:

.Access control; perimeter security; communications cypher and decryption systems.

.Anti terrorist photo acquisition and comparison systems.

.Ship Security; automated maintenance manuals printed out in detail for mechanic or technician.

3. Cataloging Systems

.Detailed parts break down and color picture of each item in inventory to help the person ordering item in determining pricing, criteria. Accessible by part number. Also, detailed blue prints of schematics, store and retrieve (to be printed on demand).

.Detailed personnel break down in field (Accessible in 1 second). Detailed stores breakdown motor pool maintenance records accessible at all times.

.Enemy intelligence Systems
Analyze, store and retrieve, process and display data. Interpret, project, obtain information on any subject. Translate and teach languages.

4. All Types of Simulators

.Vehicle Driver Simulator, tank, truck, ship, spacecraft, artillery, heavy equipment, aircraft, helicopter, c3 systems, SDI Systems, can be programmed and tested in 3 dimensions, one has 2 channels audio, video and digital to test and train on SDI Systems in a real time sense.

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WATCHER SERVICE SEPARATE FROM THE FBI, CIA, DOD.

Watchers are to be specifically chosen for the job of watching people not as they are presently chosen for FBI and CIA jobs, and not temporarily on the watcher job, at trainee level. I envision an organization similar to the Canadian service only taken one step further to be totally separate organization reporting directly to the Attorney General for operational instructions.

This Watcher Organization would be used mostly for watching foreign embassy personnel or UN personnel suspected spies etc. The only time they would be used to watch American citizens would be when these citizens were orally, in writing or visually connected to a foreign national who is involved in s suspected subversive activity, terrorism, etc. This would relieve the other services from is duty and allow the job to be done in a professional manner with the proper amount, and the right types of personnel and equipment required to do the job. Other specialties that could be added to this service are wire tapping, clandestine radio intercept watching, and others as they are defined and determined to be better performed by this organization. All of the personnel must be chosen for very specific physical and mental attributes that can not be overlooked, as they are at present. Example - the FBI chooses personnel, all personnel from college grads list. New FBI agents must look on this duty as very boring. Therefore, this may not be the type of person who makes the best watcher. Good Watchers are Mr. Average in all ways, physical looks, education, height, weight, speech level, dress style, etc. He would never stand out in any way in a crowd, or alone. So intelligence is not the primary factor, but a photographic memory would be a great asset. The same logic holds for CIA and DOD personnel who are working in this field. Also, the type of super patient person who can sit and watch a target for months or race down the middle of a large city in a very tricky assignment following a highly trained KBG Agent takes a very special type of person with unlimited patience and stubborness, but who will call for a hand off before detection.

One useful benefit of using a separate organization is the watchers never know the other agents in the FBI and the CIA or DOD so as to further compartmentalize these organization and improve security. One might also use only numbers and code names when describing target persons.

References:

1. Men in the Shadows, by John Sawatsky, Doubleday and Company, Inc.; Garden City N.Y.; Toronto, Ontario (Non-Fiction).
2. For Services Rendered, by John Sawatsky; Doubleday.
3. A Man Called Intrepid, by William Stevenson Ballantine/Non-Fiction.
4. Intrepids Last Case, by William Stevenson Ballantine/Non-Fiction.

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LASER DISK CATALOGING SYSTEM

This is a catalog system to help identify all known foreign agents or terrorists. These machines would be stationed at the following locations: border entry points, international airport customs, coast guard ships and facilities, FBI offices, DOD security offices, police stations, US embassies, and other places where it may be needed.

The following types of information could be stored in the system: color or black and white still photos, color or black and white video images from video tape or from movie film. The following digital information can also be stored: descriptions and information pertaining to targeted individuals. Information can be obtained directly from the following sources through a computer and communications interface: teletype, RS232 computer modem from telephone or word processors. Audio information can be obtained from the following sources and in the following modes: monaural or stereo audio, voice prints, bi-lingual (foreign language plus english translation).

One single side of a video disk can contain 54,000 video frames of different forms of information: audio, video, digital, and program control information.

Access to any laser disk frame is zero to 3 seconds, depending on the computer speed, laser disk access speed, and number of laser disk drives. The present access speed can be increased by advanced hardware and software research and development. Legal safeguards must be established so that this security system can not be used against innocent American citizens.

The following scenario could illustrate a possible operation of the laser disk security system. An American agent in a foreign country identifies a known terrorist or foreign agent. This fact is communicated through a secure governmental tracking network to a central or regional watcher C3I (command, communications, control and intelligence)center. The computer would search for a match on the foreign agents ID. If locally found, the intelligence is added to foreign agents local file and is transmitted to the watchers C3I central. If requested, the latest information on the agent is brought up for display to the American agent. If there is no match on the foreign agents ID, the search request is transmitted to the watcher central C3I center (Washington). If this foreign agent boards a vehicle of transportation such as an airplane, the schedule of landings or stops will be transmitted along with the description and other pertinent data. The C3I Center will download the file to the remote equipment at all landing points or stops. Would be surveiled by personnel and or remote equipment. Appropriate personnel would be dispatched to watch or apprehend what may be a dangerous threat to our nations security.

[redacted]

February 3, 1983

OUTSIDE SOURCE

Senate Subcommittee on FBI Oversight

Dear Mr. Webster,

In connection with the enclosed clipping, I am an Alabamian who did not (and will not) vote for Senator Denton and I would like to compliment you on the dignity and grace of your responses under harassment.

b6
b7C

Very truly yours,

[redacted]

DE-68 62-115695-103

V-73

23 FEB 25 1983

[redacted]

ACK 2/22/83

[redacted]

b6
b7C

FBI/DOJ REC. UNIT

Denton 'begs' for FBI nuclear freeze stance

B'ham Post Herald Feb. 3 '83

Associated Press

WASHINGTON — FBI Director William H. Webster, bobbing and weaving under questioning by Sen. Jeremiah Denton, yesterday declined to characterize Soviet influence in the U.S. nuclear freeze movement.

Denton, R-Ala., prefaced one series of questions by practically begging the FBI chief to answer because of the "slant" his remarks would have on public perception of the issue.

He then asked whether Webster believed the Soviet Union was pushing a nuclear freeze as a major foreign policy objective.

Webster said that much was clear from public statements made by Soviet leaders.

Denton then asked for Webster's opinion as a "private individual" on the merits of a nuclear freeze.

Webster declined to give one, saying it would be impossible to draw the line between any personal opinions he might have and his capacity as FBI head.

At another point, Webster said the "FBI has never suggested and does not now suggest" that Soviet interests in a freeze mean the domestic groups "ipso facto" are being manipulated by the Soviets.

But he acknowledged that the "quantum of effort and nature of effort (by the Soviets) all are a matter of legitimate interest" and agreed to go into more detail in a secret hearing.

Yesterday's session by Denton's subcommittee on security and terrorism was billed as an FBI oversight hearing.

But with the preliminaries out of the way, Denton directed the line of questioning to his concern with Soviet involvement in the freeze movement in particular and terrorism in general.



Jeremiah Denton



William H. Webster

Responding to a Denton question about the source of violence at an aborted Ku Klux Klan march in Washington Nov. 27, Webster said it "has not been traced to any group or organization."

When thousands of anti-Klan demonstrators lined the planned parade route near the Capitol, the Klan canceled its march. When it became clear the march would not take place, a series of rock- and bottle-throwing incidents broke out. Several cars were overturned, some policemen were injured and a few stores were looted.

"The consensus of all law enforcement agencies is that the violence was a spontaneous expression of outrage that the KKK people were not going to march and be exposed to whatever activities the counter-demonstrators had in mind, whether to shout, boo, throw rocks or shoot," Webster said.

DOJ

FROM

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW

Mr. Colwell	( )
Mr. Mullen	( )
Mr. Otto	( )
Mr. Bayse	( )
Mr. Geer	( )
Mr. Glover	( )
Mr. Groover	( )
Mr. McKenzie	( )
Mr. Mintz	( )
Mr. Monroe	( )
Mr. O'Malley	( )
Mr. Revell	( )
Mr. Stames	( )
Mr. Young	( )
Mr. Hotis	( )
Mr. Andrews	( )
Mr. Gants	( )
Tele. Room	( )
Miss Devine	( )

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2/21/85 BY

See Me	( )
Note and return	( )
Prepare reply and return for my signature	( )
Please Handle	( )
Respond over your signature	( )
Prepare memo for the Department	( )
For your recommendation	( )
What are the facts?	( )
Hold	( )

Remarks:

FBI/DOJ

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1 - [redacted] - Enc.
(Attn: [redacted]
1 - [redacted] Enc.
1 - [redacted] - Enc.
3 - [redacted] - Enc.
1 - [redacted] Enc.

April 8, 1983

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your letter requesting the FBI to furnish you a report on the Cuban Government's involvement in illegal drug trafficking has been received. A further response from Judge Webster will be forthcoming as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

/s/

Roger S. Young
Assistant Director in Charge
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

DE-122

106

1 - Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs
Department of Justice

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Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

[redacted] (7)

MAIL ROOM

SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]
Room 7240, TL-245

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APPROVED:

Director ___
Exec. AD-Adm. ___
Exec. AD-Inv. ___
Exec. AD-LES ___

Adm. Servs. ___
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1 - [redacted] Enc.

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August 13, 1982

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Denton

Please find enclosed a partial response to your request of July 16, 1982, in the form of cost estimates pertaining to S.1701, the Missing Children Act of 1982. The estimates represent anticipated added costs to us based on a range of possible numbers which could be reported should the bill become law.

The remainder of our response as to the potential legal liability we could incur will be forthcoming in the immediate future.

Sincerely yours,

William H. Webster

William H. Webster
Director

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NOTE: By letter dated July 16, 1982, Senator Denton requested the FBI's views regarding S.1701, specifically as to its possible impact on the FBI's resources and legal liability. The enclosed cost estimates were prepared by Administrative Services Division, with the assistance of Technical Services Division and should provide the Senator with an excellent overview of the added expenses we would incur should the bill become law.

A copy of the cost estimates will also be provided to the Congressional Budget Office per a request from [redacted] of that office.

62-120735-100

DE-226

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Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.: [redacted] (8)
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Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. Off. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM

FEB 11 1988

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. ___ Laboratory ___
Crim. Inv. ___ Legal Coun. ___
Director [redacted] Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Exec. AD ___ Ident. ___ Rec. Mgnt. ___
Exec. AD-Inv. ___ Inspection ___ Tech. Servs. ___
Exec AD-LES ___ Intell. ___ Training ___

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1437927-001

Total Deleted Page(s) = 1
Page 28 ~ b6; b7C;

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
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FD-340 (Rev. 8-18-89)

Universal File Case Number 66F-NF-29865-1A (1)

Field Office Acquiring Evidence NF

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 2/13/95

From _____
(Name of Contributor)

_____
(Address of Contributor)

_____ VA.
(City and State)

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b7C

By SA _____
(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No
Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S);
THREATENING TELEPHONE CALLS
TO _____

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

b6
b7C

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

COPIES OF 2 MICRO-CASSETTES RECEIVED
FROM _____

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[redacted]

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
441 SOUTH INDEPENDENCE BLVD.
SUITE 4
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA 23452-1126

Threat - Tapes


COPIES ENCLOSED (2)



[redacted]
2/13/95


CATALOG NO.
A
maxell
PROFESSIONAL INDUSTRIAL P/I
Communicator Series
C90


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A
CATALOG NO.
TITLE
RUNNING TIME
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maxell
PROFESSIONAL INDUSTRIAL P/I
Communicator Series
C90


CATALOG NO.
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maxell
PROFESSIONAL INDUSTRIAL P/I
Communicator Series
C90

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CATALOG NO.
TITLE
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B
TITLE
RUNNING TIME


maxell
PROFESSIONAL INDUSTRIAL P/I
Communicator Series
C90

Complaint Form
FD-71 (Rev. 2-13-86)

NOTE: Hand print names legibly; handwriting satisfactory for remainder.
Indices: ☐ Negative ☒ See below

Subject's name and aliases Unknown	Character of case Threatening Phone Calls
	Complainant ☒ Protect Source [redacted] b6 b7C
	Complaint received ☐ Personal ☒ Telephonic Date 1/30/95 Time 12:10 PM
Address of subject Unknown	Complainant's address and telephone number [redacted]

Race	Sex	Height	Hair	Build	Birth date and Birthplace
	☒ Male				
Age	☐ Female	Weight	Eyes	Complexion	Social Security Number

Scars, marks or other data

Facts of complaint

[redacted] advised that a caller left approximately 15 obscene and threatening messages on his business answering machine on 1/29/95, between the hours of 12:30 AM and 2:30 AM. He advised that the caller sounded like a drunken male whose threats were of a "blood-curdling" nature and threatened murder. [redacted] Virginia Beach, telephone [redacted]

[redacted] advised that it was difficult to discern if the calls were directed to [redacted] Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr., who is a retired Naval officer, former POW, and former U.S. Senator who served on an intelligence committee. b6 b7C

Since [redacted] was unsure of the source (local or interstate) of the call, writer advised him to notify the Virginia Beach PD and the phone company. [redacted] advised that he kept the tape containing these calls.

[redacted]
(Complaint received by)

Do not write in this space
VB-NF-29865-4
SEARCHED [redacted] INDEXED [redacted]
SERIALIZED [redacted] FILED [redacted]
JAN 30 1995
FBI — NORFOLK
BLOCK STAMP [redacted]

b6 b7C

(09/19/94)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 03/01/1995

To: Norfolk

From: SSA [redacted]
Squad 6
Contact: SSA [redacted]

b6
b7C

File Number(s): 66F-NF-29865

Document Content: To provide information to the file.

Title: UNSUB(S);
THREATENING TELEPHONE CALLS
TO [redacted]

Reference: FD-71 dated 1/30/95 and letter from [redacted] dated 2/1/95.

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b7C

Details: Referenced letter from [redacted] to SAC Torrence, dated 2/1/95, requested contact with the FBI re this matter. (A copy of this letter is attached)

On 2/13/95, SSA [redacted] telephonically contacted [redacted] at his law office and discussed his complaint regarding the telephone calls made to his business office on 1/29/95. [redacted] advised that he had the particular telephone calls made by the unknown individual to his office recorded. SSA [redacted] advised him that an Agent would pick up these tapes and copies would be made for future reference if a suspect was developed in this case. [redacted] was questioned regarding whether he had any idea as to who may have made the calls and he advised he had no idea and the voice was unfamiliar to him. [redacted] advised he had not received any additional calls since these original calls in 1/95.

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It was explained to [redacted] that the FBI does, in fact, investigate threatening telephone calls and that we would be glad to investigate this matter at some point in time if a suspect could be developed or if additional calls were received by him at his office or home.

On 2/13/95, SA [redacted] went to [redacted] office and retrieved two micro-cassettes and on the same date copies were made of these on regular cassette tapes. These tapes will be filed in a 1A envelope for future reference. On 2/24/95, the original micro-cassette tapes were returned to [redacted] office.

No further investigation is being conducted regarding this matter at this time.

66F-NF-C29865-4A

SEARCHED [ ] INDEXED [ ]
SERIALIZED [6] FILED [9]
MAR 0 1 1995
FBI — NORFOLK

b6
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To: Norfolk From: SSA [redacted]
Re: 66F-NF-29865, 03/01/1995

b6
b7C

Drafted By: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

♦♦

[redacted]

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SUITE 4
[redacted]
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA 23452-1126

[redacted]

TELEPHONE [redacted]
TELEFAX

b6
b7C

February 1, 1995

SPECIAL AGENT [redacted]
150 CORPORATE BLVD
NORFOLK VA 23502

b6
b7C

Dear [redacted]

On January 30, 1995 I gave certain information to [redacted] of your office concerning various threats to kill myself and [redacted] made over the telephone in the early morning hours of January 29, 1995. [redacted] after taking the information reported back to me that "for jurisdictional purposes" the FBI could not do anything other than advise me to call the Virginia Beach Police Department and the phone company both of which I have done. The Virginia Beach police did make a report of my complaint and told me that, if there were any further developments the report would be turned over to an investigator. The phone company has placed a trap on my phone line.

It was my understanding that threats made using interstate telephone wires fell under the jurisdiction of the FBI because the call involves the use of the interstate phone system, regardless of whether the caller called from out of state, but perhaps that is incorrect. I would very much like to have the FBI investigate this matter, so if there is any possible jurisdictional basis for doing so, I would certainly appreciate your getting in touch with me.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

[redacted]

b6
b7C

JAD:imd
Lt.

66F-NF-29865-4B

SEARCHED [redacted] INDEXED [redacted]
SERIALIZED [redacted] FILED [redacted]
FEB 2 - 1995
FBI — NORFOLK

UCP unclassified work file
2/28/95

CLOSING AGENT PLEASE ATTACH

Memorandum

Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
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Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgmt. ___
Tech. Ser ___
Training ___
Off. of Cong & Public ___
Telephone ___
Director's Sec'y ___

To : C. P. Monroe

Date 3/23/84

From : W. M. Baker

b6
b7C

Subject : INQUIRY BY SENATOR DENTON REGARDING REPORT OF NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE ON ARCHIVAL VALUE OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE CASE FILES

PURPOSE: To solicit the views of the Records Management Division on an analysis by the Natinal Archives and Records Service of Civil Service Commission regular size investigative case files from 1928 - 1959 at the Washington National Records Center.

DETAILS: By communication dated 3/6/84, the Office of Senator Jeremiah Denton, Chairman, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, requested our views on a report by the National Archives and Records Service regarding the archival value of Civil Service Commission personnel security investigative case files. Enclosed is a letter from Robert M. Warner, Archivist of the United States, to Senator Denton, in which it is noted that destruction of these records was suspended years ago pursuant to a Judiciary Committee request. The Archivist intends to resume disposal of the records and has solicited Senator Denton's views. Some of the records in question appear to be copies of old FBI documents.

DE-120 66-19249-332

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the Records Management Division review the enclosed correspondence and furnish views to the Congressional Affairs Office so that Senator Denton's office may be advised of the FBI's position on this issue.

23 MAY 17 1984

3- ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

1 - [redacted] - Enc.
1 - Mr. Monroe - Enc.
1 - Mr. Baker - Enc.
3 - [redacted] - Enc.
1 - [redacted] Enc.
1 - [redacted] Enc.

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[redacted] (9)

APPROVED:

Director ___
Exec. AD-Adm. ___
Exec. AD-Inv. ___
Exec. AD-LES ___

Adm. Servs. ___
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Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___

(CONTINUED OVER)

SA [redacted]
Room [redacted] TL#2[redacted]

Off [redacted] Affs.

b6
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66 JUL 25 1984

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum from W. M. Baker to C. P. Monroe
RE: INQUIRY BY SENATOR DENTON REGARDING REPORT
OF NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
ON ARCHIVAL VALUE OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE CASE FILES

2. That, upon receipt of views of the Records Management Division, the Congressional Affairs Office prepare a letter to Senator Denton furnishing FBI views on this matter.

APPROVED:
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

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Memorandum from W. M. Baker to C. P. Monroe
RE: INQUIRY BY SENATOR DENTON REGARDING REPORT OF NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE ON ARCHIVAL VALUE OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE CASE FILES

ADDENDUM OF THE RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION (RMD) [redacted] 4/3/84) b6 b7C

The RMD has reviewed the 1/12/84, letter from the Archivist of the United States to Senator Denton and the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) report, dated August, 1983, concerning archival value of regular-sized Civil Service Commission (CSC) personnel security investigative files. A previous NARS report was submitted to Senator Denton regarding the preservation of so-called "bulky"-sized CSC personnel security investigative case files for the period 1928 - 1959. It is noted that representatives of the RMD participated in an ad hoc task force, composed of representatives of NARS, Office of Personnel Managment (OPM), and the FBI, to review approximately 1,171 cubic feet of "bulky" CSC personnel security investigative case files retained at the Washington National Records Center, which resulted in a recommendation by NARS that these "bulky" CSC investigative case files be permanently retained due to their historical and archival value. Subsequent to the termination of the ad hoc task force, a report was submitted by NARS to Senator Dentor on 7/30/82, reporting the recommendation of NARS regarding the retention of the "bulky" CSC investigative case files. Subsequent to the termination of the NARS/OPM/FBI task force, an evaluation was conducted by NARS of approximately 18,613 cubic feet of regular-sized CSC personnel security investigative case files also retained at the Washington National Records Center. It is noted that the FBI did not participate in any manner in this appraisal and accordingly, the RMD defers to the judgment of NARS and OPM concerning the regular-sized CSC personnel security investigative case files.

APPROVED: Adm. Serva. Laboratory
Crim. Inv. Legal Coun.
Director Off. of Cong.
Exec. AD-Adm. Ident. Pub. Aff.
Exec. AD-Inv. Inspection Rec. Mgt.
Exec. AD-LES Intell. Training

b6 b7C

General Services Administration
National Archives and Records Service
Washington, DC 20408

JAN 12 1984

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

JAN 10 1984

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to send you an additional report of the National Archives and Records Service on the archival value of Civil Service Commission (CSC)personnel security investigative case files. This report supplements an earlier study, forwarded to you on July 30, 1982, which recommended that the portion of bulky files, 1928-1959, which has been segregated by CSC from the remaining investigative case files because of their size (about 1,171 cubic feet total) be preserved by the National Archives. We had found that the bulky files contain significant documentation of the Federal civil service loyalty-security programs of the 1940s and 1950s. The remaining 18,613 cubic feet of regular-sized personnel security investigative case files, however, generally lack the types of documentation which would be useful for historical research. The enclosed report therefore concludes that the regular-sized case files should be destroyed.

Destruction of these records, and subsequent collections of personnel security investigative case files stored at the Washington National Records Center (totalling 41,059 cubic feet), was suspended several years ago, in response to the Judiciary Committee's request. We understand that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has reaffirmed that it has no need for files over 15 years old. Consequently, we propose to resume disposal of the records (other than the permanent portion), in accordance with approved OPM records disposition schedules, and would appreciate your concurrence.

I shall be glad to answer any questions you may have concerning our findings.

Sincerely,

ROBERT M. WARNER
Archivist of the United States

Enclosure

cc: Donald J. Devine
Director
Office of Personnel Management

Ltr 1924 9-332

United States Senate

MEMORANDUM

6 March 1984

[redacted]

Enclosed is the report we discussed on the destruction of government files. If you would please request review by an appropriate person. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

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b7C

[redacted]

JAN 1 0 1984

ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION REGULAR-SIZED INVESTIGATIVE CASE FILES 1928-1959 AT THE WASHINGTON NATIONAL RECORDS CENTER

National Archives and Records Service

August 1983

66-1924-332

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A National Archives task force has appraised the 18,613 cubic feet of regular-sized Civil Service Commission investigative case files, 1928-1959, in accession 146-61 B200 stored at the Washington National Records Center. The task force recorded information about 1,685 cases on standard data collection sheets. After analyzing the collected data and comparing it with the findings regarding the 1,171 cubic feet of oversized investigative case files previously examined by the task force, the task force concluded that the entire series of regular-sized case files lacked sufficient unique research value to warrant accessioning by the National Archives. In the attached report, Part I explains the background of the project and the goals and methods of the task force. Part II summarizes and analyzes the collected data. Part III contains the appraisal recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

Accession 146-61B200 at the Washington National Records Center (WNRC) consists of 19,784 cubic feet of Civil Service Commission (CSC) investigative case files, 1928-1959, relating to several kinds of investigations of civilian Federal job applicants and employees. Close to 1200 cubic feet comprise oversize cases which were filed separately from the remaining case files because of their bulk. These oversize case files have been appraised for permanent retention in the National Archives because they contain significant amounts of information about the implementation and operations of the Federal employee loyalty and security programs of the 1940s and 1950s. See "Analysis of Oversize Civil Service Commission Investigative Case Files" transmitted by the Archivist of the United States to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism on July 30, 1982. The remainder of the accession (c. 18,600 cubic feet) consists of additional CSC investigative case files, 1928-59, individually less voluminous (generally less than one inch thick) than the oversize case files. Subsequent to the appraisal of the oversize case files, NARS also undertook an examination and appraisal of these regular-sized case files or "thin files." This report describes that process and the task force's findings.

To collect pertinent information, a modified version of the data collection sheet for the oversize case files was used (copy attached at Appendix 1). The basic change in the data sheet was the reformatting of the data elements to permit elimination of the second side of the sheet. This structural change expedited the data collection. In addition, that part of the oversize data collection sheet relating to the cross-match with documents in FBI case files was eliminated because of OPM assurances that few of the regular-sized case files involved cases referred to the FBI for further investigation. The revised data sheet retained an item for noting evidence of referral of cases to the FBI (item 6c), however, to permit verification of that assertion. The task force's examination of these files bore out OPM's contention, since only 45 cases in the basic sample (3%) contained evidence of FBI referral. Using a separate sheet for each case examined, the appraisal team recorded objective data on types and dates of documents and information in the file about the type of case and the individual investigated, and judged the research potential of the file.

Data was collected on a basic sample of 1,500 cases selected by means of a random access table of numbers subsequently sequenced by a computer to expedite the examination process. Because the case files are arranged alphabetically, the list of numbers identified whole boxes of files, from each of which the appraiser pulled the third file for examination. In those instances where the third file was not present in the selected box, the following file was examined. Similarly, the following box was substituted for a missing box in some instances.

To ensure that enough data was collected on the thicker case files in the regular-sized series to permit a valid comparison with the oversized case files previously examined, the appraisal team also examined an additional 185 files thicker than one inch found in the same boxes as the basic sample. This oversampling was discontinued when the task force found that sufficient numbers of files thicker than one inch had been examined to permit comparisons with the basic sample and oversize files.

All data was then keyed into a Hewlett Packard 86A minicomputer to produce analyses of the basic sample with regard to incidence of various types of cases, various aspects of case file documentation, and the research potential of the collection as a whole (see Appendix II for totals of data keyed for basic sample). A detailed summary of the analyses of the basic sample of the regular-sized case files is found in Part II below.

II. DATA ANALYSIS OF FILES

The CSC investigative case files which formed the basis for this study consist of records relating to applicants and Federal employees investigated by the Commission in administering the merit system (includes both the determination of the suitability and fitness of applicants, eligibles, and appointees and the investigation of violations of Civil Service laws and regulations), and in carrying out its responsibilities under such statutes as the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 as amended and under the national security program initiated in 1947. Over 95% of the material post-dates 1940.


The cases, which are arranged alphabetically by name of individual, contain papers documenting the investigation from initiation or referral to the CSC to the conclusion or discontinuance of the Commission's investigation. Cases appealed to regional offices or the Central CSC Office, the CSC Board of Review and Appeals, and the Loyalty Review Board are rarely found in the thin files collection. (Less than 1% of the basic sample involved a case on appeal.) Also not included in this collection are several million files on cases which produced no derogatory information in the initial stages of investigation. (These National Agency Check and Inquiry (NACI) cases have been destroyed under NARS authorization when three months old for a number of years.)

The cases are filed for the most part in manila envelopes identified only by name and date of birth. Cases more than one inch in size generally are filed in more than one manila envelope bound with string or rubber bands. The average number of cases found in each sampled box was 92.5. By extrapolation, the entire collection of thin files (18,613 cubic feet) includes about 1.72 million files, a reasonable approximation of the two million figure provided by OPM.

The basic tally of data entered for each element on the data collection sheet produced several significant facts about the regular-sized or "thin" files, each of which contributed to the appraisal team's decision that the thin file collection as a whole possesses negligible research value. (Fully 95% of the case files were deemed to have no research potential by the appraisal team.):


a. Over 86% of the sampled files measured less than one-fourth inch in size. (The relative ratios of each file size in the basic sample is illustrated in the chart below.)

CHART 1. File Sizes of OPM Thin Files Basic Sample



b. More than 95% of the cases either began or ended between 1940 and 1950 (see Chart 2 below).


CHART 2. FREQUENCY OF BEGINNING AND ENDING DATES OF BASIC SAMPLE. 1



[1]Frequencies exclude c. 30 cases for which data on dates of file were not collected

c. More than 86% of thin files were closed in one year or less (see Chart 3 below).

CHART 3. LENGTH OF INVESTIGATIONS IN BASIC SAMPLE[1]



[1]As indicated by inclusive dates of documents in case files

d. 316 cases (or 21%) exhibited substantial duplication; that is, more than half of each of these files consisted of duplicate materials.

e. Only one of the ten types of documents found in the permanently valuable oversize files -- applications -- was found in more than half of the thin files. Documents especially rich in research potential, such as interrogatories and hearing transcripts, occured in less than 2% of the thin files.

f. A negligible proportion of the files concerned prominent individuals (only 0.1% of the basic sample).

g. More than half of the cases were initiated as loyalty/security investigations; however, only 66 (or 7%) of these loyalty cases produced loyalty-related allegations and over 65% produced no allegations.

h. In over half of the cases, the appraisal team could not determine, from the documents in the case file, the final outcome of the investigation. This ratio was even higher for cases initiated as loyalty investigations, approaching 3/5 of all cases in this particular subset.

A summary table of all the data elements is found in Appendix II.

Comparison of the appraisal team's findings on the thin files with data on the previously appraised oversize files shows striking differences in the two collections.

a. The thin files collection overall is more fragmentary and contains substantially less information than the oversize records. Close to 100% of the oversize files contain documented allegations; over half of the thin files do not. Results of the investigation could be determined 93% of the time in the oversize collection, but only 49% of the time in the thin files.

b. The thin files are significantly less apt to contain those documents (CSC reports, interrogatories, analytical memos, hearing transcripts, and FBI reports) determined in the appraisal of the oversize files to be richest in research potential. While these documents were found with great frequency (between 55% and 83.7% of the time) in the oversize case files, their incidence in the thin files was less than 5% in most instances, and never more than 44% (see Table I below).

c. A third significant difference between the oversize and thin files collections is the predominance in the thin files collection of information not related to loyalty/security issues:

TABLE I. COMPARISON OF SELECTED DOCUMENTS IN FILE IN OPM THIN FILES COLLECTION AND OVERSIZE FILES COLLECTION [1]

Document Type	Incidence in thin files (basic sample)		Incidence in oversize files	
	No.	% of basic sample	No.	% of all oversize files
FBI Reports	228	15.2	443	83.7
CSC Reports	659	43.9	337	63.7
Interrogatories	62	4.1	327	61.8
Analytical Memos	34	2.3	291	55.0
Hearing Transcripts	21	1.4	349	66.0

[1] Data on oversize files are taken from "Analysis of Oversize Civil Service Commission Investigative Case Files," July 30, 1982.

(1) The oversize collection documents cases generated under the loyalty/security programs 25% more often than the thin files collection; that is, 87% of the oversize cases were initiated as loyalty investigations, while only 62% of the thin files were. Consequently, almost half of the thin files relate to non-loyalty issues, such as criminal records, falsification of job applications, and medical and moral problems.

(2) More than 80% of the allegations documented in the oversize collection relate to loyalty issues. Only 5% of the allegations documented in the thin files relate to loyalty issues.

A more comprehensive comparison of oversize files' and thin files' data elements is found in Table 2 below.

In sum, the salient features of the thin file collection are as follows:

a. Although the collection includes documents dated as early as 1929, more than 9/10ths of the files post-date 1940. (Most of the earlier case files were destroyed when 30 years old pursuant to NARS Disposition Job No. II-NNA-3152, under Congressional authorization of January 18, 1960 (H.Rep. 1203, 86th Congress, 2nd Session).)

b. Over 4/5th of the thin files are less than one-quarter inch thick.

c. Less than half of the files contain even one of the documents determined during the appraisal of the oversize files collection to have the best research potential.

d. Nearly ¼th of the thin files contain substantial duplication.

e. More than half of the thin files were initiated as part of the loyalty-security program; yet over 9/10ths of all thin files contain no loyalty allegations.

f. More than 4/5ths of the cases closed within one year of opening.

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF DATA ELEMENTS IN OPM THIN FILES COLLECTION AND OVERSIZE FILES COLLECTION

Data Element	Thin Files (Basic Sample)[1]		Oversize files[2]	
	No	% of basic sample	No.	% of all oversize files
Investigatee				
Employee	803	53.5%	–	–
Contractor	60	4.%	–	–
Applicant	548	36.5%	–	–
Prominence				
Yes	2	0.1%	–	–
No	1466	97.7%	–	–
FBI Referral	45	3%	–	–
Point of Investigation				
Loyalty	925	61.7%	459	86.8%
Non-loyalty	360	24%	68	12.9%
Mixed	161	10.7%	–	–
Allegations				
Yes	612	40.8%	–	–
No	862	57.5%	10	1.9%
Type of Allegations				
Loyalty Issues (#1-8)	75	5%	443	83.7%
Nonloyalty Issues (#9-13)	547	36.5%	59	11.2%

1 To simplify table instances of no data have been omitted; therefore, the sum of the parts of each data element will not always equal 1500 or the percentage 100.

2 Blanks denote categories not tallied for purposes of the study. Data is taken from "Analysis of Oversize Civil Service Commission Investigative Case Files," July 30, 1982.

TABLE 2 (Continue)

Final Determination	Thin Files (Basic Sample) No.	Thin Files (Basic Sample) % of basic sample	Oversize Files No.	Oversize Files % of all overs files
Favorable	354	23.6%	239	45.2%
Unfavorable	196	13.1%	164	31%
Discontinue	190	12.7%	84	15.9%
Results not known	733	48.9%	34	6.4%
On appeal	14	0.9%	19	3.6%

III. APPRAISAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The nature of the systematic sampling used in this appraisal allows us to extrapolate our findings regarding the basic sample to the thin files collection as a whole. Thus, the foregoing data analysis reveals a collection of files overwhelmingly lacking in the informational values which played an important part in the identification of the oversize files collection as permanent records. Permanent retention of all or some of the thin files on that basis is therefore unwarranted.

Similarly, retention of all or some of the thin files for evidential purposes also is not necessary, since CSC program records, and the oversize files collection as well, contain ample evidence of the activities and functions in merit, suitability, and loyalty investigations. The related CSC program records presently scheduled for permanent retention in the National Archives include eight cubic feet of administrative records of the Loyalty Review Board, 1947-53, such as minutes, transcripts of meetings, correspondence, reports, and procedural manuals, containing detailed information about policy development and the Board's oversight of agency and regional loyalty boards; over eleven cubic feet of correspondence, procedural issuances, and other records relating both to the loyalty/security programs and to the CSC investigations program in general, 1919-1962, preserved in the CSC central file system and OPM Investigations Division files; and 42 linear feet of records of the Commission on Government Security, established 1955-57 to consider the status of the loyalty program and including correspondence, investigators' questionnaires, reports of interviews, and memoranda of information collected, basic fact briefs considered by Commission Subcommittees, their recommendations to the members of the Commission and the members' opinions, minutes of Commission meetings, and a manuscript of the Commission's report.

Finally, sampling the thin file collection also is unwarranted for the following reasons:

a. The destruction of the cleared NACI case files damages the usefulness of the thin files collection for statistical research purposes by distorting the universe of investigative case files in an unquantifiable fashion (cf. R. S. Schofield in "Sampling in historical research," Nineteenth-century society: Essays in the use of quantitative methods for the study of social data, Cambridge (1972): "... no amount of refinement in the way a sample is drawn can rescue evidence which... has become deficient through the accidents of survival."

b. The fragmentary nature of most of the thin files damages their reliability. In combination with the standard privacy considerations, access to files would require extensive screening, resulting in administrative costs not justified by the low level of informational value in the files.

Therefore, the current appraisal of these records as nonpermanent is affirmed.

APPENDIX I.

DATA C[redacted]TION SHEET / OPM THIN FILES [redacted]

_____ Reviewer/Date	____ BASIC SAMPLE	____ # FILES IN BOX
	____ OVER SAMPLE (>1")	____ # FILES CHARGED OUT
		____ FILES >1/4"
1. BOX # _____		

2. FILE SIZE (inches)

___ 0 -1/4

___ 1/4 -1

___ >1

3. DATES OF FILE _____

4. SUBSTANTIAL DUPLICATION

____ Yes ____ No

5. DOCUMENTS IN FILE

___ FBI reports	____ HUAC Record Check
___ CSC Reports	____ SRAS (SFS, REF)
___ Interrogatories	____ Other Agency Records
___ Analytical Memos	____ Applications, etc.
___ Hearing Transcripts	____ Other

6. DATA ELE MENTS

a. ___ EMPLOYEE ____ CONTRACTOR ____ APPLICANT

b. ___ PROMINENT ____ NOT PROMINENT

c. ___ FBI REFERRAL (CASE # _____)

d. ___ LOYALTY ____ NON-LOYALTY ____ MIXED

e. ___ ALLEGATIONS ____ NO ALLEGATIONS

___ Organization/Leader
___ Organization/Member
___ Activities/Petitions
___ Statements
___ Fifth Amendment
___ Relatives
____ Associates
____ Foreign Connections
____ Criminal
____ Moral
____ Medical
____ False Statements
____ Other

f. FINAL DETERMINATION

___ Favorable Decision
___ Unfavorable Decision
___ Discontinued
___ Results Not Known
___ On Appeal

7. RESEARCH POTENTIAL

___ HIGH ___ LOW ___ NONE

8. COMMENTS:

66-19249-332

[redacted]

APPENDIX II: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR BASIC SAMPLE OF OPM THIN FILES COLLECTED

DATA COLLECTION SHEET / OPM THIN FILE

Reviewer/Date

1500 BASIC SAMPLE

____ OVER SAMPLE (>1")

47833 # FILES IN BOX (Data Collected from 58 boxes)

6582 # FILES CHARGED OUT

1127 FILES >1/4" (# of boxes contained)

Average 92.5 files per box

1. BOX # _____

2. FILE SIZE (inches)

1302 0 -1/4

165 1/4 -1

12 >1 21: no entry

3. DATES OF FILE

4. SUBSTANTIAL DUPLICATION

316 Yes 1127 No

57: no entry

	Beg.	End
20-29	13	8
30-39	29	26
40-49	664	574
50-59	765	847
60-69	2	13

5. DOCUMENTS IN FILE

228 FBI reports

659 CSC Reports

62 Interrogatories

34 Analytical Memos

21 Hearing Transcripts

560 HUAC Record Check

318 SRAS (SFS, REF)

62 Other Agency Records

1087 Applications, etc.

227 Other

6. DATA ELEMENTS

a. 803 EMPLOYEE 60 CONTRACTOR 548 APPLICANT

b. 2 PROMINENT 1466 NOT PROMINENT 32: no entry

c. 45 FBI REFERRAL (CASE # _____)

d. 925 LOYALTY 360 NON-LOYALTY 161 MIXED 54: no entry

e. 612 ALLEGATIONS 862 NO ALLEGATIONS 26: no entry

0 Organization/Leader
21 Organization/Member
24 Activities/Petitions
6 Statements
0 Fifth Amendment
18 Relatives
5 Associates
1 Foreign Connections
234 Criminal
83 Moral
40 Medical
126 False Statements
64 Other

f. FINAL DETERMINATION

354 Favorable Decision
196 Unfavorable Decisio
190 Discontinued
733 Results Not Known
14 On Appeal

7. RESEARCH POTENTIAL

2 HIGH 62 LOW 1432 NONE 4: no entry

8. COMMENTS:

COMPARISON OF ASPECTS OF THIN FILES, VARIOUS SUBSETS THEREIN, AND OVERSIZE FILES[1]

Percentages	Basic Sample	Thin Files 1/4"-1"	Thin Files >1"[2]	Over-Sample	Oversize Files
Dates of Files	N=1500	N=165	N=12	N=185	N=529
Beg. 1920s	0.9	3.6	0	4.9	-
Beg. 1930s	1.9	3.0	8.3	2.7	-
Beg. 1940s	44.3	32.1	58.3	44.3	-
Beg. 1950s	51.0	60.0	33.3	45.9	-
Beg. 1960s	0.1	0	0	0	-
End. 1920s	0.5	1.8	0	1.1	-
End. 1930s	1.7	3.6	0	3.2	-
End. 1940s	38.3	14.5	25	16.8	-
End. 1950s	56.5	77.6	75	75.1	-
End. 1960s	0.9	0	0	1.1	-
Substantial Duplication	21.1	41.8	66.7	70.3	-
Documents in File					
FBI reports	15.2	26.1	50	58.9	83.7
CSC Reports	43.9	67.3	75	64.9	63.7
Interrogatories	4.1	7.9	50	38.4	61.8
Analytical Memos	2.3	10.9	33.3	42.7	55
Hearg. Transcript	1.4	4.2	33.3	35.1	66
Investigatee					
Employee	53.5	49.7	75	60	-
Contractor	4.0	6.7	0	1.6	-
Applicant	36.5	35.2	25	33.5	
Prominence					
Yes	0.1	0	8.3	2.2	-
No	97.7	97.6	91.7	95.1	

[1]Data for oversize files taken from "Analysis of Oversize Civil Service Commission Investigative Case Files," July 30, 1982. Blanks denotes categories not tallied for purposes of 1982 study.

[2]Small number of subset (N=12) distorts percentages significantly.

Percentages	Basic Sample	Thin Files 1/4"-1"	Thin Files >1"	Over-Sample	Over File
	N=1500	N=165	N=12	N=185	N=5
FBI Referral	3.0	10.3	33.3	48.1	—
Point of Investigation					
Loyalty	61.7	62.4	66.7	63.2	86.8
Non-loyalty	24.0	21.2	25.0	23.2	12.9
Mixed	10.7	14.5	8.3	8.1	-
Allegations					
Yes	40.8	58.8	91.7	87.0	(98.1)
No	57.5	40.6	8.3	11.9	1.9
Type of Allegations					
Loyalty Issues (#1-8)	5.0	16.3	66.7	54.0	83.7
Non-loyalty Issues (#9-13)	36.5	42.4	25.0	33.5	11.2
Final Determination					
Favorable	23.6	27.3	58.3	49.2	45.2
Unfavorable	13.1	19.4	41.7	23.8	31.0
Discontinued	12.7	12.7	0	12.4	15.9
Results not known	48.9	39.4	0	11.4	6.4
On appeal	0.9	3.6	16.7	7.6	3.6
Research Potential					
High	0.1	0	8.3	1.1	7.0
Low	4.1	16.4	41.7	50.3	77.0
None	95.5	83.6	50.0	46.5	16.0
Research Potential					
One year or less	86.1	65.5	16.7	34.1	-
2-4 years	7.4	18.8	25.0	23.2	-
5-9	5.0	12.1	25.0	24.9	-
10 or more years	1.5	3.6	33.3	17.8	-

The evident lack of research values in the basic sample, the files ¼" – 1", and the oversample (in comparison with the oversize files) revealed by the above chart support the contention that no sample of the thin files should be selected for permanent retention in the National Archives. (The small number of files greater than one inch (N=12) examined as part of the basic sample produce percentages too distorted to be of value in this analysis. Therefore, findings regarding the oversample of 185 cases greater than one inch examined by the appraisal team in conjunction with the basic sample are used.

Specific comparisons bearing on this finding follow:

a. The characteristics of the files in each sample do not differ significantly.

1. There are no significant differences in the dates of the files in each collection.

2. There was no significant difference in the relative incidence of type of investigatee in the basic sample, the subset ¼"-1" or the oversample.

3. Approximately the same percentage of each sample were nonprominent individuals.

4. FBI referrals occurred 3% of the time in the basic sample, about 10% of the time in the subset ¼"-1", and 48% of the time in the oversample.

5. There was no significant difference in the percentages of types of investigations in any of the subsets of the basic sample (i.e., the percentage of loyalty cases was about the same in each).

6. The major part of the basic sample consisted of files closed in one year or less (86.1%). 65.5% of the files ¼"-1" closed in one year or less. More oversample cases lasted 2-9 years before closing.

7. Research potential of the files ¼"-1" was overwhelmingly "none" (83.6%), with no "highs." Only 1.1% of the oversample was designated "high" and close to 50%, "none". This contrasts sharply with the oversize files, which included 7% "highs" and only 16% "nones".

b. Substantial duplication rather than more substantive information, characterizes the thicker "thin files".

1. There is twice the amount of substantial duplication in the subset ¼"-1" as in the basic sample; there is almost 3-½ times the amount of substantial duplication in the oversample as in the basic sample.

2. Of those documents in file considered richest in research potential, there is no substantial difference in the subset ¼"-1" and the basic sample except for CSC reports, which appear about 25% more often than in the basic sample. In the oversample, these documents appear on average 48% of the time, making them, nonetheless, considerably less rich than the oversize files, wherein these documents appear on average over 66% of the time. (Less than 40% of the oversample, for example, contain hearing transcripts or interrogatories.)

c. The files, regardless of size, are largely fragmentary.

1. Cases ¼"-1" were marginally more apt than the basic sample to have documented allegations. Cases in the oversample showed allegations about twice as often as the basic sample. (This circumstance, however, is not in itself sufficient justification to screen all 18,600 cubic feet of investigative case files for those thicker than one inch.)

2. Documented allegations in the basic sample and files ¼"-1" were overwhelmingly related to nonloyalty issues. A little over 50% of documented allegations in the oversample relate to loyalty issues. (This is substantially less than the percentage of loyalty allegations documented in the oversize files, however.)

3. Over 50% of the basic sample cases and cases ¼"-1" were discontinued or otherwise incomplete (results not known). The determination of cases in the oversample more or less paralleled the oversize files.

November 15, 1985

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman
Subcommittee on Security
and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

WEDERAL GOVERNMENT

This is to advise you of our efforts to date in response to your communication of August 21st enclosing correspondence from [redacted] and my reply of September 24th.

b6
b7C

[redacted] who advised you of an alleged Black Muslim plot to destroy and overthrow our country, has been interviewed by representatives of our Birmingham Office. [redacted] refused to identify the individual who had provided him with the information regarding that plot. Investigation is continuing to determine the source of this information, and I will be back in touch with you if any pertinent facts are developed regarding this alleged plot.

Sincerely yours,

Floyd I. Clarke
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

APPROVED: Adm. Serv. Legal Coun. Crim. Inv. Plan. & Insp. Director Rec. Mgnt. Exec. AD Adm. Ident. Tech. Servs. Exec. AD Inv. Intell. Training Exec. AD LES Laboratory Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.

2 - Birmingham
ReBulet to Senator Jeremiah Denton dated 9/24/85 and urtel 10-23-85.

b6
b7C

1 - [redacted]
1 - Administrative Unit - CID (Room 5121)
1 - Congressional Affairs Office

157-35201-2

NOTE: By communication dated 8/21/85, Senator Denton's office furnished a letter from an individual who claimed he had been told that the Black Muslims had a plot to kill the police, take over the National Guard arms depot and start killing whites. Although name was inadvertently left off our copy, Senator Denton's office advised the sender was [redacted] said there were enough Black soldiers committed to the cause to kill soldiers and disrupt the army. He also alleged that QADHAFI was sending muslims into this country to assist in this matter. An interim reply was sent on 9/24/85. By teletype 10-23-85, Birmingham advised that [redacted] had been interviewed and that he refused to furnish the name of the individual who had provided him with the information. A probable source, however, was identified as a [redacted] Birmingham will interview him and advise the Bureau of results. This reply was coordinated with SA [redacted] Terrorism Section, CID.

[redacted] (10)

MAILED 16
NOV 18 1985
FBI

Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Insp. ___
Intell. ___
Lab. ___
Legal Coun. ___
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM

JUN 4 1986

Fc/7

For Filing

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b7C

1- Mr. Revell
1- Mr. Baker
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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

March 21, 1984

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

ALL INFO CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
DATE 12-3-87 BY SP8BTS/CSL

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your request of March 12, 1984, I am designating Assistant Director Oliver B. Revell of the Criminal Investigative Division as the lead FBI witness at your hearing in Los Angeles April 13, 1984 on security arrangements for the 1984 Summer Olympics. Mr. Revell will be accompanied by Special Agent in Charge Richard T. Dertaing.

A representative of the Congressional Affairs Office will be in contact with Mr. Lisker of your staff to finalize arrangements for this hearing.

Sincerely,

William H. Webster
Director

1- Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs - Enc.

1- SAC Los Angeles - Enc.

DE-197 [illegible] 541

V-24

SA [redacted]
Room 7240, TL- 245

LER:rlh (14)

Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Di[illegible] ___
Ad[illegible] ___
Cr[illegible] ___
Iden[illegible] ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Insp. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Public Affs. O[illegible] ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___ MAIL ROOM ☐

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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FOI/PA# 1437927-001

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FD-610 (Rev. 10-9-85)

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
Attn: Criminal Investigative Division
Civil Rights Unit

FROM: SAC, EL PASO (187-10) (C)

1. Title (use additional page if necessary)

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE, DC
U.S. SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON;
[redacted] VICTIM; b6 b7C
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PRIVACY ACT OF 1974;
8/26/86;
OO: EL PASO

Re: Enclosed for the Bureau are three copies of an El Paso LHM, an FD-302, and Officer Record Brief. Also enclosed is an envelope of voter registration material.

2. Office of Origin File No: 187 - 10 (include alpha)
3. Auxiliary Office File No: _____ - _____ (initial submission only)
4. X initial submission _____ supplemental submission
5. Matter Type: (check more than one if applicable) - Privacy Act Violation

A. Brutality
- ☐ Law Enforcement
- ☐ Non-Law Enforcement

No Brutality
- ☐ Law Enforcement
- ☐ Non-Law Enforcement

B. Violence
- ☐ Racial ☐ Religious ☐ Other

C. ISS Matters
- ☐ Migrant Victim ☐ Other

D. Known/Suspected Extremist Group
- ☐ Klan ☐ Other _____

Use to describe above (check all applicable)
☐ Arson ☐ Injury ☐ Property damage
☐ Death ☐ No injury ☐ Cross burning

6. Date of incident 8/26/86
7. Date of complaint 9/10/86
8. Synopsis of case:

[redacted] received voter registration material from the subject organization at his official military address on August 26, 1986. [redacted] advised that he believes that personal information, i.e., his military mailing address and home of record (state of voter registration), were improperly or illegally obtained from Department of Defense military personnel files in violation of his privacy rights. Other officers at the same address received identical material.

b6 b7C

DE-175 187-[redacted]459 1018

9. Significant case ☐ Yes ☒ No (if yes, provide reason) _____

Remarks/Administrative

El Paso will close its case pursuant to M10G, Section 187-3

1. C10/CRD
(2) - Bureau (Encl. 6)
1 - El Paso
(3) [redacted]

2 Enc C10, CRD
2 Enc CRD, DOJ
UIQ 6-84D
10-3-86 [redacted]

CRS
Received [redacted]
Entered
Mailed
Completed

b6 b7C

FBI/DOJ

CIV[illegible]

I. PURPOSE

SEP 23 [illegible]

The FD-610 is designed to promptly provide FBIHQ with a complete set of pertinent facts for each Civil Rights case investigated by the FBI. Data is directly entered into a computer which will assist in more effective, efficient, and economical management of the Civil Rights Program by FBIHQ and the field. Each office **MUST** correctly complete **ALL** items requested on the form either on the initial submission, or later by supplemental submission prior to the close of the case. Title changes should be submitted by report **or** FD-610, whichever is more appropriate.

II. WHEN TO SUBMIT

The FD-610 is to be submitted in all cases supervised by the Civil Rights Unit, which include the following classifications: 44-CR; 50-ISS; 173-CRA 1964; 177-DIH; 187-Privacy Act of 1974-Criminal; 189-ECOA; 204-FRS; 214-CRIPA. The FD-610 should be, in most cases, the initial communication advising FBIHQ of the initiation of the investigation. In all instances, the FD-610 should be submitted within 5 working days of receipt of the complaint; however, the urgency of the situation may require a prior telephone call or teletype to FBIHQ.

III. DESCRIPTION AND REQUIREMENTS REGARDING ITEM #4 ON THE FD-610

Initial - Should be checked if it is the first FD-610 submitted in the case. Every attempt should be made to provide all the information required on the initial submission; however, the initial submission of the FD-610 should not be held in abeyance while awaiting data which will be obtained on a later date. The auxiliary office (AO) should submit the initial FD-610 when they receive the original complaint with two copies designated to the office of origin.

Supplemental - This should be checked whenever a subsequent FD-610 is submitted. When submitting a supplemental FD-610, provide data only for those items requiring a change. Instances requiring a supplemental submission are: when previously unknown data is obtained, data was previously omitted, or data was previously incorrectly reported. The supplemental FD-610 should be used as the cover communication for the submission of LHMs.

IV. SIGNIFICANT CASE

Significant cases are those receiving extensive media attention, involving a prominent individual or involving FBI personnel as the subject or victim. Significant cases are also those wherein FBI investigation has determined the allegations to be serious and substantial thus warranting a full investigation. When prosecution becomes imminent, FBIHQ should be advised promptly and a supplemental FD-610 should be submitted designating the case "significant" if not already so designated.

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

202 U.S. Courthouse
El Paso, Texas 79901
September 11, 1986

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN
SENATORIAL COMMITTEE,
U.S. SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON;
[redacted]
[redacted] VICTIM;
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF PRIVACY
ACT OF 1974

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On September 10, 1986, [redacted] was interviewed by an El Paso Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent, at his place of business, Comptroller's Office, Bradley Building, William Beaumont Army Medical Center (WBAMC), Fort Bliss, Texas. [redacted] is currently assigned to [redacted] Fort Bliss, Texas.

[redacted] advised that on August 26, 1986, he received, at his official military address, a large envelope or packet of voter registration material from the National Republican Senatorial Committee located at 440 First Street, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20001. A copy or stamp of U.S. Senator Jeremiah Denton's signature is on a letter in the packet.

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The packet of information contains instructions for absentee ballot voting for [redacted] state of residence, which is Idaho. Also, the packet has an addressee label on which is typed [redacted] official military address. He indicated that several other officers at WBAMC received identical mailings.

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[redacted] stated that he believes that his state of residence for voter registration purposes and his official military business mailing address are only accessible through Department of Defense military personnel files. He produced a one-page computerized Officer Record Brief which contains his personal data.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

187-0-4/59

ENCLOSURE 1

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN
SENATORIAL COMMITTEE,
U.S. SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON;

[redacted] VICTIM;

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On this form is printed his current military address, which has the identical wording on the addressee stamp as is on the packet from the National Republican Senatorial Committee. [redacted] believes that the packet was mailed for purely political purposes, and that the material should have been mailed to his residential address. He advised that he does not receive any personal mail at his military address, or any other material which is not an official military document. He said that he believes that his personal information was improperly or illegally obtained from official military personnel data sheets, probably by accessing Department of Defense computer records, in violation of his privacy rights.

FD-302 (REV. 3-8-77)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/11/86

1

On September 10, 1986, [redacted] WILLIAM BEAUMONT ARMY MEDICAL CENTER (WBAMC), El Paso, Texas, telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at the Comptroller's Office, Bradley Building, WBAMC, by Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Before the interview, [redacted] was provided with the official identity of the interviewing Agent and of the nature and purpose of the interview. [redacted] then provided the following information: b6 b7C

[redacted] said that on approximately August 26, 1986, he received voter information and an Absentee Ballot Request from the National Republican Senatorial Committee which was signed by U.S. Senator JEREMIAH DENTON, Congressman from the state of Alabama. He thereon furnished SA [redacted] with the information. He said that this information was unsolicited. He stated that the voter information was forwarded to him as a registered voter in the state of Idaho. He further stated that the address on the envelope containing the voter information, was his official service address. b6 b7C

[redacted] advised that he feels that his privacy rights were violated by the individuals(s) responsible for mailing the voter registration material. He said that both his home of record (state) and his current military mailing address are maintained only in Department of Defense personnel files. He thereupon furnished SA [redacted] with a copy of a one-page computerized Officer Record Brief. This document contained personal data concerning [redacted] and is allegedly only available to appropriate military personnel. He pointed out that the address of his current military assignment is listed: [redacted] which is identical to the typewritten addressee stamp on the envelope. He stated that his home of record was also listed as Idaho in the Military Officer Record Brief. b6 b7C

Investigation on 9/10/86 at El Paso, Texas File # EP 187- [redacted] b6 b7C

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 9/10/86

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted] said that his last change of address was from the [redacted] in [redacted] Georgia. He said that only the military was aware of the change in his military address to [redacted] Texas. He said that his personal mail is being forwarded from his former residence in [redacted] Georgia to his [redacted]

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[redacted] said that he has not made his military address public knowledge, and that he has received no other unofficial documents at his business address. He said that he feels that the voter registration material from the National Republican Senatorial Committee is purely political in content and that Senator DENTON or other individuals have illegally obtained access to military personnel files.

[redacted] indicated that other officers in the Bradley Building, WBAMC, received similar information packets. He advised that he is aware that [redacted] Personnel Department, Bradley Building, WBAMC, also received a similar packet.

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[redacted] advised that the interviewing Agent could keep the packet or envelope containing the above-described voter registration material, and the copy of his computerized military personnel data sheet titled Officer Record Brief.

The following descriptive data was obtained from [redacted] by observation and interview:

[redacted]

Name	[redacted] Victim
Race	White
Sex	Male
Date of birth	[redacted]
Place of birth	[redacted] Massachusetts
Social Security Account Number	[redacted]
Georgia's driver's license number	(same as Social Security Account Number)
Height	[redacted]
Weight	
Hair	
Eyes	

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4

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b7C

Occupation	[redacted]
Business address	Comptroller Department Bradley Building WBAMC Fort Bliss, Texas
Business telephone number	
Residence address	[redacted]
Residence telephone number	

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

MAILED 9
JUL 26 1984
FBI

Exec AD Adm. ____
Exec AD Inv. ____
Exec AD LES ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Insp. ____
Intell. ____
Lab. ____
Legal C
Off. Cor
Public A
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

V-95 DE-286

1 - Birmingham
1 - Mr. Baker, Room 7116 (Enclosures - 12)
(Attn: Room 7222)
4 Room 6012
(Attn: Room 6028)
(Attn: Room 6040)
(Attn: Room 6131)
1 - Room 7159
1 - Room 7142
Room 8391

242-1-601-4

JUL 26 1984

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Honorable Jeremiah Denton

I am pleased to advise you of this milestone in the FBI's efforts to extend automation to all of its field office operations.

Sincerely yours,

William H. Webster

William H. Webster
Director

1 - Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

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b7C

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv.	Legal Coun.	
	Crim. Inv.	Plan. & Insp.	
Director		Rec. Mgmt.	
Exec. AD Adm	nt.	Tech. Servs	
Exec. AD Inv.	Intell.	Training	
		Off of Cong. &	
Exec. AD LES	Laboratory	Public Affs.	

April 19, 1984

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The FBI embarked on an ambitious automation project in 1978. The project was designed to address the investigative and administrative needs of the FBI field divisions and resident agencies that could be supported by automation. Following an automation feasibility study, the Richmond Division, one of the smaller FBI field divisions, was selected as a test site to institute automated support of field office functions. The system to support these field office functions is known as the Field Office Information Management System (FOIMS). After its successful implementation in the Richmond Division and a break-in period of approximately two years during which particular enhancements were made to the system, FOIMS was extended to support the FBI's largest field office, the New York Division. During the developmental and testing period, the future plans for FOIMS became more detailed and were refined. Through the analysis and planning phases, it was determined that the field offices should be supported by regional computer support centers (RCSCs). In the FBI's budget submissions and other planning documents submitted to the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget, are the plans to build up to six RCSCs. The original FOIMS implementation plan scheduled completion of one region per year for six years concluding in Fiscal Year 1987. Budget delays already have resulted in a cumulative delay of two years.

4 - [redacted] Room 6012
(Attn: [redacted] Room 6028)
(Attn: [redacted] Room 6040)
(Attn: [redacted] Room 6131)
1 - [redacted] Room 7159
1 - [redacted] Room 7142
1 - [redacted] Room 8391
[redacted]

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5,27

242-1-601-4 — 21

SECURE

Honorable Jeremiah Denton

I have been concerned about the delays in extending automation to support the field division functions. I view it as absolutely essential that automation be more fully employed in the gathering, storing, analyzing, and retrieving of data associated with FBI investigations. The challenges facing the FBI in this technologically advancing "information era" can best be met with broader and more enhanced automation support. In view of the substantial budget allocated to this project in 1984 and a significant budget request for 1985, I requested my staff develop and present to me alternatives to the then existing implementation plan.

Several alternatives were developed over a six-month period. These alternatives were carefully analyzed and included the use of computer modeling. Through these efforts, an alternative has been identified which will extend automated support to all 59 field divisions and approximately 25 percent of the resident agencies by December, 1985. Under the original implementation scheduled, automated support would not reach all field divisions until Fiscal Year 1989. The accelerated schedule provides for implementing selected automated applications in all field divisions, i.e., automated index, case management, and automated time and attendance. This implementation schedule provides the best return on investment for the FBI and does not involve any increase in expenditure over funds already budgeted.

The accelerated implementation of FOIMS provides the basis for us to eliminate indexing redundancy which is estimated to be at the 65 percent level. This occurs because separate index records are created in each office that conducts the investigations related to a given case. It will also allow for the implementation of the Universal Case File Number, i.e., a single file number assigned to an investigation regardless of which office is supporting the investigation. With the placement of computer terminals in all field divisions, several administrative functions will be immediately supported. In addition, each of these terminals will, in a stand-alone fashion, be a microcomputer. This means that each field division will have local computing power for its use on a discretionary basis. I am convinced the single most important benefit to accrue from this accelerated implementation of FOIMS is the increase in computer literacy among the employees of the FBI.

Honorable Jeremiah Denton

I am pleased to advise you of these strategic changes in the FBI's automation program. In addition, I am confident this approach will prepare the FBI for the future enhanced capabilities of FOIMS and will integrate the organization rapidly into the information era.

Sincerely yours,

William H. Webster
Director

1 - Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

FD-350 (Rev. 5-8-81)

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Date: SATURDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1983
Edition: THE WASHINGTON POST

Title: CONGRESSMEN, OTHERS DENOUNCE DENIAL OF VISAS TO CRITICS OF U.S.

Character: [redacted] b3 b7E
or
Classification: 00: WFO

Submitting Office: WFO

Congressmen, Others Denounce Denial o

By Rick Atkinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Academics, civil libertarians and a bipartisan array of congressmen this week denounced what many believe is a U.S. policy of barring the entry of aliens with political views the Reagan administration considers unsavory.

"The First Amendment means nothing at all if it does not permit American citizens to listen to views their government disapproves of," said John Coatsworth, a professor of Latin American history who had arranged a speaking appearance for Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge, Dec. 5 at the University of Chicago.

Borge, a leftist, and Robert D'Aubuisson, the ultra-right president of El Salvador's Constituent Assembly, were denied visas Tuesday on grounds that their entry into this country "would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety or security of the United States."

The American Civil Liberties Union deplored the decisions as the latest episodes in an "unconstitutional pattern of actions designed to deny Americans access to information challenging the administration's position." The ACLU offered to take up a legal cudgel on behalf of "any group which is unable to hold a meeting for a foreign speaker whose visa is denied because of the content of the planned speech."



TOMAS BORGE
... leftist Nicaraguan official

Wayne Smith, who served as chief of the State Department's mission in Havana from 1979-82, said that two Cuban ministers of foreign relations, Ricardo Alarcon and Jose Viera, were denied visas last year after being invited to participate in academic seminars in this country.


"I think it's deplorable," Smith said. "It demonstrates that this administration is not committed to one of the basic principles on which this country was founded—the free flow of ideas."

Other foreigness critical of administration policy who have been barred from the United States, according to the ACLU, include Hortensia Allende, widow of the late deposed Chilean leader Salvador Allende; Nino Pasti, a retired Italian general critical of the deployment of American missiles in Europe, and two Cuban women invited by U.S. universities to speak on women in Cuba. Also, a p several University of Hav sors to study at The Am versity here has been bl formal State Departm that the Cubans would ered government officials fore denied visas, accredi J. Finan, director of Lati studies at the university.

Secretary of State Shultz, asked about the denial this week, said, "A proposition I think we h freedom of speech, but abused by people who do well, and I think we h some reasonable precau that." While acknowle Borge was not "going t the government or an that," Shultz said the mi would divert attention fr tadora peace talks und Central America.

"Good grief," said the of Chicago's Coatsworth of Shultz's comment. "I

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FBI/DOJ

Visas to Critics of U.S.



ROBERT D'AUBUISSON
... ultra-right Salvadoran legislator

know where to start responding to a statement of that kind . . . . The notion that denying a visa [to Borge] will facilitate the Contadora peace-making process is not only absurd, it's preposterous."

Borge, D'Aubuisson and a number of others were barred under section 212(a)(27) of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which permits the attorney general to exclude aliens on public interest or security grounds. A State Department spokesman said that 36 visas were denied last year under that provision, and 32 in 1981, compared with 63 in 1976, 57 in 1977 and 58 in 1978. Morton Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, said recent denials were particularly disturbing because "it's more clearly focused than in the past on the content of the speech. We think the whole thing is an abomination."

In a related development, Sen. Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.) was granted a visa "almost immediately" for a two-day visit to Nicaragua this week designed in part to counter Borge's now-aborted U.S. trip, an aide said. "The Nicaraguan government asked for the opportunity to give the American people the true facts," Denton said. "The Nicaraguan people should have the same opport[illegible]y."

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TOMAS BORGE
... leftist Nicaraguan official

Union deplored the decisions as the latest episodes in an "unconstitutional pattern of actions designed to deny Americans access to information challenging the administration's position." The ACLU offered to take up a legal cudgel on behalf of "any group which is unable to hold a meeting for a foreign speaker whose visa is denied because of the content of the planned speech."

Wayne Smith, who served as chief of the State Department's mission in Havana from 1979-82, said that two Cuban ministers of foreign relations, Ricardo Alarcon and Jose Viera, were denied visas last year after being invited to participate in academic seminars in this country.

"I think it's deplorable," Smith said. "It demonstrates that this administration is not committed to one of the basic principles on which this country was founded—the free flow of ideas."

Other foreigners critical of administration policy who have been barred from the United States, according to the ACLU, include Hortensia Allende, widow of the late deposed Chilean leader Salvador Allende; Nino Pasti, a retired Italian general critical of the deployment of American missiles in Europe, and two Cuban women invited by U.S. universities to speak on the role of women in Cuba. Also, a plan to allow several University of Havana professors to study at The American University here has been blocked by informal State Department signals that the Cubans would be considered government officials and therefore denied visas, according to John J. Finan, director of Latin American studies at the university.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, asked about the Borge visa denial this week, said, "As a general proposition I think we have to favor freedom of speech, but it can get abused by people who do not wish us well, and I think we have to take some reasonable precautions about that." While acknowledging that Borge was not "going to overthrow the government or anything like that," Shultz said the minister's visit would divert attention from the Contadora peace talks under way in Central America.

"Good grief," said the University of Chicago's Coats when told of Shultz's comment. "It's hard to know where to start responding to a statement of that kind . . . The notion that denying a visa [to Borge] will facilitate the Contadora peacemaking process is not only absurd, it's preposterous."



ROBERT D'AUBUISSON
... ultra-right Salvadoran legislator

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[redacted]