

RELEASE IN PART
B6

Fw: North Korea

From: Cheryl Mills B6

To: hdr22@clintonemail.com

Subject: Fw: North Korea

See traffic from bottom up

-----Original Message-----

From: Wendy Sherman

To: Robert Einhorn ; Cheryl Mills1; MillsCD@state.gov ; Kurt Campbell External ; Kurt Campbell

Sent: Fri Feb 06 14:48:54 2009

Subject: RE: North Korea

By the way, the more senior person could be you, Bill Burns or Jim Steinberg if you didn't want to do an outside person. There just has to be someone more senior than the person who does the Six-party with Kim Gae Gwan, who is engaged , identified and ready to go.

Wendy R. Sherman

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From: Robert Einhorn [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, February 06, 2009 11:41 AM
To: Wendy Sherman; Cheryl Mills1; MillsCD@state.gov ; Kurt Campbell External; Kurt Campbell
Subject: RE: North Korea

Wendy, a few reactions to your ideas:

What worked in the second Bill Clinton term was having a respected, senior official in State (i.e., Wendy) who could bring other agencies together and lead the North Korea policy effort in Washington. One approach in the current Administration would be to have such a senior official serving both as Washington coordinator and as envoy, in which case s/he could have the stature to interact with Kang Suk Ju or the Dear Leader himself. Another model would be to have a senior line officer (e.g., EAP A/S) serve as Washington policy coordinator with another, equally or even more senior, official serving as envoy. A third model of having a Special Advisor for NE Asia Security (who would coordinate in DC and do some high-level diplomatic missions), a separate envoy (who would not be as senior), and a senior line officer with day-to-day responsibility for NE Asia, like the EAP A/S, strikes me as too many cooks in the kitchen. I would prefer either of the first two models.

I agree that we should have an early, general communication from the President to KJI (a video?) "extending his hand" and outlining the broad parameters of his approach toward the DPRK. But any direct contact with NK – even at a very general, tone-setting level – would need to be previewed to the allies and China in advance, lest we generate early suspicions of what

we're up to. That means we could use HRC's trip to preview such a contact, but not do the contact concurrently. An HAK/MKA tandem emissary visit would be fine, but also after we had previewed it with our partners.

Bob

From: Wendy Sherman



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