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RELEASE IN PART 1.4(B),B1,1.4(D),B6

From: Sent: To: Subject: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com> Monday, June 4, 2012 4:56 PM 'monica.hanley Fw: Meeting w Kofi Anan

Pls print.

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 01/29/2016 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on: 05/28/2027

----- Original Message -----From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov] Sent: Monday, May 28, 2012 12:09 PM To: H; Burns, William J <BurnsWJ@state.gov> Subject: FW: Meeting w Kofi Anan

Worth a read -- from Martin.

-----Original Message-----From: Martin Indyk [mailto: Sent: Monday, May 28, 2012 10:32 AM To: Feltman, Jeffrey D; Sullivan, Jacob J Subject: Meeting w Kofi Anan

As Jeff knows, I met with Kofi Anan at his request in Geneva on May 24, 2012. The meeting lasted for almost two hours. I had lunch afterward with Robert Dann, his Australian adviser (Robert normally heads up the UN Mediations Support Unit).

Kofi wanted to see me to get a briefing on the attitude's of Syria's neighbors to the ongoing internal conflict. He explained to me that there was no question in his mind but that Asad was finished but quite entrenched and that it would likely take some time to remove him. The question he was focused on was how to affect a transition to a new interim government in advance of elections for a new government.

Somehow he had to tamp the violence down first - he felt he was making some headway there (this was before the Houla massacre) with the deployment of the UN monitors. He was eagerly awaiting the report from his #2 Jean-Marie Guehenno who was arriving back from Syria where he had been preparing the ground for Kofi's next visit. He said that he had only had a short phone conversation with Jean-Marie from which he understood that large parts of the country were not under Asad's control.

Because the opposition was so divided and politically ineffectual, he wanted to develop a "variable geometry" approach with those neighbors and outside powers who could influence both the regime and its opponents to persuade Assad to stand aside and orchestrate as orderly a transition as possible. With this in mind, he had been speaking with all the main players. He wanted to get from me an assessment of what the regional neighbors might be willing to do. We then proceeded to do a "tour de region."

ISRAEL: He wanted to start with Israel, whence I had just come after meetings with Netanyahu, Dermer, Amos Gilad, Avi Kochavi (new DMI), Amos Yadlin (old DMI) and a phone conversation with Amidror (who had just flown in from Beijing). I told Kofi that they were united in assessing, like him, that Assad had no way back. He had lost all legitimacy. They were also united in believing that B1

They were also

Although they thought they had seen some

B6

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**B**6

cracks among the generals a few months ago, things had settled down and they now judged that for the time being Assad did not have a problem with his army's support.

Nevertheless, as time wore on they feared that	were becoming increasingly	
		1.4(D)
ar	d therefore he didn't see what	at least
for the time being.	raised the memory of	
1		

RABS: He expressed					
preoccupied	and				
	He said	had told hii	m that he thought he had		
				I said that they were	
				I noted that	

lately, because what they

which sounded very much like his own approach. He agreed that he would try to work closely with them.

	I	1.4(D) B1 1.4(B)
United States: I told Kofi that it was my understanding	B^ 1.	1 4(D)
all that, said he had spoken to her about it and was planning to speak to Robert Ford, Fred Hof and afternoon.	He welcomed Ahmed Salman that	
COMMENT: Kofi is very much in his element, back on the international stage and enjoying the act back many of his old lieutenants. I'm told	ion. He has brought	]
He did not come back to center stage in order to international statesmanship. As	as his last act of	
Inherent in such a strategy is He will clearly use whatever opportunity he can to secure the united backing of the Se will be reluctant to go there if it leads to a divided house. That means he'll often be playing for tin the hope that something turns up that he can use to the advantage of his strategy. Before the thinking of reporting in July on one particular issue in his six point plan that would		B1 1.4(D)
Martin		

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