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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

Serial: MDR-107650  
21 September 2020

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.  
27305 W. Live Oak Road  
Suite #1203  
Castaic, CA 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This responds to your request of 6 August 2019 to have a document titled "CRYPTOLOG, October 1981 Edition" reviewed for declassification. The material has been reviewed under the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requirements of Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 and is enclosed. We have determined that some of the information in the material requires protection.

Some portions deleted from the document were found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with E.O. 13526. The information denied meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Section 1.4 subparagraphs (b) and (c) and remains classified TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL as provided in Section 1.2 of E.O. 13526. The withheld information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Sections 3.3(b) (3) and (6) of the Executive Order.

In Addition, Section 3.5 (c) of E.O. 13526, allows for the protection afforded to information under the provisions of law. Therefore, the names of NSA/CSS employees and information that would reveal NSA/CSS functions and activities have been protected in accordance with Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605, formerly 50 U.S. Code 402 note).

Since your request for declassification has been denied, you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. Any person denied access to information may file an appeal to the NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority. The appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days after the date of the denial letter. The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority (P133), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, STE 6881, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6881. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes the release of information is required. The NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 60 working days after receipt of the appeal.

If you have any questions regarding this action, please contact me at 301-688-7785.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jacqueline M. Amacher".

Jacqueline M. Amacher  
Chief  
Declassification Services

Encl:  
a/s

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

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
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~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND

# CRYPTOLOG

OCT 1981



**ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE:**

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(note: no 'O' in 'log')

## EDITORIAL (v)

We are producing fewer technical reports than we used to. The numbers, for those who like statistics, are given by Ken Williams in his article on Technical Support Catalogs beginning on page 8.

We can remember when there were typists in each analytic shop, whose job it was to produce the technical reports, the Weekly (or Monthly) Technical Notes, and Technical Support Letters, and various other largely extinct or endangered species of technical documentation. But such people are rare these days. The only typists work in the front offices, and since the 'front office' work tends to have a higher priority, they don't often have very much time for typing a lot of technical reports.

Now and then, one finds an analyst who feels so strongly that some technical reporting ought to be done that he will try to type it out himself, if he can find a decent typewriter. Have you ever seen two or three people fighting over a typewriter?

Anyone who has begun to see what can be done in the analytic field with tools like a desk-side terminal connected with a TSS and PLATFORM, can only wonder why we haven't yet provided the analyst with the tools to produce decent technical reports. All those beautiful ads on TV about modern data systems! All those wonderful words in our plans about what we will have "tomorrow"!

We are reminded of an old friend, no longer here in the trenches, who once said, "There they are in the front office, talking about rockets to the moon and planetary probes; and here I am, trying to light this here fire with this piece of flint!"

W.E.S.

# ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE: Problems and Prospects (u)

by **Derek K. Craig**



EO 3.3b(3)  
EO 3.3b(6)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

*A*s a recipient of a fellowship under the newly established DCI Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program, I recently completed a one-year (S-000) research project to assess the production and use of foreign economic intelligence derived from COMINT sources. I examined how COMINT information is used in finished intelligence reports published by other intelligence agencies as well as how COMINT reports are used directly by various government agencies responsible for the formulation, implementation and assessment of U.S. foreign economic policy. I conducted most of my research while performing temporary assignments at several agencies, including the CIA National Foreign Assessment Center and the Departments of Commerce, Energy and Treasury. While working with both analysts and policymakers, I had the opportunity not only to observe how COMINT is used but also to participate in the analysis, evaluation and dissemination of economic intelligence from all sources.

[Redacted]


Also, I conducted open source research and attended international economic conferences to study foreign perceptions of global economic problems and to assess the type of information which is available from outside the intelligence community.

(S-000) During the course of my research, I was impressed with the valuable contribution that COMINT information can provide to the understanding and assessment of international economic developments. At the same time, however, I was disappointed with the failure of both producers and customers to achieve a more effective exploitation of COMINT. There is no doubt that for certain economic topics, COMINT is a unique source of valuable information and for other areas COMINT is often the most timely source. However, the volume of economic reporting from COMINT is often too overwhelming for customers to absorb the information and the intelligence itself is often too fragmented to permit adequate evaluation. COMINT reporting tends to lack

the analysis and the synthesis which is required to understand the meaning and significance of the reported information. In this age of information overload, it is essential for intelligence reporting to be more selective and better focused in the choice of items to be reported. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of the global economic environment and the changing availability of information requires intelligence producers to have increased flexibility in responding to time sensitive customer information needs. With respect to the marketing and use of COMINT economic reporting, there is a definite need to improve the personal interaction among producers and customers and to provide intelligence support which is geared to the specific needs of individual customers. It is also necessary to improve customer accessibility to COMINT information and to increase customer awareness of the limitations and capabilities of COMINT reporting. This paper discusses the problems I observed with the production and use of COMINT and offers some recommendations for improving the NSA effort to produce economic intelligence.

(S-000)  
[Redacted]

EO 3.3b(3)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



customers and should be designed so that customers can readily use the information to establish new data bases or to maintain and supplement existing data bases. Third, there is a need to produce special aperiodic reports which analyze and summarize information that indicates new trends or developments in foreign economic activity. These reports should focus on topics where COMINT is obviously a unique and reliable source and where there exists a good historical data base. Such reports would fill a major gap in the existing effort and would satisfy the needs of many customers at both the analyst and executive levels.

(S-000) From my observation, the present COMINT effort to produce foreign economic intelligence suffers from a shotgun reporting approach in which a barrage of information is fired at the customer with a minimum of analysis, synthesis and coordination. Frequently, COMINT reports do not provide sufficient analysis to enable the reader to readily understand either the meaning or significance of the information. Although it is not the role of the COMINT analyst to render all-source assessments or estimates, the COMINT analyst is often the person best suited to interpret the information in terms of its reliability, completeness and significance to previously observed activity. Without such interpretation, the reader is likely to improperly assess or even ignore the reported information. Too often, COMINT reporting focuses on the questions of who, what, when and where without adequate attention to the how and why. Good COMINT reporting should be similar to good journalism: it should not only present the facts but attempt to explain them.

(S-000) In addition to better analysis and more balanced reporting, there is a need to improve the coordination and synthesis of economic information derived from different COMINT sources and types of communications. Too often, the customer is left with the burden of sorting and collating COMINT data reported from different COMINT sources. This is a cumbersome task as often the data from different sources is conflicting, duplicative or insufficiently explained to permit adequate assessment by the customer. A more coordinated reporting effort which synthesizes material from all COMINT sources would certainly enhance the value of COMINT reporting on economics.

(S-000) Improving COMINT analysis requires a more balanced and innovative approach to the publication of reports. The present effort is overloaded with single item and periodic activity reports which flood the customer with fragments of information and overwhelming detail. The reporting effort should provide customers with a manageable balance of reports. First, single item or highlight reports should be restricted to very time sensitive or significant items. Such reports should be concise but contain enough detail and analysis for the reader to understand the information and to assess the credibility and significance of the information. Full text quotation of the original message or verbatim extracts should be provided for especially sensitive items or to emphasize the authenticity of the original message contents. Second, periodic reports on the more routine types of international economic transactions should be tailored to the specific needs of

(S-000) A further deficiency with the COMINT effort is the absence of a system which provides the capability for rapid shifts in both collection and reporting resources. The constantly changing international economic environment requires the intelligence support to be equally dynamic and flexible. Much of the present COMINT effort is "locked-in" by periodic reports and standing requirements and does not permit rapid shifting of resources to accommodate temporary tasking and reporting changes. Good opportunities for providing timely COMINT support are often missed because the lag time in making necessary changes is too long. Although [redacted] showed that collection and reporting changes can be made relatively quickly, the process was painful and not always responsive to the ad hoc information needs of various customers.

(S-000) The massive amount of information which is available from other sources requires the COMINT effort to be highly selective in the choice of targets and the information to be reported. The three primary assets of COMINT exploitation are timeliness, uniqueness and reliability. Timeliness is generally the key factor as much of the information derived from COMINT may be available later from other sources. The lag time, however, may vary from hours to months or even years. For certain types of economic activity COMINT can be the




only source of detailed information and the uniqueness of the information may be more important than the timeliness. This applies especially to areas where the confidentiality of business transactions is traditional or where secrecy is desired for national security reasons. To the extent that COMINT provides first-hand information, reliability is an important asset. In some situations COMINT may not be the only source or the most timely but is the most reliable for verifying information. To efficiently use COMINT resources, both the producer and the customer must know what information is available from other sources as well as the relative value of the gaps which can be filled by COMINT. Theoretically, such assessments are made through various requirements and evaluation systems which determine the type of information needed, establish reporting priorities and evaluate the resulting COMINT product. Unfortunately, the SIGINT requirements system is often so cumbersome and divorced from both intelligence operations and actual customers that many COMINT economic reports are produced without a thorough examination of customer needs or relevance to major economic intelligence problems.

(S-000) A final problem with the production of COMINT concerns the need for better quality control. Frequently, poorly written reports damage the credibility of the information being reported. Misuse of economic jargon, typing errors and other mistakes tend to create a lack of confidence in the accuracy of the analysis and reporting. The customer's ability and willingness to use COMINT information is influenced considerably by the quality of writing and the presentation of the material. To some degree the medium is the message and the packaging and the method of presentation can determine the acceptability and use of the material. Often, reports which are in hard copy form and contain clear, concise summaries with tables, charts or graphs are more likely to be read than electrical reports which contain many sections and merely list transactions or describe activity in a narrative form.


(S-000) Among the various customers of economic intelligence, the use of COMINT varies widely and is hampered by several problems. First, COMINT information does not always reach the right people. Frequently, individual customers are unaware of reports which are relevant to their mission and satisfy their information needs. Even though a particular report is distributed to the appropriate agency, it cannot be assumed that the information is actually read by the appropriate analyst or policy level official. Dissemination works best in situations where the customer has direct contact with the

producing element and is alerted to the publication of relevant reports. Otherwise, dissemination tends to occur on a "hit or miss" basis. The nature and severity of this problem varies with each customer agency. In some cases, the flow of reports is so voluminous that the information cannot be digested or the internal distribution system cannot adequately respond to the needs of all individual customers. In other situations, the problem lies with the customer's reluctance or even refusal to receive support. Ultimately, the type and quality of support is determined by the personality of individual customers. Some are very receptive and may be very aggressive in seeking and using information. Others are very passive and may perceive little or no value in receiving, regardless of the relevance of such material.

(S-000) Even for customers who are strong advocates of support, the use and evaluation of COMINT is difficult. Most customers are attuned to reporting from human sources (HUMINT) and do not understand the nature of COMINT sources and methods. Frequently,



This distinction can be critical in assessing the reported information. COMINT reports which fail to clearly identify the source of the information make it very difficult for customers to evaluate the reliability or credibility of the information. Furthermore,




In many cases, the credibility of reporting and the understanding of COMINT reporting in particular is determined by the relationship between the customer and the producing organization. Direct contact with people in the producing element enables the customer to understand how COMINT information is collected and processed and can significantly influence the customer's decision to accept and use such information.

(S-000) A further obstacle to the effective use of COMINT concerns classification. Most analysts and policy level officials at customer agencies lack secure storage areas and secure telephones within their own working spaces. COMINT reports can be reviewed and discussed only in special areas, usually the support or liaison offices. Such inconvenience and lack of ready access makes it difficult to work with COMINT and incorporate such data into working papers and formal memoranda. With this type of environment, COMINT data is

easily overlooked or forgotten. Furthermore, many analysts at the working level in customer agencies do not have a codeword clearance and are totally unaware of relevant information from COMINT sources. Although procedures exist for downgrading and sanitizing COMINT information, such procedures are not well known or understood by many customers. In areas where COMINT is considered essential for maintaining all-source data bases, the code-word classification controls can hinder the customer's ability to use COMINT derived information.



(S-000) COMINT reporting on foreign economic developments has both a tactical and a strategic use.



The tactical use of economic intelligence requires very time sensitive reporting but little, if any, analysis. The strategic use of economic intelligence, however, may require substantial analysis and synthesis of the raw information in order to be useful to most customers. For example, much of the reporting

requires extensive analysis to make the information meaningful and to avoid flooding the customer with useless tidbits of information. COMINT reporting and support efforts to economic customers must vary according to whether the information has tactical or strategic use. Timeliness is the key to providing effective tactical support while analysis and synthesis are the keys to providing effective strategic support.

(S-000) For some subject areas, the use of COMINT may involve a conflict between the need to protect sensitive sources and methods and the customer's desire to take action based upon the information.



A similar situation occurs with the existing prohibitions on using COMINT for commercial advantage. Reports which indicate foreign trade opportunities are used only for background information and for providing policy direction and not as the basis for taking any action to assist private industry in competing with foreign firms. Thus, in some areas, the value of obtaining information from COMINT sources is reduced because of the restrictions and limitations placed on the use of such.

(S-000). Two final problems which I observed with the use of COMINT concerned the requirements system and customer feedback. The ability of some customers to obtain COMINT information is hampered by their lack of awareness and understanding of the SIGINT requirements system. Even customers who are aware of the system often fail to use it. Some customers rely upon informal channels such as analyst contacts to convey their information needs. The informal mechanism is certainly useful for refining existing requirements but does not change reporting priorities or resource allocations. Although most customer agencies are represented on the appropriate SIGINT requirements committees, there is often insufficient contact between such representatives and the actual users of COMINT. The problem of customer feedback is perhaps more serious because good feedback is essential for providing COMINT analysts with the incentive and stimulation to improve reporting and make the effort more responsive to customer needs. The existing written and oral feedback received from customer agencies contains several flaws. First, the feedback is often superficial, focusing on what reports were shown to selected individual customers and not on how or why the information was useful. Second, most feedback is provided through intermediary staffs and seldom evolves from direct customer to analyst contact. During my various assignments with customer agencies, I was amazed at the number of occasions where COMINT information was used in preparing assessments and policy positions, but feedback on such use was not provided. In part, this problem can be attributed to the sensitivity of the policy formulation and review process, but much of the problem results from the lack of closer interaction between producers and customers.

(S-000) Many of the problems which exist with both the production and the use of

economic intelligence derived from COMINT sources can be resolved without any major expenditure or resources. In fact, some of the major deficiencies can be corrected simply by improving the level of communication and interaction between producers and customers. Good cannot be produced in a vacuum. Intelligence analysts must know not only what type of reporting is required but also why the information is needed and how it is used. Customers need to understand the limitations and capabilities of COMINT exploitation so that the information can be properly assessed. NSA production offices should encourage their analysts to identify and meet their counterparts in other agencies as well as the primary customers at policymaking agencies. Frequent personal contact helps to establish the credibility of reporting and enables both the analyst and customer to better understand each other's problems and needs. Direct interaction is also useful for clarifying the content of COMINT reports and explaining the analytic methods used. NSA managers must realize that a certain amount of production time will be devoted to communication with customers. Without management support and strong encouragement for such interaction, analysts will lack the incentive to establish and maintain good working relationships with customers.

(S-000) Improvements to the quality of COMINT analysis and reporting can be accomplished with training programs. Managers should initiate and support programs for NSA analysts which will enhance their understanding, analysis and reporting of foreign economic intelligence. Formal training courses in international economics are helpful for providing a general framework of knowledge, but must be supplemented with informal seminars and discussion groups which can provide more specific understanding and guidance. Analyst exchange programs with other agencies or with customer agencies should be set up to give NSA analysts the opportunity to better understand economic analysis and to obtain a different perspective on the role and use of COMINT information.

(S-000) COMINT reporting of foreign economic activity can be improved by providing more analysis, synthesis and summarization of information and by focusing on the quality rather than the quantity of reporting. Economic requirements should be overhauled to provide more specific guidelines for COMINT collection and reporting. COMINT reports should respond to a specific and well defined need and not to a general requirement or vague perception that the information may be useful. The requirements system also needs to develop better procedures which provide more flexibility in responding to ad hoc customer needs.

(S-000) The distribution and dissemination of COMINT information also needs improving:



Customer agencies should be provided with a periodic index of the titles of relevant COMINT reports. This index could serve as a useful and convenient reference aid to available COMINT publications. Finally, there is a need to devote more emphasis and resources to providing timely, personalized support to executive level customers through the preparation of ad hoc summary reports, special studies and oral briefings on selected topics. An effective marketing effort is often just as important as a good production effort.

(S-000) The use of COMINT information can be improved by providing customers with a better understanding of COMINT analysis and reporting methods and by improving customer access to COMINT information. Serious consideration should be given to either sanitizing more of the foreign economic intelligence derived from COMINT sources or to provide codeword clearances to more analysts at the working level in customer agencies. To reduce some of the conflict between the need to protect COMINT sources and the desire to take action based upon COMINT, there is a need to establish firmer guidelines which clarify how COMINT can be used. This is especially needed for the customer agencies which are involved in enforcing trade sanctions and export control laws.

(S-000) The NSA foreign mission has been directed toward the collection and production of information and not the analysis or evaluation of such information. However, in the effort to produce economic intelligence, I think it is a mistake to merely report the product of COMINT collection and assume that the burden and responsibility for any analysis and synthesis rests with the customer. Such an approach only increases the risk that COMINT will be ignored or misused. The massive amount of COMINT information available on foreign economic activity combined with the limited amount of time which most customers have for reviewing makes it imperative to produce reports that the customer can readily use. The production of a large volume of COMINT is wasted if the customer cannot absorb and understand the information. NSA has demonstrated a capability to play a significant role in providing valuable foreign economic intelligence. This capability now needs refining to achieve a more effective and efficient use of COMINT resources.

## NSA-Croctic No. 35 by DHW

- A. Half of Britain's most eminent words-and-music team (full name; see also Word B)  
 127 136 93 67 224 12 268 60 236 100 105 246 46  
 83 33 119 150 26 201 47 175 141
- B. The other half (full name; see also Word A)  
 192 71 234 78 252 242 99 220 188 115 89 66 20  
 262 230 171 50 207 214 162 134
- C. Comic role in Word H (3 wds)  
 208 1 128 251 133 157 152 30 57 18 65 160 198  
 14 38
- D. Short-handled axes  
 64 190 266 113 239 122 40 88
- E. Clay house in song: "My ——"  
 (2 wds)  
 118 219 267 244 92 255 9 147 51 94 82 172 6
- F. Lesser work by Words A and B  
 (2 wds)  
 170 130 22 54 213 32 11 70 189 45 108 111 257
- G. Faint light on the celestial sphere opposite the sun  
 80 144 193 55 186 176 203 260 19 222 197
- H. Major work by Words A and B  
 (abbrev. and 1 wd)  
 53 264 72 42 174 23 183 2 204 56 154
- I. Oriental hero of work by Words A and B (comp)  
 117 232 112 237 148 59 28 249
- J. Oddballs  
 81 132 77 226 24 177 87 39 187 164
- K. Gushed forth; oozed (var.)  
 231 241 258 165 248
- L. Maryland governor's annual address (4 wds)  
 149 74 79 124 159 156 102 27 182 194 29 233 44  
 8 209
- M. —— Derringer  
 84 139 7 135 17
- N. Another work by Words A and B  
 163 216 250 142 240 123 211 228
- O. "The —— a Sailor," alt. title of Word H (3 wds)  
 10 76 21 137 61 168 243 97 126 143 120 36
- P. Tried  
 180 254 73 146 121 265 259 166 218
- Q. Something impending, esp. evil or danger  
 256 195 153 101 107 131 95 140 202
- R. ". . . coals to ——"  
 35 104 3 221 210 63 238 43 75
- S. Process of dissipating like vapor  
 261 151 106 48 31 167 206 4 90 16 179
- T. Maine, New Hampshire, or Vermont, for instance (3 wds)  
 191 25 37 185 15 96 245 109 205 145 223 212 58

UNCLASSIFIED

U. Cheated

49 263 85 158 62 68

V. Hockey players on the offensive line (2 wds)

227 41 69 125 5 98 91 13 52

W. FDR called Pearl Harbor "a day of \_\_\_\_\_"

129 217 173 235 155 114

X. Coach Amos Alonzo at nightfall (3 wds)

253 199 116 184 110 34 229 196 225 86


Y. Why? (2 wds)

161 200 103 181 169 247 215

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| 1 C   | 2 H   |       | 3 R   | 4 S   |       | 5 V   | 6 E   | 7 M   | 8 L   |       | 9 E   | 10 O  | 11 F  |       | 12 A  |       |
| 13 V  | 14 C  | 15 T  | 16 S  | 17 M  |       | 18 C  | 19 G  | 20 B  | 21 O  | 22 F  | 23 H  | 24 J  | 25 T  | 26 A  |       |       |
| 27 L  | 28 I  |       | 29 L  | 30 C  | 31 S  | 32 F  | 33 A  |       | 34 X  | 35 R  | 36 O  |       | 37 T  | 38 C  | 39 J  |       |
| 40 D  | 41 V  |       | 42 H  | 43 R  | 44 L  | 45 F  | 46 A  |       | 47 A  | 48 S  | 49 U  | 50 B  | 51 E  | 52 V  | 53 H  |       |
|       | 54 F  | 55 G  | 56 H  | 57 C  | 58 T  | 59 I  | 60 A  |       | 61 O  | 62 U  |       | 63 R  | 64 D  | 65 C  | 66 B  |       |
| 67 A  | 68 U  |       | 69 V  | 70 F  | 71 B  | 72 H  | 73 P  |       | 74 L  | 75 R  | 76 O  | 77 J  | 78 B  |       | 79 L  |       |
| 80 G  | 81 J  | 82 E  | 83 A  | 84 M  |       | 85 U  | 86 X  | 87 J  | 88 D  | 89 B  | 90 S  | 91 V  | 92 E  | 93 A  |       |       |
| 94 E  | 95 Q  | 96 T  | 97 O  | 98 V  | 99 B  | 100 A |       | 101 Q | 102 L |       | 103 Y | 104 R |       | 105 A | 106 S |       |
| 107 Q | 108 F |       | 109 T | 110 X | 111 F | 112 I | 113 D | 114 W |       | 115 B | 116 X | 117 I | 118 E | 119 A | 120 O |       |
| 121 P | 122 D | 123 N | 124 L |       | 125 V | 126 O |       | 127 A | 128 C | 129 W | 130 F | 131 Q |       | 132 J | 133 C |       |
| 134 B | 135 M | 136 A | 137 O | 138 T |       | 139 M | 140 Q | 141 A | 142 N | 143 O | 144 G |       | 145 T | 146 P | 147 E |       |
| 148 I | 149 L | 150 A | 151 S | 152 C |       | 153 Q | 154 H | 155 W | 156 L | 157 C |       | 158 U | 159 I | 160 C | 161 Y |       |
| 162 B | 163 N | 164 J |       | 165 K | 166 P |       | 167 S | 168 O | 169 Y | 170 F | 171 B | 172 E |       | 173 W | 174 F |       |
| 175 A | 176 G | 177 J |       | 178 T | 179 S | 180 P | 181 Y | 182 L |       | 183 H | 184 X | 185 T | 186 G | 187 J | 188 E |       |
|       | 189 F | 190 D | 191 T | 192 B | 193 G | 194 L | 195 Q | 196 X | 197 G | 198 C |       | 199 K | 200 Y |       | 201 C |       |
| 202 Q |       | 203 G | 204 H | 205 T | 206 S | 207 B | 208 C | 209 L |       | 210 R | 211 N | 212 T | 213 F | 214 B | 215 Y |       |
|       | 216 N | 217 W | 218 P |       | 219 E | 220 B | 221 R | 222 G | 223 T | 224 A | 225 X | 226 J |       | 227 V | 228 N |       |
| 229 X |       | 230 B | 231 K |       | 232 I | 233 L | 234 B | 235 W | 236 A | 237 I |       | 238 R | 239 D | 240 N |       |       |
| 241 K | 242 B | 243 O | 244 E | 245 T | 246 A | 247 Y |       | 248 K | 249 I | 250 N |       | 251 C | 252 B | 253 X | 254 E |       |
|       | 255 E | 256 Q | 257 F | 258 K |       | 259 P | 260 G | 261 S |       | 262 B | 263 U | 264 H | 265 P | 266 D | 267 E | 268 A |

# TECHNICAL SUPPORT CATALOGS (U)

by **Kenneth J. Williams**



roviding adequate sustaining field support is one of those abstract concepts that is difficult to define and even more difficult to accomplish. DDO's Analytic Technical Health Group (ATHG) is attempting to improve that situation and to plan for future comprehensive initiatives. This article is intended to acquaint the reader with the Technical Support Catalog - one modest current step towards achieving those goals.

~~(S)~~ Technical Support Catalogs are not new; they have been produced since the early 1950's. Originally, they consisted of lists of available technical documents and publications available on a particular subject entity. They were often produced by hand, typed out from file cards maintained on each technical report produced. In some areas, producing the Technical Support Catalogs often kept one person busy full time. More recently, Technical Support Catalogs have virtually disappeared and, as a result of personnel cutbacks, the published technical reports themselves have been reduced in number and periodicity. This situation was emphasized in a DDF study of field support, based upon Field Visitation Team Reports for 1976 and 1977. The primary field complaint, according to that study, concerned the lack of technical support and timely feedback by NSA. The ATHG, formed by DDO to study the problem and find solutions to it, supported the DDF findings: there had indeed been a diminution of the flow of traditional technical support (i.e., Technical SIGINT Reports and Working Aids) from NSA, as is illustrated in the chart below (based on information provided by T512).

(U) While DDO cannot magically conjure up additional technical support, SIGINT analytic groups can, and must, ensure that appropriate field and in-house elements -

- are provided with the latest information to support their missions (including Alternate Intercept Coverage Plan) and
- are alerted to the availability of any information for which they have a legitimate support requirement.

DDO Technical Report Production  
1968 - 1979

| <u>Year</u> | <u>A</u> | <u>B</u> | <u>G</u> | <u>W</u> | <u>DDO</u> |
|-------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|------------|
| 1968        | 993      | 876      | 579      | -        | 2448       |
| 1969        | 1215     | 879      | 265      | -        | 2359       |
| 1970        | 914      | 636      | 274      | 1        | 1825       |
| 1971        | 691      | 723      | 204      | 67       | 1685       |
| 1972        | 602      | 458      | 181      | 51       | 1292       |
| 1973        | 459      | 289      | 100      | 51       | 899        |
| 1974        | 591      | 219      | 125      | 31       | 966        |
| 1975        | 540      | 197      | 112      | 21       | 900        |
| 1976        | 454      | 200      | 81       | 21       | 756        |
| 1977        | 471      | 130      | 123      | 65       | 789        |
| 1978        | 464      | 177      | 155      | 59       | 855        |
| 1979        | 199      | 133      | 100      | 76       | 508        |

(U) On 12 April, 1978, in its first report to DDO, the ATHG emphasized the purposes of Technical Support and Feedback as a means of improving the efficiency of the collection effort by -

- strengthening the motivation of field personnel,
- increasing their target knowledge,
- improving their understanding of Agency goals,
- enhancing skills and training, and
- encouraging the development of a spirit of teamwork between station personnel and the analytic workforce at NSA.

One of the ATHG recommendations, which were subsequently approved by DDO, called for the creation of two sub-groups, one for feedback and one for Technical Support Catalogs.

~~(S)~~ The Feedback Sub-group chairman, [redacted] P13, working with elements of DDO and DDT, is addressing methods of improving the production by computers (especially Terminal Sub-systems) of quick turnaround information for transmission to field sites. In addition, in order to heighten management awareness of various aspects of this data flow, [redacted] working with T131, has incorporated additional displays of "Incoming/Outgoing" data, into DDT's Quarterly Management Information Bulletin. This publication provides management information

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| ALTERNATE ALPHABETIC REFERENCE | ALTERNATE REFERENCE           | ALTERNATE REFERENCE           | ALTERNATE REFERENCE           | ALTERNATE REFERENCE           | ALTERNATE REFERENCE           | ALTERNATE REFERENCE           | ALTERNATE REFERENCE           |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| SOURCE                         | NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ARS | NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ARS | NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ARS | NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ARS | NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ARS | NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ARS | NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ARS |
| AUTHOR                         | COMMON REFERENCE              | DAVIS, GEORGE                 |                               |                               |                               |                               |                               |
| PAGE                           | 1746                          |                               |                               |                               |                               |                               |                               |

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EO 3.3b(3)  
 EO 3.3b(6)  
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| 64-124-VA-1-76         |               | 100  |
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| 64-124-VA-1-97         |               | 100  |
| 64-124-VA-1-98         |               | 100  |
| 64-124-VA-1-99         |               | 100  |
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Examples of Output

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reports, in numeric and graphic form, on the receipt and distribution of data; it includes incoming and outgoing volumes, general patterns of feedback to the sites, and data exchanges with Second and Third Parties.

(U) The Technical Support Catalog Subgroup, chaired by the author, sought a general solution to the problem of regular production of Technical Support Catalogs, and thanks to much assistance from T5, (particularly Ms. Carolyn Boaz and [redacted]), was able to focus on a solution based upon the existing NSA/CSS Technical Document Collection. The result, with some minor adjustments, and with room for potential future add-ons, has been instituted as a DDO approved Technical Support Catalog.

(U) STINFO (Scientific and Technical Information) is maintained by T5112, one of the elements of the Library at FANX. The material includes RDT&E reports prepared by NSA or its contractors, DDO technical SIGINT publications, software acquisition documents, and other relevant Agency documents. Every technical publication sent to T5112 is filed according to an S-prefixed one-up number assigned by the STINFO indexers. Prior to a recent change, T5112 prepared bibliographic descriptions of each document using the Report Document Page (DD Form 1473, 1 Jan 73); abstracts of the document were included (if provided by the author) and key words were selected from the text. This procedure, as it applies to the ATHG efforts, has been changed so that the DDO author or the OPC (Office of Primary Concern) of a given technical report must now prepare the DD Form 1473, and must enter the required pertinent information (particularly the abstract and the key word entries).

(U) The data from these bibliographic descriptions are typed by T5 personnel on a Delta Data 7000 terminal, and computer tapes are created. These tapes are processed on CARILLON to add the data to the existing off-line data base. Retrievals of information can be made by key word, author, originating organization, report number, date, etc., and all these elements make up the components of the Technical Support Catalog.

(U) The Technical Support Catalog is now a formal Agency publication included (with instructions) in the Technical SIGINT Publications Manual (USSID 200). It contains a compendium and abstracts of either general or tailored technical documents and publications on a given subject area. All of the material in the Technical Support Catalog is derived from formal records of selected technical SIGINT publications filed in STINFO.

(U) In order for the requisite information to be entered into STINFO, the OPC should forward a copy of each report to T5112, along with the Report Documentation Page (DD Form 1473). The OPC should ensure that the following blocks on the form are completed:

1. Report Number,
2. Title,
7. Author(s) (when applicable),
12. Report Date,
13. Number of pages;
15. Security Classification,
- 15a. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule,
19. Key Words, and
20. Abstract.

(U) Under current procedures, requests for information about reports, or the reports themselves, that come from outside the production group which produced the reports, must be receive formal approval from the group which produced the reports. Therefore, requests from field units for a particular Technical Support Catalog should be sent to the OPC, who will in turn forward the request to T5112.

(U) Selection of publications for the Technical Support Catalog may range from the general, such as a bibliography of all technical reports produced by A Group, to the very specific, such as a listing of all technical reports dealing with Hungarian Ground Forces [redacted]. The catalogs can also contain full bibliographic listings, sorted by one or more of the following indices: author, report number, source, and key word. Some examples are shown.

(U) A variety of production techniques for Technical Support Catalogs are being experimented with by the ATHG and various DDO/DDT elements, using various terminals and Terminal Sub-systems.

(U) Future upgrades of the Technical Support Catalog system include such possibilities as on-line bibliographic sorts, and full-text document retrievals for those subscribers with appropriate system or RJE (Remote Job Entry) terminals.

(U) No amount of sophisticated equipment and software will make the system work effectively unless the humans in the system are committed to making the system work. No matter what further developments and changes are made to the system, those who produce the reports will have to properly participate in the program, and those who need the support will have to properly exercise the system, in order to make technical support all it can be - an accurate, meaningful, and effective contribution to the overall SIGINT effort.

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# The Stairwell Society

**Walter Abbott**



I have always had a deathly fear of elevators. You may have seen me on occasion, braced in the corner, hands wrapped white-knuckled around the side rails, waiting for that twang which would announce the snapping of the cable and the inevitable plunge to follow. I've often wondered whether you could avoid destruction by jumping just as the elevator hit bottom, but this would require precision which I doubt I possess and anyway, everyone knows that in the bottom of the elevator shaft is a giant spring which would bounce the elevator right back at you in mid-jump. And even if you survive the drop, once the elevator starts bouncing off the spring, would it ever stop? Imagine being trapped for weeks in a bouncing elevator! It's enough to make one's palms sweat.

When I related this concern to another ninth floor dweller one day, he mildly asked why I didn't walk up the stairs. That, unfortunately, crunched right into a second of my deathly fears - physical exertion. But I had to do something. The elevator thing was getting to me, so the next morning I walked up . . . and nearly died. As I was lying on the floor next to my desk, wheezing and gasping and waiting for the shooting pains in my left arm to subside and my legs to unknot, my mentor showed up. "You're not supposed to do it all at once!" he railed. "There's an art to this. You must work up to it. I'll coach you." I managed a weak "Thanks."

"For openers," my new coach offered, "I'll let you in on a technique developed by one of the greats in the field - it's called the 'Bloom arc'. You take a wide turn on each landing. This allows your legs a chance to recover. Ideal for the long distance climber."

The next morning I tried this technique. I found it to be somewhat overrated, however, since the landings are just too short for much recovery; and I discovered a distinct risk with this procedure. On the fourth floor landing, as I was doing my 'Bloom arc', I walked right into a girl coming down the stairs carrying two cups of coffee. She was not at all impressed with my 'Bloom arc'

and treated me to some very unladylike observations on my general being. "Sorry" I muttered, amidst wheezes.

My coach set me straight almost immediately. "Of course there are risks. We wouldn't do this if there was no danger! You must learn to accept these and for your information, people who go down the stairs are a blight on our good name. Spurn them! By the way, you'd better get that coffee off your coat before it stains."

A few days later my coach observed that I should be ready to do the complete climb. I protested, but he was adamant and offered another inside hint. "It's called the '6th floor gambol'," he confided. "You leave the stairwell at the 6th floor and go the the staircase at the end of the hall, where you complete the climb. Great chance for a rest. Try it!"

Apparently this is a favorite practice of many of the dedicated stairwell climbers. I noted that when I stumbled through the door on the sixth floor, legs wobbly and out of breath, people politely turned their heads, snickering softly as I passed by. But they are compassionate people, those sixth floor inhabitants. The card table with small cups of gatorade located near the men's room is a nice touch.

After several days of the climb, my coach approached me, put his arm around my shoulder, and talking in a subdued voice said, "I'm proud of the progress you're making; Keep it up and you may make THE SOCIETY." "The what?" I asked. "Well, I really shouldn't tell you about this, but you are a serious person and I think I can trust you. We have, here in NSA, a secret organization of stairwell climbers." "No kidding!" I whispered. "Yup. A secret society. Only the members know who is in it. Won't see our name on the board or in the newsletter or any of that sort of stuff. We don't want any joiners in our group. You know, there are folks around who join anything just to say they are in it. Think it looks good on their record, or whatever. I, for instance, know three guys in the bridge club who absolutely hate the game but wouldn't quit

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for anything. Terrible thing, this status business. We have none of that!"

"Very interesting" I replied, "but what's the sense of being in a club if you can't talk about it?" "A society!" my coach hissed. "It's not a club. It's a society! Don't make that mistake again!" "I'm sorry" I responded remorsefully. "Our enjoyment comes from association with each other and the sharing of our stairwell. And once each year we even have an outing - just society members. No family or friends with beer and buckets of fried chicken, or any of the tacky stuff. Last year we did the Washington monument. Great fun. Even the tragedy of Harry passing away on the three hundred and fortieth step couldn't mar the enjoyment of that climb. This year we are thinking about the Empire State building, although they are giving us fits. Seems like they make money on their elevators and they hate to pass up potential revenue, but they don't know what to charge for the stairs. No matter, there are other giants for us to assail. Think of it - The Eiffel Tower . . ." His eyes glazed over and his voice broke. "Could I join?" I asked naively. "Absolutely not!" He had his composure back. "We'll have no joiners. I told you that. The elders review all potential members. Only they can choose. When your time comes, you'll know. But never, NEVER ask." "Gotcha." I responded, overwhelmed by the enormity of it all.

"You've got to learn to climb with pain" my coach offered a few weeks later, when I mentioned that my knees were bulging. "Leg cramps are common in this business and must be ignored. Likewise for arm pains. We do recommend, however, that if you experience massive chest pains, you stop for awhile. There are climber aid stations on the odd-numbered floors for emergencies, but a dedicated climber scorns such embellishments. In fact, one of the past greats was stricken early in his climb, but he made it to the ninth floor before collapsing. A heroic effort. Really fantastic. We are thinking of giving an annual award in his memory." "Gosh," I uttered, "what guts!"

"And there is the matter of dress," my coach continued. "You need climbing shoes if you are really serious about this. And loose clothing. Need to let the body move freely for maximum effort." I took this to heart, got some double-soled tennis shoes, and borrowed a suit from my neighbor, who is three sizes larger than I am. The climb went all right the next day, but I got awfully tired of the caustic comments about my attire, so I opted against "proper dress," even if it is part of the program.


"You might be interested to know that the

seniors in the Stairwell Society," my coach offered one day, "are able to take the stairs two at a time." "I'll never achieve executive status," I replied. "Don't despair," my coach responded. "Some of those people have spent years training to achieve their status. You're still a novice. Give it time. Dedicated people, the Stairwell executives. There is even a story," he confided, as he moved closer and lowered his voice, "of one person in this building who can take the stairs THREE at a time, and do the whole climb holding his breath!" "Fantastic" I replied, with true awe. "Who is he?" "Don't know. Don't even know anyone who has seen him. It's very tightly held." "Wow!" I responded, feeling very 'in'.




One day I approached my coach with what I felt was a very significant observation. "Did you know," I asked, "that there are two less stairs per flight in the end well than in the center?" "Yeah," my coach replied, "'it's well known within the society. True climbers avoid the end staircase at all costs. World class is the center well." "But does that mean that the building sags?" I asked incredulously. "Of course. That is the end of the building which supports the Director's office. Heavy decisions and all that." "I understand fully," I replied sagely.

I am now a devoted climber. I shun the elevators, avoid the back stairwell, am a master of the 'Bloom arc', have overcome the 6th floor gambol, and look with scorn on those who go down the stairs. My coach thinks I may be welcomed into the society in the near future and he talks with pride about his contributions to my advancement. One would never have expected that a simple fear could lead to a whole new way of life. And the other day a most amazing thing happened. As I was climbing, I heard a whoosing noise behind me, and when I turned to look, a figure passed me taking the stairs three at a time. I could not identify him, but his face was very red and it's possible, just possible, that he was holding his breath!



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