the runaway general

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McChrystal works aboard a C-130 between visits to the battlefield in March.

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RELEASE IN FULL

RUNAWAY GENERAL

ow'd i get screwed into going to this dinner?" demands Gen. Stanley McChrystal. It's a Thursday night in mid-April, and the commander of all U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan is sitting in a four-star suite at the Hôtel Westminster in Paris. He's in France to sell his new war strategy to our NATO allies – to keep up the fiction,in essence, that we actually *have* allies. Since McChrystal took over a year ago, the Afghan war has become the exclusive property of the United States. Opposition to the war has already toppled the Dutch government, forced the resignation of

Germany's president and sparked both Canada and the Netherlands to announce the withdrawal of their 4,500 troops. McChrystal is in Paris to keep the French, who have lost more than 40 soldiers in Afghanistan, from going all wobbly on him.

"The dinner comes with the position, sir," says his chief of staff, Col. Charlie Flynn.

McChrystal turns sharply in his chair. "Hey, Charlie," he asks, "does this come with the position?"

McChrystal gives him the middle finger.

The general stands and looks around the suite that his traveling staffof 10 has converted into a full-scale operations center. The tables are crowded with silver Panasonic Toughbooks, and blue cables crisscross the hotel's thick carpet, hooked up to satellite dishes to provide encrypted phone and e-mail communications. Dressed in off-the-rack civilian casual blue tie, button-down shirt, dress slacks - McChrystal is way out of his comfort zone. Paris, as one of his advisers says, is the "most anti-McChrystal city you can imagine." The general hates fancy restaurants, rejecting any place with candles on the tables as too "Gucci." He prefers Bud Light Lime (his favorite beer) to Bordeaux, Talladega Nights (his favorite movie) to Jean-Luc Godard. Besides. the public eve has never been a place where McChrystal felt comfortable: Before President Obama put him in charge of the war in Afghanistan, he spent five years running the Pentagon's most secre tive black ops.

"What's the update on the Kandahar bombing?" McChrystal asks Flynn. The city has been rocked by two massive car bombs in the past day alone, calling into question the general's assurances that he can wrest it from the Taliban.

Writer Michael Hastings has reported from Iraq and Afghanistan for two years. This is his firststory for RS. "We have two KIAs, but that hasn't been confirmed," Flynn says.

McChrystal takes a final look around the suite. At 55, he is gaunt and lean, not unlike an older version of Christian Bale in *Rescue Dawn*. His slate-blue eyes have the unsettling ability to *drill down* when they lock on you. If you've fucked up or disappointed him, they can destroy your soul without the need for him to raise his voice.

"I'd rather have my ass kicked by a roomful of people than go out to this dinner," McChrystal says.

He pauses a beat. "Unfortunately," he adds, "no one in

this room could do it." With that, he's out the door. "Who's he going to dinner with?" I ask

one of his aides. "Some French minister," the aide tells

me. "It's fucking gay." The next morning, McChrystal and his

team gather to prepare for a speech he is giving at the École Militaire, a French military academy. The general prides himself on being sharper and ballsi er t han a nvone else, but h is brashness comes with a price: Although McChrvs tal has been in charge of the war for only a year, in that short time he has managed to piss offalmost everyone with a stake in the conflict.Last fall, during the question-and-answer session following a speech he gave in London, McChrystal dismissed the counterterrorism strate gy being advocated by Vice President Joe Biden as "shortsighted," saving it would lead to a state of "Chaos-istan." The remarks earned him a smackdown from the president himself, who summoned the general to a terse private meeting aboard Air Force One. The message to McChrys tal seemed clear: Shut the fuck up, and keep a lower profile.

Now, flipping through printout cards of his speech in Paris, McChrystal wonders aloud what Biden question he might get today, and how he should respond. "I never know what's going to pop out until

I'm up there, that's the problem," he says. Then, unable to help themselves, he and his staffimagine the general dismissing the vice president with a good one-liner. "Are you asking about Vice President Biden?" McChrystal says with a laugh. "Who's that?"

"Biden?" suggests a top adviser. "Did you say: Bite Me?"

hen barack^L obama entered the Oval Office he immediately set out to deliver on his most important campaign promise on foreign policy: to refocus the war in Afghanistan on what led us to invade in the first place. "I want the American people to understand," he an nounced in March 2009. "We have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt. dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afchanistan." He ordered another 21,000 troops to Kabul the largest increase since the war began in 2001. Taking the advice of both the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also fired Gen. David Mc-Kiernan - then the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan - and replaced him with a man he didn't know and had met only briefly: Gen. Stanley McChrys tal. It was the firsttime a top general had been relieved from duty during wartime in more than 50 years, since Harry Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur at the height of the Korean War.

Even though he had voted for Obama, McChrystal and his new commander in chief failed from the outset to connect. The general first encountered Obama a week after he took office, when the president met with a dozen senior military officialisn a room at the Pentagon known as the Tank. According to sourc es familiar with the meeting, McChrys tal thought Obama looked "uncomfort able and intimidated" by the roomful of military brass. Their first one-on-one meeting took place in the Oval Officefour months later, after McChrystal got the Afghanistan job, and it didn't go much better. "It was a 10-minute photo op," savs an adviser to McChrvstal. "Obama clearly didn't know anything about him, who he was. Here's the guy who's going to run his fucking war, but he didn't seem very engaged. The Boss was pretty disappointed."

From the start, McChrystal was determined to place his personal stamp on Afghanistan, to use it as a laboratory for a controversial military strategy known ascounterinsurgency. COIN, as the theory is known, is the new gospel of the Pentagon brass, a doctrine that attempts to square the military's preference for hightech violence with the demands of fighting protracted wars in failed states. COIN calls for sending huse numbers of ground troops to not only destroy the enemy, but to live among the civilian population and slowly rebuild, or build from scratch, another nation's government – a process that even its staunchest advocates admit requires years, if not decades, to achieve. The theory essentially rebrands the military, expanding its authority (and its funding) to encompass the diplomatic and political sides of warfare: Think the Green Berets as an armed Peace Corps. In 2006, after Gen. David Petra-

eus beta-tested the theory during his "surge" in Iraq, it quickly gained a hardcore following of think-tankers, journalists, military officers and civilian officialsNick named "COINdinistas" for their cultish zeal, this influential cadre believed the doctrine would be the perfect solution for Afghani stan All they needed was ageneral with enough charisma and political savvy to implement it As McChrystal leaned on Obama to ramp up the war, he did it with the same

fearlessness he used to track down terrorists in Iraq: Figure out how your enemy operates, be faster and more ruthless than everybody else, then take the fuckers out. After arriving in Afghanistan last June, the general conducted his own policy review, ordered up by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The now-infamous report was leaked to the press, and its conclusion was dire; If we didn't send another 40,000 troops - swelling the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan by nearly half - we were in danger of "mission failure." The White House was furious. McChr ystal, they felt, was trying to bully Obama, opening him up to charges of being weak on national security unless he did what the general wanted. It was Obama versus the Pentagon, and the Pentagon was determined to kick the president's ass.

Last fall, with his top general calling for more troops, Obama launched a three-month review to re-evaluate the strategy in Afghanistan. "I found that time painful." McChrvstal tells mein one of several lengthy interviews, "I was selling an unsellable position." For the general, it was a crash course in Beltway politics - a battle that pitted him against experienced Washington insiders like Vice President Biden, who argued that a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan would plunge America into a military quagmire without weakening international terrorist networks. "The entire COIN strategy is a fraud perpetuated on the American people," says Douglas Macgregor, a retired colonel and

leading critic of counterinsurgency who attended West Point with McChrystal. "The idea that we are going to spend a trillion dollars to reshape the culture of the Islamic world is utter nonsense." In the end, however, McChrystal got

almost exactly what he wanted. On December 1st, in a speech at West Point, the president laid out all the reasons why fighting the war in Afghanistan is a bad idea: It's expensive; we're in an economic crisis; a decade-long commit-



the general's team makes jokes about the VP. 'biden?" laughs to P aide. 'did you sayb ite me?"

ment would sap American power; Al Qaeda has shifted its base of operations to Pakistan. Then, without ever using the words "victory" or "win," Obama announced that he would send an addition al 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, almost as many as McChrystal had requested. The president had thrown his weight, however hesitantly, behind the counterinsurgency crowd.

Today, as McChrystal gears up for an offensive in southern Afghanistan, the prospects for any kind of success look bleak. In June, the death toll for U.S. troops passed 1,000, and the number of IEDs has doubled. Spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the fifth-poorest country on earth has failed to win over the civilian population, whose attitude toward U.S. troops ranges from intenselyar y topenly hostile. The biggest military operation of the vear – a ferocious offensive that began in February to retake the southern town of Marja - continues to drag on, prompting McChrystal himself torefer toit as a "bleeding ulcer." In June, Afghanistan officiallyoutpaced Vietnam as the longest war in American history - and Obama has quietly begun to back away from the deadline he set for withdrawing U.S. troops in July of next year. The president finds himself stuck in something even more insane than a quagmire: a quagmire he knowingly

walked into, even though it's precisely the kind of gigantic, mind-numbing, multigenerational nation-build ing project he explicitly said he didn't want.

Even those who support McChrystal and his strategy of counterinsurgen cy know that whatever the general manages to accomplish in Afghanistan, it's going tolook more like Vietnam than Desert Storm. "It's not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win," says Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville, who serves as chief of operations for


McChrystal. "This is going to end in an argument."

he night after his speech in Paris, McChrystal and his staff head to Kitty O'Shea's, an Irish pub catering to tourists, around the corner from the hotel. His wife, Annie, has joined him for a rare visit: Since the I raq War began in 2003, she has seen her husband less than 30 days a year. Though it is his and Annie's 33rd wedding anni versary. McChrystal has invited his inner circle along for dinner and drinks at the "least Gucci" place his staff could find. His wife isn't surprised. "He once took me to a Jack in the Box when I was dressed in formalwear," she says with a laugh.

The general's staffis a handpicked col ection of killers, spies, geniuses, patriots, political operators and outright maniacs. There's a former head of British Special Forces, two Navy Seals, an Afghan Special Forces commando, a lawyer, two fighterpilots and at least two dozen com bat veterans and counterinsurgency experts. They jokingly refer to themselves as Team America, taking the name from the South Park-esque sendup of military cluelessness, and they pride themselves on their can-do attitude and their disdain for authority. After arriving in Kabul last summer. Team America set about chang ing the culture of the International Security Assistance Force, as the NATOled mission is known. (U.S. soldiers had taken to deriding ISAF as short for "I

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Suck at Fighting" or "In Sandals and Flip-Flops.") McChrystal banned alcohol on base, kicked out Burger King and other symbols of American excess, expanded the morning briefing to include thou sands of officersand refashioned the com mand center into a Situational Awareness Room, a free-flowing information hub modeled after Mayor Mike Bloomberg's offices n New York. He also set a manic pace for his staff, becoming legendary for sleeping four hours a night, running seven miles each morning, and eating one meal a day. (In the month I spend around the general, I witness him eating only once.) It's a kind of superhuman narrative that has built up around him, a staple in almost every media profile as if the ability to go without sleep and food translates into the possibility of a man single-handedly winning the war.

By midnight at Kitty O'Shea's, much of Team America is completely shitfaced. Two officersdo an Irish jig mixed with steps from a traditional Afghan wedding dance, while McChrystal's top advisers lock arms and sing a slurred song of their own invention. "Afghanistan!" They bellow. "Afghanistan!" They call it their Afghanistan song. McChrystal steps away from the circle, observing his team. "All these men," he tells me. "I'd die for them. And they'd die for me."

The assembled men may look and sound like a bunch of combat veterans letting off steam, but in fact this tight-knit group represents the most powerful force shaping U.S. policy in Afghanistan, While McChrystal and his men are in indisput able command of all military aspects of the war, there is no equivalent position on the diplomatic or political side. Instead, an assortment of administration players compete over the Afghan portfolio: U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Special Representativeto Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke. National Security Advisor Jim Jones and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, not to mention 40 or so other coalition ambassadors and a host of talking heads who try to insert themselves into the mess, from John Kerry to John Mc-Cain. This diplomatic incoherence has effectively allowed McChrystal's team to call the shots and hampered efforts to build a stable and credible government in Afghanistan. "It jeopardizes the mission," says Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who sup-

ports McChrystal. "The military cannot by itself create governance reform."

Part of the problem is structural: The Defense Department budget exceeds \$600 billion a year, while the State Department receives only \$50 billion. But part of the problem is personal: In private. Team McChrvstal likes to talk shit about many of Obama's top people on the diplomatic side. One aide calls Jim Jones, a retired four-star general and veteran of the Cold War, a "clown" who remains "stuck in 1985." Politicians like McCain and Kerry, says another aide, "turn up, have a meeting with Karzai, criticize him at the airport press conference, then get back for the Sunday talk shows. Frankly, it's not ver v helpful." Only Hillar v Clinton receives good reviews from McChrystal's inner circle. "Hillary had Stan's back during the strategic review," says an adviser. "She said, 'If Stan wants it, give him what he needs '

McChrystal reserves special skepticism for Holbrooke, the officialn charge of reintegrating the Taliban. "The Boss says he's like a wounded animal," says a member of the general's team. "Holbrooke keeps hearing rumors that he's going to get fired, so that makes him dangerous. He's a brilliant guy, but he just comes in, pulls on a lever, whatever he can grasp onto. But this is COIN, and you can't just have someone yanking on shit."

At one point on his trip to Paris, Mc-Chrystal checks his BlackBerry. "Oh, not another e-mail from Holbrooke," he groans. "I don't even want to open it." He clicks on the message and reads the salutation out loud, then stuffs the BlackBerr y back in his pocket, not bothering to conceal his annovance.

"Make sure you don't get any of that on your leg," an aide jokes, referring to the e-mail.

y far the most crucial - and strained - relationship is between McChrystal and Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador. According to those close to the two men, Eikenberry - a retired three-star general who served in Afghan istan in 2002 and 2005 - can't stand that his former subordinate is now calling the shots. He's also furious that McChrystal, backed by NATO's allies, refused to put Eikenberry in the pivotal role of viceroy in Afghanistan, which would have made him the diplomatic equivalent of the general. The job instead went to Brit ish Ambassador Mark Sedwill - a move that effectively increased McChrystal's influenceover diplomacy by shutting out a powerful rival. "In reality, that position needs to be filled by an American for it to have weight," says a U.S. officialfamiliar with the negotiations.

The relationship was further strained in January, when a classified cable that Eikenberry wrote was leaked to *The New* York *Times*. The cable was as scathing as it was prescient. The ambassador offered a brutal critique of McChrystal's strategy, dismissed President Hamid Karzai as "not an adequate strategic partner," and cast doubt on whether the counterinsurgency plan would be "sufficientto deal with Al Qaeda. "We will become more deeply engaged here with no way to extricate ourselves," Eikenberry warned, "short of allowing the country to descend again into lawlessness and chaos."

McChrystal and his team were blindsided by the cable. "I like Karl, I've known him for years, but they'd never said anything like that to us before," says McChrystal, who adds that he felt "betrayed" by the leak. "Here's one that covers his flankfor the history books. Now if we fail, they can say, I told you so."

The most striking example of McChr ystal's usurpation of diplomatic policy ishis handling of Karzai. It is McChrystal, not diplomats like Eikenberry or Holbrooke, who enjoys the best relationship with the man America is relying on to lead Afghanistan. The doctrine of counterinsurgency requires a credible government.

and since Karzai is not considered cred - | ible by his own people, McChrystal has worked hard to make him so. Over the past few months, he has accompanied the president on more than 10 trips around the country, standing beside him at polit ical meetings or shuras in Kandahar. In February, the day before the doomed offensive in Marja, McChrystal even drove over to the president's palace to get him to sign off on what would be the largest mil itary operation of the year. Karzai's staff, however, insisted that the president was sleeping off acold and could not be dis turbed. After several hours of haggling, McChrvstal finally enlisted the aid of Afghanistan's defense minister, who persuaded Karzai's people to wake the president from his nap.

This is one of the central flaws with McChrystal's counterinsurgency strat -

mcchrystal isn'tjustn charge on the battl efiel d: he al so calls the diPl omatic shots.

egy: The need to build a credible government puts us at the mercy of whatev er tin-pot leader we've backed - a danger that Eikenberry explicitly warned about in his cable. Even Team McChrystal privately acknowledges that Karzai is a lessthan-ideal partner. "He's been locked up in his palace the past year," laments one of the general's top advisers. At times, Karzai himself has actively undermined McChrystal's desire to put him in charge. During a recent visit to Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Karzai met three U.S. soldiers who had been wounded in Uruzgan province. "General," he called out to McChrystal, "I didn't even know we were fighting in Uruzgan!"

rowing up as a military brat, McChrystal exhibited the mixture of brilliance and cockiness that would follow him throughout his career. fought in Korea and Vietnam, retiring as a two-star general, and his four brothers all joined the armed services. Moving around to different bases, McChrystal took solace in baseball, a sport in which he made no pretense of hiding his superiority: In Little League, he would call out strikes to the crowd before whipping a fastball down the middle.

McChrvstal entered West Point in 1972, when the U.S. military was close to its all-time low in popularity. His class was the last to graduate before the acad emv started to admit women. The "Prison on the Hudson." as it was known then. was a potent mix of testosterone, hooliganism and reactionary patriotism. Cadets repeatedly trashed the mess hall in food fights and birthdays were celebrat ed with a tradition called "rat fucking," which often left the birthday boy outside in the snow or mud, covered in shaving cream. "It was pretty out of control." says Lt. Gen. David Barno, a classmate who went on to serve as the top commander in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005. The class, filled with what Barno calls "huge talent" and "wild-eyed teenagers with a strong sense of idealism," also produced Gen. Ray Odierno, the current command er of U.S. forces in I rad.

The son of a general, McChrystal was also a ringleader of the campus dissi dents - a dual role that taught him how to thrive in a rigid, top-down environ ment while thumbing his nose at author ity every chance he got. He accumulat ed more than 100 hours of demerits for drinking, partying and insubordination - a record that his classmates boasted made him a "century man." One class mate, who asked not to be named, recalls finding McChrystal passed out in the shower after downing a case of beer he had hidden under the sink. The trouble making almost got him kicked out, and he spent hours subjected to forced march es in the Area, a paved courtvard where unruly cadets were disciplined. "I'd come visit, and I'd end up spending most of my time in the library, while Stan was in the Area," recalls Annie, who began dating McChrystal in 1973.

McChr ystal wound up ranking 298 out of a class of 855, a serious underachieve ment for a man widely regarded as bril liant. His most compelling work was extracurricular: As managing editor of The Pointer, the West Point literary magazine, McChr vstal wrote seven short stories that eerily foreshadow many of the issues he would confront in his career. In one tale, a fictional officecomplains about the dif ficultyof training foreign troops to fight: in another, a 19-year-old soldier kills a boy he mistakes for a terrorist. In "Brink man's Note," a piece of suspense fiction, the unnamed narrator appears to be trying to stop a plot to assassinate the president. It turns out, however, that the narrator himself is the assassin, and he's able to infiltrate the White House: "The Pres ident strode in smiling. From the right coat pocket of the raincoat | carried, | slowly drew forth my 32-caliber pistol. In Brinkman's failure. I had succeeded."

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ALLIES

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RUNAWAY GENERAL I

After graduation, 2nd Lt. Stanley Mc-Chrystal entered an Army that was all but broken in the wake of Vietnam. "We really felt we were a peacetime generation," he recalls. "There was the Gulf War, but even that didn't feel like that big of a deal." So McChrystal spent his career where the action was: He enrolled in Special Forces school and became a regimental commander of the 3rd Ranger Battalion in 1986. It was a dangerous position, even in peacetime - nearly two dozen Rangers were killed in training accidents during the Eighties. It was also an unorthodox career path: Most soldiers who want to climb the ranks to general don't go into the Rangers. Displaying a penchant for transforming systems he considers outdated. McChrvstal set out to revolutionize the training regime for the Rangers. He introduced mixed martial arts, required every soldier to quali fy with night-vision goggles on the rifle range and forced troops to build up their endurance with weekly marches involving heavy backpacks.

In the late 1990s, McChrystal shrewdly improved his inside game, spending a year at Harvard's Kennedy School of Gov ernment and then at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he co-authored a treatise on the merits and drawbacks of humanitarian interventionism. But as he moved up through the ranks, McChrystal relied on the skills he had learned as a troublemaking kid at West Point: knowing precisely how far he could go in a rigid military hierarchy without getting tossed out. Being a highly intelligent badass, he discovered, could take you far - especial ly in the political chaos that followed Sep tember 11th, "He was very focused," says Annie. "Even as a young officethe seemed to know what he wanted to do. I don't think his personality has changed in all these years."

visome accounts inc-Chrystal's career should have been over at least two times by now. As Pentagon spokesman during the invasion of Iraq, the general seemed more like a White House mouthpiece than an up-and-com ing commander with a reputation for speaking his mind. When Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made his infamous "stuffhappens" remark during the looting of Baghdad, McChrystal backed him up. A few days later, he echoed the president's Mission Accomplished gaffe by insisting that major combat operations in I rag were over. But it was during his next stint - overseeing the military's most elite units, including the Rangers, Navy Seals and Delta Force - that Mc-Chrystal took part in a cover-up that would have destroyed the career of a lesser man

After Col Pat Tillman the former-NFL-star-turned-Ranger, was acciden tally killed by his own troops in Afghan istan in April 2004, McChrystal took an active role in creating the impression that Tillman had died at the hands of Taliban fighters. He signed offon a falsified rec ommendation for a Silver Star that suggested Tillman had been killed by enemy fire. (McChrvstal would later claim he didn't read the recommendation closely enough - a strange excuse for a commander known for his laserlike attention tominute details.) A week later, McChrys tal sent a memo up the chain of command, specificallywarning that President Bush should avoid mentioning the cause of Tillman's death "If the circumstances of Corporal Tillman's death become public," he wrote, it could cause "public embarrassment" for the president.

mcchrystal mayha Ve sol d obama on his strategy, buthis own trooPs aren't buyinigt.

"The false narrative, which McChrystal clearly helped construct, diminished Pat's true actions," wrote Tillman's mother, Mary, in her book Boots on the Ground by Dusk. McChrystal got away with it, she added, because he was the "golden boy" of Rumsfeld and Bush, who loved his willingness to get things done, even if it included bending the rules or skipping the chain of command. Nine days after Tillman's death, McChr ystal was promot ed to maior general.

Two years later, in 2006, McChrystal was tainted by a scandal involving detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama in Iraq. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, prisoners at the camp were subjected to a now-familiar litany of abuse: stress positions, being dragged naked through the mud. McChrystal was not disciplined in the scandal, even though an interrogator at the camp reported seeing him inspect the prison multiple times. But the experience was so unsettling to McChrystal that he tried to prevent detainee operations from being placed under his command in Afghanistan, viewing them as a "political swamp," according to a U.S. officialIn May 2009, as McChrystal prepared for his confirma tion hearings, his staffprepared him for hard questions about Camp Nama and the Tillman cover-up. But the scandals barely made a ripple in Congress, and McChrys tal was soon on his way back to Kabul to run the war in Afghanistan.

The media, to a large extent, have also given McChrystal a pass on both controversies Where Gen Petraeus is kind of a dweeb, a teacher's pet with a Ranger's tab, McChrystal is a snake-eating rebel, a "Jedi" commander, as Newsweek called him. He didn't care when his teenage son came home with blue hair and a mohawk He speaks his mind with a candor rare for a high-ranking official He asks for opinions, and seems genuinely interested in the response. He gets briefings on his iPod and listens to books on tape. He car ries a custom-made set of nunchucks in his convoy engraved with his name and four stars, and his itinerary often bears a fresh quote from Bruce Lee. ("There are no limits. There are only plateaus, and you must not stay there, you must go beyond them ") He went out on dozens of night time raids during his time in Iraq, unprec edented for a top commander, and turned up on missions unannounced with almost no entourage. "The fucking lads love Stan McChrystal," says a British officerwho serves in Kabul. "You'd be out in Somewhere, Iraq, and someone would take a knee beside you, and a corporal would be like Who the fuck is that? And it's fucking Stan McChrystal."

It doesn't hurt that McChrystal was also extremely successful as head of the Joint Special Operations Command, the elite forces that carry out the government's darkest ons. During the Irag surge, his team killed and captured thousands of insurgents, including Abu Musab al-Zargawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in I rag. "JSOC was a killing machine," says Maj. Gen. Mayville, his chief of operations. McChrystal was also open to new ways of killing. He systematically mapped out terrorist networks, targeting specificin surgents and hunting them down - often with the help of cyberfreaks traditionally shunned by the military. "The Boss would findthe 24-year-old kid with a nose ring. with some fucking brilliant degree from MIT, sitting in the corner with 16 computer monitors humming," says a Special Forces commando who worked with McChrystal in Iran and now serves on his staffin Kabul, "He'd say, 'Hey - you fuck ing muscleheads couldn't findlunch with out help. You got to work together with these guys."

Even in his new role as America's leading evangelist for counterinsurgency, Mc-Chrystal retains the deep-seated instincts of a terrorist hunter. To put pressure on the Taliban, he has upped the number of Special Forces units in Afghanistan from four to 19. "You better be out there hitting four or five targets tonight," McChrystal will tell a Navy Seal he sees in the hall-

team ofi**v**al s

Gen. Stanley McChrystal isn't just fightingthe Taliban - he's waging political battles both at home and abroad

	ENEMIES
GATES	JOE BIDEN
Nicknamed "Yoda" at the White	The biggest opponent of
House, the defense secretary	McChrystal's surge, the vice
engineered McChrystal's hiring	president argued for 'C'-plus'
and is retooling the military for	- fewer troops, more counter-
more counterinsurgency fights.	terrorism. Look for him to push
"He's the mastermind," says a	Obama to stick to his timetable
McChrystal staffer.	for withdrawing troops in 2011.
IKE MULLEN	GEN. JIM JONES
As chairman of the Joint Chiefs	Obama's national security
of Staff, helped Gates push	adviser; perceived by foes as
Obama to hire McChrystal. A	an inept bureaucratic infighter.
big defender of the counter-	In March, contradicted Obama
insurgency doctrine, he has	after a trip to Kabul, spart-
even recommended it as away	ing an outcry by Karzai. Team
to fightdrugs in Mexico.	McChrystal wants to see him go.
AVID PETRAEUS	RICHARD HOLBROOKE
Wrote Army's fieldmanual	Insiders say Obama's envoy - a
on counterinsurgency. As	talented diplomat and notori-
CENTOM commander, is letting	ous jerk - has lousy relations
McChrystal take center stage	with Afghans and Pakistanis
in Afghanisan. Adfeat would	alike. Why he's staying: White
ruin his "win" in Iraq: "He's	House fears a "tell-all" more
1-0," says a McChrystal insider.	than his diplomatic blunders.
Y CLINTON	KARL EIKENBERRY
The secretary of state has	An ex-general who served two
backed McChrystal to the hilt,	tours in Afghanistan, the U.S.
even going against. her own	ambasador should be a major
ambasador, Karl Eikenberry.	player. But his relations with
Her gel-tough stame is fueling	McChrystal and Karzai havent
talk that she might replace	recovered since he slammed
Gates as defense secretary.	them both in a leaked memo.

strictions on the use of air power and

severely limited night raids. He regularly

apologizes to Hamid Karzai when civil -

ians are killed, and berates commanders

responsible for civilian deaths. "For a

while," says one U.S. official."the most

dangerous place to be in Afghanistan

was in front of McChrystal after a 'civ

cas' incident." The ISAF command has

even discussed ways to make not killing

into something you can win an award for:

There's talk of creating a new medal for

"courageous restraint," a buzzword that's

unlikely to gain much traction in the

But however strategic they may be,

McChrystal's new marching orders have

caused an intense backlash among his

own troops. Being told to hold their fire,

soldiers complain, puts them in greater

danger. "Bottom line?" says a former Spe-

cial Forces operator who has spent years

in Iraq and Afghanistan. "I would love

to kick McChrystal in the nuts. His rules

of engagement put soldiers' lives in even

greater danger. Ever v real soldier will tell

In March, McChrystal traveled to

Comhat Outpost JEM - a small encamp -

ment on the outskirts of Kandahar -

you the same thing."

gung-ho culture of the U.S. military.

way at headquarters. Then he'll add, "I'm going to have to scold you in the morning for it, though." In fact, the general frequently findshimself apologizing for the disastrous consequences of counterinsur gency. In the first four months of this year. NATO forces killed some 90 civilians, up 76 percent from the same period in 2009 -a record that has created tremendous resentment among the very population that COIN theory is intent on winning over. In February, a Special Forces night raid ended in the deaths of two pregnant Afchan women and allegations of a coverup, and in April, protests erupted in Kan dahar after U.S. forces accidentally shot up a bus, killing fiveAfghans. "We've shot an amazing number of people," McChrys tal recently conceded.

espite the tragedies and miscues, McChrystal has issued some of the strictest directives to avoid civilian casualties that the U.S. military has ever encountered in a war zone. It's "insurgent math," as he calls it – for every innocent person you kill, you create 10 new enemies. He has ordered convoys to curtail their reckless driving, put reto confront such accusations from the troops directly. It was a typically bold move by the general. Only two days earlier, he had received an e-mail from Israel Arroyo, a 25-year-old staffsergeant who asked McChrystal to goon a mission with his unit. "I am writing because it was said you don't care about the troops and have made it harder to defend ourselves," Arrowo wrote.

Within hours, McChrystal responded personally: "I'm saddened by the accusation that I don't care about soldiers, as it is something I suspect any soldier takes both personally and professionally – at least I do. But I know perceptions depend upon your perspective at the time, and I respect that every soldier's view is his own." Then he showed up at Arroyo's outpost and went on a foot patrol with the troops – not some bullshit photo-op stroll through amarket, but areal live operation in a dangerous war zone.

Six weeks later, just before McChrystal returned from Paris, the general received another e-mail from Arroyo. A 23-year-old corporal named Michael Ingram – one of the soldiers McChrystal had gone on patrol with –had been killed by an IED a day earlier. It was the third man the 25-member platoton had lost in a year, and Arroyo was writing to see if the general would attend Ingram's memorial service. "He started to look up to you," Arroyo wrote. McChrystal said he would try to make it down to pay his respects as soon as possible.

The night before the general is sched uled to visit Sot. Arrovo's platoon for the memorial. I arrive at Combat Outpost JFM to speak with the soldiers he had cone on patrol with. JFM is a small encampment, ringed by high blast walls and guard towers. Almost all of the soldiers here have been on repeated combat tours in both Irag and Afghanistan, and have seen some of the worst fighting of both wars. But they are especially angered by Ingram's death. His command ers had repeatedly requested permission to tear down the house where Ingram was killed, noting that it was often used as a combat position by the Taliban. But due to McChrystal's new restrictions to avoid upsetting civilians, the request had been denied, "These were abandoned houses," fumes Staff Sot. Kennith Hicks. "Nobody was coming back to live in them."

One soldier shows me the list of new regulations the platoon was given. "Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force," the laminateled halfway around the world to fight, that's like telling a cop he should only patrol in areas where he knows he won't have to make arrests. "Does that make any fucking sense?" asks [Cont. on 120]

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RUNAWAY GENERAL

[Cont. from 97] Pfc. Jared Pautsch, "We should just drop a fucking bomb on this place. You sit and ask yourself: What are we doing here?"

The rules handed out here are not what McChrystal in- tries to joke. "But it doesn't get tended - they've been distort ed as they passed through the chain of command - but knowing that does nothing to lessen the anger of troops on the ground. "Fuck, when I came over here and heard

that McChrystal was in charge, I thought we would get our fucking oun on," says Hicks, who has served three tours of combat. "I get COIN. I get all that. McChrystal comes here, explains it, it makes sense. But then he goes away on his bird, and by the time his directives get passed down to us through Big Army, they're all fucked up either because somebody is trying to cover their ass, or because they just don't understand it themselves. But we're fucking losing this thing.

McChrystal and his team show up the next day. Underneath a tent, the general has a 45-minute discussion with some two dozen soldiers. The atmosphere is tense. "I ask you what's going on in your world, and I think it's important for you all to understand the big picture as well," McChrystal begins, "How's the company doing? You guys feeling sorry for yourselves? Anybody? Anybody feel like you're losing?" McChrystal says.

"Sir, some of the guys here, sir, think we're losing, sir," savs Hicks

McChrystal nods. "Strength is leading when you just don't want to lead," he tells the men. "You're leading by example. That's what we do Particular ly when it's really, really hard, and it hurts inside." Then he spends 20 minutes talking about counterinsurgency, diagramming his concepts and principles on a whiteboard He makes COIN seem like common sense, but he's careful not to bullshit the men "We are knee-deen in the decisive year" he tells them. The Taliban, he


tiative - "but I don't think we do, either." It's similar to the talk he gave in Paris, but it's not winning any hearts and minds among the soldiers. "This is the philosophical part that works with think tanks." McChrvstal

the same reception from infan try companies." During the question-andanswer period, the frustra tion boils over. The soldiers complain about not being al-

who doesn't have a weapon is very cynical, politically," says insists, no longer has the iniall the shirts "

> As the discussion ends. Mc-Chrystal seems to sense that he hasn't succeeded at easing the men's anger. He makes one last-ditch effortto reach them.

acknowledging the death of Cpl. Ingram. "There's no way I can make that easier " he tells lowed to use lethal force, about them. "No way I can pretend



watching insurgents they detain be freed for lack of evi-

dence. They want to be able to fight-like they did in I raq, human rights, economic delike they had in Afghanistan velopment and press scrutiny. before McChrvstal, "We aren't The COIN doctrine, bizarrely, putting fear into the Taliban." draws inspiration from some one soldier says. of the biggest Western mili-Winning hearts and minds tary embarrassments in recent

in COIN is a coldblooded thing," McChrystal says, citing an oft-repeated maxim that you can't kill your way out of Afghanistan, "The Russians Chrystal, like other advocates killed 1 million Afghans, and that didn't work." "I'm not saying go out and

kill everybody, sir," the solmessy, expensive and easy to dier persists. "You say we've lose. "Even Afghans are constopped the momentum of fused by Afghanistan," he says. the insurgency. I don't be-But even if he somehow manlieve that's true in this area ages to succeed, after years of The more we pull back, the bloody fighting with Afghan more we restrain ourselves, kids who pose no threat to the

the stronger it's getting." "I agree with you," McChryslittle to shut down Al Qaeda. tal says. "In this area, we've not made progress, probably, You tions to Pakistan. Dispatch have to show strength here, ing 150,000 troops to build you have to use fire.What I'm telling you is, fire costs you. What do you want to do? You want to wipe the population out here and resettle it? A soldier complains that under the rules, any insurgent churches in Little Rock. "It's all

immediately assumed to be a Marc Sageman, a former CIA civilian. "That's the way this case office who has extensive game is," McChrystal says, "It's experience in the region. "Af complex. I can't just decide: It's chanistan is not in our vital shirts and skins, and we'll kill interest - there's nothing for us there

In mid-May, two weeks after visiting the troops in Kandahar. McChrystal travels to the White House for a high-level visit by Hamid Karzai. It is a triumphant moment for the general, one that demonstrates he is very much in command both in Kabul and in Washit won't hurt. No way I can ington. In the East Room, which is packed with journalists and dignitaries. President Obama sings the praises of Karzai. The two leaders talk about how great their relation ship is, about the pain they feel tion. McChrvstal may have over civilian casualties. They sold President Obama on mention the word "progress" counter insurgency, but 16 times in under an hour. But

there is no mention of victory. Still, the session represents the most forceful commitment hen it comes that Obama has made to Mc-Chrystal's strategy in months. "There is no denying the progress that the Afohan people have made in recent years in education, in health care Genohis Khan - and he wasn't and economic development." hampered by things like the president says. "As I saw in the lights across Kabul when I landed - lights that would not have been visible just a few vears earlier."

to Afghani-

stan, history is

to have any success here was

memory: France's nasty war

in Algeria (lost in 1962) and

the American misadventure

in Vietnam (lost in 1975), Mc-

of COIN, readily acknowl -

edges that counterinsurgency

US homeland the war will do

which has shifted its opera-

new schools, roads, mosques

trying to stop the drug war

in Mexico by occupying Ar-

kansas and building Baptist

campaions are inherently

It is a disconcerting observation for Obama to make. During the worst years in I rag. when the Bush administra tion had no real progress to point to officialsused to offer up the exact same evidence of success. "It was one of our first impressions," one GOP official said in 2006, after landing in Baghdad at the height of the sectarian violence. "So many lights shining brightly." So it is to the language of the I raq War that the Obama administra tion has turned - talk of progress, of city lights, of metrics like health care and education Rhetoric that just a few years ago they would have mocked. "They are trying to manipulate perceptions because there is no definition of victory -be and water-treatment facili - cause victory is not even deties around Kandahar is like finedor recognizable," says Ce leste Ward, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Cornoration who served as a political adviser to U.S. commanders in Iraq in 2006. "That's the game Even proponents of counter we're in right now. What we insurgency are hard-pressed need, for strategic purposes, to explain the new plan. "This is to create the perception that isn't a classic operation," says a we didn't get run off. The facts U.S. military official."It's not on the ground are not great, and are not going to become great in the near future." But facts on the ground, as history has proven, offer lit tle deterrent to a military determined to stay the course. Even those closest to Mc-Chrystal know that the rising on the city," says a military anti-war sentiment at home doesn't begin to reflect how deeply fucked up things are in Afghanistan. "If Americans pulled back and started paying attention to this war, it would become even less popular," a senior adviser to Mc-Chrystal says. Such realism, however, doesn't prevent advocates of counterinsurgency from dreaming big: Instead of CT-plus!" he said, according beginning to withdraw troops next year, as Obama promised, the military hopes to ramp up its counterinsurgency cam - new plan, the delay under paign even further. "There's a possibility we could ask for another surge of U.S. forces next summer if we see success here." a senior military official in Kabul tells me. Back in Afghanistan, less than a month after the White House meeting with Karzai and all the talk of "progress," McChrystal is hit by the biggest blow to his vision of coun terinsurgency. Since last year, the Pentagon had been planning to launch a major military operation this summer in Kandahar, the country's sec- erbates the problem," says Anond-largest city and the Taliban's original home base. It was supposed to be a decisive effect of aid in southern Afturning point in the war - the primary reason for the troop surge that McChr vstal wrested from Obama late last year. But on June 10th, acknowledging that the military still needs to lay more groundwork, the general announced that he is post poning the offensive until the fall. Rather than one big battle, only in creating a never-end like Fallujah or Ramadi, U.S. troops will implement what McChrystal calls a "rising tide of security." The Afghan police and army will enter Kandahar to attempt to seize control of neighborhoods, while the U.S. pours \$90 million of aid into the city to win over the civilian

going to be Black Hawk Down. There aren't going to be doors kicked in." Other U.S. officials insist that doors are going to be kicked in, but that it's going to be a kinder, gentler offensive than the disaster in Maria "The Taliban have a jackboot official. "We have to remove them, but we have to do it in a way that doesn't alienate the population." When Vice Presi dent Biden was briefed on the new plan in the Oval Office. insiders say he was shocked to see how much it mirrored the more gradual plan of coun terterrorism that he advocat ed last fall "This looks like to U.S. officialsfamiliar with the meeting. Whatever the nature of the scores the fundamental flaws of counterinsurgency. After nine years of war, the Taliban simply remains too strongly entrenched for the U.S. military to openly attack. The very people that COIN seeks to win over-the Afghan people-do not want us there. Our supposed ally, President Karzai, used his influence to delay the offensive and the massive influx of aid championed by McChrystal is likely only to make things worse. "Throw ing money at the problem exacdrew Wilder, an expert at Tufts University who has studied the ghanistan. "A tsunami of cash fuels corruption, delegitimiz es the government and creates an environment where we're picking winners and losers" a process that fuels resentment and hostility among the civilian population. So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded ing demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war. There is a reason that President Obama studiously avoids using the word "victory" when he talks about Afghanistan. Winning, it would seem, is not really possible. Not even with Stanley McChrystal in charge. ß



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population

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