



November 20, 2020

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD JR.
SUITE 1203
23705 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request No.: 1480590-000
Subject: ZEDONG, MAO

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed 49 pages of records were determined to be responsive to your subject and were previously processed and released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Please see the selected paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- In an effort to provide you with responsive records as expeditiously as possible, we are releasing documents from previous requests regarding your subject. We consider your request fulfilled. Since we relied on previous results, additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may request an additional search for records. Submit your request by mail or fax to – Work Process Unit, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, fax number (540) 868-4997. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence.
- Please be advised that additional records responsive to your subject exist. If this release of previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you must advise us that you want the additional records processed. Please submit your response within thirty (30) days by mail or fax to—Work Processing Unit, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602, fax number (540) 868-4997. Please cite the FOIPA Request Number in your correspondence. **If we do not receive your decision within thirty (30) days of the date of this notification, your request will be closed.**
- One or more of the enclosed records were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession.

If this release of the previously processed material does not satisfy your request, you may file a FOIPA request with NARA at the following address:

National Archives and Records Administration
Special Access and FOIA
8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500
College Park, MD 20740-6001

- Records potentially responsive to your request were transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and they were not previously processed pursuant to the FOIA. You may file a request with NARA using the address above.
- One or more of the enclosed records were destroyed. Although we retained a version of the records previously processed pursuant to the FOIA, the original records are no longer in our possession. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.

- Records potentially responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) according to Title 44 United States Code Section 3301, Title 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Chapter 12 Sub-chapter B Part 1228, and 36 CFR 1229.10.
- Documents or information referred to other Government agencies were not included in this release.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **“Part 1”** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **“Part 2”** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **“Part 3”** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under “Contact Us.” The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP’s FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP’s website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked “Freedom of Information Act Appeal.” Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI’s FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state “Dispute Resolution Services.” Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A standard search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include references, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files. For additional information about our record searches, visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private Citizens cannot request a name check.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

CURRENT BACKGROUND

INDEX TO
THE SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG. *Bibliography*
(Volumes I - III)
Index T. I.

Comment:

There follows a listing of the contents of the first three volumes of The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung which have been published in Chinese. This index has been prepared in Hong Kong to assist persons who may wish to refer to the official texts of Mao's writings as now edited by the Peking authorities. No attempt is made in this Current Background issue to comment on or analyze these writings.

The following information is given for each item included in Volumes I through III of the Selected Works:

Title in English (an attempt has been made to conform to the New China News Agency English usage throughout even though this has meant, in some cases, deviating from the English title under which a given essay may have been known abroad).

Chinese characters for the title.

Date as given in the Selected Works.

Translation of introductory note from the Selected Works.

Translation of other relevant NCNA releases, with original references.

Survey refers to the Survey of China Mainland Press prepared by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong. Current Background refers to the series of that name issued by the same office. Documentary History is A Documentary History of Chinese Communism by Messrs. Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, published in 1952.

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Unless otherwise indicated, these materials are translations of releases emanating from the New China News Agency (NCNA), the official Chinese Communist news agency and the basic source of news of all newspapers now published on the mainland of China. In view of the fact that these materials are translated and/or reproduced from official Chinese Communist sources, they should not be construed as representing the views of the United States Government.

Report

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THE SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG

Vol. I

THE PERIOD OF THE FIRST DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONARY WAR

AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENT CLASSES IN CHINESE SOCIETY

(中國社會各階級的分析)

March, 1926

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this article to oppose two tendencies then current within the Party. The first tendency, rightist opportunism, as represented by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, emphasized cooperation with the Kuomintang to the neglect of the peasants. The second tendency, "left" opportunism, as represented by Chang Kuo-t'ao, only paid attention to the workers' movement, also to the neglect of the peasants. Both of these opportunist tendencies realized their own impotence but did not know where to look for strength and where to look for extensive allies. Comrade Mao Tse-tung, by pointing out that the peasants are the most extensive and faithful allies of the Chinese proletariat, solved the most important problem of the Chinese revolution, that is the problem of allies. Comrade Mao Tse-tung also foresaw that the then prevailing national bourgeoisie was shaky, and that the right wing of which would desert and join the imperialists when the revolutionary movement reached a certain stage of development. The events of 1927 bore out this prediction." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 4)

"In an Analysis of the Different Classes in Chinese Society, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the industrial proletarian class is the leading force in the Chinese revolution, analyzed the friends and enemies of the Chinese revolution, brought forth the strategic idea that it is up to the Chinese proletarian class to ally themselves with the overwhelming majority (made up in the main of the peasant class) to oppose the minority, and elaborated on the political contradictions of the national bourgeoisie and showed the absolute impossibility of one-class rule over the country by the national bourgeoisie by proving it to be utter fantasy. This article of Comrade Mao Tse-tung has since become the ideological foundation of the New Democratic Revolution wherein the proletariat leads the people's masses, and, in being founded upon the precepts of Marxism-Leninism, is diametrically opposed to Ch'en Tu-hsiu's thought of capitulating to the capitalist class." (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey of China Mainland Press No. 194, p. 14)

A REPORT ON THE PEASANT MOVEMENT IN HUNAN

(湖南農民運動考察報告)

March 1927

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this article in answer to attacks against the peasants' revolutionary struggle launched both within and without the Party. For this Comrade Mao Tse-tung went to Hunan to make an inspection tour of 32 days and then to write his report. At that time, the rightist opportunists within the Party led by Ch'en Tu-hsiu were unwilling to accept the opinion of comrade Mao Tse-tung but persisted in their mistaken views. Their mistake was mainly found in their

fear for the reactionary tide of the Kuomintang, which prevented them from supporting the then established and up-and-coming peasants' revolutionary struggle. In their effort to come to an agreement with the Kuomintang, they were prepared to foresake their principal ally, the peasants, and thus reduce the working class and the Communist to an isolated and helpless position. It was mainly this weakness of the Communist Party which occasioned the Kuomintang revolt of 1927 and emboldened them to "purge the party" and fight against the people." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 14)

"In A Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan, Comrade Mao Tse-tung described and summarized the experiences gained and the results attained in the then prevailing peasant revolution, eulogized the revolutionary creative forces of the masses, supported the political power created by the masses themselves, pointed out that all imperialist and feudal forces are doomed to extinction, and that all political parties can only exist after being tested by the revolutionary peasant class. This article expresses the open and complete split, during a most critical period of the great revolution, between the Bolshevism of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Menshevism of Ch'en Tu-hsiu on the issue of the peasant movement, and conclusively demonstrated the fact that it was the capitulationism of Ch'en Tu-hsiu which would have prevented the revolution from defeating the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang rightists and thus lead to the defeat of the revolution. (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, Oct. 14-15, 1951, p. 14)

Documentary History of Chinese Communism, pp. 80-89, p. 495.

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THE PERIOD OF THE SECOND
DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONARY WAR

WHY IS IT POSSIBLE FOR CHINA'S RED STATE POWER TO EXIST?

(中國的紅色政權為什麼能夠存在?)

October 5, 1928

"This article by Comrade Mao Tse-tung is part of the resolution of the 2nd CCP Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region, the original title being 'Political Problems and the Tasks of the Party in the Border Region'." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 52)

"In the historical document Why Is It Possible for China's Red State Power to Exist?, Comrade Mao Tse-tung carried out a most sagacious analysis of characteristics peculiar to semi-colonial and semi-feudal political and economic conditions in China by declaring, 'Ever since the first year of the Chinese Republic, the imperialists and the domestic compradore and favored gentry classes have supported various old and new warlords to carry on incessant war. This is one of the salient characteristics of semi-colonial China.' 'This phenomenon is the product of two factors: local agrarian economy (not united capitalist economy), and the imperialist practice of cutting up our country into spheres of influence in order to subject China to exploitation by divide and rule.' On the basis of this analysis, Comrade Mao Tse-tung arrived at the conclusion: 'We only have to recognize the continuous state of split and fighting within China's white state power in order to sweep aside all doubts about the genesis, existence, and gradual development of red state power.' On the basis of this

analysis, Comrade Mao Tse-tung confirmed the policy of adopting the armed struggle as the principal form of revolutionary struggle, and the revolutionary policy of seizing the cities by first surrounding them from the rural areas; and of adopting a wave by wave policy of advance in the effort to expand the revolutionary areas in opposition to the policy of putchism." (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, p. 15)

THE STRUGGLE AT CHINGKANGSHAN

(井冈山的斗争)

November 25, 1928

"This is a report written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the CCP Central Committee." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 62)

"In The Struggle at Chingkangshan, an important historical document on the founding of the Red Army and the establishment of revolutionary bases, Comrade Mao Tse-tung related the then prevailing political situation and the concrete development of the armed revolutionary struggle, gave a spirited description of the way by which the revolutionary retreat after the failure of the revolution of 1924-1927 had been turned into a new revolutionary advance, solved various concrete problems born of the prevailing revolutionary struggle, and criticized various over 'leftist' mistakes committed by certain comrades with regard to concrete policy." (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, p. 15)

ON THE RECTIFICATION OF ERRONEOUS THINKING WITHIN THE PARTY

(关于纠正党内的错误思想)

December 1929

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this article as the resolution of the 9th Party Congress of the 4th Army of the Red Army. The road of the establishment of the Chinese people's armed forces has been an arduous one. The Chinese Red Army (the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army during the war against Japan, and now the People's Liberation Army) founded on August 1, 1927 during the Nanchang Uprising, had only been in existence for 2 years by the time of December 1929. During this time, the Communist Party within the Red Army learned a lot and accumulated invaluable experiences in their struggle against all sorts of mistaken ideologies. This resolution written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung is a summary of all these experiences. By enabling the Red Army to be built entirely on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism, this resolution successfully rid it of all the influences of the old armed forces. The application of this resolution not only to the 4th Army but to all units of the Red Army has since turned the Chinese Red Army into truly the armed forces of the people. Though in the course of the past 20 years and more the features of party work and political work in the armed forces of the Chinese people have gone through great changes as a result of glorious developments and creations, the basic line, as stipulated in this resolution, remains the same." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 90)

"On the Rectification of Erroneous Thinking Within the Party (a part of the Resolution adopted at the 9th Party Congress of the 4th Red Army) was of the greatest significance in the history of the building up of the Party and the founding of the people's armed forces. Basing himself upon the fact that China is an agrarian country dominated by small scale production, Comrade Mao Tse-tung criticized the various

non-proletarian tendencies within the Party and proposed ways and means for their rectification, thus to solve numerous fundamental problems connected with the construction of the Party and those having to do with the construction of the armed forces of the Chinese people. (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, p. 15)

A SINGLE SPARK WILL KINDLE A FLAME

(星火之火, 可以燎原)

January 5, 1930

"This letter of Comrade Mao Tse-tung was written to criticize the ideology of pessimism then found within the Party." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 104)

"In A Single Spark Will Kindle a Flame, Comrade Mao Tse-tung advanced one step further by giving a theoretical exposition of the problem of the establishment and development of revolutionary bases and the people's revolutionary state power as the starting point of a new revolution." (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, pp. 15-16)

ATTENTION MUST BE PAID TO ECONOMIC WORK

(必須注意經濟工作)

August 20, 1933

"This address was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in August 1933 at the Economic Construction Work Conference of 17 Hsien in South Kiangsi." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 116)

CLASS DIFFERENTIATION IN RURAL AREAS

(怎樣分析農村階級)

October 1933

"This article written by comrade Mao Tse-tung in October 1933 for the rectification of various deviations in the then prevailing agrarian reform and the correct resolution of the land problem, was then ratified by the Central Workers and Peasants Democratic Government as the criterion for class differentiation in rural areas." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 124)

"In Class Differentiation in Rural Areas, Comrade Mao Tse-tung summarized the experiences of the Chinese agrarian revolution, solved various disputes born of the differentiation of the rural classes, and rectified various mistaken tendencies found in agrarian reform work. This is one of the most important documents on China's agrarian reform movement." (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, p. 16)

OUR ECONOMIC POLICY

(我們的經濟政策)

January 23, 1934

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this report in January 1934 at the Second National Workers and Peasants Congress convened at Juichin, Kiangsi." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 128)

"Our Economic Policy has to do with the 'carrying out of all possible and necessary economic construction' in the revolutionary bases, and the simultaneous development of state-operated enterprises, cooperative enterprises, and private enterprises. The basic path of the economic development of the People's Republic of China has here been given its preliminary outline." (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, p. 16)

BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE LIFE OF THE MASSES, PAY ATTENTION TO METHOD OF WORK

(關心羣衆生活, 注意工作方(法))

January 27, 1934

"This article is a part of the summary drawn up by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in January 1934 at the Second National Workers and Peasants Congress convened at Juichin." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 134)

"Be Concerned about the Life of the Masses, Pay Attention to Method of Work stresses the necessity for all revolutionary workers to acquire the fundamental point of view of serving the people. It presents a scientific analysis and enthusiastic account of the overwhelming might of the people." (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, p. 16)

ON THE POLICY FOR OPPOSING JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

(論及對日本帝國主義(策略))

December 27, 1935

"This report was rendered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the Party Activists Conference at Wayaopao in North Shensi, following the Wayaopao conference of the Political Bureau convened in December 1935. This conference of the Political Bureau, in criticizing the mistaken viewpoint within the Party which considered it impossible for the Chinese national bourgeoisie to be allied with the Chinese workers and peasants in the fight against Japan, and in deciding to establish the national united front, is possessed of extreme importance. Based upon the resolution of the Political Bureau, Comrade Mao Tse-tung expounded the possibility and necessity of establishing a new united front with the national bourgeoisie in the fight against Japan, emphasized the decisive leading position of the Communist Party and the Red Army in this united front, pointed out the protracted nature of the Chinese revolution, and criticized the presence, for long periods in the past, of narrow-minded close-door-ism and of impetuosity in revolution within the Party - all of which were the main factors which caused the serious setbacks of the Party and the Red Army during the Second Domestic Revolutionary War. At the same time, Comrade Mao Tse-tung called upon the Party to learn from the historical lesson when the rightist opportunism of Ch'en Tu-hsiu led the revolution to defeat in 1927, and pointed out the inevitable trend for Chiang Kai-shek to sabotage the revolutionary forces. All these made it possible later for the Party to keep a cool head under new circumstances, and prevented the forces of the revolution from being destroyed by the numerous deceptions and attacks of Chiang Kai-shek. In January 1935 the Enlarged Conference of the Political Bureau met in Tsunyi, Kweichow, to establish a new Central Committee under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and to change the former 'left' opportunist leadership. However, inasmuch that conference was convened in the course of the Long March, it could only adopt resolutions in connection with the most urgent military problems, with the Secretariat, and with the Revolutionary Military Council. It was only after the arrival of the Red Army in North Shensi that the CCP Central Committee succeeded in systematically explaining various problems relating to political strategy. In this report Comrade Mao Tse-tung made an exhaustive analysis of similar problems of political strategy." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 140)

"On the Policy for Opposing Japanese Imperialism has to do with the theoretical foundation of our Party's proposal about the anti-Japanese national united front. In this respect, this article by Comrade Mao Tse-tung is altogether different from other articles on the united front written at that moment by certain of our comrades. Comrade Mao Tse-tung wisely analyzed the existing relations between the various classes in China and the new changes in relationship between the capitalist nations, brought about as a result of Japanese aggression, pointed the possibility of establishing a comprehensive anti-Japanese national united front, pointed out the new situation created by the Long March of the Red Army, refuted the immature tendencies of close-doorism and pessimism, and at the same time pointed out the necessity for strengthening the central revolutionary forces under the leadership of the powerful proletarian class, so as to avoid falling into the mistake committed by the opportunists in 1927 when they failed to reinforce the forces of revolution but rather chose to depend upon our one-time ally the Kuomintang. Many new stipulations on the class structure and the fundamental policies of a people's republic can be found in this article." (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, p. 16)

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS IN CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR

(中國革命戰爭的戰略問題)

December 1936

"This treatise was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to summarize the experiences of the Second Domestic Revolutionary War. At the time, it was also delivered as a series of lectures in Red Army University in North Shensi. According to the author, only 5 chapters of the book were completed, while the Sian Incident prevent him from dealing with such problems as strategic offensive, political work and other problems. It was the conclusion arrived at following a major dispute on military matters which took place within the Party during the Second Domestic Revolutionary War, and it was the opinion expressed to uphold one line of action and to oppose another. On this matter of the different lines, the Tsunyi Conference of the CCP Central Committee, which took place in January 1935, upheld the opinion of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and repudiated the opinion of the mistaken line. When the CCP Central Committee reached North Shensi in October 1935, Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered, in December 1935, a serious lectures entitled 'On the Policy for Opposing Japanese Imperialism' for the systematic solution of the problem of political line during the Second Domestic Revolutionary War. The following year, 1936, Comrade Mao Tse-tung further wrote this book to offer a systematic explanation of various problems of strategy in connection with the Chinese revolutionary war." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 168)

"Strategic Problems in China's Revolutionary War is a general summary of the experiences gained in the course of the 10 years of domestic war and of the then prevailing disputes over the current mistaken line of policy; as well as an ideological background to prepare the way for the strategic problems of the war of resistance against Japan. In this article, Comrade Mao Tse-tung made use of the economic and political conditions peculiar to Chinese society to analyze various highly complicated problems of war, elaborated on the laws whereby revolutions and revolutionary wars shall be enabled to expand themselves and to defeat their stronger enemies, refuted the 'leftist' opportunists who refused to admit the necessity, under certain conditions, for a strategic withdrawal (what was then termed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung as 'enticing the enemy to advance!'), and showed the utter foolishness of all such

mistakes. More than a mere scientific Marxist composition about the strategic problems of war, it is also a scientific Marxist dissertation on political policy and ideological method." (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, p. 17)

A STATEMENT ON A STATEMENT MADE BY CHIANG KAI-SHEK

(關於蔣介石的聲明的聲明)

December 28, 1936

THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA DURING THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

(中國共產黨在抗日時期的任務)

May 3, 1937

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung rendered this report before the National Party Conference of the Communist Party of China, convened in Yanan in May 1937." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 250).

"The Tasks of the Communist Party of China during the Anti-Japanese War was written at a time when the anti-Japanese national united front was first being turned from a mere possibility to actuality. In dealing with the problem of the right of the proletarian class to the position of leadership in the united front, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said, 'Whether the proletariat should follow the bourgeoisie, or the bourgeoisie follow the proletariat, is the problem of the responsibility of leadership in the Chinese revolution, and as such it really holds the key to the future success or failure of the revolution'.

Following the refutation of the immature mistaken tendency of close-doorism, the problem of the responsibility of leadership then became the fundamental point of struggle waged by Comrade Mao Tse-tung against the new wave of capitulationism." (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, p. 17)

STRUGGLE FOR THE WINNING OVER OF THE TEEMING MASSES TO JOIN THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

(為爭取千百萬羣眾進入抗日民族統一戰線而鬥爭)

May 7, 1937

"This was the summary drawn by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the National Party Conference of the Communist Party of China, convened in May 1937." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 270)

ON PRACTICE

(實踐論)

July 1937

"Within our Party, certain comrades given to dogmatism persisted in rejecting the experiences of the Chinese revolution and repudiating the truth that 'Marxism is designed to guide action but not dogma.', and only tried to cow others through a few isolated words or phrases picked out indiscriminately from Marxist writings. Still other comrades given to empiricism persisted in confining themselves to their own isolated experiences. They thus failed to understand the importance of theory

in the practical practice of the revolution, and were unable to gain an over-all view of the revolution. Though they worked hard, they yet worked blindly. The ideological mistakes of these two categories of comrades, particularly those who indulged in dogmatism, inflicted huge losses upon the Chinese revolution during the years 1931 to 1934. The dogmatists led astray huge numbers of our comrades under their cloak of Marxism. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's On Practice was written for the exposure of the subjective ideological mistakes of dogmatism and, in particular, of empiricism within the Party, by means of Marxist gnoseology. The title On Practice denotes the emphasis on the exposure of the subjective dogmatic tendency to make light of practice. Comrade Mao Tse-tung once gave a lecture in the Anti-Japanese University of Yen-an expounding the viewpoint of this treatise." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 282)

"In his philosophical work On Practice, written in July, 1937, Comrade Mao Tse-tung carried out a comprehensive, profound and general exposition of Marxist epistemology. In it, Comrade Mao Tse-tung analyzed the philosophical nature of the intra-party controversies during the Second Domestic Revolutionary War, and exposed, by means of materialistic principles, the ideological mistake of dogmatism as exhibited by the 'leftists' and that of empiricism as exhibited by the rightists. Aside from laying the foundation for the Marxist-Leninist education of the Communist Party of China, this work further served to enrich and develop the epistemology of Marxism-Leninism on the basis of the wealth of militant experiences gained during the tortuous growth of the Communist Party of China." (NCNA, Peking, Oct. 12, 1951; Survey, No. 194, p. 17)

Current Background Series, No. 88, June 25, 1951

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Vol. II

THE PERIOD OF THE
ANTI-JAPANESE WAR(A)

THE POLICIES, WAYS AND MEANS, AND PROSPECTS OF OPPOSING JAPANESE ATTACK

(反对日本进攻的方针、办法和前途)

July 23, 1937

"On July 7, 1937, the Japanese imperialists started the Lukouchiao Incident in the attempt to seize the whole of China by force. The people of the entire country rose up to a man to demand armed resistance against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek delayed making an decision and only issued his statement from Kuling 10 days after the Incident to make known the decision to fight the Japanese. This was occasioned by the pressure of all the Chinese people as well as by the fact that the action of the Japanese bandits had seriously threatened the interests in China of British and American imperialism, and the interests of the big landlords and big capitalists as directly represented by Chiang Kai-shek. However, all at the same time, the Chiang Kai-shek government still kept on negotiating with the Japanese, and even accepted various proposals for a peaceful solution resulting from talks carried on between the Japanese bandits and various local Chinese authorities. It was only after the Japanese had launched their all-out attack against Shanghai on August 13, 1937, that Chiang Kai-shek, in finding it impossible to maintain his position of rule in the Southeast, was forced to fight it out. Nevertheless, from this time on right up to 1944, Chiang Kai-shek never ceased negotiating with the Japanese bandits in secret for a peaceful solution. Throughout the fight against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek turned his back completely to his Kuling statement 'In case there is a war, then all regions, whether in the South or in the North, and all the people, whether old or young, shall be obligated to fight to safeguard our land'; opposed the general mobilization of the people in the effort to wage a total war of the people; and adopted the reactionary policy of passively fighting the Japanese but actively fighting the Communists and the people. In singling out in this treatise the 2 methods, 2 ways, and 2 futures, Comrade Mao Tse-tung successfully recounted the struggle waged during the Anti-Japanese War between the Communist line and the line of Chiang Kai-shek." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. I, p. 300)

"The Policies, Ways and Means, and Prospects of Opposing Japanese Attack, and For the Mobilization of All Available Forces in the Struggle for Victory in the Anti-Japanese War were written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the start of the Anti-Japanese War. In these 2 documents, Comrade Mao Tse-tung analyzed the two fundamentally different lines of action in the Anti-Japanese War, namely, the line of the proletarian class and the masses as represented by Communist Party of China, and the line of the landlords and the big capitalists as represented by the Kuomintang. This struggle between the two lines of action represented by the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang, as pointed out by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the very start of the Anti-Japanese War, went on throughout the eight years of the war against the Japanese." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315, p. 25)

FOR THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL AVAILABLE FORCES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR VICTORY
IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

(為動員一切力量爭取抗戰勝利而鬥爭)

August 25, 1937

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this in August 1937 as an outline for propaganda and agitation. This outline was ratified at an Enlarged Conference of the CCP Political Bureau convened in Lochuan, North Shensi." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, P. 130)

OPPOSE LIBERALISM

(反對自由主義)

September 7, 1937

Current Background series, No. 159, Feb. 15, 1952.

URGENT TASKS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION FOLLOWING THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED
FRONT BETWEEN THE KUOMINTANG AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY

(國共合作成立後的迫切任務)

September 29, 1937.

Documentary History, pp. 247-257, p. 502.

AN INTERVIEW GIVEN TO THE BRITISH CORRESPONDENT JAMES BERTRAM

(和英國記者貝特蘭的談話)

October 25, 1937

THE SITUATION AND TASKS OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR AFTER THE FALL OF SHANGHAI
AND TAIYUAN

(上海太原失陷以後抗日戰爭的形勢和任務)

November 12, 1937

"This is an outline of a report rendered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in November 1937 at a conference for party activists convened in Yen-an. Since that time, the right opportunists within the Party persisted in opposing this outline, and this rightist deviation was only basically rectified after the 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee in October 1938." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 348)

"In the report The Situation and Tasks of the Anti-Japanese War after the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan, Comrade Mao Tse-tung stressed the difference in principle between the anti-Japanese policy of the Communist Party and that of the Kuomintang by pointing out that whereas the former 'stood for a full-fledged national war of revolution through the total mobilization of all the people', the latter wanted 'a one-sided war carried on by the government without the participation of the people', and that 'the one-sided war shall certainly lead to defeat'. Comrade Mao Tse-tung thus declared, 'Following the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident, the principal dangerous deviation within the Party lay in rightist opportunism, that is capitulationism, rather than in 'leftist' close-door-ism'. He further called upon every

Comaunist not to forget the bloody lesson learned as a result of the capitulation of Ch'en Tu-hsiu in 1927, proposed the principle of independence and self-determination in the united front, stood for the expansion and consolidation of the left wing bloc in the united front, and advocated the struggle for winning over the middle-of-the-road bloc and the isolation of the right wing bloc." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315, pp. 25-26)

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGHSIA BORDER REGION GOVERNMENT AND THE REAR AREA HEADQUARTERS OF THE 8TH ROUTE ARMY

(陝甘寧邊區政府、第八路軍後方留守處佈告)

May 15, 1938

"This announcement was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the attempt to cope with the sabotage activities of the Chiang Kai-shek bloc. The Chiang Kai-shek bloc started scheming for the destruction of the revolutionary forces under the leadership of the Communist Party soon after the formation of an united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the destruction of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningshia Border Region was part of the plot. Comrade Mao Tse-tung considered it imperative to uphold a firm stand in order to safeguard the interests of the revolution. This announcement crushed the opportunist stand adopted by certain comrades vis-a-vis the intrigues of the Chiang Kai-shek bloc within the anti-Japanese united front." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 362)

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLA WAR

(抗日游擊戰爭的戰略問題)

May 1938

"During the early days of the fight against Japanese, many people both within and without the Party failed to realize the great strategic value of guerrilla warfare, but pinned their hopes on regular warfare, especially on the fighting of the Kuomintang forces. Comrade Mao Tse-tung repudiated this view and wrote this treatise to point out the correct path of development for guerrilla warfare during the anti-Japanese war. As a result, the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army which mustered only some 40,000 men in 1937, developed to a force of a million strong in 1945 at the time of V-J Day. Numerous revolutionary bases were further set up to exert a great influence during the anti-Japanese war, and to effectively prevent Chiang Kai-shek from capitulating to the Japanese or to start a nation-wide civil war during the fighting against Japan. When the nation-wide civil war was started in 1946, the People's Liberation Army, formed of the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army, was perfectly equal to the task of crushing Chiang Kai-shek's attacks." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 366)

"Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War and On Protracted War, written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the start of the Anti-Japanese War, have to do with the scientific analysis of the problems of war and with sagacious strategic plans for the development of the people's war. On the basis of a comparison of the Chinese and Japanese peoples and the relative strength of the classes, and possible changes in relative strength, Comrade Mao Tse-tung repudiated the 'defeatists' and those who stood for a quick victory, to predict a protracted Anti-Japanese War wherein victory would be gained through the 3 stages of: defensive action, stalemate, and counter-offensive. Basing himself upon these

factors, Comrade Mao Tse-tung repudiated the rightist opportunism so as to plan for the organization of the strength of the people by the vanguards of the proletarian class, and formulated the strategy for a regular war against the Japanese by the people, in the effort to secure final victory in the Anti-Japanese war." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315, p. 26)

ON PROTRACTED WAR

(論持久戰)

May 1938

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this address between May 26 and June 3, 1938 at the Anti-Japanese War Research Conference of Yen-an."
(The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 402)

THE POSITION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA IN THE NATIONAL WAR

(中國共產黨在民族戰爭中的地位)

October 1938

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung rendered this report before the 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee, which significantly ratified the line of the Political Bureau under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. In this report, Comrade Mao Tse-tung singled out the problem 'the position of the Communist Party in the national war' in order to enable all our comrades to realize and shoulder the great historical responsibility of the Communist Party in leading the Anti-Japanese War. The 6th Plenum resolutely adopted the policy of maintaining the united front, pointed out that there should be both union and struggle within the united front, and repudiated the practice of 'everything through the united front' as being foreign to conditions in China, thus criticizing the mistaken attitude of compromise on the problem of the united front. This is really the 'problem of independence and self-determination' as stated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the conclusion of the treatise. The 6th Plenum, in realizing the extreme importance for the entire Party to organize the people to engage in armed struggle against the Japanese, further decided that in party work emphasis should be given to the war areas and behind-the-enemy areas, and criticized the mistaken ideology which pinned the hope of defeating the Japanese bandits on the KMT forces and depended upon legitimate movements under the reactionary KMT rule for bettering the fate of the people. Comrade Mao Tse-tung was referring to such problems when he talked about 'the problem of war and strategy' in the concluding part of the the treatise." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II, p. 482)

"The Position of the Communist Party of China in the National War has to do with the historical responsibility of the Communists in assuming the leadership of the national war. On the basis of the concrete experiences of the Chinese revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung gave a concrete and concise exposition of the Party's organizational policy which possesses to a high degree the solemn character of the proletarian class and is closely related to the masses. In that portion of this document which has to do with studying, Comrade Mao Tse-tung poignantly declared that in order to make it possible for the Party to shoulder the responsibility of the series of historical tasks, it is first necessary to elevate the Marxist-Leninist ideological level within the Party. The mighty call for the application of Marxism-

Leninism in China, as put forward in this article, was instrumental in bringing the Party to a new high in the study of Marxism-Leninism." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315; p. 26).

THE PROBLEM OF INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE UNITED FRONT

(统一战线中的独立自主问题)

November 5, 1938

"This was a part of the summary drawn by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee. The problem of independence and self-determination in the united front was one of the outstanding differences in opinion which then existed between Comrades Mao Tse-tung and Ch'en Shao-yü on the question of the anti-Japanese united front. It was in fact the problem of proletarian leadership within the united front. On this difference of opinion, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, in his report 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' of December 1947, drew the following brief conclusion: 'During the period of the Anti-Japanese War, our Party opposed this kind of capitulationism (editor's note: The capitulationism of Ch'en Tu-hsiu during the First Domestic Revolutionary War) and other similar ideas which tended to give way to the anti-popular policy of the Kuomintang, the tendency to have more faith in the Kuomintang than in the masses, the fear to mobilize the masses for all-out struggle, the fear to extend the liberated areas and to enlarge the people's armed forces in areas under Japanese occupation, and the tendency to turn over the leadership of the Anti-Japanese War to the Kuomintang. Our Party struggled resolutely against these weak, irresolute and corrupt tendencies in contravention to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, firmly maintained the policy of 'developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle forces, and isolating the die-hard forces', and enlarged with determination the liberated areas and the people's liberation army. In this manner, not only was our Party assured of success in its fight against Japanese imperialist aggression, but also, when Chiang Kai-shek started his counter-revolutionary war after Japanese capitulation, it enabled our Party to make successful use of the people's revolutionary war to oppose the counter-revolutionary war of Chiang Kai-shek, and to win the fight in a very short time. It behooves all members of our Party to remember well these lessons of history." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 502)

"The Problem of Independence and Self-Determination in the United Front, and Problems of War and Strategy have to do with these two correlated aspects of the then prevailing political line of the Party. In these documents, Comrade Mao Tse-tung criticized the mistaken tendency for compromise found in the united front, and the fear to expand the liberated areas and to extend the people's war in Japanese occupied areas, as well as the mistaken hope of relying upon the Kuomintang forces for defeating the Japanese bandits and of depending upon legal activities carried out under the reactionary rule of Chiang Kai-shek for the future of the people. As the fundamental summation of the policy disputes prevailing in the Party at the first stage of the Anti-Japanese War, these articles are significant in unifying the steps of the Party in work." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315, p. 26)

PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

(战争和战略问题)

November 6, 1938

"This was a part of the conclusion drawn by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee. In his Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War and On Protracted War, Comrade Mao

Tse-tung successfully solved the problem of party leadership in the Anti-Japanese War. In repudiating the factors of independence and self-determination in the united front, those comrade indulging in the mistake of rightist opportunism were skeptical about and opposed to the Party's policy of war and strategy. With a view to overcoming rightist opportunism within the Party, enabling the Party to gain a better understanding of the importance of the war and strategy in the Chinese revolution, and mobilizing the entire Party to carry out this work faithfully, Comrade Mao Tse-tung further emphatically analyzed this problem, at the 6th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee, from the viewpoint of China's history of political struggles, and expounded the concrete path of change in our military development and strategy, to thus unify the Party's leadership both in ideology and in work." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 506)

THE MAY 4TH MOVEMENT

(五四運動)

May 1939

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this article for a newspaper in Yen-an in commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the May 4th Movement." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 522)

THE DIRECTION OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT

(青年運動的方向)

May 4, 1939

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this address before the youth of Yen-an on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the May 4th Movement. In this address, he developed the ideology of the Chinese revolution." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 526)

OPPOSE CAPITULATIONIST ACTIVITIES

(反对投降活動)

June 30, 1939

THE REACTIONARIES MUST BE CURBED

(必須制裁反動派)

August 1, 1939

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this address at the Yen-an people's mass meeting in commemoration of the martyrs killed at the Pinkiang Incident (June 12, 1939)." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 542)

AN INTERVIEW GIVEN TO HSIN HUA JIH PAO CORRESPONDENTS ON THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

(關於國際新形勢對新華日報記者的談話)

September 9, 1939

"In offering a clear analysis of the then complicated and changeful international situation, An Interview Given to Hsin Hua Jih Pao

Correspondents on the New International Situation, cleared up confused thinking within the Party and stipulated various policies to be followed by the Party." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315, p. 27)

AN INTERVIEW GIVEN TO CORRESPONDENTS OF CENTRAL NEWS, SAOTANG PAO, AND HSIENMIN PAO

(和中央社、掃蕩報、新民報三記者的談話)

September 16, 1939

THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE IDENTICAL WITH THE INTEREST OF THE HUMAN RACE

(蘇聯利益和人類利益的一致)

September 28, 1939

"In analyzing various international problems then in the minds of the people, The Interests of the Soviet Union are Identical with the Interests of the Human Race Discussed the problem of the fate of various peoples. To the Chinese people, this was a highly significant document on the alliance between the Soviet and the Chinese peoples." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315, p. 27)

INTRODUCING "THE COMMUNIST"

(「共產黨人」發刊詞)

October 4, 1939

"In Introducing 'The Communist', Comrade Mao Tse-tung singled out the 3 fundamental problems of the Communist Party of China in the Chinese revolution, namely: the united front, armed struggle, and Party construction. Thus declared Comrade Mao Tse-tung, 'The correct understanding of these 3 problems amounts to the correct guidance of the entire Chinese revolution.' Here Comrade Mao Tse-tung carried out a profound historical explanation of the problems: union coupled with struggle with the bourgeois class; 'In China, should we repudiate armed struggle, then the proletarian class, the people, and the Communist Party would be deprived of their positions, and victory would not be possible'; and the unity of the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315, p. 27)

Current Background series, No. 174, April 21, 1952

THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE PARTY

(目前形勢和黨的任務)

October 10, 1939

"This decision was drafted for the Central Committee by Comrade Mao Tse-tung." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 584)

THE ENROLMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA

(大量吸收知識份子)

December 1, 1939

"This decision of the Central Committee was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 588)

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

(中國革命和中國共產黨)

December 1939

"The textbook The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China was jointly written in the winter of 1939 by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and a number of other comrades then residing in Yanan. The first chapter 'Chinese Society' was drafted by the other comrades and revised by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The second chapter 'The Chinese Revolution' was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The third chapter 'The Construction of the Party' was due to be written by a certain comrade but was left unfinished. The two existing chapters, especially the second chapter, have since exercised a great influence in educating the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people. The viewpoint of New Democracy as expounded in the second chapter of this booklet was fully developed in On New Democracy, written in January 1940." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 592)

"The booklet The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China gives a succinct and popular account of the basic problems of the Chinese revolution." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315, p. 27)

Current Background series, No. 135, Nov. 10, 1951.

STALIN, THE FRIEND OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

(斯大林是中國人民的朋友)

December 20, 1939

IN MEMORY OF DR. NORMAN BETHUNE

(紀念白求恩)

December 21, 1939

ON NEW DEMOCRACY

(新民主主義論)

January 1940

"In the historically significant document On New Democracy, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, in basing himself upon the fundamental historical changes in both the international field (the start of the proletarian revolution in the world and the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia) and the domestic field (the proletarian class assuming the position of leadership in the Chinese revolution), and upon the experiences gained in the 20 years of the Chinese revolution, developed the theories of

Lenin and Stalin on revolutions in colonies and semi-colonies, differentiated the historical periods and historical categories of the old democratic Chinese revolution and the New Democratic Chinese revolution, solved the theoretical problems involved in the construction of a New Democratic China and in preparing for the realization of Socialism, and smashed the reactionary dream of the establishment of a dictatorship of the capitalist class in China. As a comprehensive Marxist-Leninist theoretical work on the Chinese revolution, it was of great assistance in the mobilization and the organizational aspects of the Chinese people's struggle for liberation and in the construction of New China, thus greatly strengthening the Chinese revolution." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315, p. 27)

Documentary History, pp 263-275, pp 502-503.

SURMOUNT THE DANGER OF CAPITULATION AND STRUGGLE FOR A TURN FOR THE BETTER IN THE CURRENT SITUATION

(克服投降危險, 力爭時局好轉)

January 28, 1940

"This directive to the Party was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 684)

"Surmount the Danger of Capitulation and Struggle for a Turn for the Better in the Current Situation, Problems of Strategy in the Current Anti-Japanese United Front, All-out Development of Anti-Japanese Forces and Resist the Attack by Anti-Communist Die-hards, On Policy, and Summation of the Repulse of the Second All-out Attack against the Communists, have to do with the vigorous continuous struggle carried out by our Party under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung against the capitulationist and anti-Communist policy of the Kuomintang in the course of the Anti-Japanese War. In these documents, Comrade Mao Tse-tung further advocated and crystallized the policy of union coupled with struggle in united front work, mobilized the masses to beat back the Kuomintang's all-out attack against the Communists, and rectified the mistaken fear to go ahead with the development of the revolutionary forces as displayed by certain of our comrades under the influence of capitulationism." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315, p. 27)

RALLY ALL ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES AND OPPOSE ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS

(團結一切抗日力量, 反對反共頑固派)

February 1, 1940

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this address at a mass meeting of the people of Yen-an in denunciation of the traitor Wang Ching-wei." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 688)

TEN DEMANDS MADE TO THE KUOMINTANG

(向國民黨的十點要求)

February 1, 1940

"This circular telegram was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the Yen-an mass meeting in denunciation of Wang Ching-wei." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 694)

INTRODUCING "THE CHINESE WORKER"

(「中國工人」發刊詞)

February 7, 1940

"The 'Chinese Worker', a monthly, was first published in Yen-an in February 1940, under the auspices of the Labor Movement Committee of the CCP Central Committee." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 700)

EMPHASIS MUST BE GIVEN TO UNITY AND PROGRESS

(必須強調團結和進步)

February 10, 1940

NEW DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

(新民主主義的憲政)

February 20, 1940

THE PROBLEM OF STATE POWER IN ANTI-JAPANESE BASES

(抗日根據地的政權問題)

March 6, 1940

"This directive for the Party was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the CCP Central Committee." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 714)

"In The Problem of State Power in Anti-Japanese Bases, Comrade Mao Tse-tung stipulated that the state power in anti-Japanese bases must be the state power of all the people who are for fighting the Japanese and who stand for democracy, that is to say it must be a state power made up of all the revolutionary classes to practice democratic dictatorship over the collaborationists and reactionaries. This sort of state power set up in the anti-Japanese bases in conformity to the revolutionary united front under the leadership of the Communist Party and participated in by the representatives of the masses, played a highly important part in helping the Party to develop the progressive forces, win over the neutral forces, and isolate the die-hard forces." (NCNA, Peking, April 9, 1952; Survey, No. 315, p. 28)

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN THE CURRENT ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT

(目前抗日統一戰綫中的策略問題)

March 11, 1940

"This outline report was rendered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a conference of senior Party cadres convened at Yen-an." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 718)

ALL-OUT DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES AND RESIST THE ATTACK BY ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS

(放手發展抗日力量, 抵抗反共頑派的進攻)

May 4, 1940

"This directive to the Southeast Bureau was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the CCP Central Committee. At the time when this directive was drafted, Comrade Hsiang Ying, Member of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Southeast Bureau of the CCP Central Committee was, ideologically seriously affected by rightist deviation, failed to carry out the Central Committee's policy with determination, was afraid to go all-out in mobilizing the masses, was afraid to extend the liberated areas and enlarge the armed forces of the people within Japanese occupied districts, was unable to realize the seriousness of the Kuomintang's reactionary attacks, and thus lacked the spiritual and organizational preparedness to cope with this attack. On receiving this directive from the Central Committee, Comrade Ch'en Yi, Member of the Southeast Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and Commander of the 1st Column of the New 4th Army, immediately carried out the necessary stipulations. Comrade Hsiang Ying, however, persisted in refusing to implement the stipulations of the directive. In thus failing to be prepared for possible Kuomintang attacks, Hsiang Ying put himself in a weak and defenseless position when Chiang Kai-shek started the South Anhwei Incident in January 1941. This resulted in the total loss of 9,000 of our armed forces in South Anhwei and the execution of Comrade Hsiang Ying by the reactionaries." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 728)

UNITED TO THE END

(團結到底)

July 1940

ON POLICY

(論政策)

December 25, 1940

"This directive for the Party was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the CCP Central Committee." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 738)

ORDERS ISSUED AND TALKS GIVEN FOLLOWING THE SOUTH ANHWEI INCIDENT

(為皖南事變發表的命令和談話)

January 1941

THE SITUATION AFTER THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ALL-OUT ATTACK AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS

(打退第二次反共高潮後的時局)

March 18, 1941

"This directive for the Party was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the CCP Central Committee." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 756)

SUMMATION OF THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ALL-OUT ATTACK AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS

(關於打退第二次反共高潮的總結)

May 8, 1941

"This directive for the Party was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the CCP Central Committee." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II p. 760)

ON CONTRADICTION

(矛盾論)

August 1937

"Following the publication of On Practice, Comrade Mao Tse-tung further wrote this philosophical treatise with the same aim in view, that is the rectification of serious strains of dogmatism within the Party. It was once delivered in the form of a series of lectures at the Anti-Japanese Political and Military University of Yen-an. In including this treatise in the present collection, the author has made the necessary supplementary additions, deletions and revisions." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. II, p. 766)

"In this outstanding militant document (On Contradiction) based on Marxism-Leninism, Comrade Mao Tse-tung developed the materialistic dialectics of Marx, Engles, Lenin, and Stalin on the basis of the rich experiences gained in the Chinese revolution, to offer a comprehensive interpretation of the principle of Einheit der Gegensätze, which constitutes the core of materialistic dialectics. Comrade Mao Tse-tung particularly expounded the peculiar nature of contradictions so as to subject to severe criticism the mistaken, subjective, unilateral, and superficial methods of thought of the dogmatists, as exemplified in their 'refusal to take pains in the study of concrete matters', and their 'failure to make a distinction between different revolutionary situations, and the failure to make use of different means for the resolution of different contradictions, thus resulting in the persistent application of a set of fixed principles, mistakenly believed to immutable, to all situations.'" This is one of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's important contributions to the invaluable philosophical treasury of Marxism." (Survey, No. 315, p. 28)

Current Background series, No. 202, August 15, 1952.

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Vol. III

THE PERIOD OF THE
ANTI-JAPANESE WAR(B)

PREFACE AND POSTSCRIPT TO "REPORT ON RURAL INVESTIGATION"

(「農村調查」的序言和跋)

March-April 1941

REFORM OUR STUDY ACTIVITIES

(改造我們的學習)

May 1941

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung rendered this report at a cadres' conference in Yen-an. The present treatise together with Rectification of the Party's Style of Work and Oppose Stereotyped Party Jargon are the basic writings of Comrade Mao Tse-tung on the remoulding movement. In these writings, Comrade Mao Tse-tung further summarized the divergencies of line within the Party from the ideological point of view; and analysed the universal presence within the Party of such camouflaged Marxist-Leninist ideas as, the ideology and style of work of the petty bourgeoisie, as manifested principally in subjectivism and sectarianism, and the inclination for stereotyped party jargon which is a manifestation of the 2 above-mentioned deviations. Comrade Mao Tse-tung called for the development throughout the Party of an educational movement in Marxism-Leninism, that is a remoulding of our style of work on the basis of the ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism. This call on the part of Comrade Mao Tse-tung rapidly precipitated a mighty clash of ideas between the proletarian ideology and the petty bourgeois ideology, thereby to consolidate the position of proletarian ideology both within and without the Party, to enable large numbers of cadres to gain great ideological advancement, and to enable the Party to attain an unprecedented state of unity." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 816)

"The 3 addresses, Reform Our Study Activities, Rectification of the Party's Style of Work, and Oppose Stereotyped Party Jargon are Comrade Mao Tse-tung's basic writings on the rectification movement. In these writings, Comrade Mao Tse-tung summed up the ideological sources of the former divergent lines within the Party, and analyzed the general presence within the Party of petty bourgeois ideology and of subjectivism which is a manifestation of petty bourgeois ideology; and pointed out that this kind of unscientific and anti-Marxist style of work is the greatest enemy of the people as well as a manifestation of impurity in Party spirit. Comrade Mao Tse-tung spared no efforts in publicizing Dialectic Materialism and Historical Materialism, and proposed to adopt the principle of 'to learn from past mistakes and to guard against future recurrence, and to cure the disease and save the man' in dealing with ideological problems within the Party. The rectification

movement was highly effective, and Comrade Mao Tse-tung correctly pointed out in his famous article The Present Situation and Our Tasks that 'its effects are in the main designed to enable our leadership organs, and large numbers of cadres and Party members, to gain a further mastery of the basic direction of a synthesis of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution'. The rectification movement enabled the Party to achieve unprecedented consolidation and unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism." (NCNA, Peking, March 10, 1953; Survey, No. 557, p. 35)

EXPOSE THE INTRIGUE OF A FAR EASTERN MUNICH

(揭破遠東慕尼黑的陰謀)

May 25, 1941

"This directive for the Party was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the CCP Central Committee." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 826)

ON THE ANTI-FASCIST INTERNATIONAL UNITED FRONT

(關於反法西斯的國際的統一戰綫)

June 23, 1941

"This directive for the Party was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the CCP Central Committee." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 828)

ADDRESS BEFORE THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGHSIA BORDER REGION COUNCIL

(在陝甘寧邊區參議會的演說)

November 21, 1941

RECTIFICATION OF THE PARTY'S STYLE OF WORK

(整頓黨的作風)

February 1, 1942

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this address at a ceremony starting the school year at the Central Party Academy of the CCP." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 834)

OPPOSE STEREOTYPED PARTY JARGON

(反對黨八股)

February 8, 1942

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this address at a cadres' conference in Yen-an." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 852)

Documentary History, pp. 392-407, p. 506.

ADDRESS AT THE YENAN ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION ON LITERATURE AND ART

(在延安文藝座談會上的講話)

May 1942

"In his Address at the Yen-an Round-Table Discussion on Literature and Art, Comrade Mao Tse-tung made fitting use of Marxism-Leninism for the systematic solution of various controversial problems long present in China's contemporary literature and art movement. This is the important conclusion on literary and art problems, arrived at as a result of the major dispute between proletarian ideology and petty bourgeois ideology during the rectification movement. Through this address, Comrade Mao Tse-tung succeeded in clearing up numerous mistakes and confusions in literary and art work, thus heralding a new historical epoch for the Chinese people's literary movement." (NCNA, Peking, March 10, 1953; Survey, No. 557, pp. 35-36)

Documentary History, pp. 408-421, p. 506.

A POLICY OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE

(一個極其重要的政策)

September 7, 1942

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this editorial for the Chieh Fang Jih Pao in Yen-an." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 902)

THE TURNING POINT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

(第二次世界大戰的轉折點)

October 12, 1942

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this editorial for the Chieh Fang Jih Pao of Yen-an." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 906)

"In his The Turning Point of the Second World War, written in October 1942 when the important fight for Stalingrad was still raging, Comrade Mao Tse-tung foresaw the glorious victory of the Soviet Union's Red Army. He made therein the following statement, 'This battle is not only the turning point of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany, and also not only the turning point of the world's fight against fascism, but verily the turning point of human history.'" (NCNA, Peking, March 10, 1953; Survey, No. 557, p. 36)

IN CELEBRATION OF THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

(祝十月革命二十五週年)

November 6, 1942

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE DURING THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

(抗日時期的經濟問題和財政問題)

December 1942

"This is the first chapter of the report Problems of Economics and Finance rendered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at a conference for senior

the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, the original title being A Basic Summary of past Work. 1941 and 1942 were the most difficult years of the Anti-Japanese War for the liberated area. As a result of the savage attacks of the Japanese bandits and the encirclement and blockade by the Kuomintang, the liberated area was confronted with the greatest financial difficulties. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out the necessity for the Party to redouble its efforts in leading the people to develop agricultural production and other forms of production, and called upon all the organs, schools and units of the armed forces in the liberated area to surmount the financial and economic difficulties by trying to attain self-sufficiency through production. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's booklet Problems of Economics and Finance, together with his The Development of the Rent-Reduction, Production, Support the Administration, and Love the People Movement in Base Areas and Be Organized constituted the basic program through which the Party led the production movement of the liberated area. In the booklet Problems of Economics and Finance, Comrade Mao Tse-tung emphatically criticized the mistaken idea of being estranged from economical development but being solely preoccupied with financial revenues and expenditures, and the mistaken practice of failing to mobilize the people and to assist the people so as to tide over the difficult period of production but asking the people to pay up all the time; and proposed the correct party policy of 'economic development and sufficient supplies'. Under the guidance of this policy, great successes were scored in the production movement of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and of various liberated areas behind enemy lines. Consequently, not only were the armed forces and people of the liberated areas enabled to surmount the most difficult period of the Anti-Japanese War, further invaluable experiences were also accumulated for the party to guide the economic construction of the future." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 914)

"Problems of Economics and Finance during the Anti-Japanese War, The Development of the Rent-Reduction, Production, Support the Administration, and Love the People Movement in Base Areas, Be Organized, and The Necessity of Learning to Do Economic Work all have to do with the basic principles adopted by the Party in leading the production movement in liberated areas. Comrade Mao Tse-tung carried out a two-fronted fight in economic and financial problems: by mainly opposing, on the one hand, the conservative viewpoint of being preoccupied with the purely financial problem of revenues and expenditures without giving a thought to economical development; and on the other hand, by opposing the blind pre-occupation with various ponderous unrealistic economic schemes in total disregard of the limitations of time and space. Comrade Mao Tse-tung, basing himself upon the theories of Lenin and Stalin on guiding the peasants to the path of Socialism by means of the cooperative movement, succeeded in concentrating the experiences of the Chinese peasants gained in their original cooperative production activities (exchange of labor and the like), and similar experiences gained in the Red areas during the Second Domestic Revolutionary War, to propose the establishment of an agricultural collective labor organization on the basis of individual economy (without disrupting private property ownership) and according to the voluntary wish of the peasants." (NCNA, Peking, March 10, 1953; Survey, No. 557, p. 36)

SOME PROBLEMS ABOUT THE METHOD OF LEADERSHIP

(關於領導方法的若干問題)

June 1, 1943

"This decision on the method of leadership was drafted by Comrade Mao for the CCP Central Committee." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 920)

"In his Some Problems about the Method of Leadership, Comrade Mao Tse-tung concentrated all the experiences gained during the rectification movement, and the experiences gained by the Party in the course of leading the revolutionary activities, to offer an explanation for the basic method for leading our work." (NCNA, Peking, March 10, 1953; Survey; No. 557, p. 36)

WE ASK THE KUOMINTANG FOR AN EXPLANATION

(質問國民黨)

July 12, 1943

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this editorial for the Chieh Fang Jih Pao of Yenán." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 926)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RENT-REDUCTION, PRODUCTION, SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION, AND LOVE THE PEOPLE MOVEMENT IN BASE AREAS

(開展根據地的減租、生產和擁政愛民運動)

October 1, 1943

"This directive for the Party was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the CCP Central Committee." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 934)

A REVIEW OF THE 11TH PLENUM OF THE KUOMINTANG CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE 2ND SESSION OF THE 3RD POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL

(評國民黨十一中全會和三屆二次國民參政會)

October 5, 1943

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this editorial for the Chieh Fang Jih Pao in Yenán." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 938)

BE ORGANIZED

(組織起來)

November 29, 1943

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this address at a meeting welcoming the labor heroes of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 952)

STUDYING AND THE CURRENT SITUATION

(學習和時局)

April 12, 1944

"The discussions carried out, during 1942-1944, by the Central leadership organs of the CCP and the senior cadres, on the history of the Party, in particular on the history of the Party ranging from the beginning of 1931 to the end of 1934, were of great help in achieving ideological unification within the Party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. When

A CRITIQUE OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S "DOUBLE TENTH" ADDRESS

(评蒋介石在双十节的演说)

October 11, 1944

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this commentary for the Hsinhua News Agency." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. III, p. 1028)

THE UNITED FRONT IN CULTURAL WORK

(文化工作中的统一战线)

October 30, 1944

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this address at a conference of cultural-educational workers of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 1032)

THE NECESSITY OF LEARNING TO DO ECONOMIC WORK

(必须学会做经济工作)

January 10, 1945

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this address at a conference of labor heroes and model workers of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 1036)

PRODUCTION WORK CAN ALSO BE CARRIED OUT IN GUERRILLA DISTRICTS

(游击区也能够进行生产)

January 31, 1945

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this editorial for the Chieh Fang Jih Pao in Yenan." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 1044)

TWO DESTINIES FOR CHINA

(两个中国的命运)

April 23, 1945

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this inaugural address at the 7th National Congress of the CCP." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. III, p. 1048)

ON COALITION GOVERNMENT

(论联合政府)

April 24, 1945

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung rendered this political report at the 7th National Congress of the CCP." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 1052)

"In his political report entitled On Coalition Government, rendered at the 7th Party Congress, Comrade Mao Tse-tung summarized the over-all experiences of struggle that took place between the Communist Party of

China and the Kuomintang during the 8 years of the Anti-Japanese War, and stipulated the general as well the specific program for rallying all the people of China to struggle for victory. Following On New Democracy, this report too exerted a great influence in rallying the people of the entire nation." (Survey, No. 557, p. 37)

Documentary History, pp. 295-318, pp. 503-504.

YU KUNG MOVES THE MOUNTAIN

(愚公移山)

June 11, 1945

"The closing speech of Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the 7th National Congress of the CCP." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 1126)

ON THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE ARMED FORCES THROUGH PRODUCTION, AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REMOULDING AND PRODUCTION MOVEMENTS

(論軍隊生產自給, 兼論整風和生產兩大運動的重要性)

April 27, 1945

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this editorial for the Chieh Fang Jih Pao of Yen-an." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 1130)

"In his On the Self-Sufficiency of the Armed Forces Through Production, and on the Importance of the Remoulding and Production Movements, Comrade Mao Tse-tung summarized the historical significance of the rectification movement and the production movement by declaring, 'The over-all rectification movement and production movement, started in 1942 and 1943 respectively, exerted and are still exerting a decisive influence in our spiritual and material lives. Should we fail to grasp these two links at the appropriate moment, it would be impossible for us to grasp the chain of the revolution, and our struggle would be stopped.' The rectification movement laid the ideological foundation in preparation for the ultimate victory of the Chinese people's revolution, while the production movement of the Liberated areas laid the material foundation for victory." (NCNA, Peking, March 10, 1953; Survey, No. 557, p. 36)

THE BANKRUPTCY OF HURLEY-CHIANG DOUBLE TALK

(赫爾利和蔣介石的雙簧已經破產)

July 10, 1945

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this commentary for the Hsinhua News Agency." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 1136)

ON THE DANGERS OF THE POLICY OF PATRICK HURLEY

(赫爾利政策的危險)

July 12, 1945

"Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote this commentary for the Hsinhua News Agency." (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. III, p. 1140)

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE WILLIAM C. FOSTER

(给福斯特同志的电报)

July 29, 1945

THE FINAL ASSAULT AGAINST THE JAPANESE BANDITS

(对日寇的最后一战)

August 9, 1945

* * *

E N D

Secret Speech by Mao Is Critical of Sovietism

By Colin Frost

WARSAW, May 14 (AP)—News of all Marxist theory, continues of a secret speech by Communist China's leader, Mao Tze-tung, threatens to set off a furious debate on ideology which can rock the Red bloc to its foundations.

Mao delivered the speech a little more than two months ago when he addressed the Political Consultative Conference in Peiping. The speech brought into serious question a number of Communist tenets which up to now have been gospel.

The text of the speech has not been published. But a condensed version is being circulated among Polish Communists. Those who have seen it compare it in importance to the denunciation of Stalin by Soviet Communist leader Nikita Khrushchev last year.

Throughout Red China, the Mao speech is under constant discussion in a rectification campaign of criticism and self-criticism, in which Chinese Community Party members are obliged to purge themselves of mistaken ideas.

Among these ideas is the notion that contradictions within the ranks of the people of a Communist state are impossible. Contradictions exist, Mao announced, not only in the ranks of the masses but between the masses and the Party.

Mao also brought into question the theory that the class struggle, which is at the heart

of all Marxist theory, continues throughout the development of a state from "socialism" to communism.

Mao now says the class struggle as such no longer exists in countries which have socialized industry, placing the means of production theoretically in the hands of the masses.

The real conflict, says Mao, is between that section of the people which wields the power—the 12 million members of the Communist Party—and the mass of a half billion Chinese people.

[To alleviate this conflict, Mao recently ordered Communist functionaries to perform manual labor so they would not lose touch with the masses.]

Polish commentators say that all this is leading to a new "liberal" policy in Red China. One leading commentator, Stanislaw Brodzki, insists it means a diminishing of the "role of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

If this is so, the development would be in sharp opposition to the doctrine as pronounced by Moscow, which pictures the Communist Party as the vanguard of the proletariat and its unquestioned leader.

[Mao also used the speech to bitterly condemn Russian tactics in suppressing the Oct. 23 Hungarian revolt, United Press reported. He warned the Kremlin to relax its rule or face further satellite uprisings.]

- Act 1 -

Washington Post and Times Herald

Wednesday, May 15, 1957

Page A13

105-25792-20
ENCLOSURE

WHO ARE THEY?

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

BY THE
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

OF THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

PART 2

August 23, 1957

Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai
(Communist China)



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1957

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105-25792-4

105-25792-4

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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RICHARD ARENS, *Director*

II

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III

PUBLIC LAW 601, 79TH CONGRESS

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946], chapter 753, 2d session, which provides:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, * * **

PART 2—RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RULE X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES

* * * * *

17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

(g) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.

(A) Un-American activities.

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman; and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

RULE XII

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES

SEC. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 85TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 5, January 3, 1957

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

(g) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

17. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American activities.

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

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26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

VI

FOREWORD

Don't Say Things. What You Are Stands Over You the While, and Thunders So That I Cannot Hear What You Say to the Contrary.

Ralph Waldo Emerson,
Essay on Social Aims.

The maxim of Emerson's, cited above, reflects a truth so elementary that any discussion of it seems redundant. Yet events of the past weeks, the dubious political explorations in which we as a Nation are now participating, seem to defy the commonsense expressed by Emerson.

Despite the long history of Soviet treachery and deceit which lies in full view of the civilized world, we find ourselves being subjected once again to the sweet persuasion which seeks to lead us into comradeship with men whose real intents are best observed in their broken promises and lust for power.

As we read about "coexistence," "disarmament" conferences, and similar delusive concepts, we may well wonder what new and bitter hoax awaits us. Beyond this, we may wonder with equal vigor how it is possible to envision valid agreements of any kind with the gangsterdom that strives daily for the extinction of freedom wherever it has managed to maintain itself.

Can there be a basis of trust with the leaders of international communism? Let their record answer this question.

In the following pages, the Committee on Un-American Activities presents authoritative biographical sketches of Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, and Chou En-lai, Premier and Foreign Minister of Communist China.

These are part of a series of biographies of the rulers of the Communist world, which the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress is preparing at the request of the committee. We believe that a perusal of the information presented in them will demonstrate beyond any doubt the character of communism's masters and the hopelessness of attempting to negotiate with them as if they were men of good faith.

It is well to remember that in the orthodox Communist view, the Communist and non-Communist camps are already locked in war. It follows then that we are dealing not with partners but with adversaries dedicated to accomplish our destruction with every ruse and subterfuge which they have already used successfully in enslaving almost half the world.

By refusing to heed "what they are," we are fast losing all initiative in our battle for survival. For this, we can place the blame not on the blandishments of the Kremlin, but only upon our own folly.

FRANCIS E. WALTER, Chairman.

VII

WHO ARE THEY?

MAO TSE-TUNG

(Chairman of the People's Republic of China)

"Let a hundred flowers bloom and let a hundred schools of thought contend"—this dictum of Mao Tse-tung received worldwide publicity this year when he urged the Chinese people to participate in free discussion of Communist shortcomings. Against the background of the blood bath through which Mao has dragged the Chinese people since 1949, he now voiced the idea that the regime "should not use methods of suppression to prevent free expression." Posing as a benign leader, Mao has again made a cunning propaganda gesture. But the Chinese people are now learning that Mao again has set a trap for them; those naive enough to take his offer at face value are being branded "right deviationists" and hence "enemies of the people," and thus a new wave of terror is to be expected.

At 64, Mao does not have the appearance of a dictator ruling millions. His garb is modest, his manner unpretentious. The impression is that of a roly-poly gardener-philosopher rather than a butcher of human beings.

However, the key to the enigma of Mao's character can be found in the discrepancies between what he says and why he says it, as well as the differences between what he says and what he does. Over and over again he has developed a propaganda line to reassure his subjects and make them relax their vigilance until he is ready to strike. By adapting the theory of communism to the situation in China and the Chinese peasant mentality, he has lulled the people into its acceptance—when his real intentions became clear it was too late.

When he began to organize peasant associations in Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces in 1927, his approach carried little portent of the brutality and violence of the Communist state he was to head. In those days he taught the peasants relatively mild techniques of dealing with their landlords—auditing their accounts, staging demonstrations, and parading landlords through the streets in pointed paper hats.

In seeking to win over the population, Mao was careful not to frighten people, but to appear liberal, and to align his program with the prevailing interests of various classes. He spoke in aphorisms that the peasant masses could understand; at the same time the workers and intellectuals were quietly snared within his net. Efforts were made to maintain the illusion abroad that "Maoism" was a reasonable program of progressive social and political action, entirely different from Soviet communism and indeed in some ways akin to the Western concepts of democracy and freedom.

Meanwhile, step by step through the years he built up his military strength and his actions became less and less restrained. He formed "spear corps" of farm workers armed with home-made weapons to capture the arsenals of the landlords' private armies. With the weapons he obtained he built up his own army and expanded into other provinces. The landlords and local gentry were imprisoned, banished, and, finally, shot. And, as time went on, the range of people subject to execution constantly widened in scope.

In the long struggle that developed between the Communist forces and the Chinese Nationalist Government, Mao's role was predominantly that of planning political strategy, of drafting blueprints for the future state, and of warping the minds of the masses; of no less importance was his role in designing Communist guerrilla tactics.

He missed no opportunity to strengthen his power. Thus, in 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnaped at Sian Fu, Mao intervened to secure Chiang's release. But Mao obtained his price: the penetration of Communists into the Central Government, the opportunity to expand into North China, and the strengthening of his armed forces and the weakening of Chiang's.

After the defeat of Japan in 1945, Mao, while pretending to dissociate himself from the Soviet Union and maintaining the appearance of cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek, built up his armies in Manchuria with captured Japanese arms turned over to him by the Soviets. As his soldiers marched southward in 1949, masses of the Central Government's troops defected in response to Mao's propaganda, which promised new freedom, representative government, land and bullocks for the peasants, and high salaries for the intellectuals.

At last, on October 1, 1949, Mao proclaimed the People's Republic of China in Peking. Since then the world has witnessed the contradiction between Mao's words and the horrors of his deeds. The Chinese who looked to Maoism as the gateway to a "New China" were now crushed by the reality of China in the merciless grip of communism.

The fiction of disassociation from the U. S. S. R. was shattered as Mao signed the Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact in 1950 in Moscow. He never makes a speech now that does not pay tribute to the Soviet Union. He has quickly shifted his loyalty from Stalin to Malenkov, and from Malenkov to Khrushchev. Soviet advisers have infiltrated the major ministries and political organs. At Stalin's order, Mao sent vast Chinese armies to fight against American and other United Nations troops resisting the Communist onslaught in Korea.

To crush resistance on the home front, Mao ordered what he called "mass shock", in which 12 million Chinese—according to Communist statistics—were wiped out. (Western sources place the figure at 20 million.) Millions more were imprisoned, sentenced to forced labor, or sent to "reorientation" (brain washing) centers. The people were urged to root out nonconformists and "counterrevolutionaries." Those who sought to prevent executions were themselves executed. If individuals failed to attend the public mock trials and shout "enemy of the people" in chorus, they were in turn branded with the same epithet.

At the same time, all the resources of the state propaganda organs hammered at men's minds to destroy the cultural heritage of China and to replace it by the new concepts of materialism. Village by

village, block by block, the party cadres drilled the people in the Communist dogmas of hatred. No one could escape from endless "confession and criticism" meetings and constant interrogations by police and party workers. Even silence was forbidden; everyone was forced to speak out in favor of Mao's regime. The institution of the family, sacred in Chinese eyes and a symbol of Confucian idealism, was undermined. An organized mass movement turned children against parents, wives against husbands, and brothers against brothers.

Violence against those who wavered in carrying out government decrees was encouraged. A 1950 land-reform directive bluntly stated that it sought—

to make the peasant participate in mob violence so as to brand him forever as a Mao Tse-tung man; the fear of revenge at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek and the landlords will make it impossible for him to lead a normal life again.

In February 1950 the regime called upon all "reactionaries" (those identified with the National Government) to register. They were promised forgiveness if they were "repentant." Three months later those who registered were condemned in a mass purge. Those not shot were given suspended death sentences and committed to a life at hard labor.

This wave of terror was followed in 1952 by a new campaign, that of the "five-antis" (antibribery, antitax evasion, antitheft, anticontract evasion, and antispeculation). On these pretexts, Mao unleashed a witch hunt to bring to an end all but the last vestiges of private enterprise.

He has conducted a "hate America" campaign for years, and still refuses to account for American soldiers missing in the Korean war. While leaving the details of foreign policy to Chou En-lai, he has endorsed his policies fully—such as the defiance of the United Nations, atrocities against prisoners of war, violations of the Korean armistice agreement, the conquest of Tibet, and subversion throughout south-east Asia.

Mao's well-publicized statement on the "hundred flowers" is only the latest move in his policy of deceit. It reinforces the portrait of Mao as a malevolent manipulator of the mass mind; it follows the pattern of Mao's early successes—of telling the people what they want to hear. But, in the long run, it represents an attempt to uncover his enemies in order to wipe them out.

CHOU EN-LAI

(Premier and Foreign Minister of Communist China)

Chou En-lai appears affable in his personal relations; he wins friends through his seeming sincerity and reasonableness, and through a deceptively conciliatory approach to those whom he really regards as his enemies. He speaks fluent English, as well as some French, Japanese, and Russian. Educated in Japan and in France, he has traveled extensively in England and Germany and in many eastern countries; and everywhere he is quick to adjust to local customs.

As with his superior, Chinese Communist Party boss Mao Tse-tung, Chou's appearance belies his true nature. His past has been that of a fanatic and a dedicated Communist, and the basic pattern of his policy—a combination of force and deceit—has been evident for many years.

His reliance on force is clearly shown in his early career as a Communist leader. Made a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1926, he organized and led a revolt of 600,000 workers in Shanghai the next year, and seized the city after bloody fighting. He headed riots and fighting in Nanchang and in Canton, and organized underground movements in an attempt to overthrow the legal authorities in Hong Kong, Canton, and Shanghai.

Chou's techniques of deceit are illustrated by his activities just after the war with Japan. At this time, Chiang Kai-shek's armies were much stronger than those of the Communists; although possessing captured Japanese weapons that the Soviets had turned over to them, the Communists desperately needed time to build up their forces. Chou En-lai, who had conducted such negotiations before, was assigned to obtain an armistice and thus provide a breathing spell; through delays under various pretexts and through false promises he managed to have hostilities suspended just long enough for the Communists to prepare their attack.

After the Communist armies had overrun most of China, the Chinese "People's Republic" was proclaimed in 1949, and Chou En-lai was given the high posts of Premier and Foreign Minister.

His internal policy was characterized by close cooperation in Mao Tse-tung's policy of ruthlessly exterminating millions of real and imagined opponents. With his usual efficiency, Chou effected thought control, suppressed liberties, and undermined Chinese culture and tradition.

In foreign policy, where Mao Tse-tung has given him a relatively free hand, Chou has operated with the same combination of force and deceit. The countries bordering China in a wide sweep of the compass have variously tasted each. To the northeast, in Korea, the infamous intervention of Chinese troops in 1950 has cost the lives of many American, Korean, and other United Nations soldiers. In the east, he has built up vast armies in Fukien Province, threatening Formosa (Taiwan), the last bastion of free China. He has built up propaganda

pressure against the British in Hong Kong and the Portuguese in Macao. In the south he has supported the Communist forces under Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and a Communist-controlled government in northern Laos. He has also sponsored a Quisling "government," seeking to establish a so-called "Greater Thai Autonomous Region" and overthrow the Thai, Burmese, and Laotian Governments. Further west, Communist troops have infiltrated border regions of Burma, and, to the west of China proper, Red forces have occupied Tibet.

Chou has applied pressure to the large colonies of overseas Chinese in southeast Asia and all over the world. On the one hand, he has offered education (and indoctrination) in Communist universities to young Chinese in foreign lands; at the same time, he has extorted large sums of money from overseas Chinese by using threats against their relatives.

Chou has also sought to build up badly needed foreign exchange through furthering the sale of narcotics to other countries and has subsidized the export of goods even in short supply at home in order to impress the neighboring peoples.

Chou's record in Korea is particularly sordid. Defying the United Nations, which branded China as an "aggressor," Communist China fought against the American and United Nations armies for nearly 3 years. When the Communists failed to win the war, Chou became one of the instigators of the false accusations that the United States had used "bacteriological warfare" in Korea. When they signed the armistice in 1953, Communist China and North Korea promised to return captured prisoners of war and not to augment their armaments in Korea. However, Chou En-lai used the captured American prisoners (and American civilians interned in China since 1949) in an insidious game of bartering United States lives for United States concessions. His promise not to increase armaments in North Korea was soon flagrantly violated.

Never weakening his ties with Soviet Russia, Chou supported Moscow after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the subsequent upheavals in Poland and Hungary. Touring Eastern Europe, Chou tried to salvage something of Communist unity by advocating "a common ideology and objectives."

A gradual shift in emphasis has taken place in Chou's policy in recent years; he has come to rely less on force and more on deceit. The reasons are not hard to find. His use of force and the threat of force have only led the free world to stiffen its determination to resist oppression. Armed intervention in Korea led to defeat; the free world has established a trade embargo; defense alliances have been set up between the United States, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and the Republic of China, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is gaining strength.

Thus he has turned primarily to a policy of deceit. Notwithstanding his record of aggression, defiance of the United Nations, and subversion, he has launched a "peace offensive" aimed at the free world, and particularly at southeast Asia. He has allegedly discovered that the other Asiatic peoples are "brothers," that there need be nothing but "friendship" between them, and that "peace and harmony" is all that the Chinese want. Obscuring the horrors of Communist

China, he has managed to arouse false hopes as to his peaceful intentions. Exploiting latent antagonisms of Asians against non-Asians, claiming parallels in China's economic development with those of other Asiatic nations, and stirring up the embers of anticolonialism, he has sought to spread "neutralism" and thereby divide the free world.

Even in regard to America, Chou is beginning to use his charm. At the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Chou capped a week of winning friends by making a dramatic offer to negotiate with the United States upon a peaceful settlement of the Formosa question. However, it soon developed that the only basis on which he would negotiate was the immediate surrender of the island to Communist control.

Chou's new approach may have impressed some people in southeast Asia and even in Western Europe. However, it is clear that his ultimate objective is the same as before: the Communist enslavement of mankind.

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DIRECTOR, FBI (61-7582)

8/27/57

SAC, WFO (100-22169)

ATTENTION: RECORDS SECTION

HCUA

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10-1

HCUA has released a publication entitled "Who Are They" regarding MAO TSE-tung and Chou En-lai.

Three copies are enclosed for the Bureau and two copies for the New York Office.

- 2 - Bureau (Encls. 3)
- 2 - New York (Encls. 2) (RM)
- 1 - WFO

JAC:mw
(5)

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Handwritten: 100-22169-4
NOT RECORDED
176 SEP 19 1957

INITIALS ON ENCLOSURE

Vertical stamp: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : *William S. Favel wsd*

DATE: *3/21/61*

FROM : *Lester C. Shook lcs*

SUBJECT: MAO TSE-TUNG

initial

encl
x

UNITED STATES

The attached INFORMATION AGENCY BULLETIN has been received in the Records Branch, appropriately initialed, and indicated for file. By use of instant transmittal memorandum, all necessary recording and indexing will be accomplished. It is to be noted this form is for internal use only within the Records Branch, principally by the Routing Unit where bulky material not accompanied by memorandum is usually received.

pl

The enclosure, if bulky and not usually filed with other papers in file, may be detached but this action should be clearly noted under the word "Enclosure."

Enclosure *pl*

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- Belmont CB
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- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan ✓
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

Wants A-1/100

Red China: Hunger But Not Revolution

VICTOR RIESEL: INSIDE LABOR

Aboard Ship Near Hong Kong August 23.—This dispatch comes to you from a spot surrounded by Chinese Communist gunboats and British patrol and small police jet engine craft. British patrol fire has just killed two of 79 refugees in a Chinese junk trying to reach this free world.

The incident was as dramatic as it was pathetic. But the sheer bloody drama of it all is deceiving many back home, including many respected experts.

The traumatic refugee outpouring and reports of the vastest starvation in civilized history are being interpreted as the signs of imminent collapse of Red China and the beginning of a revolution against Mao Tse-tung's government.

Nothing could be further from fact.

The Chinese Communist government in Peiping is still all-powerful. It is troubled. But it is not shaken. There will not be any successful revolution from within.

THE VIEW of our own and British specialists in this Macao-Hong Kong frontier sector—men who have been here for many years—can be put this way:

The Reds have lost considerable popular support. But their stability and power have not been noticeably affected. This is due largely to the far-flung and comprehensive control apparatus they have methodically built over the past 10 years.

The central core of this control system is the 17-million-member Chinese Communist Party—the world's largest Communist party. This, in turn, is supported by a vast, loyal and well-indoctrinated military "establishment." Party membership is still a prize. It puts members, as does the military, in the highest social strata.

This means fair housing, good food, and clothing, and administrative and "foremen"-type jobs.

As a proving ground for the Communist Party there is the Young Communist League of over 25 million young activists who regularly receive "Six Level" instructions. Thus, this Youth League plus the party and the military make up a pro-government force of some 50 million people. Their interests are directly interwoven with the stability of the regime.

In addition there are "People's" organizations. These groups include labor unions, women's groups, youth organizations and even religious units such as the All-China Islamic Assn. and the All-China Protestant Organization. They are used by the regime to maintain contact with the people, to test public opinion, to insure enforcement of its policies—and to provide the outlets for the greatest internal espionage system in the world.

This has made for the most stable party control in the history of Communist parties.

105-25792

file 57 RIESEL

MAO TSE TUNG

- The Washington Post and Times Herald _____
- The Washington Daily News _____
- The Evening Star _____
- New York Herald Tribune _____
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- New York Post _____
- The New York Times _____
- The Worker _____
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- The Wall Street Journal _____
- The National Observer _____
- Date _____

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AUG 24 1962

WHILE OTHER Communist parties have been purged and re-purged and their leaders killed and exiled, the Chinese party has been under the constant leadership of Mao Tse-tung and a small nucleus of his closest associates for the past 25 years.

The ability of the regime to remain in power despite the growing hunger and disillusionment of the people is easily explainable in terms of the utterly complete organizational controls which the Chinese Communists command over all the people. This command can be exerted to force at least passive compliance from every person in a nation of almost seven hundred million people.

Any person who believes otherwise is smoking political heroin — and is living in a dream world.

It is of utmost importance to check the refugee's records. They tell the real story:

Not a single military official, of all the tens of thousands of recent refugees, has defected to the free world. Not a labor leader has defected. Not a single important intellectual leader, not a single party leader, not a single writer, artist or scientist has come over.

This is the true test. The Reds' hold is powerful. The Peiping government will not be overthrown from within.



MAO TSE-TUNG
Stability in power.

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

'Great Leap' Puts Mao in Latin America

VICTOR RIESEL: INSIDE LABOR

WASHINGTON, June 26. Mao Tse-tung's newest "leap forward" is to British Guiana on the northeast coast of the South American continent. The Peking leader wants Guiana not only because he seeks to match Chairman Khrushchev's hold on Cuba, but as a base for fanning out, Laos-style, to the new West Indian island nations.

Mao's partner in the Western Hemisphere is the female security and national police chief of Guiana, Mrs. Cheddi Jagan, Minister for Home Affairs. It can be revealed that they made their first meeting during an undisclosed conference in Peking on the afternoon of August 31, 1962. They met in the almost unvisited private office of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. With them was only Wu Hsiao-ta, Mao's Latin American specialist.

Apparently Mrs. Jagan, wife of the avowedly Communist Guiana Prime Minister, was considered of vital importance to the Peking global operation. She is Secretary General of the Marxist People's Progressive Party which governs British Guiana. This is usually the position of power in a Communist apparatus. Stalin was secretary of the Soviet Party. So is Khrushchev, today.

AS SUCH Mrs. Jagan could pledge to Mao one objective long sought by Peking, a beachhead in the Western Hemisphere. Observers believe, therefore, she is more powerful than her Prime Minister husband. She is, in effect, also a military commander.

Along with documentary reports of her meeting with Mao came details of pledges she made to the Chinese Communist government.

Some leaders of the anti-Communist opposition to the Jagan in Georgetown, British Guiana capital, also have learned of this secret alliance. It is one of the reasons they have declared violent civil war against the pro-Communist government there.

Opposition leaders have expressed surprise that the U.S. public is paying so little attention to the war against the Jagan government. The anti-Communist rebels know that while in mainland China for two weeks, Mrs. Jagan met with Mao's youth leaders. She developed a plan for exchange of "students." It would mean, if the Jagans keep power, that young Guianians would be dispatched to Peking, as Castro has been sending thousands of children and teenage Cubans for indoctrination courses in Prague and Moscow.

According to intelligence reports, Mrs. Jagan sided with the Chinese Communist "Chairman" against the policies of the Soviet Communist Chairman. She expressed her approval of Mao Tse-tung's "analysis that victory in the anti-Fascist Second World War will pave the way for victory of the people's post-war struggles."

When she arrived in Peking she met with Mao's specialists in infiltrating those areas of the world in which English language nations are influential.

LATER she dined with another Chinese foreign office group. While replying to a toast from her Chinese Communist friends, Mrs. Jagan said:

"It has been my long awaited dream to see the great country of China and her heroic people. I am glad to have the opportunity to understand the struggle of the Chinese people in the past and their construction at present . . ."

"The success of the revolution in China is an inspiration for people the world over striving for national independence. It has strengthened their confidence that they had a strong future and a strong friend."

These are the words of the most powerful Communist in the Marxist government of a land just a few hours flight from the U.S.



MRS. CHEDDI JAGAN
Mao's lady friend

4258
Wentworth
L. Wright
R. [unclear]

- The Washington Post and Times Herald _____
- The Washington Daily News _____
- The Evening Star _____
- New York Herald Tribune _____
- New York Journal-American _____
- New York Mirror _____
- New York Daily News _____
- New York Post _____
- The New York Times _____
- The Worker _____
- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
- The National Observer _____

105-25792-11

NOT RECORDED

191 JUL 9 1963

JUN 27 1963

100 - Janet Jagan
file 5 - TWL

69 JUL 10 1963

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1480590-0

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *gh*

DATE: May 15, 1957

FROM : W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT: ~~REPORTED SECRET SPEECH OF MAO TSE-TUNG, CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADER~~

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
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Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Nease	_____
Tele. Room	_____
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Ref

Ko

The enclosed article appeared in the Washington Post and Times Herald newspaper on Wednesday, May 15, 1957. It refers to a secret speech reportedly made by the Chinese communist leader MAO Tse-tung several months ago.

The article reflects that MAO's speech seriously questions the contradictions presently existing in communist ideology. In addition to condemning Russian tactics in suppressing the Hungarian revolt, MAO's speech reportedly is in sharp opposition to Moscow doctrines.

The newspaper article states MAO's speech has not been published, but says a condensed version is being circulated among Polish communists. In Red China, it has resulted in a rectification campaign of criticism and self-criticism. It is being compared in importance to Khrushchev's secret speech on Stalin in 1956.

If copies of either MAO's speech or the condensed version, which reportedly is being circulated among Polish communists, could be obtained, they could be used effectively in various ways, for example, in material being prepared by the Research Section for the Counterintelligence Desk.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That Central Intelligence Agency be contacted through Liaison to determine if a copy of MAO's speech or the condensed version of the speech has been obtained.
- (2) If copies of MAO's speech are obtained, they should be made available to the Research Section for use in a monograph under preparation.

Enclosure

CDB:njp
 (4) CDB
 1 - Section tickler
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - R. R. Roach

ENCLOSURE 35

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105-25792-2

20 MAY 20 1957

EX-116
Reason checking
5/17/57

60 MAY 23 1957

[Handwritten initials]

GIR 9

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach

DATE: May 22, 1957

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

- Tolson _____
- Nichols _____
- Boardman _____
- Belmont _____
- Mason _____
- Mohr _____
- Parsons _____
- Rosen _____
- Tamm _____
- Nease _____
- Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holloman _____
- Gandy _____

SUBJECT: REPORTED SECRET SPEECH OF MAO TSE-TUNG, CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADER

W.C. Sullivan
6/12/57

Reference is made to memorandum dated May 15, 1957, from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont. Liaison was requested to contact the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in order to ascertain if that agency possessed a copy or condensed version of a speech recently made by Mao Tse-Tung, in which speech Mao allegedly raised questions concerning contradictions presently existing in communist ideology.

On May 20, 1957, [redacted] Counterintelligence Staff, CIA, advised that her agency does not have a copy or a condensed version of the speech allegedly made by Mao. CIA is in possession of some public source material, primarily newspaper articles which have referred to the speech and which have included some excerpts. [redacted] stated that it is the opinion of CIA officials that western newspapers have misinterpreted the statements made by Mao and that the Chinese leader actually has not directed any strong criticism or raised any significant questions concerning communist ideology.

b3

ACTION:

The above information is being referred to the attention of the Central Research Section.

SJP:bjt
(5)

RECORDED - 39

105-25772-3

3 JUN 5 1957

- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

60 PM

CENTRAL RESEARCH SECTION

66 JUN 20 1957