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Ref: 19-F-1401
January 13, 2021

Mr. John Greenwald Jr.
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Dear Mr. Greenwald:

This is a final response to your June 20, 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience. We received your request on June 20, 2019, and assigned it FOIA case number 19-F-1401. We ask that you use this number when referring to your request.

The Office of the Joint Staff, a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, conducted a search of their records systems and provided the enclosed document, totaling 280 pages. Mr. Scott McPherson, Chief, IMD Declassification Branch, in his capacity as the Initial Denial Authority has determined these 280 pages to be responsive to your request and are appropriate for release in their entirety, without excision.

This constitutes a full grant of your request and closes your case file in this office. There are no assessable fees associated with this response.

If you have any questions or concerns about the foregoing or about the processing of your request, please do not hesitate to contact the Action Officer assigned to your request, Raymond Hartwick, at Raymond.j.hartick.civ@mail.mil or 571-372-0432. Our FOIA Public Liaison is also available to assist you and may be reached at 571-372-0464.

Sincerely,

Stephen L. Fisher
For Stephanie L. Carr
Chief

Enclosures:
As stated

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:


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Joint Publication 3-50



Personnel Recovery



02 October 2015



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for the preparation, planning, execution, and assessment of personnel recovery.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



WILLIAM C. MAYVILLE, JR.
LTG, USA
Director, Joint Staff

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**SUMMARY OF CHANGES
CHANGE IN LIEU OF REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-50
DATED 20 DECEMBER 2011**

- **Refines the scope of the publication to include assessment.**
- **Introduces the prevention function with further reference to Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*.**
- **Accounts for the realignment of Defense Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing Personnel Office to the Defense POW/Missing in Action Accounting Agency and its roles and responsibilities.**
- **Identifies that combatant commanders should maintain a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (enduring capability) at all times.**
- **Refers to the personnel recovery (PR) enterprise as those entities/organizations supporting PR in a geographic area, region, or globally.**
- **Within the definition of isolated personnel, clarifies the meaning of US military sponsored activities to include military/civilian leave and how contractor leave status is considered.**
- **Uses the term combat support agencies clarifying applicability.**
- **Modified definition for reintegration to prioritize the medical health and psychological decompression of the recovered person.**
- **Clarification of United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) responsibilities in civil search and rescue, search and rescue regions and the inclusion of Alaska to NORTHCOM.**
- **Updated Service appendices to Service annexes with brief description and reference to Service doctrine.**
- **Modified Appendix E, “Classified Planning Supplement” (published separately).**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Provides basic constructs and principles to guide the Services, combatant commanders, and subordinate joint force commanders to prepare for, plan, execute, and adapt personnel recovery.
 - Describes command relationships to facilitate the synchronization and integration of recovery operations.
 - Addresses the combination of command guidance, education and training, and products and equipment required to prepare for personnel recovery.
 - Covers personnel recovery mission analysis; developing the operational concept of, and authorities for, personnel recovery in the basic plan; and developing the personnel recovery appendix to the basic plan.
 - Discusses the five personnel recovery execution tasks of Report, Locate, Support, Recover, and Reintegrate.
-

Introduction

Personnel recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.

Our people are important. In addition, adversaries have historically exploited captured personnel for intelligence, propaganda, or as leverage during negotiations. Personnel recovery (PR) intends to reduce those opportunities.

Military commanders prepare, plan for, and execute recovery operations by ensuring individuals are trained to contend with an isolating event, forces are capable of recovering personnel, and the staff can react quickly to the situation in accordance with standing plans and procedures to prevent loss of life, capture, and exploitation.

*The Department of Defense
Personnel Recovery System*

PR is a system comprised of four functions: preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation. The PR system prepares three elements: commanders and staff, recovery forces, and isolated personnel, through education, training, and equipping them to plan and execute PR.

The Department of Defense (DOD) PR system is centered on five PR execution tasks and supporting:

- The **report task** consists of actions required to provide notification that personnel are or may have become isolated.
- The **locate task** involves the effort taken to find and confirm the identity of isolated personnel.
- The **support task** involves providing support to both the isolated person and the isolated person's next of kin.
- The **recover task** involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel.
- The **reintegrate task** begins when the report notification is received and there is a possibility the recovered person will enter the reintegration process.

Functions and Responsibilities

Geographic Combatant Commanders

Geographic combatant commanders plan for effective and comprehensive PR, establish command relationships and clearly articulate procedures required to employ forces from different components to execute PR jointly, and establish a PR coordination architecture and ensure PR-trained personnel are included and fill critical positions.

Services and United States Special Operations Command

The Military Departments normally establish a PR office of primary responsibility within their Service organizations. Each Service Chief and Commander, United States Special Operations Command, organizes, trains, and equips forces for PR, and provides forces and processes, to accomplish the five PR execution tasks, consistent with DOD guidance and operations plans (OPLANs).

Joint Personnel Recovery Agency

Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS's)

controlled activity for PR, working through the Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development. JPRA facilitates interoperable PR capabilities through the development of joint PR guidance and PR products.

Joint Personnel Recovery Center

A Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) is the organization responsible for assisting the joint force commander (JFC) in planning and coordinating PR operations within the assigned operational area.

Component Commanders and Subordinate Organizations

Joint force component commanders plan, conduct, and designate PR forces in support of their own operations and for isolating events occurring within their assigned operational area or as tasked by the JFC. Component planners should consider the availability and capabilities of forces of the other components, multinational forces, other US Government departments and agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations operating in the operational area, and establish habitual relationships.

Command and Control

Command Relationships and Organization

Delineating appropriate command relationships for PR facilitates the synchronization and integration of recovery operations. Coordination of PR planning is vital to effective and successful PR mission execution.

PR often requires coordination with staff elements at the joint task force (JTF) and subordinate levels. Command relationships and PR coordination authority should be clearly defined and delineated in appropriate JTF and component operation orders and, as required, fragmentary orders.

A component experiencing an isolating event within its operational area may be able to conduct the recovery mission without external support. However, if two or more components are involved, the JPRC coordinates the augmentation

of forces and recommends PR mission-specific command relationships to the JFC or designated supported commander for PR. Respective component commanders normally retain operational control of their forces. For the PR mission, the JFC, designated supported commander for PR, or component commander conducting the mission, will normally have tactical control of participating forces.

Coordination and Liaison

Coordination is a key element for successful prosecution of PR missions. Continuous coordination should be conducted both vertically and horizontally. Coordinating authority is delegated to the JPRC or a designated supported commander for PR. PR coordinating authority enables a commander or individual to require the consultation of other commanders for planning or other purposes, but it cannot be applied to compel agreement.

Communications

PR communications should be rapid, reliable, secure, redundant, and flexible. A combination of secure/nonsecure commercial and landline, satellite communications radios and phones, ultrahigh frequency/very high frequency/high frequency radios, collaborative tools and systems, and computer/network “chat” capabilities should be built into communications plans.

Preparation

Preparation is a combination of command guidance, education and training, and products and equipment.

Command and Policy Guidance

In addition to overarching guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS, Services and combatant commanders (CCDRs) should provide command-specific implementation guidance. Additionally, JFCs should provide definitive PR guidance as it relates to the assigned missions for their operational areas.

PR Education and Training

PR joint education and training efforts focus on three groups—commanders and staffs, forces, and individuals at risk of isolation.

Education and training programs for commanders and staffs focus on the following learning levels: fundamentals, PR specialties, and PR program management. Formal education and exercises should stress commanders' and staffs' responsibilities to account for personnel, report missing personnel and recover them, plus command procedures for meeting these responsibilities.

Recovery force training is a Service and component responsibility. Various levels of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training are available to personnel when the requirements are defined and validated.

Products and Equipment

The capabilities to survive, evade, and help facilitate the other PR execution tasks are enhanced by preparing personnel with adequate PR equipment and products. Personnel at risk of isolation should also be familiar with and follow the combatant command's minimum evasion requirements. Several PR products are designed to enhance their ability to survive and evade.

Equipment Preparation

During pre-mission planning, carefully consider the operational environment and select the right equipment for survival in the event of isolation. Personnel should plan and equip themselves to survive or evade for an indefinite period of time, but at the very least for a minimum of five days.

Planning

PR Mission Analysis

Mission analysis should consider command relationships within the operational area and who has responsibility for PR. Planning for PR needs to take into consideration all operational and mission variables. If available, a red team can help PR planners see intangible cultural and perceptual environmental factors that may need to be considered.

Communication Synchronization

PR planners and operators should collaborate with Public Affairs, information operations, and other

information-related capabilities to include PR requirements in the JFC's commander's communication synchronization effort.

The Basic Plan

The OPLAN and supporting plans establish the joint force PR command authorities and responsibilities, coordination and communication architecture, force placement, force posture, and force response. The PR planner coordinates with and assists other staff planners in developing the basic plan to ensure it establishes the foundation for the scope, authorities, and priority for PR.

The PR Appendix in the Operation Plan

The basic plan's operational situation, the JFC's overall concept of operations (CONOPS) and intent, the mission analysis and ongoing joint planning, and the collaboration with other operation planners become the foundation of information that focuses the development of the "PR operations plan," in appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of an OPLAN (see Figure V-1). Appendix 5 contains the JFC's PR CONOPS for a specific campaign or operation. It tasks commanders and staffs, isolated personnel, and forces with actions that, when completed, will develop the PR capability envisioned by the JFC.

PR Mission Planning and Execution

Commanders and staffs from joint to unit levels need to develop a systematic process to enhance decision making during a PR mission and develop a battle-rhythm between command and control (C2) nodes.

A decision process tool, whether it is a flow chart (e.g., go/no-go) or procedure document, will guide decision makers from the time a report of isolated personnel is received through the reintegration of those personnel. A decision process allows some criteria to be decided in advance and provides a reminder (checklist) of other items that should be remembered during times of crisis.

Recovery forces normally are not committed until after successful authentication. Further, recovery

forces normally will not enter a hostile operational environment until the location and authentication of isolated personnel has been verified and recovery is feasible.

Execution

PR execution tasks

Commanders and staffs, forces, and personnel at risk of isolation should use validated procedures and techniques to accomplish the five PR execution tasks:

- Report
- Locate
- Support
- Recover, and
- Reintegrate.

Report

The report task begins with the recognition of an isolation event and ends when appropriate C2 authorities are informed. JFCs may be notified of a PR requirement through any means within the joint or component force C2 structure. A receiving entity should confirm a distress notification.

Locate

The locate task involves the effort taken to precisely find and authenticate isolated personnel. It starts upon recognition of an isolation event and continues until the isolated person is recovered. An accurate location and positive authentication are normally required prior to committing recovery forces.

Support

The support task involves providing support to both the isolated person and to the isolated person's family, with specific objectives for each. The forces used to support the isolated personnel should know the objectives and be capable of executing the tactics, techniques, and procedures to achieve them. Decision makers should properly assess and mitigate risks in order to successfully execute the support task.

Recover

The recover task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, forces, and

isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under the physical custody of a friendly organization. The recover task begins with the launch or redirection of forces or the initiation of diplomatic or civil processes, and ends when the recovery element hands off the formerly isolated person to the reintegration team. The recover task is accomplished through PR operation and mission planning, and individual and synergistic actions of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel.

Reintegrate

Reintegrate is the task that allows DOD to provide medical care and protect the well-being of recovered personnel through decompression, while conducting debriefings to gather necessary intelligence and SERE information. In their planning, CCDRs establish a reintegration process, to include locations, teams, and responsibilities. The reintegration process should also be included in combatant command PR directives. Two key components of this process are qualified SERE and intelligence debriefers who gather information from recovered isolated personnel and SERE psychologists and others who assist the recovered isolated personnel to decompress and reintegrate to their unit, family, and society.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine for the preparation, planning, execution, and assessment of PR.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

“By pledging to put every effort into recovering our highly trained [personnel], we send a powerful signal about their importance and help sustain their spirit under the stress of combat.”

**General Henry H. Shelton, US Army, 14th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
27 October 1999**

1. Overview

a. **Introduction.** This publication provides basic constructs and principles to guide the Services, combatant commanders (CCDRs), and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to prepare for, plan, execute, and adapt personnel recovery (PR). It describes the military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to recover and reintegrate isolated personnel and provides general guidance to military commanders in support of the national strategic goals. The geographic combatant commander (GCC) and JFC should be prepared to support United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, other governments, organizations, and individuals in accordance with (IAW) applicable laws, regulations, and when directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

(1) **PR** is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.

(2) **Isolated personnel** are those US military, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and DOD contracted personnel and others designated by the President or SecDef, who are separated from their unit or agency, as an individual or group, while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or mission and who are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. A sponsored military activity includes leave status for military and civilians. Contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF), who are on leave, are allowed to be on leave based on the contracting company’s statement of how they run their company and what benefits are provided to their employees. This statement is approved by the government, outside of any individual contract.

b. **Importance of Personnel Recovery.** Our people are important. In addition, adversaries have historically exploited captured personnel for intelligence, propaganda, or as leverage during negotiations. PR intends to reduce those opportunities.

c. Military commanders prepare, plan for, and execute recovery operations by ensuring individuals are trained to contend with an isolating event, forces are capable of recovering personnel, and the staff can react quickly to the situation IAW standing plans and procedures to prevent loss of life, capture, and exploitation.

d. **Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-30**, U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts, outlines the strategic objectives—prevent, prepare for,

and respond to isolating events to achieve the policy goals to include all USG departments and agencies.

(1) All USG departments and agencies are encouraged to coordinate with one another to overcome any capability shortfalls, creating a whole-of-government approach to PR, including reintegration. PPD-30 also encourages cooperation and information sharing with US allies and partners. The experience of US military personnel can be expected to be the foundational knowledge for other agencies and nations to adapt to their situation and requirements. The responsibility for overall US direction of a recovery operation remains with the chief of mission (COM) or the GCC, when so designated, in cooperation with host government officials.

(2) Many subordinate objectives and tasks under prevention and preparation in the national policy clearly support DOD force protection (FP) objectives as well as tasks in the DOD PR model. This overlap of FP and PR functions is primarily a DOD anomaly since most other USG departments and agencies and organizations include their prevention tasks within their PR programs. In coordinating PR planning and activities with interagency partners, commanders must be aware of and accommodate these doctrinal differences.

(3) Prevention actions in PR are those measures taken to reduce individual susceptibility to isolation and mitigate the adversary's opportunities to capture isolated personnel. Prevention is different from preparation in that preparation assumes that an isolating event will occur and therefore prescribes PR actions to ensure that the response (either as an individual or as a recovery force) to that incident will be effective and the outcome successful. FP, and other protection function tasks, can provide some mitigation techniques to reduce an individual's vulnerability and can be applied to prevent isolating events.

For additional information regarding joint functions, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations.

e. The PR enterprise consists of adaptive, scalable networks of synchronized capabilities, which are scaled and scoped, to prevent, prepare for, and respond to isolation events. It is a human network, regionally postured, but globally networked and flexible, supported by persistent, collaborative information sharing capabilities. The PR enterprise enhances coordination between command centers as part of the larger operational DOD and interagency network of entities prosecuting the various phases of military operations. The PR enterprise includes the element of host nation (HN), other USG departments and agencies, other governments, and civilian organizations that can contribute in any manner to the success of the recovery of an isolated person.

2. The Department of Defense Personnel Recovery System

PR is a system in which the objectives are to return isolated personnel to duty, sustain morale, increase operational performance, and deny adversaries the opportunity to influence our military strategy and national will by exploiting the intelligence and

propaganda value of isolated personnel. It is a system comprised of **four functions: preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation**. The PR system prepares three elements: commanders and staff, recovery forces, and isolated personnel, through education, training, and equipping them to plan and execute PR. The planning and execution function considers three recovery options: diplomatic, military, and civil across all phases of an operation, and then it examines the capabilities within each of those options. Within the military option, there are **four categories of capabilities that can be drawn upon**: the isolated individual, Service component, joint and multinational forces, and other government departments and agencies. **Commanders should know the PR capabilities available to maximize unified action, achieve economy of force, and enhance situational awareness (SA) to enable those most capable of executing the five PR execution tasks**: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. To perform these tasks requires an organization fully networked to respond to an isolating event. The PR system includes the debriefing and care of recovered personnel through the reintegration process. The entire system continually improves and learns from past operations and successes through adaptation. Although the functions are presented in the apparent sequential order of preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation, it is important to understand that these functions can occur nearly simultaneously. The PR system is iterative, and the individual activities are interdependent; a change occurring in one function can affect what is happening in the other three. The functions are not discrete steps, but rather activities that continuously interact with one another and adjust or adapt to maintain a relevant and effective system. See Figure I-1 and Figure I-2.

a. **Preparation.** In PR, as in all missions, success is far more likely if the forces involved are properly organized, trained, equipped, and employed to gain and maintain the ability to process relevant information and to take appropriate action. The ability to take appropriate action in a given situation is based on one's knowledge, skills, physical capability, confidence, will, and often courage. Commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel should be organized, trained, and equipped to perform their responsibilities and interface effectively with one another in order to accomplish the **five PR execution tasks**.

b. **Planning**

(1) **General.** JFCs and their staffs consider all available PR options and capabilities to successfully plan for recovery operations within their operational areas. While JFCs may not control or influence the nonmilitary options, they and their staffs work to coordinate all military actions with any diplomatic and civil options being exercised. Joint and component commanders should incorporate PR into all planning efforts to exercise the military option and prepare to support both diplomatic and civil options when directed.




Figure I-1. The Department of Defense Personnel Recovery System

(2) **PR Options.** Options to recover isolated personnel include military, diplomatic, civil, or a combination thereof.

(a) The **military** option includes the use of US, partner nation, HN military capabilities, or a combination thereof, to recover isolated personnel. The military option may be to employ a standing, ad hoc, or opportune force to conduct a recovery operation. Options are based on deliberate plans and procedures or a time critical situation. Military options can contribute to diplomatic and civil options. This publication focuses on the planning, preparation, and execution of the military option for PR. Under the military option, there are **five capabilities** that Services and GCCs seek to develop and employ: the individual, component, joint, multinational, and other government departments and agencies.

(b) The **diplomatic** option involves USG contact with the various parties involved in the isolating incident and through negotiation and communications recover isolated personnel or set conditions for one of the other options. Diplomatic options are not actions exclusive of the diplomatic corps; military personnel can also be involved. The diplomatic option makes the best use of professional and personal contacts of USG personnel supported by trained negotiators and prepared communications plans.

In 2001, a US Navy EP-3 performed an emergency landing in the People's Republic of China. The Chinese government unlawfully detained the crew and the aircraft. The Department of State assigned the Defense Attaché to assist the United States Government effort to successfully recover the isolated crew through diplomatic means.




Figure I-2. Personnel Recovery Options, Capabilities, and Methods

Diplomatic options are complicated by the nature of the isolating event, US relationship with the sovereign nation where the incident is occurring, and the legal status of the adversary. Diplomatic communication may be direct, indirect, or through the use of a third party.

(c) **Civil** options may include sanctioned or unsanctioned intervention by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), influential persons, and/or private citizens. The civil option is similar to the diplomatic option with the exception that the primary negotiator has no official ties and may want to distance themselves from the US or HN government. The civil option uses private citizens who are not affiliated with the USG and can resolve the isolating incident. They may also inject themselves into the situation without DOD solicitation. Civil methods include, but are not limited to, the use of influential private citizens, NGOs, or private businesses. The topics of negotiations, approach, and agreements to resolve the isolating event may not be supportable or sanctioned by the USG. Early coordination with external stakeholders in the planning process increases the ability to leverage civil capabilities for solving PR challenges. Family members, corporations, or religiously affiliated organizations may endeavor to gain release for hostages outside of USG knowledge or involvement.

(3) **PR Capabilities.** Commanders can expand and achieve maximum effectiveness of their PR capabilities by employing those capabilities in the context of one or more of the five capabilities in Figure I-2. To effectively mitigate the risk of personnel becoming isolated, the JFC, staff, and the Service components should be cognizant of the benefits and limitations of the various PR capabilities to optimize the employment of PR assets.

(a) **Individual.** Individuals are trained and equipped to facilitate or conduct their own recovery using one of two methods described as unassisted or opportune. The operational environment will determine the individual skills and equipment for recovery. The nature of the unit's mission and an individual's military occupational skill will determine the required training to mitigate the risk of isolation or exploitation should the individual be captured.

1. Unassisted. Isolated personnel have a responsibility to facilitate their own recovery as much as possible, especially when situations or environments may hamper other methods of recovery. For most isolating events, personnel will be unassisted for a period of time until they can contribute to their recovery. The necessary training and equipment to mitigate the risks of isolation are determined by mission analysis and is reflected in survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training criteria as part of theater entry or training requirements. Preparation includes preparation of an individual (or team) evasion plan of action (EPA) and may include the use of isolated personnel guidance (IPG), evasion aids, evasion charts (EVCs), blood chits, and pointee-talkees. See Chapter IV, "Preparation," for more details. Knowledge of the operational area is key and information that supports the development of the individual's capabilities includes, but is not limited to threat, cultural understanding, dynamics of the local population, friendly forces, and the availability of items that support survival and works in coordination with the GCC.

2. Opportune. When an isolated person, wittingly or unwittingly enlists the aid of others not normally considered in PR planning (e.g., local civilians), the opportune capability is being employed. The isolated person may actively seek an opportunity to facilitate their return to friendly control, or be apprehended by persons whose motivation is not immediately known, but who are willing to conceal the isolated person from the adversary. Theater PR planners and SERE specialists should assess and advise personnel on the risks and benefits of making contact with or coming under the control of the local population. Recovery forces must be made aware that the isolated personnel are being assisted under this method, ascertain the motivation of the entity providing the support, and take the appropriate precautions. These assessments should be contained in PR guidance issued as part of theater PR regulations and PR appendices (in operation plans [OPLANs] and concept plans [CONPLANs])."

(b) **Service Components.** The JFC will normally task the Service components with specific PR responsibilities for their own forces and for other isolated personnel within their areas of operation. Components identify their capability and shortfalls to meet the JFC's requirements and adjust assigned forces or capabilities where required. The JFC may rely entirely on component PR capability, or some combination

of joint, multinational, or other capability to meet the JFC's operational intent. Service capabilities and methods are further discussed in individual Service publications and Appendix G, "Capabilities."

(c) **Joint.** Combining the capabilities of two or more components gives the JFC a very potent tool for conducting PR. The successful use of joint capabilities requires preparation and planning for forces to jointly conduct the same PR mission. For these reasons, the JFC should state the commander's intent regarding PR and provide clear and concise specified PR tasks to components. PR using a joint force can be a difficult mission under the best of circumstances, and the risk increases when performed by an ad hoc force.

(d) **Multinational.** Combining US capabilities with one or more partner nations' capabilities may provide the commander more options and increased flexibility to meet PR requirements. Multinational capabilities may provide a broader range of PR capability; they could also increase interoperability and intelligence sharing concerns, as well as decrease the DOD footprint in the area of responsibility (AOR). Exercises and prior planning are critical to overcoming challenges such as security classification restrictions, interoperability of command and control (C2), rules of engagement (ROE), and differences in equipment, capabilities, procedures, and language. While many partner nations do not possess a PR capability, most have a capability to conduct search and rescue (SAR) that, when properly coordinated, can be put to use to alleviate the burden of using high-demand PR assets.

(e) **Other Government Departments and Agencies.** Employing or exploiting these capabilities enhances the JFC's ability to successfully plan and accomplish the PR missions. As is the case in other capabilities, other government departments and agencies may fill a critical joint force requirement, and may have a presence or wield some influence in the JFC's operational area. A thorough understanding of their capabilities, and prior planning, enables the JFC to effectively coordinate with, and when appropriate, to integrate them into the joint force PR effort.

(4) **Methods.** The recovery methods depicted in Figure I-2 are representative, but not all-inclusive. Evasion, for example, is an action on the part of individuals, and they can recover themselves without assistance or through taking advantage of an opportunity by asking the local indigenous populace for assistance. Alternatively, the other methods require some type of organized assistance, either through a component, or perhaps with the assistance of interorganizational stakeholders. Alternative methods are more fully explained in Chapter V, "Planning," and in individual Service publications and Appendix G, "Capabilities." Brief descriptions of the methods listed in Figure I-2 are provided here for a basic understanding.

(a) Combat search and rescue (CSAR) includes tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) performed by US Air Force and US Navy forces to recover isolated personnel from hostile or uncertain operational environments.

(b) Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) is a US Marine Corps mission performed by any combination of aviation, ground, or waterborne assets for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes SAR assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed.

(c) SAR uses aircraft, surface craft, submarines, and specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue distressed persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment.

(d) Isolated personnel may be recovered by forces redirected to react to an isolating event or by a quick reaction force (QRF). Forces can be redirected to the location of the isolating incident. QRF, a common method used by the Army and Marine Corps, is organized to react quickly to multiple missions, not just PR. The QRF has a general plan and adapts to the situation at hand. A QRF can respond via ground or air, depending on availability of assets and stage from afloat or from ground locations.

(e) Nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) uses indigenous/surrogate personnel who are trained, supported, and led by special operations forces (SOF), or other government agencies' personnel who have been specifically trained and directed to establish and operate indigenous or surrogate infrastructures. NAR is used when the use of conventional recovery forces in hostile areas is not feasible or acceptable, or is nonexistent.

(f) Hostage rescue (HR) is used to rescue personnel who are specifically designated as hostages.

c. **Execution.** The DOD PR system is centered on five PR execution tasks and supporting activities that should be accomplished once an isolating event has occurred. The ability to complete these tasks does not reside within a single entity, but instead resides among command and staff elements (including components), forces, and isolated personnel. The Services and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are responsible to prepare and provide forces to the GCCs that are organized, trained, and equipped to perform PR tasks. The five PR execution tasks are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs. However, the joint procedures used to accomplish them are thoroughly discussed in Chapter VI, "Execution." See Service methods amplified in individual Service publications.

(1) The **report** task consists of actions required to provide notification that personnel are or may have become isolated. The report task begins with the recognition of an isolation event and ends when appropriate C2 authorities are informed. Anyone can report an isolation event based on actual sighting, a missed report time or waypoint, observation by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, etc. Various procedures are used to notify appropriate organizations to validate the isolation event and collect information. All reports pertaining to known or suspected isolated personnel are normally forwarded through component operational channels to the component personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) and to the joint personnel

recovery center (JPRC) as quickly as possible. If a JPRC is not activated or established, reporting should be IAW current theater requirements. Time is of the essence. Direct notification to the JPRC or PRCC that an isolating event has occurred is necessary to between the staff element responsible for personnel accounting and casualty affairs and the staff section responsible for PR. As discussed later, all reports should be passed as quickly as possible to the appropriate C2 authorities who then initiate validation and location procedures. When reporting, personnel should remain mindful that in a hostile environment, information on missing or downed aircraft or missing vehicles or vessels while search and recovery operations are being planned or under way is not publicly releasable, since its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives.

(2) The **locate** task involves the effort taken to find and confirm the identity of isolated personnel. It starts upon recognition of an isolation event and continues until the isolated person is recovered. Locating may be accomplished by various means, such as intelligence assets, aircrews, ground forces, etc. To reduce response time, recovery forces should be pre-positioned as close to the isolated personnel as possible to conduct search operations when threat conditions permit. Location and authentication should be continually maintained and crosschecked throughout the support and recover execution tasks.

(3) The **support** task involves providing support to both the isolated person and the isolated person's next of kin (NOK). The support to the isolated person begins upon reporting that an individual is isolated and ends when the person is recovered and reintegration begins. Support efforts include: establishing two-way communications, increasing the isolated person's SA, providing morale-building support, suppressing adversary threats, delivering subsistence and supplies, or providing directions to a cache. Once the isolated individual is located and authenticated, support efforts can intensify. Commanders should be creative in developing support activities using all capabilities that can be understood by isolated personnel who may not be equipped with communications, signaling, or navigational aids (e.g., predetermined signal lights as a reference point for orienting an isolated person). These activities should be embedded in deception and evasion plans. The support to NOK begins when the JFC, Service component commander, or functional component commander determines it is appropriate and may extend throughout the entire reintegration process. JFCs should be aware of Service responsibilities and DOD efforts to provide NOK support (e.g., casualty assistance, public affairs [PA], and family support networks). A portion of the support to NOK during isolation or captivity is designed to increase the likelihood that isolated personnel will not be inadvertently harmed by well-intentioned public comments made by NOK.

(4) The **recover** task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel. The objective is to bring isolated personnel under the physical custody of a friendly organization. Immediate PR missions may require significant planning prior to an isolating event to minimize risk for the recovery force and improve their ability to quickly recover isolated personnel. The recover task begins when planning is initiated for recovering isolated personnel and ends when the recovery element hands off the formerly isolated person to the reintegration

team. Once the recovery force has positive control of the isolated person, the recovery force will normally perform one last authentication. Isolated personnel have a significant responsibility in the recovery process. (See Chapter IV, “Preparation.”) Recognizing that each Service or USSOCOM may use different terminology to describe their recovery methods, this publication prescribes joint recovery as the standard term to be used for all joint PR missions (see Appendix G, “Capabilities”). Joint recovery operations are thoroughly addressed in Chapter VI, “Execution.” Since HR is a recovery method, commanders need to plan for their intelligence collection and PR capabilities to coordinate with and support those organizations involved in HR. The JFC’s PR C2 architecture will likely be the reporting vehicle for a hostage event and a valuable source of information regarding the isolated person.

(5) The **reintegrate** task begins when the report notification is received and there is a possibility the recovered person will enter the reintegration process. The reintegrate task employs systematic and controlled methods to process recovered isolated personnel from the time they are recovered until they are fully reintegrated with their Service, their family, and society (see Chapter VI, “Execution,” Section E, “Reintegrate”). The goal of the reintegrate task is to gather critical information from recovered personnel through a series of debriefings and conduct the processes inherent in their reintegration, while protecting their health and welfare. This allows them to recover physically and emotionally and return to duty as expeditiously as possible. All isolated personnel should be entered into the reintegration process immediately following recovery. The reintegrate task may be as simple as both an intelligence and an SERE debriefing with a medical evaluation, or as involved as the complete three-phase reintegration process that terminates in the US, depending on the recovered person’s situation (health, length and type of isolation, etc.). The execution of the reintegrate task requires the cooperative efforts of the GCC’s staff, the components, and the Services. Generally, the early responsibilities of reintegration belong to the GCC or are split between the GCC and the subordinate JFC, if there is a JFC assigned. The Services are responsible for later reintegration procedures. The conduct of, and procedures involved in, the reintegrate task are directed by theater standard operating procedures (SOPs), directives, and operation orders (OPORDs), all of which are governed by the guidance in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3002.03, *DOD Personnel Recovery - Reintegration of Recovered Personnel*. In some cases, DOD may be asked to assist in reintegration operations of non-DOD personnel. In these cases, this process will be known as post isolation support activity (PISA) and is covered in more detail in Chapter VI, “Execution,” paragraph 27, “Post Isolation Support Activities.”

d. **Adaptation**

(1) **General.** Adaptation is dependent on real-time observations of ongoing operations, plus the collection of PR information and data from after action reports (AARs), PR mission logs, debriefings, and oral interviews. This information enables a process that includes **continuous analysis** of everything that is going on in PR as it happens, the recognition of what is working correctly and what is not, and implementing change when and where needed. Some change can happen on the spot, other change might require rigorous vetting. Adaptation includes, but is not the same as, assessment.

Adaptation includes implementing (or discarding) proposed actions following an assessment.

(2) There are two other ways to adapt. The first is **anticipation** of future actions and preparation for those actions prior to their occurrence. Anticipation permits adaptation in prepared and planned ways. This planning can be thought of as **anticipatory adaptation**. Given the nature of PR in joint operations, anticipating every occurrence cannot be accomplished. Adaptation, therefore, requires a second part, sometimes called **improvisation**, which is simply taking actions that are not initially planned. Improvisation requires modification of plans in order to react to unforeseen actions. Adaptation, therefore, includes both anticipation and improvisation.

(a) **Improvements.** Adaptation assures continuous improvements to the PR system through lessons learned (LL), assessments, requirements determination, concept development, war games, and experimentation. Additionally, this process directs forces to adapt to new ideas and concepts in order to better accomplish the mission. Adaptation impacts the other PR functions while they are being accomplished; it is not restricted to post mission input. Adaptation improvements should be responsive and continuously applied.

(b) **Changes** can be driven by the adaptation of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy to fit a situation confronting a JFC, or a verified need from the field to fill a void. No single action can be applied to all situations, thus new ideas or approaches may be developed while recognizing the reality that new developments are unfolding that were not anticipated in PR planning.

(c) **Time Relevance.** Adaptation is most effective when it is applied as soon as possible, such as the development of a field expedient solution. Actions should be taken to ensure that adaptation (especially LL) does not wait until the completion of an isolating event or redeployment from a theater of war. Timely capture of institutional memory or some of the details of a particular PR event can be important to JFCs. The reintegration task includes a process to debrief the recovered person to collect intelligence and SERE information. Similarly, information should be collected from the C2 perspective to establish a complete accounting of the PR event. Collecting C2 information can be more difficult. Reintegration involves debriefing just one person (or a few people). A larger number of people and organizations are involved in the C2 side of a PR mission. Commanders should consider processes to facilitate the collection of timely C2 PR mission information and data such as:

1. AARs from key PR C2 nodes (JPRC, PRCC, recovery forces, supporting intelligence organizations, etc.).

2. Directing the collection of PR mission logs.

3. Recorded debriefs of key C2 node personnel involved in the PR mission.

4. Conducting AAR immediately following PR events.

(3) PR practitioners should be constantly aware of how to make PR better, safer, and more efficient. Not all implemented corrective actions will work in all situations, but recognizing a need when it occurs and passing along that observation, will improve overall PR performance. All information collected from the reintegration of the recovered person and the C2 personnel should be forwarded to Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) for dissemination/sharing, further assessment and analysis, and archiving.

CHAPTER II FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

“Personnel recovery is the task of bringing our warriors home. Every leader is responsible to plan and prepare their unit and personnel for isolating events and support of recovery activities. This includes the complete integration of vertical and horizontal systems and personnel.”

**Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace, United States Army G-3/5/7,
in a message dated 22 June 2005**

1. General

a. **SecDef** develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD policy and plans for recovering and accounting for isolated personnel. The **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)** is responsible for operational implementation of PR policy and development of joint doctrine for PR. The PR responsibilities of the CCDRs, the Services, and others are listed in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3002.01, *Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense*; DODI 3002.03, *DOD Personnel Recovery- Reintegration of Recovered Personnel*; DODI 3002.04, *DOD Personnel Recovery-Nonconventional Assisted Recovery (NAR)*; DODD 1300.7, *Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC)*; DODI 1300.21, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*; DODI 1300.23, *Isolated Personnel Training for Department of Defense Civilians and Contractors*; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01, *Personnel Recovery*.

b. GCCs should also establish a JPRC to coordinate joint PR operations in their AORs.

c. GCCs, in keeping with contractor FP and theater management requirements, should promulgate FP and theater entry requirements for adherence by contractors and contracting companies. The GCC may designate other selected contractor personnel to be eligible for DOD PR assistance IAW DODI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS)*.

2. Geographic Combatant Commanders

GCCs and staffs plan and execute PR throughout their AORs. (Specific staff considerations are included in Appendix F, “Sample Checklists,” Annex E, “Joint Force Staff Considerations for Personnel Recovery.”) The key capabilities to fulfill this responsibility are:

a. Plan for effective and comprehensive PR.

b. Establish command relationships and clearly articulate procedures required to employ forces from different components to execute PR jointly.

c. Establish a PR coordination architecture and ensure PR trained personnel are included and fill critical positions.

d. During the planning process, determine the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) based on staff recommendations, including PR-related recommendations. Determine intelligence architecture to support combatant command (CCMD) intelligence requirements and obtain necessary intelligence community (IC) support as needed.

e. Develop standards, in coordination with the components, Services, and USSOCOM, to determine SERE education, training, and equipment required for DOD personnel within a specified operational area.

f. Be prepared to include capabilities of coalition, allied partners, and interorganizational stakeholders in theater PR planning.

g. Support personnel accounting practices.

For further information, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

3. Services and United States Special Operations Command

The Military Departments normally establish a PR office of primary responsibility (OPR) within their Service organizations. Each Service Chief and Commander, USSOCOM organizes, trains, and equips forces for PR, and provides forces and processes, as required, to accomplish the five PR execution tasks, consistent with DOD guidance and OPLANs. (See Appendix F, "Sample Checklists," Annex G, "Typical Service and United States Special Operations Command Personnel Recovery Office of Primary Responsibility Functions and Responsibilities.") The Services:

a. Develop doctrine and Service-level policy for PR, to include concept development and new technologies, that helps Service members prepare for deployment with the confidence that they can survive, evade, resist, and escape, or will be recovered if the need arises.

b. Provide the appropriate SERE training, commensurate with CCMD guidance, and as directed in DODD 1300.7, *Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC)*, DODI 1300.21, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*, DODI 1300.23, *Isolated Personnel Training for DOD Civilian and Contractors*, and DODI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS)*.

c. Assist JPRA in developing training standards for personnel the CCDR determines to be at risk of isolation and exploitation.

d. Develop PR intelligence and C2 capabilities by organizing, training, and equipping personnel to execute the functions and responsibilities of a PRCC, JPRC, and unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell (UARCC) as listed in paragraphs 6,

“Joint Personnel Recovery Center,” and 7, “Component Commanders and Subordinate Organizations.”

e. Ensure policies and procedures are in place to identify and track personnel who have been trained or are experienced in recovery operations and ensure components have access to this data for coordination and sourcing.

f. Establish reintegration plans incorporating applicable national, DOD, CJCS, CCMD, and JPRA guidance, and exercise this capability in order to maintain required effectiveness.

4. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency

Serves as a CJCS’s controlled activity for PR, working through the Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development.

a. JPRA facilitates interoperable PR capabilities through the development of joint PR guidance and PR products.

b. JPRA is the official repository of historical and archival materials generated by isolating events. This supports operational assessment and adaptation of the PR mission.

c. JPRA provides operational support teams and exercise support to assist GCC planning, and deployed and deploying forces executing PR.

d. JPRA provides specialized joint PR training.

e. **Other support** is provided through the publishing of PR planning products and evasion aids, and by ensuring interoperability of technical capabilities.

5. Defense Forensics and Biometric Agency

The US Army is the DOD executive agent for biometrics. The Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency maintains the authoritative DOD biometric repository providing storage and matching functions to support PR.

6. Joint Personnel Recovery Center

A JPRC is the organization responsible for assisting the JFC in planning and coordinating PR operations within the assigned operational area. The JPRC is also the JFC’s primary coordination center for PR assistance to another nation or other appropriate civil entity, when such assistance is authorized by the President, SecDef, or by US-approved prior agreements. GCCs should maintain a JPRC or JPRC-like capability at all times to ensure PR is integrated throughout their staffs. The JPRC should be integrated into the JFC’s or designated supported commander’s appropriate operations center.

a. The JPRC, as well as the component's PRCCs and UARCC (if established) should be in place and functioning at all times.

b. Typical JPRC functions and responsibilities are to:

(1) Coordinate, plan, and monitor joint PR operations.

(2) Integrate PR into other plans and operations in the operational area.

(3) Review all component PR plans and orders for consistency with OPLANs and other JFC planning.

For further guidance on the joint operation planning process (JOPP), refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(4) Develop or continue to refine appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the basic OPLAN and recommend PR-related intelligence requirements, as submitted through the operations directorate, for inclusion in annex B (Intelligence). Be prepared to coordinate joint recovery missions based on this plan. Publish additional PR guidance, as required.

(5) Clearly identify the JPRC's authority, responsibilities, and support requirements to the JFC and staff, component commanders and their staffs, PRCCs, and all other agencies and multinational forces through operating instructions and an activation message.

(6) Establish PR reporting requirements for component PRCCs.

(7) Develop a PR infrastructure and coordinate to ensure establishment and dissemination of operation-specific IPG, theater risk-of-isolation preparation, and evasion aids. Determine and submit information needs and gaps to designated supporting intelligence organizations.

(8) Recommend and monitor appropriate PR-related training and theater-entry requirements.

(9) Develop requirements for country/theater specific PR materials. Recommend SERE TTP and appropriate clothing and equipment.

(10) Develop a backup/contingency system of signals for isolated personnel when radio use is not an option and incorporate alternatives in plans (e.g., OPLANs, OPORDs, and deception, evasion, and recovery plans).

(11) Develop reintegration plans, using existing theater directives, in coordination with command staff directorates, the PRCCs, and other supporting commands outside the AOR.

(12) Develop joint force PR communications plans; use existing plans if available. Coordinate with joint force and Service communications directorates to ensure the JPRC has sufficient and redundant secure communications, as required.

(a) Ensure component PRCCs identify PR satellite coverage requirements through their commands.

(b) Request and establish required satellite coverage.

(c) Ensure component PRCCs identify specific survival radio waveform frequencies and various forms of tracking devices used by recovery forces and isolated personnel to appropriate organizations.

(13) Integrate military information support operations (MISO) efforts to favorably influence the local population regarding PR efforts.

(14) Integrate PR into all information operations (IO) planning and execution.

(15) Coordinate with the special operations liaison element, the battlefield coordination detachment, naval and amphibious liaison element, Marine liaison officer (LNO), Air Force liaison element, and the multinational liaisons to access assets available to support the theater PR plan.

(16) Submit ROE requirements for PR (status of isolated personnel, recovery force use of nonlethal and deadly force, recovery force interaction with civilians, etc.) through the chain of command.

(17) Develop a standardized notification process (i.e., special instructions [SPINS], communication or signals instructions) to disseminate daily PR information (authentication, word of the day, challenge and pass, etc.) to all components.

(18) Coordinate and disseminate launch and execute criteria, responsibilities, and procedures. Criteria should include approval by all applicable foreign nations to transit their sovereign territories IAW international law and bilateral/multinational treaties, agreements, and arrangements.

(19) Coordinate with the joint force surgeon to obtain current locations of medical treatment facilities and pass that information to all PRCCs and recovery forces, if required.

(20) Develop and disseminate guidelines for completion and compilation of isolated personnel report (ISOPREP) and EPAs or their equivalents, and, when needed, obtain ISOPREP and EPA data for further dissemination to recovery forces.

(21) Recommend to the JFC the tasking of component commands to support PR missions requiring joint capabilities, or to support PR missions when another component needs assistance or cannot accomplish the mission, or when another component command has better capability to respond.

(22) Ensure the UARCC receives all pertinent information provided to component PRCCs so they can plan in parallel and are fully prepared to support or assume control of the mission, as necessary.

(23) Monitor and support all PR missions prosecuted by component PRCCs and the UARCC.

(24) Coordinate with all sources, to include the appropriate component, civil, and multinational forces operations centers, etc., to obtain assets in support of PR missions, as required.

(25) Coordinate with component PRCCs to maintain a current location and status of PR resources.

(26) Coordinate and deconflict mutual PR support operations by joint force components, multinational forces, other governmental departments and agencies, and interorganizational stakeholders.

(27) Recommend to the JFC or PR coordinator (as delegated) a component for the overall tactical control (TACON) of a joint PR mission on a mission-by-mission basis and ensure supported and supporting relationships are defined.

(28) Ensure requirements are submitted to request available data to be collected, maintained and disseminated to appropriate commands.

(29) Coordinate with appropriate intelligence organizations to gather information relating to the location and the threat that may affect their successful recovery.

(30) Coordinate with the intelligence directorate to identify trained intelligence de-briefers to assist in reintegration.

(31) Coordinate with joint force deception planners for tactical deception support.

(32) Coordinate the status of isolated personnel with appropriate command's staff directorates.

(33) Alert appropriate organizations of the known or probable location(s) of isolated personnel.

(34) Maintain current location(s) of isolated personnel.

(35) Monitor all recovery operations prosecuted within the JFC's operational area.

(36) Coordinate preparation for short-notice over flight clearance requests with US embassies for all affected countries IAW the *Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Manual* located at <https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/>.

(37) Coordinate PA releases with joint force and component public affairs offices (PAOs), US embassies, and other participating agencies, as required, through appropriate hierarchical levels. If the isolated person is a contractor, coordinate with the Service or USG department or agency responsible for the contract. The Service or USG department or agency is responsible for coordinating with the company and advising them on the situation and the company's support to the family.

(38) Keep affected component and DOD organizations informed on the status of ongoing PR missions.

(39) Provide information to assist the Services in completing Department of Defense Form (DD) 2812, *Commander's Preliminary Assessment and Recommendation Regarding Missing Persons*. DODI 2310.05, *Accounting for Missing Persons-Board of Inquiry*, authorizes a Military Department to establish a board of inquiry for determining an isolated person's status.

(40) Coordinate with PRCC and maintain a file on each isolated person until recovery is complete. Forward all completed recovery mission files and databases to JPRA for review and storage. The files are not destroyed, regardless of whether a recovery operation was executed successfully or not. Ensure important/long term information (social security number, home of record, etc.) of key personnel, especially nonmilitary, is included in the file in the event the case/file is reopened and the isolated person's status is reviewed at a later date.

(41) Ensure PR plans address and provide for the appropriate debrief and after action review of all recovered isolated personnel participants in the recovery effort, and commanders and staffs. Additionally, if NAR mechanisms are employed, adhere to specific debriefing requirements.

(42) Assist the JFC and the components in executing their reintegration plans.

(43) Ensure debriefs of recovered personnel are forwarded to the JPRA.

(44) Conduct and collect observations, AARs, and LL to post on the joint LL information system and Service LL databases.

(45) Coordinate with participating agencies and multinational partners to appropriately facilitate the debriefing and share information.

(46) Review recovery missions to determine if forces are establishing patterns that can be used by the adversary, and take advantage of those patterns, or eliminate/disrupt the pattern as appropriate.

(47) Develop and disseminate an emergency plan of action to describe actions to be taken if the JPRC goes down or if one of the subordinate PRCCs goes down due to communications failures or other tactical reasons.

(48) Develop instructions describing the proper procedures for handling (both physically handling and chain of custody handling/accountability), storing, and transferring physical evidence.

(49) Ensure appropriate focal point representatives are on hand for unconventional assisted recovery (UAR)/NAR and other debriefings.

(50) Designate all PR events in the theater with a distinct PR mission number for tracking purposes.

(51) Protect and properly mark all personally identifiable information IAW the Privacy Act of 1974 (Title 5, United States Code, Section 552a) and applicable regulations and policies.

c. JPRCs should coordinate with the joint security coordination center (JSCC) to obtain the current force protection status, and ensure recovery forces and PR planners have applicable force protection information.

d. JPRC Director and deputy director should receive appropriate special category read on to NAR programs in order to support and integrate NAR into the PR architecture.

7. Component Commanders and Subordinate Organizations

a. **General.** Joint force component commanders plan, conduct, and designate PR forces in support of their own operations and for isolating events occurring within their assigned operational area or as tasked by the JFC. Component planners should consider the availability and capabilities of forces of the other components, multinational forces, other USG departments and agencies, IGOs, and NGOs operating in the operational area, and establish habitual relationships. Additionally, component commanders may take the following actions to ensure they are capable of conducting PR in support of their own operations or in response to JFC tasking:

(1) Clearly define the circumstances, which may be specific to an operation or specific military skill specialties, when personnel are considered in a survival or evasion situation.

(2) Ensure subordinate units and key personnel, such as the PRCCs, personnel at risk of isolation, intelligence sections, and recovery forces, are familiar with PR TTP, directives, PR standardized notification processes (e.g., SPINS, communication or signals instructions, data bursts), theater SERE procedures, and any unique or specific PR TTP that may pertain to their operational area and/or component operations.

(3) Ensure that a capability is established to coordinate all pre-combat PR preparations and to respond to PR events should they occur. The most common and

effective means to achieve this capability is through the establishment of a PRCC with a trained staff and appropriate authorities to accomplish PR missions and objectives.

(4) Publish a component PR supporting plan to the base plan. Ensure this plan details the necessary intelligence required to support PR operations. [Appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations), paragraph 1.a., with additional information available in annex B (Intelligence).]

(5) Be prepared to establish a JPRC if directed or if designated as the joint force supported commander for PR. This will not negate the requirement to perform component PRCC functions. This will require that the education, training, and staffing requirements of component PR staffs be maintained to meet the mission requirements.

(6) Ensure subordinate commanders routinely address actions to be taken should personnel become isolated.

(7) Ensure designated units and personnel develop and maintain a current EPA and ISOPREP in personnel recovery mission software (PRMS) that is readily accessible on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), <https://prmsglobal.prms.af.smil.mil/prmsconv/>. For personnel that do not possess a SECRET security clearance or higher, the FOUO (for official use only) PRMS can be accessed at: <https://prmsglobal.prms.af.mil/prmsconv/profile/survey/survey.aspx> to enter ISOPREP data.

(8) Ensure subordinate units identify an individual(s) who will manage ISOPREPS (PRMS managers).

(9) Ensure subordinate units are familiar with component PRCC(s) and immediately transmit information on isolated personnel to the PRCC or C2 node that coordinates PR events.

(10) Ensure isolated personnel authentication procedures are coordinated with the JPRC and disseminated in subordinate PR plans.

(11) Provide functionally trained PR augmentees to the JPRC as directed by the JFC. These personnel also represent their component and assist in coordinating and deconflicting their component's PR capabilities at the joint level.

(12) Clearly articulate PR launch (or pre-position) and execute procedures in support of other component commanders to the JPRCs, PRCC(s), and subordinate commanders.

(13) Ensure that intelligence pertaining to PR information requirements is disseminated to the appropriate units. Component commanders are ultimately responsible for ensuring that intelligence is fully integrated into plans and operations.

(14) Provide mutual support to the recovery operations of the other components to the greatest extent possible. Such support normally is requested and coordinated

through the JPRC using established PR communications channels maintained and monitored in the PRCC.

(15) Support higher headquarters (HQ) and Service reintegration plans by crafting supporting plans and identifying reintegration team key personnel. Ensure those personnel attend training as directed by the JFC.

b. **PRCC.** Component commanders establish a PRCC (or functional equivalent) to coordinate all component PR activities, including coordination with the JPRC and other component PRCCs. The PRCC should be collocated in the operations center or, at a minimum, where it can obtain and maintain the best SA of the isolating events and the environment in which they are occurring, and exercise its authority to coordinate and control the execution of the five PR execution tasks. Additionally, the PRCC should be in close proximity to the organic intelligence division or team (i.e., joint intelligence support element [JISE]) to receive and disseminate timely intelligence. The PRCC chief is responsible to the component commander for the coordination of component forces in the performance of PR missions. To be most effective, the PRCC requires dedicated, equipped, and functionally trained personnel to effectively prepare, plan, exercise, and execute both the PR functions and missions of the component commander. Typical PRCC responsibilities and functions include the following:

(1) Develop the PR support plan as an appendix of the operations annex to the OPLANs. Ensure PR considerations (collection, joint force counterintelligence, and human intelligence [HUMINT] staff element support, imagery support, etc.) are adequately addressed in annex B of the OPLAN.

(2) Maintain cognizance of ISOPREPs, EPAs, IPG, and NAR options for the operational area. Monitor the development of ROE and legal status decisions as they affect isolated personnel and recovery forces.

(3) Establish points of contact (POCs) with PRMS unit managers, and filing locations for EPAs, ISOPREPs (until PRMS becomes available at the unit), survival radio identification (ID) numbers and codes, PR alerting or communications equipment, and blue force tracker device numbers within subordinate commands.

(4) Establish communications with the JPRC and other PRCCs and develop procedures to ensure the timely flow and protection of PR-related information. During preparation, establish standards for redundant communications, if possible, among the C2 and ISR nodes, as well as with isolated personnel.

(5) Establish PR reporting requirements for component units to include activation and deactivation notification to the adjacent PRCCs and the JPRC.

(6) Develop and promulgate component PR communications plans. These plans are coordinated with the component commands and the JPRC, and included in plans.

(7) Coordinate for short-notice aircraft diplomatic authorization through command channels and with JPRC.

(8) Coordinate with the JPRC for a standardized notification process (e.g., communication or signals instructions, data bursts, SPINS) to disseminate daily PR information (authentication, word of the day, etc.) to all subordinate units. Ensure ground force signals (e.g., daily challenge and password, near and far recognition signals) are included in the SPINS.

(9) Coordinate with the component staff legal officer for ROE issues, legal status, and other matters, as required.

(10) Coordinate with other component staff sections and elements, including multinational and interorganizational partners.

(11) Monitor all recovery operations prosecuted by component forces and remain ready to assist as requested by the JPRC.

(12) Notify the JPRC when isolated personnel are reported. Keep the JPRC informed on component intentions or actions.

(13) Forward pertinent data regarding isolated personnel, their status, and/or location to the JPRC, recovery force, and others, as required.

(14) Coordinate with the JPRC for PR support provided to, or received from, other components.

(15) Coordinate with the component medical treatment facilities. If no component facility exists, establish liaison with primary facility within the operational area, and develop procedures for receiving recovered isolated personnel and preparing for phase I reintegration, at a minimum.

(16) Coordinate with JPRC and maintain a file on each isolated person until recovery has been completed or confirmation of death has been verified. Pass files on completed recoveries and closed incidents to the JPRC for forwarding to JPRA for review and archiving.

(17) Exercise the PR system to ensure:

(a) Units can locate and transmit ISOPREPs and EPAs efficiently and that they are in a usable format for JPRCs, PRCCs, and recovery forces.

(b) PRCC personnel can execute their PR functions and the component commander's mission.

(18) Exercise the theater-level intelligence architecture, to include coordination with national-level intelligence to ensure timely dissemination of intelligence products supporting PR. See OPLAN annex B (Intelligence).

c. **UARCC.** The JFC normally designates the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) to plan, coordinate, and execute all NAR operations in support of the PR plan. The JFSOCC retains operational control (OPCON) of all UAR (NAR conducted by special operations forces) forces in the operational area. The JFSOCC normally exercises control through the operations officer, who designates a UARCC director and, when directed, establishes the UARCC. The UARCC is a compartmented SOF facility staffed by supervisory personnel and tactical planners who are representative of each NAR capability. In some cases, the commander, theater special operations command (TSOC) utilizes the special activities cell as a functional equivalent of the UARCC. The UARCC integrates, coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes all existing unconventional and NAR capabilities and activities in support of the JFC's PR requirements. The UARCC interfaces with the JFSOCC's operations center, the JPRC, and the other component PRCCs. Other organizations supporting theater NAR operations normally retain OPCON of their forces or capabilities. Once established, the UARCC:

(1) Coordinates and prepares NAR plans for the JFC. Coordinates planning with the JPRC.

(2) Provides time-critical information between NAR forces and other PR nodes.

(3) Advises the JFSOCC on the development and employment of NAR capabilities in support of the JFC's PR plan.

(4) Integrates NAR into the JFC's PR plan. The JPRC director should be fully aware of NAR capabilities. The UARCC will establish secure technical communication to the JPRC to coordinate and deconflict NAR capabilities with conventional capabilities.

(5) Acts as the conduit through which NAR execute criteria are passed.

(6) Deconflicts NAR operations internally with all NAR forces conducting a single recovery operation, and externally with other joint and component operations to aid mission execution and avoid disruption of ongoing operations and friendly fire.

(7) Synchronizes ground tactical plans between NAR forces, and synchronizes and deconflicts NAR operations and other recovery operations, military operations, and interagency activity.

(8) Advises the JFSOCC on the employment, development, and capabilities of NAR forces, to include operational support and limitations.

(9) Coordinates NAR TTP with the JPRC to ensure compatibility with theater specific instructions, and disseminates releasable data to the PR architecture (i.e., contact plans or signals).

(10) Coordinates with the JPRC concerning NAR debriefers to support the theater reintegration team.

(11) Coordinates with the component staff legal officer for ROE issues, legal status, and other matters, as required.

8. Intelligence Activities

a. **General.** Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to joint operations. The intelligence function supports this understanding by providing integrated, evaluated, analyzed, and interpreted information concerning foreign nations' hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. Intelligence tells the JFC what the enemy is doing, is capable of doing, and may do in the future. Intelligence architecture and priorities are determined by the CDR based on the mission and staff recommendations. The CDR will determine the CCIRs, which will in turn determine the PIRs, focusing intelligence support for the joint force. At the CCMD level, the primary intelligence entity is the joint intelligence operations center (JIOC). The JIOC is the focal point for intelligence production and provides the continuously updated joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) to the CCMD. The JISE is the focal point for the joint task force (JTF) and has reachback support from the JIOC. JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture to conduct analysis of adversary systems. These supporting capabilities include combat support agencies and national-level intelligence agencies.

For further information, refer to DODI 3115.10E, Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery; JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations; JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment; and JP 3-63, Detainee Operations.

b. It is important for the PR planner and for those conducting CCMD or JTF level PR coordination to understand their entry point into the intelligence architecture in order to submit requirements, both standing and ad hoc (see Figure II-1). It is also important for the PR planner to advocate for PR PIRs/CCIRs as the JIOC and JISE will operate based on priorities established by their commander, based on mission and guidance. Based on the PIRs, the JIOC and JISE develop data and produce documents that support the JIPOE process. To ensure PR requirements are understood and integrated into the greater JIPOE effort, the PR planner/coordinator is a representative in the JIPOE coordination cell (if one is established) to articulate PR equities in line with established priorities.

(1) **JIOC.** An interdependent, operational organization at the DOD, CCMD, or JTF (if established) level, that is integrated with national intelligence centers, and capable of assessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment.

(2) **JIPOE Coordination Cell.** The JFC may establish a JIPOE coordination cell to integrate and synchronize the JIPOE effort with various supporting organizations, related capabilities, and appropriate staff functions. The organizational relationship between the JIPOE coordination cell and the organizations that support the cell should be per JFC guidance.




Figure II-1. Personnel Recovery Intelligence Nodes

(3) **JISE.** A subordinate joint force element whose focus is on intelligence support for joint operations to provide the JFC, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation.

(4) IC Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing in Action (MIA) Analytic Cell.

Established within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) by statute and Director of Central Intelligence memorandum, the IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell provides national-level intelligence in support of activities relating to unaccounted-for US personnel. The command PR OPR, JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC can request analytic support from this organization through the JISE or the JIOC. IAW DODI 3115.10E, *Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery*, the cell will provide baseline PR and NAR related assessments in support of PR planning and operations.

(5) Organic Intelligence Support.

Units typically have organic personnel to perform routine intelligence tasks in support of operations at the tactical level. Unit commanders should ensure that assigned intelligence personnel are familiar with and establish/maintain communication channels with other intelligence organizations at higher echelons of command that function in support of PR operations.

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CHAPTER III COMMAND AND CONTROL

“Of course, we couldn’t start anything until CSAR [combat search and rescue] was in place, so let’s talk about getting the CSAR in place.”

**General Richard Myers to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 30 September 2001
Bush at War, Bob Woodward, Simon and Schuster, New York, NY, 2002**

1. Command Relationships and Organization

a. **General.** Delineating appropriate command relationships for PR facilitates the synchronization and integration of recovery operations. The specific command relationships for a particular joint force are tailored to the situation and evaluated against the mission, the environment, and the specific force structure (see PR mission analysis in Chapter V, “Planning”). Coordination of PR planning is vital to effective and successful PR mission execution. PR often requires coordination with staff elements at the JTF and subordinate levels (see Appendix F, “Sample Checklists,” Annex E, “Joint Force Staff Considerations for Personnel Recovery”). Command relationships and PR coordination authority should be clearly defined and delineated in appropriate JTF and component OPORDs and, as required, fragmentary orders.

b. Command Authority

(1) CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) over forces assigned by the President or SecDef. The GCCs delegate the necessary levels of authority to subordinate commanders so they can best plan and conduct operations within their assigned operational area.

(a) JFCs should coordinate PR through their operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) or through a component commander. If a component commander is designated to coordinate joint PR, the JPRC should be integrated into the designated component’s operations center. In the case where a component commander is designated to coordinate PR for the joint force, the component also retains a PRCC capability to conduct component PR missions.

(b) If the JFC’s assigned missions require establishing multiple subordinate joint force commands with separate missions and/or operational areas, multiple JPRCs within the operational area may be required. The commander has the option to establish multiple JPRCs (one for each subordinate joint force command), or consolidate PR coordination functions under one JPRC. The decision should be carefully evaluated with respect to PR joint requirements. Considerations include the following:

1. Ability of the joint force C2 infrastructure to support recovery operations if the JPRC is established at the joint force HQ.

2. Ability of the component's C2 architecture to adequately control and support component recovery operations if it is also designated as the JPRC. CCMD or subordinate JFC OPLANs should describe C2 relationships and authorities in their PR Appendices, normally in paragraph 5 (Command and Control).

3. Potential operations tempo of the component's PRCC, while also staffing a JPRC, and its ability to handle additional PR mission activity.

4. Availability and experience level of JPRC personnel, including the JPRC director(s).

5. Capability and/or availability of forces within each joint force.

6. Distances between the operational areas.

7. Relationship between (e.g., support, separate entities) and responsibilities of the JPRCs.

8. Command level(s) where each JPRC will reside and their responsibilities (i.e., joint force HQ, component command HQ).

9. If more than one JPRC is established, the overall authority for PR in theater should be identified.

(2) A component experiencing an isolating event within its operational area may be able to conduct the recovery mission without external support. However, if two or more components are involved, the JPRC coordinates the augmentation of forces and recommends PR mission-specific command relationships to the JFC or designated supported commander for PR. Respective component commanders normally retain OPCON of their forces. For the PR mission, the JFC, designated supported commander for PR, or component commander conducting the mission will normally have TACON of participating forces.

(3) **Coordinating Authority.** The GCC or subordinate JFC should delegate appropriate coordinating authority for planning and consultation between multiple commands, multinational, and other government organizations (see Figure III-1). For PR this normally is granted to the JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC and operation centers. This coordination assists the supported commander during a PR event.

c. **Composition and Organization.** The JPRC should consist of a director, deputy director (if required), watch supervisors, controllers, personnel recovery duty officers (PRDOs), SERE experts, dedicated intelligence support, and general communications support to provide 24-hour coverage. Representation from each participating component is key. All personnel assigned to the JPRC should have proper security clearances and be trained and integrated to perform specific JPRC functions while simultaneously bringing their particular Service skill sets to the JPRC staff. Joint staffing facilitates timely coordination of component PR requirements, provides quick access to information relative to specific component PR resources and operational concepts, fosters component




Figure III-1. Notional Personnel Recovery Coordination Architecture

interest and participation in the overall PR effort, and spreads additional personnel support requirements throughout the joint force. A notional JPRC organizational chart is provided in Figure III-2. Grades and numbers of personnel staffing the JPRC will vary based on the size of the joint force involved and availability of qualified individuals. Each JPRC requires a minimum number of controllers to be available or dedicated to the PR mission. Intelligence specialists should either be assigned to the JPRC director/watch supervisor or provided as dedicated support to provide recurring updates and respond to JPRC intelligence requirements. Typically, the JISE will provide 24-hour intelligence support for a JTF-level JPRC, and the CCMD JIOC will provide such support to a theater PR OPR during contingency planning, or a theater-level JPRC, if established.




Figure III-2. Notional Joint Personnel Recovery Center Organization

d. HN and Multinational Considerations for PR

(1) Before a situation in an HN develops requiring the intervention of US forces, or in the early phases of an operation or campaign, the GCC may not be in the lead. Unless the HN has explicitly authorized unilateral US PR activities within its boundaries, that nation retains control of PR matters within their own boundaries. There will be close coordination with the US embassy, including the regional security officer (RSO) or senior defense official (SDO)/defense attaché (DATT), if a DOD person becomes isolated, but the responsibility for recovery remains with the HN until it asks for US assistance. Established relationships between the CCMD and the US embassy staff

will be pivotal in keeping the military informed of the status of location and recovery efforts, as well as providing an avenue for US offers of assistance to the HN.

(2) In other instances, the formation of an alliance or coalition of forces led by the US or another nation will require an integrated PR architecture composed of representatives and capabilities from the nations involved. The structure of such an architecture may be established by standing international agreements (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) or during the negotiations for the composition and creation of a multinational force. Multinational efforts provide the opportunity to apply expanded and integrated PR capabilities. PR exercises, with individual nations or with a group of nations, invite future successes.

(3) Planning for multinational PR activities will be more complex than a US-only OPLAN. In addition to military capabilities to be considered, some nations have political considerations applied by their governments that restrict what capabilities they can bring to the fight or in which situations they are allowed to apply those capabilities. The melding of these national caveats will require careful consideration during PR plan development.

(4) If time does not permit appropriate diplomatic coordination, on-scene commanders (OSCs) may take whatever action is necessary in life-threatening situations.

For further information on multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

2. Coordination and Liaison

a. **General.** Coordination is a key element for successful prosecution of PR missions. Continuous coordination should be conducted both vertically and horizontally. Coordinating authority is delegated to the JPRC or a designated supported commander for PR. PR coordinating authority enables a commander or individual to require the consultation of other commanders for planning or other purposes, but it cannot be applied to compel agreement. Principal nodes where coordination takes place and information is shared are described as follows.

b. **By the JPRC.** The JPRC should be granted direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) with all agencies and organizations, as required. The JPRC coordinates PR-related matters for the JFC with all C2 nodes as well as joint, nongovernment, and multinational agencies.

c. **Between the JPRC and the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC).** The JAOC (when established) is the focal point to plan, direct, and execute joint air operations. Since recovery operations often rely on air assets to accomplish some of the PR execution tasks, coordination between the JPRC and JAOC is essential. The JPRC provides the information that goes into the PR section of the air tasking order (ATO) SPINS. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) should construct ATOs that include sufficient air assets to accomplish PR tasks. During execution, the JFACC is the command authority for revising the tasking of joint air operations, unless authority to

redirect and task is delegated to a subordinate C2 organization. Building and maintaining a comprehensive PR network with the following capabilities: understand and monitor current operations; plan, decide, and direct activities in order to prevent isolating events; proactively prepare for and effectively respond to an isolating event. A PR network facilitates a more rapid response by simultaneously collaborating with other command centers based on their ability to contribute to the unified response without respect to the Service affiliation of the isolated person or responding force.

d. Deconfliction of PR missions from other air missions is accomplished through the ATO. If the JPRC is not collocated and integrated into the JAOC, it is essential the JPRC director establish a liaison element within the JAOC to facilitate tasking of dedicated PR assets in the ATO, coordinate tasking or redirection of air assets to support PR mission execution, monitor ATO and PR mission execution, coordinate changes to PR information in the ATO SPINS, assess the effectiveness of PR operations, and recommend changes to JFC/JFACC guidance for PR.

For further information on ATO development and C2 of joint air operations, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.

e. **Between the JPRC and Component PR Coordination Cells.** The JPRC coordinates and tasks PR support requirements when those PR missions involve forces from more than one component, forces from another nation, forces from one component that need the support of another component to conduct PR missions, or nonmilitary agencies, other than NAR missions. When the JPRC receives a request for PR support, it initiates action to locate the isolated person(s), makes recommendations, and coordinates the tasking of forces. This coordination is essential to prevent duplication of PR efforts, facilitate efficient exchange of PR information, and provide the most efficient use of PR resources. Coordination is particularly important when a PR incident occurs near the boundary between two components' operational areas. **When a component independently initiates a PR mission, it is required to notify the JPRC through its PRCC to help ensure rapid and effective coordination and deconfliction.** Thereafter, the JPRC will monitor the mission and be prepared to support, as required.

f. **Between the JPRC and UARCC.** The UARCC normally conducts parallel planning during all PR incidents. The UARCC articulates its capability and the feasibility of providing support to the JPRC and will coordinate with and keep the JPRC informed of ongoing NAR operations to prevent friendly fire. The JPRC may recommend the UARCC plan for the mission if it deems that NAR is the best option to prosecute the recovery. If the UARCC needs external support to complete a recovery mission, it coordinates requests for PR support with the JPRC.

g. **Between the JPRC and the JSCC.** The JPRC will coordinate with the JSCC for notification and reporting procedures in case of an isolating event.

h. **Between the JPRC and External Agencies.** The JPRC coordinates joint force PR operations with other USG departments and agencies, other governments, and NGOs. This coordination is accomplished through the external agency's designated

representative (i.e., PR POC or PR LNO). The coordination enhances habitual relationships to facilitate PR support to other agencies, which either have limited or no PR capability, or from other agencies that want to participate in theater recovery operations. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an organization normally established at each geographic CCMD to provide a venue for interagency cooperation. The JIACG can be an excellent conduit for the JPRC to coordinate the activities of other USG departments and agencies and NGOs within each AOR. With increased awareness, all PR members are able to understand and monitor what other members recognize and report. The JIACG helps determine if the other government departments and agencies have duress or emergency codes that should be included in the SPINS or other signaling instructions, and that PR staffs and recovery forces should be aware of.

i. **Between Component PR Coordination Cells and Their Respective Forces.** Each PRCC will coordinate recovery operations with the assigned and attached forces within its designated operational area, consistent with the component commander's guidance. This coordination is essential to facilitate timely tasking and accurate reporting of PR events.

j. Effective use of **established liaison channels** is critical to successful PR coordination. LNOs and/or their elements can foster valuable information exchange regarding other component operations, deconfliction of those operations, and force capabilities. However, these channels should not supersede operational coordination between the component PRCCs and JPRC.

3. Communications

a. **General.** Electronic communications play a major role in PR missions. Joint and component communications planning should include potential PR requirements, to include requirements for component communications interoperability including air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, or subsurface. PR communications should be rapid, reliable, secure, redundant, and flexible. A combination of secure/nonsecure commercial and (DSN) landline, satellite communications (SATCOM) radios and phones, ultrahigh frequency/very high frequency/high frequency radios, collaborative tools and systems, and computer/network "chat" capabilities should be built into communications plans. These communications nodes should be dedicated and integrated systems in the JPRC, PRCCs, UARCC, and other pertinent organizations and functions that should interact in real time to prosecute PR missions.

b. **Communications Plan.** An effective PR communications plan should:

(1) Provide for the use of communications systems to support C2 of forces, carry out operations security (OPSEC) measures, and execute military deception (MILDEC) actions.

(2) Provide for secure transmission and cryptographic security to deny the adversary OPSEC indicators, isolated personnel locations, and classified information.

(3) Provide for low probability of detection, interception, and jamming.

(4) Provide redundancy (where practical) while ensuring proper authentication and physical defense of communications systems.

(5) Provide for avoidance of mutual interference and jamming by friendly communications.

(6) Exploit the capabilities of advanced survival radios and other electronic signaling/communication devices (such as blue force tracker, combat ID technology, and personal locator beacons [PLBs]) to provide support to isolated personnel. PLB use has been shown to energize the PR system within five minutes after activation. This alert provides the recovery staffs and forces early warning of a potential isolating event and also provides information to confirm the isolating event and refine the search. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that this is an alerting device. Its initiation does not ensure it is a friendly force using it, or that a friendly force is actually in an isolating situation. Verifying the event with subordinate HQ should be initiated. Authenticating the identity of the isolated person is still required.

(7) Include the use of local or HN communications. While not the most effective and secure mode of communication, the varied circumstances in which a PR event could arise may make HN capabilities a viable or only option.

(8) Have capabilities with multi-intelligence sensors such as near real-time audio linkage/video feeds to provide a link between line of sight (LOS) and beyond LOS participants. Often this can be provided by using an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) or other persistent surveillance capabilities.

(9) Provide a method to exchange information among the United States and multinational commands. Both the tactical data link (TDL) and a situation awareness data link (SADL) can provide this capability. The NATO designation, Link-16, is synonymous with TDL-J. SADL is a data link capability that provides the means of obtaining mission-critical information regarding the isolated personnel, mission, and threat as quickly as possible over a highly secure, jam-resistant means.

(10) Provide a capability to receive critical PR intelligence through the Common Interactive Broadcast (CIB). The CIB delivers threat warnings and other critical information to forces operating within a GCC's AOR and to the operating forces of CIB collaborating nations.

(11) Provide a capability to detect and locate the signals of distress beacons. This can be provided by search and rescue satellite-aided tracking (SARSAT), which is designed for civil use but is highly susceptible to adversary detection. The capability of the threat should be weighed against the advantages of using the system.

(12) Provide capabilities to report, locate, authenticate, and facilitate a recovery of the isolated person. This includes some means of voice or data transmission and reception to include over the horizon (OTH), with secure or low probability of adversary

intercept, beacon capable, multiple frequency settings, and ability to obtain and transmit Global Positioning System (GPS) location.

(13) Establish a capability for isolated personnel to be located and recovered in the absence of technical communications. This includes isolated personnel articulating contact and signaling procedures in their EPA. Ensure ground force signals (daily challenge and password, near and far recognition signals) are included in the SPINS. However, if nontechnical communications (signals) differ between the EPA and SPINS, recovery forces must realize that the signals depicted in the isolated personnel's EPA will take precedence over SPINS.

(14) Include collaborative systems to rapidly disseminate and coordinate PR operations. These systems include voice and chat functions that allow PR planners to conduct mission planning and coordination.

c. **Voice Communications and Circuits.** The number of voice circuits established to prosecute a PR mission should be kept to a minimum, but backup circuits should be preplanned and available as necessary. Secure voice circuits should be used whenever possible. Use of communications equipment with a low probability of detection or intercept mode should be considered to decrease the risk to the isolated person and the recovery force.

(1) **Radio Use.** Because of the distances typically involved and the requirement for speed and flexibility, radio communications are the best (and most common) means of sending and receiving information and instructions during recovery operations. However, this form of communications is also the most susceptible to adversary exploitation. The possibility of adversary monitoring requires that secure radio communications equipment be provided to the JPRC, component PRCCs, participating PR units, and potential isolated personnel. Communications means resulting in low probability of detection and intercept should be used to the maximum extent possible. The requirement for JPRC and component PR coordinators to maintain an active two-way dialogue during every phase of a PR mission also dictates the need for dedicated or planned backup radios for the JPRC and component coordination centers.

(2) **Landline Use.** Landlines secured by secure voice devices (e.g., secure telephone unit-III, secure terminal equipment, and secure wire line terminals) should be available in all PR coordination organizations and related operations centers. Secure devices provide end-to-end encryption, allowing secure voice and data to be exchanged over nonsecure commercial and DSN circuits.

(3) **Frequency Management/Deconfliction.** A well-planned communications matrix is essential to any PR mission. Detailed communications plans are a prominent part of the overall PR plan. It is extremely important that dedicated PR frequencies be developed for use by only isolated persons and the recovery units. Uncoordinated use of PR frequencies can result in poor communications because the weak signal strength of the isolated person's radio is easily overpowered.

d. **Compromised Assets.** Communications personnel should be notified immediately of all compromised communications equipment or cryptographic keying material. When planning PR operations it is important to know which systems and information have been compromised so as to not place the recovery force in jeopardy (e.g., an ambush).

e. **Data Communications.** The capability to complete, store, and transmit ISOPREPs and EPAs is possible using digital technology, although planners and executors should be aware that other government departments and agencies and NGOs may not have access to specific DOD classified systems. Additionally, current survival radios are data capable. The SIPRNET has been widely used as the primary means of communications via collaborative tools. Computer software that tracks personnel information, ISOPREPs, EPAs, and other authenticating information, and provides text messaging and transmission can be an effective tool for successfully completing the PR mission. PRMS is the ISOPREP/EPA database that units populate from any SIPRNET terminal with access to the web and provides a joint standard for ISOPREP and EPA data elements, export format, and order format. (Procedures are available for ISOPREP and EPA preparation. For additional information on classification of ISOPREPs and access by those who do not have security clearances, see the *Personnel Recovery Security Classification Guide*.) Electronic transmission provides a significant tool to rapidly disseminate PRMS ISOPREP and EPA data. However, OPSEC should be assured. PRMS ISOPREP and EPA data can be exported to portable document format for SIPRNET e-mail forwarding and printing, as necessary. See Appendix C, "Evasion."

f. **Record Message.** Record message is used to back up verbal communications that cross Service or functional component lines, or are forwarded to joint commands and activities. Record message is a formal means of tasking, providing direction, or guidance. Planners and operators should remain aware that many government agencies, including US embassies and NGOs, may not have access to record messages and may therefore require PR messages to be transmitted via another means. A brief summary of some of the minimal information included in each of the message formats transmitted over the Defense Messaging System follows. Actual formats can be found on the US Message Text Format home page.

(1) **Search and Rescue Incident Report (SARIR).** SARIR is used to report a situation that may require a PR mission. Normally, the parent unit of the isolated person reports the incident. However, anyone observing a potential PR incident should initiate a voice report to be followed by a backup record message. Within component chains of command, unformatted or other designated message formats may be used up to the component PRCC. The SARIR should contain as much of the following information as possible, with missing data sent in subsequent search and rescue situation summary reports (SARSITs) as it is discovered.

- (a) Sea, air, or ground event leading to the PR incident.
- (b) Adversary activity, terrain, and weather in the PR incident locale.

- (c) Number of isolated personnel and their status.
- (d) Location of isolated personnel and objective area.
- (e) Unit and component PR resources available.
- (f) Designated areas that may affect the PR mission.
- (g) Communications capability of isolated personnel.
- (h) Date-time group of incident and last sighting and/or contact with isolated personnel.
- (i) Any other evidence that isolated personnel are still alive and evading capture.
- (j) Identification and location of known media outlets (friendly or non-friendly) that could compromise recovery operations.

(2) **SARSIT.** SARSIT coordinates, summarizes, or terminates joint recovery operations. The SARSIT should be transmitted at least once daily from the component PRCCs to the JPRC and forwarded as appropriate to the joint force operations officer. The SARSIT should contain the following:

(a) PR mission number (standardized assignment of mission numbers by utilizing PR, theater command abbreviation, calendar year, and sequential numbering, example: PR-EU-14-036). *See coordinated JPRA message 261738Z Nov 2012, SUBJ: PR Event Numbering Convention (U).*

- (b) Status (e.g., in progress, completed, on hold).
- (c) Call sign of disabled vehicle, aircraft, ship, etc.
- (d) Type of disabled craft.
- (e) Location of the isolating incident.
- (f) Number of personnel involved.
- (g) Status of personnel involved (e.g., recovered, located, missing).
- (h) Narrative—short explanation to enhance information.

(3) **Search and Rescue Request (SARREQ).** SARREQ is used to request forces to participate in a PR mission. This message normally is sent from the JPRC to component PRCCs and any designated functional commanders to record arrangements made to employ resources from two or more components to prosecute a PR mission. The SARREQ should contain the following minimum information:

- (a) Lost (or suspected lost) ships, aircraft, ground units, or individuals.
- (b) Capabilities required from the various components to support a specific PR mission.
- (c) Coordinating instructions for resources supporting a specific PR mission.
- (d) Adversary activity that may affect a specific PR mission.

(4) **Search Action Plan.** A search action plan delineates the C2, communications, search area, and search methods to be used to locate the isolated personnel. This message normally is sent from the requesting or executing unit to the JPRC.

(5) **Other message formats** may be used in conjunction with planning, supporting, and prosecuting PR missions.

For further information on the format of PR-specific messages, refer to Military Standard 6040, US Message Text Formatting Program.

CHAPTER IV PREPARATION

“We must train for certainty and educate for uncertainty.”

Anonymous, US Army Command and General Staff College

1. Introduction

Proper preparation enables commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to gain SA in order to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. Preparation is a combination of command guidance, education and training, and products and equipment.

2. Command and Policy Guidance

a. In addition to overarching guidance provided by SecDef and the CJCS, Services and CCDRs should provide command-specific implementation guidance. Additionally, JFCs should provide definitive PR guidance as it relates to the assigned missions for their operational areas. Necessary and sufficient guidance can be an instrumental facilitator in the joint force accomplishing the PR execution tasks.

b. Appropriately staffed and trained personnel at the JPRCs and PRCCs allow for continuity, reduce PR response times, and facilitate integration within the joint force. JPRC and PRCC staffing requirements vary based upon operational and mission variables including mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support-available-time available factors, and any relevant civilian considerations. While formalized education and training in PR execution and PR planning are highly recommended for all JPRC/PRCC staff personnel, the JFC establishes PR requirements. GCCs and theater PR OPRs specify theater-wide JPRC manning and training requirements in the theater PR regulation. JTF commanders and PR planners should identify JPRC and PRCC manning and training requirements during JOPP. Requirements formulated during the planning process are documented in appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the CONPLAN, OPLAN, or OPORD and should be reflected in appropriate manning documents (e.g., joint manning documents). Service component PRCC staffing and education and training requirements are documented at the Service level. Along with identified JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC manning and training requirements, senior leaders and key elements of the staff that interact with the JPRC and/or PRCC should have received PR training to better facilitate staff planning, integration, and execution of PR.

3. Personnel Recovery Education and Training

PR joint education and training efforts focus on three groups—commanders and staffs, forces, and individuals at risk of isolation. Education and training programs for commanders and staffs focus on the following learning levels: fundamentals, PR specialties, and PR program management. Formal education and exercises should stress commanders and staffs’ responsibilities to account for personnel, report missing personnel and recover them, plus command procedures for meeting these responsibilities.

Recovery force training is a Service and component responsibility. Various levels of SERE training are available to personnel when the requirements are defined and validated.

a. **Service and USSOCOM Education.** Services and USSOCOM provide Service-specific education and training for their personnel. Services adhere to the joint and interoperable standards, developed by JPRA. Information on available Service education and other training is available from the Services and USSOCOM.

b. **Joint Education.** JPRA develops and conducts joint and specialized PR education and training programs and assists other DOD PR training and education programs. JPRA develops joint standards for DOD training. Courses are available in-residence at designated JPRA training facilities, online through Joint Knowledge Online, and via mobile training teams.

c. **Training Exercises**

(1) Joint exercise planners should incorporate PR scenarios to exercise commanders and staffs, forces, and PR capabilities, and ensure the safe recovery of potential isolated personnel. CCMD PR OPRs, JPRA representatives, and if established, JPRCs, component JPRCs, PRCCs, and UARCCs can assist exercise planners in designing the specific scenario.

(2) The JFC's PR OPR should organize and conduct PR mission training exercises (preferably integrated into broader, established joint exercises) for the joint force, to include multinational forces and other agencies. These PR mission training exercises should involve air and ground component training in addition to any SERE requirements.

d. **Predeployment and Employment Training.** It is essential that commanders prepare their forces to meet the PR requirements of their specific operating environment. CCDRs set theater entrance requirements for SERE training (pipeline and theater-specific) for those at risk of isolation, but unit commanders should develop a predeployment program that identifies individuals for specific PR education and training (e.g., SERE training, PRCC formal training) to ensure training is accomplished prior to any possible deployments. Once deployed to their operational area, onsite training should address evolving PR conditions such as ethnic or sectarian groups that may assist or threaten an evader, meteorological conditions that will change their evasion plan and required equipment, changes in various security conditions, etc. The nature of an operational environment will help determine the scope of required training. Commanders prioritize attendance at JPRA formal PR training and should track trained PR personnel using a skill identifier to build and sustain PR expertise.

e. **JPRC Qualifications and Responsibilities**

(1) **JPRC Director and Deputy Director.** The JPRC director and deputy director advise and inform the supported commander for PR and/or the JFC on PR matters and manage all activities of the JPRC. The JPRC director is normally a senior

field grade officer and should be knowledgeable of PR procedures, theater component recovery procedures, and specific PR TTP within the operational environment. Due to the various specific intelligence products that the JPRC director will need access to, as well as the nature of UARCC and NAR activities, the JPRC director may require a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information security clearance. Additionally, the JPRC director should be experienced in recovery operations and have completed an approved PR education/training regimen that prepares the individual to perform the assigned duties. The deputy director will ideally have similar qualifications as the director and should normally be from a different Service than the JPRC director, to provide a breadth of knowledge at JPRC supervisory levels.

(2) **Watch Supervisor.** The watch supervisor monitors and coordinates active missions. Watch supervisors should be PR experienced and graduates of an approved PR controllers course.

(3) **JPRC Senior Intelligence Officer.** The JPRC senior intelligence officer advises the JPRC director and deputy director on matters regarding intelligence support to PR. In addition to their knowledge of the intelligence architecture and command structure, the senior intelligence officer needs to understand the JPRC's intelligence requirements and time constraints that may apply. Responsibilities also include support to the PR planning process, acting as liaison and JPRC representative to other intelligence entities, and monitoring the operational environment for evolving trends among the population, security forces, and adversaries. The senior intelligence officer ensures that required, recurring, and ad hoc requirements are submitted and tracked in support of the JPRC and the JFC.

(4) **Coordinators.** Coordinators monitor the report, locate, support, and recover tasks of an isolating event, and support, coordinate, and respond to the requirements of the recovery force and the isolated individual(s). Coordinators should be PR experienced and graduates of an approved PR coordinators course.

(5) **PRDO.** PRDOs function as liaisons between the JPRC and the JFC's joint operations center (JOC) and/or the JFC's designated supported commander for PR to ensure effective and efficient coordination of PR plans and mission tasking. The PRDO should be an officer with PR experience and preferably a graduate of an approved PR course.

(6) **Intelligence Personnel.** Intelligence personnel may be assigned within the JPRC or designated within the supporting JIOC or JISE. Generally, intelligence personnel should be all-source analysts with the ability to coordinate the requirements of the JPRC with the supporting JIOC or JISE. Strategic intelligence debriefers, usually located in the CCMD or JTF joint force counterintelligence and HUMINT staff element, should be tasked with reintegration phase II activities IAW DODD S-5200.37, *Management and Execution of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (U)*.

f. **SERE Expert.** The SERE expert should be an individual, normally a noncommissioned officer or equivalent, experienced in PR subject matter who has

completed appropriate training and education and possesses the appropriate security clearance. SERE experts should support theater SERE planning, coordinate theater SERE support, and conduct theater SERE training, as necessary. The SERE expert should be trained in joint/component PR doctrine and TTP. They should be familiar with the reintegration process for recovered isolated personnel, as well as DOD and theater reintegration plans, and be a trained reintegration debriefer.

g. **PRCC.** PRCCs may vary from component to component in size, composition, and location. They are typically located within the operations directorate where coordination of active PR missions is possible. The PRCC should be integrated into the organizational structure of a component in a manner where PRCC personnel gain immediate access to the component's designated command/tasking authorities in order to expedite responses to component PR missions or requests for support to PR joint missions. Additionally, PRCC personnel should have visibility of, and input to, component plans to ensure PR requirements and capabilities are properly addressed. The PRCC ideally consists of a PRCC chief and enough trained personnel to coordinate PR missions on a 24-hour basis, when required. The PRCC staff members should be trained and experienced in joint and component PR doctrine and TTP, and preferably be graduates of appropriate PR courses.

h. **UARCC.** The UARCC staff should be composed of a director, shift supervisor, a controller, and representatives of tactical organizations possessing NAR capabilities. Their mission is to coordinate, synchronize, deconflict, and manage NAR operations within the JFC's operational area. UARCC personnel should possess an appropriate security clearance and be intimately familiar with joint NAR TTP, all represented NAR capabilities, and the comprehensive NAR ground tactical plan. The UARCC director, shift supervisor, controller, and tactical planners should be graduates of a NAR plans and operations course.

i. **PR OPRs.** Service and combatant command PR OPRs should receive appropriate PR education and training commensurate with their responsibilities. Ideally, the combatant command PR OPR would have tactical PR expertise and have served at least one tour as a JPRC/PRCC director.

j. **Other Staff Elements.** Staff elements throughout the joint and component staff have PR responsibilities and should be adequately prepared prior to deployment. Commanders should pay special attention to certain special staff and directorates' responsibilities (PAO, legal, chaplain, operations, personnel, intelligence, etc.) with regard to PR. The application of this education and training can be found in the specific list of responsibilities in Chapter II, "Functions and Responsibilities," and the list of staff planning considerations in Appendix F, "Sample Checklists."

k. **Forces.** Force preparation is a Service/component responsibility. Forces should be cognizant of their inherent capabilities to perform PR tasks. All force PR education and training efforts should include joint considerations and build interoperability, while maximizing component PR capability. In many cases, processes can be adjusted to increase capability without incurring increased resource requirements or equipment

shortages. Forces operating in a joint or multinational environment need a fundamental understanding of theater recovery operations.

1. **Isolated Personnel.** The amount of time that recovery forces may be exposed and at risk in a hostile operational environment is often directly dependent on the degree to which the evader has been prepared to assist in their own recovery. An isolated person that is trained, capable of adapting to the situation, and can assist in their recovery increases the probability of mission success. SERE training provides personnel the skills to survive and evade and adapt to the various isolation situations and methods of recovery. Thorough preparation includes a current ISOPREP and a detailed, accurate EPA.

For further detailed information on specific survival TTP, refer to Appendix C, "Evasion," Army Field Manual (FM) 3-50.3, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-50.3, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) (Instruction) 3-2.26, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, and appropriate Service publications such as Army FM 3-05.70, Survival.

(1) **SERE Education and Training**

(a) **Formal SERE Curriculum.** The GCCs in coordination with the Service components establish levels of risk of isolation associated with location, mission, or other criteria. The Services and USSOCOM identify personnel to receive the appropriate levels of SERE training commensurate with the GCCs' identified level of risk. The Services and USSOCOM develop SERE training standards for the SERE training. The levels are:

1. **Level A training** provides DOD personnel the minimum level of SERE knowledge and training necessary to meet baseline worldwide theater entry requirements common to all combatant commands. Level A education and training imparts an understanding of the Code of Conduct (CoC), its application and implications, and a basic understanding of the DOD PR system and its capabilities. Following completion of Level A training, DOD personnel possess knowledge regarding preparation for isolation, basic signaling and recovery procedures, and the ability to gain and maintain a level of SA that allows behavioral adaptation during isolation. This training is available through computerized and web-based applications or Service-generated, JPRA-approved substitutions.

2. **Level B training** is provided to DOD personnel who are determined to be at an increased risk of isolation or have a greater exploitation value, thus requiring SERE education and training that exceeds Level A, but is less than Level C standards. Services determine the requisite breadth and depth of Level B education and training based on CCDR and Service requirements.

3. **Level C training** is provided to DOD personnel who are determined to be at the highest risk of isolation or exploitation. Services develop their Level C programs based on Service and CCDR requirements. Level C education and training

focuses on an extensive understanding and application of the CoC and SERE skill sets in a dynamic environment representative of the threats posed across the spectrum of potential isolation situations.

For further information regarding current SERE training for military personnel and civilian and contractor employees, refer to DODD 1300.7, Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC), and DODI 1300.23, Isolated Personnel Training for Department of Defense Civilian and Contractors.

(b) **In-Unit Training.** DOD policy and Service regulatory guidance prohibit operation of resistance training laboratories and practical resistance and escape hands-on training or exercises without approval of the JPRA director.

(c) **Training Exercises**

1. All personnel at high risk of isolation (HRI) should participate in evasion field exercises whenever possible. This training should include communications techniques and procedures, signaling devices, and other actions that enhance successful recovery.

2. DOD policy and Service regulatory guidance prohibit operation of captive role-play activities without Service approval and prior written notification to JPRA.

(2) **Individual Preparation Responsibilities.** Personnel at risk of isolation should:

(a) Obtain required formal SERE training prior to deployment.

(b) Undergo GCC/subordinate JFC-directed theater-specific SERE training.

(c) Acquire a comprehensive knowledge of their issued communication devices and a working knowledge of survival equipment and techniques, and evasion techniques and aids (e.g., PLBs, EVCs, blood chits, pointee-talkies).

(d) Understand the impact of the isolation environment (e.g., adversary threat, terrain, and weather considerations) on survival and evasion. Review appropriate IPGs.

(e) Become familiar with and know how to access regularly updated PR guidance/publications such as PR SOPs, SPINS, IPGs, and SERE updates. Develop a thorough understanding of PR authentication and reporting requirements.

(f) Know what information the recovery forces likely will need, and be mentally and physically prepared to survive and evade (perhaps over an extended period) until recovered or upon reaching friendly forces.

(g) Understand their status and ROE as an isolated person.

(h) Understand that preparation for an isolating event demands personal responsibility and commitment.

(i) Maintain and be knowledgeable of their ISOPREP.

4. Products and Equipment

The capability to survive, evade, and help facilitate the other PR execution tasks is enhanced by preparing personnel with adequate PR equipment and products. For instance, personnel at risk of isolation should carry evasion aids. Evaders may be quickly separated from their equipment or may not have time to sort through it to select the most useful evasion items. Because space considerations and clothing configurations may limit the number of evasion aids that can be carried, consider selecting items of information and/or equipment that serve more than one purpose. Suggested equipment items include EVCs, blood chits, pointee-talkies, or other means of communicating with the local populace; general reference materials on medical, survival, or cultural information; collapsible water containers; water purification products; large leaf bags for shade, wind, moisture protection, floatation, or water storage; camouflage or environmental protection items; and miscellaneous items such as a small compass, survival knife, hand-held GPS device, or signaling devices like a small mirror, flashlight, glint tape, or brightly colored piece of cloth. Personnel at risk of isolation should also be familiar with and follow the combatant command's minimum evasion requirements. Several PR products are designed to enhance their ability to survive and evade.

a. **Equipment Preparation.** During pre-mission planning, carefully consider the operational environment and select the right equipment for survival in the event of isolation. Appropriate equipment should be carried as weight, space, and mission permit. Personnel should plan and equip themselves to survive or evade for an indefinite period of time, but at the very least for a minimum of five days. Having a properly equipped individual "grab and go" or evasion kit is necessary if faced with a situation requiring immediate action. Always layer survival equipment and keep the most important items on the body. Carry less important items in a pack. During pre-mission planning, decide what survival items to keep, what to conceal, and what to discard in the event of isolation. Preplanning will prevent carrying unneeded items or excess equipment and allow personnel to retain only the items necessary for survival.

(1) Before deploying, personnel should review the operating instructions of all communications, navigation, signaling, and survival equipment. Familiarity with equipment is necessary for operating equipment in low light or total darkness.

(2) Radios and GPS devices should be loaded with information such as maps, frequencies, and waypoints based on local guidance and a risk of compromise analysis. Pre-loading cell phones with emergency contact information, such as the appropriate operations center, JPRC, PRCC, and the appropriate US embassy, may be beneficial. Test equipment prior to deploying and bring at least one change of batteries for each piece of powered equipment.

b. **Evasion kits** provide isolated personnel with essential equipment, tools, and other items necessary for successful survival, evasion, and recovery. They should be tailored to a specific operational environment and supplement/augment standard survival vests/kits designed to support a much wider range of operating conditions.

- (1) Evasion kit composition considerations are as follows:
 - (a) Tailored to specific units, missions, and PR plan, when possible.
 - (b) Fits the operational area and specific environmental conditions.
 - (c) Based on individual employment and space available.
 - (d) Supplements issued survival and signaling equipment.
 - (e) Emphasizes survival, signaling, and surface navigation.

(2) **EVCs** are managed by JPRA and jointly developed and produced with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in response to CDR requirements, per CJCSI 3270.01, *Personnel Recovery*. The EVC is designed to assist evaders in avoiding capture and surviving in hostile territory and to provide them with a means of locating and securely transmitting their position or navigating as necessary to follow their EPA. EVCs are a series of charts that cover geographic areas specifically identified by combatant commands. The EVC is produced on very strong material, which is waterproof and resistant to tearing. Tailored to cover the individual area concerned, it is a unique, multipurpose product that combines standard navigation charts with evasion and survival information located on the margins. A typical EVC contains localized information on navigation techniques, survival medicine, environmental hazards, personal protection, water and food procurement, and color pictures of edible and poisonous plants. Additionally, the chart is overprinted with a camouflage pattern similar to the natural ground colors of the area, and may aid an evader in hiding if the EVC is used as a shelter/cover. The chart is designed to fit in a military uniform or survival vest. Procedures for ordering EVCs are found in NGA's compact disc, *Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products*.

For further information on EVCs, see Products and Links menu at SIPRNET: <https://public.jptra.smil.mil/SitePages/Home.aspx>.

(3) The **blood chit** (see Figure IV-1) is a small sheet of material on which an American flag, a statement in English and other languages, and a serial number are imprinted. The blood chit identifies the bearer as an American and promises a reward by the USG to anyone providing assistance to the bearer or helping the bearer return to friendly control. The evader has no authority to barter or quote a price for the reward. When the blood chit number is presented to US authorities, the isolated person has been returned to friendly control, and the claim has been properly validated, it represents an obligation of the USG to provide compensation to the claimant for services rendered to evaders. All instances of assistance are classified to protect the assistor and their

Sample Blood Chit



ARABIC

انا امريكى ولا اناكم لغتك. انا احتاج الى مساعدتك للحصول على الطعام والمأوى والوقاية. ارجوك ان تأخذني الى من يستطيع ان يحميني وان يرجعني الى اهلي. سأعمل بكل طاقتي لحمايتك من اي ضرر. وان حكومي ستكافئك مكافأة على مساعدتكم لي عندما تقدمون لها هذا الرقم مع ذكر اسمي.

PERSIAN (FARSI)

امريكايى هستم - زبان شما حرف نميزنم - بمناسبت دچار بدبختي ميخورم از شما مساعدت خوراكن و پناه و بست بخوام - خواهشمندم مرا بكسى كه وسايل سلامت مرا فراهم كند بپريد و مراتبت كنيد كه من تحت نظارتى دولت خود واگذار شوم - نهايت كوشش خوام كرد كه هيچ اسببى بشما نيايد - دولت شما پاداش قابل خواهى داد -

TURKISH

Ben Amerikalıyım ve Türkçe bilmiyorum. Benim size hiç bir zararım dokunmaz ! Sizin halkınıza benden hiç bir kötülük gelmez. Arkadaşım, lütfen bana yiyecek, su, barınak, giyim eşyası, ilaç ve doktor sağlar mısın ? Aynı zamanda benim Amerikalıların ve onların dostu olan diğer memleketlerin en yakındaki kuvvetlerine emniyetle gitmemi sağlayın. Benim ismimi ve bu numarayı Amerikan makamlarına verdiğiniz zaman bana yardım ettiğiniz için size bir ödül verilecektir.

KURDISH

من ئەمریکەم و بە زمانی نیوه قسه ناکەم من بە هیچ چۆریک عەزەبە تو ناره حتیو ناخوشتان یی ناکە یەنم. براده ره کان تکاتان لی ئەکەم که یارمه تیم بدن به تا یه به بی بو خواردنو خوارده مەنی و جلو بەرک و ئەکەر بیویستی دکتور (حکیم) یم. هەر وهها براده ره کانم سیاستان ئەکەم ئەکەرە بم خەنە دەستی لەشکری براده ران و هەرچی ولاتیک که وا یارمه تی و دلسوزی ئەمریکا ئەدا. و منیش ئەم جانە یی نیوهم لەبیر ناچیت و ئەمەوی قازانجیکی زورتان یی بکە یەنم. هەر ناوی من لەکەل ئەم نمره یه بده ئە دەستی بیاوانی حکومه تی ئەمریکا. نیتەر هەر بترین.

ENGLISH

"I am an American and do not speak your language. I will not harm you! I bear no malice towards your people. My friend, please provide me food, water, shelter, clothing, and necessary medical attention. Also, please provide safe passage to the nearest friendly forces of any country supporting the Americans and their allies. You will be rewarded for assisting me when you present this number and my name to American authorities."

117512

PREPARED AND PUBLISHED BY THE
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY AEROSPACE CENTER
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

Updated by DMAAC 12-90

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BLOCHTXIXA
(Desert Shield)

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Figure IV-1. Sample Blood Chit

families. Blood chits are controlled items and are obtained through the theater blood chit program manager. The blood chit has certain limitations as an evasion aid and form of ID; therefore training in the use of the blood chit is essential and should be a prerequisite to their issue. Some of the limitations in the use of the blood chit are:

(a) The person providing aid may be skeptical of the value of a piece of paper with a number on it as something that may produce a reward. Overcoming this difficulty will depend largely on the salesmanship of the evader.

(b) When the evader is in the hands of a friendly group or individual, use of the blood chit as a means of reward may depend largely on the effectiveness of communications between the group and the evader. The evader should expect to encounter some reluctance on the part of the recipient who may suspect the chit to be stolen or counterfeit, or the bearer to be an adversary.

(c) Low literacy rates in certain parts of a country, or among certain groups, can hinder the use of a blood chit. In addition, only a small number of translations have been made of the thousands of languages and dialects in the world. Evaders may have to resort to sign language in conjunction with a pointee-talkee.

(d) Training of potential evader/blood chit users on when, where, and how to best use the device within the culture is necessary for safety. The blood chit should not be issued without the training to accompany it.

For further guidance on blood chits, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3290.01, The Department of Defense Blood Chit Program.

(4) **Language translator devices** enable isolated personnel to communicate with indigenous personnel who do not speak English. Examples include:

(a) **Pointee-talkees** (see Figure IV-2) are in a three column format with English phrases on the left side of the page, the same phrase in the foreign language in the middle, and the phonetic pronunciation on the right side. The evader selects the desired English phrase and points to the translation of the phrase beside it or tries to phonetically pronounce the desired phrase. The evader may augment the pointee-talkee by making drawings and signs to help communicate with a local national.

(b) GCCs are authorized to produce their own AOR-specific pointee-talkees to complement and facilitate their unique theater PR requirements. Products should consider that in many assisted evasion scenarios, the primary requirement is for the member of the evasion network to give instruction or information to the evader. Tailored pointee-talkees may need to be designed to allow communication to be initiated with the evader, giving specific directions (e.g., “Hide here,” “Return here in 18 hours.”) or information (e.g., “Coalition forces are 10 kilometers to the north,” “There are mines here.”) Whenever possible, tailored pointee-talkees should be printed on durable, weather-resistant materials.

Sample Portion of a Pointee-Talkee

<i>FARSI</i>		
INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL (معرفت)		
ENGLISH	FARSI	FARSI PHONETIC
I am an American and I need your help, but I do not speak your language. I'll point to the question in your language and you can point to the answer in your language.	من آمریکائی هستم و به کمک شما احتیاج دارم ولی با زبان شما آشنا نیستم من از روی این ورقه سوال مورد نظرم را نشان خواهم داد و شما با استفاده از این ورقه جواب مورد نظرتان را نشان بدهید.	MAHN EHM-bree-koh EE hahs TAHM, vah beh koh-MAH-keh shoh-MOH ehx-tee-OHJ duh-RUHM, vah-LEE boh zah-BAH-neh shoh-MOH ohsh noh NEE-stahm. MAHN ahz-ROO yeh EEN-vah-RAH gah-eh soh-OH-leh MOH-reh deh NAH ZAH-rahm roh neh SHUHN HOH-hahn DOHT VAH-shoh-MOH BOH EH-seh foh DAH-zeen vah-rah-GAY jah VOH-veen MOH-reh-deh nah ZAHRTahn-DOOR nee SHUHN BEH-dah-HEET.
COMMUNICATION (محواره)		
ENGLISH	FARSI	FARSI PHONETIC
Will you help me?	حاضرین بمن کمک کنید؟	HOH ZEH-reen beh-MAHN koh MAH-koh-NEEK?
Is there someone that speaks English?	شخصی انگلیسی زبانی سراغ دارید؟	SHAX SAY EHN-gee-see zah BOH-nee suh-ROHK duh-REET?
Are they willing to help me?	ایشان حاضر به کمک من هستند؟	ee-SHOHN hoh-ZEHR beh KOH-mah-kay MAHN HAH-stahnd?
Can they come here?	میتوانند به اینجا بیایند؟	MEE-tah-voh-NAHND veh EEN-joh byoh-YAHND?
I must go now but, I want to thank you for your help.	باید الان بروم ولی میخواهم از شما برای کمکتان تشکر کنم.	boh-YAHD ahl OHN BEH-rah-VAHM, vah LEE-nee xoh-XAHM ahs-shoh-MOH bah-roh YEH koh MAH keh tohn tah shah-KUHR KOH-nahm.
My government will repay you for your kindness.	دولت من از بابت کمکتان به من، به شما پاداش خواهد داد.	DOH LAH-tay-mahn ahz boh BAH-tay koh-MAH-kay-TUHN beh-MAHN beh shoh-MOH poh DOHSH hoh-HAHD-dohd.
I greatly appreciate your assistance.	از کمک شما واقعا ممنونم	AHS-koh-MAH-keh shoh-MOH voh-RAHN mahm NOO-nahm.
BASIC NEEDS (نیازهای اساسی)		
ENGLISH	FARSI	FARSI PHONETIC
May I have some water?	میتوانید بمن کمی آب بدهید؟	MEE-tah-VOH-neet beh MAHN KEH-mee-OHB BEH-dah-HEET?
May I have some food?	میتوانید بمن کمی غذا بدهید؟	MEE-tah-VOH-neet beh MAHN KEH-mee RAH-zoh BEH-dah-HEET?
I am injured. Is there someone that can help me?	زخمی شده ام. کسی میتواند بمن کمک کند؟	zahx MEE-shoh-DAHM. KÆ see NEE-tah-VOH-nahd beh MAHN koh-MAH koh-NAHD?
Do you have any bandages?	وسایل پانسمان دارید؟	VAH-soh YEH-leh POHN-say-MOHN DOH-reet?
Can you contact someone to help me?	میتوانید با کسی برای کمک تماس بگیرید؟	MEE-tah-VOH-neet boh KÆ-see BAH-roh-yeh koh-MAHK TÆ-mohs BEH-geh-REET?
Where is the latrine?	دستشویی کجا است؟	dahs-shoo-EE koh-JOHSHT?
I am very tired. Is there a place I can sleep?	خیلی خسته ام. جایی برای خواب دارید؟	XAY-lee XAHS-tahm. JOH-ee BAH-roh-yeh HOHB DOH-reet?
May I have a blanket, or more clothing?	میتوانید برایم یک پتو یا لباس فراهم کنید؟	MEE-tah-VOH-neet BAH-roh-YAHM YEHK pah-TOO YOH lay-BOHS FAH-roh hahm koh-NEET?

Figure IV-2. Sample Portion of a Pointee-Talkee

(c) The Services may consider the use of commercial, off-the-shelf electronic products which are quickly becoming available. Depending upon the operational environment and common dialect problems, machine and computer translation software may have a limited vocabulary with a focus on conversational phrases. There are limitations. What is produced using these devices may not be exactly

what was intended to be conveyed, or the recipient's breadth of vocabulary may be more limited than the device's capability. Unusual dialects may also pose a problem.

(5) **IPG** is a series of classified country-specific products developed to provide information to enhance survivability in the event of isolation or captivity. IPGs incorporate information found in other references and are designed to be used in concert with intelligence assessments, cultural briefs, country studies, and other products.

(6) **Personnel recovery reference product (PRRP)** is a reference document for PR-specific information on a particular country or region of interest. PRRPs are designed to facilitate combatant command and PR support staff planning in countries where US forces may conduct joint operations. PRRPs address geo-political disposition, military capabilities, threat to rescue vehicles, and the physical, cultural, and security environment which impact the ability of isolated personnel to survive and evade capture.

For additional information on planning products, contact JPRA.

CHAPTER V PLANNING

“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”

**Dwight D. Eisenhower, General, United States Army, (1890–1969),
34th President**

1. General

a. **JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of military operations.** It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate HQ throughout planning. JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders.

For further guidance on JOPP, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

b. The detailed joint force PR plan is located within appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the plan. The PR appendix supports the basic plan, promulgates the PR concept of operations (CONOPS), and directs PR guidance and responsibilities to subordinate organizations. Regardless of the type of plan, subordinate commanders should be aware of the JFC’s overall intent and CONOPS to complete a PR mission analysis and a PR supporting plan (see paragraph 4, “The Basic Plan”). In turn, subordinate commanders provide their PR appendix to their commands for tactical planning. The planning process is not necessarily linear; it is a continuous, concurrent process between and among supported and supporting commanders. Commanders:

- (1) Complete a **PR mission analysis**.
- (2) Develop the operational concept of, and authorities for, PR in the basic plan.
- (3) Develop the **PR appendix to the basic plan**.

2. Personnel Recovery Mission Analysis

It is important to note that while much of the discussion in this publication is focused on joint operations during phases II (Seize the Initiative), III (Dominate), and IV (Stabilize), isolating events happen during all phases of operations. Mission analysis should consider command relationships within the operational area and who has responsibility for PR. Planning for PR needs to take into consideration all operational and mission variables. If available, a red team can help PR planners see intangible cultural and perceptual environmental factors that may need to be considered.

a. PR requirements and planning tasks are developed through coordinated mission analysis. Commanders identify the tasks their staffs, forces, and isolated personnel should perform, under various conditions, to accomplish the PR execution tasks. In the PR mission analysis, the commander first determines the context in which the mission should be performed and specifies tasks necessary to accomplish the PR execution tasks. Next, the commander determines the capability to accomplish those specified tasks with assigned forces, identifies shortfalls, and decides whether to build requirements to address the shortfalls or accept the risk of not doing so.

b. In determining the context in which the mission should be performed, commanders and their planners should consider the threat, the physical environment, and friendly capabilities. Information regarding the threat and the environment are also included in PR planning products.

(1) **Vulnerabilities.** Adversaries will attempt to exploit isolated personnel and target recovery forces in an effort to cause changes in US national will and military strategy.

(a) **Isolated Personnel.** Personnel may become isolated for numerous reasons, such as equipment malfunction, enemy action, environmental constraints (e.g., weather, terrain), or other events beyond their control. An adversary may attempt to exploit the situation or the isolated person directly for intelligence, propaganda, or economic purposes.

1. **Intelligence.** Exploitation for intelligence includes, but is not limited to, technical knowledge of equipment, operational statuses and disposition of personnel and equipment, training methods, current employment tactics and OPLANs, and similar knowledge of the adversary.

2. **Propaganda.** The propaganda value may not be contingent or lie with an isolated person's status, training or experience. What an isolated person represents, or is willing to do or say, may be the value to the adversary.

3. **Economic.** Some criminal or terrorist elements, or even state actors, may be seeking monetary compensation for the turnover of isolated personnel to either friendly or hostile forces, families, or organizations. Other demands may be in the form of increased humanitarian aid, removal of sanctions, increase or decrease of military sales, etc.

(b) **Recovery Forces.** The enemy may target the recovery force as a normal response to a military operation or they may attempt to use isolated personnel as bait to ambush recovery forces. An adversary's technology, imagination, flexibility, will, audacity, and use of extremist measures can increase the threat to all forces.

CONSIDERATION OF ALL ENEMY THREATS TO RECOVERY FORCES

On 28 June 2005, a four-man SEAL team was inserted to conduct a reconnaissance mission into mountainous terrain in eastern Afghanistan. While on mission, they were compromised by three Afghan goat herders and subsequently engaged by an overwhelming Taliban force. The SEAL team leader called his headquarters for help.

As orbiting aircraft tried to assist the endangered team, a SEAL recovery element was dispatched aboard two MH-47s from a joint special operations task force. When the lead aircraft hovered to insert the rescue element, it was struck by a Taliban-fired, rocket-propelled grenade and destroyed, killing the sixteen men onboard. Additionally, three members of the isolated team were killed in the ongoing melee. The fourth man was able to contact friendly elements and was subsequently recovered.

Source: *Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10*, by Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson

(2) **Environment.** Terrain, vegetation, the populace, and potential presence of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) contamination have direct effects on PR C2, forces, and isolated personnel. The mission analysis should consider the effects of the environmental conditions on PR C2 to conduct timing and tempo of PR missions and communicate with friendly forces; on friendly forces to communicate with, locate, and recover isolated personnel; and on isolated personnel to communicate with recovery forces, evade, and survive.

(3) **Factors that impact friendly force** capabilities to successfully accomplish the five PR execution tasks could include:

(a) An adequate number of trained and/or dedicated PR personnel to staff the JPRCs and PRCCs to ensure proper PR planning and coordination.

(b) Sufficient air, ground, and maritime platforms/equipment (dedicated, designated) to execute a successful recovery.

(c) Adequate policies and procedures for completing EPAs, ISOPREPs, or other PR preparation tasks.

(d) Adequate guidance for developing PR ROE.

(e) Adequate policies and procedures to communicate PR information and requirements to all personnel in the operational area.

(f) An adequate number of SERE-qualified personnel to ensure programs are in place to prepare personnel for a possible isolation event.

(g) Innovative and effective employment of joint force PR capabilities.

(h) The JFC's procedures for conducting PR (e.g., standardized checklists and processes for evasion aides, ISOPREPs, recovery mission planning, intelligence support to PR, reintegration support).

(i) A robust C2 capability.

(j) Properly equipped personnel to support isolated personnel with:

1. Effective communication (e.g., compatible or interoperable radios, emergency locator transmitters [ELTs], cell or international maritime satellite phone, GPS devices, PLB, and/or alerting devices).

2. Protection from adversary threats, including CBRN, environmental conditions, etc.

3. Morale support to maintain mental well-being and positive attitude.

4. Resupply kits and exercised resupply delivery capability.

5. SA to enable them to make rational decisions.

(k) Accurate map and chart coverage of the entire operational area.

(l) Adequate policy and procedures for coordinating the reintegration of isolated personnel.

(m) Adequate procedures to collect LL and forward them through the proper channels.

(n) International law and arrangements, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), where appropriate.

c. Determining the PR subtasks identifies those actions that should be taken to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. The identification of the subtasks will enable the planner to subsequently identify conventional PR and NAR capabilities and shortfalls. **These PR subtasks are made up of directed tasks, execution tasks, and mission analysis tasks.** Directed tasks are derived from DOD-directed PR responsibilities. PR execution tasks are listed in CJCSM 3500.04, *Universal Joint Task Manual*. Planning for recovery operations generally employs JOPP as outlined in JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*. Using common processes that are understood throughout the military helps commanders and staffs standardize procedures. Standard processes facilitate effective planning between echelons and with adjacent units.

d. PR capabilities are determined by analyzing the ability of the joint or multinational force to perform the five PR execution tasks and subtasks in the context of the PR operational environment. When gaps are identified, the commander can direct action to resolve the shortfall, develop requirements for higher HQ to resolve, or accept risk.

3. Communication Synchronization

PR planners and operators should collaborate with PA, IO, and other information-related capabilities to include PR requirements in the JFC's commander's communication synchronization effort.

a. **Objectives.** PR guidance considers the synergistic capabilities of public diplomacy, IO, PA, and international broadcasting, along with the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, to ensure a whole-of-government approach in achieving the following objectives:

(1) Reduce the vulnerability of the capture, detention, and illegal seizure of US and partner nation personnel and citizens.

(2) Mitigate the effects of attempts by adversaries to exploit isolated personnel as part of their larger communication synchronization campaign.

(3) Increase the survivability of those held in captivity, detained, or illegally seized.

(4) Directly support the *National Security Strategy* by sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims of conveying credible, consistent messages in preserving the security of the US, its citizens, and US allies and partners.

b. **Methodologies.** The communications strategy may be used to support PR preparation and response through the following actions:

(1) Target potential adversaries with focused activities that disrupt attempts to exploit isolated personnel.

(2) Promote dialogue with local leaders and the general public in specific areas to segregate adversaries from their potential support base and assist in PR responses.

(3) Establish the conditions to locate, support, recover, and reintegrate those who have become isolated.

c. **Themes.** Fundamental themes in US policy need reinforcement before, during, and after an isolating event. The inclusion of these themes in messages, images, and activities should account for cultural sensitivities. These fundamental PR themes include:

(1) The USG holds those who capture, detain, or illegally seize US personnel or citizens directly responsible for their safety and security.

(2) The USG will not make concessions to individuals or groups holding US personnel or citizens hostage. It is USG policy to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner release, policy changes, or other acts of concession.

(3) The USG will do everything practical to recover and/or secure the release of its captured, detained, or illegally seized personnel or citizens through diplomatic, military, or civil means.

(4) The seizing of hostages is a violation of international and domestic law.

(5) The USG will work with its multinational partners to address the threat of hostage taking that threatens our collective security.

d. Planning and Execution. The themes, messages, images, and activities are implemented through the operational planning and execution of IO, PA, and targeting, which:

(1) Affects the center of gravity of adversaries who hold captive, detain, or illegally seize US and multinational persons.

(2) Prevents adversaries from achieving their strategic goals by mitigating the effects from exploiting captive, detained, or illegally seized personnel.

(3) Reinforces the USG position on “no concessions” as described in PPD-30, *U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts*.

(4) Encourages the humane treatment of isolated personnel should they be captured, detained, or illegally seized.

(5) Coordinates and synchronizes diplomatic, military, and civil efforts in a PR response across the USG.

(6) Unifies PR education and prevention efforts among all USG departments and agencies.

For further information on national strategic guidance and communication synchronization, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and Joint Doctrine Note 2-13, Commander’s Communication Synchronization.

For further information on IO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations.

4. The Basic Plan

The OPLAN and supporting plans establish the joint force PR command authorities and responsibilities, coordination and communication architecture, force placement, force posture, and force response. The PR planner coordinates with and assists other staff planners in developing the basic plan to ensure it establishes the foundation for the scope, authorities, and priority for PR. Appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the basic plan will expand on this foundation. Guidelines for intelligence support to PR, including products and processes, should be included in annex B (Intelligence) and referred in appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations). The basic plan should:

- a. Incorporate the JFC’s priority for isolated personnel, accomplishing the five PR execution tasks and CONOPS for PR in support of the joint force.
- b. Specify subordinate commanders’ responsibility to establish and disseminate the criteria that designate personnel as isolated and to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.
- c. Include the JFC’s CONOPS for integrating all PR capabilities within the operational area, to include support requirements outside the operational area.
- d. Establish the command and coordinating relationships for PR. (See Chapter III, “Command and Control.”)
- e. Design the PR architecture to facilitate timely, efficient, and effective PR mission execution at all levels of the joint force.

5. The Personnel Recovery Appendix in the Operation Plan

a. **PR Appendix.** The basic plan’s operational situation, the JFC’s overall CONOPS and intent, the mission analysis and ongoing joint planning, and the collaboration with other operation planners become the foundation of information that focuses the development of the “PR operations plan,” in appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of an OPLAN (see Figure V-1). Appendix 5 contains the JFC’s PR CONOPS for a specific campaign or operation. It tasks commanders and staffs, isolated personnel, and forces with actions that, when completed, will develop the PR capability envisioned by the JFC.

Detailed planning considerations and other guidance to develop appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) is in CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.

(1) **Search and Rescue (Tab A).** Plan for the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, ground forces, and specialized rescue teams and equipment to support SAR for distressed persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment. Tab A should include coordinated procedures or agreements with HN, multinational partners, and other organizations. It should discuss all other capabilities and activities, plans, and operations pertinent to SAR missions. Finally, it should list the specific tasks assigned to each subordinate commander required to implement SAR in the operational area and include any coordination required to deconflict recovery efforts if necessary.

(2) **NAR (Tab B)**

(a) NAR capabilities are developed to recover isolated personnel in areas where conventional recovery capability does not exist, is not feasible, is not acceptable, or where complementary PR coverage is required. NAR planning should be a coordinated effort of joint force PR planners, component recovery planners, and NAR planners. NAR requires pre-conflict planning, training, exercise of C2, and intelligence support to develop credible NAR capabilities for employment.




Figure V-1. Personnel Recovery Appendix and Tabs

(b) The employment of, and processes to properly use, NAR capabilities are critical to mission success. Initial PR planning will identify conventional recovery capabilities. Analysis of these capabilities will reveal the gaps where conventional capabilities do not exist, are not feasible, or are not acceptable. PR planners should take into consideration NAR capabilities. If PR gaps still exist, they serve as a basis for NAR planning and identifying NAR requirements for submission to the Joint Staff and JPRA. These identified gaps serve as the basis for NAR planning.

(c) It is DOD policy to complement its PR capabilities with NAR to recover isolated personnel in those instances when the use of conventional recovery forces in adversary-held or hostile areas is not feasible or acceptable, or is nonexistent. NAR is PR conducted by indigenous/surrogate personnel trained, supported, and led by SOF or other governmental agencies' personnel specifically trained and directed to establish and operate indigenous or surrogate infrastructures. NAR operations involve the employment of recovery teams (RTs) and recovery mechanisms (RMs). NAR

operations may be covert or clandestine. Although NAR supports the five execution tasks of PR, the tactical execution of NAR focuses primarily on the recover task. NAR relies on the capability of NAR forces to conduct **five specified tasks: contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel to friendly control.** These specified tasks, more fully discussed in Chapter VI, “Execution,” remain constant regardless of the mission profile. The specified tasks are separate but may be conducted concurrently or sequentially. However, all specified tasks should be conducted to complete the mission. The TTP employed to accomplish them may be many and varied, allowing for a unit’s or an individual’s particular training strengths, equipment, or employment criteria. During the recovery process, rally points should be planned in the event the isolated person becomes separated from the recovery force. These rally points will facilitate re-contact with the isolated person at a later time. During all phases of the recovery process, the isolated person should be briefed on pertinent procedures, restrictions, and re-contact plans while in the custody of the NAR recovery force. NAR capabilities are especially advantageous in areas where adversary air or ground threat prevent recovery by conventional forces. IAW Title 10, USC, DODI 3002.04, *DOD Personnel Recovery—Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR)*; USSOCOM Directive 525-21, *Personnel Recovery*; FM 3-05.220, *Advanced Special Operations (Secret document)*, UAR is NAR conducted by specially trained SOF personnel. UAR is a subset and integral component of unconventional warfare. IAW DODI 3115.10E, *Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery*, DOD and other USG departments and agencies, as well as elements from the IC, also provide operational support capability for NAR.

(d) Due to the sensitive and compartmentalized nature of NAR, with the focus on protecting sensitive information, tab B (NAR), to appendix 5 (PR), to annex C (Operations) will have information based on the overall classification of the base plan. The majority of the tab may be in a separate plan or maintained in the UARCC.

(3) SERE (Tab C)

(a) **Document Preparation and Review.** The plan should include detailed guidance for loading survival radios and navigational equipment. Individuals who have cell phones should consider adding emergency contact information such as unit operations centers, US embassy consulates, or regional security offices. Individuals should review their ISOPREPS and EPAs, authentication information such as challenge and passwords, procedures such as isolated Soldier guidance (ISG) or “Lost Marine” plans should they become isolated, and procedures when radio, phone, or GPS is not an option (signals).

1. EPA. All individuals, units, and organizations operating in hostile or uncertain territory will develop an EPA and review it prior to each mission. The EPA is one of the critical documents for successful recovery planning. It is the vehicle by which personnel at risk of isolation document their evasion plan. They can facilitate their recovery by giving recovery forces a planned direction to follow as well as signs or signals to look for. It should be based on a thorough knowledge of current theater briefings and force protection measures, risk of isolation guidance, instructions like those found in the ATO SPINS, IPGs, SERE updates, etc., or other distress notification

documents, as well as the operational environment where isolation may occur. Guidance on preparing EPAs should include consideration of both open and urban terrain. The signals instruction of both the EPA and the deception plan should include procedures to direct isolated persons toward recovery forces if radio communications are not possible. Personnel are responsible for ensuring the information in their EPA complies with JFC's policies and the contact procedures outlined in their commander's isolation notification policy. If isolated, they should follow their EPA as closely as possible. Because extended unassisted recovery or being in a situation where technical communications devices are unavailable is always a possibility, EPAs should address such contingencies. Accurate EPA data, and the evader's subsequent adherence to the EPA once isolated, are the principal factors in successful contact and recovery operations. When possible, EPAs should be developed and filed in PRMS, which would facilitate rapid transmission during contingencies. See Annex D, "Evasion Plan of Action," to Appendix C, "Evasion," for details on the content of an EPA.

2. ISOPREP. All military members, DOD civilians, or DOD CAAF should complete an ISOPREP before deploying or going on temporary duty as required by the GCC. The data in the ISOPREP is used to verify the identity of the individual who may later become isolated, missing, or captured. Specific information is necessary to positively authenticate isolated personnel during a recovery mission. Information is collected by a process that directs the user to provide statements containing personal information known only to them. These statements should be durable, able to be protected, and easily remembered by the individual. It is an important source of authentication data when communicating with US (and some allied) forces. Authentication also protects recovery forces from being lured into a trap or ambush. Proper completion, use, and archiving of authentication information could be critical to a successful recovery. As a permanent record, it is a vital part of long-term POW or MIA authentication and accountability. IAW DOD and Joint Staff guidance, ISOPREPs should be stored electronically in PRMS to facilitate rapid transmission during contingencies. The PRMS automated DD Form 1833, ISOPREP, provides the standardized data elements, export data, and order format to collect individual information and should be used by all personnel IAW theater entry requirements. Detailed procedures for completing, maintaining, and controlling ISOPREPs can be found in Annex F, "Guidance for Completing and Controlling DD Form 1833, Isolated Personnel Report," to Appendix C, "Evasion."

(b) **ROE/Legal Aspects.** Coordinate, as required, to ensure the ROE address unique PR requirements (e.g., status of isolated personnel, e.g., evader versus escapee, use of force during recovery operations, access to potential recovery sites, HN restrictions). See Appendix C, "Evasion." Identification of rules for "what if" situations in the planning process may represent a time-critical element in a decision process that will save a life during a crisis situation.

See also annex A, "Legal Aspects of Escape and Evasion," to Appendix C, "Evasion."

(c) **Contact Procedures.** A critical aspect of the recovery is the moment the isolated personnel and the recovery force initially make contact. That moment of

contact is very tense because it requires two parties, unknown to each other and located in hostile territory, to meet without being detected by either adversary forces or elements of the local population, and without compromising either party's security. **Consequently, the JPRC, assisted by component representatives, joint and unit intelligence personnel, and recovery operations specialists will develop appropriate contact procedures for use in the operational area and include them in the SERE tab.** When developing contact procedures, recovery planners should adhere to JFC's policies to ensure operational consistency throughout the joint force, and should address various recovery methods because each involves different considerations. Ground forces should adhere to the near and far recognition signals and treat this operation in the same manner as a link up with friendly force operation. The JPRC also will ensure that joint force components, commanders, personnel at risk of isolation, recovery forces, mission planners, and briefers are familiar with contact procedures by publishing them in broadly disseminated operation instructions. General contact procedures for NAR operations should be published in appropriate instructions as well. To facilitate contact with NAR forces, potential isolated personnel should articulate contact procedures with and without communications in their EPA. Procedures should be passed by the UARCC to NAR assets, when required.

For detailed information on signaling, see Annex C, "Signaling Techniques and Procedures," to Appendix C, "Evasion."

(4) **Reintegration (Tab D).** GCCs are responsible for the initial processing of recovered isolated personnel.

(a) Reintegration planning should be coordinated with all components, agencies, national forces, and others whose members are at risk of isolation. The plan should address the following objectives:

1. Attend to the medical needs of the recovered isolated person(s).
2. Conduct operational debriefings.
3. Protect and treat the mental health of the isolated person(s).
4. Conduct intelligence debriefings and collect/disseminate intelligence.
5. Protect sensitive PR sources and methods.
6. Collect SERE information.
7. Provide SERE psychologist oversight to ensure proper decompression.
8. Attend to personal and family needs.

9. Enable the decompressed isolated person(s) to return to duty as soon as possible.

(b) Reintegration plans will be formatted as described in CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance*, and should:

1. Establish procedures that ensure the proper care for recovered isolated personnel, the collection of SERE and intelligence information, and the recovered isolated personnel's return to duty or family. The procedures will be specific for each location phase as detailed in Chapter VI, "Execution."

2. Ensure procedures exist to notify promptly the Service organization responsible for coordinating reintegration activities, the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Agency (DPAA), JPRA, and the Service casualty offices of the initial release and of subsequent information, including medical information, on recovered personnel.

3. Establish procedures to take custody of returned isolated personnel from an HN, in cases where DOS is the lead USG organization.

4. Establish teams and procedures for reintegration of isolated personnel. Normally, reintegration is conducted at three locations that are referred to as phases. Phases I and II are the responsibility of the CCDR. Phase III is usually in the United States and is the responsibility of the isolated person's Service. The JFCs coordinate, through the JPRC, with the PRCCs to establish phase I and II reintegration locations and teams. A more detailed discussion of reintegration activities and phases is in Chapter VI, "Execution," Section E, "Reintegrate." The plan should be as detailed as possible for phase I and II reintegration teams and team chiefs, and outline their authorities and responsibilities. Team composition is dependent on circumstances; circumstances may also dictate adjustments to the amount and type of reintegration activities conducted during phases I and II.

(5) **Accounting (Tab E).** Commanders should implement timely and effective procedures to accurately determine the status of those who are isolated and coordinate that information through command, PR, and personnel channels.

b. **PR Capabilities.** With the direction and authority of the basic plan, PR planners can expand on the responsibilities for and use the five PR capabilities (i.e., isolated individual, component, joint, multinational, and other governmental departments and agencies). (See Figure I-2.)

(1) **Isolated Individual**

(a) **Unassisted.** Evaders independently exercise their capability to make their way back to friendly control or travel toward a point where contact with friendly forces can be accomplished based on an EPA. However, in many instances the best technique is to find a hide site and wait for recovery forces to arrive. From the enemy's perspective, watching for movement is one of the best techniques for hunting. Evasion

and recovery takes as long as it takes. Being patient and maintaining SA can be a valuable tool in maintaining freedom. The plan should promulgate the component and Service responsibility to identify personnel at risk of isolation and prepare them to survive, evade, resist, or escape to effect their own recovery if it becomes necessary. This may be necessary when friendly forces are not aware that an isolation event has occurred, it is not possible to execute a recovery or support mission, or it is a backup option to a failed recovery mission. In addition, to the extent possible and depending on the operational requirement, the JFC should place a similar responsibility on DOD contractors, other agencies, and multinational partners.

For further information on evasion, refer to Appendix C, "Evasion."

(b) **Opportune.** Planning guidance will address responsibilities for theater SERE briefs and the preparation of potential isolated personnel's capability to facilitate opportune situations. Opportune situations are those where isolated personnel make a conscious decision to take advantage of an opportunity to make contact with friendly forces not considered in the PR plan, or approach a potentially neutral individual and ask for assistance (e.g., medical, sustenance, and directions). The SERE and intelligence briefings and IPG will provide potential isolated personnel knowledge of individuals, groups, and organizations in the area of operations that will enhance their ability to successfully negotiate opportune situations. Plans should also ensure potential isolated personnel have the equipment, such as blood chits and pointee-talkies, to enhance the success of an opportune situation.

(2) **Component.** Components are responsible for PR planning that encompasses the accomplishment of the five PR execution tasks within their operational area. Component commanders should coordinate PR plans with the joint force plans. Components may not be organized, trained, or equipped to accomplish all aspects of the five PR execution tasks. Shortfalls in capabilities should be reported to the JFC and JPRC. NAR capabilities are developed to recover isolated personnel in areas where conventional recovery capabilities do not exist, are not feasible, or are not acceptable.

(3) **Joint.** JFCs should exploit all available appropriate component resources to develop the optimum PR capability. Unity of effort and the integration of capabilities are the JFC's major challenges in joint recovery operations, and require planning, training, and rehearsal to develop synergistic mission-capable skills.

(4) **Multinational.** JFCs may need to include multinational stakeholders in PR planning. In most cases, the JFC will have to consider the PR coordination between US forces and the HN military. As in the previous capabilities discussions, multinational PR capabilities may offer the JFC leverage (force multiplier) that entails gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power. The JFC's PR CONOPS should address the multinational PR architecture to promote detailed planning, coordination, and the implementation of legal agreements to effect a multinational PR effort and recognize constraints. Achieving balance and unity of effort among multinational forces is a major challenge that can be mitigated by planning, training, and rehearsing.

(a) **HN Capabilities.** The HN can provide capabilities for PR prevention and response. Coordination between the GCC and the COM, who may be the USG lead, fosters a cohesive response between the HN, DOS, and DOD. HN security force and emergency response personnel may not always possess the capabilities required to respond effectively to an isolating incident involving US personnel. The US may need to partner with an HN to build upon or supplement their capabilities for a given mission.

For more information on the importance of building partner capacity to perform those functions, see PPD-30, U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts.

(b) Building partner capacity allows US military advisors to operate in conjunction with counterparts in remote and austere locations throughout the world. These advisors understand the environment (ground truths) and the partners' capabilities and may provide future ability to conduct PR tasks to locate, support, and recover isolated personnel.

(c) As with all military engagements, the emphasis should be on developing trust, incentives, mutual benefit, and ensuring proper alignment of incentives for all. PR activities in multinational operations are complex, typically involving units and personnel from many different organizations. The example that follows highlights a PR operation involving DOD contractors, multinational partners, and several different US organizations.

(5) **Other USG Departments and Agencies.** The JFC may be directed to provide PR support to other USG departments and agencies in the operational area or incorporate their PR capabilities into military recovery operations. Directed or not, JFCs should be aware of the activities of other USG departments and agencies and determine the possibility of those personnel becoming isolated in hostile or uncertain areas within the operational area. Other USG departments and agency personnel operating over, in, or near the operational area can be at risk of becoming isolated. JFCs should take the initiative to request these organizations plan PR with the use of organic PR capabilities in support of their own personnel to mitigate the use of combat forces. Should military support be required, taking the opportunity to do advance planning is a better choice than confronting a crisis during operations. As in joint and multinational considerations, unity of effort and integration of capabilities are the JFC's major challenges in recovery operations involving other USG departments and agencies capabilities, and require planning, training, and exercise.

(a) The DOS and US missions abroad are most likely to have resources to support recovery operations, especially when diplomatic options are required or HN laws and agreements or internationally recognized territorial sovereignty rights have to be considered. The Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Justice also may offer capabilities or need military PR assistance. In most countries, the DOS will lead the USG's efforts while the HN retains the responsibility for all PR events occurring within their borders. US forces would provide support as required and capable.

MULTINATIONAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY

Early in the morning of 14 July 2009, a Department of Defense-contracted MI-26 helicopter supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was shot down in the mountainous area of Regional Command-South (RC-South), Afghanistan. On board were six Ukrainian contractors. The incident was reported to the Combined Personnel Recovery Center-Afghanistan in Kabul who, in turn, notified the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) in Qatar.

RC-South tasked a British ground quick reaction force (QRF) from a nearby forward operating base (FOB) to respond to the site, while RC-South requested additional assets from Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF)-82 and the USCENTCOM JPRC. CJTF-82 diverted four AH-64 helicopters to the crash site as the JPRC authorized the launch of two United States Air Force (USAF) HH-60G helicopters and their GUARDIAN ANGEL team from Kandahar airfield. The JPRC also coordinated with the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar for unmanned aircraft coverage of the crash site. The time from shoot-down to launch of the USAF assets was one hour, with the GUARDIAN ANGEL team inserted 23 minutes later. Upon arrival, the pararescuemen discovered that the MI-26 had crashed into a house, killing one occupant and severely burning another. The team accounted for five killed in action (KIA) crewmembers, then evacuated the critical burn patient to the nearest medical facility via HH-60.

The AH-64s provided support for the British ground QRF, who were unable to account for the remaining crewmember due to intense heat and fire from the burning aircraft. The ground QRF did, however, evacuate the five KIA crewmembers to the British FOB. The next day, with the British QRF providing security, the contracting company recovered the aircraft wreckage and accounted for the last KIA crewmember.

The entire incident lasted just over thirty six hours and involved a personnel recovery task force comprised of British and US forces coordinated through multinational headquarters elements separated by over a thousand miles.

SOURCE: USCENTCOM Joint Personnel Recovery Center

(b) In many areas of the world, the joint force will not have freedom of action to unilaterally respond to isolating incidents. Instead, US authority to respond to an incident may be limited to that which is granted by the sovereign nation. Available resources are similarly limited by sovereign nation prerogatives.

1. The COM continues to represent US interests in an HN. The country team, including the RSO, SDO/DATT, and legal attaché coordinate with resident interagency personnel and HN assistance in support of the country team's PR plan. The

COM will designate members of the country team for executing IAW the established plan. The GCC will designate the command's DOD lead for recovering the isolated personnel IAW the established plan.

2. Every US embassy, if established, is affected somewhat differently—by the ambassador, the foreign policy initiatives of the country's head of government, the embassy staff, the operational environment, and the relationship between the US and the particular country. For PR to be successful, the HN government and the country team, especially the security cooperation organization (SCO), RSO, and SDO/DATT should work together. Since the HN government usually has primacy over resolving isolating events, it is incumbent upon all concerned to continuously work toward common goals of interoperability and understanding. The GCC coordinates with the country team through the COM to work with a partner nation and offers PR expertise and assistance in crafting a workable country PR plan that satisfies all concerns. An approved PR annex to the embassy's emergency action plan sets the stage for the relationship between the RSO, the military, and the partner nation.

3. DOD's relationship with the country team may change from supporting to supported and back again. DOD receives support from the country team via established relationships with HN military/diplomatic/law enforcement personnel, gains indirect physical access via country team personnel, and benefits from country team influence and situational/cultural awareness. DOD supports the country team when a COM requests DOD assistance for an isolating incident. DOD may have capabilities that the country team can use to help locate, support, recover, or reintegrate an isolated person.

4. If relationships and written agreements are established between the GCC and country team (prior to events), mutual support actions should occur more rapidly. COMs should include PR in their emergency action plans and establish agreements between the GCC and country team to clarify roles, expectations, and instances during which mutual support can be provided without use of the lengthy formal executive secretary process.

5. While each country PR plan should be tailored to a particular HN, it may be possible to develop a regional approach, where several smaller countries of like circumstances cooperate and leverage their resources to recover isolated personnel.

6. Long-term cooperative relationships take time to develop. The GCC may start, with the approval of the COM, by appointing a PR representative to assist the RSO. The RSO, using their contacts with and knowledge of the capabilities of the local police or security forces, begins paving the way for further cooperation. Year by year, cooperation expands between the US and the partner nation, perhaps to the point both militaries are cooperating during isolating events, even leveraging loaned equipment from one party with another's first-hand knowledge of the local geography and political situation to effect a recovery. This may extend operational reach indirectly into otherwise denied or sensitive areas.

7. Where necessary, US effort and resources should be applied to building the partner nation capacity to support and perform PR. These efforts should enhance the quality of response to isolating incidents.

8. The goal is to recover US isolated personnel while respecting the sovereignty of the partner nation. As the elements of PPD-30, *U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts*, are implemented, these kinds of cooperative relationships will become more and more important.

“During World War II, US Navy amphibious aircraft rescued 2,735 people and US Navy submarines recovered 520 aviators while conducting ‘Lifeguard’ operations in hostile waters.”

George Galdorisi and Tom Phillips, *Leave No Man Behind*

c. **Other Planning Considerations.** The following are additional planning factors to be incorporated in the PR appendix to the OPLAN.

(1) **Interoperability.** Successful PR depends on the accurate identification of interoperability requirements and shortfalls, including those of multinational organizations and other governmental departments and agencies. Interoperability concerns are always a relevant consideration when executing a recovery. Interoperability between the isolated person, the forces, and the C2 is essential. Interoperability issues are usually identified when PR planning and operations involve forces from two or more joint force components. Since PR missions normally require an urgent response, an understanding of potential interoperability requirements is essential to successful and timely PR planning and execution. Interoperability is essential to joint shipboard helicopter operations, communications equipment, intelligence collection assets, intelligence automated data processing, fuel and refueling, and maps and charts.

(a) **Ship-helicopter interoperability** should be considered during recovery operations in the maritime operational area (which includes the littorals). The extended range of some helicopters (with or without inflight refueling) makes the use of shipboard support facilities feasible in many inland PR scenarios. Generally, United States Coast Guard (USCG) and Navy flight-deck-equipped vessels are capable of recovering, supporting, and launching US Army and United States Air Force (USAF) helicopters operated by deck-landing qualified aircrews. Specific procedures and requirements for operating helicopters on flight-deck-equipped vessels should be employed for safe execution. Procedures for Coast Guard and Navy vessels, to include hospital ships, are contained in JP 3-04, *Joint Shipboard Helicopter and Tiltrotor Aircraft Operations*; Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 00-80T-122, *Helicopter Operating Procedures for Air-Capable Ships*; NAVAIR 00-80T-105, *CV Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Manual*; NAVAIR 00-80T-106, *LHA/LPH/LHD NATOPS Manual*; and Commandant of the Coast Guard Instruction (COMDTINST) M3710.2, *Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual*. Physical dimensions

and flight-deck clearance information are contained in Naval Air Engineering Center-Engineering (NAEC-ENG)-7576, *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*.

(b) **Communications Equipment.** Interoperability and compatibility of secure and nonsecure communications equipment in recovery operations is essential, particularly when a personnel recovery task force (PRTF) is employed. Compatible communications that support the timing and coordination necessary for successful recovery operations have become considerably more difficult as additional resources are added to the PRTF, due to the possible increase in dissimilar equipment. Depending upon the composition of the joint force, specific communications interoperability considerations should include the potential for PR-related air-to-air, surface-to-air, and/or surface-to-surface communications. Communications equipment that is not interoperable could preclude the effective usefulness of a PRTF and may be a factor for assigning the PR mission to a single component as a mission-type order.

1. Communications equipment interoperability issues will typically challenge multinational forces.

2. **TDLs** provide a standardized communication link capability suitable for transmission of digital information. This is a key communication capability for effective PR C2 and successful accomplishment of the PR execution tasks. Without data links, the user would be required to revert to voice systems, possibly compromising recovery operations or the location of isolated personnel, due to the substantial difference in transmission times. Data link network capacity should take into consideration the number and variance of terminals (US and multinational) in a geographic area, and the gateways should allow interoperability among new, emerging gateways to/from other communications networks.

(c) **Fuel and Refueling.** Interoperable fuel and refueling equipment should be considered during PR planning. Cross-tasking of PR assets, particularly helicopters, may result in unanticipated fuel requirements. Refueling interoperability requirements include both ground and aerial refueling considerations. Nozzles, fittings, and couplings vary among Service helicopters. Cross-tasking of helicopters for PR may also require cross-tasking of refueling support (ground and/or aerial) for these aircraft. Various ground vehicles also have different fuel and lubricant requirements that should be considered.

(d) **Maps and Charts.** Maps and charts play a key role in the planning and execution of recovery operations. The necessity for PR planners, isolated personnel, and operators to use the same map or chart series or geodetic datum (i.e., World Geodetic System-84, digital point positioning database) is particularly crucial to effective and timely operations coordination, aircrew flying safety, and a successful PR mission. With a search capability already limited by scarce resources and probably further debilitated by hostile capabilities and intent, it is essential that forces use the same reference points and same reference system (e.g., grid or latitude and longitude, to include coordinate format) for ingress, recovery, and egress.

(2) **Assets and Availability.** Planners should identify the PR resources, delivery date, and employment location that will be required for a particular operation and ensure these requirements are supported by the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Integration of Service and component warfighting requirements with PR requirements avoids duplication of effort, establishes complementary systems, and exploits unique and specialized resources. Interoperability of dissimilar joint force assets is essential to safe and successful recovery operations. Commanders should ensure the force flow includes mission capable PR forces commensurate with the risks of incurring an isolating event. Commanders should efficiently employ a broad range of PR abilities that may consist of forces that:

(a) Are specifically organized, trained, and equipped for PR and identified to the JFC by their component commander as the PR force for planning purposes. Identified forces should include dedicated component PR coordination elements, if established.

(b) Have not been designated as primary PR assets but, because their capabilities can be applied to PR situations, have been identified as the assets to be tasked, if required.

(c) Are not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for PR, but have a recognized ability to perform some elements of the five PR execution tasks.

(3) **Force Placement.** Precautionary planning involves the pre-positioning of PR aircraft, ships, or ground forces and facilities close to an area most likely to have a PR incident before an operation commences. The planning of precautionary PR is usually done by the JPRC, PRCC, or operations staff with PR expertise and background. Precautionary PR planning may also be conducted concurrently with mission planning or as a corollary planning effort when one joint force or component is tasked to provide PR support to another joint force or component. Options should also be established to support an unsuccessful recovery that requires an additional PR mission. Precautionary postures include the following:

(a) **Lifeguard.** Naval vessels may be pre-positioned along ingress and egress routes for rescue purposes when the mission indicates a potential need for waterborne assistance or the PR function is compatible with, or becomes the primary assigned mission of, a submarine or surface vessel. Vessels, when involved with recovery operations, maintain the vessel voice call sign “Lifeguard.” Aircraft providing cover for a Lifeguard vessel should establish contact immediately upon arriving on station and then, when practical, search the area around the Lifeguard’s position for adversary vessels. An aircraft commander involved with recovery operations who wants to establish communications with an unknown Lifeguard vessel will maintain the aircraft voice call sign “Rescue.” A Lifeguard vessel commander who wants to establish communications with an unknown PR aircraft should use the voice call sign “Rescue.”

(b) **Duckbutt** is a precautionary PR procedure normally used in environments where the risk from adversary threats is low. Aircraft are positioned along

or over a water route to provide a recovery resource if required, support deployment of single-engine aircraft, or meet other specialized situations. Duckbutts often are used as a precaution when single-engine aircraft, or aircraft with certain very important persons aboard, have to cross large bodies of water, in the event the pilot has to ditch the aircraft. Duckbutts should be multi-place aircraft with sufficient endurance and refueling, communication, airdrop, and navigational capabilities to support recovery requirements. If unable to effect the extraction of isolated personnel, duckbutt aircrews should be prepared to locate isolated personnel; airdrop survival equipment, medical supplies and pararescuemen or equivalent; and coordinate additional PR assets. Commanders are responsible for coordinating duckbutt support with the component PRCC or JPRC.

(c) **Airborne Alert.** Suitable fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters when practicable, may be tasked to provide PR airborne alert in support of operations. These aircraft should monitor operating frequencies and may function as the mission coordination platform to coordinate recovery operations. Supporting PR aircraft should establish radio contact with the JPRC or PRCC immediately upon departure from their home stations. If extraction is not imminent, recovery forces should avoid compromising the isolated personnel's position. Airborne alert locations should be outside the threat area and should not compromise PR mission intentions. Recovery helicopters may land in a permissive area and maintain a listening watch through airborne platforms or SATCOM networks. Planners using air recovery assets should consider the feasibility of establishing clandestine forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) when aerial refueling might be too hazardous to risk.

(d) **Quick Response Posture (QRP).** Trained and proficient combat and support forces should be fueled, armed, and positioned (strip alert, maneuver force) for rapid employment in support of PR missions to the maximum extent possible, based on mission constraints. A QRP can be accomplished from main operating bases or with forces pre-positioned at forward operating locations (e.g., FARP, forward operating base, holding area) near combat operations. This may include staging the forces physically in their vehicles or aircraft with the engines running. Though response time is decreased, a QRP can adversely impact force endurance over extended periods of time.

(4) **IO** assists in implementing PR communication synchronization and supports the PR support and recovery execution tasks. Information-related capabilities integrated by IO are complemented by a set of capabilities such as MISO, MILDEC, OPSEC, cyberspace operations, electronic warfare (EW), civil-military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy. Planning and execution of PR should consider the following aspects of these capabilities:

(a) MISO forces conduct information-related activities to influence relevant populations to report information about isolated personnel, support PR activities, and deny support to adversaries. These forces provide commanders a means to communicate with local populations and isolated personnel. These forces inform the populace on the benefits of noninterference with PR efforts and providing support and protection of isolated personnel. The staff planners coordinate with the joint rescue center to ensure information activities are integrated into PR plans.



Surface vessel performing precautionary personnel recovery with helicopter assistance.

For further information, see JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

(b) MILDEC may be used to deny adversaries knowledge of recovery activities.

(c) OPSEC may be used to deny adversaries knowledge of PR plans and recovery activities.

(d) Cyberspace operations may be used to monitor adversary computer activities for activities for PR-related information.

(e) Combat camera may be used to document recovery missions and sensitive site exploitations.

(f) EW consists of electronic warfare support (ES), electronic attack, and electronic protection (EP). Electronic attack may be used to deny the adversary use of the electromagnetic spectrum to detect and locate isolated personnel and recovery forces. EP guarantees the use of the electromagnetic spectrum by isolated personnel, coordinating agencies, and recovery forces. ES may also be employed to determine if the adversary is discussing the isolated event or isolated person in their communications.

(g) CMO may be used to gain the support of influential HN leaders and encourage the local population to aid isolated personnel and report their location. The civil- military operations center (CMOC) can provide immediate contact and coordination with NGOs, IGOs, and indigenous populations and institutions, working

within the operational area. These established relationships can be leveraged for an immediate and effective response to assist in certain PR operations, reducing the time to respond to the situation. The civil information compiled by the civil information cell at the CMOC can provide detailed information on the infrastructure, cultural composition, and networks that can support the commander's course of action (COA) in response to a PR operation. The CMOC can be used as an alternate meeting location with influential HN leaders if the PRCC/JPRC is not an acceptable place for the meeting site by HN officials. The CMOC can provide anonymity to a meeting of this nature.

(5) PA may garner support for PR activities by negating adversarial propaganda through the reporting of actual facts. PA is used to educate friendly forces on PR activities and prevent individual isolation. The PAO develops guidance for media release of information that protects against inadvertent disclosure of information that could increase the risk to the lives of isolated personnel or negatively affect the national will. The JPRC, PRCCs, reintegration teams, and the PAO should collaborate to release information about PR activities in a deliberate, controlled manner that will not bring harm to isolated personnel. Consider the ramification of a well-meaning friend immediately notifying the isolated person's family by cell phone. The family will probably request confirmation from authorities, which may alert the media and in turn alert adversarial forces in the objective area. Specific identifying information on isolated personnel or events will not be released to the media while planning or conducting recovery operations. IAW the DOD *Personnel Recovery Strategic Communication Guidance*, Annex D, "Quick Reference Guide for National Capital Region Decision Makers during an Isolating Event," the agent responsible for PR is also responsible for the public release of information. Information may be released to the media after recovery is complete, and then only when approved by the appropriate commander, JPRC, and PAO.

(6) **Operational Limitations.** Typical PR operational constraints include a limited capability of airborne assets to conduct searches in uncertain or hostile operational environments. Although ground force search capabilities are not as limited, PR-dedicated resources in forces, to include shortages of personnel knowledgeable in PR to staff the JPRC, PRCCs, and PR liaisons are. Alternate COAs should be developed to overcome these operational limitations. The use of ground forces can serve to overcome some of them. Armored vehicles increase survivability and have extensive "loiter" time. The exact location of the isolated personnel is not always an absolute requirement for ground forces as they can move into, or through, an area searching for an isolated person and can stay until they are withdrawn, depending on the nature of the threat.

(a) **Search Capabilities.** Sensor searches or monitoring for radio and beacon transmissions by standoff airborne platforms, UASs, intratheater aircraft engaged in ongoing air operations, and/or satellites should be considered and planned, as appropriate. In some cases aerial, ground, or sea search cannot be conducted; increasingly sophisticated weapons, especially air defense weapons available to military forces worldwide, including insurgents and terrorists, make extended searches by aircraft for isolated personnel in adversary-held territory highly prohibitive. However, ground combat forces can greatly increase the search capabilities of an organization. For example, a Bradley, Stryker, or Abrams battalion conducting a movement to contact to

link up with isolated personnel has robust firepower, survivability, and staying ability. Time constraints for a successful rescue should be weighed against the risk of sending personnel or assets into a hostile environment.

(b) **PR-Dedicated/Capable Resources.** The ability of the Services to deploy PR-dedicated/capable forces and PR coordination elements may be constrained by the combination of time and priorities to meet all mission requirements, synchronizing force deployment with other competing interests in a TPFDD, PR-dedicated/capable forces engaged in other operations, and readiness conditions. To mitigate these constraints, JFCs may consider coding PR requirements on the TPFDD to enable the extraction of that data for comparison to the flow of the other forces and scheduling PR deployments to properly support the force.

(7) Intelligence

(a) Determining and Managing Intelligence Requirements

1. **Connectivity.** Intelligence personnel supporting the JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC need direct access to dedicated intelligence communications systems with connectivity among intelligence entities from national to unit level.

a. **Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS).** All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels will be primarily via JWICS and SIPRNET. Security and facility constraints permitting, a JDISS terminal should be colocated with, or in close proximity to, the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC.

b. **SIPRNET.** Because JWICS is a dedicated intelligence network operating at the sensitive compartmented information level, much of the information carried on it is not available to operational users reliant on SIPRNET systems. Regardless of the proximity of JWICS terminals to PR C2 nodes, intelligence personnel should act as a bridge between the two networks and ensure that commanders and forces have the information they need. Intelligence products and analysis disseminated via JWICS should be replicated on SIPRNET, within security restrictions, to afford maximum utility to the end users.

2. **UASs** are capable of providing multi-intelligence sensor streaming video in real time of an objective area. Depending on system capabilities this can range from a few to thousands of miles from home base with short to long loiter times. This resource and other intelligence collection capabilities could provide PR mission planners with key information on the adversary, shape planning and decision making, and pinpoint the location of isolated personnel.

3. **Surveillance and Reconnaissance.** The JPRC should be prepared to coordinate with appropriate elements, such as the joint collection management board, and JAOC (if established), to conduct air, ground, amphibious, electronic, surveillance,

reconnaissance, etc., as dictated by the threat, environment, and time requirements to locate isolated personnel.

For further guidance regarding intelligence support to joint operations, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

4. Requests for Information (RFIs). The intelligence organizations supporting the command PR OPR, the JPRC, component PRCCs, UARCC, and PR-capable units submit formal RFIs to higher echelons to satisfy intelligence requirements that exceed local capabilities and resources. Responses should be tailored to the needs of the requestor and be timely, accurate, and in a usable format. Formal RFIs will be submitted and tracked using the community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers (COLISEUM) to facilitate visibility at all levels of command, including critical, time-sensitive RFIs in support of an emergent PR incident. Direct point-to-point exchanges of information should be followed up with record communications and documented in COLISEUM as soon as time permits.

For further information regarding RFIs from national agencies, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

(b) **Intelligence Planning.** Intelligence planning produces multiple products to meet the supported commander's requirements and supports the commander's top priority plans. The intelligence planning process will result in intelligence estimates from DIA and the CCMD, a CCMD-developed annex B (Intelligence), Defense Intelligence Enterprise supporting plans, and the annual joint intelligence posture assessment. The CCMD intelligence estimate will be a conglomeration of the JIPOE products produced by CCMD analysts. Intelligence directorates of a joint staff (J-2s) at the CCMD level lead development of annex B, which is the intelligence annex to a plan that includes the intelligence estimate, establishes intelligence priorities, assigns intelligence tasks, requests support from higher echelons, describes the concept of intelligence operations, and specifies intelligence procedures. Both products will be essential to the PR planner to determine any PR-specific gaps and to identify requirements.

(c) **Intelligence Products**

1. JIOC or JISE personnel will store intelligence products and reports for command or theater access on the CCMD or theater J-2 website. These products will be focused on supporting the CCIRs and subsequent PIRs and contribute to producing the JIPOE products. PR planners should be able to use the JIPOE products to answer the majority of their requirements for planning, but will most likely need to submit PR-specific requirements detailing gaps within the JIPOE through the CCMD or JTF established RFI process.

2. The IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell provides a variety of pre-capture and post-capture intelligence products that address PR threats, captive and hostage TTP,

assessed detention locations, intelligence support products for NAR, and other tailored products in support of planning and operations. These products are aligned with the POW/MIA Analytic Cell's congressional, Director of National Intelligence, and DOD mandates.

(d) **Intelligence Support.** Current intelligence briefings, situation displays, and intelligence documents should be available to recovery forces early in the mission planning process. Planned PR mission go/no-go criteria should be developed based upon an assessment of adversary capabilities and weather effects in order to characterize the environment and to formulate measures that mitigate the threat. PR procedures published in the PR portion of operating instructions should incorporate intelligence to establish effective communications/signaling procedures and recommendations that avoid adversary exploitation.

(8) **Authentication.** There are multiple ways to authenticate the friendly status/identity of an isolated individual such as challenge and password; numbers, letters, and words of the day; far and near recognition signals; specific code words; and ISOPREPs and biometric data. Each system for authentication has specific TTP and should be reviewed by individuals and recovery forces as part of mission preparation.

(a) ISOPREP information should be durable, providing usable authentication during multiple or future recovery attempts. This is best accomplished by initially providing recovery forces with only two facts from the ISOPREP leaving the remaining information for future missions. Isolated personnel should not provide, nor be asked to provide, any full ISOPREP item during a given recovery. Recovery forces in contact with an isolated person, but unsure of the individual's identity, should ask a question derived from a portion of the four-digit number, or a portion of one of the two authentication statements being used. The best methods are adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing two of the digits, or asking a question using a single element from one of the statements. Examples: If the evader's ISOPREP number is 8147, then a question is "Subtract your third digit from your first digit," and the evader should respond with "4." If the evader's first ISOPREP statement reads, "My first dog was a three-legged, yellow, Labrador retriever named Lucky," then a question is "What color was your first dog?" and the response should be "yellow." This allows for maximum use of the ISOPREP information, while minimizing the compromise of that information.

1. During initial contact, forces may need to validate their own authenticity to the isolated person prior to obtaining further information. Forces can do this by using the personal authentication statement. This method allows the recovery force to identify itself by providing information from the isolated person's ISOPREP. Using the statement above, the recovery force could authenticate themselves to the isolated person by saying "Your first dog had three legs." Another method is to use the isolated person's authentication number. For example, "Jack one zero, this is Jolly five zero. The sum of your first and third numbers is 12."

2. ISOPREP data can be used effectively to validate instructions to the isolated person. If adversary forces are attempting to deceive the isolated person with

false radio calls, the PR force can instruct the individual to follow only instructions accompanied by valid combinations of the authentication number. For example, “Pop smoke when I say the sum of your first and third number.”

(b) **Theater Code Words.** The JPRC should develop **standardized operational codes and symbols** for PR purposes. These usually are in the form of a PR word, letter, duress number, color of the day, week, or month; challenge and password; or near and far recognition signals, and are published in the operation and mission orders and instructions throughout the operational area. The JPRC should coordinate with PRCCs and multinational liaisons to ensure mechanisms are in place to provide published PR information to all forces. Consideration should be given to classification, releasability, and dissemination of this information to multinational forces that have a need to know. The use of these daily or frequently changed codes can provide immediate authentication of isolated personnel. When using a word of the day, using just one of the letters can extend durability of the code. For example if the word of the day is “BOXER,” a quick authentication can be made by the recovery force asking the evader, “The third letter of the word of the day is X- RAY, what is the second letter?” The evader should respond, “OSCAR.” This authenticates the recovery force to the evader while having the evader authenticate back.

(c) **Local Authentication Codes.** This authentication method is often used by forces when codes are not disseminated through operating instructions. JFCs should recognize the potential for confusion when local authentication codes are implemented, and should pursue a policy that standardizes the use of ISOPREPs and codes published in operational instructions. If local authentication codes are absolutely necessary, they should be passed by the originating unit to the component PRCC and JPRC. Local authentication codes for long-term evaders should be kept on file with the parent unit and component PRCC.

(9) **Communication Plan.** An effective communication plan is an important part of a successful recovery operation. A generic recovery communication plan should be developed for the operational area and distributed through the ATO SPINS or other appropriate mechanism. To the maximum extent possible, all recovery forces should be secure voice capable (see Figure V-2).

(10) **Contractors**

(a) All CAAF are subject to individual personnel accountability standards; are required to meet specified deployment preparation requirements; and will be provided requisite government furnished support as identified in the contract. US citizens and third country national contractor employees, who are not normal residents of the operational area, will normally be afforded CAAF status. It is also possible, depending on command guidance, selected mission essential local national contractor employees may also be afforded CAAF status.

(b) GCCs should identify specific PR-related contractor policies and requirements in the OPLAN/OPORD for selected CAAF personnel.




Figure V-2. Sample Personnel Recovery Task Force Communications Plan

For further information on CAAF, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

(11) **HN.** HNs generally have “first right of refusal” for operations occurring within their sovereign borders, requiring close coordination between the JFC and each HN. Typically, this coordination is accomplished through the COM. COMs have authority over, and responsibility for, all USG elements in country, other than those under the authority of the GCC. The SDO/DATT and chief of the SCO is the COM’s principal

military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission, and the single POC for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. Limitations such as ROE, sharing of information with HN agencies, language differences, equipment differences, and cultural differences can further complicate a JFC's effort to recover isolated personnel. During PR planning, planners incorporate a number of factors into their PR staff estimates.

(a) What non-DOD personnel will require PR coverage? During a foreign humanitarian assistance mission, for example, the pool of potential isolated personnel increases from primarily military members to include IGO/NGO American citizens and citizens from other nations.

(b) What authorities does the CCDR have to execute PR? In some instances, HN governments may allow limited PR operations. In other cases, the HN may insist that its own capabilities act as the primary responders for isolated personnel (e.g., law enforcement, military).

(c) What authorities does a JFC have to contact HN government capabilities directly? Typically, a PRCC/JPRC will coordinate HN law enforcement capabilities through the COM's RSO, while the SDO/DATT can provide coordination with HN military capability. In some instances, a JFC may be granted DIRLAUTH to coordinate directly with HN PR capabilities.

(d) What information will be shared? Information over-classification could inhibit the ability to coordinate PR with HN and interagency partners. In some instances, military personnel may be conducting operations in a foreign nation without the umbrella of a JTF. In these cases, preplanning with the embassy becomes paramount. Prevention of isolating events by incorporating a robust FP effort is a critical factor in PR planning. Coordination with CCMD or JTF FP element, the local RSO, and the SDO/DATT can establish both a FP plan to prevent PR as well as preplanned COAs in the event of an isolating event.

(12) **NGOs.** Although a part of the civil option, exploitation of NGOs' capabilities may offer the JFC a PR force multiplier. PR planning should include NGO considerations and the coordination processes and responsibilities for diplomatic support to PR. Diplomacy can emphasize agreements that can affect isolated personnel (e.g., Geneva and Hague Conventions) and implement negotiations that directly accomplish the recovery of isolated personnel. Members of NGOs are also susceptible to isolation, and planners should consider the effect of their isolation and/or capture, especially if depending on the NGO for assistance with US or multinational isolating events. Remember that many NGOs are reluctant to conduct business with, or ask for assistance from, military organizations, fearing a compromise to their neutrality or impartiality.

6. Personnel Recovery Mission Planning and Execution

a. **PR Mission Decision Making.** Commanders and staffs from joint to unit levels need to develop a systematic process to enhance decision making during a PR mission and develop a battle-rhythm between C2 nodes. The decision process will be improved as PR missions are completed and updated as personnel, resources, environmental, and other factors change. A decision process tool, whether it is a flow chart (e.g., go/no-go) or procedure document, will guide decision makers from the time a report of isolated personnel is received through the reintegration of those personnel. A decision process allows some criteria to be decided in advance and provides a reminder (checklist) of other items that should be remembered during times of crisis. See Figure V-3 for an example of a decision flow chart. This preplanned decision map assists commanders in developing and delegating launch and execute criteria. Recovery forces normally are not committed until after successful authentication. Further, recovery forces normally will not enter a hostile operational environment until the location and authentication of isolated personnel has been verified and recovery is feasible.

(1) Essential Information

(a) **Communication.** To permit interaction and coordination with available recovery forces, JFCs should ensure all personnel at risk of isolation have access to appropriate contacts, communications procedures, and survival equipment. Commanders should also ensure these personnel are updated in a timely manner as changes occur in the operational recovery environment. This element includes information on how and when isolated personnel are communicating, their ability to communicate with recovery forces (secure or nonsecure), present situation, and other essential data. For example:

1. Contact radio frequency, call sign, and date/time group of call.
2. Day and time of incident.
3. Cause of the isolation event.
4. Type/number/color of downed aircraft or disabled/hijacked vehicle to include last known location, speed, and course/direction.
5. Number of isolated personnel.
6. Departure points, rally points, traffic control points, phase lines, and last known location.

(b) **Authentication.** Authentication will continuously assure the decision maker and recovery forces that isolated personnel are an identifiable friendly target not under duress. This is an important element when identifying adversary ruses or tactics using isolated personnel as bait. Authentication information can be acquired using ISOPREP data or, if not available, other information provided by isolated personnel's organization.




Figure V-3. Sample Personnel Recovery Decision Flow Chart

(c) **Location.** Accurate information on the location and physical condition of isolated personnel prior to launching a recovery mission is critical. The degree of

accuracy required will depend on the threat or other risk to search/recovery forces; planners can better task organize the recovery force, identify special equipment and personnel requirements, and plan ingress and egress routes. There are many ways to determine the isolated person's location, with varying degrees of accuracy. They are discussed in detail in Section B, "Locate," of Chapter VI, "Execution."

(d) **Intentions.** An EPA or contingency plan such as ISG or "Lost Marine" plan may provide an indication of what the isolated personnel will do in an isolating incident. Isolated personnel may not follow their EPA for many reasons, such as confusion, enemy, threat, stress, etc., and therefore the EPA should not be used exclusively. Direct communications with isolated personnel are preferred, whenever possible.

(e) **Condition.** Planners should identify requirements for special equipment and personnel and considerations for recovery force egress routes conducive to ambulatory or non-ambulatory isolated personnel. The isolated personnel's ability to move to meet recovery forces should also be considered.

(f) **Situation.** This includes adversary activity, OPSEC concerns, terrain, climate and weather information, and astronomical conditions.

1. Climate and weather information including temperature, precipitation, humidity, visibility at ground level, predicted winds, fog, cloud cover, dust storms, radio frequency propagation, and other hazards to survival and recovery will have a great effect on PR mission planning and execution. The decision maker will use this information to determine the impact on the conduct, timing, and tempo of PR missions.

2. Astronomical conditions including sunrise, sunset, moonrise, phases of the moon, predicted ambient light, and hydrographic data affect recovery operations much the same as weather and also play an important role in the timing and tempo of PR missions.

(2) **PR Operational Risk Management.** Recovery operations should not normally risk isolating additional combat personnel, preclude execution of higher priority missions, routinely expose certain unique assets to unduly high risk, divert critically needed forces from ongoing operations, or cause loss of operational initiative. Commanders at all levels should carefully evaluate these factors before ordering or authorizing a PR effort.

(3) **PR Threat Decision Matrix.** PR threat decision charts (see Figure V-3) provide commanders with a framework for identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks arising from operational factors and make informed decisions about recovery operations that balance risk with mission benefits. Recovery forces may consist of individual or a combination of components including airborne, surface, and/or subsurface resources. Recovery forces can be affected by multiple operational factors and threats such as geography, adversary weapons systems and tactics, weather, etc. However, the operational factors and threats will not affect all components of a recovery force equally.

Therefore, each component will develop a PR threat decision matrix tailored to the current threat analysis and type of resource used for identifying go/no-go and abort decision points. The components forward their PR threat decision matrices to the JPRC to help PR planners understand the interrelationships of the various component resources.

b. Considerations During Development of Recovery Courses of Action

(1) **Recovery Force Selection.** Commanders and their staffs should be knowledgeable of the type and characteristics of the resources that can be used for recovery operations, and their unique capabilities and limitations in order to properly employ them. This in-depth knowledge also enables commanders and recovery planners to quickly develop alternative COAs in response to changing scenarios. In addition, the following considerations could affect the selection of an appropriate recovery force:

(a) **Activate Alert Forces.** Alert forces can be activated to execute the preplanned PR mission if decision makers are satisfied that the appropriate execute criteria have been met (i.e., communication, authentication, location, intentions, condition, and situation [CALICS] and the results of the decision process).

(b) **Divert Forces from Other Missions.** In some cases, forces assigned to other missions may be diverted to effect an immediate recovery. This option can be applied when the diverted forces are familiar with PR TTP and/or have conducted PR plan briefings as part of their primary mission, or the risk (decision process) associated with an ad hoc mission is considered acceptable.

(c) The **tactics, training, capabilities, and limitations** of available recovery or supporting forces.

(d) **Capacity.** Recovery forces and assets are based or pre-positioned in locations where they are expected to most effectively facilitate recovery operations. Since individuals are often isolated in unexpected areas and numbers, in some cases the capacity of available recovery forces may be inadequate for the number of isolated personnel. Commanders should be prepared to reallocate recovery assets to compensate for this imbalance or to establish priorities to determine which categories of isolated personnel will be recovered.

(e) **Other Combat Operations.** Other ongoing combat operations often contribute to a PR mission by diverting adversary activity from the area of the PR incident or by providing on-scene resources that may either complement a PR effort or conduct the recovery. Examples include aircraft returning with unexpended ordnance, airborne C2 platforms, Bradley-equipped brigade combat teams, and surface supporting arms within range of the PR objective. Any deconfliction between PR events and ground operations must be coordinated by the PRCC through the theater air support operations center (ASOC) if one is in operation.

(f) **Location of orbits** for support aircraft such as EW, aerial refueling, and airborne C2 platforms are often required for PR missions. Because these assets are

normally employed in a standoff role, range and altitude capabilities of threat systems will affect the usefulness of these support platforms.

(g) **Supporting Arms.** The development of supporting arms requirements and subsequent supporting arms coordination are often factors in PR mission planning. Units capable of conducting recovery operations will develop appropriate fire support coordinating measures to safeguard friendly forces and provide responsive support to recovery operations.

(2) **Selection of Recovery Site.** Local conditions should be considered as exploitable, surmountable factors rather than absolute barriers to success. Considerations in the selection of a recovery site include whether there is air, land, or maritime access to the site, the location of the site from friendly, neutral, or adversary controlled territory, and the need to get diplomatic clearance to gain access.

(3) **Airspace and Ground Operation Deconfliction.** The PRTF commander, in coordination with the JPRC and PRCC, should deconflict both ground and airspace activities with PR mission plans to ensure safety and prevent adverse effects on other combat operations. JPRC and PRCC planners can prepare some deconfliction actions in advance by considering artillery fire zones, amphibious objective areas (AOAs), strike aircraft airflow patterns, no fire zones, restricted fire zones, altitude restrictions, and unit boundaries in ground recoveries. Coordination with the airspace control authority and reference to the airspace control order is essential to deconflicting joint air operations. The JPRC and component PRCCs normally visualize spatial relationships by including the following on their situation maps:

(a) Adversary threat order of battle, disposition of friendly forces, and locations of future targets.

(b) Information from the airspace control order, to include planned PR mission routes or waypoints, bullseye, and search and rescue point (SARDOT).

DECONFLICTING PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS FROM OTHER ONGOING MILITARY ACTIONS AND EVENTS—THE LEGACY OF BAT 21

On 2 April 1972, North Vietnamese forces shot down a USAF [United States Air Force] EB-66, call sign–Bat 21, with an SA-2 missile while it conducted electronic reconnaissance near the small village of Cam Lo in northern South Vietnam. One crewmember, the navigator, Bat 21 Bravo, survived and parachuted into a raging battle between advancing North Vietnamese mechanized forces and defending South Vietnamese units. This was the opening battle of the “Easter Offensive,” one of the largest battles of the war. Over the next 16 days, multiple recovery attempts for Bat 21 Bravo and additional survivors from four other aircraft downed while supporting the overall effort occurred as the larger melee between north and south raged on.

The rescue forces utilized standardized tactics developed from earlier operations in theater, and commanders diverted over 800 air sorties to directly support the recovery efforts. However, such tactics were clearly insufficient for dealing with such a large mechanized enemy force and failed to account for the changing battle space and increased threat environment. During the recovery attempts, eleven Americans were killed, and two were taken prisoner. Reviewing the results of the failed efforts, COMUSMACV, [Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] General Creighton Abrams forbade any additional rescue attempts by helicopter. Subsequently, a joint/combined Special Forces team was inserted to rescue Bat 21 Bravo and one other airman.

This complex series of events highlighted several key issues:

The importance of adjusting operational plans to accommodate a complex and evolving operational area through preparation and planning.

The use of threat assessment techniques and intelligence preparation of the battlefield to shape the battle space and to determine the most cost-effective courses of actions.

Little coordination between rescue missions and the larger battle took place and no priority of effort was established. Therefore, South Vietnamese ground forces could not take full advantage of the voluminous US airstrikes conducted near their front lines.

An ill-timed restricted operating zone established to protect the rescue forces further interfered with defensive operations on the ground and facilitated the North Vietnamese crossing of a key bridge that was not destroyed in a timely manner.

South Vietnamese commanders questioned the efficacy of doing so much for one American airman when the ground forces were taking such heavy losses.

After the rescue operations were concluded, the larger battle continued unabated, and South Vietnamese forces were eventually driven south from their defensive line.

Source: Darrel Whitcomb, *The Rescue of Bat 21*, US Naval Institute Press, 1998

(c) Location of orbits for support aircraft such as EW, aerial refueling, and airborne C2 platforms often required for PR missions.

(d) Location of ground force established FARPs.

For further guidance on airspace deconfliction, refer to JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

(4) **PR Mission Planning Checklist.** A sample checklist for PR mission planning is provided in Annex A, “Personnel Recovery Task Force Mission Planning Checklist,” to Appendix F, “Sample Checklists.” Forces conducting PR missions should develop comprehensive and highly detailed mission checklists.

(5) **PR Mission Execution Decision.** Based on the PR command authorities established, a commander’s awareness of the situation, and level of confidence in CALICS, recovery forces can be launched and/or given an execute order at any time after a PR incident report is received.

(a) **Immediate.** Immediate PR mission responses generally use available assets that are in the immediate vicinity of the isolated person’s location, on alert, or can be expediently diverted from other missions.

(b) **Deliberate.** The threat, asset availability, current operations, and isolated personnel situation may preclude using an immediate PR response option in favor of more detailed planning and real-time intelligence information. Consequently, the PR mission coordinator will need to plan and organize a deliberate PR response that could involve the creation of a recovery force comprised of assets from a single component, joint or multinational forces, or multi-agency organizations.

(c) **Hold.** A PR mission placed on “hold” status typically reflects a lack of confidence in the accuracy of, or amount of, data collected on CALICS, and/or the outcome of the decision-making process does not meet the criteria to execute the mission (e.g., the location of isolated personnel is unknown and there is no contact). Missions also may be placed in a “hold” status by the CDR due to overriding political concerns, or to preclude compromise of strategic or operational objectives. Every incident placed in this category should remain open and be continuously reviewed until the isolated personnel have been recovered or declared dead by the appropriate authorities. It is possible for isolated personnel to survive for long periods of time, or escape captivity, before finally making contact with friendly forces.

(6) **PR Mission Closure.** A PR mission is closed when the death of an isolated person is confirmed or when the recovered isolated person has been reintegrated. A report of “no chute seen” or “duty status-whereabouts unknown” is not justification for closing the PR mission. If the JFC has exhausted all means to locate and recover an isolated person and the case is still open, the JPRC should formally transfer it to DPAA for final resolution IAW established procedures normally developed by DPAA for transferring POW or unaccounted for personnel information. If a recovered isolated person is returned to duty at the end of reintegration phases I or II, or once a JFC transfers the person back to their Service for phase III, the JPRC will close the case folder and transfer it to the JPRA, when no longer needed in theater by JPRC, or operations cease, whichever is sooner. The JFC provides a copy of the file to the Service personnel or casualty branch. The JPRA will continue to monitor and assist the Services with phase III reintegration of returned isolated personnel from theater.

(7) **Mission Reports.** All data connected with a specific mission will be consolidated into one PR mission package and sent to the JPRA for archival purposes. The AAR and LL will be provided to joint and Service LL databases by the JFC.

CHAPTER VI EXECUTION

“In critical and baffling situations, it is always best to return to first principle and simple action.”

**Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill
(1874–1965)**

1. Introduction

Successful execution of PR missions requires creativity, improvisation, and real-time intelligence, even when forces are well-trained, prepared, and pre-positioned. Commanders and staffs, forces, and personnel at risk of isolation should use the following validated procedures and techniques to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.

SECTION A. REPORT

2. Distress Notification

a. The report task begins with the recognition of an isolation event and ends when appropriate C2 authorities are informed. JFCs may be notified of a PR requirement through any means within the joint or component force C2 structure. A receiving entity should confirm a distress notification. The distress indicator may be detected by multiple assets, each relaying the incident directly to the PRCC or JPRC, causing multiple reports of the same incident. Be aware that adversaries may employ counter-PR techniques to lure assets to an ambush. Confirmation of actual reported PR events is essential to protect recovery forces. The report task may be accomplished by the JPRC or PRCC as a result of active coordination with other staff sections. For example, reports may come through personnel or logistical channels that suggest that a member of the organization is missing.

b. **Determining Method of Notification.** The communication method or device used to generate the notification, either by the observer or the isolated personnel, is an important piece of information and can be an important element of the locate task and the recovery planning. It can let the recovery force know what kind of communication capability the individual does or does not have, affecting their actions once the individual is located.

3. Notification Methods and Procedures

a. **Methods.** Notifications fall into two general categories: observer-reported and self-reported.

(1) **Observer-Reported.** Any ground or maritime unit, agency, aircrew, or individual observing an isolation event, making contact with isolated personnel, or recognizing a potential isolating event is about to occur should immediately notify their appropriate C2 elements. An observer report is either a positive action such as a radio

call or a negative activity such as the failure to return from a mission. A report should be made by potential isolated personnel, for example, when aircrews detect significant aircraft problems, or bailout, ejection, crash landing, or ditching appear imminent; or when ground personnel sense being lost or cut off from other friendly forces. The opportunity to report after the event has happened may be hindered by lost or damaged communications equipment or because of incapacitation or capture.

(a) The observer should attempt to establish radio contact with isolated personnel by using established radio procedures on the frequency of last contact, an established common frequency, or the international emergency frequencies.

(b) When communication is established, obtain and retransmit essential information such as location, call sign, number of individuals, and health status. These elements of information help establish an accurate location of the isolated personnel, their status, and their environment. All transmissions with the isolated personnel should be as brief as possible.

(2) **Self-Reported.** The ideal method to validate the occurrence of an isolation event and to convey the accurate location and physical health of the isolated person is through self-reporting by the isolated person. All personnel should attempt to report their situation as soon as possible after an isolation event occurs with consideration given to the environment, avoiding adversary threats, and not compromising the security of the contact area. Isolated personnel should attempt to establish radio contact with any friendly forces in the area (wingman, squad, unit, aircraft, vessel, etc.). Mission orders and instructions dictate local notification methods and procedures. Transmissions should be brief to avoid detection or localization by hostile forces. Isolated personnel should generally not display international distress signals or transmit blind distress calls unless pre-briefed to do so or if forces in the immediate vicinity are known to be friendly (e.g., permissive environment).

(a) **Signaling.** Isolated personnel should attempt to report their situation by any means available. However, radio transmissions, visual signals, or other predetermined methods should only be employed after assessing the adversary's ability to intercept and the ability of friendly forces to receive the distress signal. In some circumstances (i.e., radio silence procedures), visual signals may be the best (or only) way to communicate with friendly forces. Information on ground-to-air signals (GTAS) should also be available in common signaling instructions.

(b) **Emergency PLB.** Some personnel may possess an emergency PLB. The PLB should only be used as directed, as it is susceptible to adversary direction finding (DF). Personnel should register all PLBs in the Joint Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking Electronic Tracking System (JSETS) before use in any operational area. Additionally, personnel should annotate their ISOPREP/EPA with the PLB unique ID number and inform their PRCC that they are deploying with the device. During the months prior to a deployment into theater, PRCC directors should begin accounting for and registration of the PLBs that will be or are active within their

operational area. The JSETS PLB registration site is <https://prmsglobal.prms.af.mil/PRMS215/Login/start.aspx>.

b. Responsibilities

(1) **Emergency Frequency Monitoring.** If equipped, all forces should monitor emergency frequencies and acknowledge, record, and relay distress transmissions. The forces receiving isolated personnel emergency transmissions should transmit their location to the C2 nodes at time of receipt.

(2) **Communications Relay.** Any friendly force receiving information about potential isolating events or isolated personnel should forward the details (by secure means if possible) to the nearest C2 authority (e.g., Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS], local unit, E-2C, control and reporting center, component PRCC, or the JPRC). Extreme care should be taken to ensure the isolated personnel's situation is not compromised, and that relay transmissions do not interfere with distress calls.

(3) **OSC.** Reporting forces may assume the role of the OSC and should remain in the area as conditions permit or until relieved or replaced by the rescue mission commander (RMC) or other forces. (See OSC responsibilities in Section D, "Recover.") Forces should be sensitive to compromising the isolated person's position to adversary forces. The reporting/supporting forces, if capable, should:

(a) Keep personnel or equipment in sight.

(b) Note the current location of, or last known location of, the isolation site. In case of pilot ejection, note the approximate ejection site and winds at altitude so PR planners can compute the isolated person's probable landing position.

(c) During radio communication with the isolated person, recommend switching the isolated individual to a discrete frequency. Aircraft should consider switching ID, friend or foe to EMERGENCY and transmitting "MAYDAY" on GUARD frequency. This technique should be carefully weighed against the probability of adversary detection.

(d) Provide communications relay and defensive cover, if possible.

(e) Provide necessary updates, using CALICS, to include possible isolated personnel injuries, disposition and movement of hostile forces, terrain factors, and potential recovery sites.

4. Notification Responses

a. **Unit.** When notified of a subordinate element or individual's isolation, the unit commander confirms the identity of the isolated personnel, notifies the parent PRCC of the incident, decides if immediate support using nearby forces is appropriate, designates an OSC and/or RMC accordingly, and forwards ISOPREP and EPA data, as required. Unit commanders also need to keep their higher HQ apprised of their capability to

conduct recovery operations and the status of ongoing activities in support of their own operations. **History shows that acting quickly and using all immediately available resources improve the chance of successful recovery.** When immediate recovery is not possible, the unit commander expeditiously requests assistance from the parent joint force component, using the most secure communications system available. Such requests should be followed by appropriate message (e.g., SARIR, SARREQ). Specific procedures should be annotated in the PR CONOPS or OPLAN.

b. **The PRCC** assumes responsibility for coordinating the response initially and reports the incident to the JPRC by the quickest and most secure means. Such reports should be followed up using the applicable message system or other electronic means as directed. The component PRCC then initiates PR mission planning, continuously updates CALICS, determines the isolated person's location, notifies JPRC and the recovery force, receives an intelligence briefing on the threat surrounding the objective area (if known), tasks subordinate forces when authorized, and informs the JPRC if component recovery forces will attempt recovery. The component PRCC reports to the JPRC the status of the component's capabilities to conduct the PR mission and may request additional PR support to be arranged for by the JPRC. The JPRC may request additional support from the JTF, or may request that the mission be reassigned to a more capable recovery force within another component. The component PRCC will be the vital link between the OSC and joint force support that may be available within, or adjacent to, the operational area. The component PRCC obtains ISOPREP and EPA data from the isolated person's unit, or retrieves the information from PRMS.

c. **The JPRC** forwards PR incident reports and information to higher authority, as directed, and alerts all forces operating in the area of the isolation event to report any evidence of isolated personnel. The JPRC also provides follow-up PR incident reports and information to higher authority, adjacent JPRCs, and component PRCCs, as appropriate. Depending on the situation, the JPRC also should:

(1) Notify theater and national-level intelligence agencies to initiate collection efforts to refine the location of the isolated personnel and assess the adversary threat in the objective area.

(2) Direct component(s) parallel planning, as required.

(3) Coordinate JFC tasking of another component(s) (per the PR CONOPS) to execute the PR mission when notified that a component is unable to do so or requires support.

(4) Coordinate with the components, as needed, for use of PR resources.

(5) Coordinate development of a PRTF.

(6) Coordinate with the UARCC to alert NAR forces.

(7) Continuously update CALICS.

For further information on national PR support capabilities, refer to Concept of Operations for National Overhead SIGINT Support to Personnel Recovery. Also refer to Appendix B, “Classified Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery (published separately).”

d. Documentation Requirements. Documentation is used during all PR tasks to include reintegration and development of PR LL. Accurate reporting and tracking of each PR incident and mission is essential. The following documentation should be completed and forwarded by the JPRC and maintained on file until no longer needed. When the files are no longer needed, they should be forwarded to the combatant command PR OPR, who in turn forwards them to JPRA for final disposition. **Incident logs, mission folders, or case files will not be destroyed.**

(1) The controller’s log maintains a chronological record of all incidents and daily activity.

(2) Mission folders are prepared each time an incident receives mission status. A PR incident transitions to mission status when the available information reasonably validates the need for a PR effort. Mission folders should include:

(a) Authentication information in effect at the time of isolation, the isolated personnel’s evasion plans and ISOPREP, and any other specific information or SPINS about, or briefed to, isolated personnel before their departure. This type of information becomes more important the longer a person is isolated and becomes increasingly more difficult to gather as time progresses.

(b) The JPRC mission tracking number.

(c) Participating PR units or assets.

(d) Date mission opened, suspended, and closed.

(e) Mission results.

(3) The ELT and emergency position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) worksheet documents all ELT and/or EPIRB incidents received by the JPRC.

(4) The aircraft incident log documents awareness and the response to aviation PR incidents.

(5) The non-aircraft incident log records the receipt and response to all non-aircraft, non-ELT incidents.

SECTION B. LOCATE

5. General

The locate task involves the effort taken to precisely find and authenticate isolated personnel. It starts upon recognition of an isolation event and continues until the isolated person is recovered. An accurate location and positive authentication are normally required prior to committing recovery forces.

6. Determine and Maintain Location

a. A successful recovery generally depends on the accuracy and reliability of the coordinates or description of the isolated personnel's location. Accurate and reliable location coordinates and the ability to communicate those coordinates between the force elements in a secure manner are necessary to ensure proper support to, and recovery of, isolated personnel. However, some ground force maneuver units can conduct searches of large areas using their movement techniques (e.g., movement-to-contact to link up with friendly forces or isolated personnel). The preferred device or technique to be used by isolated personnel to communicate their location is dependent on the situation in which they find themselves and the recovery force dispatched to find them. The environmental situation or the individual's SA may be an impediment to finding an exact, accurate location. JPRCs/PRCCs/UARCCs, working with employed forces, supporting functions, intelligence assets, and when possible, the isolated personnel, should continue to refine the accuracy and reliability of location information (coordinates and description) until the isolated person is recovered. Based on risk and the probability of success, the methods and TTP in searching for isolated personnel should be evaluated prior to employment. For instance, the risk of conducting an overt search could highlight the isolated person's location to the adversary. This should be weighed against the potential benefit of a rapid recovery before enemy forces have time to mount an organized response. Appropriate forces should be employed to mitigate all risks while meeting mission requirements. For example, a UAS could minimize the risk to forces but may not be able to provide needed protection to the isolated personnel.

b. **Using Information Sources.** Commanders should consider devising signals that can be recognized by isolated personnel not equipped with communications equipment. The commander's analysis and planned exploitation, integration, and interoperability of all capabilities available (see Chapter I, "Introduction") should pay large dividends in accomplishing the locate execution task. All agencies, nations, and military, governmental, NGOs, and external (outside the operational area) organizations form an operational area network with enormous capability to assist in locating isolated personnel. Adequate charts, route overlays, patrol reports, and available photos or imagery of the objective area can assist in determining the isolated personnel's last known location, physical condition, direction of travel, and proximity to population centers or threats. EPA information, recorded contact information, the last known direction of travel, and other pertinent information should be superimposed on a chart of the objective area to provide the recovery force with an isolated personnel movement

pattern. Note natural boundaries and features such as hills, foliage, streams, or lakes that may enhance or restrict isolated personnel movement.

c. **Search methods** include electronic, ground force reconnaissance, and/or visual search methods specifically tailored for each isolation incident. The operational environment, adversary activity, weather, time of day, terrain, and available resources all play an important role in selection of the search area and method.

(1) **Electronic searches** require an electronically permissive environment. Current radio systems are all subject to some degree of adversary jamming, deception, monitoring, or DF intrusion. Initial radio contact with isolated personnel usually occurs on an emergency (Guard) frequency, but subsequent transmissions should be on a pre-designated PR frequency. Standoff electronic support aircraft and satellites should be used. Electronic searches involving use of DF or homing equipment may be limited initially by the sending (i.e., emergency locator beacon) and receiving (i.e., homing adaptor) capabilities of isolated personnel and recovery forces and subsequently by adversary activity. Some additional isolated personnel radio and electronic equipment limitations and capabilities to consider are:

(a) The adversary can intercept its signal, so isolated personnel should limit radio transmissions and use code words until the recovery phase.

(b) Some radios are limited to LOS capability, thereby presenting a major concern for helicopters operating in a threat environment at low altitudes.

(c) Final authentication should still be ascertained to ensure the radio operator is indeed friendly personnel.

(d) For GPS equipped radios, the PR mission coordinators should always check time of GPS fix against transmission time stamp and coordinates to ensure accuracy of information prior to relay to recovery forces.

(e) Similar to US and multinational forces, adversary forces also employ DF techniques to locate isolated personnel. Adversary DF and intelligence-gathering methods should be understood by all recovery mission participants prior to utilizing DF locating methods. Use of aircraft with high speed, accurate DF equipment will minimize required transmissions by the isolated personnel and reduce the probability of adversary detection.

(f) Radios have limited battery life making it critical that monitoring and transmission times be controlled by PR forces to maximize communication time with the isolated personnel. Transmitting uses battery life much more rapidly than monitoring, another factor to be considered by PR forces during the recovery process. Alternatively, some isolated personnel may not be equipped with radios but may have a 406 megahertz (MHz) PLB with a 24-hour battery life.

(2) **Visual Searches.** Manned reconnaissance flights over hostile areas are a viable option when the isolated personnel's location has not been refined. However it

incurs risk. The JPRC or PRCC should be prepared to coordinate with appropriate elements of the operations center and the JAOC for reconnaissance flights over threat areas. Again, the decision process will assist the mission coordinator in assessing threats, isolated personnel training, equipment capabilities, etc., to develop a plan that has fully considered, to the extent possible under unique conditions, the risks and options (e.g., day or night operations and passive or suppressive threat neutralization). Communications plans and frequency emission control procedures should be kept as simple and as streamlined as possible without decreasing the SA of the search force. Another visual search technique is to employ ground forces in this role. Ground combat forces are robust and have staying power; employing armored forces can increase the survivability of the reconnoitering assets.

(a) **Airborne Search.** Recovery planners may be able to define an air search pattern if the operational environment allows. Otherwise, the only viable airborne search option may be the use of unmanned or stand-off platforms. Searching along the isolated personnel's intended flight or surface route, areas offering concealment, and pre-briefed locations should be considered. Search patterns should avoid major lines of communications such as roads, railroads, large rivers, or open valleys. These areas are normally frequented by people and often pose the greatest threat to recovery forces and isolated personnel. Combat reconnaissance assets and, in some situations, other aircraft can conduct modified visual searches of specific areas in all operational environments. However, their effectiveness is best if used once the search has been narrowed, as the evasion or concealment site of isolated personnel may be some distance from initial contact or the point of loss. Keep in mind an enemy might use a concentration of allied airborne search platforms to focus their own capture efforts. Night vision device (NVD) or forward-looking infrared (IR)-capable assets are preferred for night searches.

(b) **Ground Search.** If terrain, vegetation, isolated personnel condition, or the threat makes an airborne search infeasible, a ground search may be required. A ground team or a ground combat unit with a secure communications capability is highly recommended. Recovery planners also should investigate the possibilities of using HUMINT assets and other resources (IGOs, NGOs, etc.) in the area to locate isolated personnel and to determine their status (i.e., health, captured, evading, direction of movement).

(c) **Maritime Search.** An open ocean or littoral search may be required. When planning a maritime PR operation, due consideration must be given to international versus territorial waters, international law, proximal nation-state or terror organization capabilities and practices, operation-specific ROE, and FP.

(3) **Search Areas and Patterns.** Electronic and visual searches may be conducted in **inland** and **maritime** areas using the listed search patterns. Repeated searches of the same area are almost always necessary. The grid pattern is unique to inland searches and the following are some of the methods that may be used in inland or maritime searches.

(a) Boundary method.

- (b) Corner point method.
- (c) Center point method.
- (d) Trackline method.
- (e) Counter method.

For further guidance on visual searches and search area designation methods, refer to United States National Search and Rescue Supplement (NSS) to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual.

(4) **Objective Area Search.** The objective area is the designated vicinity surrounding the isolated personnel's expected position. Once in the objective area, it may be difficult to visually obtain the isolated personnel's exact location. A visual search in the objective area can increase the risk to the recovery force, other assets, and isolated personnel. A limited visual or electronic search employing radio DF capability may be employed. Every effort should be made to minimize highlighting recovery assets and isolated personnel. The recovery force should be prepared to use the isolated personnel to signal their location and, if possible, direct the recovery vehicle(s) to their selected extraction location.

(a) A **terminal area search** is normally conducted by the OSC. The **objective/terminal area** is the immediate vicinity around the extraction site, which becomes the primary focus for FP and recovery activities. Recovery vehicles remain at a holding point with some escort assets, if available, while the OSC locates and authenticates isolated personnel. Extraction site location and ingress and/or egress routes will be relayed to the recovery vehicles.

(b) **Electronic Search.** All recovery force participants should be prepared to establish communications with isolated personnel. Radios should be preset to PR mission channel frequencies. Unless a radio silent recovery is required and planned, a transmission with the isolated personnel's call sign should be made when communications are expected. When communications are established, the recovery vehicle can be vectored to the precise extraction location. The recovery force may be able to "home-in" on the isolated personnel's radio transmission or receive an encrypted data burst transmission, if the equipment and systems are available. If no response is received (isolated personnel may be able to receive but not transmit), the recovery force should continue to monitor and transmit on designated frequencies, or attempt contact with the isolated personnel on other PR frequencies. Some survival radios have the capability to transmit authentication and GPS location. These advanced survival radios include not only voice and beacon capability but the ability to send/receive secure voice and data. There are also current technology solutions such as blue force trackers, which are constantly adapting and evolving, that offer capabilities to accomplish the locate execution task. Once contacted and authenticated, isolated personnel should be asked to identify, within acceptable risks, their position using established procedures.

(c) **NAR Support to Area Search.** In some cases NAR forces may be operating in vicinity of the isolating event and depending on the threat situation, may be able to provide a limited search capability, or verify the existence of an isolated person in the objective area through a spotter network or the presence of evasion signals. This information would be relayed through the UARCC to the JPRC.

7. Protracted Recovery Cases

a. Generally speaking, a case becomes protracted when:

(1) The frequency or value of intelligence, information, or search results decreases to a point that it is no longer helpful in reducing the area of uncertainty in the isolated personnel's location to a manageable level.

(2) All logical leads have been exhaustively pursued with negligible (isolated personnel not found) results.

(3) The heightened risk to forces involved in performing searches outweighs potential gains in information.

b. At this point, the commander develops a strategy for a protracted situation. It may be helpful to perform a global review of all information received up to that point to provide a holistic view, using a separate team, if available, to allow for a fresh perspective. In this respect, PR activities in protracted cases share equities with intelligence collection and law enforcement investigative procedures, which may be useful in providing insight or new approaches to the case. However, the focus must remain on the isolated personnel, and the lead for coordination of investigative and intelligence activities should remain with the PR cell.

8. Extended Searches

a. There are occasions during hostilities when isolated personnel cannot be located in a timely manner and all investigative avenues have been exhausted. The effort to locate them continues, but evidence and information arrive much more slowly, and may be of little value. Complicating this is the need to continue concentrating limited resources and efforts of the JPRC or PRCC on more current isolating events. JFCs may establish an organization that supports the JPRC or PRCC by handling these long-term cases. Once hostilities are over and depending upon the US military presence, the GCC will seek guidance on the disposition of unresolved cases.

b. Elements of the Extended Search

(1) **Investigate Cases to Locate Isolated Personnel.** When investigating hostage taking, kidnapping, and other cases whose location resolution is not immediately forthcoming, a commander may need to establish an investigative team using a standing cell integrated into the local or regional joint/interagency operations center to assist the investigation of these longer-term, "cold cases" while hostilities continue. Manning for the investigative cell will vary depending on the number of cases, extent of territory

PERSONNEL RECOVERY DIVISION, IRAQ

In Iraq, US Central Command created an organization called the Personnel Recovery Division (PRD) that collaborated with Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD agencies to provide intelligence fusion to assist in locating missing DOD personnel and non-DOD American citizens, coalition members, and other designated individuals. US Government agencies such as US Embassy Baghdad's Office of Hostage Affairs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as well as representatives of coalition forces, were synchronized through a Joint Interagency Personnel Recovery Working Group (JIAPRWG) to ensure coordination, collaboration, and synergy. Additionally, the government of Iraq and its agencies often were the best source of intelligence and support for personnel recovery (PR) operations, due to their local knowledge, as well as their understanding of the operational environment. The PRD and the JIAPRWG were also prepared to provide PR planning and intelligence support to commanders, as requested, to facilitate the rapid recovery of military personnel, especially in cases in which the location continued to be unknown.

SOURCE: Joint Personnel Recovery Agency

covered, and variables in the hostile operational environment. Assigned personnel may include all-source intelligence analysts with experience in human network analysis (counterterrorism or similar experience), and personnel with experience investigating and managing cases (like criminal cases). The cell should coordinate with and establish relationships that include DOD, interagency, multinational, and HN partners. The network supporting this function may include (but is not limited to) theater forensics organizations, mortuary affairs representatives, military investigative and intelligence services, DOS, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), national intelligence agencies, other government organizations, HN law enforcement and intelligence assets, and multinational PR, intelligence, and law enforcement assets if appropriate. HN liaison is especially critical as these individuals will often have the best understanding of the area, local affiliations, and local hostage-taking attitudes and TTP.

(2) **Select Personnel Accounting Team.** In addition to investigatory techniques, many tasks and techniques associated with personnel accounting (traditionally conducted to recover remains of Service members from previous wars) may become viable. Personnel accounting operations typically require specialized teams operating in a permissive environment that are trained in sensitive site exploitation, forensic investigation, history, regional affairs, archival methods, interview techniques, and foreign languages to carry out the personnel accounting processes. Such capability may help in a recovery.

(3) **Evaluate Site for Exploitation.** Sensitive sites rarely fit a standard template, and the size, nature, and complexity of the site is often not readily apparent. The unit conducting the exploitation directs reconnaissance to determine the enemy defenses, extent of the site, and terrain factors. The team will request information

through their intelligence channels to gain information on possible historical or current hostile activity which may involve conventional or improvised weapons. The unit may request additional surveillance means to gain an accurate, three-dimensional picture of the site. Reconnaissance continues until the site is secured. In some cases, the sensitive site operation will combine hasty operations with a deliberate response.

(a) **Collect, Preserve, and Transport Evidence from Site.** Under the direction of forensics and other experts, or if directed to do so by higher HQ, the tactical unit or sensitive site exploitation team searches the scene for evidence—documenting, processing, collecting, and preserving the evidence that is found. The search may unearth fragile items of evidence that should be processed and collected as they are found, rather than after the preliminary search is completed.

(b) The FBI and HN law enforcement may accompany recovery forces in order to preserve evidence that will support future criminal prosecutions.

(c) **Conduct Forensic Investigation and Associate Collected Evidence with Isolated Personnel.** Forensic specialists evaluate available data and determine identity supported by a preponderance of evidence. This effort often is facilitated by the collection of family reference DNA samples and other evidence from families to narrow the field of possible IDs. Proper excavation and handling of remains IAW appropriate scientific and legal guidelines is necessary for removing doubt about the validity of ID. The ID process is lengthy, and efforts to identify a particular set of remains may require additional data or newer technologies.

(d) **Conduct Investigation (Interviews, Records Collection/Review)**

1. The tasks included in a long-term case investigation, in its most basic form, consist of planning, collecting factual data, documenting collected data, assessing all data, and taking measured and prudent actions to resolve the event. Focused investigations may require the collection of information from a variety of sources, such as US and foreign archives, witness interviews, field research, forensics, private individuals and groups, military units, intelligence organizations, and many others. Analysts evaluate and correlate this information to identify potential captivity locations or/burial sites. Given the scope of incoming data and the diversity of sources, information sharing among analysts within the PR and accounting communities is critical to the comprehensive evaluation of data.

2. The investigatory techniques simply represent another method of determining location and status of isolated personnel—information should be accessible to all members of the network, and network members should be able to contribute case information that is accessible to the rest of the network.

3. Access to a complete collection of information related to a particular case is particularly important to investigation-oriented PR efforts. Without ability to review and analyze all the data collected by the various members of the network, the case event manager and investigators are limited in their ability to solve the case.

4. A subset skill of investigating is the ability to properly interview persons to obtain information of value and develop sources for locating isolated personnel. Investigators and intelligence collectors supporting PR missions should be sufficiently trained or experienced. In addition, the investigators should have access to information from a variety of persons, to include witnesses, and then collate and connect that data with forensic information (e.g., biometric information of the isolated personnel and perpetrators of the isolating event, latent prints, computer messages, messages left behind, behavioral analysis of the last known location of the isolated personnel, soil samples, tool marks, or casts of impressions).

9. Authenticate

Every effort will be made to authenticate isolated personnel prior to committing recovery forces in a threat environment. The recovery force may follow detainee handling procedures to minimize risk to the recovery force and the isolated person, whether or not authentication has occurred. The authentication systems, as discussed in Chapter V, “Planning,” should be attempted when feasible. Where reference biometric files for isolated personnel or methods of transmitting biometric data are not available, other effective authentication methods include use of ISOPREP data, theater code words, challenge and password, and visual signals discussed earlier. The recovery force should conduct a face-to-face authentication once isolated personnel are in custody. It may be necessary to conduct multiple authentications of isolated personnel during various stages of the recovery effort.

SECTION C. SUPPORT

10. General

The support task involves providing support to both the isolated person and to the isolated person’s family, with specific objectives for each. The forces used to support the isolated personnel should know the objectives and be capable of executing the TTP to achieve them. Decision makers should properly assess and mitigate risks in order to successfully execute the support task. There are several aspects of support.

11. Support to Isolated Personnel

The support to the isolated person may begin upon reporting that an individual is isolated and ends when the individual is recovered, once reintegration begins. There are five objectives in supporting isolated personnel:

a. **Communication.** Establishing communication with the isolated person will facilitate all other tasks. Two-way voice communication would be ideal, but any type of

“Our country will do everything in its power to rescue [our troops] or to bring them home safe and sound.”

Senator John McCain
18 April 2003

overt or covert communication can increase the likelihood of a successful recovery. MISO communications platforms can provide loudspeaker commentary that would be understood by isolated personnel. OTH data transmission capable hand-held survival radios can provide SA and moral support to isolated personnel until a recovery can be accomplished.

b. **SA.** Gaining, maintaining, and increasing the isolated person's SA by providing information on adversary and environmental threats, recovery procedures, and other pertinent information will enable the isolated person to better plan actions and make accurate decisions.

c. **Morale.** All interaction with the isolated person should consider the need to establish, maintain, and enhance their positive attitude. A high morale enhances the isolated person's ability to focus on proper application of their knowledge and skills to survive, evade, resist, and escape. Communication with isolated personnel can provide positive reinforcement to offset the effects of emotional stress, fear, or injuries. Creative planning, positive messages, embedding visual signals into plans, and resupply can serve to boost the morale of isolated personnel.

d. **Protection.** Protection activities can range from fire support (close air support [CAS], artillery) to deception techniques designed to make an adversary believe the isolated person is someplace other than the actual location.

e. **Resupply**

(1) **Caches** may be pre-positioned in adversary-controlled territory or in regions subject to being overrun by adversary forces, and their use should be considered in environments where extended evasion is necessary. Evaders and ground recovery forces can use caches as sources of supplies, communications equipment, and other evasion aids. In denied areas, nonconventional forces may emplace caches before and/or after the outbreak of hostilities. Agencies and organizations that direct the establishment of caches to support potential evaders need to keep the JPRC advised of the status and locations of those caches.

(2) **Resupply Operations.** When there are no pre-positioned caches, it is possible to deliver resupply packages to isolated personnel by aircraft. The need for this type of activity should be weighed against the risk to the isolated person and the forces involved, and the capability to mitigate that risk.

12. Support to Families of Isolated Personnel

Support to the families or primary NOK of an isolated person begins with initial notification. The casualty assistance officer, supported by a Service-appointed SERE psychologist, should be the primary POC to the family. In addition to the casualty assistance officer support requirements defined in DODI 1300.18, *Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures*, family support goals during a PR event include assuring the family of the commitment and capability of the USG to recover their family member, providing information and updates regarding their

family member, education on how they can best support their family member during isolation or captivity, and preparing them to support and participate in the reintegration of their family member upon recovery. When deemed appropriate, PR-trained combatant command and other Service personnel, as well as representatives from DPAA and JPRA, should meet with the family members to update them on the situation, provide points of contact, and establish means of support. Casualty assistance offices should follow applicable Service doctrine to help provide the casualty assistance officer with additional resources. Planners should coordinate with the employer, if the isolated person is a contractor. The contracting company may have a public relations office and family support program to assist in the support efforts.

a. **Family Awareness.** Informing the family about the USG commitment and, in broad terms, the capability to recover isolated personnel should reduce the frustration experienced by the family. The Service or combatant command (depending on location of the family) should provide a POC that will provide timely, accurate, and pertinent information (consistent with OPSEC and other security concerns) to the family in a sensitive manner.

b. **Media** always seek out family members of isolated, detained, or captured personnel. It is essential that the Services rapidly communicate and coordinate with the families of distressed personnel to aid the survival of the isolated person, including the awareness of intense media interest and possible repercussions to the isolated person from what the families might say or reveal. It is important to remember that families are not obligated to follow the recommendations of the DOD with regard to media interaction. Therefore, Services should emphasize to the families the need to minimize the harm to the isolated person.

(1) **Project.** The following themes can serve to express what most families feel during these situations and should not harm the isolated personnel.

(a) Confidence that the USG is doing all it can to recover the isolated personnel.

(b) Expectation that the captors will treat isolated personnel IAW the Geneva Conventions.

(c) Love/respect/etc., for the isolated person.

(2) **Protect.** Family members should be cautioned about releasing information or visual images that may be harmful or compromise the isolated personnel's resistance posture if captured.

(a) Specific personal information.

(b) Professional information of any kind (assignments, qualifications, etc.).

(c) Negative emotions.

SUBJECT: OPERATION DESERT STORM EVASION AND ESCAPE TIPS

“Combat search and rescue recovery may be executed by any of the following: helicopters with or without protective fighter aircraft; naval vessels with possible air cover; armored vehicle reconnaissance [sic]; infantry units as part of an advance. All of these methods may involve a surprise move by the recovery force to at least temporarily overwhelm the enemy with superior firepower in the vicinity of the evader(s). Such efforts usually require speed to prevent the enemy from increasing his strength. Evaders that can move may be able to improve their chances of being successfully recovered by conducting initial evasion travel to a suitable hole-up site, employing discreet communication and signaling procedures, and selecting a site for recovery that considers the potential enemy opposition in the area.”

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SECTION D. RECOVER

13. General

The **recover** task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under the physical custody of a friendly organization. The recover task begins with the launch or redirection of forces or the initiation of diplomatic or civil processes, and ends when the recovery element hands off the formerly isolated person to the reintegration team. The recover task is accomplished through PR operation and mission planning, and individual and synergistic actions of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel. Operational flexibility and multi- system redundancy are the primary factors in successful recovery. No single recovery system, force, or organization is suitable to all situations or can meet all requirements in any given situation. To cover all contingencies, a mix of conventional and nonconventional recovery capabilities should be available for employment. Failure to establish and test multiple recovery capabilities or to adapt standardized recovery capabilities to local conditions invites failure. The decision-making process, established early during planning and preparation, will greatly assist decision makers and PR mission coordinators to launch and execute a timely and successful recovery effort.

14. Recovery Methods

Isolated personnel have a responsibility to facilitate their own recovery to the maximum extent possible. When this is not possible, each Service has formal doctrine to aid in recovery. Methods that may be employed independently or as part of a joint recovery effort include immediate, deliberate, or external supported recovery (ESR) (US Army), CSAR (US Air Force and US Navy), TRAP (US Marine Corps), NAR (SOF), HR, or any TTP employed for a PR mission. Details for many of these methods are found in individual Service doctrinal manuals and Appendix G, “Capabilities.”

15. A Personnel Recovery Task Force

A PRTF is organized to execute a specific PR mission. A PRTF is capable of locating and authenticating isolated personnel, protecting isolated personnel from adversary threats, providing FP for itself, providing mission C2 systems support, and recovering isolated personnel. A PRTF can be dedicated, put on alert, or designated and tasked when needed by the JFC. It is a cohesive, interoperable force that may consist of any variety of dissimilar aircraft, ground vehicles, or maritime vessels. Its size can range from a single recovery vehicle operating within a joint C2 context, to dozens of air, ground, or sea elements working in concert. Short-notice PRTF operations are extremely dependent on the ability to quickly and effectively marshal the required interoperable forces to effect a recovery.

16. Recovery Force Elements

a. **PRTF Commander.** Appointed by the JFC or the supported commander for PR, the PRTF commander plans, coordinates, and executes the PR mission, using a force comprised of US and/or multinational military forces and/or USG departments and agencies.

b. **OSC.** The OSC is an individual in the immediate vicinity of an isolating event, who temporarily assumes command, with the best ability to communicate with C2 nodes, recovery forces, and isolated personnel. Once communications have been established with the isolated personnel, the OSC should continue to monitor the isolated personnel's radio frequency in case immediate actions are required to prevent capture. Communications on the isolated personnel's radio frequency should be minimized in order to decrease an adversary's ability to locate the isolated personnel via radio transmissions. Once a qualified RMC is in position to take control of the recovery effort, the OSC should perform a turn-over to include: isolated personnel's condition, authentication methods, location, threat, supporting assets, and other applicable information that will affect the recovery. A checklist is located in Annex C, "On-Scene Commander/Rescue Mission Commander Checklist," to Appendix F, "Sample Checklists."

c. **RMC.** The RMC is the individual specifically designated to control recovery efforts and provide protection of the isolated personnel from ground threats in the objective area. The RMC controls the airspace above and immediately around the isolated personnel and the objective area, usually defined as a restricted operating zone. The RMC is designated through the JPRC, or by the component commander through the PRCC. The RMC initial actions are to collect essential information in the objective area that is threatening to the isolated personnel or recovery force. The RMC should plan and coordinate with all applicable units (organizations) to develop communication plans, ingress and egress routes, and actions of the objective area. Aircraft with a call sign "SANDY" are specifically trained to conduct RMC duties in support of PR missions. It is important to choose the most appropriate platform based on factors such as threat level, on-station time, communication capabilities, and availability of other supporting assets. A checklist is located in Annex C, "On-Scene Commander/Rescue Mission Commander

Checklist,” to Appendix F, “Sample Checklists.” Depending on mission requirements it may be necessary to coordinate for air support such as assault air support, escorts, combat air patrol, tanker support, etc. The RMC must carefully coordinate all mission requirements, planning, and execution among all ground forces, air forces, and supporting forces.

d. **Airborne Mission Coordinator (AMC).** The primary role of the AMC is to coordinate and control aircraft during a mission. Platforms for an AMC are dependent on aircraft availability, but should contain necessary communication abilities to communicate with air and ground units. The desired AMC aircraft is an airborne platform with the best combination of on-station time and organic communications capability. The AMC coordinates mission activities between the OSC, RMC, other recovery force elements, and the supported commander’s operations center, including the applicable JPRC or component PRCC; monitors the status of all elements; requests additional assets as required; and ensures recovery and supporting forces arrive at designated locations to accomplish the recovery mission. The AMC also ensures safety of flight of airborne recovery assets by providing altitude separation, airspace and ground deconfliction, environmental information, and monitoring fuel states. The crew supports the recovery effort by providing navigation assistance and relaying isolated personnel intelligence and authentication data to appropriate C2 agencies and recovery force elements. The AMC coordinates refueling of air recovery assets; keeps the recovery force elements, PRTF commander, and the RMC informed of all pertinent information such as threats, aborts, and EW information; advises the PRTF commander, RMC, and JAOC of mission support requirements; and coordinates the designation and use of appropriate fire support coordinating measures. The AMC advises the PRTF commander and the recovery force elements of mission progress with predesignated execution calls and weather conditions or any other factors affecting mission progress. A PR mission checklist for the AMC is provided in Annex B, “Airborne Mission Coordinator Checklist,” to Appendix F, “Sample Checklists.”

e. **Rescue Escort (RESCORT).** The number and type of RESCORT aircraft may determine the success of a recovery operation. Aircraft assigned RESCORT responsibilities should be capable of providing the recovery vehicles with reconnaissance, suppressive fire support, and, if possible, communications relay. RESCORT pilots should be specifically trained for recovery operations. When employed, the RESCORT and recovery vehicles of the task force should operate initially under the mission control of an OSC at a predetermined, prebriefed point and time near the objective area. Recovery operations at night and in high-risk situations require unique weapon system capabilities. Because of the differences in the lethality of threats to helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, knowledge of the threat in the recovery area should be assessed in the risk management analysis and carefully evaluated in the decision process that will include the assignment of RESCORT assets. RESCORT aircraft should have the ability to sweep an ingress route and rendezvous with the escorted asset in the event of a route change or other action. RESCORT aircraft should also be able to respond quickly to all threats en route to, from, and in the vicinity of the recovery location and deliver accurate suppressive fire. Coverage should continue through egress until the recovery vehicles reach a permissive operational environment.

RESCORT tactics, routing, potential threat encounters, and countermeasures should be understood by all participants. On other than immediate response missions, recovery element briefings (Annex D, “Personnel Recovery Task Force Checklist” to Appendix F, “Sample Checklists”) are mandatory and should include rendezvous points, communications, navigation points, number of helicopters, number of ground vehicles, number of maritime assets, landing zone positions, objective rally points, near and far recognition signals, and code words. Typical RESCORT responsibilities may include conducting route reconnaissance of the flight route, ground route, maritime route, and area reconnaissance of the objective area and determining the level of adversary activity and suppressing surface threats to, from, and within the objective area. RESCORT also assists recovery helicopters, ground forces, and maritime vehicles in locating (i.e., objective area search) and authenticating isolated personnel, function as the RMC when designated by the PRTF commander, and coordinate and control activities of supporting recovery force elements in the objective area.

f. **Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP).** RESCAP aircraft are counterair aircraft assigned to protect the recovery force and isolated personnel from airborne threats. RESCAP forces should be available before committing recovery forces if adversary air activity is forecast along the intended flight route, ground or maritime route, or in the objective area. RESCAP may assist in detecting and establishing communications with isolated personnel due to their higher operating altitudes. Typical RESCAP tasks:

- (1) Maintain patrol and protect isolated personnel until other elements of the recovery force arrive in the objective area.
- (2) Assist in locating isolated personnel.
- (3) Maintain protection against, and ensure suppression of, airborne threats.
- (4) Function as OSC until other elements of the recovery force arrive in the objective area.

g. **Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A]).** The FAC(A) can locate and authenticate isolated personnel prior to arrival of the recovery force and provide a current threat assessment near the objective area. Initial on-scene coordination of the PR effort may be assumed by the FAC(A) when no dedicated RESCORT or other (e.g., wingman) assets are available, or until the RESCORT arrives. The FAC(A) is trained in terminal attack control (CAS) and can provide a link between the recovery vehicles and other threat suppression assets. Fast-strike aircraft may require FAC(A) assistance to effectively support the recovery force. FAC(A) requests or diversions should be considered to provide an OSC capability prior to recovery force arrival, or when threats in the objective area require extensive suppression.

h. **Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC).** Given their unique position on the battlefield, JTACs may be the first to become aware that an isolating event has occurred. Utilizing their inherent communications capabilities, they can provide initial report and location of the event, and can provide basic C2 as an OSC until relieved by an airborne

platform. A JTAC is qualified to direct the action of combat aircraft engaged in CAS and other offensive air operations, and is capable and authorized to perform all types of terminal attack control. Similar to a FAC(A), a JTAC may assume initial OSC duties and can provide a link between recovery vehicles and strike aircraft.

For further information on JTAC capabilities, see JP 3-09, Joint Force Support, and JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

i. **Support Aircraft.** Tankers, AWACS, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, EW, UASs, and other aircraft provide vital support to the recovery force. Availability of support aircraft is often the difference between the success or failure of a recovery operation. Air refuelable fixed-wing assets can play a critical role in extending the operational range of refuelable helicopters. While refueling operations in a permissive environment are highly desirable, the depth of the operational environment and the isolated personnel's location may require such operations be conducted in uncertain or hostile conditions.

j. **EW/Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).** SEAD missions are designed to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade surface-based enemy air defenses. Joint SEAD operations can be accomplished through destructive and disruptive means described as follows, and using combinations of the two can maximize their effectiveness.

(1) **Destructive Means.** Destructive means seek the destruction of the target system or operating personnel. The effects are cumulative and increase aircraft survivability, but destructive means may place large demands on the available combat capabilities/forces. Examples of destructive SEAD capabilities are bombs, air and surface-to-surface missiles, air delivered mines, and artillery.

(2) **Disruptive Means.** Disruptive means temporarily deny, degrade, deceive, delay, or neutralize enemy air defense systems to increase aircraft survivability. Disruptive means may be either active or passive. Active means include electronic attack (anti-radiation missiles, directed energy, electromagnetic jamming, and electromagnetic deception), expendables (chaff, flares, and decoys), and tactics (deception, avoidance, or evasive flight profiles). Passive means include emission control, camouflage, IR shielding, warning receivers, and material design features.

k. Some forces, like USAF Guardian Angel and special tactics teams, are specifically trained to provide direct support to isolated personnel. They may be airdropped or inserted via air, land, or sea at an offset location to conduct a limited ground search, link-up, and recovery. Pararescuemen provide emergency trauma treatment, field/crash extrication, field medical care, field survival skills, and security and movement of isolated personnel to friendly control or a suitable extraction zone.

17. Recovery Vehicles and Forces

a. **Rotary-Wing Aircraft.** Operational experience shows that helicopters with advanced avionics, navigational systems, and terrain following/terrain avoidance radar

RECOVERY OPERATIONS FOR BOLAR 34 IN LIBYA, 2011

On 21 March 2011, a USAF F-15E, call-sign Bolar 34, crashed east of Benghazi, Libya, after attacking a Libyan air defense facility. The pilot and weapons systems operator (WSO) ejected and landed in open terrain about 25 miles southeast of the city. The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), deployed in the Mediterranean Sea at the time of the incident, was directed to launch its Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) team to recover the crew. Subsequently, two AV-8s and two MV-22s launched from *USS Kearsarge*, followed by two CH-53Es. The lead AV-8 assumed the role of on-scene-commander and located the F-15E pilot. After establishing radio contact with the pilot, the AV-8 dropped ordnance on a suspected hostile and advancing force. When the MV-22s arrived, the second aircraft landed, recovered the pilot, and safely returned to *USS Kearsarge*. The F-15E WSO was rescued by Libyan opposition forces and returned to friendly control.

Source: 26th MEU briefing to the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies,
24 June 2011

systems are excellent pathfinders and recovery vehicles. Smaller assets (such as the H-60 variants) generate less dust and debris during landing and reduce the probability of detection in the objective area. Knowledge of PR aircraft capabilities and procedures and improved interoperability between components can best be ensured through PR training and exercises. A variety of helicopter formation and extraction techniques and procedures exist within and between joint force components and subordinate units. Terrain, visibility, high-density altitude limitations, aircraft and component capabilities, and aircrew experience should be carefully considered when selecting these techniques and procedures. Recovery mission briefs should address flight integrity criteria, mission roles, and individual aircraft responsibilities. In certain situations, recovery missions should be conducted with minimal radio transmissions relaying safety of flight, threat, and critical mission data only when required.

b. **Fixed-Wing Aircraft.** Circumstances may warrant using fixed-wing aircraft as the recovery vehicle. The concept of employment would be similar to that of combat delivery aircraft conducting air-land operations. Airfields should be designated and surveyed by special tactics teams or other personnel qualified in landing zone preparation procedures. Fixed-wing aircraft provide greater range and speed, which are invaluable capabilities when transporting critically injured personnel over vast distances. PR planning should identify suitable locations to transload recovered personnel from rotary-wing to fixed-wing aircraft when appropriate. The HC-130 is a dedicated USAF PR asset, with crews specially trained to perform recovery operations. The HC-130J is capable of being aerial refueled, further increasing range for recovery and transportation.

c. **Tiltrotor Aircraft.** C/MV-22 aircraft currently used by USAF and United States Marine Corps (USMC) units possess the ability to vertically access a position and to

quickly enter and exit the recovery area. Their excellent navigation, communications, and night vision capabilities make them a potentially viable resource as recovery aircraft.

d. **Ground Forces.** Ground maneuver and support units can provide the JFC a viable capability for recovery of isolated personnel when the isolating event is in their vicinity, or in an area to which they can move to or be delivered. Ground forces can fight through adversary forces to reach isolated personnel and provide the PRTF with a survivable recovery vehicle. Ground forces can move into and through an area to search for isolated personnel when the exact location is unknown. Additionally, these forces are trained to establish check points to seal off small urban areas and prevent hostage takers from moving out of the area, and can conduct cordon and search operations to look for isolated personnel.

e. **Navy Surface Ships and Submarines.** Navy surface ships and submarines can conduct recovery operations directly or can serve as host platforms for recovery insertion operations.

f. **Navy Expeditionary Combat Forces.** Navy expeditionary combat forces operating in green and brown water or ashore, can conduct recovery operations directly as well as provide intelligence for other recovery forces. Additionally, Navy expeditionary bases located ashore can serve as staging areas for other recovery forces as necessary.

g. **Recovery by NAR Forces.** NAR missions are conducted in those circumstances beyond the capabilities of conventional forces and in which NAR forces may act with indigenous or surrogate personnel, other elements of DOD, other governmental departments and agencies, or multinational forces to effect a recovery. NAR RTs or RMs are directed and trained to conduct the five specified tasks of NAR: contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate.

(1) **Contact.** Contact entails all actions that lead to the positive control of isolated personnel. This may include locating the isolated personnel, use of technical and nontechnical communications, and employment of various conventional and unconventional PR techniques and procedures.

(a) **Process.** NAR forces employed to locate isolated personnel should maximize and exploit the opportunities for success. TTP should be tailored to the operational environment, NAR force capabilities, and the applicable recovery considerations (availability of resources, capabilities and limitations, task organizing, recovery criteria, location and physical condition of the isolated personnel, time, freedom of movement, capacity, and risk assessment). A NAR force should be able to locate isolated personnel in all weather and light conditions and in both rural and urban environments.

(b) **Guidelines.** When developing standards and guidelines for contact procedures, several factors should be considered. These include, but are not limited to, the type of terrain in the operational or recovery area, the equipment and evasion aids that

may or may not be available to isolated personnel, and enemy capabilities (e.g., air superiority, reconnaissance, and DF capabilities). The JPRC, in coordination with the UARCC, disseminates the theater-specific policies that will guide isolated personnel and RTs conducting a mission, to the contact and recovery of an isolated person. These policies need to be widely available to ensure commanders, potential isolated personnel, recovery forces, and mission planners understand their respective roles in the operation. The isolated person should initiate a series of specific actions leading to successful contact.

(c) **Contact Considerations.** Whenever an isolated person is recovered with the assistance of a NAR force, the most critical aspect of the recovery is the moment the isolated person and the RT first meet. This period is very dangerous because it requires two parties, unknown to each other and located in hostile territory, to meet without being detected by either enemy forces or elements of the local population and without compromising either party's security. Contact between isolated personnel and an RT requires comprehensive preplanning. The UARCC, assisted by component intelligence and tactical representatives, should ensure the appropriate contact points and procedures are developed and provided to the JPRC for inclusion in the appropriate operating instructions (e.g., SPINS and communication or signal instructions) and other operational procedures for authentication. The JFC should ensure that joint force components are familiar and comply with these procedures to preclude placing recovery forces at great risk, and avoid significant recovery delays or the capture of the isolated person by enemy forces.

(d) **Intent.** All measures should be taken to keep the procedures for contact as simple as possible, while still affording the requisite security measures essential to the protection of both the NAR force and the isolated person. The isolated person should make a conscious decision to deviate from the planned evasion routine in order to initiate actions that will signal their intent to make contact with a NAR force. The isolated person is no longer evading from all unknown persons; the individual is now looking for someone that will carry out a specific act indicating the intent to assist. There are two basic scenarios for coordinating contact:

1. **Technical communications with isolated personnel.** This situation requires the isolated person to establish technical communications (e.g., radio communications) with friendly forces. The NAR force will be alerted to service a coordinated contact point by the UARCC. All contact procedures are coordinated between the JPRC and UARCC and then passed to both the isolated person and the NAR force. The isolated person would know when to expect contact, and the NAR force would know the isolated person is in place prior to initiating contact procedures. Secure technical communications with the isolated person affords the NAR force greater flexibility and greatly increases its ability to make contact.

2. **Absence of technical communications with isolated personnel.** This situation requires the isolated person include in their EPA potential contact procedures with a recovery force without the use of technical communications. For example, the isolated person would describe in his or her EPA how they will emplace the

signals that would assist a recovery force in finding their location and the procedures for making contact. The isolated person should consider both day and night signals as well as urban versus rural signals. Operating instructions serve as a comprehensive guide to signals an isolated person should consider to facilitate their recovery.

(e) **EPA Application.** The unit's PR coordinator is responsible for ensuring potential isolated personnel provide a comprehensive EPA that complies with theater policies. Adherence to, and skill in execution of, EPA activities is crucial to successful contact and recovery operations. The absence of communications or an EPA will place the NAR force at an increased risk of compromise and may prevent mission execution.

(2) **Authenticate.** As soon as tactically feasible, the NAR force will initiate the authentication process to determine that the recovered person is in fact the person it has been tasked to recover.

(a) **Control**

1. Positive Control Measures. Once under control of the NAR force and within the infrastructure, the recovered person may be placed under positive control measures. These measures may include sensory deprivation and physical restraints, dependent with the level of perceived risk, not as a matter of SOP. The recovered person will have limited contact with the NAR force and may be segregated during the authentication process.

2. Procedural Control Methods. Once the isolated person is authenticated, the control measures exerted over the individual may be relaxed; but control should be maintained throughout the isolated person's association with NAR forces. Due to significant physical, emotional, or mental stress, exposure and/or deprivation, or injuries sustained, safeguarding isolated personnel also means protecting them from their potential impaired judgment and decision-making abilities. The recovered person will be provided daily expectations, routines, security parameters, as well as a recontact plan in case of an emergency and the recovered person is forced to evade.

(b) **Authentication Management.** Within an operational area, the JPRC manages and establishes thresholds for authentication. In the conduct of NAR operations, the NAR force facilitates the process. The UARCC is the linkage between the two. The JPRC forwards the isolated person's ISOPREP and EPA information to the UARCC. Only the minimum amount of information required to perform authentication is forwarded to the NAR force, usually in the form of questions. Definitive authentication may be based on the information contained in operating instructions, the ISOPREP card or EPA, a detailed physical description, a digital photo, digital fingerprint information, or any combination thereof. The NAR force conveys to the UARCC the isolated person's responses to the authentication questions. The JFSOCC has the authority to positively authenticate the identity of an isolated person under the control of NAR forces, which the JFSOCC may delegate to the UARCC director. The UARCC

confirms or denies authentication. Since the NAR force, or parts thereof, may only have access to nontechnical, clandestine communications, the process of authenticating some isolated personnel may take days or weeks. This potential time lag needs to be factored into the considerations for control and support of the isolated personnel.

(3) **Support.** Support includes all actions taken to provide sustainment to the isolated person, and ensure their well-being. Isolated personnel may not be in the best physical, mental, or emotional condition upon making contact with NAR forces. The NAR force will provide the greatest degree of support possible without compromising OPSEC. NAR forces may provide the following support:

(a) **Sustain.** When possible, NAR forces will provide sufficient nourishment, clothing, shelter, documents, safeguarding, and medical care to restore and sustain the recovered person's health and physical condition.

(b) **Monitor and Assess.** Recovered personnel should be continually monitored and assessed throughout the duration of the recover task. It is important that recovered personnel not deteriorate physically and mentally. It may be beneficial to reassure them occasionally to help maintain morale and focus on the successful return to friendly control.

(c) **Procedures and Contingencies.** The NAR force should inform recovered personnel, as soon as possible, on procedures, restrictions, daily routines, expectations, and recontact plans.

(d) **Security.** Direct interface between recovered personnel and the NAR force should be strictly limited to preserve OPSEC and the future viability of the NAR force. The logistic support to sustain an injured person while moving, or waiting to move, without violating OPSEC is one of the primary planning considerations of the NAR force.

(4) **Move.** The movement phase of the recovery process consists of all actions taken to transport isolated personnel from a contact point to an exfiltration site. The movement may include multiple segments, multiple methods, or multiple elements that should plan for the movement of injured recovered personnel. To ensure the future viability of the NAR force and the safety of the isolated person, OPSEC procedures practiced by the NAR force will impact the speed at which the recovered person is moved from place to place. The logistical austerity of both the environment and the NAR force, and the distance over which the recovered person should be transported will also affect the movement process. There may be occasions when the recovery force that made the initial contact with the isolated person cannot, for operational, security, or other reasons, deliver the recovered person safely to friendly control. In such cases, the recovered person may be turned over to another NAR asset or to a conventional recovery force to complete the extraction from hostile territory. The UARCC is responsible for coordinating all turnovers of recovered personnel recovered by a NAR force.

(5) **Exfiltrate.** Exfiltration is the final action to remove recovered personnel from hostile territory to definitive USG control in a permissive environment. Exfiltration will occur by the most secure means available, be it an exfiltration point serviced by a PRTF, by clandestine aircraft or watercraft, by ground movement crossing an international border, or through the passage of friendly lines.

18. Isolated Personnel Responsibilities Prior to Recovery

a. **General.** Isolated personnel are an integral part of any recovery effort. Consequently, they should perform their portion of each PR task successfully to aid their own recovery. During recovery, isolated personnel should:

(1) Respond quickly and accurately to authentication procedures and requests for ISOPREP information.

(2) Provide positional assistance to recovery forces to the greatest extent possible.

(3) Properly use all issued signaling devices and improvise signals, as needed, to improve the chances of being sighted.

(4) Provide pertinent information about the dispersal of other group members, if applicable.

(5) Inform recovery forces if operational developments require altering their EPA and hence, the recovery plan.

(6) Be prepared to receive and follow instructions from the recovery force that require EPA alterations to adapt to operational exigencies.

(7) Pay close attention to, and explicitly follow, instructions of recovery forces to the maximum extent possible given the tactical situation (including adversary positions and medical condition).

(8) Continue to communicate with inbound recovery forces, as required, to ensure their authentication and location is understood and retrieval is efficiently executed.

(9) Remember the word/letter/number (of the day/week/quarter), challenge/password, near and far recognition signals.

(10) Do not run toward the recovery vehicle until or unless directed. Weapons should not be held in a manner that could be perceived as threatening.

(11) Be prepared to be treated as a captive until authenticated. Authentication might not occur until hand-over by the recovery forces.

b. **Recovery by Helicopter or Tiltrotor.** Isolated personnel should reposition near a landing zone large enough to accommodate at least one helicopter. The landing zone

should provide concealment, be fairly level and free of major obstacles (particularly high tension lines or telephone wires), and allow easy identification by the aircrew. The use of chemical lights or other visual markings can aid in identification. If the recovery helicopter cannot land, the isolated personnel will have to be hoisted aboard or moved to another location. Isolated personnel should be aware that a hoist recovery greatly increases exposure and risk to the recovery helicopter and may adversely affect the timeliness of their recovery. Therefore, landing zone suitability should be determined as early in the recovery process as possible, so this information can be passed to the recovery helicopter prior to entering the objective area. Isolated personnel should turn away from the landing helicopter to avoid flying debris and hold their position in sight of the cockpit or side door until signaled or instructed to enter the helicopter.

c. **Recovery by Ground Forces.** Isolated personnel should follow their EPA until contacted by ground forces. The isolated personnel should not make any threatening moves. They should assume a passive position (e.g., drop to one knee) and explicitly follow the ground force instructions. Recovery by ground forces could be employed in four general scenarios:

(1) **The isolated person is not in communications with friendly forces, and an exact location is unknown.** Ground forces may conduct a movement to contact or hasty attack in uncertain or hostile terrain, to secure an objective and link up with friendly forces. The isolated person should be prepared to use the far recognition signal to alert the ground force of their presence. As the ground force responds and moves closer, the forces will use the near recognition signals for the final link up.

(2) **The isolated personnel may or may not be in communication, but their location is known.** The ground force may fight through to link up with isolated personnel in contact with the enemy. The isolated personnel will be escorted by ground forces and returned to friendly control.

(3) **The location (or general vicinity) of the isolated personnel is known, but they are already captive.** Ground forces can conduct a raid to release the isolated personnel.

(4) **The general location of the isolated personnel is known, but they are presumed captive, and the adversary is expected to transport the isolated personnel to another location.** Ground forces can establish checkpoints around an urban area and conduct a cordon and search mission to find the isolated personnel. This would probably be used if the isolating event had just occurred, and the unit involved determines that personnel are missing during an accountability check. This unit or a nearby unit would cordon the area to ensure the captives are not transported out of the area and begin a systematic search of the buildings and vehicles.

19. Physical Custody

a. **Initial Actions of Recovery Force.** Recovered isolated personnel should be searched and secured pending confirmation of their identity. Any weapons will be

confiscated. Recovered isolated personnel should be quiet, avoid resisting, and carefully follow all instructions to avoid compromising the security of the recovery force. If the recovered isolated person is incapable of answering or responding, the recovery force will follow accepted detainee handling procedures as described in existing ROE and operations procedures. The status of the recovered isolated personnel can change once their identity has been ascertained and the recovery force commander has evaluated the situation. The recovered isolated person(s) could be held as an unarmed detainee. Recovered isolated personnel may or may not be briefed on what to expect during the remainder of the recovery operation.

b. Conduct while in Custody of Recovery Force. Recovered isolated personnel should never appear as a threat to the recovery force, and they should make no movements that could be interpreted as hostile. While in a RM or under the control of a foreign force, recovered isolated personnel should project a favorable image of the US and its values, avoid acts that violate international law or discredit the US, avoid expressing ideas that could be misconstrued as official US policy or popular American attitudes, and refrain from making any agreements contrary to the interests of the US.

c. Transfer of Custody. The recovery force should pass all pertinent information on, and possessions taken from, the recovered personnel to the reintegration team. Pertinent information includes authentication status, significant information passed by the recovered isolated personnel, and physical status. There may be occasions when the recovery force that made the initial contact with the recovered isolated personnel cannot, for operational reasons, deliver the individual safely to friendly territory. In such cases, the recovered isolated personnel may be handed over to another group or PR force to complete the extraction from hostile territory. The recovered isolated personnel should be kept informed (as much as necessary). At no time will isolated personnel be abandoned. The recovered isolated personnel are kept under positive control at all times by either the delivering force or the receiving force, according to prior arrangements made by the two forces. Cooperation, trust, and discipline by all are essential for mission success.

SECTION E. REINTEGRATE

“Today is a great day for the families, comrades, and loved ones of the seven MIAs [missing in action] who are now free...It’s a good way to start the morning, to be notified that seven of our fellow Americans are going to be home soon in the arms of their loved ones.”

**President George W. Bush,
13 April 2003**

20. General

Reintegrate is the task that allows DOD to provide medical care and protect the well-being of recovered personnel through decompression, while conducting debriefings to gather necessary intelligence and SERE information. In their planning, CCDRs establish

a reintegration process, to include locations, teams, and responsibilities. The reintegration process should also be included in combatant command PR directives. Two key components of this process are qualified SERE and intelligence debriefers who gather information from recovered isolated personnel and SERE psychologists and others who assist the recovered isolated personnel to decompress and reintegrate to their unit, family, and society. It is important for planners to include provisions for the recovery of DOD civilians and contractors.

21. Process

a. **General.** The combatant command's PR directive, policy, guidance, plans, and orders specify the reintegration process and required teams, to include their composition and responsibilities (see Chapter V, "Planning"). The JFC usually coordinates all reintegration procedures through the JPRC, which executes the reintegration plan and the oversight of, and assistance to, component reintegration teams. The JPRC should coordinate all joint requirements necessary to conduct reintegration at phase I and II locations, and to transition to phase III when necessary. Latitude and flexibility should remain with the component commander to conduct reintegration procedures within the context of ongoing military operations, allowing for sequential, concurrent or, if necessary, delayed conduct of reintegration procedures. The scope and complexity of the process will vary depending on the classification of the recovered isolated personnel (e.g., survivors and evaders may require less debriefing and psychological attention than captives, detainees, and POWs).

b. **Decompression Protocols.** An inherent and crucial part of the reintegration process is the **decompression protocols**. The length of decompression will be dependent upon the individual characteristics of the recovered person and the conditions of their isolation, detention or captivity, and recovery. Recovered personnel who have experienced only a short isolation (such as a precautionary landing) may need minimal decompression, while a recovered person who has experienced a lengthy detention may require a much longer decompression time. The long-term successful reintegration of recovered isolated personnel into military and social/civil environments is directly affected by proper decompression. Protocols have been established to maximize the benefit of decompression. At the very least, under "normal" conditions, they require a minimum of 72 hours to be effective. Deviating from established protocols can have a severe impact and, under certain circumstances, create permanent psychological trauma to the recovered isolated personnel. From past detention incidents, this trauma has manifested itself in recovered isolated personnel separating themselves from military Service, having dysfunctional family relationships, and, in severe cases, committing suicide. Some of the decompression protocols include normalizing physical and emotional reactions to their isolation experience; providing an opportunity to predict and control their environment; allowing them to repeatedly tell their story in a positive manner; allowing a group of recovered isolated personnel from the same event to have time together to recount their experience in a positive manner; allowing individual down time to come to grips with the whole event; assisting them in developing an action plan for dealing with the media, integrating into family, returning to duty, etc.; providing access to Service chaplains and opportunities to receive religious support at the request of

the returned isolated personnel; and offering and providing follow-up care after the formal reintegration process is over. A key to successful decompression is creating an environment where isolated personnel feel they are safe and can relax.

c. **Reintegration Debriefing.** Reintegration debriefs are designed to obtain specific information regarding the experience of recovered isolated personnel. Intelligence and SERE debriefing should occur in all three phases of reintegration. SERE and intelligence debriefs may run separately or concurrently as dictated by mission circumstances, but should be coordinated with one another. SERE debriefs should follow accepted protocols to produce transcription quality audio recordings essential to the SERE analysis and development of LL. Following NAR operations, and before the debriefing begins, the chief debriefer will ensure the debriefers are made aware of the use of NAR capabilities and will ensure only those with the need to know and appropriate security access and clearance are present during the debriefings, and nondisclosure statements are completed. The NAR debriefer will coordinate with the reintegration team chief and chief debriefer on proper processes and procedures. In order to protect the recovered person's right to avoid self-incrimination, debriefers should always consult with the staff judge advocate (SJA) regarding required legal rights advisements before conducting interviews, and an SJA representative should be present during debriefings.

(1) **Intelligence Debrief.** Following the approval of medical and psychological personnel caring for the recovered person, the initial intelligence debrief should occur as soon as possible in phase I. It should be conducted by a qualified and trained intelligence debriefer, per DODD S-5200.37, *Management and Execution of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (U)*.

(a) During phase I, the intelligence debriefer seeks specific time-sensitive and perishable information. In phase II and III, the intelligence debriefer will seek to answer IC requirements at the operational and strategic level. Additionally, a notice of intelligence potential should be released to garner any new or emerging intelligence requirements specific to the current case.

(b) Intelligence gained during the phase I debrief is quickly reported via established dissemination channels IAW standard intelligence reporting procedures. All information collected is assigned proper security classification based on its content prior to dissemination to appropriate IC recipients.

(2) **SERE Debrief.** The SERE debrief should occur as soon as possible, pending the approval of medical personnel caring for the recovered isolated personnel, and should be conducted by a trained SERE debriefer. To ensure cooperation and full disclosure of information by the recovered personnel, SERE debriefs are considered "close hold" and will only be disseminated on a need to know basis, protected from public disclosure according to The Privacy Act and other legal protections, and primarily used to develop LL to adapt joint and Service-level SERE training products and TTP. The initial debrief material is normally classified secret until the subsequent analysis determines a more appropriate classification. In addition, the SERE debriefer, in coordination with the SERE psychologist, focuses on mental and psychological health

and well-being of the recovered isolated personnel, and provides an avenue for isolated personnel to decompress and come to terms with the circumstances encompassing the time in isolation. The SERE debrief focuses on the isolation experience in an effort to evaluate the adequacy and usefulness of:

- (a) SERE operational guidance, education, and training.
- (b) SERE equipment to include evasion aids and radios.
- (c) The PR processes that either assisted or hindered their isolation. Focus on processes to report, locate, support, and recover the isolated person.

(3) **Other Debriefings.** Depending on the nature of the mission performed by the person before they were isolated, the nature of the isolation, and the recovery means employed, some debriefing will be sensitive. The primary debriefing team will either be augmented by personnel to deal with select issues or a nondisclosure agreement (Standard Form 312, *Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement*), will be signed by all participants in the debriefing session. Various aspects of the isolating event may be of interest to the IC, civilian law enforcement agencies, Service criminal investigation organizations, and even safety investigation boards. They may all need access to the recovered individual, and their debriefings will be conducted separately from the SERE debriefing. All debriefings must be coordinated with the reintegration team chief and SERE psychologist.

(4) **Debrief Team.** Debriefing teams are normally established as part of a reintegration team to focus on obtaining accurate and complete intelligence, as well as gather SERE information to be forwarded to JPRA for further analysis. Debriefing team members will be trained to conduct PR debriefs IAW Joint standards. The ideal ratio of debriefers to debriefees is one-to-one. It is difficult for a debriefer to track and encourage the story of more than one debriefee, especially if the debriefees experienced the same event together. The team will include a chief debriefer to manage and synchronize the various debriefings and related requirements.

(5) **Debrief Team Preparation.** Debriefing team members should meet in advance to compare information requirements and deconflict interview questions to avoid duplication. All available information pertaining to the recovered person should be obtained from the JPRC and reviewed when refining debrief checklists and developing questions. Visual aids such as maps and photographs should be available to assist the recovered person in providing a chronicle of their experiences.

(6) **Sequence of Events.** Debriefers will coordinate and agree upon a sequence of events for interview sessions. Because they have different uses, the team should ensure the recovered isolated personnel clearly understand the distinction between the different debrief sessions. If possible, debriefers may attend other debrief sessions to monitor the information exchange and develop follow-up questions to be covered in subsequent sessions. The sequence will be heavily influenced by the physical/mental stability of the recovered person as determined by the SERE psychologists, availability of

debriefers, and other limiting factors. A possible debriefing sequence of events is as follows:

(a) Recovered isolated personnel provide a narrative account of their experience while debrief team components monitor and build an understanding of the incident.

(b) The SERE debriefer, in collaboration with the other debriefers and SERE psychologist, asks a series of structured questions during sessions that are orchestrated for duration and attendees. The structured questions are designed to elicit the most accurate details from the debriefee based on their story and other information available. The maximum total hours of debriefing should not exceed four per day.

(c) Debrief teams may conduct follow-up interviews, as required.

(d) The SERE psychologist assists the debriefer and interacts with the recovered isolated personnel as they feel necessary.

(e) The SERE debriefer should ensure the SERE debrief recordings and all other pertinent information is forwarded to JPRA for processing immediately upon completion of the debriefing process.

d. **SERE Psychologist.** The SERE psychologist is primarily focused on the decompression and long-term welfare of the recovered isolated personnel. Decompression is an essential activity that can prevent psychological damage to recovered personnel and the loss of accuracy in recalling critical intelligence and operational information. SERE psychologist support is a required part of the debriefing process during reintegration. The SERE psychologist:

(1) Provides an explanation of the reintegration process to the recovered person.

(2) Conducts a behavioral assessment to address critical elements of evasion, capture, detention/captivity, and liberation in terms of their impact on the adjustment of recovered isolated personnel.

(3) Monitors the recovered personnel and advises the reintegration team leader regarding the coordination of all aspects of the reintegrate task, to ensure the health, welfare, and stamina of recovered isolated personnel are maintained.

(4) Provides the behavioral assessment of the recovered personnel to the reintegration team leader who makes the recommendation on disposition (i.e., return to duty or continue to next phase) to the component commander.

(5) Consults with mental health providers, as needed, regarding potential diagnostic conditions.

e. **Phases.** The reintegration process consists of three phases, whose activities and levels of intensity are based on their location. The first two phase locations are directed

by the GCC in coordination with the components, and the third phase is located in the US, at a site selected by the respective Service. The JFC coordinates through the JPRC, with the component commanders' PRCCs to determine the location(s) of phase I and II, the composition of the phase I team (or other process if a team is not required), the transition process from phase I to phase II, the phase II, the composition of the phase II reintegration team, and the transition process to phase III. Phase I encompasses the process of transporting the recovered isolated person to a safe area to conduct initial medical/psychological assessment and debriefings. Phase I will end with the recovered isolated personnel being returned to duty or recommended for phase II. Phase II starts with the arrival of the recovered person at the phase II theater treatment and processing facility, where the focus is decompression, structured debriefings, and required medical care. Phase II will end with the recovered isolated personnel being released to duty or recommended for phase III. Phase III begins after the phase II reintegration team chief transfers the reintegration mission to the phase III reintegration team chief. Phases II and III do not have prescribed time limits, but depend on the needs of the recovered person in coordination with the concerns of the GCC, the Service, reintegration team debriefers, the SERE psychologist, and medical providers.

(1) **Phase I.** The focus of phase I is medical triage and stabilization, initiation of SERE psychologist support and decompression, and collection of time-sensitive information. At a minimum, all recovered isolated personnel should undergo an initial reintegration assessment, which is normally accomplished at a phase I location. Before recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty, they should be medically cleared, complete any required debriefs, and have some form of decompression. With proper support, all of these essential activities can occur at phase I and, when appropriate, the recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty within 48 hours. In some cases, a more comprehensive SERE debrief, and other LL activities, can be accomplished at a later date. Based on the reintegration assessment and theater guidance, the GCC, in coordination with the component commander, has the authority to return isolated personnel to their DOD duties or transfer them to the next phase. Phase I begins as soon as the recovered isolated personnel are in the care of the phase I team, or other established process, and should be accomplished as soon as possible. The JPRC, in coordination with the PRCCs and the reintegration team chief, will determine the most appropriate place and means to accomplish phase I. Based on the CCCR's guidance, and component requirements, phase I will normally consist of:

(a) Immediate medical attention.

(b) Providing the recovered isolated personnel information about the reintegration process and events before they occur. This is an essential element of decompression for phase I, giving back to the recovered isolated person their ability to predict and control the world around them, thus giving them the ability to make some decisions about phase I activities.

(c) Time-sensitive intelligence and SERE debriefs to collect any appropriate tactical or perishable intelligence, SERE information and/or any appropriate isolated personnel identification and status information.

(d) Assessments necessary to determine whether recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty or require additional time for decompression and medical treatment. Questions will be composed to ascertain the following:

1. Name, rank, Social Security number, organization, and health and physical condition.
2. Recovery details such as location, date, time, and method.
3. Did isolated personnel make contact with an RM? If yes, the recovered isolated personnel will be advised not to disclose details of this information except to a specific NAR representative.
4. Were isolated personnel held captive or detained at any time?
5. Other information that will give the SERE psychologist anecdotal or defined evidence that further decompression may or may not be needed.

(e) The phase I team chief or other responsible organization, based on an assessment of debrief requirements, and consultation with the SERE psychologist regarding the mental and physical condition of the isolated personnel, will make a recommendation to the appropriate commander and PRCC about their further continuation in the reintegration process. The PRCC keeps the JPRC informed. If the recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty, they will remain under the auspices of the parent command. If it is determined that additional time is required for debriefing and decompression, the recovered isolated personnel will be recommended for phase II and all records, to include the personnel processing file (PPF), will be transferred to the designated JFC phase II reintegration team chief.

(2) **Phase II** will be conducted at the theater designated facility where the focus is decompression, structured debriefings, and necessary medical care. Phase II is executed by the JFC's designated reintegration team and includes services rendered by a SERE psychologist who facilitates decompression and ensures the health and welfare of the recovered person remains at the forefront of the process.

(a) The reintegration team chief will ensure coordination with members of the JFC's staff, components, Services, and other agencies who should be involved in the reintegration processing of the recovered isolated personnel or require proprietary debriefings. The reintegration team chief will be charged with prioritizing and monitoring, in coordination with the SERE psychologist, all reintegration processes to prevent confusing, or adversely affecting the mental or physical health of the recovered isolated personnel. To fully meet its responsibilities, an ideal reintegration team would consist of:

1. **Team Chief.** An individual familiar with reintegration and SERE debriefing processes and procedures, the combatant command's requirements for administrative processing (personnel, financial, legal, accident investigations, etc.) of personnel, and theater joint coordination processes. Team chiefs, faced with a large

number of joint force returnees (and corresponding increase in reintegration team members), may consider requesting a deputy team chief of a sister Service to assist in addressing Service unique reintegration issues and to share the workload. The team chief will be in the grade of O-6, with the authority to coordinate with component commanders.

2. SERE Psychologist. As previously explained/discussed.

3. SERE Debriefers. As previously explained/discussed.

4. Intelligence Debriefers. As previously explained/discussed.

5. Medical Officer. Will advise the team on the physical condition of the returned isolated personnel as it impacts their ability to undergo the reintegration process.

6. Legal Representative. This person can assist with the reintegration and debriefing procedures especially when there are sensitive legal issues to consider, such as suspected violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

7. Chaplain. Chaplains provide and facilitate religious support to isolated personnel. Religious support can be beneficial to the immediate spiritual, mental, and psychological welfare of recovered isolated personnel and contribute to their successful long-term reintegration. Recovered personnel who request pastoral care or counseling from Service chaplains should be clearly advised that their communications with the chaplain, as a formal act of religion or matter of conscience, are privileged communications and confidential under Military Rules of Evidence, Rule 503 (b). In order to ensure this right of confidentiality for recovered isolated personnel, chaplains will not, at any time, participate in or conduct SERE, intelligence, or other debriefings.

8. PA Officer. This person is very important to advise on the proper disposition of media inquiries. This assistance is valuable to the team as well as recovered personnel and their families.

9. Personnel Officer. This person ensures the procedures required by the theater joint personnel center or other personnel procedures are accomplished. This person is also the GCC's key coordination link to the appropriate Service casualty assistance office to initially coordinate the family support requirement.

10. Service Support Representative(s). The Service team member is an individual that can provide for the personal needs of the recovered personnel. This person should have the ability to obtain clothing, hygiene items, Service ID cards, credit cards, and other personal items, as required. If possible, this should be someone known by or familiar to the recovered personnel, and should be available to offer support and be a confidant.

11. Service Casualty Assistance Representative. This is a very important team member who ensures the continuation of family support that should have

started during the isolating event. The Service casualty assistance representative provides SA and coordination among the theater reintegration team chief, the PAO, the SERE psychologist, and the Service casualty assistance office in direct support of the recovered person and their family. This casualty assistance representative will also play a key role in family visits and the transition of family support from phase II to phase III.

12. Other Team Members, such as administrative and financial specialists, can be added as deemed appropriate to the situation.

(b) During phase II family members may begin initial contact by telephone. Rarely is there any benefit for family members to travel to phase II locations. In fact, until decompression/debriefing is complete, the primary concern of recovered isolated personnel is the objective assessment of how they conducted themselves while isolated—they have a need to know the answer to “did I conduct myself well and with honor?”

(c) At the request of the phase II reintegration team chief, a representative from the phase III team may observe phase II debriefs.

(d) The reintegration team chief will consult with the SERE psychologist and other reintegration team members and make a determination on the completion of phase II, as well as make a recommendation to the component commander or the JFC on the disposition of the recovered person. They can either return them to their DOD duties or transfer them into phase III where the recovered isolated personnel will come under the control of their respective Service in the US. The JFC, JPRC, and respective PRCCs will be informed on all decisions.

(e) If the recovered person is returned to duty, the JFC’s reintegration team chief will transfer the PPF and all other data and records collected during phase I and phase II to JPRA. If the recovered person is proceeding to phase III, the PPF and all other data and records collected during phase I and phase II will be properly transferred to the phase III team chief.

(3) **Phase III.** Phase III begins after the phase II reintegration team chief transfers the reintegration mission to the phase III reintegration team chief of the appropriate Service. Ideally, a personal escort, a member of the reintegration team or Service representative, and a SERE psychologist will accompany the recovered isolated personnel during transition from phase II to the phase III location. Other transition team members will be assigned based on the specific requirements of the recovered personnel as determined by the phase II team chief in consultation with the SERE psychologist and the recovered personnel. These arrangements should be coordinated by the teams involved, preferably before an event has occurred. At a minimum, this coordination will consist of an exchange of contact information among the phase II and phase III reintegration team chiefs and the combatant command and Service PR OPRs.

(4) **Process Flexibility.** Though conducted by phase, the critical tasks within each phase are not necessarily conducted sequentially or on a rigid time schedule. Latitude and flexibility remain with the Service and Service component commander to

accomplish the reintegration process based upon the needs of the recovered isolated personnel and within the context of ongoing military operations.

22. Challenges

The challenges faced by formerly isolated personnel depend on the situation. Someone recovered within a few hours or days evading with no contact with the adversary will face different challenges than someone held captive for years. The former may require more simple medical treatment, decompression, and SERE and intelligence debriefings, while the latter will need more in-depth decompression and reintegration. The greatest challenge during reintegration is when well-intended actions are implemented without understanding their full ramifications. These actions may negatively impact the recovered person as they strive to return to a healthy family, social, and professional life. The following are some of the common ways senior military leadership and senior executives have negatively impacted the reintegration process while trying to be helpful.

a. Overwhelming the Recovered Isolated Personnel with a Show of Support. Regardless of how well they performed during isolation, all recovered isolated personnel are in a mild state of shock when they return. They need time to psychologically decompress; recount their story in a normal, healthy manner; develop an understanding of what their isolation/captivity meant to them; and prepare to reengage with their family, work, and society. Media events, political photo opportunities, ceremonies, and celebrations have their place but not during the early stages of reintegration. These types of activities serve to increase the state of shock of recovered isolated personnel and usually end up overwhelming them and complicating the reintegration process.

b. Awarding Medals and Accolades Too Early. Expediting medal processing or giving bold public accolades early in the reintegration process is not recommended. It takes time for recovered isolated personnel to work through the intensity of their emotional reactions to the isolating event. Medals given while recovered personnel are still struggling with intense emotional reactions complicate the reintegration process and, in many cases, may isolate/alienate recovered personnel from unit members. Additionally, in PR events involving multiple individuals, awarding medals or other public proclamations of heroism too early can create tension and resentment within the group of recovered personnel. This is especially true if varying levels of recognition and credit are ascribed to different members of the group before there is a full understanding of the isolating event.

c. White House and Senior-Level Command Presentations/Visits. Attempts to honor recovered isolated personnel with high level visits serve necessary political purposes but are not in the best interest of the recovered isolated personnel if conducted during the early stages of reintegration. Recovered isolated personnel will remember these events as positive if they are conducted at the proper time and IAW the wishes of the recovered isolated personnel. Brief telephone calls may be appropriate during early stages if coordinated with the reintegration team.

d. **Reuniting Recovered Personnel Too Soon With their Families.** Families are an essential part of reintegration and there is a natural desire to reunite recovered personnel with their loved ones as soon as possible. Although counterintuitive, reuniting families and other designated individuals with recovered personnel too early not only complicates the reintegration process, but can also create significant harm for long-term family relationships. Recovered isolated personnel try to protect families from the horrors of their ordeal while family members tend to overwhelm recovered isolated personnel and do not allow them time to decompress. Recovered isolated personnel should be allowed to make telephone contact with families during the early stages of the reintegration process. Family reunions are more appropriate when the reintegration process is nearing completion or when recovered isolated personnel return to the US.

e. **Working with Contractors.** PR planners face multiple challenges in coordinating the reintegration of a contractor who has been isolated. Entry into the reintegration process for many contractors is voluntary, and the contract company may not provide the level of cooperation anticipated. The family support group that military forces enjoy at home station will not normally be available to the contractor employee's family. The company may release information to outside sources that the recovery forces or the isolated personnel do not want made public. Developing a close relationship with the contract company can assist the reintegration team in ensuring all aspects of the reintegration run smoothly.

23. Follow-Up

SERE psychologists will follow up with recovered isolated personnel, as needed, for at least one year. Intelligence organizations may require follow-up contact with recovered isolated personnel to pursue additional intelligence requirements, particularly to support investigations of unresolved POW and/or MIA incidents.

24. Administrative

a. Initial Control

(1) **Administration.** The command gaining initial control of recovered isolated personnel will ensure that an escort is assigned until the designated reintegration team assumes control of the recovered isolated personnel. Thereafter, recovered isolated personnel normally will complete a nondisclosure agreement and a debriefing statement.

(2) **PPF.** The reintegration team chief should coordinate with the designated component commander to obtain each recovered isolated person's PPF from the appropriate Service or PRCC. This file will be used during the entire reintegration task as a debrief document and will be forwarded to JPRA once reintegration has been completed. If the reintegrate task is accomplished prior to receiving the PPF, the PPF will be included in the final disposition of debrief documents.

For further guidance on the PPF, refer to DODI 3002.03, DOD Personnel Recovery-Reintegration of Recovered Personnel.

(3) **Initial Recovery Report.** This report will be transmitted by the JPRC as soon as possible to the returned isolated person's parent Service, with copies to the theater reintegration team chief, JPRA, the appropriate JOC, and the recovered isolated personnel's commander. Along with recovered personnel data, the report will include an assessment of potential support required, a road map for reintegration activities, and a reintegration team chief recommendation to return the individual to duty or proceed to phase II.

b. **Debriefs.** All debriefs should be focused, timely, and last only as long as the recovered isolated personnel can mentally and physically continue. The maximum total hours of debriefing should not exceed four hours per day. Debriefers will ensure DD Form 2810, *Personnel Recovery Debriefing Statement*, has been signed before beginning the debriefings. Typically, information obtained in the intelligence debriefings is immediately disseminated per intelligence architectures and processes. The verbatim text/transcription of SERE debriefings is statutorily protected and is not releasable unless approved by the Director, JPRA. JPRA is required to analyze raw debrief material, summarize it, and provide synopses of LL to the GCC and all DOD organizations that have a need to know. SERE debriefs are initially classified secret until the information can be further analyzed and reclassified according to the Personnel Recovery Classification Guide and other guidance, as applicable. SERE debriefs are DOD property, and are not to be released to the public without the approval of the classification authority, the DOD document release processes, and in coordination with established PA guidance.

For further guidance on reintegration, refer to DODI 3002.03, DOD Personnel Recovery-Reintegration of Recovered Personnel.

25. Medical

Medical personnel play a key role in the successful debriefing and reintegration of returned isolated personnel. The objective of medical support during reintegration is to provide recovered isolated personnel with appropriate and complete medical evaluation and treatment, establish a detailed medical record for future reference, maintain or restore dignity, and facilitate readjustment to society. During reintegration, immediate medical care and mental health issues are addressed first. The medical treatment of returned isolated personnel includes the services of a SERE psychologist to facilitate decompression and address any psychological issues.

a. **Medical Triage, Evaluation, and Stabilization.** Recovered isolated personnel should receive a comprehensive medical triage and any medical treatment necessary to medically stabilize their condition. Many recovered isolated personnel have been subjected to physically traumatic experiences and require immediate medical evaluation and treatment for life threatening injuries or conditions. A hands-on medical assessment is necessary to avert missing any serious medical conditions that may go undetected due to shock, ensure medical stabilization, and assure the health and well-being of recovered isolated personnel.

b. **Return to Duty Recommendations.** Not all recovered isolated personnel will require phase II and III of reintegration. Often essential medical care will take place at forward locations within the theater. Definitive care is more appropriately addressed during phase III due to a higher level of care available at phase III facilities. The lead medical officer is responsible for consulting with the reintegration team chief and the SERE psychologists in providing return to duty recommendations.

26. Support to Families and Designated Individuals

Family and other designated individual support is important to reintegration. The Service-appointed casualty assistance officer and SERE psychologist will strive to keep families informed during the reintegration process within limits of medical confidentiality and the desires of the recovered person.

a. During reintegration, the early stages of support to families and designated individuals involve keeping them informed and assisting them in coping with a variety of well-meaning people or media organizations. In reintegration phase II, families may show up, often against the advice of the reintegration team, when the individual has been moved to a medical facility in a more easily accessible foreign location. Support to families and designated individuals may become more intense and complex during reintegration phase III, when the returnee is transferred to a medical treatment facility within the US. Considerations during phase III may include:

- (1) Billeting.
- (2) Food.
- (3) Access to morale, welfare, and recreation facilities.
- (4) Access to restricted areas of the hospital.
- (5) Child care.
- (6) Medical needs and care of family or designated individuals.
- (7) Returnee's desires regarding family members/loved ones presence:
 - (a) Who the visitors are.
 - (b) The number of visitors.
 - (c) What their relationship is to the returnee.
 - (d) How long they are staying.
- (8) Travel expenses.

(9) Interaction with contractors and different rules.

b. This family support preparation and execution is in addition to the logistics necessary to prepare for receiving the isolated personnel themselves. Ultimately, the reintegration is about the recovered person, and family support issues may need to be adjusted to meet the needs of the recovered person.

27. Post Isolation Support Activities

a. PISA are ways by which DOD assists other USG departments and agencies in supporting non-DOD individuals (to include foreign nationals) who have been isolated or held captive. These efforts facilitate the return of a mentally and physically healthy individual back to society and are meant to augment the various capabilities of our interagency partners. USG departments and agencies may request some or all of the capabilities available, depending on each case's unique circumstances. Many of DOD's core reintegration capabilities may be modified to support PISA:

- (1) Transportation.
- (2) Meals and lodging.
- (3) Medical.
- (4) Chaplain.
- (5) SERE psychologist.
- (6) SERE debriefings.
- (7) Intelligence debriefings.
- (8) Security.
- (9) PA.
- (10) Family support.
- (11) Team chief.

b. The COM normally requests PISA directly from the GCC. SecDef is authorized by public law to carry out PISA and is authorized to provide DOD-specific support to non-DOD personnel (to include foreign nationals). SecDef has delegated that authority down to the GCCs.

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APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL SEARCH AND RESCUE

1. Introduction

a. Civil SAR is different from other civil support mission areas. Civil SAR is governed by international agreements, national plans and distinct instructions including the National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States (NSP) and the National Response Framework (NRF). DODI 3003.01, *DOD Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR)*, defines DOD roles and Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) responsibilities.

b. The US has established its civil SAR system to provide SAR services as part of the global SAR system. SAR services ensure the US meets national and international humanitarian and legal obligations. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, and the Convention on International Civil Aviation are civil treaties containing SAR-related provisions to which the US is a party. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) implement the treaties and the international cooperative effort toward the continued development of an effective, standardized global SAR system. The US is a principal member of these organizations and the National Search and Rescue Committee represents USG SAR-related interests.

2. Background

SAR is a key lifesaving mission area well-grounded in history and highlighted during and since Hurricane Katrina, the earthquake in Pakistan, and the tsunamis in the Pacific. Federal and state partners have learned the lessons and the SAR enterprise continues to evolve. Domestic and international partnerships are better than ever and new initiatives are being codified and refined constantly.

3. International Search and Rescue Coordination

According to international agreements, the world is sectored into search and rescue regions (SRRs). The SRRs are well established and have been codified in the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual. Every SRR must have a rescue coordination center (RCC), an operations center capability that is capable of receiving a request and has responsibility to coordinate SAR services within the SRR. It is important to note that SRRs are different from UCP AOR GCC boundaries.

4. Civil Search and Rescue

a. Civil SAR is defined in the NSP as search operations, rescue operations, and associated civilian services provided to assist persons and property in potential or actual distress in a nonhostile environment. Civil SAR is further defined in DODI 3003.01,

DOD Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR) as SAR operations in the air, on the land, and on the water to assist persons and protect life in a permissive environment.

b. In general there are three main classifications of a SAR response based on the size and scale of the event and the numbers of persons in actual or potential distress:

(1) **Routine SAR.** Day-to-day civil SAR operations include beacon activations, requests from state and local authorities for assistance, search for downed aircraft, and civil SAR assistance in the vicinity of airports. Examples of routine SAR are requests from state authorities for DOD assistance to search for lost hunters, rescue of a fallen mountain climber, or searching for lost boaters at sea.

(2) **Mass Rescue Operation (MRO).** Incidents that are characterized by the need for SAR services for large numbers of persons in distress and the resources and capabilities normally available to SAR authorities are inadequate. However the normal SAR coordination architecture remains in effect. An example of mass rescue might be a cruise ship in distress, where the USCG requests additional DOD resources to effect rescue operations.

(3) **Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue (CISAR).** Civil SAR operations carried out as part of a response to any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. CISAR operations are characterized by an emergency or disaster declared by the president and are executed under the provisions of the NRF including the Emergency Support Function (ESF) # 9 annex. CISAR is considered a defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) event in which funding and support fall under different rules than routine SAR or MRO.

5. Department of Defense Role in Civil Search and Rescue

a. IAW DODI 3003.01, *DOD Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR)*, DOD will support domestic civil authorities providing civil SAR services to the fullest extent practicable on a noninterference basis with primary military duties according to applicable national directives, plans, guidelines, and agreements, pursuant to the authority in and IAW provisions of the NSP of the US. DOD, consistent with its capabilities and authority under applicable law and regulations, can provide the following:

(1) Support foreign civil authorities performing civil SAR operations in territory and international waters beyond recognized US SRRs.

(2) Provide assistance to persons, ships, and aircraft in distress IAW US and international law and applicable regulations.

(3) Follow the civil SAR standards and procedures to the maximum extent possible when supporting civil SAR activities.

b. In addition, DOD emergency beacons that are SARSAT system-compliant or type-approved must comply with US national guidance. All DOD 406 MHz SARSAT emergency beacons must transmit a unique digital identifier and be configured to include standardized DOD coding and operated and maintained to ensure effective use and be registered in the Joint SARSAT Electronic Tracking System, a component of the PRMS.

c. During any event requiring SAR services, under the provisions of the NRF, USG departments and agencies may provide immediate lifesaving assistance to states under their own statutory authorities without a formal presidential declaration.

For further information regarding immediate response authority, refer to DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA); and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

6. The National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States

a. It is the policy of the signatory US federal agencies to provide an NSP for coordinating SAR services to meet domestic needs and international commitments. DOD is a signatory to the NSP; the NSP is implemented by the National SAR Supplement, its addenda, and other relevant documents. Aspects under the NSP include:

- (1) Maritime (involving rescue from a water environment);
- (2) Aeronautical (including civil SAR assistance in the vicinity of airports);
- (3) Land (including operations associated with remote areas, swift water, caves, mountains, etc.);
- (4) Urban search and rescue (US&R);
- (5) Provision of initial assistance at or near the scene of a distress situation (e.g., initial medical assistance or advice, medical evacuations, provision of needed food or clothing to survivors, etc.);
- (6) Delivery of survivors to a place of safety or where further assistance can be provided or further transportation arranged;
- (7) Saving of property when it can be done in conjunction with the saving of lives;
- (8) MROs; and
- (9) SAR services associated with incidents of national significance covered by the NRF.

b. It is important to understand that DOD may be called upon to perform or support any of the SAR services listed above with or without a method of reimbursement.

7. Combatant Commander Search and Rescue Responsibilities

Some key responsibilities of GCCs include: be knowledgeable of civil SAR responsibilities; perform civil SAR functions, review security cooperation agreements, and ensure security cooperation agreements account for civil SAR agreements. In addition, CDRUSNORTHCOM has additional domestic SAR responsibilities.

a. **Domestic SAR Coordination.** State and local authorities are responsible for land-based SAR and designate a person to be “SAR coordinator” within their respective jurisdictions. State SAR coordinators are integral partners in national SAR coordination and are critical to providing effective civil SAR services.

b. There are two US SAR coordinators responsible for identified SRRs, an area of defined dimensions associated with an RCC, within which SAR services are provided, as prescribed by the *IAMSAR Manual* and further delegated within the NSP. The federal SAR coordinators are:

(1) **United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).** SAR coordinator for the US aeronautical SRRs corresponding to the continental US as well as US aeronautical SRR corresponding to the inland area of Alaska. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the SAR coordinator for both the Tyndall SRR and the Elmendorf SRR and has overall responsibility for coordinating DOD support to civil SAR services within those SRRs. CDRUSNORTHCOM’s SAR architecture has been operationalized through USNORTHCOM CONPLANs and OPORDs. In summary, the strategic responsibilities are retained by HQ USNORTHCOM. However, operational responsibilities and authorities are delegated to Commander, Air Force North (CDRAFNORTH) as the SAR Operations Coordinator to be executed through the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) (Tyndall SRR), the JPRC, and Alaska Command Commander to be executed through the 11th RCC (Elmendorf SRR).

(2) **AFRCC Tyndall Air Force Base** is the established RCC for the SRR and provides for and coordinates day-to-day routine SAR thru MRO response to include US military assets. CDRUSNORTHCOM has delegated the federal routine aeronautical SAR coordination authority (routine SAR and MRO) for the Langley SRR to CDRAFNORTH.

(3) **The USNORTHCOM JPRC** has been established and provided the authority to plan, integrate, coordinate, execute, and monitor CISAR operations and in support of federal, state, tribal, or territorial SAR operations. JPRC personnel will deploy in support of CISAR planning and operations to collaborate, cooperate, and coordinate CISAR response with all SAR stakeholders and participants on behalf of CDRAFNORTH when designated the USNORTHCOM JFACC.

(4) **USCG.** SAR coordinator for all other US aeronautical and maritime SRRs including Hawaii as well as waters over which the US has jurisdiction, such as navigable waters of the US. These SRRs are more regional and have a corresponding USCG district office and corresponding RCC.

AIR FORCE RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER

The Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) coordinates search and rescue (SAR) services every day in support of civil authorities. From 2005 through 2014, the AFRCC reported 62,700 incidents and coordinated 14,588 missions, and the United States Northern Command SAR enterprise was involved in 2,745 saves with rescue missions ranging from day-to-day, hurricane, and flood response operations.

Source: AFRCC, 2014 Annual Report

(5) **Service/Unit Implications.** Services and units that have the ability to perform SAR services should maintain points of contact with appropriate authority to approve a request for civil SAR. Within the US and territories, ensure the appropriate information is exchanged and RCC(s) are aware of the process to request approval.

8. Search and Rescue Agreements and Memorandum of Understanding with States

The AFRCC maintains and continuously reviews SAR memoranda of understanding and/or memoranda of agreement with all 48 contiguous states for routine SAR response as well as files to provide controllers with both roles/responsibilities and contact information for state and federal assets. The AFRCC controllers use them to understand roles/responsibilities and obtain contact information for state and federal assets when coordinating inland SAR operations.

9. Ways to Request Federal/Department of Defense Search and Rescue Support

DOD resources are provided only when response or recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of local, state, and federal civil authorities, and when they are requested by a federal agency with lead responsibility and approved by SecDef. An exception to this is in the case of immediate response authority. See DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*. When requested by civil authorities, commanders can respond to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions within the US. Refer to DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, for a full explanation of the requirements and constraints of immediate response authority. See Figure A-1 for SAR support sourcing methods.

Department of Defense Search and Rescue Support Sourcing Methods	
Civil Authority Direct to a Department of Defense (DOD) Official	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DOD official may respond under Immediate Response Authority in accordance with (IAW) Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.18. • Resources remain under Service Command and Control • Must reassess not later than 72 hours

<p>Civil Authority to a Rescue Coordination Center</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rescue coordination center will coordinate IAW strategic communication responsibilities per National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States and National Search and Rescue Supplement • DOD policy to respond IAW Department of Defense Instruction 3003.01 • “DOD shall support domestic civil authorities providing civil SAR [search and rescue] services to the fullest extent practicable on a non-interference basis with primary military duties. • Each Participant will fund its own activities....unless otherwise provided for by law or arranged by the Participants in advance, and will not allow cost reimbursement to delay response to any person in danger or distress. • Resources remain under Service Command and Control
<p>Civil Authority submit written request with commitment to reimburse (IAW DODD 3025.18)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Normally after Emergency Support Function #9 Activated • Normally associated with a Mission Assignment in anticipation/post Declaration, Stafford Act, Economy Act. • Under United States Northern Command/dual-status commander Command and Control

Figure A-1. Department of Defense Search and Rescue Support Sourcing Methods

10. Emergency Support Function # 9, Search and Rescue

The ESFs under the NRF provide the structure for coordinating federal interagency support for a federal response to an incident. They are mechanisms for grouping functions most frequently used to provide federal support to states and federal-to-federal support, both for declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act and for non-Stafford Act incidents. ESF #9 is continuously updated and contains major revisions from the post-Katrina 2007 version. The current version captures LL and evolving doctrine and incorporates best practices among the federal partners.

a. DOD is one of four primary agencies for ESF#9 (SAR). An ESF primary agency is a federal agency with significant authorities, roles, resources, or capabilities for a particular function within an ESF. ESFs may have multiple primary agencies, and the specific responsibilities of those agencies are articulated within the relevant ESF Annex. The four primary agencies for ESF #9 are Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for structural collapse US&R; DHS/USCG for maritime, coastal, waterborne SAR; Department of the Interior/National Park Service and DOD (through USNORTHCOM) for land SAR. During large-scale events such as Hurricane Sandy, DHS/FEMA (as ESF #9 Coordinator) may designate any of the primary agency (such as the USCG) as the overall primary agency for ESF #9 (SAR) responses for that particular event.

b. DHS/FEMA activate ESF #9 when an incident is anticipated or occurs that may result in a request for a unified SAR response to an affected area (i.e., declared disaster area). As required, the primary agencies are represented at the National Response Coordination Center, joint field office, and state, tribal and local emergency operations centers. DHS/FEMA designates the overall primary agency for the particular ESF #9

response. Designation is dependent upon incident circumstances and the type of response required. The designated overall primary agency coordinates integration of federal SAR resources, including support agency resources, in support of the requesting federal, state, tribal, or local SAR authority. When designated as the overall primary agency, DOD through USNORTHCOM:

- (1) Manages DOD SAR resources in the affected area.
- (2) Coordinates the provisioning of additional support resources.
- (3) Coordinates with federal, state, tribal, and local designated SAR authorities to integrate federal SAR resources.
- (4) As required, provides representation at the National Response Coordination Center, joint field office, state, tribal and local emergency operation center.
- (5) Provides incident reports, assessment, and situation reports (SITREPS), as required.

11. Time Criticality

Based on LL from Hurricane Katrina, SAR training, and doctrine, standing SAR objectives have been derived and promulgated in the Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue Addendum to the National SAR Supplement. They are:

- a. Specialized response team searches and hasty searches accomplished within 24 hours; and
- b. Primary searches completed within the next 48 hours.

12. Funding of Search and Rescue Services

Authorities and funding are main issues that impact DOD's ability to respond to and provide DSCA. DSCA is provided on a reimbursable basis unless otherwise directed by the President or reimbursement is waived by SecDef. Cost reimbursement for DSCA is usually IAW Title 31, USC, Section 1535 (commonly called the Economy Act), which mandates cost reimbursement by the federal agency requesting support. The Stafford Act sets the guidelines for reimbursements to federal agencies and states from federal funds set aside to support missions in response to a presidential declaration.

For more information on reimbursement, see JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations, and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

13. Search and Rescue Incident Management

SAR services are normally coordinated by a civil authority that has responsibility such as the incident commander IAW the National Incident Management System incident command system (ICS). The incident commander sets tactical objectives and coordinates

and integrates the response of the supporting organizations. The incident commander may be the county sheriff during a routine SAR event such as a lost hunter, or the incident commander may be a city emergency manager during a bigger event or a state SAR coordinator during a catastrophic event. DOD forces are not under “command” of the incident commander, but DOD is normally a member of the incident commander’s structure and provides direct support to accomplish the incident commander’s objectives.

14. Integration into the Civil Search and Rescue System

a. Military forces supporting civil SAR should be aware that significant terminology and procedural differences exist between DOD and the civil SAR system. Civil SAR standards and procedures identified in the NSP, the IAMSAR Manuals, and the NSS and its addenda are followed to the maximum extent possible when supporting civil SAR activities consistent with applicable law and regulation. Particular attention should be paid to the standards and procedures contained within the CISAR and land SAR addenda to NSS.

b. CDRUSNORTHCOM has directed the use of the CISAR addendum for military forces conducting DOD support to civil SAR, unless a recognized authority having jurisdiction directs otherwise. All federal SAR partners utilize the CISAR addendum and strong familiarity with civil SAR terminology and procedures will enhance the DOD effort to achieve synchronization, interoperability, and unity of effort within federal ESF #9 agencies and among state, tribal, territorial, and local SAR authorities. A glossary of terminology is found in the CISAR Addendum.

15. Search and Rescue Command and Control

SAR C2 is related to, but different from, SAR incident management. CDRUSNORTHCOM’s role is one of a coordinating authority until forces are formally transferred to USNORTHCOM. CDRUSNORTHCOM has designated CDRAFNORTH/JFACC as the coordinator and has delegated the authority to coordinate SAR and to provide formal C2 of DOD forces formally requested, sourced, and transferred to USNORTHCOM during a military response.

a. C2 arrangements for the performance of SAR services are dependent upon the method of request for DOD SAR forces, the size and scope of the incident and the organizational structure that is able to C2 SAR services most effectively. All Services have equities and are able to provide lifesaving SAR services, but since time is always of the essence, CDRUSNORTHCOM has preplanned and built SAR C2 arrangements assuming a large scale, multi-state, multi-jurisdiction incident and the premise that the SAR Operations Coordinator (CDRAFNORTH/JFACC) is the operational commander that can most effectively provide operational C2 of DOD forces performing SAR services in support of the authority having jurisdiction. SAR C2 will generally be dictated by the following situations but may be altered by command authorities depending upon the specific mission situation.

b. If a DOD official responds to a request from a civil authority for SAR services, and the DOD official responds under immediate response authority, C2 remains within parent Service channels, and provides a coordination function through the AFRCC and/or USNORTHCOM JPRC.

c. If a civil authority requests SAR services through an RCC, C2 of the responding forces remains within parent Service channels and provides a coordination function via the AFRCC and/or the USNORTHCOM JPRC.

d. If military forces are transferred to USNORTHCOM to provide SAR services either from a request from a civil authority or sourced to fulfill a request for forces, then those military forces will normally be transferred to the USNORTHCOM SAR Operations Coordinator (CDRAFNORTH/JFACC), who will have the authority to further delegate command authority. If the response is localized, is of small scale, in a single state, and from a single service, the CDRAFNORTH/JFACC may delegate C2 to a Service component or an established JTF, whichever is the most effective C2 arrangement to conduct the SAR mission. Additionally, as the dual status commander (DSC) is the usual and customary tactical C2 arrangement when state and federal military forces are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities, the CDRAFNORTH/JFACC may delegate TACON and/or elements of command of SAR assets to the activated dual-status commander (DSC) to provide SAR support to the incident commander.

16. General Hurricane Response

In order for the federal agencies to be in position to support the time objectives above, DHS/FEMA will activate ESF#9 approximately 110 hours before land fall (H-96). Activation normally requires a representative at the FEMA NRCC from the primary agencies. The initial plan is to designate USCG as the overall primary agency; at such time USCG Atlantic Area will assume that role to lead the coordination of ESF#9 partners. Anticipate FEMA to deploy a federal SAR coordination group to a forward location to coordinate the federal SAR efforts.

a. **Service Impact:** USNORTHCOM will begin mission analysis based on the track, size and intensity of the storm and will request forces best suited to perform SAR services. Based on the mission analysis, the services will be requested to provide capabilities that are assessed to be best suited to support the federal and other authorities. CDRUSNORTHCOM may request forces achieve prepare to deploy order (PTDO) status and remain in place, or to deploy immediately depending on the timing of the response required.

b. USNORTHCOM seeks a joint solution, so service capabilities may be required to work together to achieve SAR objectives. However, CDRUSNORTHCOM will never ask services to accomplish objectives that are outside of the scope of their training or the operational risk analysis performed by the appropriate commander is deemed unacceptable.

17. No-Notice Event Response

a. During a no-notice large-scale incident such as an earthquake, predeployment will not have happened. In that case, since time is of the essence, DOD can anticipate requests for SAR services through immediate response authority, RCC coordination and through the formal DSCA process.

b. **Service impact.** The civil authorities in the vicinity of the incident will coordinate with the appropriate DOD officials to request SAR services, in addition the state, tribal or federal SAR authorities will contact the AFRCC to request SAR services and the AFRCC will begin to coordinate a large scale rescue effort. Simultaneously, USNORTHCOM will accomplish a hasty mission analysis and will requests forces best suited to perform SAR services based on existing preplanning and mission analysis results. Then the services will be requested to provide capabilities that are assessed to be best suited to support the federal and other authorities. Anticipate CDRUSNORTHCOM will request SAR forces achieve PTDO status and issue orders to immediately deploy to the vicinity of the incident and begin assisting the authority having jurisdiction.

18. Military Support to Federal Emergency Management Agency Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces

FEMA identified the need to augment their 28 US&R task forces (TFs) for a large-scale SAR event and requested DOD support to US&R TFs during a major continental United States (CONUS) catastrophic incident (e.g., earthquake, major hurricane, terrorist attack) that could exceed FEMA US&R capacity. The military has been, and can be, used as a force multiplier to augment/support US&R TFs. USNORTHCOM developed a CONOPS that was accepted by FEMA.

a. When directed by SecDef, DOD will provide military support to FEMA US&R TFs in response to a catastrophic domestic incident. USNORTHCOM will coordinate a combination of skilled search and extraction capability and functional support provided by available military forces sourced from National Guard, Active Component, or Reserve Component. Military forces that are requested then deploy to provide SAR capability, and would be in direct support of the state efforts and in close support of the FEMA US&R TFs. The state SAR coordinator sets the search priorities and objectives in collaboration with the FEMA US&R incident support team and provides mission tasking through the command established within the ICS structure.

b. The military chain of command will remain intact and flow through state or Title 10, USC, lines of authorities at all times. If there is a DSC established, the chain of command will flow through the DSC within the state.

For more information on DSC, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

c. Specialized search and extraction elements can be tasked to provide skilled/technical rescue expertise. Conventional forces will provide general labor and enabling capability as a force multiplier to the FEMA TFs.

d. Anticipated sourcing of the capability will be search and extraction elements from the National Guard's chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives enhanced response force packages (CERFPs), or similar capabilities from DOD Active Component or Reserve Component forces. The DOD response could include components of the defense CBRN response force, the USMC's Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force, the USAF's Guardian Angel rescue squadrons, and troops in the vicinity of the incident.

e. Two employment options can be used: stand-alone employment by skilled search and extraction elements of CERFP, or similar and/or integrated operations utilizing conventional forces in a company size building block approach.

f. C2 will remain within appropriate military channels, likely TACON to a DSC as the usual and customary method in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

g. Incident management is always in support of the incident commander/authority having jurisdiction.

h. Transportation. Via ground vehicle to the maximum extent practical (inside of 400 miles).

i. Just-in-time safety and other training will be conducted on site.

j. Response timeline for military support to US&R begins with initial catastrophic incident notification (N+0) to FEMA.

(1) N+0, Incident Notification. ESF#9 teleconference, FEMA initiates military support request for assistance/mission assignment (Top Down). USNORTHCOM in coordination with NGB coordinates response; required airlift coordinated; PTDO released.

(2) N+6, FEMA US&R TFs, National Guard search and extraction elements, conventional force units prepared to deploy. Travel by ground if within 400 mile radius. Airlift required if outside of 400 mile radius.

(3) N+24, Initial military augmenting forces at incident site; just-in-time trained and ready to commence operations.

(4) N+72, Primary Search Complete. Normally after 94 hours, the incident commander reassesses the mission and transition to recovery operations.

k. **Tactical Execution:** Details of tactical execution, TTP, and LL from Hurricane Katrina to date are found in the Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue Addendum to the National SAR Supplement. This document is a compilation of federal partners' TTP and definitions, and its use is mandatory in the USNORTHCOM AOR in support of an authority having jurisdiction that utilizes the document. It is found on the USCG website.

19. Search and Rescue Support to other Rescue Regions, Domestic, and International

It is customary and there are provisions in international agreements to support requests for SAR from other rescue regions. The AFRCC coordinates with, and supports USCG requests regularly. There are SAR agreements in place with Canada and the USCG has SAR agreements in place with Mexico. USNORTHCOM is working to streamline SAR coordination with Mexico through less restrictive agreements.

20. Search and Rescue Exercises

The routine SAR process is executed on a daily basis. When a SAR “life, limb, eyesight, or undue suffering” request is received, AFRCC requests immediate support from any/all proximate federal assets to include military units of all services. This process, which is IAW Community Online Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers the National SAR Plan, has been used by the AFRCC for many years. MRO and CISAR are exercised regularly with states and other federal partners.

Amplifying guidance and further direction on DOD support to civil SAR can be found within DODI 3003.01, Department of Defense Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR). See also the IAMSAR Manual at www.imo.org and the National SAR Plan at [http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/manuals/Natl_SAR_Plan\(2007\).pdf](http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/manuals/Natl_SAR_Plan(2007).pdf).

APPENDIX B
CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PERSONNEL RECOVERY
(PUBLISHED SEPARATELY)

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APPENDIX C EVASION

- Annex A Legal Aspects of Escape and Evasion
- B Evasion Strategies
- C Signaling Techniques and
Procedures
- D Evasion Plan of Action
- E Imminent Capture
- F Guidance for Completing and Controlling DD Form
1833, Isolated Personnel Report

1. General

Evasion is the process whereby isolated personnel avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. This appendix provides factors that may affect, and techniques and procedures of, evasion to assist commanders in planning for and accomplishing the five PR execution tasks. Evasion techniques and procedures, as well as the evader's status, vary among the types of military operations and the conditions in which they are conducted.

2. Types of Military Operations

a. **Military Operations During Peacetime.** There may be occasions when individuals will become isolated in a friendly or neutral foreign country as the result of an aircraft mishap, inadvertent border incursion, or similar circumstance. In such situations, the individual's goal should be to return to friendly control openly and as soon as possible. Individuals isolated under these circumstances should approach local authorities and request assistance in returning to friendly control or, if possible, openly approach a US embassy or consulate or a representative of a friendly government. On the other hand, evasion may be the proper COA when an individual accidentally and unintentionally becomes isolated in a foreign country unfriendly to the US, in an area where there is no effective local government, or when there is reason to believe the local population would mistreat the individual. Whenever "covered persons" operate in or near such areas during peacetime, CCDRs should ensure that appropriate PR plans have been developed, personnel at risk of isolation have been properly trained and briefed, and recovery forces are prepared to execute the plans when appropriate.

b. **Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.** Isolated personnel are faced with contrasting concerns depending on whether the US is supporting an insurgency or counterinsurgency. For example, individuals whose mission is to support an insurgent movement can expect to receive assistance in areas controlled by the insurgents or where the local populace is sympathetic to the movement. They should avoid government forces, government controlled areas, and areas where the population supports the government in power. Evaders can also anticipate that any recovery effort will most likely be conducted in a clandestine manner. On the other hand, personnel isolated while providing support to a counterinsurgency are faced with a completely different scenario. In a counterinsurgency, evaders should move to government-controlled areas, seek out government forces, and expect recovery by a force operating in a more overt manner. Because each situation has unique requirements, personnel at risk of isolation involved in either of these scenarios should be fully briefed prior to the onset of operations on the TTP and resources that will be used to effect their recovery.

c. **Combating Terrorism.** Isolated personnel who were participating in counterterrorism activities are faced with a dilemma similar to that for insurgencies. The key variables in this situation are the location where the action has occurred and where the individual is evading (e.g., is the country where the individual is evading supportive or hostile to the US presence and action?). Evasion, even in a country where the

government supports the US action, can be dangerous because the evasion area could be populated by elements supporting the terrorist group.

d. **Peacekeeping Operations.** Although a prerequisite for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation is the consent, cooperation, and support of the parties to the dispute (a negotiated truce), the peace operations force is often required to deal with extreme tension and violence. Such conditions could lead to a situation where members of the peace operations force find themselves in an evasion situation. Once again, the territory where the evasion takes place and the controlling power's political attitude toward the US will influence evader actions. Members of the peace operations force should be well briefed on the current political climate, on the attitudes of the parties to the dispute, and proper evasion guidance that includes various possible evasion scenarios. In addition, planning for quick-response recovery operations should always precede the initial deployment of the force.

e. **Other.** Certain crisis avoidance or consequence-management situations may require the use of military force to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives, respond to emergencies, or protect US citizens. Detailed PR plans should be developed for these operations to the extent allowed by the crisis situation.

f. **War**

(1) **General.** Evasion may be severely restricted by the large number of adversary forces along the forward line of own troops (FLOT), by combat operations, and by the possibility that adversary forces may possess sophisticated NVDs and various sensors. Evaders along the FLOT should concentrate on hiding and surviving. After the battle has passed over, the evader should try to link-up with other friendly forces without surprising friendly patrols. Isolated personnel should not make fast or threatening moves and allow themselves to be captured. Once contact is made, authentication procedures will identify personnel as bona fide US isolated personnel.

(2) **CBRN Defense.** Planning should include providing personnel at risk of isolation with education, training, and equipment to survive and operate in CBRN environments. The evader should be trained in TTP to sense, recognize, avoid, and protect against CBRN hazards, and decontaminate themselves, if necessary. Personnel must be current in all CBRN defense awareness and CBRN defense survival skills.

For additional information regarding SERE planning considerations and actions for isolated personnel and recovery forces, refer to Appendix E, "Classified Planning Supplement" (published separately).

For additional information regarding planning for and operations in a CBRN environment, see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX C LEGAL ASPECTS OF ESCAPE AND EVASION

1. General

The actions of isolated personnel will be governed by applicable law and policy including US law, international law, the law of war (e.g., the Hague and Geneva Conventions), and the laws of the nation in which the isolated person is located. Whether a particular body of law or policy applies will depend both on the type of conflict taking place and the status of that isolated individual.

2. During an International Armed Conflict

a. **POW Status.** POW status is an essential characterization as it confers significant protections upon isolated personnel who meet the criteria outlined in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). First, a POW, if a privileged belligerent, will receive combatant immunity (i.e., the POW's lawful warlike acts will not expose the POW to criminal punishment). Second, the GPW provides for and regulates the humane treatment of POWs. On the battlefield, individual status may determine one's survival. Legal status determines whether one is: a lawful target; a POW or a spy; or a combatant, civilian, or noncombatant. This distinction is essential as unprivileged belligerents (e.g., terrorists, spies, and civilians directly participating in the hostilities) are persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in warlike acts during an armed conflict. They may be targeted or captured and prosecuted under the domestic law of the detaining nation for their warlike acts.

(1) GPW, in its entirety, applies only when the conflict is an international armed conflict. Under Common Article 2, the "Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more [countries]." Examples include World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Operation DESERT STORM, and the early phases of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

(2) Once the conflict is determined to be an international armed conflict, Article 4 prescribes the requisite criteria for POW status. POWs include members of the regular armed forces involved in an international armed conflict. They also include members of militias or resistance fighters belonging to a party to the conflict if they meet certain criteria set forth in Article 4. These individuals are lawful combatants.

(3) In addition, numerous other individuals who are captured are entitled to POW status if "they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany." These include contractors, reporters, civilian members of military aircraft crews, and merchant marine and civil aviation crews. Although such persons are entitled to the benefits of POW status, they are not considered lawful combatants, i.e., they are not entitled to fight and they do not have the right to participate directly in hostilities as members of the armed forces do.

hors de combat—A French term used in diplomacy and international law meaning “outside the fight.” It refers to soldiers who are incapable of performing their military function. Soldiers *hors de combat* are normally granted special protections according to the law of war, sometimes including prisoner of war status. Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions defines a person is *hors de combat* if (and provided that in any of these cases he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape):

- the individual is in the power of an adverse party;
- the individual clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or
- the individual has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself.

**SOURCE: Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
(Note: The United States is not a party to Protocol I)**

b. **Pre-Capture (Evasion) versus Post-Capture (Escape).** The law of war makes a distinction between isolated personnel depending on whether they are still evading initial capture or have escaped after being captured. Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict and militias, if they meet the requirements set forth above, who are evading capture are still considered lawful combatants. As a lawful combatant, they will continue to have combatant immunity. However, once captured, the individual is now considered *hors de combat*, or out of combat. If the individual evading capture is a civilian accompanying the armed forces (see paragraph 2a[3]), the civilian is only authorized to use force for individual self-defense. Unless immune from HN jurisdiction by virtue of an international agreement or international law, inappropriate use of force could subject them to US or HN prosecution and civil liability.

c. Although escape attempts are legal under the law of war, a POW whose escape is unsuccessful may be punished by the POW’s captors for the unsuccessful escape. Offenses committed by POWs with the sole intention of facilitating their escape that do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as offenses against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary punishment only. (See generally GPW, Articles 91 to 94.) Recaptured POWs may be charged with a crime if the escape attempt involves any offense resulting in violence to life or limb, or self-enrichment. (See GPW, Article 93.)

d. An escape is deemed successful once the POW has rejoined their, or an ally’s, armed forces, or the escapee has left the territory of the detaining power or its ally. If the escape is successful, the escapee cannot then be later punished by the captor for offenses committed during the escape, except crimes of violence or self-enrichment. If later recaptured, there is a real possibility that the detaining power might attempt to punish the escapee for such crimes. Accordingly, US policy is not to return successfully escaped POWs to the same theater of operations.

e. **Neutral Countries.** Instead of being captured by an enemy state who is a party to the conflict, isolated personnel may find themselves in the territory of a country which is not a party to the conflict. In such a situation, there are rights and duties of that country and issues regarding the status of the isolated personnel.

(1) **Rights and Duties of a Neutral State.** A state which chooses not to take part in an international armed conflict, and treats belligerents in an impartial manner, is called a “neutral state” or a “neutral power.” Rights and duties of a neutral state are governed by a number of treaties, in particular the Hague Convention, *Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Cases of War on Land, 18 October 1907 (Hague V)*. If isolated personnel cross into a neutral country’s territory and are captured, the neutral state may disarm and intern them, and take such measures necessary to prevent them from rejoining their forces.

(2) **Status of Captured Personnel.** Isolated personnel in neutral states are treated in the same way as POWs under the GPW. Therefore, interned isolated personnel should receive at a minimum, the same treatment as POWs (but they do not have the formal status of POWs). The GPW also adds that the neutral state might give them “more favorable treatment.” This is justified by the fact that neutral countries were not adversaries as far as the internees were concerned. Isolated personnel who enter neutral territory should attempt to successfully return to friendly lines as if in a hostile party’s territory but should not, to the extent possible, do anything that would be considered a criminal act. There is no combatant immunity, or immunity from criminal prosecution (absent a SOFA with the HN), in the neutral state.

(3) **Internment and Repatriation.** Although the detaining power can give more favorable treatment than what is required under the GPW, it cannot escape its obligation under international law to intern troops belonging to the belligerent armies (this implies groups of military forces). The neutral detaining power has the obligation to ensure those troops do not perform military acts against their enemy during the conflict. Additionally, the internees should be repatriated without delay at the end of the conflict, although there is no requirement to repatriate an internee against his will if there are serious reasons to fear that the individual may be the subject of unjust measures affecting life or liberty, especially on grounds of race, social class, religion, or political views. Moreover, no sick or injured internee may be repatriated against his will during the hostilities. With respect to individual isolated personnel, the neutral state that receives escaped POWs will leave them at liberty. If the state allows escaped POWs to remain in its territory, it may assign them a place of residence (see generally, Hague V, Article 13).

f. The law of war places certain restrictions on isolated personnel, but also provides them with certain latitude in what is considered acceptable conduct. This is particularly true in the case of disguises.

(1) **Wearing of Adversary Uniforms.** It is a violation of the law of war to “make improper use of” the uniform of the adversary. Persons captured while fighting in the adversary’s uniforms have traditionally been subject to criminal prosecution and possible execution for war crimes and espionage. It is, however, still permissible for

personnel isolated in hostile territory to use an adversary's uniform to evade, as long as no efforts to kill or wound the adversary are made while so attired. Persons who use the adversary's flag, uniform, insignia, markings, or emblems solely for evasion are not lawfully subject to disciplinary punishment on that account, as long as they do not attack the adversary, gather military information, or engage in similar operations. However, wearing an adversary uniform is extremely dangerous because it could result in the mistaken, but likely, treatment as a spy.

(2) **Disguises.** Under certain circumstances during an escape or an evasion, the adoption of varying degrees of disguise may be logical and appropriate. For instance, if the population density is such that movement in uniform is not possible, isolated personnel may be required to adopt some sort of disguise to transit the area. Likewise, if contact with an indigenous assistance group has been established, isolated personnel may disguise themselves to facilitate movement. In these instances, the judgment of the assistance group should be respected. However, isolated personnel need to understand that in the event of capture, they will likely be treated exactly like members of the assistance group, unless they can convince their captors that they are lawful combatants. If the disguise is essentially civilian clothing, they should retain at least some of their uniform or personal ID (e.g., ID tags, US Uniformed Services/Geneva Conventions ID card, blood chit) to use as proof of status in the event of capture.

(3) **Misuse of the Red Cross and Other Protected Emblems.** Protected emblems may not be used as disguises for purposes of escape or evasion in armed conflict. Only bona fide medical personnel, chaplains, and relief agency personnel may wear these emblems during armed conflict. Misuse of these protected emblems could result in undermining the inviolability of these emblems and the credibility of US forces; the perception of the global community that the US does not adhere to the law of war; and other extremely adverse effects on the organizations and personnel they represent.

3. During Operations Short of International Armed Conflict

a. **General.** Legal considerations for evasion during operations falling short of international armed conflict differ from those during an international armed conflict. Because many military operations involve conflicts of a noninternational nature or situations where the parties to the conflict are not nation states, the national domestic criminal laws of the country in which the operation is taking place and/or the law of war applicable to noninternational armed conflicts will apply.

b. Because POW status and combatant immunity are international armed conflict concepts, a participant in an operation short of international armed conflict, upon capture, is not entitled to POW status, nor does combatant immunity apply. Therefore, if captured, isolated personnel operating under such circumstances face the possibility of prosecution by the HN for any warlike acts committed. However, because these operations generally tend to support the HN, the possibility for such an occurrence is reduced. Furthermore, it is also likely that the HN will be a party to an international agreement, such as a SOFA, prior to the operation, which may provide a sufficient degree of immunity from HN laws. Furthermore, if the United Nations (UN) sponsors the

operation, the participants may be entitled to “expert on mission” status, and be returned to the UN forces upon capture.

c. If isolated personnel are captured by an insurgent group, as opposed to the HN, or if captured where there is no functioning HN and the fighting is between warlike clans, practically speaking, isolated personnel should have a reduced expectation for protections under the law. Although insurgents would be subject to criminal prosecution by the HN, this may have little real impact on their willingness to provide protections to captured isolated personnel.

d. International law does contain some guidance as to the treatment of captured soldiers or others who are *hors de combat*. The minimum treatment is prescribed in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II (the United States has signed but not ratified Protocol II and it is therefore not binding. However, some items of the protocol are considered customary international law). These standards include protection from violence, extra-judicial killing, and “outrages upon personal dignity”; wounded and sick should be cared for and all those who are *hors de combat* should be treated humanely. The minimum humane treatment standards outlined in those documents should be applied to captured personnel in a noninternational (or internal) armed conflict.

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX C EVASION STRATEGIES

1. Threats to Evasion

a. **Terrorists, Criminals, and Unfriendly Populations.** Areas controlled by terrorist organizations and illegally armed groups of criminals should be considered high-threat evasion environments. Personnel may be targeted by terrorist or criminal organizations while in the conduct of their normal business. Several deployment locations are characterized by widespread poverty, ineffective government control, cultures of immunity and corruption, and ineffective/rogue security forces. At these locations, even a nominally friendly populace or government is a threat to evaders. Evaders should be wary of local residents, including children, who often notice minute changes to their surroundings. If influenced by anti-American propaganda, they may alert others to the location of a stranger. Homeless, displaced, refugee, or mentally ill people are also a threat. In many ways, they live the same lifestyles as an evader and may compete for the same resources. They may see the opportunity for reward from the enemy. A mentally damaged or insane person will be undependable; they may attempt to cause harm without an apparent cause. If evading near or on the border, evaders face the hazardous situation of a hostage taking event when encountering terrorist organizations and criminal elements (smugglers, drug runners, or human traffickers). These elements are mainly interested in their security and protection of smuggling routes.

b. **Biometric Threats.** The growing use of automated biometric systems and multimodal search engines by foreign governments and intelligence/security agencies is another threat to the evader, especially in urban areas and at border crossings. As more foreign organizations and governments turn to biometrics to combat identity fraud, the possibility of an evader being compromised or detected will increase. Scores of countries are deploying face-based biometric alias detection systems to help monitor civil identity, driver licensing, immigration and migration, visa, as well as voter registration processes. Intelligence and security services typically have access to the information in these systems as a matter of course, and therefore they have the added capability to easily vet images and identities of subjects they suspect of using aliases. Once personnel have cleared immigration screenings at border crossings, they may still be subjected to biometric interrogation and alias discovery in other situations such as during routine law enforcement stops, transiting other security check-points, or while being detained and questioned by police officers on the street. Law enforcement sectors are becoming large purveyors of facial recognition and other biometric technologies to identify suspects. Law enforcement technology exists that allows authorities to capture photographs/fingerprints, extract biometric templates, and remotely identify, verify, or vet individuals against criminal and identity databases as new intelligence on individuals or organizations is received.

c. **Landmines/Unexploded Ordnance (UXO).** In several countries where personnel could potentially become isolated, the land is littered with landmines and UXO as a result of years of armed conflict. Evaders should take this into consideration, especially if traveling in areas near borders where conflicts have taken place, or near

facilities requiring protection such as government buildings or power plants. Refer to country specific IPG located on the JPRA SIPRNET, <https://prpublic.jp.ra.smil.mil/products/ipgs.cfm>, or the landmine monitor report on the NIPRNET [Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network], located at <http://Im.icbl.org>, for country specific information.

d. **Illness/Disease.** The need for illness/disease prevention cannot be overemphasized. Illness during isolation is foremost among the many problems that can compromise the ability to survive. The effects of poor health can add to the stress of isolation by limiting a person's ability to function. Loss of well-being could possibly mean losing the ability to continue to avoid capture or resist the captor.

(1) In many countries, the local food and water sources (including ice) are heavily contaminated with pathogenic bacteria, parasites, and viruses to which most personnel have little or no natural immunity. Consumption of water contaminated with raw sewage, or runoff containing fecal pathogens, or one-time exposure to fecal contamination in food may cause a variety of infections, to include bacterial diarrheal diseases, giardiasis, hepatitis A, and typhoid. Aside from water and food-borne illnesses, other maladies could be caused by vector-borne arthropods (malaria, human/bubonic plague, pneumonic plague, yellow fever, rift valley fevers, spotted fever, etc.), animal contact (anthrax, Q fever, rabies, etc.), or soil contact (hookworm, cutaneous, larva migrans, etc.). Evaders could be debilitated for a week or more with any of these diseases; in some cases, such as rabies or pulmonary anthrax, the fatality rate is near 100 percent, absent a post-exposure treatment.

(2) **Illness/Disease Preventive Measures.** The best way to deal with illnesses is for personnel to prevent them from happening in the first place. Evaders should observe basic field sanitary practices as much as practical; prevent insect and animal bites with proper clothing, defensive actions, repellants, and netting. Certain environments may expose captives to high-risk local nationals and their diseases. The best preparation against infectious diseases is to maintain current immunizations. To prevent water-borne illnesses, consider all surface water biologically contaminated. Purify all water before consuming. If purification is not possible, use water from plant sources or non-stagnant, running water obtained from a location upstream from habitat or contaminations sources.

e. **Psychological Attitude**

(1) Do not become discouraged. The will to survive, training in survival and evasion TTP, and equipment, coupled with an ability to withstand hardships and overcome obstacles, are essential to staying alive and successfully evading.

(2) Value clothing and equipment. Items such as shoes, clothing, and supplies are not likely to be replenished behind the lines; therefore, maintenance may be vital to survival.

(3) Focus on the situation and the EPA. Develop a physical and mental pace and be methodical. The entire journey to friendly or neutral areas may require living off the land and traveling on foot.

(4) Patience and knowledge of the adversary's population controls and internal security measures such as patrols, travel restrictions, security checkpoints, rationing, etc., may be key to a successful evasion.

(5) Understand that delay of a recovery effort is likely due to recovery force capabilities, threats, or environmental conditions.

f. Modification to the evader's EPA will be dictated by the situation. However, changes should be considered carefully, since recovery forces expect execution as promulgated. For example:

(1) Travel plans may change due to restrictions such as unexpected enemy action, curfews, checkpoints, and roadblocks.

(2) Unanticipated local customs may need to be imitated to avoid being conspicuous.

g. **Equipment.** The evader may be forced to decide what equipment to keep and how and where to dispose of the remainder (preparation, based on training and experience, will facilitate making the appropriate decisions for a given situation). Evaders should presume an adversary has observed the isolation event. The important thing is to avoid capture, even if it means leaving the scene of initial isolation and leaving valuable equipment behind. Breaking visual contact with the enemy is essential for evasion success.

2. Assistance from the Local Population

Indigenous persons living in disputed or enemy-held areas have assisted US and partnered nation personnel in various degrees throughout military history. Under some circumstances it may become necessary to seek assistance from local people in order to survive. However, this should be done only as a last resort. Even when isolated individuals do not require emergency assistance and are doing everything possible to avoid contact with local people, unplanned contacts may occur. While all such contacts are risky, if handled properly, they could result in life-saving assistance while isolated. Assistance from the local populace may be gained from either planned or unplanned contact:

a. **Planned contact** should be considered only after all other options have been exhausted. When an isolated person makes a conscious decision to purposefully make contact for assistance, it does not always guarantee aid or recovery. See Appendix E, "Classified Planning Supplement," for planning and recommended contact procedures. Assistance may aid the isolated personnel in several ways:

(1) Providing direct assistance by transporting the isolated individual to friendly forces.

(2) Directing friendly forces to the isolated individual.

(3) Providing security, shelter, sustenance, or information about enemy forces.

b. **Unplanned contact** occurs without notice or with limited planning due to dire circumstances and may result in immediate capture or execution of isolated personnel. Whether the contacts are *accidental* or an *act of mercy*, they are situations that if properly exploited could provide a means to gain lifesaving assistance and/or recovery.

(1) **Accidental** contact occurs when a local person and an isolated person accidentally encounter one another. Neither is comfortable with the situation and both are apprehensive about the outcome. Pre-mission study of the local people may make the evader aware of local attitudes toward Americans and provide some guidance as to how to communicate. A pointee-talkee or blood chit may also assist in communication and soliciting aid. This aid may range from the local person not sounding an alarm, to providing directions, survival assistance or information, to the best-case scenario where the isolated person is returned to friendly control. Generally speaking, the best COA for an isolated person subsequent to accidental contact is to clear the contact area as covertly as possible since the inclinations and resources of the local person are unknown.

(2) **Acts of mercy** are those actions shown for a fellow human being in need of life-saving assistance. Isolated personnel in danger of dying because of environmental extremes or injuries may elect to seek an act of mercy from an individual in the local populace. This contact is very dangerous and may result in death or capture. The blood chit may be useful in communicating and convincing an individual to perform an act of mercy.

c. Potential isolated personnel should receive specific cultural training to prepare them for the above situations. Assistance to the isolated person may be improved if the individual can represent himself as a polite fellow human being and empathize with the assistor's position of being accused of aiding and abetting a criminal or the enemy. Cultural preparation can also be provided through theater IPG and briefings. Potential isolated personnel receive training in evasion aids through Service SERE schools, unit or mission-specific training, and theater briefings. This training enhances the capability of an individual to take advantage of an opportune situation and may provide the capability a commander is seeking, as discussed in Chapter V, "Planning." CCDRs can ensure their personnel at risk of isolation possess the required knowledge and skill levels by publishing minimum SERE skill requirements in OPLANs, OPORDs, and theater entry requirements.

See Appendix E, "Classified Planning Supplement" (published separately), for recommended contact procedures.

3. Evasion in an Urban Area

The likelihood of being isolated in an urban area is increasing. With so few available landing zones and the high vulnerability of recovery vehicles or forces in any given urban area, it is likely that isolated personnel will need to evade for a substantial amount of time, avoiding observation and contact. The evader should always be ready to fight, if necessary, and travel extended distances to get to a feasible recovery site or friendly forces. Conducting recovery in an urban environment poses a unique challenge and can place a heavy demand on the isolated person(s), the recovery force, and operational planners. Individuals who can avoid immediate capture should be familiar with urban evasion. The challenges of urban evasion are mitigated through realistic training and a prepared evader. Generally, successful evasion in an urban area requires an in-depth knowledge of the local area and the attitude of the populace, as well as a detailed map/diagram of the urban area. Isolated personnel should leave urban areas as quickly as possible.

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ANNEX C TO APPENDIX C SIGNALING TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

1. General

a. The most important action the evader can take to assist in the recovery effort is to periodically provide evidence to friendly forces that they are alive, where they are located, and some information on their physical and mental state. This action can be best accomplished by effective signaling. Radios are the best form of signaling and communication, but are not always viable. The evader can also indicate his or her location to overhead assets via GTAS IAW the individual's EPA and theater and unit PR instructions. Signaling can be electronic, visual, or acoustic.

b. **Pre-Mission Signaling Considerations.** Personnel at risk of isolation should know how to use issued communications and signaling equipment, including radio silence procedures, for a specific contingency. Issued equipment should include primary and alternate signaling devices that facilitate detection in both day and low-light conditions. Further, environmental factors, the chance of discovery by local civilians, and the adversary threat should be major considerations when determining which particular signaling devices to utilize within the operational area.

For a detailed discussion of signaling, refer to Appendix E, "Classified Planning Supplement" (published separately).

c. Evaders who are trained in various SERE tactics and techniques can decrease the risks to themselves and the recovery force by being able to:

(1) Overcome signaling problems associated with terrain, weather, medical status, capabilities of the signaling devices, and adversary activity.

(2) Improvise and use signals to improve their chances of being sighted by friendly forces.

(3) Select signaling sites that enhance signaling efforts and the likelihood that it will be detected by friendly forces (i.e., use the terrain to maximize radio transmissions to friendly forces). The signal site should also have materials readily available for immediate use in the construction of visual signals. Materials may be either natural, man-made, or a combination. Consideration should be given to being recovered from or near that site (e.g., large enough for a helicopter, no flying hazards, terrain masked to reduce the potential of adversary observation/ground fire).

(4) Employ clandestine TTP to avoid disclosing their position to any unintended people while signaling (i.e., use the terrain to mask radio transmissions from the adversary).

d. The evader, as a minimum, should be prepared to use many types of signals: ground to air, strip, and load (discussed at subparagraph 2b, "Visual").

2. Signals

a. **Electronic.** Radio transmitters, beacons, and text messaging devices may be used to attract recovery forces to a specific or general location and to authenticate the evader's identity using the DD 1833 ISOPREP data.

b. **Visual**

(1) **GTAS** can assist recovery forces in the objective area to determine the evader's exact location.

(a) A **strip signal** (sometimes called a pattern signal) is a pre-coordinated GTAS from an evader to a receiving or observing source. The strip signal could be issued in theater PR instructions or developed by the individual and in either case should be annotated in the EPA.

(b) **Patterns.** Parachute panels, signal tarpaulins, space blankets, and other man-made or natural materials set in specific patterns and configurations may provide excellent visual signals. Natural material includes sticks, logs, snow, grass, leaves, brush, and rocks.

(2) **Signal mirrors** can sweep the horizon to attract aircraft or naval craft along a coast during daylight or moonlit nights. Inland, they are meant to be a directional signaling device and should only be used on ground or air targets. They should be covered when not in use. Caution should be taken to avoid inadvertent flashes to unintended observers.

(3) **IR chemical lights**, used in a pre-briefed manner, are an effective and readily discernible visual signal.

(4) **Strobe lights**, with IR or colored shields, and pyrotechnic signals should be used only as pre-briefed and annotated in the EPA or requested by recovery forces.

(5) **Fireflies** are IR light emitting diodes powered by a 9-volt battery. Multiple fireflies can be used like strip signals and should be annotated in the EPA.

(6) **Additional Methods.** In combat situations, most hand-held, nondirectional visual signals are best used with radio communications during final approach of a recovery asset, or when prescribed in the individual's EPA. Use of a visual signal without pre-coordination may be suspected as hostile activity. Use before coordination with the recovery asset may pinpoint the evader's location to the adversary and result in death or capture of the evader. The evader will necessarily weigh the risk of losing the "first chance may be the only chance" to be located with the possibility that delay may allow an adversary time to set up an ambush for the recovery asset.

(a) **Pyrotechnics** (e.g., flares, tracers, smoke grenades) are best used with radio communications during final approach of a recovery asset or when prescribed in the individual's EPA. Fire and/or smoke fire generators are dangerous to the evader and

should only be used in peacetime situations, extremely remote areas, or as a desperate act when death is the only other alternative.

(b) **Improvised.** Alternative, multiple-use visual signaling devices (e.g., laser pointers, flashlights with colored lenses, foil reflectors) are best used with radio communications during the final approach of a recovery asset or when prescribed in the individual's EPA.

(c) **Sea marker dye** may be used during daylight in any body of water (e.g., open seas, lakes, ponds, swamps, streams, rivers) or to color snow.

(d) A **load signal** is a precoordinated, close proximity signal that indicates the evader is positioned and prepared to make direct contact with recovery forces. This type of signal is classified and articulated in the individual's EPA.

(e) **Glint tape** is a very sensitive IR reflecting cloth that is lightweight, durable, and very reliable. It is very useful as an emergency night signaling device (e.g., a one-inch square piece of tape is detectable by airborne systems).

3. Authentication Procedures

Once an evader is detected, the recovery force will require ID authentication to confirm that an adversary attempting to entrap a recovery force has not replaced the evader. Recovery may not be immediate and depends on the situation. After an evader has been out of contact, even for a short time, re-authentication may be required and could occur multiple times. Definitive authentication will be based on the information contained in the ISOPREP, which contains questions the evader should recognize. Generally, the recovery force does not carry the ISOPREP with them on the mission, to preclude loss or compromise; they should contact the JPRC or unit holding the ISOPREP to obtain the information. If the evader is unable to respond to questioning, the ISOPREP (blocks 6, 7, 10, 11, and 24) contains information on the individual's physical attributes that may assist in confirming an identity. If identity is in doubt, the recovery force will follow accepted detainee handling procedures pending authentication or return to friendly territory.

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ANNEX D TO APPENDIX C EVASION PLAN OF ACTION

1. Minimum Information

a. **General.** EPAs should contain at least the minimum information required IAW theater instructions, and be tailored appropriately for the scope of the operation and mission of the unit. Individuals completing EPAs should not use the statement “PER ATO SPINS” as substitute information. Such a statement fails to provide recovery forces with the information required and provides no concrete data with which to plan a recovery operation. Inclusion of this prescribed information into one document, or an electronic database (e.g., PRMS), enhances operational effectiveness and precludes the possibility that critical information might not be available in a time-sensitive situation. Before beginning EPA preparation, the planner should have a thorough understanding of the friendly and adversary situation at the time of the mission. EPAs should be classified to at least the level of the OPLAN/OPORD for the mission they support. Paragraphs should be individually classified to the appropriate level. The information should be completed with assistance from appropriate communications and/or signal, intelligence, SERE, and support/life support personnel, as needed.

b. A standardized EPA format can be found on PRMS. Following is a sample for organizing the information needed in an EPA, divided into three parts. The information can be easily manipulated and updated, depending on the situation. Because it is only an example, it can also be used as the start of a checklist of items to be considered when developing an individual EPA. Although the information in parts one and three are applicable to both urban and field environments, part two is dependent on the circumstances of the mission and needs to be customized accordingly. Smaller elements of SOF and conventional ground forces may develop a single SOP-type of EPA applicable to most missions, since all will be generally operating together under the same set of circumstances. It is important that all individuals be thoroughly familiar with the elements of this pre-established EPA.

c. This sample EPA is organized in three parts:

(1) **PART I—PERSONAL ACTION PLAN**—information common to every mission. This portion contains basic TTP that an individual plans on using if isolated. It is designed to be basic to all evasion situations. For some, this may take more time to complete initially; however, once developed, this portion would become somewhat repetitious, remain on file, and generally would not be required to be redeveloped for subsequent missions. This portion of the document could be reviewed weekly, monthly, pre-mission, or as the situation or theater PR manager dictates.

(2) **PART II—MISSION SPECIFIC PLAN**—quick sketch of the intended goals or general direction of travel for each leg of each specific area, target, or mission. This may be accomplished with graphics, sketches, text, or a combination. The effort should be practical and depend on the breadth of the mission. Sketches and maps should have reference points annotated. The ever-changeable part of an EPA is the planned

ingress and egress routes. This may be sketched on a map, with each turn point labeled with a letter, number, or color. Any last minute changes (equipment, signals, etc.) to the Part I personal action plan should be annotated here. Surface forces may require more detailed, specific plans based on command/unit prerogative; what are outlined here are the desired minimums.

(3) **PART III—REQUIRED OTHER SOURCE DATA**—additional information that would be helpful to recovery forces and may be supplied by others to the Service PRCCs:

- (a) Unit level intelligence briefing and instructions that were provided.
- (b) Unit level mission specific briefings provided and equipment lists of issued items carried by the isolated individual.
- (c) Unit level operations: mission brief, instructions, and other data.
- (d) Location of emergency action data for the isolated individual.

d. Common to all situations is a high likelihood of injury, but each type of entry into evasion has its own set of problems, to include:

(1) Ejection or bailout with parachutes—visible for miles, enemy positions unknown; may be concealed and observed at a distance; evader may not know their own location once on the ground.

(2) Damaged rotary winged aircraft—high visibility in descent and possibly smoke; damaged aircraft provides a vector for the enemy to the evasion starting point; leaving footprints may indicate a direction of travel.

(3) Engaged surface forces—close proximity of the enemy; possible mass confusion; decisions: Communicate now or later? Stealth or speed? Dissuade pursuit?

2. Sample Evasion Plan of Action Format

Following is a set of examples for different types of evaders. These represent broad examples only and should be tailored to the needs of the individual and the mission.

Legend: (if no annotation, presume it applies to all types of evaders)
FWA fixed-wing aircraft with chutes
GF ground forces
RWA rotary-wing aircraft (or fixed-wing without chutes)

EVASION PLAN OF ACTION

Name:
Rank:
Service:
SSN:
Unit and Location (in pencil, if not electronic):
Date of this record:

PART I-PERSONAL ACTION PLAN—On file and common to every mission; change as situation dictates. It should contain basic TTP the individual plans on using if isolated on any mission.

Pre-mission personal preparation checklist

- Dress for the ground environment
- Dog tags, ID/Geneva Convention card
- Sanitize pockets and uniform - combat wallet
- Personal pocket survival/evasion items
- Issued items to support evasion
- Attached sketch or map - (YES) - (NO)

NOTE: The individual should create and memorize his/her own personal TTP. They may be pre-printed and standard for the individual, with same general plan for every mission. However, the equipment used may change with season or location.

I consider the following to be not essential to my evasion, and plan to conceal and/or leave the following:

- **FWA**—Harness, helmet, G-suit, personal flotation, canopy (less 6 cords and GREEN goes).
- **GF**—Rucksack, entrenching tool, mortar tube and base plate, extra M-60 ammo.
- **RWA**—M-60s and ammo (make inoperative) if not wounded and travel is possible, med kit if not in-use, flight helmet, 5 gallon water can.

I consider the following top priority items, in order, and plan to keep them if at all possible:

- **FWA**—Vest, hit and run kit, seat kit, beacon, 6 chute cords, 16P black raft (only if within 3 miles of the coast).
- **GF**—Weapon, water, ammo, web gear, camelback, radio, Gore-Tex jacket, PVS-7, VS 17 panels, 2 claymores.

- **RWA–Vest, MP-5 w/4 mags, web gear, survival gear, rucksack, extra water jug.**

I will carry the following personal survival/evasion kit items in my pockets on every mission:

- **FWA–Mirror, multi-blade pocketknife, fishing kit, fire kit, 3-color lens flashlight, space blanket.**
- **GF–light emitting diode (LED) light (blue, green, and red lens), mirror, glint tape patch, 5-IR Fire Flies, laser pointer, Leatherman, 2 large leaf bags, 3 Ziploc bags, 50 iodine tabs, 2- 4x7 battle dressings, metal match, 20 ft 550-nylon cord, dental floss, needles, hooks.**
- **RWA–Sheath knife, reflector kit, glint tape, mirror, red laser pointer, 4 flashing IR LEDs, fire kit, 6 power bars, Ziploc bag, 50 iodine tabs, pen gun, 7 flares, 5 small (3x3) S- 17 signal panels.**

EVASION ACTIONS

NOTE: The level of detail in the plan will be determined by the theater/unit guidance or directive, mission requirements, and, if no other planning guidance, the individual’s own assessment of the need for detail, e.g.:

- **In all cases, I will communicate upon starting evasion using “MAYDAY” (or applicable code word) call sign, and approximate location using search and rescue numerical encryption grid (SARNEG) for coordinates, or position and distance from SARDOT, or other encoded references in EPA, presuming it does not compromise security.**
- **COMM–OUT–Assume evasion has started if four communication windows are missed.**

If not seriously injured:

INITIAL ACTIONS–(1ST 30-60 MIN - APPROXIMATELY) (FWA)

- **If possible, steer aircraft or parachute away from action and to a location conducive to evasion and recovery.**
- **I plan initial movement from the landing site to the nearest feasible land form or vegetation and conceal equipment and myself.**
- **Understood - If the enemy is in very close proximity–no time to conceal equipment - I will move 15 minutes, away from my direction of flight, change direction 90 degrees; move approximately another 30 min and hide.**
- **I plan to hide by burrowing into the duff/forest litter, feet first, lay still, and stay put for three days–unless forced to move.**

EVASION COMM-PLAN THROUGHOUT

- I will monitor my radio and key the mike as specifically indicated in the EPA or as briefed in the comm-plan.
- My duress word is_. Duress action____. At close approach, I will display one or more specific visual signals in a specific manner, as described in my EPA.
- At night, I will use standard IR devices as indicated here in my EPA, or unit guidance, at recognizable US aircraft sound.
- Authenticate IAW recovery asset direction, using personal information and number found in the ISOPREP. I will keep transmissions as brief as possible to avoid enemy direction finding (DF). If the transceiver is inoperative, I will utilize visual signals appropriately.

EXTENDED PLAN

- If no contact in 3 days, I will travel at times of low light or moonlit nights for 3 nights or over the first ridgeline/elevation and attempt radio contact one hour after sundown.
- Movement will be toward the landmark(s) referenced in Part II of my EPA. I will use the briefed ground-to-air signal, made from natural materials, after day seven and hide 1,000-1,500 yards away in the best concealment available.

INITIAL ACTIONS - (1ST 30-60 MIN - APPROXIMATELY) (GF)

- Fire last AT-4 or green smoke as signal to break contact and start evasion plan. Dump unnecessary gear quickly where they are.
- Use rally points to regroup, if necessary, IAW times in Part II.
- Will counter enemy pursuit efforts by applying counter-tracking techniques—radically changing direction—zigzag repeatedly, and employ anti-pursuit munitions/grenades and booby traps with remaining mortar rounds.

EVASION COMM-PLAN THROUGHOUT

- If radio is available, will report initial situation as soon as possible with word “SAWDUST.” If no positive contact, I will communicate “in-the-blind” IAW the unit communication plan. Will initially attempt contact on sight/sound of any friendly aircraft. Authenticate as briefly as possible IAW ISOPREP. Duress word “Rations.”
- Any signaling device that I may use will have appropriate specifics on exactly what the device is, when, where, how many, and how the individual device or technique will be used, will be recorded here in the EPA. I realize that details such as specific numbers, spacing, shapes, colors, orientation and pattern, and movement actions are important in the EPA for recognition by the rescue force.

EXTENDED PLAN

- Maneuver to a hide site after maximum of 2 hours movement.
- Lay still for 24-36 hours depending on periods of light and enemy activity.
- After initial 48 hours, will move in low light - at dusk, dawn to allow for finding food and water.
- If celestial light and terrain allows, movement in the middle of the night and sleep in the day time. Night vision device batteries will be saved for movement when enemy activity/population density requires night movement.
- Movement will be generally away from the mission line of travel, with regular “dog legs.”
- If forced to select my own improvised signal and recovery site other than stated elsewhere and have no radio, my personal emergency GTAS will be: “-X>” unless otherwise directed in theater plans - annotated in Part II of this EPA.
- I will hide 1-2 kilometers from the signal in the direction of the “dash” off of the side of the “-X>” or other directed (Day/Week/Monthly/Quarterly) signal shown in Part II.
- Any signaling device that I may use will have appropriate specifics on exactly what the device is, when, where, how many, and how the individual device or technique will be used, will be recorded here in the EPA. I realize that details such as specific numbers, spacing, shapes, colors, orientation and pattern, and movement actions are important in the EPA for recognition by the rescue force.

INITIAL ACTIONS—(1ST 30-60 MIN - APPROX) (RWA)

- Communicate upon realization of a problem.
- Put aircraft down placing one or more landforms (river, ridge, canyon) between crew and enemy as far from enemy action as possible. Available cover and concealment and results of the last communication drives actions.
- Remove useful gear as soon as possible. If enemy is in close proximity, remove all weapons, ammo, water, and medical kits into cover and concealment; assess situation. Prepare to defend in place, only with immovable casualties and/or if recovery is imminent.
- If travel is desirable due to superior enemy activity, move as soon as possible to avoid contact with the enemy being initially drawn to the aircraft. Display a “V” of local materials at/near the crash site with the open end of the “V” indicating our initial general direction of travel. Move 2-4 hours and select concealed positions that are defensible. Consider waiting for low light to mask movement. Move in rough terrain or heavy vegetation, using areas of solid soil, to avoid leaving tracks.

- If no contact with the enemy, decide to stay put or move to a better position. If we move, it will be toward a locally developed, predetermined recover site annotated in PART II. We will try to leave as little evidence of direction of travel as possible.

EVASION COMM-PLAN THROUGHOUT

- Radio and visual signals to any passing US aircraft. Will vector overhead if feasible, and use one small VS-17 signal panel and mirror to pin-point our location.
- If the radio is inoperative, we will display three small VS-17 signal panels in a straight north-south line 20 feet apart and will use mirror flashes to gain attention.
- Any signaling device that I may use will have appropriate specifics on exactly what the device is, when, where, how many, and how the individual device or technique will be used, will be recorded here in the EPA. I realize that details such as specific numbers, spacing, shapes, colors, orientation and pattern, and movement actions are important in the EPA for recognition by the rescue force.
- Duress word: “Dog” - Duress visual signal - triangle instead of straight lines, laser light up and down.

EXTENDED PLAN

- If recovery is not possible, move in low light until survival radio contact can be made or a ground-to-air signal and recovery site is found.
- Any signaling device that I may use will have appropriate specifics on exactly what the device is, when, where, how many, and how the individual device or technique will be used, will be recorded here in the EPA. I realize that details such as specific numbers, spacing, shapes, colors, orientation and pattern, and movement actions are important in the EPA for recognition by the rescue force.

- **INJURED/UNABLE TO MOVE:**

- I will move the injured from immediate danger, conceal nearby if possible, avoiding and/or concealing tracks, with defense in place the only likely option. If injured, very sick, or incapacitated I will provide for specific signals listed here in my EPA to maximize recovery assets potential of locating my position. If unable to speak due to thirst or injury and recovery asset is close, I will use a specific number and pattern of mike clicks, taps on the mike with a rock, or mirror flashes to prove life and assist in locating my position.
- PART II–MISSION SPECIFIC PLAN (Insert Hyper-link annotated map)
- Developed by: SFC Rock. H K

- Time and date: 1 MAR 2005
- Call sign: GLOCK-21
- Radio Frequency: 123.4 MHz
- Mission start date: TBD
- Planned completion date: 9 days from start +/- 8 hours
- Ranking Person on Mission: Capt. Marvel. I. B.
- Unit: PDA 700
- POC not on mission: Maj. Flagg
- Phone: DSN 555-1234
- Number in group: 12
- Attached list: Yes/No–Y

SARNEG:	T	H	U	N	D	E	R	P	I	G
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

- Duress word: SNAKE Word of Day: REDSKIN Letter: “L“
- Number: 14
- Unit authenticator: 7123
- Close proximity challenge: “APPLE”
- Response “JACK”–back-up: “WORM”

NOTE: Radioed location references will be distance and headings from lettered rally points in lieu of SARDOTs. Visual signal - No Radio - GTAS: “ X”–(dash, dash X) using your foot. Insert evasion plan specific to this particular mission; may be a modification of plans laid out in Part I.

ADD ANY CHANGES TO PART I - FILE PLAN (add sheets if necessary)

PART III–REQUIRED OTHER SOURCE DATA–Information that would be helpful to recovery forces - supplied by isolated personnel’s unit to component PRCC or JPRC:

- Intelligence briefings received. Unit level, and any instructions that were provided. (Insert Hyperlink to intelligence briefing and SPINS)

- **Equipment list of issued survival/signaling items provided to the isolated personnel by unit level Aircrew Flight Equipment/ALCE/Para-Rigger—any and all mission specific briefings. (Insert Hyperlink of issued life support equipment list)**
- **Mission brief—mission operations instructions. Unit level operations, and other data. (Insert Hyperlink of pre-mission operational briefing as related to PR)**

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ANNEX E TO APPENDIX C IMMINENT CAPTURE

1. Members of the Armed Forces of the US may never surrender voluntarily. Even when isolated and no longer able to inflict casualties on the adversary or otherwise defend themselves, it is their duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly force. Surrender is the willful act of members of the Armed Forces of the US turning themselves over to adversary forces when not required by utmost necessity or extremity. Surrender is always dishonorable and never allowed. When there is no chance for meaningful resistance, evasion is impossible, and further fighting would lead to their death with no significant loss to the adversary, members of Armed Forces of the US should view themselves as “captured” against their will versus a circumstance that is seen as voluntarily “surrendering.” They should remember that capture was dictated by the futility of the situation and overwhelming adversary strengths. In this case, capture is not dishonorable.

2. There are many potential actions that could assist the “about to be captured” evader. Preparation activities should be performed clandestinely to not draw the adversary’s attention. Even when the situation looks insurmountable, the adversary could make a mistake and miss finding an evader, even one that is not well hidden. This is a situation where maintaining patience and flexibility may result in continued freedom, as panicking often leads to poor evasion decisions. The individual weapon the evader has is for self-defense and not for starting a new front in the war. Possible steps to consider when capture looks imminent include:

a. Communicate with friendly forces or broadcast in the blind, for as long as possible, your situation, health, and, if applicable, status of other members of your team or crew if known; inform them of possible capture. Theater procedures normally will dictate the disposition of radio, GPS, and other signaling and communication devices.

b. Sanitize for any information you may have such as knee boards, authentication books/tables, cryptological items, marked maps, survival radios, GPS, pocket litter, etc.

c. Note the time and your location for future reference.

d. Consume all the water and food available.

e. Scatter small survival/medical items within the clothing. These items may make it through a search. Initial searches concentrate on weapons, maps, watches, and wallets.

f. Disable your weapon(s).

g. Zeroize and disable/destroy radio equipment.

For further information regarding SERE planning considerations and actions for isolated personnel while detained or captured, refer to Appendix E, “Classified Planning Supplement” (published separately).

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ANNEX F TO APPENDIX C
GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETING AND CONTROLLING DD FORM 1833,
ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT

1. Completion

a. As PR mission management software applications are developed, information and storage is transitioning from paper format to electronic data. The guidance that follows will need to be adapted to the circumstances present at the time of the operation, and the capabilities of the individuals, units, and recovery assets involved. Regardless of the medium in which the data is maintained, what will not change are the security classification and forwarding/archival requirements of the ISOPREP.

b. Digital preparation is the preferred method for creating an ISOPREP. However, the data may be entered on a paper DD Form 1833 if electronic means are not available. If ISOPREPs are handwritten, they should be printed legibly. All data fields should be done in ink.

c. When choosing numeric codes, use a number that can be easily remembered. This number should not be in the individual's military records or be public information. The number should not be sequential (1234, 9876, etc.), have repeated numbers (7777, 2299, etc.), or have zeros.

d. **Personal authentication statements** require declarative sentences, not questions and answers. They should involve personal details that are easily remembered and not subject to change. Details of friends, relatives (other than immediate family), pets, vehicles, vacations, and other such details would be appropriate (e.g., "My first car was a blue, 4-door, 1979 Trans Am."). Recovery forces will be able to derive four or more questions from each statement to authenticate the individual. Some simple guidelines follow:

(1) Do not invent stories that may not be remembered during an actual recovery due to the stress of the situation.

(2) Do not use preferences, memories, or favorites subjected to change (e.g., My favorite ice cream is..., My current dog is..., The last time I went out with my brother...).

(3) Do not use slang or jargon that may not be understood by the recovery forces. If the recovery force cannot understand the statement, they cannot formulate a question.

(4) Avoid referencing information (e.g., dates, ages) that can be found in the individual's military records or is readily accessible public information (i.e., available on capture).

(5) Avoid using culturally sensitive information.

(6) Avoid using information that would cause embarrassment if disclosed.

e. Additional data entered, as a minimum, should provide SERE/CoC training courses and year attended, known medical conditions (e.g., allergies, medications), and other information as directed for local use, or as stated in theater guidance.

f. Provide current front and right side head and shoulders digital photographs of the individual in the appropriate uniform without headgear.

2. Maintenance and Control

a. ISOPREPs are CONFIDENTIAL once the authentication data is filled in, per combatant command guidance and the PR Security Classification Guide, subject to change.

b. Per DOD and Joint Staff guidance, all personnel completing an initial ISOPREP are required to utilize PRMS. PRMS can facilitate the immediate transmission of ISOPREP information to the parent/component PRCC or JPRC when an isolating event occurs. During military operations, ISOPREPs should be stored with the individual's EPA.

c. Individuals should review their ISOPREP IAW combatant command requirements.

d. The individual should never carry a copy of the ISOPREP or the information with them on a mission. PRMS digital ISOPREPs are accessed using secure means.

e. Theater or joint force PR plans will establish guidelines for ISOPREP data transfer timeliness and methods. ISOPREP data may be released to multinational recovery forces with authorization. The JFC's operations staff routinely requests authorization from the CCDR foreign disclosure office.

f. Unit commanders should establish and periodically exercise procedures to ensure accurate ISOPREP data can be immediately provided through secure means. They should also ensure the parent component PRCC and the JPRC have been provided 24-hour access to PRMS to obtain ISOPREP information.

g. ISOPREPs used in successful recoveries will remain classified and forwarded to JPRA as part of the mission folder. Stringent control of ISOPREP information necessitates recovery forces and PRCC transmit ISOPREP usage to the JPRC. Should the formerly isolated person require a new ISOPREP in the future, only the uncompromised authentication information may be reused.

h. As long as the recovery mission is open and an active search is still being conducted, the printed PRMS digital ISOPREP will be maintained at the PRCC managing the recovery.

i. Upon notification that a recovery mission has been unsuccessful and/or terminated, the authentication information on the ISOPREP will remain classified, and it will be retained within the mission folder at the PRCC. The JPRC will transmit copies of the ISOPREP and other pertinent information to the theater PR OPR and JPRA for permanent archiving. Upon the cessation of hostilities and redeployment of US forces from the theater of operations, all open mission files will be forwarded to JPRA for archiving. These files remain classified per theater and PR classification guidance.

j. If the death of the isolated person has been verified, the ISOPREP may be declassified and maintained in the archival mission folder. The information will continue to be afforded protection under the Privacy and Missing Persons Act.

k. Upon separation from government service, or when no longer needed by the individual, the PRMS digital ISOPREP is archived in PRMS.

l. Individuals identified to maintain and provide oversight of ISOPREP filed in PRMS conduct education of program capabilities and management.

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APPENDIX D PERSONNEL RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS

1. General Instructions

PR instructions which are appropriate to all participants in a joint operation should be included in OPOORDs and remain applicable for the duration of the operation. PR guidance should be included in the coordinating instructions to alert commanders to more detailed responsibilities and guidance in the appendices per formats in CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance*, and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

2. Specific Mission Personnel Recovery Instructions

a. PR guidance for a specific mission will be included as part of mission tasking orders. The PR instructions should address specific PR plans unique to that mission (e.g., PR call signs and frequencies, PR air and ground methods, and preplanned tactical prepositioned locations [ground and air]).

b. PR Information

(1) The JFACC publishes an ATO to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and C2 agencies projected sorties, capabilities, and/or forces for targets and specific missions. For PR operations, the ATO will contain tasking for dedicated or designated PR air assets by country, Service, and unit, to include call signs, number/type aircraft, alert periods, response times, etc.

(2) Published along with the ATO are SPINS used to disseminate information not available in the ATO otherwise, but needed to execute the ATO missions. The initial SPINS, normally called the “standing SPINS,” will be developed during operational planning for a contingency operation. During the course of the operation, these standing SPINS will be revised and/or updated on a weekly basis. Additionally, SPINS, not affecting the standing/weekly SPINS, will be published which contain information such as changing call signs, codes, challenge and password, near and far recognition signals, frequencies, etc.

(3) The JPRC director is the functional OPR for the PR section of the ATO SPINS. PR information may also be contained in other sections of the SPINS (e.g., commander’s guidance, ROE, communications plan, EW plan). The JPRC should coordinate approval of changes to PR information contained in those sections with the applicable OPR. JPRC and component PRCC personnel need to be familiar with the format and contents of the ATO and SPINS.

(4) Many ground forces, especially small tactical units, will not be able to access or store the SPINS information due to physical security limitations, lack of classification access, or constant force maneuvering in the operational area. Often these elements will create their own operational instructions, including authentication or

password codes, or predesignated escape and evasion procedures. It is imperative that this information be documented locally and forwarded to the component PRCC. Should an isolating event occur, this information, combined with the ISOPREP, will be readily available to the recovery planners and forces at the PRCC and JPRC.

(5) The JPRC should integrate the development of SPINS with the UARCC if possible, to ensure the compatibility of signals and procedures are accurate and relevant based on the ground truth. NAR forces are normally operating within the area of concern well in advance of operations and will have the best SA whether or not signals or procedures will actually work in the environment. Such signals should include GTAS and load signals to indicate the presence of an isolated person within the operational area. The UARCC should be able to provide the location and basic procedures for contact points within the classification parameters of the SPINs for dissemination.

3. Personnel Recovery Instructions Template

The following are PR elements of information that should be considered for inclusion in operation and fragmentary orders. Some information remains current for a month or more, while others are changed weekly and daily. The information contained in each item would be determined by theater requirements.

a. PR General Information

- (1) PRC-112B and combat survivor evader locator radio canned data burst messages.
- (2) Pre-mission preparation.
- (3) Brevity codes.
- (4) SARDOTs.
- (5) SAR numerical encryption grid.
- (6) Departure points.
- (7) Phase lines.
- (8) Rally points (en route, objective, etc.).
- (9) Duress word.
- (10) PR word, number, and letter.
- (11) Challenge and password.
- (12) Near and far recognition signals.

b. Communication/Navigation Procedures

- (1) PR communications plan.
- (2) Tactical checkpoints or navigation waypoints.
- (3) Communications check times.

c. Isolated Personnel

- (1) Initial actions.
- (2) Immediate actions for isolated personnel.
- (3) Radio communications.

d. Extended Evasion

- (1) Support procedures.
- (2) Procedures when radios are not available.

e. Recover Task Procedures

- (1) General.
- (2) Signaling devices and procedures.

f. Personnel Recovery Task Force

- (1) General.
- (2) Air/ground navigation.
- (3) Mission execution checklist.
- (4) Radio interrogation procedures.
- (5) PRTF checklist.
- (6) OSC/RMC checklist.
- (7) AMC immediate action checklist.
- (8) AMC changeover procedure.
- (9) Multinational force member ID card formats (if any).
- (10) Medical report.

(11) PRC-112B and combat survivor evader locator radio canned data burst messages.

(12) Abbreviations and acronyms.

APPENDIX E
CLASSIFIED PLANNING SUPPLEMENT (PUBLISHED SEPARATELY)

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APPENDIX F SAMPLE CHECKLISTS

The sample checklists in this appendix inform joint planners as to the details that mission planners, task force planners, and operators need and use in conducting their activities. Additionally, there are a myriad of tasks that individual directorates of a joint staff must consider in their planning to support a recovery or to support an isolated person during and subsequent to their recovery. CCMDs' and Service PR OPRs' responsibilities are ongoing during all phases of operations.

- Annex A Personnel Recovery Task Force Mission Planning Checklist
- B Airborne Mission Coordinator Checklist
- C On-Scene Commander/Rescue Mission Commander Checklist
- D Personnel Recovery Task Force Checklist
- E Joint Force Staff Considerations for Personnel Recovery
- F Typical Combatant Command Personnel Recovery Office of Primary Responsibility Functions and Responsibilities
- G Typical Service and United States Special Operations Command Personnel Recovery Office of Primary Responsibility Functions and Responsibilities

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX F
PERSONNEL RECOVERY TASK FORCE MISSION PLANNING CHECKLIST

- _____ 1. Date-time group notified _____
- _____ 2. Pre-mission:
 - _____ a. Record event on appropriate incident form.
 - _____ b. Plot isolated personnel on situation map.
 - _____ c. Determine PR plan of action.
 - _____ d. Complete PR worksheet:
 - _____ (1) Obtain current intelligence brief.
 - _____ (2) Obtain ISOPREP, authentication data, and EPA.
 - _____ (3) Determine threat level.
 - _____ (4) Obtain weather brief.
 - _____ (5) Study terrain/obtain sea conditions.
 - _____ (6) Determine survival equipment.
 - _____ (7) Determine type of CBRN contamination, hazard, or threat.
 - _____ (8) Determine medical status.
 - _____ (9) Special considerations.
 - _____ e. Complete PR planning:
 - _____ (1) PR plan (forces, timing, locations).
 - _____ (2) Communications plan including backups.
 - _____ (3) Recovery forces informed.
 - _____ (4) Support forces requested (as required).
 - _____ (5) OSC/RMC appointed/notified.
 - _____ f. Coordination complete with all PR forces.
- _____ 3. Mission progress:
 - _____ a. Monitor mission progress:
 - _____ (1) Start times.
 - _____ (2) Keep component PRCC/JPRC advised of actions.
 - _____ (3) Arrival times at scene.
 - _____ b. Arrange for transport of injured (as required).
 - _____ c. Obtain additional recovery forces (as required).
 - _____ d. Complete reports (as required).
- _____ 4. Closing actions:
 - _____ a. Rescue forces/personnel debriefed.
 - _____ b. Intelligence debriefed (as required).
 - _____ c. Component PRCC/JPRC notified of mission results.
 - _____ d. Recovered personnel entered into the reintegration process; status confirmed.
 - _____ e. Mission file completed, log updated, SARSIT message transmitted.
 - _____ f. Mission file forwarded to JPRC and/or JPRA, accordingly.

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX F
AIRBORNE MISSION COORDINATOR CHECKLIST

Checklist based on air recovery; may need to be modified to be applicable to a ground recovery where air assets are assisting.

PR Information

PR A: _____ PR B: _____
PR Primary: _____ PR Secondary: _____
PR Bullseye: _____ Elevation: _____
SARDOT and Location: _____
PR Code word: _____ Number: _____
Letter: _____ Color: _____

Checklist

1. Downed A/C or isolated vehicle type: _____ Notified by: _____ Time: _____
2. Notify PRCC/JPRC. Relay following information as available:
 - a. C/S of downed A/C:
 - b. Type of A/C/souls on board/# chutes:
 - c. Location of survivor(s)/qualifier (GPS, estimated, last known, ground, water):
 - d. Physical status of survivor(s):
 - e. OSC C/S/fuel state/load out:
 - f. Authentication status:
 - g. Cause of loss/time/notified by:
 - h. Weather/terrain:
 - i. Threats (ground/air):
 - j. Friendly forces and or assets in the area and location:
 - k. Recommended spider route:
3. Designate OSC (air-to-ground ordnance availability preferred), if required by the tactical situation. Switch to PR primary and survivor's frequency.
4. Request alert or support forces if required.

5. Establish communications with recovery force on PR primary. Control radio discipline.

OSC/RMC:	Number/Type A/C:	Station:
FAC (A):	Number/Type A/C:	Station:
RESCORT:	Number/Type A/C:	Station:
RESCAP:	Number/Type A/C:	Station:
SEAD:	Number/Type A/C:	Station:
CAS:	Number/Type A/C:	Station:
Helo:	Number/Type A/C:	Station:
ELINT:	Number/Type A/C:	Station:
Tanker:	Number/Type A/C:	Station:

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX F
ON-SCENE COMMANDER/RESCUE MISSION COMMANDER CHECKLIST

1. _____ INITIAL ACTIONS

- a. _____ Authenticate.
- b. _____ Number of isolated personnel.
- c. _____ Establish order of communication.
- d. _____ Determine injuries.
- e. _____ Determine isolated personnel intentions.
- f. _____ Determine adversary activity.
- g. _____ Check all assets on-station time, ordnance, and other relevant factors.
- h. _____ Determine location of friendly forces in the recovery area.

2. _____ LOCATION

- a. _____ Attempt location via electronic means (PRC-112, GPS and/or chart position passed over radio by survivor, high-speed DF)
- b. _____ Determine signal devices.
- c. _____ Request general terrain description.
- d. _____ Request isolated personnel give vectors to their position.
- e. _____ Locate all isolated personnel as accurately as possible.

3. _____ THREAT

- a. _____ Identify and mitigate threats detrimental to rescue.
- b. _____ Note all other adversary positions.
- c. _____ Determine ingress and egress routes.

4. _____ RECOVERY

- a. _____ Brief recovery vehicle and remainder of recovery force on:
 - (1) Number and condition of isolated personnel.
 - (2) Distance to isolated personnel from initial point.

- (3) Describe terrain.
- (4) Isolated personnel location.
- (5) Elevation of recovery area.
- (6) Wind speed and direction.
- (7) Describe isolated personnel signal devices.
- (8) Known or suspected adversary activity.
- (9) Describe ingress and egress routes.
- (10) Emergency safe landing area.
- (11) Location of friendly forces in the immediate area.

b. _____ Direct isolated personnel to:

- (1) Prepare signaling devices for use and/or ignition, but use only as briefed or when directed by authenticated rescue forces.
- (2) Call threatening adversary positions.
- (3) Vector helicopter, if necessary.
- (4) Approach the helicopter, ground force recovery assets, or maritime recovery vehicles only when directed, and follow instructions.

**ANNEX D TO APPENDIX F
PERSONNEL RECOVERY TASK FORCE CHECKLIST**

Items 1 through 7 are required to be briefed to the RMC prior to mission execution. All other information should be provided to the PRTF as applicable.

_____ ISOLATED PERSONNEL INFORMATION

1. _____ Tactical call sign(s).
2. _____ Number of isolated personnel.
3. _____ Location(s) (latitude/longitude, grid, range/bearing to/from SARDOT).
4. _____ Condition/injuries: Walking? YES NO UNKNOWN
5. _____ Equipment (communications/signal).
6. _____ Authentication complete? NO/YES When _____ METHOD:

_____ RECOVERY AREA INFORMATION

7. _____ Threats (air/ground/missile).
8. _____ Elevation _____ (nearest 1,000 feet, mean sea level).
9. _____ General terrain description.
10. _____ Friendly forces in the recovery area.

_____ RESCORT PLAN

11. _____ Initial point.
12. _____ Link up point (if not at initial point).
 - (a) _____ Ingress.
 - (b) _____ Egress.
13. _____ Ordnance.
14. _____ RESCORT tactics.

_____ RECOVERY VEHICLE PLAN

15. _____ Rescue tactics.
16. _____ Communications/signaling procedures.

_____ REFUELING PLAN

- 17. _____ Fixed-wing assets.
- 18. _____ Rotary-wing assets.
- 19. _____ Ground force assets.
- 20. _____ Maritime assets.

_____ ADDITIONAL ITEMS/QUESTIONS

ANNEX E TO APPENDIX F

JOINT FORCE STAFF CONSIDERATIONS FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY

The following considerations are a starting point for considering actions to be taken in support of a PR event, and for integrating with and supporting the PR portion of the OPLAN (i.e., appendix 5 to annex C of the OPLAN). They do not constitute a checklist of tasks that are the responsibility of joint staff section(s) to accomplish in support of a PR event.

1. Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

a. Notify appropriate offices and begin preparations to support isolated personnel per DODI 3002.03, *DOD Personnel Recovery–Reintegration of Recovered Personnel*. The respective Service or agency prepares a PPF in coordination with the respective Service casualty office when notified that an individual is isolated, missing, or captured. The same procedure applies in the case of DOD civilians and is accomplished by their parent Service or agency. In the case of DOD contractor employees, the contractor's company, working in conjunction with DOS and the DOD, provides the required information to JPRA to prepare the PPF. These files need to be pre-positioned outside the CONUS and are used as an aid to initial processing.

b. If activated, augment JPRC with manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1) PR representative.

c. Identify, coordinate, and provide component PRCC personnel to augment United States military group (USMILGP)/major subordinate command and support of recovery operations.

d. Source components with augmentees for the JPRC/component PRCC, as required.

e. Be prepared to initiate reintegration plan, if required.

f. Ensure factual information is provided to PAO.

g. Assist JPRC with sourcing personnel to support designated component commander responsible for the reintegration of isolated personnel.

h. Obtain PPF from isolated person's respective Service, agency, or company and forward to the JPRC.

i. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

j. In conjunction with SJA, determine legal rights the individual is entitled to, and convey those rights, as well as information regarding any applicable benefits for which the recovered person may be eligible through the reintegration team/designated component commander.

k. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

l. Notify the Service and Joint Staff immediately upon notification of an isolating event. If fingerprints are needed and not included in the ISOPREP, request a copy from the FBI. The Service can access photos and an index fingerprint from Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System/common access card records.

2. Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

a. Prior to the onset of hostilities, establish communications with combatant command PR OPR and the JPRC/component PRCC. Ensure J-2 PR representative coordinates with the combatant command PR OPR and the JPRC/component PRCC for briefing, threat assessment, and development of intelligence and information requirements.

b. Augment JPRC with J-2 PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Conduct initial threat assessment (using JIPOE criteria) and intelligence update and immediately forward information to the JPRC/component PRCC.

d. Identify all available national assets and task/request national support to assist in locating and recovering the isolated individual(s).

e. Facilitate coordination of national intelligence support to PR and ensure information is pushed to the JPRC/component PRCC.

f. Obtain and provide to the JPRC/component PRCC updated terrain, vegetation, and threat information in the vicinity of isolated personnel.

g. Update national intelligence systems/agencies when isolated personnel location is known. **Send requirements to queue national systems/agencies /theater assets if location is unknown.**

h. Through the JPRC/component PRCC, provide the PRTF with updated intelligence SITREPs.

i. Determine the threat to recovery force capabilities.

j. Continue to provide intelligence updates to the PRTF through the JPRC/component PRCC.

k. Evaluate threat level at recovery sites when the JPRC/component PRCC or PRTF provides location(s).

l. Monitor recovery mission and support return of isolated personnel to US control. Identify any threat counter-recovery trends and pass to theater and national level.

m. Stand down national intelligence systems when JPRC/component PRCC transmits final PR SITREP.

n. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

3. Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

In many combatant commands this function is conducted in a JOC with the assistance from the PR OPR.

a. Coordinate PR planning activities with HN and COM representatives, IAW GCC procedures.

b. Establish JPRC and implement crisis action planning procedures/battle drills. Augment JPRC with J-3 PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Through the JPRC/component PRCC director, designate a PRTF to direct, coordinate support, and assist in planning the PR mission.

d. Through the JPRC/component PRCC director, task components and request other agencies and HN (through JOC/USMILGP) to identify and report availability of their recovery capabilities to the JPRC/component PRCC.

e. Review and authorize release of JPRC/component PRCC's PR incident report.

f. Activate the IO cell, and implement the IO plan.

g. Alert theater airlift to plan and prepare for airdrop of emergency supplies to isolated personnel and coordinate with the PRTF.

h. Request JPRA provide support to isolated personnel's families and reintegration effort through the PRCC.

i. Through the JPRC/component PRCC director and PRTF, designate a recovery force commander to evaluate the probability of success, and plan and execute the recovery mission.

j. In conjunction with PRCC and JOC/USMILGP, alert designated initial reception point facilities to prepare for the returnee's initial medical evaluation, stabilization, and debriefing.

k. In coordination with JPRC/component PRCC, determine task force composition requirements (on scene-immediate, maneuver force, joint).

l. Prepare to deploy debriefing team to initial reception point. (May involve requesting JPRA assistance.)

m. Assist the JPRC/component PRCC director with identifying requirements/capability to support search operations if necessary.

n. Authorize reintegration team to deploy to initial reception point to assist in reintegration activities (if not already deployed).

o. Coordinate and obtain approval for supplemental ROE required to accomplish recovery operations. (A copy of supplemental ROE needs to be on-hand during the recovery operation.)

p. Through the PRCC, designate a component commander that will support the return and reintegration of isolated personnel and be responsible for the returnees initial processing.

q. Through JPRC/component PRCC director, task components to support the PRTF in planning and executing recovery mission.

r. In conjunction with the JPRC/component PRCC and J-2, review and validate PR COAs.

s. Monitor recovery mission and support return of isolated personnel to US control.

t. Review and authorize release of JPRC/component PRCC's PR SITREPs.

u. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

4. Joint Operations Center Considerations

a. Receive report of isolated personnel IAW Initial PR Response Notification Checklist:

(1) Notify JPRC/component PRCC of PR incident.

(2) Notify staff.

(3) Transmit an operational report.

(4) Coordinate with JPRC/component PRCC.

b. Forward all incoming PR information to the JPRC/component PRCC.

c. Assist the JPRC/component PRCC with transmission of SARIR.

d. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

e. Assist JPRC/component PRCC with transmission of their respective PR SITREPs.

f. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

5. Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

- a. Identify and request logistics support for recovery operations from the appropriate staff elements.
- b. Identify possible intermediate staging base/forward operating location to be used in support of recovery operations.
- c. Augment JPRC with logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) PR representative to coordinate PR support.
- d. Coordinate support for pre-positioned PR forces or other PR support assets.
- e. Identify theater air assets to load and drop survivor support kits.
- f. Identify transport requirements for personnel and equipment into and throughout theater. Coordinate aeromedical evacuation requirements with US Transportation Command and AMC.
- g. Notify the JPRC/component PRCC of all actions and any available support.
- h. Monitor recovery mission and support return of isolated personnel to US control.
- i. Ensure returnee's transportation requirements to phase III location are in place.
- j. Assist in coordinating the return of deployed PR forces and equipment.
- k. Be prepared to coordinate and provide mortuary affairs support, as required.
- l. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

6. Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

- a. Coordinate with US embassy to obtain foreign nation diplomatic clearances for entry and over flight by US aircraft/personnel in support of recovery operations. Consistent with the *Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide* and the *DOD Foreign Clearance Manual*, located at <https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/>, ensure clearances are obtained from all nations affected by the recovery operation, as appropriate.
- b. Augment JPRC with plans directorate of a joint staff PR representative to coordinate PR support.
- c. Through the JPRC/component PRCC, update the PRTF when diplomatic clearances are approved.
- d. Assist JPRC with identifying and coordinating an in-theater treatment and processing facility.

e. Coordinate through JOC/USMILGP to obtain partner/HN approval of cross border operations in support of isolated personnel.

f. In conjunction with JPRC, identify, coordinate, and plan for the initial reintegration point.

g. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

h. Coordinate diplomatic clearances for flights supporting redeployment missions. (Memorandum of agreement in place.)

i. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

7. Communications System Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

a. Ensure PR communications (SATCOM, SIPRNET, etc.) are operational.

b. Augment JPRC with communications system directorate of a joint staff PR representative to coordinate communications support.

c. Coordinate with JPRC/component PRCC to determine if additional radio frequencies are required.

d. Monitor status of PR communications channels to ensure C2 is not degraded or interrupted.

e. Assist in identifying and locating equipment required by deploying recovery and support forces.

f. Identify communications equipment and/or cryptographic keying material which may have been compromised, contact the appropriate communications security manager, and ensure widest dissemination across the joint force.

g. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

h. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

8. Public Affairs Office Considerations

a. Coordinate with JOC/US embassy PAO and JTF J-1 for coordinated release of information.

b. Notify the Office of the Secretary of Defense PAO of isolated personnel situation and coordinate for information flow to isolated personnel's family members through Service survivor assistance officer.

c. Augment JPRC with PAO PR representative to coordinate PR support.

d. Manage command PR information to media, higher HQ, and through the Services to the isolated personnel's family.

e. Manage command PR information to media and higher HQ in coordination with subordinate commands and other organizations, as required. (Ensure integration with IO plan.)

f. Coordinate with JPRC/component PRCC to ensure no compromise of sensitive information or isolated personnel status.

g. In conjunction with JPRC, coordinate with the respective military Service or agency to ensure NOK receive timely and accurate information concerning their isolated family member.

h. Coordinate and provide support to recovery forces, as required.

i. Make periodic releases to keep the public updated on mission progress, and a final release summarizing the entire mission when the case is concluded.

j. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

k. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

9. Staff Judge Advocate Considerations

a. Assist as needed in determining status of isolated personnel.

b. Augment JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC with SJA PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Assist with the coordination and publication of appropriate ROE for potential isolated personnel. Review ROE for legal accuracy.

d. Assist in monitoring recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

e. Identify and task legal representative for recovered personnel.

f. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

10. Medical Support Considerations

a. Be prepared to request forensic capability as required to support recovery operations.

b. Augment JPRC with medical PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Validate/confirm capabilities of appropriate in-country/theater hospitals and determine required medical capability for the return of isolated personnel.

d. Reassess required medical capabilities after communication is established with the isolated personnel and their medical status is confirmed.

e. Be prepared to provide recommendations to J-3 and J-4, if medical supplies will be air dropped to isolated personnel.

f. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

g. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

11. Chaplain Considerations

a. Provide for or facilitate the religious support to recovered personnel.

b. Coordinate religious support team (RST) activities to provide religious support to families.

c. Augment JPRC with RST PR representative to coordinate PR support.

d. Advise the JPRC regarding the delivery of religious ministry to recovered personnel.

e. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

ANNEX F TO APPENDIX F
TYPICAL COMBATANT COMMAND PERSONNEL RECOVERY OFFICE OF
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Ensure a coordinated PR program for the assigned operational area is developed and that all assigned forces possessing PR capabilities and assets are prepared to execute component PR responsibilities and contribute to PR joint efforts, if required.
2. Assist in developing the command joint mission essential task list, and training and exercise scenarios, ensuring PR equities are sufficiently represented.
3. Develop combatant command PR policies, directives, and SOPs to provide command guidance on staff and component PR responsibilities, coordination procedures, requirements, etc. Develop policy, plans, and exercise tasks that outline component operating procedure construct requirements. Policy tasks should address planning, preparation (to include exercise and rehearsal), and execution tasks to ensure joint interoperability.
4. Develop an integrated PR CONOPS, across the range of military operations, in coordination with the component commands.
5. Develop appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery), to annex C (Operations), of OPLANs and OPORDs. Ensure appendix 5 and associated tabs are complementary to related annexes or appendices for personnel; intelligence; medical services; processing of formerly captured, missing, or detained US personnel; mortuary affairs; PA; and reports. Ensure the PR appendix and relevant supporting plans are properly distributed to all required agencies.
6. Maintain direct and continuous liaison with all combatant command PR coordination elements and other designated recovery assets, as required.
7. Act as liaison for local/HN forces capable of PR. Assist in establishing procedures between forces and establish formalized relations at the tactical and operational level for future planning. This liaison will be important if the JPRC is not established initially and the PR OPR must act as the primary POC until a JPRC is operational.
8. Coordinate with the components, Services, USSOCOM (for NAR planning and support to CCMD/ theater SOC initiatives), JPRA (for requesting NAR requirements or statutory fiscal authority and for theater support), Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency (for biometric support), and other pertinent combatant commands and DOD agencies to meet PR requirements and responsibilities.
9. Establish procedures to provide support to recovery forces and monitor mission progress and status of recovery assets.
10. Establish procedures to locate and communicate with isolated personnel.

11. Determine requirements for JPRA intelligence support, IPG, evasion aids, support team assistance, and training. Coordinate with JPRA for the production of evasion aids as appropriate.
12. Develop a reintegration plan for processing returned isolated personnel; ensure coordination with Service reintegration plans.
13. Recommend supplemental ROE to support PR.
14. Coordinate and deconflict component PR plans and review them for supportability.
15. Develop the PR portion of communications plans.
16. Establish reporting requirements for the JPRC and component PRCCs.
17. Ensure JPRC and component PRCCs are capable of accomplishing their assigned duties and meeting their functional responsibilities.
18. Organize and conduct PR mission training exercises for the joint force. Ensure PR scenarios during field and command post exercises are realistic, adequate, and reflect the theater environment and operating conditions.
19. Develop a plan to transition from peacetime to combat operations, and back to peacetime to include:
 - a. Developing augmentation personnel requirements.
 - b. Establishing additional communications support requirements.
20. Designate a NAR OPR. Plan, coordinate, and prepare to execute NAR. Coordinate with the theater SOC for applicable command NAR requirements requiring USSOCOM, Joint Staff or JPRA support.
21. Coordinate with combatant command PA agencies for establishment and dissemination of specific guidance on the release of PR information to media by DOD personnel.
22. Develop a PR communications plan and coordinate with the GCC or JFC to ensure inclusion and cohesion of the PR communications efforts.
23. Be prepared to serve as the combatant command or JTF JPRC to facilitate civil SAR efforts during humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

ANNEX G TO APPENDIX F
TYPICAL SERVICE AND UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND PERSONNEL RECOVERY OFFICE OF PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Develop PR policies, directives, and SOPs to provide guidance on PR responsibilities, coordination procedures, requirements, etc. Develop policy, plans, and exercise tasks that outline component operating procedure construct requirements. Policy tasks should address planning, preparation (to include exercise and rehearsal), and execution tasks to ensure joint interoperability.
2. Assist in developing the Service mission essential task list and training and exercise scenarios, ensuring PR equities are sufficiently represented.
3. Coordinate PR education, equipment, intelligence, and product requirements to support PR mission readiness.
4. Develop appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) to plans and orders as required.
5. Establish and maintain direct liaison with combatant command PR OPR, coordination elements, and other designated recovery assets, as required. (See CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance*, for content and format.)
6. Develop a reintegration plan for processing returned isolated personnel; ensure synchronization with combatant command/JTF reintegration plan.
7. Coordinate and deconflict component PR plans with combatant command/JTF PR plans and review them for supportability.
8. Coordinate with appropriate PA agencies for establishment and dissemination of specific guidance on the release of PR information to media.

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APPENDIX G CAPABILITIES

- Annex A United States Army Personnel Recovery
- B United States Marine Corps Personnel Recovery
- C United States Navy Personnel Recovery
- D United States Air Force Personnel Recovery
- E United States Coast Guard Personnel Recovery
- F Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX G UNITED STATES ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

a. Army PR doctrine is based on leadership and accountability at every level, from the individual Soldier to the largest military organization. It is embodied in the precept in the Soldier's Creed to never leave a fallen comrade. PR is both an individual and collective responsibility. It depends on every Soldier, civilian, and contractor to be trained to survive in isolated situations, and to use ISG to know what actions to take during an isolating event. Individual actions are supported by planning and preparing at the unit level to execute PR tasks. Unit commanders and staffs are responsible to synchronize the activities with plans, orders, and SOP. Soldiers have the responsibility to advise, assist, facilitate, train, coordinate—and if required—execute PR tasks.

b. The objective of Army PR operations is to unite the perspective of the PR system and the individual, design the PR structure for each unique operational environment, and identify the training and readiness requirements. This occurs in an operational environment that is typically a mix of enemies known to be hostile, adversaries that may become hostile, supporters, and neutrals. All PR activities are planned and executed with the knowledge that individuals and collections of individuals, such as nation-states, ethnic groups, independent armed forces, or religious movements, are free to move from one category to another—and often do.

c. Army PR has its own unique lexicon that is continually evolving to keep pace with changes in doctrine, technology, and PR capabilities. Many of the changes reflect interaction with entities outside the Army. Some basic terms are:

(1) **Isolated Personnel.** Any military, DOD civilian, eligible DOD contractor employee, or other designated persons, who are separated from friendly forces, unable to complete their intended mission or activity, and are required to employ the five PR proficiencies (architecture, communicate, navigate, preserve life, and endure hardship) to return to safety or friendly control.

(2) **Designated Person.** Any military, DOD civilian, DOD contractor, or other individual identified by the President or SecDef.

(3) **Personnel Recovery Guidance (PRG).** Direction to the force with regards to PR operations developed during the Army operations process that defines the PR concept for the operation, allocates resources, describes control measures, and identifies specified PR tasks.

(4) **Isolated Soldier Guidance.** Mission-specific direction to each Soldier on the circumstances that constitute being isolated and what actions the isolated person should take during an isolating event.

2. Personnel Recovery Roles and Responsibilities

a. Army PR roles are categorized in three focal groups with responsibilities to prepare for, plan, execute, and assess the PR mission.

(1) Commanders and staff leaders are responsible for the conduct of operations.

(2) Units of assignment and recovery forces are responsible for accountability and immediate recovery of any isolated unit member.

(3) Isolated personnel use ISG and basic Soldier skills to regain contact with friendly forces.

b. Army PR is further grouped by echelon based on whether there is a dedicated staff capability available at that echelon.

(1) **Company and Below.** Army units with no formal staff exercise their PR responsibilities along with all other individual, collective, and leadership tasks.

(2) **Battalion and Brigade.** Units with small staffs exercise PR responsibilities as an additional duty for an officer or noncommissioned officer in the training and operations staff section battalion or brigade operations staff officer (Army; Marine Corps battalion or regiment) (S-3). Brigades include the brigade combat teams (infantry, heavy, and Stryker), functional brigades (engineer, military police, air and missile defense, intelligence, medical, explosive ordnance disposal, signal and CBRN), modular support brigades (combat aviation, fires, sustainment, maneuver enhancement, and battlefield surveillance), and the brigade-size modular elements of theater-level commands (including groups).

(3) **Echelons above Brigade.** Army unit HQ at division, corps, and theater levels have trained officers and noncommissioned officers who perform the specific role of PR staff specialist. The Soldiers in the PR element are part of the protection cell and typically have representation on the current operations integrating cell. Because of its subordinate nature to the protection cell, the PR element is called the personnel recovery coordination section (PRCS). Sometimes it is also referred to as the PRCC.

c. The commander's responsibilities include deciding what the end state should be, determining what to do to reach that end state, deciding how to employ the available resources, and how best to direct the force to influence the action. Army Regulation 525-28, *Personnel Recovery*, discusses the responsibilities of commanders.

d. There are staff PR responsibilities associated with each of the joint functions: movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, C2, and protection. The PR staff has the same general responsibilities whether they are trained PR specialists in echelons above brigade HQ, the PR staff officer or noncommissioned officer serving at the brigade level, or a multifunctional staff officer at battalion. The PR specialist is primarily a coordinator and supports the PR tasks. Responsibilities fall into three broad categories:

(1) **Advisor.** The PR specialist knows joint and Army doctrine and is an expert on PR operations. As such, commanders at every level seek counsel when confronted with an isolating incident. The PR specialist may provide advice when requested, or may even accompany the commander when exercising C2 in response to an isolating event.

(2) **POC.** By occupying the position of PR specialist—whether as an additional duty for a multifunctional staff officer at battalion or brigade, or in a required and authorized position at large unit HQ—the incumbent becomes the target of inquiries about the doctrine and TTP for PR efforts. Questions and comments may come from within the HQ, outside staff entities, or other commanders. Depending on the situation, this may include skip-echelon contacts where a commander or staff members from lower or higher in the chain of command jumps over the next level—or levels—of command in an RFI and guidance. Frequently, the contact is an attempt to get information about a planned, on-going, or completed PR mission. POC responsibilities include the necessary training to inform the command on its responsibilities.

(3) **Staff Coordinator.** The difference between the POC and the staff coordinator is the level of activity and personal involvement. Whether located within the staff of a battalion or brigade or one of the sections or cells at echelon above brigade HQ, the PR specialist is a member of the team that contributes to the successful accomplishment of the recovery mission. The coordination responsibilities can be routine or exceptional, depending on the situation.

e. The PRCS is a staff organization. It has three primary responsibilities: education and training, routine coordination, and mission support coordination. There are PRCSs at theater army, corps, and division HQ. The location of the PRCS is a command decision, but it is typically located near—or is digitally connected with—the operations center to gain and maintain SA and receive immediate information on isolating incidents and the status of PR operations. Multiple PRCSs can exist at multiple locations, based on the need for staff support for the command at geographically dispersed locations. Whether they report to a senior PRCS or are independent organizations depends on the situation and the direction of the commander. The PRCS specific responsibilities include:

- (1) Implement PR policies and programs at the component level.
- (2) Serve as subject matter experts and POC for PR operations and issues.
- (3) Develop PR SOPs.
- (4) Coordinate education and training of subordinate commanders, staffs, and individuals in their PR responsibilities.
- (5) Provide staff supervision of PR officers at subordinate echelons.
- (6) Participate in the decision-making processes for PR situations.

(7) Coordinate with PR related cells and elements: intelligence, airspace C2, lethal and nonlethal fires, protection, C2, engineer, aviation, judge advocate, and others to enable PR operations.

f. For isolated personnel, recovery is not a leadership or accountability challenge; it is a matter of survival. For the individual, whether a Soldier, DOD civilian, contractor, or other designated person, the situation becomes the answer to a series of basic questions:

- (1) How do I know I am isolated?
- (2) What do I do about it?
- (3) How do I help with my own recovery?

3. Concept of Army Personnel Recovery Operations

a. Guidance is both general—PRG—and specific—ISG. Recovery forces use the ISG information to support isolation incident response, including identification and authentication. The PRG and the ISG are parts of the same whole. Typically, guidance is a part of the general protection actions relayed to unit members. Commanders may provide guidance to protect the force without formally identifying it as PR guidance. This may change in areas with HRI, whether from individual decisions, enemy action, or the environment. As PRG progresses from combined and joint commands, through senior Army HQ to brigade level, it becomes more detailed and prescriptive. The PRG contains the direction unit commanders need to plan for, prepare, execute, and assess mandated PR activities. As a minimum PRG provides this direction:

- (1) Communicate the commander's concept for PR.
- (2) Establish PR command, support, and liaison relationships.
- (3) Specify subordinate commanders' PR responsibilities.
- (4) Discuss the prevention initiatives required to prepare the force.
- (5) Establish isolated personnel criteria.
- (6) Direct when and where to establish PRCSs.
- (7) Designate units to execute PR operations when the risk is deemed high enough to warrant them on-call or in a higher state of readiness.
- (8) Delegate authority to execute recovery operations.
- (9) Incorporate PR activities in unit SOPs.

b. There is no fixed format for PRG; it is contained in various parts of the order, including the base order and appropriate annexes, appendices, tabs, and exhibits. PR information is covered in the base order, primarily in paragraph 3f. (Execution: Scheme

of Protection), and in 3i. (Execution: Tasks to Subordinate Units), especially in subparagraph 3j(8) (Execution: Coordinating Instruction Personnel Recovery Coordination Measures). Much of the information on PR and the PRG can be consolidated in appendix 2 (Personnel Recovery) of annex E (Protection).

c. At the tactical level of PR, the PRG is translated into specific actions for the Soldier as ISG. As with PRG, there is no set format or content for ISG. ISG can be standardized, but is always mission-specific. ISG normally consists of directions to carry certain equipment such as PLBs and survival radios, or learn the location of rally points, safe recovery zones, or communications frequencies. There will always be ISG during any military deployment to an area with a risk of isolation. ISG is written for all members of the command, not just the Soldier at the lowest echelon. The uncertainties and complexity of military operations across the spectrum of conflict can expose everyone to risk of isolation. A general officer or other senior leader may be as vulnerable to isolation as any other Soldier, perhaps more so given the need to travel long distances to show command presence and coordinate with subordinates.

(1) ISG should provide basic information on the initial actions to take when isolated. Education and training can reduce the psychological impact of isolation, but it still will remain a condition of the isolation and affect the actions taken by the isolated person. Many of the initial actions taken by an isolated person are those embodied in the Warrior Ethos and the Soldier combat skills initially taught in Army basic and advanced combat training. Things like the use of cover, concealment, and camouflage; movement; land navigation; first aid; marksmanship; communications; SERE; and CBRN defense and explosive ordnance defense are basic Soldier skills. While they can be reinforced in ISG, they should not be covered in it. Actions to take should be mission-specific and the list of actions to take should be simple and direct, such as stay with your vehicle unless discovered by enemy forces or be prepared to authenticate who you are by use of the daily password and countersign.

(2) Isolation criteria are the circumstances under which a Soldier or other designated individual should execute the ISG. It is mission-specific. It depends on the situation. Isolation criteria should be direct and easy to interpret. They are few in number. Isolation criteria serve as a trigger for ISG. Execute ISG if:

(a) You have no communication with your unit or higher HQ by any means for (specified) hours.

(b) You have no contact with fellow unit members for (specified) hours.

(c) Your aircraft makes a forced or precautionary landing in hostile or suspected hostile territory.

(d) You are ordered to do so by your chain of command.

d. Everyone involved in PR operations cooperates in executing the five PR tasks (report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate). Together they provide a logical way to look at the complex actions involved in Army PR.

e. The PR proficiencies shown in Figure G-A-1 contribute to the successful recovery of isolated personnel. All five PR proficiencies are shared to some extent. Structure is a commander and staff responsibility. Communicate is shared by all three focal groups. The recovery force should communicate, navigate, and preserve life. Finally, the individual is responsible for all but structure.

(1) The PR **structure** is a composite of the doctrine, policy, procedures, people, organizations, equipment, and information systems. It is the intellectual framework used to provide the foundation for prevention of, preparation for, and responses to isolation incidents. Structure is the responsibility of commanders and leaders at all levels. They establish it and direct its use. At every echelon, the PR structure is visible in two activities: maintaining the unit’s link to the chain of command as well as maintaining the PR program within the unit.

(2) Knowledge of how to **communicate** is a basic Soldier skill. It is the responsibility of all three PR focal groups. Knowledge of, and the capability to use, PR related equipment is a key to a potential recovery. Low-tech communications systems augment electronic systems. Training in these means of information sharing is a command responsibility.

(3) The ability to determine location is an important skill in any military operation and critical in PR operations. **Navigation** is a basic Soldier proficiency taught and re-taught throughout a Soldier’s service. In a mission with the potential for isolation, all should know how to locate and move to friendly forces. Isolated forces can direct friendly forces to their location only if they accurately know that location. Conversely, PR operations are much more efficient if the unit knows where the isolated personnel were when they lost contact.




Figure G-A-1. Shared Personnel Recovery Proficiencies

(4) **Preservation of life** is a basic human drive, but not all isolated persons are equally trained or suited to help themselves. They may not possess the skills necessary to stay in a healthy condition long enough to assist in their own recovery. Therefore, preservation of life in an isolation incident is a shared responsibility. The unit and the recovery force should act quickly to locate and recover the isolated individuals without exposing themselves to undue danger from hostile forces or the environment. The chain of command has the responsibility to provide the means for survival, but the command can only succeed if individuals cooperate and make use of their training.

(5) **Enduring hardship** is a very personal responsibility, but the unit and recovery forces and the higher HQ commanders and staffs share responsibility to prepare the Soldier or other designated individual. The psychological preparation for isolation is as important as other proficiencies. Knowledge that each Soldier or other designated isolated individual will be the object of an immediate recovery effort goes a long way to prepare that individual for isolation. The articles of the Army CoC are a part of initial Army training and are reinforced periodically in units and other organizations, especially those preparing to serve in an environment with a greater risk of isolation. Endurance training and exercises in SERE contribute to the individual's preparation.

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX G UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

The Marine Corps views PR as an implicit requirement in all combat operations. All elements of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) possess the ability to support PR operations, or participate in the recovery of isolated personnel. The MAGTF commander may, or may not, elect to dedicate forces to perform this mission; however, additional capability to perform self-supporting recovery operations and external PR support is provided through a mission known as TRAP. Aviation, ground, or waterborne assets, or any combination of these may conduct a TRAP mission. The TRAP mission differs from CSAR in that it usually does not involve extended visual search procedures to locate isolated personnel, particularly in a medium- or high-air threat environment. TRAP assets may also be employed in the conduct of other non-recovery missions and called upon to perform a recovery as it becomes necessary. The TRAP mission emphasizes detailed planning and the use of assigned and briefed personnel for the specific purpose of recovering personnel and/or aircraft. The MAGTF commander may utilize the TRAP force when an immediate recovery is impractical, or the tactical situation necessitates the additional capabilities a TRAP force provides. Confirmation of a survivor(s) status and location is required prior to committing a force to a recovery mission.

2. Personnel Recovery Role and Responsibilities

- a. USMC forces deploying to an operational area should be prepared to conduct self-supporting recovery operations.
- b. The MAGTF commander is responsible for the conduct of TRAP operations involving his forces. The MAGTF commander should also be prepared to provide augmentation personnel to the JPRC and component PRCC, if established, as required and directed by higher authority.
- c. The MAGTF commander should ensure all MAGTF personnel committed to a hostile environment are familiar with tactics employed by PR forces during recovery operations.
- d. The MAGTF commander should provide mutual support to PR operations of other joint force components to the greatest extent possible.
- e. MAGTF subordinate commanders should ensure their personnel are familiar with evasion and PR tactics and are capable of meeting individual responsibilities.
- f. MAGTF commanders are responsible to ensure personnel identified to organize, prepare, and conduct PR are functionally trained commensurate with their responsibilities. Likewise, the commander must ensure subordinate commanders are directed to plan and execute their PR specified tasks.

3. Concept of Marine Corps Personnel Recovery Operations

a. **General.** Recovery missions should not supersede assigned mission objectives and resource requirements, but in a typical situation should be accorded a priority level of importance. The prerequisites for conducting a recovery mission are as follows:

- (1) There should be reasonable certainty that isolated personnel are alive.
- (2) The location of the personnel, equipment, or aircraft must be known.

b. Planning

(1) It is critical that as much recovery mission planning as possible be done before deployment of the MAGTF to minimize confusion at the time of mission execution. Such planning comprises three phases:

- (a) Analysis of theater PR guidance or CONOPS.
- (b) Assault contingency planning.
- (c) Final recovery mission planning.

(2) The MAGTF CONOPS for TRAP missions should include possible scenarios and geographic areas in establishing basic policy. The CONOPS should also describe the conditions under which other resources external to the MAGTF will be requested. The concept should include a specific decision matrix that will assist in determining basic go/no-go criteria. Figure G-B-1 is a typical TRAP decision matrix.

(3) There is no standard TRAP mission because each tactical situation is unique. The key to success is proper attention to the planning process. A simple, concise CONOPS that accurately reflects theater policy, a thorough contingency TRAP plan for each assault, and rapid final planning after each initial loss report will greatly reduce uncertainty and confusion during the recovery mission.

c. **Execution.** In many cases, isolated personnel will be in a no-go sector. In this situation, other resources may be requested or a clandestine recovery may be employed. In some situations, isolated personnel will have to evade to a viable recovery area. The ultimate goal of a TRAP, or any other means of recovery, is to effect the expeditious return of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft without further loss of friendly forces.

(1) **Immediate Recovery.** Immediate TRAP occurs as soon as commanders or staffs recognize there is an accountability issue with a Marine under their command. This can occur as a result of the daily personnel reports, missed checkpoints, overdue aircraft or vehicles, or even during consolidation and reorganization in the middle of combat operations. It is the sum of actions that local or on-site commanders and staff take to immediately report an isolating situation and execute the locate and recover phase within their assigned areas of operation. Immediate TRAP efforts should be tempered by considering the effects an immediate recovery would have on assigned mission




Figure G-B-1. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel Decision Matrix

accomplishment. Some threat levels will permit a quick reaction effort to conduct a successful recovery. An immediate report is critical to prepare deliberate PR options by vertical or horizontal elements, if an immediate recovery is impossible. The ideal time to execute a TRAP mission is immediately after the incident occurs. Immediate recovery is most desirable because friendly forces may still be in the area, adversary forces may not have had an opportunity to react, and required medical treatment can be rendered quickly.

(2) **Deliberate PR.** Deliberate TRAP is the sum of plans and actions that occur across the Marine component capability beginning with an isolating incident report. Deliberate TRAP is the direct use of a particular unit or type of force, such as the TRAP force. It includes a variety of integrated capabilities including air, ground, and maritime. Marine operations centers or PRCCs are responsible to conduct multi-echelon

coordination and deconfliction internal and external to Marine forces. This continues until the isolated personnel are recovered successfully regardless of the recovery capability. In many instances, a delayed recovery may be necessary because of assigned mission requirements or the adversary threat. Upon completion of an assigned mission, TRAP-capable resources may then be directed to plan and conduct the delayed recovery. In the face of an overwhelming adversary threat, isolated personnel may be directed to evade to a viable recovery area.

(3) **ESR.** ESR is the sum of coordination and support provided by any entity external to that component. This is the responsibility of the operations center, PRCC, and the commander's staff. Routinely, components of a joint force have arranged for various national and operational level support to conduct PR. This support should be cited in the joint CONOPS for PR and should be exercised and rehearsed routinely.

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX G UNITED STATES NAVY PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

a. Navy units are tasked and trained to execute PR missions, including over water recovery, underwater recovery, and over land recovery. NTTP 3-50.1, *Navy Search and Rescue (SAR) Manual*, describes Navy PR missions in permissive environments (includes surface, air, and submarine disaster SAR missions). US submarine search, escape, and rescue operations are outlined in Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet (COMSUBLANT)/Commander Submarine Force, United States Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC) OPLAN 2137, *Submarine Search, Escape, and Rescue (Rev A)*. International submarine SAR mission procedures are spelled out in NATO Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-57, *The Submarine Search and Rescue Manual*.

b. For isolated personnel located in low or medium threat areas, recoveries are assigned to units specialized in CSAR. Traditionally, CSAR assets have been trained and equipped to rescue forces most likely to be isolated during combat, including downed aviators and distressed SOF. Naval CSAR doctrine can be found in NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare Manual*. Navy CSAR includes all previous CSAR requirements, but places increased emphasis on integrating rescue planning and coordination into planning and execution of all strike operations.

2. Personnel Recovery Roles and Responsibilities

a. A Navy component commander (NCC) or joint force maritime component commander may establish an RCC as directed by the JFC or in support of component operations. However, the senior member (usually the officer in tactical command [OTC]) of any deployed unit or group of units is directly responsible for conducting unit PR operations. In most cases, the carrier strike group (CSG) or expeditionary strike group commander is the OTC. To ensure effective and expeditious execution of CSAR missions, the OTC establishes a rescue coordination team (RCT) as described in NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare Manual*. The RCT is the Navy's functional equivalent of a component PRCC. The RCT is the planning and operations nucleus responsible to the strike warfare commander for conduct and execution of all CSAR operations. RCT responsibilities include planning, coordination, control, and recovery of downed aircrews in combat operations. Figure G-C-1 shows the Navy's CSAR command relationships.

b. All carrier air wings receive CSAR training during predeployment training, and the carrier air wing is responsible for providing assistance in planning and executing all CSAR missions through the RCT. As part of Navy strike planning per NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare Manual*, trained crews and aircraft are normally allocated to meet potential CSAR requirements. The carrier intelligence center (CVIC) is the central clearing point and storage center for intelligence specific to the CSAR mission. CVIC is also directly responsible for information pertaining to planning and executing all CSAR operations.




Figure G-C-1. Navy Combat Search and Rescue Command and Control

c. The senior member of the RCT should function as the CSAR mission controller, and be directly responsible to the strike warfare commander for the conduct and execution of CSAR missions.

d. During an amphibious operation, the commander, amphibious task force (CATF), is responsible for CSAR in the AOA. CSAR planning is coordinated with the commander, landing force (CLF).

(1) The CLF staff is not structured to support landing force (LF) CSAR requirements. Consequently, the CATF staff should coordinate CSAR assets or request CSAR support from the JPRC.

(2) If a CSG is in support of the amphibious operation and not under OPCON of the CATF, the CATF should coordinate with the CSG commander to ensure clarity of CSAR responsibilities.

(3) Once C2 of the LF has been passed ashore, the CLF is responsible to the CATF for CSAR in the land portion of the AOA until the amphibious operation is terminated.

3. Concept of Navy Personnel Recovery Operations

a. **General.** CSAR forces may employ any one of a variety of procedures to recover isolated personnel. The situation and threat will dictate the specific TTP employed. Personnel in nontactical, permissive environments can expect to be recovered using SAR procedures. Independent helicopter operations in conjunction with naval surface warfare are an additional option. Recovery methods employed in hostile environments may vary considerably. Plans should be flexible to ensure efficient employment of available resources with respect to the specific level of threat. The OTC should establish a basis for go/no-go criteria to provide the conditions and circumstances in which the OTC is willing to risk additional assets to conduct CSAR.

b. Planning

(1) Planning for the CSAR mission begins during predeployment training. A complete CSAR posture should be developed using an orderly and logical planning process. Planners should apply the following three criteria to each phase of CSAR planning:

- (a) Theater or subordinate joint force PR guidance or CONOPS.
- (b) Strike planning and associated rescue contingencies.
- (c) Final rescue mission planning.

(2) The PRCC and the RCT should make an inventory of organic and external resources available to the strike group. This should include all aviation and non-aviation resources, their respective capabilities and limitations, proper request channels, and the estimated time needed from receipt of CSAR requests to availability on station.

(3) Planning for a CSAR mission requires specialized intelligence. In the preplanning and predeployment phases, the PRCC, the RCT, and carrier intelligence

center are responsible for acquiring applicable intelligence publications and developing a database for CSAR mission planning.

(4) The CSAR mission often involves coordinated operations using fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Because of differences in flight regimes, aircraft-specific threats should be carefully evaluated by the PRCC and the RCT to determine the appropriate rescue vehicle to be used or requested. The threat varies with weapon systems as well as the employment doctrine and tactics of the adversary.

c. **Execution.** The modern battlefield relies heavily on control of the air and immediate reaction for targeting. In a time-sensitive environment, PR missions are allocated resources for an immediate recovery if a survivor's location is known and valid. In the sea or coastal area, the NCC should have forces that can feasibly execute rapid PR and be able to suppress adversary defenses effectively in small areas for short periods. Recovery of personnel inland requires extensive planning to circumvent air defense and surface threats, localize and authenticate isolated personnel, and coordinate support forces such as tactical aircraft, naval surface fire support, shore-based artillery and ground forces, and SOF. Options include the following:

- (1) Clandestine or supported helicopter recoveries.
- (2) Direct or supported surface recoveries.
- (3) Direct or clandestine subsurface recoveries.
- (4) SOF recoveries.

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX G UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

CSAR is the operational capability that enables USAF rescue forces to respond effectively across the range of military operations. It is normally accomplished with a mix of dedicated and augmenting assets. CSAR operational capabilities enable USAF rescue forces to conduct other collateral tasks during varying degrees of crisis with little or no increase in effort. Such examples may include, but are not necessarily limited to noncombat civil and military SAR, casualty evacuation, noncombatant evacuation operations, National Aeronautics and Space Administration flight operations support, humanitarian relief, international aid, counterdrug activities, and other missions as directed by the GCC and the commander, Air Force forces. For more specific information on USAF PR and CSAR, see Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-50, *Personnel Recovery Operations*.

2. Personnel Recovery Roles and Responsibilities

a. The USAF organizes, trains, and equips dedicated PR staffs, fixed and vertical lift airborne assets, and ground recovery forces. Air Combat Command is the lead command and proponent for USAF PR. However, Pacific Air Forces, USAF Europe, Air Force Reserve Command, and the Air National Guard all contain USAF rescue squadrons and expertise. In addition, other theater air commands will normally contain rescue squadrons and expertise when PR assets and other aircraft are deployed to their theaters. As an example, Air Force Special Operations Command aircrews and aircraft, special tactics teams, and PR capabilities will normally be resident within the joint special operations air component command.

b. All joint force requests for Air Force PR assets are made through the force provider/appropriate major command and Presented to the JFC. The Air Force presents its forces through Service component commands (air and space expeditionary force [AETF]) to a JFC as AETFs. Through effective scheduling, each AETF is provided comparable force capability and a predictable pattern of deployment eligibility.

3. Concept of Air Force Personnel Recovery Operations

a. **Planning.** USAF PR forces proactively accomplish mission planning tasks to execute the mission based on theater OPLANs and CONPLANs. Effective pre-mission planning is essential due to the unpredictability and time-critical nature associated with PR operations. Pre-mission planning permits PR forces to anticipate multiple responses to common scenarios significantly reducing response times. Planning requirements include, but are not limited to weather, threat awareness of isolating event and counter-rescue intentions, mission status (ground versus airborne alert), staging/basing, assigned/tasked forces and capabilities, route of flight (preplanned waypoints/spider routes), communications plan, decision matrix for go/no-go, time-sensitive targeting procedures, insertion/extraction procedures, isolated PR procedures, and roles and

responsibilities of assets used for FP. Recovery operations are subject to operational risk assessment and threat analysis in the same manner as other operations.

b. **PR planning involves coordination with C2 assets and supporting forces.** PR missions have unique planning considerations and requirements. The planning process will be executed at several levels, starting at the component PRCC and in coordination with the JPRC (if established) for missions requiring joint assets, and continuing down to the tasked recovery unit. Mission planning, composite force tactics, unit-level TTP, training, and operational employment should focus on exploiting the unique characteristics of the recovery forces. To leverage effectiveness, actions should be integrated, mutually reinforcing, and clearly focused on compatible objectives. Recovery forces should be pre-positioned to react quickly and minimize mission response time.

c. **Execution.** Execution includes mission launch, ingress to the objective/terminal area, aerial delivery of RT or supplies, terminal area operations, and combat egress. To gain a better understanding of employment concepts and system capabilities, see AFTTP 3-1.24, *Tactical Employment*, AFTTP 3-1.HC-130 and 3-1.GA (CRO/PJ/SERE). These volumes, in conjunction with AFTTP volumes 3-3.24 (HH-60G), and AFTTP 3-3.HC-130 should serve as a baseline for current and future employment concepts.

(1) **Launching.** This subtask is normally undertaken when isolated personnel have been located and identified sufficiently (PR execution tasks report and locate) to initiate the recovery phase of the mission being conducted. To reduce the time an enemy has to react and possibly thwart a recovery operation, forces should have timely and accurate reporting/locating mechanisms in place in order to assume appropriate alert postures and enhance SA.

(2) **Ingress to the Terminal/Objective Area.** This subtask accounts for PR operations from the staging point (orbit, airfield) to the terminal/objective area. Threat avoidance tactics include detailed mission planning, low altitude terrain masking, high altitude penetration, and marginal weather/night penetrations. When threat avoidance is not feasible, threat suppression techniques can include the use of countermeasures and jammers, as well as the use of available FP assets. Night missions and crew workload require the use of artificial aids to enable night operations. These include NVGs, IR detection sets, helmet mounted displays, or other sensor fusion technologies. PR forces should be capable of penetration into marginal weather conditions to include moderate icing. Depending on the theater of operation, air-refueling support for rotary-wing assets, in either permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments, may be essential. Air-refueling support for receiver capable fixed-wing assets will normally be conducted in permissive environments.

(3) **Terminal/Objective Area Operations.** Terminal/objective area operations address arrival, confirmation, and fixing of the isolated personnel's location and their extraction (directly or via employment of a ground RT), their support (via aerial delivery of ground RTs and/or equipment), and protection of PR forces from localized threats. RT employment may be accomplished by landing, alternate insertion/extraction, parachute, amphibious surface/subsurface, ground vehicle, or a combination of employment

methods. Fixing of the isolated personnel's position requires increasingly precise location information to allow ground teams to quickly locate an isolated person, and to allow weapons employment in close proximity to PR forces.

(4) **Egress.** Egress is the return of recovery forces with recovered isolated personnel. It includes en route medical treatment, refueling if necessary, transload operations, and the transition of recovered isolated personnel to reintegration teams at the appropriate medical or predesignated phase I reintegration site.

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ANNEX E TO APPENDIX G UNITED STATES COAST GUARD PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

USCG cutters, aircraft, and boats, which normally conduct civil SAR missions, are potential PR resources. USCG vessels range from high and medium endurance cutters, which operate offshore for extended periods of time, to coastal patrol and utility boats capable of operating in coastal and local waters for shorter durations. USCG aircraft include fixed-wing aircraft capable of extended long-range PR, and rotary-wing assets for medium-range and short-range operations. Rotary-wing assets also have hoisting capability and a deployable rescue swimmer.

2. Personnel Recovery Roles and Responsibilities

a. The NSP designates the Coast Guard as the Federal SAR Coordinator for the conduct of SAR operations within the IMO and ICAO recognized maritime and aeronautical SRRs of the US in the maritime environment. To perform this mission, the Coast Guard maintains command centers/RCCs throughout the US, in addition to rescue sub-centers (RSCs), as follows:

- (1) Atlantic Area - Norfolk, Virginia.
 - (a) First District - Boston, Massachusetts.
 - (b) Fifth District - Norfolk, Virginia.
 - (c) Seventh District - Miami, Florida-Sector San Juan (RSC) - San Juan, Puerto Rico.
 - (d) Eighth District - New Orleans, Louisiana.
 - (e) Ninth District - Cleveland, Ohio.
- (2) Pacific Area (no SRR) - Alameda, California.
 - (a) Eleventh District - Alameda, California.
 - (b) Thirteenth District - Seattle, Washington.
 - (c) Fourteenth District - Honolulu, Hawaii- Sector Guam (RSC) - Guam.
 - (d) Seventeenth District - Juneau, Alaska.

b. In wartime, Coast Guard RCC/RSCs will continue to function at their present location and retain their RCC/RSC capability and function. Figure G-E-1 shows the locations and SRRs for each of the Coast Guard's RCC/RSCs, in addition to those




Figure G-E-1. National Search and Rescue System Search and Rescue Regions

operated by DOD in the inland SRRs of the US, and those operated by Canada for their inland and maritime regions.

c. Upon request via all appropriate echelons of command and at the discretion of the respective area commanders (Pacific and/or Atlantic), the USCG may be able to provide qualified personnel who can augment deployable JPRCs or PRCCs operating outside the continental US, to include contingency establishments of JPRCs and PRCCs.

d. The JFC may request additional USCG resources for recovery operations from Commandant, USCG, via all appropriate echelons of command.

3. Concept of United States Coast Guard Personnel Recovery Operations

a. **Planning.** The PR role of the USCG is an extension of its SAR mission. The USCG participates in the joint contingency planning process. When planning military

operations, it is prudent to plan for PR as early in the planning phase as possible. Although all OPLANs and OPORDs contain a PR appendix, a PR plan of action and allocation of resources are frequently not identified before they are needed or placed on standby for PR operations. This CONOPS assumes JPRC functionality before the mission begins and that USCG coordination and support efforts and force transfer procedures for USCG units will be identified in the planning phase.

b. Execution

(1) USCG cutters, boats, and aircraft routinely operate in a low-threat maritime environment under the defensive protection of other military forces. USCG cutters, aircraft, and small boats carry little or no defensive capability; most have no offensive weaponry. Offensive capability or increased defensive capability may not be necessary for USCG PR taskings, even though some cutters have the capability to operate in medium- to high-threat scenarios. Planning the PR search phase is quite similar to civil SAR planning and coordination the USCG performs on a daily basis. USCG personnel are well suited to perform in this similar capacity during joint operations. USCG cutters and fixed-wing aircraft are equipped and their crews are trained for, and regularly perform, OSC duties. USCG resources are ideal for low-threat, precautionary PR missions such as duckbutts.

(2) USCG units are accustomed to operating independently and are equally adept at responding to changing missions in mid-sortie. For example, a buoy tender whose primary function is the maintenance of navigation aids may be diverted from that function at any time to perform a higher priority mission. Cutters and aircraft assigned to perform surveillance and interdiction patrols could also be employed as an immediate PR resource. Thus, the multi-mission capability of USCG forces becomes a PR force multiplier. Given the latitude of automatic response, USCG forces will respond to a PR incident and complete it without further guidance.

(3) Large USCG cutters are fully capable of operating as part of a Navy task force. USCG aircraft are fully capable of operating from non-USCG shore-based facilities, military or civilian. Several similar Coast Guard patrol boats (WPBs) may be deployed, using a squadron concept, with additional spare parts and a small cadre of support personnel. When designated, a squadron commander will direct patrol boat employment. These squadrons may be sea-based as an independent force or part of a Navy task force.

(a) USCG small boats (less than 65 feet in length) are normally shore-based and are designed to operate in the coastal environment. Although they could be deployed aboard ships similar to the squadron concept mentioned above for WPBs, these boats are not designed for open-ocean operations.

(b) Some types of USCG helicopters can be deployed with USCG cutters and/or Navy ships, subject to restrictions described in COMDTINST M3710.1, *Air Operations Manual*; COMDTINST M3710.2, *Shipboard-Helicopter Operational*

Procedures Manual; and NAEC-ENG-7576, *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*. Normally, the ship commander will task deployed helicopters.

ANNEX F TO APPENDIX G SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

SOF provide JFCs with an extremely flexible force. As a result, SOF may be tasked to perform missions for which they are either the best suited among available forces, or the only force available but not necessarily organized, trained, or equipped to conduct. SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct specific core tasks. Each joint force component is responsible for performing PR in support of its own operations. As such, SOF regularly train to conduct PR functions in support of SOF operations. When specifically tasked, SOF may perform PR for other members of the joint force. It is important for commanders to be aware, however, that unlike some other joint force components, SOF do not maintain dedicated PR forces. Since PR taskings often involve forces being placed on alert status awaiting mission execution orders, such taskings would be at the expense of the SOF's ability to perform their core tasks. Therefore, greatest utility of SOF to the conduct of PR is in SOF recovery operations and UAR.

2. Personnel Recovery Roles and Responsibilities

USSOCOM maintains a Service-like responsibility to perform PR in support of its own operations, consistent with capabilities and assigned functions and IAW the requirements of the supported commander. Because PR and emergency exfiltration planning and operations are an inherent part of every special operations mission, SOF should maintain an organic capability to conduct recovery within their core task force structure.

a. **Special Operations Commander PRCC.** Joint force component commanders are responsible for planning and conducting recovery operations in support of their own operations while executing the JFC's campaign and OPLANs. The TSOC PRCC is the primary SOF component SAR facility. The TSOC PRCC is staffed and equipped for coordinating and controlling SOF component recovery operations. It coordinates PR activities with the JPRC and other component PRCCs, as appropriate. If the SOF component commander does not establish a PRCC, another component staff organization, usually the operations section (J-3), coordinates those PR activities and assumes the responsibilities normally assigned to the TSOC PRCC. For example, the JFSOCC/joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander may designate its JOC to coordinate recovery operations that use SOF component forces. Other typical TSOC PRCC responsibilities and functions include the following:

(1) Develop and review PR appendices to annex C (Operations) for component supporting plans, CONPLANs, and OPORDs.

(2) Extract planning factors from the theater PR CONOPS and provide them to subordinate units to assist in the development of supportable and feasible EPAs.

- (3) Coordinate and develop unit and personal EPAs, as required.
- (4) Maintain staff awareness for preparing and maintaining ISOPREPs.
- (5) Coordinate for component augmentation personnel to the JPRC.
- (6) Develop specific component PRCC procedures.
- (7) Notify and coordinate with the JPRC when conducting unilateral PR missions.
- (8) Coordinate with the JPRC for PR support (e.g., RESCAP, RESCORT, SEAD provided to, or received from, other components).
- (9) Maintain a file on each isolated individual until recovery has been completed.
- (10) Forward, but do not destroy, all files and the database regarding isolated personnel, their status, and/or location to the JPRA, via the JPRC, once the recovery mission is complete and the JFC no longer has a requirement to maintain the files.

b. **UARCC.** The branch of the TSOC J-3 normally responsible for compartmented operations forms the nucleus of the UARCC. The mission of the UARCC is to integrate and coordinate all theater NAR capabilities in support of the JFC's PR operations. The UARCC fulfills similar responsibilities and functions as a component PRCC, but tailors those roles and functions from the perspective of NAR support for the theater. A more complete explanation of the UARCC can be found in Chapter II, "Functions and Responsibilities."

3. Concept of Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery Operations

a. Planning

(1) SOF view PR from the dual perspective of potential consumer and potential force provider. SOF PR coordinators are responsible for planning, coordinating, and tracking all SOF PR operations. SOF PR coordinators should be formally trained (e.g., the JPRA Personnel Recovery Plans and Operations Course, PR301). SOF PR coordinators should also have a thorough understanding of theater PR architecture, roles and missions, and coordination process. The logistic planner, signal planner, and the operations planners should have periodic meetings to ensure resources are available to meet PR mission requirements.

(2) PR planning such as intelligence preparation of the operational environment and operational preparation of the environment is a continuous process. SOF PR coordinators should be familiar with all aspects of PR, to include SERE, CSAR, joint CSAR, and NAR. PR planning is inherent to FP, and recovery planners should address PR in all missions. All planning should be based on the five execution tasks of PR (report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate). SOF PR coordinators should assume

every mission may result in an evasion situation and should prepare SOF forces for unassisted evasion. Plans for both assisted and unassisted evasion should be developed IAW theater PR guidance to ensure a coordinated recovery by PR forces.

b. Execution

(1) **SOF Recovery Operations.** Direct action operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF or special operations-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. One of the activities that falls within the direct action mission area is SOF recovery operations. These are operations to locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security in areas sensitive, denied, or contested. Special operations recovery missions are often characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. These operations may employ unconventional tactics, techniques, clandestine search, indigenous assistance, and frequent use of ground forces. SOF recovery operations offer an additional capability to conduct the recover PR execution task. Historical examples of SOF recovery operations would be the Son Tay Raid in Vietnam, Operation EAGLE CLAW (the Iranian HR mission), and the rescue of Kurt Muse in Operation JUST CAUSE.

(2) **UAR.** A unique contribution of SOF units to a CDR's PR plan is their capability to conduct UAR. UAR is NAR conducted by SOF. These forces operate in uncertain or hostile areas where PR capability is infeasible, inaccessible, or does not exist to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel back to friendly control. UAR forces generally deploy into their assigned areas before strike operations and provide the JFC with coordinated PR capability for as long as the forces remain viable. The military aspects of UAR are those of UW for which SOF units are specifically organized, trained, and equipped. SOF personnel conduct a thorough analysis of the area before insertion. The theater SOC is normally tasked by the GCC to plan for and execute UAR in coordination with the JPRC in support of the theater PR plan. The intent of UAR is to bring isolated personnel into contact with, and ultimately into the custody of, a recovery force as soon as possible and then move the isolated personnel to an area where exfiltration to definitive USG control can occur.

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APPENDIX H REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-50 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Presidential Directives

- a. Executive Order 13526, *Classified National Security Information*.
- b. PPD-30, *U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts*.

2. Department of Defense Publications

- a. Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide.
- b. DODD 1300.7, *Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC)*.
- c. DODD 2310.07E, *Personnel Accounting—Losses Due to Hostile Acts*.
- d. DODD 3002.01, *Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense*.
- e. DODD 4500.54E, *DOD Foreign Clearance Program (FCP)*.
- f. DODD 5110.10, *Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO)*.
- g. DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*.
- h. DODD 5205.75, *Department of Defense Operations at US Embassies*.
- i. DODD 8521.01E, *Department of Defense Biometrics*.
- j. DODI 1300.21, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*.
- k. DODI 1300.23, *Isolated Personnel Training for Department of Defense Civilian and Contractors*.
- l. DODI 2310.05, *Accounting for Missing Persons-Boards of Inquiry*.
- m. DODI 3002.04, *DOD Personnel Recovery—Nonconventional Assisted Recovery (NAR)*.
- n. DODI 3002.03, *DOD Personnel Recovery-Reintegration Of Recovered Personnel*.
- o. DODI 3003.01, *DOD Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR)*.
- p. DODI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS)*.

q. DODI 3115.10E, *Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery*.

r. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Implementation of the (30 January 2008) Personnel Recovery Strategic Communication Guidance (4 March 2008).

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3150.25E, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*.

b. CJCSI 3270.01A, *Personnel Recovery Within the Department of Defense (U)*, (Secret/NOFORN document).

c. CJCSI 5120.02D, *Joint Doctrine Development System*.

d. CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance*.

e. CJCSM 3290.01, *The Department of Defense Blood Chit Program*.

f. CJCSM 3500.04F, *Universal Joint Task Manual*.

g. Director Joint Staff, Memorandum-1103-92, DOD US POW/MIA Program.

4. Joint Publications

a. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.

b. JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

c. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.

d. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*.

e. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.

f. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

g. JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*.

h. JP 3-04, *Joint Shipboard Helicopter and Tiltrotor Aircraft Operations*.

i. JP 3-05, *Special Operations*.

j. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*.

k. JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*.

l. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments*.

- m. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.
- n. JP 3-30, *Command and Control of Joint Air Operations*.
- o. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.
- p. JP 3-52, *Joint Airspace Control*.
- q. JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*.
- r. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.
- s. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.

5. Multi-Service Publications

FM 3-50.3/NTTP 3-50.3/AFTTP (Instruction) 3-2.26, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery*.

6. United States Navy Publications

- a. COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC OPLAN 2137, *Submarine Search, Escape, and Rescue (Rev A)*.
- b. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1000.24C, *Personnel Recovery*.
- c. OPNAVINST 3130.7B, *Naval Aviation Personnel Recovery Program*.
- d. OPNAVINST C3505.1A, *Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) Program; Doctrine and Policy Concerning (U)*.
- e. NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare Manual*.
- f. NTTP 3-50.1, *Navy Search and Rescue (SAR) Manual*.
- g. NAEC-ENG 7576, *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*.

7. United States Air Force Publications

- a. Volume I, *Basic Doctrine*.
- b. Volume IV, *Operations*.
- c. Volume IV, *Annexes*.
- d. Annex 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*.

e. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 13-208, *Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell Operating Procedures*.

f. AFI 14-101, *Intelligence Contingency Funds*.

g. AFTTP 3-1, *Mission Employment Tactics*.

8. United States Army Publications

a. FM 1-100, *Army Aviation Operations*.

b. FM 1-564, *Shipboard Operations*.

c. FM 3-0, *Operations*.

d. FM 3-04.111, *Aviation Brigades*.

e. FM 3-04.113, *Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations*.

f. FM 3-05.60, *Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations*.

g. FM 3-05.70, *Survival*.

h. FM 3-05.231, *Special Forces Personnel Recovery*.

i. FM 3-14, *Space in Support of Army Operations*.

j. FM 3-50.1, *Army Personnel Recovery*.

k. FM 4-02.2, *Medical Evacuation*.

l. FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*.

m. Graphic Training Aid 80-01-001, *Fundamentals of Army Personnel Recovery*.

9. United States Marine Corps Publications

a. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-16, *Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element*.

b. MCWP 3-2, *Aviation Operations*.

c. MCWP 3-23, *Offensive Air Support*.

d. MCWP 3-25, *Control of Aircraft and Missiles*.

10. United States Coast Guard Publications

- a. COMDTINST M16130.2E, *US Coast Guard Addendum to the National Search and Rescue Supplement*.
- b. COMDTINST M3710.1, *Air Operations Manual*.
- c. COMDTINST M3710.2, *Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual*.

11. Allied Publications

- a. ATP-10(D), *Search and Rescue*.
- b. ATP-33(B), *NATO Tactical Air Doctrine*.
- c. ATP-40, *Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War*.
- d. ATP-57(C), *The Submarine Search and Rescue Manual*.
- e. ATP-62, *Combat Search and Rescue*.

12. Other Publications

- a. National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States.
- b. United States National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual, May 2000.
- c. National Security Agency/National Reconnaissance Office Information Memorandum, *Concept of Operation for National Overhead SIGINT [Signals Intelligence] Support to Personnel Recovery (U)*, (Secret document).
- d. *JPRA Personnel Recovery Guidance* documents refer to JPRA home page: <https://public.jptra.smil.mil/SitePages/Home.aspx>.
- e. *The Rescue of Bat 21*, US Naval Institute Press, 1998.

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APPENDIX J ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the JPRA. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Joint Force Development (DJ-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*, 20 December 2011.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

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b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JED.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

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GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAR	after action report
AFI	Air Force instruction
AFRCC	Air Force Rescue Coordination Center
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AMC	airborne mission coordinator
AOA	amphibious objective area
AOR	area of responsibility
ATO	air tasking order
ATP	allied tactical publication
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
C2	command and control
CAAF	contractors authorized to accompany the force
CALICS	communication, authentication, location, intentions, condition, and situation
CAS	close air support
CATF	commander, amphibious task force
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CCMD	combatant command
CDRAFNORTH	Commander, Air Force North
CDRUSNORTHCOM	Commander, United States Northern Command
CERFP	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives enhanced response force package
CISAR	catastrophic incident search and rescue
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CLF	commander, landing force
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
CoC	Code of Conduct
COLISEUM	community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers
COM	chief of mission
COMDTINST	Commandant of the Coast Guard instruction
COMSUBLANT	Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet
COMSUBPAC	Commander Submarine Force, United States Pacific Fleet
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	concept plan

CONUS	continental United States
CSAR	combat search and rescue
CSG	carrier strike group
DATT	defense attaché
DD	Department of Defense (form)
DF	direction finding
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
DPAA	Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Agency
DSC	dual-status commander
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
DSN	Defense Switched Network
ELT	emergency locator transmitter
EP	electronic protection
EPA	evasion plan of action
EPIRB	emergency position-indicating radio beacon
ES	electronic warfare support
ESF	emergency support function
ESR	external supported recovery
EVC	evasion chart
EW	electronic warfare
FAC(A)	forward air controller (airborne)
FARP	forward arming and refueling point
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)
FLOT	forward line of own troops
FM	field manual (Army)
FP	force protection
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GPS	Global Positioning System
GPW	Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
GTAS	ground-to-air signals
HN	host nation
HQ	headquarters

HR	hostage rescue
HRI	high risk of isolation
HUMINT	human intelligence
IAMSAR	International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue manual
IAW	in accordance with
IC	intelligence community
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICS	incident command system
ID	identification
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IO	information operations
IPG	isolated personnel guidance
IR	infrared
ISG	isolated soldier guidance
ISOPREP	isolated personnel report
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
JAOC	joint air operations center
JDISS	joint deployable intelligence support system
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIOC	joint intelligence operations center
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JISE	joint intelligence support element
JOC	joint operations center
JOPP	joint operation planning process
JP	joint publication
JPRA	Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JPRC	joint personnel recovery center
JSCC	joint security coordination center
JSETS	Joint Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking Electronic Tracking System
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTAC	joint terminal attack controller
JTF	joint task force
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

LF	landing force
LL	lessons learned
LNO	liaison officer
LOS	line of sight
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MHz	megahertz
MIA	missing in action
MILDEC	military deception
MISO	military information support operations
MRO	mass rescue operation
NAEC-ENG	Naval Air Engineering Center-Engineering
NAR	nonconventional assisted recovery
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVAIR	Naval Air Systems Command
NCC	Navy component commander
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NOK	next of kin
NRF	National Response Framework
NSP	National Search and Rescue Plan
NSPD	national security Presidential directive
NSS	National Search and Rescue Supplement
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NVD	night vision device
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPR	office of primary responsibility
OPSEC	operations security
OSC	on-scene commander
OTC	officer in tactical command
OTH	over the horizon
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs office
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PISA	post isolation support activity
PLB	personal locator beacon
POC	point of contact
POW	prisoner of war
POW/MIA	prisoner of war/missing in action

PPF	personnel processing file
PR	personnel recovery
PRCC	personnel recovery coordination cell
PRCS	personnel recovery coordination section
PRDO	personnel recovery duty officer
PRG	personnel recovery guidance
PRMS	personnel recovery mission software
PRRP	personnel recovery reference product
PRTF	personnel recovery task force
PTDO	prepare to deploy order
QRF	quick reaction force
QRP	quick response posture
RCC	rescue coordination center
RCT	rescue coordination team (Navy)
RESCAP	rescue combat air patrol
RESCORT	rescue escort
RFI	request for information
RM	recovery mechanism
RMC	rescue mission commander
ROE	rules of engagement
RSC	rescue sub-center
RSO	regional security officer
RST	religious support team
RT	recovery team
SA	situational awareness
SADL	situation awareness data link
SAR	search and rescue
SARDOT	search and rescue point
SARIR	search and rescue incident report
SARREQ	search and rescue request
SARSAT	search and rescue satellite-aided tracking
SARSIT	search and rescue situation summary report
SATCOM	satellite communications
SCO	security cooperation organization
SDO	senior defense official
SEAD	suppression of enemy air defenses
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SERE	survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SITREP	situation report
SJA	staff judge advocate
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement

SOP	standard operating procedure
SPINS	special instructions
SRR	search and rescue region
TACON	tactical control
TDL	tactical data link
TF	task force
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TRAP	tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (Marine Corps)
TSOC	theater special operations command
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAR	unconventional assisted recovery
UARCC	unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
UN	United Nations
US&R	urban search and rescue
USAF	United States Air Force
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USG	United States Government
USMILGP	United States military group
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UXO	unexploded ordnance
WPB	Coast Guard patrol boat

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

act of mercy. In personnel recovery, assistance rendered to evaders by an individual or elements of the local population who sympathize or empathize with the evaders' cause or plight. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

airborne mission coordinator. The designated individual that serves as an airborne extension of the component commander or supported commander responsible for the personnel recovery mission. Also called **AMC**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE JP 3-50)

area search. Visual reconnaissance of limited or defined areas. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

authenticate. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

authentication. 1. A security measure designed to protect a communications system against acceptance of a fraudulent transmission or simulation by establishing the validity of a transmission, message, or originator. 2. A means of identifying individuals and verifying their eligibility to receive specific categories of information. 3. Evidence by proper signature or seal that a document is genuine and official. 4. In personnel recovery missions, the process whereby the identity of an isolated person is confirmed. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

blood chit. A small sheet of material depicting an American flag and a statement in several languages to the effect that anyone assisting the bearer to safety will be rewarded. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

bona fides. 1. In personnel recovery, the use of verbal or visual communication by individuals who are unknown to one another, to establish their authenticity, sincerity, honesty, and truthfulness. (JP 3-50) 2. The lack of fraud or deceit: a determination that a person is who he/she says he/she is. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01.2)

cache. A source of subsistence and supplies, typically containing items such as food, water, medical items, and/or communications equipment, packaged to prevent damage from exposure and hidden in isolated locations by such methods as burial, concealment, and/or submersion, to support isolated personnel. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

call sign. Any combination of characters or pronounceable words, which identifies a communication facility, a command, an authority, an activity, or a unit; used primarily for establishing and maintaining communications. Also called **CS**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

civil search and rescue. Search and/or rescue operations and associated civilian services provided to assist persons in potential or actual distress and protect property in a nonhostile environment. Also called **civil SAR**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

code word. 1. A word that has been assigned a classification and a classified meaning to safeguard intentions and information regarding a classified plan or operation. 2. A cryptonym used to identify sensitive intelligence data. (JP 1-02 SOURCE: JP 3-50)

combat search and rescue. The tactics, techniques, and procedures performed by forces to effect the recovery of isolated personnel during combat. Also called **CSAR**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

combat search and rescue task force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

combat survival. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

contact point. 1. In land warfare, a point on the terrain, easily identifiable, where two or more units are required to make contact. (JP 3-50) 2. In air operations, the position at which a mission leader makes radio contact with an air control agency. (JP 3-09.3) 3. In personnel recovery, a location where isolated personnel can establish contact with recovery forces. Also called **CP**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

contact procedure. Predesignated actions taken by isolated personnel and recovery forces that permit link-up between the two parties in hostile territory. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

decompression. In personnel recovery, the process of normalizing psychological and behavioral reactions that recovered isolated personnel experienced or are currently experiencing as a result of their isolation and recovery. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

diplomatic authorization. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

distressed person. An individual who requires search and rescue assistance to remove he or she from life-threatening or isolating circumstances in a permissive environment. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

ditching. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

emergency locator beacon. A generic term for all radio beacons used for emergency locating purposes. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

escapee. Any person who has been physically captured by the enemy and succeeds in getting free. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

evader. Any person isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory who eludes capture. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

evasion. The process whereby isolated personnel avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

evasion aid. In personnel recovery, any piece of information or equipment designed to assist an individual in avoiding capture. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

evasion chart. A special map or chart designed as an evasion aid. Also called **EVC**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

evasion plan of action. A course of action, developed prior to executing a combat mission, that is intended to improve a potential isolated person's chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing the recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader's action and movement. Also called **EPA**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

exfiltration. The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

helicopter support team. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

holding point. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

homing. The technique whereby a mobile station directs itself, or is directed, towards a source of primary or reflected energy, or to a specified point. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

homing adaptor. A device, when used with an aircraft radio receiver, that produces aural and/or visual signals indicating the direction of a transmitting radio station with respect to the heading of the aircraft. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

hostage rescue. A personnel recovery method used to recover isolated personnel who are specifically designated as hostages. Also called **HR**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

initial reception point. In personnel recovery, a secure area or facility under friendly control where initial reception of recovered isolated personnel can safely take place. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

inland search and rescue region. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

isolated personnel. United States military, Department of Defense civilians and contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated from their unit (as an individual or a group) while participating in a United States sponsored military activity or mission and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

isolated personnel report. A Department of Defense form containing information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an isolated person by a recovery force. Also called **ISOPREP**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

joint personnel recovery center. The primary joint force organization responsible for planning and coordinating personnel recovery for military operations within the assigned operational area. Also called **JPRC**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

joint personnel recovery support product. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

listening watch. A continuous receiver watch established for the reception of communication addressed to, or of interest to, the unit maintaining the watch, with complete log optional. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

load signal. In personnel recovery, a visual signal displayed in a covert manner to indicate the presence of an individual or object at a given location. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

locate. In personnel recovery, the task where actions are taken to precisely find and authenticate the identity of isolated personnel. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

mission type order. 1. An order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. An order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

movement to contact. A form of the offense designed to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

neutral state. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

nonconventional assisted recovery. Personnel recovery conducted by indigenous/surrogate personnel that are trained, supported, and led by special operations forces, unconventional warfare ground and maritime forces, or other government agencies' personnel that have been specifically trained and directed to establish and operate indigenous or surrogate infrastructures. Also called **NAR**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3- 50)

on-scene commander. 1. An individual in the immediate vicinity of an isolating event who temporarily assumes command of the incident. 2. The federal officer designated to direct federal crisis and consequence management efforts at the scene of a terrorist or weapons of mass destruction incident. Also called **OSC**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

on-station time. The time an aircraft can remain on station, which may be determined by endurance or orders. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

personal locator beacon. An emergency device carried by individuals, to assist locating during personnel recovery. Also called **PLB**. (JP 1- 02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

personal locator system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

personnel recovery. The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Also called **PR**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

personnel recovery coordination cell. The primary joint force component organization responsible for coordinating and controlling component personnel recovery missions. Also called **PRCC**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

personnel recovery reference product. A reference document for personnel recovery containing specific information on a particular country or region of interest. Also called **PRRP**. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

personnel recovery task force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

pointee-talkee. A language aid containing selected phrases in English opposite a translation in a foreign language used by pointing to appropriate phrases. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

prisoner of war. A detained person (as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949) who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. Also called **POW or PW**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

recognition signal. Any prearranged signal by which individuals or units may identify each other. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

recovery. 1. In air (aviation) operations, that phase of a mission that involves the return of an aircraft to a land base or platform afloat. (JP 3-52) 2. The retrieval of a mine from the location where emplaced. (JP 3-15) 3. In personnel recovery, actions taken to physically gain custody of isolated personnel and return them to friendly control. (JP 3-50) 4. Actions taken to extricate damaged or disabled equipment for return to friendly control or repair at another location. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-34)

recovery force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

recovery mechanism. An indigenous or surrogate infrastructure that is specifically developed, trained, and directed by United States forces to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate designated isolated personnel from uncertain or hostile areas back to friendly control. Also called **RM**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

recovery operations. Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

recovery site. In personnel recovery, an area from which isolated personnel can be recovered. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

recovery team. In personnel recovery, designated United States or United States-directed forces, that are specifically trained to operate in conjunction with indigenous or surrogate forces, and are tasked to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel. Also called **RT**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

recovery vehicle. In personnel recovery, the vehicle on which isolated personnel are boarded and transported from the recovery site. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

reintegrate. In personnel recovery, the task of providing medical care and psychological decompression to allow the conduct of appropriate debriefings to ultimately return recovered personnel back to duty and their family. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

rescue combat air patrol. An aircraft patrol provided over that portion of an objective area in which recovery operations are being conducted for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft. Also called **RESCAP**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

rescue coordination center. A unit, recognized by International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, or other cognizant international body, responsible for promoting efficient organization of search and rescue services and coordinating the conduct of search and rescue operations within a search and rescue region. Also called **RCC**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

safe area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

search. A systematic reconnaissance of a defined area, so that all parts of the area have passed within visibility. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

search and rescue. The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, and specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue distressed persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment. Also called **SAR**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

search and rescue numerical encryption grid. A predesignated ten-letter word without repeated letters used exclusively by recovery forces or isolated personnel to encrypt numerical data such as position, time, and/or headings in a covert manner. Also called **SARNEG**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

search and rescue point. A predesignated specific location, relative to which isolated personnel provide their position to recovery forces. Also called **SARDOT**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

search and rescue region. An area of defined dimensions, recognized by the International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, or other cognizant international body, and associated with a rescue coordination center within which search and rescue services are provided. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

situation report. A report giving the situation in the area of a reporting unit or formation. Also called **SITREP**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

survival, evasion, resistance, and escape. Actions performed by isolated personnel designed to ensure their health, mobility, safety, and honor in anticipation of or

preparation for their return to friendly control. Also called **SERE**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel. A Marine Corps mission performed by an assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed. Also called **TRAP**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

terrain avoidance system. A system that provides the pilot or navigator of an aircraft with a situation display of the ground or obstacles so that the pilot can maneuver the aircraft to avoid the obstruction. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)


unconventional assisted recovery. Nonconventional assisted recovery conducted by special operations forces. Also called **UAR**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell. A compartmented special operations forces cell, established to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict nonconventional assisted recovery operations within the operational area assigned to the joint force commander. Also called **UARCC**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

United States message text format. A program designed to enhance joint and combined combat effectiveness through standardization of message formats, data elements, and information exchange procedures. Also called **USMTF**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-50** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

