

RELEASE IN PART B6

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2012 8:39 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: H: Egypt election campaign intel. perhaps some OBE, but perhaps other info not. Sid

More info.

From: sbwhoep([redacted])
Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2012 08:27 AM
To: H
Subject: H: Egypt election campaign intel. perhaps some OBE, but perhaps other info not. Sid

B6

CONFIDENTIAL

April 10, 2012

For: Hillary
 From: Sid
 Re: Egypt campaign

SOURCE: Sources with access to the highest levels of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. After studying their internal polling data from mid-March 2012, the leadership of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) became concerned by events surrounding the presidential elections scheduled for late May 2012, with a second round planned for late June 2012. According to a source with excellent access to the highest levels of the MB, speaking in strict secrecy, two developments are of particular concern to Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie and his advisors: first, and most importantly, they are alarmed by the steady rising in popularity of Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, the candidate of the Salafist al Nour party. Secondly, the MB leaders are studying the decision to pursue the presidency by former Prime Minister, and Chief of Intelligence General Omar Suleiman.

2. According to this source, the MB's polls taken in mid-March 2012 showed that Ismail has closed the gap between himself and independent front-runner Amr Moussa. In the opinion of this individual, Badie and his advisors decided that they could not stand by their previous policy of staying out of the presidential election and carefully selected a candidate. Their concern was generated by their polls in mid – March showing that Ismail was trailing Moussa by only 30 percent to 23 percent; compared to the 40 percent to 6 percent lead held by Moussa in early February. The MB leaders believe that the surprisingly successful parliamentary campaign conducted by al Nour strengthened Ismail's presidential bid. Badie and the Guidance Council selected Khairat al-Shater, whom they see as a relatively moderate figure, widely respected by the Islamist community. In the opinion of this individual they also believe that al-Shater will not raise the concerns of Western business and government leaders, or interim head of state Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

3. (Source Comment: Badie's advisors discussed this situation with their SCAF counterparts during their continuing discreet contacts. The SCAF officers confirmed that Tantawi is concerned over the rise of Ismail, and after some discussion they agreed that they would have no problem with al-Shater as a presidential candidate. For their part the MB representatives asked if Tantawi and the SCAF were involved with the candidacy of Suleiman, who the MB finds completely unacceptable. They also warn that Suleiman's candidacy risks inflaming the liberal/ secular parties who

cannot forget that he was the last Prime Minister under deposed President Hosni Mubarak. The MB leaders also believe that the Salafists are watching the Suleiman candidacy very closely, particularly given the enthusiastic support Suleiman is receiving from the Coptic Christian community, who make up approximately 10 percent of the voting public.)

4. According to this individual the SCAF officers assured their MB counter-parts that Tantawi and Suleiman do not have a good relationship, having been rivals for many years, and that the SCAF is not backing the former Intelligence Chief. They add that the SCAF does not believe that Suleiman has any real chance of winning the election. While they did not reveal their polling to the MB officials, SCAF officers stated in private that their figures show that Suleiman is polling at only about 6 percent of the population. One MB official said that he suspected the majority of Suleiman's support comes from the Coptic Christian vote. The SCAF officers added that Suleiman's candidacy did not come as a surprise, especially since his former deputy Chief of Intelligence, General Hossam Khairallah withdrew plans to run for president shortly before Suleiman's announcement of his candidacy.

5. In the opinion of this knowledgeable source, al-Shater can mount a credible campaign against both Moussa and Ismail. This individual notes that al-Shater has excellent Islamist credentials, earned during the 12 years he served in prison for his membership in the MB during the Mubarak era. He is also one of the wealthiest financiers in Egypt and a master of the Sharia banking system. Since being released from prison he has returned to the leadership of the MB, serving as one of the Brotherhood's three deputy leaders. Perhaps most importantly, al-Shater played a key strategic role in crucial, secret negotiations with the SCAF during 2011. An especially sensitive source noted that he has also managed the development of the MB's economic policy, meeting with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) team that is negotiating a \$3.2billion loan with the current military led government. At the same time, al-Shater led senior MB delegations meeting with ambassadors, visiting foreign officials, and international investors.

6. (Source Comment: An extremely sensitive source added that Badie and the other leaders of the MB believe that al-Shater is an excellent spokesman for their moderate Islamist vision: commitment to democracy, the rights of religious minorities, and a free market. That said this source believes he will meet the expectations a majority of the Egyptian officials who have, through the parliamentary election results, demonstrated that they want an Islamist regime to replace the interim military government. This same source adds that al-Shater maintains a reasonable relationship with many of the Salafists leaders, and other conservative groups (Note: This good relationship does not extend to Ismail). That said, in the opinion of this individual, there was a heated debate among Brotherhood leaders about whether to back al-Shater. The final vote in the Guidance Council deciding his nomination was extremely close. The source added that the nomination was opposed by a group led by former MB leader Mohammad Habib, which believes that al-Shater represents the traditional power structure in the MB and will not appeal to younger Egyptians. According to this source, Habib believes that Moussa will eventually be elected president.)

7. A separate source noted that during 2011 and 2012 Badie used al-Shater as his disciplinarian, enforcing the Brotherhood's unified support for the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in the parliamentary elections. Al-Shater, acting on behalf of Badie, led the effort to discredit the former MB leader Abdul Moneim Abu al-Futuh, who is seeking the presidency as an independent in defiance of the instructions of Badie and the Council. Al-Shater has gone out of his way to make it clear that he is not personally ambitious, and is taking this step at the behest of the MB. In this spirit, al-Shater did not make a personal appearance when Badie, read the letter in which the new candidate resigned his position in the MB in order to pursue the presidency. According to this source, al-Shater owns furniture and textile stores, a computer firm, and a chain of supermarkets. This source also expects him to emphasize his role as a family man with 10 children.

8. (Source Comment: An extremely sensitive source states in secret that al-Shater is a direct, very serious individual who worked his way up through the MB leadership. Al-Shater began his political career as a leftist student organizer and admirer of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Later in the 1070s, as an engineering student at Alexandria University, he was arrested for his anti-government student activities, protesting President Anwar al Sadat's policy of pursuing peace negotiations with Israel. After joining the MB he was arrested on numerous occasions, the most serious of which took place in 2007, when a military tribunal jailed him for supplying university students with weapons and military training.)

9. This same source notes that while prison terms can bar access to elected office, al-Shater appears to have addressed this with the interim military government, and his candidacy is going forward. At the same time, Ismail's campaign exposed the story that prior to her death, al-Shater's mother moved to the United States and became an American citizen. This could also derail his candidacy, but again the interim Government seems to be willing to allow this to pass. Having decided to field a candidate, Badie plans to use the MB's extensive network of followers to support al-Shater in the first round of the presidential elections scheduled for May 2012.

10. (Source Comment: For his part, Badie stated privately that, while some officials and commentators believe Suleiman will appeal to a desire for stability among many Egyptians, the former Intelligence Chief is not his major concern. He believes that Suleiman is hoping for an increase in violence during the presidential campaign, which will cause people, including officers in the SCAF, to turn to him. Badie believes this is unlikely, particularly given Suleiman's poor relationship with Tantawi. Instead, he believes that the rise of the al Nour party and Ismail presents the most immediate threat to the MB, particularly as the Brotherhood is working to reassure Western government and business leaders that the civilian government that the MB/FJP/al Nour coalition, while committed to Islamist values, will be a responsible member of the World community. Badie is worried that having an al Nour president will embolden the anti-Western elements in the Salafist movement, and complicate this effort.