



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/JOINT STAFF
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155**

Ref: 18-F-1106
June 13, 2025

Mr. John Greenewald Jr.
The Black Vault, Inc.
27305 W. Live Oak Road
Suite #1203
Castaic, CA 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is a final response to your May 31, 2018, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the National Security Agency (NSA), a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience. The Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff (OSD/JS) FOIA Requester Service Center received your request on June 5, 2018, from the NSA along with 22 pages of records, and assigned it FOIA case number 18-F-1106. We ask that you use this number when referring to your request.

The National Security Agency conducted a search of their records systems and located 22 pages determined to be responsive to your request. The Joint Staff conducted a review of the 22 pages. Mr. Scott McPherson, Chief, Information Management Division Declassification Branch, Joint Staff, and Mr. John R. Chapman, Chief FOIA/PA Office, NSA in their capacities as an Initial Denial Authorities, have determined that portions of the 22 responsive pages are exempt from release. The redacted information is exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1), currently and properly classified in the interest of national security. This classified information is withheld in accordance with Executive Order 13526, as amended, applying 3.3(b)(5) formally named or numbered U.S. military war plans that remain in effect, or operational or tactical elements of prior plans that are contained in such active plans; and 3.3(b)(6) disclosure of which would cause serious harm to relations between the United States and a foreign government, or to ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States. Information was also withheld pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3), information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding, applying 50 USC 3605 (P.L. 86-36), NSA Functions and Information Section 6. Please note that we have considered the foreseeable harm standard when reviewing records and applying exemptions under the FOIA in the processing of this request.

In this instance, fees for processing your request were below the threshold for requiring payment. Please note that fees may be assessed on future requests.

If you have any questions or concerns about the foregoing or about the processing of your request, please do not hesitate to contact the Action Officer assigned to your request, Subat Matin, at subat.matin.ctr@mail.mil or 571-372-0440. Additionally, if you have concerns about service received by our office, please contact a member of our Leadership Team at 571-372-0498 or Toll Free at 866-574-4970.

Should you wish to inquire about mediation services, you may contact the OSD/JS FOIA Public Liaison, Toni Fuentes, by email at osd.mc-alex.oatsd-pclt.mbx.foia-liaison@mail.mil or by phone at 571-372-0462. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS
College Park, MD 20740
E-mail: ogis@nara.gov
Telephone: 202-741-5770
Fax: 202-741-5769
Toll-free: 1-877-684-6448

You have the right to appeal to the appellate authority, Ms. Joo Chung, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Transparency (PCLT), Office of the Secretary of Defense, at: 4800 Mark Center Drive, ATTN: PCLFD, FOIA Appeals, Mailbox #24, Alexandria, VA 22350-1700. Your appeal must be postmarked within 90 calendar days of the date of this response. Alternatively, you may email your appeal to osd.foia-appeal@mail.mil. If you use email, please include the words "FOIA Appeal" in the subject of the email. Please also reference FOIA case number 18-F-1106 in any appeal correspondence.

We appreciate your patience in the processing of your request. As stated previously, please contact the Action Officer assigned to your request, Subat Matin, and reference FOIA case number 18-F-1106, if you have any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

For Charles C. Marye
Pamela Andrews
Chief, FOIA

Enclosures:
As stated

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL
SECURITY SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE-DEFENSE

~~SECRET~~

~~PRIVILEGED INFORMATION~~

10 August 1983

EXERCISE

Read File

TO: P39
FROM: NCRDEF
SUBJECT: Action by JCS OPSDEPS on Exercise NIGHT TRAIN 84

This briefing regarding proposed scenario changes to Exercise NIGHT TRAIN 84 was scheduled to be presented at a meeting of the JCS OPSDEPS on 10 August. The OPSDEPS accepted the recommendation and approved the scenario, concept and objectives contained therein.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Very respectfully,

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

ONCRDEF, JCS-DIA Matters

cc: Chief of Staff (Dr. Iredell)
DDX (Mr. Volenick)

~~PRIVILEGED INFORMATION~~

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CONCEPTS & OBJECTIVES BRIEF

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

SLIDE 1 ON

SIR, THIS IS A DECISION BRIEFING ON THE CONCEPT, OBJECTIVES AND SCENARIO FOR JCS EXERCISE NIGHT TRAIN 84. THE DEPUTY OPERATIONS DEPUTIES APPROVED THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVES ON 3 MAY 1983, DIRECTED A NAME CHANGE, AND AGREED THAT THE EXERCISE SCENARIO REQUIRED FUTURE ADDRESSAL. DUE TO POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES, THE ORIGINAL EXERCISE CONCEPT WAS CHANGED TO TAKE WAR-FIGHTING OUT OF THE POST-NUCLEAR ATTACK PHASE OF THE EXERCISE; THE CJCS WAS BRIEFED ON THIS NEW CONCEPT ON 29 JULY 1983 AND HE DIRECTED THAT THE CONCEPT AND SCENARIO BE BRIEFED TO THE JCS. THE SCENARIO WAS BRIEFED TO THE DEPUTY OPERATIONS DEPUTIES ON 2 AUGUST 1983. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SCENARIO WAS TOO POLITICALLY SENSITIVE AND SHOULD BETTER REFLECT THE DEFENSE GUIDANCE. THIS BRIEFING THEREFORE, IS TO OBTAIN APPROVAL OF THE CHANGED CONCEPT AND SCENARIO FOR EXERCISE NIGHT TRAIN 84.

SLIDE 1 OFF~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~SLIDE 2 ON

THESE SUBJECTS WILL BE COVERED IN THE BRIEFING.

SLIDE 2 OFFSLIDE 3 ON

NIGHT TRAIN 84, A MAJOR BIENNIAL NUCLEAR WAR EXERCISE WAS DESIGNED WITH THESE CONCEPTS. (PAUSE) OF SIGNIFICANCE IS ITS LINKAGE TO SAC'S GLOBAL SHIELD, NORAD'S AMALGAM CHIEF, AND FEMA'S REX 84 ALPHA. INCORPORATION OF ACTIVE FLYING AND LIVE FIRING OF US STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS AS PART OF EXERCISE PLAY RESULTED AFTER REVIEW OF THE JUNE 1982 LARGE-SCALE SOVIET EXERCISE. CINCSAC PLANS FOR FULL GENERATION OF HIS BOMBER FORCE FOLLOWED BY A LAUNCH OF PEACETIME RECONFIGURED BOMBERS ON SIMULATED SIOP MISSIONS. CINC NORAD PLANS TO TRACK AND DIRECT INTERCEPT OF SAC'S AGGRESSOR B-52 AIRCRAFT. CINCLANT PLANS ON A C-3 SLBM LAUNCH FROM THE ATLANTIC TEST RANGE.

SLIDE 3 OFFSLIDE 4 ON

THIS GRAPHIC DEPICTS THE ANTICIPATED PARTICIPANTS. EXPANDED

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NATIONAL PARTICIPATION IS ANTICIPATED BECAUSE OF THE DESIRE TO
EVALUATE POST-NUCLEAR ATTACK CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT PLANS.

SLIDE 4 OFF

SLIDE 5 ON

IN ORDER TO FACILITATE ALL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES, THE EXERCISE IS
DESIGNED WITH TWO FOUR-DAY PHASES. PHASE I CONCENTRATES ON THE
PRE AND TRANS-ATTACK PERIOD.

A 24-HOUR ADMINISTRATIVE BREAK, WILL SIMULATE 15 DAYS OF SURVIVAL
AND RECOVERY ACTIVITY. PHASE II WILL BEGIN ON DAY 6 OF THE
EXERCISE AND WILL CONCENTRATE ON ACTIVITIES IN THE POST-NUCLEAR
ATTACK PERIOD.

SLIDE 5 OFF

SLIDE 6 ON

EXERCISE OBJECTIVES ARE SHOWN ON THE NEXT THREE SLIDES.

(PAUSE)

SLIDE 6 OFF

SLIDE 7 ON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(PAUSE)

SLIDE 7 OFF

SLIDE 8 ON

(PAUSE)

(PAUSE)

WITH REGARD TO THE LAST BULLET, SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF OUR
STRATEGIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES, PROCEDURES, REACTIONS, AND TIMING
ARE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS, AND WILL BE MAJOR FACTORS IN
DESIGNING THE DETAILED PLAYER ACTIONS.

SLIDE 8 OFF

SLIDE 9 ON

THESE ARE PERCEPTIONS TO BE REINFORCED IN THE EXERCISE.

SLIDE 9 OFF

SLIDE 10 ON

THESE PERCEPTIONS WILL BE DENIED.

SLIDE 10 OFF

SLIDE 11 ON

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~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ INCREASING TENSIONS WORLDWIDE IN 1983 AND 1984 CONFRONTED SOVIET LEADERS WITH A VARIETY OF CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES THAT LED THE POLITBURO TO VIEW THE WORLD SITUATION AS INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE. PROBLEMS FOR THE WEST SURFACED IN CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, AND IN INCREASED SOVIET PRESENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA THE CARIBBEAN AND VIETNAM.

~~(S)~~ THE ASSASSINATION OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IN MARCH 1984 LED TO OPEN CIVIL WAR IN IRAN AND A TOTAL BREAKDOWN IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THAT COUNTRY. THE COUNTRY WAS SPLIT BETWEEN THE COMMUNISTS AND THE MULLAHS AND FACTIONAL INFIGHTING WAS BLOODY ESPECIALLY IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY.

~~(S)~~ EVENTS IN ASIA REVEALED A MARKED DETERIORATION IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH CHINA DUE IN PART TO SOVIET SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMESE MILITARY ACTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. PRC FORCE MODERNIZATION, SPONSORED IN PART BY THE US, WAS A PROBLEM OF MAJOR CONCERN TO

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~~SECRET~~

THE SOVIETS.

~~(S)~~ WHILE TENSIONS REMAINED HIGH IN POLAND FOLLOWING THE 1983 PAPAL VISIT, NO OVERT SOVIET ACTIONS WERE EVIDENT. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAD ANNOUNCED A MAJOR SERIES OF LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES FOR THE SPRING OF 1984 TO COVER POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS REQUIRED BY A DETERIORATING POLISH SITUATION.

SLIDE 11 OFF

SLIDE 12 ON

(BLUE BACKGROUND SCENARIO)

~~(S)~~ SOVIET INROADS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN AREA AND DISCOVERY OF SA-5 SITE CONSTRUCTION IN CUBA LED TO A US PRESIDENTIAL WARNING TO CASTRO

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

~~(S)~~ IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET OPPORTUNISM IN ETHIOPIA, AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN, INITIAL PHASES OF CINCENT CONPLAN 1002 WERE EXECUTED AND THE PACOM CVBG IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS MOVED WITHIN STRIKING

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RANGE OF THE AREA. ADDITIONALLY, INCREASED MILITARY AID WAS APPROVED FOR MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONS.

~~(S)~~ BECAUSE OF THE SIZE AND COMPLEXITY OF SOVIET FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE TAKING PLACE IN THE WESTERN, SOUTHWESTERN AND NEAR EASTERN TVDS, THE US ALLOCATED ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES FOR MONITORING THESE ACTIVITIES. IT BECAME APPARENT BY THE END OF MAY THAT THESE EXERCISES WERE ELABORATE COVER OPERATIONS FOR MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT ACTIVITY IN ALL THREE AREAS.

~~(S)~~ HIGH LEVEL DIPLOMATIC TALKS WERE HELD IN PEKING TO MAKE THE PRC LEADERSHIP AWARE OF THE SOVIET BUILDUP AND THE THREAT POSED TO CHINA AND JAPAN. CINCPAC INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF THE SOVIET AIR AND NAVAL BUILDUP IN VIETNAM.

~~(S)~~ IN EUROPE, NATO'S MINISTERS RESPONDED TO INTELLIGENCE WARNING INDICATORS BY BRINGING NATO TO MILITARY VIGILANCE AND PREPARING FOR SIMPLE ALERT.

SLIDE 12 OFF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SLIDE 13 ON

(STARTEX SITUATION)

~~(S)~~ AT THE START OF THE EXERCISE, SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET ELEMENTS WERE DEPLOYED IN THE LARGEST COMBINED NAVAL EXERCISE SINCE OKEAN - 75. CINCPAC FORCES WERE BROUGHT TO INCREASED READINESS BECAUSE OF THE THREAT TO US INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC.

~~(S)~~ IN IRAN, COMMUNISTS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE OF AZERBAIJAN, ESTABLISHED A SEPARATIST PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND REQUESTED SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO END THE CIVIL WAR. THE SOVIETS RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY, SENDING GROUND AND AIRMOBILE FORCES INTO THE AREA ELIMINATING ALL OPPONENTS. CIVIL WAR AND VIOLENCE CONTINUED TO PLAGUE THE REMAINDER OF THE COUNTRY.

~~(S)~~ ON 3 APRIL 1983, INTELLIGENCE SOURCES REPORTED THAT THE USSR HAD BEGUN DISPERSING SSBN FORCES FROM THEIR MAIN BASES. REASONS FOR THIS MOVE WERE NOT KNOWN.

~~(S)~~ DUE TO THE INCREASE IN SOVIET INVOLVEMENT THROUGHOUT THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

REGION, SAUDI ARABIA, REQUESTED THE US TO CONSIDER INCREASING ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE THEATER.

~~(S)~~ ALTHOUGH THE US ADMINISTRATION FORCEFULLY ADDRESSED THE ESCALATING CRISES SITUATIONS, THE MEDIA AND ANTI-WAR ADVOCATES ATTEMPTED TO MOBILIZE PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATIONS PROPOSALS. A LARGE ANTI-NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATION WAS SCHEDULED IN WASHINGTON FOR 5 APRIL 1983.

~~(S)~~ UNDER THE GUISE OF LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES, SOVIET FORCES OPPOSITE NATO'S CENTRAL REGION AND TURKISH THRACE HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REINFORCED AND DEPLOYED NEAR ATTACK POSITIONS.

~~(S)~~ IN KOREA, INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH INCREASED AND SABOTAGE ACTIVITY AGAINST US AND ROK MILITARY BASES CAUSED THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND TO INCREASE DEFENSE ALERT CONDITIONS THROUGHOUT THE SOUTH.

~~(S)~~ CULMINATING THESE SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED ESCALATORY EVENTS WAS THE DISCOVERY OF SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABLE CRUISE MISSILES IN CUBA.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SLIDE 13 OFF

SLIDE 14 ON

(BLUE STARTEX POSITION)

~~(S)~~ IN RESPONSE TO THE CUBAN MISSILE THREAT, US MILITARY
CRISIS ACTION CENTERS WERE ACTIVATED AND DEFENSIVE PLANS WERE
REVIEWED.

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

~~(S)~~ THE PRESIDENT DECLARED A STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY AND
CALLED FOR PARTIAL MOBILIZATION. IN FACE OF INCREASING TENSIONS
WORLDWIDE AND AT HOME, THE JCS RECOMMENDED TO OSD THAT CINCREC
OPLAN 7045, MILITARY SUPPORT FOR CIVIL DEFENSE, BE TAKEN TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR APPROVAL.

~~(S)~~

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

~~SECRET~~

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SLIDE 14 OFF

SLIDE 15 ON

THIS MATRIX DEPICTS RED ACTIVITY/ISSUES PROGRAMED TO TRIGGER
PLAYER REACTION IN THE BLUE FUNCTIONAL AREAS.

SLIDE 15 OFF

SLIDE 16 ON

~~(U)~~ THESE EVENTS OCCURED DURING PHASE I THE PRE-NUCLEAR ATTACK
PERIOD. (PAUSE)

~~(S)~~ AT DAWN, 5 APRIL 1984, SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT FORCES
ATTACKED IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND TURKISH THRACE. SOVIET SOURCES
STATED THAT THE ATTACK WAS MADE TO OFFSET A PLANNED NATO ATTACK
ON THE EASTERN BLOCK.

~~(S)~~ ON 6 APRIL, STIFFENING NATO RESISTANCE AND HIGH ATTRITION
RATES LED THE SOVIETS TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
THE CENTRAL REGION. THESE STRIKES PERMITTED LIMITED

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BREAKTHROUGHS BUT FAILED TO RESTORE MOMENTUM TO THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE. TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN TURKEY, SOVIET AIRBORNE AND AMPHIBIOUS FORCES SUCCESSFULLY LANDED ON BOTH ENDS OF THE BOSPORUS.

~~(S)~~ ON 7 APRIL, IN RESPONSE TO STRATEGIC WARNING, CHINA DISPERSED ITS LEADERSHIP AND ITS MOBILE ICBMS.

SLIDE 16 OFF

SLIDE 17 ON

(BLUE PRE-NUCLEAR ATTACK PERIOD)

~~(S)~~ THIS GRAPHIC INDICATES THE ACTIVITIES AND ISSUES WHICH WILL BE DRIVEN BY THE SCENARIO. THIS ACTIVITY WILL PROVIDE DATA FOR ANALYSIS OF THE AREAS SHOWN. (PAUSE)

SLIDE 17 OFF

SLIDE 18 ON

~~(S)~~ DISPERSAL OF ALLIED STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS AND SENIOR LEADERSHIP, COUPLED WITH AN INCREASINGLY UNFAVORABLE EUROPEAN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MILITARY SITUATION, CAUSED THE SOVIET UNION ON 8 APRIL TO SIMULTANEOUSLY CONDUCT NUCLEAR COUNTERFORCE ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND FOLLOW-ON THEATER NUCLEAR STRIKES ON NATO.

~~(S)~~ SOVIET FORCES CONTINUED ADVANCING ACROSS NORTHERN GERMANY TOWARD THE LOW COUNTRIES, DESPITE SERIOUS LOSSES AND DISRUPTION TO LINES OF SUPPLY. THE WARSAW PACT OFFENSIVE INTO TURKISH THRACE GROUND DOWN TO A STANDSTILL.

~~(S)~~ NORTH KOREAN FORCES AND

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

SLIDE 18 OFF

SLIDE 19 ON

(TRANS-NUCLEAR ATTACK PERIOD)

~~(S)~~ SHOWN ARE KEY ACTIVITIES AND ANALYSIS AREAS FOR THIS PERIOD OF THE EXERCISE. THIS IS THE HEART OF THE EXERCISE AND TESTS, END-TO-END, THE WORLD-WIDE AIRBORNE RESOURCES SYSTEM; A LIVE FLY OF SAC FORCES IN EXERCISE GLOBAL SHIELD; A LIVE AIR

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DEFENSE EXERCISE, AGAINST THE SAC BOMBER FORCE IN NORAD EXERCISE
AMAL AM CHIEF AND CONSIDERATION OF

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

SLIDE 19 OFF

~~(S)~~ THE NEXT SERIES OF GRAPHICS DEPICT THE WORLDWIDE SCENARIO
DURING THE 15 DAYS AFTER THE NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THE U.S. THIS 15
DAY SURVIVAL AND RECOVERY PERIOD IS COMPRESSED INTO A 24-HOUR
ADMINISTRATIVE BREAK: EXERCISE STARTING CONDITIONS FOR PHASE II
WILL BE BRIEFED TO PLAYERS ~~DURING THIS TIMEFRAME.~~

SLIDE 20 ON

(SURVIVAL/RECOVERY PERIOD)

~~(S)~~ WHILE MOST OF THE SOVIET AND ELEMENTS OF WARSAW PACT
LEADERSHIP SURVIVED THE US RETALIATORY STRIKE, THEY WERE NOT
ABLE TO RECONSTITUTE THEIR STRATEGIC ARSENAL AS QUICKLY AS HAD
BEEN EXPECTED. RESTORATION OF KEY PRODUCTION AND SERVICES WAS
INHIBITED BY POPULAR UNWILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO CONTAMINATED
AREAS. THE WAR EFFORT WAS FURTHER HAMPERED BY OUTBREAKS OF CIVIL

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UNREST, THE MOST SERIOUS OF WHICH OCCURRED IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS. INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES WERE EMPLOYED TO MAINTAIN ORDER. HIGH LOSSES IN THE SSBN FORCE FURTHER DEGRADED SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AND DENIED THEM A LARGE PORTION OF THEIR STRATEGIC RESERVE. FACED WITH THESE PROBLEMS, SOVIET LEADERS BEGAN TO SEEK A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS.

SLIDE 20 OFFSLIDE 21 ON~~(S)~~

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

A SUCCESSFUL

NATO COUNTERSTRIKE WHICH SERIOUSLY ATTRITED SOVIET REAR ECHELONS AND IMPAIRED SUSTAINABILITY OF THE SOVIET ADVANCE.

~~(S)~~ ON D+3, NATO FORCES COUNTER-ATTACKED INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CAUSING REDIRECTION OF MAJOR 2D ECHELON FORCES.

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b)
(6); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

(b)(1); Sec. 3.3(b) (6); Sec. 3.3(b) (5)

~~(S)~~ AT THIS POINT

(b)(1); Sec.
3.3(b) (6)

ACTING AS MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE

~~SECRET~~

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SUPER POWERS, PROPOSED A CEASE FIRE. WHILE MOSCOW ORIGINALLY REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL STAGNATING MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC RECOVERY PROBLEMS LED THEM TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS. ON D+15, BOTH SIDES AGREED TO REFRAIN FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE AND NEGOTIATIONS RESULTED IN A CEASE FIRE IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER.

SLIDE 21 OFFSLIDE 22 ON

~~(S)~~ IN ASIA, TENSIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE DMZ REMAINED HIGH. HOWEVER, MEETINGS AT PANMUNJOM WERE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE CRISIS COULD BE SOLVED PEACEFULLY. THE SOVIETS HAD LINKED REMOVAL OF US FORCES FROM JAPAN TO THE CEASE FIRE IN EUROPE, BUT BY D+15 HOSTILITIES HAD CEASED BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET, AND THE US REMAINED NONCOMMITTAL TO REMOVING FORCES FROM JAPAN OR KOREA.

SLIDE 22 OFFSLIDE 23 ON

~~(S)~~ IN IRAN, SOVIET FORCES REMAINED IN PLACE AND IN CONTROL OF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE NORTH. A MAJOR INSURGENCY WAS UNDERWAY IN AFGHANISTAN AND BALUCHI INSURGENTS CONTROLLING THE TRI-BORDER REGION DEMANDED INDEPENDENCE FOR BALUCHISTAN.

~~(S)~~ IN TURKISH THRACE, SOVIET AND BULGARIAN FORCES WITHDREW FROM TURKISH TERRITORY UNDER TERMS OF THE CEASE FIRE IN EUROPE.

~~(S)~~ IN THE CARIBBEAN, CUBA HAD BEEN NEUTRALIZED AND MOSCOW CHOSE TO REDUCE ITS SUPPORT TO OTHER LEFTIST REGIMES IN THIS PERIPHERAL AREA. ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSINGS INTO THE SOUTHWESTERN US CREATED PROBLEMS IN US RECOVERY EFFORTS.

SLIDE 23 OFF

SLIDE 24 ON

(SURVIVAL/RECOVERY PERIOD)

~~(S)~~ ACTIVITIES DURING THIS 15 DAY SURVIVAL PERIOD ARE SHOWN. THIS PERIOD ALLOWS TRANSITION THROUGH THE SURVIVAL PERIOD AFTER NUCLEAR ATTACK, AND DEVELOPMENT OF INITIAL POST-ATTACK RECOVERY ACTIVITIES.

SLIDE 24 OFF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DURING THE ACTIVE PLAY OF THE POST ATTACK PERIOD AN UNSTEADY
PEACE IS ESTABLISHED. MAJOR EVENTS FOR THIS PERIOD ARE SHOWN.

(PAUSE)

SLIDE 25 ON

(POST-ATTACK PERIOD)

~~(S)~~ SOVIET LEADERS WERE FORCED TO COPE WITH AN INCREASING
NUMBER OF PROBLEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY IN POLAND,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR. THESE SPREAD INTERNALLY THROUGHOUT
THE BALTIC REPUBLICS AS SHORTAGES OF CRITICAL FOODSTUFFS,
MEDICINES, AND ENERGY SUPPLIES MOUNT. MEANWHILE, THE SOVIETS
ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH NATO TO STABILIZE THE EUROPEAN
SITUATION.

~~(S)~~ TO IMPROVE THEIR STRATEGIC POSITION IN ASIA, THE SOVIETS
PRESSED FOR REMOVAL OF US FORCES FROM JAPAN AND KOREA.

~~(S)~~ REGIONAL STATES ASSERT THAT THE MAJOR POWERS ARE IN NO
POSITION TO SUPPORT THEIR FORMER CLIENTS AND BEGIN TO SETTLE OLD
SCORES. IRAQ LAUNCHES A LIMITED OFFENSIVE AGAINST DIVIDED IRAN.

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~~SECRET~~

WHICH DISRUPTS OIL TRAFFIC AND PRODUCTION IN THE GULF AREA.

~~(S)~~ IN THE CARIBBEAN, A CONDITION OF INSTABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY PREVAILS. POWER STRUGGLES CONTINUE IN CENTRAL AMERICAN NATIONS.

SLIDE 25 OFF

SLIDE 26 ON

(POST-ATTACK PERIOD)

~~(S)~~ THESE POST-ATTACK ACTIVITIES WILL BE ANALYSED. (PAUSE). UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS WILL OPERATE AT REDUCED STRENGTH FROM ALTERNATE COMMAND LOCATIONS DURING THIS PHASE AND WILL CONCENTRATE ON RECONSTITUTION OF THEIR COMMANDS AND REDIRECTION OF THEIR FORCES. MAJOR CONNECTIVITY DURING THIS PERIOD WILL BE BETWEEN CINCS, THE SURVIVING SERVICE STAFFS AND THE DOD NODE. OF PRINCIPAL INTEREST WILL BE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE SURVIVING NCA, THE RECONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, AND SURVIVING STATE GOVERNMENTS. THE PART CINCREC WILL PLAY IN HIS ROLE IN MSCD WILL BE OF GREAT INTEREST.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~(U)~~ THIS PHASE IS IMPORTANT AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD DEFINING, DEVELOPING AND EVALUATING PROCEDURES FOR COPING WITH EVENTS WHICH MIGHT OCCUR IN THE AFTERMATH OF NUCLEAR WAR.

SLIDE 26 OFF

SLIDE 27 ON

THIS GRAPHIC DISPLAYS THE BOUNDARIES OF THE TEN FEMA REGIONS. FEMA WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE MILITARY SUPPORT FOR CIVIL DEFENSE PLAY WITH RESPONSE CELLS DEPICTING REGIONS VI AND VII AND CIVIL DEFENSE DIRECTORS FROM STATES IN THESE REGIONS. FIFTH CONUS ARMY WILL PARTICIPATE FULLY AND STATE AREA COMMANDS WILL INTERFACE WITH RESPONSE CELLS. ADDITIONALLY, THE FIRST AND SIXTH CONUS ARMIES WILL PARTICIPATE WITH FEMA REGIONS III AND IX FROM RESPONSE CELLS

SLIDE 27 OFF

SLIDE 28 ON

PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND OPSEC SENSITIVITY WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL. THIS GUIDANCE IS BEING PROPOSED IN THE SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BRIEF FOR NIGHT TRAIN NOW BEING STAFFED IN DOD.

SLIDE 28 OFF

SLIDE 29 ON

(SUMMARY)

~~(U)~~ THIS SCENARIO ALLOWS TESTING OF MAJOR EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED TO PROVIDE ISSUES FOR FUTURE STUDY AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLEX ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE TRANS- AND POST-NUCLEAR ATTACK PERIODS.

SLIDE 29 OFF

SLIDE 30 ON

() THE J-3 RECOMMENDS THAT THE CONCEPT AND SCENARIO IN THE FOURTH CORRIGENDUM BE APPROVED.

SLIDE 30 OFF

~~SECRET~~