

**From:** H <hdr22@clintonemail.com>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 30, 2011 12:55 PM  
**To:** Sullivan, Jacob J  
**Subject:** Fwd: H: Very good intel re: inside NTC. Sid

RELEASE IN PART  
B5,B6

[Redacted]

B5

Sent from my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** sbwhoeop [Redacted]  
**Date:** August 30, 2011 12:00:05 PM EDT  
**To:** [hdr22@clintonemail.com](mailto:hdr22@clintonemail.com)  
**Subject:** H: Very good intel re: inside NTC. Sid

B6

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CONFIDENTIAL

August 30, 2011

For: Hillary  
From: Sid  
Re: Inside NTC latest

As of August 30, 2011, the leaders of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) are adjusting to their success in fighting against the forces of Muammar Qaddafi in Tripoli and throughout the country. According to a knowledgeable source, the numerous tribal, regional, political divisions within the 31 member NTC are complicating the process of moving from a revolutionary movement focused on Qaddafi, to a new, established government.

In the opinion of this source, there is a danger that governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the other major powers will identify allies on the NTC, expediting the formation of rival groups among the council members. These sources believe that Prime Minister Mahmoud Jabril, and General Khalifa Haftar lead a faction that is well disposed toward the U.S. government. Their principal rivals in the NTC

appear to be President Mustafa Abdul Jalil, and General Suleiman Mahmoud, who, in the opinion of one sensitive source have well established relationships with the British and French governments respectively. In light of the dangerous situation that exists throughout Libya, all of these leaders are remaining as discreet as possible regarding their relationships with foreign governments and firms.

(Source Comment: Generals Haftar and Suleiman Mahmoud are rivals for the overall control of the National Liberation Army (NLA). This is the continuation of the struggle between Haftar, and General Abdel Fatah Younis, the previous commander of the NLA, who was detained and secretly executed by NTC security personnel on orders from Jalil. The President ordered this execution after receiving evidence that Younis was carrying on a secret dialogue with Saif al-Islam Qaddafi. Several members of the NTC pressed for Jalil's removal from office after this incident, but he was able to hold on to his position as Chairman of the NTC and President of the new Libya.)

A separate sensitive source adds that, in their opinion, the various leaders of the NTC are well aware of which governments and firms supported them during the rebellion, including the major oil companies and international banks. As the new government takes shape, its leaders will factor this information into decisions they make regarding future business relationships, including oil leases. This source adds that the Libyans will, of course, weigh these concerns against the practical advantages offered by particular relationships with foreign governments and firms. That said, the source notes that the feeling of animosity toward certain countries and firms is particularly pronounced.

In the opinion of this individual, Italy, and the Italian oil firm ENI are in especially problematic positions. Jalil and his supporters are convinced that the Italian government and ENI did not fully support the rebellion against Qaddafi's rule, hedging their bet against the contingency of a victory by the old regime. According to this source, the recent meetings in Rome between Prime Minister Jabril and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi did not produce the definitively positive results the Italians had hoped for.

(Source Comment: According to a very knowledgeable source, the Italian government and ENI found themselves in an impossible position during the rebellion, with much of their investment in Libya located in the Western part of the country, which was held by Qaddafi's forces throughout the fighting. This source believes that in the end, given the longstanding cultural and political links between Italy and Libya, the NTC will have positive business and diplomatic relationships with Rome, however; given their frustration over the Italy's role in the rebellion, the Libyans can be expected to demand highly favorable terms in any future business dealings with Italian firms. This source adds that while U.S., British and French firms will most likely have positive positions under the new government, the final details of any major business arrangement will be subject to serious debate in the NTC. This is particularly true in terms of contracts related to the oil industry and international bank. )

In addition, during the afternoon of August 28, 2011 sources with direct access to the highest levels of the NTC stated in confidence that the new Libyan regime would resist efforts by the United States and its allies to arrange the extradition to any country of the convicted organizer of the Lockerbie bombing, Mohamed Ali al-Megrahi. In a private discussion, these senior NTC officers reacted forcefully to questions regarding this

possibility, pointing out that such a move "will never happen, and even so, Megrahi was just a captain in the Libyan Mukhabarat (Security/Intelligence service)." They explained that as a captain he was of no particular importance and was "just following Muammar Qaddafi's orders." This matter has been discussed at some length within the NTC. These officials stated that many NTC members blame the Bush administration for accepting \$2.7 billion in "blood money" as compensation from Qaddafi for the Lockerbie bombing. One particularly senior official said that act "dishonored the dead" and caused the Libyan people to "lose respect for America," especially after the U.S. Department of State lifted sanctions against Libya.

At the same time, these individuals added that the International Criminal Court (ICC) was in contact with the leadership of the NTC, requesting that Muammar Qaddafi, Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, and other senior officers of the regime be turned over to the ICC for prosecution when they are captured. Speaking in strict confidence, the NTC officials replied that Saif al-Islam and any other officials would, if capture alive, be extradited to The Hague for trial. However; they added that a majority of the NTC had decided that Muammar Qaddafi would be held for trial in Libya if he is captured by forces under the direct control of NLA central command. That said, they added that it was very likely that if Muammar Qaddafi is captured by one of the regional militias that make up the bulk of the NLA, he will be summarily executed. The ICC representative protested this stance but was rebuffed.

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