



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



JUL 20 2023

John Greenwald, Jr.
27305 W. Live Oak Rd.
Suite #1203
Castaic, CA 91384-4520

Subject: OSD MDR Case 18-M-0102

Dear Mr. Greenwald:

We have reviewed the enclosed document in consultation with the Joint Staff and United States Transportation Command and have declassified it in full. If you have any questions please contact Mr. Jonathan P. Bennett by email at whs.mc-alex.esd.mbx.records-and-declassification@mail.mil.

Sincerely,

John D. Smith
Deputy Chief, WHS, Records and
Declassification Division, ESD

Enclosures:

1. MDR request
2. Document #1



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#1

SL's copy / ORIGINAL handed
to J Pw/sh in
Saturday session
of 4-11-92



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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUN 29 2023

POLICY
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LIBBY

SUBJECT: Abbreviated Scenarios for Inclusion in DPG -- Issues? (U)

(U) Attached for your review are the abbreviated scenarios in close-to-final form (TAB A). General Powell has begun to review the Joint Staff's detailed versions for his personal final judgements; we may receive them formally as soon as early next week. You and/or Mr. Wolfowitz may still have one or two major issues (as I have advised the Joint Staff); MRC-Europe particularly needs resolution.

~~(S//NF)~~ On MRC-Europe, you earlier raised a possible preference for a Poland-focused alternative to the Joint Staff's Kaliningrad-Lithuania draft. We have prepared such an alternative narrative, working with REE staff; both versions are at TAB B for your review. The abbreviated draft now has this Poland focus. Meanwhile, DIA's bid to exclude Belarussian forces from the threat was reportedly reversed by senior Joint Staff leadership, in part to stay with the earlier (leaked) version; we and REE staff prefer this result.

~~(S)~~ On Reconstitution, the Joint Staff deleted specific dates from their scenario timeline as you wished, and we have provided some inserts to reflect a possibility of a more rapid political reversal (highlighted in the abbreviated draft attached). But the actual timeline retains the full 7-8 year warning time projected by DIA and generally accepted by other offices. We believe this duration is realistic, and necessary to reflect the reconstitution strategy's new focus on long-term preclusion of any potential hostile global challenge. Unless you direct otherwise, it will likely proceed.

~~(S//NF)~~ We are still working a few less major points with the Joint Staff. (Of most note, it appears they may resist editing MRC-East to reflect an ideal aim of defending populous areas of Kuwait, with full recognition that such capability still depends on further prepo/access agreements -- as Mr. Wolfowitz desired in the Mobility Requirements Study.) We will bring to your attention any points that merit it, and are available to discuss the set in more detail as you wish.

Dale A. Vesser
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary
Resources and Plans

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Date: JUN 29 2023

Attachments:
a/s

Prep: Rod Fabrycky, x79478

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18-M-0102

ILLUSTRATIVE PLANNING SCENARIOS

PREFACE

This set of Illustrative Planning Scenarios constitutes guidance for the FY 94-99 Defense Program appropriate to the changing security environment and new strategy. Most broadly, this scenario set tangibly reflects the shift in focus from a single monolithic global scenario to an array of regional scenarios. The uncertainty of the international security environment makes it difficult to predict and estimate the circumstances under which US military power might be employed. Although changing world events make some individual scenarios decidedly less probable than others, all are useful for planning under the new strategy.

These scenarios are illustrative, not predictive or exhaustive. They depict plausible future events illustrating the types of circumstances in which the application of US military power might be required. Consistent with the new strategy, each scenario involves plausible threats in regions of vital interest to the US, and corresponding achievable military objectives. While these scenarios do not represent the only threats which could emerge in regions vital to US interests, they do illustrate a substantial range of the kinds of capabilities US forces might have to employ in various regions of the world, and are therefore useful for analysis.

This scenario set is to be used as an analytical tool for the formulation and assessment of defense programs. While the Base Force is sized to support the elements of the new strategy, these scenarios enable planners and programmers to examine defense programs for appropriate levels of combat power, mobility, readiness and sustainment. The FY 94-99 Program Objectives Memoranda should reflect requirements derived largely but not solely from this scenario set. Although these scenarios focus largely on Crisis Response and Reconstitution, each of the four elements of our strategy involve other requirements which are not fully addressed in this scenario set and yet require programming actions and analysis. The order in which the scenarios appear does not imply any regional priority for programming purposes.

This scenario set is not intended to constrain planners from adjusting to future changes in the strategic environment. Subsequent to its publication as guidance for formulation and assessment of the FY 94-99 program, continued evolution in the strategic environment, or emerging requirements for scenarios for other applications, may require the development of additional or more detailed scenarios. If necessary, the data presented in this set

should be updated for future applications until superseded by the next DPG scenario set. However, strategic concepts and assumptions presented in this scenario set should generally be retained in any scenarios developed for other applications.

The US FORCES listing in each MRC includes, in addition to those forces that would be required to conduct fully effective counteroffensive operations (listed as Deploy-to-Fight Forces), extra forces (listed as Overwhelming Forces) whose optional employment would reduce US and allied casualties and achieve victory more quickly and decisively. If the NCA determined that the presence of these forces was required, major counteroffensive operations would be delayed until these forces could be delivered to the conflict.

Any detailed analysis of this DPG scenario set should use the information in the more detailed version developed by the Joint Staff and promulgated by _____ official(s) on _____ date _____, from which these scenarios were derived.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed by: JH1, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: JUN 29 2023

1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance
Major Regional Contingency - East

(S) Situation Summary. In the late 1990s, a regional power again threatens to take control of a major portion of the oil in Southwest Asia by seizing Kuwait and northern Saudi Arabia (including ports, airfields, and other military facilities there). Having learned from the war of 1991, the aggressor mobilizes and positions adequate forces to reach his objectives quickly against Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces. Also, having learned from that conflict, the GCC nations request external assistance shortly after detection of the initiation of mobilization and offer full support to the reinforcing nations.

(S) The United States responds quickly with deterrent actions including employing forward deployed forces and moving carriers, amphibious forces, maritime prepositioning ships, and other afloat prepositioning ships to the region. When the aggressor continues his mobilization and positioning of forces, the president authorizes deployment of forces sufficient (in conjunction with GCC forces) to stop the attacking force short of important assets and restore any lost territory. Normally friendly nations provide enroute base and overflight rights from the outset of deployment. GCC forces participate in the initial defense. (In a situation of this sort, other nations both in the region and in Europe could well deploy combat and/or support forces in response to requests for assistance. For purposes of developing the defense program, however, no such assistance is assumed.) The timing of these and other events is summarized in Figure 1.

(S) Threat Forces. The aggressor attacks with 300,000 men organized into six heavy division-equivalents and 14 light division-equivalents, plus supporting units. An additional ten light division-equivalents are available for protecting lines of communication in occupied territory. This force has 2,200 tanks [25 percent T-80/T-72 Mods, 25 percent T-72s, and 50 percent T-55/T-59s]. The aggressor has 300 fighter and ground attack aircraft [50 MIG-29s, 100 SU-25s, 80 SU-24s, and other older aircraft] and presents an extensive land and naval mine threat.

(S) The aggressor may have produced a small number of nuclear explosive devices and has modest chemical capability with a small stock of low-tech missile warheads and aerial bombs and biological capability somewhat greater than prior to Operation Desert Storm. He might attempt to deny airfields and ports to allied reinforcements with weapons of mass destruction prior to the ground invasion. U.S. forces should be prepared to fight in nuclear, chemical, and/or biological environments.

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~~Declassify On: OADR~~

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~ MRC East

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~~(S)~~ Gulf Cooperation Council Forces. Saudi ^{and other GCC} and Kuwaiti forces are comprised of 60,000 men in one and two-thirds armored divisions, two and one-third mechanized divisions, and one infantry brigade, which have about 515 tanks and 1925 armored fighting vehicles; and of 480 fighter and ground attack aircraft [F/A-18s, F-15s, F-16s, and Tornados]. Other GCC states make modest contributions.

~~(S)~~ United States Forces. The U.S. forces are comprised of 175,000 troops in two and two-thirds heavy and two light Army divisions, plus supporting units; and one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)¹ (which consists of command, ground combat, combat service support and air combat elements); 20 fighter squadrons; four heavy bomber squadrons; three carrier battle groups; and special operations forces. It has 900 tanks, 360 fighter and ground attack aircraft, and 65 heavy bombers. The delivery schedule for these forces is given in Table 1. Additional forces (up to four heavy and one light Army divisions plus supporting units, one Marine Expeditionary Force, eight Air Force fighter squadrons, and one carrier battle group) might be employed to reduce U.S. and allied casualties and achieve victory more quickly and decisively.

~~(S)~~ Mobility Assumptions and Key Authorities Used. Deterrent actions are accomplished by active duty military forces and some government-owned sealift. As a precautionary measure, other government sealift is activated and limited U.S. civil shipping is chartered--voluntary U.S. commercial sealift will provide six U.S. flag ships under charter plus the equivalent of 2500 forty-foot containers per week from contracted commercial liner service. Once the decision is made to deploy a sizeable force, the President authorizes use of the 673b authority and CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet) Stages I and II are activated. (In a situation of this sort, it might be possible to charter airlift and shipping from other nations, or other nations might contribute such support. For purposes of developing the defense program, no such assistance is assumed.) Table 1 shows the brigade and squadron arrivals achievable with the programmed mobility forces, full implementation of the recommendations of the Mobility Requirements Study, and use of the Suez and Panama canals.

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¹ Two brigades from Maritime Prepositioning Ships and one brigade from amphibious ships.

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Table 1: BRIGADE/SQUADRON ARRIVALS
MRC-East

<u>WEEK</u> <u>C+</u>	<u>Air Force</u> <u>Fighter/Bomber</u> <u>Squadrons</u>	<u>Army-Heavy</u> <u>Brigades</u>	<u>-Light</u> <u>Brigades</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u> <u>MEBs</u>	<u>Navy</u> <u>CVBGs</u>	<u>Special</u> <u>Operations</u> <u>Forces</u>
In-place	-	-	-	1 MEU(SOC)	1	-
1	10/2	-	1	1	1	1 SF Group 1 Naval Special Warfare Group 1 Special Operations Wing 1 Ranger Regiment
2	8/1	1	2	-	-	-
3	2/1	-	-	-	1	-
4	-	2	1	2	-	-
5	-	4	-	-	-	-
6	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	-	-	2	-	-	-
8	-	1	-	-	-	-
Total	20/4	8	6	3	3	

NOTE: Two round-up brigades would be activated when the Selected Reserves are called up and would become available for deployment when they had completed post-mobilization training.


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~~SECRET NOT FORN~~ MRC-East

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Figure 1: Timeline (Day activity begins.)
MRC-East



C=Deploy day.
 D=Hostilities day.
 M=Mobilization day.
 R=Ready day.

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~~SECRET - NOFORN~~ - April 2, 1992

1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance
Major Regional Contingency - West

~~(S)~~ Situation Summary. In the late 1990s, North Korea tries to unify the peninsula under the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by force. Its plan relies upon a surprise invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) with the capture of Seoul as an early objective. The Peoples Republic of China and Commonwealth of Independent States do not support the DPRK.

~~(S)~~ The United States and the ROK have less than 24 hours of unambiguous warning of the attack. The President promptly declares a National Emergency. The objectives are to defeat the DPRK's attack with minimum penetration of the ROK, destroy the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction, and diminish sufficiently the DPRK's military potential to commit renewed aggression. The elimination of the DPRK as a sovereign state is not a U.S. war aim. The timing of these and other events is summarized in Figure 1.

~~(S)~~ Threat Forces. The aggressor's forces consist of

- o 1.2 million men organized into 17 armored brigades, 32 mechanized brigades, and 30 divisions and 17 brigades (infantry), with 5,000 tanks (T-72/62/55/54) and 4,500 armored personnel carriers
- o 450,000 reserves forming 27 divisions and 20 brigades (infantry) and 11 artillery brigades
- o 4.5 million additional reserves.

~~(S)~~ The aggressor's two-front invasion consists of three armies attacking toward Seoul on two fronts and one army attacking down the east coast (totaling 300,000 men from three armored divisions and 16 infantry divisions). The North Koreans also have 650 naval vessels primarily of patrol size, but including 27 Romeo/Whiskey class diesel submarines and 50 midget submarines. They also have more than 600 jet fighter aircraft, mostly older models (MIG 17/19/21), a small number of advanced aircraft (MIG 23/29 & SU-25), and extensive special operations (SO) capabilities (63,000 personnel).

~~(S)~~ The DPRK possesses a limited nuclear capability (five to ten weapons deliverable by aircraft or missiles) and an offensive chemical and biological capability. It is not likely to use its nuclear capability unless its national survival is at stake or unless a crisis escalates rapidly, posing the armed forces with catastrophic defeat. It may use its chemical and/or

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biological capability to achieve initial breakthroughs or attrite allied forces at the outset of the conflict, overcome critical defensive points or avert imminent defeat. Allied forces should be prepared to fight in nuclear, chemical and biological environments.

~~(S)~~ **ROK Forces.** ROK forces consist of 620,000 men organized into seven armored brigades, four mechanized divisions, and 20 divisions and six brigades (infantry), with 2,500 medium tanks and 2,500 armored personnel carriers/infantry fighting vehicles and of 4,700,000 reserves organized into 27 infantry divisions. The ROK also has 225 naval vessels, including five submarines (type 209) as well as large destroyers and frigates. The ROK has more than 600 combat aircraft (mostly 3rd and 4th generation) and 350 attack helicopters.

~~(S)~~ **United States Forces.** The in-place U.S. forces are comprised of 36,000 troops in one two-brigade Army division (heavy), eight fighter squadrons, and one carrier battle group. The reinforcing U.S. forces are comprised of 215,000 troops in ~~three~~ ^(minus) divisions, and ~~two~~ separate brigades (heavy), and two divisions and one brigade (light), plus supporting units, and two Marine Expeditionary Forces (two MEU(SOC)s and two MPS and two amphibious MEBs, where each MEB consists of command, ground combat, combat service support and air combat elements); 24 fighter squadrons and four heavy bomber squadrons, four carrier battle groups, and special operations forces. It has 1050 tanks, 576 fighter and ground attack aircraft, and 65 heavy bombers. The delivery schedule for these forces is given in Table 1. Additional forces [up to one light division, and one Armored Cavalry Regiment, one Marine Expeditionary Brigade, ten fighter squadrons, and one carrier battle group] might be employed to reduce U.S. and allied casualties and achieve victory more quickly and decisively.

~~(S)~~ **Mobility Assumptions and Key Authorities Used.** Deterrent actions are accomplished by active duty military forces and some government-owned sealift. As a precautionary measure, other government sealift is activated and limited U.S. civil shipping is chartered--voluntary U.S. commercial sealift will provide six U.S. flag ships under charter plus the equivalent of 2500 forty-foot containers per week from contracted commercial liner service. Once the decision is made to deploy a sizeable force, the President authorizes use of the 673b authority and CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet) Stages I and II are activated. (In a situation of this sort, it might be possible to charter airlift and shipping from other nations, or other nations might contribute such support. For purposes of developing the defense program, no such assistance is assumed.) Table 1 shows the brigade and squadron arrivals achievable with the programmed mobility forces, full implementation of the recommendations of the Mobility Requirements Study, ROK ships and aircraft committed by treaty, and use of the Suez and Panama canals.

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Table 1: BRIGADE/SQUADRON ARRIVALS
MRC-West

<u>WEEK</u> <u>C+</u>	<u>Air Force</u> <u>Fighter/Bomber</u> <u>Squadrons</u>	<u>Army-Heavy</u> <u>Brigades</u>	<u>-Light</u> <u>Brigades</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u> <u>MEBs</u>	<u>Navy</u> <u>CVBGs</u>	<u>Special</u> <u>Operations</u> <u>Forces</u>
n-place	8/-	2	-	-	1	-
1	10/3	-	-	1 MEU(SOC)	1	1.5 SF Groups 1 Ranger Regiment 1 Naval Special Warfare Group 1 Special Operations Wing
2	6/1	1	1	1+1MEU(SOC)	1	-
3	-	-	-	1	1	-
4	-	-	3	-	-	0.5 SF Group
5	-	2	-	1	-	-
6	-	2	3	1	-	-
7	-	1	-	-	-	-
Total	24/4	8	7	4 ¹	4	-

NOTE: Two round-out brigades would be activated when the Selected Reserves are called up and would become available for deployment when they had completed post-mobilization training.

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¹ Organized into 2 MEFs.

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1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance
Concurrent Major Regional Contingencies - East & West

~~(S/NF)~~ **Situation Summary.** In the late 1990s, with the U.S. engaged in and preoccupied with a major regional contingency in Southwest Asia (MRC-east), the North Korean leadership seizes the opportunity to strike against the Republic of Korea (MRC-west).

~~(S/NF)~~ The scenario assumptions of MRC-east and MRC-west apply, while the timeline differs. Until early warning indicators are recognized in Korea, events proceed per the MRC-east timeline. Once intelligence indicators show a problem in Korea, a small portion of the lift is made available to support deterrent options in Korea, to attempt to delay outbreak of conflict in Korea for as long as possible. The National Command Authority (NCA) orders a counteroffensive in MRC-east as soon as sufficient forces have been delivered to Southwest Asia. After the U.S. delivers the DTF forces adequate to conduct a counteroffensive in MRC-east, NCA diverts substantial lift assets to MRC-west. (This delays closure and counteroffensive for the second major regional contingency.)

~~(S/NF)~~ A timeline is shown in figure 1. All times are relative to day one of MRC-east. In particular:

	<u>Day</u>
o Initial warning indicators for MRC-west	55
o CINC begins executing Flexible Deterrent Options	58
o Unambiguous warning for MRC-west (W-Day)	68
o Hostilities begin for MRC-west (D-Day)	69
o Forces deploy as lift is available (C-Day)	63
o Additional lift becomes available for MRC-west	76

~~(S/NF)~~ **Threat Forces.** See individual scenarios.

~~(S)~~ **United States Forces.** See individual scenarios. Note that in addition the U.S. must have forced entry capability and logistics-over-the-shore capability in MRC-west because counterattack forces will be delivered late to MRC-west and the U.S. may have to regain key military objectives that could be lost early in the conflict. In addition, unique assets such as hospital ships and space vehicles will be dedicated to the successful conclusion of MRC-east and then shifted to MRC-west.

~~(S)~~ **Mobility Assumptions and Key Authorities Used.** After warning of conflict for Korea is received, the U.S. quickly activates the civil reserve air fleet (CRAF), stage III and requisitions U.S. flag vessels. A major portion of the resulting increase in lift capacity (although not necessarily those assets) will be allocated to Korea. Further, lift assets no longer required for delivery of DTF forces or of sustainment to MRC-east will be shifted to

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
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support MRC-west. In addition, Korean lift assets committed by formal agreement to support MRC-west will be used solely for this theater.

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Figure 1: Timeline (Week/Day activity begins.)
MRC-Concurrent: East then West



C=Deploy day, D=Hostilities day, M=Mobilization day.

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1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance
Major Regional Contingency - Europe

~~(S)~~ **Situation Summary.** The likelihood of a conflict with some former Soviet forces in Europe in the planning period is believed to be low. However, there are economic, political, and cultural factors that will foster tensions among the states in the region that could, in some circumstances, lead to conflict. This scenario assumes that these underlying tensions could compel political leaders to make decisions that appear irrational. This scenario represents the more demanding end of the spectrum of projected threats to European security in the planning period.

~~(S)~~ By the late 1990's, an authoritarian, hostile, and somewhat paranoid government assumes power in Russia. After unsuccessful diplomatic pressures to create a more favorable regional alignment, Russia expands its forces in Kaliningrad. In the next six to eight months, Russian and Belarussian forces move into position for an offensive into northeastern Poland, while Ukraine elects not to become involved but places its northern forces on alert (but does not mobilize). Russia delivers an ultimatum to Poland and warns the Baltic capitals to remain neutral. A week later, Poland requests NATO military assistance. Within a week of the Polish request, NATO orders the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) into western Poland. As the ARRC deploys into Poland, Russia/Belarus moves their forces toward the border. One week after the ARRC deployment, Russian/Belarussian forces attack across the Polish border.

~~(S)~~ The Russian/Belarussian objectives would be a permanent halt or reversal of trends toward Polish security ties with the West. The US/NATO objectives would be to halt the Russian aggression and restore Polish borders to defensible status. There would be no effort to capture Kaliningrad or eliminate it as a political entity.

~~(S)~~ **Threat Forces.** The aggressor forces (Russian and Belarussian) consist of:

■ **Initial Forces:**

5 armored divisions plus 1 armored brigade,
17 motorized rifle divisions,
3 airborne divisions plus 1 airborne brigade,
1240 combat aircraft,
580 helicopters, and
naval units of the Northern and Baltic Fleets.

■ **Follow-on forces:**

3 armored divisions, and
4 motorized rifle divisions.

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The aggressor forces possess significant conventional capability and are capable of nuclear, biological and chemical delivery. However, use of these weapons is not expected unless survival of a republic is at stake.

~~(S)~~ NATO Forces. NATO forces include:

- ARRC consisting of:
 - 4 heavy divisions (including 1 U.S. division)
 - 1 infantry division
 - 1 multinational airmobile division from the southern region
 - 29 tactical fighter squadrons (4 U.S. fighter squadrons), and allied naval forces (to include 4 US CVBGs).
- Other NATO forces include:
 - 18 NATO division equivalents (includes US forces of 6 heavy divisions, 1 separate brigade and 2 armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) and special operations forces),
 - 66 tactical fighter squadrons (including 39 US fighter squadrons),
 - over 80 ships including 2 US CVBGs, and
 - 1 US Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).
- Additional US forces representing the National Command Authority's option for use of extra force:
 - 3 light divisions,
 - 4 heavy divisions,
 - 18 fighter squadrons,
 - 2 CVBGs, and
 - 1 MEF are available for deployment to the theater.

~~(S)~~ Polish Forces.

6 mechanized divisions and
200 combat aircraft.

~~(S)~~ Mobility Assumptions and Key Authorities Used. Voluntary US commercial sealift will provide six U.S. flag ships under charter plus the equivalent of 2500 forty foot containers per week from contracted commercial liner service. Once the decision is made to deploy a sizeable force, the President authorizes use of the 673b authority for lift. Also, CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet) Stages I and II are activated. The President authorizes partial mobilization for sustainment. Table 1 shows the brigade and squadron arrivals for this scenario. They seem achievable with the NATO lift agreements. Foreign vessels not secured by formal agreement will be assumed not available.

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Table 1: US BRIGADE/SQUADRON ARRIVALS

WEEK	MRC-Europe					
	Air Force Fighter/Bomber Squadrons	Army--Heavy Brigades	Army--Light Brigades	Marine Corps MEBs	Navy CVBGs	Special Operations Forces
In-place	6/-	6+1ACR	-	1 MEU(SOC)	1	0.5 SF Group 1 Naval Special Warfare Group 1 Special Operations Wing 2 SF Groups 1 Ranger Regiment 1 Special Operations Wing 1 Special Operations Squadron
1	20/3	3*+1ACR	-	2	2	
	10/1 7/-	3*	-	1	1	
4	-	3	-	1	2	
5	-	3	-	-	-	1.5 SF Groups
7	-	1 Separate	-	-	-	
Total	43/4	19+2ACR	-	1 MEF+	6	

NOTE: Three round-out and two round-up brigades would be activated when the Selected Reserves are called up and would become available for deployment when they had completed post-mobilization training.


* Totals (of 2 brigades) divisions to POMCLIS.

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Figure 1: Timeline (Week activity begins.)



C=Deploy day. D=Hostilities day. M=Mobilization day.

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~~SECRET NOFORN~~ -- April 2, 1992

1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance
Lesser Regional Contingency - Far

~~(S/NF)~~ Situation Summary. In the late 1990s, with a substantially reduced military presence but a large number of American citizens and dependents (approximately 5,000) remaining in the Philippines, U.S. forces respond rapidly to a crisis in the Philippines. In the aftermath of a major coup attempt, an anti-American faction takes Americans hostage. The CINC's operational objectives include securing former U.S. facilities, rescuing American hostages, and evacuating American citizens and foreign nationals desiring to leave.

~~(S/NF)~~ U.S. forces, with the permission of the Philippine government, respond to protect U.S. facilities in Manila, rescue 300 American hostages from Subic Bay, protect American citizens, and evacuate up to a total of 5000 American citizens and 2000 third country citizens wishing to leave. The operation would include an amphibious assault to rescue American hostages at the former Subic Naval Station complex; simultaneous seizure by Army airborne forces of the Manila airport for use as an airhead; and evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel in Manila by Marine forces.

~~(S/NF)~~ Operations would include about one week of low to mid intensity combat, with continued presence for several weeks to conduct civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance operations.

~~(S)~~ Threat Forces. The coup involves up to 48,000 men--roughly one-third of the Philippine armed forces, one-fourth of the Philippine national police, and up to one-third of the New People's army--with associated military equipment. This could include up to 30 fixed-wing aircraft, 30 helicopters, and several fast patrol craft.

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~~Classified By: Derivation from a draft J-5 scenario of January 30, 1992~~
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~~SECRET NOFORN~~ LRC-Far

~~(S)~~ U.S./Allied Forces.

<u>Army</u>	<u>Required Delivery Day (C+)</u>
1 Special Forces Group	2
1 Ranger Regiment (Air Drop)	2
1 Airborne Infantry Brigade	2
1 Battalion Air Drop	
2 Battalions Air Delivered	
1 Infantry Division (-)	4
1 Military Police Battalion	4
1 Corp Headquarters	4
<u>Air Force</u>	
1 Special Operations Wing	2
1 A/OA-10 Squadron	2
3 Theater Airlift Squadrons	3-4
1 C-2 Unit	2
<u>Navy/Marine Corps</u>	
2 CVBG	2
1 Naval Special Warfare Group	2
1 Amphibious MEB including	2
1 ARG/MEU(SOC)	
1 Command Element (MEF)	4
1 Maritime Prepositioning Squadron	4


The speed with which this scenario develops precludes the assembly of a coalition combat force. But allies support U.S. operations and provide base access, transit authority and limited host nation support.

~~(S)~~ Mobility Assumptions and Key Authorities Used. The deployment is conducted with organic military assets, including some portions of the fast sealift ships and ready reserve force (ROS-4). A portion of the selected reserve is needed to mobilize, deploy and sustain combat forces.

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Figure 1: Timeline (Day activity begins.)
LRC-Far



C=Deploy day.
 D=Hostilities day.
 M=Mobilization day.

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~~SECRET NOFORN~~ April 2, 1992

1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance
Lesser Regional Contingency - Near

~~(S/NF)~~ Situation Summary. In the late 1990s, a coalition of the right wing of the Panama Public Force (PPF - a national police force) and former drug-dealing Panamanian Defense Force leaders threaten continued operation of the Panama Canal, U.S. citizens in Panama, and the government of Panama. With the assistance of narco-terrorist elements of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), this coalition attempts a coup, threatening to close the canal unless the legitimate government turns over the reigns of power. The U.S. has no combat forces in Panama and no supporting infrastructure. The Panamanian government reports that it is unable to provide for the security of American citizens or the canal.

~~(S/NF)~~ The CINC's short term operational objectives include keeping the canal open, rescuing up to 25 Panamanian officials being held hostage, protecting American nationals and evacuating up to 15,000 American citizens and foreign nationals. His longer term objectives would include restoring stability and improving the Panamanian government's ability to defend the canal and safeguard American citizens and property.

~~(S/NF)~~ U.S. forces would initially secure--through non-permissive airborne and amphibious landings--airports and seaports of debarkation (APOD/SPOD). These ports would serve as advanced bases through which to flow forces and to conduct NEO operations. A SPOD is needed because APOD ramp space is limited and cannot support the timeline for force delivery and NEO evacuation. Operations would include about one week of low to mid intensity combat, with continued presence for up to 90 days to conduct civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance operations.

~~(S)~~ Threat Forces. The coup involves up to 10,500 men. Up to 10,000 are police; 7500 armed with standard police weapons, 2,500 from SWAT units. Up to 500 are FARC members. The coup forces have no fixed wing assets, no dedicated AAA capability, no ECM capability. They do have some unarmed helicopters, shoulder fired SAMs, some anti-tank weapons, heavy and light machine guns and land mines.

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~~SECRET NOFORN~~ LRC-Near

~~(S)~~ U.S. Forces.

<u>Army</u>	<u>Required Delivery Day (C+)</u>
1 Special Forces Group (-)	2
2 Ranger Battalions	2
1 Airborne Division (-)	
1 Brigade Air Drop	2
1 Brigade Air Delivered	3
1 Military Police Brigade	4
1 Corp Headquarters	4
<u>Air Force</u>	
1 Special Operations Wing	2
1 A/OA-10 Squadron	2
3 Theater Airlift Squadrons	3-4
1 C-2 Unit	2
<u>Navy/Marine Corps</u>	
1 CVBG	2
1 Naval Special Warfare Group	2
1 Amphibious MEB	2
1 Command Element (MEF)	4
1 Maritime Prepositioning Squadron	4


The speed with which this scenario develops and its geographic location precludes the assembly of a coalition combat force. But allies support U.S. operations and provide access or other enroute support.

~~(S)~~ Mobility Assumptions and Key Authorities Used. The deployment is conducted with organic military assets, including some portions of the fast sealift ships and ready reserve force (ROS-4). A portion of the selected reserve is needed to mobilize, deploy and sustain combat forces.

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Figure 1: Timeline (Day activity begins.)
LRC-Near



C=Deploy day, D=Hostilities day, M=Mobilization day.

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1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance
Reconstitution

~~(S)~~ **Situation Summary.** A single nation or a coalition of nations adopt an adversarial security strategy and develop a military capability to threaten U.S. interests through global military competition. U.S. strategic objectives are:

1. To deter any potential resurgent/emergent global threat (REGT) entity from adopting an adversarial strategy and building a force structure capable of militarily competing with the U.S. on a global scale.
2. Failing that, to create additional forces at a rate sufficient to deter offensive action by the REGT.
3. If deterrence failed and global war ensued, to provide sufficient military power to deny the REGT its objectives by inflicting unacceptable losses upon its forces.

~~(S/NF)~~ The resurgence/emergence of a global threat would take many years and be highly visible.

o A first phase would likely involve the evolution of an authoritarian and strongly anti-democratic foreign government or coalition of governments with an aggressive expansionist security policy. In the immediate future, this phase could take as little as several months, but it is becoming more likely that it would require several years.

o A second phase would likely consist of the realignment or development of international relationships, domestic policies, military doctrines, and force structure necessary to support an offensively-oriented military build-up resulting in a credible capability to wage global war. This phase could take as little as two years, but is expected to take longer—for the near term because of the extensive disruption of the potential REGT military forces and for the mid-term because of continued deterioration of their economies.

o A third phase, perhaps as short as two to three years, would likely consist of actual expansion of military forces through industrial production and manpower expansion.

~~(S/NF)~~ Not before the turn of the century or about seven to eight years from the beginning of the resurgence/ emergence, would any REGT have the forces necessary to undertake multi-theater offensive operations. After attaining the capability for offensive operations, there are several possible paths events could follow including rearmament without hostilities ever erupting (as in the Cold War) or the occurrence of some event that triggers REGT mobilization and leads to a short war of several months, or a protracted war over a period of years, or initial engagements resulting in a stalemate followed by a second mobilization race.

(U) Figure 1 is a possible timeline that such events might follow.

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~~(S)~~ Threat Forces. The aggressor forces consist of:


- Ground Forces: 100 Divisions (2 million men)
- Air Forces: 65 Wings (5,000 aircraft)
- Naval Forces: 4 Aircraft Carriers
- 15 Cruisers
- 75 Destroyers/Frigates
- 50 Submarines
- 200 ICBMs or SLBMs (or combination)

~~(S)~~ The aggressor forces possess significant nuclear, biological and chemical capability. However, use of weapons of mass destruction is not expected unless survival of the REGT is at stake.

~~(S)~~ Mobility Assumptions and Key Authorities Used. It is assumed that activation of the Fast Sealift Ships (FSSs), the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP), and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF); movement of Maritime Prepositioning Ships, Afloat Prepositioning Ships, amphibious ships, and other Military Sealift Command ships; along with chartering and requisitioning of the U.S. flag fleet, would occur at the appropriate times to support force movements. It is also assumed that should increased U.S. recruitment and retention incentives fail to produce adequate manpower to form the new forces needed, the President would authorize use of the 673b authority and declare Partial Mobilization and/or conscription earlier than depicted.

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Figure 1: Timeline (Month activity begins.)



- Month
- 1 Resurgent/Emergent Global Threat begins.
 - 24 (2 years) National Command Authority (NCA) notes ambiguous intelligence indicators. U.S. begins force expansion debate. Allied debates follow shortly. U.S./allies intensify diplomatic responses to REGT developments.
 - 32 NCA orders increased surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence activity.
 - 37 REGT begins realigning international relations, domestic economic and industrial policy, military doctrine, and force structure to support an expansionist offensive security policy.
 - 39 NCA notes increased military activity in REGT.

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~-- Reconstitution

- 40 NCA detects limited mobilization and deployment by REGT. REGT begins increasing readiness of existent units, lengthens conscription period, and begins rebasing selected units. U.S. defense budget stabilizes.
- 43 NCA notes significant increase in espionage efforts by REGT intelligence services.
- 45 W REGT military units conduct deployments in areas of vital interest to U.S. President accepts strategic warning of possible military threat from REGT; with Congressional agreement, directs early reconstitution measures.
- 47 U.S. increases military equipment production through 1) full scale production of low rate production runs, 2) restarting closed-down production lines, and 3) expanding industrial production capability; expands recruiting; improves retention; modernizes mothballed/stored equipment; and improves military facilities at installations to support expanded training, production and maintenance.
- 49 U.S. allies accept strategic warning of REGT threat and begin reconstitution.
- 53 NCA begins activities in support of force reconstitution using active and reserve personnel (without call-up). As deterrent measures, U.S. increases forward deployments and exercises with allies.
- 60 (5 years) REGT decides to proceed with major force expansion.
- 61 NCA detects major REGT expansion of military industry and personnel. CINCs execute deterrent measures within their authority. U.S. breaks out mothballed/stored equipment.
- 62 U.S. begins major industrial mobilization; major increases in defense budget; fill (personnel) of cadre units.
- 65 U.S. ships large amount of arms to allies and friendly countries.
- 72 (6 years) REGT violates one or more arms control obligations.
- 76 With allied concurrence, U.S. stations additional forces overseas.
- 79 REGT issues ultimatums to the U.S. and allied nations demanding economic and territorial concessions.
- 83 REGT decides on military action; begins major mobilization. NCA notes repositioning of tactical nuclear weapons.
- W President determines that REGT intends to engage in offensive military operations and that U.S./allied military actions will be required.
- M₁ President declares National Emergency; calls up selected reserves. SecDef authorizes Stoploss. Service Secretaries authorize retiree activations.
- 85 REGT positions forces to support multi-theater offensive operations. U.N. calls on REGT to desist.
- 86 Major U.S. forces notified to prepare for deployment.
- M_p President declares Partial mobilization; authorizes recall of Ready Reserve.
- 87 C Major U.S. combat and support forces deploy.
- 89 R REGT forces sufficiently trained, equipped, and deployed to begin global offensive operations. REGT attacks non-belligerent neighbor nation.

90 (7 1/2 yrs) REGT threatens allied or U.S. territorial integrity.

Congress declares National Security Emergency.

M₁ Congress authorized and funds full mobilization. Elements of total mobilization invoked. Selective Service Act invoked. Conscription implemented.

C=Deploy day. R=Ready day (adversary). M=Mobilization day.

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Possible rewrite for Europe scenario narrative

~~(S-NF)~~ The likelihood of a conflict with former Soviet forces in Europe in the planning period is believed to be low. However, there are territorial, economic, political and ethnic factors that will foster tensions among the states in the region that could, in some circumstances, lead to conflict. This scenario assumes that these underlying tensions impel political leaders to make decisions that appear irrational. Although there may be other (generally smaller) potential conflicts in Europe that are individually more likely than the scenario posited here, this scenario represents a threatening situation, short of one requiring reconstitution, that Europe might plausibly face. It represents the more demanding end of the spectrum of projected threats to European security in the planning period.

~~(S-NF)~~ Former Soviet republics are independent nations but maintain aligned in varying degrees. In Russia a new government -- authoritarian, anti-western, and somewhat paranoid -- assumes power. The new leaders have viewed with alarm Polish efforts to solidify security and economic ties with the West, or at least with other East Europeans. Russia seeks to capitalize on Poland's impatience with Western aid levels and denial of EC/NATO membership by pressuring Poland for a new security relationship, but is only further alarmed when this only heightens both Polish entreaties to, and the responsiveness of, NATO members (including Germany, of particular concern to Russia). Feeling these developments could lead to security threats, Russian leaders (with support of Belarus, which retains close economic and political alignment with Russia) oppose them with increasing urgency.

~~(S-NF)~~ After a period of aggressive but unsuccessful political and economic pressure, Russia begins increasing military actions in support of aggressive diplomacy to halt or preempt steps that it perceives as unacceptably threatening and irreversible (e.g. Polish membership in NATO, or stationing of NATO-member forces in Poland). Russia begins a major expansion of forces in Kaliningrad, primarily using land routes through Lithuania, creating fears of border incidents with Poland. Considering Polish and NATO protests provocative, Russia and Belarus mobilize forces and move them toward the northeastern Polish border and in modest numbers toward the Baltic states. Ukraine and Kazakhstan, avoiding entanglement, place forces on alert but do not mobilize.

~~(S-NF)~~ After 6-8 months, x Russian and y Belarussian divisions (plus z follow-on divisions available by D+30) are poised for an offensive into northeastern Poland and for rapidly overrunning the Baltics. Surface and submarine elements of the Northern Fleet begin deployment to the North/Norwegian Sea, and several SSNs to the North Atlantic. Units of the Baltic Fleet prepare for operations in the southeastern Baltic. All these naval forces posture to harass sea traffic bound for the conflict area.

~~(S-NF)~~ With diplomatic efforts stalemated, Russia delivers an ultimatum to Poland and warns the Baltics to remain neutral. The day after the ultimatum, the Baltics and Poland protest to the UN and NATO, and Poland mobilizes and requests NATO military assistance. Four days later, NATO orders the bulk of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) into western Poland. Russia seeks to preempt that deployment, initially attacking westward through the Baltics. The ARRC completes its deployment into Poland in 15 days. (18 additional NATO division equivalents and 66 TFSS become available within 30 days.) As the ARRC completes deployment into Poland, Russian and Belarussian forces attack across Polish borders.

~~(S-NF)~~ Russian strategic objectives would be to permanently halt or reverse trends toward Polish security ties with the West (giving an object lesson to other former Warsaw Pact states), by occupying Polish territory, forcibly changing Polish policy or leadership, and rebuffing Western objectives. Operational objectives would be to militarily isolate and rapidly overrun the Baltic states to neutralize that flank with economy of forces, then to rapidly seize defensible Polish territory (including Warsaw and northern areas east of the Vistula) before the West could assemble effective defenses. The concept of operations would include rapidly overrunning the Baltic states; establishing air superiority over northeastern Poland and the Baltics, and air and sea superiority in the eastern Baltic; harassing NATO's SLOCs to Poland; and attacking overland toward Warsaw, both westward across the Polish-Belarussian border and southward from Kaliningrad, and quickly occupying defensible territory.

~~(S-NF)~~ US/NATO strategic objectives would be to deter Russian/Belarussian aggression, but if deterrence failed, to restore Polish borders to defensible status, and then at least initially maintain military presence to bolster diplomatic support for the Baltics. Once conflict began, operational objectives would include isolating hostile forces from resupply/reinforcement; maintaining secure land and sea LOCs to Poland; containing Russian naval forces in the eastern Baltic; forcing hostile forces out of Poland; and disabling hostile forces' capacity to continue cross-border operations. The concept of operations would include establishing air superiority over Poland and, as necessary, adjacent territory, as well as sea and air superiority in the western Baltic; interdicting hostile forces' land LOCs with air power and SOF beginning early in the campaign; then counterattacking directly or with flanking maneuvers to collapse hostile forces' positions and/or reverse their advance. Absent impending threats elsewhere and upon NCA/NATO determination that allied objectives warranted, Overwhelming Forces might be deployed to more decisively execute the counterattack and terminate the conflict. It would not be a US/NATO war aim to permanently occupy any Russian or Belarussian territory (e.g. Kaliningrad).

1994-99 Defense Planning Guidance
MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY - EUROPE
1999

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

~~(S-NF)~~ The likelihood of a conflict with former Soviet forces in Europe in the planning period is believed to be low. However, there are economic, political, and cultural factors that will foster tensions among the states in the region that could, in some circumstances, lead to conflict. This scenario assumes that these underlying tensions could compel political leaders to make decisions that appear irrational. Although there may be other potential conflicts in Europe that are individually more likely than the scenario posited here, the forces in this scenario represent a non-worst case non-reconstitution threat that is plausible in light of recent events in the former Soviet Union. This scenario represents the more demanding end of the spectrum of projected threats to European security in the planning period.

~~(S-NF)~~ Former Soviet republics are independent nations but remain aligned loosely as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). An expansionist authoritarian government assumes power within the former Russian Republic. Using the safety and rights of Russian minorities in the Baltic countries as a pretext for expansionist aims, the Russian government moves to regain lost territory in the Baltics.

~~(S-NF)~~ ^{say have} NATO has extended associate membership to Poland and the Baltic nations, ^{if} ~~to the extent of giving them security guarantees under the North Atlantic Charter, but it has not included them in the integrated command structure or concluded any agreements concerning infrastructure or cooperative defense arrangements.~~

~~(S-NF)~~ The Russian government pursues a policy demanding that Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia provide autonomy for their Russian minorities (with covert plans to, as an initial measure, attach ethnic Russian areas in Lithuania to Kaliningrad). After some period of steadily increasing but unsuccessful diplomatic pressure, Russia begins an expansion of its forces in Kaliningrad via air, sea and overland routes. Fearful of aggression, Lithuania and Poland unsuccessfully attempt to restrict the overland movement of military forces into Kaliningrad through their territory. With the coerced consent

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of Belarus, which remains economically dependent upon and militarily inferior to Russia, Russian forces are mobilized and moved into Belarus. Ukraine, which elects not to become involved, places its Northern forces on alert and mobilizes some reserves. After 6-8 months, 18 Russian divisions (plus 7 follow-on divisions available by D+30) are poised for an offensive into northeastern Poland and southeastern Lithuania on an axis oriented roughly along the Polish-Lithuanian border. Russia moves its forces to the Polish-Lithuanian border with Belarus. Submarine elements of the Northern Fleet begin deployment to the Norwegian Sea and the vicinity of the Danish Straits while the remainder of the Northern Fleet deploys to its bastion defensive positions. Several Northern Fleet submarines would also deploy to the North Atlantic to threaten maritime resupply from CONUS. Units of the Baltic Fleet would prepare for sea denial operations in the southeastern Baltic. Together, all of these naval forces would posture to defend Russian territory and interdict sea traffic bound for the conflict area.

~~(S-NF)~~ As the Russian forces assemble on the Polish-Lithuanian border with Belarus, the Baltic nations and Polish government protest vehemently to the UN and NATO and Poland requests NATO military assistance. Four days later, NATO orders the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) into western Poland. Russia delivers an ultimatum to the Baltic capitals and warns Poland to remain neutral. NATO's ARRC completes its deployment into Poland in five days. Eighteen additional NATO division equivalents and 66 Combat Squadrons will be available over the next 30 days.

~~(S-NF)~~ Five days after the Russian ultimatum and as the ARRC completes its deployment into Poland, Russian forces attack westward along the Polish-Lithuanian border while limited Kaliningrad forces move eastward to complete a link-up. Lithuania immediately requests NATO military assistance.

~~(S-NF)~~ Russian strategic objectives would be territorial expansion around Kaliningrad and creation of a permanent overland access to it from Belarussian territory. Operational objectives would be to carve out a corridor from Belarus to Kaliningrad and then seize regions of Lithuania adjacent to Kaliningrad which contain ethnic Russian minorities. The concept of operations would encompass establishing air superiority over northeastern Poland and southern Lithuania; gaining sea and air superiority in the eastern Baltic; conducting naval operations in the western Baltic to deter movement of NATO supplies and warships into the eastern Baltic; and digging in to defend the overland corridor while garrisoning an expanded Kaliningrad with enough forces to defeat any NATO response.

~~(S-NF)~~ The US/NATO strategic objective would be to deter Russian/Belarussian aggression and to restore the original Polish and Lithuanian borders if aggression occurs. It would not be a US/NATO war aim to capture Kaliningrad or eliminate it as a political entity.

A | ~~(S-NF)~~ Once conflict was initiated, operational objectives would include isolating the Russian forces in Kaliningrad; insuring SLOC security in the Atlantic; keeping the Danish Straits open and the Russian naval forces bottled up in the eastern Baltic; and driving Russian forces back into Kaliningrad and Belarus. NATO may also consider deployment of limited forces to the Northern Region (USMC NALMED, several Combat Sqds, and NATO Composite Forces) with the objective of deterring a widening of the conflict.

~~(S-NF)~~ The concept of operations would encompass establishing air superiority over Poland, Lithuania and Kaliningrad; gaining sea and air superiority in the North Sea and western Baltic; interdicting Russian resupply, C3 and follow-on forces using special forces, heavy conventional bombers (both deployed and CONUS based), long range cruise missiles, and tactical airpower; and conducting a counteroffensive to cut the Russian overland corridor, isolate Kaliningrad, restore and reinforce the Lithuanian and Polish borders with Belarus, and collapse the Russian salient around Kaliningrad.

~~(S-NF)~~ Absent impending threats elsewhere and upon NCA/NATO determination that allied objectives warranted, Overwhelming Forces might be deployed to more decisively execute the counteroffensive and terminate the conflict.

A | ~~(S-NF)~~ Follow-on humanitarian assistance and civil affairs operations would continue where required for several months after the end of hostilities.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
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