

RELEASE IN PART  
B5,B6

**From:** Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Saturday, November 17, 2012 6:31 AM  
**To:** H  
**Subject:** Fw: Amidror

Fyi

**From:** Shapiro, Daniel B (Tel Aviv)  
**Sent:** Saturday, November 17, 2012 06:18 AM  
**To:** Shapiro, Daniel B (Tel Aviv); Lempert, Yael; Hale, David M; Patterson, Anne W; 'ssimon [redacted] <'ssimon [redacted]>; 'jabell [redacted] <'jabell [redacted]>; Sullivan, Jacob J; Ratney, Michael A; Dibble, Elizabeth L; Jones, Beth E; Prem G. Kumar; Ryu, Rexon Y; Sherman, Wendy R; Burns, William J; 'dmcdonough [redacted] <dmcdonough [redacted]>  
**Cc:** Goldberger, Thomas H; Sievers, Marc J; 'kcanegallo [redacted] <kcanegallo [redacted]>; 'svinograd [redacted] <svinograd [redacted]>  
**Subject:** RE: Amidror

B6

To a narrower group: My clear impression from these two conversations was that, barring a rocket strike that produces significant casualties or significant new strikes on Tel Aviv, today will not/not be the decision point for a ground operation – although they will be ready by tonight. If they see the Cairo engagements progressing and having any chance of success, I think they will give it time. [redacted]

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They also understand that if and when a time is agreed for a mutual stand-down, there is often a "tail" on the agreement, i.e., the last few rockets that are launched beyond the agreed time. If the "tail" is relatively minor, it does not need to wreck the agreement. If it goes too far, it can wreck it.

**From:** Shapiro, Daniel B (Tel Aviv)  
**Sent:** Saturday, November 17, 2012 1:00 PM  
**To:** Shapiro, Daniel B (Tel Aviv); Jones, Stuart (Amman); Weigold Schultz, Eva A; Lempert, Yael; Bitar, Maher B; Hale, David M; Patterson, Anne W; 'ssimon [redacted] 'jabell [redacted]; Sullivan, Jacob J; Ratney, Michael A; Dibble, Elizabeth L; Jones, Beth E; Prem G. Kumar; Blair, Oni K; Herrup, Andrew R; Ryu, Rexon Y; Pascal, Alexander J (USUN); Holtsnider, James W  
**Cc:** Goldberger, Thomas H; Sievers, Marc J; Gavito, Jennifer D; Hegadorn, Chris S; Schwartz, Jonathan B; Escrogima, Ana A; Ranz, David J; Eussen, Matthew; Lasensky, Scott B; Mack, Jason R; Duwan, Gottlieb J  
**Subject:** RE: Amidror

B6

Some overlap between this chain and another chain. Sorry if you are receiving this twice.

I've spoken to Amidror and Barak in the last hour, following up on POTUS's calls yesterday, and conveying the message from Frank Ricciardone.

Without getting into too much detail, I would say that both 1) appreciate the President's effort to engage with PM Erdogan and President Morsi on this; 2) recognize the opportunity represented by today's consultations in Cairo; and 3) will try to give it enough time to see if it can succeed in producing a stable ceasefire.

They will obviously be looking for some signs of goodwill from the other side to determine if any proposed ceasefire is real -- they note that they observed a pause during PM Kandil's visit to Gaza, whereas Hamas et al fired dozens of rockets during the visit, so they are

wary. They are in direct contact with the Egyptians, of course, and have had some direct contact with the Turks.

Amidror was not enthusiastic about the notion of a "US guarantee" of Israeli action. While being clear that Israel would not violate any terms it agrees to, he worried that the US would be blamed if anything happened that led to a breakdown of the ceasefire. He did not rule it out, and was not giving an official answer, but he considered it unwise.