

RELEASE IN PART B1,1.4(D),B3 CIA PERS/ORG,B6
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**From:** newmyer [redacted] on behalf of Jackie Newmyer [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 2, 2009 11:01 AM  
**To:** H  
**Subject:** Iran insights from [redacted]

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1.4(D)  
B1

Secretary Clinton,

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 10/30/2015 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on: 09/07/2024
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Last week I traveled to Israel [redacted] an Iran-related seminar and simulation exercise with the IDF general who is likely to become Israel's next chief of military intelligence and his team

and, separately, [redacted] Yesterday, [redacted]

[redacted] Iran workshop in Washington involving DoD and think tank experts. Despite the fact that the meetings were with defense [redacted] personnel, there was universal sentiment that a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would be counterproductive, on the one hand, and that incremental measures would be perceived by Iran as an indication of weakness, on the other.

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The conclusions of the conversations therefore tended to emphasize diplomatic measures targeted at Iranian elites' psychology, and non-conventional military options derivative of this psychological approach. Specific operational recommendations include:

#### From the IDF meetings:

--- The post-election situation in Iran has reduced popular fear of the regime. At the same time, the Iranian people are not suicidal and seek ways of confronting the regime that do not put their lives at risk. Accordingly, a general strike or a strike among oil field workers that would, as in the period before the deposition of the shah, demonstrate the weakness of the regime domestically while also starving it of resources. As in the period of Solidarity in Poland, American or, even better, European non-governmental groups could work with Iranian popular leaders to provide training and money to help them organize such strikes. A call to Bernard Kouchner or another European with a similar background (grass-roots political activism tied to transnational organizations) might be productive in this regard.

#### From the conversation with [redacted]

--- If Iran acquires a nuclear capability, no single American/allied countermeasure will be adequate. Something like the "flexible response" posture from the Cold War will be required, necessitating a range of actions from enhancing the US deterrent presence -- nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles in the Arabian Sea -- to bolstering regional actors' defenses.

--- Israeli leaders should be able to contain the damage to the Israeli population's morale from an Iranian bomb, but this will require careful management of public statements. There is a tension between building up support for action against the Iranian nuclear program now and delivering the kind of reassurance that will be necessary once the capability has been acquired.

#### From the DC workshop:

--- Based on patterns of Iranian behavior in the past, there is reason to think that some diplomatic communications may serve to increase Iranian fears about the consequences of its pursuit of a


nuclear capability. These messages, which could be delivered in the course of speeches or less formal interactions, would play on existing Iranian paranoia.

I would be happy to chat in person if you might have 15 minutes to discuss such measures, or any of the other points above.

Yours sincerely, and best, Jackie

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