RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

From:

H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>

Sent: To:

Friday, February 25, 2011 2:22 PM

'JilotyLC@state.gov'

Subject:

Fw: H: Q's scuds, Seif's private strategy, more. Sid

Attachments:

hrc memo qaddafi scuds & strategy for holding on 022511.docx

Pls print.

From: sbwhoeop

sbwhoeop(

Sent: Friday, February 25, 2011 01:59 PM

To: H

Subject: H: Q's scuds, Seif's private strategy, more. Sid

CONFIDENTIAL

February 25, 2011

For: Hillary From: Sid

Re: Qaddafi's Scuds and strategy for holding on

On the morning of February 25, a former official of the government of Muammar Qaddafi stated in confidence that he and other former members of the Qaddafi regime are concerned by the knowledge that the soldiers and officers assigned to the Libyan Army's Scud Missile Battalions remain loyal to Qaddafi. While the issue remains open as to whether or not the Libyan government maintains small quantities of mustard gas and other Weapons of Mass Destruction, Qaddafi's forces can use these Scuds to carry conventional high explosives, and launch random, but destructive attacks against Benghazi, Tobruk or other towns under the control of anti-government forces.

Source Comment: These sources repeated their earlier warning that Qaddafi would not resitate to use all of the resources at his disposal to attack civilian, political, and economic argets if he feels he is on the verge of being defeated by anti-government troops.)

During the afternoon of February 25, Qaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam stated in private that his ather is convinced he can hold power, if he can maintain control of portions of Tripoli for the text ten (10) days. Saif al-Islam states that it is important to remember that his father is still the lead of State in Libya, and that the UN and the major nations of the world are reluctant to lepose a sitting Head of State. (Source Comment: The United States invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan sere as the examples that prove the rule in this case.) The Libyan diplomats erving abroad who remain loyal to Qaddafi have been instructed to press this point with other governments. These diplomats are particularly active in sub Saharan African, and at this point saif al-Islam is pleased with what he considers the rather mild reaction of these states to the riolence used by forces loyal to Qaddafi in suppressing anti-government activities in libya. Saif al-Islam believes that while the leaders of countries like Chad, Benin, and Burkina as must call for an end to violence, they will continue to stop short of statements supporting he demonstrators. By the same token the Organization of African Unity (OAU), after delaying ts response to the violence for several days, has limited its statements to an expression of concern.

The current President of the OAU is Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the President of Equatorial Guinea, who, according to well placed sources, considers himself a friend and supporter of Qaddafi. Mbasogo received support from Libya when he seized power in a violent nilitary coup d'état in 1979, and he has remained loyal to Qaddafi over the years. Mbasogo eceives technical and business advice from Libyan experts, particularly in managing Equatorial Guinea's substantial oil resources.

Since coming to power in 1969 Qaddafi has worked to establish strong relationships with the leads of State in many sub-Saharan African nations. This support has included technical and inancial aid, military support, and private payments to the various Heads of State. According o Saif al-Islam, Qaddfi believes these African states will now continue support him as he deals

with the rebellion in Libya. Well placed sources report that Mbasogo has received millions of lollars in private payments from the Qaddafi regime.

Since 1969, Qaddafi has been one of the only Islamic leaders in North Africa to seek out cordial elations with the nations of sub-Saharan Africa. According to a former official of the Kenyan government, these African states feel that the Islamic nations of North Africa look down on heir southern neighbors and focus most their attention on relations with the Arab states of the Middle East. Libya and Israel are the two countries of North Africa and the Middle East who have invested substantial time, money and personnel resources in supporting these African tates. For its part, Kenya has a history of conflict with Libya rooted in the Cold War, however, his individual notes that even these relations improved after the 2003-2004 Libyan agreement with the Western powers regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Source Comment: The leaders of the OAU states also fear that the wave of anti-corruption mrest that is sweeping North Africa will spread south. This is particularly true in the case of lictators like Mbasogo and Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. However, even elected leaders like South Africa's Jakob Zuma must be concerned because of the economic downturn in their ountries and the rampant corruption that exists across Africa. It is highly unlikely that these African states will support any attempt by the UN, or NATO to organize some form of military esponse to the Libyan situation, including the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya.) iolence continues throughout Tripoli, with those military, and Para military units still loyal to dafi using deadly force against protesters. These forces are being supported by mercenaries 1 the sub-Sahara Africa. The various tribal, civic and political groups continue to form olutionary committees in an effort to begin to organize the parts of the country under the rol of anti-government forces. According to a former government official, these mittees are hoping that the international community will reach out to them and assist in blishing a new government in Libya.

CONFIDENTIAL

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During the afternoon of February 25, Qaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam stated in private that his father is convinced he can hold power, if he can maintain control of portions of Tripoli for the next ten (10) days. Saif al-Islam states that it is important to remember that his father is still the Head of State in Libya, and that the UN and the major nations of the world are reluctant to depose a sitting Head of State. (Source Comment: The United States invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan sere as the examples that prove the rule in this case.) The Libyan diplomats serving abroad who remain loyal to Qaddafi have been instructed to press this point with other governments. These diplomats are particularly active in sub Saharan African, and at this point Saif al-Islam is pleased with what he considers the rather mild reaction of these states to the violence used by forces loyal to Qaddafi in suppressing anti-government activities in Libya. Saif al-Islam believes that while the leaders of countries like Chad, Benin, and Burkina Faso must call for an end to violence, they will continue to stop short of statements supporting the demonstrators. By the same token the Organization of African Unity (OAU), after delaying its response to the violence for several days, has limited its statements to an expression of concern.

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