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RELEASE IN PART B1,1.4(D),B3 CIA PERS/ORG,B6

From: Sent: To: Subject:	Sullivan, Jacob J <sullivanjj@state.gov> Wednesday, September 09, 2009 8:03 AM H Re: Iran insights from</sullivanjj@state.gov>	!
Will do.		
Original Message From: H <hdr22@clinto To: Sullivan, Jacob J</hdr22@clinto 	·	1.4(D) B1
<u>=</u>	.00.2000	!
Sent: Wed Sep 09 06:07		
Subject: Fw: Iran insight	s from	
Have you met Jackie? Pl	s. call and ask her to come in and discuss her insights w us at a time that I ca	n stop by.
Original Message		
From: newmyer(<newmyer< td=""><td>B6</td></newmyer<>	B6
To: H	\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	1
Sent: Tue Sep 08 08:52:	10 2000	·
Subject: Re: Iran insight		1.4(D)
Subject. Re. Iran insignt	2 HOII	B1
Secretary Clinton,		
I will be in Washington 1	for a day-long meeting on Thursday this week	
	and my travel plans are flexible, so I could meet you any time on We	dnesday afternoon.
after 5 pm on Thursday.	or any time on Friday morning. If those times do not work, I would be happy	
your convenience.	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	-
,		B3 CIA PERS/ORG
All best, Jackie		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
On Mon. Sep 7, 2009 at	4:06 PM, H <hdr22@clintonemail.com> wrote:</hdr22@clintonemail.com>	!
•	discuss and will call to set up a time to do so. Thx.	
>		
> Original Message	****	
> From: newmyer	<newmyer com=""></newmyer>	B6
> To: H		
> Sent: Wed Sep 02 11:0	01:17:2009	
> Subject: Iran insights f		
>	10	·
> Secretary Clinton,		1.4(D)
> Secretary Christon,		B1
> Last week I traveled to	o Israel in an Iran-related seminar and simulation exercise with	= :
	el's next chief of military intelligence and his team and, separately	the ibi Beliefat willo
	Yesterday, Iran workshop in Washingto	on involving DoD and
think tank evnerts. Dec		I, there was universal
•	on Iran's nuclear facilities would be counterproductive, on the one hand, and	
	caived by Iran as an indication of weakness, on the other	!
	Ectived by Italias all illulcation of weakiless, off the other.	33 CIA PERS/ORG

> The conclusions of the conversations therefore tended to emphasize diplomatic measures targeted at Iranian elites' psychology, and non-conventional military options derivative of this psychological approach. Specific operational recommendations include:	:
>	•
> From the IDF meetings:	
> From the last meetings.	!
> The post-election situation in Iran has reduced popular fear of the regime. At the same time, the Iranian people are not suicidal and seek ways of confronting the regime that do not put their lives at risk. Accordingly, a general strike or a strike among oil field workers that would, as in the period before the deposition of the shah, demonstrate the weakness of the regime domestically while also starving it of resources. As in the period of Solidarity in Poland, American or, even better, European non-governmental groups could work with Iranian popular leaders to provide training and money to help them organize such strikes. A call to Bernard Kouchner or another European with a similar background (grass-roots political activism tied to transnational organizations) might be productive in this regard.	
> From the conversation with	1.4(D) B1
> If Iran acquires a nuclear capability, no single American/allied countermeasure will be adequate. Something like the "flexible response" posture from the Cold War will be required, necessitating a range of actions from enhancing the US deterrent presence nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles in the Arabian Sea to bolstering regional actors' defenses.	
> Israeli leaders should be able to contain the damage to the Israeli population's morale from an Iranian bomb, but this will require careful management of public statements. There is a tension between building up support for action against the Iranian nuclear program now and delivering the kind of reassurance that will be necessary once the capability has been acquired.	
> From the DC workshop:	
>	
>	'
> Based on patterns of Iranian behavior in the past, there is reason to think that some diplomatic communications may serve to increase Iranian fears about the consequences of its pursuit of a nuclear capability. These messages, which could be delivered in the course of speeches or less formal interactions, would play on existing Iranian paranoia.	i
> I would be happy to chat in person if you might have 15 minutes to discuss such measures, or any of the other points above.	
>	
> Yours sincerely, and best, Jackie	'
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>	i
> Jacqueline Newmyer	
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