RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

Fw: Follow Up to Meeting	
From:	Jack Keane
То:	Hillary Clinton hdr22@clintonemail.com
CC:	Jack Keane
Subject:	Fw: Follow Up to Meeting
Have correct e Sent via Black	
Original M From: jkeane	essage
To: HRC	eb 2009 23:55:54 follow Up to Meeting
	g you on Friday in your regal surroundings. So delighted you are there!! Rich and I did not have much time, do e, so I passed the follwing to him. I also did not want to overload him and stuck to the most critical. All the best, Berry by AT&T
Original M From: jkeane	essage
To:	eb 2009 23:52:09 v Up to Meeting

Ambassador,

Enjoyed seeing you again on Friday. Know you were rushed and we were not able to talk very much so I thought I'd summarize some of the key points on Afghanistan:

- 1. Strategy- overall strategy and end state does not exist. What do we want to see in 5 and 10 years that is realistic and achievable. While NATO complicates this, to be certain, the US should drive it, and its absence undermines a much needed unity of effort. Our strategy must result in the development of a Joint/Combined Campaign plan which is the driver for our entire effort in Afghanistan. This will take time to develop because it requires collective understanding and making difficult choices. We do not have one now, because it is very hard to do, but essential for success. ___civil/military strategy also does not exist. Most of our efforts in a counter insurgency are largely non-military and we most go forward with an integrated civil/military strategy with buy-in from the GOA.
- ---military strategy- it should not have to be stated, but we need a military strategy, to defeat the insurgency. Throwing troops and resources at the issue is not the solution and is what paralyzed USG efforts in Iraq for 3 years. Passing it to the ANA, while a strategy, is doomed to fail. Only a partnership with the ANA conducting side by side operations, using proven counterinsurgency practices, has a chance to succeed. Fighting a rural insurgency is different than an urban insurgency, as was the case in Irag. E.G. the Afghans are considerably less tolerant to occupation and damage to their villages and towns than were Iraqis. We should not conclude we don't protect the people or just leave it to the Afghans. It does suggest a thoughtful Afghan/Nato approach which considers this reality.
- 2. Leadership- Having the right leaders to implement the strategy is crucial. POTUS has right to expect the very best we have, particularly, when we are conducting a counter-offensive to regain the offensive momentum, beginning in 2009. --- As such, Mckiernan while smart and a solid guy, is too cautious and not aggressive enough, to drive the strategy, performance, and the results needed. His lack of interpersonal skills handicaps the command from getting the much needed support from key influencers, both in and outside USG, which is vital to maintain public support for our efforts. Additionally, his staff is much too small to develop a Jt Campaign Plan, much less oversee its execution. His headquarters needs a significant staff plus up to meet the demands. What is truly missing is an operational headquarters to fight the war, which would be subordinate to Mckiernan's Hqs and all the tactical Hqs would work for this commander. This should be a corps level headquarters with a 3 star commander and his complete staff. This HQs should deploy in 2009 and rotate every year. --- Carl Eikenberry is clearly a step in the right direction as Ambassador. His close working relationship with the NATO commander cannot be overstated.
- ---Karzai is increasingly unpopular due to pervasive corruption and ineffectiveness. As such it is spilling over on us because he is perceived as our surrogate. If reelected and allowed to continue current practices it is hard to imagine a more worse scenario as he executes another 5 year term. We can encourage other candidates to run and monitor the election to insist o