

From: PIR <preines[redacted]> on behalf of PIR
Sent: Sunday, October 30, 2011 10:09 PM
To: Evergreen; Jake Sullivan
Cc: CDM; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: WaPo

RELEASE IN PART
B5,B6

B6

NEAR DUPLICATE

Both items now fixed

-----Original Message-----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2011 22:08:36
To: 'jake.sullivan[redacted]' <jake.sullivan[redacted]>
'preines[redacted]' <preines[redacted]>
Cc: 'cheryl.mills[redacted]' <cheryl.mills[redacted]>; Huma Abedin<Huma@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Re: WaPo

B6

I'm sure I spoke w HBJ just not for 90 minutes.

----- Original Message -----

From: Jake Sullivan [mailto:jake.[redacted]]
Sent: Sunday, October 30, 2011 09:34 PM
To: preines[redacted] <preines[redacted]>
Cc: H; CDM <cheryl.mills[redacted]>; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: WaPo

B6

It says Juppe in the piece now, so it must have been fixed.

I don't know where he got the 90-minute call with HBJ from. PIR, you might ask him.

On 10/30/11, PIR <preines[redacted]> wrote:

> Jake and I will review, and flag for Joby

>

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
> Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2011 21:01:35
> To: 'preines[redacted]' <preines[redacted]>
> Cc: 'cheryl.mills[redacted]' <cheryl.mills[redacted]>
> 'jake.sullivan[redacted]' <jake.sullivan[redacted]>; Huma
> Abedin<Huma@clintonemail.com>
> Subject: Re: WaPo

B6

B6

> There are a few factual errors--biggest is that the 4-way call was w Juppe
> not Sarkozy. Did I talk for 90 minutes w HBJ? Can you review for other
> issues? [redacted]

B5

>

>

> ----- Original Message -----

> From: PIR [mailto:[redacted]]
> Sent: Sunday, October 30, 2011 08:27 PM
> To: H
> Cc: CDM <cheryl.mills[redacted]>; Jake Sullivan <jake.sullivan[redacted]>
> Huma Abedin

B6

> Subject: WaPo

> Below is the front page of tomorrow's Washington Post.

B5

> Clinton's key role in Libya conflict

> By Joby Warrick

> Washington Post

> Sunday, Oct 30, 2011

> TRIPOLI, Libya — At 5:45 p.m. on March 19, three hours before the official
> start of the air campaign over Libya, four French Rafale jet fighters
> streaked across the Mediterranean coastline to attack a column of tanks
> heading toward the rebel city of Benghazi. The jets quickly obliterated
> their targets—and in doing so nearly upended the international alliance
> coming to Benghazi's rescue.

> France's head start on the air war infuriated Italy's prime minister, who
> accused Paris of upstaging NATO. Silvio Berlusconi warned darkly of cutting
> access to Italian air bases vital to the alliance's warplanes.

> "It nearly broke up the coalition," said a European diplomat who had a
> front-row seat to the events and who spoke on the condition of anonymity to
> discuss sensitive matters between allies. Yet, the rift was quickly patched,
> thanks to a frenzied but largely unseen lobbying effort that kept the
> coalition from unraveling in its opening hours.

> "That," the diplomat said, "was Hillary."

> Seven months later, with longtime American nemesis Moammar Gaddafi dead and
> Libya's onetime rebels now in charge, the coalition air campaign has emerged
> as a foreign policy success for the Obama administration and its most famous
> Cabinet member, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton.

> Some Republicans derided the effort as "leading from behind" while many
> others questioned why President Obama was entangling the nation in another
> overseas military campaign that had little strategic urgency and scant
> public support. But with NATO operations likely ending this week, U.S.
> officials and key allies are offering a detailed new defense of the approach
> and Clinton's pivotal role — both within a divided Cabinet and a fragile,
> assembled-on-the-fly international alliance.

> What emerges from these accounts is a picture of Clinton using her mixture
> of political pragmatism and tenacity to referee spats among NATO partners,
> secure crucial backing from Arab countries and tutor rebels on the fine
> points of message-management.

> Clinton, in an interview, acknowledged "periods of anguish and buyer's
> remorse" during the seven months of the campaign. But she said, "We set into
> motion a policy that was on the right side of history, on the right side of
> our values, on the right side of our strategic interests in the region."

> From skeptic to advocate

> During the initial weeks of unrest in Libya, Clinton was among the White
> House officials clinging to fading hopes that Gaddafi might fall without any
> help from the West.

> From the first armed resistance on Feb. 18 until March 9, the disorganized
> opposition movement appeared to be on a roll, taking control of Libyan

> cities from Benghazi to Brega and Misurata on the Mediterranean coast. But
> in a single, bloody week, Gaddafi loyalists turned rebel gains into a rout,
> crushing resistance in towns across Libya before marshaling forces for a
> final drive against Benghazi, the last opposition stronghold.
>
> With Gaddafi threatening to slaughter Benghazi's population "like rats," the
> rebel leaders pleaded for Western intervention, including a no-fly zone. The
> appeal garnered support in Europe, particularly among French and British
> officials who began working on the text of a U.N. Security Council
> resolution that would authorize the use of military against the Libyan
> autocrat.
>
> But the idea of a no-fly zone drew skepticism from within the Obama White
> House. Some officials, most notably then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates,
> opposed military intervention. And Clinton, during two trips to Europe in
> early March, made clear that Washington was not eager to lead a politically
> risky military campaign against yet another Muslim country.
>
> She was loath to see Gaddafi trouncing aspiring democrats in his country and
> menacing fledgling governments in neighboring Egypt and Tunisia. But Clinton
> told aides, who later described the administration's inner workings on the
> condition of anonymity, that the hard reality was that a no-fly zone, by
> itself, might make things worse.
>
> "We were opposed to doing something symbolic - that was the worst of both
> worlds," said one of the aides. "We would have crossed the threshold [of
> intervention] without accomplishing anything."
>
> Clinton had drawn up a list of conditions that included a formal request by
> Arab states for intervention. On March 12, the 22-nation Arab League did
> exactly that, voting to ask for U.N. approval of a military no-fly zone over
> Libya.
>
> The next day, on March 13, Clinton traveled to Paris for a meeting with
> foreign ministers from the Group of 8 countries. In the marbled conference
> rooms of Paris's Westin Hotel, she sat down for the first time with Mahmoud
> Jibril, the interim leader of Libya's fledgling Transitional National
> Council. She also met privately with Gulf diplomats to gauge Arab
> willingness to send warplanes to enforce a possible no-fly zone. And she
> huddled with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, whose country's veto
> potentially could block any intervention effort at the United Nations.
>
> "When she went to Paris, there were no instructions from the White House on
> whether to support strong action in Libya," said a senior State Department
> official. Yet, within three days, the official said, Clinton began to see a
> way forward.
>
> "This was an opportunity for the United States to respond to an Arab request
> for help," the official said. "It would increase U.S. standing in the Arab
> world, and it would send an important signal for the Arab Spring movement."
>
> By March 15, when Clinton spoke with President Obama by phone to brief him
> on the meetings, she had become a "strong advocate" for U.S. intervention,
> one administration official said. The president, who had been weighing
> arguments from a sharply divided Cabinet for several days, sided with his
> secretary of state.
>
> Clinton was halfway across the Atlantic on March 17 when a resolution went
> before the U.N. Security Council authorizing a Libyan intervention with "all
> necessary means" - U.N. code for military force. From the plane, Clinton
> worked the phones while the administration's ambassador to the United
> Nations, Susan Rice, met with counterparts to line up votes and to ensure

> that both Russia and China would withhold their vetoes.
>
> The resolution passed, 10 to 0, with five countries abstaining.
>
> Keeping alliance together
>
> The French air attack that so angered the Italians two days later grew from
> French President Nicolas Sarkozy's desire to launch an early, symbolic
> strike before the official start of the campaign. The White House did not
> object - Sarkozy had been a key advocate of military intervention, and
> French leadership on Libya had boosted the president's popularity at home.
>
> But the other allies were wary. France had floated the idea of a command
> structure distinct from NATO, that would include some Arabs while excluding
> Germany and other opponents of intervention. Italy and Turkey, meanwhile,
> insisted on NATO control and threatened to boycott any other arrangement.
> The early French attack deepened suspicions by the two countries that
> Sarkozy harbored "hidden agendas and different agendas," as Turkish
> President Abdullah Gul would later say.
>
> With the alliance threatening to unravel, Clinton focused on damage control.
> She spent hours on the phone and in person with Berlusconi and Italian
> Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, who eventually played crucial roles in
> providing air bases as staging grounds for attacks.
>
> The details of the military command were ultimately decided in a four-way
> conference call between Clinton and Sarkozy, British Foreign Secretary
> William Hague and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.
>
> Yet even as that conflict cooled, another one was erupting.
>
> Several Arab states, including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan,
> had agreed to supply warplanes and pilots to the coalition in a symbolic
> show of support by Muslim countries for military action against Libya.
>
> But three days into the bombing campaign, the Arabs appeared to be backing
> away, concerned by the possibility of a backlash in their own countries and
> angered by U.S. criticism of the Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain
> to put down an uprising there. By March 24, Qatar's four promised jets still
> had not yet made an appearance over Libya, and the United Arab Emirates and
> Jordan had announced that they would provide only humanitarian assistance.
>
> In a bid to woo the Arabs back into the alliance, Clinton spoke for 90
> minutes by phone with Sheik Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani, the Qatari foreign
> minister, while also making repeated calls to the UAE's Sheikh Abdullah bin
> Zayed Al Nahyan and to Jordan's King Abdullah II.
>
> "This is important to the United States, it's important to the president and
> it's important to me, personally," Clinton told Arab leaders, according to
> one of the State Department officials.
>
> On March 25, Qatari-flagged Mirage 2000 jets flew their first sorties over
> Libya. All three countries eventually would supply military aircraft and
> experienced pilots to the Libyan campaign.
>
> Getting past stalemate
>
> The NATO-led air campaign quickly pushed Gaddafi's forces from Benghazi. But
> by May, the alliance's planes were patrolling front lines that barely moved.
>
> In Washington and in Europe, the word "stalemate" began to creep into
> opinion columns as lawmakers, skeptical of U.S. policy in Libya, began

> threatening to block funds for military operations there. Meanwhile, a cash
> crunch also loomed for the rebels, who were unable to sell oil and were
> legally blocked from tapping into Gaddafi's overseas bank accounts. By early
> July, they had run out of money for weapons, food and other critical
> supplies.
>
> Clinton, ignoring the advice of the State Department's lawyers, convinced
> Obama to grant full diplomatic recognition to the rebels, a move that
> allowed the Libyans access to billions of dollars from Gaddafi's frozen
> accounts. At a meeting in Istanbul on July 15, she pressed 30 other Western
> and Arab governments to make the same declaration.
>
> "She brought everyone over at once," said a Western diplomat who attended
> the Istanbul meeting.
>
> Tripoli fell five weeks later, after a relatively small U.S. expenditure of
> \$1 billion, and with no regular U.S. troops on the ground. In the air
> campaign, U.S. jets flew less than a third of the missions but supplied
> critical support in air refueling, surveillance and logistics for sorties
> flown by more than a dozen other nations.
>
> Still, no hero's welcome
>
> The political benefits to Clinton and Obama remain far from clear. To many
> Libyans and others in the Muslim world, the lasting impression from the
> campaign is that of a reluctant America, slow to intervene and happy to let
> others take the lead. While Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron
> were given heroes' welcomes during victory laps through Libya last month,
> Clinton was confronted during her recent Tripoli visit with questions about
> why the United States had not done more.
>
> "Many people feel that the United States has taken a back seat," one student
> told her.
>
> U.S. critics of the administration's policy say the administration's Libya
> policy, while ultimately successful, is emblematic of a slow and haphazard
> response to the Arab Spring uprisings.
>
> "Earlier intervention might have prevented the conflict from ever reaching
> that dangerous precipice," said Michael Singh, a former senior director for
> Middle East affairs at the National Security Council under President George
> W. Bush. "There is a difference between building an international consensus
> and following one."
>
> Clinton acknowledged that history's verdict on the Libyan intervention was
> far from assured and said that NATO's formula for aiding a popular uprising
> against a dictatorship may not be easily applied elsewhere.
>
> "We need to assess where we are, what we accomplished together, what the
> costs were," Clinton said. Meanwhile, she said, "we do have to be more agile
> and flexible in dealing with a lot of the challenges we face, and we should
> be unembarrassed about that."