RELEASE IN PART B6

From:	H <hrod17@clintonemail.com></hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Sent:	Sunday, January 1, 2012 11:47 AM
To:	'ShermanWR@state.gov'; 'Burnswj@state.gov'; 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
Cc:	'millscd@state.gov'
Subject:	Fw: Letter to the Secretary
Attachments:	Letter to President Obama 11 12 11.pdf; Letter to Donilon on TRR (2).pdf

Fyi. Let's discuss the following from Tom Pickering next week. Thanks.

From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov] Sent: Sunday, January 01, 2012 07:27 AM To: H Subject: Fw: Letter to the Secretary

From: Pickering, Thomas R [mailto: Sent: Saturday, December 31, 2011 06:06 PM To: Mills, Cheryl D Subject: Letter to the Secretary

Cheryl:

This letter follows up two conversations with the Secretary and has been sometime in the making. I would be grateful as always for your assistance in getting it to her.

Sincerely and all good wishes for the New Year.

Tom Pickering

Dear Madam Secretary:

Following up our brief talk on Monday the 19th and our previous exchange at the Crisis Group dinner on Iran, I send you these few ideas on how the Administration might take advantage of recent developments to further US interests.

I am attaching for your background two letters that relate to two aspects of our relations with Iran – (1) how we might benefit from following up on the Iranian offer to discuss a cessation of enrichment to 20% in connection with providing fuel elements for the Tehran Research Reactor and (2) how we might work toward better communications to avoid conflict by accident or miscalculation.

Iran has raised again the option of ceasing enrichment of uranium to the level of 20% for use in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) to produce medical isotopes. It seems clear that while Iran can produce material at 20% enrichment, it cannot now and perhaps for some time manufacture the fuel elements which the reactor requires to continue operation. The cessation of enrichment to 20% would be in return for a quantity of fuel elements. The arrangement holds out possibilities for two areas of expansion – (1) getting Iran to contribute its already produced 20% materials to the project and also (2) to agree not to exceed 5% levels of enrichment, the next level below 20% for which they have a putative civil use. Even if Iran were not willing to contribute its currently held quantity of 20% enriched material, I would encourage exploring the offer with the idea of seeking an agreement because the cap on enrichment at 5% is a solid step on the way to our objective of a cessation and can be described as such, and the offer opens the possibility of further meetings on the nuclear question now reinforced by the Iranian announcement of December 31st

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