

RELEASE IN PART
B6

Fw: Follow Up to Meeting

From: Jack Keane [redacted] B6

To: Hillary Clinton hr15@att.blackberry.net

CC: Jack Keane [redacted]

Subject: Fw: Follow Up to Meeting

Hillary

Enjoyed seeing you on Friday in your regal surroundings. So delighted you are there!! Rich and I did not have much time, do to his schedule, so I passed the following to him. I also did not want to overload him and stuck to the most critical. All the best, Jack

Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

-----Original Message-----

From: jkeane [redacted]

Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 23:52:09

To:

Subject: Follow Up to Meeting

Ambassador,

Enjoyed seeing you again on Friday. Know you were rushed and we were not able to talk very much so I thought I'd summarize some of the key points on Afghanistan:

1. Strategy- overall strategy and end state does not exist. What do we want to see in 5 and 10 years that is realistic and achievable. While NATO complicates this, to be certain, the US should drive it, and its absence undermines a much needed unity of effort. Our strategy must result in the development of a Joint/Combined Campaign plan which is the driver for our entire effort in Afghanistan. This will take time to develop because it requires collective understanding and making difficult choices. We do not have one now, because it is very hard to do, but essential for success.

___civil/military strategy also does not exist. Most of our efforts in a counter insurgency are largely non-military and we most go forward with an integrated civil/military strategy with buy-in from the GOA.

---military strategy- it should not have to be stated, but we need a military strategy, to defeat the insurgency. Throwing troops and resources at the issue is not the solution and is what paralyzed USG efforts in Iraq for 3 years. Passing it to the ANA, while a strategy, is doomed to fail. Only a partnership with the ANA conducting side by side operations, using proven counterinsurgency practices, has a chance to succeed. Fighting a rural insurgency is different than an urban insurgency, as was the case in Iraq. E.G. the Afghans are considerably less tolerant to occupation and damage to their villages and towns than were Iraqis. We should not conclude we don't protect the people or just leave it to the Afghans. It does suggest a thoughtful Afghan/Nato approach which considers this reality.

2. Leadership- Having the right leaders to implement the strategy is crucial. POTUS has right to expect the very best we have, particularly, when we are conducting a counter-offensive to regain the offensive momentum, beginning in 2009.

--- As such, Mckiernan while smart and a solid guy, is too cautious and not aggressive enough, to drive the strategy, performance, and the results needed. His lack of interpersonal skills handicaps the command from getting the much needed support from key influencers, both in and outside USG, which is vital to maintain public support for our efforts. Additionally, his staff is much too small to develop a Jt Campaign Plan, much less oversee its execution. His headquarters needs a significant staff plus up to meet the demands. What is truly missing is an operational headquarters to fight the war, which would be subordinate to Mckiernan's Hqs and all the tactical Hqs would work for this commander. This should be a corps level headquarters with a 3 star commander and his complete staff. This HQs should deploy in 2009 and rotate every year. --- Carl Eikenberry is clearly a step in the right direction as Ambassador. His close working relationship with the NATO commander cannot be overstated.

---Karzai is increasingly unpopular due to pervasive corruption and ineffectiveness. As such it is spilling over on us because he is perceived as our surrogate. If reelected and allowed to continue current practices it is hard to imagine a more worse scenario as he executes another 5 year term. We can encourage other candidates to run and monitor the election to insist on openness and fairness(and provide personal security). Or we could cut a deal with Karzai and insist on substantive improvement in exchange for our continued support. We must do something because the status quo dooms us.

3. Resources. We must know what we want based on sound analysis and it should be comprehensive.

---US/NATO force increase(how much and what for)

---ANF/ANA must ramp up significantly(closer to 300K). Requires trainers, money and time(note: we produced 125K ISF in Iraq in one calendar year, 2007, and they were invaluable)

---development- need a strategy and plan first, that makes sense and has GOA buy in, then apply the resources, with performance objectives and oversight. ---Timing. Currently, we are rushing additional brigades to Afghanistan without a clear strategy and with no Jt Campaign Plan to drive their operations. NOTE: if we gave Gen Casey in Iraq more troops, we still fail, because we were executing the wrong strategy. We should spend 2009 getting the strategy correct, putting the JT Campaign Plan together, deploying the Corps Hqs and then, finally, deploying the troops after we have set the conditions for their success.

Recognize there are many ancillary issues that are vital for success, as well, which I am not documenting. Frankly, if we do not get the strategy right with the best leaders available and then apply the resources necessary for the strategy to succeed, then, we fail.

If I can ever be of assistance, do not hesitate. Please protect this confidential info.

All the best, Jack Keane

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