RELEASE IN PART B6

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Monday, June 22, 2009 8:42 AM

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Subject:

Best analysis so far of Iranian vote. Sid

Yesterday, June 21, Chatham House in UK published a detailed study of the Iranian vote, concluding from close analysis that the election results were a fraud. This is the most definitive objective analysis so far. Sid

http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14234_iranelection0609.pdf

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Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran's 2009 Presidential

Election

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21 June 2009

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Executive Summary

Working from the province by province breakdowns of the 2009 and 2005 results, released by the Iranian Ministry of Interior, and from the 2006 census as published by the official Statistical Centre of Iran, the following observations about the official data and the debates surrounding it can be made.

- In two conservative provinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, a turnout of more than 100% was recorded.
- At a provincial level, there is no correlation between the increased turnout and the swing to Ahmadinejad. This challenges the notion that Ahmadinejad's victory was due to the massive participation of a previously silent conservative majority.
- In a third of all provinces, the official results would require that Ahmadinejad took not only all former conservative voters, all former

B6

centrist voters, and all new voters, but also up to 44% of former Reformist voters, despite a decade of conflict between these two groups.

· In 2005, as in 2001 and 1997, conservative candidates, and Ahmadinejad in particular, were markedly unpopular in rural areas. That the countryside always votes conservative is a myth. The claim that this year Ahmadinejad swept the board in more rural provinces flies in the face of these trends.

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1. Irregularities in Voter Turnout

Two provinces show a turnout of over 100% and four more show a turnout of over 90%. Regional variations in participation have disappeared. There is no correlation between the increase in participation, and the swing to Ahm adinejad.

Firstly, across the board there is a massive increase in turnout, with several provinces increasing their participation rate by nearly 75%. This increase results in substantially less variation in turnout between provinces, with the standard deviation amongst provincial turnouts falling by just over 23% since 2005. The 2005 results show a substantial turnout gap, with seven provinces recording turnout below 60%, and ten above 70%. In 2009, only two were below 70% and 24 were above 80%. In fact, 21 out of 30 provinces had turnouts within 5% of 83%. The data seems to suggest that regional variations in participation have suddenly disappeared.

This makes the evident lack of any sort of correlation between the provinces that saw an increase in turnout and those that saw a swing to Ahmadinejad (Fig. 1) all the more unusual. There is no significant correlation between the increase in participation for a given province and the swing to Ahmadinejad (Fig. 1). This lack of correlation makes the argument that an increase in participation by a previously silent conservative majority won the election for Ahmadinejad somewhat problematic.

Furthermore, there are concerns about the numbers themselves. Two provinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, have results which indicate that more votes were cast on 12 June than there were eligible voters and that four more provinces had turnouts in the mid-nineties.

In a country where allegations of 'tombstone voting' – the practice20of using the identity documents of the deceased to cast additional ballots – are both longstanding and widespread, this result is troubling but perhaps not unexpected.

This problem did not start with Ahmadinejad; according to official statistics gathered by the International institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance in Stockholm, there were 12.9% more registered voters at the time of Mohammed Khatami's 2001 victory than there were citizens of voting age. In conclusion, a number of aspects of the reported turnout figures are problematic. The massive increases from 2005, the collapse of regional variations, and the absence of any clear correlation between increases in turnout and increased support for any candidate on their own make the results problematic.

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Source: Ministry of Interior Publications 2005 and 2009 (See appendix)
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2. Where did Ahmadinejad's New Votes Come From?

According to the official Ministry of Interior voting data (see Appendix), Mahmud Ahmadinejad has increased the conservative vote by 113% compared to the 2005 election. There is little correlation in provincial level results between the increase in turnout and the swing to the President, challenging the notion that a previously silent conservative majority has come out to support him. Interestingly, in 10 out of 30 provinces, mainly former Mehdi Karrubi strongholds, the official data suggests that Ahmadinejad received not only the votes of all former non-voters and former Rafsanjani voters, but also took up to 44% of the vote from those who had previously voted Reformist.

According to the official data1, Mahmud Ahmadinejad has received approximately 13m more votes in this election than the combined conservative vote in the 2005 Presidential election2.

Assuming that Ahmadinejad retained all 11.5m Conservative votes from 2005, these additional 13m votes could have come from three sources, in descending order of likelihood:

- · The approximately 10.6m citizens who did not vote in 2005, but chose to vote in this election
- · The 6.2m citizens who voted for the centrist Rafsanjani in 2005
- The 10.4m citizens who voted for Reformist candidates in 2005 In order to examine in detail where Ahmadinejad's increased support came from, the table below (Fig.3) shows the composition of the 2009 vote by province, dividing it into those who voted Conservative, Rafsanjani, and Reformist in 2005, and those who did not vote at all in 2005. It assumes that 2005 voters will vote again.

The table demonstrates that in the 10 of Iran's 30 provinces highlighted red, in order for the official statistics to be correct Ahmadinejad would have needed to win over all new voters, all former Rafsanjani voters, and also up to 44% of former reformist voters.

- 1 Serious complaints have been raised about both the 2005 elections and the 2009 elections. Government data is not perfectly reliable.
- 2 In 2005 there were three Conservative candidates in the first round. Ahmadinejad can reasonably be expected to have received in 2009, all votes cast for Conservatives in 2005. Here, Ahmadinejad's 2009 performance is compared to the combined performance of all three Conservatives in 2005.

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It is notable that many of these are provinces where the Reformist cleric Mehdi Karrubi polled highly in 2005, and the government's figures would appear to suggest that his former supporters have not voted tactically for the likely Reformist challenger Mir Hussein Musavi, as many had expected, but rather that they have defected to the hard-line conservative incumbent Ahmadinejad. This interpretation is to some extent supported by the relationship between the percentage of former Karrubi voters in a province, and its swing to Ahmadinejad (Fig.2).

To many Reformists, this situation is extremely unlikely. Mehdi Karrubi is a well-known reformist, of polar opposite views to Ahmadinejad on issues of political and cultural freedoms, economic management, and foreign policy. They allege fraud, and it is likely that the provinces where Karrubi's vote has collapsed will provide the bulk of the 600+ complaints which the defeated c andidates are lodging against the conduct of the election.

However, Karrubi, like Ahmadinejad, is seen as a 'man of the people', and Ahmadinejad is as much a re-incarnation of the Islamic Republic's early hard left as he is a leader of its current hard-right. Ahmadinejad's supporters thus claim that rural voters voted for Ahmadinejad in 2009 for precisely the same reasons that they voted for Karrubi in 2005.

The data offers no arbitration in this dispute, although Roukema's application of statistical fraud detection techniques to the 'by district' data has turned up some anomalies with respect to the figures for Karrubi's vote,3 which may suggest that they were created by a computer. These can be followed up should the fully disaggregated 'by polling station' data be released during the ongoing dispute.

3 B Roukena, 'Benford's Law Anomalies in the 2009 Iranian Presidential Election' (as yet unpublished article, 2009).

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Source: Ministry of Interior Publications 2005 and 2009 (See appendix) Preliminary Analysis of Voting Figures in Iran's 2009 Presidential Election www.chathamhouse.org.uk 8

Potential sources of new votes for Ahmadinejad (Fig.3)

Province

Ahmadinejad

Voters '09

Ahmadinejad

Voters '05

Other

Conservative

Voters '05

Non-Voters

'05

Rafsanjani

Voters '05

Reformist Voters '05

Assumed Take

of Former

Reformist

Voters

East

Azerbaijan

1,131,111 198,417 150,235 684,745 268,954 690,784 -24.79%

West

Azerbaijan

623,946 75,319 156,724 520,896 151,525 409,798 -68.45%

Ardebil 325,911 34,090 114,038 161,510 95,490 232,505 -34.07%

Isfahan 1,799,255 801,635 271,861 854,867 260,858 423,098 -92.17%

llam 199,654 32,383 47,865 20,165 40,580 168,179 34.88%

Bushehr 299,357 82,376 55,169 81,202 97,412 171,637 -9,79%

Tehran 3,819,495 1,500,829 860,548 2,424,653 1,274,276 1,345,533 -166.54%

Chaharmahal

& Bakhtiari

359,578 90,960 87,195 126,366 59,521 128,451 -3.48%

Southern

Khorasan

285,984 101,638 54,759 95,657 57,244 71,939 -32.41%

Razavi

Khorasan

2,214,801 377,732 956,641 638,925 527,707 656,736 -43.58%

Northern

Khorasan

341,104 22,954 116,991 115,487 70,407 135,090 11.30%

Khuzestan 1,303,129 232,874 206,798 543,802 319,921 707,428 -0.04%

Zanjan 444,480 93,309 94,234 132,237 110,698 150,062 9.33%

Semnan 295,177 98,024 65,249 90,128 69,773 56,344 -49.69%

Sistan &

Baluchistan

450,269 47,743 93,559 117,432 155,147 563,454 6.46%

Fars 1,758,026 242,535 334,925 738,209 403,074 786,195 5.00%

Qazvin 498,061 118,414 102,048 188,868 108,928 168,013 -12.02%

Qom 422,457 256,110 36,686 125,178 104,004 67,557 -147,31%

Kordestan 315,689 22,353 59,174 251,014 54,004 211,918 -33.44%

Kerman 1,160,446 129,284 333,275 337,502 480,271 215,357 -55.67%

Kermanshah 573,568 70,117 137,472 251,113 137,010 374,100 -5.92%

Kohgilouye &

Boyerahmad

253,962 34,396 72,565 53,615 56,154 148,985 24.99%

Golestan 515,211 56,776 129,856 156,256 155,498 358,715 4.69%

Gilan 998,573 149,026 221,632 465,190 215,478 420,258 -12.55%

Lorestan 677,829 69,710 101,394 162,848 121,130 500,859 44.47%

Mazandaran 1,289,257 159,291 581,654 581,269 311,949 270,104 -127.69%

Markezi 572,988 161,669 89,086 200,024 143,118 184,172 -11,35%

Hormozegan 482,990 81,054 103,487 136,459 75,601 340,740 25.35%

Hamedan 765,723 195,030 96,988 218,400 175,997 322,938 24,56%

Yazd 337,178 175,206 76,209 150,781 77,924 123,828 -115.44%

Totals 24,515,209 5,711,254 5,808,317 10,624,798 6,179,653 10,404,777

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3. Do Rural Voters Support Ahmadinejad?

Many commentators have suggested, before and after the Presidential Election, that Ahmadinejad is very popular in rural areas and that this explains his high levels of support. However, the data from the 2005 Presidential election does not support this contention. Instead, it confirms that what support Ahmadinejad did gain in 2005 was mainly from urban and suburban areas. The graphs below show the levels of support for Ahmadinejad against the rural population of the province in question (Fig.4) and Conservatives as a group (Fig.5).

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Source: Ministry of Interior Publications 2005 and 2009 and Iranian Census of 2006 (see appendix)

This data supports the con tention of academic experts on rural Iranian politics4 that rural voters have not been the dedicated Ahmadinejad supporters occasionally described in western media. This is supported by the fact that much of Iran's rural population is comprised of ethnic minorities: Lors, Baluch, Kurdish, and Arab amongst others. These ethnic minorities have a history both of voting Reformist and of voting for members of their own ethnic group. For

example, they were an important segment of Khatami's vote in 1997 and 2001 and voted largely for Karrubi and Mostafa Moin in 2005.

The 2009 data suggests a sudden shift in political support with precisely these rural provinces, which had not previously supported Ahmadinejad or any other conservative (Fig.5) showing substantial swings to Ahmadinejad (Fig.6). At the same time, the official data suggests that the vote for Mehdi Karrubi, who was extremely popular in these rural, ethnic minority areas in 2005, has collapsed entirely even in his home province of Lorestan, where his vote has gone from 440,247 (55.5%) in 2005 to just 44,036 (4.6%) in 2009. This is paralleled by an overall swing of 50.9% to Ahmadinejad, with official results suggesting that he has captured the support of 47.5% of those who cast their ballots for 4 Cf. Hooglund 'Iran's Rural Vote and Election Fraud' Agence Global, 17 June 2009. http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?ld=2034

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Reformist candidates in 2005. This, more than any other result, is highly implausible, and has been the subject of much debate in Iran.

This increase in support for Ahmadinejad amongst rural and ethnic minoritiy voters is out of step with previous trends, extremely large in scale, and central to the question of why (or indeed whether) he won in June 2009.

Source: Ministry of Interior Publications 2005 and 2009 and Iranian Census of 2006 (see appendix)

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Appendix

By Province Results for the 2009 Iranian Presidential Election

Source: Iranian Ministry of Interior 2009

Available at:

http://www.moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&ID=e3dffc8f-9d5a-4a54-

bbcd-74ce90361c62&LayoutlD=b05ef124-0db1-4d33-b0b6-

90f50139044b&CategoryID=832a711b-95fe-4505-8aa3-38f5e17309c9

Province Ahmadinejad Rezai Karrubi Musavi Invalid

Total Votes

Cast

Total Valid

Votes

1

Fast

Azerbaijan 1,131,111 16,920 7,246 837,858 17205 2,010,340 1,993,135

2

West

Azerbaijan 623,946 12,199 21,609 656,508 20094 1,334,356 1,314,262

3 Ardebil 325,911 6,578 2,319 302,825 4372 642,005 637,633

4 Isfahan 1,799,255 51,788 14,579 746,697 25162 2,637,481 2,612,319

5 llam 199,654 5,221 7,471 96,826 3495 312,667 309,172

6 Bushehr 299,357 7,608 3,563 177,268 6193 493,989 487,796

7 Tehran 3,819,495 147,487 67,334 3,371,523 115701 7,521,540 7,405,839

Chaharmahal

& Bakhtia ri 359,578 22,689 4,127 106,099 2953 495,446 492,493

9

Southern

```
Khorasan 285,984 3,962 928 90,363 1920 383,157 381,237
10
Razavi
Khorasan 2,214,801 44,809 13,561 884,570 24240 3,181,981 3,157,741
11
Northern
Khorasan 341,104 4,129 2,478 113,218 3072 464,001 460,929
12 Khuzestan 1.303.129 139.124 15.934 552.636 28022 2.038.845 2.010.823
13 Zanjan 444,480 7,276 2,223 126,561 5,181 585,721 580,540
14 Semnan 295,177 4,440 2,147 77,754 3790 383,308 379,518
15
Sistan &
Baluchistan 450,269 6,616 12,504 507,946 5585 982,920 977,335
16 Fars 1,758,026 23,871 16,277 706,764 18359 2,523,297 2,504,938
17 Qazvin 498,061 7,978 2,690 177,542 6084 692,355 686,271
18 Qom 422,457 16,297 2,314 148,467 9505 599,040 589,535
19 Kordestan 315,689 7,140 13,862 261,772 12293 610,756 598,463
20 Kerman 1,160,446 12,016 4,977 318,250 10125 1,505,814 1,495,689
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21 Kermanshah 573,568 11,258 10,798 374,188 13610 983,422 969,812
22
Kohgilouye
Boverahmad 253962 8542 4274 98937 2311 368.026 365.715
23 Golestan 515,211 5,987 10,097 325,806 14266 871,367 857,101
24 Gilan 998,573 12,022 7,183 453,806 11674 1,483,258 1,471,584
25 Lorestan 677,829 14,920 44,036 219,156 8329 964,270 955,941
26 Mazandaran 1,289,257 19,587 10,050 585,373 15571 1,919,838 1,904,267
27 Markezi 572,988 10,057 4,675 190,349 7889 785,958 778,069
28 Hormozegan 482,990 7,237 5,126 241,988 5683 743,024 737,341
29 Hamedan 765,723 13,117 12,032 218,481 9816 1,019,169 1,009,353
30 Yazd 337,178 8,406 2,565 255,799 5908 609,856 603,948
Totals 24,515,209 659,281 328,979 13,225,330 418,408 39,147,207 38,728,799
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By Province Electoral Results for 2005
Source: Ministry of Interior 2005
Available at: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/i/iran/iran20052.txt
Province Ahmadinejad Karrubi Larijani Mehralizadeh Moin Qalibaf Rafsajani Totals
Azarbaijan-e
Sharqi
198,417 121,969 28,075 378,604 190,211 122,160 268,954 1,308,390
Azarbaijan-e
Gharbi 75,319 99,766 15,435 163,091 146,941 141,289 151,525 793,366
Ardabil 34,090 53,906 7,766 111,465 67,134 106,272 95,490 476,123
Esfahan 801,635 196,512 73,452 30,325 196,261 198,409 260,858 1,757,452
llam 32,383 108,627 6,783 3,026 56,526 41,082 40,580 289,007
Bushehr 82,376 98,148 8,207 4,942 68,547 46,962 97,412 406,594
Tehran 1,500,829 415,187 246,167 281,748 648,598 614,381 1,274,276 4,981,186
Chahar Mahal
va Bakhtiari 90,960 75,044 23,127 5,051 48,356 64,068 59,521 366,127
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Khorasan-e
Janubi
101,638 27,705 5,716 4,958 39,276 49,043 57,244 285,580
Khorasan-e
Razavi 377,732 297,967 78,976 33,488 325,281 877,665 527,707 2,518,816
Khorasan-e
Shomali
22,954 89,551 16,900 8,209 37,330 100,091 70,407 345,442
Khuzestan 232,874 538,735 58,564 20,164 148,529 148,234 319,921 1,467,021
Zanjan 93.309 62,845 22,869 18,568 68,649 71,365 110,698 448,303
Semnan 98,024 25,899 28,190 3,873 26,572 37,059 69,773 289,390
Sistan va
Baluchestan
47,743 77,017 24,954 7,312 479,125 68,605 155,147 859,903
Fars 242,535 546,633 61,383 22,440 217,122 273,542 403,074 1,766,729
Qazvin 118,414 81,569 24,649 18,078 68,366 77,399 108,928 497,403
Qom 256,110 25,282 10,894 14,451 27,824 25,792 104,004 464,357
Kurdestan 22,353 111,249 10,261 7,785 92,884 48,913 54,004 347,449
Kerman 129,284 152,764 221,219 9,697 52,896 112,056 480,271 1,158,187
Kermanshah 70,117 254,780 22,033 12,516 106,804 115,439 137,010 718,699
Kohgiluyeh va
Buyer Ahmad 34,396 96,459 20,306 1,572 50,954 52,259 56,154 312,100
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Golestan 56,776 193,570 42,334 8,283 156,862 87,522 155,498 700,845
Gilan 149,026 203,941 50,070 33,996 182,321 171,562 215,478 1,006,394
Lorestan 69,710 440,247 31,169 6,865 53,747 70,225 121,130 793,093
Mazandaran 159,291 103,229 464,891 18,467 148,408 116,763 311,949 1,322,998
Markazi 161,669 104,522 17,258 14,058 65,592 71,828 143,118 578,045
Hormozegan 81,054 177,413 78,161 9,679 153,648 25,326 75,601 600,882
Hamadan 195,030 218,018 24,002 20,496 84,424 72,986 175,997 790,953
Yazd 175,206 58,132 9,317 5,186 60,510 66,892 77,924 453,167
Totals 5,711,254 5,056,686 1,733,128 1,278,393 4,069,698 4,075,189 6,179,653 28,104,001
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Urban and Rural Populations by Province
Source: Iranian Census of 2006, Statistical Centre of Iran.
Availa ble at:
http://www.sci.org.ir/content/userfiles/_sci_en/sci_en/sel/year85/f2/CS_02_6.H
TM
Urban Rural Unsettled
Province
Absolute % Absolute % Absolute %
Total
East
Azerbaijan
2,402,539 66.67% 1,200,820 33.32% 97 0.00% 3,603,456
West
Azerbaijan
1,724,954 60.03% 1,148,505 39.97% 0 0.00% 2,873,459
```

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715,597 58.27% 512,195 41.70% 363 0.03% 1,228,155

```
Isfahan
3,798,72
Ilam
```

3,798,728 83.32% 758,890 16.65% 1,638 0.04% 4,559,256

331,231 60.69% 210,703 38.61% 3,853 0.71% 545,787

Bushehr

577,465 65.16% 303,409 34.23% 5,393 0.61% 886,267

Tehran

12,260,431 91.34% 1,161,889 8.66% 46 0.00% 13,422,366

Chaharmahal

& Bakhtiari

442,298 51.56% 414,624 48.33% 988 0.12% 857,910

Southern

Khorasan

326,695 51.33% 308,305 48.44% 1,420 0.22% 636,420

Razavi

Khorasan

3,811,900 68.15% 1,779,980 31.82% 1,199 0.02% 5,593,079

Northern

Khorasan

392,458 48.36% 414,365 51.06% 4,749 0.59% 811,572

Khuzestan

2,873,564 67.22% 1,383,946 32.37% 17,469 0.41% 4,274,979

Zanjan

559,340 57.99% 405,261 42.01% 0 0.00% 964,601

Semnan

440,559 74.70% 149,183 25.30% 0 0.00% 589,742

Sistan &

Baluchistan

1,193,198 49.60% 1,206,547 50.15% 5,997 0.25% 2,405,742

Fars

2,652,947 61.17% 1,650,614 38.06% 33,317 0.77% 4,336,878

Qazvin

777,975 68.05% 365,203 31.95% 22 0.00% 1,143,200

Qom

983,094 93.92% 63,639 6.08% 4 0.00% 1,046,737

Kordestan

855,819 59.43% 584,337 40.57% 0 0.00% 1,440,156

Kerman

1,552,519 58.53% 1,089,748 41.09% 10,146 0.38% 2,652,413

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Kermanshah

1,255,319 66.79% 618,718 32.92% 5,348 0.28% 1,879,385

Kohgiluyeh &

Boyerahmad

302,192 47.64% 329,849 52.00% 2,258 0.36% 634,299

Golestan

795,126 49.17% 819,584 50.68% 2,377 0.15% 1,617,087

Gilan

1,295,751 53.88% 1,109,104 46.12% 6 0.00% 2,404,861

Lorestan

1,020,150 59.43% 691,448 40.28% 4,929 0.29% 1,716,527

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```
Mazandaran
1,554,143 53.18% 1,368,233 46.82% 56 0.00% 2,922,432
Markezi
932,073 68.98% 419,184 31.02% 0 0.00% 1,351,257
Hormozegan
661,325 47.11% 740,605 52.76% 1,744 0.12% 1,403,674
Hamedan
980,771 57.58% 721,225 42.34% 1,271 0.07% 1,703,267
Yazd
789,803 79.71% 200,988 20.29% 27 0.00% 990,818
Totals
48,259,964 68% 22,131,101 31% 104,717 0.15% 70,495,782
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Official Turnout Figures for I. R. Iran Elections (Fig. 7)
Year Type Turnout
1980 Mailis 52%
1980 Presidential 70%
1981 Presidential 68%
1981 Presidential 79%
1982 Assembly of Experts 78%
1984 Majlis 65%
1985 Presidential 60%
1988 Mailis 59%
1989 Presidential 60%
1990 Assembly of Experts 38%
1992 Mailis 59%
1993 Presidential 52%
1996 Mailis 71%
1997 Presidential 76%
1998 Assembly of Experts 45%
1999 Municipal 60%
2000 Mailis 69%
2001 Presidential 68%
2003 Municipal 48%
2004 Majlis 60%
2005 Presidential 63%
2005 Presidential 60%
2006 Municipal Not available
2006 Ass embly of Experts Not available
2008 Majlis 54%
2009 Presidential 84%
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Changes in Voter Turnout by Province (Fig.8)
Province Turnout
2009
Turnout
2005
Participation
Swing
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East Azerbaijan 82% 51% 30%

West Azerbaijan 71% 44% 27% Ardebil 80% 54% 26% Isfahan 88% 59% 30% llam 87% 80% 7% Bushehr 85% 72% 13% Tehran 86% 64% 22% Chaharmahal & Bakhtiari 88% 65% 23% Combined Khorasans 86% 71% 15% Khuzestan 73% 55% 17% Zanjan 93% 65% 27% Semnan 88% 73% 14% Sistan & Baluchistan 75% 74% 1% Fars 89% 61% 27% Qazvin 92% 69% 23% Qom 91% 77% 14% Kordestan 65% 37% 27% Kerman 87% 78% 9% Kermanshah 80% 62% 18% Golestan 82% 55% 27% Gilan 94% 65% 29% Lorestan 86% 58% 27% Mazandaran 100% 67% 33% Markezi 89% 65% 24% Hormozegan 81% 62% 19% Hamedan 81% 78% 3% Yazd 100% 76% 24%

A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy steps!