RELEASE IN PART

From:

Hanley, Monica R < Hanley MR@state.gov>

Sent:

Sunday, October 28, 2012 3:05 PM

To:

ш

Subject:

Re: 3:15 confirmed for Annan

Not a problem

---- Original Message -----

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com] Sent: Sunday, October 28, 2012 03:03 PM

To: Hanley, Monica R

Subject: Re: 3:15 confirmed for Annan

PIS PUSH IT BACK. I cannot do it then. Tell ops I will call in when I can be connected.

---- Original Message -----

From: Hanley, Monica R [mailto:HanleyMR@state.gov]

Sent: Sunday, October 28, 2012 03:01 PM Eastern Standard Time

To: H

Subject: 3:15 confirmed for Annan

This is the same sheet that Oscar printed for you.

The Secretary's Call Sheet for

Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan

(SBU) Purpose of Call: Kofi Annan requested a follow-up call with you to discuss Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's reaction to possible Syria strategies based on the principles outlined in the Geneva Action Group Communiqué. This call comes just days prior to Joint Special Representative Brahimi's October 28-29 trip to Moscow, where he will discuss the Geneva Communiqué as a way forward on a political transition in Syria. Deputy Secretary Burns spoke to Brahimi October 25 about his outreach to Russia. You spoke with Annan October 15 about your willingness to revisit the Geneva Communiqué as long as it launches a real political transition and includes consequences for non-compliance.

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S	. Department of State Case No.	F-2014-20439 Doc No. C0579	98110 Date: 11/30/2015
all parties, including the U longer formally involved o latter's close relationship sought Brahimi's advice and to believe that it will be vestrong support from both United States and Russia a (SBU) Brahimi told us that elections forward to 2013 proposals outlined in the subsequent transition. Brahimi wants to be United States and Russia sunited States and Russia subsequent on November	nnan resigned from his position a nited States, for the failure of his n Syria, Brahimi remains in close with Russian Foreign Minister Law of insights on internal Syrian policy difficult, if not impossible, for the United States and Russia. The bridgeable and are trying to use during his recent trip to Damaso and might be persuaded to not of Geneva communiqué for the marahimi does not intend to speak a and the opposition. Prior to engassured of critical external supposem willing to pursue the ideas fending high-level representative 3 or 4. If an understanding is rest. Deputy Secretary Burns spoke	mission, and also calling for A touch and seeks advice from A vrov. When Annan was the Joi tics and regional dynamics. Be the UN mediation efforts to be ey also appear to believe that se their good offices to overco cus, Asad seemed to accept the contest them. Brahimi is also conagement of the period leading bout this proposal publicly becausing in more detailed discussort, particularly from the United to meet discretely with him is ached with the United States a	sad to step down. Though no annan, especially given the nt Special Envoy, he frequently oth Annan and Brahimi appear ear fruit, unless underpinned by the differences between the me them. e proposition of moving onsidering some of the gup to elections and the sause he has not sufficiently sions with the Syrians on this d States and Russia. If both the e to explore the option of the n Cairo (or another location if

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