

**From:** "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>

RELEASE IN PART  
B1,1.4(D),B6,B7(E)

**Sent:** 11/19/2012 1:42:55 AM +00:00

**To:** H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

**Subject:** Fw:

**From:** Dennis Ross [mailto: [REDACTED]]

**Sent:** Sunday, November 18, 2012 08:26 PM

**To:** simon, steven N; Sullivan, Jacob J; David Hale [REDACTED]

Schwartz, Jonathan B

**Subject:**

B6

Just got back from Israel today and had long talks with YM. Notwithstanding what is going on with Gaza, he is very focused on NY and the shortage of time. YM was very taken with Jon's ideas—and he wants Tal Becker to come very shortly to work on these with Jon. But he is concerned about how all this will be put into action. November 29 will be upon us very soon. He wants to know if there is a game-plan for acting on these ideas, and if so, who is going to be doing what and how soon. On Jon's language for the resolution idea, YM recognizes that who we might have go to the Palestinians on language refinements is very important. The timing is also very important—and while he wants to have a game-plan in place soon, he feels the mitigation approach with the Pals must come close to the brink. He had in mind the French to approach the Pals at the right time, but I suggested it might be better if the Brits and the French go together.


But I also raised the issue of Gaza and how it fits into all this. On the one hand, Hamas has reminded everyone again that whatever AM does, they can trump him. While I suspect that Gaza makes it harder for AM to give up any idea of postponing, there is the fact

Classified by Director A/GIS/IPS, DoS on 05/30/2017 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on: 05/30/2032

that AM has absolutely no influence on what is happening in Gaza. He would seem to fail on the important criteria of control of over territory and I wonder whether that can at this point play any role in NY. This is still in the realm of tactics.


There is, however, another point on Gaza that I raised with YM—namely, that if the events in Gaza are ongoing and the IDF has moved into Gaza in some form at the time non-member state status is pushed in NY, it is likely to complicate our best efforts, particularly with the Euros. YM took the point but wanted to think about its implications for action.

In the meantime, my own feeling is that Israel will find it hard to keep the forces they have mobilized in a heightened state of readiness for very long. If we don't see a ceasefire in the next couple of days, I suspect the IDF goes in—maybe not like Cast Lead, but in, nonetheless, in some form. There are lots of ironies in the current situation—it is not in Egypt's, Israel's, or Hamas' interest to have this escalate and get out of control. And, yet it may do so because the time for brokering a ceasefire before the Israelis launch some form of ground incursion may be fairly short. If Egypt actually brokers a deal, it would also ironically change the character of the new Egyptian government's relations with Israel.



1.4(D)  
B1

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**Message Headers:**



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B7(E)

B6  
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Subject: Fw:

Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2012 20:42:55 -0500

Message-ID:


[Redacted content]

From: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>

To: <hdr22@clintonemail.com>

[Redacted content]

B6  
B7(E)



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