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		7. DATE MATERIAL REQUIRED (YYYYMMDD) 08/02/2021		8. PRIORITY TP1	
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3. SHIP TO - MARK FOR: John Greenwald, Jr 9999999999999999		12. DATE SHIPPED (YYYYMMDD)		b.	
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4. APPROPRIATIONS DATA	AMOUNT
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ITEM NO.	FEDERAL STOCK NUMBER, DESCRIPTION, AND CODING OF MATERIEL AND/OR SERVICES	UNIT OF ISSUE	QUANTITY REQUESTED	SUPPLY ACTION	TYPE CONTAINER	CONTAINER NOS.	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL COST
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16. TRANSPORTATION VIA AMC OR MSC CHARGEABLE TO

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RECEIPT	18. ISSUED BY RINA BLANDINO	TOTAL CONTAINERS 1	TYPE CONTAINER EN	DESCRIPTION L:13 W:10 H:1 1202X333XXX	TOTAL WEIGHT 1	TOTAL CUBE 1	19. CONTAINERS RECEIVED EXCEPT AS NOTED	DATE (YYYYMMDD)	BY	SHEET TOTAL 0.00
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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

20 July 2021

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.
27305 W. Live Oak Road, Suite #1203
Castaic, CA 91384
John@greenewald.com

Ref: NRO Tracking Number EOM-2018-00030

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

(U) Per your request dated 28 April 2018, and under the provisions of Executive Order 13526, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has reviewed the document "NRO Charter and Management Evolution - (chronology of events), author unknown, undated. Circa February 1989" and determined that it includes no NRO equities that would preclude release. The responsive document is being released to you in full.

(U) If you have any questions, please the Requester Service Center at (703)745-0600 and reference case number EOM-2018-00030.

Sincerely,

Anita Casamento
Chief, Information Review and
Release Group

Enclosure: NRO Charter and Management Evolution

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NRO CHARTER AND MANAGEMENT EVOLUTION

This document is a chronological listing of the more important events in the evolution of the management of the National Reconnaissance Program, to include the internal structure of the National Reconnaissance Office as well as changes in the external environment which have affected the management of the program. It is not a complete compilation of every action on all issues, and additional material may be found in the file references and in the Management volume of the History of the NRO prepared by Robert Perry. The purpose of this chronology is to provide an overview and to permit ready recall of pertinent events and their timing.

1958. President approves a covert CIA/Air Force reconnaissance satellite project (DISCOVERER).

19 Aug 60. In the summer of 1960, the intelligence community was faced with a lack of information about the Soviet Union. There was a perceived "missile gap," U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union had been permanently grounded, and the Air Forces' SAMOS program was behind schedule. President Eisenhower had commissioned a Special Panel, Co-Chaired by Dr. James R. Killian and Dr. Edwin H. Land, to assess the status and prospects for satellite reconnaissance. It was in this setting, under great pressure and after thirteen previous launches, that the joint Air Force-CIA covert CORONA satellite reconnaissance project successfully returned film of the Soviet Union aboard DISCOVERER XIV on 19 August, 1960 (RAR-A-1 General).

25 Aug 60. Following a briefing to the President by the Special Panel on Satellite Reconnaissance, the National Security Council directed that ... "selected components of the satellite reconnaissance program be assembled into a program of very high priority and that the program be managed with the directness that the Air Force had used on occasion, with great success, for projects of overriding priority. This can best be accomplished by a direct line of command from the Secretary of the Air Force to the general officer in operational charge of the whole program..." (RAR-A-1 General).

15 Sep 60. Acting Secretary of Defense Douglas charged the Secretary of the Air Force with direct responsibility for the reconnaissance satellite program, reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for program review and approval. He directed a management structure to insure that the USAF Director of the program would report directly to the Secretary of the Air Force. Finally, he directed that the Office of the Director of

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Defense Research and Engineering serve as the principal staff agency to assist the Deputy Secretary of Defense in all program matters (RAR-A-1 General).

24 Jul 61. Under Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Charyk forwarded a draft Memorandum of Understanding for management of a National Reconnaissance Program to the Secretary of Defense. This document called for the Department of Defense to be responsible for the Program, to be managed by a Special Assistant appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The CIA would assist the DOD by providing support in areas of program security, communications, and contract support (RAR-A-1 General).

6 Sep 61. The first Memo of Agreement for conducting the National Reconnaissance Program was signed by CIA and the DOD. It encompassed all reconnaissance satellite and overflight projects whether overt or covert. It included all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic intelligence and communications intelligence resulting therefrom. SECDEF McNamara signed an Agreement which called for a Director-Deputy Director management structure, which the CIA objected to. The Agreement was revised to provide for a program jointly managed by co-equal DOD and CIA Directors, and in this form was signed by DEPSECDEF Gilpatrick and the Acting DCI, General CABELL. It established on a covert basis the National Reconnaissance Office, to manage the program, and placed it under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy Director (Plans) of the CIA, acting jointly. The NSC 5412 Group rejected, almost immediately, the Co-Director provisions, on the basis that the reconnaissance program was too important nationally to be conducted under divided management (RAR-A-1 General).

6 Sep 61. SECDEF McNamara designated Under Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Charyk as his Assistant for Reconnaissance, and delegated to him full authority for management of the Program. The SECDEF directed that the Assistant for Reconnaissance be given any support he required from normal staff elements, although these staff elements were not to participate in program matters except as he specifically requested. (RAR-A-1 General).

2 May 62. The second NRP Agreement was signed, superceding the agreement of September, 1961. This document specified a single Director, designated by the SECDEF and the DCI, responsible directly to them for the management and conduct of the NRP. This change was due in large part to the recommendation of the NSC 5412 Group. (RAR-A-1 General).

14 Jun 62. DOD Directive TS 5105.23, (S) "National Reconnaissance Office", was issued. This document formally exempted the DNRO from unsolicited outside assistance, and implemented the provisions of the SECDEF letter of 6 September,

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1961. (1964 Revision filed RAR-A-1 General).

6 Jul 62. The President approved a recommendation by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board :

"...we believe that the actual structure of the documents is inadequate to support an efficient organization when the present experienced and distinguished group moves on to other tasks. We therefore recommend a continuing study of a more satisfactory permanent documentary basis for the National Reconnaissance Office with particular references to existing National Security Council directives with which the present National Reconnaissance Office plan may be in conflict". (RAR-A-1 General).

5 Oct 62. The DCI passed to the SECDEF a Proposed Agreement on National Reconnaissance Planning and Operations which would revise the 2 May Agreement by establishing a National Reconnaissance Planning Group (NRPG), consisting of the SECDEF and the DCI. It would be responsible for providing policy and program guidance and managerial direction for the NRP. The document also contained provisions for financial management which would split responsibilities between the DOD and the CIA. Commenting on the Proposal, the DNRO generally agreed with the concept of the NRPG, noting that it should satisfy the concern expressed by the Killian Board, but that the financial management paragraph was entirely unacceptable. The revision was never put into effect (RAR-A-1 General).

13 MAR 63. The third Agreement for management of the NRP was signed. This Agreement established the SECDEF as the Executive Agent for the program, and established the NRO as a separate operating agency of the Department of Defense. It provided that the DNRO would be appointed by the SECDEF with the concurrence of the DCI, and that a Deputy Director would be appointed by the DCI with the concurrence of the SECDEF. The Agreement also provided that the SECDEF and DCI could appoint officials to monitor the activities of the NRO (RAR-A-1 General).

26 Mar 63. The DEPSECDEF designated Dr. Eugene Fubini as the official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to examine and monitor on his behalf the activities of the NRO, under the provisions of the 13 March 1963 Agreement. Dr Fubini was the Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering (RAR-A-1 General).

18 Sep 63.

27 Mar 64. Revised DOD Directive TS5105.23, Subject: (S) National Reconnaissance Office, is issued. The purpose of this directive is to provide both an exemption for the NRO from normal DOD processes, and to require DOD agencies to respond to requests for support from the NRO. (RAR-A-1 General).

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2 May 1964. In a memorandum for the President, the PFIAB noted that the NRP was vital to the national security, and likely to become increasingly so. But the PFIAB also observed that the NRP had not reached its full potential, basically because of inadequacies in the organizational structure and support of the effort. The program was complicated by the absence of clear, authoritative delineation and understanding of pertinent roles and missions of the DOD, the CIA, and the DCI in his capacity as principle intelligence officer and coordinator of the total U.S. intelligence effort. The PFIAB recommended providing guidelines by issuing a Presidential directive which would incorporate the better features of the 1963 Agreement, but would also strengthen the role of the SECDEF as executive agent for the NRP; strengthen the role of the DNRO; and establish a coordinated, comprehensive budget for all elements of the program, including fiscal control and accounting procedures to assure proper utilization of funds by the agencies concerned in support of the Program. The PFIAB also recommended that in lieu of the monitor and review functions currently in effect, the Executive Agent report periodically to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the PFIAB, concerning all aspects of the Program. (RAR-A-1 General).

11 Aug 65. The Agreement for Reorganization of the National Reconnaissance Program was signed by the DEPSECDEF and the DCI, incorporating some of the PFIAB's comments. It did strengthen the role of the SECDEF, giving him review and final approval power over the NRP budget, and authority to decide on issues on which the Executive Committee could not agree. The Executive Committee itself was established by this Agreement, and consisted of the DEPSECDEF as Chairman, the DCI, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; the DNRO was a non-voting attendee. The Satellite Operations Center (SOC) was added as an element of the NRO. (RAR-A-1 General).

11 Apr 69. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) Froehlke addressed a memo to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF, "Intelligence Resource Management", in which he set forth his views on alternative solutions to managing DOD intelligence resources. One of his points was that DIA, NSA, and NRO should be brought under one focal point within DOD. (RAR-B-14-c).

29 Apr 69. SECDEF Laird assigned Mr. Robert Froehlke, ASD(A), the additional duty of Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and named as the principal advisor on intelligence management. (RAR-B-14-c).

5 May 69. Secretary Laird dispelled any doubt by writing that Mr. Froehlke's responsibilities "encompass the NRP". (Strangely,

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the DNRO was not included in the list of addressees.) (RAR-B-14-c).

11 Jul 69. ASD(A) Froehlke sent a copy of his "Tentative Report on Defense Intelligence" to DNRO McLucas. One of the major concerns to the NRO was that the EXCOM would be replaced by a DOD Advisory Board, that would address all DOD intelligence programs. (RAR-B-14-c).

1 Aug 69. SECDEF Laird formally assigned ASD(A) Froehlke additional responsibilities for intelligence, to include the responsibility to establish a resource review and decision making process for all Defense intelligence activities. (RAR-B-14-c).

17 Dec 69. The DNRO, in a memo to the DEPSECDEF, points out his untenable position -- that he does not know whether to respond to ExCom guidance, or to the Special Assistant for Intelligence, whose guidance considers the NRP just another component of DOD. (RAR-A-1 General).

19 Mar 70. A briefing by the DNRO to the SECDEF, DEPSECDEF, and the Special Assistant for Intelligence clarified that the DNRO worked for the DEPSECDEF and the ExCom; that the Special Assistant did not need to review the NRP internally, but that the DNRO should provide to the Special Assistant for Intelligence the kind of data provided to the ExCom, which would permit him to examine DOD intelligence issues in proper perspective (RAR-B-14-c, see marginal notes on memo for BGen Allen from Col Marshall, 10 Mar 70).

1970 The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Defense Panel report alleged that the NRO was somehow derelict in its failure to report to the Special Assistant for Intelligence. Despite attempts by the DNRO and the Director, NRO Staff to determine either the source or the meaning of the allegation, it was never satisfactorily explained. (Copy attached to Memo for Mr. Plummer from Lt Col Coyle, 2 Oct 74, RAR-B-14-d).

6 Nov 70. DNRO McLucas commented to ASD(A) Froehlke on his proposed intelligence organization alternatives, recommending continuation of the EXCOM and honoring the 1965 Agreement. He personally saw no benefit to the NRO from the creation of an ASD (Intelligence). (RAR-B-14-d).

1971 ASD(I) Established. (? Intent? Announcement? Approval by Congress? Charter was not formal until DODD 5115.1, 1/18/72)

5 Nov 71. President Nixon signed a memorandum directing reorganization of the Intelligence Community. He specifically directed retention of NRO management structure; created a National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) and an Intelligence Resources Advisory Council (IRAC); and directed

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rewriting the NSCIDs. (RAR-A-1 General).

21 Nov 71. The NRO Staff prepared a draft of an NSCID for the NRP, for internal consideration. The provisions of the draft closely followed the 1965 Agreement. The NRO had been successful in maintaining management integrity of the NRP by citing the 1965 Agreement, which was more recent than the 1958 NSCIDs. But with the NSCIDs and other directives in the process of revision, and in view of changes in the external environment over the years, the Staff saw a need for timely protection. (While the NSCID series was revised and published in early 1972, no action was taken on an NSCID for the NRP at this time, although largely through its own efforts the NRO kept the topic open). (There is a two-volume chronology which traces the drafting of an NSCID for the NRO through March, 1974, filed under RAR-B-26-b).

1 Dec 71. Draft of revised NSCID No. 6, "Signals Intelligence", was published, containing new provisions:

"5. Relationship to other SIGINT Activities

a. The Director of Central Intelligence with the advice of the United States Intelligence Board shall determine the requirements and priorities for collection by SIGINT satellites which shall be developed, launched and maintained in orbit by the National Reconnaissance Office. The Director of the National Security Agency, with respect to his technical and operational control of the intercept payload, and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, with respect to his control of spacecraft operations, shall provide for the tasking of these satellites based on guidance provided by the Director of Central Intelligence."

The provision for control over the technical and operational aspects of satellite intercept payloads by the Director, NSA came as a surprise to the NRO, which had always been responsible for of these functions. (filed RAR-B-26-b, NSCIDs)

3 Jan 72. The SECDEF circulated a proposed charter for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). The NRO, feeling its authorities were being stripped away by both NSCID No. 6 and this proposed ASD(I) charter, prepared a letter for SECDEF Laird's signature to the ASD(I) and the DIRNSA, citing the direction in the President's letter of November 5, 1971 to retain the present management structure of the NRO. The SECDEF declined to send the letter, saying that he did not see the threat that the NRO Staff did. (RAR-B-26 b).

6 Jan 72. DNRO Dr. McLucas, in a memorandum to the ASD(I), pointed out the ambiguity in paragraph 5 of NSCID No. 6, and stated that the best interests of the collection activity were not well served by splitting the tasking and operation of NRO collectors. He pointed out that technical control implied that NSA would be the principle agent in technical design of future

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SIGINT collectors, and that Messrs. Laird and Packard saw no reason to change the existing, satisfactory, relationship between NSA and NRO. (RAR-B-14-d, RAR-B-26-b)

7 Jan 72. SECAF Seamans provided one set of comments to the SECDEF on the proposed ASD(I) charter, which considered comments from the NRO. It was unclassified; no other comments were made by the NRO. (RAR-B-14-d, RAR-B-26-b).

18 Jan 72. DOD Directive 5115.1 established the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (RAR-B-14-d).

17 Feb 72. Revised NSCID No.6, "Signals Intelligence", was published; it did not incorporate any of the NRO comments. (RAR-B-26-b).

4 Jan 73. DNRO Dr. McLucas handcarried a draft of an NSCID to Dr. Schlesinger at the AEC; Dr. Schlesinger had been designated to head the CIA, but had not yet been appointed (RAR-B-26-b).

22 Feb 73. Dr. Schlesinger, newly appointed as the DCI, forwarded to SECDEF Richardson a draft NSCID for the NRP. This differed in several significant ways from the draft Dr. McLucas had given to Dr. Schlesinger. One key change was that the DCI would become the Chairman of the EXCOM (which would consist of only two members). While the Presidents 5 November 1971 letter said that the DCI would chair all intelligence community advisory boards or committees, it also directed retention of the present management structure of the NRO. (As long as Richard Helms had remained DCI, the ExCom continued to operate as it had for several years.) (RAR-B-26-b).

2 Mar 73. DDNRO Singel and NRO Staff Director Col Kulpa met with IC Staff Director Gen Allen and his Deputy, Dr. John Martin. It was learned that the DCI's proposed NSCID had been prepared in DDS&T, and while the DCI wanted to formalize the NRO with an NSCID, he did not want to become deeply involved in how DOD implemented it's responsibilities.

5 Mar 73. Memo for Col Kulpa and Mr. Singel from LtCol Hofmann, reporting conversation with Gen Lew Allen, Jr. (then with IC Staff). Dr. Schlesinger (DCI) had been told by the President to take over chairmanship of the Excom in order to give him control for carrying out his Community responsibilities. It was not Dr. Schlesinger's intent to cause a change in the way the DOD carried out the program -- the DNRO could well stay as the Under Secretary of the Air Force (RAR-B-26-b).

Note that the NRO took the position that the President's statement in the 5 November 1971 letter to mean no changes in the management structure of the NRP, which encompassed the EXCOM function; the President actually directed retention of the

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management structure of the National Reconnaissance Office. This provision of the 5 November Memorandum was included due to the insistence of the PFIAB (for there were some who would have preferred to see the NRO cease to exist). Thus there is some doubt as to the real intent of the statement, and the assumption of the Chairmanship of the EXCOM by the DCI may not have appeared inconsistent at the highest policy-making levels. Dr. Schlesinger's statement seems to bear this out.

Gen Allen suggested that the NRO would want to submit a revised draft of the NSCID which would specify that the DEPSECDEF would be the EXCOM member. It was not meant for the DNRO to report to the DCI on a daily basis. (filed RAR-B-26-b, NSCIDs)

In this same time period, ASD(I) Dr. Hall provided written comments to the SECDEF on the proposed NSCID; when asked by the DDNRO, the ASD(I) would not divulge his comments to the NRO.

9 Mar 73. The DNRO drafted a memo to the SECDEF, summarizing the iterations in attempting to write an NSCID, and again forwarded a proposal which contained the essential provisions of the 1965 Charter. Dr. McLucas reported that he, the SECAF and the Chief of Staff felt strongly that the DNRO should be an Air Force Official and principal support for the program should come from the Air Force. He personally believed that the Under Secretary of the Air Force was in the best position to be DNRO, and that a DNRO in an Assistant Secretary position would be less effective. The DNRO summed up his position that an NSCID with provisions similar to the 1965 Charter would be a step forward; if those provisions of the CIA draft which turned over effective control of the program could not be eliminated, then he would agree with Dr. Hall that the NRO would be better off keeping the 1965 Charter and merely having the DCI appointed as ExCom Chairman (RAR-B-26-b).

9 Mar 73. The SECDEF forwarded the draft NSCID and the ASD(I)s comments to the OSD General Counsel J. Fred Buzhardt. The OSDGC reported that the DCI was primarily interested in chairing the EXCOM, while DOD insisted the budget stay within DOD. The OSDGC redrafted the NSCID for transmittal back to the DCI; it would put the management of the NRP in the DOD and relegate the role of the DCI to coordination. The DCI found this unacceptable: Gen Allen observed that writing an acceptable Directive was becoming impossible, and that further work on the present draft would not result in agreement. He then drafted a very short NSCID, covering only management essentials, to be used for discussions between the DCI and the SECDEF at a meeting planned for April 10 or 11.

15 Mar 73. The DDNRO sent a memo to the OSDGC, reiterating points made by the DNRO in a meeting on 13 March: that it would be desirable to designate the DNRO as an ex officio member of the

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ExCom, and that the DNRO staff the ExCom secretariat (RAR-B-26-b).

At this point, work on an NSCID for the NRO was dropped.

2 Jul 73. Dr. Schlesinger left the post of DCI to become Secretary of Defense, and was replaced by William Colby on 4 September 1973.

10 Jul 73. The PFIAB Executive Secretary wrote to the DCI, expressing the Board's consensus that the NRP management structure should be evaluated, and an NSCID instituted for the NRO (RAR-B-23 PFIAB).

20 Dec 73. Dr. McLucas was appointed Secretary of the Air Force and was replaced as DNRO by James Plummer.

27 Feb 74. PFIAB Chairman ADM Anderson wrote to DCI Colby, following the DCI's presentation to the Board. With respect to NRO management, the Board supported a review of the management directives governing the NRP, but was reluctant to indorse an Omnibus NSCID which would treat the NRO like any other intelligence system, particularly if it would replace the 1965 Vance/Rayborn Agreement. With respect to the strategic-tactical intelligence interface, the Board strongly endorsed the DCI's intent to address the subject in the comprehensive manner it deserved (RAR-B-23 PFIAB).

1 May 74. President Nixon directed the PFIAB to conduct a thorough study of the NRP, to examine a structure and organization best suited to fulfill the purposes of the NRP "...now and for the future." (RAR-B-23 PFIAB).

9 Aug 74. DCI Colby sent to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger a draft of an Omnibus NSCID for consideration by the NSC Intelligence Committee. This would replace all of the current NSCIDs; it was felt that the current NSCIDs were in some cases too specific, and there were also certain gaps, such as provisions for the NRO (RAR-B-26-b).

22 Aug 74. The DNRO wrote the ASD(I) that he has no objections to an Omnibus NSCID, but did object to acknowledging the NRO at the SECRET level. He also pointed out that the PFIAB was studying the NRO, the NRO Staff had been working on an NSCID, and if it was determined that an Omnibus NSCID was in fact needed, the NRO would provide the details for that section (RAR-B-26-b).

23 Aug 74. The NSC Intelligence Committee approved the concept of an Omnibus NSCID at the Secret level as a replacement for the existing NSCIDs and a codification of the existing situation. The DCI assigned the task of drafting this document to a USIB Task Group (RAR-B-26-b).

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5 Dec 74. The draft NSCID was reviewed at the USIB meeting. All members of the USIB coordinated on the Omnibus NSCID by 19 December, but the document was not issued (NOTE: don't know if it went to the NSCIC or not). (RAR-B-26-b).

10 Dec 74. LtCol Coyle of the NRO Staff queried the IC Staff on the status of approval in principle of yet another draft (prepared by the NRO Staff) of an updated NRO Charter. The IC Staff preferred to withhold comment until the PFIAB study being conducted by Dr. Baker was completed -- expected about February, 1975. The introduction of the draft agreement was deemed useful because it moderated the desire to embellish the Omnibus NSCID with detailed references to space reconnaissance and the NRO. (RAR-B-26-b).

31 Mar 75. The Chairman of the USIB Omnibus Task Group recommended that the DCI resubmit the draft to the USIB members for consideration of the changes and additions made since the 5 December meeting. He pointed out that the Rockefeller Commission proceedings and the scope of investigations to be conducted by the Congressional Select Committees might call for new legislation and require major changes to existing NSCIDs, but noted that the DCI might want to have the Omnibus NSCID in-hand in case it became useful to surface it (RAR-B-26-b).

13 Oct 75. The DCI forwarded a proposal for reorganization of the intelligence community, titled "American Intelligence: A Framework for the Future", to the President. The study was prompted in part because the intelligence community was under investigation from several sides; the Rockefeller Commission had made recommendations, and the House and Senate Select Committees were expected to do the same. The DCI's report did not constitute an official Agency view or recommendation. (It referred to the NRO as being "...an anomalous patchwork originally constituted in a period of bureaucratic strife.") (RAR-B-2,).

21 Oct 75. The DNRO. in a memo to the ASD(I), agreed with the DCI study that the NRO was subject to some degree of compromise at its founding, but he believed that the NRO is "...one of the best run development organizations in our government". The DNRO observed that the NRO could be analogous to the NSA, and, armed with an NSCID, could provide for streamlined management and tight program direction. He believed that the program could report most effectively to the SECDEF (RAR-B-2).

14 Nov 75. The President initiated a study of the organization and management of the foreign intelligence community. The study was directed to evaluate the need for changes in the current organization of the community, and present options for possible reorganization (RAR-B-2).

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26 Nov 75. The DNRO provided inputs to OSD for the President's study on reorganization. Recommendations included an NRO structure which would not be covert, and it would be placed within the Defense organization as a separate operating agency.

18 Feb 76. Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities" was issued, superseding the Presidential Memorandum of November 5, 1971, "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community". The Order created a new command structure for foreign intelligence. Overall policy direction was reserved solely for the National Security Council. Management of intelligence was assigned to the newly created Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), chaired by the DCI; other members were the ASD(I) and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The CFI reported directly to the NSC, but most significantly, the CFI was responsible not only for the NRP but for all national foreign intelligence programs. Thus, the CFI replaced the NRP EXCOM but expanded its scope to include all foreign intelligence programs. Also established was the Oversight Board to monitor the performance of intelligence operations, whose members were to be private citizens. The Operations Advisory Group (OAG) was established to review and advise the President on covert operations and sensitive foreign intelligence collection missions. The Executive Order abolished the United States Intelligence Board, the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, the 40 Committee, and the NRP Executive Committee. Finally, the Order directed amending all NSCIDs to insure consistency. (POL-A-4).

3 Mar 76. The NRO staff prepared a revised National Reconnaissance Program Charter which the DNRO forwarded to the DEPSECDEF. This paper recognized the organizational changes resulting from E.O.11905, and attempted to strengthen the DNROs control over the NRP.

3 Mar 76. The DEPSECDEF forwarded the draft revised NRO Charter to the other members of the CFI. There followed a series of events in which the CFI established a task group to prepare a CFI Directive for the NRP; ultimately it became too hard a project to reach agreement, and the idea was dropped. (POL-A-4).

12 Mar 76. A CFI Task Force met to discuss revisions to the NSCIDs resulting from the issuance of Executive Order 11905. The Task Force elected to remove paragraph 5a. from NSCID No. 6, so that the basic document could be classified SECRET, and make paragraph 5a. the sole subject of a new document, NSCID NO. 6-A (RAR-B-26-b).

21 Apr 76. The 40 Committee, which formerly approved NRO missions, was formally abolished by NSDM 326 on April 21, 1976.

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The Intelligence Committee, established by the President's Memorandum of November 5, 1971, was also abolished by NSDM 326. (POL-A-4).

29 Apr 76. The DNRO proposed to the ASD(I) that paragraph 5a. of NSCID No. 6 be revised, limiting reference to the NSA to only their role in processing collected satellite data. The requested change was not entertained, under the groundrules of the NSCID revision process (RAR-B-26-b).

4 Jun 76. PFIAB member Dr. Baker told the DNRO that in a meeting with DEPSECDEF Ellsworth the PFIAB had discussed the position of the NRP in the Defense intelligence organization; that they had misgivings about and objections to the way the organization charts were constructed, and that they urged retention of the special organization status that had characterized the NRP in the past (RAR-B-23 PFIAB).

6 Aug 76. The Acting DNRO, Dr. Cook, briefed the PFIAB on the NRP. The Board expressed the opinion that NRP management should be preserved, and that the streamlined management technique had realized remarkable achievements. The Board also foresaw that this capability might be degraded (RAR-B-23 PFIAB).

26 Jan 77. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs issued clarification to PD/NSC-2 and Executive Order 11905. PD/NSC-2 abolished the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), whose duties were assumed by the NSC Policy Review Committee (Intelligence) (PRC(I)). The Operations Advisory Group (OAG) was also abolished, and its functions assumed by the NSC Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) (RAR-A-1-b).

17 May 77. Senator Huddleston of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence forwarded to Adm Murphy, DDCI(IC), a draft of "The National Intelligence Act of 1977", noting that the President had endorsed the notion of legislative charters for the nation's intelligence activities (filed "Intelligence Charter, 1977-1981").

9 May 77. Acting DNRO Dr. Cook, in a memo to the SECDEF, expressed concern over the planned reorganization of Defense Intelligence and its effect on the NRO management environment. He cited examples of changes which had diluted management concepts and resulted in growing normalization of the NRP, and urged an update of the NRP Charter.

20 Aug 77. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brzezinski, in a memo "Intelligence Charter Legislation" asked the intelligence community organizations, including the NRO, to submit views, including specific legislative language, on charter legislation for their organizations (filed "Legislative

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Charter, 1977-1981").

24 Jan 78. Executive Order 12036, "United States Intelligence Activities" was issued; it superseded E.O. 11905 (18 Feb 76), E.O. 11985 (13 May 77), and E.O. 11994 (1 Jun 77). E.O. 12036 established the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB). A National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC) was established under the DCI, as the mechanism for assigning targets and objectives to national foreign intelligence collection systems (RAR-A-1-b).

3 Oct 79. A change to DOD Directive TS 5105.23 amended the duties of the DNRO, specifying that he was to work directly with the Defense Space Operations Committee (DSOC) on policy, budgets, requirements and programs; the DSOC became the principal advisory body to the SECDEF for the NRP. Its members included the DUSD(PR), ASD(C3I), and the SECAF, who would Chair the DSOC. These changes replaced the provisions for the DNRO to keep the DDR&E and the ASD(C) informed on the status of projects of the NRP.

11 Sep 80. DEPSECDEF Claytor approved the "Plan for the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program (DRSP)". The DRSP was established to provide management oversight for tactical intelligence satellite activities, including those that augment NFIP activities and Defense initiatives whose primary or exclusive purpose is support to military commanders during crisis and war. It is a subset of the total Military Space Program (MSP) defined in PD/NSC-37, and consists of the tactical intelligence, targeting, ocean and battlefield surveillance subset of the MSP. The role of the DNRO was modified to add full responsibility for the DRSP. The Plan established an "Assistant to the DNRO for Military Support" (ADNRO) and a "Military Support Staff". The DNRO has the option of using NRO Program Offices or service elements for studies, developments, and procurements (filed, "Intelligence Charter, 1977-1981").

4 Dec 81. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities" was issued; it revoked E.O. 12036.

10 Nov 83. Adm Burkhalter, Director of the IC Staff, sent his views on NRP management and reconstitution of the EXCOM to PFIAB member Dr. Foster (BYE-3398-83). He attributed the success of the NRO to streamlined management; "cradle-to-grave" control of the programs; and access to the best people in the business. The latter two features were still intact, and even the chain of command was still relatively short. The change with the biggest impact was greater Congressional oversight, which dictated a DCI with authority to speak for intelligence programs across the board. Four Presidents had dictated that the DCI exercise ever greater control over the NFIP, and DCI authority over the NRP had graduated from requirements to budget decisions, and defending them before Congress. If there was one fundamental difference

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from the past, it would likely be the commingling of the NRP with the other NFIP programs; the NRP was no longer an autonomous entity. To take it out of the NFIP structure, establishing a new ExCom, would dilute the DCI's budget authority (and the author suggested that this might well be an objective of its advocates). Both the President and Congress looked to one spokesman for national foreign intelligence activities, and that was the DCI.

Adm Burkhalter believed there was probably greater coordination than ever before between the SECDEF and the DCI; whereas the ExCom was originally established to insure such coordination, the DOD membership was gradually relegated to the Assistant Secretary level, and it was debatable whether that final constitution of the ExCom actually facilitated the coordination originally intended. Now, the DCI made the decisions, but in full consideration of DOD views and authorities for line management; the DCI was an "honest broker" on Community issues, and it was difficult to understand how an ExCom would improve coordination.

Reluctance to re-establish the ExCom is easier to understand when viewed from this perspective !

11 Feb 85. The President acknowledged that the NRO plays a critical role in the security of our nation, and directed the SECDEF, the DCI, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to periodically review the program, priorities and resources of the NRO, as recommended in the DOD/DCI/PFIAB report of July 13, 1984.

1987. Redraft of the NRO Charter -- work started.

1988. The Staff investigated the desirability of seeking legislation to establish a formal charter for the NRO. The consensus from the legal standpoint was that the NRO is better off operating as it is and has been; that there are too many vested interests that would rise up to cause further erosion in the management scheme of things; that legislation would be very restrictive and the program would suffer more than it would gain.

Nov 88. The DNRO completes a plan for reorganization of the structure of the NRO, and establishes a transition team to work out the details of implementation.

12 Dec 88. The Defense Space Council was established to coordinate space policy issues, replacing the Defense Space Operations Committee established 3 Oct 79. The Council is co-chaired by the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition and Policy; its members are the Service Secretaries, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, and the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. Note that the Secretary of the Air Force chaired

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the DSOC. (Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12 Dec 88.)

16 DEC 88. DNRO Aldridge resigned from the Air Force. Mr. Hill appointed Acting DNRO.

An observation that can be made is that the NRO has had very little influence in its own destiny. It has not been able to change its Charter since 1965; it was unable to influence the outcome of the NSCID No. 6 revision or the changes to the EXCOM structure; or to achieve either an Executive Order or legislation to solidify its position and reduce its vulnerability to future changes. The one, constant, outside supporter over the years has been the PFIAB, and while their efforts have been admirable and their effect essential, it is not at all clear that they understand the problems that have been created at the NRO Staff level by all of the changes in the community.

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