

RELEASE IN PART B5,B6

From: newmyer [redacted] on behalf of Jackie Newmyer [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2009 10:51 AM
To: H
Cc: H2
Subject: Re: update: workshop key findings

B6

Secretary Clinton,

Thank you for your response, and very glad to hear that your elbow is on the mend.

On the Indian Ocean, moving faster than our normal bureaucratic pace on clearing the export of technologies to India would seem to be in order, [redacted]

B5

[redacted] We have discussed with Mr. Marshall the kinds of assessments that need to be done to identify which technologies can be transferred even if there is a risk of their being compromised.

Another concrete measure would be for the United States to use our good offices to facilitate intra-regional bilateral dialogues -- e.g., between India and Japan, or India and Australia, or Japan and ROK -- on issues of common concern. We have been told by the Japanese and Indians that they are reluctant to undertake such dialogues for fear of US opposition. If this is a sincere concern, it is an unfortunate misunderstanding that can be easily clarified, and the US State Department could offer to create a venue for such meetings.

A few other ideas for the State Department might be more appropriate to discuss in person, and I'd be happy to meet if you have a few minutes over the weekend. Also, with regard to your forthcoming sessions with Treasury and the Chinese, it might make sense to brief you on some of our findings with regard to what we believe to be the actual state of the Chinese economy and political economic issues in China.

On the contract question, we are still working with Mr. Marshall to establish a vehicle that might allow us to do work for Michele. When you next speak with her, if she mentions what she envisions for the start date, that would be very helpful to know!

Thank you again, and all best, Jackie

On Sun, Jul 19, 2009 at 7:53 AM, H <HDR22@clintonemail.com> wrote:
Jackie--

Sorry this reply is so tardy but btw my elbow (which is improving) and India (where I am now), it's taken awhile!

Thx for the analysis which raises concerns we have to address. I would welcome your ideas about how best to

do that. By the way, did the DOD contract work out?

Hope you're well--H

----- Original Message -----

From: newmyer [redacted]

To: H

Sent: Fri Jul 10 15:58:00 2009

Subject: update: workshop key findings

Dear Secretary Clinton,

I hope that your elbow is healing quickly. I mentioned that we were doing some work on maritime developments in the region from the Persian Gulf to the East China Sea and Sea of Japan. Below are key findings from the report, but the main takeaway is that the political impact of Chinese military modernization may be greater than a narrow technical analysis of China's capabilities would suggest, and for a range of reasons, technical and political, prospects for regional cooperation are limited, but pathways to conflict are numerous and increasing.

All best, Jackie

Key findings from the workshop include:

- Chinese naval modernization has proceeded at rates higher than forecast 10 years ago and has created the capability to complicate operation of US carrier battle groups within 1,000 kilometers of the Chinese coastline.
- The Indian Ocean may in the coming decades be the operating area of SSBNs from countries with limited experience in sustained SSBN patrols, including India, China, and possibly Pakistan.
- Chinese maritime relations with countries along the littoral area have continued to develop, with a new friendly relationship emerging with Sri Lanka, to complement the existing relations with Myanmar and Pakistan. This may lead to a new form of "blue-brown water" naval operations, in which Chinese naval forces operate far from Chinese bases, but close to the coasts of client states.

The workshop tended to the conclusion that the trends in the region were not such as to make maritime cooperation easy. These trends include:

- Japanese concern that Chinese dominance in the waters within 1,000 miles of Chinese territory has immediate consequences for Japan's maritime autonomy.
- Indian suspicion of Chinese naval developments in Hainan Island, Chinese development of port infrastructure in Pakistan and Myanmar,

B6

and the possibility of Chinese ballistic missile submarines operating close to India.

- Indian interest in SSBNs, plus Chinese SSBN ports in Hainan and even, possibly, Pakistani SSBNs, all of which creates the possibility of multiple SSBN patrols in the Indian Ocean, along with the potential for naval nuclear accidents at sea.
- Asymmetries in levels of operational competence, and technology, in submarines and maritime aviation, which, for example, make functional multi-national naval cooperation harder for states that are afraid of revealing technologies or weaknesses.
- The major role of land-based maritime warfare strike complexes in this region, which means that war at sea always carries with it the risk of escalation to strikes on ground targets in homeland areas.

The report also offers two scenarios under which the United States may consider engaging militarily in the region.

The first scenario, which concerns a clash between Japan and China in waters claimed by both, compels us to consider:

- The circumstances under which the Chinese may seek to demonstrate that their new maritime capabilities must be taken seriously and respected, and
- What the United States would lose if it did not support the Japanese, and then faced a world in which Japan became either a subordinate power to China or a nuclear armed state, capable of pursuing its national interest independent of the United States.

The second scenario concerns an American naval blockade of an Iran that has tested a nuclear weapon, potentially giving rise to an interaction between the United States and China far from the operating bases of each but close to territory of a client of China, a “blue-brown water” clash. In this scenario, China is using its navy to show presence, and to force the United States to ask itself whether it wants to go to war with China over a political conflict that is less than black and white. Thinking about the options that would be left to the United States under these circumstances underscores how Chinese naval forces may have more political impact by 2025 than a narrow assessment of their military capabilities would suggest.

On Fri, May 22, 2009 at 7:45 AM, <newmyer[redacted]> wrote:

> Secretary Clinton, The Australian is the newspaper in which I read your remarks on Asia-Pacific. Thank you again, Jackie

>

> Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry

>

> -----Original Message-----

B6

> From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
>
> Date: Fri, 22 May 2009 07:40:19
> To: 'newmyer' [redacted]
> Subject: Re: Australian! and update

> P.S. What's the reference to "Australian" mean?? H

> ----- Original Message -----

> From: newmyer [redacted]
> To: H
> Sent: Thu May 21 10:22:48 2009
> Subject: Australian! and update

> Dear Secretary Clinton,

> I was heartened to read your forceful remarks about the US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region this morning. On Monday, our office held a workshop for the NIC that highlighted the downsides associated with an American withdrawal from the region. I will be providing you with our report from that event. Also, in early June, we are holding two workshops with US policy makers (one for Democrats and one for Republicans) to illuminate how contingencies in Pakistan might affect US-China relations. I will give you a read out on those events as well.

> Anne-Marie was in touch last evening to tell me that she had looked into the possibility of working with LTSG and found that unfortunately her office would not be able to do so. Happily, Michele Flournoy's office is reaching out and has asked me to participate in a wargame next week for the QDR, which I hope will help build the foundation for a contract between her office and LTSG.

> I am extremely grateful to you for helping me find opportunities to serve our government. As ever, I will keep you posted. Thank you again, and yrs, Jackie

> --
> Jacqueline Newmyer
> President, Long Term Strategy Group
> 12 Eliot St., Cambridge, MA 02138

> [redacted]

> www.ltstrategy.com

--
Jacqueline Newmyer
President, Long Term Strategy Group
12 Eliot St., Cambridge, MA 02138

[redacted]

www.ltstrategy.com

B6

B6

B6

--

Jacqueline Newmyer
President, Long Term Strategy Group
12 Eliot St., Cambridge, MA 02138



www.ltstrategy.com

B6